Collective action in Turkey: What do we know and where do we go next?

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Abstract

This book chapter aims to review the existing social psychological studies on collective action that have been published in the context of Turkey. First, we provide a brief historical background of Turkey in terms of collective movements, especially focusing on the last decade. Second, we discuss how other disciplines in the social sciences have approached collective action much earlier than social psychology. Third, we provide an up-to-date review of how collective action has been studied in social psychology in Turkey by specifically focusing on the a) antecedents and dynamics of and b) outcomes of collective action. Finally, we discuss future directions stemming and highlight in which areas more collective action research is needed in Turkey in particular and in authoritarian contexts in general. We discuss the importance of context when
research is conducted in a non-WEIRD environment, in a country where the typical antecedents and outcomes of collective action may not be in place. Thus, we aim to add to the existing global literature by discussing areas where the research based in Turkey is similar to yet diverges from the existing literature.

**Keywords:** Collective action, solidarity, WEIRD, Turkey, Gezi Park protests, identification
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Scholars from different disciplines have long been interested in collective action. However, collective action research has steadily gained importance in social psychology in recent years. One of the reasons behind this interest is that collective action can have enormous consequences for groups and societies (e.g., Louis, 2009). For example, advantaged groups may lose power, or disadvantaged groups may challenge the status quo as an outcome of social movements (Wright, 2001). In general, the theoretical understanding of why, how, and when collective action takes place, as well as its outcomes, contributes to a better understanding of social change (van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009).

Numerous studies conducted on collective action have included participants from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies, such as the U.S., Holland, U.K., and Germany (Henrich et al., 2010). While Turkey has been classified as WEIRD or non-WEIRD in a variety of studies, recent research by Quayle et al. (2020) suggests that Turkey should be considered under the “WEIRD” nation category. Even though Quayle et al. (2020) claim that Turkey should be considered under the WEIRD category, we argue that Turkey is a partly non-western, mostly Muslim, and quasi-authoritarian context, and therefore it is sufficiently different from North American or Western European countries. Given that Turkey is no longer considered a full-fledged democracy (see, e.g., Öktem & Akkoyunlu, 2016), we contend Turkey should be categorized under the “non-WEIRD” category and operationalize it as such throughout this book chapter.

In this chapter, we focus on the social psychological antecedents and consequences of collective action in Turkey and how these dynamics may look both similar to and different from the dynamics that have been suggested in WEIRD contexts. In what follows, first, we provide a
short section on the historical background of Turkey in terms of social movements by focusing on the last decade. Second, we briefly discuss how other disciplines in social science such as political science and sociology have approached collective action much earlier than the social psychology discipline in Turkey. Third, we provide an up-to-date review of how collective action has been studied in social psychology in Turkey by specifically focusing on the a) antecedents and dynamics (e.g., social identification, perceived injustice, emotions, collective efficacy, political ideology, religiosity, and intergroup contact) and b) outcomes of collective action (e.g., empowerment, identity, well-being, positive emotions, solidarity, prejudice reduction, and societal change). Finally, we discuss future directions stemming from the review and highlight in which areas more collective action research is needed in contexts like Turkey.

### A Brief Historical Background of Protests and Mobilizations in Turkey

Turkey has had a long history of protests and social movements in the form of massive boycotts, strikes, and campus occupations since the establishment of the republic in 1923 (Alper, 2010; Brockett, 1998; Gorgas, 2013; Ozturk & Tumen, 2018). In the present chapter, however, we focus on the last ten years during which collective action, i.e., protests, marches, and demonstrations, became the main form of political engagement against many incidental and historical disadvantages such as the Tekel resistance (Özcan, 2018), the Gezi Park protests (Acar & Uluğ, 2016), environmental protests including protests against mining disaster in Soma and anti-nuclear demonstrations (Taşdemir Yaşın, 2020), pride marches (Erol, 2021), and world women’s marches including feminist night walks (Şener, 2021).

The Taksim Project, one of the many ongoing urban renewal projects of İstanbul, aimed to redevelop Gezi Park and the surrounding Taksim Square area. On May 27, 2013, a small number of activists gathered in Gezi Park after bulldozers arrived to cut down trees in the park.
Over the next few days, more and more people, who witnessed what they considered disproportionate force on the part of the police, joined the activists (Acar & Uluğ, 2016). In the end, thousands gathered in the park and pushed out the developers and police. Activists spent the next 15 days camped out in the park, where they created discussion forums and classes, cooked, cleaned, and lived together communally. The protests spread to 79 of 81 provinces in Turkey, with at least three million people participating in the protests around the country.

The 2013 Gezi Park protests can be considered as a milestone for system-challenging collective action practices in Turkey. These protests mobilized millions of citizens to protest against the government’s existing social, political, and economic arrangements. In 2016, however, an attempted coup further exacerbated the already unstable political landscape. Following the coup attempt, any opposition protest is regarded as a threat to the government, and the police have used disproportionate force against protesters (Gürsoy, 2017). As the country has become more authoritarian (Akkoyunlu & Öktem, 2016), statistics show how costly even sharing content on social media can be in Turkey. In 2016, the Turkish government investigated approximately 10,000 social media users. Legal action was taken against 3,710 people, and 1,656 formally arrested (AP News, 2016). In a context like this, social psychological research on the antecedents and consequences of this transformation is still to catch up.

