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Sticky objects and cruel desires

EXPLORING THE JOURNEYS OF EGYPTIAN WOMEN POSTGRADUATES INTO AND OUT OF UK HIGHER EDUCATION.

YASSER KOSBAR
PhD International Education and Development
University of Sussex
November 2021
Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:…………………………………………
ABSTRACT

In a world of globalised education, the internationalisation of higher education and one of its vital mechanisms, namely mobility, have become central issues for governments, higher education institutions, and individuals. Internationalisation has become a signifier for global prestige, advancement, and exponential monetary growth. However, internationalisation could also be constructed as a site of neo-colonial dominance where international comparisons, benchmarking, rankings are constantly made, and universities in the Global North dominate the global university ranking systems. Despite the extensive scholarship, research and policy documentation, internationalisation in higher education remains elusive, and the belief in its achievement could be described as a cruel attachment to the neoliberal knowledge economy. Internationalisation has become a site of binaries between winners - in the core - who could decipher the code and losers - on the periphery - who lag behind. For Egypt, the aesthetic conventions of internationalisation in higher education as a cruel object of desire gain their significance in the national imaginarie through new and renewed narratives of crisis and the fear of failure. Despite its centuries-long efforts to internationalise its higher education, Egypt does not always appear to break the code, play by the rules, and internationalisation was and has remained a site of an affective assemblage of aspirations, anxieties, dread, and shame.

Furthermore, much of what has been written in scholarship concerning the intersection of internationalisation in higher education and gender have focused on mobility experiences within the Global North. Our knowledge of the experiences of postgraduate women from the Global South in universities in the Global North remains very limited, particularly the experiences of women postgraduates from the African continent. This is the first study of its kind to focus solely on the experiences of Egyptian women postgraduates in the UK, and to deploy queer feminist theory in its design, analysis, and conclusions. The overall objective of this thesis is to queer discourses of internationalisation and one of its fundamental mechanisms: mobility, and to destabilise its depictions as a rewarding, neutral, disembodied, and absolute good.
By relying on onto-epistemological underpinnings and theoretical framings of the affect, this thesis aims to queer the linear spatial-temporal crossings between the historical, socio-economic, political, and cultural spheres of internationalisation in higher education. In particular, it will seek to queer the homogeneity and typifying of ideal mobile subjects by problematising the gendered, raced and classed binaries embedded in the internationalisation discourse. The theoretical, methodological, and analytical approaches of this thesis are guided by queer, feminist research traditions to answer the overarching research question: **How can we understand the complexities of international mobility for Egyptian women postgraduates?**

From the central question, this thesis will seek to address the following two research sub-questions:

1. What made international mobility possible for Egyptian women postgraduates?
2. What social expectations framed their trajectories of international mobility and what were the affective modalities of these trajectories?

I conducted 24 semi-structured interviews with Egyptian women postgraduates (Taught Master’s and PhD) across 11 universities in the UK. The sample included students from state-owned public universities and private universities in Egypt and ranged across sciences, technology, medicine, and engineering (STEM), social science, arts, and humanities disciplines. The data collection employed exploratory and interpretive qualitative modes of enquiry guided by queer feminist theorisations. For the data analysis, I utilised a thematic analysis framework to enable rigorous and deep triangulations to grasp the contradictions, and complexities of Egyptian women postgraduates’ embodied mobilities and temporal-spatial borders crossing. Overall, this thesis shows that; firstly, class positionalities continue to shape the prospects of mobilities for postgraduate education among Egyptian women. Secondly, the enduring strength of colonial legacies constitutes a critical element that demarcates the geographies and directions of mobility. Finally, the gendered potency of chrononormativity continues to organize the lives and social expectations of Egyptian women postgraduates.
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“The night before, I kept telling my sister I am going to Europe, I am going on a scholarship. It is something big. I need to feel happy”, recalled Tokka, as she described her last night in Egypt before coming to the UK on a fully funded scholarship for a postgraduate research programme (PhD).

According to Egypt’s dominant script of happiness, Tokka is happy or at least she should be. On a career level, she is an aspiring early-career academic, who before coming to the UK, was working as an assistant lecturer in one of Egypt’s top state-owned public universities. On a personal level, Tokka is married with one child and attests to the support she receives from her family (including her husband) concerning her education plans and career trajectories. In a nutshell, Tokka’s life in Egypt before deciding to come and pursue a PhD study in the UK can be described as the poster child for the happy nuclear family that aligns with the nation’s ideology of hetero-reproductive futurism and its gendered social expectations (Edelman, 2007). The reason behind Tokka’s unhappiness came with the realization of the unequal gendered social expectations and the limitations on her own freedom for mobility. After her husband dismissed the idea of re-locating as a trailing spouse, Tokka was faced with either giving up her aspirations and dreams for mobility or going ahead and risking the breaking up of the family. In deciding to pursue her plans for postgraduate education in the UK, she turned from the ideal citizen in a heteronormative neoliberal economy (Duggan, 2002) to become a happiness alien (Ahmed, 2010) who is willing to face social condemnation in order to follow her dreams.

Tokka is not alone. Over the past decades, the number of academic women on the move has grown exponentially. According to the OECD, the mobility trajectory among academic women doubled from 9.8 million to nearly 16.6 million (OECD, 2017). In Egypt, while a breakdown by gender is unavailable, the general trend on international mobility for postgraduate education abroad shows the number of students seeking postgraduate taught education abroad have tripled (for Masters) and doubled (for PhD) in the period between 2009 - 2018 (CAMPAS, 2019). The trend transcends national border to other neighbouring countries, for example in Saudi Arabia, the number of academic women on the move from Saudi Arabia to G20 countries multiplied by 3.5 between 2000 and 2011 (OECD,
Yet, and despite the exponential growth over the past decade, the experiences of Egyptian women seeking postgraduate education abroad are often absent from policy debates, frameworks, and scholarship on the topic. This thesis will address this gap in knowledge and will seek to understand the complexities of international mobility decisions among Egyptian women postgraduates as they navigate their ways into and out of UK higher education. The first section of this chapter gives a brief overview of the scope of the study against historical, socio-economic, and political backgrounds. The second section will then interrogate internationalisation in higher education as affective and gendered spaces. The third section will lay out the theoretical frameworks of this thesis and the central research questions. Finally, it concludes with reasons for personal and academic interests in the topic.

1.1 THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY

In the context of Egypt, the introduction of international higher education and its most visible mechanism: mobility, are neither new phenomena introduced during the colonial occupations in Egypt nor a recent response to the globalised neoliberal capitalist knowledge economy. There is a widely held misconception that the colonial occupation introduced higher education in Africa, and its state has deteriorated in postcolonial times (Zeleza, 2014). Moreover, efforts for internationalisation in higher education and the increased scholarly interest on the topic are often suggested as a response to globalisation under the influence of neoliberal ideologies (Stromquist, 2007; Brooks and Waters, 2011; Yemini, 2017). The case of Egypt’s higher education queers these widely held notions, and interrogation of its history with internationalisation troubles these discourses. Egypt was the cradle of multiple civilisations (i.e., Ancient Egypt, Jewish, Roman, Coptic, and Islam), and scholarship on three main religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam prospered in Egypt and enriched today’s global knowledge. Egypt is the birthplace of some of the oldest forms of higher education, including the Alexandria Library and Al-Azhar Mosque University, established in Cairo in 970 (Said, 2017). Over the centuries, Egypt became the hub for knowledge exchange among Arabs, Muslims, and orientalist (mostly European) scholars thanks to its history and its geographical location at the heart of the Muslim and Arab worlds (Said, 2003).
The tradition of academic mobility is a hallmark of Arab and Muslim civilisations. The beginning of the Islamic calendar marks the migration journey (لاجية النبوة hijra) of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) from Mecca to Al-Madina to continue the teaching of Islam (Said, 1996). Academic mobilities of Arab and Muslim scholars resided at the heart of Arabic and Muslim pedagogies and are well documented in their archives and traditions. Early accounts of travel (رسالة في طلب العلم, the journey in search of knowledge) by male Muslim scholars such as Ibn Battûta, the Andalusian Ibn Jubayr (d. 614/1217) and Abd al-Latîf al-Baghdâdi (d. 629/1231–1232) significantly transformed global knowledge, and its influence can still be felt in today’s knowledge economy within the concepts of geometry, literature, geography, mathematics, and history (El Moudden, 1990; Malti-Douglas, 1995). The scholarly tradition for academic mobility never ceased and continued over centuries. It is a torch which has been handed down through the generations to this day.

However, the re-orientation to Europe as a happiness object occurred in Egypt starting in the 19th century following the devastation left by the French colonisation between 1798 and 1801 (Richmond, 2012; Rogan, 2012). The short-lived French colonial occupation left the country in a state of colossal devastation, chaos and the social reality became a site of ‘affective erethism’ marked by shame, loathing and contempt (Fanon, 2008:118). Egypt occupied a state of affective in-between-ness (Gregg et al., 2010) tied with past attachments to the Ottoman empire through shared culture and religion while aspiring for an imagined future embodied in secular Europe. This state of affective intensities shaped its present moment and set Egypt on a journey for the following centuries to pursue sticky objects (Ahmed, 2010) and the fulfilment of cruel desires (Berlant, 2011). From this point on, the internationalisation of its higher education began to be regarded as a happiness object (Ahmed, 2010) and pursuits to its achievement led to a monumental shift and transformation in Egypt’s higher education and patterns of academic mobility. Egypt’s race to modernisation began with the expansion of its higher education following the introduction of secular education and vocational training and the shift in patterns of academic mobility from voluntary, individual travels to institutionalised, state-sponsored study missions to parts of Europe (Cochran, 2012; Richmond, 2012; Rogan, 2012; Ead, 2019).
As part of its efforts to modernize and expand its higher education, academic mobility was an effective tool to achieve that goal and study abroad in parts of Europe remained associated with prestige, value, and the promise of upward social mobility. Yet, Egypt’s efforts to expand and internationalize its higher education faced tremendous challenges through different phases of its history of colonisation. Under the British colonisation, opportunities for mobility remained scarce and highly coveted among scholars and intellectuals. The influence of colonial legacies can still be felt today in the persisting and tremendous social and cultural resistance towards Egyptian women’s access to higher education and mobility for studies (Megahed and Lack, 2011, 2013; Megahed, 2017).

After its independence from British colonisation and the birth of the Republic of Egypt in 1952, its higher education entered a phase of massification and efforts for internationalisation stalled as the country enacted a state-wide programme of nationalisation. As part of its nation-building process after independence from the British colonial rule, Egypt needed to capitalise on its resources, and women’s education was integral to these efforts (see Chapter Three). However, the massification of access to Egypt’s higher education required tremendous resources that rendered plans for the sector’s growth ineffective and futile. After decades of geopolitical tensions, Egypt was drained morally, economically, and socially, and its higher education suffered tremendously. By the mid-1970s, Egypt needed a new outlook to counter affected feelings of isolation, shame, and defeat. The state needed a way to compensate for its spending on public services, and the paternal state role was deemed very costly. Egypt’s new outlook after the introduction of an ‘open door’ policy meant embracing neoliberalism ideologies and came with promises of happiness and dire consequences, especially on women’s access to higher education and the rights for mobility (Assaad and Arntz, 2005; El Saadawi and Newson-Horst, 2010).

The open-door policy opened the gate for increased foreign debt, the brutal intervention of international development organisations in national affairs and higher education became a site of neo-colonial dominance (Cochran, 2012). Given its history as a pioneer in the region, Egypt’s higher education was regarded with prestige, and its status was highly esteemed in the region. However, in the neoliberal global ranking and internationalisation economy, Egypt’s higher education seemed not
to be hitting the mark and not to be producing the ideal global graduate (Elsaid, 2015). While international mobility remained highly coveted among scholars, the deterioration of higher education nationally due to decades of neoliberal policies made a compelling case for Egyptians to seek postgraduate degrees abroad.

The case of Egyptian women’s mobility for postgraduate study reveals some of the silences, erasures, and inequalities in internationalisation discourses. Despite its centuries-long history, the journeys of Egyptian women for postgraduate studies abroad received little to no scholarly attention and interrogation of internationalisation discourses in Egypt’s higher education often overlooked its affective structure and its classed and gendered stratifications. In principle, Egyptian women’s rights for mobility are guaranteed by the constitution and by international conventions. For instance, Article 15 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women CEDAW, which Egypt ratified in 1981, stipulates that state parties shall “accord to men and women the same rights concerning the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile” (United Nations, 2010:no page). However, the social and cultural attitudes tend to view Egyptian women’s freedom of mobility as problematic (Malti-Douglas, 1995). Despite the notable efforts of Egyptian feminist scholars (El Saadawi, 1982, 1995; Eltahawy, 2016), women in Egypt still face tremendous challenges, violence and discrimination in exercising their rights for mobility. For instance, up until 2000, there was an applicable restriction on issuing a passport to married women without written approval from the husband (Riad, 2016). Although Egypt recognised the equal rights of men and women on a passport in Article 7 of the Egyptian Passport Law, women still face institutional and legal restrictions on their movements (Tadros, 2016, 2018).

The journeys of Egyptian women postgraduates for study mobility in the UK reveal some of the colonial, historical, political, and cultural complexities, silences, and idiosyncrasies embedded in the internationalisation in higher education discourses. Furthermore, the strict temporal and spatial organising of postgraduate education in Egypt’s higher education attest to the gendered social expectations and heteronormative assumptions. For instance, according to the regulations of Egypt’s higher education, only state-owned public universities can offer doctoral education and students who
wish to pursue postgraduate studies in those universities must complete their postgraduate taught and research degrees within ten years from the date of finishing their undergraduate studies (Cantini, 2020). Given the context of Egypt, women often face tremendous social pressure to follow the heteronormative path of getting married and starting families after their undergraduate studies (Elbadawy, 2010; Salem, 2015; Fattah, 2019). The holy trinity of dominant happiness scripts: mobility, marriage, and motherhood put Egyptian women at crossroads with difficult choices, impossible reconciliations, and sacrifices. Furthermore, the rationale of choosing the UK as a study destination for postgraduate education brings back the colonial past and attachments to colonial education which continues to shape the landscape of internationalisation in higher education discourses (Nour and Nour, 2020).

Against this backdrop, this thesis aims to understand the complexities of international mobility decisions for postgraduate education among Egyptian women postgraduates. In particular, it will seek to understand a) the necessary social and cultural capital that made their mobility possible, b) the gendered social expectations that framed their trajectories of international mobility and how these expectations were affectively loaded. This is the first study to address these questions and to deploy concepts of queer feminist and postcolonial feminist theories to critically interrogate the internationalisation discourses in Egypt. Furthermore, it will rely on intersectional approach to determine the extent to which social class, nationality, age, religion, and gender intersect and shape the journeys of Egyptian women postgraduates in the UK. By moving away from the well-rehearsed rhetoric of internationalisation as a neutral experience, disembodied and unconditional good (Morley et al., 2018, 2019, 2020), I aim to queer the temporality and spatiality (Lefebvre and Enders, 1976; Foucault, 1979, 1982; Lefebvre and Nicholson-Smith, 1991) of internationalisation discourses in higher education by critically examining its affective structures and assemblages. My contention is to work closely and critically with notions of affect (Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011) to explore its discursive, entangled, and expansive structures and assemblages.
1.2 QUEERING INTERNATIONALISATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION

This thesis understands internationalisation in higher education as affective and gendered spaces (Morley et al., 2020). As such, an interrogation of the term ‘gender’ is deemed imperative to the analysis and findings of this thesis. Since Ann Oakley (1972) re-introduced the use of the term gender in a feminist study in Sex, Gender and Society, scholars have sought to challenge and “denaturalise” essential assumptions of sex and gender (Vigoya, 2016:853). Connell and Pearse (2015:19) define gender as “a social structure. It is not an expression of biology nor a fixed dichotomy in human life or character. It is a pattern in our social arrangements, and the everyday activities shaped by those arrangements.” In earlier work, Connell (1987:120) identifies gender regimes as the interplay of gender relations within three main sites or institutions; the family, the state and the street. Butler (1993:5) challenges the dichotomous binaries of nature (sex) vs nurture (gender), saying:

> If gender consists of the social meanings that sex assumes, then sex does not accrue social meanings as additive properties, but rather is replaced by the social meanings it takes on; sex is relinquished in the course of that assumption, and gender emerges, not as a term in a continued relationship of opposition to sex, but as the term which absorbs and displaces sex.

Debates on the definition of gender and its usefulness as category of analysis have concerned academic circles and scholars across feminist, queer and trans studies (Davidoff et al., 1999; Tudor, 2018, 2019). The debates often return to dichotomous binarized categories of nature (sex) vs nurture (gender) (Butler, 2004) and the use of the term gender in studies on migration and mobility tend to assert heteronormative notions and assumptions (Dhoest, 2020). In Gender Trouble, Butler (1990:33) introduced the notion of performativity and argued for expanding our understandings of gender as:

> The repeated stylisation of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being. A political genealogy of gender ontologies, if it is successful, will deconstruct the substantive appearance of gender into its constitutive acts and locate and account for those acts within the compulsory frames set by the various forces that police the social appearance of gender.

In Critically Queer, Butler (1993:28) warns that performativity must not be read as “self-expression or self-presentation, but as the unanticipated resignifiability of highly invested terms.” Trans studies scholars challenged some of Butler’s concepts suggesting that they engender further binary
oppositions. Prosser (2013:40) asserts that Butlerian iterations assert binaries such as “queer versus straight; subversive versus naturalising; performative versus constativity; gender versus sex” and that “transsexual ruptures these binaries and their alignment.” The Butlerian approach to gender as performative, they argue, must be understood in its potential to “accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior, authorities set of practices.” Wilchins (2014:41) contends that gender must be understood as a linguistic performativity “that tends to make space for some things while excluding others. It is that words and meaning work because of a process of exclusion.”

Despite its theoretical limitations, I find Butler’s iterations and notions of gender as performative by ‘making trouble’ (Butler, 1990, 2004, 2011) extremely useful to form the theoretical springboard to queer the temporality and spatiality of Egyptian women’s journeys and the internationalisation in higher education discourses. In an interview with Ahmed, Butler explains that “trouble becomes the name for a scene in which a certain effort to contest the status quo is punished or maligned for its ostensible destructiveness” (Ahmed, 2016:484). With this framing, I contend that the journeys of Egyptian women postgraduates in and out of the UK troubles the heteronormative logics, notions and assumptions that continue to shape Egypt’s discourses of internationalisation. Cohen (1997:440) identifies heteronormativity as “both those localised practices and those centralised institutions which legitimise and privilege heterosexuality and heterosexual relationships as fundamental and natural within society.” In thinking with Cohen, I aim to illustrate how Egyptian women’s journeys queer the gendered heteronormative ideologies and its assumed common sense. Halberstam (2011:89) defines heteronormative common sense, saying:

Heteronormative common-sense leads to the equation of success with advancement, capital accumulation, family, ethical conduct, and hope. Other subordinate, queer, or counterhegemonic modes of common-sense lead to the association of failure with nonconformity, anti-capitalist practices, nonreproductive lifestyles, negativity, and critique. By exploring spatial and temporal border crossings, my task will begin by queering internationalisation in higher education as a site of class fantasy (Berlant, 2011) and its most visible mechanism: mobility as a happy object (Ahmed, 2010).
My uses of *queer* both as a term and a verb throughout this thesis are to serve my intentions to capture the ambiguity, fluidity, messiness, and non-linearity of mobility trajectories in internationalisation discourses. Moreover, by deploying queer as a verb, I aim to capture politics of dissidence, disruption and resistance to heteronormative assumptions that participants made during their journeys (Butler, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2004). Furthermore, my goal is to queer the temporal and spatial linearity embedded in postgraduate education and the heteronormative dominant happiness scripts presented to Egyptian women (Ahmed, 2010). In thinking of internationalisation as a site of affective assemblage and gendered performativity, I intend to highlight the antagonisms, contentions, possibilities, disruptions and interpellations participants made during their journeys as “turning around as keeping open the possibility of not returning to the same place, or not being affected quite as expected” (Butler cited in Ahmed, 2016:483). In doing so, I begin my analysis by drawing on Butler’s iterations of attachment to power in *The psychic life of power* (1997:9), in which she asserts that our attachments are impossible to break and by:

> Embrac[ing] the very form of power - regulation, prohibition, suppression - that threatens one with dissolution in an effort, precisely, to persist in one’s own existence.

Taking Butler’s point of view into consideration, this thesis will investigate the powerful attachments to internationalisation as happiness object and the negotiations, reconciliations and compromises participants made during their journeys for postgraduate education in the UK. Interrogating the affective assemblages of Egyptian women postgraduates’ journeys requires a critical examination of gender in intersectional association to social class, age, race, religion, disability, and nationality. Risman (2004:443) emphasises the importance of understanding gender in context rather than the abstract construct, saying:

> We cannot study gender in isolation from other inequalities, nor can we only study inequalities intersection and ignore the historical and contextual specific that distinguishes the mechanisms that produce inequality by different categorical decisions, whether gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, or class.

This thesis takes an intersectional approach as an integral part to its theoretical and methodological frameworks that guide its design, development, and analysis. Since Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) coined the term intersectionality, it gained “citational ubiquity” across academic circles and more specifically
in gender and feminist studies (Wiegman, 2012:240). In recent years, intersectionality in feminist and gender studies has become normalised in that “everyone does intersectional work” (Cooper, 2015:385). The use of the term intersectionality in sociology drew several critiques for “its alleged epistemological and identarian investments” (Cooper, 2015:391). McCall (2005) questions the rising stardom of intersectionality in sociology and highlighted some of its methodological limitations. Nash (2008:4) calls for rethinking intersectionality by exposing its underlying essentialism and called for transformative and collective scholarly efforts to “craft nuanced theories of identity and oppression,” and “grapple with the messiness of subjectivity.” Queer feminist theorists highlight some of the theoretical and methodological limitations to the use of the term. Puar (2005:128) asserts that:

Intersectionality demands the knowing, naming, and thus stabilising of identity across space and time, generating narratives of progress that deny the fictive and performative of identification: you become an identity, yes, but also timelessness works to consolidate the fiction of a seamless stable identity in every space.

The critical epistemological and theoretical limitations of deploying intersectionality in this research lie in its “unrelenting epistemological will to truth” and its ambivalence to “attune to intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities, textures as they inhabit events, spatiality, and corporealities” (Puar, 2005:128). Connell (2015:76) asserts that “to understand gender, we must constantly go beyond gender since gender relations are a major component of social structure as a whole.” Against this theoretical backdrop, the overarching objective of this thesis is to think of queerer ways to destabilise fixed notions of gender in internationalisation and its affective structures (Schilt et al., 2018). Puar (2005:128) contends “that intersectionality privileges naming, visuality, epistemology, representation, and meaning, while assemblage underscores feeling, tactility, ontology, affect, and information.” In recognizing both its theoretical benefits and limitations, this thesis will weave together feminist iterations of intersectionality and queer notions of assemblage in its design and analysis. It will benefit from weaving together these multiple theoretical threads to capture the multiplicities, complexities and idiosyncrasies of identities, subjectivities and meaning making, as well as the affective intensity of feelings, emotions, and anxieties among participants during their journeys.
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

The intellectual beginnings of framing the central research questions of this thesis were primarily influenced by the works of Egyptian feminist writer Nawal El Saadawi on the happiness scripts (i.e., marriage and motherhood) that are presented to women in Egypt from an early age (El Saadawi, 1982, 1995; El Saadawi and Newson-Horst, 2010). In *My Travels Around the World*, El Saadawi’s (1992) brilliant account of her travels reveals the choices, sacrifices, and challenges she faced in reconciling between her desire for mobility and the gendered heteronormative social expectations of women in Egypt to become wives and mothers. Her travels put her in direct confrontation with the patriarchal regime in Egypt and its heteronormative ideology of female domesticity. Even after changes and amendments in the law concerning women’s rights for mobility, Egyptian women still face tremendous barriers and social condemnation to follow their dreams and aspirations for international mobility (Tadros, 2019). Egyptian women, who seek to pursue postgraduate education abroad, are often at crossroads between demands of the global neoliberal knowledge economy and its happiness promise of ‘move or perish’ (Steunenberg, 2007; Morley et al., 2018), and social pressures to settling in by getting married and having children.

The central aim of this thesis is to interrogate several aspects of the dominant happiness scripts presented to Egyptian women postgraduates and the complexities of their decision for international mobility. To this end, this thesis's theoretical, methodological, and analytical approaches are guided by queer, feminist research traditions to answer the overarching research question: **How can we understand the complexities of international mobility for Egyptian women postgraduates?**

From the central question, this thesis will seek to address the following research sub-questions:

1. What made international mobility possible for Egyptian women postgraduates?
2. What social expectations framed their trajectories of international mobility and What were the affective modalities of these trajectories?
To answer these key research questions, this thesis relies on two critical theoretical frameworks that will underpin understanding the affective structures and assemblages of Egyptian women’s journeys for postgraduate education in the UK. The first theoretical framework will draw on Ahmed’s (2010) *The Promises of Happiness* which provides essential critiques of the dominant happiness scripts and its affective biopolitics of discipline, conformity, and normativity. Ahmed (2010:8) asserts that promises of happiness are “disciplinary techniques” with their own dominant scripts. In Ahmed’s (2010:1) view, “happiness is consistently described as the object of human desire, as being what we aim for, as being what gives purpose, meaning and order to human life.” While Ahmed gives a historical account of the dominant happiness scripts, I find her interrogating the dominant scripts of happiness under neoliberal ideologies to be most compelling and valuable to the overarching objective of this thesis.

Following Ahmed’s critical and close examination of the dominant discourses through which happiness is measured, located, commodified, and embodied in specific happy objects and scripts, this thesis aims to attend closely to affective modalities as these supposedly happiness objects become sticky and unattainable. Moreover, in her analysis, Ahmed offers four critical figures of happiness aliens: the feminist killjoy, the unhappy queer, the melancholic migrant, and the radical revolutionary, who rebel and resist the happiness scripts. I find Ahmed’s four figures to be extremely useful in articulating the theoretical and methodological underpinnings and complexities of participants’ narratives. By expanding on Ahmed’s iterations and figures, I aim to demonstrate participants’ meaning-making of internationalisation as happiness discourse and the sacrifices they made to attain it as they cross-temporal and spatial borders.

While Ahmed’s account of the promises of happiness offers an extensive analysis of the dominant happiness discourses, one pressing question that needs to be asked, however, is why do individuals remain faithful to attain these happy objects? As Tokka’s story - earlier in the chapter - shows the attachments to happiness objects are imagined elsewhere, more specifically in the Global North (Europe) and embodied in specific objects.
Therefore, the second theoretical framework that underpins this thesis and complements Ahmed’s work is Berlant’s (2011:1) notion of Cruel Optimism, which by definition means:

A relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing. [sic] They become cruel only when the object that draws your attachment actively impedes the aim that brought you to it initially.

Berlant (2011:2) explains cruel optimism as “a stubborn, passionate, and irrational belief in the prospect of change that’s gonna come.” Berlant’s (2011:170) brilliant elaboration to the affective modalities of these attachments to happiness objects lie in the investment in specific notions of the good life “that does not have to keep being reinvented,” and in which individuals are compelled to “remain faithful to specific fantasies of satisfaction even after they have repeatedly disappointed us.”

Taking together, these theoretical frameworks will illuminate my efforts in understanding the complexities of the international mobility decisions and the rationale among participants to mobilise social and cultural capital in order to enable their decisions of international mobility for postgraduate education. Furthermore, by understanding internationalisation as a site of class privileges, fantasies, and anxieties, this thesis will interrogate its structures, patterns, and dynamics (Morley et al., 2018). It will begin by a historical account to Egypt’s efforts of internationalisation in chapter two and three and will provide a gender-specific analysis in chapter four. It will then move to a comprehensive approach of analysis in the findings chapters six, seven and eight to answer the overarching research questions and provide more evidence on how gender intersects with social class, history of mobility, race, type of education, marital status and geographical location in framing the trajectories of Egyptian women postgraduates for international mobility and its affective modalities.

1.4 MY POINT OF ARRIVAL

In the north of Egypt, my hometown of Port Said has a unique way of celebrating the first day of Spring (ميسنلا ميش) each year. The tradition traces its roots to a time in history when Egypt was part of the British colonial empire. What remains unique about this ceremony is that it ties, enmeshes, and entangles our sense of identities, nationality and belonging. Each year, on the eve of the first day of Spring, citizens in my hometown parade through the streets carrying a stuffed figure resembling Lord
Allenby (Governor of Egypt from 1919 - 1925), which carries on into an all-night celebration. This tradition goes back to protests against Allenby’s draconian and humiliating laws during his governing period of Egypt. Allenby’s short-term rule of Egypt caused havoc across the country. Perhaps the most interesting fact is that the tradition has continued decades after Egypt’s independence. My childhood memories are full of vivid images of this tradition, from the making of the figure - one essential requirement is to choose torn and ragged clothes as a symbolic way to humiliate colonial rule - to the chanting and parading across alleys and streets. Colonial history has tied us together with an unbreakable umbilical cord that has shaped our identities and linked us to our colonial oppressors.

In the national imaginary, the construction of the British colonial figure is contradictory as “the father and the oppressor” (Bhabha, 2013:136). The UK has always occupied a place of reverence, admiration, and fear in the minds of Egyptians. The colonial ghosts never left us, and they have occupied our bodies, minds, and spaces. The shared history, contradictions, and dualities are what intrigued me and led me to investigate why participants choose the UK as a study destination and why it remains an object of desire. Neither postgraduate studies in the UK nor any elite formation were part of my family legacy, and neither one of my working-class parents is a university graduate. My siblings and I are first-generation university graduates who benefitted from the accessible public education offered in Egypt. Typically, the path among working-class families in Egypt is laid in a strict temporal order: graduation, employment, and marriage. Leaving the city to study somewhere else was never an option for me, let alone studying abroad. Those, like myself, who dared to choose and desire differently put themselves at huge risk of social condemnation, criticism and ostracisation. While studying abroad was a dream of mine, studying in the UK was beyond the periphery of these dreams. My first experience of postgraduate study abroad was in Germany where I was honoured to receive a fully funded scholarship for a master’s study programme. Over the past two decades, Germany expanded its efforts to recruit more international students as part of its internationalisation efforts and programme (Hahn, 2005; Deppe et al., 2018). In addition to covering the tuition and maintenance fees, the scholarship offered an intensive language course to learn German, another example of internationalisation as site of linguistic imperialism (Morley et al., 2020).
During my journey, I encountered many Egyptian scholars from different socio-economic backgrounds who came to Germany with set of aspirations, and expectations to study, mainly at the MA and PhD levels. In these encounters, I often heard stories similar to Tokka’s from Egyptian women who came to Germany for postgraduate studies and faced tremendous challenges to their mobility decisions. After graduation and during my work at the OECD, I learned more about the challenges facing women’s mobility in the MENA region and became acutely aware of the staggering gap in knowledge about Egyptian women postgraduates’ education abroad. These experiences planted the seeds of my curiosity. This curiosity was peaked after learning that despite the extensive research and policy documentation on the internationalisation of higher education and academic mobility, little is known about the international education experiences of Egyptian women postgraduates, either globally or in the UK. I was particularly keen to investigate the colonial ties and their impact on participants’ rationale, meaning making and subjectivities. Furthermore, to queer the happy narratives of internationalisation as site of fantasy and upward social mobility it is imperative to critically examine its history to grasp the affective assemblage of the present moment and how its future is imagined.

1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The overall structure of the thesis takes the form of nine chapters, including this introductory chapter. **Chapter two** begins by a brief historical account of specific moments of internationalisation discourse in Egypt’s higher education and the construction of Europe as a site of happiness and aspirations for imagined futures. It interrogates Egypt’s journey for building a modern nation and pays close attention to the state’s efforts to further women’s education as part of this project. The question of women’s education exemplifies the silences, tensions, antagonisms, and colonial power discourses embedded in internationalisation discourses and its stratifications on different levels of gender, class, nationality, religion, and race. Understanding the historical, political, and cultural backgrounds serves the purpose of this thesis to answer key research questions in the findings chapters (6, 7 & 8).
**Chapter three** examines internationalisation discourses in postcolonial times and explains Egypt’s affective attachment as cruel optimism. It looks closely at the postcolonial afterlives and Egypt’s ascension into the global scene after independence from colonialism. Most specifically, this chapter focuses on the efforts to nationalise its higher education, and the democratisation of its access. In doing so, it pays close and critical attention to the gendered and classed stratifications to these efforts. Moreover, the chapter addresses the introduction of neoliberal policies and its effects on the structure, mission, and development of Egypt’s higher education. Most notably, it highlights the gendered impact of neoliberalism on women’s access to education and public life. Grasping the extent of this issue provides a contextual background for the rationale for postgraduate studies abroad and the affective assemblage of the shifting landscape of Egypt’s higher education under neoliberal ideologies.

**Chapter four** investigates the conflicting and competing discourses and their dominant scripts of happiness for women in Egypt. It begins with analysis of women’s current share in higher education and the challenges they face during their journeys of postgraduate studies. It then moves to the marriage question and its promises of happiness. It concludes with discussion on mobility as a happiness discourse for women in academia and interrogates the colonial attachment to UK’s higher education as an object of desire. These discussions introduce the three overarching themes that are central to the analyses I present in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

**Chapter five** lays out the theoretical and methodological approaches for this thesis. It offers my reflections in response to inquiries on my positionality and my own experience in the field. My reflections and theorisations draw on concepts from queer feminists and postcolonial feminists. These reflections guide the structure of this chapter as they inform the rationale of the research design, the selection of research methods and data collection, analysis, and presentation.

**Chapter six** responds to the first research sub-question and focuses on how social class positionalities are implicated in the decision for mobility. At the outset, this thesis draws its understanding of social class from Bourdieu’s works (1990, 1997, 2002). By presenting participants’ narratives, I aim to queer notions of social class in relations to gender, age, history of mobility, type of education and funding. Moreover, the analysis of this chapter addresses the rationale and direction of mobility as it relates to
the enduring strength of colonial legacies that continue to frame the imaginary constructions of UK. Building on the historical account of colonial education as a signifier of value, prestige, and upward social mobility (see Chapter 2), this chapter gives more evidence on the degree to which these constructions continue to frame the directions of mobility among Egyptian women postgraduates today.

**Chapter seven** responds to the second research sub-question on the social expectations that frame the mobility trajectories of Egyptian women postgraduates and demonstrate by robust evidence the affective intensities of their mobility trajectories. It specifically investigates the journeys of unmarried participants as they negotiate their decisions for outward mobility. The analysis of this chapter looks into the tenacity of compulsory coupledom (i.e., marriage) and the degree it remains the measuring stick against which the value of women’s postgraduate education and their social membership is constantly evaluated and measured.

**Chapter eight** extends the response to the second research sub-question and explores the gendered social expectations that fall on the shoulders of married women postgraduates by focusing more particularly on motherhood, marriage, and mobility. It looks into the types and levels of negotiations, scarifies and challenges faced by married women during their journeys. This chapter specifically interrogates the pressures married participants face in keeping the family together and the family life as a site of renunciation of desire, shrinking, sacrifices, and shame. So far, there has been little to no attention to these questions and avenues of interrogation, and much uncertainty still exists on the trajectories and journeys of married Egyptian women postgraduates into and out the UK.

**The final chapter** draws upon the entire thesis, tying up the various theoretical, methodological, and empirical strands together. It gives a summary of answers to research questions and provides a space to reflect on the limitations of the study. Moreover, it points out future directions for research on gender and internationalisation in higher education. It concludes with final thoughts on the future of internationalisation in the post-COVID-19 topography of higher education.
Egypt is a marvellous instance of progress. She has advanced as much in seventy years as other countries in five hundred.

- The London Times, January 6, 1876 (cited in Ronall, 1968:61)

Much of what has been written on internationalisation in higher education suggest that internationalisation is a response to globalisation (Collins, 2009) and the growing interest of its most visible mechanism: mobility intensified over the past three decades as a result of pressures of the neoliberal knowledge economy (Brooks and Waters, 2011). The history of Egypt’s efforts to internationalise its higher education queer these taken-for-granted assumptions, notions, and temporalities. Internationalisation of Egypt’s higher education was an integral part of its project to build a modern nation that began in the early nineteenth century, and its efforts to achieve it are still being pursued today. The overall objective of this chapter is to give a brief historical account of internationalisation in Egypt’s higher education and to demonstrate the construction of ‘Europe’ or the ‘West’ as a ‘happy place’ in Egyptian imaginaries.

This chapter consists of five parts and covers two critical phases of Egypt’s internationalisation discourse: defensive developmentalism (1805 - 1880) and colonial capitalism (1882 - 1936). In the first part, I will begin by tracing the roots of internationalisation discourses and Egypt’s efforts to build modern nation after the devastation left by the French colonisation (1798 - 1801). I will pay close attention to the expansion of higher education in Egypt and its impact on women’s access to education. The second part will investigate the influence of embracing modern/western knowledge and the introduction of heteronormative ideologies in Egypt. The third part will discuss Egypt’s entry into the global market economy following the cotton boom and the impact on gender, race, and class relations. The fourth part will interrogate the British colonisation in Egypt and its promises of happiness. Understanding the colonial history provides a substantial contextual background to the construction of the UK in Egyptian imaginaries. This chapter will conclude with insights on the early efforts of the Egyptian women’s movement and their success by gaining entry for women to the university.
2.1 KNOCKING ON MODERNITY’S DOOR

Even though the French colonisation in Egypt lasted for a brief period, it left the country in devastating chaos and colonial power struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the burgeoning ambitions of the British empire in the Mediterranean region (Rogan, 2012). Internally, the national discourse in Egypt was cramped with ‘civilisation anxieties’ (Massad, 2007:51), and the defeat at the hands of western power left the country in a state of shame and humiliation. Egypt entered of what can described as a state of temporal and spatial impasse which Berlant defines as “a time of dithering from which someone or some situation cannot move forward” (Berlant, 2011:4). Egypt’s aspirations for building a modern nation were nothing short of imitating the European model and its colonial aspirations in the region. These aspirations required a shift in its gaze towards Europe and massive investments in its human capital and resources. While these investments and sacrifices were justified for the change they were hoped to bring, they were also the source of anxieties, fears, and failures.

