Muûls, Mirabelle and Petropoulou, Dimitra (2013) A swing-state theory of trade protection in the electoral college. Canadian Journal of Economics, 46 (2). pp. 705-724. ISSN 0008-4085
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Abstract
This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re-election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.
Item Type: | Article |
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Schools and Departments: | University of Sussex Business School > Economics |
Depositing User: | Dimitra Petropoulou |
Date Deposited: | 22 May 2012 09:55 |
Last Modified: | 02 Jul 2019 21:03 |
URI: | http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/22528 |
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