**Aim of the Chapter**

In the current chapter, we present an overview of and elaborate on social psychological research focusing on collective action as the main form of political engagement during this tumultuous decade (2010-2020). Our aim in this review is to bring together the recent studies on collective action and present how they have been studied in the context of Turkey. To do so, we first conducted a literature search using the keywords: “collective action in Turkey,” “protests in
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Turkey,” and “social movements in Turkey.” We then conferred and eliminated unpublished work and studies that fell too far outside of the scope of social psychology. As a result, we ended up with 62 articles on this topic. While our main focus was social psychological research, we also included studies that utilized socio-psychological constructs or variables (such as social identity). Accordingly, we grouped and reviewed these 62 studies under two headings as a) antecedents and b) outcomes of collective action in Turkey.

Approaches to Collective Action in Social Psychology

Antecedents of collective action

Collective action researchers around the world have identified various psychological factors, mechanisms, and processes that explain why individuals engage in collective action (see Jost et al., 2017; Thomas et al., 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren, 2016). Similarly, scholars who study collective action in the context of Turkey have predominantly provided insightful explanations about who might participate in collective action and why that is the case. These scholars have mostly devoted their attention to collective action for progressive social change (see Akkuş et al., 2020; Demirdağ & Hasta, 2019 for a few exceptions), that aims “at establishing more social equality in society,” rather than collective action for reactionary social change, that aims “at fostering more social inequality in society” (Becker, 2020, p. 7). Combing through this burgeoning literature on collective action in Turkey, we identified three defining features. First, the majority of social psychological research conducted in the last ten years on collective action has mostly focused on the Gezi Park protests (e.g., Leach et al., 2016; Stewart et al., 2019; Uysal & Akfirat, 2021a). Only a few studies have been conducted on protests against sexism (e.g., Fischer et al., 2017; Uluğ, Odağ, & Solak, 2020), protests related to women’s issues (Okuyan & Curtin, 2018), protests related to LGBTQ+ rights (Uysal et al.,
protests supporting religious groups’ rights (e.g., Acar et al., 2021; Bükün, 2014), protests for improving the current conditions of one’s ethnic group and for ethnic justice (Bagci et al., 2019; Bagci & Turnuklu, 2019; Tropp et al., 2021) and protests favouring freedom of expression (Solak et al., 2021).

Second, most studies aimed to apply the existing theoretical models and concepts imported from the West per se rather than developing new theoretical models that are sensitive to cultural contexts (but see Ayanian et al., 2021; Baysu, 2017; Odağ et al., 2021 for a few exceptions; see Kışılculoğlu & Uluğ, 2015 for a discussion). Considering context- and culture-relevant characteristics such as risks and costs in collective action participation in the various regions will help researchers better understand the barriers to and facilitators of collective action and social change (see Ayanian et al., 2021; Klandermans, 2004). Third, many of the studies are quantitative and correlational (but see Acar & Coşkan, 2020; Gezici Yalçın & Uluğ, 2017; Odağ et al., 2021 for a few exceptions).

When we looked at the works adopting a social psychological perspective on collective action in Turkey, we see five interrelated antecedents: (a) social identification, (b) injustice perceptions and emotions, (c) group efficacy, (d) political ideology and religiosity, and (e) intergroup contact. Among them, identification, group efficacy, and anger-based perceptions of injustice are acknowledged as the central facilitators of collective action in collective action literature (see van Zomeren et al., 2008) and have received the most empirical attention by collective action scholars in Turkey. Below, relying on empirical articles with a social psychological approach, we attempted to describe how each of these antecedents of collective action has been studied in the context of Turkey.
Social identification. The social identity approach suggests that individuals identify with groups and define themselves in group terms (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Individuals are motivated to achieve and maintain a positive social identity. Positive social identity derives from intergroup comparisons. When social identity is disadvantaged, individuals adopt various identity management strategies to cope with their disadvantaged status. One such strategy is to improve their group position by challenging the status quo.

Since ingroup identification—or psychological attachment to the group—motivates individuals to protect and positively evaluate their identity, it is a significant psychological factor determining collective action participation. Drawing on social identity theory, extensive research on collective action has demonstrated that stronger ingroup identification results in stronger intentions to participate in collective action (Simon et al., 1998; van Zomeren et al., 2008). The results based on a meta-analysis also showed that identification appears to be a significant direct and indirect predictor of collective action, particularly identification with a social movement or action groups that aim for social change than identification with disadvantaged groups (van Zomeren et al., 2008).

