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Doctoral Thesis

How do political parties become transnational actors? An ethnographic study of Andean party politics in Barcelona

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PhD in Migration Studies

University of Sussex
Submitted in July 2022
Signed Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:........................................
How do political parties become transnational actors?
An ethnographic study of Andean party politics in Barcelona

Thesis Summary

Party organisations are no longer limited to the domestic arena. A growing number of works has examined why parties become transnational actors, and how they campaign, and organize abroad. However, still largely unexplored is how parties become and remain transnational actors. Existing work investigates either the transnational activities of party organisations, or migrants, but not the interaction of both. The mechanisms that underpin the transnationalisation of political parties are therefore not fully understood yet. This thesis addresses this gap. I argue that parties must actively negotiate their entry and presence within migrant communities. I claim that emigrants often oppose the presence of parties, but that parties can partly overcome this resistance with a specific set of incentives, mobilization, recruitment, and linkage strategies. I situate my analysis in the relevant transnationalism and political science literatures. To empirically support my argument, I draw on 62 interviews with hard-to-reach key informants and 50 logged field reports, which I conducted during 13 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Barcelona. The comparative research design includes Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. First, I find that parties succeed as transnational actors when migrants can use them to produce collective goods in the home and host country. Migrants also engage when parties can stimulate emotional bonds, or offer political career opportunities. Second, successful transnational parties exploit informal networks and harness networks and organizational structures of local migrant organisations and Spanish parties. Finally, migrant organisations act as strong gatekeepers and force party chapters, who lack funding and political clout, to apply more aggressive, informal, and multi-layered linkage tactics. This thesis contributes to our understanding of transnational politics by providing first-hand, in-depth insights into how political parties establish a presence abroad, the challenges that they face, and how both home and host country factors shape this development.
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1 Introduction

Political parties are no longer limited to the domestic arena. Plenty of parties have extended their activities beyond the national borders (Dresser 1993; Tether 1994; Waterbury 2006; Gamlen 2015; Bermúdez 2016; Burgess 2018; Koinova 2018; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a; Paarlberg 2019; Burgess 2020; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a; Rashkova and Van Der Staak 2020; Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021; Van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021). Parties maintain offices in foreign cities, organize transnational campaign rallies, and engage in local migrant community projects. For these activities, political parties rely on the active support of emigrants and emigrant collectives. Emigrants have access to the social networks that are essential for parties to recruit and mobilize across borders. They also know the ropes of how to access and use local resources. The support of emigrants is indispensable for parties to thrive in the transnational arena. Yet, emigrants are active actors who can also withhold their support.

Transnational parties must woo, persuade, and win migrants over to flourish abroad. This, however, is no easy undertaking. There is an abundant literature that demonstrates how migrants tend to disengage from home country politics once abroad. These studies maintain that only a minority of migrants perpetuate a regular political involvement across borders (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Waldinger 2008; Wong et al. 2011; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019). Occasional political engagement is more common; still, low turnout rates abroad remain the rule. Notwithstanding the bureaucratic and logistical challenges to registering and voting by distance, only a moderate number of emigrants succeed to overcome these voting barriers (McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Kostelka 2017; Burgess and Tyburski 2020; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Alternatively, some emigrants engage in non-electoral forms of cross-border activism. Yet, transnationally active collectives usually seek to challenge or bypass home state authorities (M. P. Smith 1994; M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Escobar 2007). They organize protests to raise public awareness of government failures, demand political rights, or gather funds to substitute state services that politicians omit to deliver. These collectives, and many emigrants, adopt clear
positions in opposition to home country parties, and the political home country elite in general.

Notwithstanding this apparent resistance, political parties are alive and kicking abroad. A burgeoning literature highlights the extent to which the transnationalisation of political parties has become a global phenomenon. A systematic literature review reveals that, as of today, modern-day political parties in at least 47 sending countries have crossed borders to organize abroad. This includes parties from South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, North America, and Oceania. These parties have successfully connected with the non-resident electorate and transplanted their feet. What remains largely unclear, however, is how parties have achieved this. Political parties are member-based organizations formed and sustained by individuals, and civil society groups. Parties need feet on the ground to function as an organization and to stay competitive (Lawson 1980; Scarrow 2002; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Seyd and Whiteley 2004; Scarrow, Webb, and Poguntke 2017). In this thesis, I explore how parties have succeeded to plant roots abroad to become transnational actors and remain active abroad thereafter. How do parties gain a foothold abroad? How do parties relate to emigrants? And in turn, how do emigrants relate to parties? These are the main research questions that guide this thesis.

The importance of understanding political party transnationalisation

The transnationalisation of political parties has important political consequences. The campaigning of political parties abroad significantly increases the voter participation of emigrants (Burgess and Tyburski 2020). The available evidence shows that while emigrant voters turn out less than resident voters, their votes still can be decisive. Gamlen (2015) shows how overseas votes can swing elections, complicate coalition negotiations, and create feedback effects that encourage parties to actively reach out to emigrants. In many parliaments, emigrants nowadays fill seats and advocate the demands of their transnational constituency. Systems of special emigrant representation have increased the presence of emigrants in legislatures who now negotiate policies and increase the dominance of diaspora issues in parliamentary
debates (Lafleur 2013, 135–137; Collyer 2014a; Palop-García 2018; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019b). In countries without special representation, some parties have emigrant candidates run on in-country party lists. Emigrants contested or won seats from abroad in the Dominican Republic (Guarnizo 2001, 230), Mexico (Burgess 2020, 127), Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 112–113), New Zealand (Gamlen 2015, 5), Hungary (Pogonyi 2017, 104), Switzerland (Braun 2007), Spain and Peru. Regardless of the electoral system, political parties need some form of transnational structure to recruit these candidates abroad. That said, the transnationalisation of political parties impacts how politics is practised in representative democracies.

Transnationally active parties are important venues that shape how migrants relate and take part in home country politics. The active presence of parties in host countries facilitates migrants to participate in transnational politics (Burgess 2014). Migrants use home country parties to partake in elections, promote political principles, exhibit partisan identities, and connect with home. Home country parties are, thus, diaspora channels, which migrants can use to send ‘social remittances’ to the homeland (Levitt 1998). There is an abundant literature that demonstrates how international migrants influence the political behaviour and attitudes of non-migrants via social cross-border interactions, economic individual remittances, collectively raised remittances, or upon return to the home country (see, Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Careja and Emmenegger 2012; Pfutze 2012; Kessler and Rother 2016; Barsbai et al. 2017; Batista, Seither, and Vicente 2019; Córdova and Hiskey 2015; Boccagni, Lafleur, and Levitt 2016; Lacroix, Levitt, and Vari-Lavoisier 2016; Karakoç, Köse, and Özcan 2017; Tertytchnaya et al. 2018; Krawatzeck and Müller-Funk 2020; Pérez-Armendáriz 2021; Escribà-Folch, Wright, and Meseguer 2022; Peters and Miller 2022). These studies maintain that migrant transnationalism shapes how resident citizens relate to the political system in place.

1 In the 2017 Catalanian regional elections, Carles Puigdemont (JuntxxCats) successfully contested a seat from self-exile in Belgium.
2 In the 2016 legislative elections, at least six non-resident citizens ran for Congress (author’s data collection, Ch. 4, Section 3.1.)
Political parties are an important part of this equation. Government parties push outreach policies to connect with emigrants, aiming to steer the effects of international mobility and to politically benefit of them (FitzGerald 2000; Tyburski 2014; Gamlen, Cummings, and Vaaler 2017; Koinova and Tsourapas 2018; Miller and Peters 2018; Turcu and Urbatsch 2019; Burgess 2020; Duquette-Rury 2020; Wellman 2021). Transnational parties are present within communities abroad and directly mobilize votes, opinions, and financial support. These are parties across the whole political spectrum, including party organizations that promote democratic outlooks, but also those who champion authoritarian, nationalist, and populist values (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Waterbury 2006; Jakobson, Tõnis, and Kalev 2020; Yener-Roderburg 2020). Transnational parties are essential joints that link migrants and their home country. Hence, if we want to better understand how migrants shape democratization or democratic backsliding processes it is important to better understand how home country institutions, that undergird these dynamics, such as parties, have succeeded to take root abroad.

The extension of voting rights to non-resident citizens has de-territorialized and reconfigured the notions of citizenship. Indeed, the ways in which emigrants are incorporated, and by extension, relate to the polity of their home country have changed profoundly in recent decades (Laguerre 1998; FitzGerald 2000; Bauböck 2007; Collyer 2013; Lafleur 2013; Collyer 2014b; Margheritis 2016; Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). In turn, political parties take on new roles as intermediaries. Parties no longer connect only resident citizens with their elected representatives but are expected to strengthen links between non-resident citizens and the political system in the homeland. External voting rights entail that political parties are asked to extend their core set of functions across borders (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002, 6). For parties in the transnational electorate, this means they must conduct transnational campaigns to simplify emigrants’ vote choices, close information gaps by educating emigrants about policy issues, stimulate emigrants’ identification and loyalty to the home state to stabilize the political system and mobilize emigrants into electoral participation. Party behaviour research has well documented how parties have transformed and adapted over time to their changing environment (Mair, Müller, and Plasser 2004; Webb and White 2007). There is a clear pattern of how parties have moved away from cadre or mass party models of
organisation (Duverger 1954) towards a more professionalized party type (Panebianco 1988) that tends to rely more on state funding (Katz and Mair 1995), and which operates in a permanent campaign mood (Conaghan and De La Torre 2008). Nowadays, parties use social media, run opinion polls, digitalize their campaigns, and personalize their recruitment strategies (Norris 2005; Scarrow 2015). Much less is known, however, about how parties react and adapt to a globalized and increasingly mobile electorate. The analysis of parties’ transformation into transnational actors is, thus, rooted in larger questions of party adaption, party building, and party survival in times of international mass migration.

**Migrants as active actors and gatekeepers**

While some parties indeed become transnational actors, other parties never do. Scholars have argued that parties “face the choice of engaging or not in this new arena” (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020b, 2). This perspective maintains that parties can deliberately decide whether they become transnationally active or not. Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei (2019a) have situated this decision-making process within a rational cost-benefit analysis according to which parties enter into competition abroad when they possess the resources and can expect to gain an electoral advantage. Umpierrez and Dandoy (2021, 2) also speak in this context of “parties’ strategic entry in overseas electoral districts”. However, the transnationalisation of political parties is a much more complex process. Parties need to convince migrants to lend their support, locate allies abroad, establish trust, and mobilize resources in residency countries. Parties must link up with migrants on the ground in order to establish a firm transnational presence. I argue that parties are not entirely in charge of this process but need to enter into negotiations with the migrants and their associations in residency countries. So far, however, migrants are largely missing as active actors in the analysis of transnational political parties.

The emerging transnational party literature adopts a party-centred perspective (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a; Rashkova and Van Der Staak 2020; Van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021). Scholars primarily analyse party-level characteristics and
institutional sending state features that either encourage or discourage parties to invest in their transnational outreach capacities. In this regard, a growing number of works have examined why parties become transnational actors (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a; Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021). Several other studies have analysed how parties campaign, and organize abroad (Tether 1994; Levitt 2001; Richman 2008; Collard 2013; Lafleur 2013, 124–130; Tabar 2014; Koinova 2018; Paarlberg 2019; Collard and Webb 2020; Gauja 2020; Kalu and Scarrow 2020; Yalaz, Aydin, and Østergaard-Nielsen 2022). What remains largely unclear, however, is how parties become and remain transnational actors. Expanding on these works, in this thesis I propose to scrutinize transnational parties with an analytical lens that centres on the activities of migrants within and in relation to homeland parties. Because migrants are active actors who sustain and curtail parties abroad, it is important to study both migrants and parties in interaction with each other. Only in this way we can fully understand the mechanisms that underpin the transnationalisation of political parties.

Parties rely on migrants to enter the transnational electoral arena and to take root abroad. I argue that similar to the domestic arena, parties abroad depend on individuals and organized collectives to thrive as an organisation. Transnational parties need emigrants to staff offices, conduct lobby work, or run party-initiated neighbourhood projects. They are the parties’ transnational ‘ambassadors in the community’ (Martin and Cowley 1999). During election times, parties need emigrant candidates to contest special extra-territorial seats in the legislature; and they need partisans who pound the pavement, put up campaign posters, and distribute campaign material at ethnic restaurants or the entrance of metro stations. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic when many aspects of our life, including election campaigns, have moved online parties have continued to rely abroad on devoted grassroots support groups who engaged in online touting to target their friends and acquaintances next door, and who kept campaigning in-person in the neighbourhoods, and even across borders (Fliess 2021a). Regardless of the global state of affairs emigrants are gatekeepers who manage parties’ access to the transnational electorate. Transnational parties need the support of key actors within the communities abroad to recruit, mobilize, and link up.
The struggle of parties to find their feet abroad

Political parties must court, incentivize, and convince migrants to open the transnational gate wide open so that they can fully enter the electoral arena abroad. Yet, migrants are often reluctant to lend their support to homeland parties. For example, most Andean emigrants in the 21st century feel that economic crises and political mismanagement forced them to leave their home country (Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2015a; Rosas and Gay 2015; Hierro 2016). Indeed, Castles (2003, 17) reminds us how economic migration seldomly is entirely voluntary because “failed economies generally also mean weak states, predatory ruling cliques and human rights abuse.” These transplanted electorates tend to hold the political elite in low esteem, and „while the homeland may maintain a strong attractive power as an elicitor of nostalgia and belonging, it is also there as a reminder of past failures, of pervasive corruption, of very dubious life prospects“ (Boccagni and Ramírez 2013, 746).

The political transnationalism literature evinces that widespread political distrust among migrants is one of the factors that help explain the prevailing abstention of emigrants from homeland politics, including elections (Guarnizo 2001; Escrivá 2013; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Bermúdez 2016). Low participation rates abroad are the norm (Burgess and Tyburski 2020; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). While higher bureaucratic hurdles and logistical difficulties have been found to depress transnational turnout, these factors cannot explain why emigrants do not engage in other homeland-related political activities, such as party activism. Yet, today, we know that it is rather the minority of emigrants who regularly engages in cross-border politics (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Waldinger 2008; Wong et al. 2011; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019).

There is firm empirical evidence, which indicates, that emigrants tend to disengage from home country politics over time. The more years someone has lived abroad the less that person participates in political home country affairs (Waldinger 2008; Waldinger and Soehl 2013; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Chaudhary 2018). Some migrants have never politically engaged with their home country in the first
place. Amongst others, this includes 1.5 and 2nd generation migrants who politically socialize abroad. While these migrant cohorts often retain the citizenship rights of their parents’ country of origin, it is unsurprising that they often make little political use of them (Morales and Pilati 2014; Safi 2018).

Certainly, there is evidence of how migrants engage in political home country affairs. There are many stories of how Latin American migrant collectives in the United States have organized abroad to demand the right to vote and dual citizenship (Jones-Correa 2001; Escobar 2007). Other studies have demonstrated how migrants raise funds abroad and propel development projects in their home communities (M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007; Mercer, Page, and Evans 2009; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2015; Lacroix 2016). However, these tend to be migrant-led activities that challenge the parties in power. Migrants demonstrate and protest to demand rights, which home country parties have kept refusing to grant them for decades. Migrants engage in development projects to substitute missing state services and to provide those public goods, which elected politicians have failed to deliver. Hence, some migrants politically engage with their home country, but not necessarily with home country parties.

The interaction of parties and migrants on three different levels

The broader political transnationalism literature highlights the attitudes of emigrants towards homeland politics but overlooks how parties develop strategies to respond, address and overcome the resistance of migrants who seek to withhold their support. In turn, party-centred approaches overlook migrants as active actors. This thesis addresses these shortcomings. I analyse the relationship between homeland parties and emigrants as a dynamic interaction. I demonstrate that emigrants often oppose the presence of parties, but that parties can partly overcome this resistance with a specific set of incentives, mobilization, recruitment and linkage strategies.

To fully understand this reality and the processes that shape the transnationalisation of political parties I scrutinize the dynamic interactions of migrants and parties on three
levels. First, on the micro-level, I examine why and how migrants become active in homeland parties. Second, on the micro-meso-level, I analyse how transnational parties recruit, mobilize, and organize abroad. In addition, on the meso-level, I study migrant associations’ attitudes towards homeland parties and their relationship during electoral and non-electoral periods. I exploit a comparative research design to take into consideration homeland and host country-related factors that shape how the transnationalisation of political parties unfolds. The following overall research question guides this thesis:

1. How do political parties become and remain transnational actors?

As discussed, I approach and study this question from both the migrant and the party perspective, which leads me to propose the following sub-questions that shape this thesis.

a. How do transnational parties connect with emigrants?

b. How do emigrants relate to homeland parties?

To answer these three research questions I use an ethnographic approach embedded in a comparative research design that builds on an analysis of Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian party politics in Barcelona, Spain.

An ethnographic study of Andean party politics in Barcelona

Much of our knowledge of how political parties organize and campaign abroad is limited to the national level. One set of studies focuses on the party headquarters in the sending country to explore why and how parties organize abroad (Tether 1994; Tabar 2014; Burgess 2018; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a; Rashkova and Van Der Staak 2020). Another line of works extends this analysis to a specific destination country to trace the transnational activities of homeland parties. In this latter respect, scholars have scrutinized the activities of Dominican (Graham 1997), Haitian (Laguerre 1998), Salvadorian (Paarlberg 2019), and Mexican parties (Dresser 1993; R. C. Smith 2003; M.
P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Paarlberg 2020) in the United States. Other studies have examined Turkish parties in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Yener-Roderburg 2020), or Colombian parties in Europe (Bermúdez 2016). These works have uncovered important dynamics and patterns of party behaviour in the transnational arena. Expanding on these works, in this thesis I study transnational party politics in a city context. Existing works in this respect acknowledge cities as research sites, but their analysis still tends to centre on the party and migrant group on the country level. Parties and emigrants, however, interact most with each other on the local level (Guarnizo 2001; Levitt 2001; Çağlar and Glick Schiller 2011; Yalaz, Aydin, and Østergaard-Nielsen 2022). Hence, if we want to understand how parties, individual migrants, and migrant associations negotiate parties’ access and presence within the communities abroad we need to look at the city level where these interactions take place on a day-to-day basis.

This thesis focuses on transnational Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian party politics in Barcelona. This case and research site selection also address shortcomings in the existing party abroad literature that, so far, has focused on South American and Caribbean parties in the United States (see for an important exception, Bermúdez 2016, Ch. 8). Grounded in a most similar research design the similarities of the Andean context help to hold constant an array of potential independent variables. Furthermore, with some notable exceptions, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru are characterized by similar migration patterns to Europe, including a similar socio-demographic composition of their communities in Spain. These characteristics suggest that these migrant groups in Barcelona collectively organize to meet similar community needs (Morell 2005; Aparicio and Tornos 2010; Morales and Jorba 2010). Studying several groups in one setting, Barcelona, allows us to carve out how city-level and host country-related variables shape emigrants’ attitudes towards political home country actors. This research design also provides an analytical lens to understand how transnational parties use local resources to reach out and connect with emigrants and other host country institutions, such as host country parties.

The three countries, however, differ in their electoral systems. In Ecuador and Peru, emigrants are enfranchised in presidential elections, legislative elections, and national
referendums. Moreover, Ecuador exclusively reserves special seats in the national parliament for emigrant MPs. Peruvian emigrants can stand as candidates in national legislative elections, but special emigrant seats remained a long-held wish of emigrant collectives3. Bolivia, in contrast, does not allow any form of extra-territorial representation and grants the right to vote from abroad only in presidential elections and national referendums. This variance in terms of emigrants’ political inclusion translates into parties’ interest to campaign and being present abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020c). In this thesis, I explore how the electoral sending state system interacts, on the one hand with parties’ recruitment, mobilization, and linkage strategies abroad, and on the other hand, shapes emigrants’ attitudes towards homeland parties and their propensity to become active in one.

Barcelona offers an ideal setting to examine transnational Andean party politics. The city hosts a significant number of Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian migrants in Europe. Barcelona maintains a vibrant associative landscape (Morales and Jorba 2010; Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala 2015; Mora 2020). It is thus intriguing and challenging to scrutinize local and transnational network structures as well as parties’ linkage strategies within this setting. Finally, foreign parties are free to organize and campaign in Barcelona, Spain.

Ethnographic fieldwork was carried out in Barcelona between February 2018 and March 2019. In total, I conducted 62 semi-structured qualitative interviews with local key informants. This sample includes in-depth interviews with transnational party activists and leaders of migrant associations. In addition, I interviewed three movement activists and three sending state officials to gain entrance to the field and generate additional data. Finally, I have conducted 50 logged participant observations in a large variety of settings.

3 In 2020, Peru also adopted special emigrant parliamentary representation in the national legislature. However, this thesis’ study period is limited to events before 2019.
Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is organized in seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents a literature review and a theoretical framework to motivate my research question. Chapter 3 is devoted to the data collection and analysis methods. Chapters 4 – 6 present the core empirical analysis. Each chapter deals with a specific level of analysis. As discussed, the analysis unfolds on the micro-level (Chapter 4), both micro and meso-level (Chapter 5) and meso-level (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 presents the conclusions and implications for future research.

Chapter 2 situates my research questions in the political transnationalism and the relevant political party behaviour literatures. I systematically review the political transnationalism literature and highlight the important blind spots. Political parties attract increasing scholarly attention. Yet, the relations and linkages between parties and migrants have, so far, largely remained undertheorized, exposing significant gaps regarding the processes and dynamics that undergird how parties become and remain transnational actors. This chapter develops a theoretical framework that is grounded in the relevant political science work on party mobilization, recruitment, party membership, and party-interest group relationships.

Chapter 3 introduces the research design and the methods used for the data collection and analysis. In the first part, I present the comparative research design and my case selection. I delineate the relevant political and migratory characteristics of my country cases with a specific emphasis on Barcelona (Spain) as the research site. In the second part, I discuss my data collection and analysis methods. I also discuss the sampling strategy and present in greater detail my samples of 1) interviewees 2) political parties, 3) migrant associations, and 4) participant observation sites. I provide details about the interview set-up and discuss the challenges I encountered during fieldwork. I conclude with an overview of additionally used secondary data sources.

Chapter 4 analyses the motivations of migrants to become active in a political home country party. This chapter uses the General Incentive Model (GIM) to conceptualize emigrants’ motivations to engage in homeland parties. The GIM has become the
dominant theoretical model in party membership research to explain why individuals join political parties (e.g., Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019). I apply and test this model in the transnational Andean context. This chapter demonstrates why individual migrants support transnational parties, their importance for transnational parties, and how parties can attract human capital support abroad.

Chapter 5 traces the trajectories of emigrant party activists and explores the recruitment mechanisms of parties abroad. I situate my analysis in the transnationalism and party recruitment, mobilization, and party-interest group literatures (e.g., Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Allern 2010; Verge 2012). In the first part, I examine how migrants self-start into transnational party activism. In the second part, I scrutinize the strategies of parties to recruit volunteers and candidates abroad. I differentiate between recruitment in the private sphere to highlight the importance of friendship circles, and recruitment in the public sphere to emphasize the importance of migrant associations and host country parties as recruitment pools. This chapter unravels the micro-level dynamics of party cell building abroad by highlighting the importance of migrants’ social networks, resources, and their access to host country institutions.

Chapter 6 engages with the question of how parties and migrant organizations interact with each other on an institutional level. This analysis is embedded in the state transnationalism and party-interest group literatures (e.g., Allern 2010; Burgess 2012; Verge 2012; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2015). In the first part, I analyze the attitudes of migrant associations and their leaders towards cooperating with a home country party. In the second part, I scrutinize the strategies of parties to lure associations into an institutional partnership. Throughout this chapter, I highlight the importance of migrant associations as partners for parties. The analysis in this chapter unfolds country by country to underscore the importance of the countries’ electoral systems in shaping this relationship.
Chapter 7 concludes with the main findings. I moreover situate my discussion in the larger transnationalism and political party literature to highlight the contributions of this thesis and fruitful avenues for future research.
2 Theoretical Framework

Nowadays, a vast number of parties have extended their activities beyond the national borders offering migrants new avenues to exercise their transnational citizenship. Party outreach towards emigrants can vary significantly from country to country and by party. Most visible are transnationally conducted campaigns with candidate appearances in countries of residency at public places that draw masses of emigrant supporters. Importantly, however, the transnational activities of political parties go far beyond selective campaign events. This includes permanently established party chapters abroad, civil society projects within the migrant community, and professional lobby work to influence host country governments. For what we know, political parties have become transnational actors in countries as diverse as Algeria, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Mexico, New Zealand, Romania, South Korea, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States to name but a few (Levitt 2001; Hammond 2012; Gamlen 2015; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a; Paarlberg 2019; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a). The phenomenon of the transnational party stretches across different world regions, political systems and on occasion takes place in settings where emigrants cannot even vote. The only feature all these countries seem to have in common is that they have a significant share of their population residing abroad and that political parties seem to see these citizens abroad “as uniquely positioned to offer resources that they need to be competitive” (Pearlman 2014, 65).

Historical studies on political exile parties demonstrate that the transnationalisation of political parties is not entirely new (Wright and Oñate 2007; Iskander 2010, Ch. 3; S. Ellis 2013; FitzGerald 2016; Hartnett 2020). Today parties from conflicted and repressive home country regimes continue to cross borders to mobilize more effectively (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Lyons and Mandaville 2012). Yet, what is new is that political parties from young and established democracies also have entered the transnational arena. In the 21st century, the transnationalisation of political parties has become global practice. Nevertheless, research on parties’ cross-border activities significantly lags behind. The transnationalism literature has indeed made reference to parties’ presence
abroad but with some few notable exceptions (see for example Dresser 1993; Itzigsohn 2000; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a) this body of work has largely remained uninterested in theorizing party outreach or engaging more in-depth with this transnational actor type. The political science literature, on the other hand, has largely ignored the party abroad entirely (see for an early outlier Tether 1994). Only recently, political scientists have made some strides towards correcting this shortcoming (Burgess 2018; Koinova and Tsourapas 2018; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a; Paarlberg 2019; Burgess and Tyburski 2020; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a; Rashkova and Van Der Staak 2020; Fliess and Østergaard-Nielsen 2021; Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021; Van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021).

Voting from abroad is not a new phenomenon. From a historical perspective, local senate members of the Roman empire under Augustus have already been voting from abroad and in more recent times, soldiers from Wisconsin (1862), Australia (1902) and seafarers from New Zealand (1890) were allowed to vote while residing abroad (A. Ellis 2007). However, for a long time states limited voting to specific professional groups and only more recently, non-resident citizens have gained voting rights regardless of their occupation (Lafleur 2013). While some countries, such as Colombia, Indonesia, New Zealand or France account for a long legacy of out-of-country voting, the majority of countries worldwide introduced these legislations between 1990 and 2020 (Wellman, Allen, and Nyblade 2022). As part of this enfranchisement trend, some countries have gone as far as to reserve exclusive seats in the legislature for emigrant representatives (Collyer 2014a). The extension of active and passive electoral rights to non-resident citizens has increasingly incentivized political parties to transcend borders and party researchers to investigate them. As of 2020, 141 countries legally allow voting from abroad (Wellman, Allen, and Nyblade 2022). Noteworthy, voting from abroad is practised in fewer countries however due to states and parties who delay the implementation process for their own benefit or strategically disenfranchise emigrants in practice (Turcu 2018; Palop-García and Pedroza 2019; Wellman 2021). Nevertheless, by 2020, 127 countries had held at least one election abroad (Wellman, Allen, and Nyblade 2022).
In this chapter, I will develop a theoretical framework to analyse the transnationalisation process of political parties. I adopt an agency-based perspective to explain the transnationalisation process of political parties. My analysis focuses on “transnational agency “from below” as well as “from in-between”“ (M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 20). For this purpose, I will combine the insights from the transnationalism literature and the political party literature. In the first section, I will provide an overview of the transnationalism research field and discuss the lack of transnational party member research. I conclude with an analytical framework to analyse the activism of migrants in homeland parties on the micro-level. In the second section, I will review the research field on political parties abroad. I will begin with a methodological conceptualization of parties abroad and subsequently discuss why parties become transnational actors. In the following part, I will present the recruitment approach and the linkage approach to analyse how parties connect with migrants and migrant collectives on both the micro and meso-level. In the remainder of this chapter, I will provide the key implications of these discussions for my research question of how political parties become and remain transnational actors.

2.1 Political transnationalism from below

Traditionally, political scientists have understood and analysed political behaviour in relation to immobile citizens, within and confined by national borders. Although, at present scholars pay substantial attention to international migrants, for a long time they have tended to focus on migrants’ participation in host country politics (e.g. Saggar 2007; Sobolewska 2017). Since the mid-1990s, however, scholars have started paying more attention to the political behaviour of migrants in relation to their country of origin. In their seminal work, Basch and colleagues (1994) look at Caribbean and Filipino migrant populations in New York delineating “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (p. 8). Their analysis places the daily life and social, economic, and political relations of migrants in a larger framework of de-territorialized nation-building in times of global capitalism. This work provides an anthropological account of how race, identity, and class shape migrants’ simultaneous incorporation into the host and home
society. This new transnational perspective called the until then prevalent assimilation paradigm into question according to which migrants ought to shadow their origin country identity and assimilate as part of their integration process (Alba and Foner 2015). Transnational activities represented a way for migrants to “by-passing assimilation, constructing instead a new mode of social and economic adaption by simultaneously living and participating in two communities in different nation-states” (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 2017, 1486). The transnational optic opened new lines of research along which scholars started also investigating migrants’ political activities directed towards their countries of origin (see for a comprehensive review of the concept and theoretical discussions, Lafleur 2013, 2–9; Waldinger 2013; Waldinger 2015, Ch. 2). These studies emphasize transnational grassroots activities “from below” that migrants develop to circumvent (transnational) state structures and in response to a globalized capitalist economy (M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998).

2.1.1 Categorizing and measuring political transnationalism

In a first effort to categorize these migrant practices, Portes and colleagues (1999) suggested to distinguishing between economic, socio-cultural, and political transnational activities. In their view, scholars should “delimit the concept of transnationalism to occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation” (p. 219). In a similar vein, Itzigsohn and colleagues (1999) differentiate between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ transnational practices “as two poles of a continuum defined by the degree of institutionalization, degree of movement within the transnational field, or the degree of involvement in transnational activities” (p. 323). Narrow political transnationalism includes membership and activism in political home country parties, while, for example, engaging in political discussions with compatriots during election times is a broader form of political transnationalism.

Individuals can participate in politics in manifold ways. Political scientists stress that political participation must be conceptualized along different dimensions. The study “Participation in America” by Verba and Nie (1972) draws attention to the difference
between electoral and non-electoral behaviour and is a watershed that broke with an until then prevalent uni-dimensional apprehension of political behaviour according to which it was synonymous with voting political elites into office or simply helping them win elections (Milbrath and Goel 1977, 11; Teorell, Torcal, and Montero 2007). The authors developed the concept of ‘modes of participation’. The main idea is that citizens’ private goals and motivations define how individuals politically engage in order to “influence[e] the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” (Verba and Nie 1972, 2). The electoral modes of participation encompass (1) voting and (2) campaign activities, while non-electoral activities include (3) contacting political officials and (4) communal, non-partisan engagement in groups or organizations. The authors argue that citizens dedicate their resources only to the one cluster that best serves their interests. The differentiation between electoral and non-electoral participation has remained highly influential until today and Guarnizo and colleagues (2003) have adapted it in their seminal study on the transnational political practices of Colombian, Dominican, and Salvadorian migrants in the United States.

Another approach has been to organize transnational political activities in relation to migrants’ claims. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b) differentiates between immigrant and homeland politics. The former includes activities to enhance migrants’ situation in the host country that become transnational once migrants draw on origin country networks or when the sending state itself becomes involved. In contrast, ‘homeland political activities’ are directed towards the domestic or foreign policy of the home country. It can be divided into three sub-categories. First, ‘emigrant politics’ involve migrants who demand and make use of passive and active electoral rights and other institutionalized channels of political co-determination. Second, ‘diaspora politics’ evolves around heated political disputes over national sovereignty, or peace negotiations after armed conflicts. Third, ‘translocal politics’ deals with migrants’ development work to improve the situation of local communities in the country of origin. Subsequent work has empirically assessed the scope and frequency with which migrants engaged in activities related to homeland politics. Occasionally, these works conflate emigrant and translocal politics. Yet, the categories electoral vs. nonelectoral, and narrow vs. broad remained somewhat important (see e.g., Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019).
To measure the scope and relevance of migrants’ transnational political involvement, Guarnizo and colleagues (2003) carried out a representative survey of Dominican, Colombian and Salvadorian migrant populations in the Los Angeles and Washington D.C. area. The authors found that only a minority of migrants regularly engage in political transnational activities while one third of migrants do so on an occasional basis. This study provided an essential basis for future debates because its survey design addressed previously often raised criticism to have sampled on the dependent variable which led to an initial exaggeration of the transnational phenomenon (Portes 2003). While migrants tend to become more active in nonelectoral politics, the sample indicated that membership in political home country parties still reaches significant levels. Some 18% of the survey respondents were transnational party members. The study also laid bare a transnational field that was highly gendered and socially stratified. Their results showed that men with higher levels of education and larger social networks, who had resided for longer times in the United States were the most likely ones to become active in home country politics.

Contrarily to the developments in political science research, the act of voting, central to the research of political participation, had not attracted much scholarly attention until the mid-2000s. Clearly, one reason is that much of the pioneering works focused on Latin American migrants in the United States, and at that time only a minority of Latin American countries had enabled their citizens to vote by distance (Calderón Chelius 2003; Palop-García and Pedroza 2017). As a matter of fact, the Grenadian, Vincentian, and Haitian transmigrants in Basch and colleagues’ (1994) seminal study are barred from voting in home country elections until the present day. Yet, other Latin American countries undertook wide-reaching electoral reforms in the early and mid-2000s that involved the implementation of external electoral rights. Often this has been the result of strenuous lobby work by well-organized migrant groups (M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Escobar 2007), met by political parties that scent easy electoral gains (Lafleur 2013) and sending states that gave in to the pressure “from below” but who at the same time became more interested in maintaining ties with their citizens abroad (R. C. Smith 2003; M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Iskander 2010; Margheritis 2016). This development
has been accompanied by a global norm diffusion trend that established diaspora voting rights as a worldwide phenomenon (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010; Lafleur 2015; Turcu and Urbatsch 2015).

At the same time, the research field on political transnationalism became more established and while at the beginning anthropological research and scholars of international relations were driving the field, now political sociologists with an interest in decomposing political transnationalism into different forms of political behaviour joined the debate. These discussions hugely benefited from the increasing availability of survey data, with nationally representative sample designs in the United States, that included specific questions on migrants’ transnational electoral attitudes and behaviour. Drawing on this rich data scholars could further probe into the scope of transnational activities, yet the debate increasingly evolved around the question of whether transnational political engagement would hinder political involvement in the host country. On the one hand, these studies confirmed previous findings and showed that only a minority takes part in homeland-related political activities (Waldinger 2008; Wong et al. 2011). On the other hand, they showed that transnational engagement remains too marginal to significantly interfere with immigrants’ involvement in U.S. politics. At present, most migration scholars have subscribed to the idea that “[b]elonging, loyalty and sense of attachment are not parts of a zero-sum game based on a single place” (Vertovec 2009, 78). Indeed, firm empirical evidence has emerged showing that political activism in one political system does not preclude simultaneous involvement in another and that one can on occasion reinforce the other (Collet and Lien 2009; Waldinger and Soehl 2013), a finding that studies in Europe have echoed (Bermúdez 2010; Koopmans et al. 2005; Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2015; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017; Chaudhary 2018).

The study of transnational electoral behaviour gained increasing attention over the years. In 2006, Italy and Mexico, two major emigrant-sending countries, allowed their citizens to vote from abroad for the first time, a development that motivated further and vital research on the subject (Lafleur 2011; Tintori 2011; Leal, Lee, and McCann 2012; Waldinger and Soehl 2013; Lafleur 2013). Systematic large-scale data collection efforts to quantify and qualify external electoral rights followed suit and encouraged
subsequent comparative research (A. Ellis et al. 2007; Collyer and Vathi 2007; Collyer 2014b; Pedroza and Palop-García 2017; Arrighi et al. 2019; Wellman, Allen, and Nyblade 2022).

The emerging academic debates evolved around the normative question of whether non-resident citizens should be entitled to vote in the first place (Bauböck 2005; López-Guerra 2005; Spiro 2006; Bauböck 2007), and why emigrants take part in home country elections (Boccagni 2011; Boccagni and Ramírez 2013; Waldinger 2008; Leal, Lee, and McCann 2012; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017; Chaudhary 2018). In the following, researchers in Europe predominantly fielded small-scale surveys around election time in cities with significant migrant populations or made use of qualitative research methods to investigate determinants of electoral political cross-border engagement. This research strategy stands in stark contrast to the early U.S. approach that built on quantitative methods in combination with nationally representative surveys (Waldinger 2008; Wong et al. 2011; Waldinger, Soehl, and Lim 2012; Waldinger and Soehl 2013) and may reflect the more general differences in research traditions on both sides of the Atlantic. Political scientists have also started exploiting aggregated election data to systematically analyse emigrant voting patterns across time, several migrant groups, and a vast number of host countries (Fidrmuc and Doyle 2005; Turcu and Urbatsch 2019; Burgess and Tyburski 2020; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020; Ognibene and Paulis 2021; Østergaard-Nielsen et al. 2022; Turcu and Urbatsch 2022).

2.1.2 Where are the party members and activists in the transnationalism literature?

In new democracies, so far, scholars have mainly shed light on the interactions of migrants with the political parties in their country of origin in two respects. Either they have analysed the transnational vote choices of emigrants (Fidrmuc and Doyle 2005; Escrivá et al. 2010; Ahmadov and Sasse 2015; Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015; Jaulin 2016; Goldberg and Lanz 2019; McCann, Escobar, and Arana 2019), or they have investigated translocal development projects and whether they allow migrant collectives to gain political influence back home (e.g., Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999;
Goldring 2002; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Burgess 2012; Schütze 2016; Duquette-Rury 2020). Transnational party membership or activism in home country parties, however, has received almost no special attention at all. The existing literature on migrants’ transnational political behaviour acknowledges migrants’ activism in political parties, but since these scholars are more interested in the general political involvement of emigrants they simply cluster party membership together with other political practices, such as voting, or giving campaign donations (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Bermúdez 2010; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Snel, Hart, and Van Bochove 2016; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019). In consequence, these studies treat transnational party membership either as only one of many forms of political expression or discard it all together when they focus on voting alone. In a similar vein, these studies tend to reduce party membership to an electoral activity, omitting the ways in which parties continue to function during inter-election times (Scarrow 1996, Ch. 5), providing platforms for migrants to politically engage with the homeland all year around. That having said, even the emerging literature on parties’ cross-border campaigns has adopted a strict party-level perspective (Dresser 1993; Paarlberg 2019; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a) omitting the question of who wears the “boots on the ground” and why (Webb, Poletti, and Bale 2017, 64), a study subject that traditionally has motivated much political behaviour and political party research (see e.g., Clark and Wilson 1961; Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whitely and Seyd 1996; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; Van Haute and Gauja 2015a; Scarrow 2015; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019).

In this regard, scholars have rarely studied emigrants’ relationship with political home country parties in their role as party activists and members. One reason might be that transnational party membership is a rare and less visible form of political transnational engagement. Few survey respondents state to be active in home country parties. The available large-n surveys indicate membership rates between 15.81% of the politically active Colombians and Dominicans in Europe (Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019) and 18.30% concerning Colombian, Dominican and Salvadorian migrants in the United States (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003). Another reason might be that there are no official and easy-to-access party membership statistics, which contrasts for example with the increasing availability of official extra-territorial electoral data on the macro-level. Similarly, partisan engagement is not as visible as for example
diaspora protest activities that yield much more media attention. Yet, in order to better understand how political parties become and remain transnational actors it is crucial to know who carries those parties along on foreign soil and why they do so.

So far, only two studies exist that have specifically analyzed transnational party membership. Setrana and Owusu (2015) have studied two Ghanaian party branches in Amsterdam. Their findings resonate with the broader political transnationalism literature showing that transnational party activists were well-educated, predominantly male, and were simultaneously active in host country politics. This study falls short, however, to explain why migrants become active in homeland parties. Very recently though, Collard and Kernalegenn’s (2021) study on British party members abroad has engaged with this question. They find that emigrants mainly joined the parties for political and ideological reasons; a finding that echoed domestic party member research in the United Kingdom. Yet, the study focuses on card-bearing members in an established democracy and overlooks the importance of individual resources. We still lack insights into the motivations of party activists from countries with democratically less responsive parties that organize more informally and must attract activists with more resource-poor backgrounds.

2.1.3 Why and how migrants become transnational party activists

The question of why individuals join political parties has motivated a large body of research in political science. The general incentive model in combination with the resource model prevails as the main explanatory approach. The recruitment approach is also relevant to explain political transnationalism but it is situated on both the micro and meso-level. For this reason, I will discuss it in the “transnationalism in-between section” where I also deal in greater detail with meso-level processes. In the following sub-sections, I will discuss the general incentive and resource model in relation to the transnationalism literature to develop a theoretical framework that helps explain the transnational party activism of Andean migrants in Barcelona.
The General Incentive Model

The General Incentive Model (GIM) has been developed by Seyd and Whitley in 1992 who subsequently fine-tuned it over the years (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 1994; Whiteley, Seyd, and Billinghurst 2006). The GIM has gained a strong standing in party behaviour research and has become the standard theoretical model to explain party enrolment and activism on the micro-level (Van Haute and Gauja 2015a; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Power and Dommett 2020). Ribeiro and Do Amaral (2019) have recently first applied it to explain party membership in Latin America. The lack of reliable data, partly a result of the informal party culture, has long hampered research on party membership in Latin America, but this does not mean that party members and activists are less important in Latin America as an evolving scholarship on this topic evinces (Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Piñeiro and Rosenblatt 2017; V. Pérez, Piñeiro, and Rosenblatt 2019; Sells 2020; Meléndez and Umpierrez de Reguero 2021).

The GIM combines theoretical insights from organizational behaviour theory (Clark and Wilson 1961), collective action research (Olson 1965), and social psychological research on unconventional modes of activism (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989). In doing so, it moves beyond rigid rational choice approaches to explain political behaviour. A key assumption of the model posits that political parties produce collective goods (e.g. specific policies) and that individuals will benefit regardless of whether they participate in a political party or not. In addition, involvement in parties is irrational because individual contributions are too marginal to influence election outcomes. And yet, citizens participate in political parties, creating a ‘paradox of participation’. Scholars claim that organisations must offer additional incentives to members that become only available to those who participate (Clark and Wilson 1961; Olson 1965).

Syed and Whiteley (1992) argue that citizens join political parties in response to collective and individual incentives that the party provides. Party members believe that their engagement can make a real difference; either for the collective or them personally. The authors distinguish between 1) collective incentives, 2) emotional
incentives, 3) selective outcome incentives, 4) selective process incentives, and 5) social norms. In the next sub-sections, I will briefly discuss the relevance of these incentives in relation to migrant political transnationalism. I argue that the GIM can be applied to explain party membership of Latin American migrants abroad. Yet, we can expect that the transnational arena reconfigures the GIM’s incentive structure to some extent.

**GIM: Collective Incentives**

Collective incentives refer to the programmatic outlook of parties. In this regard, citizens join to promote, reverse or prevent certain policies. The logic is that whether migrants join the party “depends on whether they see it collectively as a vehicle for achieving those goals” (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 62). In a similar fashion, Clark and Wilson (1961) have argued that an organisational purpose to change the status quo is imperative for individuals to join a political organisation. As Seyd and Whitley put it “[a]ny adequate theoretical account to collective action needs to consider situations where the individual ‘thinks’ collectively rather than individually” (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 61). A broad scholarly consensus exists that collective incentives are the main driver for individuals to become involved in a political party (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 1994; Whiteley, Seyd, and Billinghurst 2006; Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Scarrow 2015, 158–159; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Power and Dommett 2020; Sells 2020). Collard and Kernalegenn (2021) show that this also holds true for British party members abroad. Ahmadov and Sasse (2016) provide empirical evidence that migrants’ wish to improve or preserve the situation of their relatives and friends back home can motivate them to engage in electoral cross-border activities. In that sense, similar to money remittances that migrants send to alleviate the effects of natural disasters (Licuanan, Omar Mahmoud, and Steinmayr 2015), homeland parties might be used as social remittance channels to improve the political situation back home (Levitt 2001).

In politically stable settings with a strong and legitimized state apparatus, the sending state itself generates important platforms to generate collective goods. Collective goods should be understood “as any good such that, if any person (...) consumes it, it cannot
feasibly be withheld from the others in that group. In other words, those who do not purchase or pay for any of the public or collective good cannot be excluded or keep from sharing in the consumption of the good” (Olson 1965, 14–15). Activism in transnational parties may lower access to sending state programs and increase opportunities for individual party members to engage in the production of collective goods. Gamlen (2008, 851) distinguishes between “diaspora building” mechanisms, which cultivate or formally recognize non-residents as members of a diasporic community, and “diaspora integration” mechanisms, which project various membership privileges and responsibilities onto various extra-territorial groups”. Diaspora building tools include for example cultural policies and specific bureaucratic structures. The diaspora integration mechanism can be helpful to reinsure migrants’ trust in political institutions which in turn renders transnational political engagement more meaningful. These ‘diaspora integration’ outreach efforts come in different forms (M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Iskander 2010; Ragazzi 2014; Pedroza and Palop-García 2017; Pogonyi 2017; Gamlen 2019) and can include, amongst others, external electoral rights including guaranteed seats in the national parliament for emigrants (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010; Collyer 2014b; Collyer 2014a; Turcu and Urbatsch 2015; Palop-García and Pedroza 2017; Wellman, Allen, and Nyblade 2022), dual citizenship (Jones-Correa 2001; Escobar 2007; Vink et al. 2019), co-development and investment programs (Burgess 2012; Schütze 2016, Ch. 3; Duquette-Rury 2020; all three works are on Mexico), and migrant advisory councils at consulates (Berg and Tamagno 2006; Palop-García 2017). While these institutional channels help legitimise the political involvement of migrants, they vary in how much access and voice they grant to migrants. For example, a strong sending state outreach may incentivize migrants to engage in homeland parties because it seems more likely that parties and state institutions respond to their demands. Alternatively, a weak sending state outreach may increase demands abroad and migrants may become active in homeland parties to better voice their claims.

GIM: Emotional incentives

Emotional incentives evolve around altruistic and affective motivations to become active in a political party. These motivations also shape collective incentives and they
“may of course have policy implications, but a moral imperative is the driving force behind the decision to participate, not the specific policy goal” (Whiteley, Seyd, andBillinghurst 2006, 81). In this regard, migrants’ emotional connection to home is one factor that shapes their enrolment in a homeland party (Collard and Kernalegenn 2021). Boccagni and Ramírez (2013) find that Ecuadorian emigrants’ main motivation to vote derives from their “homeland attachment deconstructed at a variety of levels, from intimate kinship ties to broader and generally more superficial forms of affiliation and identification” (p. 748). Boccagni’s (2011) work also draws attention to the importance of patriotic feelings that undergird Ecuadorians’ involvement in electoral homeland politics. In a similar fashion, Knott (2017) argues that non-resident citizens vote from abroad to legitimize their transnational citizenship. Emigrants’ frame of reference can also be their village of origin. For example, the political activism of male Mexican community leaders in Schütze’s (2016) transnationalism study was driven by a strong commitment to their rural origin community and a prevalent sense of social obligation to support. However, in settings with less rural out-migration and a weaker sending state development program outreach we may expect that motivations are different.

Furthermore, individuals join parties out of a “sense of loyalty and affection for the party that is unrelated to cognitive calculations of costs and benefits” (Whiteley, Seyd, andBillinghurst 2006, 81). Several studies argue that party attachment is key (Whiteley and Seyd 1994; Whiteley, Seyd, andBillinghurst 2006; Bob-Milliar 2012; Poletti, Webb, andBale 2019). Existing research moreover suggests that party leader identification is also an important incentive to join a political party. Research finds that while party personalities are important in Ghana (Bob-Milliar 2012), Canada (Young and Cross 2002), and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom (Power and Dommett 2020), it was not important in Mexico (Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013). This suggests that party leader identification is contingent upon context and party figures. In the Andean context, parties are often less important but charismatic leaders are (Levitsky andLoxton 2013; Loxton and Levitsky 2018; Madrid 2019). Hence, we can expect that Andean emigrants rather join because they identify with the party leader or a presidential candidate.
Migrants’ commitment to their home country also varies with the time they spend abroad. Arguably, this has implications for their desire to produce collective goods and shapes their emotional connection to home. Existing research shows that migrants lose interest in home country politics and participate less the longer they have resided abroad (Waldinger 2008; Leal, Lee, and McCann 2012; Waldinger, Soehl, and Lim 2012; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Chaudhary 2018). On the one hand, this helps explain why the majority of migrants abstain from political transnationalism in longer-established migratory systems. On the other hand, this pattern indicates that political cross-border activities predominantly attract first generation migrants (Snel, Hart, and Van Bochove 2016; Safi 2018). Yet, migrants’ connection to home can be mediated by the ties that they maintain. Burgess (2014) argues that extensive cross-border linkages increase migrants’ incentives to have their say in public good provision processes and hence to “activate the diaspora channel”. Some studies suggest that economic ties to the homeland go hand in hand with more transnational political engagement (Waldinger, Soehl, and Lim 2012; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019). However, the relationship between remittances and emigrants’ political participation has remained inconclusive so far (Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2015; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020).

**GIM: Selective outcome incentives**

Selective outcome incentives are material private goods that help individuals to achieve certain goals. Political scientists have focused on political career ambitions as the main outcome incentive that encourages party enrolment (see e.g., Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019). Research in established democracies suggests that material benefits are not important (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 1994; Young and Cross 2002; Whiteley, Seyd, and Billinghurst 2006; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Collard and Kernalegenn 2021). In contrast, research in Mexico, Chile, and Brazil claims that professional career ambitions are the main driver for party enrolment (Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Piñeiro and Rosenblatt 2017; Sells 2020). In the Latin American context, these
material benefits are often closely associated with clientelism and patronage (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). At present, it is unclear to which extent this dimension holds explanatory power with regard to Latin American emigrants’ engagement in home country parties. We can expect that it depends on the extent to which parties deploy economic resources into overseas party chapters, pay salaries, and how much these chapters are incorporated into the wider homeland party structure.

Moreover, social status benefits could gain relevance in the transnational arena. So far, political scientists have largely ignored these private outcome benefits. Yet, migration scholars have argued that engagement in transnationalism offers migrants a way to compensate for a status loss abroad and is a strategy to combat experiences of discrimination (Portes 1999, 465–466; Joppke and Morawska 2003, 25–26). In this regard, transnational party involvement can stimulate social status increase. For example, Schütze (2016) finds that male Mexican community leaders sought to gain respect and wider recognition by propelling community projects in their hometowns.

Parties have also started to thicken their membership packages to attract more supporters (Achury et al. 2020). Available only to members these are also selective outcome benefits. Many parties have extended primaries and participation in policy working groups to their rank and file (Gauja 2013; Cross and Pilet 2015; Freidenberg 2021). In particular advancements in technology have allowed parties to re-think their modus operandi (Gerbaudo 2019). Scarrow (2015) has coined the term ‘multi-speed membership party’ to describe the various ways in which individuals can affiliate and access the staggered benefits that come with different types of memberships. These new membership models seem to bare fruits. Individuals tend to join those parties that reduce the costs and increase the benefits of joining (Kosiara-Pedersen, Scarrow, and Van Haute 2017). Our knowledge regarding party membership rights in the transnational arena is still very fragmented. However, some case studies indicate that parties indeed may extend these rights to their members abroad. For example, the Democratic Party of the United States and the Unione coalition in Italy have held primaries abroad in the past (Lafleur 2013, 125–126; Kalu and Scarrow 2020). Some British parties also have opened channels to enable the participation of emigrant members, albeit to varying degrees (Collard and Webb 2020). Domestic party research
has shown that parties which scale up their membership rights attract more members (Kosiarapedersen, scarrow, and Van Haute 2017). Assumably, more opportunities for participation in intra-party decision-making processes increases members’ individual or group efficacy because they believe their engagement can make a real difference. The impact on transnational party enrolment, however, has remained unexplored so far. Similarly, party membership rights in non-western parties have remained little explored so far (see for an exception, Umpierrez and Dandoy 2020).

**GIM: Selective process incentives**

Selective process incentives refer to the benefits members receive from the participation itself. It pays tribute to the social dimension of party politics. According to Seyd and Whiteley (1992, 60), “party membership is a way of meeting like-minded and interesting people, and for some this is motive enough for getting involved”. The empirical evidence regarding the importance of selective process incentives is mixed concerning both party member research in established and developing democracies. Some studies indicate that they matter a great deal (Bob-Milliar 2012; Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b, 193; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019; Collard and Kernalegenn 2021) while others stress that they are of secondary importance (scarrow 2015, 158; Piñeiro and Rosenblatt 2017; Power and Dommett 2020). In the transnational arena, social process incentives would entail that migrants become active in home country parties to meet and mingle with like-minded people from their country of origin. In a way, home country parties can provide platforms for migrants to socialize with compatriots and talk about the politics in their home country (Collard and Kernalegenn 2021). Similar to transnational election days migrants’ party involvement might be connected to a desire to reproduce a socio-cultural context that resembles the one at home in order to counter homesickness and to address feelings of patriotism (Boccagni 2011; Boccagni and Ramírez 2013).

The intrinsic motivations to participate in a homeland party are also contingent upon previous political activism before emigrating. In this view, transnational party membership can be a way to continue a previous political life to stimulate intrinsic
pleasure. There is an ongoing discussion that evolves around the question of to which extent the political socialization processes experienced in the country of origin continues to dominate citizens’ political behaviour once abroad (White et al. 2008). Some research demonstrates that partisanship, political ideology and regional political identities formed in early adulthood before emigrating are so deeply ingrained that they prevail in informing migrants’ candidate and vote choice long after (Ahmadov and Sasse 2015; Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015; Jaulin 2016; McCann, Escobar, and Arana 2019) while other works have argued that these forms of identification weaken over time and hence migrants significantly differ in their political orientation from their non-moving compatriots (Fidrmuc and Doyle 2005; Escrivá et al. 2010; Goldberg and Lanz 2019). Paul (2013, 190) suggests adopting a more nuanced perspective according to which “socialization experiences from different contexts can interact with one another to create new meanings as learning is synthesized across time and space”. In the case of Mexican hometown association leaders, Bada (2007, 139) observed that many kept their original political party affiliation while some switched to parties that they thought had better chances to win. In less stable party systems like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, however, emigrants will have difficulties retaining their homeland party membership because parties have broken down and disappeared in the meantime (Levitsky et al. 2016; Mainwaring 2018). In this context, migrants may need to join new parties from abroad.

**GIM: Social norms**

Social norms that favour party enrolment is the final component of the GIM. In contrast to altruistic motivations, social norm incentives “are primarily determined by a desire to win the respect or approval of other people” (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 64). This incentive centres on significant others who enforce these norms. Political scientists use survey questions asking whether someone has been recruited by the parents, spouse or children, friends and workmates, a party canvasser, and explore party traditions in the family (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 1994; Whiteley, Seyd, and Billinghurst 2006; Young and Cross 2002; Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019; Power and Dommett 2020; Collard and
In addition, membership in other organisations has been used to proxy party members’ exposure to the social pressure of joining a party (Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019). The available evidence suggests that social recruitment networks are far more important in Latin America than in Western democracies.

The party membership literature understands social norms as a result of individual private interactions between a party prospect and a party recruiter. I will deal with this discussion in greater detail in the ‘party recruitment and mobilization approach’ section later on. What we need to clarify before, however, is that social norms in private interactions arise because the individuals form part of a society that embeds them in a larger net of societal expectations that shape the perception of their roles in the private and public space. Migrants’ simultaneous embedment in two nation-states at a time entails that migrants need to comply with several sets of norms and expectations that are tied to their home and host country environment alike. For one, the norms and social expectations are informed by migrants’ social space and their ties to the country of origin that over time “have developed – altered, declined, or strengthened” (Faist 2000, 131). For example, migrants may avoid engagement in home country parties because of prevalent distrust towards politicians and home country institutions, a characteristic that has helped shed light on migrants’ non-participation in transnational politics (Guarnizo 2001; Escrivá 2013; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Bermúdez 2016). This might be reinforced within social migrant networks and manifest itself within emerging local norms. For another, migrants’ social, cultural, and political embedment in the host country creates another layer of values and norms migrants ought to comply with. In this view, an ethnically heterogeneous society that emboldens multiculturalism on a day-to-day basis may render activism in home country parties easier to justify for immigrants (Joppke and Morawska 2003).

