Alexander, Carol (1992) The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in wage negotiations. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 43 (8). pp. 779-786. ISSN 0160-5682

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Abstract

This paper characterizes the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution when firms and unions negotiate over wages alone, and firms set the level of employment in order to maximize profits given the agreed wage. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is analysed for the case that the wage elasticity of employment and the union's risk aversion are both constant. In this case there is a simple relationship between the Kalai-Smorodinsky and the Nash solutions.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	Industrial Relations; Manpower Planning; Game Theory
Schools and Departments:	School of Business, Management and Economics > Business and Management
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labour > HD4801 Labour. Work. Working class > HD4909 Wages H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labour > HD4801 Labour. Work. Working class > HD5306 Labour disputes. Strikes and lockouts Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA0150 Algebra. Including machine theory, game theory
Depositing User:	Carol Alexander
Date Deposited:	26 Sep 2012 11:53
Last Modified:	26 Sep 2012 11:53
URI:	http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/40595

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