In the context of Turkey, previous work on the association between identification and collective action confirm the significant role of ingroup identification in offline collective action (e.g., Acar & Uluğ, 2016; Bükün, 2014; Özkan, 2014; Stewart et al., 2019) and online collective action (Odağ, Uluğ, & Solak, 2016; Varnali & Gorgulu, 2015). In addition, Odağ et al. (2021) have demonstrated that social identity concerns, such as uniting for a common cause or being a part of something larger (i.e., a larger protest movement), are particularly important motivators that drive activists to participate in collective action.
With regards to the operationalization of social identification, research has focused on identification with a variety of groups such as identification with protesters of movement (Ayanian et al., 2021; Leach et al., 2016; Stewart et al., 2019; Uysal & Akfirat, 2021a, 2021b), ethnic identity (Bagci et al., 2019; Bagci & Turnuklu, 2019; Çakal et al., 2016), gender identity (Özkan, 2014), feminist identity and heterosexual identity (Uysal et al., 2021), women’s rights defender identity (Uluğ et al., 2020), religious identity (Baysu & Phalet, 2017; Bükün, 2014), university identity (Bükün, 2021) or an emergent social identity developed in the contexts of crowds such as çapulcu identity in the Gezi Park protests (Odağ et al., 2016; Uluğ & Acar, 2019; Uluğ & Solak, 2021). However, the majority of work (e.g., Bükün, 2021; Uluğ et al., 2020) drew on social identity theory, particularly the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008). More recently, by focusing on an emergent social identity during movements, a few studies (e.g., Uluğ & Solak, 2021; Uysal & Akfirat, 2021b) have tested the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA; Thomas et al., 2012) in Turkey. For example, work by Uysal and Akfirat (2021a) focused on the Gezi Park protesters’ identity as an emergent shared identity derived from an opinion-based group and demonstrated that this emergent Gezi Park protestor identity positively and directly predicted participation in the protests.

Importantly, although identification is associated with collective action, the strength and direction of this relationship may depend on the status position of one’s ingroup (see Jost et al., 2017). However, only a few studies in the context of Turkey focused on the role of group status (e.g., advantaged vs. disadvantaged group) in the association between identification with the group and collective action (e.g., Bagci & Turnuklu, 2019; Çakal et al., 2016).
In sum, research focusing on the role of identification in collective action in Turkey mostly applies theories, measures, and concepts widely used in the relevant domain. Regarding social identification, research results in Turkey are congruent with research results obtained from other parts of the world on similar topics. Nevertheless, studies on the association between group status and collective action are limited in Turkey (see Bagci et al., 2022 in this volume). This can evoke a research gap that needs to be filled by future research.

**Perceived injustice and emotions.** Perceived injustice is one of the key antecedents of collective action. A number of studies have shown that perceived injustice regarding the cause of activism motivates individuals to participate in protests (see Corcoran et al., 2015; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Similarly, studies have shown that injustice perceptions are closely related to collective action commitment in Turkey. For instance, perceived injustice about government attitudes (Odağ et al., 2016) and police brutality (Uysal & Akfirat, 2021a) during the Gezi Park protests were positively associated with protest participation. Relatedly, a sense of justice (e.g., Kaya & Mamatoğlu, 2019) and justice-related motives such as belief in a just world (e.g., Uluğ et al., 2020) and system justification (e.g., Solak et al., 2022) negatively predicted system challenging collective action.

In addition, the predictive power of affect was illustrated in van Zomeren et al.’s (2008) meta-analysis, which showed that measures based on affective injustice (e.g., dissatisfaction, fraternal resentment; group based-anger) produced stronger effect than those based on non-affective injustice (e.g., perceived undeservingness of collective action, perceived unfairness of procedure, perceived collective mistreatment). Justice related emotions, particularly anger, is a powerful engine of collective action (e.g., Jost et al., 2017; Shuman et al., 2018). Anger derives from appraisals of injustice and leads to confrontation (Frijda et al., 1989). Group-based anger
and system-based anger served as mediators between ingroup identification and system justification on the one hand and collective action participation on the other (Osborne et al., 2019).

Examples of direct and indirect effects of anger on collective action can be found in several works carried out in Turkey (e.g., Akkuş et al., 2020; Ayanian et al., 2021; Aytaç et al., 2018; Bükün, 2021; Stewart et al., 2019). However, in a more recent work, Solak et al. (2021) have demonstrated that the way individuals regulate their emotions shaped individuals’ responses regarding commitment to protest behavior. Specifically, they found that system-based anger (e.g., anger regarding how things work in Turkey’s system) mediated the association between system justification and collective action in those who suppress the expression of their emotions less frequently, but not in those who use expressive suppression more frequently in Turkey (see Studies 1 and 2). This work indicated that individuals who were dissatisfied with the way the system works reported anger and subsequently participated in collective action unless they used expressive suppression strategy less frequently.

Moreover, in addition to anger, other negative emotions that have been relevant to collective action were also studied in the context of Turkey. Examples include fear (Akkuş et al., 2020; Ayanian et al., 2021; Solak, 2015), hatred (Akkuş et al., 2020), sadness (Akkuş et al., 2020; Solak, 2015), and guilt/shame (Bükün, 2021; Solak, 2015). Interestingly, although fear evokes withdrawal behaviors in response to threatening events (e.g., Osborne et al., 2012), fear regarding government reaction to protests (Akkuş et al., 2020) or fear about consequences of protest for protesters (e.g., the way police treat the protesters; Ayanian et al., 2021) positively predicted support for protest or willingness to protest in future. Likewise, sadness and hatred
regarding government reaction to protests emerged as positive predictors of support for Gezi Park protests (Akkuş et al., 2020).

Nevertheless, positive emotions as antecedents to collective action have received little research attention in the context of Turkey. Of the little work in this area in Turkey, positive emotions derived from being a participant of Turkey’s system (e.g., Solak, 2015), and institutional trust and satisfaction with how the democracy works (e.g., Acar & Uluğ, 2021a; Kentmen-Çin, 2015) were negatively related to willingness to participate in system-challenging collective actions.

