Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Contemporary Anti-Realism

Allais, Lucy (2003) Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Contemporary Anti-Realism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 11 (4). pp. 369-392. ISSN 0967-2559

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This paper compares Kant's transcendental idealism with three main groups of contemporary anti-realism, associated with Wittgenstein, Putnam, and Dummett, respectively. The kind of anti-realism associated with Wittgenstein has it that there is no deep sense in which our concepts are answerable to reality. Associated with Putnam is the rejection of four main ideas: theoryindependent reality, the idea of a uniquely true theory, a correspondence theory of truth, and bivalence. While there are superficial similarities between both views and Kant's, I find more significant differences. Dummettian anti-realism, too, clearly differs from Kant's position: Kant believes in verification-transcendent reality, and transcendental idealism is not a theory of meaning or truth. However, I argue that part of the Dummettian position is extremely useful for understanding part of Kant's position - his idealism about the appearances of things. I argue that Kant's idealism about appearances can be expressed as the rejection of experiencetranscendent reality with respect to appearances.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Depositing User: Lucy Allais
Date Deposited: 06 Feb 2012 18:19
Last Modified: 28 Jun 2012 15:53
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/15805
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