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The Habermas-Rawls dispute redivivus
This article re-examines the Habermas-Rawls debate. It contends that what is at issue in this dispute has largely been missed. The standard view that principle (U) and the original position form a useful point of comparison between their respective theories and that the dispute between them can be fruitfully understood on this basis is rejected. I show how this view has arisen and why it is wrong. The real issue between them lies in their respective accounts of the justification of political norms,and in their competing conceptions of legitimacy. I show how these two concepts connect. I distinguish between methodological disputes arising from the differences in approach that each takes to the questions of political legitimacy and political justification, and substantive issues about whether, and if so how moral (and ethical) reasons are germane to the justification of political norms.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
Politics and Ethics ReviewISSN
1743-453XPublisher
Edinburgh University PressExternal DOI
Issue
1Volume
3Page range
144-162Pages
18.0Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-02-06Usage metrics
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