Importantly, Odağ et al. (2021) looked into the emotions and social psychological facilitators of collective action among protesters in Turkey in a qualitative study. They found that happiness/entertainment and feeling of elevation are emotions that are closely related to the formation of social identity during protests. However, although negative emotions including sadness, anger/hate, despair, fatigue/exhaustion were associated with the perceived risks of protest participation (e.g., police intervention, being judged by others), positive emotions such as accompanied with a sense of accomplishment/pride and gratitude were related to overcoming these barriers.

In short, the role of emotional experiences in collective action has attracted limited research interest in Turkey. Among a few studies mentioned above, negative emotions, particularly anger, emerged as an important predictor of collective action. More research is needed to better understand the role of other negative discrete emotions (e.g., fear, guilt) and positive emotions (e.g., pride) in collective action in Turkey's socio-political context.

**Collective efficacy.** Collective efficacy is a significant psychological driver of collective action. A sense of collective efficacy can be understood as “people’s collective shared belief of
being able to solve their group-related problems by unified error” (Mummendey et al., 1999, p. 232). This subjective sense of collective efficacy motivates individuals to participate in collective action (Berman & Wittig, 2004; Kelly & Kelly, 1994; van Zomeren et al., 2010). This positive association between efficacy and collective action is confirmed by van Zomeren et al.’s (2008) meta-analysis. Nevertheless, recent studies demonstrated that the link between efficacy and collective action is not fixed (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2018; Osborne et al., 2015). The direction and strength of this link can change depending on the type of protest. For instance, collective efficacy positively predicted normative collective action such as peaceful demonstration but negatively predicted non-normative collective action such as violence demonstration (Tausch et al., 2011). Also, collective efficacy has been shown as a stronger predictor of “hard” (high cost) collective action rather than “soft” (low cost) collective action (Shi et al., 2015).

Moreover, collective efficacy itself is not monothetic. Thus, heterogeneity for the effect of efficacy on collective action also emerged when researchers considered different types of efficacy (see Acar & Uluğ, 2021a; Hornsey et al., 2006). In a recent study, Cichocka et al. (2018), for example, demonstrated that external political efficacy (i.e., perceptions that the government considers one’s demands) was negatively related to collective action intentions. In contrast, collective efficacy (i.e., perceptions tapping a belief in the effectiveness of protests) was positively associated with collective action. Additional research confirms the importance of the type of efficacy for collective action. Saab et al. (2015) focused on different conceptualizations of efficacy and claimed that political efficacy (i.e., perceived efficacy of collective action itself) differs from identity consolidation efficacy, which captures efficacy bolstering the identity of the protesting group. They found that both types of efficacy motivate individuals to take part in collective action.
Consistent with study results in the literature on collective action, a positive association between collective efficacy and collective action is confirmed in Turkey (e.g., Odağ et al., 2016; Odağ et al., 2021; Uluğ et al., 2020; Uysal & Akfirat, 2021a; see also Coşkan et al., 2022 in this volume). These studies mainly consider collective efficacy as a belief that the collective effort produces change—one of the significant variables that have been studied in previous collective action research mentioned above. To our knowledge, there are a couple of studies that consider the role of the types of collective efficacy in collective action. For example, Ayanian et al.’s (2021) study showed that different types of efficacy have different outcomes for collective action participation in Turkey (see also Acar & Uluğ, 2021a). They looked into the associations between facets of efficacy, namely political efficacy, identity consolidation efficacy (i.e., belief in actions’ ability to lead a broader movement), and participative efficacy (i.e., belief in one’s personal contribution to the movement) on the one hand and willingness to participate in future collective action on the other. Similar to Saab et al.’s (2015) study, they found that identity consolidation efficacy has a positive direct effect on future collective action (see also Odağ et al., 2021), but different from that study, political efficacy does not. One reason for this insignificant finding might be that many protesters were imprisoned and repressed, and no significant changes regarding the political system occurred in recent years (see Ayanian et al., 2021). Thus the forms of collective efficacy should be considered when researchers look at the role of efficacy in social movements in Turkey. However, to our knowledge, there is no empirical work on how the effects of collective efficacy vary across different types of collective action, mentioned above, in Turkey. This can also induce a research gap that needs to be filled in future research.

**Political ideology and religiosity.** Socio-political ideologies play a major role in shaping the protest potential of individuals. However, most models on collective action have not
considered the role of political ideology in collective action (Becker, 2020). In line with findings obtained from the studies conducted in other parts of the world, research on collective action in Turkey indicated that left-wing political ideology positively predicted intention to engage in and support for the Gezi Park protests (Akkuş et al., 2020; Demirdağ & Hasta, 2019; Stewart et al., 2019). However, conservative political ideology positively correlated with the endorsement of violent repression of the Gezi Park protests (Akkuş et al., 2020).