That affective state of this impasse meant that Egypt found itself in a sticky situation then, tied by shackles of the past while imagining aspirations for the future. On the one hand, Egypt’s shared culture and history tied it to the Ottoman empire, and on the other hand, its aspirations for the future brought the country closer to western colonial powers (i.e., France and Britain). Building a ‘modern’ nation was Egypt’s way to cope with the loss and to break from spatial and temporal impasse. By directing its gaze to parts of Europe as imagined futures, Egypt’s history opened a new chapter primarily marked with tensions, complexities, sacrifices and aspirations. As such, the analysis of this chapter will draw on concepts from postcolonial theories (Bhabha, 1984; Said, 2003), postcolonial feminist theories (El Saadawi, 1982, 1982; Heng et al., 1997) and queer feminist theories (Sedgwick, 2008; Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011).

2.1.1 LIAISONS DANGEREUSES

After the ascension of the Albanian-born Muhammed Ali Pasha (1805 - 1848) to power, Egypt embarked on a state of defensive developmentalism (Jakes and Shokr, 2020) that entailed comprehensive socio-economic transformation plans to build a modern nation (Piwowarski, 2020).
The vision of Muhammed Ali Pasha of building a modern nation was characterised by internal expansion through reforms in three main sectors: education, military and economy, and external expansion by colonising parts of the Levant and the Sudan territories (Powell, 2003). Similar to its colonisers, Egypt viewed colonisation as a happiness project and geared its resources to achieve colonial dominations in the region. Six years into power, between 1811-1814, military campaigns were successful in curbing the growing influence of Wahabi’s movement and annexing the Hijaz route around the Red Sea area (Rogan, 2012). By 1820, a successful military campaign southward conquered Sudan, thus growing Egypt’s influence in the region as a newly emerging colonial power (Powell, 2003). Egypt’s colonial ambitions required ferocious socio-economic reforms to develop necessary human resources and to finance the growing military forces. The internationalisation efforts of higher education and subsequently the expansion of the education sector was crucial for achieving these goals.

Influenced by the successful French model *levé en masse* of mass citizen conscription into military services, Muhammed Ali Pasha introduced a new model *Nizam-I Cedid* - which was a hybridised version of the existing Ottoman model and the French model - to recruit Egyptians into military service under the command of French military experts (Rogan, 2012). The mandatory conscription of Egyptians into military services brought several challenges such as a) resistance from Egyptians to the mandatory conscription, which was draining the country’s agriculture sector of its human resources (Tucker, 1979) and; b) shortage of skilled soldiers familiar with modern concepts of war (Cochran, 2012) and c) the sufficient funds to finance mass conscription (Rogan, 2012). It shall be noted that in the pre-modern era, Egyptians were prohibited from serving in the military and the divisions of Egypt’s social structure were marked horizontally by ethnicity between the Turks Mamluk who were trained to rule (*Amir*) and the Egyptians who were working as farmers and only few were trained to become theologians (*Ulama*), and vertically across religions between Muslims, Christians, and Jews (Cochran, 2012; Richmond, 2012). Religious education in Egypt was the only form of education available then, and the fear of mandatory conscription made Egyptians afraid to send their kids to learn reading and writing (Williamson, 1987). Moreover, the lack of experience and their agrarian
background did not prepare Egyptians to serve in the military or to understand secular concepts of science and the use of modern weapons (Cochran, 2012). To mitigate these barriers, the state relied on two crucial mechanisms; a) the recruitment of foreign experts in key leadership positions across different branches of the government and who were responsible for leading plans of reforms (Ronall, 1968), b) the institutionalisation of study missions by selecting graduates from Al-Azhar Mosque University, public servants and military officers to travel on training missions to parts of Europe (i.e., France and Britain) to learn concepts of modern science, law and techniques of war (Williamson, 1987; Rogan, 2012). Upon their return to Egypt, they were entrusted with running command posts in the military and a translation bureau to publish European books and technical manuals in Arabic (Rogan, 2012).

The scientific renaissance as a result of the intellectual encounters with parts of Europe kicked off an *epistemicide* discourse and its predatory and hegemonic processes rendered western and modern knowledge valuable over other forms of knowledge (De Sousa Santos, 2005; Bennett, 2007). The scholars trained in Europe were promoted to higher ranks across different departments of the state and were responsible for overseeing Egypt’s plans for modernising its education sector, among others (Al-Sayyad, 2019). Integral to these plans were efforts to internationalise Egypt’s higher education by introducing alternative education (i.e., secular education and vocational training) beside religious education (Cochran, 2012). These efforts included establishing a school of accounting (1826), an engineering school (1829), a midwifery school for women (1832), and an administration school (1834) (Bill, 1974; Sonbol, 1991). The efforts were challenged by the lack in supply of students recruits and the transition from religious education to secular education (Cochran, 2012; Ead, 2019). In order to mitigate these challenges, the state introduced secular education at primary and secondary levels, thus enacting a process of internationalisation on all levels of education (Cochran, 2012).

### 2.1.2 THE CURIOUS CASE OF EGYPTIAN HAKIMAHS

The internationalisation of higher education brought an unprecedented opportunity for women’s access to education in Egypt. As historical evidence suggests, most of the pre-colonial education across
the Middle East and South Asia was permeated by religion, and educational institutions were also places of worship where women were not allowed to enter and share these spaces with men (Langohr, 2005). For instance, Al-Azhar Mosque University (established in 969) first opened its doors to women in 1962, almost a millennium since its establishment (Britannica, n.d.). However, an important -and often overlooked- achievement for women’s education was born out of Egypt’s earlier efforts to internationalise its higher education: the establishment of the midwifery school for women in 1832. The school’s story shows a mixture of circumstances that presented women in Egypt with unprecedented access to higher education and in the field of medicine, no less.

On the advice of French physician Clot-Bey, Muhammed Ali Pasha sponsored the establishment of the school to train women as health officers (hakimah in Arabic) to tackle the problem of underpopulation due to high infant mortality and mandatory military conscriptions (Kuhnke, 1992). It is worth remembering that Egypt’s most prominent structure for social arrangements during this period was the harem and slavery system. In principle, the system was put in place to regulate women’s bodies, sexualities, and access to public spaces (Kozma, 2011) and as a critical apparatus for elite reproduction (Baron, 1994, 2005). The Ottoman elite household relied on the system to reproduce itself in “differentiation from other social groups (Egyptians, Sudanese, Abyssinian)” and Circassians female slaves “served as a linchpin in the elite social system” and to keep “the ethnic identity of the ruling elites intact” (Baron, 2005:20).

The high mortality rate threatened the elite reproduction and visions for colonial domination in the region, especially after the human resources from Sudanese and Egyptian recruits from Upper Egypt started to dry up (Tucker, 1979). The need for trained female health officers (hakimahs) queered the national discourse that tended to hold views against women’s education. However, the plans for the school were hampered by a few challenges that highlight some of the historical complexities, tensions, and anxieties towards women’s education in Egypt. The key obstacle was finding female recruits to be trained at the school (Kuhnke, 1992). To fulfil its supply of students, the state needed a novel approach to negotiate access to women beyond the gates of the harem. Recognising the power structure inside the harem and anticipating social resistance from the elite, the French physician Clot-
Bey successfully convinced Muhammed Ali Pasha to recruit young slave Sudanese and Abyssinian girls as first recruits in the midwifery school (Kuhnke, 1992). His wish was granted, and the first group of female student recruits were composed of “eight Sudanese and Abyssinian girls, a pair of eunuchs from the palace harem to act as guards, a third eunuch to watch the first two, and a shaykh of mature age to teach the women reading and writing” (Kuhnke, 1992:123). While this move was effective in supplying the school with its needs of students recruits with minimal disruption to the dynamics of the harem, it failed to abate the social scrutiny and suspicion to its mission. The project succeeded at first in producing a group of female medical officers who occupied several positions across different government functions and:

Within two years, the students were literate in Arabic, and acquired the knowledge and techniques of dressing wounds, scarification, and cupping, and mastered the theory in a basic manual of obstetrics (Kuhnke, 1992:124).

Beyond their functions in the military, the female health officers (hakimahs) became highly crucial to the state by serving in police stations to conduct medical checks on female slaves, especially runaway slaves, to ensure their hymens were intact (Kozma, 2011). Despite its success and the demonstration of its value to the state, the midwifery school remained a subject of public scrutiny, social panic and anxieties, especially as it concerned the lives of female recruits after graduation (Kuhnke, 1992).

Technically speaking, Hakimah’s were free from slavery on account of their level of education and their appointments as public servants. The notion of autonomous and independent Egyptian women inflamed the public debates and renewed sentiments of hostilities towards the school's mission. In particular, the question of marriage and graduates' future concerned the public the most. To assuage the heightened panic among the public, the state expanded its power and assumed an unprecedented role as a matchmaker. Kuhnke (1992:126) traces the government correspondences to show that:

In 1844, the director of the School of Medicine was ordered to submit the names of appropriate spouses among the male medical officers of Cairo for prospective graduates from the hakimahs’ school. The purpose of marrying off these women students to students at the School of Medicine is to enable both of them to practice their sciences together so that the government would benefit from that practice.

The story demonstrates the pioneering positions of Egyptian women in the medicine profession and highlights some of the tensions and complexities of their access to higher education which remain
relevant today. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that the midwifery school set a precedent for women’s access to higher education in Egypt despite the social and institutional barriers. Such important historical evidence queers the global discourse on women’s access to Science, Technology, Engineering and Medicine (STEM) disciplines and highlights the pioneering positionalities of Egyptian women in these fields. Furthermore, it highlights the impact of internationalization efforts in Egypt and the introduction of western and modern notions of time and temporalities (Savransky, 2013). These notions of temporalities emphasized heteronormative ideologies that will shape women’s trajectories in and out higher education to this day (see Chapter Four).

Moreover, by assuming the role of the matchmaker, the state expanded its authority by deploying “specific techniques of power that regards individuals as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault, 1979:170). In taking responsibility for graduates’ (female and male) marital futures as part of its mission, the state, at the advice of European experts, introduced new forms of governmentality in Egypt through normalising a particular kind of rationality: compulsory heterosexuality. In addition to this, there seems to emerge a strong association between the kind of modern and western education offered to women (the midwifery school) and the imagined reproductive heterofuturity of knowledge production and social relations in Egypt (Edelman, 2007). Finally, it highlights the impact of embracing western knowledge on steering gradual shift in Egypt towards the heteronormative nuclear family (Hatab, 1970). By agreeing to take charge of women’s futures after graduation, the State’s intervention set in motion gears of heteronormativity at times primarily characterised with sexual diversity, fluidity, ambiguity and queerness (El-Rouayheb, 2005; Massad, 2007; Habib, 2010; Kugle, 2010).

2.2 THE LOSS OF INNOCENCE

As discussed in the previous section, Egypt’s aspiration to build a modern nation by adopting modern knowledge and the growing foreign interference in its national affairs set the country on a path towards embracing heteronormative ideology. The discourse of heteronormativity relied on three crucial mechanisms, a) the statement of the law (Foucault, 1979), b) the queer erasures through
operations of taboos and shame (Butler, 1997); and c) the introduction of binarized categories (homo/hetero) (Sedgwick, 2008). A good starting point to this discussion is to turn to Berlant and Warners’ (1998:548) definition of heteronormativity as:

The institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent – that is, organised as sexuality – but also privileged.

Accordingly, it is imperative to first begin by interrogating Egypt’s most prominent social structure during this period: the harem system. In doing so, my efforts will not only aim to subject its orientalist depictions to critical examination but will do more than that in terms of trying to understand the impact of translation as an erasure apparatus to the colonial project.

### 2.2.1 INSIDE THE QUEER HAREM

In principle, the harem systems in Egypt served as vital instruments for elite reproduction and differentiation between the Ottoman Turks and other groups in the Egyptian society (Baron, 1994, 2005). That should not necessarily be understood that lives and social bonds inside the harem system were exclusively heterosexual or followed a strict heteronormative order. Granted, there are several limitations to our knowledge of women’s experiences and lives inside the harem system in Egypt since most of their histories have “been suppressed from the collective Egyptian memory along with the Ottoman past” (Baron, 2005:20). Furthermore, most narratives of lives inside the harem were the product of the invasive and colonising orientalists male gaze (Said, 2003). As such, these depictions portrayed distorted versions of Egyptian women’s lives from inside the harem and relied to a large extent on a mix of wild imaginations and pornographic fantasies (Roberts, 2007). The works of orientalists in paintings and writings evoked images of subjugated femininity and lives spent in confinement, captivity, and lack of agency (Herath, 2016). Surely, these depictions were a form of asserting hetero masculinist and colonial domination as a form of exercising power. Said (2003:6) reminds us of French writer Flaubert’s authoritative tone in his letters during his visit to Egypt:

He spoke for and represented her. He was foreign, comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him not only to
possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell his readers in what way she was typically Oriental.

Few studies attempted to counter these orientalist depictions and assert that women demonstrated agency by their ability to control the depictions of their private spaces (Herath, 2016). In *Intimate Outsiders*, Roberts (2007) dives into the archives to enumerate the limitations to male orientalists’ accounts on lives inside the harem and their depictions in the literary works, paintings, and travelogues. She invokes the example of orientalist painter John Frederick Lewis whose paintings gained scholastic notoriety on women’s lives inside the harem, despite “the actual limits of his insider knowledge” (Roberts, 2007:19). By critically examining the works of British women travelogues, she contends that, they had better access to the harem spaces than men on the virtue of shared gender, an advantage that gave them an insider knowledge and enriched their writings with more nuanced portrays of lives from inside the harem (Roberts, 2007). This is not to suggest that representing the harem from the view of orientalist female artists was free from inscribing orientalists gendered and raced misconceptions and stereotypes, on the contrary, they were also the product -to some extent - of certain orientalist fantasies (Kuehn, 2011; McDaniel, 2014). However, their efforts are to be applauded for bringing complementary views that capture -to some extent- the fluidity, multiplicity, and richness of lives inside the harem.

Nonetheless, there was a shred commonality between the two and that is the tendency to portray lives inside the harem in a realm of exclusive heterosexuality and ignoring the sexual diversity inside these spaces and the homosocial bonds among women (Penrose, 2001). Robust evidence shows transgressive acts of love between “the royal women of the harems” who “developed what scholars call gendered homosexual relations with the female attendants who acted as their bodyguards, or even among themselves” (Penrose, 2001:23). The study further demonstrates that notions of intimacy, sexuality and gender identity queered the narratives of exclusive heteronormativity. Despite these pieces of evidence, the erasure of women’s history of sexuality was part of the deliberate queer disappearance from the archives in studies coming from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (Habib, 2012).
2.2.2 LOST IN TRANSLATION

The deliberate queer erasure began at the hands of orientalist scholars of the 16th and 17th centuries whose homophobic tenets portrayed Arabs as “deviant, sexually promiscuous, aberrant, hot-tempered and lascivious”, and African women as “libidinous... monkeys” (Kapoor, 2015:1614). The study missions to Europe as part of its internationalisation efforts exacerbated Egypt’s awareness of its queerness and feelings of shame and failure. For instance, the 19th-century Egyptian scholar Rifa’a al-Tahtawi wrote upon his return to Egypt after spending five years in a study mission in France:

Amongst the laudable traits of their [European] character is they are not being inclined toward loving male youth and eulogising them in poetry, for this is something unmentionable for them and contrary to their nature and morals [...] Therefore if one of them [European] translates one of our books he avoids this by saying in the translation: I loved a young female or a person (cited in El-Rouayheb, 2005:2)

Reading into al-Tahtawi’s praise of the (exclusively heterosexual) European character exemplifies how, in the eyes of the Egyptian intellectual elites, both proximity to whiteness and heterosexuality was regarded as ‘happiness objects’ (Ahmed, 2010) and shaped their understanding of what counts as modern and progressive. In his own words, it is evident that same-sex love and homoeroticism permeated Arabic art and literature. A prominent example is the The Neck Ring of the Dove, by Ibn Hazm, a well-established Muslim scholar, who “professed that much of the best poetry written by Muslims was homoerotic and recognised it as a beautiful expression of love” (Kugle, 2010:28). Such transgressive acts of love and same-sex intimacy were culturally acceptable and legally permissible.

Under the Ottoman Empire’s law code Tanizmat, queer intimacy and sexual diversity were permissible across the region, and there is strong historical evidence to support its existence in various parts of the region (El-Rouayheb, 2005; Massad, 2007; Kugle, 2010). Building on Foucault’s (1979,1982) interrogation of the history of sexuality, subjectivity and power, Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet (2008) examined the strong links of embracing western and modern knowledge in the introduction of binarized categories (homo/hetero) and queer erasure.

Sedgwick argued that the emergence of binaries such as hetero/homo intertwined with other binaries such as knowledge/ignorance and was instrumental in asserting colonial dominance in both
knowledge and practice. This is evident in al-Tahtawi’s views, who relied in his condemnation of the sexual diversity and queerness of his era on his experience of studying abroad and international education. Moreover, his words show the heterocolonial dominance of modern knowledge and its hegemonic practices of erasure such as translation. Several studies noted that translation was one of modernity’s most effective instruments for queer disappearance and invisibilising of queer bodies, identities and desires (Massad, 2007; Habib, 2010, 2012; Mikdashi, 2013). Vázquez (2011:27) interrogates the power of translation as an erasure apparatus and argues that:

This operation of translation renders invisible everything that does not fit in the parameters of legibility of modernity’s epistemic territory. Modernity’s epistemic territory designates both the realm where the discourses of modernity thrive and their very horizon of intelligibility. Translation brings to view the epistemic borders where a politics of visibility is at play between erasure and visibility, disdain and recognition.

Egypt’s queer phenomenology rendered it constantly failing to align to the strict heteronormative logic of modern knowledge and its binarised gendered notions in organising social structure and relations (Ahmed, 2006). The logic of censorship and erasure engendered discourses of prohibitions, restrictions and taboos that continued to govern the knowledge production on gender and sexualities in Egypt today (El-Feki, 2014).

After establishing Egypt’s first press Bulaq Press and publishing its first book in 1822, Egypt entered a state of a literary renaissance (Verdery, 1971). While the motives for establishing the printing press were to serve the needs of the military in printing manuals and manuscripts, its use expanded -thanks to the efforts of Egyptian intellectuals such as al-Tahtawi- to the preservation of various monuments of Arabic literature and to publish books in Arabic (Verdery, 1971). Massad (2007:50) contends that efforts by Arab intellectuals to restore history were carried out through re-construction of Arab identity and disavowing all forms of queerness. Habib’s *Female Homosexuality in the Middle East: Histories and Representations* (2007) comprehensively traces the erasures, silences, and disappearances of queer women from the Middle East archives by providing multiple shreds of evidence of visible female homosexual relations across different eras and centuries starting from the ninth century.
It is an essential contribution to a neglected history of female sexuality in the region and illustrates the epistemic silences of the Arab queer archives. Concerning the scope of this thesis, my goal of invoking these examples was not to engage in debates of essentialist versus social constructionist theorists of homosexual relationships in the Arab and Muslim world (El-Rouayheb, 2005). My objective of invoking examples from the Arab queer archives was to disrupt the silences, erasures and disappearances embedded in Egypt’s internationalisation discourse and its normative power structures.

2.3 WHITE GOLD, BLACK HANDS

The boom of Egyptian cotton crop industry is of monumental significance to Egypt’s efforts for modern nation-building and internationalising its higher education. The story of cotton began in the nineteenth century, and the emergence of the cotton plantations economy led to profound changes in Egypt’s social class structures, hierarchies and relations (Abaza, 2013). It is a story about the ethos of capitalism, colonial power, and class. Before the exploitation of cotton, Egypt’s primary revenue was through grain exports as the breadbasket for the Ottoman Empire and certain parts of (colonising) Europe (Rogan, 2012; Ajl et al., 2020). The discovery of cotton was Egypt’s golden ticket to enter the global market and establish its position against fierce competition from the US and its cheap and slave-grown cotton productivity (Saleh, 2017).

As a result, Egypt was on a fast track of industrialization, and even though it remains as agriculture society, the State began to shift its socio-economic direction from an economy that was overly reliant on grains exports to cotton exports and trade (Abaza, 2013). The state continued to introduce comprehensive financial reforms to encourage the growing cotton-crop industry by granting tax relief to landowners and permitting foreign investments to cotton crops industry (Jakes and Shokr, 2020). The cotton industry in Egypt transformed its gender regimes, class structure and race relations. In this part, I will discuss the intensified desire to embrace modern knowledge and the European lifestyle after the cotton boom.
2.3.1 THE RUSH OF WHITE GOLD

Perhaps the most significant outcomes of Egypt’s entry to the global market following the boom in the cotton industry can be summed as follows a) increased attractiveness in the eyes of the British empire and its colonial interests in the region, b) the introduction of new forms of labour (slavery) and c) the emergence of a new order to its social structure (the Egyptian bourgeoisie). After the disruption of cotton production in the US due to the American Civil War between 1861-1865, British mills put tremendous pressure on Egypt to increase its cotton production (Abaza, 2013; Saleh, 2017; Ajl et al., 2020). With production being halted from its main competitor (the U.S.), Egypt fast became a rising star in the global market, and its fame brought lucrative socio-economic dividends and pressures to meet the needs of the global market. In order to capitalise on the newfound fame, Egypt began a nationwide reform program of private land ownership (Iqta’a = feudalism), with the sole objective of increasing cotton production and exports (Abaza, 2013). Nonetheless, the concentration of land ownership remained in the hands of the monarchy (Muhammed Ali Pasha’s family), and the rest was divided among rural notables (Jakes and Shokr, 2020). The new orders of land distribution led to the emergence of a new social strata, and massive gaps between the ‘Egyptian Bourgeoisie’ on the one hand and peasants on the other hand (Abaza, 2013). Egypt continued its socio-economic transformations for global integration by signing an agreement with foreign investors for rights to build the Suez Canal and seeking financial support from Europe (Ajl et al., 2020).

Even though Egypt may have shown some resistance to the British pressures to increase cotton production to compensate for the loss due to the Civil War in the U.S., limited but compelling evidence suggests there was an increase in cotton production during this period, as shown by increased slave labour (Baer, 1967). Saleh (2017) contends that before the cotton boom, the Egyptian slavery system was exclusively feminised, and the male slavery system was (almost) non-existent. Relying on archival evidence, he points out the increase in the number of male slaves of working age in cotton districts asserting that they were indeed employed in agriculture. His analysis shows how the boom in cotton productivity was bound up with the growth of the slave trade in Egypt (Saleh, 2017). Following these developments, the village community began to transform drastically after the emergence of large
estates (Izba’s) and its new forms of labour (slavery). Abaza (2013) narrates life inside the cotton plantation of two worlds: the landowners (upper-middle class Egyptian bourgeoisie) and the poverty-stricken peasants and slaves who worked in the cotton plantations and led completely different lives to their owners. While little is known about the lives of slaves inside the cotton plantations, the lives of the upper-middle-class Egyptian bourgeoisie thrived during this period. To carve their space in Egypt’s new social class hierarchy, they embraced ‘Europeanization’ in culture and mannerism (Abaza, 2013:105). Although there is no substantial evidence to confirm the time of its emergence in the Egyptian-Arabic lexicon, various studies suggest that the term ‘uqdit al-Khawaja’ (عَدْةُ الخِرَاجة), which translates to ‘foreigner complex’ and often refers to the ideology of placing exclusive value in everything western/European, may have emerged during this period (El-Feki, 2014:30). Education, particularly international private language education, was considered an integral part of their efforts to assert their class positionalities. Abaza observes (2013:11):

The adoption of European lifestyles, entailing the introduction of European furniture and salons, the spread of European apparel, and the preference for speaking French, English, Italian, German, or Greek instead of Arabic, became one of the significant shifts of the Egyptian haute bourgeoisie, which shared quite a few characteristics with the communities of Greeks, Italians, Jews, Belgians, British, and French who lived in Egypt.

The growing demand for language education led to significant growth in private foreign language education in Egypt and opened opportunities for girls to receive education. For example, the first foreign language school for girls in Egypt was opened by an American missionary in 1856, followed in 1873 by the first Egyptian school for girls, founded by Tcheshme-Afet, the third wife of Ismail Pasha (Cochran, 2012). There were also notable efforts from the State to improve the conditions of education in Egypt. Under Ismail Pasha’s ruling, a decree of mandatory literacy in 1867 was introduced and required that within 18 years, all members of the legislative council should be able to read and write and members of the electorate should achieve literacy within 30 years (Cochran, 2012). Furthermore, the state renewed its commitment to support the establishment and growth of foreign education schools (Sedra, 2011). These efforts yielded some positive outcomes; by 1883, there were 60 students in an Arabic teacher training school (دار العلوم), 300 girls in female schools (albeit from elite backgrounds), and 48,664 students in foreign or language schools (Krapp, 1999:74). The notable
progress in the state of education should not mask that education remained an exclusive right to the elites, strict sex segregation was in place across different educational settings, and the curriculum offered to girls focused on heteronormative gender roles (Cochran, 2012). Despite their tireless efforts emulati... and differences (Bhabha, 1984). As discussed above, racial demarcations were drawn under the ruling of the Ottoman Turks to distinguish themselves as the elite from the rest of Egypt. With the emergence of new segments of social class and the growing influence of orientalist western knowledge in Egypt through private international education, these racial demarcations began to trouble Egypt’s constructions of its national identity.

2.3.2 ‘NEGRO PARTIALLY WHITEWASHED’

The orientalist scholarship contributed to the class-bound and racialised construction of Egyptian bodies and identities by erasure and whitewashing. For instance, in the English version of Arabian Nights, the British explorer Richard Burton wrote, “the Egyptian is not an Asiatic, but a Negro partially whitewashed” (Kabbani, 1986:51). While Burton’s characterisation of Egyptian bodies was primarily based on pornographic fantasies of the other (Colligan, 2002), it is hard to dismiss its influence on steering the direction of colonial discourse and Egyptians’ awareness of their identity (Said, 2003). Moreover, the intellectual encounters and engagements between Egyptian scholars and their European counterparts solidified racial ideologies in Egypt based on racist theories of twentieth-century modern Europe (El Shakry, 2014). Powell (2003) examines Egyptian literary texts written by the Egyptian intellectual elites from 1800 to the late 1920s to show how Sudanese identity was often associated with servitude and slavery. The Egyptian bourgeoisie’s awareness of their class-bound positionalities and their racialized identities translated affectively into intensified feelings of inferiority and compassionate attachment to mimicry and emulation (Bhabha, 1984, 1988, 2013). They bought into the fantasy of ‘Europeanisation’ with ardent fervour in the belief that international education will bring them into closer proximity to whiteness and to Europe.
Egyptian historian Amina Elbendary asserts:

The decades-long presence of the Turkish-Ottoman elites in Egypt, who were white and fair-skinned, followed by French and British colonialism in Egypt, created an association between whiteness and upward social mobility. Membership in the upper class—especially in the modern period—was associated with whiteness as darkness was associated with working or servile classes (cited in Egyptian Streets, 2020:no page).

Telles (2014:13) argues that unequal social and economic status “is at least as much a function of skin colour as of ethno-racial identification and skin colour revealed an unambiguous pigmentocracy”.

While the study was conducted in Latin America, it helps understand some aspects of colourism and pigmentocracy in the Egyptian context, especially considering the shared colonial histories. Al-Solaylee (2017:7) asserts that in Egypt, “to be white or very fair-skinned was to win the genetic lottery and the few who claimed their tickets ensure that social traditions perpetuated this understanding”.

The internationalisation discourse introduced gendered, racialised and classed stratifications that shaped Egyptians’ awareness of their gendered, raced, and classed identity and their aspirations for the future. For Egyptian women, the gendered and racial scars of colonial epistemic violence remain to dictate their prospects in life and their trajectories. Nawal El-Saadawi writes:

I still remember, despite the passing of years, that from the moment I was born, I realised two truths in which there is no doubt. The first of them is that I am a girl and that I am not a boy like my brother. The second of them is that my skin is dark and not white like my mother’s. And with these two truths, I realised something else even more important: that these two characteristics by themselves and without any other defects would be enough to cause failure in my future (cited in Malti-Douglas, 1995:no page)

Racially motivated hostility is still felt in Egypt today. Egyptian Nubians are the most affected and are more likely to suffer from discriminatory treatment from the public because of their darker skin colour (Janmyr, 2017). Race-based discrimination in Egypt extends to African refugees who escaped from war and prosecution in their home countries. For example, the Associated Press (2020) report shows that African refugees in Egypt face dangers of racially motivated harassment in Egypt not faced by other refugee communities such as Syrian refugees, for example (AP NEWS, 2020). Violence is tied with gender and African women refugees in Egypt are gravely affected and are usually the target of sexual harassment in public spaces and risks of rape (UNHCR, 2012). In sum, the proximity to whiteness directed Egypt’s re-orientation towards Europe and its internationalisation discourse. In a
global knowledge economy where the constructions of black and brown bodies are often surrounded by negativity (Hirsch, 2018), understanding this part of Egypt’s history and the construction of its identity is important to discussions in Chapter Four on the rationale and experiences of Egyptian women postgraduates.

2.4 THE COLONIAL GIFTS OF HAPPINESS

Egypt’s desire to emulate Europe and its immersion in the global capitalist economy came with a heavy price tag on the state treasury that led to its financial and moral bankruptcy. The growing foreign interference (primarily British and French) in its national affairs under the pretext of financial reforms ignited intense feelings of nationalism and demonstrations erupted nationwide calling for bringing ‘Egypt for the Egyptians’ from 1879 to 1882 under the leadership of colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi (Williamson, 1987; Mestyan, 2018). The growth of nationalism in Egypt posed a threat to ambitions of expanding the British colonial empire in Egypt and the region. The civil unrest did not escape the watchful eye of the British empire and the military occupation of Egypt was justified in Lord Cromer’s words that the “real future of Egypt …lies not in the direction of a narrow nationalism, which will only embrace native Egyptians…but rather in that of an enlarged cosmopolitanism” (Said, 2003:37). Cosmopolitanism was the gift from the coloniser and meant fusion into the British empire and upholding its values. In this part, I will discuss the colonial education as a gift of happiness (Ahmed, 2010), and the colonizer’s rationale for women’s education as an entry point for domination in Egypt.

2.4.1 COLONIAL EDUCATION AND THE GIFT OF MODERN MOTHERHOOD

The British colonisation of Egypt in 1882 is often presented from the coloniser’s point of view as a gift of happiness, as a philanthropic mission to avoid future misery (Ahmed, 2010). As the words of Cromer indicate, an independent and sovereign Egyptian nation was deemed first and foremost dangerous to Egyptians themselves and thus presented a justification for the coloniser’s philanthropic mission for its annexation. Rogan (2012:130) contends that Egypt was “not an attractive” colony in the eyes of British coloniser, and that “Britain did not want to occupy Egypt. A bankrupt state with a discredited ruler and an army in revolt is not an attractive proposition to any imperial power.” This
rings true to some extent in the case of Egypt. Lest to forget, Egypt’s bankruptcy was at the hands of foreign advisers and the coercive pressure of the British colonial administration to further its control in the region (Ronall, 1968). Moreover, despite its financial bankruptcy, Egypt remained valuable to the British interests in other areas. Thanks to its geographical location (particularly after the construction of the Suez Canal), Egypt was valuable point to control the trade routes from other colonies (i.e., India) (Rogan, 2012). Moreover, Egypt was a valuable source of commodities to the British colonial economy, including cotton and sugar, and a source of human resources (Ajl et al., 2020). To understand how the colonisation of Egypt is often presented as a gift from the coloniser, I turn to Ahmed (2010: 124), who reminds us that colonialism— from the point of view of the coloniser— was often presented as:

A sacrifice was given that the colonies were widely perceived as costing more than they earned, the augmentation of happiness was often presented as a relative cost to the happiness of the colonisers […] this gift of happiness is imagined here in terms of civility. Human happiness is increased through the courts (law/justice), knowledge (reason), and manners (culture, habits).

To achieve their civilising mission, disciplinary techniques were introduced, varying between intensified military presence in Egypt to discipline the nation in the public sphere and infiltration in Egyptians’ private lives (Mitchell, 1991). The British colonial administration took a particular aim at education in Egypt. The first decisions were to defund all state investment in public education, including abolishing free education and introducing tuition fees (Cochran 2012). Policies of education in Egypt during this period revolved around one objective: to develop a cadre of elite male bureaucrats to run the administration of the coloniser’s interests in the country (Cochran, 2012). These policies had devastating gendered and classed outcomes to the state of girls and women’s education in Egypt. Crossouard and Dunne (2021:1) remark that “the processes of colonisation imposed a modern/colonial gender system, which subordinated women by binding them to the domestic sphere”. The introduction of colonial education was a widespread practice across colonised territories in Africa and other parts of the British empire (Zeleza, 2014). Leach (2008:1) notes that colonial education for girls was geared towards domesticity as wives in monogamous family structures who are responsible for “providing moral and practical support for men, and to bring up their
children in the new faith”. In Egypt, the colonial policies on education had a devastating impact on women’s education. By 1913, only 6.5 per cent of girls and 20.5 per cent of boys in Egypt were enrolled in primary education, and school entry remained exclusively to the elite and upper-middle-class Egyptians (Cochran, 2012). The British colonial administration needed moral and ethical justifications to continue their presence in Egypt. Ahmed (2010:128) reminds us:

Colonialism is justified as necessary not only to increase human happiness but to teach the natives how to be happy […] to turn others into individuals is to turn them around, by turning them toward the norms, values and practices of the coloniser.

Colonial education was geared towards reaching this goal through discipline, subjugation, and re-orientation. Happiness became “a form of being directed or oriented, of following the right way” (Ahmed, 2010:128). Efforts of re-orienting meant “becoming cultivated and civilised” that is “understood as becoming European” and “is presented as both a compensation for past loss and the avoidance of future misery” (Ahmed, 2010:128). Women’s education was at the heart of the colonizer’s civilisation mission in Egypt and was perceived as a guarantee for its success. Mitchell (1988:111) in Colonising Egypt reminds us of Lord Cromer’s commentary on the status of women in Egypt as “a fatal obstacle to the attainment of that elevation of thought and character which should accompany the introduction of European civilisation.”

Despite their draconian policies in education, the British colonial administration endorsed calls by Egyptian reformists who advocated for women’s education. As shown earlier in this chapter, the study missions to parts of Europe in the late nineteenth century sparked civilisation anxiety in Egypt (Massad, 2007) and influenced efforts by Egyptian reformists such as Muhammad Abdu, Gamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Qassim Amin who advocated for women’s rights (Cole, 1981). Of particular importance and relevance to this thesis are Amin’s works and his advocacy for women’s education in Egypt. In The Liberation of Women (1899) and The New Woman (1900), Amin advocated for women’s education, unveiling, and ending women’s confinement (Qāsim Amīn, 2000). Primarily influenced by his international education and sojourn in France, Amin regarded the position of French women in society as a model to emulate in Egypt and linked it directly to the progress of French nation and society (Freedman, 2007; Khater, 2011).
The influence of modern notions of organizing social relations guided Amin’s visions, and his efforts were geared towards a future immersed in heteronormative assumptions and ideologies of hetero-reproductive futurism (Edelman, 2007). The onto-epistemological limitations to Amin’s vision for women’s emancipation rest in his tendency to valorise orientalist, heterocolonial notions of gender relations and reproductive roles (Mazid, 2002). Amin wedded aspirations for building a modern nation by advocating for ‘modern motherhood’ and argued that “women can elevate the nation by bringing to society a man brought up to be of benefit to his country” (cited in Khater, 2011:61–65).

Amin’s notions of modern motherhood were counterintuitive to his argument for women’s liberation. His logic reinscribed patriarchal values by escaping a form of attachment and tying women to another bondage: motherhood. There are critical flaws to Amin’s arguments. Firstly, he overlooked women’s homosocial bonds (Abu-Lughod, 1998) by making heteronormative assumptions on their lives and identities. Secondly, his notions excluded women from the efforts of nation building by relegating and confining them to cis-gendered-reproductive roles of childbearing and childrearing. Thirdly, according to Amin, the future is imagined and embodied as exclusively cis-hetero male, whereas the possibility of imagining a future where the women, for whom he advocated, can lead the nation remained absent. Indeed, one can argue that Amin’s views are reflections of the contemporary moment of this period; however, as highlighted earlier in the chapter, there was robust evidence of women’s subversiveness and agency beyond the heteronormative matrix. However, it must be recognised that Amin’s work introduced debates around gender to the public, some of which were foreign to Egypt, and caused a necessary jolt to its social structure. Moreover, his point of reference (western culture) emphasised binarised gendered, class-bound and racialised divisions that were impossible to reconcile. Lugones (2007:186) argues that:

  Gender itself is a colonial introduction; a violent introduction consistently and contemporarily used to destroy peoples, cosmologies, and communities as the building ground of the civilised West.

The building grounds of a civilised and modern Egypt, according to Amin, were to be based on emphasizing heteronormativity above any other forms of social relations and structures. Moreover, Amin and his secular reformists’ occupied a hybrid space between resisting the colonial presence in
Egypt, while imagining a future modelled after westernized notions of modernity and citizenship (Mazid, 2002). Women’s right to education became the site of clashes between imperial colonial powers (i.e., the Ottoman and British empires), and re-emphasized a set of binarized constructions, secular vs religious, reformist vs traditionalist, inferior vs superior and east vs west. While the traditionalists imagined a future of Islamic renaissance by revisiting and reconstructing history, the secular reformists imagined a future modelled after western notions of citizenship and civil liberties (Baron, 1994, 2005).

2.4.2 THE VEIL UNDONE

At the heart of these tensions between each side were the abolition of the harem system and women’s rights in the new social structure (Baron, 2005). Even after signing the Anglo-Egyptian conventions of 1877 and 1895 to suppress slavery, the harem and slave trade did not cease in Egypt (Baron, 1994). Islam does not prohibit practices of slavery and the harem system, and thus traditionalists did not raise any objection to their structures and existence. Aside from its cultural permissibility, the harem and slavery trade brought economic dividends through labour in cotton plantations and monetised value in slave trade. The whole system was culturally permissible and economically appealing which made it impossible to abandon across the region. However, with the growing pressure on the Ottoman Empire and the disruption in the slave trade route, the harem system started to dismantle gradually but never ceased to exist (Baron, 2005). Following the slow and gradual dismantling of the harem system, the question of women’s education and her role in the new (nuclear) family structure united both secular and traditionalists reformists in Egypt (Hatab, 1970; Baron, 2005).