**The Resource Model**

The resources model centres on the importance of individual resources that enable political participation. In line with theories on general political behaviour (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady 1995; Teorell, Torcal, and Montero 2007), political party scholars argue that citizens’ access to resources determines if they are sufficiently equipped and interested to become active in parties (Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Achury et al. 2020).

In a similar vein, there is compelling evidence that socio-economic resources drive processes of political transnationalism. Overall, study findings lend strong support to Guarnizo and colleagues’ (2003) pioneering work, indicating that older, male migrants with higher levels of education engage the most in transnational political activities (Leal, Lee, and McCann 2012; Burgess 2014; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Schütze 2016, Ch. 4; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017; Safi 2018; Chaudhary 2018; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019). Higher levels of education are commonly associated with a larger interest in politics, better job opportunities, social upward mobility and a more stable situation in the host country that frees time and resources to engage in cross-border activities. In the context of Latin America, the dominance of older men in transnational politics has been interpreted as a reproduction of “prevalent power relations based on patriarchal structures that have historically dominated” (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003, 1239). This has implications for leadership roles within politically active associations too. Schütze (2016) argues that women who immigrate after their men tend to take on supporting roles in the associations that their husbands lead.

On occasion, migrants have already been politically active before emigrating. They have amassed individual political capital that will make it easier for them to become actively involved in a homeland party. Indeed, having previous voting experience appears as a strong indicator for maintaining interest in home country politics or voting from abroad (Waldinger, Soehl, and Lim 2012; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015). This effect is particularly pronounced in contexts with traditionally high domestic voter turnouts which increases migrants’ likelihood to have voted before emigrating (Chaudhary 2018).
2.2 Political transnationalism from in-between

In the previous section, I have discussed the agency role of individual migrants (from below) in relation to political homeland party involvement. In this section, I will focus on the meso-level and on political parties that are key transnational actors “in-between”. First, I will develop a definition of parties abroad. Second, I will discuss why parties become transnational actors. Second, I elaborate on how parties reach out to emigrants and embed my discussion in the relevant political science and transnationalism literatures. In this context, I will discuss parties’ recruitment approach and interest group linkage strategies in relation to the sending state outreach literature.

2.2.1 Identifying political parties abroad

How we define transnational parties is of conceptual and methodological importance. Most commonly, scholars have referred to parties’ formal branches outside the country to delineate the transnationalisation of a political party (e.g. Dresser 1993; Tether 1994; Guarnizo 2001; Dark III 2003; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Mügge 2010; Pearlman 2014; Setrana and Kyei 2015; Burgess 2018; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a; Gauja 2020; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020c). Moreover, Kernalegenn and van Haute (2020c, 238) differentiate “according to the location of their headquarters: in the home country (...) or abroad” and “based on the focus of their politics, especially their more or less conflicting relationship to the home country”. They define four party types: Emigrant party branches, emigrant parties, diaspora parties, and forbidden parties. In this thesis, I focus on emigrant party branches. Their party headquarters is in the homeland and the chapters abroad engage in “peaceful participation in the politics of their home country” (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020c, 238). The creation of a transnational infrastructure is a clear statement of the parties’ long-term interest to link up with emigrants. It certainly involves some costs to rent offices around the world (often in capitals with high rental prices). However, formal infrastructure presents a methodological difficulty because it overlooks that parties can tap into alternative spaces abroad, such as (office) spaces provided by migrant associations, labour unions, and sister parties in host countries.
More recently, studies have zeroed in on party laws, such as party statutes, to delineate the rights and duties that non-resident members enjoy (e.g., Collard and Webb 2020; Kalu and Scarrow 2020; Gauja 2020; Umpierrez and Dandoy 2020). Paarlberg (2019) used party constitutions and statutes to analyse how Salvadorian parties organize and mobilize in the United States. Party statutes are an important source of information, yet do not capture more informal ways in which transnational party activity is organized (Rashkova 2020). Another prominent way to identify parties’ transnational outreach has been to recount politicians’ visits to emigrant communities (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994, 135; Collard and Webb 2020). However, in this context scholars have traditionally focussed on visits during campaign periods (see e.g., Guarnizo 2001; Levitt 2001; Richman 2008; Tabar 2014; Paarlberg 2017; Paarlberg 2020). This is a clear signal of party interest, in particular in contexts of large geographic distances where airfares are costly, but it is a punctual and temporarily limited outreach that says little about a party’s more general presence abroad. Moreover, in times of readily available online communication services physical visits might not be as informative as they used to be. Alternatively, scholars have analysed whether parties field candidates in extra-territorial constituencies (Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021). This approach is useful in countries with special representation but does not work in countries without.

In this thesis, I define a transnational party as a political party that maintains an official representation in a foreign country in the form of at least one officially accredited party representative who permanently lives in that locality. This definition resembles Kernalegenn and van Haute’s (2020c) ‘emigrant party branches’ with the difference that a physical branch office is no pre-condition. This definition is simple and covers both formal and more informal activities of parties abroad.

### 2.2.2 Why parties become transnational actors

It may seem paradoxical that political parties establish a party presence abroad given the logistical challenges to mobilising and the difficulties to gain trust abroad. Turnout figures abroad remain traditionally low (Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020) and most of the time the emigrant vote is rather of symbolic importance. Nevertheless, some notable exceptions exist. Gamlen (2015) points to votes that have swung election results...
and so-called ‘interregnums effects’ which occur when the waiting for the extra-territorial votes to arrive distorts coalition negotiations. However, he argues that “the most far-reaching impacts of overseas voting in recent decades have not been direct vote-swings or even interregnums, but rather “feedback” effects” (p. 5) which he understands as an increased party outreach across borders caused by the importance that parties attach to the emigrant vote.

A growing body of work has engaged with the question of why parties become transnational actors. Although these works do not deal with the party transnationalisation process in principle, they provide useful initial insights into how parties operate in the transnational arena. These studies suggest that the political homeland context, electoral homeland sending-system, and party-level characteristics are important. I will now briefly discuss these three dimensions.

The political context

The debate on why political parties reach out is closely connected to the political context in which parties operate. In autocratic settings and conflicted states, the incumbent status matters. Opposition parties go abroad so that they can build up resistance and better lobby foreign governments (Shain 1989; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Collyer 2006; Hammond 2012; S. Ellis 2013; Koinova 2018). In contrast, incumbent parties from autocratic states cross borders to monitor oppositional forces (Collyer 2006; Brand 2010; Iskander 2010). These studies hold that we must conceive the transnational political field as a heterogeneous group of actors with disparate agendas, that often mirrors homeland trenches and developments.

In countries with competitive elections parties seek to connect with citizens abroad to access their money and win votes as “a way of enhancing their position in the political battles in the country of origin” (Itzigsohn 2000, 1144). Itzigsohn (2000) argues that parties from Haiti, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic started establishing a formal presence in the United States once competitive elections had been introduced. Former exile parties now could openly enter the electoral contest back home and had a clear transnational mobilizing advantage (see also, Graham 1997). Case studies on the cross-
border activities of Mexican, Colombian, and Ecuadorian parties also support the competition argument (Dresser 1993; Guarnizo 2001; Umpierre de Reguero and Dandoy 2021). Authors have revealed a similar dynamic on the local level in Mexico and El Salvador (Goldring 2002; Burgess 2012).

The fund-raising activities of migrants can be a significant source of income for political parties, in particular when raised in more developed countries where strong currencies yield large exchange rates (Koslowski 2005, 14). In the words of Whitaker (2011, 779) “[d]emocracy is expensive, even in poor countries and parties must find ways to finance rallies, publicity, and other aspects of their campaigns.” Raising campaign funds abroad is the main incentive for parties in developing democracies to become transnational actors (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). This argument seems, in particular, convincing in contexts where emigrants are barred from voting. For example, Ghanaians cannot vote from abroad. Their party chapters’ main transnational support is financial remittances (Setrana and Kyei 2015). In the case of opposition parties, these funds can help challenge the traditional political elite (Laguerre 1998; Setrana and Kyei 2015).

In established democracies, however, migrants’ financial support seems less relevant. Katz and Mair’s (1995) famous cartel party theory posits that parties increasingly penetrate the state for resources to become less dependent. Indeed, American parties rely more on private domestic donations and public state subsidies than contributions from abroad (Kalu and Scarrow 2020). Moreover, some Western parties fund their chapters abroad. The British Conservative party has financed transnational campaigns during critical elections (Tether 1994; Collard and Webb 2020).

Narrow elections have also encouraged political parties from Italy, Romania, Spain (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciommei 2019a), Lebanon (Tabar 2014), and the United States (Dark III 2003; Klekowski von Koppenfels 2013) to upgrade their presence abroad. These studies also highlight the importance of rivalry and path dependency effects (see also, Umpierre de Reguero and Dandoy 2021). In this regard, political parties follow each other abroad to keep rival parties in check (see also, Collard 2013). In these settings, the vote-seeking rationale drives the party transnationalisation process.
Parties abroad not only seek the votes cast from abroad. The concept of “overlapping electoral arenas” suggests that parties aim to link up with emigrant communities to generate spill-over effects that benefit them in home country constituencies (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a). This can include the mobilization of indirect votes. Latin American political parties have long campaigned among disenfranchised emigrant communities in the United States because of the assumption that emigrants influence the voting behaviour of their relatives and friends back home (Laguerre 1998; Guarnizo 2001; Levitt 2001; Goldring 2002). Recent research could partly validate this claim drawing on survey data with resident citizens in Latin America. Although regular contact with relatives in the United States does not increase their propensity to vote, it increases citizens’ party identification and encourages campaigning (Córdova and Hiskey 2015; Paarlberg 2017). Emigrants also temporarily return home during elections to jump in as campaign volunteers (Laguerre 1998, 160; Guarnizo 2001, 241; Mügge 2010). They buy their own plane ticket and take leaves of absence. Additionally, research shows that political parties use the transnational arena to sharpen their ideological profile. For example, the Hungarian FIDESZ party has capitalized on the diaspora issue to create a long-term programmatic party ideology and used existing transnational networks to strengthen its weak organizational structure (Waterbury 2006).

In Latin America, democratization processes provide the macro-level context in which initial party outreach has taken place (Escobar 2007). Parties have gained incentives to invest in transnational party building to mobilize financial resources, and direct and indirect votes to remain competitive. Finally, some research also indicates party outreach can help strengthen a party’s ideological profile.
The electoral sending state system

The electoral sending state system defines who votes how and who can run. Scholars argue that the answers to these three questions shape parties’ rational decision-making as to whether it is profitable to invest in a transnational presence. Research has argued that restrictive voting modalities can discourage voting from abroad and render transnational mobilization a costly and ineffective endeavour (Collard and Webb 2020; Gauja 2020). Indeed, several studies have demonstrated the negative effect of high voting hurdles on transnational turnout levels (Lafleur 2013; Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2015; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Bermúdez 2016; Jaulin 2016; Kostelka 2017; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). In this view, one-time valid voter registrations in person, short registration periods, and physical voting in diplomatic missions instead of postal or electronic voting keep emigrants effectively off the polls. The institutional barrier effect is so prevalent that it significantly suppresses turnout even in settings that account for a significant party outreach towards emigrants (Burgess and Tyburski 2020). Hutcheson and Arrighi (2015) argue that states have practical and normative reasons to restrict access to external voting. On the one hand, they aim to avoid that external votes swamp or tip election results. On the other hand, states want to ensure that citizens abroad have a lesser say in home country politics because they are less affected, and maintain fewer stakes. However, parties are also often afraid that external voting rights could benefit their rivals (Østergaard-Nielsen, Ciornei, and Lafleur 2019). Indeed, several authors have argued that parties strategically attempt to tweak electoral systems and voting systems abroad to their electoral advantage (Hinojosa, Domenech, and Lafleur 2012; Lafleur 2013; Collyer 2014a; Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015; Lafleur 2015; Turcu 2018; Wellman 2021).

Some countries have created special seats for emigrant candidates in the national parliament. This institutional feature presents one of the most powerful incentives because party outreach directly pays off in terms of seats won in an extra-territorial constituency (Collard and Webb 2020; Kalu and Scarrow 2020; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020c). In contrast, emigrant votes carry less weight in electoral systems that assimilate these votes into the total national count. In light of the millions of votes cast
by domestic voters, emigrant votes tail off. In the United Kingdom, and the United States
decentralized vote-counting systems and single-member districts curtail parties’
motivation to expand their activities abroad (Collard and Webb 2020; Kalu and Scarrow
2020). In contrast, in the case of Italy, France, and Romania, the introduction of special
emigrant representation has significantly fostered parties’ transnational campaign
outreach (Collard 2013; Lafleur 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a). Other
works hint at similar dynamics in young democracies but, so far, lack a comparative
perspective (cases with and without special representation) that would allow us to
confirm this pattern for a broader set of political regimes (see e.g., Kernalegenn and van
Haute 2020a).

Electoral campaign restrictions are another factor put forward in the literature. However, the available evidence shows that these laws rather shape than prevent
transnational party outreach. In response to a transnational campaign ban, South
Korean parties set up friendship circles instead of party branches abroad (Uekami, Park,
and Chen 2020). In Mexico candidates simply schedule their visits abroad before the
official campaign period (Paarlberg 2020) and in Turkey, parties have tended to establish
cultural camouflage organisations to mobilize emigrants in Germany despite
institutional home country restrictions (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Mügge 2010). Host
country legislations can also interact with the sending state electoral system and hinder
party mobilization abroad. For example, Canada opposes the election of extra-territorial
representatives on its soil (Lafleur 2013, 141–143). In general, however, Canada is an
exception.

Party-level Factors and Migratory Patterns

The institutional framework in which parties operate is useful to explain the variance of
transnational party behaviour across different countries. A party-level perspective
complements this approach. Party-level variables help explain why some parties from
the same country become transnational actors while others remain absent.
Several studies argue that party resources and migratory patterns matter for transnational party behaviour. Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciorni (2019a) have analysed parties’ infrastructure and party manifesto promises tailored towards emigrants among European parties. They argue that parties apply a cost-benefit analysis. Larger parties with more resources are the more transnationally active ones, regardless of ideological orientation. Moreover, they focus on those countries and cities that account for the largest voter pools (see also, Tether 1994; Peraza 2003; Tabar 2014; Gauja 2020; Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021, 12). In a similar vein, Greek parties have become active in neighbouring Albania where a significant number of Greek emigrants live (Vullnetari 2013, 40f) and Mexican parties have been traditionally active in the United States (Dresser 1993; FitzGerald 2016). However, the dynamics that underpin these findings are still to be explored. For example, political capital is more available in larger communities. Assumably, the pool of emigrants who proactively seek to engage in party politics is larger. Moreover, larger communities maintain denser networks and contain more migrant associations that ease access to local resources, and human capital. In consequence, parties may easier connect, offset their resource constraints, and gain a presence within these communities.

Political scientists claim that parties emerge and operate in relation to different socio-demographic voter bases, i.e. social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Caramani 2004). This implies that some parties will find it easier than others to link up with citizens abroad. The electorate abroad can be more or less different to the one at home but this depends on the party and host country we look at. Burgess (2018, 376) claims that in countries like Lebanon where parties’ “social bases are more stable, loyal, and clearly defined (…), the costs of identifying and mobilizing emigrant supporters are much lower while the likely payoffs in votes and financial support are much greater”. Migratory patterns cut across this dynamic because they shape the composition of the constituencies abroad. In this regard, chain-migration networks can re-produce regional cleavage structures in specific host country localities. The political re-socialization theory argues that citizens abandon their regional partisan identities abroad (Waldinger 2015). In contrast, others have argued that political home country socialization continues to shape citizens’ political beliefs abroad (White et al. 2008; Paul 2013; Just 2019). In
relation to the latter migrants reproduce regional home country cleavages abroad. Recent research demonstrates that geographic home country regions are determinant for the vote choice of Bolivian, Polish, and Ukrainian emigrants in home country elections (Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015; Ahmadov and Sasse 2015). In these cases, political parties have electoral strongholds in particular home country regions. In this regard, we can expect that specific migratory patterns also shape transnational party activity.

In sum, we can expect that the political culture, sending state electoral system, and migratory patterns are important factors that also shape the transnationalisation process of political parties. In the next section, I will turn to the ways in which parties reach out to emigrants. This perspective is important to illustrate the key mechanism through which parties may succeed to establish a presence abroad.

2.2.3 Party transnationalisation: the recruitment approach

Parties must recruit partisans, volunteers, party activists, political entrepreneurs, supporters, and members, however named, for various reasons. I argue that political parties abroad need activists to stay rooted in society, claim legitimacy, recruit candidates, source free labour, and mobilize campaign funds. First and foremost, party activists help anchor parties in society (Lawson 1980; Scarrow 2002). They assist political organizations in articulating and aggregating political interests and provide an important source of legitimacy (Martin and Cowley 1999; Ignazi 2014). Party activists are a “testament to the fact that a party has support in the community and is rooted in the concerns and values of real people” (Seyd and Whiteley 2004, 361). Second, political parties must staff internal positions, and fill extra-territorial candidate tickets (Østergaard-Nielsen and Camatarri 2022). Regardless of whether party organizations have also become professional staff-based entities abroad (Katz and Mair 1995; Mair, Müller, and Plasser 2004), parties still need loyal members as a mouthpiece, and candidate material (Norris 1997; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). Third, party volunteers provide essential free labour and monetary contributions. While new communication channels have encouraged novel mobilization tactics (Norris 2005),
rendering door-to-door canvassing less attractive, recent research demonstrates that grassroots campaigns still form an important part of the canvassing machinery, and can generate substantial electoral gains (Fisher, Fieldhouse, and Cutts 2014; Dalton, Farell, and McAllister 2011, Ch. 3; Webb, Poletti, and Bale 2017).

Given the importance of party members for party organisations the global trend of mass party membership decline seems puzzling (Whiteley 2011; van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012; van Haute, Paulis, and Sierens 2018). Some scholars claim that party members have become obsolete for the functioning of political parties. Others argue “that party organizations have evolved and adapted as society has modernized” (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002, 266). As part of this adaption process, parties turned to the state for resources, developed looser forms of membership, and extended more membership benefits (Gauja 2013; Cross and Pilet 2015; Gauja 2015; Faucher 2015; Katz and Mair 1995; Scarrow 2015; Kosiara-Pedersen, Scarrow, and Van Haute 2017; Gerbaudo 2019; Achury et al. 2020). That said, political parties have changed and rely less on members, but there are still no ‘parties without partisans’ (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002). Party activists continue to be important to political parties regardless of whether they operate domestically or transnationally. In the following, I will apply the party recruitment approach to the transnational party-building process.

Party scholars distinguish between self-starters who pro-actively seek to enrol in a political party and recruits who join in response to the invitation of a party canvasser (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 83–85; Young and Cross 2002, 556; Scarrow 2015, 159–160; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019). In Western democracies, the vast majority of people tend to self-start into party membership (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 83–85; Young and Cross 2002, 556; Scarrow 2015, 159–160) although there is some indication that conservative party members are more likely to enter as recruits (Whiteley and Seyd 1994, 77–79). Empirical evidence in South America is much thinner. The only available study suggests that Brazilian party members rather respond to mobilization efforts (Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019). In the transnational arena, self-starting and recruitment may hinge on the transnational recruitment infrastructure of parties.
The recruitment approach is important to explain how parties mobilize emigrants into participating as volunteers and supporters for their transnational party cells. I have previously argued that individual motives, incentives, and resources are key to understanding why migrants become involved in political parties. In this section, I claim that parties must also actively recruit abroad to offset the lack of individual motivations and resources. Brady and colleagues (1995, 271) argue that people do not participate in politics mainly for three reasons. They politically abstain “because they can’t, because they don’t want to, or because nobody asked”. First, a lack of previously mentioned resources, motives, and incentives impedes participation. Second, a socio-psychological dealignment with the goals and efficacy of the political organisation undercuts the desire to participate. Third, recruitment networks on the meso-level, such as associations, unions, churches and political parties themselves, are absent. Scholars argue that parties specifically target citizens who in their eyes have a high propensity to support their cause (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Cross and Young 2008; Morales 2009). The recruitment approach is relevant not only to better understand why migrants join parties but also how migrants join parties. An important feature of migrant institutions in the host country is that they can provide points of contact, and transmit information through their social networks. They are thus key to identifying and actively mobilising migrants, while they help offset some of the resource constraints of individuals (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Trumm and Sudulich 2016; Giugni and Grasso 2019). In addition, parties can recruit on the micro-level targeting friendship circles and family members. In the transnational context, scholars have mainly looked at migrant associations and political home country parties as mobilizing actors.

**Recruitment via migrant associations**

Migrant associations are beneficial to migrants’ political involvement in several ways. Membership in these groups helps migrants to develop skills, acquire political knowledge, heighten their group consciousness, develop trust, and become embedded in social networks with contacts to party activists. Recent research that tested these various explanatory approaches suggests that in particular migrants’ embedment in
recruitment networks is beneficial for party activism “insofar as one is “pulled” into it by other people within the association” (Giugni and Grasso 2019, 6). Bermúdez and colleagues (2014a) show that, indeed, ethnic associations can serve as a springboard for migrants to enter more conventional forms of political home country activism. Similarly, Chaudhary (2018) demonstrates that membership in a migrant association can double migrants’ propensity to vote in home country elections. Schlenker and colleagues (2017) also find that membership in a migrant association significantly fostered the political interest and electoral and non-electoral participation of Swiss migrants in homeland politics. Yet, the underlying mechanisms for this behavioural pattern remain less clear.

With regard to the Latin American context, Holland and Rubin (2015) have argued that associations can serve as “organizational brokers” who mobilize their members in exchange for goods. Tintori’s (2011) study provides some evidence for this argument in the extra-territorial context. He claims that Italian candidates in Latin America have drawn on a well-established network of migrant associations to deploy electoral manoeuvring techniques in order “to control thousands of ballots” (p. 178). In a similar fashion, Song and colleagues (2020) find that Mexicans in the United States who live in areas with high concentrations of hometown associations experienced significantly more vote-buying attempts from home country parties. They suggest that Mexican parties build on the associations’ social networks to execute a transnational clientelist campaign strategy. In contrast, Escrivá (2013) argues that migrant associations have demobilizing effects. In her work on the political behaviour of Peruvian migrants in Spain, she finds that associations enjoy a dubious reputation in the communities for being “corrupt, self-interested and allies of the political power elite” (p. 25), which significantly limits their potential as mobilizers. In addition, Escobar and colleagues’ (2015) analysis of Colombians in the United Kingdom asserts that migrants’ membership in ethnic associations is insignificant for their intentions to vote back home.

However, these studies exclusively focus on associations in the context of voting. In this regard, they offer little to explain what role migrant associations play in parties’ member recruitment strategy or how those associations and their members perceive a potential involvement in political activities. After all, research has shown that the majority of ethnic associations focus on domestic issues while similar to individual migrant
transnationalism, only a minority is active in transnational political activities (Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2008; Morales and Jorba 2010).

Recruitment via political parties

Similar to the domestic setting (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2008; Trumm and Sudulich 2016), political parties are essential to politically mobilize emigrants (Levitt 2001, Ch. 5; Burgess 2014; Waldinger 2015, 89; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a). In their quantitative analysis of 108 elections in 24 countries, Burgess and Tyburski (2020) find that political party outreach is a key driver for extra-territorial turnout. Importantly, this finding holds true even after controlling for resource, migration and institutional context variables. In this regard, the absence of parties abroad has significant demobilizing effects. Bermúdez and colleagues (2014a) argue that Latin American migrants in Southern Spain faced difficulties to become active in transnational party politics because there were no politically active emigrant groups with whom they could connect. Guarnizo and colleagues (2003) have made similar observations with regard to Salvadorian migrants in the United States where in consequence Salvadorians tend to engage more in civic activities than in transnational partisan affairs. Other research has drawn attention to the importance of parties’ transnational party structures to effectively mobilise emigrants during elections (Paarlberg 2019).

In a similar fashion, host country parties can become important allies abroad. Existing studies acknowledge the connections between transnational parties and political host country parties (Lafleur 2013, 128; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a, 633; Siotos 2020, 176–177). Yet, so far, there has been no detailed investigation of these connections. To date, we still lack systematic knowledge of how these agreements arise and what they maintain, among which parties these connections are common (left vs. right), and how these connections shape party transnationalisation processes on the micro and meso-level.
Informal Social Networks: Friendship circles

While political institutions are essential springboards for political participation, informal social networks are equally important. This can be politically active family members or friends with whom migrants discuss politics and who take them to party meetings. As Hooghe (2007, 242) points out „political behavior should never be seen as an isolated act, but has to be considered as a form of social behavior“. The social environment provides people with political cues that they take up, select, discard, adapt, and apply. Zuckerman (2005) refers to this as “the social logic of politics”. In the literature, two main reasonings prevail for how embedment in social networks can lead to political involvement. First, social contacts ease access to information, shape patterns of communication, and network actors themselves can appear as active mobilizers by inviting and asking their peers to politically participate (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Second, social networks evolve around norms and create pressure toward conformity with which members want to comply to avoid cognitive dissonance (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and MacPhee 1954; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008). We may expect that political parties draw on such links in the extra-territorial context to “heighten the credibility of their messages through the choice of credible messengers, and often the most credible messengers are the friends and neighbours and co-workers whose viewpoints we take seriously “ (Huckfield and Sprague 1995, 22). This feeds into arguments previously made that evolve around social norms to explain individual party membership enrolment (Clark and Wilson 1961; Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 1994; Whiteley, Seyd, and Billinghurst 2006).

Previous research has made some strides in examining the importance of social networks for transnational political participation. In the context of external voting, smaller communities seem to be most effective in mobilizing emigrants (Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020). Ahmadov and Sasse (2016) find that contact with diaspora members in the host country is one of the strongest determinants for electoral and non-electoral engagement. In contrast, Guarnizo and colleagues (2003; 2019) contend that the location of those contacts does not matter but that the total number of contacts in migrants’ social networks does. Finally, Escobar and colleagues (2015) point out that it
is not sufficient to simply reside in neighbourhood settings with high shares of migrants from the home country or region. Nevertheless, social networks remain key to winning extra-territorial battlegrounds. McIlwaine and Bermudéz (2015, 396) suggest in the 2010 Colombian elections “[t]he Green Party’s extensive use of the internet and social networking to contact and reach people probably accounts for the fact that it won the election in London.” These works, however, have tended to adopt a bird-eye perspective, saying little about the underlying social dynamics on the micro-level that link migrants’ social embedment with political activism. An important exception presents Levitt’s (Levitt 2001, Ch. 5) pioneering study on transnational Dominican politics in the United States. Her study highlights the importance of social ties in the transnational space that are upheld by frequent round-travels and a shared sense of rural belonging. Similarly, Mügge’s (2010) study of Surinamese parties in the Netherlands emphasizes the importance of return migration dynamics. Returnees were important drivers to establish party chapters in their former residency country. The study highlights the importance of kinship ties for transnational party activity. Finally, two recently published party case studies draw attention to the role of political activists in residency countries for transnational party-building processes in established democracies (Jakobson, Tõnis, and Kalev 2020; Siotos 2020). We still do not know, however, what role local or transnational ties play in different migration systems where for example home visits are less frequent because of larger distances or return migration is less common and a shared sense of rural belonging is missing because migration profiles are more urban or lower-skilled. We may expect that political parties draw more on local links in these contexts. Most importantly, we still need more fine-grained insights into the micro-foundations of migrants’ social ties and how they structure transnational party activity. In sum, I argue that the social world of migrants needs to be taken into consideration to explain party transnationalisation processes.

2.2.4 Party transnationalisation: the linkage approach

The recruitment approach is useful to explain how and where parties seek to recruit activists abroad. It does not fully explain, however, how parties connect with migrants who are organized as collectives. I claim that parties seek to connect with civil society
groups abroad because they can provide benefits similar to the ones parties derive from activists. Linkages with interest groups enable parties to mobilize core voter blocks, secure funding, and stay competitive (Poguntke 2002; Quinn 2002; Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007; Allern et al. 2021). In addition, interest groups can provide organizational facilities, reputation, policy expertise, volunteers, candidate material, and information on voter profiles (Warner 2000, 29; Thomas 2001; Allern 2010). These party-group relationships are politically significant because they “form structures that may shape, enable, and constrain political action” (Allern et al. 2021, 1255). The party-interest group literature suggests that parties rely on a specific set of linkage strategies to connect with civil society groups (Schwartz 2005; Poguntke 2006; Allern 2010; Verge 2012). I argue that parties apply the linkage approach in a similar manner abroad to connect with migrant associations, but that the local context and sending state outreach both shape how parties execute their linkage attempts in practice.

Partnerships between political parties and migrant associations in host countries have become a common feature of transnational campaigns in origin countries around the world (Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; R. C. Smith 2003; M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Mügge 2010; Hammond 2012; Lafleur 2013, Ch. 6; Klekowski von Koppenfels 2013; Schütze 2016; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a, 633; Paarlberg 2019, 547; Yener-Roderburg 2020). While previous research has shown a strong correlation between association membership and migrants’ political mobilization (Tintori 2011; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017; Chaudhary 2018; Song et al. 2020) the underlying mechanisms of how parties link up with associations are less clear. Indeed, we know relatively little about the strategies that parties develop and deploy to tie up with organized migrant collectives or the micro-foundations of these linkages.

The party–interest group link has always shaped the organizational character of parties (Kirchheimer 1966). Political parties and civil society organizations continue to be linked nowadays in a variety of ways (Allern 2010; Poguntke 2006; Scarrow, Webb, and Poguntke 2017). Scholars have mainly concentrated on formal linkages between parties and civil society groups. For this purpose, they look to statutory indicators that reveal overlaps in corporate memberships, formal group affiliations, representation rights, and
formal access to decision-making bodies (Poguntke 2002; Allern 2010; Allern et al. 2021). Parties and interest group also formalize their relationship in joint agreements and become observable in regularized meetings between top-leadership actors, and financial group donations (ibid.). For Schwartz (2005) these formal alliances or affiliations represent a party strategy to forge ties with groups the party views as “central to its mission and critical to its self-definition” (p. 41). In the transnational context, this can mean that parties grant membership rights to autonomous citizen collectives abroad (Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999).

Allern (2010) points out, however, that so-called ‘unorganized links for contact’ play an important role too. The work delineates how parties and interest groups in Norway generate linkages through unofficial, personal contacts between individual representatives and spokespeople. This finding resonates with social movement research that highlights the importance of overlapping social networks in generating inter-organizational connections (Kitschelt 1989). Verge (2012) argues that political parties consciously draw on these informal connections as part of their strategy to connect with civil society organizations. The study demonstrates that Spanish parties rely on four different types of strategies to establish links with interest groups: creating groups, infiltration, co-optation, and collaboration. Parties apply these strategies informally and formally.

The creation of their own social groups allows parties to target specific social segments, anchor the party in society, and overcome weak party membership (Poguntke 2006; Verge 2012). For example, Levitt (Levitt 2001, 136) has shown that the Partido Revolucionario Dominicana chapter in Boston has established church groups and a social club to connect with emigrants. It is unclear, however, to which extent local contexts are always that supportive. In other localities, emigrants may oppose that parties use apolitical institutions to pursue political goals.

Infiltration tactics include party members entering the executive board of an association or affiliating with an association as individuals. This informal overlap in membership recalls Allern’s (2010) ‘unorganized links for contact.’ Infiltration allows parties to
“locate their agents openly or covertly in citizen organizations” (Lawson 1980, 11). Once inside the association, party activists encourage association members to join the party organization. As previously discussed, membership in migrant associations is a strong driver for emigrants’ engagement in homeland politics (Bermúdez, Escrivá, and Moraes 2014a; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017; Chaudhary 2018). Infiltration tactics may, thus, explain how parties link up on the meso-level to influence political behaviour on the micro-level.

Alternatively, parties can co-opt associations by recruiting their leaders for party posts or public offices. This strategy allows parties to mobilize supporters, exclude opponents, and recruit skilled government servants or party employees (Schwartz 2005; Verge 2012). In this regard, co-optation takes place on both the micro- and the meso-level. On the one hand, party cells co-opt leaders of migrant associations to gain their individual support. On the other hand, they seek to tap into the resources of the organisation and use these links to gain legitimacy in the community.

Some studies report individual incidences which suggest that co-optation tactics are also a strategy that parties apply abroad to connect with migrant organisations. Mexican parties in Chicago have placed migrant organization leaders in charge of the local party headquarters (Schütze 2016, 119–123). Italian parties have courted migrant organization leaders with extra-territorial candidate seats (Lafleur 2013, 126–127), and Turkish parties have included association leaders from Germany on domestic party lists (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 112–113; Yener-Roderburg 2020, 230). At present, however, we still lack systematic knowledge as to which extent parties rely on this tactic in general and what factors contribute to or constraint them. Importantly, we also do not know yet how parties execute co-optation in practice and when parties rely on them. At the same time, co-optation presents an opportunity for organized migrant collectives to place their members in government (Lawson 1980). In this regard, we still must explore how migrants make use of extra-territorial candidate seats and party structures to aggregate community interests.

Moreover, parties establish formal and informal forums of contact that promote collaboration with civil society organizations (Allern 2010; Verge 2012). One example
would be an invitation to a party meeting to gather migrant demands for an electoral program. These encounters allow parties to offer specific benefits to interest groups, potentially resulting in an exchange relationship. Put simply, parties provide access to legislation and policymaking in exchange for votes, fundraisers, and organizational assistance (Schwartz 2005; Poguntke 2006; Allern 2010). The promise of a “policy responsive linkage” (Lawson 1980) ties the civil society group to the political party.

In countries with a strong sending state outreach, parties may exploit state structures to create forums of engagement and initiate these collaborations (Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999; R. C. Smith 2003; M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Burgess 2012; Burgess 2018; Duquette-Rury 2020). The sending state literature demonstrates that states, i.e. parties in government, create diaspora state institutions, like specific ministries, and implement policies that reach into emigrants’ social, political, economic, cultural and religious lifeworld (M. P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Gamlen 2008; Iskander 2010; Collyer 2013; Ragazzi 2014; Margheritis 2016; Poganyi 2017; Gamlen 2019). Within this stream of research, political parties have long played a subordinated role despite being crucial actors in the state-led transnationalism process. Notable exceptions include studies of states’ co-development programs and the domain of emigrant citizenship policies. Several works on Mexico’s state-financed development program have provided insightful accounts of how parties in power use state structures to court emigrants’ support. At the same time, these studies delineate how migrants have used those matching-fund programs as a platform to raise demands for more political rights and better representation (Goldring 2002; R. C. Smith 2003; Burgess 2012; Schütze 2016; Duquette-Rury 2020; Paarlberg 2020). The strength of these studies lies in their analysis that dynamically delineates the relationship between political parties state and migrant actors.

Some other studies have looked at parties’ involvement in granting dual citizenship and extending electoral rights to emigrants. These works indicate that parties either respond to pressure from transnational grass-root movements or take the initiative themselves (Jones-Correa 2001; Escobar 2007). In this context, recent research has highlighted the importance of potential electoral gains and losses parties associate with extending citizenship rights to citizens residing abroad (Tether 1994; Lafleur 2013; Lafleur 2015;
Importantly, the strategy of luring associations with policy pledges must be separated from parties’ ‘linkage by reward,’ which involves “a much more pragmatic relationship with their supporters: votes for favors” (Lawson 1980, 17). For example, the Mexican government party used linkages by reward abroad until other parties began seriously challenging the one-party system (R. C. Smith 2003; Schütze 2016, Ch. 5).

Five main linkage strategies emerge from a review of the literature: formal alliances or affiliations, the creation of social groups, infiltration, co-optation, and collaboration (exchange relationships, linkage by reward). Parties can choose to deploy none, some, or all of these strategies abroad. They must decide whether to execute these strategies formally or informally (except for formal alliances, which are formal by definition). Authors such as Thomas (2001) and Verge (2012) acknowledge the difference between formal and informal linkages but remain vague on how and why parties choose one over the other. Allern (2010, 59) argues that informal contacts and personal overlaps represent a ‘weaker kind of link’. While this might be true in the Norwegian case (Allern 2010) and other Western democracies (Poguntke 2006, 399), the transnational Latin American context requires a different perspective, as parties and party systems are far less institutionalized. Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru contain some of the weakest party systems in the region (Mainwaring, Bizzarro, and Petrova 2018). Poorly rooted in society and having little organizational capacity, their parties often only exist for short periods of time (Levitsky et al. 2016). This makes formal linkage strategies more difficult to execute. Informal contacts, in contrast, can be more easily established, and offer more flexibility for parties and representatives of interest organizations alike (Schwartz 2005, 44).

The existing literature stresses various factors that shape the relationships between political parties and interest groups. First, structural and institutional determinants are crucial to explaining differences in how parties from different countries behave towards interest groups (Allern 2010, 98–101; Thomas 2001, 16–17). The role of national political
institutions, such as the country’s electoral system, which I have previously discussed, therefore merits further consideration here. Secondly, party-level characteristics, such as funding, and incumbency status, play an important role to define the extent to which parties, on the one hand, depend on civil society groups (Katz and Mair 1995; Yishai 2001), and, on the other hand, can deploy resources to link up with them (Rasmussen and Lindeboom 2013). Indeed, Pearlman (2014) argues that it depends on the strength of a state to which extent parties use state structures to mobilize emigrants. In turn, the individual agenda of each association, and its leader define the interest they maintain in teaming up with home country parties (Thomas 2001). Finally, a lack of trust, scepticism or antipathy towards political parties or the government can hamper the development of party-interest group relationships (Escobar 2010).

2.3 Towards an explanation of how parties become transnational actors

In this chapter, I set out to situate political parties as actors in the broader transnationalism and political party literatures. I have approached this task from two different angles. First, I have discussed migrants’ individual involvement in political home country politics on the micro-level with a special emphasis on their engagement as party activists. While research on migrants’ political cross-border activities has prospered during the last two decades, political parties as an important venue of migrants’ political transnational involvement have been notoriously overlooked. Second, I have taken stock of the available literature on political parties abroad. Although parties are core actors that structure the transnational political field, at present, scholars have only begun to approach transnational parties as a research subject in their own right. In this regard, parties’ recruitment and linkage strategies to connect with individual migrants and migrant collectives, so far, have received very little scholarly attention.

Highlighting the micro and meso-level dimensions of transnational party politics another important gap in the literature emerges. Scholars have rarely studied both, migrants and home country parties, in conjunction. As a result, studies on political home country parties have largely discarded the role of individual migrants and migrant collectives for
forming and maintaining those parties abroad. Yet, how can we understand how parties emerge and remain transnational actors when we ignore the individuals and support groups on the ground that establish and maintain branch chapters and party activities in the residency country? Only when we study both actors in relation to each other we will be able to understand how parties become and remain active in the transnational arena. Similarly, this analytical focus allows us to uncover the patterns of engagement that undergird the negotiation processes between migrants and parties. I argue that a micro-meso-level approach is key to understanding the dynamics and processes through which political parties emerge as transnational actors. Adopting this analytical perspective, we will be able to better understand the behaviour of political parties in relation to non-resident citizens, as well as how migrants perceive and practice their transnational citizenship. Instead of restricting the analysis to forms of transnationalism “from below” or “from above” there is merit in analysing transnational party activity as a form of transnationalism “in-between” as Smith and Bakker (2008, 20) have put it to highlight “the interplay of social actors operating at multiple scales in the political construction of transnational citizens” (emphasis in original). In doing so, my analysis benefits from a dynamic agency-based approach that avoids the pitfalls of structural determinism.

In this chapter, I have developed a theoretical framework to analyse the transnationalisation process of Andean parties in Barcelona. To this end I have embedded the analysis of transnational parties in three political science literatures concerning 1) party membership, 2) party recruitment and 3) the party-interest group relationship. The implications of this framework for my empirical analysis are as follows. On the micro-level, I argue that individual motivations and resources are key to explaining why migrants become involved in transnational party-building processes. In this context, I have highlighted the desire to produce collective goods, emotional incentives, individual selective outcomes and selective process incentives and social norms. In addition, individual resources are also expected to play a role. I suggest that the Latin American sending country context, transnational and local social ties, previous political experiences, and migration-specific factors may reconfigure the importance that different motivations and resources play.
On the micro-meso level, I argue that parties deploy a specific recruitment approach to target specific migrants with higher chances to become active. They can rely on private networks, such as friends and family circles, and public networks, in particular in relation to host country institutions, such as migrant associations and host country parties. On the meso-level, parties apply a set of linkage strategies that parties commonly use in the domestic arena. Based on the party interest group literature parties may forge formal alliances, infiltrate, co-opt, and offer exchange relationships to connect with migrant associations in Barcelona. Parties may also create their own social groups. Several factors may shape these dynamic interactions between migrants and parties. To this end, I will explore the role of the political home country context, the sending state electoral system, and specific migratory patterns. In addition to that, I argue that the local context creates specific informal and formal opportunity structures (Koopmans et al. 2005) that can either encourage or constrain the transnationalisation of political parties. Migrants in residency countries actively shape this environment and can grant or withhold the support that parties need to thrive as an organization abroad.

In the next chapter, I will detail my methodology before I turn to the empirical analysis in the chapters thereafter.
3 Methodology

In this chapter, I first present the comparative research design of the thesis and the reasons to study the activities of Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian parties in Barcelona, Spain. Secondly, I introduce my qualitative data collection and analysis methods. Data was collected via qualitative interviews with activists and representatives of homeland parties and leaders of migrant organisations in Barcelona and via participant observations. I will detail my sampling and recruitment approach and recount the difficulties that I have encountered in the field and how I have addressed them. I conclude with a section on additional data sources.

3.1 Research design and case selection

In this thesis, I study the transnationalisation process of Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian parties in Barcelona, Spain. I have chosen a “several groups in one country approach” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b, 772) to better isolate host country effects and specific sending country factors that both potentially shape the interaction of parties and migrant communities in the transnational space. In contrast to previous research, however, my analysis combines and unfolds on two levels: The individual level (party activists), and the meso-level (parties and associations). In this section, I will expound on my case and research site selection.

This study builds on three migrant-sending countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Several indicators informed this case selection. First, a significant proportion of the countries’ population resides abroad. This is important since larger diaspora communities are positively associated with transnationally active parties (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020c). Second, I focus on Latin American parties in Europe to address the shortcomings of previous works that have tended to concentrate on the United States as the destination country. Therefore, a significant part of the countries’ emigrant population also had to reside in Europe. Table 3.1 shows the share and distribution of the emigrant population from 21 Latin American countries. Most of these countries account for a
sizeable diaspora, yet only a few meet the second criteria. For example, El Salvador has a very large diaspora, but its members mainly reside in the United States. Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru all have a significant share of their electorate abroad, of which many live in Europe.

Table 3.1 Emigrant population size and external electoral voting rights in 21 Latin American countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of population abroad 2019</th>
<th>% of emigrants in Europe 2019</th>
<th>% of emigrants in Spain 2019</th>
<th>Number of emigrants in Spain 2019</th>
<th>Enfranchised de facto</th>
<th>Special Rep. System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>7,63</td>
<td>21,94</td>
<td>17,22</td>
<td>151.235</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>6,81</td>
<td>46,00</td>
<td>35,09</td>
<td>415.310</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>4,65</td>
<td>25,39</td>
<td>12,81</td>
<td>193.786</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2,26</td>
<td>40,08</td>
<td>25,65</td>
<td>259.946</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0,83</td>
<td>37,63</td>
<td>6,28</td>
<td>109.552</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3,43</td>
<td>25,48</td>
<td>8,72</td>
<td>56.704</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>5,70</td>
<td>19,23</td>
<td>12,82</td>
<td>367.816</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2,98</td>
<td>8,16</td>
<td>2,30</td>
<td>3.459</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
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<td>13,29</td>
<td>8,55</td>
<td>141.447</td>
<td></td>
<td>X°</td>
</tr>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>10,73</td>
<td>167.176</td>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,11</td>
<td>0,59</td>
<td>9.524</td>
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<td>7.678</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>0,05</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>X°</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>8,24</td>
<td>7,21</td>
<td>57.764</td>
<td>✓/X°</td>
<td>X°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>9,25</td>
<td>1,12</td>
<td>0,45</td>
<td>53.158</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>10,43</td>
<td>4,91</td>
<td>3,80</td>
<td>25.969</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>3,79</td>
<td>6,02</td>
<td>2,73</td>
<td>4.399</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>8,86</td>
<td>7,41</td>
<td>64.547</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>68,43</td>
<td>0,003</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>18,30</td>
<td>15,38</td>
<td>11,93</td>
<td>75.539</td>
<td>X°</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>8,84</td>
<td>12,87</td>
<td>8,05</td>
<td>202.859</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Emigrant stock measured as foreign-born population, which excludes migrants beyond the 1st generation

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4 Peru introduced special representation in 2021 after the fieldwork was carried out

5 Honduras allows non-resident citizens to vote in presidential elections, but polling stations are only set up in the United States. Hondurans in Spain are de facto disenfranchised.

6 Some Mexican states have implemented special emigrant representation on the regional level.

7 Uruguayans registered in the electoral register in Uruguay can return to cast their vote in person.
An important third selection criterion was the sending countries’ electoral system. This is a defining feature of the transnational electoral arena (Collyer 2014a; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciomei 2019a; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a; Fliess and Østergaard-Nielsen 2021). To shed light on how the electoral system shapes the transnationalisation process of political parties, I rely on a comparative research design. Only in relation to other electoral systems one can understand and evaluate the effect of one particular electoral system (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 61). In Bolivia, non-resident citizens can vote in presidential elections and national referendums. While this law had already been enacted in 1991, the parties in power feared electoral defeats abroad and stalled its implementation (Hinojosa, Domenech, and Lafleur 2012). Thanks to the immense pressure of the Morales government and migrant collectives, it was finally first applied in 2009 (ibid.).

In Peru, emigrants can vote in presidential and legislative elections, as well as national referendums. In addition, Peruvians can run for office from abroad. These rights were enshrined in the 1979 constitution while transitioning to democracy, arguably as a form of “symbolic compensation for the misdeeds of earlier undemocratic regimes” (Pogonyi 2014, 128; Palop-García and Pedroza 2019, 413–415). Until recently, emigrant candidates ran on in-country party lists in the Lima constituency, which has been changed in 2020 after the period I seek to cover in this thesis.

Ecuadorian emigrants can vote in presidential and legislative elections, and national referendums. The right to vote in presidential elections was granted in the 1998 constitution following lobby efforts of civil society organisations and was first practised in 2006 (Araujo 2009, 35–38). Low state capacity, little attention to emigration, and political instability explain this delay in the implementation process (Araujo 2009; Ramírez and Boccagni 2013). This changed during the Correa administration and emigrants gained also the right to vote and stand as candidates in legislative elections,

---

8 External votes in legislative elections were counted in a nation-wide district until the 2000 elections. Since the 2001 elections, external votes are counted in the Lima District (Ley N° 27387, Dec. 28. 2000). The 2009 electoral law reform (Ley 29403, Sept. 7. 2009) has subdivided the Lima district into Lima Province and Lima Metropolitan, which increased the number of districts from 25 to 26. External votes counted in the latter. Since 2020, Peru specifically reserves two of its 130 seats in the Congreso for emigrant MPs, which are elected in a global constituency (Ley 31032). This feature has first been practiced in the 2021 elections.
which was first practised in the 2007 Constituent Assembly elections. For the unicameral *Asamblea Nacional*, emigrants elect 15 MPs in a single national constituency, and six MPs for extra-territorial representation. In relation to the latter, Ecuador divides the world into three constituencies with two seats each: 1) Europe, Asia, and Oceania, 2) Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, 3) the United States and Canada. The 2008 Constitution codified emigrants’ political rights and also included their right to participate in national referendums. In addition, albeit much less important, non-resident citizens are also entitled to elect the *Consejo de Participacion Ciudadana y Control Social* (CPCCS)\(^9\), which has been first practised in March 2019.

Possible replacement countries for Ecuador would have been Colombia or the Dominican Republic. However, Colombia only reserves one\(^{10}\) seat in a global constituency, which makes it less likely to observe a significant special representation effect on party transnationalisation. Indeed, Colombian parties seem to maintain little interest in these seats and are weakly institutionalized in Europe (Bermúdez 2016, 183). The Dominican Republic reserves seven seats for emigrant MPs, of which European-based emigrants elect two. Yet, the Dominican community in Europe is in absolute and relative terms far smaller than the Ecuadorian one. Finally, I have limited my sample to countries with external voting rights because those Latin American countries that disenfranchise their emigrants only reach modest diaspora size levels in Europe, in relative and absolute terms. It is also important to note that campaigning abroad, transnational party membership, and maintaining party offices in foreign countries are legally allowed in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru (Pedroza, Palop, and Hoffmann 2016).

Voting modalities can influence whether parties are likely to invest in transnational mobilization (Gauja 2020; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020c). It is thus important to keep voting modalities somewhat stable across all three cases. According to the GLOBALCIT Conditions for Electoral Rights 2019 database (Arrighi et al. 2019), emigrants

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\(^9\) Following the 2018 constitutional referendum, the seven members of the CPCCS are no longer appointed but publicly elected. The council was created in 2008 to increase transparency and social control, but has faced much criticism since (Burbano and de La Torre 2020).

\(^{10}\) Colombia had intermittently reserved two seats for emigrant MPs in the *Cámara de Representantes*, but this has been reversed since.
from all three countries must actively self-enrol in the voting registers abroad, and voting must be exercised in person on election day in embassies, consulates, or specified voting centres abroad\textsuperscript{11}. Voters must only update their registration if their place of residence changes. While voting for resident citizens is mandatory, voting abroad is voluntary. In Peru, voting from abroad is compulsory, yet since the 2006 elections non-voting is no longer associated with sanctions and has practically become voluntary (Bermúdez, Escrivá, and Moraes 2014b, 149–150).

Scholars have argued that electoral reforms entail that “[p]arties, candidates, and voters have to learn new strategies while passing through a period of enhanced surprise, disappointment, and frustration” (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 218) and that this “may take two or three elections to fully observe and respond to the effects and incentives of particular changes” (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis 2005, 23). Indeed, lack of experience and logistical difficulties often undermine the organization of transnational elections when they are carried out for the very first time (Lafleur 2013, 111–112). Transnational electoral politics in all three countries is sufficiently institutionalized. All have already hosted several elections abroad. Bolivians in Spain were called to vote four times\textsuperscript{12}. Ecuadorians abroad could vote on nine different occasions\textsuperscript{13} while Peruvians abroad could vote in 12 elections\textsuperscript{14}. In addition, and as already stated, all paradigmatic policy changes in the countries’ transnational election frameworks have already been adopted at least a decade before fieldwork started\textsuperscript{15}.

\textsuperscript{11} Peruvian emigrants are automatically enrolled in the voter register once they register their residency in the consulate (Pedroza, Palop, and Hoffmann 2016, 296).
\textsuperscript{12} The 2009 presidential elections restricted external voting to Bolivians in four destination countries: Spain, Argentina, USA, Brazil. This number has subsequently been extended to 33 countries.
\textsuperscript{13} This includes the 2006 presidential elections, the 2007 Constituent Assembly elections, the 2009, 2013, and 2017 general elections, the national referendums in 2008, 2011, and 2018, and the 2019 CPCCS elections.
\textsuperscript{15} In relation to external electoral rights, Østergaard-Nielsen and colleagues (2019, 379) differentiate between paradigmatic and incremental policy changes. The latter “refer to the recognition/abolition of external voting rights, special representation, and expansion/reduction of the type of elections that citizens abroad can take part in”. The former “include expansion or restriction of length of residence abroad in order to participate in elections or changes in, for instance, voting modality and type of registration”.
Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru provide excellent cases to analyse the transnationalisation of political parties. The countries provide a great bandwidth of political party types, covering new, niche, indigenous, corporate-based, movement, populist, traditional, and authoritarian successor parties (van Cott 2005; Madrid 2012; Barndt 2014; Levitsky et al. 2016; Anria 2018; Loxton and Levitsky 2018; Mainwaring 2018). This large spectrum of parties is also a characteristic of the countries’ weakly institutionalized party systems (Mainwaring, Bizzarro, and Petrova 2018). Following the party system breakdown in the 1990s (Peru) and the 2000s (Ecuador, Bolivia), many traditional parties have vanished and have given room to new contenders and party types. However, some traditional parties have prevailed although they tend to underperform in elections. Prominent examples are the Partido Aprista Peruano (APRA), the Bolivian Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, and the Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano renamed 2014 Fuerza Ecuador (FE). Over the last decade, some of the newer parties have also started to invest more in organisation building, and to plant firmer roots in society. This includes the Bolivian Movimiento al Socialismo–Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (MAS-IPSP), and the Ecuadorian Movimiento Alianza PAIS - Patria Altiva i Soberana (MPAIS).

In contrast, party-building efforts in Peru have traditionally remained low after 2000 in the post-Fujimori era (Levitsky et al. 2016). Contenders only use parties to contest elections but do not invest in organization-building thereafter. The frequent emergence and re-birth of new party organisations in all three countries make them interesting case studies because it enables us to witness multiple processes of party transnationalisation over a short time period.

The case selection follows ‘geographical area lines’, a strategy to balance a “homogenous milieu in more than one respect: history, culture, level of development” (Dogan and Pelassy 1984, 118). Table 3.2 displays the similarities between the three countries that allow us to hold constant an array of potential independent variables. All report similar democracy and electoral integrity scores in the middle range. All account for some of the most weakly institutionalised party systems in the region, yet in Bolivia and Ecuador presidential tenure has been somewhat stable over a decade. Since 2006, the same leftist parties have been governing Bolivia and Ecuador. Peru’s presidential tenure has been more tumultuous. In 2016, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK) won the
presidential elections but he resigned in March 2018 in the wake of several corruption scandals and to avoid impeachment.

Table 3.2 Country characteristics: Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
<th>Peru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Level 2018⁶</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of Electoral Integrity ¹⁷</td>
<td>50/100</td>
<td>46/100</td>
<td>63/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party System Institutionalisation ¹⁸</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Perception Index 2018 ¹⁹</td>
<td>29/100</td>
<td>34/100</td>
<td>35/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita 2018²¹</td>
<td>8,655.53 $</td>
<td>11,561.75 $</td>
<td>12,781.42 $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI Index 2018 ²²</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances as % of GDP 2018²³</td>
<td>3.45 %</td>
<td>2.83 %</td>
<td>1.45 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: various, see footnotes

Corruption is a significant problem in all three countries, as the Corruption Perception Index demonstrates. Kuczynski’s vice president, Martin Vizcarra, stepped in until he

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⁶ The Democracy level is an average of the five core democracy indices for 2018 from the V-Dem V.11 dataset (Coppedge et al. 2021): Electoral democracy index, liberal democracy index, participatory democracy index, deliberative democracy index, egalitarian democracy index. The interval is from low to high (0-1).

¹⁷ This Index derives from Norris and Grömping (2019). It reflects the most recent general elections before fieldwork commenced: the 2014 presidential elections in Bolivia, the 2016 general elections in Peru, and 2017 presidential elections in Ecuador. The interval is from low to high (0-100).

¹⁸ The party system institutionalisation score derives from Mainwaring and colleagues (2018). The most institutionalized party systems in their sample have an average Z-score between 1.27 (USA) and 0.90 (Chile). The least institutionalized party systems score between -0.81 (Argentina) and -1.28 (Guatemala).

¹⁹ Index interval is from low to high (0-100) and can be accessed here: [https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2018](https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2018)

²⁰ Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK) won the 2016 presidential elections but was impeached in March 2018. His vice president Martin Vizcarra took over, but he is not an affiliated PPK member.

²¹ GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2017 international dollars. Data provided by the World Bank (2022a).


²³ Personal remittances based on World Bank (2022c).
was impeached in November 2020. Economically, all three countries are within range in terms of their GDP per capita, globally placed in the lower midfield. High inequality dominates in all countries according to the GINI Index, while remittances are an important source of revenue in Bolivia, Ecuador, and to a lesser extent in Peru.