Notably, Gezi Park protests mobilized people with different stances on left-wing political ideology (liberals and secularists) and several social issues. A study by Baysu (2017) showed how socio-cultural and historical contexts evoke different political concerns for protesting (see also Baysu & Phalet, 2017). In particular, Baysu (2017) examined how political profiles specific to the Turkish context were related to types of protest participation and the endorsement of democratic attitudes in the Gezi Park protests. The results demonstrated that liberals (those who support liberties for everyone, including ethnic minorities and the LGBT) and secularists (those who concerned with national unity and laïcité\(^1\)) were the most engaged in the Gezi Park protests, and conservatives were the least engaged in these protests Although liberals and secularists reported similar concerns over the environment, deterioration of democracy, and women’s rights, they differed from each other regarding their concern over what they are protesting. Liberals reported slightly more concern over LGBT and minority rights compared to the secularists. At the same time, Baysu (2017) and Baysu and Phalet (2017) looked at how political ideology is associated with the type of collective action during the Gezi Park protests (see also Coşkan et al., 2022 in this volume). Although liberals and secularists fell on the left side of the political spectrum, they differed in their type of protest participation. Liberals were more likely to

\(^1\) Turkey’s secularism (laïcité) emphasizes the separation between religion and the state (Tarhan, 2011).
participate in “direct” collective actions (e.g., street protests), whereas secularists were most likely to protest through “indirect” acts (e.g., switching lights on and off, hanging flags from windows, or honking cars). Direct collective actions are more costly than indirect collective actions, and using the distinction of “hard” *(high cost)* collective action versus “soft” *(low cost)* collective action (see Shi et al., 2015), we can infer that liberals are more likely to prefer hard collective action than secularists, and secularists are more likely to prefer “soft” collective actions. Future studies can focus on the factors behind the different collective action preferences of liberals and secularists in Turkey.

In addition to political ideology, religiosity may have an impact on collective action participation. For example, in the context of Turkey, participants supporting the Gezi Park protests were more likely to have a secular way of life, whereas anti-Gezi participants were more likely to have a religious lifestyle (Demirdağ & Hasta, 2019). Nevertheless, by looking beyond a homogenous social identity of religion, Baysu and Phalet (2017) investigated whether the interplay between participants’ group identities and their Muslim identification in the Gezi park context was associated with endorsement of democratic attitudes. They found that increased religious identification among conservatives and moderates indicated less support for democratic attitudes. However, religious identification made little or no difference in liberals’ and secularists’ democratic attitudes.

In sum, the findings regarding the roles of political ideology and religiosity in collective action in Turkey showed similar trends with those in various parts of the world. At the same time, some of the studies in Turkey expand on previous research by underlining the importance of considering the socio-cultural and historical context for collective action research.
**Intergroup contact.** Intergroup contact is one of the central catalysts of collective action (see Hässler et al., 2021). Intergroup contact is often studied in the form of positive intergroup contact (i.e., positive interactions between ingroup and outgroup members; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). Greater positive intergroup contact with disadvantaged groups is associated with greater willingness to participate in solidarity-based collective action to promote social equality among advantaged groups, but this relationship (i.e., positive contact with advantaged groups and willingness to engage in collective for one’s ingroup) is negative among disadvantaged groups (Hässler et al., 2020) because it may lower disadvantaged groups’ collective action tendencies by creating a sedative effect (Cakal et al., 2011). Research on the role of intergroup contact in collective action in the context of Turkey has mostly been conducted in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict setting, where Turks constitute an advantaged group and Kurds a disadvantaged group.

Some of these studies attempted to reveal the mechanisms behind the association between contact and collective action intentions. Work by Tropp, Uluğ, and Uysal (2021), for instance, concentrated on the advantaged group (i.e., Turks). They showed that the association between positive intergroup contact with Kurds and willingness to engage in collective action for Kurdish rights (i.e., solidarity-based collective action) was mediated by communication about group differences in power (e.g., talking about the discrimination faced by Kurds in their daily lives), but not cultural differences (e.g., talking about how Kurds and Turks have different customs and cultural traditions), during contact. Çakal et al.’s work (2016), however, demonstrated that perceived threats, both in the form of symbolic and realistic threats, mediated the link between intergroup contact and collective action among both the advantaged (Turks) and disadvantaged (Kurds) groups. In particular, positive intergroup contact negatively predicted perceived threats, which in turn increased collective action intentions among both the advantaged and
disadvantaged groups. Thus, Çakal et al. (2016) argue that contact between groups can create a sedative effect not only for the disadvantaged, but also for the advantaged through the mediating pathway of decreasing perceived threats.

Findings from more recent research in Turkey suggest that the link between intergroup contact and collective action motivations is not as straightforward as it seems. For example, Bagci and Turnuklu (2019) studied different forms of intergroup contact such as positive and negative intergroup contact (i.e., negative interactions between groups). They found that positive and negative intergroup contact were not directly associated with collective action tendencies for one’s ingroup among Turks or Kurds. However, they also showed that positive intergroup contact, but not negative intergroup contact, was indirectly associated with collective action tendencies through the mediating pathway of ingroup identification. Bagci and Turnuklu’s (2019) findings are in line with Çakal et al. (2016), as both studies show that intergroup contact may create a sedative effect for different reasons, both for the advantaged and disadvantaged groups.

Last, imagined contact has also attracted research attention in the context of Turkish-Kurdish relations in Turkey. Imagined contact is defined as “the mental simulation of a social interaction with a member or members of an outgroup category” (Crisp & Turner, 2009, p. 234), and this type of contact is usually employed as an intervention strategy in contexts where direct contact may not be desirable or direct contact opportunities are limited (Stathi et al., 2013). In the Turkish-Kurdish conflict context, Bagci et al. (2019) showed how imagined contact might play an important role in collective action motivations among both Turks (advantaged) and Kurds (disadvantaged). They showed that, among Kurds, imagined positive contact with Turks increased collective action tendencies for improving the conditions of Kurds through the
mediating pathway of increased ethnic identification and perceived discrimination based on ethnic identity. Similarly, they showed that imagined contact also directly increased collective action tendencies for protecting their own group’s rights among Turks. Although imagined contact also increased perceived discrimination among Turks, the indirect effect of imagined contact on collective action through perceived discrimination was not significant. This line of research shows that positive intergroup contact may improve relations between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, though it may also create a sedative effect for both groups. These effects are particularly prominent for disadvantaged groups as contact may reduce their willingness to demand changes that would benefit their group through collective action.

