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A swing-state theory of trade protection in the electoral college
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 00:15 authored by Mirabelle Muûls, Dimitra PetropoulouThis paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re-election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.
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Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Journal
Canadian Journal of EconomicsISSN
0008-4085Publisher
Blackwell PublishingExternal DOI
Issue
2Volume
46Page range
705-724Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-05-22First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2013-03-18Usage metrics
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