3.1.1 Migration patterns and migrants' socio-demographic characteristics

In this section, I will discuss the recent migration history of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. In addition, I will describe the socio-demographic characteristics of their emigrant communities.

Andean Emigration: Destinations, size, and composition

In Bolivia, rural out-migration to the neighbouring countries Argentina, and, to some lesser extent, Chile and Brazil dominated during the 21st century (Tapia 2014). Lack of employment later also forced the urban middle class into emigration (Farah, Sánchez, and Bejarano 2003). Various military dictatorships from 1964 to 1982 drove exile migration to new destinations, most prominently the United States (Tapia 2014, 16). Bolivia’s economic instability continued to encourage international migration, a trend that holds up until today (Farah, Sánchez, and Bejarano 2003; Tapia 2014). In 2001, the economic crisis in Argentina and the American policy change after 9/11 redirected these migration flows to other destinations, above all to Spain, which had a growing demand for low-skilled labour and favourable visa policies (Tapia 2014; Hinojosa and de la Torre 2014; Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2015a; Nijenhuis 2015). Bolivians abroad report middle to low levels of education (Hinojosa 2008, 94; Carpio and García 2012, 54) and come from rural and urban areas (Farah, Sánchez, and Bejarano 2003; Tapia 2014).

While foreign-born statistics suggest that 7.6% of the Bolivian population resides abroad (see Table 3.1), Hinojosa and de la Torre (2014, 7), estimate that it is 20%, indicating that Bolivia, in proportional terms, has one of the biggest diasporas in Latin America. In addition, considering the circular migration dynamics, it is assumed that 25% of the countries’ population engages in international migration (de la Torre 2014; Nijenhuis 2015, 202).
Ecuador’s younger emigration history is characterized by two major out-migration waves (Herrera 2008). The first one in the 1980s directed many migrants to the United States, and a much lesser extent Venezuela, and Canada. Historically, primarily peasants from specific rural regions emigrated to the United States (Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002). The second mass emigration period occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s. The economic crisis in the late 1990s, a flood catastrophe, and bad financial management within a time of political instability predominantly drove this latest migration flow (Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002; Herrera 2008; Bertoli 2010). This time, individuals from all regions and socio-economic backgrounds emigrated (Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002). Up until today, Ecuador maintains the dollar as its national currency, a measure adopted in 2000 to stop the freefall of its economy. Ecuadorians predominantly went to Spain, the United States and Italy. As in the case of Bolivia, the restricted entrance restrictions carried out by the Bush administration after 2001 forced Ecuadorians to look for alternative destinations. The lax visa restrictions, possibilities for family reunifications, the available job opportunities and the shared language made Spain a preferred destination (Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002; Bertoli 2010, 365).

In Peru, mass out-migration began in the 1980s with the transition to democracy. These years were characterized by a downturn in the economy and political instability so an increasing number of Peruvians left for the United States. Emigration has become a strategy adopted across all social classes to combat economic vulnerability (Altamirano 2006; Durand and Ortega 2010). A defining feature of the Peruvian diaspora is that it is scattered across a large number of countries (Paerregaard 2008). Peruvians started migrating to new destinations in the mid-1980s when the United States enacted more restricted immigration policies, and countries like Spain, Italy and Japan lowered their immigration barriers to meet their low-skilled labour demands (Merino 2004; Paerregaard 2008; Paerregaard 2014a). Political instability, a deteriorating economic crisis, and political violence in the late 1980s encouraged further out-migration (Altamirano 2006). During this time and the 1990s, the Peruvian community in Chile and Argentina also grew (Paerregaard 2008; Paerregaard 2014a, Ch. 2). The Fujimori government brought some stability during the 1990s, yet its neoliberal policies,
corruption scandals, and an economic recession soon drove citizens again abroad (Takenaka, Paerregaard, and Berg, Ulla 2010). As of today, the Peruvian diaspora is estimated to be between 1.5 and almost 2.6 Mio., equalling 4.7% to 8.5% of Peru’s population (Paerregaard 2014a, 40; United Nations 2019a). According to Horn (2017, 525), Spain hosts the second-largest community of Peruvian voting-age migrants.

3.1.2 Latin American migration to Spain

Between the 1970s and mid-1980s, immigration to Spain was very modest in numbers and dominated by Europeans seeking retirement abroad, and a couple of thousand Argentinians, Chileans, Cubans, Uruguayans and Venezuelans fleeing from dictatorship (Arango 2000). Yet, from 1985 on this picture dramatically changed. The foreign-born population in Spain increased 23-fold from 1981 to 2007 (Hierro 2016, 67). In 2018, the most numerous migrant communities were Moroccans and Romanians, accounting together for 22.2% of the foreign-born population. Latin Americans and Caribbeans, however, represent 39.3% and EU member nationals add up to 24% (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2020a). Almost 13.7% of the Spanish population is of foreign origin (ibid.); a number equally high as in long-standing immigration countries like France, the United Kingdom and the United States (OECD 2022).

The literature highlights a combination of factors to explain the Latin American migrant influx to Spain. On the migrant-sending state side, the economic crisis that many Latin American countries faced throughout the 1990s and early 2000s pushed citizens into emigration (Rosas and Gay 2015). On the migrant-receiving side, scholars refer to the transformation of the Spanish work market, the social upward mobility of Spanish society, the demographic change and the blooming economy as the reasons that lead to a constantly growing demand for foreign labour (Arango 2000; Rosas and Gay 2015). Spain maintains one of the most liberal immigration systems for low-skilled migrants in Europe (Consterdine and Hampshire 2020). In addition, Spanish as an official language and its cultural proximity to Latin America have contributed to Spain’s attraction for Latin American migrants (Spörlein 2015). Moreover, the Spanish immigration law made it easy for Latin Americans to immigrate. For a long time, they could enter Spain simply
with a tourist visa. Because many overstayed the Spanish government re-enforced its entry requirements. Peruvians needed a visa to enter Spain from 1992 onwards, a regulation that was extended to Ecuadorians in 2003, and Bolivians in 2006 (Hierro 2016)\(^\text{24}\). In addition, at various points in time, the government initiated regularization programs to meet the challenges of an increasing clandestine population. In 2005, following the largest regularization effort, 565,000 migrants gained regular status, so that in 2011 the number of undocumented immigrants was around 250,000, or 5% of Spain’s foreign population (Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2015b, 3).

Spain sets a scene that stands in stark contrast to the United States or other major migrant-receiving European countries. While the Spanish citizenship regime is highly restrictive towards most immigrants, many Latin American states have signed bilateral agreements with Spain. Only two years of legal residency (compared to 10 years for other nationals\(^\text{25}\)) and the exemption to hold dual citizenship significantly lower the barriers to naturalisation. In addition to that, Bolivians, Ecuadorians, and Peruvians, together with non-citizen residents from seven other countries enjoy the right to vote in local elections after five years of legal residence, an agreement based on reciprocity (GLOBALCIT 2017)\(^\text{26}\). However, additional practical barriers persist. For one, it has been argued that the continual possession of the permanent residency card represents the actual difficulty for immigrants in Spain nowadays (Garcès-Mascareñas 2012, 139–142). For another, in adopting mandatory civic and language courses in 2011 Spain joined other European countries, who enacted similar frameworks to manage more strategically their immigration (Goodman 2010; Gebhardt 2015). In the case of Spain, the government has left the specific course and naturalization modalities to the autonomous regions. In consequence, migrants residing in Catalonia are required to master the Catalan language when naturalizing, yet “given that the refusal rate in Catalonia as a whole stands at 8.5%, it can be assumed that Barcelona still enjoys some

\(^{24}\) In March 2016, Spain lifted the visa restrictions for Peruvians again.

\(^{25}\) Citizens from Andorra, Equatorial Guinea, the Philippines, Portugal and Sephardic Jews enjoy the same right to naturalize after 2 years of permanent residence (Hierro 2016, 81).

\(^{26}\) This includes Bolivia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, and Peru.
scope to interpret the guidelines favourably“ (Gebhardt 2015, 12–13). While these new requirements may disincentive naturalization for some parts of the migrant population, access to nationality in Spain remains high. Based on the 2019 MIPEX score, Spain ranks near the top group of countries and accounts for an integration framework that is ‘slightly favourable’ (Solano and Huddleston 2020). Assumably, Spain would score even higher when adjusted to the special conditions that apply to Latin American migrants.

Andean migration to Spain: size and composition

The large-scale presence of Bolivians, Ecuadorians, and Peruvians in Spain is noticeable since the early 2000s. Figure 3.1. shows the development of these communities between 1998 and 2020.

Figure 3.1 Foreign-born population in Spain between 1998 and 2020.


The Bolivian population in Spain saw a sudden growth in the 2000s, jumping from less than 5,000 registered residents to slightly more than 200,000, an “increase of more than 5,000 per cent” (Nijenhuis 2015, 204). During the financial crisis in Spain, this figure drastically shrank again and since mid-2015 the numbers have solidified at around 170,000 (see Figure 3.1). The crisis significantly affected Bolivians, especially men, most of whom are employed in the construction sector. Unemployment for Bolivian men and women continued to be high in 2015 at 33.9% and 20.1%, respectively (Martínez-Buján 2019, 3111). In response to the crisis many, Bolivians returned or onward migrated with intermediate stops in Bolivia (de la Torre 2014; Martínez-Buján 2015; Parella et al. 2017).
Spain ranks second, after Argentina, hosting 17% of the Bolivian foreign-born population, followed by the United States with 10% (United Nations 2019b).

Like all other groups in this study, most Bolivians in Spain work in the migrant-dominated domestic, care, construction and agriculture sectors (Hinojosa 2008; Tapia 2014; Martínez-Buján 2015; Martínez-Buján 2019). In the 2007 national immigrant survey, 40% of the Bolivians in Spain indicated to be without papers (Reher and Requena 2009). By 2015, however, “the undocumented Bolivian-born population in Spain appeared to have virtually disappeared” (Martínez-Buján 2019, 3112). Some 31% had legal residency status, and two-thirds had acquired Spanish citizenship. A considerable part of the irregular population has also left during the crisis (Martínez-Buján 2015; Parella et al. 2017).

The Ecuadorian migrant stock in Spain rapidly increased from an estimated 11,000 or less in the mid-1990s (Jokisch/Pribilsky 2002, p. 83; Iglesias 2015, p. 20) to 242,522 in 2002, and peaked in 2011 with 480,626 foreign-born immigrants (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2020a). However, in the course of the unfolding economic crisis in Spain and the recovery of the Ecuadorian economy during the last years, a part of the Ecuadorian community has returned or onward migrated. Yet these numbers are far lower than in the Bolivian case. Many Ecuadorians were already regularized in the mid-2000s which reduced their vulnerability during the crisis (Herrera 2012). As of 2018, the figures seem to have consolidated around 405,000, making Ecuadorians the largest Latin American and the third largest immigrant group in Spain (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2020a; Rosas and Gay 2015). In comparison, Italy accounts for a considerably smaller Ecuadorian population of around 85,000 (United Nations 2019b).

Ecuadorians took on Jobs as domestic cleaners, and carers, done so far by Dominicans and Peruvians (Hierro 2016, 71). Particularly men found work in the agriculture and construction sector (Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002). Bertoli and colleagues (2010, 270) find that compared to the U.S., Spain attracted significantly more Ecuadorians from urban areas who had higher levels of education. Nevertheless, the Ecuadorian migrant group is highly diverse with people from all socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds,
predominantly from urban areas but also from rural areas (Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002; Herrera 2008; Jokisch 2014). More recently family unification processes dominate the Ecuadorian migration to Spain (Jokisch 2014). In 2014, 54.3% of the Ecuadorian population in Spain had dual nationality while less than 3% had an irregular status (Iglesias et al. 2015, 61–63).

Peruvian communities in Spain have become particularly noticeable during the early 1990s. Until then, only students from middle and upper-class families had tended to emigrate to Spain (Paerregaard 2014b, 2135). According to some estimates, between 18,000 and 25,600 Peruvians resided in Spain in 1996 (G. Pérez and Veredas 1998; United Nations 2019b). Peruvian immigration further accelerated in the early 2000s and, according to official foreign-born statistics, Spain encompassed between 193,786 (United Nations 2019b) and 216,802 Peruvians in 2019 (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2020a). These figures, however, do not include the 2nd generation, which is considerably numerous given that Peruvians were one of the first Latin American countries to immigrate to Spain. Throughout the 1990s Peruvians were the largest group of Latin Americans (Merino 2004, 244). Due to the Peruvian migration in the early 1990s, a 1.5 and second generation has grown up in Spain (Aparicio 2007).

Peruvian migrants come almost exclusively from urban areas, are socially diverse, and encompass all income classes (Paerregaard 2014a, Ch. 2). In comparison with Bolivians and Ecuadorians, Peruvians in Spain exhibit higher education levels. More than one fourth holds a university degree, a figure that exceeds the national migrant average (Carpio and García 2012, 54; Talavera et al. 2013, 159). Existing research on the effects of the economic crisis has therefore mainly focused on more vulnerable migrant groups, such as Bolivians and Ecuadorians. During the crisis years, the numbers of Peruvians in Spain stagnated, suggesting that most Peruvians did not return or onward migrate but stayed put.

A survey conducted in Peruvian consulates in 2012 offers some insights into the socio-demographic composition of the group in Barcelona (Talavera et al. 2013). The majority work in the domestic and care sector (44.1%), followed by other forms of unskilled
labour jobs (25%). Likely, women are predominantly employed in the former and men in the latter (Merino 2004). Economic considerations clearly dominated their motivation to emigrate. Only one fourth emigrated for family reasons and one fifth to study. Almost one third of the Peruvians in Barcelona hold a university degree, which is extraordinarily high in comparison with Bolivians or Ecuadorians. In terms of legal stability, less than 4% have an irregular status. Around one third of the Peruvians maintain permanent residency, dual nationality, or a work visa, respectively.

A firm characteristic of the Latin American immigration to Europe is the dominant presence of female migrants (Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2015a; Martínez-Buján 2015). Many scholars argue that this characteristic makes these new Latin American migration flows towards Europe different to the ones to the United States (Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2015a; Rosas and Gay 2015). While family reunification processes have worked for some groups in Spain to diminish the gender imbalance (Rosas and Gay 2015), the majority of the Latin American foreign-born population still consists of women. According to Spanish statistics, 60% of Bolivians, 54% of Ecuadorians, and 56% of Peruvians in Spain were female migrants in 2019 (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2020a).

What does this novel characteristic of migrant flows imply for research on political transnationalism? Political scientists have demonstrated that gender impacts the forms of political activism individuals engage in, as well as the frequency with which they do so (Schlozman et al. 1995). For example, women are more likely to vote and sign a petition, boycott products, or donate, while men are more likely to participate in party activities, protest, and contact politicians or media (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010). A gender gap also is observable in relation to transnational political engagement with male migrants participating significantly more (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019, 201), including voting in homeland elections (Ahmadov and Sasse 2016). Bearing this in mind, political parties abroad face the challenge of entering and mobilizing an electorate that shows in comparison with the one at home or other immigration countries significant differences with regards to gender composition, and socio-economic profile.
3.1.3 Barcelona city as a research site

Migration and transnationalism researchers often focus on the political activities and opportunities for migrants on the national level (see e.g., Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Burgess 2018; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a; Rashkova and Van Der Staak 2020). The dynamic of transnational political mobilization, however, is most clearly observable on the local level. This is because it allows us to approach “migrants as residents of cities and actors within and across space rather than as aggregated ethnic “communities”” ( Çağlar and Glick Schiller 2011, 3). Indeed, as Yalaz and colleagues (2022, 2181) affirm “the city focus gives us an analytical leverage to explore how local, national, and transnational resources and factors come together and shape the dynamics of migrant transnational mobilization”.

In this thesis, I focus on greater Barcelona. Barcelona is Spain’s second-largest city with 1.6 million inhabitants. A significant number of Andean migrants reside in greater Barcelona (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2020a). Although Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian migrants are greatly scattered across different cities in Spain, the Barcelona province hosts the largest Bolivian community and the second-largest communities of Ecuadorians and Peruvians in Spain. Barcelona provides an interesting case to analyse transnational Andean politics. The formation of associations is easy and inclusive consultation mechanisms encourage their participation in local governance processes (Morales, González, and Jorba 2009). The city accounts for a vibrant associative scene with strong ‘ethnic bonding networks’ (Mora 2020). It is particularly interesting and challenging to analyse network structures and linkage strategies of transnational party cells within this setting.

A significant number of studies has carried research in Barcelona to analyse the transnational political involvement of individual citizens (Escrivá et al. 2010; Escrivá 2013; Chaudhary 2018; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019) and associations (Morales and Jorba 2010; Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala 2015). However, until now transnational parties have not been analysed specifically in this context yet.
3.2 Data collection and analysis methods

In this thesis, I draw on a range of data collection methods. During January 2018 and March 2019, I have carried out ethnographic fieldwork in Barcelona to collect primary data. During this time, I have conducted 62 qualitative interviews with key informants, and 50 logged participant observations. Additional data was collected via a number of secondary sources, such as the online Facebook pages of party chapters and associations, official government documents, party manifestos, and local and ethnic media outlets. In the following section, I will detail my data collection strategy, explain my interviewee sampling and recruitment approach, provide an overview of my samples and observation sites, and expound on the practical challenges that I have encountered along the way.

3.2.1 Qualitative interviews

The core data for the empirical analysis in this thesis derives from qualitative, high-quality, in-depth interviews with local key informants. The interview is one dominant form in qualitative research (Kvale 1996). It allows us to unearth meaning and insights from another person’s perspective that are not directly observable (Patton 2002, Ch. 7). My key informants consist of persons in leadership or decision-making roles of migrant institutions. On the one hand, I have interviewed official representatives and high rank activists of Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian party chapters in Barcelona. I define volunteers, members, and actively involved supporters of parties as party activists to account for the informality of transnational and Andean party life. Party activists perform “a set of practices, whether sporadic, informal, or devoted ... to support a political party either during an electoral campaign or more permanently, independently of being enrolled in the party or not” (Meléndez and Umpierrez de Reguero 2021, 1).

Although the large majority of these interviewees played an active and essential role in the party organisation and even formally inhabit key positions in the transnational party structure, they often are not formally affiliated with the party. During fieldwork, I realized that card-bearing members are a small minority and that the majority prefers a
more loose affiliation. The interviews with party activists were key to understanding the motivations of individual migrants to join a homeland party (Ch. 4), parties’ recruitment tactics (Ch. 5), and their linkage strategies to connect with organized migrant collectives (Ch. 6). On the other hand, I have interviewed presidents and executive board members of Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian migrant associations and federations. These interviews were crucial to understanding the gatekeeper role of migrants and migrant collectives, and the setting in which transnational party politics takes place in Barcelona. I am drawing in all three empirical chapters on these interviews. By interviewing both party activists and migrant organisation leaders, I was able to uncover network structures and informal relationships that would have remained hidden with quantitative data collection methods.

In total, I have conducted 62 semi-structured qualitative interviews. This includes 23 migrants whom I have primarily interviewed in their capacity as party activists and 33 migrants whom I have interviewed because they lead an important migrant association or federation. However, during fieldwork, I realised that 13 of the migrant association/federation leaders were or previously had also been transnationally active in an Andean party. This dual engagement was very common and produced an overlap between the ‘party activists sample’ and the ‘migrant association leaders sample’. This further increased my party activist sample size to 36. In addition, I have interviewed one state official from each country with insight knowledge regarding transnational migrant and party affairs in Barcelona. Finally, I also interviewed one Bolivian, one Ecuadorian, and one Peruvian social movement activist for contact generation and background information.

Sample characteristics

Table 3.3 delineates the socio-demographic composition and migration background of the interviewee core sample used for the main analysis. Appendix B contains a more detailed overview with individual information for each participant. All 56 interviewees

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27 In Chapter 4, Section 5. I discuss this in greater detail in relation to individual resources and party demand-side considerations.
are 1st generation migrants who on average had lived in Spain for 18.3 years at the time of the interview. They were 48 years old on average. Only four were younger than 35 years old, but no one was older than 63 years old. The large majority holds dual citizenship, regardless of origin. The sample contains more male (62.5%) than female (37.5%) interviewees. This is because men are significantly overrepresented in the leadership positions of transnational party cells. Indeed, the sub-sample of association and federation leaders is more balanced between men (54.5%) and women (45.5%) while the party activist sample is hugely skewed in favour of men (69.4%). Although this resonates with other transnationalism studies, which have found that men are more likely to engage in political cross-border activities (see e.g., Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017; Chaudhary 2018; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019), this gender gap is particularly significant in light of the Andean migration flow to Spain, which is dominated by women (See Section 3.2.).

Finally, the respondents report a comparatively high education level. At least half of the sample holds a university degree while around at least one fourth holds a high school degree in combination with continuing education training. One quarter only has finished school. In comparison with the Andean community in Spain, thus, the interviewees reach significantly higher education levels (Carpio and García 2012, 54; Talavera et al. 2013, 159). This resonates with studies on civic participation and transnational activism which demonstrate a strong correlation between activism and higher levels of education (e.g., Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Safi 2018; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019).
Table 3.3 Interviewees core sample. Socio-demographic status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
<th>Peru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Sampling Crieria</td>
<td>Associations</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party activist sample</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Average</td>
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<td>46.8</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17-34</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>50-64</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Missing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number interviewees</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Citizenship</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation</td>
<td>1st Generation</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Generation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own elaboration

The interview process and coding approach

The vast majority of the interviews (57) were conducted face-to-face. Four interviews were conducted via phone to accommodate the respondent (2) or because they already had returned to their home country (2). On five occasions an informal unrecorded interview preceded the formal interview to better explain the project and to build rapport. In four cases I formally interviewed with a tape recorder the same person twice
and one key informant was interviewed three times. With many of the respondents, I stayed in contact after fieldwork for informal follow-up conversations. The interviews were all conducted with informed consent and tape-recorded upon the interviewees’ approval. Before the start of the interview, the participant was briefed with an information sheet and the consent form (see Appendix F and Appendix G). The overwhelming majority gave consent that I could use their original name and affiliations. Phone interviews were conducted with oral consent. After the interview I debriefed the participants with a turned-off tape recorder, asking how they had experienced the interview and whether they had questions. All interviews were set up as individual interviews, but seven interviewees came accompanied by their partner, co-association leader or someone they considered relevant to the project. They also participated in the interview upon oral consent but I have not used their input for the core analysis.

To accommodate the interviewees as much as possible I let them pick the day and time and I moreover suggested public places, such as cafés, or restaurants in an area that was easy for them to reach or they suggested the place if I was not familiar with the area. The majority of my interviews were conducted in these public places (46) and done during the week before or after their work shifts started. However, upon invitation, I also conducted seven interviews in the meeting place of an association or party chapter, three interviews at the respondents’ office space, and five interviews in private homes. Overall, The interviewees kindly volunteered their time and patiently answered my questions. It should be mentioned, however, that sometimes it was challenging to set up the interview, which was only possible upon repeated follow-up calling and messaging (sometimes over several weeks and months), and meeting in person to establish rapport. Their busy work schedules and family responsibilities, occasionally paired with distrust, understandably made it hard for them to meet me and I am very grateful that much more often than not they have made time for me.

My questionnaire was organized in thematic blocs with open-ended questions that I continuously adapted to each respondent and her/his role and my understanding of their realities as fieldwork progressed. In that sense, my data collection method is rooted in grounded theory (Charmaz 2006). For example, it was important for me to gain insights into how the respondents wanted me to understand their political involvement.
The questions for party activists evolved around their individual political and associative trajectories, their motivations to become involved, their demands, the organisational features of their party chapter (e.g. funding; candidate selection processes etc.), the electoral campaigns in Barcelona, the relationships that their party maintains with associations and host country parties, how these contacts are initiated, and the difficulties they encounter. The standard questionnaire for migrant organisation leaders included questions regarding the main activities of the associations, how they organize, the associations’ general political involvement, the associations’ relationships with home country parties and attempts of home country parties to establish contact to receive their support, the leader’s personal political involvement and her/his evaluation of their electoral rights.

All interviews were conducted in Spanish, except for one which was done in English. The information and consent sheets were in Spanish and proofread by an academic Spanish native speaker to ensure the translation was accurate. The semi-structured interviews took 1.5 hours on average. The by far shortest interview took 18 minutes and the longest one was 2 hours and 33 minutes. In total, I ended up with over 97 hours of recorded interview material. Each participant also received his/her interview transcript if they had indicated that they wished to receive it.

For the empirical analysis, I transcribed the relevant parts of the interviews for a systematic analysis with Atlas.ti. I developed a coding system appropriate to answer the research questions in each of the empirical chapters. This original dataset constitutes the empirical backbone of my analysis. The coding started after the fieldwork had ended. I developed the coding categories both deductively based on my theoretical framework and inductively while reading, interpreting, and coding the interviews. For example, for Chapter 4 I have coded the interviews of party activists with the General Incentive Model (GIM) in mind using the broad categories that Seyd and Whiteley (1992) had developed to analyse the motivations of individuals to join a political party. However, during the coding process, I developed sub-codes to further refine their categories. To give an

28 Unfortunately, seven participants could not be reached anymore to pass on the transcript.
example, emigrants’ emotional motivations to join were broken down into 1) homeland patriotism, 2) altruism, and 3) their identification with party figures. In addition, I have created new categories to code the migrants’ resource constraints, their co-determination rights (e.g. voting rights in the candidate selection process), party chapter funding, membership formalities or activists’ experience of political socialization in the homeland etc.. In a similar fashion, the coding schemes in the Chapters 6 and 7 are rooted in the mobilization literature, and the party – interest literatures. Yet, the trajectories and network structures of migrants and migrant communities in Barcelona, as well as the reasons for associations to not cooperate with homeland parties were coded and organized inductively. In this regard, I have applied an “ad hoc meaning generation” approach to my interview analysis. This involves “a free interplay of techniques during the analysis” (Kvale 1996, 203). Various techniques, outlined in greater detail in Miles and Huberman (1994, 246–261), were used to generate meaning.

To ensure the internal validity and robustness of my results I employed different forms of data triangulation (Natow 2020). I pursued, what Denzin refers to, as a “strategy of multiple triangulation” (Denzin 2009, Ch. 12). First, I used multiple data sources by interviewing both party activists and association leaders. This was important, for example, to corroborate statements of party representatives regarding their relationship with associations. In addition, I relied on social media, government documents, and local media reports to double-check gathered information during fieldwork. Second, I used multiple methodologies by conducting both interviews and participant observations. This was essential, for example, to understand the nature of town hall meetings with homeland politicians. Third, I also used multiple data analysis techniques by analysing my data both deductively and inductively.

3.2.2 Political parties and party activists: sampling and recruitment strategy

The purpose of this study is to better understand the transnationalisation process of political parties. Kernalegenn and van Haute (2020c) identify four transnational party types, which are defined in relation to the physical location of the party headquarters and their relation with the home country. In this thesis, I focus on ‘emigrant party
branches’. To be selected, parties needed to have an official representative in Barcelona during the last national homeland election period. This selection criterion was important to account for the temporality of transnational parties. Many party cells only function during election periods. This way I could also include those that do not institutionalize in the transnational arena thereafter.

Initially, however, I pursued a different sampling strategy which would have allowed me to sample less on the dependent variable; a criticism that transnationalism studies often have received (Portes 2001, 182). I had pre-selected several parties from each country based on their recent voting results and sought to explore whether and how they have extended their presence to Barcelona. However, my initial contact attempts via email to party headquarters in Bolivia and Ecuador had failed, so that I adapted my sampling strategy accordingly.

The first step involved identifying which Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian parties had previously campaigned in Barcelona on-site. However, directories with contact information of foreign party representatives in Barcelona do not exist. Therefore, entry into the field could only be gained through contacts on the ground, which I established at events organized by the consulates or migrant associations. Snowball and chain-referral sampling helped generate further contacts (Patton 2002). Hence, my sample was not entirely prespecified but evolved as fieldwork progressed and I could collect information on the transnational presence of Andean parties in Barcelona. I thus applied a purposive sampling method (Patton 2002, 230–242). In total, I identified 13 Andean parties who had been active in Barcelona during the last 2017 Ecuadorian general elections, the 2016 Peruvian general elections, and the 2014 Bolivian presidential elections. In addition, I interviewed three high rank party activists of one Ecuadorian and two Peruvian parties who had been active in Barcelona in previous general elections. These interviews were conducted to learn about their partisan trajectory but not the party organisation per se.

Based on my data collection during fieldwork, I inductively developed a categorization of transnational party chapter types. The resulting four ideal types highlight, on the one
hand, the temporality, and on the other hand, the level of institutionalisation of the emigrant party chapters. These categories undergird my sampling strategy and data analysis. My categorisation centres on two core indicators. The first criterion determines whether the party cell maintains a continuing presence in Barcelona after election day in the form of an official party representative that migrants can approach all year around. The second criterion is the level of party activity after election day. Party cells can conduct no activities, sporadically organize activities, or frequently organize activities. This categorization should be understood as a continuum within which party cells can gradually transform. Table 3.4 contains the categorisation of the 13 transnational emigrant party chapters.

I find that only a minority of parties stay active during inter-election times. This sharply contrasts with the permanent campaign mode of domestic parties (Scarrow 1996; Conaghan and De La Torre 2008). I differentiate between “pop-up party cells”, “dormant party cells”, “ad-hoc party cells”, and “engaged party cells”. First, pop-up party cells do not account with an official representation abroad anymore after election day and only become active once elections approach. In particular, this includes smaller, poorly institutionalized or newcomer parties. These fleeting cells only pop-up abroad before elections, usually terminate the electoral process unsuccessfully, and then vanish afterwards from the transnational stage.

Second, dormant party cells have an official representation abroad. These are usually only one or two persons who take on a representative role in the absence of elections. They do not host any activities. After an election, the party cell becomes dormant until the next electoral contest. The leaders often enjoy a private and directive communication line with the home country office and this way they stay informed about intra-party developments.

Third, ad-hoc party cells also have an official representation abroad, yet they additionally organize punctual activities for specific events, such as internal board elections or international visits of high rank party members. The size of the cell varies but usually involves an elected board committee.

Fourth, engaged party cells maintain an extensive executive board. The chapters frequently organize activities throughout the non-electoral calendar. This can entail
information campaigns, assemblies, working groups to prepare input for legislative projects, protest or lobby events directed towards the home or host country, and social gatherings such as the celebration of specific holidays or memorandum days.

In my empirical analysis (Chapters 4-6), I will refer back to these party cell types to contextualize the party transnationalisation processes that I have observed.

Table 3.4 Transnational party chapter ideal types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>pop-up Party cells</th>
<th>dormant party cells</th>
<th>ad-hoc party cells</th>
<th>engaged party cells</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official Representative Abroad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Election Activities</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
<td>Fairly frequently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch office Abroad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (eventually)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment Strategy before the elections</td>
<td>Recruit mostly from scratch</td>
<td>Recruit almost from scratch</td>
<td>Small basis which is significantly extended before elections take place</td>
<td>Medium to large size group of members and supporters which is continuously extended, in particular before elections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party Type Examples:

- Bolivia: UN - MAS-IPSP
- Ecuador: CD - SUMA, PSC - CREO - MPAIS (until 2017)
- Peru: PPK, FA, PPC, APP - FP - APRA (until ca. 2017)

Source: Author’s own elaboration
Party activist sample: selection criteria and difficulties

My aim was to interview at least one official representative of each party chapter in Barcelona and to cover all different party cell types. I specifically targeted official party representatives in Barcelona. I sought to interview at least one additional supporter in the case of engaged party cells to better understand the activity profile and strategies of these party types. Finally, I also interviewed one current and one former Ecuadorian emigrant MP. Additional interviews resulted with three Ecuadorian emigrant candidates. Appendix C. provides an overview of what roles and posts the interviewees have performed as transnational party activists.

In total, I formally interviewed 36 transnational party activists from 16 different parties, covering 12 of the 13 parties that had been active in the last national elections. These interviewees are well distributed across the different parties. Only MPAIS activists are clearly overrepresented in my sample (11 in total). MPAIS is an engaged party that required more interviews. The party has also successfully recruited many association leaders. In five interviews with association leaders, the respondents revealed a previous or ongoing involvement in the party. The two interviewed emigrant MPs were also MPAIS members. Finally, following the 2017 elections MPAIS split into two sections. In this thesis, I focus on MPAIS under Correa, as it existed until early 2017. I, therefore, have mostly interviewed ex-MPAIS members. I also attended several meetings and events organized by the informal Correa support groups to generate contacts, build trust, and link up with the transnational political world of Ecuadorian migrants in Barcelona.

Finally, the local Peruvian APRA cell also split in 2017, yet due to internal leadership quarrels in Barcelona. For this thesis, I interviewed one member of each fraction.

Several party representatives could not be interviewed as envisioned. This concerns the local representative of MAS-IPSP (Bolivia), FP, APP, APRA (Peru), and PSC (Ecuador) in Barcelona. Trust issues, temporary party cell inactivity, and returned party leaders were the main reason for this. In response, I adapted my selection criteria and located replacement contacts. I formally interviewed campaign volunteers (MAS-IPSP), a
supporter (FP), or campaign coordinators and members close to the party cells’ inner circle (MAS-IPSP29; PSC; APRA). This also includes one brief informal fieldwork conversation with an APP campaign coordinator. This means that I still could learn about the partisan trajectories, mobilization strategies, and recruitment tactics of these parties, but that I lack in some cases more substantial information regarding party-level characteristics (e.g. FP).

The transnational party cell sample

The party activists in my sample generally inhabit or have inhabited key positions within the transnational party structure. I cover a broad range of transnational party cell types (pop-up/dormant/ad-hoc/engaged), party families (left/right), and party sizes (niche/incumbent/opposition). I also came across several cases of party cells that failed to institutionalize or broke down, which offers important insights into the difficulties that parties face abroad. This sample is obviously not representative of the party activist universe in Barcelona. However, it is heterogeneous and large enough to detect patterns of transnational party institutionalisation. Moreover, the broad coverage of transnational party chapters and party-level characteristics (e.g. funding, internal membership rights) also allows for drawing some more general conclusions.

The sample of Bolivian parties includes both the government party, MAS-IPSP, and the main opposition party, Frente de Unidad Nacional (UN). The former is a leftist party, the latter a centrist party30. Both have been dominating elections and national politics in recent years. MAS-IPSP has enjoyed almost unconditional support since its leader, Evo Morales, won the presidency in 2005. The party governed since with an absolute majority in the lower house. However, the result of a constitutional referendum in 2016 legally prohibited Morales from seeking a fourth term. However, Morales decided to ignore the result. Frequent street protests in Bolivia, and Barcelona, termed 21F to refer

29 I met this person several times during fieldwork, but I only succeeded to do the formal interview in December 2019.
30 Party ideology for all parties in this section is based on the economic left-right scale from the V-Party dataset (Lührmann et al. 2020). The dataset does not cover SUMA and Centro Democrático, which I have coded with secondary sources.
to the date of the referendum (21\textsuperscript{st} February), aimed to prevent him from postulating. Nevertheless, he ran in the 2019 October elections.

The Ecuadorian party sample is larger. It includes MPAIS, which has dominated Ecuadorian politics since its leader Rafael Correa gained office in 2006. His leftist party uninterruptedly governed Ecuador until 2021 although in a coalition with the conservative party Creando Oportunidades (CREO) and the Partido Sociedad Unida Más Acción (SUMA) between 2017 and 2021. Since 2017, its founder Rafael Correa has self-exiled in Belgium. He had endorsed his long-time vice-president Lenin Moreno for president. However, once sworn into office Moreno “began dismantling Correa’s autocratic grip on the institutions of justice and accountability” (de La Torre 2018, 83). Many high-rank party figures were imprisoned and Correa left the country. The party split into Correistas and Morenistas; a division that also split the Barcelona party cell. I focus on MPAIS under Correa. In addition, the sample includes the leftist Centro Democrático (CD), the conservative Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), and centrist Fuerza Ecuador (FE). The many Ecuadorian parties in this study reflect the slightly more institutionalized Ecuadorian party system, on the one hand (Mainwaring, Bizzarro, and Petrova 2018), and the Ecuadorian electoral system’s extra-territorial representation on the other hand, which tends to spur transnational party outreach (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020c).

The Peruvian sample includes Peruanos Por el Kambio (PPK), which had won the presidency in 2016. It also includes APRA, one of the oldest Latin American parties, founded in 1924. In addition, I collected some information on the leftist party Frente Amplio (FA), the conservative Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), and the centrist electoral coalition Alianza Para el Progreso (APP) in Barcelona. This overrepresentation of Peruvian pop-up party cells is a reflection of the poorly institutionalized party system where party-building efforts have traditionally remained low in the post-Fujimori era. Contenders rather create new party organizations before each election instead of joining or remaining loyal to existing ones (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016). The Peruvian party system is one of the least stable ones in the entire region (Mainwaring, Bizzarro, and Petrova 2018).
The size of these transnational party chapters in Barcelona is difficult to establish because of the temporality and informality of many party cells. Only a few chapters undertake active efforts to formerly inscribe their supporters as members. This is also because migrants often prefer a more flexible affiliation with the party (see also Ch. 4, Section 5) while return and onward migration make it difficult to gain accurate estimates. What is certain, however, is that engaged and ad-hoc parties are the most active ones to affiliate members. For example, MAS-IPSP had around 1500 card-bearing members. In contrast, the size of dormant party cells varies between 100 and 300 formal members. Other less institutionalized party cells only maintain campaign teams for election periods which are smaller but still can reach 40 regular activists and more.

3.2.3 Migrant associations and representatives: sampling and recruitment strategy

In this thesis, I argue that transnational parties must actively negotiate their presence within emigrant communities. In this context, migrant associations act as gatekeepers. To gain a more holistic understanding of these processes it was therefore important to also interview migrant association and federation leaders. In this thesis, I use migrant organisation and migrant association interchangeably. I follow Morales and Jorba (2010, 274) who define an association based on Knorke (1986, 2) as “a formally organized named group, most of whose members – whether persons or organizations – are not financially recompensated for their participation”. This encompasses a broad range of formal and informal associations but excludes private-sector firms, such as professional non-government agencies, ethnic businesses, and government organisations.

I limit my analysis of migrant associations to Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian organisations since these are the most relevant actors from the transnational party perspective. Citizenship is a pre-condition to be entitled to vote and shapes migrants’ interest in homeland elections. A Bolivian, Ecuadorian, or Peruvian association is defined as an association if its 1) president, 2) majority of the executive board, and 3) majority of the membership is of either Bolivian, Ecuadorian, or Peruvian origin. This includes foreign-born and second-generation migrants with at least one foreign-born parent but
excludes ethnic, pan-ethnic, or Andean organisations if the previous three criteria are not fulfilled (see Moya 2005 for a discussion on these terminologies). For theoretical and practical reasons, I limit my sample to legally registered associations. First, this comprises the largest, most prominent and most resourceful migrant organisations who are the most relevant ones for transnational parties. For another, this delimitation helps with the identification strategy and to keep my basic population sample to a manageable size. In this view, my definition is narrower than that of Morales and Jorba (2010, 274) who also include informal migrant associations and demand that only “at least nearly half of its members or half of its board members (i.e. its leadership) were of migrant origin”.

Building an association census for greater Barcelona

In the absence of a national sampling frame for associations in Barcelona, I have built an association census myself. Previous studies have applied a similar strategy (see e.g., Fennema and Tillie 1999; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007; Aparicio and Tornos 2010; Morales and Jorba 2010; Mügge 2010, 86–89; Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala 2015).

To assemble this original database I rely on the official Spanish association registers on the local, regional (Catalonia), and national levels. Since Spanish law does not state on which level associations must register, I have consulted the registers on all three levels (Aparicio and Tornos 2010; Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala 2015). Building the association census I encountered two main challenges. The first difficulty was to identify the Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian associations in the registers. Because these registers lack information regarding the national or ethnic composition of the associations I had to rely on name cues (Cortés 1998). Luckily, most migrant associations that organize based on origin chose a name with an explicit reference to their country, region, or village of origin. I started with basic search terms, such as the country names, and subsequently developed a search term sheet. On the local and regional level, I could focus on associations registered in the categories ‘immigration’. This likely led to the

31 On the local level this includes the registers from Barcelona, L'Hospital de Llobregat, and Santa Coloma de Gramenet
exclusion of several migrant church and sports groups. This, however, does not seem to be a serious limitation. The regional register from the Catalonian Ministry of Justice alone still produced 1296 migrant associations which I checked one by one to identify Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian associations and federations. This involved thorough online background searches. The national level register from the Ministry of Interior, however, does not contain an ‘immigration’ category. In this case, I exclusively relied on the search term sheet (see Appendix D). To identify associations that I might have missed. I additionally consulted the web pages of civic and ethnic umbrella organisations. I also contacted sending state institutions, but my emails remained unanswered and only the Peruvian consulate in Barcelona and the Peruvian Ministry of Labour and Employment shared an association list online. Importantly, I only added new associations to the census after confirming that they were also formally registered in one of the Spanish association registers.

The second core challenge was to know whether these associations were still active. The information in the official association registers is outdated (Aparicio and Tornos 2010; Morales and Jorba 2010; Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala 2015). Associations do not de-register when they stop functioning and public authorities do not regularly update these registers. After cleaning the data the raw census contained 267 associations whom I manually checked for their activity status. I conducted systematic internet, social media, and local press searches. As fieldwork progressed I also used information gathered during participant observations at cultural community events to verify the status of associations. This included flyers, programs, observations to detect logos, and informal conversations with other attendants. In addition, I developed an association census questionnaire that lists all associations and I asked my interviewees to kindly fill it out. I also had one consulate employee from each country, and one volunteer from a Latin American federation fill them out. The respondents indicated whether an association was currently active or not. However, going through the list is time intensive. I therefore could not present it to all my interviewees. Nevertheless, I had 22 respondents and 24 filled out questionnaires: 8 Bolivian, 9 Ecuadorian and 7 Peruvian questionnaires. I also

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32 Fedelatina Federación De Entidades Latinoamericanas De Catalunya (FEDELATINA)
asked the respondents to add associations that were missing, which I included in the census after confirming that they were legally registered. Respondents also indicated the most active associations. The results of this questionnaire also significantly informed my sampling strategy that I will explain in greater detail below.

The final association census contains 53 Bolivian associations, 33 Ecuadorian associations, and 50 Peruvian associations that all were active in greater Barcelona in 2018. In addition, it contains 4 Bolivian, 2 Ecuadorian, and 1 Peruvian federation who each acts as an umbrella organisation for several of the associations. The Bolivian associations are on average 6.5 years old while Ecuadorian associations and Peruvian associations are slightly older with 9.5 years and 12.5 years on average, respectively. In relative terms, there are 1.5 associations for every 1,000 Ecuadorians, 2 associations for every 1,000 Bolivians and 2.4 associations for every 1,000 Peruvians in the province of Barcelona (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2020b). These characteristics are most likely a reflection of the different arrival times and the specific socio-demographic composition of each community that defines the particular needs for collective organizing.

Sampling representatives of migrant organisations

To select the migrant organisations I applied a purposive sampling method. The basic idea is to “select[] information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the question under study (Patton 2002, 237). For the purpose of this investigation, I targeted the most active, and established associations, as well as all active federations. In the absence of clear guidance in the literature on how to identify salient associations, I developed several indicators myself. First, I examined whether an association is enrolled in various public registers on different levels (local, regional, national), and private registers (from civil society organizations and homeland institutions). I defined the most active and established associations as those that are listed in comparatively many

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33 For example, for the selection of interviews, Portes and colleagues (2007, 250) have focussed on the “principal organisations identified in the process of building the [associations] inventory”, but it remains unclear how they have identified the ‘principal organisations’. 
registers at a time. Second, I corroborated my assessment with press articles and the associations’ online appearances (e.g., Facebook and Webpages). As fieldwork progressed I also used insights gained from participant observations at cultural events. For example, some associations participated more than others in these events; some organized larger events than others etc. Third, I relied on the results of the association questionnaire that I have described above. Finally, I targeted the oldest still active association in Barcelona from each country.

In the beginning, I cold contacted several federations and associations via email with the information sheet attached. Contact information was available in the registers and online. However, the response rate was very low and I resorted to phone calls. I used my first interviewees for contact details generation and reference. However, I also successfully cold-phoned several leaders. This way, I succeeded to create several entries to the field and could minimize the risk of selection bias that is commonly associated with snowball sampling. I carried out interviews until saturation was reached. Saturation was defined as 1) having interviewed the most salient associations as by my definition above, and 2) when interviewees would refer to institutions whose leaders I already had interviewed.

In total, I interviewed 33 representatives from 32 migrant organisations in Barcelona. This equals 23.5% of all active Andean organisations in Barcelona in 2018. In all cases, I interviewed the current president of the organisation. It was not uncommon that a president would lead or at least be involved in more than one association. Their insights thus moreover allowed for identifying associative patterns and dynamics beyond my sample.

Only a few association leaders refused to be interviewed and in these cases, I easily found replacement cases. The only somewhat significant organisation that is missing in my sample is the Federación Peruana Cataluña (Fepercat). However, I interviewed one

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34 In the case of two associations I cannot reveal the interviewee’s position within the association or the institution’s name due to their request to stay anonymous. In the case of the Fedebol, the very first Latin American federation in Catalonia, I interviewed the current general secretary and one former president.
current and one former member of the federation with some insight knowledge. Similarly, I never interviewed the president of the Federación de Fraternidades Cruceñas en Cataluña (Fedecruz), but I extensively interviewed one of its founding members on the current executive board and informally interviewed the president of the federation during a cultural event.

The final sample consists of 3 Bolivian and 2 Ecuadorian federations; 6 Bolivian, 10 Ecuadorian, and 11 Peruvian associations. Appendix D contains a full list and the interviewees’ internal position. The sample of Bolivian associations may seem small in light of the 53 active Bolivian associations in the city. This, however, is no reason for concern. First, the majority of these associations engage in dance activities. During interviews with Bolivian cultural dance associations, I soon reached saturation in terms of information and answers. Second, I interviewed more federations than in the other countries. These federations group between 7 and 12 associations; yet, none of these associations I have individually interviewed. Third, I attended a large number of community events where I approached leaders of Bolivian associations for informal conversations about their relationship to homeland politics and parties (see Section 3.4 Participant Observations).

My sample of Andean migrant associations and federations covers a great range of organisations. They vary in size, activity profiles, and transnational outreach. The large majority of associations groups between 10 and 50 members. In particular Peruvian organisations tend to be smaller in comparison. However, only one-fifth of all organisations reach a membership base larger than 100. All organisations rely on volunteers. Only one association from each country stated to receive public funding. Federations tend to apply for public funding to organize large-scale events. In contrast, associations try to stay independent and avoid complex funding applications. They autofinance themselves with fundraisers, donations, and some charge a membership fee. The majority take advantage of the local infrastructure and uses public civic centres to meet. Others struck agreements with local ethnic associations, foundations, schools, or

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35 I also interviewed one Ecuadorian federation (Feelcat) that was still in the process of regularizing. The organisation was relevant for the study and regularized in 2019 shortly after fieldwork had finished.
Catalan and Spanish associations (e.g. Galicia). A few organisations, including two of the Bolivian federations, meet in cafés, restaurants and homes, or rent private spaces for their activities. Only six associations and one Ecuadorian federation maintain their own meeting space.

From the 32 migrant organisations in my sample, all but three associations engage in cultural host country activities. This includes practising and performing traditional folkloric dances, organising music, culinary, or theatre workshops, offering indigenous language classes, hosting literary readings, and participating in local cultural festivals, amongst others. In addition, half of these organisations simultaneously engage in civic work in relation to the host country. They help immigrants to regularize, offer Catalan or English language classes, IT seminars, entrepreneur workshops, or help to find work. Some organize workshops on gender violence or household management, collaborate with the local Red Cross for specific events, or gather funds to support compatriots in Spain. In a cross-country perspective, half of all interviewed Peruvian and Bolivian associations exclusively focus on cultural work in the host country while Ecuadorian associations in particular tend to combine this with civic engagement.

Some organisations also engage in transnational civic activities. Five associations regularly engage in different forms of development work. For example, they gather funds to alleviate needs in local homeland localities and send medicine or hospital equipment. Another four associations sporadically have become involved in the past, for example, to organize fundraisers for natural disaster relief or to ship containers with toys for children to the homeland. Occasional transnational engagement is more common among Ecuadorian and Peruvian organisations (1/4 of all organisations) while the Peruvian transnationals tend to stay regularly involved (1/4 of all Peruvian organisations).
3.2.4 Participant observations

Participant observations were an additional essential part of my data collection strategy. It is conceived as a method “whereby the researcher more or less actively participates with people in commonplace situations and everyday life settings while observing and otherwise collecting information” (Jorgensen 2015, 1, emphasis in original). It is an appropriate methodology to study transnational politics which is a phenomenon about which “little is known”, and that is “somehow obscured from the view of outsiders”, (Jorgensen 1989, 12–13).

During fieldwork, I carried out 50 logged participant observations. I attended a great variety of events that range from folkloric dance activities over consulate events to street protests, town hall meetings with homeland MPs, and general elections. Table 3.5 summarises these events by country of origin and the type of event. Importantly, political events can have a cultural component and vice-versa (see also Ch. 6), which this table does not reflect. Appendix E includes a detailed list of all events. The participant observations were important to gain entry to the field, generate contacts, build rapport, and to collect primary data for the analysis. Moreover, immersing myself in these different worlds was crucial to understand network structures, and the natural realities, dynamics and context in which transnational politics takes place in Barcelona.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Event Character</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Latin America/Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own elaboration
In the beginning, I relied on Facebook to learn about the Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian events in the city. I primarily consulted the consulates’ social media accounts and Latin Americans Facebook groups in Barcelona. As fieldwork progressed, people also send me invitations and added me to WhatsApp groups. The latter was particularly helpful because it permitted me to enter more closed settings. At events, I approached people and presented myself as a doctoral researcher from the University of Sussex and the Universidad Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), which hosted me as a visiting doctoral student during the entire fieldwork period. The UAB is locally well-known which helped build rapport. These events allowed me to meet new people, and later also to strengthen already existing relationships. I also used these occasions to present myself and my project in person to association leaders whom I wished to interview. We would exchange phone numbers and later set up the interview. Later on, it also occurred that people recognized me from previous events which helped build rapport and establish trust. The participant observations also allowed me to create several entries to the field and to access different social circles. For example, following an event observation, I succeeded to interview some Bolivian opposition party activists whom I would not be able to locate otherwise.

Finally, the participant observations were essential to generate primary data. I took notes on-site and wrote small field reports at home. These reports included my observations and information gathered from informal conversations. For example, I noted who attended the events, but also which actors were absent. I also logged the place of the events. A transnational party meeting at the office of a Spanish party would reveal the proximity of their relationship. Informal conversations with attendees allowed me to triangulate information from interviews, contextualize my findings, and gather new data. For example, I asked about the presence of transnational parties in the community. Yet, I also encountered suspicion and distrust when I wanted to talk about politics although I always revealed my role as a researcher. Next to public events, I also participated in several private meetings. Here I inevitably further moved on the continuum from a “non-participant participant observer” to a “participant observer” (Riemer 2012, 172). I attended semi-open and closed assemblies of political groups which were crucial for my understanding of the strategies that parties deploy to
approach migrants and the difficulties that they face. Similarly, I participated in social
activities and meetings of migrant organizations to better understand how they organize
and interact, and what issues they face. Finally, I also attended two national elections in
Barcelona during fieldwork. However, migrants perceived these elections as of low
importance in comparison with the general elections. I, thus, did not observe significant
campaign activity which may distort the comparative analysis.

During my participant observations, I sought to maintain a neutral position. This,
however, was sometimes challenging because people wanted to involve me. In
particular group pictures at political meetings are difficult because they tend to be
posted on social media, which could undermine my access to other groups. So as not to
offend anyone I offered to take the picture myself. This way I also could maintain a
neutral role to the outside world.

The data that I collected via participant observations during fieldwork has informed my
data analysis and understanding of the Andean communities in Barcelona in general. On
various occasions in this thesis I moreover explicitly draw on my fieldwork reports from
the participant observations.

3.2.5 Additional data sources

In addition to the qualitative interviews, participant observations, and the original
association census I also build on a range of secondary data sources. This includes law
and policy documents to better understand the sending state outreach, press releases
from migrant organisations and political party cells in Barcelona, as well as newspaper
articles and social media to corroborate and contextualize my findings. For example,
policy documents were used to understand the special representation implementation
process in Peru (Ch. 6). Newspaper articles and press releases were important to learn

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36 I also attended five transnational elections in Barcelona after fieldwork had officially finished to improve
my understanding of transnational electoral processes: The 2019 and 2020 Bolivian presidential elections;
the 2021 Ecuadorian general elections (see also, Fliess 2021a); the 2020 and 2021 Peruvian general
elections.
about the conflict between the Bolivian consulate and the migrant associations (Ch. 6). Facebook pages of party cells gave me invaluable insights into some of the social activities that they conduct in Barcelona (Ch. 4).

For Chapter 4, Section 3.1 I analyse the trajectories of 216 candidates in the 2016 Peruvian legislative elections to identify non-resident candidates. I rely on the Curriculum Vitae (CV) that the electoral commission of Peru (Jurado Nacional de Peru, JNE) provides for each candidate on its webpage\(^\text{37}\). These CVs contain information on the study and employment periods abroad. I define emigrant candidates as candidates who have resided abroad during the (pre-)campaign period in 2015/16. However, I exclude short stays abroad, such as leadership training or consultancy work. To validate each emigrant candidates I conducted systematic online background searches. For example, Alberto de Belaunde (PPK) studied a Master’s degree in Barcelona in 2016 but simultaneously worked in a local Peruvian government agency since 2011. Since I could not confirm his physical presence in Barcelona, I have not coded him as an emigrant candidate. I afterwards was able to confirm my coding decision via email with him\(^\text{38}\). In my analysis, I focus on the six parties that won at least one seat in the Lima Metropolitan district. This is the district where emigrant votes are counted\(^\text{39}\). I focus only on the 2016 elections because data for the 2011 elections is not available and the 2020 elections were held after the fieldwork had finished.

Finally, for Chapter 6, Section 6.2 I analyse the electoral programs of 15 Peruvian parties and electoral alliances that have contested the 2011 or 2016 elections. I simply code the presence of specific emigrant policy pledges in these programs and sub-code whether a party promises to create an extra-territorial representation in the Peruvian parliament. I rely on a number of search terms to identify the relevant passages\(^\text{40}\). I limit my analysis to the 10 most voted parties and electoral coalitions in each election. The party manifestos were retrieved online from various trustworthy sources.

\(^{37}\) [https://consultalistacandidato.jne.gob.pe](https://consultalistacandidato.jne.gob.pe), accessed [May 2022]

\(^{38}\) Email conversation with Alberto de Belaunde, 11.07.2022.

\(^{39}\) See footnote 8.

\(^{40}\) These search terms are: distrito, circunscripción, exterior, representación, migrante, migrar, emigrante, emigrar, consulado, remesas, PEX (and various variations and inflected forms)
4 Transnational party activism: why migrants become active in home country parties

I am telling you, Javier he had a van. Because he has a print shop and so he has a van. And he fully lined that van with MPAIS [campaign advertising]. And wherever he went, thus, he went with his MPAIS campaign advertising. It was his van, and it was full of pictures of [the party’s presidential candidate] Rafael Correa. All over. And he did the advertising himself because he had a print shop.

Anabell, ex-member MPAIS, Ecuador

Until today we have been volunteering. We have even contributed with our own money to do the campaigns, to buy the material, the flags, to print the pamphlets or leaflets. We even have organized activities to raise money with [selling] food. That is to say that above all we have been auto-financed.

Fabian, party activist, MAS-IPSP, Bolivia

We have received absolutely nothing from nobody. Everybody contributes out of his own pocket.