Outcomes of Collective Action

The majority of research on collective action across contexts focuses on motivations and antecedents for participation (Louis, 2009) and far less research on outcomes of activism and collective action; we can see the same trend in the research in Turkey. Of this body of work, a few studies have focused on outcomes of collective action, while others have discussed them incidentally. Overall, we have found outcomes of collective action related to a) empowerment, b) identity, c) well-being and positive emotions, d) solidarity and prejudice reduction, and e) societal change. While we have categorized these studies in this way, we should also note that these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Especially as it relates to multi-level outcomes of collective action, these most likely occur in tangent with one another rather than separate from one another. Below, relying on articles having a social psychological perspective, we attempted to describe how each of these outcomes of collective action has been studied in the context of Turkey.
**Empowerment.** Empowerment is a key factor for collective action—often as both an antecedent and as an outcome. Empowerment can be understood as a social psychological state of confidence in one’s ability to challenge existing relations of domination (Drury & Reicher, 2005). It differs from efficacy in that it captures an emotional aspect of experience that efficacy does not (Acar & Uluğ, 2021b). If the feeling endures beyond the collective action itself, it has the ability to affect participants’ personal lives and motivate further involvement in collective action. For example, Stewart and colleagues (2019) looked at the differences in participating, visiting, or watching the Gezi Park protests. In two studies, they showed that although participation in the Gezi Park protests was positively associated with empowerment, watching or visiting the protests were not enough to experience empowerment. Acar’s (2018) work also discusses empowerment experiences; these were discussed especially as they related to conflict with police and engaging in community activities in the park, though every participant in this study reported empowerment. In a similar vein, Acar and Coşkan (2020) found that participation in—but not vicarious experience of—collective action resulted in empowerment, including feeling both individually and collectively efficacious and feeling a sense of support. In a similar vein, Coşkan et al. (2021) noted that contextual factors such as political climate and neoliberalism could take away from feelings of empowerment—especially relevant for research on collective action in repressive climates (see Ayanian et al., 2021).

These findings in Turkey are in line with previous research on empowerment as an outcome of collective action participation (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2005, 2009). As discussed above, empowerment is considered both an antecedent and as an outcome—here, we see how engaging in protest, conflict with police, and the community-driven nature of collective action can bring about a sense of empowerment.
Identity-related changes. There has been substantial previous research on the way that collective action can result in a change in social identity (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005). These changes in identity can involve radicalization or politicization or can sometimes be discussed as a more simple change in the way that people understand their social identities after participation. In Turkey, identity-related changes have mostly been studied in conjunction with empowerment, where empowerment functions as a catalyst for these changes. Acar’s (2018) work focuses on empowerment experiences through the Gezi Park protests and how those experiences influenced participants’ decisions to join political organizations after the protests ended and maintaining participation in collective action through these new identities. Through interviews with 25 participants who later joined various political organizations, Acar (2018; Study 2) looked at empowerment, especially through encounters with police, as a means to greater politicization. All participants strove to continue collective action after the protests ended through their new organized/politicized identities.

Uluğ and Acar’s (2018) paper featured discussions of multi-level outcomes of protest. In some instances, participants’ experience of empowerment during and after Gezi resulted in politicization and organization. Participants described their experience at Gezi as “the reason [they] got into politics (Uluğ & Acar, 2018, p. 5). In their subsequent work, Uluğ and Acar (2019) examined the çapulcu identity that formed during the Gezi Park protests. They detail the identity formed and the group norms that were associated with the identity (see also Haciyakupoglu & Zhang, 2015; Odağ et al., 2016). This research shows that identities can form out of collective action, and that these identities can be well-structured with clear contents, boundaries, and norms, and that they can continue to carry meaning after the protest event. For
many, çapulcu identity became associated with individuals’ own activist or protester identity and became another form of politicization.

Research in Turkey on identity-related changes (i.e., Acar, 2018; Haciyakupoglu & Zhang, 2015; Odağ et al., 2016; Uluğ & Acar, 2018) is in line with research done in other contexts on protest participations’ impact on changing identities (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2000; 2005; Klandermans et al., 2002; see Vestergren et al., 2017). It also expands on previous research by indicating that an extended collective action event such as the Gezi Park protests can create a completely new identity (çapulcu identity), rather than simply politicizing a previously existing one (Uluğ & Acar, 2018).

