An externalist account of introspective knowledge

Sawyer, Sarah (1999) An externalist account of introspective knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80 (4). pp. 358-378. ISSN 0279-0750

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The Content Skeptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Skeptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Depositing User: Sarah Sawyer
Date Deposited: 06 Feb 2012 21:19
Last Modified: 09 Jul 2012 08:32
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