While the traditionalists agreed in principle with Amin’s calls for women’s education, they opposed his views on other issues such as; unveiling, equality within the family and citizenship rights (Baron, 2005). Amin’s insistence on unveiling led the traditionalists to question his motives and efforts as a vessel for British colonialist rhetoric to infiltrate Egyptian women’s lives and spaces (Ahmed, 1992). The question of the veil became the “cat’s paw of imperial power”, and made it “impossible for those opposed to the colonial occupation and to European influence to critique the veil without looking as if
they were taking the side of the west” (Eltahawy, 2016:42). It is worthy of underscoring that veiling was a matter of social status and cultural associations rather than symbolic to Islam. In Egypt, veiling was a signifier to “differentiate between free women (who veiled) and enslaved women (who did not)” (Eltahawy, 2016:39). Making a note of such important and critical observation averts the risk of reproducing a widely common misconception in Middle Eastern studies that often associate the veil with Islam exclusively. Veiling became a highly contested issue that ignited heated confrontations between the secular vs traditionalist reformers. Under the watchful eye of the British coloniser, confrontations between the two reached a level where some traditionalists went as far as to suggest that women who dare to remove their veil to either pay a hefty fine or be sent to prison as a punishment for their acts of transgressions (Eltahawy, 2016).

The coloniser’s interest in debates around veiling lies in its usefulness to their mission to discipline and humiliate the nation. While the public discipline was reinforced by the police and the presence of military forces in Egypt, the colonial administration saw infiltrating women’s bodies and spaces as an entry point to discipline the private lives of Egyptians (Mitchell, 1991). From the coloniser’s point of view, disciplinary techniques were strategic in humiliating the nation by inflicting physical violence and infiltrating Egyptian private spaces. Physical violence against Egyptian women was committed at the hands of British soldiers on several occasions. Baron (2005:43) reminds us of the Dinshaway incident:

In June 1906, British army officers en route from Cairo to Alexandria accidentally shot and wounded the wife of the local prayer leader in the village of Dinshaway near Tanta while pigeon-shooting. This caused a struggle between villagers and officers, with casualties on both sides. One soldier died on the march back to camp as the result of head wounds or sunstroke, and soldiers returning to the scene killed a bystander. The British reaction was swift and severe: after a hastily held trial at which three British officials sat, the court sentenced four villagers to hang, many to imprisonment with hard labour, and others to public flogging.

Taking a direct aim of Egyptian women, the coloniser’s techniques aimed to inflict humiliation and shame to the nation’s honour (Treacher, 2007). Similar techniques remain part of contemporary British politics towards Muslim women in the diaspora to this day.
Malia Bouattia (2019) reminds us that Muslim women remain an entry point to disciplining the native household in Britain’s current policy and argues that:

Contemporary British practice remains highly reminiscent of this colonial approach. It sees Muslim women as the key entry point for the repressive apparatus unleashed against our communities under cover of fighting terrorism, radicalisation, and ‘non-violent extremism (cited in Khan, 2019:258).

In sum, the debates around the veil then/now symbolise the powerful discourses of colonial dominance and subjectivities. The contemporary debates about the veil or the burqa that populate the cultural and political scenes in the UK (Khan, 2019) are an extension to colonial power structures and patriarchal dominance that traces its roots to centuries ago (Dunne and Crossouard, 2020).

2.5 OUT OF THE HAREM INTO THE STREETS

The feminist consciousness in Egypt grew hand in hand with the nationalist movement, and Egyptian suffragettes played an undeniable role in resisting the British colonial occupation in Egypt (Kamal, 2016). With the increased acts of violence committed by the British coloniser that specifically targeted Egyptian women, the feelings of resentment towards the coloniser’s presence in Egypt continued to rise. Baron (2005:40) asserts that “against the backdrop of imperial intervention and occupation, it [incidents of violence against women] was used as a mobilising strategy to resist foreign control.” The Egyptian suffragettes’ movements efforts for equality faced challenges twofold: colonial occupation and nationalist ideology of patriarchy. Furthermore, the frictions inside and between movements highlight the impact of race and class in shaping their directions and demands. A good starting point to this discussion is the growth of the women’s press and its impact on developing early forms of feminist consciousness in Egypt. This final part will look closely at this topic and will conclude with the success of feminist movements to secure women’s access into Egyptian universities.

2.5.1 THE WOMEN’S PRESS QUESTIONED

By the end of the 19th century, Egypt’s women’s press grew exponentially in number, presence, and influence. The publication of the first women’s newspaper Al-Fatah (The Young Woman), in 1892 was followed by several others, such as Anis al-Jalees in 1898, Fatal al-Sharq in 1906 and Al-jins al-Lateef in
1908 (Baron, 2005; Kamal, 2016). The women’s press was pivotal in cultivating a community of women readers and writers and reinvigorated the cultural scene in Egypt (Baron, 2005). Most importantly, it offered a space for women to explore issues surrounding their rights to education, citizenship and social expectations of marriage and motherhood (Baron, 2005). Furthermore, it was instrumental for women to connect and build literary communities under the watchful eye of the colonial and patriarchal state (Baron, 2005). Most notable examples are literary and cultural salons such as Princess Nazli Fadel’s Salon and May Ziyada’s Salon (Kamal, 2016). Other studies were critical to the role of the women’s press and questioned whether it was responsible for developing an early feminist consciousness or as an apparatus to assert patriarchal values disguised under the pretext of liberal nationalism. According to Booth (2001), most of the women’s press was led mainly by men who were in higher editorial leadership positions and decided the directions, scope and topics discussed in each issue. The study asserts that the vital mission of women’s press during this time aligned with the heteronormative colonial efforts that valued women’s education in so far as it was useful to prepare women for gendered reproductive roles as wives and mothers. Assie-Lumumba (2013:35) contends that:

The curriculum used in colonial education created gender differences between boys and girls. In schools, there was the differential treatment of boys and girls, where boys were trained to be productive citizens, and girls were domesticated, thus negating African education for girls conceived as future women playing their roles as active agents in the various spheres of life outside the home. Indeed, boys were taught subjects such as woodwork, agriculture, and leatherwork, while girls were taught home economics subjects such as needlework and cooking.

In framing their messages of each issue, a few publications of the women’s press emphasised on colonial notions of gender segregation and the fantasy of ideal womanhood (Booth, 2001).

Furthermore, the target audience was aimed mainly at upper-middle-class women who received private language education and can identify with the themes explored in each issue and understand some of its terms written in colonial languages (a mix of English and French) (Baron, 1994, 2005; Booth, 2001). Nonetheless, the women’s press was valuable in providing alternative epistemic spaces to further education for women after their ban from entry into Egypt’s first university in 1908.
The case of banning women from entry into higher education in Egypt illustrates the hypocrisy and duplicity of the heterocolonial patriarchy and limits of how much further women can pursue an education. In 1908, Egypt opened its first westernised university that later was renamed Cairo University after the 1952 revolution (Said, 2017). Under the suspicions of the British coloniser, a group of Egyptian male elites and intellectuals took the first steps to establish a university in Egypt. Influenced mainly by the European model, the university was promised to deliver lectures on secular notions of literature, philosophy, sociology, and history (Cochran, 2012). Similar to other African countries, British colonial administration resisted the notion of a national university due to their general suspicions of the highly-educated elite who may resist their colonial presence (Zeleza, 2014).

To stall the plans for establishing a national university, the British colonial administration withheld any plans to finance and fund the university (Cochran, 2012). The elites’ efforts successfully convinced Khedive Abbas II, the king of Egypt at that time, to allow an aid grant of L.E.2,000 to be paid to the university (Cochran, 2012:15). The king’s gesture encouraged the elite to contribute, leading to its successful inauguration in 1908.

Teaching and pedagogical methods were largely influenced by the western model and followed a mix of European and Egyptian pedagogies. Egyptian and European lecturers delivered lectures on mathematics, astronomy, and physics. Some students were sent to Europe to specialise in various subjects and then return as lecturers (Cochran, 2012). Interestingly, and perhaps as compensation for being barred from entry into higher education, the state opened its first vocational school for women in 1910 instead, to provide a “specialised study of home economics, embroidery, and needlework” (Cochran, 2012:11). Another example which illustrates the persistence of heterocolonial patriarchal values in shaping the imagined futures of the modern nation. Nonetheless, it must be noted that, despite the challenges and shortcomings, the women’s press contributed to the development of Egypt’s community of women readers and invigorated the cultural scenes (Baron, 1994).
The exclusion of women from higher education did not deter them from carving their own spaces and creating alternatives to formal higher education. These acts, however, were largely determined by class such that upper-class women organized meetings and conventions where they exchanged views on women’s equal rights and roles in society (Kamal, 2016). These acts of transgressions and forms of resistance aimed to reverse the discourse of power and as Foucault (1980) described it:

> Discourse and resistance coexist; if a self is positioned as powerless by one discourse, it is possible that she/he may position her/himself as powerful via an alternative discourse (cited in Bank et al., 2007:57).

Women’s fight for access to higher education continued. However, the efforts took a new form of institutionalised organising this time. The establishment of the first Women’s Educational Association in 1914, was a significant achievement and offered discursive space for women to talk about rights to education and other issues (Kamal, 2016:9). Women (albeit from privileged backgrounds) continued their engagement in resisting the patriarchal discourse through other forms of organizing such as charity organisations and political activism (Al-Ali, 2002; Moghadam, 2002). Class remained a barrier to women’s education, and a different approach was necessary to reach out to women in lower-middle-class and marginalised communities. In its first constitution of 1923, Egypt acknowledged women’s rights in education and the state role in providing compulsory (but not for free) education for boys and girls from 6 to 12 (Said, 2017). Nevertheless, the plans for widening participation in education were restricted by a lack of qualified teachers and facilities, a strategy devised by the colonial administration to curb progress in education provision in Egypt (Cochran, 2012). There were no other notable gains for women in Egypt’s first constitution regarding political and citizenship rights (Al-Ali, 2002; Kamal, 2016). Acts of exclusion by the nationalist movement that men spearheaded continued to be committed against women. Baron (2005:1) invokes the following example to illustrate the double act of women’s marginalisation from the national imaginary:

> Inspired by the 1919 revolution, Mahmud Mukhtar sculpted a work called Nahdat Misr [Egypt’s awakening], which shows a peasant woman lifting her veil from her face with her left arm and placing her right arm on the back of a sphinx as it rises on its forelegs [sic] The government planned a big ceremony for the unveiling of the statue in 1928, to which foreign dignitaries and local
notables were invited and over which King Fu’ad presided. But by the latter’s explicit orders, and with few exceptions, Egyptian women were barred from the ceremony.

The historical moment vividly captures the contradictions, silences, and paradoxes embedded in Egypt’s modern nation-building discourse. The question on women’s rights seemed to send the nation into a frenzy of social panic, and debates on equal citizenship rights renewed the tensions and contradictions of colonisation, modernisation, and nationalism. Egyptian women entered a state of an ‘impasse’ caught between tentacles of the past and aspirations for the future, which I may add still await their perfect reconciliations.

Lorde (1997) notes the potential of feminists use of anger. The exclusion of women from the nationalist project, despite their equal participation in the struggle against the coloniser, brought a sober awareness of the dominance of male patriarchy. It brought a realisation that the British colonial administration and the Egyptian nationalist movement (both spearheaded by men) shared more in common than they differed: women’s subjugation. The shared sense of anger and frustration among Egyptian feminist movements crystallised into organised and powerful political activism. The number of grassroots political movements increased, calling for women’s awakening on all aspects of public life (Baron, 1994, 2005; Al-Ali, 2002; Kamal, 2016). Their acts of subversiveness began with calls for the unveiling, following the footsteps of Egyptian feminists Huda Sha‘rāwī and Saiza Nabarawi to challenge Egypt’s heterocolonial and nationalist male patriarchy. After their return to Cairo in 1923 from attending an international feminist conference in Rome, both women drew back the black veil from their faces, an act that was greeted by cheering and loud applause, and then imitated by other women in the audience (Sha‘rāwī, 1987). By taking off the veil, women were subject to a widespread social backlash and accusations of being tainted by foreign influence, especially in light of their recent participation in the feminist conference in Rome (Baron, 1994, 2005).

The public began to realize the impact and potential of women’s freedom for outward mobility to dismantle the patriarchy. Organised calls for women’s solidarity followed, first by establishing the Egyptian Feminist Union (FEU) in 1923, under the leadership of Huda Sha‘rāwī (Kamal, 2016). The FEU called for equal education rights, citizenship and political rights, and family laws (Ghazi et al.,
2001; Al-Ali, 2002; Elsadda, 2011). The feminist grassroots movements grew in Egypt in the years to follow, yet class and race continued to inscribe divisions. Women’s groups such as *Daughter of the Nile* (دنلیا تنبی), under the leadership of its founder, Doria Shafik, sought to shift the focus from political participation to broadly encompass calls for eradicating illiteracy, equal opportunities to access higher education and improvement of public services in the health sector (Nelson, 1996).

Other feminist groups, led by Ceza Nabarouni and painter Inji Efflatoun in their organisation *Partisans for Peace* (مﻼﺳﻟا رﺎﺻﻧا), aimed for women to play an active role in their society through engaging urban working-class women in the changing sphere of politics and the struggle to unify the Egyptian people (LaDuke, 1989; Wilson-Goldie, 2019). However, they were united on breaking barriers to women’s access to higher education, and staged demonstrations took place on several university campuses where women disrupted the lectures by storming into lecture halls calling for wider participation (Baron, 2005). Their efforts were successful, and by 1928, a few female students from elite backgrounds had entered the university (Baron, 2005). Egypt’s higher education continued to expand following the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 that announced Egypt’s ‘quasi independence’ and outlined limited British interference in national affairs, and the presence of British troops was limited to protecting foreign-owned assets such as the Suez Canal (Goldschmidt, 2008). By 1959 there were 42 women who completed their doctoral education from Egyptian universities (Cantini, 2020).

### 2.6 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

In this chapter, I illustrated that historically, Egypt’s efforts to internationalise its higher education were at the heart of its vision to build a ‘modern nation’. Egypt’s compassionate attachment to internationalisation was intensified by an affective assemblage of civilisation anxieties, shame, dread, and failure following waves of colonisation. Internationalisation and the expansion of its higher education became a site of fantasy for Egypt to reinvent and reimagine its future. It justified the re-orientation of its gaze from the Ottoman empire, which resembled the painful past, towards parts of Europe as the imagined future. In occupying this space of suspension, Egypt was in a state of affective in-between-ness. At a crossroads of conflicting hegemonic and dichotomous discourses; secular vs
Muslim, West vs East, superior vs inferior, white vs black, Europe vs Africa, national vs cosmopolitan, feminine vs masculine, modern vs traditional, international vs national, success vs failure, mimicry vs authenticity and so on. The question of women’s rights lay at the heart of these tensions, contradictions, and idiosyncrasies. While the expansion in the education sector as a result of internationalisation efforts provided women with opportunities to access education, it was simultaneously a discourse of colonial domination, silencing, erasure, disappearance and inscribing heteronormative norms. The state fully recognised the value and potential of women’s education as part of its vision to build a modern notion. Nevertheless, colonial notions of gender and heteronormativity inhibited efforts for transformative change regarding women’s education. The internationalisation discourse was embedded with ontological and epistemological violence that led to queer disappearance and erasure. Moreover, there is strong historical evidence of women’s subversiveness, resistance, and defiance to the hetero-colonial patriarchy during this period.

Internationalisation transformed Egypt’s gender regimes, class structure and race relations and became a critical instrument for the Egyptian elite to embrace European values, culture, and mannerisms. It is imperative to underscore that internationalisation discourse in Egypt was nothing short of a site of fantasy for the elite to re-imagine a future of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship and only the highly privileged women had access to education. This chapter offered some important insights into the construction of internationalisation as an object of desire and the attachment among the colonial elite to international education. After giving this short historical account, the next chapter will pay close attention to Egypt’s internationalisation efforts in postcolonial times and the impact of introducing neoliberal policies on changing the vision, structure, and direction of its higher education.
Al-Sisi’s words exemplify the narratives of crisis that populated the national discourse in Egypt recently and are currently steering the directions of its internationalisation efforts. During the Economic Development Conference in 2015, Egypt presented its plans to build a New Administrative Capital as part of its national Strategy 2030 (Africa Report, 2021). That, it is hoped, will bring ‘economic renaissance’ and has come at a heavy price tag of 300 billion US dollars. In a country where 32.5 per cent of its population still live under the pressures of crushing poverty (World Bank, 2020), the plans are examples of Egypt’s cruel attachment to internationalisation as a site of fantasy for endless upward mobility and attaining the good life. The overarching objective of this chapter is to explore the notion of the internationalisation of Egyptian higher education by drawing on Berlant’s notion of cruel optimism (2011). In doing so, this serves as a precursor to the more nuanced understandings developed later in the thesis.

Berlant (2011:11) argues that fantasies of the good life “become more fantasmatic, and (have) less and less relation to how people can live” and as such, under neoliberal ideologies, we witness “its attrition [which] manifests itself in an emerging set of aesthetic conventions that make a claim to affective realism derived from embodied, affective rhythms of survival”. In this chapter, I will argue that the aesthetic conventions of internationalisation in higher education gain their significance in national imaginaries through new and renewed narratives of crisis. Morley et al. (2020:5) assert that “fear of the (imagined) future is stimulated in the present via numerous crises discourses, disaster capitalism and the tendency to catastrophising” and internationalisation emerges as “a signifier of flexibility, flow and resilience, is represented as a happiness formula and a promise of the good life.”

In thinking critically and closely with Berlant and Morley, I will examine the shift in Egypt’s efforts to internationalise its higher education in postcolonial times and the transformation in its landscape after...
embracing neoliberal policies. This chapter consists of three parts; the first part will examine the postcolonial afterlives in Egypt and its ascension as a sovereign nation on the international scene. It will provide an overview of Egypt’s efforts to massify access to its higher education and the impact of such policies on women’s access to higher education. The second part will begin with the introduction of neoliberalism in Egypt as a promise of happiness and its impact on the direction, structure, and value of higher education. The chapter will conclude with an overview of the status of Egypt’s higher education and its efforts to embrace internationalisation policies to meet the demands of the neoliberal knowledge economy.

Throughout this chapter, I will pay particular attention to the “situation tragedy” which Berlant defines as “in the situation tragedy, the subject’s world is fragile beyond repair, one gesture away from losing all access to sustaining its fantasies: the situation threatens utter, abject unravelling” (Berlant, 2011:6). As such, to better grasp the affective realism that organises Egypt’s efforts to internationalise its higher education, it is imperative to interrogate the “set of processes” that shape Egypt’s “ideology, affective adjustment, and the conversion of singular to general” (Berlant, 2011:6). It is hoped that this analysis of the multi-faceted internationalisation processes will help this thesis achieve its objectives to answer key research questions on the complexities of international mobility decisions among Egyptian women postgraduates and their affective modalities.

3.1 THE HAPPY PROMISE OF FREE EDUCATION

Post World War II, the British imperial presence in Egypt had waned and the dethroning of the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952 by coup d’etat of the Free Officers Movement signalled the emergence of a new form of governing in the region: nationalist military-backed authoritarian regimes. After the disastrous events of Black Saturday in January 1952, there was no desire from the British colonizer to intervene in what they saw as national conflict (McNamara, 2004). Interestingly, the British administration regarded the transition in power as an opportunity for economic gains and was in three-party negotiations with Egypt and the US to fund infrastructure projects such as the Aswan’s high dam (Ajl et al., 2020). In this first part, I will discuss Egypt socio-economic reforms and plans to
assert its presence regionally and globally as a sovereign nation. At the heart of these efforts - and of high relevance to this study - is Egypt’s state-wide nationalisation project and the massification of access to higher education.

### 3.1.1 NATIONALISM AS HAPPINESS PROJECT

In *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon (2004) warned that cultural nationalism that populated the national discourse in postcolonial era will soon descend into ‘nativism’ that is “the excessive pride in native traditions and native culture, which posits a fear and dislike of foreign culture and murderous tribalism” (cited in Nayar, 2012:31). The Nasserist social project in Egypt exemplifies this prediction - to a certain extent - and exemplifies the hegemony of nationalism as reverse discourse (Foucault, 1982) in resisting the colonial domination in postcolonial times. Following the Conference of Afro-Asian Peoples, commonly known as the Bandung Conference of 1955, Egypt - under Nasser’s leadership - formed the globally renowned coalition of non-alignment with India and Yugoslavia (Ampiah, 2007).

Being part of this coalition, Egypt tried to assert its presence globally while at the same time breaking ties with colonial and imperial powers. Kapoor (2015:1612) draws similarities between the Third World and queerness and argues that:

> Both arise from a history of subjugation, attempting to resist and destabilise domination and the power of the status quo. Both operate from the margins, questioning normalising power mechanisms and social order while upholding deviant, non-conformist, and non-assimilationist politics. And both are associated with equally negative and disparaging discursive connotations – the one attempting to reclaim such meanings in favour of radical politics, the other stemming from a (failed) progressive politics of development that now awaits recuperation.

Accordingly, the queered Third World emerged through shaming interpellations that required it to “disown and purge its queerness” while simultaneously “imitating the West and pursuing neoliberal capitalist growth” (Kapoor, 2015:1611). The nationalisation efforts in Egypt began with forced expropriation of privately owned assets and resistance to the colonial monopoly on essential commodities (i.e. cotton) in the global market. For instance, the first step taken by the Free Officer’s Movement was establishing the Revolutionary Tribunal Council in 1952 that oversaw the execution of the nationalisation programme under the pretext of returning Egypt to the hands of the people.
(Gordon, 1992). The reforms included confiscating all assets owned by the Monarchy of Muhammed Ali Pasha’s family, agrarian reforms in land ownership, and the state control over crucial commodities such as cotton (Ajl et al., 2020). While the state-wide nationalisation programmes may be seen by some as an act of anti-colonial resistance, the historical evidence suggests that intensified efforts under Nasser’s leadership (1957-1970) were nothing short of an imitation of the British colonial project in Egypt. For example, Salem (2020:83) observes:

The Nasserist project, however, was built on internal contradictions, among them the continuation of capitalist development, the absorption and weakening of radical movements such as labour, and the reproduction of colonial institutions such as the nation and nationalism.

After negotiation for a loan deal to build the Aswan high dam fell through with the withdrawal of the US and then Britain, Egypt moved on with its decision to nationalise the Suez Canal, hoping that toll fees would be sufficient to cover construction and operation costs (Ajl et al., 2020; Jakes and Shokr, 2020). As discussed in Chapter Two, the British colonial continuing presence in Egypt after the 1936 agreement was to protect foreign-owned assets such as the Suez Canal. The decision of its nationalisation escalated the tension and led to the tripartite aggression of Britain, France, and Israel on Egypt in 1956 (Helali, 2018). The short-lived tripartite aggression was not successful to re-occupy the Suez Canal and ended with the complete withdrawal of the British, French, and Israeli military forces from Egypt. The aggression was the colonizer’s last resort to humiliate Egypt. Treacher (2007:287) contends, “Humiliation is precisely one of the tropes of colonisation - colonised, taken over and made to feel as if they cannot and should not rule, Egyptian men were castrated.” Egypt’s resistance to the tripartite aggression became a global symbol of the anti-colonial struggle and boosted Nasser’s popularity as a ruler in Egypt and across the region. Nasser became the “leader of the Arab world, the patron of the Palestinian cause who ruled the nations by the radio” (Dakhllallah, 2012:401). His vision took a ‘god-like’ status beyond questioning or reproach. To this day, Nasser is regarded as one of its most popular presidents (Ghanem, 2016), despite atrocious crimes committed during his administration against all political opponents (Abdel-Latif, 2008) and the growth of antisemitic rhetoric in Egypt (Sharnoff, 2012).
While the Nasserist project of nationalism was perceived as a happiness project that would rid Egypt of colonisation and poverty [as the cartoon in Figure 1 illustrates], the national discourse was overcrowded with pernicious sentiments of othering, suspicions, and xenophobia. After the introduction of citizenship laws (Laskier, 1995) the once diverse Egyptian social fabric degenerated, and the nation was set on a path of homogeneity, normativity, and conformity (Salem, 2020). In particular, the 1956 war intensified anti-Semite feelings and the once-flourishing Jewish communities in the country became the collateral damage to the war leading to mass migration and displacement of more than twenty two thousands of Jews from Egypt (Laskier, 1995). Furthermore, during this period, Egypt once again re-directed its gaze from the west (i.e., Britain and France) towards the east (the Soviet Union), whose administration was willing to provide financial and technical assistance to support Nasser’s vision. (Ajl et al., 2020). Surely, it helped that the Nasserist project aligned with the Soviet Union interests in the region, and both regimes were united by shared ideologies of antisemitism (Rubinstein, 1959; Lindemann and Levy, 2010).
3.1.2 COUNT WOMEN IN

Similar to its predecessors, the Nasserist socialist project relied on building a state apparatus geared for planning, mobilising and managing national resources (Salem, 2020). The Nasserist socialist project recognised the value of women’s education to achieve its vision for nation-building, and the state amended its constitution to allow for free and compulsory education from the age of 6-12 (Said, 2017). The second step was to nationalise Egypt’s education sector. Egypt began a brutal state-wide nationalisation programme to education under Nasser’s regime and targeted private language education schools. The once-thriving private education sector diminished tremendously as foreign schools were nationalised or put under strict government control (Cochran, 2012). Only a tiny number of Egyptian-owned private schools remained; meanwhile, the growing nationalism ideology created a hostile environment for foreigners in Egypt working as teachers and administrators (Harik, 1998). As discussed in Chapter Two, the hostile policies of the colonial administration hindered any developments in the education sector in Egypt primarily by defunding teachers’ education and development (Cochran, 2012). As a result, Egypt’s vision for massifying access to education was inhibited by extreme challenges of finding and training qualified teachers.

Massifying access to higher education nationwide was one way to overcome the shortage of qualified teachers (Mellor, 2015). In 1959, Egypt amended its 1923 constitution to acknowledge the importance of higher education and established “access to education as the right of all Egyptians offered free at all levels” (Said, 2017:58). Next to free university education, Egypt introduced incentives to encourage higher education enrolments, such as a state-sponsored employment scheme where the state guaranteed “a job in the public sector to all university graduates” (Said, 2017:58). Similar to other countries in the African continent in postcolonial era, Egyptian universities were regarded as central for producing highly skilled labour force, enhancing the national prestige and the nation building efforts (Reid, 2002). Egypt’s efforts to widen participation created opportunities, especially for women from working-class backgrounds, to receive university education (Elsaid, 2015). Furthermore, the teaching profession was deemed socially acceptable for women in Egypt and there was a high concentration of women students in fields such as arts, music or humanities (Howard-Merriam, 1979).
With the expansion of higher education, the teaching profession thrived in Egypt, and Nasser started deploying Egyptian teachers to other parts of the Arab world as part of his vision for Pan-Arabism and to help in the nation-building efforts after independence from colonisation (Mellor, 2015). Egyptian teachers leaving Egypt to work in other Arab countries rose from 690 in 1952 to 1,676 in 1956 (Mellor, 2016). However, the arbitrary deployment of Egyptian teachers abroad resulted in a tremendous loss of national resources and revenues, leading to a shortage of teachers nationally and eventually impeded the development of Egypt’s education system (Cochran, 2012).

Nasser’s decisions were strategic in twofold: a) to build a regional coalition of pan-Arabism where Egypt assumes the leadership position, b) to tie Egyptians (especially women) to a state of infantile citizenship which by definition means:

> While citizens should be encouraged to love the nation the way they do their families and their fathers, democracies can also produce a special form of tyranny that makes citizens like children, infantilized, passive, and overdependent on the immense and tutelary power of the state (Berlant, 1997:27).

It was clear from the beginning the Nasserist vision for women’s education aligned with the heteronormative common-sense of reproductive gender roles for women as daughters, wives, and mothers. For instance, according to the amended labour code under this regime, women’s entry into the labour market was conditional on gaining the approval of a legal guardian, e.g. father, husband (Kamal, 2016). Moreover, even though the state made few constitutional amendments to encourage women’s entry into higher education and public life, the state continued to take an important role in emphasising heteronormative social structures modelled after the nuclear family (Hatem, 1992). Draconian laws were still in place, such as the ‘home of obedience’ law (‘بية الطاعة’) which refers to “the husband’s right to resort to legally proving his wife’s disobedience if she leaves home without permission and having her forcibly brought back to the marital house” (Kamal, 2016:11). Another notable example is the citizenship law that prohibited women married to non-Egyptians to pass their nationality to their children and remained unchanged until 2004 (ElChazli, 2012). In terms of international mobility, according to Article Seven of the Egyptian Passport Law, women required written permission from a male legal guardian to apply for a passport (Riad, 2016). The restrictions on
women’s mobility remained in place and women could not leave their homes or travel alone without written approval from the father or the husband, or a divorce certificate. For example, feminist Egyptian Writer Nawal El Saadawi recalls encounters with border control officers as she prepared to leave Egypt on her first trip abroad:

> He stared into my face with narrow eyes; the thick moustache on his upper lip quivered, reminding me of the snoring that came from beneath another large black moustache. This is the authorisation of the state. But where is her husband? I heard him say. After showing the official documents to prove my status as a divorced woman, the officer relented: Why didn’t you tell me from the start that you have been divorced? I have not been divorced, I replied angrily. I am divorced (El Saadawi and Newson-Horst, 2010:21).

El Saadawi’s playful twist of the words is feminism in action. At the time of this incident, women did not have the right to initiate divorce. The right to initiate divorce in Egypt (Khul) became law first in 2004. By turning it around, El Saadawi’s interpellation turned the deployment of the word from subordinate to agentic. In *Of Grammatology*, Derrida (1976) interrogates the deployment and usage of language to deconstruct power structure. Wilchins (2014:40) contends that “gender is a language, a system of meanings and symbols, along with the rules, privileges, and punishments pertaining to their use—for power and sexuality”. El Saadawi’s twisting of the words illustrates her philosophy of creativity as dissidence in queering the linguistics powers and structures of the patriarchy (El Saadawi, 1995). For her, language was a space for getting into trouble and disrupt the linguistic constructivism and essentialism of patriarchy (Butler, 2004).
3.2 HAPPY PROMISES OF NEOLIBERALISM: TEETERING OVER CLIFFS

The examples above highlight the Nasserist vision for nation building and its model of state feminism were enmeshed and entangled in paradoxes and contradictions. The nationalisation programme alienated Egypt globally, and the antisemitic rhetoric nationally decimated the vibrance of its diverse social fabric. Its vision to mitigate social inequalities only benefitted the few ruling elites: the military (Jakes and Shokr, 2020) and its state feminism set a precedence of the gift economy to the patriarchal state. Salem (2020:83) troubles Fanon’s prediction (1956) that the ruling class in postcolonial era would reproduce the same colonial power hierarchies and structures and argues:

The Nasserist project complicates this prediction somewhat. While it did fail in its task of independent economic development, it cannot be neatly characterised as Fanon’s dependent bourgeoisie either, a bourgeoisie that was to fully emerge after the downfall of the Nasserist project.

While nationalism remained a symbol of Egypt’s resistance to the colonial dominance of the global markets, the shift in its policy towards privatization starting the 1970s exemplifies the biopower of neoliberalism and limits of sovereignty in postcolonial nations (Foucault, 1982; Mbembe, 2008). Over the period between 1952 and 1973, Egypt engaged in four major wars (1952 aggression, 1962 North Yemen conflict, 1967 Arab Israeli War, and 1973 October war), and consequently, the state was on the verge of moral, human, and economic bankruptcy. The humiliating 1967 defeat in the Arab Israeli War shattered Egypt’s dignity in the region, and pride was replaced by shame. Treacher observes (2007:287), “Egyptian morale plummeted as the hollowness of the regime was exposed. Optimism was replaced by anger and bitterness and this erosion of hope”. Under the new administration of Sadat (1970-1981), Egypt needed a new outlook after the October war of 1973. The introduction of neoliberal policies in Egypt was its mechanism for re-inventing hope through collective investment in the form of sacrifices leading to the good life (Berlant, 2011).

The open-door policy (حﺎﺗﻔﻧا) began in 1974 and outlined new socio-economic reforms (Frerichs, 2015; Jakes and Shokr, 2020). As its title indicates, Egypt’s new economic policy was hoped to help the country to re-enter the global markets by bringing back foreign investments after the assault of the state-wide nationalisation under previous administration. Moreover, the policy identified critical
directions for reforms and spending in public sector services such as education, health, and employment. Most notably, the policy welcomed increased interference by international development organisations in Egypt’s national policies. The advice of international development organisations led to gradual submission to the pursuit of the global economy (Moutsios, 2009). In December 1976, as part of its negotiation deal for a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Egypt planned to introduce a national strategy that entailed cutting subsidies on critical commodities (i.e. oil, flour, and sugar) with hopes to secure the loan (Jakes and Shokr, 2020). The introduction of neoliberal policies was gradual and presented as:

> an order of normative reason that, when it becomes ascendant, takes shape as a governing rationality extending a specific formulation of economic values, practices, and metrics to every dimension of human life (Brown, 2015:30)

The plans to cut subsidies led to angry protests across the country that are historically known as the ‘Bread Riots’, and Egyptians took to the streets to demonstrate against the newly imposed measures (Frerichs, 2015:614). The people’s efforts were successful in preventing the government from reaching an agreement with the IMF. Nonetheless, Egypt struggled to afford the costs of its comprehensive subsidy programmes and sought to continue cuts in public funds for the health and education sectors (Jakes and Shokr, 2020). Under neoliberal ideology, sacrifices were often justified as a way to reduce public expenditures in education, leading to precarity, defunding and deterioration of public services (Giroux, 2014). The public discourse transformed and “the throne of interest has vanished and at the extreme is replaced with the throne of sacrifice” (Brown, 2015:79). With the encouragement of the IMF, Egypt continued its draconian reforms in crucial sectors such as education, health, and energy that affected “the middle and lower ranks of the vast salaried state bureaucracy, the working class, and labour unions” as well as the lower-class population, who “became hostage to inferior quality public goods and higher prices as the state tightened its belt” (Handoussa and Tawila, 2008:2). On the international level, however, and despite its best efforts to embrace global market ideologies, Egypt continued to be regarded as a threat to foreign investments following decades of nationalisation programmes and inter-regional conflicts. Egypt needed a novel approach to portray a global image as ‘unthreatening’ and open state in order to re-enter the global markets.
3.2.1 WHAT HAS ‘PEACE’ GOT TO DO WITH IT?

The Camp David Peace Treaty in 1978, for which Sadat and Begin received the Nobel Peace Prize, was a step to re-enter the global markets and was driven by economic rationale more than anything else. Indeed, it marked a new era in Egypt’s foreign policy with a new orientation that shifted from the east (Soviet Union & Arab countries) to the west (the United States and Israel). However, it neither ended the Arab - Israeli conflict in the region nor the antisemitic rhetoric in Egypt. Nonetheless, it was a lucrative deal for Egypt, and since its signing, Egypt has become the second-largest non-NATO recipient of US aid after Israel, with over $50 billion received in military aid and nearly $30 billion in economic aid (Ajl et al., 2020:59). However, the price was high, and the peace deal alienated Egypt regionally and resulted in socio-economic isolation. As a reaction to signing the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt was under an economic embargo by other Arab states, which included the suspension of its membership in financial and technical organisations, including the Arab Monetary Fund, the Islamic Conference, and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) (Lavy, 1984).

The impact of the economic embargo on Egypt’s economy differed by sectors and relationships varied by country. For example, the impact was significant to the trade sector but remained low and temporary in tourism and migration sectors (Lavy, 1984). In terms of exporting human capital, Egypt remained a vital source of the high-skilled, low-cost human capital necessary for nation-building efforts following the oil boom in other emerging economies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and UAE (Schielke, 2015). While views differ on the extent to which the embargo affected Egypt economically and socially, it is safe to say that during this period, Egypt’s orientation shifted internally from forced socialism to hostile capitalism and externally from Pan-Arabism to US imperialism (Frerichs, 2015). Interestingly, the same countries (i.e., UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan) that shamed Egypt for its peace treaty and trade relations with Israel are now following the same path. Indeed, fostering trade relations and access to global markets continue to dominate peace negotiations in the region. Sadly, these efforts undermine the progress of peace in the region, and the Palestinian/Israeli conflict continues unabated.
To continue its efforts as an unthreatening state in the global arena, Egypt under Sadat’s leadership sought to paint itself in an image of champion to women’s rights. In 1981, Egypt signed the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), making it the first Arab country to sign the convention (Sjoberg and Whooley, 2015). Nevertheless, Egypt’s ratification came with a few reservations concerning equal rights for citizenship and mobility (Freeman, 2009). Women’s mobility remained tied to their marital status, and their freedom to move remained at the hands of the patriarchy. El Saadawi describes her life inside the Sadat’s open-door regime:

“I feel I am in exile in my own country [...] Things reversed themselves in our lives. Danger became security. And freedom, dictatorship. And we began to see beer and Israeli eggs in the Egyptian stores. A flow of American advertisements poured out for Kent cigarettes and Seven-Up and Schweppes and artificial eyelashes. The national products disappeared from the market (cited in Malti-Douglas, 1995:no page).”

El Saadawi’s words describe the affective and gendered load of neoliberalism’s assault on civil and citizenship rights. Giroux argues (2014:29) “the authoritarian nature of neoliberal political governance and economic power is also visible in the rise of a national security state in which civil liberties are being drastically abridged and violated.” While Sadat was appealing to global powers internationally, he was waging a war against feminists and grassroots activists for women’s rights nationally. In other seminal works such as Men and Sex (1972), and Women and Sex (1972), El Saadawi rejected the inscription of heteronormativity and delved into questions of sexualities, gender identity, and sexual orientation. Her writings challenged the state’s performative feminism and the patriarchal gift-giving approach to women’s rights. She became a grave threat to the patriarchy and its form of state feminism leading to her imprisonment in 1981 and the banning of all her writings (Hitchcock et al., 1993; El Saadawi and Newson-Horst, 2010). In sum, Egypt’s pursuit of peace during this period was motivated and driven by socio-economic gains. The social inequalities continued to increase, and the state of public sector services such as education and health continued to deteriorate, which brought negative consequences to women, on some more than others (Hatem, 1992; Assaad and Arntz, 2005).
3.2.2 FULL IMMERSION

Neoliberalism is “characterised by four central processes of change in the political economy of capitalism: privatisation, deregulation, financialisation and globalisation” (Morley and Crossouard, 2016:150). Public policies to invest in higher education were mainly influenced by advice from international donor organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF. As the case in other African countries, the advice was to re-direct resources from vocational education/training and tertiary education towards heavy investment in primary education (Psacharopoulos, 2006). The rationale behind this logic is the alleged link to positive economic externalities in development of human capital, although such benefits proved “difficult to measure and the instruments available to economists are not powerful enough to prove the case conclusively” (Boissiere, 2004:18).