**Well-being and positive emotions.** Previous research has shown that protest and activism have a positive effect on different measures of well-being, as well as greater happiness (see Vestergren et al., 2017). Participants in Uluğ and Acar’s (2018) research on multi-level (individual, group, and societal level) outcomes of collective action reported positive emotions at the individual level after participating in the protests. They reported feeling courageous, hopeful, and that they were not alone. Benevento and Okuyan’s (2019) paper focuses on implicit meaning in Gezi Park protesters’ discussion of their participation both “before” and “after the resistance.” Outside of the tent of the Association of Psychologists for Social Solidarity’s (Toplumsal Dayanışma İçin Psikologlar, TODAP), they placed pieces of cardboard with two prompts: “before the resistance” and “after the resistance.” Similar to Uluğ and Acar’s (2018) findings, they found that the “after” narratives included almost exclusively positive affect states, with words such as hope, happiness, joy, confidence, power, and enthusiasm, as well as feeling identified, unity, being proud of oneself and/or the nation, and admiration.
Acar and Uluğ (2021a) examine political trust, collective action, and well-being in light of the 2017 referendum and 2018 general elections in Turkey. Their first study showed a significant indirect effect of political trust on well-being through collective action participation in the Gezi Park protests. However, unlike previous work (e.g., Klar & Kasser, 2009), the relationship between collective action and well-being was negative. Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1, albeit only with online collective action. It could be that previous work found a positive relationship between collective action and well-being because it was conducted in a democratic context, where political participation is not as risky as it is in authoritarian contexts (see Ayanian et al., 2021).

Research in Turkey is generally in line with previous work that shows collective action may increase well-being and positive emotions. However, it also indicates that these positive outcomes may have a relationship with authoritarianism. As Turkey has become increasingly authoritarian, well-being and positive emotions have become more difficult to correlate to collective action. As mentioned earlier, engaging in street protests in Turkey has become increasingly difficult over the past few years; even online political engagement is fraught with potential risk (AP News, 2016; Uluğ et al., 2020). The outcome of research in Turkey suggests that future work should further examine the effect of collective action on well-being in authoritarian contexts.

**Solidarity and prejudice reduction.** Experiencing collective action with others might be associated with prejudice reduction towards other disadvantaged groups, and consequently can result in solidarity between groups that may not have engaged in collective action together before. Acar and Uluğ’s (2016) work suggests that collective action can lead to reductions in intergroup prejudice as well as taking steps toward social justice. Findings showed that
participants experienced instances of common identification that increased political solidarity during the protests. Participants also indicated that they achieved their initial goal of the park remaining a park, and that they did this through cooperation with others they had not previously worked with. Uluğ and Acar’s (2018) research noted that these instances of solidarity continued after the protests—at the group level, results show there was increased cooperation between groups that were previously excluded, as well as increased sensitivity to other groups’ priorities. Both intragroup and intergroup changes occurred. Notably, results show that the LGBTQ movement became more visible afterwards; this was, as LGBTQ participants noted, both positive and negative—positive as the LGBTQ movement was embraced by others, but negative in that increased visibility left them more vulnerable to state—and opposition-side oppression. Similar to Acar and Uluğ’s works, Acar and Coşkan’s (2020) work also showed that academics felt a sense of psycho-social support and solidarity with other academics that they had not previously experienced.

While the concept of solidarity has often been referred to in research, it has rarely been operationally defined in a meaningful way for collective action studies (but see Neufeld et al., 2019 for a recent exception). Research into solidarity and prejudice reduction should be continued as a viable method to maintain social movement participation as well as extended collective action participation in contexts like Turkey.

**Societal outcomes.** While other disciplines such as sociological or political science have addressed how to use collective action to create social change, this topic has rarely been addressed in social psychology (see Louis, 2009 for a detailed discussion). Social psychological research on collective action mostly focuses on intrapersonal and intergroup levels of analysis
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(see Iyer & Leach, 2009; Turner et al., 1987), leaving the question of whether the collective action achieved its initial goals relatively untouched.

Uluğ and Acar’s (2018) work followed up on the societal outcomes of the Gezi Park protests three years later in 2016 in order to see what sorts of societal outcomes might be ongoing. Notably, this research also discussed the fallout from the protests. How much of this can be conflated with the political turn that Turkey took in 2015 and 2016 is unclear; however, participants noted that initial positive outcomes from collective action participation did not all last. At the societal level, the study indicates that consciousness increased after the protests, such that people may have become more sensitive to issues they did not pay attention to before. There was also success in new political platforms, notably the success of the Peoples’ Democracy Party (Halkların Demokrasi Partisi, HDP). Uluğ and Acar (2018) note, however, that if this increased consciousness is not embraced by the government and/or society at large, it can be met with political repression.

Most social psychological research on collective action focuses on individual- or group-level outcomes of collective action. Based on the outcomes of this research, we suggest that the societal aims or goals of participation should be considered when understanding the motivations for protest participation, as well as how these outcomes then encourage future participation in collective action.

Where do we go next? Recommendations for future research

In this chapter, we aimed to provide an up-to-date review of how collective action has been studied in social psychological research in the context of Turkey. We presented the relevant studies on the a) antecedents and dynamics of and b) outcomes of collective action in social psychology literature. Based on the patterns we observe, we believe that future studies that focus
on collective action in Turkey will benefit by more closely considering the dynamic interplay between individual-level (e.g., politicization of individuals), group-level (e.g., trust between groups) and societal-level factors (e.g., political structures) (see Pettigrew, 2006 for a discussion on the advantages of multi-level approaches). First, we need more research on the role of social identity in collective action in Turkey. Although identification is related to collective action, the strength and direction of this relationship may be affected by the status position of one’s ingroup (see Jost et al., 2017). However, only a few studies in the context of Turkey took into account the role of group status (e.g., advantaged vs. disadvantaged group) in the association between identification with the group and collective action (e.g., Bagci & Turnuklu, 2019; Çakal et al., 2016; see also Bagci et al., 2022 in this volume). Future studies, therefore, should also focus on the interface between ingroup identification and one’s group status in understanding collective action in authoritarian contexts by especially investigating the power dynamics and asymmetries between groups in Turkey. For example, more studies should focus on how and why advantaged group members become allies and take action on behalf of the disadvantaged, especially in the context of conflict (see, e.g., Tropp et al., 2021 for an exception). It is especially likely that when people’s efficacy to bring about social change is lower in such contexts (Odağ et al., 2021), their identities may function as a more crucial predictor of collective action participation or identity and efficacy perceptions may interact. Therefore, future studies should look at not only the role of social identities but also different types of efficacy, especially as they relate to their social identities. Researchers focusing on contexts like Turkey may examine how efficacy functions in high-risk contexts.

