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An externalist account of introspective knowledge

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 09:40 authored by Sarah SawyerSarah Sawyer
The Content Skeptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Skeptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism.

History

Publication status

  • Published

Journal

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

ISSN

0279-0750

Publisher

Blackwell

Issue

4

Volume

80

Page range

358-378

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2012-02-06

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