Consequently, the state of higher education started to deteriorate, and the growth of privatisation in the higher education sector increased. Neoliberalism’s assault on Egypt’s education, specifically on higher education, started to accelerate and went full throttle. As Egypt re-immersed in the global market, there was a desire to internationalise its higher education to keep up with the growing competition globally. The higher education sector witnessed a speedy growth between 1972 - 1976, and seven new public universities were set up outside Cairo, in addition to Helwan University in the capital (Elsaid, 2015). However, the expansion in the sector was not matched with state funding, and universities struggled to absorb the massive increase in numbers of students’ enrolments each year (Cochran, 2012). This was combined with a lack of staff and weak investment in infrastructure (Said, 2017). Moreover, after decades of nationalisation efforts under the previous administration, Egypt’s higher education was less compatible with the global knowledge economy regarding credit transfer, the levels of content, and the length of the preparatory stage in specific study programmes (Cochran, 2012). The objective of this interrogation into Nasser and Sadat’s regimes is not to minimize the impact of their immense efforts to widen participation in higher education and to modernize its institutions. Instead, my objective was to highlight the degree to which their approach of carrying out these efforts lacked democratic and participatory methodologies, and as such led to its failure.
Egypt’s higher education, which was highly regarded in the region, became increasingly underfunded, understaffed, and overwhelmed with increasing numbers of students enrolled each year. After the assassination of Sadat in 1981, Mubarak came to power and remained as president of Egypt for 30 years till he was ousted in 2011. Egypt’s negotiation with the IMF continued, and it successfully secured a loan after reaching a structural adjustment agreement pushing for full-on privatisation, deregulation, free trade, and economic expansion (Jakes and Shokr, 2020). Like other African countries, the introduction of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) accelerated the deterioration of higher education in Egypt. Rizvi and Lingard (2009:40) contend:

[Structural Adjustment Policies] served to institutionalise everywhere the neoliberal notion that governments were highly inefficient in promoting growth and even in addressing the problems of social inequalities. [They] promoted the ideology that only markets could solve the intractable problems facing societies. Markets thus defined the limits of national policies by exerting an unprecedented amount of influence in shaping policies and in allocating funds for social and educational programmes. The policy role of nation-states was thus redefined as a facilitator of markets rather than an instrument that steered them or mediated their effects.

The introduction of SAPs in Egypt did not yield the economic benefits it promised, and foreign debt accumulated at a higher pace. By 1991, Egypt had US$50 billion in foreign debt; while half of this debt was cancelled as a reward for Egypt’s participation in the Gulf War, Egypt saw it necessary to continue its privatisation efforts of the public sector to help with economic recovery (Ajl et al., 2020).

In the context of higher education policies, the privatization efforts began after the Egyptian Parliament passed a law in 1992 allowing the establishment of for-profit private universities (Said, 2017). While the provision of postgraduate education remained an exclusive right to public universities until the law was amended again in 2011 (Cantini, 2020), this step opened the way for more competitors (national and foreign) to enter and control the sector and as a result, the impact was felt for decades to come. Ball (2013) asserts that the introduction of neoliberalism in higher education has transformed its landscape, mission, and structure. Giroux (2014:17) contends that neoliberalism has turned higher education into “adjacent to corporate power, and its mission for critical learning has been replaced with mastering test-taking, memorisation and learning how not to question knowledge”.

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Understanding the meaning of neoliberalism encompasses a broader meaning than the binary of the public and private sectors, as Ball (2013:15) invites us to think of its processes as:

Not simply, as some writers portray it, a process of privatisation, individualisation and state attrition, although those are essential components. Neoliberalism also works on and in public sector institutions, and on and in the state – indeed, the state is important to neoliberalism as a regulator and market maker. Neoliberalism is also realised, disseminated, and embedded through quasi-markets, Public-Private Partnerships, the ‘enterprising-up’ of public organisations, and the work of charities and voluntary organisations.

Globally, decades of neoliberal policies in higher education led “to weaken public control over education while simultaneously encouraging the privatisation of the educational service and greater reliance on market forces” (Berman et al., 2003:253). Privatisation of higher education meant “universities are being driven to act as for-profit businesses in order to compensate for the withdrawal of public funding by neo-liberal governments” (Morley, 2018:17). This rendered universities vulnerable to market dynamics and contributed to the growth of academic capitalism (Bank et al., 2007).

The emergence of entrepreneurial universities symbolised the change in its structure and leadership style and the pool of selecting university leaderships now draws from corporate executives (Kim, 2010). The structure of salaries and pay transformed drastically in favour of universities leadership and academics staff were demoted, put in precarious work conditions, and overloaded with teaching and administrative responsibilities (Boden and Rowlands, 2020). Despite the devastating outcomes on Egypt’s public sector, the country intensified its efforts to embrace neoliberal policies. For example, by the 2000s, the Egyptian government adopted a new approach, ‘the government of businessmen’ calling for accelerated privatisation of public assets (Ajl et al., 2020). The embrace of neoliberal policies led to increased privatisation, commodification and deregulation of higher education institutions (HEI) and augmented sense of the entrepreneurial university (Joya, 2011, 2017). The concentration of wealth remained in the hands of the elites who lived in a ‘bubble of privilege’ of gated communities, private international education, and lucrative ministerial jobs, unaware of the increased poverty and inequalities around them (Eltahawy, 2016:26). The individualistic race to get rich quickly replaced social solidarity, fairness, equity, and equality notions.
Ruti (2017:16) argues that:

Neoliberal capitalism is psychically appealing, and hence economically lucrative because it plays into the basic structure of human desire by promising that it can replace a state of scarcity by a state of satiated abundance; like religions of yesteryear, it implies that (the right kind of) exertion leads right to paradise.

Egypt’s head-first deep dive in implementing neoliberal policies not only led to the erosion of its public sector but its social and moral pillars. Privatisation policies reached a peak across the public sector, including higher education, to a point where it seemed that the ruling elite “had stolen Egypt from its people” (Marfleet, 2017:8). Furthermore, the political corruption inhibited any hope for democracy and the fraudulent 2010 parliamentary elections caused an outcry on both national and international levels, resulting in the boycott from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Wafd party (the most prominent two political opposition entities in Egypt at the time) (Wickham, 2015). The endless state of emergency law (Reza, 2007) that justified police brutality and the massive gap of inequalities eventually led to the social uprising of 25th January 2011.

3.2.3 BACK TO SQUARE ONE

Several studies have attempted to understand the phenomenon of the social uprising on 25th January 2011 in Egypt (aka the Arab Spring) and the reasons behind its failure to achieve its demands (Jamshidi, 2014). Durkan (2011:no page) argues that incidents leading to the social uprising across the region were “economic-based decision(s),” asserting that “questions of democracy, liberty, and freedom of expression were of little interest to the majority of the population.” (cited in Costello et al., 2015:90). This view ignores the fact that since its beginning, the demands for social and democratic transformations formed the three pillars of the social uprising and were clearly written in its slogans (bread, freedom, and social justice). Moreover, to go as far as to suggest that democracy is of no interest to the majority of Egyptians is an extension to colonial and orientalist line of thinking (Said, 2003). However, this is not to deny the impact of economic slowdown on the democratic transition. As the events unfolded in Egypt during the period between the toppling of Mubarak’s regime in 2011 and the return of the military in civilian suits in 2015, the fight for democracy continued despite the high level of hostility and human rights violations (Haddad et al., 2015; Hafez, 2016). The return of the
military to rule exemplifies the biopolitics power discourse and the intangible ways neoliberalism infiltrate the deepest layers of the bodily and psychic beings (Foucault, 1982).

For a brief historical moment at the beginning of the social uprising, a queer spirit of opting out populated the public spheres (Ruti, 2017), and the air was filled with optimism, aspirations and refusal to assimilate into the state-sponsored nationalist discourse (Puar et al., 2007). The overwhelming response to Mubarak’s speech of ‘either me or the chaos’ embodied the queer politics of negativity (Bersani, 1987) that embraced anti-normativity and choosing chaos over oppression (Halberstam, 2011). The refusal of a future of normativity was, at first, a signal of hope not only in Egypt but to the whole world. However, the true test was in resisting the counter-discourse by military authoritarianism who relied on the deployment of fear, narratives of crisis, and failure to regain the thrones of power. Ahmed argues (2004:120) “affect does not reside positively in the sign or commodity but is produced only as an effect of its circulation.” The circulation of fear and enticement of gnawing anxieties were vital instruments to reclaim the thrones of power by the military in Egypt. The backlash in the years following exemplified the deeply rooted internalisation of patriarchal and heterosexist systems of oppression (Bersani, 1987) and its impact in steering the national discourse in Egypt.

During the period of transition of power, Egypt remained under the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) ruling. Firstly, the SCAF tried to distance itself from Mubarak’s regime by populating the public domain with national slogans full of clichés such as (Military and people are one hand الجيش والشعب ايد واحدة) calling for national unity, cohesion, and healing after a period of what the national slogans referred to as tumultuous disturbance (Smith, 2015). This type of social messaging under the pretext of social unity and cohesion was primarily to vilify all forms of resistance, especially by women protesters who refused to leave the streets until their demands for democratic transition were met. The state’s propaganda particularly targeted feminist revolutionaries and justified the physical assault on them by portraying them as troublemakers and culprits working for foreign agents to destabilise the country’s security and threaten its future (Hafez, 2012, 2016; Ghanem, 2016; Naber and El-Hameed, 2016). Secondly, the state relied on its most potent effective mechanism to silence any demand for democratic transition, that is fear (Ahmed, 2004, 2013).
As it is the case in any social transition, some sectors suffer more than others. It so happens that was the case in one of Egypt’s most prominent sources of revenue: tourism. The economic losses combined with lack of security engendered gnawing anxieties and began to dominate the public discourse (Springborg, 2017). For instance, the majority of Egyptians were reported to be “fed up”, leading to a desire for transition “to end quickly” (Winegar, 2012:69). The fear of contingent future of loss, dread and failure clouded the nation’s vision for democracy and muted its voice for resistance. Within this short period, Egypt’s dreams for democratic transition took a turn to the worse, and the subsequent power vacuum led to a haemorrhage of its human and natural resources. The lack of national security ushered the country into a period of curfews, social chaos, violence, and crime (Morsy, 2014).

Women were mainly targeted during this period and were subjected to widespread violence and hostility by the state (Elsadda, 2011). The violence against women continued as Mona Eltahawy recalls an incident where the Police Riot Forces broke her arm during street demonstrations (Guardian, 2011). To inflict fear and anxiety on the nation, the state started ‘virginity tests’ against women demonstrators, a technique to inflict shame and humiliation similar to those deployed by the British coloniser in previous decades (Alvi, 2015; Hafez, 2016). Inflicting fear and shame on the nation by intensifying anxieties became the only way to regain the thrones of power. Ahmed (2004:127) draws specific attention to the affective circulation of fear:

"Fear does not reside in a particular object or sign, and it is this lack of residence that allows fear to slide across signs and between bodies. This sliding becomes stuck only temporarily, in the very attachment of a sign to a body, whereby a sign sticks to a body by constituting it as the object of fear, a constitution taken on by the body, encircling it with a fear that becomes its own."

Moreover, the growth of religious, political parties in number and influence brought new anxieties to Egypt’s future, especially when it concerns women’s rights (Morsy, 2014). In March 2012, The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood, held a conference called Women and the Future where demands were made to reverse what they called ‘Mubarak laws’ including the disentanglement of the National Council for Women and re-instatement of reservations on CEDAW, among other demands (Al Bawaba, 2012; Tadros, 2019).
Sonneveld (2017:88) asserts that:

When an authoritarian government introduces legislation that enhances women’s legal rights with regard to the family but does not reform men’s legal rights inside that same family, it is not surprising that when political oppression ends, disenfranchised men will try to abolish the laws that expanded their wives’ freedom and curtailed theirs.

The deranged rhetoric by extremist groups was very effective in inflicting fear on the direction of the nation’s future, and particularly women’s rights (Morsy, 2014). The return of the military-backed regime in Egypt following the *coup d’état* in 2014 and fraudulent elections in 2015 brought Egypt back to square one. Moreover, the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the refugee crises in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, were instrumentalised by the state to extend the emergency laws and tame any demands for democratic transition and social change. On the global level, the rise of Trumpism in the US and Brexit in the UK gave Egypt’s new regime more grounds to legitimize the abortion of democracy and its unlawful grasp to power. For his first foreign tour as US president in 2017, Trump chose the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a demonstration of the new direction of US foreign policy in MENA. The meaning of the visit can be summed up in one picture (see Image 1) which shows Trump, King Salman of Saudi Arabia, and Al-Sisi holding a glowing orb (resembling the earth) in a darkened room (BBC News, 2017).

**Image 1: Trump during his first foreign visit as US president in May 2017**

The images convey a message of continued alliances and the dawn of a dark era marked with misogyny, hate and human rights violations. Furthermore, the Brexit vote had an impact on the UK relations with Egypt. After most of the British public voted to leave the EU in 2016, the UK - under the Tories' leadership - started to look in its colonial archives for its forgotten allies. In 2017, a trip by then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson was scheduled where he expressed his excitement to meet both President Sisi and Foreign Minister Shoukry and stated that the UK was “Egypt’s top economic partner and strong ally against terrorism and extremist ideas” (AfricaNews, 2017:no page). In 2018, a three-nation trip to Africa (South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya) was arranged to forge trade and investment plans after hiatus of 30 years in relations with a country such as Kenya (GOV.UK, 2018). The outcomes of these visits were materialised in terms of trade and investment deals and collaborations in the higher education sector.

In short, internationalisation of higher education became the UK’s neo-colonial gift to its (ex) colonised territories and subjects. Moreover, the plans are examples of the deteriorating state of ethics in internationalisation in higher education. For instance, the research collaboration plans were not in any way affected by the deteriorating state of academic freedom, freedom of speech and civil liberties in Egypt. According to an Amnesty International report (2015), at least 200 students were arrested during protests in September and October 2014. Moreover, between 2013 and 2017, more than 1,000 students, professors, and university staff were killed, detained, tortured and arrested (GCPEA, 2018). The message was clear: trade and economic relations overrode any concerns about human rights violations.

3.3 THE RULES OF THE GAME: ALWAYS BEHIND, NEVER AHEAD

As illustrated in Chapter Two, efforts of internationalisation in Egypt’s higher education are not a new phenomenon; however, in a neoliberal economy, Egypt’s optimistic attachment to internationalisation involved “sustaining inclination to return to the scene of fantasy that enables [Egypt] to expect that this time, nearness to this thing will help [Egypt] to become different in just the right way” (Berlant, 2011:2).
In 2019, during the Annual Youth Summit in Sharm Elsheikh, Egypt declared the year as the Year of Education and introduced a policy paper outlining the critical directions for transforming its higher education in Egypt. Again, the same rhetoric of sacrifice was repeated by President Al-Sisi, who asserted that “real educational reform is difficult. It requires sacrifice from students, teachers and parents” (Al-Ahram Weekly, 2019: no page). The renewed narratives of crisis were to justify the socio-economic sacrifices which will eventually pay off and bring Egypt to the promised land of internationalisation.

The shift in internationalisation discourses following the introduction of benchmarking, global comparisons, assessments, and indicators turned Egypt’s attachment to internationalisation into a cruel one. In 2018, the overall quality of the education system in Egypt ranked 130 out of 137 countries surveyed globally (PwC Education & Skills Practice, 2019). On the Times Higher Education Ranking for research, Egypt, once the ‘cradle of civilisation’, was ranked between brackets of less than 30 points out of 100 (THE, 2020). Recently, the deteriorating state of education, notably higher education, caused a state of national panic and regional and global embarrassment (Elsaid, 2015).

Berlant (2011:24) describes cruel attachments as “the condition of maintaining an attachment to a significantly problematic object”. Expanding on Berlant’s definition, I argue in this part that Egypt’s intensified attachment to internationalisation as a problematic object became increasingly cruel after the shift to global comparisons, assessments, and benchmarking.

In this part, I will explore the literature on internationalisation and its meanings and mechanisms. My contention is to demonstrate that internationalisation’s ambiguity, elusiveness, and boundlessness render countries such as Egypt to constantly fail in its attainment. Followed by a brief overview of current debates on how internationalisation efforts by nations are measured and evaluated, I will then focus on Egypt’s latest efforts to internationalise its higher education sector and conclude with specific attention to Egypt’s higher education sector.
Internationalisation means different things across different contexts. The shift to measuring internationalisation through ranking, ratings and assessments have turned its meaning into abstract numbers without a clear definition of what it means or what counts as internationalisation. Perhaps one of the most significant challenges in achieving internationalisation is the impossibility of pinning down exactly what it means to begin with. According to Stromquist (2007:82):

Internationalisation covers a wide range of services, from study abroad and greater recruitment of international students, to distance education and combinations of partnerships abroad, internationalised curriculum, research and scholarly collaboration, and extracurricular programs to include an international and intercultural dimension.

The global dynamics of knowledge economy under neoliberal ideologies transformed internationalisation discourses from “sporadic, thin, limited and international academic links and mobility have become systematic, dense, multiple and trans-national” (Kim, 2010:579). A report by the European University Association (2015:1) offers a few recommendations on the importance of internationalisation to doctoral education and regards it as “key priority for universities” and “universities must facilitate mobility for both doctoral candidates and staff.” The report did not offer a clear definition for what it means by internationalisation, except perhaps a plethora of successful examples from countries that seemed to succeed in its achievement. The majority were from the Global North, it shall be noted. Furthermore, if understood according to the report, internationalisation shall be understood in terms of quality policy frameworks, exchange study programmes, and research collaboration programmes. Kim (2009:396) explains that “the discourse of internationalisation is much entwined with globalisation nowadays, and the new modes of cross-border, transnational and virtual education are becoming important and causing much confusion in defining internationalisation.” The OECD (2012:7) suggest that mobility is the most visible part, but internationalisation should not be tied or limited to mobility:

One aspect, sometimes referred to as internationalisation at home, consists of incorporating intercultural and international dimensions into the curriculum, teaching, research, and extracurricular activities and hence helps students develop international and intercultural skills without ever leaving their country. Other fast-growing forms of internationalisation are emerging (e.g.,
transnational education sometimes delivered through off-shore campuses, joint programmes, distance learning, etc.) and suggest a more far-reaching approach, especially where higher education is now seen as an integral part of the global knowledge economy.

Accordingly, internationalisation can be understood to operate simultaneously on local and global levels. The local level delineates actions and policy interventions concerned with adjustments in curriculum, teaching etc. and the introduction of transnational education ‘without ever leaving their country’, which in a sense is the antithesis of an economic agenda that encourages circulations of goods, ideas, and people. From this definition, it can be inferred that internationalisation means national self-reliance and that immersive internationalisation equates to reduced international mobility. In a way, it effectively allows dominant players to move outwards into other (Global South) higher education markets, and encourages students from privileged background for outward mobility (King et al., 2010; Rachel Brooks and Waters, 2011; Larsen, 2016, 2019).

Integral to this debate is the role of international donor and development organisations such as the OECD, UNESCO, and the World Bank in writing the rules of the internationalisation game. According to the logic of indicators, benchmarking, assessments, ranking and ratings, internationalisation can be measured, commodified, and located across countries and continents. For instance, global assessment tools such as the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the Education at a Glance series and International Indicators of Educational Systems (INES) are a few good examples that have had a significant impact on national educational policies, internationalisation efforts and mobility trends (OECD, 2017). International organisations are developing a new range of international assessment tools, data, and benchmarking to evaluate and rank education systems worldwide. Inbound and outbound student mobility, and acquired skills and knowledge are a few examples used to benchmark the participating countries against each other according to aggregated learning measurements (King and Palmer, 2013; Carbonnier et al., 2014).

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1 It is worth mentioning that PISA is currently expanding its reach considerably as a way to measure various indicators of SDG Goal 4, specifically through PISA for Development.
Benchmarking, global assessments, standards, and ranking have reinforced the role of international organisations to interfere and regulate education policies. Morgan and Shahjahan argue (2014:10):

Once the assessment is built, evaluation policies and practices have already been transferred by the International Organisation to the participating country. Close attention to the process and techniques through which IOs construct tests can enhance our understanding of how IOs acquire the legitimate power to define what counts in education.

Accordingly, the soft power of international organisations turned internationalisation into a site of neo-colonial dominance exercised by international organisations, most of which are located in the Global North. As such, what counts as successful examples of internationalisation is now in the hands of a few international organisations with unlimited power to devise international policies of education in “largely asymmetric, non-democratic and opaque procedures of decision-making with the sole purpose to serve the economic interests of the North or the globe’s rich club while neglecting the interest of developing countries” (Moutsios, 2009:61).

Transnational education policies, benchmarking and comparisons exacerbated notions of systemic and human “crisis ordinariness” according to which countries are sucked in by the premise that sacrifices made in the name of internationalisation -if done in the right way- will eventually bring the change it promises and sacrifices will eventually pay off (Berlant, 2011:10). This form of cruel optimism in internationalisation discourses “takes shape as an affectively stunning double bind: a binding to fantasies that block the satisfactions they offer, and a binding to the promise of optimism as such that the fantasies have come to represent” (Berlant, 2011:51). Internationalisation under neoliberal ideologies is a binding fantasy that panders to various kinds of sacrifices, austerity measures and policies of transnational circulation of knowledge, capital and human resources that will eventually block the satisfactions these fantasies promise to bring (Berlant, 2011). Furthermore, international assessment tools have become the neo-colonial canons which serve to further the imperial power of a few global players to shape national and supranational education policies (Ross and Gibson, 2007). Countries such as the USA and the UK contribute the most considerable portions to organisations such as the OECD and UNESCO to get the upper hand in deciding what counts as internationalisation and who is counted among the winners. Considering both the USA and the UK
records in embracing policies of “economic Darwinism that promotes privatization, commodification, free trade, and deregulation” (Giroux, 2014:10), it shall come as no surprise the global proliferation of neoliberal policies and the gendered stratification in its landscapes and leadership that are not necessarily in favour of gender equality (Morley and Crossouard, 2015).

3.3.2 CHASING THE HONEY POT

The neoliberal knowledge economy turned the landscape of internationalisation in higher education into a “relational environment” guided by binary logics that divides the winners from the losers who lag behind (Marginson, 2008:303). It is often regarded as a “zero-sum game” where the success of some means the failure of others (Brooks and Waters, 2011:125). It panders to the exertion of the right efforts, in the right direction will bring the happiness it promises (Ahmed, 2010). It justifies disciplinary techniques, regulations, governmentality, and constant re-orientation that will eventually reap the promises of lucrative dividends (i.e., students fees, research grants etc.), global recognition (i.e., ranking, benchmarking) and prestige (i.e., league tables). Morley et al. (2020) suggest embracing an affective turn in thinking about internationalisation in higher education as an ‘affective assemblage’ that is shaped by neoliberal knowledge economies in its rationale, directions, patterns, modes, trends, and policies. They argue that:

Internationalisation policy and process is formed by, and productive of affect. By affect, we mean emotions, responses, reactions and feelings that are construed as relational and transpersonal rather than located solely in the interior individual subject (Morley et al., 2020:5).

The new direction of exerting internationalisation efforts as articulated in Egypt’s national strategy 2030 demonstrate the aspirations and hopes the country places on internationalisation. Egypt set the following goals to internationalise its higher education:

1. International student numbers to increase by 100 per cent
2. Ten Egyptian institutions in the top 500 world rankings
3. All Egyptian higher education institutions to be accredited by the National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation of Education (NAQAAE)
4. Reduced graduate unemployment
5. Increased graduate satisfaction with labour market opportunities

As part of its commitment to renew its relationship with African countries in post-Brexit policies, the UK offered to help Egypt achieve these goals by signing multiple memorandums of understanding (MoU) to increase transnational education and research collaborations. Currently, the UK is Egypt’s fourth-largest collaborator with respect to HE provision (UUKi, 2018), thus reinforcing its neo-colonial dominance by shaping higher education policies in ex-colonised countries such as Egypt. The dilemma facing Egypt’s higher education system lies in the (im)possibility of meeting the equation of providing free massified access while maintaining a promise of providing global higher education under neoliberal ideologies. It must be noted that in general, access to higher education in Egypt is free and meritocratic by design. In principle, the meritocratic system is designed to grant equal admission “to only the most academically gifted students, regardless of the family’s ability to pay the admission system” (Buckner, 2013:531). Access to state-owned universities is primarily based on the results of the Thanawiya Amma exams (see Table 1).
### Table 1: Structure of different levels of the Egyptian education system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade/Years</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>National System (Public &amp; Private)</th>
<th>Total Enrolled Students</th>
<th>Key Regulators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KG2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>20.0 million students in total: 19.4 million students in the general education system excluding Al-Azhari system and technical secondary education (18.6 million in public schools and 2 million in private schools)</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Technical Education (MoETE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thaseeriyaa Amma Certificate: Grade Point Average (GPA) accumulated through 12 quarterly tests between Grades 10-12.</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>2.4 million students (2.3 million in public universities, 150 thousand students in private universities)</td>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Education Certificate: Grade 9 examination.</td>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education Certificate: Grade 6 examination.</td>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PWC, 2019

According to the latest data collected by Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAMPAS), Egyptian higher education institutes (HEI) comprise 28 public universities, 25 private universities, eight public technical institutes (post-middle), 11 private technical institutes and 13 higher institutes and academies (CAMPAS, 2019). In the academic year 2018/2019, HEI accommodated 2.5 million students, of which 53.2 per cent were females. State-owned public universities and institutes accommodated 92.1 per cent of the total students’ population, while the private sector share was 7.9 per cent (CAMPAS, 2019). Egypt’s spending on higher education in the academic year 2019/2020 reached 2.1 per cent of the total of the state’s public expenditure (CAMPAS, 2019).
The OECD (2010:186) notes that “internationalisation efforts in Egyptian higher education are still relatively marginal”, and in terms of national policies “there appears to be no explicit, integrated policy on the internationalisation of higher education.” Examples of international research collaboration and exchange programmes include initiatives such as the European Union’s sponsored ERASMUS programme, UK Chevening Scholarship Programme, US Fulbright Scholarship Programme, Germany DAAD Exchange Programme (OECD, 2010). Language remains a key detriment to Egypt’s success in the internationalisation Olympics. According to Article 2 of the Constitution, Arabic is the official language and the language of delivery in higher education in Egypt is Arabic (State Information Service, 2019). Article 60 emphasises that in the educational context, the Arabic language is a primary subject in all stages of education in all educational institutions (State Information Service, 2019). However, the extent Arabic is used as the mode of delivery differs between state-owned public universities and international private universities.

A growing body of literature in the African context investigates the use of colonial languages in education and the perceptions on the benefits of learning colonial language to better prospects in terms of employability, income, and mobility (Alidou, 2003; Matsinhe, 2005; Obondo, 2007; Albaugh, 2014). A recent study on learning colonial languages versus the use of colonial languages as the medium of instruction in primary and secondary schools in Africa shows that “the percentage of teaching periods devoted to a colonial language as a subject of study has no association with income inequality. However, where colonial languages are the medium of instruction, income inequality is significantly higher, even controlling for robust predictors of cross-national inequality” (Coyne, 2015:619). These findings may explain the increased demand on international private language education in Egypt in recent years (Barsoum, 2014, 2017). However, not all colonial languages were created equally. Recently, intensified efforts were reported in ex-colonised countries in the MENA region to embrace the English language as the lingua franca in higher education. For instance, in countries such as Algeria and Morocco, there is a growing tendency to embrace English rather than French (Bensouiah, 2020).
In North Africa, English is now perceived as “the language of the future, equated with moving on from the colonial past towards new connections, new horizons, and new articulations of a global-national identity” (Jacob, 2019:6). The level of proficiency in colonial language shapes the rationale for the direction of mobility as well as participants’ ability to compete and gain admission to universities abroad (Nour and Nour, 2020). As illustrated earlier, the predominant language of delivery to courses in public universities is Arabic in Egypt. Those who wish to continue postgraduate studies abroad have two options a) either to seek undergraduate education in a private university where the primary language is English or b) take English courses and exams to prove their proficiency after graduation. This point brings the discussion to the value of Transnational Education (TNE) and its importance to the decision of international mobility.

3.3.3 THE LOGIC OF GOING ABROAD

Transnational Education (TNE) is another critical mechanism of internationalisation and for shaping the rationale and decision-making processes for outward mobility. Another aspect that adds to the appeal and attractiveness of TNE is the global accreditation (Alam et al., 2013; Hill and Sughnani, 2021). The UUK (2018:3) defines TNE as “the delivery of an educational award in a country other than that in which the awarding body is based. It can include but is not limited to branch campuses, distance learning, joint and dual degree programmes, fly-in faculty, or a mix of these, often referred to as blended learning.” In recent years, TNE has gained tremendous traction globally (McBurnie and Ziguras, 2006; Collins, 2009; Alam et al., 2013; Bannier, 2016; Francois, 2016) and across the MENA region (Mir, 2013; Erguvan, 2015; Hill and Sughnani, 2021). The case of TNE in Egypt and its rapid expansion confirms the continued attachments to internationalisation as cruel optimism which:

Gives a name to a personal and collective kind of relation and sets its elaboration in a historical moment that is as transnational as the circulation of capital, state liberalism, and the heterofamilial, upwardly mobile good-life fantasy have become (Berlant, 2011:11).

Egypt’s recent shift in TNE policies is strategic in twofold: to develop a competitive edge in the global knowledge economy and to increase its attractiveness as study destination. On the national level, the appeal of international private higher education among the elite and upper middle-class is premised
on its capacity to offer quality of education and prospects of employability that the state-owned public universities failed to do (Barsoum, 2017). Boden and Nedeva (2010) observe the changes in employability discourses in response to market dynamics of neoliberalism and its consequences of reshaping landscape of higher education by creating different tiers of universities. A study by PwC Education & Skills Practice (2019) suggests that reasons behind the increased provision of TNE in Egypt include the poor quality of the public universities, high unemployment rates among graduates from public universities and the shortage in securing white-collar employment. Egypt’s ample supply of graduates is not acquiring the skills required by employers in the neoliberal economy and the appeal of TNE lies in the premise of fulfilling these gaps. Furthermore, TNE offers student from elite and privileged background the possibility to enrol in study fields in which they failed to secure admission in public universities (Elsaid, 2015). However, TNE in Egypt suffers from a lack of regulations, and absence of quality frameworks and control (Barsoum, 2014, 2017).

In 2018, Egypt established the International Branch Campus (IBC) regulations for foreign universities in Egypt. Unlike its legal predecessor, the new regulations did not require the owner to hold Egyptian nationality or a conclusion of an international treaty between Egypt and the home country of a foreign university. Furthermore, the new regulations aimed to facilitate the procedures and even provide some investment incentives to attract more foreign universities to Egypt (PwC Education & Skills Practice, 2019). Despite these challenges, the sector is performing relatively well as evidenced by exponential growth in the rate of graduates from private universities that offer TNE in Egypt over a decade from 2008 till 2018 (see Figure 2).
TNE is an essential mechanism to Egypt’s internationalisation efforts to recruit international students. In 2017, the number of international students in Egypt grew three times over since 2013 and contributed 1.25 billion US Dollars to the Egyptian economy in 2018 (MOHE, 2017). Students from Malaysia remain the majority of international students in Egypt (WENR, 2019). Various reasons are behind this trend and are closely related to affordable education in the globally renowned leading institutions of Islamic studies (Al-Azhar University) and socio-economic conditions such as culture and affordable living costs (Tarek Abd el Galil, 2017). The quality and availability of TNE shape the rationale for outward mobility among Egyptian students. Recent data by UNESCO shows the top destinations for outbound mobility among Egyptians seeking tertiary education abroad are the United Arab Emirates, with a share of 4,700 students of a total of 38,667, followed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 4,560, the United States 2,928, and Germany at 1,743 (UIS, 2017). The United Kingdom is the 7th most favour ed destination on the list, with only 1,413 students from Egypt (UIS, 2017).

The increased rates of outward study mobility to nearby Arab countries such as the UAE can be attributed to multiple factors such as; the thriving TNE sector of university branching (i.e. British University in Dubai, New York University Abu Dhabi, American University in Dubai, Paris-Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi etc.); perceptions of a better quality of higher education; shared
culture, simple visa procedures; and higher prospects of employment after graduation (Alam et al., 2013; Alpen Capital, 2014; Hill and Sughnani, 2021). Other factors shape the rationale and decision-making processes, such as economic slowdown, political instability and growing desire to study abroad. The data of World Education Services (WES, 2012) reports a significant increase in the volume of applications from prospective students from Egypt of (41 per cent) to US education institutions between Q1’2011 and Q1’2012 following the uprisings of 2011.

Changes in the host country’s policies can be regarded as another factor to attract students. Germany’s *Excellenzinitiative* of 2005 (Hazelkorn, 2009) and new offers for study exchange programs by the German Academic Exchange Services (DAAD) serve as useful examples. The state of art and research facilities can influence the motivation for mobility and the choice of study destination. A recent poll published by Fouad et al. (2015) names a few factors that influence the rationale among Egyptian medical undergraduates to study abroad and their choices for study destinations. The study shows that 85.7 per cent of the sample intended to leave the country after graduation. The study reveals some interesting findings on the gendered decision-making processes and rationale regarding the choice of study destination and motivations for going abroad. First, while the sample of respondents was evenly distributed between sexes, those that stated they did not have such intention were 14.3 per cent of the sample size and were majorly females (72.4 per cent, 97). Secondly, the three majorly chosen destination countries were: the USA, Germany, and the UK. The study also points out that most respondents signalled a desire to return to Egypt citing “feelings of belonging and a desire to serve the country” (Fouad et al., 2015:193). In the next chapter, I will discuss in further details the social pressures women face towards their rights for mobility which will shed some light on the findings of the study.

### 3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this chapter, I demonstrated some postcolonial anxieties and their affective structure in Egypt’s efforts to internationalise its higher education. I began this chapter by highlighting the barriers and challenges Egypt faced in asserting its positionality as an independent and sovereign nation. Egypt’s
politics of disorientation put the country at odds and in direct confrontation with the colonial power.

The massification of Egypt’s education sector is part of its plans to maximise the human and national resources to continue its nation-building efforts. However, the nationalisation discourse proved to fail in yielding the benefits it promised, and Egypt was caught in crossroads trying to resist colonial power while following the same colonial model for capital accumulation and development. The country’s desire to re-enter the global markets rendered it susceptible to neoliberal dynamics and policies that shifted the landscape, structure, and mission of its HE to this day. On the recommendations of international development organisations, investment in higher education diminished, which led to deterioration in its infrastructure and failure to absorb the massive numbers of students it matriculated each year. Internationalisation of education (including TNE) became a site of fantasy for the state to generate revenues to compensate public education expenses and for parents to invest in education they believe will lead to upward social mobility.

The slow attrition of internationalisation as a site of fantasy became apparent as Egypt constantly failed to meet the rapidly shifting landscape of global rankings and assessment. This failure rendered the country in a state of shame and dread. Internationalisation became the promise to compensate for the loss of citizenship rights and to mask human rights violations. It engendered narratives of crises that justified sacrifices in the name of attaining the fantasy of the good life. These sacrifices have multiple stratifications in line with gender, class, race, age, and geographical location. International private education is still regarded as prestigious and associated with better quality, despite the lack of regulations in the sector. The increase in the numbers of offshore campuses in Egypt and the MENA region reflect the increasing demand for this type of education. Furthermore, the extent of internationalisation efforts at home universities (or the lack thereof) combined with socio-economic conditions contributes to the rationale, direction, and willingness for outward mobility.

Having established the central argument, the next chapter will pay close attention to the impact of shifting landscapes of internationalisation that shapes Egyptian women’s decision for outward mobility for postgraduate studies and their choice of the UK as a study destination.
I saw myself on a white stallion, flying through the air, in my hand a sword with which I felled the enemy and liberated the homeland. I had been born in a country ruled by foreigners. My grandmother gasped when I told her about my dream:

— That is no dream for girls.
— What do girls dream of then, grandmother?
— Of bridegrooms and wedding dresses.

Nawal El Saadawi (El Saadawi and Newson-Horst, 2010:19)

El Saadawi’s memories of rebellious childhood reveal two dominant scripts which depict the happy good life for women in Egypt. Her words will guide the structure of this chapter to illustrate that Egyptian women’s spatial and geographical mobilities are mapped by temporal, gendered and affective demarcations that articulate through both national and global discourses. My contention is that Egyptian women postgraduates’ geographical and spatial mobilities are straddled by hegemonic dominant and conflicting discourses. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, internationalisation is constructed as a site of fantasy for upward mobility. In this chapter, I argue that women postgraduates in Egypt are presented with powerful scripts of happiness concerning mobility, marriage and motherhood, whose gendered social expectations are saturated with affect. On the one hand, the heteronormative dominant happiness script equates the good life with domestic bliss (i.e., marriage, children etc.), and on the other hand, the neoliberal knowledge economy panders to different scripts of happiness that associate academic mobility with career advancement, upward social class mobility, and the attainment of the good life.

The affective assemblage of occupying this liminal space is exacerbated by the erosion in the mission and value of higher education after decades of neoliberalism (see Chapter Three). This chapter consists of four parts, in part one I will investigate Egyptian women’s entry into higher education, their transition to postgraduate studies and the social pressure they face after graduation. In part two, I will focus on the intensity of heteronormativity to confine women within strict notions and orders of temporal and spatial organizing of their lives. In part three, I will illustrate the appeal of outward mobility and the neoliberal promises for women to move. The chapter will conclude by interrogating
the construction of the UK’s HE as an object of desire and the colonial afterlives in mobility trajectories. In this chapter, I will continue to work closely and critically with affect theory (Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011) to interrogate the promises of happiness for women in Egypt.