In addition to identity and efficacy processes, more work is needed to understand the role of content of injustice perceptions. In line with work on collective action conducted in other parts
of the world (van Zomeren et al., 2008), perceived injustice emerged as a significant antecedent of collective action in Turkey. However, studies on collective action only consider the strength of injustice appraisals rather than their content derived from fairness principles (e.g., merit, need, equality; see Mikołajczak & Becker, 2019). Ultimately, considering how various notions of injustice influence collective action participation will highlight for whom injustice appraisals might motivate such participation.

Similarly, emotions and what roles they play in collective action need to be well understood in the context of Turkey. In particular, fear is proposed as a significant barrier to collective action (Miller et al., 2009; Musgrove & McGarty, 2008), especially in non-WEIRD and authoritarian contexts. However, in the context of Turkey, research has shown that fear positively predicts action tendencies (e.g., Ayanian et al., 2021; see also Akkuş et al., 2020). Ayanian et al. (2021) argued that since the threat is excessive in high-risk contexts, fear can particularly lead to the boomerang effect, which results in confrontation. Future studies should analyze under what conditions fear may (de)motivate collective action participation in contexts like Turkey.

In addition to negative emotions, positive emotions relevant to collective action have received little research attention in Turkey. Since positive emotions are understudied, this calls for future research to reveal how and when discrete positive emotions serve as facilitators of or barriers to collective action. One important emotion relevant to collective action is hope for social change (Cohen-Chen & van Zomeren, 2018; Wlodarczyk et al., 2017). However, in high-risk and authoritarian contexts, hope for social change tends to be low (Odağ et al., 2021). Future studies should therefore examine how hope for change interacts with group efficacy and group identification.
It is fair to argue that studies that focused on offline collective action in Turkey have measured collective action participation as people’s willingness to engage in collective action rather than actual participation. As some studies have shown that willingness to engage in collective action and collective action participation may be predicted by distinct psychological concepts (see Tropp & Brown, 2004; Tropp & Uluğ, 2019), future studies need to pay attention to these distinctions and potential antecedents of these variables in Turkey. In addition, the influence of online collective action on well-being and positive emotion should be further explored to see if it can provide the same sort of outcomes as offline collective action. Research has started to examine the role of social media in its ability to a) engage people to participate in offline collective action, b) function as a tool to facilitate offline collective action, and c) as a type of collective action in and of itself. In Turkey, we also see an increasing trend of online collective action research among the studies on collective action. For example, group norms and identification may influence political participation on social media (e.g., Twitter; Varnali & Gorgulu, 2015). On the other hand, social media can also facilitate large-scale collective action (Odağ et al., 2016) by facilitating information exchange necessary for the coordination of protest in terms of practical coordination such as transportation, locations of police, medical services, and legal support (Jost et al., 2018) as well as by facilitating messages of social identity during the Gezi Park protests (Haciyakupoglu & Zhang, 2015). Future studies should take a detailed look at the unique role social media plays in authoritarian contexts in de(motivating) people to take action.

It is fair to argue that studies that focused on collective action in Turkey have tended to examine system-challenging collective action (e.g., Gezi Park protests) rather than system-supporting collective action (e.g., the 15th July protests; for an exception, see Sümer & Kaya,
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2017). However, the motivations, mechanisms, processes, and outcomes of system-supporting collective action should be well understood in authoritarian contexts like Turkey. One can observe different motivations and emotions in terms of collective action participation in such contexts and thus complement the burgeoning literature on collective action by showing context-dependent social psychological mechanisms.

Even though collective action participation is an essential subject to study, given that many people are still less likely to participate in any forms of collective action, future studies should also focus on collective inaction (i.e., why people do not take action; van Bezouw et al., 2019). A study by Price et al. (2019) showed that people in Turkey who a) are less educated, b) are less liberal, c) are unemployed, d) are not civically engaged, e) are highly religious, and f) do not consider politics important are less likely to participate in political action. In addition to these socio-demographic and political characteristics of participants, future studies may also examine the barriers to collective action participation in non-WEIRD and authoritarian contexts.

Last but not least, one can ask how collective action functions in non-WEIRD and authoritarian contexts. People may participate in different types of protests and resistance when there is too much suppression (e.g., banging pots and pans, turning on and off the lights). Participating in protests is not necessarily a case of social change; sometimes, it may be just a case of self-maintenance. Even if people know that their actions may not bring about social change, they show that they “still exist” by resisting. We hope that our review opens a road for further discussion on how, why, and when collective action participation in non-WEIRD and authoritarian contexts happens in ways similar to, yet different from, WEIRD contexts.
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