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Habermas's moral cognitivism and the Frege-Geach challenge
A critical account of Juergen Habermas's conception of moral cognitivism that shows that and why it is open to a to a version of the Frege-Geach challenge. Habermas can solve this problem in several ways, each of which requires adjustments in the theory. I give a cost-benefit analysis of each possible response.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
European Journal of PhilosophyISSN
0966-8373Publisher
WileyExternal DOI
Issue
3Volume
13Page range
319-344Pages
26.0Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-02-06Usage metrics
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