4.1 WOMEN’S EDUCATION IN EGYPT: A REASON FOR CELEBRATION?

There are encouraging outcomes to Egypt’s efforts to increase access to its education and to close the gender gap on all levels of education. Today, and according to the Global Gender Gap Index (2020) which ranks countries’ gender regimes in four focal areas: educational attainment, economic participation and opportunity, health and survival, and political empowerment- Egypt has almost closed the gender gap at all levels of educational attainment. In 2020, Egypt ranked 102 (8th on the regional level) on educational attainment out of 153 countries included in the index. The data show that girls outnumber and outperform boys at all levels of education (World Economic, 2020). These numbers are indeed a cause for celebration and optimism for closing the gender gap in education and for the future of women’s education in Egypt. However, they also mask persistent and chronic challenges facing girls’ and women’s education in the country. For instance, the illiteracy rates among girls and women, the female youth school drop-out rates, and women transition to employment after higher education. Furthermore, the index does not show the increasing gaps based on social class, age, religion, family’s level of education and geographical locations. This first part will investigate the status of women’s education as it intersects with class, age, and geographical location.

4.1.1 THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

To start with the issue of illiteracy rates in Egypt, which is often a cause of global and regional embarrassment. Even though Egypt achieved gender parity across different levels of education, eradicating illiteracy among the female population, especially those over the age of 15, is a task far from over. The data collected between 1975 to 2017 reveal that the literacy rate among the female population aged 15 and older has more than tripled from 20 per cent to 65 per cent (UNESCO, 2020). However, the percentage decreases by age population with only 21 percent of women over the age 65 able to read or write (see Figure 3).
Several factors contribute to this stubborn phenomenon: the colonial legacies and its persisting influence on shaping Egypt’s notion on gender and education (Megahed and Lack, 2011), the gendered impact of poverty in Egypt (El-Laithy, 2001) which increased in recent years and often drives the family to prioritise boys’ education, access to schools in rural and marginalised communities (Langsten, 2016); and the prevailing ideology of early marriage and female domesticity (Bassem et al., 2018). The data show age-related discrepancies with high illiteracy rates among older female populations; 78 per cent of women over the age of 65 are still unable to read or write (UNESCO, 2020). Geographical location is another dimension with higher percentages of illiteracy recorded among females in rural areas; 38.8 per cent in Upper Egypt, 45 per cent in Minia and 44 per cent in Beni Suef (The World Bank, 2018). Moreover, disguised illiteracy is another challenge which remains absent from policy documentation and frameworks. According to the World Education Services...
(WES), there are around 30 per cent of school children, most of them living in rural regions and Upper Egypt, who lack basic reading and writing skills (WES, 2019).

While education in Egypt is free, the progress between different levels of education remains highly influenced by social class. In 2007, estimates suggested that Egyptians spend $2.2 bn a year on after-class school tutoring services (Hartmann, 2008). Private tutoring has reached epidemic levels in Egypt, so much so that in response to parents’ complaints, the Ministry of Education has proposed a draft law that would criminalise private tutoring (Daily News Egypt, 2018). Recent statistics show that, on average, 60 per cent of household investment in education in Egypt is spent on private tutoring (Loveluck, 2012). Sieverding et al. (2019) found no gender difference in family’s decisions to invest in private tutoring. However, they note there may be a correlation between families’ investment in their daughters’ education and outcomes of the marriage market. I will return to this point in detail in part two of this chapter. However, for now I would like to focus on the topic of transition through different levels of education. The data on performance on different levels show that in terms of transition to tertiary education, girls show better performance and completion rates of the exit exams (Thanaweya Amma) than boys, especially among populations in rural areas and upper Egypt (The World Bank, 2018). Interestingly, in eight governorates, where traditional gender norms prevail such as Fayoum, Beni Suef, Minia, Assiut, Sohag, Qena, Luxor and Aswan, the percentage of girls earning secondary school degrees is higher than boys (The World Bank, 2018). In terms of enrolment in state-owned public universities, in the academic year 2018/2019, the share of women reached 53.2 per cent of the total student population, whereas in terms of graduation, women’s share exceeds that of men with 57.1 per cent of total graduates (CAMPAS, 2019). In private universities, there is almost gender equality with men’s share is 50.7 per cent and women’s share is 49.3 per cent (CAMPAS, 2019).

The colonial legacies can still be felt in the persisting social attitudes towards women’s access to higher education and mobility for study purposes. The lack of freedom for trans-local mobility for study purposes remains the biggest challenge facing women’s entry into higher education in Egypt (Megahed and Lack, 2011, 2013). A study by the Strategic Planning Unit (2010) at the Ministry of Higher Education in Egypt concluded that the lowest number of female students’ enrolment exists in
Upper Egypt governorates due to a) the uneven geographical distribution of universities; b) socially and culturally conservative notions and resistance to the idea of daughters’ trans-local mobilities; and c) socio-economic challenges to families’ capabilities to afford the costs of university education for their children (cited in Megahed, 2017).

In 2016, a report by the Egyptian Centre for Public Opinion Research (Bassera) supports this view and points out that conservative social views on women’s trans-local mobility remain prevalent in Egypt; particularly in Upper Egypt, where families refuse to allow their daughters to travel for long distances or live independently separate from the family in other cities for the sake of education (Ragab et al., 2016). As a result, women’s access and choices for higher education studies are tied to the options available in their governorates. Since the majority of Egypt’s higher education institutions are clustered in the northern region of Egypt (see Figure 4), women from Upper Egypt are disproportionately affected by the lack of opportunities to access higher education in their regions.

**Figure 4: The geographical distribution of Egypt’s higher education institutions**


Against this backdrop, to suggest that access to higher education in Egypt is meritocratic is to dismiss its gendered and classed disparities. Morley and Lugg’s (2009) analysis of higher education systems in
two African countries shows that gender and class stratifications challenge notions of meritocracy in access to higher education. As the case from Egypt shows, geographical location and social attitudes on women’s mobility must also be taken into consideration when talking about meritocracy in higher education.

4.1.2 THE VALUE OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR WOMEN IN EGYPT

Despite these challenges, the share of Egyptian women students in STEM and non-STEM fields remains very high. In the academic year 2018/2019, 77.6 per cent of the student population were enrolled in non-STEM fields where women’s share made up 54.9 per cent, and 22.4 per cent of students were enrolled in STEM fields where women’s share recorded at 47.2 per cent (see Table 2).

Table 2: Enrolment in STEM and Non-STEM fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>19/18</th>
<th>18/17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical &amp; Practical Faculties in A.R.E Universities</td>
<td>19/18</td>
<td>18/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Students in Theoretical &amp; Practical Faculties (Million)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Faculties (%)</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical Faculties (%)</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Students in Theoretical Facilities (Million)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males (%)</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females (%)</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Students in Practical Facilities (Million)</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males (%)</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females (%)</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Education Graduates</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Graduates in University Education (Million)</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>537</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governmental Universities (%)</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Universities (%)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Graduates in Governmental Universities (Million)</td>
<td>486.3</td>
<td>368.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males (%)</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females (%)</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Graduates in Private Universities (Million)</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males (%)</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females (%)</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The consistent and robust representation of women in STEM fields in Egypt queers the global discourse of women in STEM and their relatively low representation globally in these fields. However, this should not suggest a shift in social attitudes on women in STEM in Egypt (Islam, 2017; El Nagdi and Roehrig, 2020). Furthermore, women are graduating at higher rates with a share of 57.1 per cent from public universities and 49.3 per cent from private universities of the total undergraduates' population (CAMPAS, 2020). Despite their outstanding performance, socio-cultural and institutional barriers face women to pursue careers after graduation, especially in STEM fields. The latest data show that women’s share of employment in Egypt is 24.7 per cent with only 15 per cent of women in parliament, 24 per cent in ministerial positions and less than 8 per cent as legislators, senior officials, and managers (World Economic Forum, 2020). The labour code of 2003 in Egypt prohibits women from employment in specific industries such as construction and mining, certain types of night work in industrial establishments, and roles “deemed morally inappropriate” for women (UNDP, 2018:9).

The blatant discrimination against women exemplifies the double standards of the patriarchal state that holds women in different moral regard than men. Moreover, it gives a legal leeway for employers to openly discriminate against women regarding recruitment, promotion, and career advancement.

The level and type of education shape women’s prospects for employment. According to the World Bank (2016), the percentage of youth in the age bracket between 15-29 who are Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEET) reached 40.7 per cent in 2016. The study shows a striking gendered stratifications to youth unemployment in Egypt, as two out of three young women in rural Egypt (69.7 per cent), and more than half of the female youth in urban areas (60.4 per cent) are NEET. In contrast, only one out of eight young men in urban areas (13.2 per cent) and a tenth of young men in rural Egypt (10.5 per cent) are NEET. Those holding higher education degrees seem to be most affected by unemployment. A large proportion of university graduates (ages 25-29) are NEETS, with the majority living in urban areas. Although recent accurate and reliable source of data on employment were not available, it is estimated that these numbers are likely to increase as a result of COVID-19 (OECD, 2020).
The social attitudes of what deemed as an acceptable profession for women remain to shape their entry into the labour market, their choices and continuation (Ghafar, 2016; Fattah, 2019). The distribution of skilled workforces across sectors shows a high number of women are employed in the service sector (52 per cent) compared to men (46 per cent), according to the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2016). The reasons behind the changes in the employment sector in Egypt are closely linked to the impact of embracing neoliberal policies (see Chapter Three). The shrinkage of the public sector combined with limited geographical mobility harmed women’s chances for employment and widened the gender pay gap (Hatem, 1992). Assad and Arntz (2005) contend that gender pay gaps and gendered stratifications in employment, especially in the non-governmental sector, widened as a result of neoliberal policies in Egypt. The neoliberal assault on the public sector, which was the largest employer for women in Egypt, resulted in a growing reliance on the private sector where women face high levels of discrimination in contractual and labour conditions (ILO, 2010).

Precarious employment conditions, especially among women, led to the rise of the “consultancy class” and growing anxieties caused by frictions in the social contract from forging “episodic dealings as opposed to having institutionally shaped long-term relationships” (Berlant, 2011:215). In Egypt, there are approximately more than 21 per cent of Egyptian women working under precarious employment conditions of time-related underemployment, compared to only 4 per cent of working men (ILO 2016). Higher education remains one of Egypt’s most prominent employers for women, partly because most of its institutions remain in the public sector, despite the growing increase in the private sector. The data on labour force participation show a strong presentation of women researchers (see Table 3 and 4).
Table 3: Distribution of researchers by sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Researchers by sector of employment in full-time equivalents (%)</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<th>2015</th>
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<tr>
<td>Business enterprise</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>5.31</td>
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<td>5.31</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>5.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>41.22</td>
<td>52.03</td>
<td>45.67</td>
<td>36.25</td>
<td>35.23</td>
<td>35.08</td>
<td>32.70</td>
<td>33.61</td>
<td>32.70</td>
<td>33.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>54.11</td>
<td>47.76</td>
<td>53.33</td>
<td>58.24</td>
<td>59.02</td>
<td>58.66</td>
<td>60.46</td>
<td>59.76</td>
<td>60.46</td>
<td>59.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private non-profit</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>4.67</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>16.26</td>
<td>23.77</td>
<td>20.61</td>
<td>18.40</td>
<td>17.61</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>16.36</td>
<td>17.51</td>
<td>16.36</td>
<td>17.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>74.76</td>
<td>76.09</td>
<td>79.39</td>
<td>77.88</td>
<td>78.57</td>
<td>78.56</td>
<td>79.48</td>
<td>78.47</td>
<td>79.48</td>
<td>78.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private non-profit</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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Table 4: Women’s share of total researchers populations

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<tr>
<td>Per million inhabitants</td>
<td>433.33</td>
<td>492.41</td>
<td>491.76</td>
<td>517.14</td>
<td>539.02</td>
<td>675.24</td>
<td>672.94</td>
<td>689.25</td>
<td>677.10</td>
<td>686.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% female</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>41.65</td>
<td>41.87</td>
<td>43.81</td>
<td>43.69</td>
<td>41.17</td>
<td>42.56</td>
<td>42.81</td>
<td>43.61</td>
<td>43.80</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per million inhabitants</td>
<td>1,098.35</td>
<td>1,078.65</td>
<td>1,076.43</td>
<td>1,255.51</td>
<td>1,253.01</td>
<td>1,382.10</td>
<td>1,382.16</td>
<td>1,398.51</td>
<td>1,384.52</td>
<td>1,407.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% female</td>
<td>37.30</td>
<td>41.70</td>
<td>42.30</td>
<td>41.60</td>
<td>42.80</td>
<td>42.20</td>
<td>43.40</td>
<td>44.10</td>
<td>45.30</td>
<td>45.60</td>
</tr>
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</table>


Women’s share of total researchers’ population recorded at 45.80 per cent in 2018 (see Table 4). The social views and attitudes on women entering the teaching profession remain favourable. The findings of a recent study titled *Women’s careers in the Arab Middle East: Understanding institutional constraints to the boundaryless career view* (2014) points out that women in Egypt, among other countries in the region, choose academic careers as a profession due to a) perception of an academic career as ‘a calling’, b) the lack of access to other career options, c) and the flexibility of academic work (Afiouni, 2014:321). Egypt’s state-owned public universities offer more extended employment contracts, relatively short working hours (compared to the private sector), maternity leave and childcare leave (up to two years) that can be incentives for working women to mitigate the social pressure of maintaining their work-life balance. As it concerns the global issue of the gender pay gap, there is a wide gender pay gap in Egypt’s labour market and by type of employment and employer across the public and private sectors.
In education settings, studies suggest that Egyptian teachers with international qualifications have better employment prospects in the private sector with better salary schemes and benefits than the public sector (Tansel et al., 2018). This can be regarded as another incentive for parents to invest in international education for their children and, in particular, for women to seek international qualifications through TNE at home or go abroad for postgraduate education.

4.2 MARRIAGE: PATRIARCHY’S GREATEST PUBLICITY STUNT

Beside the legal and institutional barriers, the social pressures on women to follow path of heteronormativity (i.e. to get married and have children) intensify after graduation and undermine their prospects of employment (Salem, 2015; Sieverding and Hassan, 2016; Fattah, 2019). Ahmed (2010:6) contends that “one of the primary happiness indicators is marriage. Marriage would be defined as the best of all possible worlds as it maximises happiness. The argument is simple: if you are married, then we can predict that you are more likely to be happier than if you are not married.” Queer theorist Lisa Duggan (2003) stresses that the heteronormative processes of nation-building under neoliberal ideologies establish ‘the decent citizen’ subjects (i.e., ones that get married, have children, produce human supply for labour demands, and live middle-class lives of consumerism). The temporal organizing of marriage is important for the overall argument of this thesis that postgraduate education queers the “straight time” according to which “the only futurity promised is that of reproductive majoritarian heterosexuality, the spectacle of the state refurbishing its ranks through overt and subsidized acts of reproduction” (Muñoz, 2009:22). Singlehood is often perceived as sign of social failure and associated with loneliness, and misery. Cobb (2012:15) analyses what singlehood means in global neoliberal capitalist economies and contends:

The problem of the single is not the actual, lived experience of people who find themselves alone as much as the feelings that deliberately foreclose our understanding of singleness because singles are thought to be lonely-and loneliness, as we’re frequently reminded, has terrible consequences.

The terrible consequences of leading a single life for women in Egypt are too many to count. Singlehood is another site of infantile citizenship (Berlant, 1997) and its gendered and affective structure rely on stigma, shame and failure. In Egypt, as in other parts of the world, shame is
misogynist, and the single world is divided in binary logic between the glorification of ‘confirmed bachelors’ and the abject of ‘old maids’. Marriage in Egypt remains one of the state’s most effective apparatus to regulate women’s bodies, identities, and sexualities. To grasp the significance of this phenomenon and its relation to the objective of this thesis, it is imperative to interrogate the horizontal and vertical social pressures on single women in Egypt.

4.2.1 THEY SHUN SINGLE WOMEN, DON’T THEY?

The ILO survey on School-to-Work transition shows that young women in Egypt face a particularly difficult time joining the labour market as a result of early age of marriage (ILO, 2010). The Global Gender Gap index (2017) highlights that 61 per cent of Egyptian women were married by age 25, compared to only 13 per cent of men (World Economic Forum, 2017). The time to enter marriage in Egypt is gendered and classed. The minimum age of marriage in Egypt is 18 for both males and females according to Child Law of 2008. However, in recent years there has been an increase in cases of child marriages with a reported 14.8 per cent from the total number of registered marriage cases (World Economic Forum, 2020). The UNICEF (2017) report points out that legal loopholes, socioeconomic factors and traditional views contribute to this growing phenomenon in Egypt.

Generally speaking, among adults, Salem’s (2015) study shows that a) Egyptian women enter marriage unions earlier than men, and b) longer periods of education for women (i.e., postgraduate education) negatively impact their prospects in Egypt’s marriage market. Across the studied sample, 21 per cent of women got married by the age of 18, while 78 per cent got married by the age of 25, and 93 per cent were married by age 30. As highlighted earlier, there is no explicit gender bias in families’ investment in their children education (i.e., private tutoring); however, other studies claim that there is an implicit expectation of better marriage prospects for women who completed undergraduate studies (bachelor's degrees) than those who do not (Lloyd et al., 2003; Assaad and Krafft, 2015).

The pressures of social expectations for women to follow heteronormative paths often intensify in the period after finishing undergraduate studies. Fattah (2019:29) points out that, after graduation, women are often “forced to choose either to join the labour market or the marriage market” and as such the
social pressures led to the “rise to the new baby boom Egypt is currently experiencing” and explains the “low participation of females in the labour market.” It must be noted that postgraduate students in state-owned universities are hired as faculty members, according to the general regulations of the higher education sector in Egypt, and are required to complete their postgraduate education within 10 years from finishing undergraduate studies, in addition to publishing two articles, as formal requirements for obtaining their PhD degrees (Cantini, 2020). As such, most women often find themselves at crossroads between social expectations and pursuing their aspirations for postgraduate studies and/or employment.

Marriage in the eyes of Egypt’s patriarchal state is the ultimate promise of happiness (Ahmed, 2010) and maintaining the “absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (Edelman, 2007:17). Marriage is nothing short of a state-sponsored “program of privilege” and “is never a private contract between two persons. It always involves the recognition of a third party and not just a voluntary or neutral recognition but an enforceable recognition” (Warner, 2000:117). It is permission from the state for consented adults to legally have sex (El-Feki, 2014) and their ascension into sexuality and adulthood (Foucault and Hurley, 1979). It is the state’s gift to its subjects to fantasize about classed upward mobilities and equal citizenship rights (Berlant, 1997, 2011; Berlant and Warner, 1998). Those who opt out of the compulsory state-sponsored heterosexuality programmes are queered on their refusal to buy into the fantasy of hetero-futurism (Edelman, 2007). Women in Egypt are often at the receiving end of the social backlash, suspicions and hostility towards their singlehood (Eltahawy, 2016). Egyptian women who reach the age of 28 and remain unmarried are considered “spinsters” who “lost half of their religion” (Golia, 2008:180).

For women in Egypt, their social status is often tied with their roles as being wives and mothers “no matter how accomplished or professionally successful [they] might be” (El-Feki, 2014:51). Single women, regardless of their achievement in education or employment, are often “treated with the pained kindness reserved in less traditional societies for the handicapped and terminally ill” (Golia, 2008:180). Moreover, the stereotypical gender roles and concerns about their safety deprive women of their rights to lead an independent life separate from the family (El-Feki, 2014). For most women in
Egypt, their navigation across temporal and spatial spaces remains confined under the surveillance of the patriarchal state and male conservatorship (i.e., fathers, husbands). The overriding fear of women leading independent lives stems from a misogynistic view that if women were left to their own devices, they would bring dishonour to the family and the nation (Eltahawy, 2016). The fear of dating, let alone premarital sex drives the whole nation’s paranoia towards independent living for women.

The colonial legacy of gender segregation is felt in Egypt today and consenting adults of the opposite sex cannot share certain spaces (i.e. housing, hotel rooms) together without presenting a marriage certificate (El-Feki, 2014). The ideology of compulsory heterosexual coupledom in Egypt feeds on the “rhetoric of normalisation” that asserts:

The taken-for-granted norms of common sense are the only criteria of value, rival views become unimaginable by this standard. So just as isolation, privatisation, and obviousness have the effect of coercion in the politics of shame, so does that idealisation of the normal (Warner, 2000:60).

Even in societies that extend social arrangements beyond the heterosexual norm, such as in European societies, coupledom remains one of the most potent objects of normativity (Roseneil et al., 2020). Against this tremendous social pressure, it can be inferred that for many Egyptian women postgraduates, the decision for mobility abroad is influenced - to a certain degree - by a desire to escape the crushing weight of heteronormative ideologies and its expectations and by challenging its temporal logic of organizing their lives.

4.2.2 HAPPILY, NEVER AFTER

One word can accurately sum up the marriage discourse for women in Egypt: violence. As discussed in Chapter Two, the dominance of heterocolonial modern knowledge relied on operation of taboos and logic of censorship. Egyptian women learn from an early age that their bodies are sites of taboos. El Saadawi (1980:38) questioned the violent and invasive patriarchal dominance over women’s bodies:

Every female Arab child, even today, must possess that very fine membrane called a hymen, which is considered one of the most essential, if not the most essential, parts of her body. However, the mere existence of the hymen is not in itself sufficient. This fine membrane must be capable of bleeding profusely, of letting out red blood that can be seen as a visible stain on a white bed sheet the night a young girl is married. [sic] No girl can suffer a worse fate than she whom
nature has forgotten to provide with a hymen, or whose hymen is so delicate that it is torn away and lost by repeated riding in a bicycle or a horse, or by masturbation, or by one of this minor accident that happens so often in childhood.

El Saadawi (1980) points out nature’s cruelty to those girls’ more unfortunate who were born with an elastic hymen, or delicate hymen or no hymen at all. A death sentence with a birth certificate.

Traditionally speaking, the wedding ceremonies in Egypt are celebrations for sacrificing women at the “altar of the god of virginity” (Eltahawy, 2016:114). In principle, according to Islamic jurisprudence, there are four types of marriage conventions (conventional marriage, Urfi, Muyaser and Muta‘ä). In Egypt, as a predominantly Sunni Muslim society, the first two types of marriage contract are the most common and legally acknowledged (El-Feki, 2014). Ishhar (public announcement for marriage) is the key defining between the two according to the Sunni Muslim school of jurisprudence and is a core requirement for legitimatising marriage (El-Feki, 2014).

In Egypt, the wedding night is called Dukhla, referring to the “defloration of bride on her wedding night” (El-Feki, 2014:128). A brutal and violent tradition practised equally among Muslims and Copts in Egypt which means piercing the bride’s hymen on the wedding night to ensure the bride’s virginity and restoring the family’s honour (El-Feki, 2014). The break of the intact hymen on white sheets symbolises the restoration of the nation’s honour and women’s purity. For those more unfortunates who were born with elastic hymens or lost their virginity before the wedding night, social punishment (sometimes death) is often in the cards. Honour killing are still widespread in Egypt. As recently as 2019, a father stabbed his 16-year-old daughter and her boyfriend to death, as reported by the news, because he suspected that they had premarital sex (Nabbout, 2019). Egypt’s open secret is the exponential growth in hymenoplasty surgeries in recent years despite the tremendous legal and health risks (Wynn, 2016). Families are willing to risk the health and safety of their daughters in order to maintain a deranged ideology of honour (Eltahawy, 2016). Another example to illustrate that women’s bodies in Egypt remain the property of the state, not their own.

Intimate partner violence is permissible by the law in Egypt and widely condoned by society. The patriarchal state grants men licence to use violence against their wives as part of the privilege package in the marriage programme. For instance, article 60 of the Egyptian family law explicitly gives
husbands the right to “discipline his wife and daughters as long as he leaves no marks” (Eltahawy, 2016:144). The Penal Code and Law No. 6 of 1998, indicates that injuries committed by domestic violence are legally recognised as an offense on one condition “if they transcended the accepted limits of discipline decided by the judge” and “if the injuries are apparent” for the “disobedient wife” (Eltahawy, 2016:161). Butler (2020:19) reminds us that:

We have to accept that violence and non-violence are used variably and perversely, without pitching into a form of nihilism suffused by the belief that violence and non-violence are whatever those in power decide they should be.

There is a litany of (un)written social cues and codes of what counts as women’s disobedience in the eyes of Egyptian society, for example, leaving home without husband’s permission, refusing marital intercourse, or even the slightest transgressions such as talking to male strangers. Recently, the public debates on conjugal (marital) rape in Egypt has caused a widespread outcry and divided the nation between proponents and opponents. Legally speaking, conjugal (marital) rape is not recognised as a crime in Egypt, and as such women are often deprived from rights to seek legal counsel and help. For most women victims, there are usually few options either to eek the support of the family or to report the incident to authorities. Considering the suffocating culture of taboos in Egypt, families often coerce their daughters to stay in abusive situations to keep the marriage from dissolving out of fear of the stigma attached to divorced women (El-Feki, 2014). Going to the police is not a safe option either, and women often face harassment when reporting cases of gender-based violence (UNWOMEN, 2015). These facts should come as no surprise in Egypt, where women continue to live in a rape culture, the definition of which is:

An environment in which rape is prevalent and sexual violence against women is normalised and excused in the media and popular culture. Rape culture is perpetuated through misogynistic language, the objectification of women’s bodies, and the glamorisation of sexual violence, thereby creating a society that disregards women’s rights and safety. Rape culture affects every woman. Most women and girls limit their behaviour because of the existence of rape. Most women and girls live in fear of rape. Men, in general, do not. That is how rape functions as a powerful means by which the whole female population is held in a subordinate position to the whole male population, even though many men don’t rape, and many women are never victims of rape (Solnit, 2015:130).

Unfortunately, violence in Egypt is not only sponsored by the state but also widely accepted by society.

A recent study finds that almost half of men sampled reported having used physical violence against
their wives. More disturbingly, 90 per cent of men and 70 per cent of women sampled said they believe “wives should tolerate violence to keep the family together” (UN Women and Promundu, 2017:47). What is striking about these numbers is the normalisation of violence in the name of keeping the family united, against which women risk their physical safety and emotional well-being. In many cases of marital violence, married women remain in life-threatening situations due to social and legal coercion.

However, there is an argument that women in Egypt - unlike their peers in different parts of the Arab and Muslim world - can leave abusive marriages by initiating divorce through the Ḫulʿ law. This argument slightly oversimplifies the impact of socio-economic status and cultural norms. In principle, the Ḫulʿ law - which is written by men - is full of complex legal terms and conditions. For example, women initiating divorce must in return forfeit their rights to alimony (nafaqa), the rights for financial compensation (mutʿa), and return the dowry paid at the beginning of marriage (mahy), as well as renounce its deferred portion (muʾakkhar al-saddāq) (Bernard-Maugiron and Dupret, 2008). Socio-economic capabilities draw the dividing line between women in a solid financial position to buy their way out of a bad marriage and those who remain stuck in dangerous and abusive marriages due to socio-economic dependency on the spouse. Moreover, in rural and marginalized communities, regardless of the socio-economic status, divorce is not an option for women (Singerman, 2008; Sonneveld, 2009) and the burden to keep the happiness promise of the united family (Ahmed, 2010) falls solely on the shoulders of women.

Fattah (2019) investigated married Egyptian women’s happiness and concludes that women’s happiness in marriage is largely reliant on the interaction between household chores, having children and having a job. In Against Love: A Polemic, Kipnis (2009:52) deploys Foucauldian inquiry into the institution of marriage in order to figure out why individuals voluntarily enter into what she describes as “domestic gulag”. Kipnis (2009:19) describes domestic life as “shop-floor discipline designed to keep the wives and husbands and domestic partners of the world choke-chained to the status quo machinery.” Marriage in neoliberal times have turned women into cogs in the machinery for hetero-reproduction and the sole purpose of matrimony is to maintain the nation’s ideology of heterofuturity
(Edelman, 2007). For instance, the issue of married women’s sexual (dis)satisfaction in Egypt. The data obtained from Egypt’s Forensic Medicine Department shows that female genital mutilation (FGM) robbed 70 to 80 per cent of Egyptian women of their rights to sexual pleasure (Deccan Chronicle, 2017). Moreover, FGM is strongly correlated to causing female sexual dysfunction (Ibrahim et al., 2013; Abdelhafeez et al., 2020) and even after its prohibition by the law, FGM is still widely practised in Egypt. According to the Demographic and Health Survey (2014), as high as 92 per cent of Egyptian married women aged from 15 and 49 have undergone FGM, and 72 per cent of these operations were done by licensed doctors (UNFPA Egypt, 2016).

The invasive hands of the patriarchy not only cut through women’s bodies but their minds too. In general, Egyptians do not receive any type of sex education either at schools or at home (El-Feki, 2014). In 2010, the Egyptian government decided to remove any references in school curriculum across different levels of education that relates to sex education, reproductive health, and sexually transmitted diseases (Guardian, 2010). As for LGBTQ+ inclusive education, any public display or connotation alluding to homosexuality is considered a public offence and criminalised by the law. In 2019, a TV presenter was sentenced to one year in hard labour for interviewing a gay man on his show and for discussing homosexuality in public (BBC, 2019). Even though online spaces such as Hemayya [in English means protection] or Love Matters, provide resources for students to learn about sex and relationships (Muller et al., 2017), social class, digital inequalities and censorship continue to be huge barriers facing access to any form of sex education. To add insult to injury, married women are often blamed for failures in their marriage and the wandering eyes of their spouses. On the one hand, their failures in intimacy are often taken to justify for the husband's polygamy, which is still legally permissible in Egypt. On the other hand, women who show initiatives in bed are often shamed as being experienced, or a ill-reputed (El-Feki, 2014).
4.3 THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: MOVE OR PERISH?

Against this backdrop, there is a strong case to be made for outward mobility among Egyptian women to pursue postgraduate studies abroad and escape the social pressures guided by heteronormative logics. Migali and Scipioni’s (2019) global survey on mobility and migration shows a strong association between dissatisfaction with the standard of living and a higher desire to move. Other studies show that escaping social pressure is among motivations for academic mobility (King et al., 2010; R. Brooks and Waters, 2011). To understand internationalisation, and mobility as happiness discourses, it is imperative first to subject the happiness industry to critical scrutiny. Ahmed (2010:4) interrogates the happiness industry and argues that happiness became the “ultimate performance indicator” and is regarded as a “genuine way of measuring the progress of nations in recent years.” Similar to internationalisation, the happiness industry became a site for measurement, regulations, comparisons and shame. For example, the World Happiness Report (2020) which measures happiness and life satisfaction across 156 countries in six variables (GDP per capita, social support, healthy life expectancy, freedom, generosity, and absence of corruption), ranked Egypt at 138 out of 156 countries. The industry of happiness panders on a premise that happiness is “out there”, that is “commodified and expected to be found in certain places” and its attainment as an individual responsibility guided by a logic that panders to the notion of “to feel better is to get better” (Ahmed, 2010:5). As highlighted in Chapter Three, Egypt’s higher education is not producing the ideal ‘global graduate’ according to dynamics of neoliberal knowledge economy. With the failure of home institutions, the desire for mobility become “a linguistic antithesis to stuckness” (Morley et al., 2020:14), with gendered, classed and racialised stratifications. In the section that follows, I will investigate the lure of mobility as happiness discourse and its buried narratives in lines of gender, social class, age, and race.

4.3.1 THE HAPPY PROMISES FOR OUTWARD MOBILITY

A considerable amount of literature has been published on the rationale for international student mobility (ISM) (King et al., 2010; Waters, 2012; Larsen, 2016, 2019; Yemini, 2017). King et al. (2010)
identify three primary levels that shape the rationale for ISM discourse in the global neoliberal knowledge economy as follows; a) the macro-scale: socio-economics global regimes and internationalisation of HE systems; b) the meso-scale: institutional initiatives and higher education institutions and c) individual-scale: such as desire for improving social and cultural capital. ISM is often thought of as high-impact practice (HIP) for its perceived benefits for developing social and cultural capital (Kuh et al., 2008). Several studies linked robust associations of ISM and better employability prospects, career progress and building global networks (Brooks and Waters, 2011).

According to the Global Graduates into Global Leaders report (2011), graduates require more than developing core competencies at the home university in order to join the global labour market. In a survey of twelve leading employers representing over 3,500 graduate recruits, a set of competencies was identified as “global and were considered favourable by employers” (Diamond et al. 2011:5). The attractiveness of ISM builds on the premise of developing transferrable skills (Colucci et al., 2012:57); intercultural sensitivity and proficiency (Jones, 2013:102), intellectual, academic and personal growth (Ingraham and Peterson, 2004), prestige and study credentials (Brooks and Waters, 2011), independent intellectual competence (Bachner and Zeutschel, 2009), and intercultural development (Rexeisen et al., 2008). Some studies contend that “precisely those generic, transferable skills sought by graduate employers” (Jones, 2013:102) are indispensable for a successful academic career (Schaefer et al., 2017). Other studies assert that international mobility in academia is increasingly perceived globally as a signifier to excellence, prestige, value, and advancement in the academic ladder (Leung, 2017).

Developing the social capital (i.e., building a global network) became another promise of happiness from internationalisation, especially for women in academia. Academic mobility is often cited for its benefits to enrich academic women’s social capital and provide opportunities for networking not available locally (Ismail and Rasdi, 2007; Coleman, 2010; O’Neil et al., 2011). Developing social capital in higher education is often linked to academic women’s career advancement, visibility, retention, and success (Morley, 2005, 2006, 2013, 2014). It should come as no surprise the phenomenal growth in rates of international mobility in recent years, especially among women
seeking postgraduate degrees. In 2001, there were 1.54 million international students enrolled in tertiary education outside their country of citizenship, this number tripled to record 5.3 million students in 2017 and is expected to rise to 9 million (UIS, 2019). Mobility has become a “combination of subtle brutality” and universities are increasing deploying aggressive branding and marketing strategies to recruit international students (Cresswell, 2006:86).

The decisions for outward mobility for seeking postgraduate degrees can be motivated by the availability of alternatives to access elite universities abroad after failing to gain admission at home universities (Waters, 2012). For instance, approximately 53 per cent of international students enrolled in OECD countries at postgraduate levels are from Asia (OECD, 2016). There is also the appeal of flexibility for students to carry out postgraduate degrees in later stages of life and to avoid the strict temporal structure of postgraduate studies at home universities (i.e., Egypt). In the 2015 academic year, 26 per cent of doctoral graduates in OECD countries were international students, compared to 16 per cent of graduates from masters and 7 per cent of graduates at the bachelor’s level or equivalent (OECD, 2016:61). Access to fields of study is another appeal for students to seek degrees abroad and avoid the tough examinations at home (Waters, 2008, 2012; Waters and Leung, 2013). Thirty-three per cent of international students who graduated with a doctorate earned a doctorate in sciences, and 20 per cent earned a doctorate in engineering (OECD, 2016:61).

In the context of Egypt, the happy promises of international mobility for upward social mobility queer the social attitudes and notions on women’s mobility. As discussed earlier, parents often oppose women’s decision for trans-local mobility for education. A recent article by the BBC (2015) titled Egypt: The lure for girls of living alone sheds some light on the gendered stratification of independent living among Egyptian youth, especially women. The article points out to social class, family level of education and the destination for mobility influence women’s negotiations with their family and the outcomes. The article concluded with a quote that sums it up nicely: “parents can’t accept their daughters living alone in the same neighbourhood, and yet they would accept their daughter living alone if she went abroad for study” (no page). The future aspirations override the family’s reservations towards women’s postgraduate education and their rights for international mobility. Despite the
passing of the years, internationalisation remains constructed as part of the class fantasy of endless upward mobility and the attainment of the good life (Berlant, 2011).

4.3.2 THE BURIED NARRATIVES OF MOBILITY

In making a case for outward mobility, my argument goes beyond merely highlighting the benefits and positive outcomes; but sets out to queer the linear thinking and understanding of its benefits by demonstrating its discursive, expansive, and multiple affective assemblages and structures. Morley et al. (2018:1) contend that “internationalisation in higher education, and its key mechanism: mobility often presented as neutral, coherent, disembodied, knowledge-driven policy intervention—an unconditional good.” Donato and Gabaccia’s (2015) argue that despite the shift toward closing the gender gap in migration and mobility, gender stratifications still exist in terms of density, direction, and frequency. The recent data from OECD countries support their view and show that women still account for slightly less than half of the total numbers of international students from OECD countries at 48 per cent (OECD, 2016). Migali and Scipioni (2019:1) list traits of the ‘ideal’ mobile subjects that includes gender (being male), age, nationality (foreign born), ability, and other social and cultural capital (i.e., type of education and networks) that in turn still shape geographies of mobilities. Several other studies point out that women’s plans for mobility are often hindered by fulfilling family and care obligations (Hughes et al., 2020). It shall be noted that despite the growing reliance on gender analysis in migration and mobility studies, gender is still understood in narrow heteronormative and binary terms that ignore its broad scope as a critical instrument for analysis (Mahler and Pessar, 2006).

Data on internationalisation and mobility research often conflate gender and sex and tend to follow a heteronormative binarized logic of headcounts that reinscribe normativity and rendered its use to be “routinised, contributing to, rather than unsettling the stability of the man/woman opposition” (Reeves et al., 2000:58). Gender binaries remain visible and maintained in most scholarships and studies on mobility and migration (Fellabaum, 2011). The binarisation of gender analysis is evident in migration, mobility and diasporas studies, which often highlight gender inequalities immersed in heteronormative notions, ideologies and assumptions (Dhoest, 2020). Understanding the benefits of
academic mobility according to heteronormative common-sense asserts a type of linearity and ignores how its processes are discursive, multi-dimensional and multi-layered. Morley et al. (2020) stress that the affective assemblage of academic mobility must be understood in relation to gendered, racialised, linguistic, ableism and epistemic inequalities. Leung (2017:1) problematises the linear thinking of understanding outcomes of mobility and asserts that decisions for international academic mobilities are “contextual, dynamic, and multi-directional” processes. Leemann (2010:612) argues that “the institutionalisation of international mobility in academic careers paths through research funding institutions and universities has created gendered stratifying effects.” Schaar et al. (2017) agree with this view and contends that mobility can lead to reproducing gender inequalities, especially among young academics. Mählck (2016:1) draws our attention to “the direction and scope of academic mobility, as well as the possibilities for and hindrances in its transnationality, are highly gendered.”