Carlos N., member APRA, Peru

Emigrant partisans are the heart of any transnational on-the-ground election campaign. They line up in front of metro and bus stations to distribute their pamphlets, knock on doors of ethnic restaurants to leave their party brochure and coax their peers and family members to vote or visit the neighbourhood clubs on weekends to mobilize supporters. Most importantly, however, they donate their free time, and oftentimes their own money. Emigrant partisans demonstrate an overwhelming commitment to a political party that seeks office in a country in which they do not reside anymore. Some transnational parties continue their activities after election day. Emigrant partisans organize and participate in party meetings, social party events and anti-government protests, help enrol new party members, partake in working groups, or even travel to party conventions. In this chapter, I explore what motivates and incentivises migrants to dedicate parts of their life to the home country party machinery. Why do migrants engage in home country parties? What motivates, incentivises or constrains their partisan commitment? These are the main questions I aim to answer in this chapter.
In light of the apparent importance of emigrant party members to sustain transnational party activity, it is surprising how little we still know about them. A wealth of studies has investigated why migrants engage in political transnationalism, including voting, and electoral politics more generally (see e.g., Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Waldinger 2008; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017; Chaudhary 2018; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020; Finn 2020). These works provide an important foundation to understand transnational party activism, but controversially they tend to focus on why someone can politically participate as opposed to why someone wants to participate. The problem is that only because someone has the resources, networks, and skills to politically participate, this does not mean that someone also will want to do it (Whiteley and Seyd 2002, 40). To better address the question of why migrants participate in transnational parties, we must pay closer attention to their motivations. For example, previous qualitative work has argued that a sense of civic duty (Knott 2017), patriotic feelings (Boccagni 2011; Boccagni and Ramírez 2013) or a sense of belonging (McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015) shape emigrants’ voting behaviour. Expanding on this, I embed my analysis in a specific theoretical party member framework that emphasizes the importance of individual motivations.

I draw on the General Incentive Model (GIM) to conceptualize the motivations of migrants to become active in a transnational political party. The GIM has been developed by Seyd and Whiteley in 1992 and has since gained a firm standing in comparative political party research (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Seyd and Whiteley 2004; Van Haute and Gauja 2015a; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019; Power and Dommett 2020). At the time of writing, only Collard and Kernalegenn (2021) have specifically analysed the motivations of emigrants to join a home country party41. Their case study of British party members abroad also uses the GIM but contains several caveats. For one, their analysis ignores the role of individual resources; a key factor in both party member research and political transnationalism. For another, they focus on card-bearing members in an established democracy. As I will demonstrate, this means

41 Setrana and Owasu’s (2015) study of Ghanaian party members in Amsterdam analyses their demographic characteristics but does not explicitly engage with their motivations to join.
that they neglect the informal dimension that characterises many (transnational) party chapters, in particular in less developed democracies (see e.g. Levitsky 2003; Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Gherghina, Iancu, and Soare 2018).

In this chapter, I address these shortcomings. I provide the first systematic analysis of emigrants’ motivations to join transnational parties in developing democracies. In line with research on domestic party members in established democracies and Latin America, I find that emigrants primarily become active in a party for political motives that evolve around collective benefits (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 1994; Whiteley, Seyd, and Billinghurst 2006; Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Scarrow 2015, 158–159; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Power and Dommett 2020; Sells 2020). Emigrants engage in parties to politically influence their country of origin and to promote specific policies. A strong sense of patriotism and altruism also play an important role. These findings resonate with Collard and Kernalegenn (2021), but also provide important refinements. In contrast to transnational British party members, Andean emigrants attach much more importance to material benefits and identification with the party leader. This is due to the more clientelist and personalized nature of Latin American politics (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Stokes et al. 2013). In addition, Andean parties provide opportunities to socialize but this dimension is less important to explain party enrolment than suggested by Collard and Kernalegenn (2021). Moreover, I find that migrants use home country parties as vehicles to advance their goals vis-à-vis the host society. They organize street protests and lobby the local government for more recognition. These findings offer nuances to previous work that, so far, has suggested that immigrant politics only gains importance for transnational parties from countries “where the institutional incentives for the development of parties abroad are absent or minimal” (Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020b, 12).

This chapter is organized into five sub-sections. In each section, I will deal with one of the five key components of the GIM. My analysis starts with the collective goods

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42 Social norms also are key component of the GIM. Party scholars operationalize social norms by asking whether members were recruited through the influence of friends, or relatives (e.g., Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Young and Cross 2002; Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Ribeiro and Do...
dimension (4.1.), followed by emotional motivations (4.2.), selective outcome benefits (4.3.), and selective process benefits (4.4.). Finally, I discuss the importance of individual resources (4.5.) and the main conclusions of this chapter (4.6.).

4.1 The desire to produce collective goods

The emigrant party activists that I interviewed believe that their engagement can make a real difference. I find that the desire to produce collective goods is the strongest motivation for emigrants to join a transnational party. They aim to ‘change the homeland’ and seek to promote, reverse or prevent certain policies. Moreover, home country parties serve as platforms to make claims towards their host society. In this section, I differentiate between homeland politics and immigrant politics (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b) to highlight these multifaced ways in which emigrants use home country parties for collective organizing.

4.1.1 Homeland politics: change the homeland

The desire to change the homeland has motivated half of all interviewed emigrant partisans to join a transnational party. Most of them feel that the economic, or political situation in their country of origin had forced them to emigrate. In their view, transnational party activism offers a pathway to improve the country that they had to leave behind. It is striking that they often have joined newly founded parties which provide a more credible platform for systematic change.

Ecuador: the promise to get out of the crisis

Most Ecuadorians, including those migrant partisans in this study, have emigrated to Spain in the late 1990s and early 2000s in response to the proliferating economic crisis in Ecuador (Bertoli, Moraga, and Ortega 2011). The banking system collapsed and

Amaral 2019) or include their membership in other organizations (Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019). In chapter 5, I extensively discuss the role of social networks and membership in host country organizations. I therefore will not specifically engage with social norms it in this present chapter.
hyperinflation devalued in record speed Ecuador’s currency, leading the country to adopt the US-Dollar in early 2000. This prompted rising unemployment, and significantly increased living costs (Gratton 2005). In 2000 alone, around 4% of the population left the country (Gratton 2005, 38). Unsurprisingly, these emigrants blame the political elite for their emigration. Rampant corruption scandals, nepotism, and a failed coup caused a crisis of legitimacy (Conaghan 2011). Between 1997 and 2005, six presidents had taken turns; one resigned only after five days43. Many emigrants must have felt like Carlos X.B..

Well, we went into exile because I will call it exile. It is not that we wanted to. We did not want to migrate. Because of the situation I told you about more than two million Ecuadorians exiled. So, that’s why we are here.

Carlos X.B., party activist (MPAIS; CD, Ecuador)

The 2006 presidential elections, finally, brought some political stability. MPAIS, founded by Rafael Correa that same year, ran in an electoral coalition with other leftist and indigenous parties and won the presidency. Meanwhile, emigrants had gained political importance in the public discourse and had been allowed to vote (Araujo 2009, 39–41). Emigrants had been identified as the major victims of the crisis (Araujo 2009; Boccagni 2014; Herrera 2011) while being championed as savours whose remittances had become crucial during the crisis (Araujo 2009). Between 1999 and 2008 remittances comprised between 5.0% - 7.2% of the GDP (World Bank 2020). MPAIS initiated a state transformation process that incorporated emigrants on various levels (Boccagni 2014; Margheritis 2016, Ch. 4; Pedroza and Palop-García 2017; Pugh 2017; Ramírez 2017; Ramírez and Olavarria 2016; Sánchez Bautista 2017). Correa had already made promises to emigrants in his 2006 election program, and he frequently addressed non-resident voters in his campaign speeches (Araujo 2009, 58–61; Sánchez Bautista 2017, 67). Despite this outreach, Correa lost in 2006 both rounds abroad44. Nevertheless, the party succeeded to lay the foundation for a transnational party structure in Europe. Esteban Melo, who later would become an emigrant MP (2013-2021) was one of MPAIS’s early founding members in Europe.

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44 More detailed emigrant election results available for the 1st round show that Correa came third abroad (22.9%), in Spain (19.5%) and in Barcelona (17.7%) respectively.
Not participating makes you an accomplice because you permit the others to be there [in government]. I could neither be an accomplice nor be passive towards the destruction of the country, so I had to participate. We must change things.

Esteban Melo, MP ex-MPAIS (Ecuador)

Many Ecuadorians in Spain saw a chance to transform their country. As Alba, a former MPAIS campaign coordinator recalls “At that time, we saw in MPAIS an alternative to get out of the crisis from which we fled”. It is significant that six Ecuadorian partisans\(^{45}\), whom I had interviewed in their capacity as migrant association leaders, were personally active for MPAIS in Barcelona at some point. One of them is Luis, leader of the association JOVECUC.

We believed that it is possible to change the country from abroad and we believed in a new era, a new change, a new political profile.

Luis, ex-member MPAIS, president JOVECUC (Ecuador)

The party’s message of change and hope during a time of crisis strongly resonated with many of the migrants that I interviewed. Following the 2006 elections, MPAIS won all subsequent elections in Spain, securing the two seats of the European, Asia and Oceania constituency ever since. Naturally, other more recently founded parties like CREO\(^{46}\) also served as a vehicle for migrants to foster change.

For now, I think that CREO is the best opportunity to get there and change Ecuador.

Maria R., candidate CREO 2017, vice-president CREO Catalonia (Ecuador)

CREO’s 2017 campaign slogan stated “Everybody for the change”. However, the idea of change has been particularly prominent among MPAIS activists. Previous works have well documented Correa’s discursive outreach towards the diaspora, which had been accompanied by a comprehensive policy framework (Boccagni 2014; Margheritis 2011; Margheritis 2016, Ch. 6; Ramírez and Olavarria 2016; Pedroza and Palop-García 2017; Pugh 2017; Ramírez 2017; Sánchez Bautista 2017). My analysis in this chapter adds to this debate in important ways by showing that emigrants have been very receptive to

\(^{45}\) Alba, Annabell, Sonia, Milton, Luis, Paco*

* name anonymized

\(^{46}\) The party was founded in 2012
these outreach efforts. Some of them have become highly active partisans in the transnational Correa movement.

Peru: the promise of ending corruption

The ‘change the home country’ narrative has also been present in interviews with Peruvian emigrant partisans. Five of nine respondents stated a desire to politically change the homeland. It is striking that they also have tended to join newly founded parties. Peruvian parties had trouble gaining a firm standing after Alberto Fujimori’s autogolpe in 1992, which transformed the country into a competitive authoritarian regime (Cotler 1995; Tanaka 1998; Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Carrión 2006). The already weak party system collapsed, and while Fujimori’s removal from office in 2000 raised hopes to restore democracy, his dictatorial legacy casts a long shadow over present-day Peru. Elections are again free and fair but overall democracy remains weakly institutionalized (Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016). Politicians continue to copy Fujimori’s winning formula and create a new party before every election cycle (Roberts 2006; Levitsky 2018). Parties have been reduced to personalistic, label-carrying vessels to gain power (Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016). Moreover, high-profile corruption cases and power abuse have remained a major problem. Five of the six presidents after Fujimori have been convicted, stand trial or are currently investigated due to corruption. A journalist investigation from July 2020 revealed that 68 of the 130 Congress deputies were currently under criminal investigation by the Public Ministry (Marchán 2020). In this political climate it is easy to promise change, but hard to have citizens believe in it. Indeed, several Peruvian activists had long abstained from party politics because no party offered a real alternative. For example, Fernando47 had come to Barcelona in 2000, but it was not until 2011 that he engaged with the Partido Nacional Peruano (PNP), a party that had only been founded in 2005, but which would win the presidency that same year.

The directive board and the whole base, and everybody .. that was a lot of people. They had the hope that they would see change. A real change even.

47 Name anonymized
That there will be a very profound change. We had this hope, a lot of people ... so I joined.

Fernando, party activist PNP (Peru)

The party’s candidate, Ollanta Humala, a political outsider who ran on a centre-left platform, faced a stand-off in the second round with Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of ex-dictator Alberto Fujimori. The fear to return to the autocratic past mobilized other emigrants to support Humala in the run-off. Isabela had immigrated to Barcelona in early 2000. She had experienced Peru under Fujimori and was committed to preventing his daughter’s re-election. She volunteered to represent the PNP as poll watcher on election day.

And so in the second round .. of course for us it was so important that Keiko won’t win. And so we wanted Humala to win ... We believed in him and the transformation ... a big group of us went celebrating, waiting for the results throughout the night. We celebrated and believed that there will be a change.

Isabela, party activist FA (Peru)

At first, the election win encouraged an institutionalization of the PNP party chapter in Barcelona. Yet, once Humala took office “[h]is promise of a “great transformation” became a joke among Peruvians, who noted that Humala’s only transformation was his own” (Vergara and Watanabe 2019, 36). Many emigrant partisans “felt disillusioned. They felt betrayed” (Interview Fernando, party activist). Eventually, the Conga conflict was the straw that broke the camel’s back, provoking the dissolution of the party chapter in Barcelona. Some of the former PNP partisans even organized protests against Humala, the president whom they had fiercely backed just half a year ago.

In 2012, a new Peruvian party, *Tierra y Libertad*, attempted to take root in Barcelona. Marco Arana, a Peruvian environmental activist, had regularly come to Barcelona since 2009 to forge alliances with Catalan NGOs. Several emigrants joined *Frente Amplio* (FA)

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48 Name anonymized
49 Name anonymized
50 Name anonymized
51 In 2012, pro-environment protesters organized against the Conga mining project in Northern Peru. The Humala administration responded with the armed forces. Five individuals died, and several ministers resigned.
for his election campaign in 2016 (Interview Isabela). They donated money, created advertisement content, and represented the party at polling booths on election day. FA offered a credible platform for change according to one of the campaign organizers in Barcelona: “we saw that it was a favourable alternative for Peru”. This activist had come to Europe in 1988 but remained politically inactive until 2016.

... for the first time in my entire life, after almost four decades a leftist movement ... gave way for hope to people to get to know something different in Peru. So yes, this hope of FA caught me. I fully dedicated myself to supporting the candidature of FA here in Barcelona.

Miguel\footnote{Name anonymized}, former party activist FA (Peru)

The new electoral coalition also attracted former partisans of other parties who had been disappointed, recalled one respondent: “all the people who were with Partido Nacional [Peru (PNP)], a lot of people switched to the FA” (Interview Fernando). Although the party did not win the presidency, it became the third strongest force in Congress. Emigrants were eager to extend the party’s base in Barcelona. However, tensions rose because new activists appeared who were widely unknown within the community.

I saw them in the meetings I went to, these guys who came with the mandate from Lima ... also they were very close with the directive board there [in Lima] ... They did not know anyone, but they wanted the leadership ... so what was happening there was like taking advantage of us who are active [here] for years, the resources, the contacts, and everything but they wanted to appropriate all that.

Isabela, party activist FA (Peru)

These tensions encouraged Isabela and the other emigrant party activists to leave the party. Although the party’s 2016 electoral success offered an opportunity to participate more in the decision-making processes in Peru, they acted on their agency and abandoned the party. In the end, FA failed to establish a formal party presence in Barcelona, partly because the party lost its trust within the migrant community.
Bolivia: a different type of change?

In the Bolivian case, the ‘change the homeland’ narrative has been more mixed. While partisans of the opposition party UN emphasized their desire to foster change, partisans of the government party MAS-IPSP have not talked about change. MAS-IPSP had come into power in 2005 following the party system breakdown in the 2000s. The Bolivian party system started shaking when new politicians, oftentimes members of the indigenous and mestizo community, empowered by decentralisation reforms in the mid-1990s, entered the political front stage (van Cott 2005; Anria 2018). Cultural and ethnic identity cleavages had given rise to new grassroots-based political organisations that succeeded to build large support coalitions (Faguet 2018). Social unrest further fuelled the political upheaval. Protesters clashed with government forces in the Cochabamba “Water War” (2000)53, and the “Bolivian gas conflict” (2003)54. In 2003, President Sánchez de Lozada resigned and fled into exile. His successor, Carlos Mesa, won the following elections, but he too was ousted in 2005 due to the resurgence of social unrest over Bolivia’s natural gas policy55. The MAS-IPSP successfully swayed the social protest forces and its candidate, Evo Morales, became Bolivia’s first indigenous president. The party has its origin in social peasant and Coca farmer movements and had been founded less than ten years ago (Anria 2018).

Notwithstanding that emigration had increased by more than 50% between 2000 and 2005 (United Nations 2019b), emigrants did not receive the same level of attention as in the case of Ecuador. Unlike Correa, Morales did not include any emigrant-related policy issues in his first electoral program or address emigrants when he first took office (Evo Morales, Inauguration Speech, 22. Jan. 2006). While the Morales administration improved consulate services and granted non-resident citizens the right to vote, at large emigration remained low on the political agenda (Hinojosa and de la Torre 2014).

53 In 2000, several street protests were organized against the privatization of the public water supply in Cochabamba. These protests prompted the government to declare a state of siege, which ultimately escalated in violent encounters between protesters and the military.
54 Violent confrontations between protesters and government forces over the use of Bolivia’s natural gas reserves.
55 In 2004, the Bolivian government held the ‘gas referendum’. The voters decided to stop the gas project. The government, however, ignored the referendum and continued with the project to satisfy its multinational investors, IMF and World Bank donors.
In Barcelona, MAS-IPSP supporters started organizing in 2008. One of them was David who had arrived in Barcelona in 2006. He participated in the previously mentioned Cochabamba “Water War” and the “Bolivian gas conflict”, which had made him receptive to actively supporting MAS-IPSP. In the following year, Bolivians abroad could vote for the first time and emigrant partisans, including David, actively campaigned in Barcelona for the re-election of Evo Morales.

The party’s 2009 and 2014 electoral programs included promises to improve protection mechanisms for Bolivians abroad. Hinojosa and colleagues (2016, 121) argue that “in return ... emigrants were expected to support the political project of the new Government with their vote”. Indeed, in both presidential elections emigrant support for Morales surpassed inland ratios by 10%. As Fabian, a MAS-IPSP activist, put it, “there is no other Bolivian organization [in Barcelona] that only dedicates itself to defending the rights of all Bolivians”. He and the two other MAS-IPSP partisans whom I interviewed claimed that they wanted to contribute to the homeland but they did not talk about changing the homeland.

Change can be understood in various ways. Previous experiences shape how emigrants perceive the political developments in their country of origin. For example, Walter had already been politically active in the 1970s and early 1980s during the dictatorship in Bolivia. He had been collaborating with the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) due to which he was temporarily imprisoned. Soon after he emigrated to Barcelona. Once the country had transitioned to a democracy in the 1980s, he returned. The MIR party had gained power and offered him a government post. However, he fast became disillusioned with the widespread corruption, so he re-emigrated to Barcelona. New parties started emerging in Bolivia. In the 2009 elections, Walter became politically active again to preserve the ongoing democratisation process in Bolivia.

Informal fieldwork conversation; name anonymized.
Election results MAS-IPSP: 2009 Elections: 64% in Bolivia vs. 76% abroad; 2014: 61% in Bolivia vs. 72% abroad
There was rising hope for the country and moreover, I was disappointed by the people on the left. Of course, having been in prison, and having had to leave the country .. the corruption cases of the MIR [party]. many MIR supporters allied with the MAS-IPSP party or switched to UN. And I believed the UN had a more Centralist position. And this was the reason why I joined them, trying moreover to build a broad front since 2009 that could confront this resurgence [of the MAS-IPSP] that already since its beginnings had a populist and totalitarian tendency.

Walter, party activist, UN (Bolivia)

The party commitment of Walter is framed as a desire to prevent an ongoing change in Bolivia. Accordingly, the local campaign team approached voters in Barcelona proclaiming that “we were the change that could stop the governing party”, recalls Ariel, the general secretary of UN in Barcelona.

Many emigrants also expressed specific ideas of how this change should look. Around one fourth of the respondents emphasized that the party’s program was a major reason as for why they had become active in the party. This alignment has been important regardless of country of origin. Moreover, several interviewees sought to improve specific homeland policy areas. Above all, they stressed social services with an emphasis on gender equality. There have been no differences across countries or the ideological left-right axis. Finally, Ecuadorian activists of MPAIS emphasized the achievements of their party. They have referred to the infrastructure projects of the Correa administration (e.g., highways, hospitals etc.), and improved social services (health, education). Clearly, they see party activism as an effective tool to help further develop the country. These findings demonstrate that Andean parties, and MPAIS in particular, have succeeded to establish themselves as credible agents of change that invite non-resident citizens to support the home country transformation process. However, to which extent these parties actually promote positive changes and democratisation is another question (Levitsky and Loxton 2013).

4.1.2 Emigrant politics: sending state policies

Emigrant partisans also recognize home country parties as important vehicles to produce collective goods in the transnational arena. Nearly half of all emigrant partisans
have emphasized the desire to improve their countries’ emigrant policies. Across all three cases, respondents highlighted the need to improve consulate services. In the Bolivian case, partisans claim that these services have gradually improved due to their lobbying work, which suggests that transnational party activism can indeed be an effective tool to improve the situation of citizens abroad. Peruvian partisans also demanded a return assistance program and a homeland investment scheme; however, both demands have not been met yet. In comparison with Bolivian and Peruvian partisans, Ecuadorians have been the most vocal to demand more emigrant rights. Respondents highlighted the following three policy fields. First, they demand more economic policies, especially state aid to support migrant entrepreneurship. Second, they advocated for improved transnational social services, especially repatriation support. Third, they have called for more state assistance in relation to return migration.

Ecuadorian parties have shown a much stronger commitment to connecting with emigrants, which helps explain why Ecuadorians have been particularly responsive to these collective policy incentives. In the absence of designated parliamentary seats for migrants, political parties lack the capacity but also a greater interest to build programmatic linkages with non-resident citizens. While partisans from all three countries engage in home country parties to foster change in the homeland, they do not seek to influence emigrant politics to the same extent. Ecuadorian partisans strive to improve their situation abroad. Bolivian partisans have pursued similar goals but concentrated more on the consulate. In contrast, Peruvian emigrants have tended to focus on the homeland. One explanation is that party and state outreach towards emigrants has been much higher in the Ecuadorian and Bolivian cases, which has opened opportunities for emigrants to raise demands (see on state outreach, Pedroza and Palop-García 2017).

4.1.3 Immigrant politics

Collective incentives can also evolve around immigrant politics. Emigrants use transnational parties as hubs to coordinate immigrant protest activities, participate in public debates, or implement public community projects. Immigrant politics gain
significance between transnational election campaigns for party activists of *engaged parties*.

Members of the Bolivian MAS-IPSP regularly participate in protest activities. Most prominently, this includes Labour Day protests and the anti-racism protests on October 12th, but the party cell also mobilizes around other issues, explains Fabian, one of its supporters.

... when it is about certain claims that also affect us, such as cuts in health, education or the curtailment of freedoms.

Fabian, party activists MAS-IPSP (Bolivia)

The MAS-IPSP cell also regularly participated in public political debates concerning immigrant issues. Members of APRA have participated in protests “against measures of the right” in Spain and “against the PP government”, organized by PSOE (Interview Carlos N.). These inter-party connections are very common. The Peruvian APRA party and the Ecuadorian MPAIS have signed written agreements of mutual assistance with the Spanish PSOE, while MAS-IPSP has forged an alliance with Podemos. In Chapter 5, I will offer more details on these collaborations and demonstrate how home country parties use these venues for recruitment purposes.

These inter-party collaborations also serve migrants to realize community projects. In the early 2000s, the APRA chapter in Barcelona became invested to name a public plaza in Barcelona after the party’s founder, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, who has evolved to become a key figure in Peru’s history. PSOE was essential to help find and obtain a suitable terrain. In November 2008, the plaza’s place and name were finally approved. Another ten years passed until the plaza was officially inaugurated. An ongoing struggle persists to deploy a bust and an information plate at the plaza. That said, migrants use home country parties to lobby for more recognition and visibility of their collective on the part of the host society. The plaza project and protest activities vividly demonstrate

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58 That day street protests are organized in Barcelona to denounce the colonization of Latin America that began that day in 1492 with Christopher Columbus’ “discovery of Latin America”. It is a national holiday in Spain.
59 PSOE signed similar agreements with: The Dominican PRD and PRM; The Lebanese Socialist Party; the Moroccan USFP, among others.
that transnational parties are multifaceted venues which migrants use to gain influence in host country politics. This finding extends previous works that have tended to overlook the immigrant dimension of transnational party politics.

One reason for this oversight might be that not every transnational party cell also mobilizes around immigrant issues. For example, the Ecuadorian Correista group focuses on homeland issues. During fieldwork, the group organized several anti-government protests. They also lobbied host country politicians. In September 2018, they met with Javi Lopéz (PSOE), a member of the European Parliament to gain support for their demands; one of them was to release Jorge Glaas, Ecuador’s former vice president, from prison. I also attended three internal assembly meetings during which immigrant politics were not discussed at all. This ‘negative case’ illustrates that not all party activists use homeland parties to mobilize around immigrant issues. It seems that in particular heated homeland politics can render immigrant politics of secondary importance.

4.2 Emotional motivations

In the previous section, I have argued that emigrant partisans champion political home country parties as effective instruments to shape the future of their country of origin. Yet, the question remains, why do citizens care about changing a country that they have left many years or sometimes even decades ago? A cost-benefit analysis of party activism alone would fall short of fully explaining why individuals join home country parties. According to the GIM emotional, altruistic or affective incentives also play an important role (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Power and Dommett 2020). In this section, I demonstrate that patriotic feelings, a strong sense of altruism, and identification with party figures are essential factors that help explain transnational party activism. Moreover, I argue that political socialization processes experienced in the homeland, and a transnational party outreach further shape these factors.
4.2.1 Homeland patriotism and altruism

Homeland patriotism refers to a feeling of how emigrants relate to their country of origin. It can be defined as “a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation” (Huddy and Khatib 2007, 65). More than one third of all emigrant partisans have made patriotic statements during the interview to explain why they had become active in a home country party. They declared to love their homeland, or that they feel an obligation to contribute to the home country. This sense of national loyalty is paramount to understanding transnational high-intensity party activism. The following quotes are illustrative of how party activists frame their engagement as a form of patriotism.

To work in politics is to want the good for our country.
Maria R., vice president CREO Catalonia / Candidate 2017 (Ecuador)

We are at our country’s disposal.
Diego61, member MAS-IPSP (Bolivia)

Several migrants also talk about the bienestar in this context, which translates into welfare, prosperity, or well-being.

It was our initiative to contribute to the bienestar of the country. That was the idea.
Wilmer, campaign advisor PPK (Peru)

The narrative of wanting to contribute to the home country has been present across all countries. Certainly, this desire must be understood as an aspiration to belong to the political entity of their country of origin (see also, Boccagni 2011; Boccagni and Ramírez 2013; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015). For example, several emigrant partisans have referred to la patria (homeland) or to el pueblo (town or the people) to invoke the idea of a transborder community of which they form part. Emigrants can use their home country to redefine their role as community members, as the local representative of the Ecuadorian CREO party, José V., explains.

But logically. This is the struggle ... to achieve representativeness and to be able to break down barriers ... that we are not only considered fundamental

61 Name anonymized
to save the country’s economy and nothing more. In other words, we want to feel more useful, we also want to feel responsible within the country.

José V., Director CREO Catalonia (Ecuador)

This quote highlights but also problematizes the public Ecuadorian narrative that tends to reduce migrants to remittance senders. Migrants try to leverage their transnational party activism to re-negotiate their role in the domestic political sphere. Some activists moreover see their party activism as a civic duty.

We cannot untie ourselves from the norms, [and] laws that will affect us when we return to Bolivia. Therefore, we also try, and it is our obligation, [and] not solely out of interests if not [it is] our obligation to try to participate in the elections or in the proposals that are channelled via the MAS-IPSP to Bolivia that can be defended later in the Bolivian parliament.

Fabian, party activist MAS-IPSP (Bolivia)

Similar to Fabian, many migrants have emphasized that there are no personal interests involved. Clientelism, patronage and cronyism are widespread in Latin America (Stokes et al. 2013). Therefore, some migrants are suspicious of compatriots who engage in transnational party activism although their activism is unpaid. Almost one third of all emigrant partisans have actively denied that they had joined the party because of selective outcome benefits.

We are not like oligarchs, that we are after our own interest. No. No. We do not have any personal interest or anything like it. We work for the pueblo, for the ordinary people.

Diego, member MAS-IPSP (Bolivia)

There is no money. There is no money and we [do it] out of love for la patria, love for politics. That’s why we do it.

Sonia, party activist MPAIS (Ecuador)

We don’t look for a post ... we don’t look for that. We want to serve the country. Above all because of the sentiment because you are far away, when you feel most [close to] your country. From there on you are valuing what your country is. That’s what we feel.

Wilmer, campaign advisor PPK (Peru)

These and other respondents rely on notions of homeland patriotism and altruism to create a provide a socially more acceptable justification for their transnational party activism.
Homeland patriotism depicts migrants’ deep sense of belonging to their country of origin. It is therefore closely embedded in political socialization processes. First-generation migrants tend to experience these learning processes before emigrating while 1.5- and second-generation immigrants depend on ‘transnational social fields’ that help create these homeland bonds (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). It is striking, however, that all but one interviewed party activist have grown up in the Andeans and on average emigrated to Europe at 31 years old. Home country parties face difficulties to recruit younger people. Unlike their parents and grandparents, younger immigrants might find it less useful to use the home state as a reference frame. Instead, they rely more on ethnic identity re-assertions in the cultural sphere. My participant observations further support this notion. While it was very rare to see younger migrants attend partisan events, they participated in large numbers at cultural dance events.

Many migrants put forward altruistic motives as to why they had become involved in a political home country party. They wanted to “help the people” (Diego, MAS-IPSP Bolivia), or to “work for equality. Not just for me and for you” (Sonia, MPAIS Ecuador). They stated that “our duty is to work for the people” (Kevin, PSC Ecuador), “to work for others (...) in the benefit of others, to help others” (Saul, SUMA Ecuador), and that they had become involved because of “the love to help” (Carlos X.B., MPAIS/Centro Democrático Ecuador), to work for the “bienestar of humankind” (Wilmer, PPK Peru), or “with the goal to improve society” (Luis, MPAIS Ecuador). Clear expressions of patriotism are absent in these quotes. The respondents avoid using the home state as their primary point of reference. That said, they refer to “the people” or “the society”, but do not specify whom (resident or non-resident citizens) or which society (host or home country society).

In a cross-country comparison, Ecuadorian emigrant party activists have been particularly vocal to express altruistic motives. Their self-conception as economic crisis refugees has shaped how they perceive their role in an Ecuadorian transborder nation. These interviewees have succeeded to escape poverty and unemployment in Ecuador. They have gained a stable socio-economic status in Spain. Several of the respondents have even set up their own businesses. Almost all possess dual nationality. They are mindful of how things could have played out and feel privileged to give back, using home
country parties as social remittances channel. Certainly, transnational kinship connections play an important role too. Two Ecuadorian and one Bolivian partisan have alluded to the future well-being of their non-migrant family members as an important driver for their party activism. Interviewees use various reference frames to depict whom they want to help. This holds not only true in relation to altruistic motives. Around one fourth of all emigrant partisans have offered both altruistic and patriotic motivations to substantiate their transnational party activism.

4.2.2 Identification with party figures

Patriotic sentiments and altruistic motives are important emotional factors that motivate transnational party activism, but they fall short to explain why emigrants chose one party over another. As discussed in 4.1.1 and 4.1.2., the parties’ programmatic outlook offers one answer to this question. However, emigrant partisans also relate in less rational terms to their party organization. More than half of all party activists in this study have formed strong attachments with their party, its leader or its candidates.

Slightly one fourth of the respondents have expressed a deep identification with the party brand. Notably, this has been the case among partisans who belong to more traditional parties, as in the case of APRA, Peru’s oldest party. Many of its activists in Barcelona had joined the party already many years ago in Peru. They have formed a strong partisan identity before emigrating. Abroad they seek to continue their party engagement. Respondents refer to APRA as “my party” and “feel I am an Aprista (...) I believe in the philosophy of the party” (Carlos N.), or even state to be a “soldier of the APRA ideology” (Carlos B.).

Some newer Ecuadorian parties, like MPAIS and CREO, have also succeeded to build strong party brands (Interviews Sonia, Nilo, José V., Maria R.). However, charismatic leadership has been much more important for Ecuadorian party activists. In particular, Rafael Correa, leader of MPAIS and former president of Ecuador (2007-2017) has won many hearts abroad. In his speeches, he often has directly addressed emigrants, specifically during electoral periods (Pugh 2017). His personalist governing style and
anti-establishment discourse (Levitsky and Loxton 2013) strongly resonate with many Ecuadorians abroad who feel that their emigration had been forced upon them by a corrupt political elite. Correa also frequently visited Barcelona during and after his presidential reign to establish bonds with the migrant community (see also Ch. 6., section 4.1.). In April 2018, I have witnessed first-hand the “Correa effect” during an event with Correa, held at the Worker’s Commission (CCOO) office in Barcelona, which attracted some 250 spectators. At that time, four Correa grassroots support groups existed in Barcelona. Some of them came wearing shirts with their group logo and a Correa portrait imprint. They had large campaign posters and waved Ecuadorian paper flags. Correa addressed the migrants as exiles of former governments, and heroes who had saved the country with their remittances. He also portrayed migration as a national tragedy that had split families. His discourse was interrupted several times by exclamations and a chorus chanting “We love Correa” or “We do not have a president, we have Rafael”. The event partially resembled a popstar concert, an impression that was reinforced at the end when people stood in a long queue to take selfies with Correa. At that time, Correa prepared his political comeback, using the event to sign up new supporters for his political movement “Alfaristas Para Siempre”.

Almost all MPAIS activists have named Correa as an important reason as for why they had joined. In a similar vein, Ecuadorian and Peruvian activists of CREO, FP, and APRA named Guillermo Lasso, Alberto Fujimori, and Alan García, respectively. Activists of the Bolivian MAS-IPSP strongly identify with its leader Evo Morales. In interviews they refer to him by his first name “Evo” and a reoccurring party event in Barcelona is the celebration of Morales’ birthday in October that features a birthday cake that bears his picture. At another event in February 2018 at the Casa del Mar in Barcelona, which had partly been organized by the local consulate, some spectators came carrying a Bolivian flag and an Evo Morales banner. In the absence of the original Evo Morales, they took pictures with the Bolivian consul and other speakers. One can easily imagine how this would have looked like if Evo Morales indeed had come to visit himself.

62 Despertar Ciudadano; Correístas Para Siempre; Mujeres Migrantes Revolucionarias; Revolución Ciudadana
The identification with party figures is an important driver for transnational party activism. Their discursive diaspora outreach often invokes a sense of homeland patriotism, which I have previously discussed as an important factor that encourages transnational party activism. Indeed, the broader literature has identified many of these party leaders as full populists or ethno-populists, yet the previously analysed presence of altruistic motives, and the importance of the parties’ programmatic outlook, which I have extensively discussed in the first half of this chapter, suggests that populism only plays a subordinated role to explain transnational party activism on a broader scale. A recently published study supports this assessment, finding that emigrants are less likely to vote for populist parties than domestic voters (Turcu and Urbatsch 2022).

4.3 Selective outcome benefits

Selective outcome benefits are private goods only available to those who join the party. In this context, researchers have focused on individual ambitions for a political career (see e.g., Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 74; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019). In the transnational arena paid party or bureaucratic posts are rare. Taking this into consideration, and despite a possible social desirability bias, it may surprise that almost half of the partisan sample expressed the desire to professionally work in politics. Moreover, emigrants also become active to increase social capital, access specific services that parties offer, and boost their social status. Party member research has largely overlooked these latter forms of selective outcome benefits (see for an exception, Bob-Milliar 2012). One reason is that they gain particular importance in the transnational arena and developing democracies.

4.3.1 Political career ambitions

All Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian parties in Barcelona maintain an executive board. The number of board seats greatly varies from one to five seats, and further increases if

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63 For example, broad academic consensus exists that Rafael Correa, Evo Morales, and Alberto Fujimori are populists (see e.g., Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Madrid 2019).
we were also to consider internal commissions. Importantly, however, all these positions are unpaid. Even parties with an extensive overseas European party structure do not maintain paid positions abroad. Political home country parties do not financially support their transnational party cells as I will discuss in greater detail in Section 4.5. Nevertheless, almost half of all party activists stated to harbour an ambition to professionally work in politics. Theoretically, three transnational political career paths are open to emigrants: paid posts upon return, candidacy positions paid posts in home country administration abroad (e.g. consulates). In this thesis, I focus on the former two, since they have been the most prevalent ones in the interviews.

**Political career ambitions: upon return**

Emigrant partisans can assume paid positions within the party organisation or in public administrations upon return. Especially after a change of government, the new incumbent must fill many administrative positions. In Latin America, political parties often use patronage to garner support (Stokes et al. 2013). This behaviour can extend across borders (Song et al. 2020). Yet, the party headquarters generally appear unreceptive towards demands from abroad.

I went too, and I returned again to Spain since the MAS government did not have much capacity. There was not much space for those Bolivians that had lived abroad but who had intentions to return. There was no big welcoming or reception [in the MAS government] and so we left the country again.

Nestor, party activist MAS-IPSP, Bolivia

Look, in the end, it is cynical. After all, we have supported him [Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, presidential winner 2016] … they [from the party headquarters] thought I came [to Peru] for a party post. And everybody [from abroad] followed me because I went to Peru. But I went to my hometown to rest a bit. And among them, some stayed. There were some from Argentina, Germany, England, and from all over the world, Japan. Everybody came. At least they wanted to greet the president, but he did not provide any opportunity to do so. You know. That is the issue.

Wilmer, campaign advisor, PPK Peru

Nestor and Wilmer had been coordinating the transnational campaigns of the winning parties in Catalonia. Another interviewee, who had been volunteering in the electoral
campaign of an Ecuadorian candidate, recounted that he had been promised to be made the MP’s personal assistant in case his candidate would have won the elections. However, since the candidate did not win, this promise never materialized. These stories demonstrate that for some emigrants selective outcome benefits (i.e., the promise of a political career) are strong incentives to join a political home country party. This is notwithstanding the low probability of actually gaining the envisaged position. During fieldwork, I only learned about two transnational party entrepreneurs who had been active for a transnational party in Barcelona and who succeeded to gain a government position upon return.

**Political career ambitions: candidacy positions**

Candidate positions can also act as powerful selective outcome incentives for emigrants to join home country parties. This is particularly true for Ecuadorians who are entitled to elect and run for two seats in the national parliament that are exclusively reserved for emigrants. These candidate positions are much sought after.

Look, it is everyone’s dream, of every person who is in politics. It is everyone’s dream to become a MP.

Manel, former party activist of MPAIS (Ecuador)

Home country parties offer a springboard for a political career. The logic is that “if you demonstrate that you are working [for the party], you could become a future candidate” (Lorena, Correista Group). Yet, the internal pre-selection processes are unfavourable to low-rank partisan members, often untransparent and follow a clear top-down decision-making process. Only CREO has organized binding primaries abroad. Moreover, parties tend to use these list places to co-opt unaffiliated leaders of well-known migrant associations (see Chapter. 6).

Bolivia has no system of special representation. The Bolivian constitution requires, moreover, that candidates for the national assembly have permanently resided in the country during the 2 years preceding the election (Art. 149). Practically, emigrants cannot run for office, which makes Bolivian parties less attractive to career-oriented
party activists. Indeed, Bolivians have less emphasized career motivations and when they did they rather referred to paid posts in the homeland or diplomatic posts abroad.

Peru has introduced special representation only in 2021\textsuperscript{64}, but non-resident citizens could already run for office before in any of the 26 inland districts. To better understand the extent to which Peruvian parties offer candidate positions to emigrants I have analyzed the Curriculum Vitae of 216 candidates\textsuperscript{65}. I have limited my analysis to the six parties who won at least one seat in the Lima Metropolitan district. I focus on this district because emigrant votes are counted in this district. I find that Peruvian parties rarely field emigrants. In total, only six non-resident candidates (2.78\%) ran in 2016 for Congress (see Table 4.1). All are first-generation migrants. Except for AP, all parties have fielded emigrant candidates. Only FP has fielded two. One explanation, supported by the interviews, is that emigrant party activists have difficulties internally lobbying their party headquarters. Parties do not want to invest in their emigrant outreach and extend tangible outcome benefits to activists abroad. However, even when parties are willing to field emigrant candidates, this only incentivizes emigrants with a very high socio-economic status to join because candidates must self-finance their campaigns (see also section 4.5 on individual resources).

\textsuperscript{64} See Ch. 6, Section 6.2 for more details on the law adoption process. 
\textsuperscript{65} See for more information Ch. 3, Section 2.5 for more details.
Many party activists dream of becoming an emigrant candidate or gaining public employment upon return. This is in spite of high investment costs and low probability of actually succeeding. In Latin America, political career ambitions are the main motive to join a political party (Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Piñeiro and Rosenblatt 2017; Sells 2020). In this section, we have seen that this pattern also extends into the transnational

### 4.3.2 Membership rights: primaries and national electoral programs

In recent years, many political parties have thickened their membership packages, allowing their followers to participate in primaries and the development of electoral programs (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008; España-Nájera 2018). These are selected outcome benefits to attract new members and retain the current ones (Kosiara-Pedersen, Scarrow, and Van Haute 2017; Achury et al. 2020). In this section, I explore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Residency Place</th>
<th>List number / seats won / total seats constituency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Francisco Petrozzi (e)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>15 / 15 / 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Jaime Verástegui</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>23 / 15 / 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPK</td>
<td>Mercedes Araoz</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>01 / 10 / 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP</td>
<td>Luis Olazabal Conde</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>21 / 03 / 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP</td>
<td>Julia Panta Quevedo</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>35 / 02 / 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Martina Portocarrero</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>04 / 03 / 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP (PPC, APRA)</td>
<td>No emigrant candidates</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>03 / 36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Author’s own elaboration. (e)= elected. Sources: Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE).
the role of presidential and legislative primaries and national electoral programs for party activism in the transnational arena.

Primaries for presidential candidates are legally required in Ecuador and Peru, while Bolivian parties have no obligation (Freidenberg 2021). Andean parties domestically hold presidential primaries, but they do not extend them abroad. While this is in violation with national law, emigrant partisans have not pushed back. This is because they strongly identify with the parties’ presidential candidates, which renders formal approval mechanisms obsolete. Nevertheless, transnational party chapters can withhold support for candidates that they do not approve of. In the 2019 Bolivian elections, Evo Morales re-ran although constitutional term limits prohibited it and a referendum to change them had failed. The party cell in Barcelona internally voted whether to support Morales’ campaign, eventually ruling “clearly in favour of Evo” (Interview Fabian, MAS-IPSP activist).

Primaries for legislative candidates are also mandatory in Ecuador and Peru (Molenaar 2012, 18). In Bolivia, MAS-IPSP selects its candidates from territorial grass-root organisations in line with democratic norms (Anria 2016), while UN holds formal primaries (Party Statutes, Art. 40). These benefits are rarely extended to members abroad. Only Ecuadorian parties have made some attempts. Most inclusively, CREO held formally binding primaries abroad in 2017. Centro Democrático and SUMA accepted informal candidate suggestions from their local coordinators in Barcelona (Interviews Carlos X.B., Saul). Finally, MPAIS asked its transnational party chapters to nominate candidates in 2017. However, the party ignored these nominations and instead re-nominated Esteban Melo, incumbent emigrant MP, and Esther Cuesta, Ecuador’s then-consul in Geneva. Interviewees were angry and disappointed, the party’s former vice-Director in Spain calling the primaries “democratic smoke and mirrors” (Interview Sonia). Yet, while they have shared their discontent with the party leadership, they did not defect from the party. In conclusion, participation in primaries does not seem to

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66 Bolivian parties voluntarily held their first presidential primaries in 2019, but parties had each only one internal candidate.
67 I have collected data on this for 11 parties in total.
function as a powerful incentive to join transnational parties although they can help to mobilize the transnational bases during pre-campaigns (Lafleur 2013, 126; Kalu and Scarrow 2020).

Participation in the creation of national election programs offers an alternative way to thicken party membership. In the Ecuadorian case, only MPAIS activists were able to influence the electoral program of their presidential candidate. MPAIS also organized open assemblies in Spain to collect migrant demands in the 2017 pre-election campaign. Other Ecuadorian parties only invite emigrants to help with the election manifesto of their emigrant candidates for the extra-territorial constituency\(^68\). SUMA has fielded a web survey to collect demands abroad, while CREO has encouraged its emigrant members to raise demands.

In contrast, Peruvian APRA members repeatedly “had the possibility [to present demands] but were not heard” (Carlos N.). Activists of the Peruvian PPK also have approached their party with demands “but unfortunately, there was no political intention” (Wilmer, activist PPK). The local PPC representative claimed he could raise some demands because the party leader “is a personal friend of mine”, yet the 2006, 2011, and 2016 electoral programs only sporadically included emigrant policy pledges. This highlights the difficulties to gain internal party support despite friendship connections to high-rank party figures. Bolivians face similar difficulties. The UN representative claims that these programs are developed by “the people on top in the leadership of the political party” (Ariel). MAS-IPSP emigrant partisans revealed that they had sent their demands to the party headquarters via the consulate, but “I don’t know if they arrive” (Diego, party member MAS-IPSP). So far, “few things have been reflected in the program” complained another activist (Fabian). Its 2014 electoral program promises to improve the protection of Bolivians abroad but does not mention other policy domains.

Participation in the elaboration of electoral programs and in primaries is clearly important to transnational party activists. However, so far, the party headquarters have

\(^{68}\) Candidates must present an election manifesto at the National Electoral Council (CNE) when they register.
warded off most attempts of interest aggregation from abroad. As the MPAIS primary case indicates, extending these rights could force parties to become more accountable for emigrant interests, which party headquarters clearly seek to avoid. To conclude, in comparison with other selective outcome benefits, such as career opportunities, co-determination rights play a subordinated role to attract emigrant members.

4.3.3 Social capital: privileged information, contacts, and service

Parties also offer more tangible selective outcome benefits to their members. As I will demonstrate, activists use home country parties to access privileged information, generate useful contacts, and stay up-to-date with political developments in the home country.

The Bolivian MAS-IPSP in Barcelona regularly holds assemblies. Members of the Bolivian MAS-IPSP use these meetings to “talk, and comment about the news from Bolivia” (Diego, activist MAS-IPSP). They also talk about host country politics. During non-electoral times the party cell is “primarily [concerned] to be informed about what happens in the Spanish society” (Fabian, activist MAS-IPSP). Finally, some of the members are well-versed regarding consulate errands and broker information to members. Others are active in associations and diffuse useful information. For example, one of the party members works for an association that focuses on the containment of the Chagas disease, a tropical parasitic disease that is widespread in Bolivia and offers health advice to party members on this matter.

The Ecuadorian MPAIS offers similar benefits to its members. The party regularly organizes events. During on-site assemblies with emigrant MPs, attendees can pose questions and raise demands. However, non-party members tend to abstain. As one association leader put it “I have no relationship [with these MPs]. Because for me it is a very closed space” (Cecilia, a leader of Llactacaru). A town hall meeting in June 2018 with Esteban Melo, a MPAIS/Correa emigrant MP, offered valuable insights to corroborate this claim. The event classifies as a party event. It had not been publicly advertised and the meeting place had been decorated with large partisan flags. In the
first part, the MP discussed emigrant policy legislation concerning pension schemes, repatriations, returnee programs, external voting, and the recognition of Ecuadorian degrees abroad. To accommodate non-party supporters, the MP discussed party politics only in the second half of the assembly during which he condemned the opposition and called for anti-government protests at public spaces. However, none of the attendees left indicating that all of them were either MPAIS/Correa partisans or sympathizers. On other occasions, the party set up video calls with politicians in Ecuador, during which party members could directly ask questions and raise their concerns (Interview Guillermo). The party also organized local events with experts to inform about Ecuador’s social security system.

Moreover, the party offers a range of services to its supporters. In the past, the party had organized IT classes (Interview Sonia) and had helped with repatriation cases (Interview Nilo). Furthermore, using its contacts within the Unión General de Trabajadoras y Trabajadores de España, a Spanish labour union, the party offers employment counselling (Interview Nilo). In the past, it also organized events to inform about micro-credits for migrant entrepreneurs. Finally, the party supports its followers with health concerns “especially when there are cases of compatriots in a vulnerable situation” (Interview Nilo). The party leader is a medical doctor and said that “we provide all the help that is within our reach because we have, at least here in Catalonia, within MPAIS, we have a medical team”. Evidently, a MPAIS membership extends far beyond political benefits.

Similar to the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases, a Peruvian APRA membership also helps increase one’s social capital. Party events offer opportunities to meet, chat, and gather information. A vivid example offers the mass, held in Barcelona, for the deceased party leader Alan Garcia. Waiting for the event to begin, several attendees talked about host country bureaucratic errands; the Spanish tax law in particular. An essential difference to MAS-IPSP and MPAIS is that social capital is more privatized in the Barcelona APRA cell. This is because the party only perpetuates informal communication channels with the headquarters in Lima. Emigrant partisans individually maintain direct links with party members and leaders in Peru. During party meetings in Barcelona, well-connected
partisans diffuse their information from Lima as they see fit. Often times these transnational contacts are long-standing friends made during their party activism in Peru (Interview Carlos N, Carlos B.). Some of them have risen in rank during the years and now inhabit important internal party positions (Interview Carlos B). Emigrant partisans who have returned to Peru and stay active in the party also serve as important nodes (Interview Carlos N.). Other partisans who have joined the party from abroad also try to build a personal transnational information network. They maintain these links even years after he has left the party (Interview Tito).

Peru is the only country in this study that maintains special emigrant representation at the consulate level (Palop-García 2017). The board in Barcelona consists of nine seats which are filled with volunteers following annual public elections. Candidates affiliated with the APRA party can rely on vote and campaign support from the party (Interview Carlos N.). In turn, the party receives first-hand information from the consulate, which it diffuses to its members. While some emigrants might see an advisory council seat as the prime objective to propel local community projects, others see it as a stepping stone for a transnational political career. Regardless of their intentions, home country parties can bridge essential social capital to reach these goals.

4.3.4 Social status

Transnational party activism endows migrants with an increased social status in some pockets of the Andean community in Barcelona. A photo with the president or a proclaimed proximity to a high-rank party figure are ways in which migrants aim to present themselves as well-networked political insiders and to gain prestige. During interviews, several party activists mentioned presidents, ministers, or MPs whom they have met or are acquainted with (Interview Annabell AP; Sonia AP; Carlos N, APRA; Carlos B, APRA).

I have met Rafael Correa when he came [to Spain]. I think he has come to Barcelona, Alicante, Valencia, Murcia and Madrid. I have always gone … And I have been in these places, close to him. We have shaken hands’ I've had my
picture taken with him. I have had my picture taken with almost all the ministers of Rafael Correa.

Guillermo, ex-MPAIS member, and Rafael Correa movement activist (Ecuador)

Party supporters share their pictures on Facebook or file them in their photo albums at home. Occasionally they also showed them to me to bolster their claims. One transnational campaigner has proudly told me that the president has sent her a note of thanks (Interview Annabell). One third of the respondents associated their party involvement with a somewhat higher social status during our conversations. It is clear that these connections and pictures matter more in the transnational political and associative world than they do outside. After all, parties often struggle with their reputation abroad and many party supporters have had to defend their activism against critics in the past (see Section 4.2.1). Evidently, activists do not claim a higher social status because they are active in a political organisation that produces collective goods but because they have met a famous party figure or personally know one. The queue of spectators wanting to take pictures with Rafael Correa at the event in April 2018, which I have discussed earlier, helps illustrate the popstar-like effect some politicians have on large parts of the community. Finally, an improved social status can also derive from running as an emigrant candidate. For example, Maria R. shared the following impression from her campaign with me.

When you go out there you feel important. Everybody applauds you; everybody felicitates you; everybody wants a picture with you, wants to greet you. It’s very nice. It’s a very, very nice experience. Very nice.

Maria R., candidate CREO (Ecuador)

Many migrants associate party activism with a higher social status as long as this means being near prominent party figures or candidates. This social status narrative has been most present amongst Ecuadorian activists. This is because Ecuadorian politicians travel more frequently to Barcelona, giving party activists chances to meet and have taken pictures with them. Peruvian politicians rarely travel to Barcelona, but party activists still can claim proximity with high-rank party figures due to the personal connections that they often maintain from their previous activism in Peru. In contrast, the social status
narrative has been largely absent amongst Bolivian activists since they lack similar opportunities.

Transnational Andean parties have succeeded to offer private outcome benefits to their activists abroad. Half of all interviewees link their party involvement to political career opportunities or a more prestigious social status. They moreover use home country parties to stay politically up-to-date, and boost their social capital, using the parties’ contacts and their specific services. These private benefits are not as important as the production of collective goods, but they certainly carry an important weight. In the next section, I will explore the relationship between intrinsic benefits and transnational party activism.

4.4 Selective process benefits

Turning to the fourth key element of the GIM, I will now analyse the importance of selective process benefits. These posit that individuals join parties to meet new people, make friends and because they think that politics is fun (Seyd and Whiteley 1992). While some studies suggest that intrinsic motivations do not matter (Scarrow 2015, 158; Piñeiro and Rosenblatt 2017; Power and Dommett 2020), others highlight their importance for party enrolment (Bob-Milliar 2012; Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b, 193; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019). I find that selective process benefits play a somewhat important role in the decision-making process of migrants to join a transnational party. I argue that this is because transnational parties promote an ethnic or political home country identity that gains importance in a migration context.

4.4.1 It’s the taking part that counts

Many migrants are involved in a political home country because they enjoy being active in politics. A few also engaged because they had become curious about home country politics. For a large part of the interviewees, party socialization in the homeland is
essential to understand why they enjoy transnational party activism. One third of the sample had already been active in a party before emigrating. Abroad they seek to keep old habits alive.

Maria R. and another three Ecuadorian respondents had participated (Kevin, Nilo) or worked (Guillermo, Nilo) for a political party before they emigrated. She stated that “I always liked politics since I was young” (Maria R.). Abroad they sought to continue their activism, yet oftentimes their parties, as so many others, had broken down following the economic crisis in the 1990s/early 2000 (Levitsky et al. 2016, 13), so that they joined newly formed parties.

Among Bolivians, pre-migratory partisan socialization also has been prevalent. At least three of the six activists had already been engaged in party politics before they emigrated. Similar to the Ecuadorians, they joined different parties abroad (Interview Diego; Walter). Another interviewee, Neide, highlighted the party activism of her father as an important reason why she had become a party member abroad.

Finally, four out of nine Peruvian party activists already held a party member card in Peru. A remarkable difference to the Ecuadorians or Bolivians is that all but one have continued to be active in the same political party abroad. Their parties had survived, and it was easy to continue their party activism abroad. They had moved countries, yet they remained firmly plugged into their partisan network. As Carlos N. put it “politics is my life”.

The history of Carlos N. also highlights the relationship between transnational party activism and migrants’ sense of identity. He had been an active APRA member all his life, having also worked for the party in public administrations. In 1990, APRA lost power and the political climate started changing significantly with Alberto Fujimori in charge. The outgoing president, Alan Garcia, went into self-imposed exile, fleeing later to Paris. Carlos eventually left for Paris too. Upon arrival, he started meeting other self-exiled APRA members, including Alan Garcia. While these encounters gave rise to an
institutionalized APRA party infrastructure in Europe, they also offered an opportunity to meet people who shared the refugee experience.

When I came to Paris, we were very few. The party was totally discredited at that time because of the bad way in which the Alan Garcia government had terminated its term … and being very few in Paris we united all the party members, the few that were there, because during this time nobody cared about us, and this is how a party cell evolved in Paris. And this way, I met Alan Garcia. The few of us who were there started seeing each other frequently, we shared talks and had meetings.

Carlos N., APRA member (Peru)

The party activism of these APRA members formed an integral part of their daily life and their self-conception ever since. Many aim to maintain or re-establish it in migration. The large majority of the Peruvian community in Barcelona comes from the Coastal region, 78.31% in 2007, according to data from the Spanish National Immigrant Survey (Reher and Requena 2009). The coastal region, in particular the northern part, is known to be the electoral bastion of the APRA party. Indeed, in conversations, respondents often claimed the strong presence of the APRA party in Barcelona is due to the many Peruvians in Barcelona from the Peruvian North (Trujillo). The Trujillo-Barcelona migration corridor facilities emigrant partisans to build and deepen friendships with fellow party members from their home country.

Many [APRA members] here in Barcelona were from my home town. Apart from party membership, there was friendship. (...) And later, after 20 years, well these relationships have solidified

Carlos N., APRA member (Peru)

Emigrants reproduce local contexts, including regional identities and political cleavage structures, abroad. The transnational arena heightens their importance. This is why intrinsic motivations are relevant to better understanding why migrants are active in transnational parties.

