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A swing-state theory of trade protection in the electoral college

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-08, 00:15 authored by Mirabelle Muûls, Dimitra Petropoulou
This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re-election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Accepted version

Journal

Canadian Journal of Economics

ISSN

0008-4085

Publisher

Blackwell Publishing

Issue

2

Volume

46

Page range

705-724

Department affiliated with

  • Economics Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2012-05-22

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2013-03-18

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