Several studies thus far have reported a decline in the level of mobility and progress to postgraduate education (i.e., the doctoral and postdoctoral levels) among female researchers (Ackers, 2004; Jöns, 2011). Other studies show that in contexts where “stereotypical notions of gender roles are still prevalent, the decisions for mobility among women’s academics are more tied to the status of their male spouse than vice versa” (Leemann, 2010:615).

Over the last three decades, the trailing spouse phenomenon in academia has received tremendous attention in migration and global mobilities studies (Jöns, 2011; Kõu et al., 2015; Zippel, 2017; Slobodin, 2019). The female trailing spouse phenomenon refers to the stage “where women put their partners’ careers first for the good of the family, ultimately sacrificing potentially high-paying work for years to come” (Bernhagen, 2017:no page). There seems to be a consensus in the literature on the gendered stratifications to this phenomenon and its negative impact on women’s well-being, career progress and adjustment in new environment (Espino et al., 2002; Leemann, 2010; Slobodin, 2019). Further studies suggest global mobilities can be a stressful and frustrating experience to academics, especially for women, and their families in regard to negotiations of partnering and parenting arrangements (Schaer et al., 2017). According to a large-scale study of dual-career academic couples in 2006, 68 per cent of all male survey respondents (compared to less than 20 per cent female) report
that “they consider their career more important than that of their partner” (Bernhagen, 2017:no page). This is not to suggest that being a female trailing spouse should be exclusively viewed in negative terms, Kõu et al. (2015:1) challenge the notion of trailing wives and suggest that “despite gender differences in the life course patterns, the joining spouses play an active role in the family migration decisions of the highly skilled.” Nonetheless, stereotypical gender roles and heteronormative assumptions significantly impede women’s equal participation in the decision to relocate and their adjustment to the new environment. Cohen et al. (2019:162) observe that:

The tension between these hegemonic and heteronormative discourses - coupled with, and circulating through, the construction of the good mother as one that is always physically present - disrupts and fragments opportunities for female academics to engage in academic mobility.

The binarized construction of a good vs bad mother is a shaming technique and vital apparatus of the patriarchy to curb women’s aspirations for mobility. In a neoliberal capitalist economy, ‘good motherhood’ has become a multi-billion global industry and site for affective, gendered and classed anxieties (Cuppes, 2005; Thornton, 2011; Vandenbeld, 2014; Barbagallo, 2016). Managing the three M’s (marriage, motherhood, and mobility) seems an impossible equation for most women, with the potential of one cancelling the others. With the large portion of childcare responsibilities falling on women’s shoulders, mobility becomes an extremely difficult prospect. Granted, most of the studies paid considerable attention to negotiation within heterosexual couples; however, in recent years, growing attention of emerging scholarship investigates the negotiations for global mobilities of highly skilled same-sex couples (Chauvin et al., 2021). Taken together, the studies above can serve as points of reference to understand the reluctance Egyptian women reported about their decisions for outward mobility (see Chapter Three). Moreover, the happy promises of mobility such as employment have been challenged in recent years. Grigoleit-Richter (2017) study shows that highly skilled migrant women’s entry into the labour market of STEM fields in Germany is determined by gendered and ethnic conditions and not necessarily linked to their history of mobility. Other studies found that high-skilled returnee Egyptian migrants often face problems of being ‘over educated’ and mismatch to the labour market demands and dynamics (David and Nordman, 2017).
“Our eyes and faces were always facing the Mediterranean, Europe, and America, with our backs toward Africa, toward ourselves” wrote El Saadawi (cited in Malti-Douglas, 1995:no page). This view still rings true today and explains some patterns, directions, and geographies of global mobilities from the Global South. Recent data shows the United States remain the most favourable destination among international students hosting the largest share of students at postgraduate levels (master’s and doctoral or equivalent level) with 26 per cent, followed by the United Kingdom 15 per cent, France 10 per cent, Germany 10 per cent and Australia 8 per cent (OECD, 2016:186). The colonial legacies continue to shape the rationale of students and academics from the Global South for choosing study destinations (Madge et al., 2009). Other factors such as proficiency of colonial language, global ranking and prestige are suggested to explain students rationale for favouring these countries as study destinations (Marginson and Van der Wende, 2007; Hazelkorn, 2009; Nyaupane et al., 2010, 2011; Smith, 2014; Antonova et al., 2020). One essential way to explain this persistent phenomenon is to understand how universities are tapping on the colonial legacy by “unbundling and the uberisation of higher education” (Morley et al., 2018:15) that became very common in the neoliberal university and shaped their marketing and rebranding efforts. Ahmed (2010:6) argues that “happiness in a neoliberal economy is performative by finding happiness in certain places, it generates those places as being good, as being what should be promoted as goods even when happiness is reported as missing.” In thinking closely and critically with Morley and Ahmed, I will interrogate branding and marketing efforts of the neoliberal universities in the UK that still capitalise on the colonial legacies to recruit international students.

4.4.1 THE GLOBAL AUCTION OF THE CROWN JEWELS

Slaughter and Leslie (1999) found that changes in national policies in the United Kingdom had measurable effects on spending patterns for higher education. The Browne Report (2010:47) proposed restructuring the UK’s higher education’s governance, financing, and evaluation systems. The report made several recommendations that ranged from removing tuition fees cap, and the re-channelling of
public investments to support “science and technology subjects, clinical medicine, nursing and other healthcare degrees, as well as strategically important language courses.” To understand the impact of these recommendations on the structure of funding and public investment in tertiary education in the UK, it is imperative to have a bird’s eye view of the whole picture. Overall, the OECD (2021) notes that the public expenditures on primary and tertiary education in the UK per full-time students were £7,181 (USD $9,704), which is below the OECD average at £7,400 (10,000 USD). Moreover, the OECD (2021) observes that the total expenditures of primary to tertiary private institutions in the UK is higher £13,105 (USD 17,711) than that of public institutions at £8,486 (USD 11,470) per full-time student. Overall, approximately 71 per cent of expenditure on tertiary educational institutions in the UK comes from private sources, compared to 30 per cent comes from public funding (OECD, 2021).

In 2016-17, 162 higher education institutions in the UK received public funding via one of the UK funding councils, according to the Higher Education Statistics Agency (UUK, 2017). However, the data from academic year 2018/2019, show the total education and training expenditure was £1,318 per head for the UK as a whole. The data also shows that levels of investment largely depend on the regional location of universities. For instance, the highest rate was recorded in Scotland at £1,558 and the Southwest had the lowest level at £1,165 per head. Taken with level of education across tertiary education institutions, larger gaps were witnessed from £272 per head in Scotland to as low as £19 per head in the East of England (Bolton, 2020:11).

One essential way to substitute the loss of public funding was through internationalisation efforts and the recruitment of international students. Over the past two decades, the recruitment of international students proved to be a lucrative industry to generate income for the UK economy (De Vita and Case, 2003; Sidhu, 2006). Studies suggest that the increase in inward mobility to the UK was in juxtaposition with the implementation of neoliberal policies such as differentiating tuition fees and reducing public funds (Bridger, 2015). International students’ fees have provided “an attractive means of compensating for a loss of revenue” (Smith, 2014:118). International students, especially those from the Global South, are often viewed as valuable consumers, who in turn, will generate variegated sources of income to compensate for economic and human deficits (Deumert et al., 2005; Sidhu,
In 2006-07, 14.1 per cent of students were from non-UK domiciles (4.6 per cent from the EU and 9.6 per cent from non-EU countries); in 2015-16, this had increased to 19 per cent (5.5 per cent EU and 13.5 per cent non-EU). In 2019/20, the number of first-year international postgraduates grew by 18.5% compared to previous academic year, totalling 184,920 (UUK, 2017, 2021). The HEPI (2021) data show that non-domiciled UK students are expected to bring approximately £28.8bn over the entire period of their studies (£6.1bn by EU students, and £22.7bn by non-EU students).

Besides the monetary value, international students and academics are regarded as “good value for money” in terms of improving the curriculum by bringing new insight to academic departments (Kim, 2010:579). International students are often considered as important human capital to foster overseas partnerships, improve research collaborations, create interdisciplinary curriculums and networks (Malicki and Potts, 2013). However, the lack of regulations and policy frameworks of internationalisation in higher education renders most international students vulnerable to exploitation, mistreatment and abuse (Brooks and Waters, 2011; Waters, 2012). Moreover, changes in national policies of immigration can negatively impact students’ abilities to access higher education in certain countries and the recruitment efforts by universities. For instance, in 2018/2019 academic year, the negative impact of the Brexit negotiations can be seen in the drop in total number of first year enrolments among EU students (PGT down by 4 percent and PGR down by 14.8 percent). The data also report a strong demand from non-EU students for PGT (up 26.4 percent) and a slight decline of approximately 5.9 percent in PGR enrolments (UUK, 2021).

As it pertains to students from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the colonial ties continue to determine the direction of outward mobility with France hosting 42.87 percent compared to the UK with only 3.22 percent (Nour and Nour, 2020). The percentage of outbound students’ mobility from the region coming to the UK continued to grow over the years, recording an annual growth rate of 101.8 per cent in recent years (UIS, 2020). In academic year 2017/18, there were 2,570 students from Egypt pursuing a degree in UK higher education (UUK, 2019). Aly (2016:195) identifies three interrelated factors shaping the image of Britain among Arab migrants:
Britain’s colonial past and neo-colonial presence in the Middle East in the post-gulf war era; the ebbs, flows and failings of pan-Arab identity under postcolonial systems; and the British long relationship with the other.

However, as discussed in Chapter Three, the UK ranks sixth on the list of study destinations favourable among Egyptians for tertiary education abroad. The increase in international students’ fees may suggest that only the most privileged students from Egypt have the chance to come and study in the UK. As discussed in Chapter Two, there is a long history of the Egyptian elites’ attachment to colonial education. One way to theorize this cruel attachment among the colonial elites to British education is to return to Bhabha’s definition (1984:126) of colonial mimicry, that is:

The desire for a reformed, recognisable others, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference.

Accordingly, there is a case to be made on the impact of colonial history on shaping the rationale for choosing the UK among postgraduates from the Global South and can be linked to the imaginary constructions of the ex-coloniser as close and familiar (Bhabha, 1996). Moreover, these fantasmatic constructions of colonial education derive their meanings from a desire to reinvent the self by forging membership to the global cosmopolitan elites who will receive the best education on offer. In a post 9/11 world, such rationale signifies a desire to escape the crushing pressures and hostilities of the present moment by forcing the “gaze, voice, and ear to engender a particular kind of present” (Berlant, 2011:62). That is to escape the gendered and racialised hostilities of navigating the world as a Muslim and brown woman (Crossouard et al., 2020).

4.4.2 WALKING INTO TRAPDOORS OF CLASS, RACE AND GENDER

“That day, I stood in front of the mirror, confused. Which door do I enter?” recalled El Saadawi during her trip to the US segregated south in 1965. “The colour of my skin was not white or black, but a middle colour between white and black. And I did not know to which world I belonged, to the world of the whites or the world of the blacks” (Malti-Douglas, 1995:no page). Occupying gendered and racialised state of in-betweenness can render spatial navigations very challenging. Debates on persisting inequalities in UK academia are often eclipsed by stubborn attachments to rhetoric of
multiculturalism, meritocracy, and collegiality (Morley, 1997, 2005; Emejulu, 2017). There remains a strong resistance in academia to address racial (Arday and Mirza, 2018) and gender discrimination and class inequalities (Morley, 2021). Partly because whiteness is constantly imagined as ‘futurity’ and aspiration in global higher education (Shahjahan, 2021) and partly perhaps because the essentialism - embedded in diversity policies and frameworks- is creating new frameworks of inequalities (McCall, 2005; Nash, 2008; Cooper, 2015). Similar to El Saadawi, brown women in diaspora, including Egyptian women postgraduates, often find themselves at crossroads of doing and presenting diversity (Ahmed, 2018). Being a brown woman in predominantly white spaces make access and survival a matter of constant reconciliations and negotiations (Khan, 2019). Muñoz (2006:680) queers notions of brownness and asserts that it:

[i]s not white, and it is not black either, yet it does not simply sit midway between them. Brownness, like all forms of racialised attentiveness in North America, is enabled by practices of self-knowing formatted by the nation’s imaginary through the powerful spikes in the North American consciousness identified with the public life of blackness. At the same time, brownness is a mode of attentiveness to the self for others that is cognizant of the way in which it is not and can never be whiteness.

I acknowledge the limitations of applying Muñoz definition (based in North America) to the context of this study. Nevertheless, I find it helpful as it paves the way for understanding some of the complexities faced by Egyptian women postgraduates in a similar context: the UK. As discussed earlier, Egypt’s (home) imaginary for women is crowded with images of domesticity and violence, on the one hand. On the other hand, the UK (host) imaginary for brown women has not fully escaped the colonial legacies (Dunne et al., 2017), the tropes of the white saviour (Spivak, 2003) and the plight of Muslim women (Khan, 2019).

Racial discrimination does not operate in a vacuum, and it is closely tied with other frameworks of exclusion of gender, age, disability, class, and geographical location. Understanding the intersectionality between these different forms and frameworks of exclusion helps to set the stage of the type of higher education systems Egyptian women postgraduates are getting into. Despite the decades of equality schemes, intervention and policy frameworks, gender, race, and class inequalities remain acutely visible across the landscape of the UK higher education institutions (Morley, 2015, 2018;
Arday and Mirza, 2018). Recent data shows that access to the UK higher education institutions remains elitist with a high tuition fees system (approximately £9,200 per annum for undergraduate courses). UK higher education remains “a site of class privilege and a vehicle for social differentiation” (Morley, 2021:6). The lack of public funding because of neoliberal policies forced most students to often opt for a mix of loans, grants, and scholarships to pay tuition fees in the UK (OECD, 2017). Efforts of widening participation (WiP) have yielded positive outcomes in narrowing levels of inequalities in access to higher education. In 2020, around 23.3 per cent of UK 18-year-olds from low participation neighbourhoods entered to study for a full-time undergraduate degree compared to 14.0 per cent in 2011 (UCAS, 2020). The breakdown by gender shows that female students in the academic year 2018/2019 counted 1,362,365 compared to 1,019,045 male students (HESA, 2020). The data also show that students in the UK enter higher education at earlier age with the highest proportion of students at 972,280 at the age of 20 and under (HESA, 2020).

The undergraduate student population in the UK remains predominantly white. However, access has increased in recent years among the black and minority ethnic (BME) groups in higher education. Students from UK Asian ethnic backgrounds come in second place with 209,705, followed by 137,185 students from black ethnic backgrounds. This should not mask the fact that BME students are less likely than their counterparts to enter elite Russell group universities and face challenges in retention, progress, and transition to postgraduate studies and academic careers (Arday and Mirza, 2018). The Office for Students report (2018:4) shows that while the rate of access among UK-domiciled BME students starting their first degrees has increased by 34 per cent between academic years 2010-11 and 2015-16, disparities remain at higher levels among students enrolled in postgraduate programmes and studies. The data suggest that BME students of Chinese background are in the top categories of entry-level students, while students from African-Caribbean backgrounds are in the lower categories. Furthermore, retention rates among all ethnic groups (except among students from Chinese and Indian ethnic backgrounds) are lower than their white peers. Moreover, the non-continuation rates among students from African-Caribbean backgrounds remain highest among all groups. Other studies support these findings. For instance, the UCU report shows that while BME undergraduate
students in the UK are progressing in their undergraduate studies, they are less likely to go on to research or other postgraduate research courses (Arday, 2017). Boliver (2011:229) suggests that the changes in entry rates may be linked to the fact that “enrolment of most socio-economically advantaged social classes has reached a saturation point.” Ahmed (2012:3) questions the institutionalisation of diversity and inclusion policies in universities across the UK and contends that “whiteness” of higher education is the issue, “not the visibility of BME groups in higher education.” She contends that higher education commitments to diversity are “non-performatives and do not bring about the effects that they name.” She insists that diversity and inclusion schemes, speeches and programmes are instead “shallow versions of multicultural consumption” (69). Despite the persisting inequalities, there remains a widely propagated portrayal of the UK, and its higher education, as a multicultural and post-racial society (Bhopal, 2018). The Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities report (2021:10) claims that institutional racism is not the problem and that “racial discrimination often does not have their origins in racism.” However, the report, for example, did not offer sufficient explanation to why as of 2019/20, only 1 per cent of university professors in the UK were Black, compared to 7 per cent of professors who were Asian and 89 per cent are white (Coughlin, 2020).

### 4.5 CONCLUSION

In sum, colonial legacies and their heteronormative discourses continue to shape the social attitudes that frame Egyptian women’s education. Despite the tremendous progress in women’s access to education in Egypt, they face barriers to transitioning to higher levels of postgraduate education and employability. Women who wish to pursue doctoral studies face social pressure to follow the heteronormative path of marriage and reproduction. Marriage is another site of fantasy and attaining the good life. The legal and cultural institutionalisations of marriage render it a site of violence, surveillance, and compulsory heterosexuality. Women who choose differently and challenge the heteronormative logic of temporal organizing to social arrangements often find themselves subject to prosecution, questioning and ostracization. The decisions for postgraduate studies abroad among women queer these temporal and spatial forces and send the country in a state of public panic. Mobility becomes an object of desire, an imagined happiness discourse to escape some of these
inequalities and frameworks of exclusions. Despite the growth in rates of mobility among women, there remains gaps and barriers to their trajectories. Women are often faced with challenges in negotiating their obligations toward their families and social expectations. In a post 9/11 world, Muslim women often navigate different spaces and spheres that require constant code-switching. While navigating hostile environments, they are also burdened by doing the diversity work where universities have failed. In chapters Two, Three and Four, I provided a detailed and comprehensive review to significant phases of internationalisation efforts in Egypt’s higher education, focusing on women’s mobility. In the next chapter, I will explain how these historical, political, and cultural backgrounds informed my methodological and theoretical approaches.
I could feel the weight of the air shift with an electric charge and a chilly sensation trickling down my spine as the words left my mouth and vanished into thin air. It was the first year of my PhD programme, and during a researchers’ workshop, I was answering a question about the objectives of the thesis, target sample and my aspirations to do feminist research. The seminar moderator quickly pointed out that she could think of many senior academics who would ferociously argue against the notion of men identifying as feminists and doing feminist research. In the years to follow, I experienced several forms of epistemic violence that attest to the enduring strength of colonial and orientalist imaginings of the other as I progressed in my PhD studies. I often found myself the subject of interrogation, surveillance and questioning on my interests in the topic and my positionality as an Egyptian man doing gender research in international education.

Under the pretext of academic curiosity, I was constantly questioned on interviewing Egyptian women and whether this was appropriate and advisable? These questions, observations, and inquiries mask heterocolonial and orientalist undercurrents around a debate that intersects with gender, race, class, power and neo-coloniality. In *Strange Encounters*, Ahmed (2013:8) talks about techniques of racialisation in locating danger and violence in bodies that “are deemed out of place.” Egyptian feminist writer Eltahawy (2016:39) contends that writing about gender in diaspora is like:

> walking in a minefield. On one side stands a bigoted and racist Western right-wing that is all too eager to hear critiques of the region and Islam that it can use against us [...] on the other side stand those Western liberals who rightly condemn imperialism and yet are blind to the cultural imperialism they are performing when they silence critiques of misogyny.

In this chapter, I will offer reflections on these issues based on my experience in the field. In doing so, I draw on concepts from queer feminists (Lorde, 1997, 2007; Ahmed, 2010, 2012, 2017) and postcolonial feminists (El Saadawi, 1995; Eltahawy, 2016) in framing these reflections. Taking an intersectional approach was imperative to this thesis and informed my theoretical and methodological decisions. It allowed for a level of reflexivity and recognition to my multiple positionalities in line with
gender, class, age, nationality, and disability in relation to research participants as we navigate and negotiate the affective economies of the heterocolonial situatedness of the field. This chapter consists of six sections and begins by giving an account of reflections on ontological and epistemological complexities that underpin this thesis. The second section provides a brief overview of obtaining ethical clearance and my entry to fieldwork. The third section highlights the research spatiality and the target sample. The fourth section explains the recruitment stages and sample composition. The fifth section will highlight data collection methods, and the final section will address procedures of data analysis and processing. It concludes with final remarks on methodological approaches and directions for future research.

5.1 INTRODUCTION: ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND COMPLEXITIES

Over the past few decades, writing across the field of sociology has taken quite a few turns; the queer turn (Hall and Jagose, 2012), the affective turn (Gregg et al., 2010), and the spatial turn (Urry, 2000). Nevertheless, despite the increasing scholarly attention to internationalisation in higher education, it remains an under-theorised area of research (Larsen, 2016, 2019). Moreover, our understandings of mobilities trajectories, journeys and directions often tend to follow a linear mode of thinking that ignores gendered and affective assemblages (Morley et al., 2019, 2020). Said discussed the imaginative constructions of human geographies and demarcations as forms of colonial dominance by labelling Egypt (as part of the Orient) as the abject other, “the land of barbarians” (Said, 2003:54). Egypt’s queerness troubled the heterocolonial powers, and their attempt to align it relied on the use of force and mechanisms of exclusions (see Chapter Two). The residues of colonial legacies in regulating Egypt’s temporal and spatial landscapes remain evident in the journeys of Egyptian women’s access to higher education, employment, and other venues of public life (see Chapters Three and Four).

Foucault (1974) advised using his theories and notions on time and space as a toolbox; however, Lorde (2003) warned against using the master's toolbox to dismantle the master's house. In following Lorde’s advice, I draw on postcolonial and queer feminist conceptual, theoretical frameworks to understand
how participants’ journeys disrupted and destabilised some of the linear and binary logics of internationalisation in higher education.

The academic resistance I experienced through my journey exemplifies the extent to which internationalisation remains a heterocolonial dominant discourse, and its spatiality and temporality are framed by assumptions on who is recognised as an ideal subject to conduct gender research.

Foucault (1980, 1986) argued for a relational understanding of space and power across multiple sites and among groups and individuals. My understanding of internationalisation is a social space (Lefebvre and Enders, 1976; Lefebvre and Nicholson-Smith, 1991) that is porous, complex, enmeshed and entangled with discursive forms of power relations and sites. I argue that social constructions of internationalisation and its spatiality and temporality are far more complex than binarised understandings of east vs west, local vs global, north vs south (Massey, 2005; Massey et al., 2009; Soja, 2009; Waters, 2012; Larsen, 2016; Morley et al., 2019, 2020; Peters, 2019). I draw specific attention to affective capitalism (Peters, 2019), and the silences and inequalities embedded in internationalisation discourses. I highlight how “mobility and control over mobility both reflect and reinforce power. Mobility is a resource to which not everyone has an equal relationship” (Skeggs, 2013:49). Taking on the task of queering notions, binarised categories and assumptions embedded in internationalisation and mobilities discourses required a constant destabilising of the essentialism of fixed categories and classifications. In doing so, my theoretical approaches are geared towards weaving together notions of gender identity, gender regimes, nationality, social class, age, culture, religion, and socioeconomics. Moreover, to grasp the fluid meanings and multifaceted processes of internationalisation, a critical inquiry and examination of issues of power, reflexivity, and queer positionality are imperative as I navigate and negotiate multiply positionally in this colonial situatedness. To this end, I begin this section with reflections on my positionality and engagement with postcolonial and queer feminist theories.
5.1.1 MEMBERSHIP DENIED: NOT FEMINIST ENOUGH

In 2001, a court case was brought against feminist writer El Saadawi accusing her of apostasy after questioning some concepts of Islamic Sharia Law (i.e., the inheritance law) during an interview for Al-Midan weekly (El Saadawi and Newson-Horst, 2010). I recall this incident well, as it shaped my earliest memories and encounters with feminism. These memories were coloured with the awareness that being a feminist or identifying as one can bring dire and life-threatening consequences (Hitchcock et al., 1993). Moreover, Egypt was then under draconian endless emergency law imposed by Mubarak’s authoritarian regime, which allowed the state to censor and curb all activities of civil society organisations (Reza, 2007; Hassan, 2011). In Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World, Jayawardena (2016) discussed the ‘double trap’ situation most Arab women found themselves in between national patriarchy and the developmental processes with its modern ontological and epistemological assumptions. Heywood (2006) explains the rapid adoption of feminism worldwide, particularly in the Global South; women find themselves caught between different discourses, torn between national attachments and global discourses of economic oppression. El Saadawi notes that women in the Global South face “triple oppression” based on nationality, class, and sexuality. She calls for transformative change against “the patriarchal class system, which manifests itself internationally as world capitalism and imperialism, and nationally in the feudal and capitalist classes of the Third World countries” (El Saadawi, 1982:206). While the Egyptian regime extended support to state and developmental feminisms, they continued the oppression of anti-capitalist, anti-authoritarian and anti-imperialist feminisms (Elsadda, 2011; Naber and El-Hameed, 2016). For instance, El Saadawi’s writings and works were often banned from being sold in book fairs and by bookshops (El Saadawi and Newson-Horst, 2010). Moreover, state-sanctioned feminism in Egypt was primarily guided by heteronormative ideologies advocated by most international development organisations that positioned cis-gendered heterosexuality as the 'norm' and contributed to the (in)visibilising of queer, trans and nonbinary women (Kapoor, 2015).

My engagement with gender and feminist writings and theories continued during my postgraduate studies in Germany. This time, there was no ban on access to knowledge, and my understandings of
gender and feminism were shaped by the writings of postcolonial feminist theorists who questioned the hegemonic global discourses on women’s subjectivities in the Global South and challenged its fixed gendered stereotypes and misconceptions (Mohanty, 1988; Bose et al., 1996; Heng et al., 1997; Spivak, 2003; Mahmood, 2005, 2009; Davies et al., 2006). I came to understand feminism in the words of bell hooks’ (2000) in *feminism is for Everybody: Passionate politics*, where she describes feminism as “movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation and oppression” (hooks, 2000:9). hooks’ words were constantly in my mind after I joined the OECD and saw my positionality entailed a ‘double responsibility’, which meant being “responsible both to [the] women participants and to the broader world of women whose lives we hope to improve” (Preissle and Han, 2012:594). I often reflected on my positionalities and the immense privileges that intersect with gender, class, age, nationality, and religion. I was, more often than not, troubled by the ontological and epistemological silences embedded in policy-driven gender research, and I often asked how my efforts would improve the worlds of women in general, especially women whose geographies of mobilities are still governed by material poverty (Skeggs, 2004, 2013). Moreover, I often reflected on the colonial situatedness of my positionality as a male researcher in elite university located in the Global North and whether my contributions will continue to feed into its epistemic monopoly on internationalisation and gender research (Naples, 2019).

Several attempts have been made to address the question of whether men can identify as feminists and do feminist research (Lemons, 1997; Khan, 2014; Jones, 2018). *In Feminism and Men*, van der Gaag (2014) conducted a survey asking can men be feminists? The findings suggest that the tide is shifting in the UK, and the general atmosphere is more acceptable for men to identify as feminists. Views expressed by the survey respondents reveal two significant findings: a) the majority of respondents (almost 90 per cent) agreed that women benefited from men's involvement in gender equality work; b) more than 80 per cent said they believed that men could be feminists. Other findings show that age and social class play an equally important role in steering public opinion on this topic. However, although the views generally remained positive, sampled opinions differed in labelling men's engagement, oscillating between different labels such as a feminist, feminist ally, pro-feminist, etc.
Previous studies have stressed that developing feminist consciousness and reflexive practices on researcher’s own positionality are imperative for men doing feminist research (Shepherd, 1997; Kimmel et al., 2005; Rydstrom and Hearn, 2017). Other studies stressed that developing research ethics of care, mutual respect, and collaborations are critical for men who intend to do feminist research (Pease, 2000, 2010; Essers, 2009; Oakley, 2015). Hearn (2004:59) suggests that we must see “the double complexity that men are both a social category formed by the gender system and collective and individual agents, often dominant agents, of social practices.” In navigating across different contexts (the UK and Egypt), I was fully aware of the multiplicity of my identity and the power and privileges attached to my positionality in representing and writing about the experiences, challenges, aspirations and trajectories of Egyptian women postgraduates in the UK (Leaney and Webb, 2021).

My theoretical and methodological approaches were guided by feminist methodologies (Lather, 1988; Oakley, 2015; Mason, 2018), which assert that women's concerns, perspectives, and experiences are the basis of any feminist research and correspond to the scope of this thesis. My efforts were informed by principles of inclusive and transformative feminist pedagogies in researching frameworks of silences and exclusions in gender research in higher education (Morley, 1998, 2012, 2018). My approaches were driven by a desire to destabilise the binaries through different stages of research such as; a) the construction of researcher as an expert & research as an object; b) negotiating the power relations and combining knowledge and experience of both the researcher and researched; and c) in data analysis and dissemination with an aim for improving Egyptian women’s lives in general, and in higher education in particular (Becker et al., 2012). I believe, therefore, that men can do and engage with feminist research through constant reflexivity on their positionalities before, during and after fieldwork.
5.1.2 HOW DO YOU SAY QUEER IN ARABIC?

Running through this thesis is an objective to disrupt, destabilise and queer binarised categories of gender analysis in internationalisation. Butler (1991) reminds us that “categories tend to be instruments of regulatory regimes, whether as the normalising categories of oppressive structure or as the rallying point for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression” (cited in Johnson, 2008:2). In some academic quarters, there are passionate attachments to essential binarised notions and fixed categories (i.e., sex/gender) that remain projected onto knowledge production (Tudor, 2018). Rydstrom and Hearn (2017:146) highlight the need for “a queer way of looking at things where you do not take for granted the categories of analysis.” My efforts to find a 'queer way' meant destabilising and troubling the tendency of generalisation and frameworks of exclusion in queer studies and theories (Puar et al., 2007; Browne and Nash, 2010). Halperin (1997:62) contends that queer is:

[whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers. It is an identity without an essence. Queer then demarcates not a positivity but a positionality vis-à-vis the normative.]

The ambiguity of defining what queer is or should be perhaps a pivotal incentive to my initial leaning towards queer theory. Within these spaces of ambiguity and unknowingness, the ordinariness of everyday lives is disrupted and queered (Berlant, 2011). Queer as something “odd and perplexing that can disrupt the status quo of a social milieu, such as an academic discipline” (Schilt et al., 2018:38) and offer possibilities of disrupting the linear thinking of temporalities (Freeman et al., 2010), nationality (Puar et al., 2007; Mikdashi, 2013), geographies of mobilities (Puar, 2005; Amar and El Shakry, 2013), Arab identities (Massad, 2007), theological perspectives of religion and women’s sexuality (Habib, 2010), approaches of analysis in Islam (Adang, 2003); and notions of progressive Muslims (Kugle, 2010). As Mikdashi (2013:350) argues:

Queer theory can be a methodology, a way of interrogating normative practices of and assumptions about race, class, the state, and the body. By queering these supposedly non-queer categories and terms, we demonstrate how they are inextricable from the production and regulations of gendered and sexual regimes.
To situate queer in the field of gender and education research, I find it helpful to invoke Bank et al.’s (2007:84) suggestion to look into queer that:

- does not teach for or about identities but studies the processes that different subjects as normal or deviant seeking to disrupt categorisation and foster new forms of relation and affiliation.

A key objective of this thesis - that guided my efforts - is a desire to escape the claustrophobic and narrowness of identity politics which have, for the most part, crowded gender research in sociology (Schilt et al., 2018). Instead, my efforts were geared towards dissecting, disrupting, and troubling 'the queer' and its processes, hierarchies, structures, and affective assemblages. My deployment to concepts of affect from queer theory rests for its usefulness to offer a:

- [b]ody of scholarship that renders the subject destabilised, multiple, and fluid, with social science research methods that utilise categories and explicitly bounded concepts as a starting point (Browne and Nash, 2010:16).

Through my engagement with queer and feminist theories, I was constantly in epistemic and existential splitting (Rooke, 2010). I often felt being pulled in different directions and confronted with the persisting question of “whose side you are on 'feminist' or 'queer?'” (Taylor, 2016:72). On one hand, I was troubled by the attachment to categories in some feminist circles, on the other hand, queer exceptionalism, elitism, and tendency to generalisation presented onto-epistemological limitations (Browne and Nash, 2010; Schilt et al., 2018). Puar criticises queer exceptionalism as “an elite cosmopolitan formulation contingent upon various regimes of mobility” (Puar et al., 2007:22) that “depends on the exclusion of others who are already positioned as not free in the same way” (Ahmed, 2004:152). The ambivalence of queer scholarships to signifiers such as class (Brim, 2020), race (Cohen, 1997; Johnson, 2001), religion (Puar et al., 2007), and ethnicity (Muñoz, 2009) further troubled my ontological and epistemological engagement. Moreover, the epistemic geographies of queer theories remain concentrated in the Global North. Mikdashi and Puar (2016:215) ask, “whether queer thoughts will still be recognisable if they come from elsewhere?”. Locating queer entails an interrogation of bodies, contexts, and locations. Queer theory and studies are frequently perceived as white (Muñoz, 2016), partly due to racialised knowledge production (Johnson, 2001, 2008) and its classed positionings (Henderson, 2019; Brim, 2020).
Cissexism in queer studies remains a point of exclusion, marginalisation, and complex reconciliations (McCann, 2019). For example, I recognise that the queer dismissal and rejection of categories is a position of cis-gendered power and privilege (Butler, 2004, 2011). For instance, the right to be identified in categories, especially in a context such as Egypt and the UK, means access to citizenship rights such as health care. It also brings attention to the need to broaden our understanding and readings of categories. Tudor (2018:1) draws attention to the “misreading on many levels” of gender, race, migration, disability, and nationality and their “complex crossovers.” I find these tensions, contestations, and frictions enriching, thought-provoking, intellectually stimulating and greatly missing amid the deafening noise by canons of identity wars. Navigating across different spaces were ‘over coded’ (Heckert, 2016) and required constant efforts on my part for self-revelation to align with the queer spaces situated in hetero-colonial hierarchies and structures (Ahmed, 2006). Butler (1991) recalls her journey in joining an elite university (Yale) and the epistemological reproduction the self that is often required from early-career queer researchers as they navigate the academic landscapes in elite universities. Butler (1991:4) describes the “professionalisation of gayness” that:

requires a certain performance and production of a self which is the constituted effect of a discourse that nevertheless claims to represent that self as a prior truth. I found myself telling my friends beforehand that I was off to Yale to be a lesbian, which of course did not mean that I was not one before, but that somehow then, as I spoke in that context, I was one in some more thorough and totalising way, at least for the time being.

I could relate to some aspects of Butler’s journey, and I find her Butler's biting cynicism for the elitism in queer knowledge production is telling. There are a few aspects to Butler's journey that I could relate to, after joining an elite university (University of Sussex), I found navigating academic spaces to be over coded that required constant negotiations and reproduction of the self as a queer feminist researcher. Furthermore, by living and studying in a supposedly one of the UK’s most LGBTQ+ friendly city: Brighton, I became aware of the multiplicity of my minoritized identity (queer, African, Muslim, disabled, and migrant) and what that entails in terms of access. My queerness that once put a target on me by the state, and society at home, has now allowed total strangers to project on me orientalist and colonial depictions. Furthermore, my access and entry into spaces has always been announced (Ahmed, 2018), I often heard comments after presentations commending me for being a
'progressive Egyptian man' who is engaging in gender research, something not to be expected from the irrational, barbarian subaltern (Said, 2003; Spivak, 2003).

Navigating across different colonial contexts and situations, I was constantly reminded of the epistemic violence in some queer circles, which informed my positionality in the field. However, it is not to deny the tremendous support I received from other queer and feminist circles who were constantly by my side and were very generous with their advice. In being aware of the ontological and epistemological convergences and divergences between queer and feminist studies (Wiegman, 2012), I could better reflect on my positionality and presence in navigating the field. It allowed me to understand the power I had as a researcher to frame research questions, select research methods, develop interview schedules, initiate interviews, recruit participants, conduct analysis, and represent my data. Moving forward, after this critique of such binarised logics, I address how drawing from notions of queer and feminist theories informed my entry to the field, the ethics of my presence and my awareness to attend to context and resist homogenisation constantly.

5.2 REFLECTIONS ON RESEARCH ETHICS

Drawing on my experience in the field, I would like to address ethical considerations and challenges encountered during fieldwork as LGBTQ+ early career researcher from the Global South doing qualitative research on gender and internationalisation in higher education in colonial situatedness.

5.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL CLEARANCE

For the purpose of this thesis, an ethics clearance was obtained from the Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (C-REC). Furthermore, the ESRC Framework for Research Ethics and intersectional feminist ethics of care provided guidance and practical information to mitigate any foreseeable risks and protect the confidentiality and anonymity of participants (Doucet and Mauthner, 2007). To ensure integrity and quality throughout the research design, data collection, and analysis, I prepared a project information package explaining the project's aims, scope, and objectives. The project’s information package was disseminated among gatekeepers and participants before they
participated in the project. The scope of this study does not fall under the category of a high-risk topic. However, I was fully aware of the challenges facing academic research in general across different contexts (i.e., Egypt) and tried to mitigate any risks by putting the safety of participants first.

Participants' roles and responsibilities were explained in total, and concerns about their safety were addressed. Informed consent was obtained from all participants using the University of Sussex ethical consent form. At the start of each interview, I reminded participants that their participation was voluntary, and they retained the right to withdraw at any time without a need to explain why and without prejudice from my side. Procedures of withdrawal from participation in the project were explained thoroughly to participants. All collected data followed the guidelines of confidentiality and anonymity in order to guarantee participants' safety by using a pseudonym and anonymising the name and location of the university. I was also keen to remind participants of my independence and impartiality at all levels of research design, data generation and dissemination.

5.2.2 BACK TO THE CLOSET: IN AND ‘OUT’ THE FIELD

My methodological choices for a queer feminist approach meant cultivating relationships of reciprocity, representation, and voice (Hughes, 2018; Pascoe, 2018). I often reflected on the level of reciprocity I should have maintained in the field as I navigated different settings and contexts. Developing reciprocal relationships is widely discussed among black feminist researchers who stressed its importance for the researcher, participants and knowledge production (Collins, 2002). Within certain circles of queer feminist studies, the researcher’s sexuality is regarded as a central part of the research process (Pascoe, 2018), and disclosing research’s genderqueer identity during fieldwork has been addressed in many studies (Meadow, 2013, 2018a). England (1994:251) contends that:

Fieldwork is intensely personal, in that the positionality [i.e. position based on class, gender, race, etc.] and biography of the researcher plays a central role in the research process, in the field, as well as in the final text.