4.4.2 Party events: social gatherings, and memorandum days

Social gatherings form an essential part of the transnational partisan life. We can differentiate between four main types of events: ordinary social lunches or
dinners, symbolic or public holidays, party-specific memorandum days, and visits of MPs. Most commonly, Andean party cells in Barcelona organize the first type, oftentimes with typical dishes from the home country, or BBQs in public parks. These events are important “to attract and engage people” as explains Ariel, general secretary of UN. During non-electoral times, the other event types gain importance. They vary by party and country of origin.

**Ecuador: mingling with emigrant MPs and celebrating public holidays**

Ecuador’s emigrant MPs regularly travel to Barcelona. While these visits enable emigrants to gather political information they also provide opportunities to socialize with fellow citizens. For example, in February 2019, I attended an event with the MP Esther Cuesta. After the official part, some Latin music was played over a speaker, food on a nearby table was unwrapped and people started talking, eating Ecuadorian homemade corn pie and some of the people also danced. Some took pictures with the MP to remember the day. In the past, some of these meetings later continued in the house of the party’s official representative.

Annabell: After the meetings we would go to eat somewhere, to have fun, have some drinks at someone’s place. The last time we did this with Esteban [Melo] we did it at Nilo’s house ... He has a big house in a village and we had some beers and everything .. talking about politics but on good terms ...

Nicolas: Did also people come who were not part of MPAIS?

Annabell: No. The majority was from the MPAIS.

Two meetings with MP Esteban Melo, held in June and October 2018, were less social although afterwards, a part of the group had dinner at a nearby restaurant. Extra-territorial incumbents can easier offer these selective process benefits because their MPs are more present abroad. Parties also celebrate symbolically important days to stay attractive for members. MPAIS celebrated Mother’s Day and Father’s Day at its local branch office. The party’s official representative, Nilo, explains that “at these days we meet there, even though it might only be a small cultural event, but we’re present to not lose contact with the people”. Other important dates include Women’s Day and
Three Kings. At Christmas, the party organizes a ceremonial act to gift toys to children. Finally, parties also use social gatherings to strengthen their group identity. The Correa grassroots support group, Correista Para Siempre, gathered in memory of the attack on Rafael Correa (30. September 2010). The group also met to celebrate its annual birthday.

**Bolivia: public holidays and presidential birthdays celebrations**

Bolivia does not reserve seats in the national parliament for emigrants. In consequence, party figures visit the community far less frequently and parties can only punctually offer selective process incentives. MAS-IPSP is the only Bolivian party that remains active after election day in Barcelona. Similar to the Ecuadorian MPAIS, the party has organized social gatherings, including Mother’s Day, or All Saint’s Day in previous years. Additionally, a reoccurring party Memorial Day is the birthday of its president, Evo Morales. The party cell decorates the place, and a birthday cake with blue icing (the party colour) and the president’s picture on it reads “Happy birthday brother Evo. From MAS-IPSP Barcelona, Spain”. These days give room to emigrant partisans to socialize and connect with their home country but also to strengthen their bonds within the group.

**Peru: gathering in the memorandum of the party, its leaders, and to celebrate public holidays**

The Peruvian APRA party cherishes similar customs that are closely tied to the party’s history and its leaders. Just like MAS-IPSP, the party celebrates its founder’s birthday. At the “Día de Fraternidad” the party organizes celebrative activities with seminars and speeches. Its significance is illustrated by the fact that in the past Carlos Roca Cáceres, currently the party’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Jorge del Castillo, long-time Congressman, former mayor of Lima and current General Political Secretary of the National Executive Committee, have assisted at the event. During fieldwork, APRA also organized a mass to commemorate Alan Garcia, the party leader and two-time president, who had committed suicide in April 2018. Some speeches were held and afterwards we went for lunch in a nearby Peruvian restaurant. On another occasion, the party cell came together to commemorate a fellow partisan member who just had died
Interview Carlos B.). These examples demonstrate the deep connection between APRA partisans abroad that stretch far into the social lifeworld of the members. Finally, like the Ecuadorian MPAIS, the party cell also hosts an annual Christmas event to gift children toys. As one member pointed out, “this day is not necessary anymore as such... Every father can buy a toy. But we maintain this tradition because it forms part of the party’s fundamental base” (Carlos N.). Cultural activities, folkloristic dances and music accompany these festivities.

In this section, I have first analysed the intrinsic motivations of emigrants to become active in transnational parties. On the one hand, one third of emigrants engage in transnational party activities because they “like”, “love”, and “enjoy” or are “curious” about homeland politics. On the other hand, one third had already been active in a political party before they emigrated. I have argued that continuing their party activism abroad also provides intrinsic pleasure since it is a way to (re-)connect with home. Specific migration dynamics can re-enforce this mechanism. Taken together, intrinsic motivations were important for almost two thirds of the sample. This underscores the need to analyse transnational party involvement from a socio-political perspective.

Indeed, I also have provided first-hand in-depth insights into the social world of transnational parties. I have shed light on four types of party events: feasts, symbolic or public holidays, party-specific memorandum days, and MP visits. These social events are an important part of the transnational party reality, although they have attracted little scholarly attention so far (Collard and Kernalegenn 2021). In light of the many ethnic associations in Barcelona and their rich socio-cultural offer, however, it is doubtful that home country parties are most appealing to emigrants on the basis of social events. These events are essential for party cells to create bonding capital that stimulates and helps maintain a group identity. Hence, these events are not as important to attract new recruits as they are to prolong the lifecycle of party chapters abroad.

4.5 Individual resources

Individual resources are important to enable political participation, both domestically (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) and
transnationally (see e.g., Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Chaudhary 2018; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019). Individual resources shape citizens’ civic skills and interest to engage in party politics (Whitely and Seyd 1996; Whiteley and Seyd 2002; Whiteley, Seyd, and Billinghamurst 2006; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b; Kosiara-Pedersen, Scarrow, and Van Haute 2017; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019). In this section, I will explore the importance of socio-economic resources for transnational party activism.

Engagement in political home country parties is costly. It requires time and money. Several respondents emphasized the amount of time that they dedicate to their party. Oftentimes they attend meetings after long working days and come home late that same day.

I left work and had to be in X place at 5 pm. At 8 pm, at X place. But it was like that every day ... And obviously, that is a bit tiring because you leave work and then you’re out of the door again to participate in politics.

Jose V., president CREO Catalonia (Ecuador)

Emigrant party activists must reconcile their work, family, and political life. Several leaders complained that it is difficult to incentivize migrants. Unsurprisingly, the majority prefer to spend their scarce free with their family. This setting makes it difficult for parties to mobilize and recruit volunteers.

here there is no sufficient time to dedicate it the way one would like to because one needs to reconcile one’s family and work life with its political life. These are important factors and if you are working you do not have the time to participate in campaigns

Alba party activist (MPAIS; CD, Ecuador)

Because it is difficult, I am telling you, to capture the attention of people here because they lack the time .. go to the metro stations, the people get out and they leave running. All their life in a hurry. Nobody gives you a minute of his/her time to talk.

Ariel, general secretary UN Barcelona (Bolivia)

But we also had scarce financial resources to be able to campaign and we did it with a lot of constraints because of course many people have also their occupations .. in other words, it is not that easy.
The majority of the party activists sample is highly educated. Indeed, 55.6% possess a university degree and just one quarter has only finished school. In accordance with the political behaviour theory, higher education increases citizens’ capacity to overcome barriers to participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Whitely and Seyd 1996; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019). In addition, a large majority (77.8%) in the sample holds dual citizenship. A regular and stable status can free up additional capacities to become involved in transnational activities (McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015). However, as demonstrated above, emigrant party activists also have work obligations that can interfere with the desire to participate more in party activities.

Only a few party cells receive financial support from the mainland. During fieldwork, I collected information on party funding for 11 transnational party chapters active in Barcelona in the most recent national elections. Only the UN (Bolivia), and the PSC (Ecuador) directly received campaign funds from the party headquarters. These are centre or conservative parties. The Ecuadorian leftist party, MPAIS, financially supported a membership drive in Spain and the 2009 and 2013 campaigns of their emigrant candidate Dora Aguirre. The transnational party machinery is thus largely kept afloat by the party activists abroad. Nevertheless, none of the party chapters charges membership fees or obligates its members to formally affiliate with the party. Contributions are made voluntarily and the majority of my interviewees did not bear a party membership card. These flexible arrangements underscore the informal nature of both Latin American domestic and transnational party politics. They also reflect party demand-side tactics to attract broader social segments (Achury et al. 2020). Ironically, however, a consequence of this is that individual resources gain particular importance. As I already have illustrated with some quotes at the beginning of this chapter, emigrant party activists give not only their free time but use their own resources to support the party.

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69 I lack information for two Peruvian parties that were active in 2016 in Barcelona (FP, PPC).
70 UN received campaign funding for the 2014 general elections and the 2016 referendum. PSC funded its emigrant candidates in 2013.
So, the candidates arrive. “Look, let’s go to that place to campaign” ... But the question of the money was not easy because to organize a car, put the petrol, buy the thing to tape the posters, buy a sandwich, a Coca-Cola, a water, something like that. Everything, all that is paid for by us. So, there wasn’t any economic support [from the party] plus ... It was never there. So, everything was done by us, voluntarily.

Guillermo, ex-member MPAIS (Ecuador)

The emigrant partisans also chip in to buy food and drinks and prepare traditional dishes that they sell at fundraisers. At least seven of the 13 parties have organized so-called ‘comidas solidarias’. Emigrant partisans are well aware that their contributions are essential to the party, and interviewees were disappointed that the party headquarters does not appreciate their efforts.

Until today we have not received any help from the party in Bolivia. They have never helped us.

Diego, member MAS-IPSP (Bolivia)

And they never gave us anything. Nothing. Nothing at all. The party has given us nothing. They have used us.

emigrant candidate (Ecuador)

No, don’t even dare. They don’t give you anything, not a single dime [laughs] (...). They don’t send the money to us. Apart from that, for them we are only four wild cats who do not represent anything ... We would be the last one to receive it. They spend it in Lima, Trujillo, Arequipa where there are more votes.

Carlos N., member APRA (Peru)

The existing literature on political parties abroad argues that raising funds abroad in strong foreign currencies incentives parties from developing countries to transnationalize (see e.g., Itzigsohn 2000; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Whitaker 2011). I only came across one case where emigrants collectively raised money to support a party in the homeland. In general, Andean parties in Barcelona raise money for on-site activities in Barcelona. They do not remit money to support domestic campaigns. In fact, occasionally the money flows the other way around. For example, the Ecuadorian FE team in Barcelona received 25.000 Euros to organize its 2013 campaign in Europe. And there is more; in at least six cases, the headquarters has taken care of local advertisement costs or has sent campaign material to their Barcelona chapter. The
amount of support varies across parties and election years. While this support signals a transnational commitment, it also indicates that mainland headquarters lack trust and aim to maintain control over their chapters abroad.

The interviewee profiles suggest that more men than women are active in transnational parties. I formally interviewed 34 emigrant partisans, of which 25 were men, and 9 were women. At partisan meetings, however, the gender ratio was generally more balanced with the exception of the two Peruvian events. This suggests that while transnational politics is gender-biased, the difference between men and women is particularly pronounced with regard to high-rank party positions. The quote of Alba, a former campaign coordinator of MPAIS, highlights the existence of this ‘transnational glass ceiling’.

Yes, in the very 21st century they tell you that a woman has not the capability to lead or something like that. Well, I showed them that I can because Catalonia got one of the best voting results.

Alba, former party activist of MPAIS (Ecuador)

Seven of the nine women in the sample are Ecuadorians. Four of them ran for a political party as candidates. The Ecuadorian electoral law demands gender parity on party lists. In consequence, parties actively seek female candidates. Hence, a strong party outreach that targets female emigrants, and my interview sampling strategy that targeted ‘political elites’ may help explain the over-representation of men in the sample. Nonetheless, I find that transnational party activism, similar to other forms of political transnationalism and domestic party activism, is skewed towards men (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b, 194; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017; Chaudhary 2018; Polettì, Webb, and Bale 2019).

These studies also emphasize that a higher socio-economic status increases political participation, but in relation to transnational party activism its impact is even more explicit. Without the individual contributions of emigrant partisans there hardly would be any transnational party activity at all. It is apparent that access to the transnational

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71 Participant observations with recorded gender ratio (n=10): Bolivia (n=2/3); Ecuador (n= 6/8); Peru (n=2/2)
partisan field is uneven. Emigrant party activism is reserved for the migrant middle class and elite who can afford political high-intensity activism because they possess the time and money. This is particularly notable in relation to extra-territorial candidacy positions.

Emigrant candidates often must finance their campaigns themselves. In practice, this is a huge entry barrier. For example, Jaime T., the representative of PPC in Barcelona has been offered twice a candidate ticket; once in Peru and once as an emigrant candidate, but he declined both times.

When I was 25 years old, they offered me to become a MP. I resisted because I did not have 50.000 Dollars for the campaign. I am going to be honest with you, they said “Jaime, why don’t you run?” I told them “I don’t because I want to win, not [only] participate”. In 2006 they asked me again to run as a MP for the Peruvians abroad and I resisted again because I had gotten here [to Barcelona] only recently.

Jaime, party activist PPC (Peru)

Five of the six Ecuadorian candidates that I have interviewed have drawn on their private savings to fund their campaign. One revealed that “one of the candidates had put up much more than 50,000€” (Interview Saul) and another stated to have spent 30,000€, explaining it to me as follows:

All the candidates pay for their own candidacy ... for example, if I am a candidate, it is like you go to eat in a restaurant, you pay for the food yourself. It’s something like that.

Maria R. candidate CREO in 2017 (Ecuador)

As previously discussed, candidacy positions serve as selective outcome benefits. However, emigrants must be willing as well as capable to invest their own money. From a democratic point of view, these neoliberal candidacy agreements are highly questionable. This client-patron relationship entails that election tickets remain reserved for the migrant elite who can afford the risks to run and lose.

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the reasons of Andean migrants in Barcelona to join transnational political parties, applying the General Incentive Model (GIM) to the
transnational arena. I claim that the GIM provides a sensible theoretical lens to better understand transnational party activism. As I have demonstrated, however, both the transnational context and the political home country culture shape how the GIM performs.

First, I find that the desire to produce collective goods is the main driver for transnational party activism. This supports previous party member research (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 1994; Whiteley, Seyd, and Billinghamurst 2006; Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Scarro 2015, 158–159; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Power and Dommett 2020; Sells 2020; Collard and Kernalegenn 2021). The Andean party activists in Barcelona seek to change the homeland and draw more attention to emigrant policy making. These findings shed new light on an important mechanism through which migrants aim to remit ideas and values back home in developing democracies (Levitt 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011; Krawatzek and Müller-Funk 2020). Moreover, emigrants deploy transnational parties to influence host country politics. They use intra-party networks to participate in protest activities and inter-party networks to lobby local governments. These findings require an understanding of transnational parties as multidimensional venues.

Second, emotional motivations are also essential to explain transnational party activism. I demonstrate that the identification with charismatic leaders and a strong sense of patriotism often underpin migrants’ cross-border party involvement. The personalist political culture in the Andes, and a strong sense of belonging, invoked by policy and discursive outreach strategies, help explain these findings (Boccagni 2011; Boccagni 2014; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015). The latter carries particular weight in the case of Ecuador. Altruistic motivations and party brand identification also play a role but are much less important in the transnational arena as some of the domestic party member research would suggest (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Power and Dommett 2020).
Third, selective outcome benefits gain importance abroad in the form of political career aspirations. This is in spite of the narrow career pathways available to emigrant partisans. This is interesting given that studies in established democracies have consistently argued that material outcome benefits hardly matter (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 1994; Whiteley, Seyd, and Billinghurst 2006; Scarrow 2015, 158; Van Haute and Gauja 2015b, 193; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Collard and Kernalegenn 2021). Evidence is slowly increasing, however, that in developing democracies selective outcome benefits are key to explaining party enrolment (Bob-Milliar 2012; Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Piñeiro and Rosenblatt 2017; Sells 2020). This suggests that the home country regime alters the incentive structure to join a political party for both resident and non-resident citizens.

Fourth, selective process benefits are not as relevant as Collard and Kernalegenn (2021) suggest. They find that British citizens abroad often engage in party activities to socialize in a familiar setup. Andean migrants in Barcelona, however, can tap into the rich local offer of socio-cultural migrant organisations and additionally speak the host country’s language. Home country parties are therefore less important to socialize. Nevertheless, parties regularly organize social events. I argue that these activities perform an important function to stimulate a group identity but are less important to draw new recruits.

Fifth, individual resources are key to understanding who participates in transnational parties and why. This is largely in line with studies on individual political transnationalism (see e.g., Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Chaudhary 2018; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019), and domestic party membership (Van Haute and Gauja 2015b, 194–195; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019). However, resources gain particular importance abroad in light of poor funding from the mainland. Partisans are expected to contribute with their own resources. In many cases, they fully sustain the transnational party chapter. This finding offers new insights into why resources actually matter for political transnationalism. Previous work has argued that money and education translate into time and skills that enable migrants to politically participate. In addition to that, it is noteworthy that some
modes of participation also include informal financial contributions that make them more exclusive.

Both the transnational arena and the political home country culture shape the specifications of the GIM. This warrants caution to simply extrapolate research findings from studies on domestic (e.g., Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019), or transnational Western party members (Collard and Kernalegenn 2021) to explain the transnational party activism of migrants from developing democracies. Moreover, the local context influences how migrants perceive parties’ offer regarding selective process benefits, suggesting that motivations are also dependent on host country features.

Transnational parties can try to strategically offer incentives to attract volunteers abroad. Promising avenues are campaign funding support to lower barriers to participation, and transnational career pathways in the form of candidate list places or paid posts abroad. Participation in policy working groups could also make parties more attractive while voting rights in primaries seem less important. However, these incentives alone are not sufficient. Paramount for emigrant recruitment are credible party platforms that promise change, trustworthy leaders, and pledges to improve the sending state policy outreach. That said, parties must deliver collective, emotional, and selective outcome benefits to become successful transnational actors. Moreover, selective process benefits are important for group identity formation.

In the next chapter, I will examine in greater detail the pathways of transnational party activists. In doing so, I will offer further insights into how parties become transnational actors.
5 Transnational party enrolment: how migrants become active in home country parties

Transnational party chapters have become an established feature of the Andean community in Barcelona. These organisations greatly vary in size, activity profile, and level of institutionalisation, but what all of them have in common is that they are social organisms formed and run by committed emigrants. In the previous chapter, I have analysed why emigrants join home country parties. I have provided substantial evidence as to why emigrants support and participate in the transnationalisation of political parties. To fully comprehend this process we also must delve into how migrants come about to join these organisations. The individual trajectories of emigrant party activists offer important insight into how transnational party activity can strike up and consolidate over time. In this chapter, I will explore the trajectories of emigrant partisans and analyse the factors and social dynamics that underpin migrants’ pathways towards transnational party activism.

The transnationalism literature has identified migrants’ embedment in social networks, membership in migrant organisations, and transnational party outreach as important drivers for transnational political engagement (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Tintori 2011; Boccagni and Ramírez 2013; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017; Chaudhary 2018; Guarnizo, Chaudhary, and Nyberg Sørensen 2019; Burgess and Tyburski 2020; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020; Song et al. 2020). In this chapter, I build on these studies to address two major gaps in this body of literature. First, none of these studies has specifically looked at transnational party activism. What I mean by transnational party activism is migrants’ sporadic or frequent, informal or formal involvement in homeland party activities with the aim to support this party (see also, Meléndez and Umpierrez de Reguero 2021). At present only two studies have examined in greater detail transnational party membership, yet surprisingly social networks do not play a prominent role in their analysis (Setrana and Kyei 2015; Collard and Kernalegenn 2021). It is therefore unclear to which extent what type of network matters for emigrants’ party involvement and what role networks play for the transnationalisation of political parties.
Second, while studies acknowledge that social networks and organisational memberships underpin transnational political behaviour, the exact mechanisms at work have remained largely unexplored. Methodologically, these studies tend to use survey data, which makes it difficult to uncover micro-level network dynamics as opposed to using qualitative interview material. This caveat also extends into the party membership literature (e.g., Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Young and Cross 2002; Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Poletti, Webb, and Bale 2019; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019). In this chapter, I demonstrate how migrants establish and maintain contact with significant others in relevant social circles to advance their partisan goals. These circles are embedded in broader networks within the private and public spheres, which unfold and overlap in the transnational arena. I differentiate between private and public social networks to make an analytical distinction between, on the one hand, friends, and family, and, on the other hand, participation and membership in migrant organisations and host country parties. Importantly, I moreover show how in practice these networks overlap. The transnationalism literature has largely overlooked the nested nature of these migrant networks. As I will demonstrate transnationally active emigrants often move within and across different social networks and accumulate organisational memberships to drive their individual agenda.

The existing party membership literature suggests differentiating between *self-starters* who actively set out to join a political party, and *recruits*, who become active in response to party canvassing (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 83–85; Young and Cross 2002, 556; Scarrow 2015, 159–160; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019). I argue that both self-starters and party recruiters rely on local, transnational, and translocal social networks. Each route, however, presents difficulties that they need to overcome. Self-starters must locate points of contact in order to join the organisation from abroad while party canvassers need to develop strategies to locate and convince potential recruits. Organisational recruitment structures act as mediators in both of these processes that are tied in with

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72 Guarnizo and colleagues (2003, 1224; 2019) have made a somewhat similar distinction. They define migrants’ network scope as “the ratio of out-of-town contacts, including those living abroad, to those in the city of residence”, but in both studies, network scope does not influence regular political transnationalism.
parties’ demand-side expectations, i.e. what parties aim to gain from recruiting members abroad (Scarrow 1994; Scarrow 2015). Hence, by shedding light on the pathways of transnational party activists, we are not only able to better understand how political parties take root abroad but also what motivates them and what challenges they face.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first part, I will explore the party self-starting process of Andean emigrants. In the second part, I will analyse the recruitment strategies of transnational parties. This section is subdivided into private social networks and public organisational networks. I will conclude with a discussion of my findings.

5.1 Self-starting into transnational party activism

In the transnational arena, self-starters are a significant minority. Over one quarter (10) of the interviewees in my sample have self-recruited into transnational party activism. Case-specific dynamics shape how migrants choose one network over another to link up.

The MAS-IPSP party chapter in Barcelona would not have had existed without the initiative of a committed group of Bolivian migrants; or at least it would have taken much more time. In 2005, the MAS-IPSP, a leftist party born out of social organisations, started to gain relevance in national Bolivian politics, winning the general elections in a landslide (Anria 2018, Ch. 2). Holding onto its campaign promises, the party “has brought about impressive social changes in Bolivian society” (Farthing 2019, 213) that also excited many of the Bolivians who reside abroad. In Barcelona, one of them was David73 who belonged to an informal group of Bolivian pan flute musicians that used to regularly meet in the Federación Entidades Bolivianos (Fedebol) to jam, share some beers and eventually talk politics. With the 2009 general elections approaching, they sought to actively support the MAS-IPSP from afar. The president of Fedebol at the time, recalls these early days of the MAS-IPSP in Barcelona as follows.

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73 Informal fieldwork conversation; name anonymized.
The Bolivian community wanted to express its proximity to the president, and organized events, also to affiliate [party members]. So it happened the other way around. Not MAS was inviting ... rather the Bolivian community wanted to be closer ... the affiliation events, the talk about MAS, that was more the initiative of the [political group within] Fedebol, yet not as a strategy of action but as an expression of proximity to the Bolivian state.

Nestor, president Fedebol (2007-2011)

At that time, however, MAS-IPSP had no transnational representation in the city yet. How do migrants become active in a political homeland party in the absence of recruitment structures? Whom do they contact? These are important questions that transnational self-starters face. David and his peers contacted the Bolivian consulate in Barcelona. The consulate forwarded their request to the party headquarters in Bolivia. Soon after, the migrant group received the party registration documents, and a membership book to enrol other Bolivian migrants in the party’s formal register. The consulate remained the primary point of contact for the local party cell, and the party organisation in Barcelona further grew.

As the case of David indicates, home country elections are important trigger events that motivate emigrants to pay closer attention to the political developments in their country of origin. At the same time, elections incentivise transnational parties to scale up their activities abroad. Electoral contests are therefore the time during which self-starting into transnational party activism is most common and easy. For Miguel74 such a window of opportunity opened in 2016. He had become aware of the leftist opposition party alliance Frente Amplio (FA) some months before election day. He recognized that one of the party leaders was someone he had studied with back in Peru.

No one connected with me from there [Peru] ... I simply found out about it. I looked for information about the Frente Amplio and I began to be interested in its postulate, its program, its objectives, the profiles of its leaders. Among them, there was one person whom I had known for 40 years. We were fellow students ... That’s what led me to the initiative to promote a base of Frente Amplio here in Barcelona. But it was not because they called me from there or because I had contacted [him]. It was very much a personal initiative. From

74 Interviewee anonymized upon request.
then on we were the ones who began to have contact with them [the party in Peru].

Miguel, former party activist FA (Peru)

Another interesting self-starter process offers Kevin, who had moved from Ecuador to Barcelona in 2016. In the context of the 2017 general elections, he learned about the conservative Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) candidate, Veronica Sarco, who ran for the constituency Europe, Asia and Oceania. Kevin decided that he wanted to join her campaign. In the interview, he clearly states that “I looked for them”. In the absence of any useful contacts in his social surrounding in Barcelona, he made use of his transnational friendship ties to a group of political activists in Ecuador to which he had belonged before he had emigrated. This group had been organizing meetings, marches and social activities in Ecuador to mobilize in opposition to the Correa government. Some of the group members were connected to Cynthia Viteri, the leader and presidential candidate of PSC, as well as Veronica Sarco herself, he explained.

I asked them if they knew if there was anyone from the Christian Social Party here in Spain and what they did was look for information and they sent it to me. They told me "Look, this is her, so and so, get in touch with her, so and so" ... I met them because I knew people from Ecuador, friends and those friends were friends with the presidential candidate.

Kevin, Campaign Youth Section Coordinator PSC (Ecuador)

At that time, PSC functioned only as a dormant party cell. Thanks to his transnational network, however, Kevin succeeded to become involved anyways. His political capital, acquired before emigrating, had been a crucial stepping stone for his transnational party activism. The trajectory of Kevin highlights the long way that self-starters must go at times when they lack local network access. Yet, even emigrants embedded in a larger and politically more active local network can face difficulties to join a home country party. This holds particularly true when a party is still weakly institutionalized abroad. The Movimiento Alianza PAIS - Patria Altiva i Soberana (MPAIS) had been founded in 2006 and while the leftist party fast gained popularity, prospective emigrant partisans had to snowball their way into their party membership in the beginning, explains Milton, a MPAIS enthusiast from the very start.

75 Veronica Sarco was the official replacement candidate (suplente) of Carlos Romero. She is based in Barcelona and the director of PSC in Spain.
Milton: ... we got in touch back in 2006 with the leaders who were coordinating [the party support groups] here in each place, through telephone...

Nicolas: How did you find the coordinators here?

Milton: Through friends and little by little ... "Talk to that person" and by phone inviting people and little by little ... until a Facebook, a Twitter was set up and that's how it went on with the organising.

It must have taken some patience until he and his companions finally succeeded to make contact. Subsequent self-starters might find it easier to join because they can use the recruitment infrastructure that their predecessors have established. At this moment, the lines between self-starting and being recruited start to blur to some extent. For example, Guillermo had learned on Facebook about a local town hall meeting of MPAIS. He went and soon he became a highly active member of the party. While Guillermo already had been thinking about becoming active in MPAIS, it was the party’s local online presence that triggered his initiative to attend the assembly.

The case of Guillermo is also illustrative because of his political trajectory that led him to become a transnational party member. He already had been active in politics during his study times in Ecuador, and even had worked in a high-level administrative post. In 1999, however, Guillermo emigrated to Spain, fleeing the galloping economic crisis in Ecuador. He paused his party engagement for several years, and then joined the Spanish Partido de los Socialistas (PSOE) in 2008, following the invitation of a fellow Ecuadorian woman. In 2010, he finally joined MPAIS. It is evident that his embedment in a politically active social network (offline and online) had situated him in a comfortable position to join a transnational party. Self-starters must first overcome their inhibition threshold to reach out and, thus, in comparison with recruits, they face higher barriers to joining a political party. Previous political engagement, however, equips self-starters with the necessary network contacts and skills and arguably lowers their inhibition threshold to seek contact with a party cell.
Self-starters who lack political capital or relevant social network ties will need more time to enrol. For example, Lorena had come to Spain in 2007. She had migrated to Sant Cugat, a small city near Barcelona, and while she was somewhat following Ecuadorian politics, she never had been politically active. In April 2014, Rafael Correa, Ecuador’s then-president, came to Barcelona to accept his honorary doctorate from the Universidad Barcelona (UB). Lorena had learned about his visit and decided to attend the public event. In the interview she recalled that his discourse deeply impressed her and that the following year she went to Ecuador to visit home, seeing “that he [Rafael Correa] was carrying through with what he had said in his speech”. Upon return to Spain, she sought to become an active member of his political party, MPAIS.

I tried looking for places where they support Rafael Correa. Well, I started taking a class at the consulate. There I met a woman who invited me to a talk, and well everything started there. In the 2017 campaign, I was supporting MPAIS.

Lorena, campaign volunteer MPAIS (Ecuador)

The quest to join MPAIS took Lorena between one and two years. During this time she also had relocated to Barcelona city and undertaken some efforts to improve her network position. Other emigrant self-starters, such as Kevin, have drawn on transnational ties to kickstart their party activism. For this scenario, however, previous political capital and good connections are indispensable.

When Wilmer and his friend became invested in campaigning for the Peruvian presidential candidate Pedro Pablo Kuczinsky in 2015, they faced one hard challenge from the very beginning. Kuczinsky’s party, Peruanos Por el Kambio (PPK), had only been founded in 2014 and in 2015 it had no representation in Barcelona yet. Nevertheless, they would become two of the main campaign organizers of PPK in Spain. Before Wilmer had emigrated to Barcelona, he had been active in the APRA party and also had been the general secretary of a teachers union. In Spain, he stopped his political activism until a friend recruited him for the Spanish PSOE. With the Peruvian 2016 presidential elections approaching, he decided to also become active again in Peruvian politics. For this purpose they established contact with PPK in Peru, exploiting a friendship tie. His friend was friends with a candidate in the 2016 legislative elections who ran on a PPK
ticket. They send him a letter and he “then contacted us with the party [headquarters] of PPK in Lima. And in response to the letter they named him [my friend in Barcelona] "coordinator [of PPK] in Barcelona" (Wilmer, political campaign advisor PPK Barcelona). The party welcomed the initiative from Barcelona and also connected them with the PPK cell in Madrid. Wilmer became a political advisor for the transnational campaign team. The history of Wilmer demonstrates the importance of transnational connections for emigrant self-recruits. In particular, this holds true for self-starters whose party still lacks a transnational representation. For example, the Bolivian self-recruits of the MAS-IPSP party, which I have presented earlier, had been able to approach the local consulate, knowing that MAS-IPSP was the incumbent party in charge of the diplomatic representation. In contrast, Wilmer and his friend had to go a much longer way, locating their person of interest in the country of origin.

Many party activists in the sample had already been involved in a political party before they emigrated (17 out of 36). In most instances, their party had broken down, and those who sought to continue their activism must find a new party. Yet, members of traditional, still-existing parties can simply keep their party activism alive once abroad. They still self-recruit, however, since they must re-evaluate whether and how they want to continue their involvement from abroad. For example, at a birthday party during fieldwork, I met a lifelong member of the Peruvian APRA party. Yet in Barcelona, he refused to actively engage with the local party cell. Moreover, just like other self-recruits, they must locate a party cell in the new place of residence. In spite of their political capital, they still can face serious difficulties, as the case of Carlos B. will illustrate. He had not only been a lifelong APRA member but a general party secretary in Lima. In 2011, Carlos emigrated, following his wife to Barcelona. In his over 30 years with APRA he has built a large social network, with many high-profile contacts:

And as I have also said, I have been general secretary since my youth and I have been general secretary in the adult cadre. And that has allowed me to meet or liaise with a number of party fellows. And some of them now relish a very good position. (...) I know many, many, many national leaders.
Upon arrival in Barcelona, he soon sought to activate his party membership. However, despite his dense partisan network, it would take him almost three years until he finally succeeded to link up with the local party branch, notwithstanding that he has undertaken large efforts to speed up this process. Carlos still lacked local connections. He, therefore, started by searching online for an APRA representation in Barcelona, yet without results. Using his transnational contacts he then asked the Lima party headquarters for the membership census of the Barcelona chapter and tried finding some members on Facebook, which also failed. Eventually, he succeeded to phone the APRA chapter in Madrid, which was aware of an active party cell in Barcelona but had no phone contacts. Finally, a fellow party member from Peru threw him a lifeline.

The time passed by and when there was no response neither from here, nor from Madrid, nor Lima, I had been lucky that a party fellow from Peru came. He comes to Barcelona; we meet and a party member from Barcelona tags along. And [that meant that] now I knew a party fellow from Barcelona. We talked, we laughed ... And he promised to invite me to an assembly organized by the other fellows to coordinate some things because they were concerned with the approaching presidential elections in January [2016].

Carlos B. coordinator APRA Barcelona (Peru)

Carlos' case offers important insights into the technical challenges that self-recruits face, and how they can try to overcome them. Similar to Kevin, and Wilmer, his story is indicative of the importance of local contacts, which can be activated by drawing on transnational connections. Recent arrivals will often lack access to local networks but are still firmly plugged in back home and can easily reach out to relevant transnational contacts.

Local contacts have proven to be key in almost all of the self-starter scenarios presented in this section, while access to transnational partisan networks has been important in the cases of Kevin, Wilmer, and Carlos B., amongst others. All these individual partisan trajectories help illuminate the mechanisms of the self-starting process. Three main self-starter pathways can be identified. First, some interviewees have directly connected with the local party chapter by approaching the consulate (e.g. David), attending a local party event about which they have learned online (e.g. Guillermo), or attending events where they thought they were likely to meet other party activists (e.g. Lorena). The
history of Carlos B. has highlighted the potential pitfalls of this approach. Second, partisan aspirants use their own local social network and snowball their way into party activism (e.g. Milton). Third, some self-starters draw on their transnational network to set up a new party group abroad (e.g. Wilmer) or to link up with an existing local party chapter (e.g. Carlos B.). Evidently, these different trajectories signify that self-starting requires an unparalleled pool of social capital, free time, and a lot of long-lasting willpower.

The available evidence suggests that existing political capital has been essential for these transnational self-recruits. Eight out of 13 self-recruits had been previously active in a political party in their country of origin and three respondents had been involved in a social movement before they have emigrated. Only two self-starters had been politically inactive until that point. This pattern holds in all three cases, which suggests that for self-starting individual resources matter more than group resources.

The empirical material also highlights important triggers for self-starting. In particular, upcoming elections amplify migrants’ interest in home country politics. It is also an environment in which political conversations become more frequent and parties become transnationally more engaged, increasing the chances for self-starters to find contacts. This finding extends recent scholarship on party membership that has highlighted the importance of such triggers for joining a political organisation in the domestic setting (Power and Dommett 2020).

Moreover, the partisan trajectories presented in this section also draw attention to the importance of the party’s transnational recruitment infrastructures. Bolivian self-starters hardly found any point of interest and had to approach the local consulate or rely on personal contacts. Peruvians faced a similar situation. Yet, a particularity of the Peruvian case is the lifelong party members who decide to continue their party activism abroad, using local and transnational contacts to get going. Historically stronger party brands and specific migration patterns that connect party strongholds in Peru with Barcelona might be a possible explanation. In contrast, Ecuadorian self-starters encountered a recruitment infrastructure, yet admittedly it was highly under-developed in the beginning. The histories of Milton and Lorena show that prospects had to

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76 Includes the informal interview with David.
77 Lorena, Miguel
undertake large efforts to locate their person of interest. Over time MPAIS seems to have responded and started to close these recruitment cracks. For example, Guillermo had been interested in joining MPAIS and eventually did so because he had learned about an assembly in his area via Facebook. Self-starting has been prominent among migrants from all three Andean countries across conservative and leftist parties. Only the Ecuadorian case deviates with respect to the latter. Four out five self-starters joined MPAIS. As indicated in Chapter 4., a possible reason for this might be the party’s broad appeal to emigrants with its promise of change, and strong diaspora policy outreach. In the next section, I will elaborate in more detail on the recruitment strategies of political parties abroad that shape the transnational trajectories of emigrant party activists.

5.2 Party recruitment strategies abroad

Transnational parties cannot only rely on self-starters to increase their active support base abroad. As previously demonstrated, self-recruiting into transnational party activism demands an extraordinarily high level of self-initiative, political interest, socio-political capital and resources. In addition, in Chapter 4. I have shown that party activists are highly motivated to join because of their beliefs, leader or party identification, and personal sense of efficacy. However, many emigrants lack these motivations or resources and prioritize family, work, and leisure time over political engagement. Hence, parties must mobilize them into political activism. The political behaviour literature maintains that party organizations specifically target citizens who have a higher likelihood of becoming politically active and supporting their cause (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Cross and Young 2008). Transnational recruiters leverage their social network positions to access information concerning the prospects’ eligibility and likelihood to join. Recruitment in the private sphere involves party ambassadors who invite their friends and family members to join the organisation. Recruiters use their friendship and kinship ties for information shortcuts. For example, they know the nationality of their friends or partner and often they also know about their political attitudes and previous episodes of political activism in the homeland.
Recruitment in the public sphere includes activists who target active members of political host country parties and migrant associations. This latter group of migrants is important for transnational parties because it is self- and pre-selected in two important aspects. First, these migrants already demonstrate a certain level of willingness to commit their free time to an organisation that, similar to a political home country party, seeks to produce collective goods. Second, their organisational membership offers clues about their nationality, making them an easy target for parties who tend to struggle to identify home country citizens abroad. Clearly, nationality is easy to get information from migrants who participate in an ethnic association. In contrast, host country parties mainly unite citizens of the host society, yet many Andean migrants in Spain possess dual citizenship and several local parties have established internal diversity sections to attract them, which can facilitate transnational party recruitment.

5.2.1 Recruitment via social networks in the private sphere

In this section, I will explore in greater detail how home country parties aim to mobilize new members by heavily drawing on the friendship ties of existing members. While kinship connections are also important for recruitment purposes they have been less prevalent in the interviews.

**Bolivia: Local grassroots recruitment all along the way**

Bolivian parties in Barcelona mostly rely on the local social networks of their party supporters on the ground to recruit new supporters. At least four of the six Bolivian partisans, whom I interviewed, were recruited through their social network. Their individual trajectories are illustrative of the different types of social connections that home country parties aim to tap into.

Friendship circles play an essential role in the parties’ recruitment approach. Party activists invite their friends and acquaintances to attend party activities, hoping to spark

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78 Other work has also highlighted neighbours and work colleagues as party recruiters (see e.g. Young and Cross 2002). In my interviews, these forms of recruitment were not significant and therefore I will not engage with them here.
a long-term party commitment. For example, Diego\(^{79}\) first came in contact with the MAS-IPSP Barcelona cell in 2008 when a friend invited him to a party assembly. He followed this invitation and soon joined the party. This first meeting laid the foundation for Diego’s decade-long MAS-IPSP engagement, albeit the level of his involvement has varied over time, depending on his life and work circumstances. In Bolivia, Diego had already been active in another political party, and arguably this had made him more receptive to following the invitation of his friend.

On other occasions, party recruiters contact friends with whom they have shared a politically active history. This can be a former student colleague with whom they re-connect abroad, as in the case of Ariel, the general secretary of the centrist opposition party *Unidad Nacional* (UN) in Barcelona. When Ariel had immigrated to Spain in 2004, he had first lived in Madrid. His recruitment for the UN had started with a casual encounter in 2009, he recalls.

> Well, I have been in direct contact in Madrid with a friend who had already come and settled in Spain some time ago. And we coincidentally met once in a local pub. We were friends at the university and at the university we were already politically active ... He said to me "I invite you to this project I’m involved in with *Unidad Nacional*, with Samuel Doria Medina\(^{80}\) ... and I said, “of course”. They held meetings. They started to work because the [2009 presidential] elections were coming up. He introduced me to many people and in that way, I began to participate actively.
>
> Ariel, general secretary UN Barcelona

For personal reasons Ariel later returned to Bolivia, but he re-emigrated to Spain soon after. This time he went to Barcelona. He remained plugged into the UN Madrid network and upon arrival in Barcelona, and with five months before the 2016 Bolivian referendum, his friend reached out to him again.

> As the comrade I’m telling you about was still in charge in Madrid, he said to me, "Why don’t you organise something there [in Barcelona]? (...) I said "Sure. Contact me with people here". He contacted me with people and we were [numerically] strong. And it was just a matter of knowing how to organise ourselves for the referendum.
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> Ariel, general secretary UN Barcelona

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\(^{79}\) Interviewee name anonymized upon request.

\(^{80}\) Leader of UN and three times presidential candidate
The newly founded group organized internal board elections and Ariel became the general secretary of the UN chapter in Barcelona, formally recognized by the party headquarters in Bolivia. It would be misleading to argue that the only reason for the establishment of this local party group had been the revival of a friendship from university times following a chance meeting in a pub. Obviously, these processes are much more complex and are firmly tied in with personal beliefs, resources, migration histories and developments within the larger political economy of Bolivia, Spain, and elsewhere. Nonetheless, the partisan trajectories of Ariel, and also Diego, demonstrate that friendship ties, local recruitment tactics, and a political pre-migration experience clearly matter to explain how emigrants can come about to join a political home country party from abroad.

Emigrant party activists are eager to excite their friends and fellow citizens to join their party. They use mouth-to-mouth campaigns to inform about meetings and issue informal invitations within their networks. During electoral campaigns, they also rely on WhatsApp groups to spam their contacts with campaign messages and invitations to party events. However, recruiters are not always successful, explains Fabian, an activist of the MAS-IPSP Barcelona chapter.

Yes, we always invite people to attend the [party] meetings, but I’m telling you, we haven’t had more than 20 [persons]. There is not a lot of echo.

Fabian, activist MAS-IPSP (Bolivia)

Some migrants also may first accept invitations, but soon realise that they actually do not want to get involved in homeland politics, as in the case of two association leaders whom I had interviewed (Interview Walter E.; Interview Juan B.).

Yes, there were [party assemblies held in 2014]. It was the MAS. (…) I went a few times but since I was not interested in politics; I was interested in my work [so I did not continue to attend these events].

Juan B., leader of FFCSMTP

These events are attempts to interest emigrants in the party and its program. However, as illustrated by the quote above not all emigrants who attend these meetings will also join the party in the end. Finally, family ties have played a much more subordinated role
in the recruitment tactics of the Bolivian parties. A reason for this might be the small size of local family networks as compared with friendship circles.

**Ecuador: Friends, friends, friends and some extra assistance from the homeland headquarters**

Ecuadorian parties also extensively draw on the friendship ties of their supporters. To a large extent, they proceed along similar lines as the Bolivian parties. Party activists invite their friends and acquaintances to attend party meetings, campaign events, or town hall assemblies. Several of the interviewees started their transnational party involvement this way. These first encounters can indeed lead to a long-term party commitment, as in the case of Nilo, who later would even become the vice president of MPAIS Europa.

And so, through some friends who were already inside [MPAIS]. They invited us and so we joined ... we joined already in 2009/10 and we have joined to be[come] 100% a militant activist, but full time. And here we are and we continue.

Nilo, vice president MPAIS (Ecuador)

Party activists increase their recruitment efforts during campaign periods. For one, parties have a higher demand for volunteers during that time. For another, the party cells are much more active and can offer additional entertainment value in the form of debates, and cultural events that feature political speeches (see Ch. 4, Section 4.2 on selective process benefits).

Carlos X.B. emigrated to Barcelona in 2000 and started participating in the activities of MPAIS during the 2013 campaign. Some of his friends were already highly involved and had invited him. This was the first time ever that he had become involved in a political party. He did not formally affiliate with the party but became an “adherent, well, accompanying the gentlemen of MPAIS”. In 2014, Carlos X.B. returned to Ecuador, but after only one year he returned to Barcelona. Yet, because of his bad experience in MPAIS governed Ecuador he left MPAIS thereafter. Carlos became politically active again in the summer of 2016 when another friend recruited him for the Centro Democrático (CD), a leftist opposition party. He invited him to a meeting with Jimmy Jairala, the party’s leader, who had come to Barcelona on his transnational pre-campaign trail.
Mr Jairala came here … He was here in Barcelona, I had a meeting with him … well, we were talking to Mr Jairala who, like all politicians, tells you very nice things like [saying] "yes, yes..." [to everything]. The politician in Ecuador has a problem in that s/he will always tell you what you want to hear.

Carlos B.X., party activist (Ecuador)

In this campaign, Carlos assumed a more active role, becoming the CD’s vice president in Catalonia. Engaged activists will attempt to make extensive use of their social network to recruit more supporters. This ripple effect becomes clearly visible in the case of Carlos. He recruited his friend, Nancy Vera, as the party’s second candidate for the extra-territorial constituency Europe, Asia and Oceania in the 2017 general elections. They had known each other for many years because both had been neighbours back in Ecuador.

Many party activists approach their friends to recruit them, or at least attempt to mobilize their vote during election times. Several interviewees have stated how they reach out to friends and acquaintances in the hope to enlist them (Interviews Guillermo, Lorena, Sonia, Alba, Kevin, Maria R., Angelica81). In fact, friends are often the first people to contact, explains Maria R. the vice president of the centre-right Movimiento Creando Oportunidades (CREO) in Catalonia.

For example, I am the vice president. So what do I do? I look for 5-6 friends. I tell these friends about my project … [if] they like it, they talk to 5-6 more friends and so we grow as a pyramid both transversally and vertically.

Maria R. vice president CREO Catalonia (Ecuador)

In the case of MPAIS, supporters have established Comités de la Revolución (CRC). These are grass-root party cells that are formally anchored within the party statutes (Régimen orgánico MPAIS, Article 74). They usually consist of at least 10 people and often are formed by a group of friends. In Barcelona, existed between 25-30 of these cells in 2018 (Interview Guillermo). Some interviewees have estimated that in previous years there even existed between 80 and 170 to 180 CRCs in Barcelona (Interview Guillermo; Sonia), which highlights the importance and effectiveness of friendship circles for transnational

81 Name anonymized.
party cell building. Their recruitment efforts also extend into online networks, such as Facebook, where they can easily contact and invite friends to events, says Guillermo, a former CRC leader and long-term MPAIS member.

Through [online] social networks is a good system and through friends. For example, I know a friend, I invite him to our group, to a meeting and they come, you know?

Guillermo, former leader CRC MPAIS (Ecuador)

Ecuadorian recruiters also face difficulties. Similar to the Bolivians, low levels of political interest and high levels of political distrust are widespread.

Yes, we offer the opportunity to them [to become members] but people here don't want to join anymore. Because they are afraid of being cheated...

Kevin, campaign coordinator PSC (Ecuador)

Friendship ties can help overcome some of this resistance by extending bonds of trust into the political sphere. That said, these connections are not only essential to locate potential recruits abroad, they are equally important to generate confidence in the party and its project, knowing that a trusted person is already involved. Alba, a former MPAIS activist, has put it as follows.

"I know you, I tell you" or I try to convince you, “what I think is good for me will be good for you too”.

Alba, campaign coordinator MPAIS Catalonia and Baleares 2013 (Ecuador)

Family ties can serve similar ends. However, with the notable exception of one party activist, family networks have not been a core recruitment tactic for transnational Ecuadorian parties. The parents of one interviewee had already been active for a political party in Ecuador. The party had lost electoral significance since, yet they remained loyal. Their son recalls how his mother and he had become active in the party from abroad.

They contacted her and they were like .. actually, the party leader contacted her ... to [ask her to] support the campaign for the Asambleísta for Europa, Asia y Oceania, (...). And I was really interested in what was going on

82 Name anonymized to preserve the interviewee’s identity.
because it was my first year in politics, you know, like at the university ... And I started campaigning for them.

party activist (Ecuador)

Recruitment in the family can be a very effective tool for parties since it conveys more direct social pressure on the prospect to join. Yet, there are only so many family members to recruit abroad and so it is unsurprising that family recruitment is far less important in comparison to friend recruitment. In addition, the example above underscores the strong transnational top-down outreach of many Ecuadorian parties. Indeed, Ecuadorian politicians have often flocked to Barcelona during electoral periods to garner votes, support recruitment drives and signal their interest in the affairs of migrants (see also Ch. 4 and Ch.6). In contrast, Bolivian candidates have visited the Barcelona community much less, leaving it mainly to the grassroots campaign teams and the consulate to persuade and recruit supporters abroad.

Peru: A far cry for party prospects. The importance of (trans-)local friendship circles

In the section on self-starting in this chapter, I have already highlighted the importance of friendship ties for Peruvian emigrants who seek to join a home country party. This is a two-way road. Peruvian parties also rely on friendship connections to recruit abroad. In particular, home country parties who seek to establish their first transnational presence in a new locality will make use of already existing contacts on the ground. These can be former party members or friends who have emigrated.

At a cultural event during fieldwork, I met Leonardo\textsuperscript{83}, a local leader of the centrist opposition alliance \textit{Alianza Para el Progreso} (APP). He had joined the party some six months before the Peruvian elections in April 2016. At that time, the party had no formal presence in Barcelona yet, but a friend in Peru had phoned him up, coaxing him to become active for the party by distance. The APP presidential candidate, Cesar Acuña, also came to Spain and they met. Leonardo became one of the leaders of the APP

\textsuperscript{83} Informal fieldwork conversation; name anonymized.
Barcelona chapter. The party group slowly grew in size thereafter. In March 2016, the chapter put out the following post on Facebook.

Moreover, at our APP Barcelona Board of Directors meeting today, we are celebrating a very notable fact: we have passed 100 members, apart from supporters and friends, and this is a reason for us to rejoice because it means that we are moving forward with a firm and sure step to reach our goal. Let Barcelona be the standard bearer city of Europe for APP.

public Facebook account of APP Barcelona, 06. March 2016

This press release is interesting because, beyond party members, it highlights the importance of supporters and friends for the success of the party chapter’s growth. The history of Leonardo is no isolated case. The *Partido Popular Cristiano* (PPC) has also sought to recruit by distance local representatives for a party chapter in Barcelona. These outreach efforts do not go unnoticed within the broader community.

Yes, they [PPC] contacted people here [In Barcelona]. I mean, I know that several of my friends were called and asked if they wanted to become official representatives.

Tito, president CPB / former APRA activist (Peru)

One of them has been Jaime. As a student in his early 20s, he had already become involved with PPC in Peru. He became acquainted with Lourdes Flores, the leader of the party and presidential candidate in 2001, and 2006. In fact, this relationship evolved into a firm friendship over the years.

And well we became friends since ... at least ... it has been a while since Lourdes and I are friends. At least 20 years.

Jaime, representative PPC Catalonia (Peru)

In 2002, Jaime emigrated to Barcelona. He and Lourdes continued to stay in contact and to meet in person.

... Lourdes Flores is a personal friend of mine. When she came to Madrid we had two meetings and when I go to Lima we always meet at her house, at her home. Not at the [office of the] party but at her home. And I had the privilege of going to her house and I had her personal phone number.

Jaime, representative PPC Catalonia (Peru)

In the 2006 elections, Lourdes invited him to become the party’s official campaign coordinator in Catalonia. The activation of friendship ties is a powerful way in which
political organisations can set up a transnational chapter. The examples of Leonardo and Jaime have illustrated that parties rely on trustees abroad to extend their party’s activities across borders.

Once a party cell is established, Peruvians, similar to their Bolivian and Ecuadorian counterparts, attempt to recruit new supporters through their social networks. In doing so, they mainly rely on their local contacts, explains Elva, an association leader who had also been privately volunteering for the transnational APP election campaign in 2016.

what happens is that the political parties ... well in Peru... this one... has its representatives here. So they are the ones who look for people and they contact them and that’s how they contacted me.

Elva, volunteer APP (Peru)

The case of Elva offers additional important insights because her husband had already been active for APP, incentivizing her to also join. It seems obvious that party activists attempt to recruit their partners and adult children for the party. Based on my interviews, however, this strategy has not been very prevalent. There are several possible explanations for this. For one, not all emigrant party activists are married, in a firm relationship, or have a partner from their country of origin. For another, couples with small children will find it difficult to make time available, so that both parents can attend party activities. On average the party activists are 48 years old and have lived in Spain for 18 years at the time of the interview. Hence, in some cases, the children are old enough to actively participate in politics themselves. Yet, politically active first-generation immigrants find it difficult to interest their offspring in home country politics, as illustrated by the following interview excerpt with Carlos N., an APRA member.

Carlos N: Very few young people ... for example, my son knows a lot about Peru, he is 16 years old, he knows about sports, history and everything ... but I tell him "let’s go to a Peruvian activity" and he says "no". He doesn’t feel identified ... With time, things will get lost. This [political] work is left to the people who like to maintain it [alive].

Nicolas: Does he know about the APRA?

Carlos N: Yes, but he is not an APRA supporter. He is for [the Spanish party] Podemos. His mother has won me ... And he is very politically interested,
maybe because his mother is from here, Spanish, and his mother has always been very politically active (...) And now convincing a young man of the APRA; the APRA is a Peruvian ideological conception ... We exist as a party [here] so that we can do something for the benefit of Peru. But the ideology has nothing to do with Europe. So what's the point of my son being an Aprista.

Apart from APRA, Peruvian party chapters remain dormant or dissolve during inter-election times and start to be revived when elections approach. Yet, the recruiters encounter similar challenges to the Bolivian and Ecuadorian parties.

But there is very little interest from the Peruvian citizen in attending and participating in these things. No. They are preoccupied with their daily work. It is about their work, and their family and there are very few, very few devoted to [Peruvian] politics.

Carlos B. coordinator APRA Barcelona (Peru)

Peru’s slightly longer migration history to Spain aggravates these recruitment difficulties since older 1st generation migrants tend also to start decoupling from transnational high-intensity party activism over time (Interview Carlos B.), and, as previously shown, the younger generation lacks a substantial connection to transnational politics (see also, Safi 2018). In addition, constant party-breakdown and party-rebirth (Levitsky and Cameron 2003; Levitsky and Zavaleta 2016) force Peruvian parties to repeatedly re-activate translocal friendship ties to establish their presence in residency countries. Once they have accomplished this first step, Peruvian parties use local friendship connections similar to Bolivian and Ecuadorian parties.

5.2.2 Recruitment via social networks in the public sphere: host country parties

In this section, I will demonstrate how party cells rely on ideological cues to recruit prospects and how this extends into social host country party networks. One big advantage of enlisting friends is that the recruiters already have sufficient knowledge regarding their political preferences. They have a good sense of how likely it is that these people will join their party and if it is worthwhile pursuing them. Certainly, they know who not to contact. For example, a conservative party supporter will forgo inviting its socialists friends, stresses José V., the president of CREO Catalonia.
For a CREO meeting, I am not going to phone Nilo or Alba because they are socialists. You really have to call those who match. Or I make an invitation on Facebook and the people already write to me, saying “I’ll be there...”.

Jose V., president CREO Catalonia (Ecuador)

Ideology is an important marker that the recruiter can use as an information shortcut to better target recruits abroad. Research on party activism in Latin America affirms the importance of ideology to explain why citizens join and stay loyal to specific parties (Muñoz-Armenta, Heras-Gómez, and Pulido-Gómez 2013; Piñeiro and Rosenblatt 2017; Sells 2020). In contrast, transnational studies investigating the vote choice of emigrants find that ideology is of little importance (Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015; Goldberg and Lanz 2021). My empirical evidence, however, suggests that ideology is an important factor for emigrants’ party activism. Among the interviewed party activists, most have identified with a certain ideology (28 out of 36). The majority also uses party ideology to justify their involvement. The following quotes are illustrative of how party activists use ideology to position themselves in the transnational political field.

From the perspective of a progressive left, I believed, and I still believe, that democratic turnover is positive for any society, for any state, for any country. And that was the reason for my support because there was no other party. The other party that was in opposition was a right-wing party.

Walter, party activists UN (Bolivia)

My socio-political or political situation [is that] I am a conservative. I am a member of the right. I have never denied it. I have always said so.

