Habermas's moral cognitivism and the Frege-Geach challenge

Finlayson, James Gordon (2005) Habermas's moral cognitivism and the Frege-Geach challenge. European Journal of Philosophy, 13 (3). pp. 319-344. ISSN 0966-8373

Full text not available from this repository.


A critical account of Juergen Habermas's conception of moral cognitivism that shows that and why it is open to a to a version of the Frege-Geach challenge. Habermas can solve this problem in several ways, each of which requires adjustments in the theory. I give a cost-benefit analysis of each possible response.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Depositing User: Gordon Finlayson
Date Deposited: 06 Feb 2012 19:06
Last Modified: 28 May 2019 11:33
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/19268
📧 Request an update