On the question of my queer visibility in the field, I found myself again in a position of splitting. Queer studies reported some positive outcomes to visibility in the field, such as fostering more robust relationships with participants and disrupting the heteronormative assumptions in the field (Muñoz,
Other studies pointed out the high risk that disclosure of queer identity can result in judgement, censure, and ridicule (Hughes, 2018), and dangers facing LGBTQ+ researchers in the field are well-documented (Schilt & Wiswall, 2008; Schilt, 2010; Taylor & Raeburn, 1995). In the context of Africa, ethnographic studies show the risks faced by LGBTQ+ researchers during fieldwork, for instance, in Nigeria (Gaudio, 2011), Egypt (La Rotta et al., 2013), to name a few examples. Despite the growing interest in the topic, there remains a massive gap in knowledge on how LGBTQ+ negotiate multiple identities (i.e., religion, migration history, race, age, disability, career stage, nationality, and class) in the field. As a Muslim, queer, African in diaspora, early-career researcher, I often reflected on how reconciliations of multiple identity signifiers informed my presence and positionality in the field.

Moreover, in light of the high levels of homophobia reported globally and within the contexts of this research (Egypt and the UK), I was concerned about the general safety of participants and myself in the field. I was also aware that in fieldwork, LGBTQ+ researchers might encounter gatekeepers and participants who may disagree with them on the issue of gender and sexuality (Hughes, 2018), which may pose challenges in the recruitment processes. Furthermore, there was a potential of eschewing the data and being side-tracked by discussing my genderqueer identity and shifting the focus of this thesis which is to look into the experiences and journeys of Egyptian women postgraduates in the UK. My reflections on these questions required close and critical examinations to the ‘coming out’ discourse and its tropes of the legitimate visibility that are constantly populated by mainstream LGBTQ+ movements in the Global North (Amar and El Shakry, 2013).

At the outset, the notion of ‘coming out’ itself is “inadequately precise, insufficiently intersectional, and increasingly anachronistic for the contemporary moment” (Connell, 2018:126). The universality of Anglo-American notions and narratives of coming out were contested as incomparable to other parts of the world, such as across the African continent (Gaudio, 2011). Furthermore, the closet became the (in)visible line that engendered new binaries of out/proud vs in/shameful, which brings back the colonial dominance of western knowledge (Sedgwick, 2008) and its exceptionalism (Puar, 2005). In recent years, coming out “become the quintessential political act, even the sacred duty” (Connell, 2018:131) despite its insistence on maintaining binaries and “the distance between barbarism and
civilisation” to differentiate between those coded as “sexually lascivious and excessive, yet perversely repressed” on the one hand and the “upright homosexuals engaged in sanctioned kinship norms” on the other hand (Puár et al., 2007:20).

Signalling queer visibility and presence in the field can take other forms besides the compulsory self-revelations trope of the 'coming out' discourse (Gaudio, 2011; La Rotta et al., 2013). One key element is readiness and preparedness to answer personal questions (Meadow, 2018b). To level the power dynamics and signal my presence, I approached interviews with an informed queer feminist politics of care and reciprocity (Hughes, 2018). Despite the challenges and limitations, I did not wish for my genderqueer identity to be “a topic of frequent commentary and speculation” (Meadow, 2013:474). On several occasions, navigating themes that emerged during the interview required some form of self-revelation on my part. For example, as the interviews tackled themes such as singlehood and social pressure on marriage (see Chapter Seven), some participants inquired about my own marital status. In part, their efforts can be understood as a way to counter the male gaze (Kaplan, 2012); they can also be read as bridges to build rapport and trust between us. On other occasions, the conversations led to the exploration of gender themes beyond the binaries and were frequent during interviews with participants studying social sciences.

Following the footsteps of some feminist traditions, I asked participants about their interview experience with me (Campbell et al., 2010; Oakley, 2015). This was important in adjusting my recruitment and interviewing strategies during fieldwork. I also maintained a high level of flexibility and adaptability to the constant changes in interview timetables. By bringing up these ethical challenges, it is my hope to a) queer research ethics in gender and internationalisation research, b) contribute to the discussions of queering the self in fieldwork and c) disrupt compulsory heteronormativity of the field (Butler, 2004; Pascoe, 2018). In sum, my reflections on the ethics of reciprocity aimed to bring attention to the heteronormativity of the field and some complexities and challenges faced by LGBTQ+ researchers where their “visible and invisible queerness can both open and foreclose opportunities to do reciprocity in qualitative research” (Hughes, 2018:121). Debates on
research ethics should expand to include issues of protecting LGBTQ+ researchers during and after fieldwork, and it is my fervent hope that raising this issue contributes to these efforts.

5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

The theoretical, methodological, and analytical approaches of this thesis are guided by queer, feminist research traditions to answer the overarching research question: How can we understand the complexities of international mobility for Egyptian women postgraduates?

From the central question, this thesis will seek to address the following research sub-questions:

1. What made international mobility possible for Egyptian women postgraduates?
2. What social expectations framed their trajectories of international mobility and What were the affective modalities of these trajectories?

The research questions aim to examine the extent to which Egyptian women's journey for postgraduate studies in the UK queer the heteronormative temporalities and spatiality of internationalisation discourses. I relied on exploratory and interpretive qualitative modes of inquiry to answer the research questions (Mason, 2018). By using in depth semi-structured interviews, my efforts aimed to illuminate the affective structures and assemblages of internationalisation and geographies of mobilities by interrogating its intersection with gender, social class, race, age, disability, religion, and nationality.

5.3.1 RESEARCH SPATIALITY: IN LIMINAL SPACES (EGYPT & UK)

At the earlier stages of this study, the intention was to divide the fieldwork between the UK and Egypt. My rationale was to capture the experience of participants who returned to Egypt after completing their studies. However, during the first year of my study, academic freedom in Egypt deteriorated exponentially. The murder case of the Italian born postgraduate student at the University of Cambridge in Egypt in 2016 that remains unsolved (BBC, 2019) has intensified risks of conducting fieldwork in Egypt for graduate and independent researchers. Following the incident, Egypt
introduced a new law restricting independent research activities and curbing any efforts to maintain academic freedom (HRW, 2019). While the law is mainly intended to curb non-governmental organisations in Egypt, its vagueness and ambiguity subject independent researchers, including graduate students, to hefty fines, prosecution, and imprisonment (HRW, 2019). Moreover, freedom of expression and navigating online spaces in Egypt have diminished after the Parliament proposed a cybercrime bill that undermined internet freedom and proposed a hefty penalty for activities using social media (Freedom House, 2017). Any form of online self-representation and the use of the internet in Egypt, in general, became a source of high risk and imprisonment (BBC, 2020). According to Freedom House (2017), Egypt's recent crackdown on internet usage has elevated its rank to 16 out of 25 in obstacles to access the internet and 34 out of 40 in violations of users rights.

In total, out of the twenty-four interviews, eight interviews were conducted in Egypt via teleconference. The choice of this method brought technical and methodological challenges. Egypt's ban on the use of teleconferencing Voice Over IP (VOIP) such as Skype presented limited choices for choosing secure, available software that required no additional costs to participants. Slow internet connectivity added to the complexity of relying on this medium. More frequent than often, the connection was interrupted, and the interview took longer than intended. We had to repeat the questions and answers, which affected the flows during the interviews and communications with participants. There were additional limitations to online interviewing, which are well reported in the literature, such as difficulty building trust and rapport with participants, which are often challenging in standard settings (Deakin and Wakefield, 2014; O’Connor and Madge, 2017).

5.3.2 THE TARGET SAMPLE

Postgraduate education in Egypt is not fragmented between taught and research. According to the Ministry of Higher Education regulations, students who choose to continue postgraduate studies in state-owned public universities must complete their MA in 5 years and their PhD studies in 5 years, in total ten years from the date of completing their Bachelor's degree (Cantini, 2020). Understanding the strict temporality of postgraduate studies in Egypt is crucial to understanding the challenges facing
women who pursue postgraduate studies and the social pressure to get married and start a family. While state-owned public universities offer other forms of postgraduate taught and research programs (i.e. professional doctorates), the vast majority of postgraduate degrees are masters and PhDs (Cantini, 2020). The latter is offered exclusively by state-owned public universities (Cantini, 2020). In the academic year 2018, the total number of awarded masters (from public state-owned universities and abroad combined) recorded 21,436 and PhD recorded 9,261 (CAMPAS, 2019). The rate of female researchers awarded PhD reached 47 per cent, and the majority were from public universities (Cantini, 2020). The exact number of postgraduate degrees awarded abroad remain unreliable and is limited to Egyptians abroad on government scholarships (Cantini, 2020). Please see (Figure 5 and 6):

Figure 5: Total number of master’s degree awarded from national and foreign universities

![Graph showing total number of masters' degrees awarded from national and foreign universities]

Figure 6: Total number of PhD degree awarded from national and foreign universities

To obtain the number of Egyptian postgraduate scholars in the UK, I consulted with the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), which collects these data annually. Data by nationality, degree level and university were available upon subscription only and exclusively to Higher Education Institutions. My attempts to gain access to this information were not successful due to administrative and institutional challenges.

5.4 RECRUITMENT

In this part, I will explain the recruitment strategies for this research. My strategies relied on active recruitment and supplementary snowballing sample strategy.

5.4.1 RECRUITMENT OF GATEKEEPERS

The first step of the recruitment processes was to approach institutions such as international student offices in universities, funding and scholarships associations, and alumni networks. The lack of accurate gender-segregated data on the number of Egyptian postgraduates currently in the UK posed
tremendous challenges in locating institutions with the highest numbers of Egyptian women postgraduates. Furthermore, during the recruitment phase, the introduction of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) was in its first stages, and there was a high level of ambiguity concerning data privacy. Especially in light of the global scandal of Facebook-Cambridge Analytica early in 2018, universities were cautious about sharing any information about their students. I provided international student offices with a project information package to mitigate these challenges and encouraged them to disseminate it among prospective participants.

Understanding the limitations of researching a niche group, I sought different channels for recruitment. At the kind recommendation of an esteemed Centre for Higher Education and Equity Research (CHEER) colleague and scholar, Dr. Paul Roberts, I was nominated to act as rapporteur for a conference “Maximising the power of tertiary education: strengthening partnerships for global impact” hosted by Wilton Park in March 2018. The conference brought together a wide range of policymakers from around the globe, including representatives from governments and the tertiary education sector in the UK and globally. My participation offered me an invaluable opportunity to build valuable networks with representatives from the Universities UK International, the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office - Chevening Programme, the UK Council for Graduate Education, and the British Council. Their advice was constructive in the recruitment of gatekeepers and for navigating some of the challenges.

Furthermore, as a CHEER member, I was provided with several opportunities to recruit gatekeepers and participants. With the generous support of CHEER, I was able to participate in the 2018 SRHE International Conference on Research into Higher Education titled “The changing shape of higher education: Can excellence and inclusion cohabit?”. Through the conference, I discussed the objectives of my research with a wider global audience. The conference participation was tremendously helpful in recruiting prospective participants, especially those in the UK as self-funded postgraduate students, a category that is often hidden from data counts (Cantini, 2020). My participation in other conferences was also beneficial. For example, I attended the Cumberland Lodge conference “Life Beyond PhD” with the support of the Doctoral School at the University of Sussex. The conference brought many
international students from across UK universities. As part of the conference programme, we were encouraged to make brief presentations on the scope and objectives of our PhD research. Many students approached me after my presentation, offering their help in the recruitment through their network. Another method for recruiting gatekeepers was the alumni networks.

Access to contact information of alumni became limited due to GDPR. However, on most universities’ websites, I found the information of a contact point in the respective country (Egypt). Unfortunately, most of the contact information was not up to date and resulted in a frustrating outcome after a long and excruciating process of navigating each university's website. I also contacted some funding institutions such as; PEARs Foundation, Aga Khan Foundation, Newton Fund Scholarship, and Al Alfi Foundation. The main concern behind this approach is the potential risks that participants feel any pressure or any form of coercive solicitation of information (Kaplan, 2012). I was aware of the limitations of this approach that funding institutions may not share the project information sheet with potential participants after learning about the scope and objective of this project. Furthermore, I was aware of the risks of being perceived as affiliated with the institutions and prospective participants may feel pressured in any way. Lastly, I was aware of the risks of surveillance and the hostile environment I navigate, which may present challenges in the recruitment process. To mitigate these issues, I provided all related information on the project scope and objectives and a weblink to previous studies and projects on internationalisation and mobility, e.g. in Japan, as part of my role in CHEER.

5.4.2 THE SAMPLE COMPOSITION

For this study, 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Egyptian women postgraduates PG (Taught Master's and PhD) across 11 UK universities. The sample included different backgrounds, institutions, and disciplines. Among the different study disciplines, 13 participants studying postgraduate degrees in the UK came from (STEM) disciplines, and 11 participants were from arts, humanities, and social sciences disciplines. Regarding the type of postgraduate degrees provider, 19 participants studied in Russell Group universities, while five were from non-Russell group universities.
In terms of mode of study, 3 participants were enrolled in part-time postgraduate studies, while 21 were in full-time studies.

Besides the main recruitment strategies, I relied on snowballing as a supplementary recruitment strategy for participants to reach hidden research populations (Ibrahim and Sidani, 2014). For example, there are limited data on self-funded postgraduate students or binational Egyptian students. Furthermore, most available data do not offer an accurate breakdown by gender, study level and type of university, making snowballing more valuable. Snowballing also offered other advantages, including cost-effectiveness, efficiency and better communications with prospective participants (Ghaljaie et al., 2017). From my experience, this strategy proved to be tremendously beneficial in explaining the research projects, building rapport, and nourishing trust with participants. However, there were some methodical limitations such as prolonged duration of the recruitment process and demanding project management (Streaton et al., 2004).

5.5 DATA COLLECTION

5.5.1 REWRITING HISTORY: NARRATIVES AND LIVED EXPERIENCES

In *Zami: A new spelling of my name* (2011), Audre Lorde introduced the concept of *biomythography* to disrupt the notion of absolute truth when it comes to memories of the past and the interpretation of facts. I find Lorde’s concept to be extremely useful in the narrative analysis of this research. Narratives of personal experience were the key data source of this research. I am aware that participants’ narratives were not “transparent renditions of truth but reflect a dynamic interplay between life, experience and story” (Eastmond, 2007:1). As research participants were reconstructing their stories, we were transported in time and space, defying all laws. We found ourselves suspended in liminal spaces across geographical, temporal, and spatial boundaries. Participants queered the linearity of retelling their stories in chronological order to a messy order of events and past experiences. They freed their narratives from how time binds and is binding (Freeman et al., 2010). While the leading research questions focused on a specific phase in their lives: the postgraduate studies, participants brought memories from their childhood, their undergraduate studies, and their lives afterwards. The
boundaries between these phases were messy, murky, and sometimes non-existent. During the interviews, participants sometimes wished to revisit, clarify, and add to their answers to questions posed at the beginning of the interview. As the trust grew between us, the narratives became clearer. The missing connections started to link together. For example, on the rationale for choosing the UK, the familial attachments were the overriding reason for some participants. However, that was not expressed at the beginning of the interview but rather later on.

Retelling narratives brings discussion on memory and forgetting. The messy puzzle of life (Browne and Nash, 2010) as participants tried to piece it together bit by bit, they queered the “so-called natural bonds between memory and futurity” (Halberstam, 2011:98). Considering the colonial situation and context, participants and I were navigating, remembering or forgetting brought tremendous potential and possibilities as “a tactic for resisting the imposition of colonial rule” (Halberstam, 2011:98).

Queering the narratives made it possible for new arrangements of bodies, memories, histories, pleasures, pain, and time, in what Freeman (2010:95) calls “erotohistoriography” or “counter-history of history itself”. In reconstructing the past, participants broke free from the shackles of the 'good girl' and modesty tropes. We were transported in times and space by retelling events that took place with the confinement of domestic imprisonment: the family home, participants’ reconstruction of the event was not necessarily the exact depiction of what took place. For example, some participants’ objections to the parental wisdom for intergenerational reproduction of heteronormativity were silenced by social conventions, taboos, and social stigma in Egyptian society of disobedient children and bad girls.

However, in the reconstruction of their narratives, there was an opportunity to voice these objections. To protest the injustices committed in the name of hetero-reproductive futurism. To reject the dominant script handed to them as a happiness gift. To return the gift of parental wisdom, the life sentence of domestic misery projected into their future.

They were taking off the masks that silenced their words and voices. They were also burning the guidebooks of being a ‘good girl’, an obedient daughter and dutiful wife. For some, one way to express this was through language (Derrida, 2016). Their constant use of ‘colourful’ language, for example, ‘fu**’ or ‘shi*’, can be understood as defying the structure of dominant social power and colonial power.
and its pillars of oppressive politeness. In their reconstruction of the past, they were queering ‘rudeness’, politeness and civility, the pantheons of hetero-colonial patriarchy. They queered shame and stigma for daring to choose differently. They were reclaiming their spaces, their lives and owning up to their decisions. The narratives came flooding with memories. With a light tap on the thin film surface, we were flooded with ocean tides of emotions and currents of affect. In some instances, I was surprised by the intensity, the emotional nakedness in the level of information they shared. Their narratives involved parents, siblings, spouses, partners, close family members and friends, not only participants lived experiences. The fieldwork and our bonds as researcher/participants queered the heteronormative assumptions of kinship and familial bonds and revealed tensions, complexities and frictions inside the united happy families and societies.

### 5.5.2 RESEARCH METHODS

Mason (2002) contends that interviewing can generate data that may not be available when utilising other research methods, for example, surveys and questionnaires. In comparison, semi-structured interviewing allowed for the floating and emergence of themes that I had not anticipated or expected before fieldwork. Ghaziani (2018) claims that while surveys can capture data in terms of attitudes or judgments, they can also abstract it from situated lived experiences and their affect. Semi-structured interviewing allows researchers to “pay attention to the emotion and affect in an interview is one useful way to hone in on such productive discomforts” (Connell, 2018:132). I was keen to capture the fluidity, multiplicity, silences, misalignments, and diversified fieldwork experience. For example, it ensured that the relevant contexts were brought into focus (Mason 2002). Since interviews were conducted in different contexts across countries (UK & Egypt), private spaces (home via teleconference) or public spaces (office, library, coffee shops) when meeting in person, I was able to see how different contextual effects among participants.

Furthermore, for interviews conducted in the UK, the colonial situation was impossible to overlook, forget or not notice. Participants often illustrated their point of view by comparing Egypt and the UK and how the arrangement for our interview (i.e., choice of location) may have been different if we
were in Egypt. Mason (2002) asserts that interviewing requires a certain level of ascertaining on lived experiences rather than views; and connection with social interaction in which it was produced. Ghaziani (2018:207) contends:

Interview enables researchers to wonder about the situated nature of social life and can capture interactional tones if we ask questions about specific groups of people and the situations in which they interact, even if we were not around when the action occurred.

Despite its benefits, interviewing as a research method brought some methodical challenges and limitations. First, negotiating the power dynamics embedded in interviewing the elite (Kvale, 1996; Kezar, 2003; Selwyn, 2013) and the considerable grasp on power to my positionality and my decisions such as initiation of interviews, selecting the questions to be asked, choice of location, analysis of responses and representation of participants and their life stories. Campbell et al. (2010:22) offer suggestions to balance the power dynamics in interviewing:

Interviewers should not just ask questions but answer them as well to share back with participants, which helps equalise the power imbalance by letting participants see into the world of the researcher, both personally and professionally.

Oakley (2015) supports the view that feminist researchers should allow more equally balanced relationships with participants. However, Essers (2009) believes that this power shift does not necessarily mean that participants will view it as positive or desirable, especially during elite interviewing. Drawing on my own experience from the field, conceptualising interviews as dialogue can be misleading, especially when interviewing the elite (Kvale, 1996). Dialogue requires active and equal participation from both parties, which was sometimes very challenging to navigate in researching the elite in an educational context (Selwyn, 2013). I was also aware of my transgressions and space invasion (Ahmed, 2017), particularly as we navigated through accounts of personal experiences. Navigating topics and themes required careful sensibility and developing queer feminist sensitivities (Taylor and Dwyer, 2016). I was aware that some topics may trigger traumatic experiences (Gerdes, 2019) and always checked with participants as we navigated these unchartered territories of memories together. I also kept a list of national support organisations for students’ mental health and well-being for signposting if needed. My engagement on a CHEER project on postgraduates’ mental
health and well-being guided my awareness of the chronic issue (Hazell et al., 2020). Essers (2009:167) contends:

Despite these well-intentioned efforts to create equal relations with the researched, one could state that by initiating an interview situation, the researcher is already in power and that most researchers create their own research agenda anyway.

The temporalities of the interviews also queered the notions of encapsulating lived experiences and organising them into packaged fragmentations. The interviews represented “only a silver of an individual’s life or an institution’s environment” (Connell, 2018:136). Despite the richness of participants’ narratives, I am aware they only capture a few episodes of their journeys and trajectories. Interviews presented a “deeper experience of time” (Ricoeur, 2012:35) that varied among participants. For some, the interviews lasted longer than the allocated time. As participants and I were immersed in the interviews, our temporal attachments were queered and queering to the global governance of time and temporality (Halliday, 2017). Our queered positions suspended into liminal spatiality and temporality further troubled the binarised dichotomy of the knowledge economy between the global north and the global south. Indeed, we were in a colonial situation in the Global North while maintaining the Global South’s temporality. Interviews can have “profound and unanticipated consequences in the real lives of our participants long after we say our goodbye” (Connell, 2018:136). Listening to the recorded interviews during the data analysis phase meant that I never left the field. Hughes (2018:121) contends that the masculinist approach to fieldwork often “subordinates emotion, intersubjectivity, and empathy in favour of a more scientific objectivity.” This was not my experience, and I often felt the affective load as I was brought back to the field during the data analysis and writing phases.

The language used in each interview further troubled the temporality and spatiality of the fieldwork. At the beginning of each interview, I gave participants the option to conduct the interview in Arabic or English. I did not take it for granted that participants in postgraduate studies in the UK are on equal levels of English proficiency. All interviews, except one, were conducted in English, an example of the colonial situated afterlives of nations and narrations (Bhabha, 2013). I must acknowledge that no interview was carried out in a monolingual fashion. Participants often cited Egyptian Arabic
proverbs, expressions, and idioms to illustrate their points. They were like a rosary of whispered prayers to avert the colonial gaze. Furthermore, the ease in which participants used the English language was indicative of the type of institutions where they received formal education (i.e., state-owned public universities and private universities) and the type of international language education (i.e., British, American). Moreover, among the latter group, there was a clear distinction between those who received British education and those who received American education in terms of their use of language (i.e. gonna, wanna etc.). It is important to note these discrepancies as they illustrate imperialist neo-colonial power dynamics embedded in internationalisation in higher education research.

5.6 DATA ANALYSIS AND PROCESSING

The data analysis followed a thematic analysis approach. Boyatzis (1998:Vii) describes thematic analysis as a “bridge and a translator” encoding qualitative information. Braun and Clarke's (2006:4) regard thematic analysis as “a foundational method for qualitative analysis.” Even though a clear definition of thematic analysis and its processes are still lacking in the literature, I found it extremely useful for providing me with the tools to conduct “rigorous thematic approach can produce an insightful analysis that answers particular research questions” (Braun and Clarke, 2006:28) and offered epistemological flexibility and fluidity to allow for discoveries to multiple layers of themes (Terry et al., 2017). Nevertheless, there were certain limitations and drawbacks in relying on and the use of thematic analysis. These limitations were for example, a) the lack of substantial literature on thematic analysis (Nowell et al. 2017); b) the binary role assigned to the researcher of either active/passive concerning the emergence of themes (Terry et al., 2017); c) the use of multiple language English & Arabic (Braun and Clarke, 2006); and d) inconsistency and incoherence in theme development (Holloway and Todres, 2003). In recognizing these methodical limitations, my methodology in data analysis followed a step-by-step approach that was developed by Nowell et al. (2017) as I sought to familiarize myself with the data, generate codes and themes and establish trustworthiness during phases of thematic analysis (see Figure 7).
Qualitative data analysis software such as NVivo was utilised in data coding and analysis. All interviews were recorded electronically using Voice Recorder and recordings were saved in a secure location with permission to access set only to me. For the data management, I created an interview log where all identities of research participants were anonymised, and pseudonym names were given to all participants. The names of recorded files were coded with security codes with limited access to me only. For the transcription, I relied on NVivo self-transcription mode. Choosing NVivo as a transcription tool was cost-effective and efficient in linking the transcription and coding stages together (Robins and Eisen, 2017).

The data presentation and writing of the finding chapters were guided by my desire to capture the affect of the writing processes, their fluidity and messiness (van Eck et al., 2021). I often reflected on the different ways for data presentations and was frequently experiencing self-doubt in handling the data and deciding which parts to include in the analysis (Ball, 1990). I tried to capture the rawness of emotional nakedness that resided at the heart of each narrative, and my objective was to present in a way to allow readers to be fully immersed in an affective experience as they navigate each personal narrative (van Eck et al., 2021). I was also keen that participants' narratives be seen in their unique personal and individual way, despite their similarities and commonalities. The choice of titles of each section was guided by a desire to indicate each individualised narrative. I frequently found myself...
returning to the data in order to give myself more chances for immersion into their narratives. Going in and out of my “authorial role” meant that negotiating these responsibilities required tremendous efforts on my part and constant revisiting of my fieldwork notes and recordings (Leaney and Webb, 2021:49). It shall be noted that the use of pronouns throughout the data presentation was guided by how participants referred to themselves during the interviews.

hooks (1997:208) wrote “language is a body of suffering and when you take up language you take up the suffering too”. Writing in a colonial language means this suffering is compounded with generational trauma and renders the ‘subaltern’ to the space of liminality, ambivalence, and exile (Bhabha, 1984; 2013). Writing with learning differences means confronting academic ableism and its “pervasive systems of discrimination and exclusion” (Kattari, 2015:376). Despite the growing interest in neurodiversity recently (Pollak, 2009; Clouder et al., 2020), I could not shake off the feelings of shame and vulnerability after I learned of my diagnosis. In a wider context, where research by BME scholars and their efforts tend to often be regarded in as disorganised and less rigorous (Atkinson et al., 2018; Mahmud and Gagnon, 2020), I was often concerned and anxious about my prospects in academia afterwards. Combined with gnawing and pernicious anxieties of my ‘imposter syndrome’ (Nori et al., 2020; Wilkinson, 2020), I often felt under tremendous pressure to perform a certain academic self. I was fortunate to have the backing (and patience) of my supervisors who were more than generous in offering the utmost support, care and guidance. My study is an example of (neuro)diversity in academic research. In this new journey, I tried to develop the necessary skills and mechanisms to overcome these anxieties, and which are hoped to open new avenues to explore, disrupt and queer notions of the ‘ideal student’.

5.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In sum, my thesis's theoretical, methodological, and analytical choices were guided by an onto-epistemological framing that disrupts and queers some of the embedded assumptions in gender research in international higher education. In this chapter, I reflected on the different phases and stages of research design, development, and data collection and provided the rationale for the
decisions I made during each stage. At the heart of this thesis are efforts to queer western notions and methodologies and their epistemic acts of violence for reproducing heterocolonial structures and hierarchies of power. The reflections I made in this chapter on my theoretical, methodological, and analytical choices are not meant to be interpreted as taking a victim stand in the oppression Olympics (Yuval-Davis, 2012). By engaging critically with these debates, I intend to carve a space in the global conversation on the messiness of fieldwork and its triangulations with our identities and positionalities. They are a reminder of the messiness of the fieldwork, a fact that was acknowledged by black and queer feminists and is often neglected or deliberately overlooked. Furthermore, tropes of ideal deserving students and brown and black excellence can operate as a 'straitjacket' and further marginalisation. Finally, the fieldwork was an invaluable opportunity for my growth and development as an early-career researcher. The experience in the field will continue to surprise us as much as we continue to surprise ourselves. After explaining the rationale for my methodological and theoretical approaches, I will now move to the findings chapters, where I will address the first sub-question in Chapter 6 and the second sub-question in Chapters 7 and 8.
“Class plays a huge role in how people come to the UK”, said Hanaa during our conversation on her rationale for postgraduate studies in the UK. She first came to the UK on a fully funded scholarship to undertake a master’s programme a few years ago. After completing her degree, Hanaa returned to Egypt, changed careers, and after two years returned to the UK for PhD studies. This time, Hanaa was only awarded a tuition-fees only scholarship and relied on part-time employment to fund her studies. During the interview, she elaborated on the importance of accumulating social and cultural capital concerning her decision for mobility. Other participants highlighted the advantages and privileges to their social class positionalities regarding their mobility decision and choice for the UK.

This chapter responds to the first research sub-question: What made international mobility possible for Egyptian women postgraduates? Participants’ narratives demonstrate the importance of acquiring social and cultural capital to their decisions for mobility and how social class operates in insidious ways that are not always obvious, apparent or explicit. Their narratives provided a critical opportunity to advance our understandings of social class in internationalisation in higher education. Morley (2021:8) urges for queering the “hetero masculine analyses of socio-economic differences” that govern and limit our understanding of social class as a category of analysis in international higher education and “to move beyond often archaic binaries of working-class (abject, excluded, exploited) and middle-class (secure, strategic, smug) identities.” Recently, more scholarly attention has focused on social class in internationalisation and mobility from the Global South (Iorio & Pereira 2018; Muñoz-García, 2021). In the context of Egypt, there has been increased attention to debates around social class in recent years (McMahon, 2016). However, only a few studies have attempted to investigate social class and mobility (Schielke, 2015); and far too little attention has been paid to social class in relation to internationalisation in higher education and academic mobility.

The issue of social class occupied queer theorists who stressed the need move beyond the “single-oppression framework” and for queering the binaries of “heterosexual privilege and queer oppression” (Cohen, 1997:453). In *Love and Money: Queers, class, and cultural production* (2013), Henderson argues that
an understanding of queer culture will remain incomplete as long as the issue of social class remains
ignored and overlooked. In their view, social class operates “in the vernacular and analytic ways to
mark a cultural universe”, and one way to understand social class is “the economic and cultural
coproduction of social distinction and hierarchy” (Henderson, 2013:38-39). Brim (2020) contends that
despite the growing attention to social class by queer theorists, little efforts have been made to address
the class inequalities within queer circles and in knowledge production. Other queer theorists called
for broadening the scope and understanding of queer to include frameworks of exclusion in lines with
social class inequalities, race, age, mobility, migration and religion (Cohen, 1997, 2019; Muñoz, 2009;
Miklashi and Puar, 2016; Brim, 2020). In this chapter, my analysis draws its understanding of social
class from Bourdieu’s work (Bourdieu, 1990, 1997, 2002) and aims to capture how social class
positionalities intersects with gender (Skeggs, 2004), age (Hey et al., 2021), histories of mobility and
migration (Van Hear, 2014), and level of postgraduate education (Roberts, 2021). In this chapter, I
will discuss the construction of internationalisation as site of class fantasies, anxieties and failures
(Berlant, 2011). I do this by first highlighting participants' mobilisation of social and cultural capital to
their decisions for mobility. I will then interrogate the link between social class and family negotiations
to live independently abroad among participants. Following this point, I will then move on to a
discussion on financing and funding for postgraduate education. Finally, I present some participants'
reflections on the conditions of funding and their plans after the complete their studies.

6.1 CLASS PREMIUMS, PROMISES AND FANTASIES

Over the past three decades, studies on internationalisation in higher education and mobility highlight
embodied, institutionalised, and objectified social and cultural capital accumulations as essential to
international mobility (Brooks and Waters, 2011). In response to my questions on their rationale for
carrying out postgraduate studies in the UK, participants narratives highlighted the importance of
history of mobility (Siddle, 2000; Rizvi and Lingard, 2009; King et al., 2010), private world-class
education (King et al., 2010), and their families' psychological, emotional, and financial support
(Blunt, 2007; Waters, 2012) that were instrumental to their decisions and prospects for postgraduate
education in the UK.
6.1.1 WHAT IS ‘EGYPTIAN’?

“Forgive me for saying this”, began Hanaa, as a way to prepare me for some challenging questions as we continued our interview:

How can you tell me that you are looking at the study from an intersectional perspective, but then the way you approached me was simply by presuming that I am Egyptian? But what does that really mean? What is Egyptian? How are you even defining Egyptian?

The questions posed by Hanaa display a desire to trouble and disrupt gendered heterocolonial notions of national identity, belonging and social class positionalities (Butler, 1990, 2004). Hanaa is troubling the gendered constructions of infantilised citizenship (Berlant, 1997) according to Egypt’s national discourse and its affective assemblages (see Chapter Three). She is questioning the essentialism embedded in intersectionality (McCall, 2005; Nash, 2008; Cooper, 2015) and expressing her tiredness, and frustration concerning the overuse of the term (Cooper, 2015; Wiegman and Wilson, 2015). She is making explicit mention to the increased absences and silences surrounding social class from debates on internationalisation and gender in higher education (Iorio and Pereira, 2018; Morley, 2021; Muñoz-García, 2021). Hanaa wonders:

I mean, it is just because we carry a passport, then let us look at this from a cultural perspective. Let us say you are looking at transnational mobility and opening opportunities that may entail cultural shifts and mindsets, and so on. what do you know about the sample of the individuals you are interviewing? And their background? And their history? And their personalised narrative? And their social class?.

By switching positionalities from interviewee to interviewer, I recognise the shift in power dynamics typical in elite interviewing (Smith, 2006; Selwyn, 2013). Moreover, by questioning the level of my knowledge on the topic, she is not only reminding me of internationalisation as silencing discourse in Egypt and the massive gap in knowledge on women’s mobility but also, she is seeking to disrupt the cis-hetero-masculinist assumptions that position the interviewer as the expert in the field (Pascoe, 2018). Hanaa further elaborates:

I mean, as an individual, I grew up moving and travelling around the world. I went to seven schools. I have lived in more than 12 cities. My perception of my sense of identity is a lot more multicultural than it is that I am Egyptian. When people ask me where I am from, my answer is Egypt because that is the
strongest element of where I perceive my roots to be. It is the passport I carry.
But what does that really mean? What does that really mean to the Egyptians?
What does that mean for people who have never left the country in Egypt?.

Hanaa’s history of mobility is tied closely to the gendered construction of her identity, belonging, social class positionality and trajectories of future mobilities. Her use of terms such as ‘multicultural’ to describe her identity’s fluidity and multiplicities reflects an insistence on asserting classed positionalities and claiming global citizenship (Ong, 1999; Yemini, 2017). She is queering the governmentality of borders crossings in a world that remains primarily governed by ‘passport privilege’ (Neumayer, 2006; Chalk, 2014; Perkins and Neumayer, 2014; Keshavarz, 2018). Furthermore, her views aim to disrupt the homogeneity and neutrality discourses of internationalisation and their constructions of the ‘ideal’ mobile subjects (Waters and Leung, 2013; Larsen, 2016, 2019).

Nadine, who came from a similar class background, echoes the same views. She contends that she “did not have to struggle” to convince her family of her decision to pursue taught master’s programme in the UK. She emphasises that postgraduate studies abroad are a quintessential part of her education trajectory and is very common among her peers:

This is the mentality of my family. This is how I was raised. I will always be equal to my brother, and I will always do the same way. This is my individual situation. I cannot say Egypt, the whole Egypt, but I mean the community that I live in, the people who are my friends, a lot of them studied abroad, they lived on their own, everywhere I have friends in the US, Canada, to Australia, they did not have a problem and their families were very accepting.

Nadine and Hanaa see themselves as part of the ‘transnational capitalist class’ whose history of hypermobility transformed their notions of citizenship and belonging (Sklair, 2001). They are bringing into focus the set of classed demarcations and boundaries that map the landscapes of internationalisation in higher education. Despite the boundaries and limitations facing Egyptian women’s mobility in the passport privileges world, for the Egyptian women elite, the world - literally and figuratively - remains their oyster, and international mobility is an essential part of their educational trajectory. I now turn to the claims of cosmopolitan identity and belonging expressed by many of my participants and how they closely relate to social class positionalities.
After completing her PhD in the UK, Rokia is now an early-career academic working as a lecturer in higher education in the UK. Rokia, who is binational, and identifies as a “third culture kid”, takes pride in her global citizenship and her hybrid identity (Bhabha, 2013). From early childhood, Rokia spent her life in transnational mobility between two continents (Africa and Europe):

I belong to the world. I was brought up with no real national belongings. Although my parents are Egyptian, they never stressed an Egyptian identity. We have friends from all over the world. We were not associated with the Egyptian embassy in any way: We never went to any activities or events. Our friends were from around the world. Of all faith and nationalities and so on. I was brought up as a Muslim, but I view that the understanding of being a Muslim is to be open and connect to humanity, and so even when I travel, and everywhere I travel to, I really find home.

Rokia’s history of mobility displays a strong association between the family’s history of mobility, the type of education she received (international private language education), and her decision to pursue postgraduate studies in the UK. Speaking of her education, she contends that her parents wanted her to:

[h]ave this quality of education [international education] and wanted me to be around people who are similar to myself.

As discussed in Chapter Three, privileged and upper-middle class families in Egypt often decide to invest in international private education as it is associated with better quality and a desire for global integration. During our conversation, I brought up the silences and absences of social class in debates of internationalisation in higher education in Egypt and globally. Rokia asserts:

Social class comes up in almost everything; whom are you related to? Whom you hang out with? where do you shop? What do you buy? where do you live? And people do talk about why they would not go to live in a certain place? Or hang out with certain people?

I was curious to hear Rokia’s views on international education as a vehicle of elite reproduction in Egypt. Rokia contested the opinion that private education in international schools caters
predominantly for the elite in Egypt. She mentions that there are opportunities through initiatives of widening participation:

Yes, we identify that it was for the elite [..], but there are also many initiatives within that community to support marginalised communities in Egypt. And I have been part of some of these initiatives, so it was not, I think joining the [Name of private university] was not really to join the elite but mainly for reasons that have to do with my own identity and the quality of education that I wanted to have.

I suspect part of Rokia's resistance to my question stems from a desire to distance herself from the elite bubble of privileges, who are often seen as unaware of the social inequalities in Egypt (Eltahawy, 2016). Yet, her claim to a cosmopolitan identity and assertion for global citizenship that transcends the parochialisms and particularities of a national identity can also be understood as a sort of misrecognising of privileged and classed positionalities. Hanaa asserts:

I'm aware of the privileges I have. I know it is not to dismiss my capacity, my skills, my potential, but I know that my capacity, for instance, to write a proposal that stands out and my capacity to do strong research have to do with how well trained I have been and the kind of opportunities I was exposed to. I know that's a privilege, it's privilege in action, and we have to admit our privileges and own up to it because it is our responsibility.