José V., president CREO Catalonia (Ecuador)
And well, here I continue to militate, not militating, but participating in the ideologies, in what Correaism is, and we continue to move forward. We are going to continue participating in that.

Guillermo, ex-MPAIS member, and Rafael Correa movement activist (Ecuador)

I am a leftist. Not since [I arrived] here, but since Peru. From a very young age, I already had it clear ... when I was a student. But at the moment I am not a member of a political party

Miguel, former party activist FA (Peru)

Ideology is important for transnational party activism but less so for voting behaviour. The reason might be that party activism is a high-cost political activity, typically associated with a long-term commitment that demands more justification than a vote choice. Many of the emigrant party activists have also been involved in host country party politics at some point in their life. Many of the formally interviewed emigrant party activists have been active in a Spanish political party (23 out of 36). Their level of engagement greatly varies from person to person and across time. Some only occasionally participate in a party activity or become involved during electoral periods, while others lead an internal party section or have run as a candidate in a local election.

The chronological sequence of participation in party politics also differs by person. Some emigrants have first become involved in a home country party, and then they have joined a Spanish party. In other cases, host country party involvement has preceded a transnational engagement. Both of these trajectory patterns highlight the duality of migrants’ political profiles, whereby transnational and host country activism clearly can reinforce each other. Previous work has made similar observations in relation to voter participation and non-electoral political engagement, including party attachment, trust in government, and involvement in social movements (Wals 2011; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017; Quinsaat 2019). It is striking that the large majority of dual activists in the sample have remained ideologically congruent in their party choices, that is party activists who have previously been active for a leftist host country party, chose a leftist home country party, and vice versa. There have been only five exceptions to this rule.
Transnational party cells can moreover use ideology cues in relation to the host country party arena to recruit volunteers. It makes sense that emigrant partisans target compatriots who are already politically active in an organization that ideologically matches their home country party. One illustrative example offers the case of Fabian, who had been active for the Spanish *Podemos* party before he became involved with the Bolivian MAS-IPSP cell in Barcelona. In his case, *Podemos* not only served as a forum to engage in local politics but to also meet transnationally active Bolivians of the MAS-IPSP cell.

I was invited [to join MAS-IPSP] because I coincided with some comrades who were already [active] in MAS-IPSP. They approached Podemos and there we made contact as Bolivians. I met all of them there within Podemos.

Fabian, activist MAS-IPSP (Bolivia)

It is, however, no coincidence that transnational party recruiters and potential recruits meet at a host country party activity. Many transnational parties seek to collaborate with local parties to gain additional local support in the form of resources, political leadership training, legitimacy, or for lobby purposes. During fieldwork, I have collected data for the inter-party relationships of 11 Andean parties. Based on this material, eight parties have been collaborating with a Spanish or local Catalan party in the past at one point or another. This includes four leftist parties, one centrist party, and three conservative parties. Unsurprisingly, all of them have partnered with ideologically matching host country parties, except for the centrist UN which has teamed up with the Spanish PSC-PSOE\(^4\). A very common form of support of Spanish parties is to grant Andean parties free access to their office space to organize meetings, assemblies, or campaign events, and to use their printer and phone. The inter-party relationship becomes also very visible at transnational party events that Spanish party representatives attend, where they often times also hold speeches to publicly express their support. That said, the general level of support and the formality of the arrangement greatly vary by party. This collaboration can be as loose as in the case of the Peruvian *Frente Amplio* (FA) and *Iniciativa por Cataluña Verdes* (ICV). In the past, an

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\(^4\) Party ideology is based on the economic left-right scale provided by the V-Party dataset (Lührmann et al. 2020). The dataset does not cover the Ecuadorian parties SUMA and Centro Democrático, nor the Spanish party ICV, which I therefore have coded myself using secondary sources.
interviewed FA party activist made use of its ICV membership and contacts to organize a FA fundraiser at the ICV office. It is very uncommon that parties provide financial support since this would violate Spanish, Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian campaign laws although this has happened once in the case of a local MAS-IPSP campaign team, which received 3,000€ and 1,000€ in 2014 from PSC-PSOE and ERC, respectively. Alternative non-monetary forms of support have been consultancy and leadership training, which for example, the Ecuadorian party CREO has received from the Partido Popular and Ciudadanos during the 2017 elections. The most institutionalized partnership has been forged by the Peruvian APRA party and the Spanish PSC-PSOE, which is based on a written agreement of mutual assistance. Both parties supply each other with volunteers during election periods and mobilize their members for each other. This goes as far as that the APRA party has an official representative within the PSC-PSOE. Certainly, a more institutionalized inter-party relationship provides a better forum for emigrant and immigrant party activists to meet and exchange ideas, which increases the opportunities to recruit immigrant party members for a home country party, as illustrated by the case of Tito.

Tito had left Peru as a young adult to continue his studies in Barcelona. During this time he also became active in the PSC-PSOE. With time he also assumed various internal posts. In 2002, he moreover was invited to participate in a congress of the Peruvian APRA party, held in Mexico.

I attended [the congress], invited by the APRA, but because I was a member of the Socialist Party [PSC-PSOE]. And from then onwards they invited me to form part of APRA. So, for a few years, I formed part of, or I met with the Apristas here [in Barcelona].

Tito, former APRA activist (Peru)

This encounter led him to become simultaneously active in Spanish and Peruvian politics. This dual engagement reached its peak when he was a PSC-PSOE member while being actively involved in the APRA campaign in the 2006 presidential elections.

All transnational cooperations between an Andean party cell and a Spanish party have been the initiative of the Andean party. Spanish parties are indeed highly responsive to
these linkage efforts. Only three of the 11 Andean parties have not collaborated with a host country party, but the interviewees claim that this is because they have not wanted to establish any relationship. This includes one Peruvian and two small Ecuadorian pop-up parties which each had a very weakly institutionalized overseas presence in the first place. It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the motivations of host country parties to engage in transnational party collaborations, but ideological reasons, shared memberships in transnational party organisations, such as the Socialist International, and high levels of party competition and polarization in the context of Catalonia’s independence debate in combination with bilateral state agreements that grant local suffrage and easy access to Spanish citizenship for Andean migrants are certainly essential drivers in this context. In particular, the latter arguments also help explain why my finding deviates from Levitt’s pioneering (2001) work on the Dominican party chapters in the United States. In her study on the transnational villagers of Miraflores, she found that “despite transnational party structures, strategies, financing, and leadership that were all put in place, in part, to promote political participation in the United States, Mirafloreños integrated little into U.S. politics” (p. 147). She explains this finding with the strong desire of Dominicans to return, and their resistance to giving up their citizenship in exchange for US nationality. High language barriers and lack of interest on part of the Democrats and Republicans are further reasons. In contrast, Andean migrants in Spain enjoy the right to hold dual nationality, a fast track to naturalisation, are native speakers, and are strongly courted by local and national parties who seek to gain a competitive edge in a narrow election climate that has been dominated by hot debates on Catalonia’s independence since the 2010s.

Although, as illustrated in this section, these transnational inter-party relationships are very common, they have been widely overlooked by existing research. Existing work on parties abroad has acknowledged these transnational party collaborations, but only in passing (Lafleur 2013, 128; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a, 633). On the individual level, transnational studies and the party membership literature have, so far, with one notable exception, largely ignored migrants’ “double militancy” (Bermúdez 2010). In this section, I have shed light on new mechanisms beyond political socialization
to explain this dual engagement, additionally extending the empirical evidence beyond the Colombian case (ibid.).

5.2.3 Recruitment via social networks in the public sphere: migrant associations

As previously demonstrated, transnational parties seek to approach compatriots who are already engaged in some form of voluntary activism. This includes immigrant members of political host country party parties, but also members and leaders of migrant associations. As discussed, this latter group of migrants is important for transnational parties because it is self- and pre-selected in terms of nationality and readiness to volunteer. Moreover, associations collaborate and attend each-other events, building dense organisational and social networks. Accessing these networks is essential for transnational parties in order to connect with citizens abroad. Several quantitative studies have shown that an associative membership leads migrants to participate more in transnational politics (Tintori 2011; Leal, Lee, and McCann 2012; Chaudhary 2018; Schlenker, Blatter, and Birka 2017).

Existing studies on association membership and non-transnational political engagement have explored the mechanisms that underpin this positive relationship. These works demonstrate, on the one hand, that parties specifically target associations whose members are most likely to become politically active (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Morales 2009). On the other hand, studies argue that politically active association members pull their fellow members into political activities (Leighley 1996; Walgrave and Wouters 2014; Giugni and Grasso 2019). Both of these logics can apply when party activists infiltrate associations for recruitment purposes. A third approach suggests that involvement in associations fosters the development of civic skills, which facilitate participation in politics (Verba and Nie 1972; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Yet, only because participation becomes easier we cannot expect that individuals automatically participate.

In migration studies, the exact mechanism through which association membership influences migrants’ transnational political engagement has until now remained largely
unexplored. One reason is that the existing literature on migrant associations and home country parties has, so far, tended to focus on the formal linkages between these two actors, mainly looking at state development programs (R. C. Smith 2003; M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Burgess 2012; Schütze 2016; Duquette-Rury 2020). This focus obscures the many informal connections through which associations and parties are linked on the individual level (Allern 2010). Verge (2012) argues that political parties consciously draw on these informal connections as part of their strategy to connect with civil society organizations. She differentiates between three main types of linkage strategies: penetration, creation of own groups, and collaboration. In this section, I concentrate on the penetration tactics of parties abroad. This strategy can unfold in two ways. First, party activists infiltrate associations by participating in the associations’ activities, and becoming members or occupying an executive board seat in the association. Second, parties co-opt association leaders, offering them the leadership of an internal commission, seats on the internal party board, or candidate positions. These penetration tactics enable parties to approach and recruit individual members of migrant associations without having to forge a formal partnership. It is an innovative solution to overcome the resistance of migrant associations to formally collaborate with home country parties, which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 6.

**Bolivia: Infiltrating associations – the staple recruitment approach**

Bolivian parties heavily draw on infiltration tactics to mobilize and recruit supporters in Barcelona. In a strict sense, infiltration refers to partisans entering migrant associations and penetrating them from the inside (Verge 2012). However, in practice, this process is less straightforward. Migrants engage in associations for various reasons that range from accessing and producing social services to meeting compatriots, diffusing the home country culture, and connecting with home (Morell 2005; Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). Some of these association members are simultaneously active in a political home country party. In this regard, they have not joined an association because of an ulterior

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85 In Chapter 6 I will elaborate on the collaboration tactics of the Andean parties in Barcelona. Furthermore, with one exception (PPK), Andean parties abstain from creating their own associations (see also Fliess 2021b). I therefore will not engage here with this linkage strategy.
political motive. However, once an opportunity presents itself to talk about politics, or to issue an invitation to a party event these party activists take advantage of their network position, and pull their fellow association members into the party activities.

During the Bolivian 2016 referendum campaign, these well-connected and highly active party activists were key to increasing the outreach of the Unidad Nacional (UN) in Barcelona. The party used its supporters’ social network to locate association leaders, claims Ariel, the general secretary of the UN Barcelona chapter.

> From one or another acquaintance. It is the work of many ants, as we say. “Let's see, do you know someone? Call all your contacts, invite them. By phone. Telephone, WhatsApp groups”
> Ariel, general secretary UN Barcelona (Bolivia)

They also attended dance activities and other social events in the city to connect with migrants participating in associations or small sports clubs. Party cells benefit from access to a dense network that Bolivian associations maintain in Barcelona. The many festive activities make it easy to approach association leaders, explains Ariel.

> By word of mouth. By people knowing people. That’s how people get to know each other a lot here. Here people socialize a lot at parties … Carnival is the time when all Bolivians meet and get to know each other between one party and another party … So they get to know each other and they already have established these contacts.
> Ariel

He estimated that “half of the people who attended the [party] meetings were involved in these [associative] things”. It is obviously difficult to verify this statement, but it highlights the importance of these associative networks for the transnational recruitment efforts of political parties. These networks also stretch into other regions of Spain. For one, some association leaders onward migrate to different cities. They remain plugged into their Barcelona network and can activate it for political purposes thereafter. For another, cultural associations attend dance and gastronomy festivals around the country and, thus, constantly extend their network. For example, the leader of the UN chapter in Madrid leads a migrant association. It was easy for him to link Ariel up in Barcelona.
Well, that's it. You look for people who share your party's ideas. As I said, I didn’t know anyone here in Barcelona, except for my partner and a couple of friends. But this friend I told you about, who lives in Madrid, already knew a lot of people. Because apart from doing politics he has a dance organisation ... So they move within that and they know each other ... So he put me in touch with people. That's how we organised the [political] party here.

Ariel

The MAS-IPSP cell in Barcelona is also firmly plugged into the local associative landscape. All four interviewed activists were or had been active in a Bolivian migrant association. They maintain important broker positions between the many different institutions in the city, developing strong and weak ties to their non-affiliated compatriots. The leader of the Federación Entidades Bolivianas (Fedebol) has phrased it as follows.

_Hombre, claro!_ There were links, of course, because it's all the same circuit. If you look at the associations, the consulate, the entities, we are all the same people. But of course, some of them were with their flag, with their hat, walking around and waving, campaigning ... and others did not.

general secretary Fedebol

This overlap of membership networks can be well observed in the case of the Fedebol, which was the first Bolivian federation in Catalonia, officially registered in 2007. Its first president, Nestor (2007-2011), played an important role in forging ties with the MAS-IPSP in Bolivia and setting up a support group in Barcelona. He had already been coordinating various civil society organisations in Bolivia. His civic activism had also brought him in contact with some MAS-IPSP politicians who would later become political key figures in modern-day Bolivia. Nestor activated his transnational contacts so that the federation could lobby more effectively the Bolivian government, demanding the improvement of consulate services, and the extension of social and political rights to the Bolivians living abroad, amongst other things. At the same time, some of the federation members, including Nestor, became invested in setting up a MAS-IPSP support group in Barcelona. This informal group operated from within the federation but independently from the federation and the party headquarters in Bolivia. They sought to maintain full autonomy, even against outside pressure to draw the federation nearer the party.
MAS had its operators, let’s say, political supporters. So they wanted that Fedebol would be partly directed [by the party] ... I have sometimes felt that kind of intention ... And o.k. we were part of it, being an operator [of MAS]. But that was different in my opinion from what the organised Bolivian community in Spain, in Catalonia, wanted. In a way, we did come closer [to MAS]. We maintained fluid contacts [with them], but we also kept a certain congruence, a certain fidelity to the objectives of Fedebol.

Nestor, ex-president Fedebol (Bolivia)

They were walking a very thin line between doing party politics and alienating the organisation. In the early days, they held meetings, debates, and organized protests and one mock election at Plaza Cataluña to raise awareness for the disenfranchisement of Bolivians abroad. The lines between Fedebol and MAS-IPSP started to blur increasingly, however, when the group started exploiting the organisational infrastructure of the federation to execute a more coordinated and targeted recruitment strategy. Nestor states that “already in 2011 one starts to see even membership registers for party membership in Barcelona. Party membership with the government party. To a certain extent, we promoted it ourselves”. One recruitment tool was the federation’s newsletter *Infobol*.

Sometimes it talked about the *Fiestas Patrias*, sometimes it talked about culture ... Not so much, let’s say, this propaganda material. The Carnival of Oruro, the Cultural Heritage ... Or Fedebol has reached some kind of agreement with the Immigration Secretariat. Things like that ... So, from MAS, what did we publish? Well, the call for a debate ... or the registration. So let’s say, some registration forms for those who wanted to join [the party] and so on. But we haven’t reached large numbers either.

Nestor

The group also used the office of Fedebol at Plaza Espanya to meet, and organize small gatherings, which arguably has facilitated recruiting more supporters. However, they soon experienced internal push-backs by some of the association members, recalls the general secretary of the federation.

Nestor created the political group there in our headquarters ... it wasn’t difficult for him, he had a key and he created the political group there. And then there came a time when we told them “no”. All of us who were rank and file ... so we asked them not to meet there, to find a political space for their political purposes, to separate things a bit. And that’s what he did.

general secretary Fedebol
The party cell continued to grow in size, albeit having been forced to organize outside the federation. In 2013, the party sent Leónida Zurita, Secretary of Foreign Relations and member of MAS’ national directorate, to host a party congress in Madrid. The consulate in Barcelona, a transnational beachhead of the MAS-IPSP headquarters, transmitted the congress invitation and directly approached some of the Bolivian association leaders, including Severino.

When we are with the association we know what is going on. And here we were in contact with the consulate ... it was the vice-consul who came [to us]. He is from MAS ... he told us that there was this congress. "Ah ok. Look, let's go, right?"

Severino, president As. Salaiy-Urus / campaign coordinator MAS-IPSP 2014 (Bolivia)

Migrant delegations from Madrid, Valencia, and Sevilla also participated in the congress where Zurita appointed the official regional party representatives. Co-optation tactics, however, are rather the exception in the Bolivian case. Penetration is the main strategy since it is less cost-intensive and easier to implement for the resource-poor party chapters in Barcelona.

Ecuador: penetrating associations – an upgraded multi-layered recruitment approach

Ecuadorian parties also extensively rely on penetration tactics to recruit personnel from local migrant associations. As with Bolivian parties, many party activists are simultaneously active in a home country party and a migrant association. During fieldwork, a reoccurring episode was that I set up an interview with a leader of a well-known Ecuadorian association and during our conversation s/he would reveal to also be or have been transnationally active in an Ecuadorian party. This dual engagement pattern is even more interesting since their associative engagement usually preceded their party activism. Most of the Ecuadorian association leaders that I interviewed had also become active in a transnational party (9 out of 12). In turn, 15 out of 20 Ecuadorians in the party activist sample had an association trajectory. These membership overlaps are no coincidence. They are a result of a conscious party recruitment strategy that specifically targets association members, leaders and their
events. Ecuadorian parties are particularly successful because of two factors. First, they exploit the fact that the friendship circles of their activists are often nested within associative social circles. Second, they co-opt leaders of the migrant organisations by offering party posts, including extra-territorial candidate positions. The latter tactic reinforces the former when co-opted association leaders recruit members and friends of their own association and other organisations.

In a previous section, I have already discussed the importance of friendship ties for partisan recruitment strategies. These social circles continue to play an important role on the associative level. In the mid/late 2000s, the Asociación de Ecuatorianos en Catalunya (AEC) has been an important hub in this regard. Several of the interviewees were AEC members, including Alba, and Luis, and had been recruited by fellow AEC members to join MPAIS.

Yes, yes, yes, through friends [I joined MPAIS] because we were linked to the associative world and the different entities collaborated in the Asociación de Ecuatorianos [en Catalunya], which at the time I was its interim president and its vice-president.

Luis, president JOVECU / ex-member MPAIS

To MPAIS, I arrived through the Asociación de Ecuatorianos [en Catalunya]. That's why Saul says, that's where we all came from ... We came together, we began to talk in the association, President Correa came for the first time, he visited [Barcelona] ... We formed cells ... and we were grouping, grouping together to support it [the party].

Alba, association leader / former activist MPAIS

Over time the association and partisan networks have become increasingly intertwined. Association leaders and members, turned party activists, have accelerated this development by exploiting their network positions. Moreover, many of the interviewees are actively involved in more than one association. Consequently, long-standing friendships have evolved that span across and connect many institutions.

Most of us here know each other. If you are involved in some association, everyone knows you. You know who is the president of such and such [association], you know who is the president of such and such [association], you know everyone here if you are involved in associative [activities and] politics.
Barcelona’s vibrant associative landscape makes it easy for the party cells to recruit and mobilize, explains Nilo, the sub-director of MPAIS in Europe.

The associations are already constituted, every day you meet new people. So, if you have a reference through a third person, you invite them directly, and if you meet them coincidently, you pitch to them. You have to listen if he is interested … If he doesn’t want to know anything about MPAIS, he will tell you directly and that’s it. If he is interested to stay in contact you arrange a second meeting.

Nilo

In some cases, these connections further multiply because some home country party representatives are simultaneously involved in a migrant association, a host country party, or a political movement, as in the case of José V., the president of the CREO in Barcelona.

At least I am always invited. It must be because I am a former president of the Federación [de Ecuatorianos en Catalunya (FAEC)]. I am a former president of the Asociación [de Ecuatorianos en Catalunya]. I am former director of the Espai Latino\(^{86}\). I am a former director of the Movimiento Ecuatoriano en Catalunya [MoveCat].

José V., director CREO Barcelona (Ecuador)

These additional network contacts bear less recruitment potential because they also cluster immigrants of other nationalities. Nevertheless, they can serve as weak ties to link up with compatriots outside their core networks. This has also been a strategy used by Bolivian MAS-IPSP in the 2014 campaign (Interview Severino).

Co-opting association leaders

Ecuadorean parties also use co-optation tactics to recruit leaders of well-known migrant associations. During electoral times they offer candidacy positions to migrant leaders for the extra-territorial constituency Europe, Asia and Oceania. Parties can offer four places in total: Two main candidate positions with each one replacement. This

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\(^{86}\) An internal section of the Catalan party Convergència i Unió (CiU)
institutional feature has shaped parties’ linkage strategies ever since it has been introduced in 2009. All Ecuadorian parties, who had an official representation in Barcelona during campaign periods, have utilized this co-optation approach. Findings show that more than half of the candidates had an association trajectory (see Table 5.1). Although candidates resided in different localities (Spain, Italy, United Kingdom) the combination of associative engagement and political commitment was a common feature. Smaller, less institutionalized parties also approach migrant leaders with list places. For example, in 2017, the president of the FAEC ran for CD.

Table 5.1 Ecuadorian main candidates for the constituency Europe, Asia, Oceania, 2013-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Association Board Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Esther Cuesta (e)</td>
<td>MPAIS</td>
<td>Milan, Italy</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Esteban Melo (e)</td>
<td>MPAIS</td>
<td>Murcia, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jorge Rivera</td>
<td>CREO/SUMA</td>
<td>Madrid, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maria Rendón</td>
<td>CREO/SUMA</td>
<td>Barcelona, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carlos Romero</td>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Milan, Italy</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tatiana Candell</td>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Geneve, Italy</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nancy Vera</td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Madrid, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Juan Torres</td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Barcelona, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Dora Aguirre (e)</td>
<td>MPAIS</td>
<td>Madrid, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Esteban Melo (e)</td>
<td>MPAIS</td>
<td>Murcia, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Katty Bone Barzola</td>
<td>CREO</td>
<td>Murcia, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edger Piñaloza Vega</td>
<td>CREO</td>
<td>Madrid, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saul Mora</td>
<td>SUMA</td>
<td>Barcelona, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Martha Macías</td>
<td>SUMA</td>
<td>Geneve, Italy</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pedro Duart</td>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Madrid, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yessenia Enriquez</td>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Barcelona, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luis Tilleria</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>London, U.K</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pamela Limongi</td>
<td>FE</td>
<td>unclear</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raquel Caizapanta</td>
<td>Avanza</td>
<td>Barcelona, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emilio Celi Otero</td>
<td>Avanza</td>
<td>Madrid, Spain</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Author’s own elaboration based on interviews and candidates’ webpages; (e) = elected.
Note: Some parties are only included for one election cycle.

87 Spain: 13 (of which Barcelona: 5; Madrid: 6; Murcia: 2); Italy: 4 (of which Milan: 2; Geneve: 2); U.K.: 1 (London).
88 CD fielded the first time candidates abroad in 2017. FE only fielded candidates abroad in 2013. Avanza only had an official Barcelona representation in 2013.
Internal party regulations and membership rights shape the extent to which parties can apply co-optation tactics involving candidate positions. As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 3.2., only CREO held transparent and fair primaries abroad for the Europe, Asia and Oceania constituency. In other cases, the top-level party leadership in the home country nominates and selects the candidates. Again, parties tend to rely on transnational social and friendship networks to contact the desired candidate. Sometimes it is a simple phone call that catapults a migrant leader into the candidate seat, as in the case of Saul.

I was contacted via telephone. By telephone! So for me, it was very surprising because suddenly someone calls you and tells you that "we are setting up a movement" and that they need representation abroad ... And at that time I was the secretary of the Asociación de Ecuatorianos en Catalunya (AEC). In other words, I wasn't a person that many people knew. That's what I thought. I didn't know anyone and it turned out that after the campaign and the election results, well, I realised that there were people who knew me. But I didn't know anything about politics. I didn't even know how to speak [laughs]. I learned that as time went by.

Saul, candidate 2013 and director SUMA in Europe (Ecuador)

It was his friend, Martha Macias Cedeno, the second SUMA candidate in 2013, who had called him up to broker the deal. Although Saul’s bid for the parliament was unsuccessful he remained active for SUMA thereafter, becoming the party’s director in Europe. Saul’s experience is no isolated case. During fieldwork, I have interviewed another two migrant association leaders, who had been cold-contacted by an Ecuadorian party to become their candidate. In particular, new parties seem to proceed along these lines since they often still lack a large enough recruitment pool abroad. In contrast to Saul’s experience, however, in both cases, the party had sent a high-ranking figure to persuade them to accept the offer. Previous political experience seems to be of secondary importance for the candidate selection. Name recognition, familiarity, and network size matter more. The following interview excerpt with a migrant organization leader in Barcelona offers a vivid account of an extreme co-optation attack during an invite-only party dinner in Barcelona.

So they contacted me from Madrid saying "there is a meeting with an Ecuadorian politician who is coming to meet the community. They want to
have a meeting with people of reference in Barcelona". So they invited me to a dinner where there were several presidents of associations and also private people of reference ... I think there were 15 of us ... for me, it was a bit of a trap ... they said "Well, we need representatives ..." ... and they all asked me if I wanted to be the representative and they all voted, saying "yes, yes". And I was like "no, it's just that ... I don't know a bit about the ideology ..." and I asked them "please allow me to study the ideology of this party a bit, who is behind it, what are their objectives". And [they said] "No, we don't have much time left to register [the candidacy] and so on". And well, that's how it was. And within a week I became a candidate for this political party.

emigrant candidate (Ecuador)

Sometimes migrant leaders can also seize this situation to negotiate their terms before they accept the candidacy as in the following case.

They found me through some friends here and they came. The leader of the party came [from Ecuador] to look for me, to talk to me ... And they wanted me to represent [the party] ... And I told them my conditions ... and they accepted my idea. And well, I also accepted on the condition that I participated as an independent. Not affiliated.

emigrant candidate (Ecuador)

Almost two thirds of all interviewed Ecuadorian associations have experienced co-optation attempts. Only a minority has refused the offer. Ecuadorian parties enjoy a recruitment advantage over Bolivian or Peruvian parties. The Ecuadorian electoral system demands that candidates for the extra-territorial constituency must reside abroad. Therefore, parties must offer these positions to emigrants if they want to contest these special parliamentary seats. Peruvian parties can also legally field emigrant candidates in the Lima constituency, but they rarely do so (see Ch. 4, Section 3.1.). Bolivian parties can legally not nominate emigrant candidates, as the Bolivian constitution requires candidates for the national assembly to have permanently resided in the country during the 2 years preceding the election (Art. 149). In practice, Bolivian parties, therefore, have never fielded a non-resident citizen in an election.

In addition, parties can also use seats on their transnational executive board to court leaders of migrant organisations. These posts are far less prestigious than candidate list places, but parties can offer them all year round. As with the candidate places, these posts are financially not renumerated. Nevertheless, they are still attractive entry
positions for emigrants who wish to pursue a political career. This recruitment strategy, thus, can be used to offer selective outcome benefits to migrant leaders. This tactic is available to all parties with a transnational party structure.

Three of the seven Ecuadorian parties in this study have set up a comprehensive and permanent transnational executive committee with multiple internal positions. Local party representatives from MPAIS, CREO and SUMA each simultaneously hold a presidency in a migrant association. In particular, MPAIS extensively uses this co-optation tactic. Three migrant organization leaders in my sample have held a MPAIS executive board position at the regional or national level (Alba, Annabell, Sonia) while one association leader had been entrusted to lead an internal commission (Luis). While candidate positions are used to purge unaffiliated leaders of well-known migrant organizations, internal board seats strengthen and further solidify the tie to an association leader who is already active for the party. In a narrower sense, thus, this is a modified co-optation sub-type to re-enforce the commitment of already affiliated migrants who lead an association. It should be noted, however, that also the Peruvian APRA party and the Peruvian Nationalist Party, which have maintained each a permanent party structure in Barcelona, have at least partly used internal party posts for similar purposes. In contrast, Bolivian parties’ internal appointments to the executive boards are not offered to association leaders. They are either temporary positions for the election cycle (UN), or restricted to the party’s ‘old guard’ (MAS-IPSP). For all these reasons, Bolivian parties have largely refrained from co-opting associations and prefer to infiltrate associations on an individual level.

Peru: Infiltrating associations – recruiting members and forging bonds of trust

Members of Peruvian migrant organisations and Peruvian party activists frequently meet at the many socio-cultural events in the city. As in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases, many social and friendship circles are nested within associative networks. During electoral campaigns or recruitment drives, party activists exploit their network positions. They specifically target members and leaders of migrant organisations, states Maria, the president of the Asociación Takillaquta.
When you belong to an organisation, you find out about their campaigns because they send you emails, through Facebook, they make propaganda,WhatsApps. You know that one friend or another you didn't know which party they belong to and at that moment you know which party they belong to because they send you WhasApps, inviting you to conferences, inviting you to talks by the political parties.

Maria, president of *Asociación Takillaquta* (Peru).

The approach of Peruvian recruiters resembles the one of Bolivian and Ecuadorian ones in so far that activists invite their friends and peers from the associations to participate in the party activities, hoping to ignite a commitment to their organisation. As already indicated by Maria, many party activists are simultaneously active in parties and migrant organisations. For example, in the 2016 PPK campaign “Yes, there were several. Of course there were. Several [campaign helper]” who were also members of Peruvian associations (Interview Wilmer, advisor PPK). Similarly, the 2011 campaign team of the *Partido Nacional Peruano* (PNP) comprised many members of a Peruvian association in Hospitalet (Interview Isabela89). The association’s leader also succeeded to recruit Fernando90, the leader of another migrant association.

He got me interested in politics. Because until I was 22-23, like all young people, I was apolitical ... He said to me he had seen virtues in me, qualities that could be strengthened and that he wanted to prepare me to be a political leader.

association leader / activist PNP (Peru)

Fernando soon joined the PNP and assumed an internal post. Moreover, his friendship with the association leader, and, hence, his embedment in local associative networks was essential to overcome his distrust in political home country institutions. The fact that the recruiter led a migrant association himself and that both already had supported each other for folkloric activities is key to understanding how and why Fernando ultimately joined the party of his friend.

I could trust him because he is a person who was also a leader here. He also had an association. And he always supported us [the association] ... But every year he supported us. And selflessly. In other words, he is a reliable person you can trust.

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89 Name anonymized
90 Name anonymized
Voluntary engagement in associations can help party activists to gain trust within the community, which will facilitate their recruitment efforts. A post on the executive board of an important migrant association signals commitment to the community. That said, associations are not only important recruitment pools for political parties but serve to create bonds of trust. Party activists can use their association membership capital to convince potential recruits and voters that their political party is trustworthy too. An APRA member has bluntly put it as follows:

... if that association is doing something good, they should know that the man who is president, the man who is secretary, one or two of them are Apristas... It's a question of the image more than anything else ... We tell our colleagues "if an association is going to be formed to defend the interests of such and such a thing, then participate, so that they can see that we are there". Not to capture the association, but so that they can see that we are willing to do good things.

Carlos N., member APRA Barcelona (Peru)

The APRA party is the only Peruvian engaged party cell in Barcelona; that is it is the only party chapter that is active all year round (see Ch. 3, Table 3.4). A reason and a consequence for this are its roots within the associative scene. Many of its members are active in Peruvian migrant associations. Moreover, as in the case of the Bolivian MAS-IPSP and the Fedebol, the Peruvian APRA party’s history in Barcelona is tightly interwoven with a local migrant organization. The Asociación Cultural Deportiva Perú was officially registered in 1996 by Ruben Cardenas, a Peruvian emigrant and committed APRA partisan. Ruben ran a bar in Cornellà de Llobregat, a border municipality next to Barcelona. Throughout its history, this bar had been an important meeting point for Peruvians and APRA partisans in greater Barcelona. When later at the end of the 1990s the APRA chapter was officially founded in Barcelona, Ruben’s brother, Alfonso, became its general secretary and the association started serving as the party’s headquarters office.
I recall it a lot ... a simple bar that was run by a companion who had been general secretary for many years [for the APRA party in Barcelona]. A good companion, a good general secretary, Alfonso Cardenas. ... It had a pool table alongside the business and when we had party meetings he closed the pool and it was our venue.

Carlos N., APRA partisan

The association became an important pillar for the APRA cell in Barcelona. The association provided social bridging capital in form of a meeting and recruitment place. Many partisans started to attend the association’s activities and become actively engaged in voluntary work. As a result, the number of Peruvians with a concurrent membership in the party and the association considerably rose over the years. In the association also participated non-partisans, yet to be clear “most of us we were party members”, states Carlos in the interview. The association as such did not engage in political activities but fostered an additional layer of a common identity.

It is only to maintain a presence ... It was created by an Aprista and logically the rest of the members, we supported it. So the association made us identify a bit more but it did not function as a political entity. No. It was more like there were many people from the party. But nothing more.

Carlos N.

The lines between a socio-cultural and a more political use of the association blur when party members discuss political matters and internal party issues during association assemblies or aim to recruit at the cultural events organized by the association. Most visibly, these lines become fuzzy when party meetings take place in the association’s assembly room. However, in this case, the general secretary of APRA also owned the meeting space of the association. Hence, association members who did not identify with the APRA party did not challenge him or the party.

The many socio-cultural activities in the city are of course open to the broader public and attract migrants far beyond the membership basis of the organizing associations. Party activists are often amongst the guests and, in particular, during electoral times, attempt to recruit supporters. Carlos B., a longtime APRA member, breathes and lives the life of a permanent party recruiter. He specifically tries to locate migrants who already had been active for the party in Peru.
Many people [abroad] chose not to remain in the party. And I have been meeting them. I've been going to events. Because wherever I go I always present myself as a comrade. "I am an Aprista", I always say. I receive a lot of criticism; well, but I always retrieve something. I'm always retrieving something.

Carlos B., coordinator APRA Barcelona (Peru)

It was also at one of these community gatherings that Gonzalo91, the leader of a socio-cultural association, had been approached by a recruiter of the conservative Fujimori party *Fuerza Popular*.

And then when I arrived in Spain and took over the presidency of the association, they [party recruiters] looked for me. They came to me through some people. Well, I said, “I’m going there, to see how it goes…”

Not a member of the association. It was other people I know ... Because of the activities, a lot of people always come ... And of course, it was there that they told me "hey, look what do you think ...” And so I joined in to support them.

Gonzalo, association president (Peru)

Up until this point Gonzalo had never been active in a political party. His engagement, however, did not last longer than six months. He soon quit the party because he felt very disappointed “with the way things turned out at the time. And the things that later came to light”. Because of political scandals, but also due to the fleeting nature of most transnational party organizations in Barcelona and a volatile party landscape in the homeland, many Andean party activists quit and switch parties.

Newer and transnationally less institutionalized parties have difficulties infiltrating or co-opting an entire migrant association. An alternative strategy is to approach community gatekeepers via a local NGO. One Peruvian party has used this approach. Its leader formed part of a Peruvian NGO and could exploit the organization’s transnational network to link up with NGOs in Catalonia. Eventually, one of them put the politician in contact with a Peruvian migrant association in Barcelona, which was civically active

91 Name anonymized
concerning issues in Peru. At that time, the party was not legally established yet, but it already sought the support of non-resident citizens.

Isabela: but that was not for the party. That was on an individual level ... they contacted us as an association to meet this politician ... So he comes back another year and the relationship is not with the association. It's like, let's say, as individuals. But it's like we drop the label of the association and we get more people involved, but like "Isabela" [not as association], so to speak.

Nicolas: And how many [members] of the association took part?

Isabela: Or supported. I think everyone [laughs].

Nicolas: But then not with the label of the association?

Isabela: No, no, no, no, no.

The group of emigrant activists actively supported the party. Most significantly, they organized a fundraiser and collected signatures from Peruvian citizens abroad to formally inscribe the movement as a political party with the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE). As with the Ecuadorian parties, this Peruvian party has infiltrated migrant organisations using transnational associative networks. Yet, the Peruvian party has not offered any list places to court the association leader. Rather the association members joined because both organizations had an aligned agenda.

5.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have traced the individual trajectories of transnational party activists and analysed the recruitment strategies of political parties abroad. By differentiating between self-starters and recruits I have situated this discussion within the relevant political party literature (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 83–85; Young and Cross 2002, 556; Scarrow 2015, 159–160; Ribeiro and Do Amaral 2019). Until now existing transnational studies have discarded this analytical distinction. Yet, as I have demonstrated it is very useful to understand the mechanisms that underpin the transnational trajectories of emigrant party members.

Self-starting into transnational party activism has been widely practised among interviewees across all three countries. Collective incentives are key to understanding
this autonomous decision making-process, corroborating previous findings presented in Chapter 4. It is clear that parties must convince emigrants of their collective utility. Once they succeed, a significant number of emigrants will set out to move heaven and earth to join in. They draw on local and transnational network contacts to overcome barriers imposed by the lack of substantive recruitment infrastructures. Local contacts prevail but in their absence, transnational connections become essential for self-starters. In particular prospects of new parties and weakly institutionalized parties rely on transnational contacts. In addition, previous political capital is a key asset for self-starters.

The many difficulties self-starters face in the process of joining a home country party are also indicative of parties’ demand-side expectations (Scarrow 1994; Scarrow 2015). Only during electoral periods, did Andean party chapters in Barcelona maintain a significant interest to recruit, except for engaged party cells. During campaigns, emigrant volunteers are essential to organize grassroots activities, provide financial resources, and fill internal party posts, and electoral lists. However, it is surprising that in the 21st century emigrant self-starters rarely have tried to join online via Facebook or a party webpage. Although emigrant grassroots campaign teams heavily campaign online to mobilize and recruit, and many of the party chapters maintain individual Facebook pages, self-starters have rarely made use of this offer. Instead, they have relied on personal contacts and friendship ties, which underscores the informal nature of Andean party politics in Barcelona. This also points to an important image problem of parties abroad. Generally, emigrants prefer to rely on trustees than cold-contacting a party chapter.

Private networks also are part and parcel of parties’ recruitment strategies. In the private sphere, parties exploit the friendship connections of their members to create contacts and bonds of trust. In this context, family and kinship ties seem to play a subordinate role. A possible explanation is that they prove less useful to significantly extend the parties’ reach abroad. In the public sphere, parties tap into the networks of local Spanish parties and ethnic migrant associations. Compatriots in these organisations already maintain a high interest to participate in collective action and
possess skills that can ease their involvement in transnational politics. Parties can easily access essential information to judge the propensity of potential prospects to join their organisation. That said parties apply similar recruitment strategies as in the domestic setting (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Cross and Young 2008). Moreover, friendship ties are often nested within these local migrant networks, which enables home country parties to move between these different networks.

Host country parties are essential recruitment venues where transnational parties can target politically active, ideologically matching party prospects. In addition, they provide Andean parties with essential resources to foster their transnational recruitment and mobilization capacities. So far, the transnationalism literature has largely ignored these inter-party networks to explain transnational political activism. Migrant associations are also pivotal institutions with which transnational parties aim to link up. Most commonly, party members infiltrate these organisations to create rapport. In this regard, transnational parties act similarly to parties in the domestic setting (Schwartz 2005; Verge 2012), yet with some important variations. While parties across all three countries use the infiltration approach, only Ecuadorian parties also extensively co-opt leaders of migrant organisations. The electoral home country system grants special emigrant representation in the parliament and encourages parties to set up transnational party structures. Ecuadorian parties use these list places and internal positions to court leaders of well-established migrant associations in Barcelona and elsewhere. While association membership has been shown to foster transnational political engagement, the micro-level dynamics and mechanisms as to why this is the case have remained widely unexplored until now.

This chapter has highlighted new processes that undergird the political activism of non-resident citizens. These findings are essential to better understand how political parties become and remain transnational actors. Parties are social organisms that only can thrive and survive abroad with the help of committed emigrants on the ground. Occasionally, as demonstrated, emigrants can even initiate party cell building abroad. However, migrants and migrant collectives also resist serving transnational party ends.
Migrant organisations, like Fedebol, or leaders, like Isabela, attempt to draw clear lines as to how far parties can misappropriate their organisation. In particular, associations aim to evade any form of *institutional* partnership with homeland parties, thus, limiting their outreach. In the next chapter, I will elaborate in greater detail on the attitudes of associations towards home country parties, and parties’ tactics to take advantage of associations in spite of their resistance.
6 Transnational parties and migrant organisations: why, how, and when do they link up

Migrant associations are crucial for any political party that aims to establish a transnational presence. As I have demonstrated in the last chapter, associations extend the parties’ reach abroad and grant access to essential local networks. They serve as recruitment pools for committed campaign volunteers, and election helpers. Moreover, some association leaders enjoy almost local celebrity status, which in combination with their contacts, skill set, economic resources and means make them attractive as local representatives or candidates. Associations also help with event logistics and can raise the legitimacy of a political party within the community. Parties value migrant associations as mass entertainers, crowd magnets, door openers, and use them as organisational skeletons. In some way, thus, migrant organisations are the ultimate vote multipliers. Transnational parties must mobilize a widely dispersed electorate and Andean associations, who in Barcelona all organize based on nationality, could perfectly act as the parties’ eyes and ears to better navigate the transnational terrain. In short, migrant associations are like Swiss army knives that transnational parties rely on to build an efficient party machinery abroad. Obviously, however, parties cannot deploy associations as if they really were some handy tool. These are autonomous groups of individuals who have collectively organized to pursue their own goals. They follow their own agenda, adhere to their own set of norms, and bring together a large diversity of individuals who differ in their political attitudes and partisan identities.

Paradoxically, however, the existing transnationalism literature has neither problematized nor discussed in greater detail the relationship between migrant associations and transnational parties. Several country case studies show that transnational linkages between political parties and migrant associations are a global phenomenon (Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999; R. C. Smith 2003; M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Hammond 2012; Klekowski von Koppenfels 2013; Lafleur 2013, Ch. 6; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Mügge 2010; Lacroix 2016, 91; Schütze 2016; Paarlberg 2019, 547; Yener-Roderburg 2020), yet so far they have escaped greater systematic scrutiny. Most importantly, we still know very little about how these connections between parties and
migrant associations arise, and what challenges parties face to connect with civil society groups abroad. One reason is that scholars have tended to analyse parties and migrant organizations separately. Another reason is that studies tend to analyse the existence of transnational linkages, but not their non-occurrence. Surprisingly, however, I find that Andean associations in Barcelona aim to evade home country parties. With some notable exceptions, associations have little to no interest in teaming up with political parties and are committed to escaping institutional partnerships at all costs.

To better understand this dynamic, I situate my analysis in the broader party interest group literature. According to the main argument advanced in this body of work, parties and associations cooperate when they can benefit from each other (Warner 2000; Poguntke 2002; Quinn 2002; Allern 2010; Allern and Bale 2017). The exchange model presupposes that associations seek to connect with parties to access state subventions and policy-making while parties aim to link up because of the groups’ financial, electoral and organisational support. Hence, both actors depend on each other for various forms of support. However, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, the Andean party branches in Barcelona have little means to offer these benefits. The transnational party chapters are chronically under-financed and lack access to intra-party decision-making bodies. They cannot offer state subventions abroad or access to policy-making processes simply because they miss access themselves. In addition, they lack credibility and face distrust abroad. Andean associations in Barcelona exhibit a strong agency to keep home country parties away. In response, resource-poor parties use penetration and co-optation tactics to access the associations’ capital and networks (Lawson 1980; Schwartz 2005; Verge 2012). Moreover, I find that occasionally Andean parties also succeed to enter into exchange relationships with migrant associations. This is the case when they can deploy state resources to offer attractive deals, or enjoy a super incumbency status that allows them to invite migrant collectives to the policy-making table. Parties can also benefit from regional cleavages, promise participation in the production of collective homeland goods, or leverage local competitive associative environments.

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between migrant organisations and political home country parties. My analysis sheds light on why, how, and when political parties
and migrant organisations link up abroad or do not. I begin by studying the attitudes of migrant associations towards engaging with political home country parties. In the second step, I scrutinize the situations in which associations and parties engage in mutual exchange relationships. The analysis unfolds country by country.

6.1 Bolivia: attitudes of associations towards linking up with home country parties

Andean migrants in Barcelona have built a dense net of associations, and federations to cater for their cultural, civic, economic, and political needs. In 2018, at least 52 Bolivian migrant associations were formally registered and active in greater Barcelona. More than half were only founded after 2013. There are clear frictions within the Bolivian community that have fostered the formation of ever-new organisations. In September 2018, I attended a meeting organized by several Bolivian association leaders in Hospitalet who sought to found a new federation. The Union de Folkloristas would become the fifth Bolivian federation, all of which were simultaneously active during fieldwork. Notwithstanding these frictions, Bolivian associations are united in their attitudes to keep home country parties at bay. In the meeting, all 17 association leaders emphasized that they do not want to cooperate with any Bolivian party. The president of another Bolivian federation, the Federació d'Entitats Culturals Bolivianes (FeCuBe) took a similar stance.

So we have said if they want to campaign, they have to generate their political space themselves and campaign there … but they have tried several times. And we have had to stop them even though many within the federation were in favour and others against it. But despite all this, we stay united in line with our principles. We say “No. These spaces are not for that”. There are other spaces for that because for us it is difficult. It costs us money … time and all this. So campaigning at our events would be invading our space.

Walter E., federation president FeCuBe
These attitudes are widespread among Bolivian association leaders. As Sara\textsuperscript{92} another organisation leader put it, “we are not political. We are anti-politics. It is not a political entity”.

The large majority of Bolivian associations in Barcelona focus on the diffusion of their home country’s culture. They organize workshops, offer dance classes, and participate in neighbourhood festivals. Moreover, very few associations are transnationally active. They travel to international cultural festivals or maintain an office in Bolivia. In Barcelona, many folkloric associations have been formed since the early 2000s when the number of Bolivian immigrants rapidly increased. They aim to cultivate Bolivia’s famous dance culture abroad, which is firmly rooted in the country’s carnival traditions. Yet, Juan B., the president of the Fraternidad Folclórica Cultural Señor de Mayo Transporte Pesado (FFCSMTP), claims that “all the 60 associations that exist [in Barcelona] … do not mix, I tell you that because I see it, they do not mix the dance with politics. They do not mix it up”. He moreover states that:

Politics as a subject is [done] outside of the culture [world]. It is separate. It has nothing to do with it. And on a personal level, I may be sympathetic to a political party … but the association is all about culture and folklore. It has nothing to do with politics.

Juan B., association president FFCSMTP

During fieldwork, I attended several cultural events featuring dance performances, live music, and food stands. They draw large crowds. The yearly national independency celebration on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of August is the largest event with an estimated 8,000 Bolivian attendants (HAZ Bolivia August Issue 2017, p. 10). The folkloric community, thus, presents an important constituency for political home country parties. However, some of the party representatives argue that the associations’ narrow focus on cultural diffusion undermines their interest to link up.

Not with the Bolivians. I repeat again, they are not up for .. all the Bolivian associations here in Barcelona are cultural [organisations]. It is about going out on stage with banners. And that’s all to it.

Severino, campaign coordinator MAS-IPSP; association president Salayi-Uru

\textsuperscript{92} Name anonymized
The majority [of the Bolivian associations in Barcelona] are the folklore type. So, their interest is just not politics. There is even a lack of [political] awareness.

Fabian, party activist MAS-IPSP

Some Bolivian organizations in Barcelona also engage in civic work. The Centro Boliviano Catalán has been founded in 2002. At this time, the association had become an important point of contact for newcomers seeking information on how to regularize their status, or access public health care services, amongst other things. The association is also home to the Tinkus Ballet, a cultural dance group. Today, the centre promotes the Bolivian dance culture, next to workshops for elderly migrants, raising awareness for migrant labour rights, and assisting migrants without papers. In spite of its engagement in civic host country activities the association claims to maintain an apolitical profile.

There is not always MAS, there are also opposition parties. Then they come "Whom do you support?" ... and we always say "no". And many people respect that and some even insult us because by saying "no" they think that we are already directly supporting [another party]. We feel more relaxed as an entity [by not engaging with home country parties]. We don’t have to be accountable to anyone for what we do .. we don’t enter politics.

Lourdes, association president Centro Boliviano Catalán

Many of the associations find it easy to decline the requests of parties because they often approach them without specific offers. One migrant organization leader argued, “the proposal is that you vote for the party. That's the only proposal they bring” (Interview Ariel M., Casa Bolivia). The president of the Federación Coordinadora Asociaciones Bolivianas (Fecoabol), José L., complains that parties do not even want to enter a mutually beneficial relationship.

Look, every three or six months before the elections they come to propose wanting to get votes. And empty-handed. I mean, as I said, they never bring projects. I mean, you can’t bet on people who don’t have projects ... the only thing they want is to win votes for nothing [in return]. As they have always done.

José L., federation president Fecoabol

The quote of José L. indicates that some organizations might be open to engaging with home country parties if it would serve their interests. Eventually, some of them publicly
raised their demands when they were presented with a platform. In March 2018, the Bolivian consulate presented the new Ambassador, inviting “all the federations, associations, dance clubs, and the Bolivian collective that resides in Barcelona” (Bolivian Consulate, Official Invitation Card 28.03.2018). The leaders of three well-known migrant organizations publicly addressed the government representative. One leader demanded study grants for Bolivian returnees, and improved labour protection for female household workers in Spain, while the president of the Centro Boliviano Catalan asked for a deal with aeroplane companies for cheaper flight fares to Bolivia. Interestingly, both as well as the president of FFCSMTP demanded state support to conduct cultural work. On another occasion, the Centro Boliviano Catalan presented a list of demands to Evo Morales (president of Bolivia, 2006-2019) when he had come to Barcelona several years ago. However, the association leader never received any response.

Occasionally, political parties try to meet some of these demands. Walter E., president of FeCuBe, told me that party representatives from the “opposition as well as from the government came. And you listen. That happens”. Associations can seize these linkage attempts to make demands. Walter recounts a situation in which the government party offered to create a culture department to support and finance Bolivian associations abroad. However, he also said that this project idea was never implemented.

Because at the end of the day it's election time and they say "look, I'm going to give you a menu of this kind" but then it turns out that the menu is gone. So that's the problem, and we leaders know that ... but closing the doors doesn't win you anything either. So you also have to listen to the offers ... What do they want for the migrants?

Walter E., federation president FeCuBe

Presumably, the lack of financial resources on the state and party level in Bolivia makes it difficult for parties to follow through on such promises. But there is also a clear disinterest to provide meaningful offers to migrant associations as indicated by the previous quotes of Lourdes, Ariel M., and José L. In the long run, political parties risk losing credibility by executing the exchange strategy without delivering. In fact, some of the migrant leaders already have a low opinion of home country parties.
I believe that everywhere politicians always manipulate. Unfortunately. In some places more, in other places less, but they always do.

Sara, Bolivian association leader

The experience from other countries indicates that parties and migrant organizations can move past these trust issues and engage in synergetic partnerships. In countries with a strong sending state outreach, such as Mexico, incumbent parties exploit transnational co-development or culture programs to initiate collaborations with migrant organizations (Burgess 2012; Burgess 2018; Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999; M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008). In these cases, parties maintain an important gatekeeper role. Simply put, they can offer state funding in exchange for electoral support (Duquette-Rury 2020). This exchange scenario, however, travels poorly to Bolivian parties in Barcelona. First, so far, Bolivia’s diaspora outreach has remained weak (Hinojosa and de la Torre 2014; Pedroza and Palop-García 2017). Co-development projects exist but have mainly been driven by the Spanish state, and NGO initiatives (Alfaro 2018, 115), and consequently have been subject to stark funding cuts following the 2008 financial crisis (Lacomba and Royo 2020). Of nine Bolivian organisations, only one has been involved in transnational development work. This renders the organizations less dependent on homeland parties. For example, the general secretary of the Federación Entidades Bolivianas (Fedebol) stated that this was one of the reasons for the federation to not extend its activities to Bolivia.

No. Not in Bolivia. The Federation was created here and in Bolivia, we did two things as associations, but not as a federation. Because of course when you become active in Bolivia you also have to get involved a bit more in politics.

general secretary Fedebol

This decision makes them and the other non-transnational associations less vulnerable towards the linkage attempts of Bolivian parties. The Casa de Bolivia de Catalunya is one of the few transnationally active Bolivian associations in Barcelona. The organisation accounts for a long trajectory of transnational philanthropic engagement, having collaborated with local libraries in Bolivia, as well as Catalan NGOs. The association, however, seeks to abstain from any direct transnational political engagement although this is not always easy to accomplish.
… politics [pauses] unfortunately is not clean. In no country it’s clean. So we try to keep out of those things a bit … although it is sometimes necessary to link up in some way, we see that we can accomplish things alone, so we decided to just do it that way.

Ariel M., association Casa de Bolivia

Transnationally active migrant organizations can circumvent formal partnerships, but this might mean that they must work with smaller budgets and cannot realize larger infrastructure projects. Other migrant leaders also highlighted their desire to maintain autonomy as an important reason to not cooperate with a political home country party. Most importantly, however, interviewees stated that an institutional partnership with a political home country party would be against their very own interest. As Walter E. has put it, “politics creates problems” (Interview President Fecube). These problems can arise because important local gatekeepers and allies will associate the association with a political party.

No politics because they always associate you [saying] "Oh, this one belongs to the party”. So they close the doors on you. Or you have a conflict to do your own activities.

Lourdes, association president Centro Boliviano Catalán

Migrant organizations also must think of the audience they want to address. Cultural associations would lose their appeal if they would start to engage in politics, according to one leader.

If we want to give the people … the spectator an artistic quality, a beautiful experience, and then a part of that show is political, the people who go there won’t like it. What people want is to see other cultures, that’s what attracts them; [they] don’t come to listen to politics.

Sara, Bolivian association leader

Ultimately, an alliance with a political party could endanger the very existence of an association.

In the federation, we have never proposed to support a political candidate. But never. Never. I guess that’s why we are surviving [as an organization]. Many federations are born and disappear.

José, federation president Fecoabol
Bolivian associations refuse to collaborate with homeland parties, yet parties have developed strategies in response. As already discussed in the previous chapter, party activists infiltrate migrant organisations and attend cultural activities to mobilize and recruit. At least five organisations have experienced event crashers who come uninvited to distribute campaign material or do photo ops. Association can do little to prevent this.

Yes, they always come. They cling, they camouflage. Or people come who hand out advertisements. There is little you can do about that. Obviously, as long as it is respectful, everything can be allowed.

Ariel M., association Casa Bolivia

And they [parties] went there with their banners, they took pictures at our activities, but we couldn't deny the space …

general secretary Fedebol

These penetration strategies must be understood as pushback tactics against the strong agency of Bolivian migrant organisations. Because parties lack the resources to make an alliance attractive enough they resort to penetration tactics. Poor state outreach, scarce (if any) party funding, no influence in intra-party decision-making processes and trust issues obstruct Bolivian parties to offer exchange relationships to migrant organisations. In spite of these constraints, however, the government party and main opposition party have both succeeded to enter occasional alliances that build on mutual exchanges, as I will demonstrate in the next section.

6.2 Bolivia: occasional collaborations between associations and home country parties

Bolivian parties and associations sometimes enter into on/off collaborations. This occurs only occasionally when parties succeed to access state resources, or when they can offer associations to participate in the production of a common good.

6.2.1 Linkage by reward: a selective linkage approach

The ‘Linkage by reward’ constitutes a clientelist exchange model (Lawson 1980). There is some indication that the MAS-IPSP headquarters in Bolivia has offered rewards to
migrant organisations in Barcelona in exchange for support. To do so it has relied on the consulate, which is manned with committed government partisans. Since 2013, a Bolivian law has eased the ‘parachuting’ of party members into diplomatic positions (Ley N° 465). The previous Consuls in Barcelona, Alicia Muñoz (2011–2016) and Marcelo Poma (2017–2018) were former Minister of Interior and a former regional MP for MAS-IPSP, respectively. Consuls and consulate staff commonly participate in the governing party’s activities in Barcelona. Indeed, previous election campaigns have been partially coordinated with the consulate, as a party member revealed during the interview. For this reason, association leaders frequently equate the consulate with the MAS-IPSP party.

