Allais, Lucy (2009) Kant, nonconceptual content, and the representation of space. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 47 (3). pp. 383-413. ISSN 0022-5053

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside and next to one another, thus not merely different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation.

Item Type:	Article
Schools and Departments:	School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Depositing User:	Lucy Allais
Date Deposited:	06 Feb 2012 18:39
Last Modified:	02 Jul 2012 14:12
URI:	http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/17586

📧 Request an update