A Hawk-Dove game in kleptoparasitic populations

Kleptoparasitism, the parasitism by theft, is a widespread biological phenomenon. In this paper we extend earlier models to investigate a population of conspeci?cs involved in foraging and, potentially, kleptoparasitism. We assume that the population is composed of two types of individuals, Hawks and Doves. The types di?er according to their strategic choices when faced with an opportunity to steal and to resist a challenge. Hawks use every opportunity to steal and they resist all challenges. Doves never resist and never steal. The ?tness of each type of individual depends upon various natural parameters, for example food density, the handling time of a food item, density of the population, as well as the duration of potential ?ghts over the food. We ?nd the Evolutionarily Stable States (ESSs) for all arameter combinations and show that there are three possible ESSs, pure Hawks, pure Doves, and a mixed population of Hawks and Doves. We show that for any set of parameter values there is exactly one ESS. We further investigate the relationship between our ?ndings and the classical Hawk-Dove game as de?ned in Maynard Smith 1982. We also show how our model extends the classical one