Although the consulate lacks the economic resources to buy the support of an association, it can offer preferential treatment in three essential ways. First, the consul can write recommendation letters that help associations solicit access to event rooms or public spaces. Only one of the Bolivian organizations that I interviewed had its own space. That said, migrant organisations often rely on public venues. Second, cultural associations frequently perform at consulate events in front of larger audiences to gain publicity. Third, associations that organize events with a consul appearance receive particular appreciation in the Bolivian community. The vast number of Bolivian dance associations also means that they compete with each other for spectators, prestige, and spaces. Thus, a good relationship with the consulate can help gain a competitive edge. In turn, the associations can help the government party to mobilize voters, and increase its legitimacy. This clientelist relationship has become most visible during the 2014 presidential elections. A telling example provides the two-day football tournament, titled “Copa Presidente Evo Morales”. The consulate financed the event and Fedebol organized it. In consequence, MAS-IPSP/Consulate and Fedebol could deliver a sports tournament to the community.

And we said OK, if the consul particularly wants to put the name of the president, if they want that and they want to support us in this tournament and it [the consulate] is also part of the organisation because they help with the budget … then we accept that it should be called the "Copa de Morales", because we don't care if it is called "Copa Azul Tercero", for example. It will be the same. If I put the money, I can put it [the name]. Another thing is that
people go to hand out pamphlets or that they have flags or posters of the president. No, no, no. It was "Evo Morales Cup".

general secretary Fedebol

Additional campaign advertisement, however, was superfluous. The official event flyer already showed the MAS-IPSP’s candidate, and sitting president, Evo Morales, holding the FIFA World Cup Trophy. Unsurprisingly, representatives of the opposition party harshly criticized the government party, stating that “This was a way to buy votes” while complaining that “the opposition, having no resources, was unable to organise these [type of events]” (Interview Walter, activist UN). Other migrant association leaders also objected to the politicization of the consulate and its exclusive relationships with Fedebol leaders. At the same time, discontent rose in the Bolivian migrant community about mistreatment in the consulate giving additional reasons to community leaders to take a public stance.

In September, the events culminated in several street protests that lasted for days. Curiously, the protest united various association leaders, local MAS-IPSP activists, and opposition figures, who joined the protest demanding the resignation of Consul Muñoz, accusing her of having “divided us, the Bolivians here in Barcelona” (Interview Diego MAS-IPSP). Some protesters even organized a hunger strike in front of the consulate, causing major newspaper outlets in Bolivia to report on the protest. In response to these protests, Fedebol released public statements and organized a banner march to publicly defend the sitting consul. The local MAS-IPSP chapter had been enmeshed in internal quarrels with the consulate, and some of its members individually supported one side or the other.

In the aftermath of these events, Fedebol lost significance. While the federation had been an important institution and mouthpiece of the Bolivian community in Barcelona till then, it suspended its activities between 2015 and 2017, only starting up again in 2018. Other federations took over. Fecoabol, founded in 2011, grew in importance, and FeCuBe was established in 2014. MAS-IPSP, on the other hand, averted any serious damage. The party still won the most votes in Spain (44.3%), losing only 4.7% of its vote share compared to the 2009 elections (Organo Electoral Plurinacional Bolivia 2018). The consul, Alicia Muñoz, survived the upheaval and remained in office until 2016. Even the
party-run consulate succeeded to team up again with migrant organisations for specific events thereafter, as I will show in the next section.

6.2.2 A catch-all linkage approach: a sovereign ocean access for Bolivia

The Bolivian consulate, MAS-IPSP, and local migrant organisations have collaborated in recent years to raise public awareness for Bolivia’s claim for sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Many Bolivians, including those living abroad, claim that Chile unlawfully deprives landlocked Bolivia of sovereign ocean access, which it had lost in 1883 following the War of the Pacific. The maritime demand is a decades-old national societal desire, that the Morales government further nourished (Otero and Pardo 2018).

In 2013, the government presented its case to the International Court of Justice in the Haque. That same year, it increased its lobby efforts towards host country governments, mobilizing consulates and emigrant collectives as transnational lobby groups (see also, Dirección General de Planificación 2012, 44). Amongst other things, consulates organize street parades, floral offerings, and other creative activities on the “Day of the Sea”93. By 2015, the “great civic parade”94 had become a reoccurring annual event in Barcelona, where Bolivian migrants, including their children, march from the city centre and to the beachfront. Photos posted on Facebook by the consulate, and the MAS-IPSP cell show protesters holding Bolivia’s national flag, the indigenous Whipala flag, and the “Pabellón de Guerra”95. Participants hold up posters that read “The ocean belongs to us by right and to retrieve it is our duty”; “I want an ocean, a blue ocean for Bolivia”96, or “For a dignified future of our children and a better Bolivia. Ocean for Bolivia”, and “Adelante DIREMAR97. Evo [Morales] por el Mar”. These slogans well illustrate the manifold attachments to the national project, including public support for the government. MAS-IPSP activists, however, participate in these demonstrations without party symbols.

93 On the 23th March Bolivia commemorates its loss of the coastal ‘Litoral Department’ to Chile.
94 Printed in large letters on an invitation card of the consulate in 2015
95 A flag created by the Bolivian government in 1966 to underline its entitlement to a sovereign ocean access
96 This also is the title of a book that the Bolivian government published in 2015 that lists all presidents who have publicly supported Bolivia’s maritime demand, starting with Franklin Roosevelt in 1943. http://www.diremar.gob.bo/diremar/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/YO-QUIERO-UN-MAR.pdf
97 The Dirección Estratégica de Reivindicación Marítima, Silala y recursos hídricos internacionales (DIREMAR) is a government agency created for the maritime demand, amongst other geopolitical goals.
Several Bolivian organisations joined the march, identifying themselves with banners. Amongst them were prominent organisations, such as the Centro Boliviano Catalán and the FFCSMTP which claim to be apolitical. Still, one president insisted that their involvement is not political.

Because one thing is the march of federations or entities that support the government ... that indeed are related to politics. But we from the Centro Boliviano Catalán, no. We participate in activities that are for the common good of Bolivia, but not politics.

Lourdes, association president Centro Boliviano Catalán

In 2017, the FeCuBe organized its own “civic parade”. Its president stated that they were publicly supporting the government by organizing the march, but similar to Lourdes, he justified their involvement as a contribution to the common good of Bolivia.

As Bolivians, we cannot back down. We have to do something. That is the idea. I think that all of us, be we leftists or conservatives need to unite to regain something.

Walter E., federation president FeCuBe

The leader of the association Casa Bolivia, in contrast, argues that the government party has politically instrumentalized the maritime demand and therefore abstains from these marches. In 2018 I attended the “Day of the Sea” event at the consulate. Due to the Morales government, this important date in the Bolivian Calendar is now also formally celebrated abroad. Around 70 people attended the event, including European and South American consuls, local party representatives of the Spanish PSC-PSOE, and MAS-IPSP. Three associations performed traditional dances, granting their institutional support to the government agenda. The event was presented as a patriotic act and citizens’ attendance was portrayed as a civic duty. Once the official act was over, the guests moved to a Bolivian restaurant across the street, owned by the MAS-IPSP’s leader in Barcelona. This is particularly illustrative as of how the consulate and MAS-IPSP are aligned again, tying in migrant collectives, to pursue a common agenda. Opposition parties lack access to the consulate. Consequently, they rarely succeed to engage in institutional exchange relationships with migrant collectives in Barcelona. Yet, as I will highlight in the next section parties might overcome this resistance when they can tap into regional cleavages (see also, Burgess 2014).
6.2.3 A regionally selective linkage approach: an autonomous Santa Cruz de la Sierra

Andean associations in Barcelona generally do not organize based on regional origin. Exceptions are the associations connected to the Santa Cruz department in Bolivia. In 2004, a Bolivian-Catalan couple founded the very first Santa Cruz association in Barcelona. The Asociación Espíritu de Santa Cruz de la Sierra (AESC) became one of the most active migrant organisations in Catalonia. In 2010, the Santa Cruz community established the Asociación Comité Cívico Femenino Pro Santa Cruz en Catalunya, the Asociación Unión Juvenil Cruceñista en Catalunya, and the Asociación Cruceña de Comparsas Carnavaleras en Catalunya. In 2011, these four associations came together under the Federación de Fraternidades Cruceñas en Cataluña (Fedecruz). They perform folklore dances typical to the Santa Cruz region, sell regional delicacies at street markets, run their own beauty pageant during the carnival season, and collaborate in community projects with the Red Cross, or TV3 - a regional television channel.

These organisations have 'sister' organisations in Bolivia and since 2010 the AESCS officially represents the Comité Pro Santa Cruz in Spain, one of the main non-government organisations in the Bolivian lowlands for territorial autonomy (Centellas 2016; Eaton 2017, Ch. 5). In 2008, a referendum on departmental autonomy statutes was held in Santa Cruz. Because Bolivian emigrants were disenfranchised, AESCS staged mock elections to protest. The Santa Cruz associations also openly oppose the national government.

almost with the start of Evo Morales, Santa Cruz has suffered a lot of damage by the government ... that is why we do not identify much with this government ... we have to support those who do us the least harm ... and by logic, let's say, we always support whoever goes against the actions of this government.

Alejandro, association president AESCS

The Santa Cruz organisations have repeatedly supported Bolivian opposition parties in Barcelona. Although they have not openly campaigned for a specific party they have bridged institutional support in several important ways. First, they have advised opposition politicians and facilitated access to local networks.
One example is if tomorrow a Bolivian party contacts our association with a proposition, we ask them about their objectives, and if it is for the common good we’ll support them. ( ... ) we transmit the information we receive to others, other collectives and other platforms.

Alejandro, association president AESCS

Moreover, in the 2016 constitutional referendum, members of Fedecruz have represented the Unidad Democrática party at polling tables. The referendum determined whether the constitutional term limit should be changed so that Evo Morales could re-postulate for the 2019 elections. The federation had approached the party to be accredited as their poll watchers. Third, the Santa Cruz collective in Barcelona has repeatedly organized anti-government protests. For one, during the Fiesta de Patria 2018 event, the associations danced carrying “21F” flags and signs to criticise Evo Morales who had announced to re-run in 2019 despite having lost said constitutional referendum. Other associations strongly disapproved of this political activism during the cultural festival. For another, their annual event, they openly criticized the government at their annual Día de la Tradición Cruceña in 2018. The event featured speeches of Spanish parties making references to 21F. A booth sold 21F merchandise. While these latter activities are not directly coordinated with a Bolivian party, they still benefit them and are worth highlighting, therefore.

In sum, the large majority of Bolivian organisations in Barcelona aim to keep Bolivian parties at distance. This attitude is widespread and associations maintain a strong agency as illustrated in the first part of the analysis. Political parties punctually succeed, however, to break the associations’ resistance. They use penetration tactics, tap into third-party funding pools and build on ideological commonalities to overcome their lack of funding. First, MAS-IPSP has used the consulate to back selected associations in exchange for support. This strategy, however, can create backlashes in form of street protests. Second, other strategies involve partnerships to create common goods, such as the maritime demand. Third, these common goods can also be embedded in regional cleavages. If they are sufficiently institutionalized, e.g. in the form of regionally focused

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21F refers to the 21st February 2016; the day of the constitutional referendum
migrant organisations, parties can easily target them. In turn, these collectives are sufficiently organized to approach home country parties for support. That said, common goods are important to mobilize collectives and individual activists alike (see Ch. 4.).

6.3 Ecuador: attitudes of associations to collaborate with home country parties

Similar to the Bolivian community, Ecuadorians in Barcelona collectively organize to address social needs and to maintain an active connection with their home country. In total, I have identified 34 active Ecuadorian organisations in Barcelona. Personal rifts between Ecuadorian leaders of associations exist but are less common than in the Bolivian case. During fieldwork, two Ecuadorian federations co-existed in comparison to five Bolivian ones.

The main mission of both the Federación de Asociaciones de Ecuatorianos en Catalunya (FAEC) and the Federación de Entidades Ecuatorianas y Latinoamericana en Catalunya (FeelCat) is to organize and promote socio-cultural activities. The concurrent engagement in cultural activities and civic work is a defining characteristic of many Ecuadorian associations. From the 13 organisations in my sample, only two associations exclusively focus on cultural diffusion and one association only concentrates on social work. The Asociación de Ecuatorianos en Catalunya (AEC) is a prime example of a socio-cultural Ecuadorian organisation. For one, it provides substantial support to immigrants seeking to regularize, find work, reunite with family members, or solicit information regarding voluntary return and sending state programs. For another, the association also engages in cultural activities hosting music workshops, or Mother’s Day celebrations at its headquarters. Already founded in 1962, it is the oldest active Ecuadorian association in the city. During all these years, however, the organisation has been committed to evading institutional partnerships with political parties.

I don’t agree with it. I think it is not right because as an association we are apolitical and we cannot be involved. We do politics here at home, but not directly like this.

Annabell, association president AEC
All the other 12 organisation leaders took a similar stance. They emphasized that their association is “apolitical”, “not interested in politics”, or that they do not pursue any political objectives. Nonetheless, 10 of the 13 Ecuadorian organisation leaders are or were active members of an Ecuadorian party. In comparison, less than one third of the Bolivian leaders, and half of the Peruvian association leaders were involved in transnational party activities. As I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, these association leaders provide important entry points for transnational parties to enter associative networks for recruitment purposes. Yet, association leaders seek to keep their political and associative activism separate. That is, organisation leaders draw a very clear line between the work of associations and the work ascribed to political parties, clarifies the president of FeelCat.

They [the associations] have very well defined their field of application and scope of action.

Politics is one thing, we respect everyone’s point of view, but associations are made for something else.

Alba, federation president FeelCat

Asking Manel, a long-time MPAIS member and the leader of the religious association *Hermandad Virgen del Cisne*, if his association has been involved in previous electoral campaigns, he responded as follows.

Not as associations. Never. At least on my part, and on the part of some colleagues, because associations always remain on the margin of a political party. These are just individuals who belong to or actively work with political parties.

Manel, association president Hermandad Virgen del Cisne

Because many association leaders are connected to a political party, they are particularly sensitive to the partisan diversity of their association members. More than half of all the Ecuadorian leaders have stated that it is important to keep party politics outside the organisation to maintain a peaceful associative life. Serious internal conflicts could endanger the very existence of an association. Several interviewees have also talked about being “respectful”, or the “principles” and “values” of their association (Interviews AEC, Sin Fronteras, FeelCat, ACEDICAR, JOVECU). The aim is to keep the association inclusive and to stay attractive to the broader community. Interestingly,
Bolivian and Peruvian interviewees have less highlighted the political affinities of their members, notwithstanding it is equally important for the survival of their organisations.

Moreover, maintaining autonomy was an important reason for half of all Ecuadorian association leaders. This ensures that associations can cooperate with other apolitical associations (Interviews CICTAEC, TEAC) while staying in charge of what projects they do (Interview JOVECU). The leaders of the Asociación de Consumidores para la Defensa de los Ecuatorianos Hipotecados en Catalunya (ADEHCAT) have felt particularly strongly about maintaining agency. The organisation supports Ecuadorian immigrants affected by the Spanish mortgage crisis. Its leaders, Marie and Milton, argue that a partnership with a political party would undermine their capacity to create a broader support base and eventually even distract from their core objectives.

[Staying] independent is better because in that way we have no obligation to either one [party] or the other [party]. We have to concentrate on the fight for decent housing.

Marie, association president ADEHCAT

A leader of the Asociación Llactacaru, Cecilia, has argued along similar lines. Llactacaru has been the most transnational association included in the Ecuadorian sample. In the past, the association has been highly active in local host country affairs while lobbying the Ecuadorian state via its sister organisation in Ecuador. The office in Quito had been established in the 2000s by two returning members. The objectives were to demand improved consulate services and external voting rights because “we had no voice, we had no vote” (Interview Cecilia, As. Llactacaru). They also set up a local school project using co-development funds from Spain. Over the years, the association has been contacted by many Ecuadorian parties. In spite of this exposure, the association has always maintained a strict anti-party line, explains Cecilia.

... what we were trying to do was rather to influence society here. Obviously. And if we can, in Ecuador. That is what allowed us to follow a clear political line that was nonpartisan. The clear agenda was [migrant] rights. Because when you are in a party, you fight for the things of the party, the interests of

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99 Many Ecuadorians lost their jobs and could not repay their mortgages as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis. Banks compelled them to keep paying the mortgage, while seizing their homes.
the party, and you forget about the rights of the people. Because you give preference to the other. So we were clear on that.

Cecilia, a leader of Llactacaru

In comparison with Bolivian organisations, Ecuadorian associations are more invested in transnational civic activities. In addition to Llactacaru, four associations are ‘broad transnationalists’ (Itzigsohn et al. 1999). At least, three of them sporadically engage in homeland philanthropy, or development work (JOVEC, Sin Fronteras, ACEDICAR). However, these organisations, as well as their non-transnational counterparts, refuse institutional partnerships with Ecuadorian parties. In response to this resistance, Ecuadorian parties target the leaders and members of migrant organisations to forge informal connections. In Chapter 5., I have demonstrated how Ecuadorian parties exploit overlaps in associative and party networks to recruit leaders and members of migrant organisations. They use their personal connections and co-opt leaders of the largest and most prestigious organisations with candidate positions and board seats. In addition, Ecuadorian parties crash local sports events to mobilize and distribute campaign pamphlets.

Yes, without an invitation. We go there just like that – it is an open space. For example, if there is a sports association and they do an event we go there, of course very respectfully so they do not throw stones at us because they do not like politics. [laughs]

Guillermo, former campaign coordinator MPAIS Barcelona

All Ecuadorian parties have applied this practice, yet they target cultural events less than Bolivian parties. Since many Ecuadorian party representatives lead cultural associations themselves, they can easier prevent event crashing and leaflet bombing. Nevertheless, the Asociación Corazón Andino also experienced a photo bombing attack, as did many Bolivian associations. Moreover, at an event of the AEC, MPAIS activists tried to fly a party flag and the president, Annabel, had to intervene.

Well, on some occasions they [MPAIS] wanted to put their advertisement and they are not allowed to do so. No. So, no, no, no ... we associations cannot show ourselves with any political ideology here.

Annabel, association president AEC
These penetration tactics are clear signs of desperation. Parties face strong resistance from associations who do not want to forge institutional partnerships with homeland parties. Yet, sporadically parties succeed to offer collaborations, as I will argue in the next section.

6.4 Ecuador: occasional collaborations between associations and home country parties

Ecuadorian parties also succeed in punctually offering exchange relationships to migrant organisations in Barcelona. In particular, MPAIS has repeatedly leveraged its long-standing incumbency status to invite migrant organisations to the policy-making table, and to deploy state resources to hire dance associations for campaign events. In the following, I will examine these linkage strategies in more detail, adopting first a top-down, and secondly a bottom-upon perspective.

6.4.1 The Correa exchange model: a top-down perspective

Soon after Rafael Correa was elected in 2006 he pushed to re-write Ecuador’s constitution, fulfilling one of his main campaign promises. A referendum in April 2007 paved the way for constituent assembly elections in September, in which his party won by landslide (80/130 seats). These elections also became the first occasion in which non-resident citizens could elect their own parliamentary representatives. Correa’s party, MPAIS, won all six seats abroad. The new constitution would install substantial powers in the hands of the president, and bring important key positions of the judiciary, and electoral authority under his control, laying the foundation for a larger authoritarian state transformation process (Conaghan 2016; Burbano and de La Torre 2020).

The new constitution also provided opportunities to incorporate so far neglected social segments of society and to link up with new constituencies. Migration scholars have well documented the new rights for migrants that were enshrined in the constitution in unprecedented ways (Margheritis 2011; Ramírez and Olavarria 2016; Sánchez Bautista 2017). From the outset, policymakers sought to actively include migrant collectives
within this transformation process (Ramírez and Olavarría 2016). In Barcelona, meetings were held in 2007/08 to collect demands and link up with migrant organisations.

Well, advisors from the Foreign Ministry came here from Ecuador to listen and hold meetings with the associations. And they met, asking some questions. They took with them a summary of the input from each association or the individuals who wanted to share their concerns or complaints, their doubts, their demands. So they held public meetings, open meetings.

State employee

These open assemblies were held outside the consulate and provided platforms for MPAIS to initiate exchange relationships with migrant organisations. Initially, association leaders welcomed these linkage efforts.

We worked for MPAIS. We all [worked] for MPAIS because we wanted that the constitution would be changed ... it was necessary to reform and we were not happy with this [old] constitution. But the bad thing is that they reformed it on their terms. At their own convenience. So, it was not a constitution that they reformed for the people. No. In their favour.

Migrant organisation leader

As in the Bolivian case, missing a party structure in Barcelona MPAIS relied on the consulate in the beginning. Migrant leaders were important to mobilize and facilitate access to local assembly places so that MPAIS could gain visibility.

Rafael Correa could not enter [Barcelona]. There were no Alianzistas [members of his party] ... Just when the ambassador came in ... I myself did an event for him, a bit of culture so that the people won’t get tired. And he came and gave his political talk ... [in] these civic centres, which you [normally] can’t use [for that], so I selected it, I don’t know how ... that’s when we [MPAIS] started to gain strength ... They simply looked for me, "Sonia, get me people together, help me", "that’s good, keep it going". Since he was the ambassador, I helped him, well, to have a link with him too. Without money, eh. Careful. No money.

Sonia, association president ACEDICAR, party activist MPAIS
In subsequent years, MPAIS relied less on the consulate. It opened an office in Greater Barcelona and formed a transnational party structure in 2012. The consulate remained important, however, to organize presidential visits. Between 2007 and 2017, Rafael Correa came to Barcelona five times. Three of these visits took place during campaign periods. In July 2007, two months before the constituent assembly elections, he met with “representatives of the Ecuadorian collectives in Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia” (DPI 2007). In November 2012, three months before the general elections, Correa visited again. The event took place in the Centro de Convenciones Internacional de Barcelona and drew over 3,000 attendants according to some estimates (El Telégrafo 2012). Cultural activities accompanied the event. The Asociación Corazón Andino was one of the dance groups that performed on stage. Its president, Alfredo, recalls how the consulate had hired them.

They said that it was a presentation or dialogue of the president of the government and that there will be a cultural program with artists. So they wanted that we perform there. And that’s how it went. Of course, I said yes and we had to give them the bank details because they would do us a transfer.

Alfredo, association president Corazón Andino

This exchange relationship continued when Correa came again in April 2014 to accept his Honorary Doctorate from the Universidad Barcelona. He arrived the day before to take “a real bath in the crowd” at an official event that drew around 3,000 Ecuadorian migrants (Gozzer 2014). Next to the Asociación Corazón Andino, the association Sentimiento Andino Internacional Humano Artístico (SAIHUA) performed on stage. In the interview, its president did not consider their participation a form of political cooperation.

We are apolitical and ready to put on our show. We have no political objectives. We are neither in favour of the one [candidate/party] nor in favour of the other [candidate/party], but we perform, make people participate in our [cultural] diffusion and that’s it.

association president SAIHUA
While both association leaders argued that their association was apolitical, they acknowledged in the interviews that these were political events and that their performances would help politicians to reach more people. However, what mattered most for them was the monetary remuneration and performing in front of a large crowd to gain wider recognition in the community. Like in the Bolivian case, the Ecuadorian government party could exploit state resources to link up with migrant organisations. However, this also indicates that financially stronger parties are in a better position to incorporate cultural migrant organisations in their transnational campaign events.

Correa returned to Barcelona in January 2017 to mobilize emigrant voters for the general elections in February. Because Correa’s approval ratings were in decline, he arranged for his former vice-president, Lenin Moreno, to replace him on the ballot. Nevertheless, Correa easily filled the halls at the Palacio de Congresos de Barcelona at Plaza Espanya, Barcelona. The city’s mayor, Ada Colau, and more than 1,000 Ecuadorians had come to see him sign the Organic Law on Human Mobility. The bill had been created between 2013 and 2016 in cooperation with emigrant organisations and returnee civil society groups, amongst others. It was designed to establish the “political, economic, social, and cultural rights of people in human mobility situations, but particularly those of Ecuadorians abroad and returnees” (Sánchez Bautista 2020, 131).

It was also one of the few occasions in which migrant organisation leaders, such as Sonia, who were connected to the party, could partake in a law-making process.

Yes, we have presented projects at the level of the association and the level of the federation, but they [the emigrant MPs] have never helped us. Never has been anything done, it has never been taken up. (...) But on the part of migration, there has been a law that has been reformed with regard to migration (...) At that time, there was, of course, Patiño ... He didn’t show much, but we did request things, which now we don’t [do anymore].

Sonia, association president ACEDICAR

Between 2010 and 2016, Ricardo Patiño, a high-rank MPAIS politician, had been leading the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility, which played an important role in the Organic Law on Human Mobility drafting process (Ramírez 2017).

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100 Lenin Moreno was Correa’s vice president between 2007-2009 and 2009-2013.
Lenin Moreno became Ecuador’s new president in 2017. Many emigrants had turned out to vote for him because of his close connection with Correa. However, he soon turned his back on Correa, sacking his vice-president, Gorge Glas, and other Correa loyalists from key positions. Many of them were later charged with corruption, including Correa himself who self-exiled in Belgium. The party split into Correístas and Leninistas. Lenin Moreno remained in charge of the party, leading many MPs, and activists to defect MPAIS, pledging their loyalty to Correa. The MPAIS Barcelona chapter also split. Barcelona being a Correa bastion, MPAIS slowly fell apart, and new Correa support groups formed in the city. During fieldwork, there were at least four active Correa support groups\textsuperscript{101}. They worked together on several occasions, but, enmeshed in leadership quarrels, they struggled to form a single group. The groups held regular meetings, planned protest activities, organized political talks, collected signatures to help register Correa’s new party in Ecuador, campaigned in the 2018 referendum, and lobbied host country politicians using their memberships in Spanish parties to establish contacts. They also send delegates for Correa’s convention in Brussels and helped prepare Correa’s Barcelona visit in April 2018. However, they did not establish relationships with migrant organisations in Barcelona. For one, the groups were weakly institutionalized. For another, Correa was now in opposition, without access to policy-making or state resources, and thus, the groups had little to offer aside from ideological warfare. An illustrative example offers my participant observation from Correa’s visit in 2018. The evening event was held at the Worker’s Commission (CCOO) office in Barcelona and drew a large crowd of energetic supporters. However, no migrant association performed on stage, and none of the leaders of the well-known Ecuadorian organisations in Barcelona was present in the audience.

In 2019, Lenin Moreno came to Barcelona to meet with representatives of Ecuadorian organisations. Unlike Correa, he avoided the masses. The press picture shows him, the consul, the president of the Ecuadorian federation FAEC, and five association leaders\textsuperscript{102}. Four of five association leaders had been MPAIS activists; one of them being the Vice

\textsuperscript{101} Despertar Ciudadano; Correístas Para Siempre; Mujeres Migrantes Revolucionarias; Revolución Ciudadana

\textsuperscript{102} Eloy Alfaro, Ecu Integración, Comité Cívico Ecuatoriano en Cataluña, Cámara Internacional de Comercio y Turismo Asociación Ecuatoriano-Catalana (Citaec)
Director of MPAIS in Europa. Leaders of other, arguably more relevant associations, such as AEC or JOVECU were missing. Their leaders had been long-time MPAIS members but when the party split they had quit their party memberships. Now, it seems, they were no longer invited to top-rank policy meetings.

Since the beginning, MPAIS frequently sought to connect with migrant organisations in Barcelona to receive their input in law-making processes, in particular in relation to the constitution writing and the bill drafting of the Organic Law on Human Mobility. MPAIS’ incumbency status made it easy to offer these exchange relationships. Emigrants were included in policy-making processes in exchange for policy expertise, which also helped legitimise the law-making process vis-à-vis domestic voters.

6.4.2 The Correa exchange model: a bottom-up perspective

Since Rafael Correa came to power, the Ecuadorian state and parties started paying more attention to emigrants. These openings have encouraged migrant organisations to actively approach parties with their demands.

Since there was Rafael Correa [and his sending state programs, such as] "Bienvenido a casa", the repatriation [program], the Bonus [for returnees]. In other words, there were many things. We felt supported. So that's the objective, both politically and associatively speaking.

Sonia, association president ACEDICAR

Unlike in the Bolivian case, more Ecuadorian leaders felt invited to share specific concerns and to proactively approach home country parties. In 2008, Ecuadorian associations in Barcelona selected José V., a well-known community leader, to travel to Ecuador and to publicly present their demands to Correa during one of its “enlace ciudadano”, a weekly government-sponsored TV show of Correa. However, José stated that “we never received a real response (...) It has always been like this”.

Migrant organisations in Barcelona have also approached their elected emigrant MPs on various occasions. They intermittently come to Barcelona to meet with the community. So far, MPAIS, and more recently Correa-backed candidates, have always won the
Europe, Asia and Oceania constituency. During fieldwork, both MPs, Esteban Melo and Esther Cuesta had come to Barcelona three and two times, respectively. Associations approach them and build personal relationships. For example, a leader of ADEHCAT revealed that Esteban Melo had accepted their invitation to speak at one of their events about home state support in relation to the mortgage situation of migrants. The Asociación de Jóvenes Ecuatorianos en Catalunya (JOVECU), also received support, stated its leader, Luis.

Whenever we have asked for support for some activity or project that we have developed we had a positive answer.

Luis, association president JOVECU

The association has, in turn, collaborated with MPAIS for a local youth festival, providing advertisement and material for the event. The association also extended organisational support to Esteban Melo during one of his recent visits, providing chairs and tables for the event. Migrant organisations can offer important support to MPs. They advertise the event and the few associations who have their own meeting space, such as the AEC, can collaborate to organize town hall meetings.

If a MP, being elected, wants to give a talk in the association, the association is ready to hear him/her. Not because of his/her party affiliation but simply because s/he is our representative, and we have to go and listen to what they have achieved for the people who live here.

Annabell, association president AEC

The association’s demands, however, have, so far, rarely been addressed, she says. For example, they had requested a repatriation insurance rolled out by the consulate, and that one emigrant MP permanently resides in Europe. These demands had not been met. While MPs can easily travel to Barcelona to speak at invited talks or hold town hall meetings, delivering emigrant policies is much more complex since this requires internal party support and legislative majorities. Only four of the 13 organisations in my sample had to say something positive about their emigrant MPs. Unsurprisingly, this includes ADEHCAT and JOVECU who, as illustrated above, have received MP support at some

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point. Additionally, the association leaders of AEC and ACEDICAR have provided a positive evaluation of the first legislative period (2009-2013); a time during which Ecuador massively invested in diaspora outreach programs (Boccagni 2014). Apart from that, association leaders have been discontent. Some of them, such as Flor, have spoken out clearly on this issue.

I think this idea of the [extra-territorial] representation is really a waste of the country's money because that's what I have seen and currently see. Unfortunately, all these assembly representatives do nothing for the country.

Flor, association president CICTAEC

Some of this discontent certainly derives from a deficient implementation of the many diaspora governance programs that Correa had proposed. Initially these sending state policies excited emigrant voters and associations, but ultimately they have fallen short of expectations. The special system of emigrant representation, however, has brought incumbent parties and migrant organisations into closer dialogue. Occasionally they moreover engage in exchange relationships. However, home country parties can also be held easier accountable for their (non-)performances. In the long run, this undermines parties’ ability to offer credible exchange relationships to migrant organisations as in the case of Bolivia.

6.4.3 Opposition parties and associations: exchange models during electoral periods

In contrast to government parties, opposition parties lack access to state resources during inter-election periods and, thus, face difficulties reaching out to emigrants. However, once elections approach, opposition parties can co-opt associations with extra-territorial candidacy seats (see Ch. 5, Section 2.3). Moreover, each candidate must file an electoral program (Plan de Trabajo) when they register their candidacy (see also Ch. 4, Section 3.2.). They can use these programs to specifically court migrant organisations. In total 14 electoral programs were available, covering 11 parties during the 2013 and 2017 elections. Six parties have directly mentioned migrant associations in their programs. Their policy pledges vary in scope, but range from "support them [the
associations and federations] financially for the work they have done” (CREO, Electoral Program 2013), and “create (...) event and meeting spaces for associations” (SUMA, Electoral Program 2013), to “promote the symbolic decoration of (...) leaders in different sectors, [such as] music, literature, artists, business, social work, etc.” (PSC, Electoral Program 2013). Another four parties have included core activity fields of associations, such as co-development projects or Ecuadorian culture diffusion abroad. Only three parties have not addressed migrant organisations in any of these ways. Nonetheless, their promises to introduce postal voting for emigrants, reduce import taxes for private goods (Centro Democrático, Electoral Program 2017), provide help for Ecuadorians affected by the mortgage crisis, or deportations (Unión Ecuatoriana, Electoral Program 2017), or more broadly to fight corruption in Ecuador (Adelante 2017), may still appeal to migrant collectives. CREO (2013) has tailored most of its emigrant policy pledges to migrant organisations. In its 51-point program, 25% address migrant organisations abroad in some way or another. This is partly because many association leaders have directly approached José, the party’s local representative.

I have received a lot of calls from [association] leaders, [and] from businesses that sympathize with Guillermo Lasso and of course once they have had been in contact with me they contact me again.

José V., director CREO Barcelona

The party has also proactively approached associations, such as JOVECU and invited their leaders to meetings to discuss projects and potential collaborations (Interview president JOVECU). In contrast, the AEC produced a list of emigrant demands before the 2017 elections, which it emailed to all the parties in Ecuador, presenting the list also to Jimmy Jairala (presidential candidate, Centro Democrático) during his Barcelona visit in August 2016. However, similar to the Centro Boliviano Catalan, the association never received any answers. In fact, candidates can be a bit wary to make specific promises. Saul has been a candidate for SUMA in 2013 and a backup candidate for SUMA/CREO in 2017.

If the president of X association comes and tells you "we are going to support you but always when you have to work it will be for us". Obviously, at that moment I would reply "... First of all, take me to the assembly and then ask
for things” because what we are not going to do is that before we win and before we are there, we are offering things that maybe we are not going to be able to do.

Saul, candidate SUMA 2013; SUMA/CREO 2017

Other parties adopt a more straightforward approach to lure migrant organisations. For example, Peter, a campaign coordinator for Fuerza Ecuador, stated: “We contacted them and we were like ‘We are this political party’ and we would just make them an offer”. However, these are informal agreements, struck after the electoral program has been finalized.

To conclude, Ecuadorian parties persistently seek to link up with migrant associations. In general, however, association leaders individually engage in party activism but clearly reject an institutional partnership with a homeland party. Yet, the Ecuadorian case highlights how incumbency and a system of extra-territorial representation can equip parties to overcome the associations’ resistance.

6.5 Peru: attitudes of associations towards linking up with home country parties

A significant presence of Peruvian migrants in Spain has already been recorded in the first half of the 20th century. These early movements occurred only on a very small scale, driven by temporary student migration from upper and middle-class families in Lima who send their sons to study law and medicine in Spain (Altamirano 2006, 127–128; Paerregaard 2014b, 2135–2136). Some of these students stayed, starting moreover to organize in associations. They also established the Centro Peruano Barcelona (CPB), which was formally registered in 1967. It is the oldest still active Andean association in Barcelona. According to Tito, its president, the association aims "to promote Peruvian culture first of all, but through conferences, meetings, congresses and, among them, to disseminate the activities of its members". The association is also eager to create platforms for political debates and exchanges, states Tito: “We maintain contact with people from all political groupings, both here and in Peru”. For example, during fieldwork the association organized a debate with Pio Zelaya, a Peruvian Senator (PSOE), who represents Jáen, a municipality in Southern Spain, to discuss “the political
participation of Peruvian migrants in Spain” (Flyer event invitation). In relation to the home country, the association receives and offers its network to Peruvian mayors, regional council ministers, and MPs who are interested in linking up with Spanish institutions.

Because this is one of the functions of the Centro Peruano, or put differently we act as a bridge between Peruvian institutions and Catalan institutions, or cities, in particular, the Ayuntamiento\textsuperscript{104}, [the regional] Deputation of Barcelona, [and] the Government of Catalonia too.

Tito, association president CPB

Some of these transnational connections have emerged because of collective remittances, such as medicine, that the association had sent to Peru. However, the association only liaises with official institutions, i.e. elected representatives. This also includes the Peruvian consulate in Barcelona. During elections, the CPB diffuses voter information and recruits volunteers for election day. Other associations, such as the \textit{Asociación Movimiento Peruano en Catalunya} (Movi Perú), have supported the consulate in similar ways. In comparison with Bolivia or Ecuador, Peruvian incumbent parties have much less politicized the consulate\textsuperscript{105} because they are rarely long enough in office to get a real grip on the consulate. Since 1962, no president, apart from Fujimori (1990-2000), has remained in office longer than five years. Another reason is that Peruvian government parties maintain less interest in linking up with Peruvian voters abroad because an extra-territorial parliament representation (Ecuador) or a geopolitical agenda that builds on emigrant collectives (Bolivia) is absent.

During fieldwork, I have identified 50 active Peruvian associations. Like so many other Andean associations, many focus on the diffusion of home country dance culture in Catalonia. During campaign periods, Peruvian parties invite them to perform at their events. However, associations often decline these invitations. For example, one president\textsuperscript{106} stated that after an internal discussion they declined.

\textsuperscript{104} Administrative municipality body in Spain, formed by the mayor and the elected councillors.
\textsuperscript{105} The only politicisation attempts that I encountered in the Peruvian case evolved around the \textit{Consejo de Consulta} and were initiated by party chapters in Barcelona (see Ch. 4, Section 3.3.)
\textsuperscript{106} Name anonymized.
No, no. Because we were all of the same minds that we don't want to [link up with a political party]. No. Apart from that within the association everyone... it has always been young people, always under 30 years old.. they're not so much into this [Peruvian politics]. Nowadays, many of them have come [to Spain] from a very young age or were born here.

president of a Peruvian association

The presidents of another two dance associations, the *Asociación Cultural Perú Ritmos y Costumbres*, and the *Asociación Nacional De Folklore Inti Tusuy Runa* have also stated that their members, who are mainly 1.5 and second-generation migrants, are not very interested in homeland politics. This is a challenge that in particular Peruvian parties face since Peruvians immigrated to Barcelona slightly earlier. In 1998, the National Statistics Institute of Spain (INE) recorded only 200 Bolivians and 571 Ecuadorians who lived in Barcelona in comparison to 5,252 Peruvians. However, some dance associations have collaborated with Peruvian parties for campaign purposes in the past. Gisela, the president of *Perú Ritmos y Costumbres*, argues that the growing number of Peruvian dance associations in the city has increased competition, which drives some collectives into the arms of home country parties.

What is happening now is that there are more types of dances. So there are more new dance groups. They want everybody to see them. They go directly to say "I want to dance here" ... So they [parties] don't ask you because they already have someone to do it.

Gisella, president *Asociación Cultural Perú Ritmos y Costumbres*

Peruvian dance associations, however, adopt an apolitical stance, similar to the Bolivian and Ecuadorian ones. For example, Gisela told me that “My job with the association is to spread culture. It is not my job to do political promotion of someone”. Maria, the president of the *Taller De Cultura, Folklore Y Arte Takillaqta*, is another Peruvian dance association that shares this point of view. She also emphasized that an apolitical association culture helps attract new members.

[The association is] apolitical, non-religious, with the intention that all those who want to join, participate, and collaborate with the association do not face any kind of impediment. Neither political nor religious.

Maria, association president Takillaqta
Despite this aversion to political engagement, both associations have danced at transnational campaign events in the past. Arguably, the urge to show their work to the broader public and the high competition between associations has encouraged them to overcome their reservations towards linking up with home country parties. The association *Cultural Perú Ritmos y Costumbres* seeks to avoid creating the impression that they indeed favour the political party by using the following strategy.

They think that when they get me, I'm going to take all my people to that place ... you know that behind me you have at least 50 people who are going to be here ... so what do I do? I analyse the situation. If I see that it's a political environment and so on, I take two [dance] couples and that's it. Two dance partners and that's it. No one else. And we don't publish anything.

Gisella, president *Asociación Cultural Perú Ritmos y Costumbres*

The *Taller De Cultura, Folklore Y Arte Takillaqta*, simply accepts the invitation of all parties to maintain a non-partisan image. In addition, its president, Maria, doubts that their involvement would really translate into a significant campaign contribution.

No, no, no, no, [laughs]. No, it is simply to perhaps lighten up the presentation of the party ... So, to loosen up the tension a little. And I think it's more like that. I don't think it helps [the campaign], no, no, no.

Maria, association president *Takillaqta*

Both of these associations acknowledge that they have participated in political events, however, they have developed coping strategies that allow them to move beyond their reservations towards linking up with a home country party while staying competitive in the associative culture scene. In spite of what Maria has stated in the interview, home country parties attach great importance to cultural activities at campaign events, according to Carlos N., a member of the APRA party.

here you have to do it [the campaign] with music, dance and food so that the people can come. Because nobody will come only to hear some guy talking [about politics].

Carlos N., member APRA (Peru)

It is important to note that none of these associations is paid in exchange for their performance. Parties clearly communicate that they can neither pay, nor offer access to public state subventions. Associations need to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of dancing at a party event. Spectators may still associate the association with the political party thereafter, which can discourage future members to join or prevent organizers of cultural festivals to invite them, explains Gisela.

So, then they say "Ah but, Perú, Ritmo y Costumbres are Apristas. Ah no, no, no, no. So, as they are involved in politics, we don’t book them. Let’s go to the other one". I’ve heard that too.

These *associative relationships* help transnational parties to extend their reach. This connection also extends to presidents of associations who are active in a political party. The Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian community associates them with their political party, assuming that they are institutionally linked when in fact they are not (Fliess 2021b). This way, parties gain legitimacy and become known to the broader electorate.

Similar to Bolivia, cultural associations dominate the Bolivian and Peruvian scenes. Some of these organisations additionally have gained recognition for their civic engagement. The *Casa del Perú en Barcelona Siglo XXI* has been founded in 2010 and organizes local sports events, promotes Peruvian dance culture and gastronomy, and organizes music workshops. Its annual main event draws around 600 people and takes place in the pre-Christmas period. On the social front, the association helps detained Peruvians and organizes fundraisers for Peruvians in need. The organisation’s president, José, echoes the words of many other association leaders when saying:

> The institution is not a political institution. We do not represent a political bond. We only represent [and] promote culture as a means of integration … Other organizations are specifically political. And they exist. To which I belong. But quite independently of as president of Casa Peru. But as a citizen.  
> José F., association president Casa del Perú Siglo XXI

José has never been involved with a Peruvian party but actively participates in a transnational protest movement in Barcelona\(^{107}\). Peruvian parties lack the capacity and credibility to appeal to him.

> There were political parties that came here to present their programmes, to make the Peruvian collective in Barcelona aware of the project they are

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\(^{107}\) The group “Against the pardon and impunity, Barcelona” was formed in 2017 in response to Pedro Pablo Kuczynsky’s pardoning of jailed ex-president Alberto Fujimori.
carrying out in Peru … But no, no, there was no party in which I can believe that would be useful. No. There have been none.
José F., association president Casa del Perú Siglo XXI

There are other Peruvian association members and leaders that share his point of view (Interview Huancayo, Inti Tusuy Runa, Omocopex). They do not trust home country parties, criticizing that they do not share the associations’ main interest which is to help Peruvians in need. For example, Ivan, the leader of Inti Tusuy Runa, laments that parties only approach them during elections.

They say this when the presidential elections are usually approaching. They propose everything. "Hey, in this campaign you'll see this, you'll see that," but when it comes down to it, nothing.

Ivan, association Inti Tusuy Runa

The empirical evidence collected during fieldwork substantiates this impression. Only APRA maintains an active presence in Barcelona during inter-election times. In contrast, other Peruvian parties vanish or become dormant after election day, waiting for the next election to approach. During this time they do not carry out activities, nor do they attempt to connect with migrant collectives or recruit supporters. This is in spite of some Peruvian associations who would like to collaborate with a Peruvian party if that would mean contributing to the greater well-being of the Peruvian community abroad or inside the country. Four of the 12 Peruvian associations, which I interviewed, are regularly active in Peru.

Movi Peru is one of them. The association originated more recently, in 2012, and was founded by a group of Peruvians active within the Espai Latino - the internal diversity section of the Catalan party CiU. Nevertheless, the group operates independently. Similar to other Peruvian, Bolivian, and Ecuadorian associations, the association promotes its home country culture in Barcelona and additionally engages in solidarity work. Transnationally, the association has focused on supporting sick children and their families in Peru. Its founder and president, Elva, stated that she had followed invitations of APRA and APP to attend party meetings in Barcelona, but that both parties showed little interest in collaborating for the association’s objective.

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108 In 2017, CiU merged into Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (PDeCAT)
I am always inclined to tell them [Peruvian party representatives] that if they really want to work, it doesn’t matter which party they belong to ... So, I have always liked the solidarity part. Social services. A kind of community work. To study the problems of the Peruvians here ... Rather than what they propose to me. I always said to them "if this happens let’s go ahead". But well, no.

Elva, association president Movi Peru

Local chapters of Peruvian parties in Barcelona show little interest in the affairs of the migrant organizations. This is also because they lack the financial resources that would enable them to significantly support the associations’ activities. Instead of offering funds, they request donations (see Ch. 4, Section 5.). Occasionally, Peruvian parties resort to low-cost intensive linkage strategies and informally penetrate associations, as do Bolivian and Ecuadorian parties. In the previous Chapter, I already have discussed how Peruvian parties infiltrate local associations and attend their events for recruitment purposes. There is little that associations can do to prevent event crashing, explains one Peruvian interviewee.

They introduce themselves and then hand out their advertising. Of course, once they are there, we try to tell them not to do it, but once they are there, they still do it. We don’t prohibit it either.

Ivan, association Inti Tusuy Runa

These tactics are part and parcel of the transnational campaigns of Andean parties. They are a response to the pushback of associations to not collaborate with parties. Overall, Peruvian associations aim to evade homeland parties, albeit with a few exceptions. However, depending on their objectives, symbolic recognition and policy influence greatly matter to them, and lead to sporadic collaborations, as I will further demonstrate in the following sections.

6.6 Peru: occasional collaborations between associations and home country parties

In this section, I examine the sporadic collaborations between Peruvian parties and migrant organisations in Barcelona. First, I focus on a community project that APRA realized in collaboration with several associations. Second, I analyse how Peruvian
organisations lobby their home state to introduce extra-territorial parliamentary representation.

6.6.1 The Haya de la Torre Plaza project

In chapter 4, Section 1.3., I have already introduced the case of the Peruvian APRA party in Barcelona that in the early 2000s determined to name a local public plaza after the party’s founder, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. The party succeeded in 2008. Additionally, two information plaques were installed at the plaza in September 2018 while a bust is still pending. At the time of writing, the party was still lobbying the local government to approve its request. During all these years, the party has closely collaborated with the Spanish Socialist party on this matter. More recently, party activists have also sought to actively tie in migrant collectives in their lobby efforts. Most importantly, the party has tapped into the network of local associations to organize public fundraiser events to finance the plaques, the 2018 inauguration event, and the bust.

The CPB has been the most prominent association that has supported the party’s plaza project. The association has diffused information and formally attended the fundraisers. How did APRA succeed to link up on a partisan issue with a migrant association, which claims to maintain a non-partisan attitude? There are important insights that we can gain from examining this case. Above all, the party succeeded because it framed its initiative as a desire for cultural recognition on part of the receiving society.

So if we already have a square, the next idea was to have a bust so that it would be more recognised and a place of pilgrimage for Peruvians or the Apristas in this case, let’s say … Haya de la Torre is an illustrious Peruvian figure, you don’t have to be an Aprista to admire him. No. Peruvians admire Haya de la Torre very much, whether or not they are followers of his ideology…

Carlos B., coordinator APRA Barcelona

Framing the plaza project along these lines, it became a non-partisan matter with which non-partisan institutions could openly identify. In doing so the party gained the support of the Peruvian consulate in Barcelona. This alliance signalled to the wider associative community that it was acceptable to support the party on this matter. For example, the
CPB’s president, Tito, clearly evaluated the plaza project as a non-partisan, apolitical initiative in the interview.

It started as the initiative of two APRA members and then they presented the project and sought our collaboration. We have already said yes. They have also asked for it from the Consulate, and they have also said yes. But not as a political issue, but as a way of recognising an important figure in Peruvian politics.

now they are campaigning for a bust of the founder of the APRA. It is Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Yes, we have offered them all our support. But not because they are Apristas, but because he represents a [historic] figure ... In that, yes, we will support them. But to support their candidates, no. No. No. Tito, association president CPB

In spite of this view, the plaza project must be understood as a public demonstration of the party’s power. The party swayed the public opinion in its favour, albeit facing little resistance, and moreover, successfully influenced decision-making bodies in the host country with a publicly visible outcome. This approach can help APRA to gain more legitimacy abroad. At the same time, however, the plaza project is little more than something purely symbolic. Considering that APRA members and associations have raised more pressing issues during the interviews, such as improved consulate services, or the implementation of extra-territorial representation, it surprises that APRA has not devoted similar efforts to achieve more tangible outcomes (see also Ch. 4, Section 1.2.).

6.6.2 Emigrants’ demand for extra-territorial representation

While the majority of Peruvian associations, similar to the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases, seek to avoid institutional partnerships with homeland parties, there are some notable exceptions. These are migrant organizations that lobby home state actors for specific rights. To achieve their goals they must interact with gatekeepers, such as home country parties or politicians. In this section, I will illustrate this point by tracing the lobbying efforts of migrant organizations in Barcelona towards the Peruvian state to introduce a system of special representation for non-resident citizens.
The first law proposal to implement special legislative representation for Peruvians abroad has been presented as early as 2001 by the National Jury of Elections, an autonomous constitutional organ. However, several leftist and conservative parties had been wanting to assume a leading role in this process, initiating no less than seven individual law proposals since\textsuperscript{109}, and countless proposals to correct the proposal of rival parties. In response to this political gridlock, Peruvian collectives abroad also started to become involved. In 2006, representatives from the consulate advisory councils (\textit{Consejo de Consulta}) in Italy, France, Germany, the United States, and Japan met in Barcelona. Their plan was to develop a common strategy to advance the electoral reform. Many of them were leaders of migrant organisations. A prominent participant was the \textit{Federación Mundial de Instituciones Peruanas} (FEMIP), a global federation of Peruvian associations. The organisation has been heavily lobbying, using its political contacts, explains the president of \textit{Salón Perú}, a member organisation of FEMIP, based in Barcelona.

The president of FEMIP spent many years in Parliament. In fact, at that time there were 120 parliamentarians and he was called the 121\textsuperscript{st} parliamentarian because he was in every session, as a guest.

And he is one of the main promoters so that the Peruvian Parliament has a representation of Peruvians abroad ... And for many years, I would say more than 15 years, he has been there presenting projects, negotiating with the deputies, with the Presidency, with the Council of Ministers, so that finally last year the law was ready to be put to the vote.

Tito, association president \textit{Salón Perú} & CPB

Another organisation that has been very vocal to demand special representation is the \textit{Organización Mundial de la Comunidad Peruana en el Exterior} (OMCOPEX). The entity has been established in 2010 with the goal to improve the political participation and representation of Peruvians abroad, as well as their access to transnational social services. The organization groups 41 Peruvian associations from all over the world. While its headquarters is in Barcelona, it is also registered in Peru. OMCOPLEX is a highly transnationalized migrant organization with a clear political agenda, and, thus,

maintains a strong interest in linking up with relevant stakeholders. OMCOPLEX annually organizes an event in Lima to which it invites MPs, mayors, consultants, and high-level bureaucrats to discuss policies in favour of Peruvians abroad. It is telling for OMCOPLEX’s influence that this international convention tends to take place in the Legislative Palace. The organisation has established a dense net of contacts by using the personal network of its members. Some of these relationships have emerged from friendships forged during study times in Peru. OMCOPLEX also has formed contacts with returning migrants who have studied in Europe or the U.S. and upon return have pursued a political or civil servant career. Moreover, several members themselves are active members of political parties in Peru. For example, the organisation’s president, Jaime, has been a long-time representative of the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC) in Catalonia. Finally, the organisation also cold emails or phones persons of interest to invite them to their annual event. While these relationships with political homeland actors form an important part of OMCOPLEX’s transnational lobby strategy, they also make the organisation vulnerable to infiltration and co-optation attempts by home country parties. Several members of OMCOPLEX, who ran for Congress from abroad, have approached the organisation in the past, asking for institutional campaign support. In general, OMCOPLEX would be open to collaborating, says its president Jaime, but he criticizes that the party programmes of the candidates do not include sufficient emigrant issues.

A qualitative analysis of the parties’ electoral programs in the 2011 and 2016 general elections offers some interesting additional insights (see Table 6.1.). The results indicate that a general lack of trust seems to be a much more pressing issue than the absence of emigrant-specific policy pledges. In 2011, two parties already promised special legislative representation for Peruvians abroad in their electoral manifestos. Another two parties had included policy pledges that directly addressed Peruvians abroad, but they did not commit to special representation. In 2016, many more parties started paying attention to emigrant voters. Six out of ten parties included in their electoral programs specific policy pledges to court Peruvians abroad. Some of these parties have even dedicated entire (sub-)sections to the special needs of Peruvians abroad. In addition, five out of ten parties promised to create an extra-territorial constituency. These promises resonate with a large majority of association leaders in Barcelona. Ten
out of 13 interviewees felt positive about a special representation of Peruvians abroad. For many years transnational civil society organisations, such as OMCOPEX and FEMIP, have constantly lobbied Peruvian parties to acknowledge their needs. Their lobbying effort is essential to understand why Peruvian parties have become more interested in non-resident voters over the years. Several parties, including Fuerza Popular, Alianza Para el Progreso and PPK have approached OMCOPEX during electoral campaigns. At times, OMCOPEX has considered to supporting their campaigns, but the organisation has grown wary since parties have made promises that they did not keep, says Jaime.

if they want our collaboration, we want theirs first. We don't live on promises because they have already deceived us a lot. Entities, institutions, politicians … but when they have come to power, like every politician, they change their mobile number … and you don't know how to reach them … So there is a lack of political and social commitment from these people...

Jaime, association president OMCOPEX

It was only in 2020 that the emigrant district was finally approved in Congress (Ley 31032). In 2021, Peruvians abroad have elected the first two emigrant MPs; 20 years after the first law initiative. Over the years, transnational migrant organisations have successfully engaged in constant lobby work, linking up with relevant stakeholders on various levels. As time went by, more parties have included emigrant-specific policy pledges in their electoral manifestos. Nevertheless, these politically active migrant organisations have resisted to openly collaborate with home country parties for electoral campaign purposes in spite of their aligned interests. The parties’ lack of political willpower to make amendments and missing trust are important factors to explain the absence of more institutionalized partnerships.
Table 6.1 Specific policy pledges in the electoral programs of Peruvian parties in the 2011 and 2016 general elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manifestos / Parties 110</th>
<th>Emigrant policy pledges</th>
<th>% won votes (in total)</th>
<th>Emigrant policy pledges</th>
<th>% won votes (in total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gana Perú (PNP &amp; others)</td>
<td>yes (no district)</td>
<td>31.70%*</td>
<td>no presidential candidate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuerza 2011</td>
<td>nothing</td>
<td>23.55%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Por el Gran Cambio (PPK, PPC, PHP, RN, APP)</td>
<td>nothing</td>
<td>9.83%</td>
<td>yes (+ district) (PPK)</td>
<td>20.91%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente Amplio</td>
<td>party only founded in 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Perú Posible (Perú Posible, Acción Popular, Somos Perú)</td>
<td>yes (+ District)</td>
<td>15.63%</td>
<td>nothing (Acción Popular)</td>
<td>6.93% (Acción Popular)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Solidaridad Nacional (Solidaridad Nacional, Unión por el Perú, &amp; others)</td>
<td>yes (+ District)</td>
<td>9.83%</td>
<td>no presidential candidate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza Popular (APRA, PPC)</td>
<td>PPC formed part of Alianza por el Gran Cambio APRA had no presidential candidate</td>
<td>nothing</td>
<td>5.79%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fonavista del Perú (2011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracia Directa (2016)111</td>
<td>nothing</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>yes (+ district)</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente Esperanza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>yes (+ district)</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progresando Perú</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Político Orden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>yes (no district)</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despertar Nacional</td>
<td>nothing</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>no presidential candidate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adelante</td>
<td>nothing</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>no presidential candidate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuerza Nacional</td>
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<td>0.12%</td>
<td>no presidential candidate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justicia, Tecnología y Ecología</td>
<td>yes (no district)</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>no presidential candidate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Parties’ electoral manifestos; election results retrieved from JNE (https://infogob.jne.gob.pe/BaseDatos#Captchimage); * = won the presidential elections

110 I have limited my analysis to the 10 most voted parties in the presidential elections in each year.
111 Same party but changed the name.
6.7 Conclusion

The relationships between political parties and civil society groups can take on many forms. Most commonly, political scientists have concentrated on institutionalized connections between both actors, looking to statutory indicators, formalized joint agreements, regularized meetings between top-leadership actors, and financial group donations (Poguntke 2002; Kosiara-Pedersen, Scarrow, and Van Haute 2017; Allern et al. 2021). If we were to apply these indicators here, however, we would conclude that party interest group ties are non-existent abroad. In Barcelona, migrant organizations and political parties are linked in much less structured ways.

