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Alexander, Carol (1992) The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in wage negotiations. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 43 (8). pp. 779-786. ISSN 0160-5682
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jors.1992.116
Abstract
This paper characterizes the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution when firms and unions negotiate over wages alone, and firms set the level of employment in order to maximize profits given the agreed wage. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is analysed for the case that the wage elasticity of employment and the union's risk aversion are both constant. In this case there is a simple relationship between the Kalai-Smorodinsky and the Nash solutions.
Item Type: | Article |
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Keywords: | Industrial Relations; Manpower Planning; Game Theory |
Schools and Departments: | University of Sussex Business School > Business and Management |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labour > HD4801 Labour. Work. Working class > HD4909 Wages H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labour > HD4801 Labour. Work. Working class > HD5306 Labour disputes. Strikes and lockouts Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA0150 Algebra. Including machine theory, game theory |
Depositing User: | Carol Alexander |
Date Deposited: | 26 Sep 2012 11:53 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2012 11:53 |
URI: | http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/40595 |