Bolivian, Ecuadorian and Peruvian associations all demonstrate a strong agency to oppose any form of institutional partnership with a home country party. They decline invitations, push back and develop self-defence mechanisms. Their reasons are manifold and can be summarized as follows. The majority focuses on host country activities, in particular the diffusion of culture and the provision of social services. Home country parties have difficulties proving themselves useful to assist in these activities since they lack access to funds and influence in the host country’s policy-making process. Moreover, many associations refuse to become politically involved to not alienate their members who hold different political preferences. Distrust in home country parties and empty party promises are other reasons for associations to decline parties’ invitations to collaborate. These factors also help explain why the transnationally active associations in my sample prefer to keep home country parties at a distance although a transnational partnership would serve their agenda. However, some associations do not entirely discard collaborating with a political home country party. Yet local party chapters have failed to offer attractive deals. Overall, Andean associations behave remarkably similarly in their attitudes and agency towards transnational parties. Nevertheless, there are some country-specific variations when we look at collaboration that punctually exist.

These occasional collaborations, however, are significant exceptions and tend to be fleeting. They clearly do not qualify as what the party-interest group literature has termed “structured interactions” (Allern et al. 2021). Nevertheless, these collaborations
are no less important since they help us better understand how parties can succeed to overcome the resistance of associations to engage in transnational party collaborations. First, incumbency status matters. In Bolivia, MAS-IPSP has misappropriated consulate resources to offer linkages by reward to migrant organizations. In Ecuador, MPAIS has led a state transformation process during which it invited migrant collectives to the policy-making table. In contrast, Peruvian parties have lacked majorities and tenure reigns in government that would have allowed them to advance emigrant policies with the collaboration of migrant associations or to politicize the consulate in Barcelona.

Second, the electoral system, i.e. special emigrant representation, matters. For one, Ecuadorian emigrant MPs have frequently travelled to Barcelona to meet with the associative communities. For another, presidents and presidential candidates have come on several occasions to strengthen their bonds with the transnational electorate outside and inside the country. In contrast, Bolivian and Peruvian party chapters tend to become dormant during non-electoral times, while party representatives only come to Barcelona on very rare occasions.

Third, transported regional conflicts can encourage associations to team up with home country parties. The Bolivian case highlights that regional associations, such as those from the Santa Cruz department, might collaborate with transnational parties to strengthen their demand for regional autonomy. Moreover, the Peruvian case illustrates that transnational organizations that pursue a political agenda can also maintain an interest to collaborate with homeland parties in the absence of transported cleavages. These informal collaborations are most likely to occur between large transnational organizations and individual MPs and government stakeholders.

Fourth, the local context matters as to whether associations are incentivized to partner up with home country parties. The cases of Ecuadorian and Peruvian associations illustrate that a high level of competition between dance associations can motivate these migrant collectives to perform on stage during transnational campaign events in spite of their presumably apolitical outlook.

Fifth, collaborations arise in situations where parties succeed to offer associations to participate in the production of common goods. These partnerships, however, hinge on the ability of parties to frame their projects along non-partisan lines. In the Bolivian case, MAS-IPSP marketed and instrumentalized the country’s demand for sovereign ocean
access as a national desire. In consequence, several organizations have joined and organized public marches in support of the government party in Barcelona. In the Peruvian case, the APRA party has advanced a project to establish a memorial of their party founder on a public plaza in Barcelona by framing this as an effort to claim public recognition on part of the Spanish society. In conclusion, migrant organizations prove to be important allies for transnational parties. While many organizations seek to evade institutional partisan connections, home country parties have succeeded in partially breaking their resistance by deploying a multi-layered set of linkage strategies.

In the next chapter, I will provide the conclusions of this thesis where I will summarize the key findings and their implications for transnational political party research and discuss avenues for future research.
7 Conclusions

On 07 April 2021, the area around the Plaza Espanya in Barcelona was buzzing with Peruvian and Ecuadorian migrants who sought to vote in the national elections of their home country. I spotted many couples, mostly first-generation migrants in their 40s and 50s, some of whom had brought their children along, but also younger people in their 20s and 30s. Peruvians were called to elect their new president and for the first time in the country’s history, they also elected two emigrant MPs in a newly created global extra-territorial constituency. Ecuadorians already had elected their special emigrant MPs in February but were called again to participate in the presidential run-off elections.

On this day, transnational politics became clearly visible to the naked eye. The police had blocked the Avinguda Reina Maria Cristina to create space for the voter crowd, while locals and tourists stopped to watch. Some Andean street food sellers touted their traditional dishes at the exits of the voting centres. Some very few migrants proudly wore their country’s football jersey or COVID-19 face masks with an imprint of the national flag. Voters gathered in groups outside to eat, drink and chat. In the days and weeks before election day, the careful eye could spot campaign posters in the streets on parking machines, pay phones, and advertising pillars. In October 2020, Bolivia also held elections, providing a similar picture with Bolivian migrants queuing in front of local voting centres to cast their ballot for a new president, after the 2019 national elections had been disputed and annulled.

Over the last decade or so, the Bolivian, Ecuadorian and Peruvian communities in Barcelona have transformed into transnational voter constituencies, and many home country parties have established a local presence in the city. Usually, however, transnational party politics goes largely unnoticed by the majority of society. This form of politics manifests itself in ethnic networks, private conversations, and local subculture scenes. Most residents of Barcelona are not aware that this world exists and are surprised to learn about it when I mention it in conversations. Yet, Andean party politics in Barcelona is a reality that shapes the lives of many migrants.
Transnational party cells have gained a presence in the community, promising to serve as vehicles to restore a homeland that the Andean migrants in Barcelona had to leave during times of economic and political crises many years ago. Parties are used as channels to remit ideas and values back home, and they nourish the dream of individual migrants to become professional politicians. Every now and then, transnational party politics also gains broader visibility, aside from election days. Ecuadorian party leaders throw the community into a dither when they visit during the campaign trail. The Bolivian community has organized public street marches to side with or oppose the home country's governing party and its institutions abroad. Thanks to a Peruvian party a local public plaza now bears the name of the party's founder Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Party representatives attempt to recruit their friends, acquaintances, and family members. They infiltrate associations, participate in host country parties, are present at cultural activities, disrupt community life and crash events. Very occasionally, homeland parties even hijack local migrant associations. In one way or another, transnational parties bring migrants in closer contact with home country politics - whether they like it or not.

This thesis has shed light on transnational Andean party politics in Barcelona with the aim to expand our understanding of how political parties become and remain transnational actors. I have selected Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru as sending states because of their migration patterns to Europe and their electoral systems. Situating my study in Barcelona has allowed me to address two essential shortcomings in the transnationalism and party abroad literature. First, existing work on South American parties has largely focused on their activities in the United States (see for an important exception, Bermúdez 2016, Ch. 8). My analysis of Andean parties in Spain stresses the importance of looking at new migration patterns, different immigration policies and a multi-party host country system to understand transnational party behaviour. Second, I chose Barcelona as the research site to locate my analysis on the local level. Adopting a city-level perspective in combination with ethnographic fieldwork has enabled me to uncover the micro and day-to-day dynamics that shape the transnationalisation process of political parties, which, so far, had remained largely unexplored. Based on 62 semi-structured interviews and 50 logged participant observations, my analysis highlights the
active role of migrants as gatekeepers and shines a spotlight on the dynamic interaction between migrants and homeland parties. Situated on both the micro and meso-level and including both sets of actors, parties and migrants, this thesis makes several important contributions to the transnationalism and party behaviour literatures. In this concluding chapter, I will underline the main contributions of this thesis and offer a summary of the key findings. The next section revolves around parties’ struggle to thrive abroad, and their transnational survival strategies. Subsequently, I will provide a condensed analysis of the contextual factors that shape the transnationalisation of political parties. Finally, I will suggest fruitful avenues for further research.

7.1 The struggle of transnational party chapters

The transnationalisation process of political parties is neither easy nor linear. In this thesis, I have demonstrated that homeland parties face a range of obstacles abroad that they must overcome so that they can establish a presence abroad. My findings offer new empirical insights into the struggles of transnational parties on the ground. This expands existing work, which, so far, had paid insufficient attention to the challenges that parties face abroad on a day-to-day basis. I claim that transnational party cells are social organisms confined by the environment in which they operate.

A main challenge is to gain trust and credibility abroad. The Andean electorate in Spain is largely composed of labour migrants who have emigrated in response to a raging economic crisis in their countries of origin during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2015a; Hierro 2016; Bayona-i-Carrasco and Avila-Tàpies 2020). Simultaneously, a ‘crisis of democratic representation’ (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro 2006) has unfolded in the Andes that continues to keep the region on tenterhooks up until today (Levitsky et al. 2016; Cyr 2017; Mainwaring 2018). Citizens are deeply dissatisfied with their political elites, institutions and often disengage from the political system or elect political outsiders.

Many citizens have left their country in response to these crises, seeking to improve their living conditions. A large majority feel that they were forced to emigrate and hold the political elite responsible for their “economic self-exile”. Unsurprisingly, political
parties struggle to connect with this part of the electorate. Throughout this thesis, I have demonstrated how homeland parties often encounter distrust, dislike, and disengagement abroad. Emigrant party activists must deal with criticism from other migrants, and actively defend their party involvement. They struggle to locate and recruit volunteers abroad who are willing to dedicate their free time and resources to the transnational party machinery. Party activists face the challenge to mobilize and recruit from an electorate that largely works in low-skilled jobs (Bayona-i-Carrasco and Avila-Tàpies 2020), and which has experienced significant downward mobility upon arrival to Spain, further aggravated due to the great economic recession in the 2000s (Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2015a; Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala 2015). These migrants often work on weekends and do late or night shifts, which makes it difficult to find time for their families, not to mention party activities. As many party activists have pointed out, migrants are not interested, or able to spend their money and scarce time volunteering for a political party. Some party activists stated that they even struggle themselves to carve out this space in their life. Migratory patterns and a changing demographic additionally complicate the grassroots work of transnational party cells. By now, the Andean communities in Barcelona have consolidated (Portes, Aparicio, and Haller 2016). A 1.5 and 2nd generation of migrants has grown old enough to politically participate, yet this new cohort does not feel connected to homeland politics and their politically active parents must deal with a shrinking recruitment pool. The attempts of party cells to formally link up with local migrant associations in Barcelona also often fail. Associations perceive open campaigning at their events as an invasion of their space. Migrant organisations close ranks to deny access to parties, and actively withhold support. Many association leaders have recounted how they push back and have developed self-defence mechanisms to keep homeland parties out. Most associations focus on socio-cultural work in relation to the host country and promote an apolitical agenda. They seek to maintain autonomy and see little benefits in teaming up with homeland parties, who have no resources, no real political clout and constantly fail to deliver on their promises. Migrants and organized migrant collectives decline invitations to party events. Organisations even abstain from the transnational development field to lower their vulnerability towards linkage attempts by homeland parties.
Against these backdrops, it is almost astonishing that in spite of all these challenges, homeland parties have gained a presence abroad. Existing scholarship on the party abroad seems to take this for granted. These works maintain that parties are in full control of their transnationalisation process. Parties conduct a rational cost-benefit analysis to decide on whether they go abroad or stay put (Burgess 2018; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020b; Rashkova and Van Der Staak 2020; Umpierrez de Reguero and Dandoy 2021). This perspective fails to recognise the active and often conflictual negotiation process in which migrants and parties engage. In this thesis, I have argued that migrants are no passive spectators but active gatekeepers who open or close doors for transnational parties. They withhold their support, and as the cases of the Peruvian PNP, Frente Amplio or the Bolivian MAS-IPSP in Chapter 4 have demonstrated, party activists also discuss withdrawing already granted support, which eventually leads party cells to break down.

Transnational party cells, moreover, struggle to consolidate and thrive abroad because they are often self-funded and operate on small budgets. These chapters are trapped between, on the one hand, party mainland headquarters who deny resources, influence, and paid party posts, and on the other hand, migrant communities who seek to keep them out because they lack all of these things and fail to generate trust. In this thesis, I offered substantial empirical evidence to highlight these ongoing struggles and how party chapters have tried and often succeeded to carve out a place for themselves in between these currents. In the next section, I will offer a condensed summary of my analysis of how Andean parties have gained and maintained a transnational presence in Barcelona.

7.2 How parties become and remain transnational actors

The transnationalisation process of political parties is an ongoing negation between party organisations and citizens abroad. I have adopted the lens of a political sociologist to study these interactions as a dynamic process with active actors on both sides. This analytical perspective bridges early and current approaches in the political
transnationalism research field. In the early days, anthropological and sociological accounts dominated. These works have highlighted the migrants’ struggle to gain political recognition at home, but political parties abroad have rarely been the main research focus. Instead, state-centred approaches prevailed. More recently, political scientists have recognized “political parties abroad [as] a new arena for party politics” (title of Kernalegenn/van Haute's (2020a) influential edited volume). Such approaches, however, have, so far, fallen short to address the agency role of migrants. I have situated this thesis in between these two research traditions to address these shortcomings. My ethnographic study of Andean party politics in Barcelona builds on in-depth qualitative interviews with local key informants and on-site field observations, providing new important real-life insights into how parties and migrants experience transnational politics on a day-to-day basis. Applying these ethnographic tools, this study moves beyond the limitations of quantitative research analysis and recent studies that only interview political elites in homeland party headquarters. In doing so I am able to uncover the micro-level dynamics of the party transnationalisation process. This study seeks to expand research on both political transnationalism and political parties. It is hoped that this research will contribute to a deeper understanding of how political parties become and remain transnational actors. In this thesis, I have argued that parties can adjust their outreach approach in three essential ways to overcome the many challenges of operating in the transnational space. They can invite migrants to participate in the production of collective goods, extend selective benefits and develop a targeted multi-layered mobilization approach.

7.2.1 The relevance of producing collective goods

The importance of collective goods has remained largely overlooked in the existing studies of individual transnationalism and political parties abroad. Yet, in this thesis, I have demonstrated that collective goods are a key driver for cross-border involvement on the micro and meso-level. Migrants and migrant collectives engage with homeland parties to produce socio-political change, promote specific policies, and gain recognition as a group.
I argue that parties successfully connect with non-resident citizens if they provide multi-dimensional arenas of engagement, which enable migrants to produce collective goods in relation to, what Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b) has termed 1) homeland politics, 2) emigrant politics, and 2) immigrant politics.

On the micro-level, I have argued that parties must offer incentives for migrants so that they join. The most important incentive that parties can offer in this respect is to serve as a platform for migrants to produce collective goods. In relation to homeland politics, parties have been particularly successful when they have articulated a message of change. As demonstrated, occasionally, this message also encourages emigrants to self-start into transnational party activism. In that sense, a clear programmatic outreach has been less important to stimulate party attachment. Migrants rather seek party platforms that more generally promise to improve the political and socio-economic homeland situation. In this regard, my findings also suggest that it matters who is the messenger. Charismatic leaders, like Rafael Correa, Evo Morales or Alan García create emotional bonds. Many party activists personally identify with party figures. Therefore, transnational campaign stops and casual visits of party leaders, candidates, and MPs are important instruments to generate a follower base abroad. Several migrants had joined a party because they personally met a high-rank party figure at a transnational rally. Over the years, several parties have sent delegates to Barcelona to meet with the community, approve transnational party boards, and recruit key community figures. These events also allow transnational activists to enjoy social status benefits and access first-hand information. This type of outreach helps legitimize party cells by signalling that the homeland politicians care. Arguably, these in-person visits are low-cost measures that party headquarters could apply more frequently given the benefits they yield. Often emigrants’ desire to produce homeland collective goods is also intertwined with a strong sense of patriotism. Some charismatic leaders, such as Rafael Correa, further nourish this sentiment in their discourses, but parties would be ill-advised to rely on charismatic leaders and patriotism alone. They clearly do not have sufficient power to attract the necessary support abroad if they are not coupled with the opportunity to produce collective goods.

In relation to collective emigrant goods, a programmatic outreach gains more importance. Party activists particularly care about social services. Political parties could
generate a broader appeal abroad when they would invest more in this policy domain. For example, previous work has demonstrated that emigrants show their gratitude by voting for incumbent parties who have enfranchised them (Turcu and Urbatsch 2019). In a similar fashion, many party activists have joined MPAIS because of the party’s strong attention to emigrant issues. Yet, these policies are cost-intensive outreach tools and therefore many parties do not take this step.

Finally, collective goods in relation to immigrant politics gain importance to sustain transnational party activity during inter-election periods. Emigrant party activists use homeland party venues to discuss host country politics and organize local protest activities. During Spanish election periods, these party activists often also volunteer in the campaigns of their local ‘sister parties’. MPAIS and APRA activists participate in the local grassroots campaigns of the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC-PSOE), while emigrants of MAS-IPSP help mobilize for Podemos. In this regard, engagement in immigrant politics helps homeland parties to remain transnational actors in the long run.

On the meso-level, parties have also been successful to link up with migrant associations when they extended the opportunity to produce collective goods. Given the strong resistance of associations to engage in formal partnerships with homeland parties, this finding is of particular interest and highlights the overarching role collective goods play in the organising of the transnational political space. The different case studies show that collective homeland goods take on various forms. MPAIS has invited migrant associations to participate in Ecuador’s constitution re-writing process. MAS-IPSP has instrumentalized Bolivia’s Maritime demand as a desired collective homeland good, whereby it exploited local migrant organisations for lobby purposes. Bolivian opposition forces have linked up with the Santa Cruz organisations in Barcelona who understand the region’s territorial autonomy as a way to create collective goods. The Bolivian case also draws attention to the continuing importance of patriotism in the mobilization of diaspora support on the meso-level. In contrast, Peruvian parties have not been able to offer migrant organisations participation in the production of concrete collective homeland goods. The reason is that the party cells are too unstable and disconnected from the party headquarters. Peruvian parties maintain an interest in linking up with
organized collectives abroad, but they have focussed on the emigrant and immigrant politics domains.

Collective emigrant goods consist of enhanced political representation and access to policymaking. Many Peruvian parties have promised to grant emigrants special representation in the parliament but failed to deliver on their promise. Their lack of willpower and political gridlock have driven migrant associations into the arms of homeland parties. Yet, due to trust issues they never entered institutional partnerships. In contrast, MPAIS has successfully connected with Ecuadorian organisations in Barcelona by inviting them to participate in the conceptualization and promotion of emigrant policies. Opposition parties have leveraged their extra-territorial electoral programs to issue specific policy pledges to migrant organisations. Bolivian party cells have successfully pressured the local consulate to improve its services but overall parties struggle to serve as useful venues for migrants to create collective emigrant goods.

Collective Immigrant goods have been less used to forge collaborations with migrant organisations. The reason is that homeland parties lack influence in the host country. Local Spanish parties are the important points of contact for associations. They can help with access to public spaces and public funding (see also, Mora 2020). Indeed, the Peruvian APRA has been able to forge formal partnerships with local migrant organisations to create the Plaça d’Haya de la Torre. Yet it first had to link up with PSC-PSOE and the Peruvian consulate before the associations came on board.

7.2.2 The relevance of selective outcome benefits

The importance of candidate positions and paid government positions for structuring the transnational political space has largely remained obscure in previous studies. However, in this thesis, I have highlighted their role in pulling individual migrants and migrant organizations into the transnational electoral arena. On the micro-level, I have argued that migrants see transnational parties as vehicles to pursue political careers upon return. In reality, however, transnational party cells lack the influence and connections to serve as stepping stones for emigrants to gain paid positions in the homeland. Although parties in the Andes commonly rely on nepotism to reward loyal activists (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013), these benefits do not tend
to be extended to supporters abroad. Paid government and party posts are a limited resource. In spite of this reality, a large number of party activists harbour ambitions to professionally work in politics. They have failed to adapt their expectations to the transnational reality and continue to apply norms that are dominant in the domestic political culture. Homeland parties feed off this misunderstanding. While parties can reap these low-cost gains, a transnational party structure with paid posts could significantly boost party mobilization in the transnational arena. Some research has shown that party professionalisation can increase the electoral performance of parties (Tavits 2012; Webb, Poletti, and Bale 2017).

Candidate positions in an extra-territorial constituency are another important source of motivation for migrants to become involved. Ecuadorian parties frequently offer candidate tickets to emigrants. Many interviewees stated a desire to win these list places. However, parties seek to maintain full control of the candidate selection process. Chances to win these places hinge on migrants’ personal connections, money, skills, and their public standing in the community. Only CREO held transparent and formally binding primaries abroad. In other parties, recruitment decisions are made behind closed doors in a top-down fashion. Arguably, parties also aim to mitigate the risks of nominating migrants who could cause internal rifts, deviate in roll calls from the party line, or defect the party altogether. A significant number of parties have also used these candidate tickets to co-opt leaders of well-known migrant organisations. Since these organisations seek to evade formal partnerships, co-opting their leaders is a strategy to still tap into their resource and social capital pools and gain legitimacy.

Although Peruvian parties are allowed to field non-resident citizens as candidates, they have rarely used this strategy. An innovative data analysis revealed that only 2.78% of candidates in the Lima constituency have run from abroad. In contrast to Ecuador, Peru had no special representation yet in 2018/19. Parties do not rely on emigrant candidates to compete in the Lima constituency. In addition, candidates are expected to fully self-

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112 Washington Cruz, emigrant MP (2009-2013), for MPAIS in the Europe, Asia, and Oceania constituency deviated several times from the party line during plenary vote calls. His vote/absence had been crucial twice, once to elect personnel for the Transitory Judiciary Council, and another time to elect the vice-president of the Assembly. In 2011, he formally defected from the party.
fund their campaign. Consequently there also has been little demand from party activists to run from abroad. The 2021 newly created extra-territorial constituency will most likely bring significant changes. If the Ecuadorian case is anything to go by, Peruvian parties will start to scale up their presence in Europe and will pull more migrant associations into the transnational political space.

In contrast, Bolivian parties are not allowed to field non-resident citizens as candidates and parties cannot offer these benefits to activists or collective leaders. Party activists harbour ambitions to gain a bureaucratic position but not to run as a candidate. So far, there also has been little pressure from abroad for special emigrant representation. One reason is that Bolivian associations, at least in Barcelona, tend to focus on cultural diffusion and immigrant politics. Another reason is that political parties, so far, have shown little interest in establishing more institutionalized links with the communities abroad, which would render them more vulnerable to the demands of non-resident citizens.

Bolivian and Peruvian party cells in Barcelona must resort to other strategies to offer individualized benefits to migrant organisations since they lack access to candidate list places. The Bolivian government party has been able to feed off the consulate and offer preferential treatment and access to resources to loyal migrant organisations. Peruvian party cells lack similar resources, but could leverage the competitive local dance culture scene and offer cultural associations access to a broader audience by inviting them to perform at campaign events. Ecuadorian parties have simply paid associations to appear on stage, facilitated by better campaign budgets. In addition, emigrant MPs of the government party have been able to link up with selected migrant organisations by attending their events. Candidates of other parties have reached out to collect the demands of associations, but having failed to secure the assembly seat these rapports have broken down thereafter.

Parties occasionally utilize clientelism and nepotism to secure the support of individual and collectively organized migrants in Barcelona. Yet, I argue that funding shortage, passive electoral disenfranchisement, and lack of access to candidate nomination processes mean that transnational party cells rely less on these tactics than domestic ones. I claim that migrants also push back to show their discontent with clientelism and
nepotism. The Bolivian case has shown how migrants have organized street protests, even across party lines, to vent their anger. Ecuadorian MPAIS activists have criticized the party leadership for cancelling the extra-territorial primaries results. However, emigrants’ attempts to enforce democratisation procedures within their parties have fallen short. This highlights how powerless migrants still are against party headquarters who lack a sense of accountability towards non-resident citizens. Parties want to be present abroad but seek to dodge a more costly commitment. These findings add important nuances to our understanding of transnational parties as social remittances machines (Levitt 2001).

7.2.3 A targeted mobilization approach

Parties’ mobilization and recruitment tactics abroad on the micro and meso-level are complex and, so far, had received little scholarly attention. In this thesis, I have shone a spotlight on these dynamics to expand our understanding of parties abroad (Burgess 2018; Koinova 2018; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciörnei 2019a; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020a; Paarlberg 2020; Rashkova and Van Der Staak 2020; Van Haute and Kernalegenn 2021). I have argued that the challenges of identifying compatriots abroad who are willing to volunteer for a transnational party cell, coupled with widespread mistrust and organized collectives who seek to stay apolitical require a targeted recruitment and mobilization approach from parties. This approach is multi-layered, cuts across the micro and meso-level, and moreover builds on various types of social networks in the public and private spheres.

Homeland party headquarters rely on their domestic members who activate transnational friendship connections for recruitment purposes. High-rank party figures in the mainland themselves reach out to more high-profile recruits, such as community leaders and board members of well-known migrant organisations. Again they often rely on well-connected members to set up the meet, but occasionally they also misappropriate consulate infrastructure as shown in the Bolivian case.
Local party cells largely build on local networks. Partisans invite their friends to party activities, spam their Facebook feeds, and add them to WhatsApp groups to circulate campaign messages. Party cells capitalize on the networks of their activists to effectively target migrants who match the party’s ideological profile and show a high likelihood to become involved. They are also in an advanced position to build up social pressure to accept their invitations. Many party activists are often simultaneously active in host country institutions. Applying an innovative ethnographic approach to the study of parties abroad, I reveal that their friendship circles are thus rooted within larger networks that connect and span several associations in Barcelona and beyond. This way, party cells informally extend their reach and tap into the resources and social capital pool of local associations while avoiding a more formal alliance. In a similar fashion, many emigrant activists are also involved in local host country parties. Almost all transnational party cells have established connections to ideologically matching Spanish parties to gain access to office space, campaign support, and leadership training. These partnerships are crucial for transnational party cells to succeed and survive abroad in the long run.

Host country institutions are important partners because they do not have a direct stake in the outcome of transnational elections. Hence, party cells face less resistance to linking up with them. Party cells are harnessing inter-organisational connections beyond host country parties and associations, which I have not discussed in greater detail in the thesis. Partnerships with Spanish labour unions, NGOs, local church groups, migrant associations of other nationalities, and other foreign parties active in Barcelona existed. Parties relied much less on these connections although they have the potential to boost transnational party outreach.

Transnational ties have been less important for the extra-territorial party cells but gain importance for self-starters who are locked in without a local network that could facilitate their enrolment. These ties also become important in settings where party cells lack an institutionalized communication channel to the party headquarters. The case of Peru’s APRA has demonstrated that emigrant members draw on transnational friendship connections to access internal party information. Finally, transnational party activism seems to take place largely outside the family circle. With shared household
responsibilities it is difficult for both partners or parents to free up time and the coming
generations maintain little interest to immerse themselves in transnational politics.

7.3 Contextual home and host country factors

The transnationalisation process of political parties is also shaped by the environment
in which they operate. Existing research has demonstrated that both home and host
country factors shape the transnational political behaviour of individual emigrants
(Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2015; McIlwaine and Bermúdez 2015; Waldinger 2015;
Ahmadov and Sasse 2016; Chaudhary 2018; Ciornel and Østergaard-Nielsen 2020; Finn
2020; Ognibene and Paulis 2021; Østergaard-Nielsen et al. 2022) and organized
emigrant collectives (Koopmans et al. 2005; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007; Landolt
2008; Escobar 2010; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2015; Chaudhary and Guarnizo 2016;
Lacroix 2016; Yalaz, Aydin, and Østergaard-Nielsen 2022), including transnational party
organizations (M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020c). This
thesis further expands on these lines of research. Both home and host country contexts
shape the need and desire of migrants to produce specific collective goods. As I have
argued, this is a main driver for individual and collectively organized migrants to engage
and support home country parties. In addition, these contexts shape migrants’
dependence on homeland parties, and homeland parties’ access to local resources.

7.3.1 Home country factors

The transnationalisation process of political parties is also shaped by the environment
in which they operate. Existing research has demonstrated that both home and host
country factors shape the transnational political behaviour of individual emigrants

My analysis has highlighted new transnational dynamics in relation to specific sending-
state factors that shape how parties organize in the transnational arena. While some of
these factors seem obvious, so far, scholars had little discussed them in greater detail. I
thus provide important nuances to the role of the electoral system, national elections, incumbency status, state outreach, political culture, and socio-political crises.

To begin, electoral systems structure how parties and emigrants interact. A system of special representation, as in the case of Ecuador, encourages parties to become transnational actors and to invest in their cross-border outreach (see also, Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2019a; Kernalegenn and van Haute 2020c). Party chapters indirectly benefit from a system of special representation in several important ways. For one, elected emigrant MPs frequently travel to Barcelona. During these meetings activists and attendants gain access to privileged information, social capital, and status capital. These events are also important to sustain transnational party activity during inter-election periods. For another, parties can offer candidate list places to recruit board members of important migrant organizations to access their networks and resources, and generate legitimacy. In the absence of special representation, Bolivian and Peruvian parties invest less in their outreach since electoral gains do not automatically translate into seats. The party cells lack this indirect state resource available to Ecuadorian parties and resort to penetration tactics to connect with migrant collectives, or they become dormant during inter-election times.

National elections are determinant for Andean party activity in Barcelona. They are the prime reason for party cells to exist in Barcelona. During election periods, migrants establish new party cells and activate existing ones. Homeland party headquarters show more interest in emigrant affairs, and party figures come to support. Migrants become also more interested in homeland politics. For one, self-starting into party activism increases. For another, party cells become more active and recruit more aggressively new supporters. They can easier convince recruits to enrol since collective, selective outcome, selective process and emotional incentives are easier extended during that time. In addition, migrants associate their involvement in transnational party activism with greater efficacy, hoping to take part in larger transformation processes. In a similar fashion, local, regional, and national host country elections help spur transnational party chapter activity; at least for those engaged parties who maintain close relationships with host country parties. However, party cells are largely inactive during non-national homeland elections because emigrants are disenfranchised.
Incumbent parties enjoy significant advantages to establish a presence abroad. As extensively discussed, incumbent MPAIS could incorporate Ecuadorian emigrants in the constitution writing process and rely on its emigrant MPs to link up with its party cells and migrant collectives abroad. Access to the consulate and presidential incumbency allowed inviting and paying migrant collectives to dance at MPAIS campaign events. MAS-IPSP transformed the Bolivian consulate in Barcelona into a transnational outpost of the party headquarters. It became a communication channel to the local party cell, provided resources to link up with migrant organizations, and supplied infrastructure and legitimacy to incorporate migrants and their associations in the geopolitical Maritime project. However, in the Peruvian case incumbency mattered less. Struggling governments constantly went from one crisis to another, which lowered interest and capacity to connect with citizens abroad in more substantial ways.

A general sending state policy outreach can benefit parties in power. Ecuador has one of the strongest outreach approaches in the region (Pedroza and Palop-García 2017). Many of the programs and policies excited emigrants to self-start and follow invitations to join MPAIS. It has also shaped MPAIS’ opportunities to incorporate migrant collectives in the migration governance policy-making process. However, it also must be said that many state programs failed to meet the expectations of migrants or were never materialized. The Bolivian state has improved social protection and consulate services, which has been a primary demand of party cells in Barcelona. Sending state policies helped to satisfy the demands of MAS-IPSP followers and to pre-empty some criticism of the opposition. Yet, other demands, such as state funds for culture diffusion, were not met. In the Peruvian case, migrants organized to demand more political inclusion, yet for a very long time parties ignored their demands to introduce special emigrant representation. It is clear, however, that in the course of this certain migrant organizations became more open to a party collaboration.

Research on the Mexican case in the United States demonstrates that a strong development outreach can encourage migrant-party partnerships and more structured exchanges (e.g., Goldring 2002; M. P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Duquette-Rury 2020). These programs thus shape local and transnational network structures in important
ways. Yet, as my research indicates these formalized connections are rare in the absence of development state programs and parties struggle to connect. Some organizations even willingly disengage from the transnational arena to limit their vulnerability towards parties’ linkage attempts.

The political home country culture shapes parties’ level of institutionalization abroad and their linkage strategies. In the Andes, many parties lack strong organizational structures, organize more informally, and constantly re-invent themselves (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Levitsky et al. 2016; Cyr 2017; Mainwaring 2018). Transnational party cells copy this form of organizing. Most party activists are involved but do not officially affiliate with the party. Association leaders feel comfortable informally participating in party activities to shield their association although this often fails because of associative relationships. Frequent party breakdown in the homeland causes many transnational party cells to dissolve and re-organize after and before election periods. Clientelism and nepotism are widespread in Latin America and have become a page in the playbook of several Andean parties to incentivize and co-opt migrant collectives in Barcelona. This tactic, however, hinges on parties’ access to resources and is thus constrained by incumbency status and systems of special representation. Personalist parties, candidate-centred campaigns and strong identification with party leaders are defining features of the Latin American political culture (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Rhodes-Purdy and Madrid 2020) and have also been internalized by party activists abroad. High-rank party leaders nourish this culture with in-person visits while local party chapters celebrate party-specific memorandum days.

Finally, the socio-political situation in the homeland has been pivotal for migrants to become involved in transnational parties. Parties have mobilized economic grievances, offered alternatives to prevent the return of an autocratic leader or replace corrupted elites, and developed policy programs to absorb the effects of the crisis. Parties mobilize grievances and political failures to encourage migrants to become involved.

### 7.3.2 Host country factors
An important blind spot in transnational party research has been the local level (see also, Yalaz, Aydin, and Østergaard-Nielsen 2022). This thesis has demonstrated the benefits of conducting ethnographic research on several migrant groups and parties in one city. I have highlighted important host country dynamics that significantly shape how parties and migrants engage in the transnational arena. My analysis underscores the importance of local associative scenes, host country party collaborations, individuals with overlapping memberships, host country migration policies, and the demographic composition of migrant communities. These findings invite us to re-assess how host country settings encourage and constrain the organizing of transnational parties, thus, contributing to existing research on parties abroad in essential ways.

A rich associative scene in the country of residence contributes to the transnationalisation of political parties in essential ways. As repeatedly argued throughout this thesis, migrant associations help parties to bridge the mobilization and recruitment gap abroad. They provide networks, volunteers, information, leadership material and resources, and can be a source of trust and legitimization. In Barcelona, the founding and registration of associations easy, which helps explain the sheer amount of associations in the city. However, similar to the party cells, most associations are self-funded. Only very few associations receive public funding and less maintain their own office space. Yet, as demonstrated, migrant organisations can easily fall victim to infiltration and poaching attacks. For example, MAS-IPSP held meetings at the office of the Federación Entidades Bolivianos (FEDEBOL) and misappropriated its newsletter to mobilize and recruit. Similarly, APRA organized assemblies in the Asociación Cultural Deportiva Perú, which is conveniently run by the APRA cell leader. The Asociación de Ecuadorianos en Catalunya (AEC) has served as a candidate recruitment pool for Ecuadorian parties. Yet, AEC successfully warded off unfriendly take-over attacks of MPAIS who sought to harness its infrastructure for campaign purposes. This draws attention to the role of associations’ self-defence mechanisms. Association leaders play a key role in this decision-making process. Some of the leaders take decisions autonomously, while others decide collectively on whether to cooperate with homeland parties. In this thesis, I have not explored this in greater detail, but subsequent research could further probe into the internal self-governing rules, and roles of leaders that shape how associations position themselves vis-à-vis homeland parties.
The number of associations and how they define their field of activity also plays an important role. A greater number of associations that engages in similar activities increases the perceived competition and can lower their barriers to cooperating with homeland parties to gain a competitive advantage. This has been the case for Andean cultural associations. However, homeland parties continue to struggle to connect with organizations that are more invested in social work. Parties can provide little assistance since they operate on foreign soil unless they succeed to exploit connections to the local consulate or other local institutions to generate social host country capital.

In this thesis, I have argued for a more nuanced understanding of this transnational party–association relationship. Because migrant organizations are key partners for transnational parties, they also assume gatekeeper positions. This complicates transnational party outreach since many associations aim to resist homeland party linkage attempts. In response to this resistance, parties infiltrate them and crash their events. In settings with more heated conflicts, this might spiral into a more serious transportation of homeland conflicts. Parties are also in a disadvantaged position to prove themselves useful for addressing immigrant concerns since the many associations already cover migrants’ needs. Parties’ offer to extend migration-specific selective process benefits becomes less relevant. Party activists with connections to associations still use their social capital to recruit and retain party members but because of the local context, these incentives are less powerful than they might be elsewhere where parties maintain unique access to specific resources which associations lack.

Host country parties significantly shape the local and national political opportunity structure of transnational party cells. Similar to migrant organizations, host country parties are essential partners who can provide resources, be a source of legitimacy, and facilitate knowledge exchange. Internal diversity sections facilitate contacts to committed compatriots and representatives of third-party institutions, such as other transnational Latin American party cells. As demonstrated, homeland party cells tap into these networks and resource pools by relying on the dual membership engagement of their members (overlapping memberships). The Catalan election climate has become highly polarized and competition between parties has steadily increased in recent years (Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 2017). This has encouraged local party chapters to activate
links with the large Latin American community in Barcelona (see also Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero 2017). During fieldwork, their party representatives were commonly present at cultural community events to establish rapport. An important question would be to which extent these dynamics and inter-organocation partnerships travel to other settings. A key ingredient to this mutually beneficial alliance is that a majority of Andean migrants in Spain are enfranchised, naturalized, and vote for the leftist parties both at home and in Spain (Morales and San Martín 2011).

Moreover, host country parties actively shape migration policies. The political host country environment influences the socio-economic and political incorporation of immigrants, and hence their capacity to engage in cross-border political activism (see e.g., Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003). On the meso-level, host country parties influence the availability of co-development programs. In recent years, Spanish authorities have heavily cut funding for co-development (Lacomba and Royo 2020). In consequence, fewer migrant organisations in transnational development work. The limited number of Hometown associations in Barcelona serves as a testimony to this. Another result is that homeland parties face larger difficulties to approach and co-opt migrant organisations because they largely abstain from the transnational arena.

Finally, specific migration waves influence the demographic structure of migrant communities and their networks. According to several party representatives, the second generation of Andean migrants in Barcelona largely abstains from transnational political activities. This has been particularly notable in the Peruvian case which accounts for a slightly longer migration history to Spain (Altamirano 2006; Paerregaard 2014b). In contexts with more onward and return migration, this picture might differ. While parties would be able to recruit from a larger first-generation recruitment pool, the instability and high volatility of this pool would entail new challenges for transnational party mobilization. My research has moreover shown that migratory patterns are important to understand how homeland party networks are reproduced abroad. Specific migration corridors can lead to higher concentrations of members from specific parties abroad. Traditional parties, like APRA, who maintain regional election strongholds in the homeland, might leverage these migration dynamics for recruitment purposes. In host
country localities with a strong connection to this region, they can easier target former members or sympathizers, while self-starters can easier locate points of contact. That said, individual political capital also becomes more available to party cells and can help spur party activity. Return migration dynamics can help open channels of communication between returning migrant party activists and their cells abroad. Migration dynamics also can enforce the transportation of cleavage structures (see also, Ahmadov and Sasse 2015; Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015). A significant part of the Bolivian community in Barcelona identifies with the Santa Cruz department. They have established regional associations and support transnational party activity of actors who support their domestic political goals.

7.4 Avenues for future research

This thesis has investigated how Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian parties become and remain transnational actors. Using ethnographic data collection and analysis methods, I have highlighted how the local context shapes their transnationalisation process. In continuation, specifically two lines of research merit further attention.

First, subsequent work could investigate the transnationalisation process of Andean (and other) parties in other cities and countries. Focused comparative in-depth case studies of one or two parties in several different settings would be important to help us better understand how different contexts shape transnational party membership dynamics, and parties’ mobilization, recruitment and linkage strategies in similar or different ways. My study has shown how the Barcelona context impacts parties from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru in very similar ways on both the micro and meso-level. This finding raises the interesting question of to which extent party activists, party organisations, and migrant collectives engage and disengage in similar ways in other destinations. In this context, it would be important to also further broaden our geographical scope and start analysing transnational parties within the South-South migration corridors. For example, at present, we know relatively little about how Latin American parties operate in neighbouring countries and the wider region. Subsequent work could apply ethnographic methods to reveal transnational party network
structures in border areas and investigate how different migration profiles, weaker host country party systems, and more or less exclusive integration policies influence how emigrants and transnational parties interact on a day-to-day basis in these settings. This research could also be further extended to transnational African and Asian parties who operate in completely different political and electoral sending state systems, but who have largely evaded scholarly scrutiny so far.

Second, transnational party research must further strengthen the dialogue between transnationalism and political science research. In this thesis, I have highlighted the importance of tying in the political party literature to explain transnational party behaviour. In this respect, I have drawn on the literature bodies concerned with party membership, party recruitment, and party-civil society groups. Future research could pursue along similar lines. For example, scholars could rely on the transnational party cooperation literature to further investigate the partnerships between homeland and host country parties. In particular, it would be important to further delve into the reasons of host country parties to support transnational parties on the ground during electoral and non-electoral periods. For this purpose, studies could also make use of the party cell typology (pop-up, dormant, ad-hoc, and engaged parties) to model the temporality of these partnerships. My analysis stresses the important role that host country parties play in the transnationalisation of homeland parties. Further research could also interview representatives of host country parties, and attend local or international forums of international party cooperation to better understand the reasons for these host country institutions to engage in transnational inter-party partnerships.

8 References


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9 Appendices

9.1 Appendix A List of abbreviations

**Appendix A List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADEHCAT</td>
<td>Asociación de Consumidores para la Defensa de los Ecuatorianos Hipotecados en Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Asociación de Ecuatorianos en Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AESCS</td>
<td>Asociación Espíritu de Santa Cruz de la Sierra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Alianza Popular (AP),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP</td>
<td>Alianza Para el Progreso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCOO</td>
<td>Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Centro Democrático</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CiU</td>
<td>Convergència i Unió</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPB</td>
<td>Centro Peruano Barcelona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCCS</td>
<td>Consejo de Participacion Ciudadana y Control Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Comités de la Revolución Ciudadana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREO</td>
<td>Creando Oportunidades (Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIREMAR</td>
<td>Dirección Estratégica de Reivindicación Marítima, Silala y recursos hídricos internacionales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Frente Amplio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAEC</td>
<td>Federación de Asociaciones de Ecuatorianos en Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>Fuerza Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDEBOL</td>
<td>Federación de Entidades Bolivianas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMIP</td>
<td>Federación Mundial de Instituciones Peruanas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFCSMTP</td>
<td>Fraternidad Folclórica Cultural Señor de Mayo Transporte Pesado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Federation Internationale de Football Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Fuerza Popular</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIM</td>
<td>General Incentive Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICV</td>
<td>Iniciativa por Cataluña Verdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNE</td>
<td>Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (Peru)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOVECU</td>
<td>Asociación de Jóvenes Ecuatorianos en Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS-IPSP</td>
<td>Movimiento al Socialismo–Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPAIS</td>
<td>Movimiento Alianza PAIS - Patria Altiva i Soberana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMCOPEX</td>
<td>Organización Mundial de Comunidades Peruanas en el Exterior</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONPE</td>
<td>Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales</td>
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<td>Partido Nacionalista Peruano</td>
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<td>PPC</td>
<td>Partido Popular Cristiano</td>
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### Appendix B List of interviewees and their socio-demographic profile

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Main sampling criteria</th>
<th>Included in party activist sample</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Years in Spain</th>
<th>Dual Citizenship</th>
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<td>.m</td>
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<td>33</td>
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**Total** 62 interviewees

*Note: .m means missing data; the five federations are included as associations to preserve the respondents’ privacy*
## Appendix C Activist sample by party, party type, and party post

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Party Type</th>
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<th>Party post/role(^{113})</th>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>dormant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>• Director (Barcelona/Catalonia)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1x Campaign volunteer</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MAS-IPSP</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>• 1x Campaign coordinator 2014</td>
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<td>• 3x Party activist</td>
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<td>• 1x Regional MP in Bolivia</td>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>ad-hoc</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>• Director Catalonia</td>
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<td>CD</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>• Vice Director Spain</td>
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<td>• 3x Executive board members Catalonia</td>
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<td>• 1x Campaign Coordinator Spain (2013)</td>
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<td>• 2x MPs</td>
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<td>• 3x Volunteers</td>
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<td>• Director Europe (also was a candidate in 2013)</td>
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<td>FE (2013)</td>
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\(^{113}\) Internal party role anonymized are simply referred to as party activist
### Appendix D Interviewed migrant organisations and interviewee posts

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<td>Fraternidad Folclorica Cultural Señor de Mayo Transporte Pesado</td>
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<td>Sayariy-urus</td>
<td>President</td>
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<td>ex-President; Secretary</td>
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<td>Asociación de Ecuatorianos en Catalunya (AEC)</td>
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<td>Asociación de Jóvenes Ecuatorianos en Catalunya (JOVECU)</td>
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<td>Cámara Internacional de Comercio y Turismo Asociación Ecuatoriano- Catalana (CICTAEC)</td>
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<td>Cultural Ecuatoriana por los Derechos y la Igualdad en Cataluña Andrés Recalde (ACEDICAR)</td>
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<td>Llactacaru</td>
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<td>Sentimiento Andino Internacional Humano Artístico (SAIHUA)</td>
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**Search terms national register**

**Ecuador**: Ecuador Equador, Quito; Quiteño

**Bolivia**: Bolivia, Santa Cruz; Cruceñ; San Simon; Yachay; Oruro; Orureñ; Chuquiag; Chuquisad; Paititi; Urkupiña; Pukaj; Wayra; Folklore; Huayha; Wiñay; Cochabamba; Tariji; Potosi;

**Peru**: Inca; Inka; Huancayo; Chimbotano; Albedrío; Puno; Virú; Limeño; Lima; Tusuy; Yachay; Paijan; Huayna
### Appendix E Participant observations conducted during fieldwork

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<td>Anti-government street protest march from the Plaza Universidad to the Bolivian consulate (21F)</td>
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<td>Consulate event to present Bolivia's new Ambassador for Spain</td>
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<td>23.04.2018</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Sant Jordi Festival. Visit Centro Boliviano Catalan booth</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Anti-government street protest</td>
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<td>11.07.2018</td>
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<td>Internal meeting Centro Boliviano Catalan (migrant association)</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.07.2018</td>
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<td>Internal meeting Centro Boliviano Catalan (migrant association)</td>
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<td>24.03.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>National elections to elect the Consejo de Participacion Ciudadana y Control Social (CPCCS)</td>
<td>political</td>
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<tr>
<td>03.04.2018</td>
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<td>Cultural event to celebrate the Asociación de Ecuatorianos en Catalunya’s (AEC) 25 birthday</td>
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<td>13.04.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Speech of Rafael Correa at the Universidad de Barcelona (UB) (Morning)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>13.04.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Townhall meeting of Rafael Correa (Evening)</td>
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<td>24.05.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Consulate event to commemorate the Battle of Pichincha in 1822</td>
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<tr>
<td>27.05.2018</td>
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<td>Internal meeting Correistas Por Siempre (MPAIS splinter group)</td>
<td>political</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.06.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Internal meeting Correistas Por Siempre (MPAIS splinter group)</td>
<td>political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.06.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Townhall meeting with Esteban Melo (emigrant MP ex-MPAIS/Correa)</td>
<td>political</td>
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<td>05.08.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Fiesta Nacional de Ecuador</td>
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<td>23.09.2018</td>
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<td>Internal meeting Correistas Por Siempre (MPAIS splinter group)</td>
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<td>08.10.2018</td>
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<td>Anti-government information event</td>
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<td>20.10.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Culture event organized by Asociacion de Artistas Ecuautiranos en Catalunña (ASAEC)</td>
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<td>21.10.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Information event for migrants to regularize, organized by the Federacion de Asociaciones Ecuatorianas (FAEC)</td>
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<td>23.10.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Anti-government information event with Esteban Melo (emigrant MP ex-MPAIS/Correa)</td>
<td>political</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.10.2018</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Internal meeting Correistas Por Siempre (MPAIS splinter group) with Esteban Melo (emigrant MP)</td>
<td>political</td>
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<td>04.01.2019</td>
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<td>Christmas event (Three Kings) organized by Comité Civico</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.02.2019</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Townhall meeting with Esther Cuesta (emigrant MP, ex-MPAIS/Correa)</td>
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<td>28.10.2018</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Religious procession organized by the Asociación Señor de los Milagros de L'Hospitalet</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.11.2018</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Informal townhall meeting ERC (invited by a Peruvian association leader)</td>
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<td>19.11.2018</td>
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<td>Socio-cultural event, organized by the Centro Peruano Barcelona</td>
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<td>23.11.2018</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Civicl society campaign event referendum</td>
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<td>09.12.2018</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Constitutional referendum Peru</td>
<td>political</td>
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<tr>
<td>30.12.2018</td>
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<td>Christmas event, organized by the Federación De Entidades Peruanas En Cataluña (Fepercat)</td>
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<td>03.01.2019</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Anti-government street protest</td>
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<td>29.01.2019</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Informal townhall meeting with Pio Zelaya (Spanish Senator of Peruvian origin)</td>
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<td>10.02.2019</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Private birthday party of one interviewee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Category</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>07.07.2019</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Event to commemorate Alan Garcia, former president of Peru who had died 17.04.2019, organized by the APRA party</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.06.2018</td>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>Fiesta de la Diversidad de L'Hospitalet in which several Andean associations participated</td>
<td>socio-cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.10.2018</td>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>Socio-cultural event organized by the Federación de Asociaciones Americanas en Catalunya (FASAMCAT)</td>
<td>socio-cultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>29.12.2018</td>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>New Year’s Eve event organized by several Latin American federations and associations in Barcelona</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.01.2019</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Campaign rally with Pedro Sanchez (Prime minister of Spain, PSC). (I was invited by members of the PSC’s internal migrant section)</td>
<td>political</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HOJA DE INFORMACIÓN PARA PARTICIPANTES

Nicolas Fliess
PhD Student
Migration Studies
Global Studies Department
University of Sussex

Título
Emigrantes latinoamericanos y sus vínculos con la política de sus países de origen

Invitación
Estás invitado/a a participar en este estudio de investigación. Antes de que decidas si lo harás o no, será importante que obtengas más información sobre esta investigación, su desarrollo y lo que ésta implica. Por favor, lee cuidadosamente la siguiente información.

¿Cuál es el objetivo de este estudio?
Este estudio es sobre el mundo político de los migrantes en España. El objetivo es conocer las actividades en el extranjero de los partidos políticos y las asociaciones de migrantes.

¿Por qué estoy invitado/a a participar?
Estás invitado/a a participar por estar activo en un partido político. Por favor, tenga en cuenta que no ha sido seleccionado/a aleatoriamente, ni por tener unas determinadas características personales, sino por su cargo / perfil de figura pública. Este estudio pretende entrevistar entre 70 -100 personas.

¿Es obligatoria la participación en el estudio?
La participación es voluntaria. Si Ud. decide participar, se le entregará esta hoja de información y se le pedirá firmar una autorización. Si Ud. decide formar parte de la investigación, es libre de retirarse cuando lo desee, sin necesidad de ofrecer justificaciones.

¿Qué pasará si participo?
Haremos una entrevista que incluye preguntas sobre el trabajo y las actividades de su partido político en el extranjero y la representación política de emigrantes. La duración prevista es de media hora/una hora y el audio será grabado solo con su consentimiento.
¿Cuáles son los posibles beneficios de participar?
Su participación en este estudio será de gran valor para este investigación. Sus percepciones ayudarán a comprender mejor el mundo político de los migrantes. Asimismo, podría ayudar a crear conciencia sobre los derechos políticos de los ciudadanos no-residentes en el marco de los debates públicos.

¿Mi información se Mantendrá confidencial?
La información se mantendrá estrictamente confidencial. Puede decidir cómo quiere ser nombrado/a en el reporte y en las publicaciones. Esto podría ser a través de: nombre y/o su apellido y/o rol como figura pública y/o nombre del lugar de trabajo y/o el país de origen. Asimismo, puede decidir permanecer en el anonimato. Si lo solicita, su privacidad y anonimato estarán completamente garantizados. Los datos estarán almacenados de forma segura y sólo tendrá acceso a éstos las personas debidamente autorizadas.

¿Qué debo hacer si quiero participar?
Si decide participar, el próximo paso será proponer fechas en las que está disponible para llevar a cabo la entrevista.

¿Qué pasará con los resultados de este estudio de investigación?
El contenido de la entrevista será usado en mi tesis doctoral. Como todas las tesis doctorales, este trabajo también será publicado. Si lo desea, me aseguraré de que reciba una copia. Además, el contenido de esta entrevista podría ser utilizado para publicaciones en libros y/o artículos en revistas. Si lo desea, también podrá acceder a este material.

¿Quién está organizando y financiando esta investigación?
Realizo esta investigación como estudiante en el departamento “Global Studies” de la Universidad de Sussex en el Reino Unido. Esta investigación no ha sido financiada por ningún órgano externo y/o institución.

¿Quién ha aprobado este estudio?
Este investigación ha sido aprobada por el Comité de Ética de Investigación de los Ciencias Sociales & Escuelas Transversales de Arte (Social Sciences & Arts Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (C-REC)).

Contactos para información adicional
Me puedes contactar por: n.fliess@sussex.ac.uk o 0034 653586230 (España)

Si tiene alguna duda sobre la forma en la que este estudio ha sido realizado, por favor no dude en contactar con mis supervisores:

Prof. Michael Collyer (m.collyer@sussex.ac.uk)
Prof. Paul Statham (paul.statham@sussex.ac.uk)

La Universidad de Sussex cuenta con un seguro para cubrir sus responsabilidades legales en relación con este estudio.

Muchas Gracias por su tiempo. Agradezco de antemano su colaboración.
9.7 Appendix G Consent form

Formulario de consentimiento para participantes

Título de Proyecto: Emigrantes latinoamericanos y sus relaciones con la política de sus países de origen

Numero de referencia de la aprobación del Proyecto: ER/NF217/6

Acepto participar en el proyecto de investigación señalado. He recibido y leído la explicación e información necesaria para ello. Por favor, marque la casilla para indicar si Estás de acuerdo / No estás de acuerdo con:

- [ ] Si
- [x] No

- [ ] Ser entrevistada/o por el investigador
- [ ] La entrevista será grabada
- [x] No será posible cancelar la entrevista después del ___/___/2019 o solo en casos de circunstancias extraordinarias.
- [ ] Recibiré una transcripción de la entrevista para mi aprobación antes que sea incluida en la investigación.
Por favor, marque la casilla para indicar cómo prefiere ser identificado/a en las publicaciones y reportes de investigación.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nombre del partido político / Asociación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nombre de mi comunidad en España / Mi país de origen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prefiero mantener el anonimato. Entiendo que cualquier información será confidencial y que ninguna información revelada puede permitir la identificación de mi persona en publicaciones o reportes de investigación.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|   |   | Entiendo que mi participación es voluntaria, puedo decidir hacerlo de forma parcial y/o total en el proyecto, pudiendo retirarme en cualquier momento del estudio sin ser penalizado/a. |
|   |   | Acepto el uso de mi información personal para los fines de este estudio de investigación. Entiendo que esta información será tratada con la más estricta confidencialidad y manejada de acuerdo con la Ley Orgánica de Protección de Datos (1998). |

Nombre y Apellido: 
Firma: 
Fecha: 