Recognising her privileged positionalities reveals a high level of reflexivity and awareness of the inequalities embedded in internationalisation discourses. Being made aware of classed positionalities can be affected externally. For example, Rokia recalls an incident when she tried to apply for PhD programme in her second home (in Europe) and was made to feel unwelcome:

When I went to even ask about opportunities for a PhD, the lady there asked me who are you asking on behalf of? I told her: myself. She said: oh really, yourself. So, I thought the beginning in itself was not promising. I contacted some people, and they told me you have to have a large amount of money in your bank account before you start, so we can assure that you can pay the tuition for the duration of your study. The entire discourse was not encouraging.

Despite her parents' best efforts to instil 'no national belonging' and accruing the necessary social and cultural capital, Rokia's visibility as a brown Muslim woman navigating a post 9/11 world rendered her as the 'other', a risk, an outsider (Ahmed, 2013). The fantasy reached a point of fraying and attrition and as such “this version of transnational class fantasy, [where] mobility is a dream and a nightmare” (Berlant, 2011:179).
Zeinab (PhD), who received British education in Egypt, elaborates that her decision for a postgraduate programme abroad was a mix of a desire to “learn properly” in order to become a “prominent academic.” She asserts that, “when you work at the university, no matter what your position is at the university, actually if you have a PhD, it will be better.” She is implicitly referring to the broad perceptions that associate international postgraduate education and career progress in academia for women (see Chapter Four). Certainly, PhD programmes are on offer nationally; however, Zeinab is adamant about choosing the ‘best university’ in the global knowledge economy of higher education. She explains:

When I came to my masters, I was asking what the good universities to study educational psychology are? [...] The Chair of the Psychology Department at my university told me if you want to study any kind of psychology, the US is better, but if you want to study education UK is better.

The same rationale for selecting study destinations and universities was echoed by Bahia (PhD). She explains her rationale for undertaking postgraduate study abroad and choosing the UK specifically:

You have to think big. You have to have high ambitions. I was looking forward to doing my PhD in big universities, not in Egyptian universities. I was looking forward to going abroad somewhere in America or UK or somewhere in Europe. I felt like due to my speciality, which is computer science, I thought that other universities in European and American countries would be more advanced with respected technology when compared to our Egyptian universities.

The same applied to Tokka (PhD) who describes the process of her decision making:

I sought this big catalogue like a manual that have all UK universities with rankings and everything. I applied, and I got accepted into two universities…. I found that the [current university] has higher rankings in computer science; that is why I chose it. You feel that when you get a PhD from a university with a higher ranking in your field, that will get your certificate more credibility and open more doors for you. At this time, I did not think of employability because I was planning to do my PhD abroad and go back to Egypt. At this time, I just wanted to get the most prestigious. I just linked ranking to prestige and better education, and so on.

As discussed in Chapter Three, the landscape of internationalisation in higher education has become increasingly shaped by global comparisons, rankings, and benchmarking. Studies show that students from privileged and upper-middle-class backgrounds often perceive themselves as choosers, and the
robust relationship between social class positionalities and the mobility decisions, rationale and choice of study destinations (Brooks and Waters, 2011; Nyaupane et al., 2011; Waters, 2012; Larsen, 2016, 2019; Oliveira, 2016).

6.1.4 FAMILY SUPPORT

The family’s financial support is another indicator of social class privileges and detrimental to the ability to come to the UK. The students’ fees (average of £11,000 per year in tuition fees) and living and maintenance costs put a high price tag on the mobility decision to the UK. Nasra (PhD) says:

I did not receive a scholarship for my master. And I did not really apply for a scholarship for my PhD either.

Nasra first came to the UK to carry out a master’s programme and then extended her stay for PhD studies. Nasra is self-funded and relies on two primary sources of income to fund her studies: financial support from her family and part-time employment, both are signifiers of her elite status. Her parents paid the hefty international student tuition fees, and thanks to her international education, she relies on part-time employment and is now looking for alternative sources of funding. She explains:

My father helps me with my fees. That was a worry, but I think I weighed the costs and benefits before I took that decision, so, for example, I got a scholarship for my fieldwork, so I am always trying to find sort of alternative funding routes because I have missed the chance to apply from the beginning.

Thanks to her world-class education, Nasra was able to join the global labour market and secure two part-time jobs, which she admits “was a bit challenging” but “quite beneficial” because “it adds to [her] research.” She acknowledges the importance of her family’s financial support, especially in light of the increasing difficulty in finding funding for postgraduate studies:

It is harder once you start your PhD to find funding. Not to mention that [it] is actually extremely hard from the beginning to find funding as well.

I will address the availability for funding and scholarship in part three of this chapter. However, at this point, I would like to dedicate this section to the importance of financial support from family in compensating the lack of funding. Sherry (PhD) came to the UK on studentship and a fee waiver to undertake her PhD studies. To compensate for the lack of funding for her last year of studies, Sherry
relies on financial support from her family and part-time employment opportunities. At the time of the interview, she was at the end of her third year, and there was a tremendous level of gnawing anxiety about the final year:

The studentship is always only for the first three years, so for the fourth year now, I am basically trying as much teaching as I can besides the PhD and sometimes from my family, really.

Participants relied on their accumulative social and cultural capital to compensate for the lack of funding opportunities. Rakia’s primary source of funding is financial support from family and partial scholarship. I was curious to learn the type of transitions in her class positionalities as a result to limited financial resources. She explains:

The transition to me was not really about class; it was about transitioning from being a teacher to being a student again, and that was the biggest transition for me. It was a transition from living in a two-storied flat in [Egypt] to living in one room in a dorm in [UK] with four hundred other people. It was the transition from having help at home with everything, to having to do everything for yourself. But that transition I was prepared for and ready for. [...] Of course, there’s an element of being privileged because I could afford to pay for my education in UK and that gave me a lot of autonomy, so I didn’t have to report back to funders. I didn’t have to go through the paperwork for that.

Rokia’s acknowledgement of her class positionalities came with the awareness of the freedoms and autonomy entailed with it. I was interested to know about the affective structure embedded to these adjustments and negotiations on her positionality. She explains:

I would not say there were fears, but there were concerns and limitations on how much you could spend, for example, on holidays or going to conferences and things like that. I asked my family to give me birthday presents by paying conference fees. That worked. That was good. So yes, I would not say fear; there were, let us say, careful calculations about my spending during that time.

I admire participants level of commitments and engagement with their studies. I often thought of whether the family financial support is another form to tie participants to the patriarchy’s ’gift economy’ and increase the family’s control over their mobility decisions. In the next part, I will discuss link this point to another area of family’s support which ties discussion together and highlights the negotiations made by participants to convince their families of their decision.
6.2 A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN: THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE

“It is just culturally unacceptable”, said Neemat (PhD) as we were discussing the social attitudes toward Egyptian women’s mobility for study and for leading independent lives separate from the family. As discussed in Chapter Four, the national discourse remains resistant to women’s trans-local mobility for study; however, social class positionalities queered these reservations and resistances. Neemat asserts:

The main thing is just the concept of young women living alone. Whether to travel within Egypt to go to another University or travel abroad, it is just the concept of living outside the family home or living alone as a single female.

Legally speaking, parental approval in Egypt is traditionally and culturally binding more than a requirement by the law. Egyptian women postgraduates are independent agents in the eyes of the law, and parents do not enjoy legal status (i.e., as guardians) for prohibiting their daughters’ mobility. However, the familial attachments and power hierarchies inside the family shape the negotiations of mobility decisions. Participants narratives on this issue demonstrate the intersections of social class, gender and postcolonial attachments on mobility decision and their desire for leading independent lives abroad.

6.2.1 THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF INDEPENDENT LIFE

“I think also it is a class, educational, intellectual level difference”, explained Neemat on the classed stratifications in social attitudes towards women’s mobility in Egypt. She is delineating key characteristics that influence the negotiations among Egyptian families to accept their daughters’ mobility decisions and to live on their own. She asserts that in certain social circles in Egypt, women face less resistance to their decision for mobility:

For example, I have friends from Alexandria who went to the AUC in Cairo to study. It does happen. I would not say a huge number of people, but it is not impossible. I think it is reserved for families who probably value this education a lot, obviously who can afford it and maybe have a background of an open mind about it.
To unpack Neemat’s statement; first, there is the question on the transnational geographical closeness (i.e., Alexandria and Cairo), second, the type of elite education (i.e., the AUC), thirdly the level of the family’s education and fourthly, their history of mobility and finally, the financial capital to afford it. I was curious to know if the same applies to international mobility. Neemat explains:

When the parents are very highly educated and have the chance to go abroad and study, they know. And the ones who do not know are the ones who are scared. The ones they have the stories, and they worry but the ones who have been abroad, and they know what it is like, I guess they have less fear.

Neemat locates family negotiations within a binary classed structure between the privileged elite and those who do not share the same privileges for mobility.

For Horeya, who came to the UK to undertake master’s studies in gender, the choices for postgraduate degrees in Egypt are limited to what was offered within the proximity of her residence in Egypt. After completing her undergraduate degree from a public university in Egypt, she worked in the not-for-profit sector as human rights and women’s empowerment activist for ten years before the start of her journey in the U.K. Horeya’s decision to pursue a postgraduate study abroad was a mix of desire to “converge between my legal practice and to use it to empower women” and the fact that gender studies programmes in Egypt are very scarce and will require trans-local mobility. At the time of the interview, there were two programmes on gender studies available in Egypt. One offered by the American University in Cairo (private sector) and the other offered by the Ain Shams University in Cairo (public sector). Horeya is drawing attention to the social and cultural capital necessary for the family’s approval concerning mobility decisions:

I believe if in my undergraduate studies, I had told my mom I wanted to study in Cairo, she would have been like, ‘ahh... I am not sure this is a good idea’ because also if we have a home or someone to stay with me there, she would have said yes, sure. But the fact that I did not have anyone there was for her ‘why would you go study in a different city when you can study with your family around and stuff?’.

I was curious to learn what made the family change their views regarding her postgraduate studies in the UK where she does not have any family attachments or support. Horeya explains:

I am lucky enough to say I was raised in a very gender-equal family, and they already respected the idea of women empowerment and equal opportunities of
men and women [...] and were very happy for me getting this prestigious opportunity.

A study by UN Women shows that men and women from upper middle class in Egypt with higher education and living in urban areas tend to hold more gender equitable views (UN Women and Promundu, 2017). However, as Horeya’s rightly pointed earlier, there are limitations to the family’s acceptance to women’s decision for mobility. The family’s perceptions and associations with prestige convey the sort of fantasmatic imaginations of mobility as a site of endless upward social mobility against which all sacrifices must be made (Berlant, 2011). Furthermore, the family’s decision and acceptance queer the binarized logics of local as familiar and global as foreign (Larsen, 2016, 2019) and brings into light some of the anxieties and fears of downward mobility embedded in the internationalisation discourses.

6.2.2 THE REVOLUTION CHANGED EVERYTHING?

Nasra contends that her family is “quite open-minded in that sense, they are not what you would normally expect from Egyptian parents” and that helped with her mobility decision and desire to live independently. However, she confesses that the social uprising of January 2011 has tremendously steered the family’s view to agree with her decision:

I think the revolution helped a lot and my participation despite my mom’s constant worry and concern, and understandably so, my participation and decisions I have made within this participation, they kind of entrusted me with being independent.

Several attempts have been made to understand the impact of the social uprising in 2011 on women’s mobility and gender equality in Egypt (Manea, 2014; Haddad et al., 2015; Alexander and Apell, 2016). While slight progress has been witnessed in women’s political participation and activism; however, the overall transformation in gender relations remains minimal (Bargain et al., 2019). Feminist writer Shirin Ebadi eloquently puts it, “the true ‘Arab Spring’ will only dawn when democracy takes root in countries that have ousted their dictatorships, and when women in those countries are allowed to take part in civic life” (cited in Sjoberg and Whooley, 2015:262). One of the few positive outcomes of the social uprising is the slight change in social views on women’s mobility.
and the notions of living separately from the family. Winegar (2012) brings attention to the class difference and elitism in the context of Egypt’s social uprising in 2011. By tracing the earlier images of the uprising, which mainly showed men in the streets, Winegar contends that the ordering of participation among women began with the higher social class and that women from the middle and poor classes came at a slightly later stage. Nasra’s participation in the social uprising marked her ascension to adulthood in her parents’ eyes and a breakthrough from the cuffs of infantile citizenship (Berlant, 1997). Nasra stresses that acceptance to her living independently is closely associated to her of social class positionalities:

> Because I think yes, in specific classes in Egypt, I do not think it is like that everywhere. I would add specific urban classes in Egypt, specifically in Cairo.

Basically, Nasra is saying that while the social uprising of 2011 helped her family acknowledge her ascension into independent adulthood by accepting her decision to live separately, this should not be taken as the ‘new normal’ and social class remains to shape everyday lives of Egyptian women and their right to mobility.

### 6.2.3 THEY SAY, ‘IT IS SAFER HERE’

Concerning independent living for Egyptian women nationally and abroad, safety is often cited as one of the critical explanations behind parental reluctance to allow their daughters to live separately from the family (El-Feki, 2014; Eltahawy, 2016). Rokia describes her independent life before moving to the UK:

> I lived independently in Egypt for many years. I think for fifteen years or something. I used to live in [Name], which is, in a way, as you know affluent part of Cairo. I have to say; I did not experience problems living on my own. I also have my car. Part of it was that I had a job, I knew how to manage my life, I think I was also mature. Independent. I also had a very good gatekeeper (Bawab), [...] if you talk about security and safety who is extremely reliable. He still is, actually. I had my independent life; I had someone supporting me at home who came over the weekends to do the cleaning and help with the cooking. In general, I did not have any problems living on my own in Egypt.

Rokia is expansively delineating the various characteristics that indicate her elite social class status: affluent gated-community neighbourhood, domestic help, family support, and private security.
Karima (PhD) contends that:

Of course, if a woman is travelling alone, the family will be, of course, afraid for her safety. But I have many friends who are single who came to the UK with no problem. Sometimes they say here in the UK is safer than in Egypt [...] that is why many females choose the UK because it is more safer.

The construction of the UK as safe brings back the colonial legacies, ties and attachments. Fatin (PhD) supports this view:

I can feel it now living abroad. I can feel the freedom now living abroad. Wearing whatever I want. Doing whatever I want at any moment. I am telling you. Sometimes I sing or dance or whatever. Nobody cares. Nobody looks, and I feel completely safe. It is something I completely miss in Egypt.

In comparing her everyday life between Egypt and the UK, Horeya (Master’s) says:

[in Egypt] I never take the bus. I cannot. It is like no. When you walk on the street, you keep walking. When I first came here, people said, ‘OK, so be careful at night, it is a bit dangerous’, and I just went out at 2 am and was just perfectly fine. I live in Egypt. I am a big girl. Because in Egypt, I keep watching behind me and beside me, I get this safety distance to make sure if someone wants to get action. I have a space to retreat. There is a strategy in walking in the street. And for me here, it is so much easier; I do not have to think about all of that. Here, I am still very careful when I walk because it is deep inside that I have this notion of being careful, but it is not as careful as I am in Egypt.

From Horeya’s words, it can be understood that social class is the ultimate divider between those who can buy their safety and those who must endure the ugliness of sexual harassment in public spaces in Egypt. Moreover, she describes the trauma of living in Egypt’s rape culture (Solnit, 2015). However, this is not to suggest that rape culture is contained within national borders. Nasra recalls -in disbelief- her experience in the UK:

I was shocked at the beginning to see that I was still getting harassed, even in England. But then I thought about it again with my old convictions. I knew that men are practising this also here. Why would they be any different?

Nasra’s words reveal sober realisation of the dangers of being a woman living in global heterosexist patriarchy (Connell, 1987, 2005). It is a reality check, an abrupt wake-up call from a long, delicious slumber populated by manicured campus lawns and well-rehearsed rhetoric of safe spaces. Hamida (PhD) shares a similar experience and draws attention to the institutional complacency in the UK to bury complaints of sexual harassment in higher education:
I know just one supervisor. A man who is known not to be very decent, but still no one is taking any actions to get him off his position. Because the longer he stays, he becomes more valuable to the university. Because he goes from just group leader to associate professor, he has a really bad reputation. Everyone who is in charge of hiring in the department, I guess pretending they do not know. But everyone in the department knows he is not a good person.

Hamida’s words demonstrate the moral decay inside the neoliberal university that has created a culture where the worst behaviours are permissible by universities in their pursuit to generate income. Their failure to address complaints of sexual harassment have muted any aspirations for transformative change across universities and undermined efforts to make higher education a safer space for women in academia (Ahmed, 2017). Her words attest that the consequences some men faced in the reckoning of the me too movement are the exception not the norm (Manne, 2020).

6.3 SING FOR YOUR SUPPER: FUNDING AND SCHOLARSHIPS

“The scholarship was the basis for everything”, recalled Tokka (PhD) as we were discussing her rationale for postgraduate studies abroad and for choosing the UK as a study destination. For Tokka, the availability of external funding and scholarships was detrimental factor in pursuing her plans and decision for mobility. She explains:

If there were no scholarship, I would not have applied because I did not have enough money to afford the trip. Even in my mind, I did not say I wanted to study abroad; I said I wanted to have a scholarship. It was basically the same thing”.

Discussions on funding and scholarship brought into focus another dimension to the decision for mobility that is tangled in lines of gender, class and age. They demonstrated an assemblage of postcolonial melancholia, linguistic imperialism, reinforcing neoliberal notions of temporalities and productivity.
Hanaa invoked the affective assemblage of postcolonial melancholia (Gilroy, 2005) and nostalgia to the colonial past as she explained the current barriers facing Egyptians to access funding and scholarships for postgraduate studies in the UK:

For instance, my colleagues from commonwealth countries can apply to commonwealth scholarships; we are not a commonwealth country. We are not a lower-income country that fits in lower-income categories.

The melancholia expressed in Hanaa’s positionality is gendered and class bound. As discussed in chapter two, the privileged elites were the primary beneficiaries of private language education and the colonial policies for education in Egypt. The affective structure of colonial afterlives is materialised through nostalgic attachments and mourning loss. Ahmed (2010:139) describes the melancholic migrant as the “one who holds onto an object that has been lost, who does not let go, or get over the loss by getting over it.” The Egyptian elite’s melancholia stems from stubborn refusal to let go of colonial past and its attachments which were maintained through international education and colonial elite formation. As such, they are trapped in a state of temporal and spatial impasse where the mobility discourse enters a phase of subtle “redirection of the fantasy” (Berlant, 2011:179).

Furthermore, Hanaa is drawing attention to Egypt’s constant failure of non-alignment (Ahmed, 2006) and the consequences to this queer failure to adhere to the neat categorisations of neo-colonial dominance by international development organisations (i.e., middle income, lower income etc.). She attests to the changes in funding structures in Egypt’s higher education as a result of recommendations and policies by international development organisations under neoliberal ideologies:

When I was working on my masters, even a private foundation [Name] that used to fund PhDs now they have stopped. So there are no sources of support from Egypt for PhD students, and of course, this is likely to be a deterrent for people to be able to come here unless they can get funding or if they are really wealthy because I have not seen any other way.

Hanaa’s view demonstrates the contradictions embedded in Egypt’s internationalisation discourse that continuously ignores the value of outward mobility and is gearing its efforts towards money-generating
activities (i.e., inward mobility and TNE). According to Hanaa, this shift in internationalisation discourse is tangled in stratifications, inequalities, and exclusion across study disciplines and universities in lines with class and gender:

If you are a social scientist and female, you are more likely to come from an affluent family background. Because how else are you going to do the program? [..] we talk a lot about expanding opportunities, but it continues to be a cycle of reproducing privilege that people who are in postgraduate studies from different nationalities, not just in Egypt, tend to come from a middle-class background and this reality, we should be open about admitting and I think it is more pronounced in some institutions than others. Most certainly, when I was in [Name of HEI], everybody around me came from a privileged background, whether they wanted to accept that or not.

As discussed in chapter four, one of the most potent impacts of neoliberalism assault in higher education is the redirection of resources and funding structures towards sciences (Giroux, 2014). Not only did this shift in the funding structure led to gendered and classed inequalities in higher education, but it also reshaped the composition of landscape across study disciplines.

6.3.2 **DO YOU SPEAK ENGLISH?**

The level of English language proficiency is another example of internationalisation as a site of neocolonial dominance and linguistic imperialism (Morley et al., 2019, 2020). Demonstrating a high level of proficiency in English is one of the main requirements for a successful funding application and admission into postgraduate studies. Universities and funders often rely on the scores of standardised exams such as the International English Language Testing System (IELTS) in awarding scholarships. Horeya recalls the gnawing anxieties of taking the standardised exam:

The first time I did [the exam] was five or six years ago when I started applying for masters and this scholarship, and then I applied again but still, it is quite a sum of money, which is around 2500 EGP. It is a lot. This is not covered in the scholarship or anything. You have to apply again and pay again. That is why it was scary. It is not ongoing. It expires after two years. You will have to re-apply again. I was really scared because I knew my scholarship would be held on that. It is not your qualifications or anything but getting the correct score for English. That was really scary. Even if I can practice English perfectly and everything, you know the fact that you are going into the exam to pass the English test. It was something I was concerned about.

Generally, scores of standardised language exams are suggested as a critical indicator for students to meet the minimum requirements for satisfactory academic performance on postgraduate levels, even
though recent studies show that the relationship between students’ IELTS results and academic performance remains inconclusive (Pearson, 2020). Moreover, a recent study in similar contexts (the UAE) shows that gender is salient in performance and colonial dominance is still prevalent in taking these exams (Altakhainehe et al., 2019). The study found that the gender of IELTS examiners affected the performance of the Arab examinees in terms of preference. The study also showed the neocoloniality embedded in the examining process and suggested that the hegemonic cultural dominance of the examiners’ culture influenced the answers provided by the examinees during the oral part of the exam. We should not forget that in Egypt, learning the coloniser’s language, particularly for human rights and feminist activists such as Horeya, is often seen with a mix of national suspicion and distrust (Eltahawy, 2016). The affective assemblage of standardised exams and its role to entrench class divisions are rarely discussed in the scholarship of internationalisation and mobility. Moreover, Horeya’s feelings of fear, dread and shame serve as a reminder of the colonial past and their techniques of humiliation (Treacher, 2005, 2007).

The requirement for standardised exams can operate as apparatus for erasure, exclusion and blatant discrimination. Neemeh, who is bi-national (British and Egyptian) earned her bachelor’s in linguistic studies from a public university in Egypt, recalls her postgraduate study application was rejected because of the language exam:

The reason it was rejected was that I was graduated from an Egyptian [public] university, and they wanted proof of my level of English even though I am British Egyptian and I studied English at the university.

Neemeh’s experience highlights the different tiers of universities under neoliberal ideologies (Boden and Nedeva, 2010) and the affective assemblage of internationalisation as exclusionary discourse. The type of university education queers notions of nationality, citizenship, and class memberships.

Graduates from public universities in Egypt, including UK nationals wanting to pursue postgraduate education in the UK, are positioned as the abject others who are expected to constantly re-negotiate their access to the global knowledge economy. It is a reminder of the pernicious and insidious ways class inequalities operate and intersects with gender, nationality, age and type of education.
6.3.3 THEY DO NOT WANT HOPE.

Writing statement letters is another critical requirement for access to postgraduate studies and successful funding applications. Navigating the application processes is entangled in cycles of gendered and classed exclusion processes. Hanaa contends:

I do not know if you ever worked in Egypt with underprivileged communities; they do not have the skills to write a personal statement; they do not have the language, they do not have the training, and if they do, they are one out of every ten thousand individuals.

Under neoliberal ideologies, narratives of academic achievements, success and boasting have become “increasingly visible, encouraged and expected practice in contemporary academic life, shaping the ways in which academics present themselves and interact” (Lund, 2020:467).

Horeya admits:

It is challenging for people, especially for me, for instance, to talk about yourself; they ask you things like to talk about your accomplishments or how to prove you have leadership skills, networking skills, what are you going to do in the future? There is a lot of scepticism in your answer to things that you do not really know, and it is really hard to express ‘what are you going to do?’ I do not know. I think it is related to our identity somehow […] because of all the ideas of patriarchy and the social norms that put women as being more like subordinated and stuff and eventually, they do not have this belief in themselves to be able to seek better opportunities. In the application, they do not want hope. They want the assertion and being sure.

Horeya is describing the gendered and classed frameworks of leading a precarious life under global patriarchy. She is caught in a “a holding station that does not hold securely but opens out into anxiety” (Berlant, 2011:199) between a present moment of crushing pressure and an imagined future shrouded with mystery, uncertainty and unbecoming (Read and Leathwood, 2018).

6.3.4 ON HOW TO FLY WITHOUT WINGS

“It took me two years to find an appropriate [funding] opportunity, and then I started my PhD journey in 2010,” Bahia (PhD) said. Developing social capital (networking) emerged as crucial to access to funding necessary for mobility. Gender and social class were tied to prospects of developing this social capital. Bahia asserts funding opportunities are not:
Down to the candidates themselves but so many other circumstances, as you know, due to corruption and all these things. So, if you do not know somebody at the management level, it is very unlikely for you to get this scholarship. So, I could not get one, which I have to say I was lucky not to get one, because when compared to the scholarship I had; my scholarship was very generous financially, and there is no obligation that I have to go back to serve in my country which made a huge relaxation for me.

Bahia is caught in a double bind; on the one hand, the appeal of mobility panders to the premise of developing social capital and networking; on the other hand, her lack of networks is impeding her desire for mobility. To put her words into context, possibilities for mobility among Egyptian women in academia are highly dependent on developing the necessary social capital (networks) and the right connections to those in positions of influence. There is a common term in Egyptian Arabic (Wasta) that captures “an implicit social contract, typically within a tribal group, which obliges those within the group to assist (favourable treatment) to others within that group” (Buttorff, 2015:1).

Understanding this social phenomenon, which is as common in Egypt as eating bread for breakfast, may help explain the multi-dimensionality of Bahia’s dilemma in lines of gender and class to find funding opportunities. Moreover, mobility is often touted as a happy promise for women to develop networks not available locally (Ismail and Rasdi, 2007). Bahia’s words also reveal a Catch 22 situation: which comes first, mobility or social capital. Furthermore, the absence of women in higher education leadership, which remains a global phenomenon (Cubillo and Brown, 2003; Elsesser and Lever, 2011; Morley, 2014) is another barrier to women developing social capital necessary for mobility.

6.3.5 THE (GENDERED) FINISH LINE

In neoliberal ideology governed by risk assessments and framework, class and gender can yield to new forms of exclusions and misrecognition. For example, Lana (PhD) remembers during the interview for the scholarship:

I remember when I was, you know, having the interview with [Name of the funder] and I was pregnant, and the lady [interviewer] asked would you able to do it while having a baby? And I told her absolutely yes, and I felt this was it. It is a word that I have said, and I have to take it.

In a similar situation of double binding, Lana’s pregnancy turned from a reason to celebrate in the hetero-reproductive futurism into an impediment that engendered anxieties, fear and shame. It
required making promises, reconciliations, assurances and confirmations. She is not only burdened by the weight of her pregnancy but the weight of the promise to meet the finish line - no matter what - in a present moment of precarity. Despite her best efforts to exhibit her merits to deserve the scholarship, Lana’s pregnancy became the (in)visible electric fence, the gravitational power pulling her back to the land of the heteronormative world. Her promise to the funders carries the weight of the world over her shoulders. She is apologising for being a woman in a world that refuses to see her humanity and equal citizenship. A ‘cruel’ world where fulfilling one dominant script of happiness (i.e. marriage, children etc.) means loss, dread and failure in another script. Lana’s confesses that social class offered her some perks on the domestic front:

I come from a social class in Egypt, I can have someone who supports me in the house, like a nanny, cook or driver,

The privileges associated with her social class positionalities put her in a better position - than those who do not - to compete in the global knowledge economy and meet its gendered finish line.

6.4 THIS ROAD IS ONE WAY ONLY.

Among some funded participants, the promise of mobility for upward social mobility and global citizenship is troubled by the condition of returning to Egypt after graduation. Some participants found themselves trying to get out of sticky situations only to be swimming in quicksand. As I now show, gender and social class came to shape the negotiations some participants made.

6.4.1 IT IS THE MORAL THING TO DO.

“So the masters have this rule where you have to go back and do two years of work back home,” said Hamida (PhD). After being awarded a fully funded scholarship, she came to the UK first to pursue a taught M.Sc. programme in STEM. Before handing in her master’s thesis, Hamida successfully secured a place in a partly funded (tuition fees only) postgraduate research programme (PhD). For many participants, the condition of compulsory return to Egypt after completing postgraduate studies was a deterrent and brought a tremendous level of anxiety. On the one hand, the funders rationale behind this condition draws its strength from debates on international student mobility and the
question of brain drain (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997; Beine et al., 2008) and brain circulation (Wit et al., 2008). On the other hand, the same rationale ignores the gendered stratifications to this condition for a context such as Egypt and can be a source of tremendous affective anxieties. Hamida expresses concerns about employability prospects in Egypt after return:

Like I would have preferred this condition to be working for two years in Egypt just anytime in your life because yes, of course, I would love to go home and I would love to help with what I learned and just do something useful with it to benefit others as well, but I cannot really do that after master’s or PhD. I need a lot more knowledge and a lot more experience to be able to reach this level. So that is not a condition that I am happy about.

Basically, what Hamida is saying in principle, is that she is not against the condition of returning to Egypt. She is, however, against the forced and compulsory temporal organising of her life. She protests:

You do not need to be obliged, and you do not want to have someone also force the timeline down your throat. To exactly work the day after you finish your PhD or your master’s, and it is scary.

Hamida’s protest reveals the attrition and decay of neoliberal happy promises of global mobility as realm of upward social mobility and opening-up possibilities. The promise of the global graduate is a well-rehearsed trope by international development organisations that turns into a nightmare of limited mobility and compulsory confinement. Their time and freedom became an expected price paid in a transaction process governed by an ideology that continues to rob individuals of their agency. Funding became an apparatus of surveillance and expansion of power. She recalls:

They also email a lot to just check upon. Even though I am doing PhD now. The masters’ funders they still email to check up; how is everything going, are you done with the masters, are you coming back home? They check up a lot.

Hamida found herself subject to surveillance (Foucault, 1982) tripled three times over, the home office, funders and her family in Egypt. The shift in Hamida’s subjugation is startlingly swift: from a hopeful scholar to a subject of suspicions and surveillance. Her citizenship rights were diminished, and her social class positionalities are in the process of renegotiation and reconceptualisation. She points out:
I just do not know if I am going to be ready to go back home after the PhD. Honestly, I am afraid about the idea of working afterwards, because what if I want to pursue work afterwards before going home, which is fair enough I think, you have a lot to learn in my area, especially of research. Egypt does not have that much to offer me in terms of teaching, so yeah, it would be much more beneficial for me and the country afterwards if I were to help it in some way. For me to work abroad first for a few years, but I do not know how that is going to go down with the funders, so yeah, I am completely not a fan of two years or any kind of years that you are bound to do, like to work in your home country right after your degree.

Hamida occupies the space of a subject who is alienated on account of colonial education (Fanon, 2007, 2008; Mbembe, 2008; Bhabha, 2013). The intersections of her positionalities queer the linear pathways and promises of happiness to individual and broader national development accruing from mobility. The gnawing anxieties of Hamida on re-integration (i.e. into the labour market) after return to Egypt are pervasive among migrant returnees (David and Nordman, 2017), and there is compelling evidence to support the positive contributions of the skilled Egyptian diaspora from abroad (Mehrez and Hamdy, 2010).

“It is like common sense in Egypt”, exclaimed Hanem (PhD). “If you got funded for one year, you have to stay in Egypt for two years.” For Hanem, the question of returning to Egypt after finishing her studies as mandated by the funder is:

The moral thing to do. To go back and to pass the knowledge that you got here. Because it is the rationale of granting me a scholarship to be an asset to them so after knowing some knowledge here to pass it there. It is quite fair.

Hanem’s words show how temporalities are negotiated into transactional processes between individuals and institutions under neoliberal ideologies (Berlant, 2011). On the one hand, her words can be interpreted as a form of obedience to authority (Milgram and Gudehus, 1978); on the other hand, by considering herself as an ‘asset’, she is challenging the national discourse of women’s invisibility, marginalisation and disenfranchisement.

6.4.2 UNWELCOME RETURN

“Because if my research is known in Egypt, I would probably disappear. Because with what is happening with researchers in Egypt,” admits Nasra. As discussed in chapter three, academic freedom in Egypt has been compromised in recent years. Speaking on her decision for a PhD:
Not entirely for academic reasons but also for just leaving Egypt because the situation was horrendous around the time I decided to leave in 2014-2015. A lot of that had to do with the situation of Egyptian universities themselves, especially with the targeting of students movements and faculty and researchers in places like Cairo university or Al-Azhar mosque university and all prestigious universities.

Nasra’s choice for gender studies is another crucial factor in her decision. She recalls the general reaction to her choices was to “study something proper.” Nasra’s choices are gendered and class-bound. She admits:

So everybody acknowledges that the topic is so interesting, but actually, any topic that includes homosexuality will be interesting, especially in Egypt because of the way it is inserted in the public imagery. Because in some circles and especially in my circle, it is progressive, it is new, it is different, what you are doing, but you see they do not understand what I am doing, it is intended to be progressive, or interesting or exciting in that sense, it is actually quite bleak and dark, and it is not great.

Social class positionalities queer the national discourse and knowledge economy in Egypt. Nasra’s class privileges allowed her to pursue postgraduate studies in a high-risk topic thanks to the support of her family without relying on formal channels of institutional funding. The Egyptian elites desire to pursue ‘progressive’ knowledge illustrates the cruel attachments to western knowledge in line with gender, class, and race (see chapter two). Such cruel attachments are not muted by the passing of time or by crossing spatial borders. However, Nasra’s access to specific spaces required renegotiation and reconceptualisation of her classed positionalities:

In any day, I feel and even within the academy, that go to the heart of your research, I feel all the time exoticised in a way where “oh you are from Egypt, so we do not know what that means, but we so are going to evoke an assumption on what Egypt is and what women in Egypt are” and you feel it subtly. You feel all the time. It is always there. It is annoying, and I feel like it takes away my confidence, so every time I am speaking, I am not speaking on equal terms as everybody else. I am speaking as this person from Egypt while anybody else here Europeans, mostly Europeans, will not be put in the same category, the focus of their research not on who they are.

Negotiation and reconceptualisation of social class positioning are very common among international mobile subjects from elite social classes (Iorio and Pereira, 2018; Muñoz-García, 2021). However, Nasra is describing the “slow, delicate, and processual” affective fraying and attrition of internationalisation as a site of fantasy to endless upward mobility (Berlant, 2011:196). The painful realisation of occupying gendered and racialized spaces is a ‘glitch’ an “interruption amid a transition”
that may bring the fantasy and its happy promises to cruel and abrupt end (Berlant, 2011:198). It troubles the happy promises of multiculturalism, global citizenships, and cosmopolitanism. It reveals the affective structure of disappointment and frustration due to unreciprocated attachments. While the coloniser (UK) is constructed in light of familiarity, the colonised (Egypt) remains queered shrouded with opacity, secrecy and invisibility (Sedgwick, 2008).

6.5 CONCLUSION

Taken together, this chapter has addressed my first sub-question on what made international mobility possible for Egyptian postgraduate women. This chapter has demonstrated how social class positionalities and privileges frame participants’ rationales for postgraduate education in UK. Moreover, participants’ agonistic narratives, shot through with ambivalence and contradictions, highlight that internationalisation remains a site of postcolonial melancholia and nostalgia. Their narratives queered some of the dominant narratives of international mobility and notions of belonging and citizenship. They also suggest that internationalisation remains a site of fantasy for endless upward mobility among participants from privileged upper-middle-class backgrounds (Berlant, 2011). Participants’ meaning making of their social class positionalities and privileges suggest that there is no unified understanding but multiple, expansive and discursive ones.

Participants’ narratives pointed towards prestige, ranking and status as key to their decision-making processes and the extent to which internationalisation panders to the premise of preserving elite status and endless upward social mobilities, that sometimes came with disappointing and cruel outcomes. Perhaps one of the most compelling findings of this chapter is the persistence of colonial legacies across class hierarchies in Egypt. The constructions of the UK in light of its familiarity and safety reflect the perpetual colonial ties in lines of gender, race and class. These constructions embedded in colonial imaginations queered the national discourses and social attitudes against women’s rights for mobility and leading independent lives separate from the family. The shift in institutional support and funding structures guided by neoliberal policies engendered feelings of class anxieties and the sense of
‘affective fraying’ of internationalisation as the site of class fantasy and endless upward mobility (Berlant, 2011:201).

The fantasy of internationalisation entered a phase of “slow, delicate, processual attrition and fraying” (Berlant, 2011:196) where the Egyptian elites turned into tendency towards “depression, dissociation, pragmatism, cynicism, optimism, activism, or an incoherent mash” (Berlant, 2011:2). The realisation that mobility, the quintessential element of their elite formation, is no longer achievable became a painful reminder of the shift in the privileges in their classed positionalities. This awareness required reconceptualisation, renegotiation and reframing of privilege, citizenship, nationality and belonging. In the following chapter, I will move on to examine the happiness scripts that framed participants’ mobility trajectories focusing first on the marriage question among unmarried participants as a dominant social expectation.
Everyone asked me; when will you get married? this was the first question, no congratulations, no anything! Every time I go back to Egypt now, and people start asking me, are you not involved in any kind of relationships? are you going to get married soon? What about marriage? When are you coming back? and then they start calculating what age I will be when I come back if I come back?

Fatin (PhD)

I have three brothers and my mom they were very happy, they were very glad and excited. However, the extended family in Egypt was very sceptic like; they asked: why are you doing this? you will be forty by the time you are done? and you will not find anyone to marry you? which they did very wrong math like I'm finishing with hopefully 32. They miscalculated that one. I heard comments like you will only have a widower with five kids who would marry you!

Sherry (PhD)

I got that question a lot. I did not get that from my family or my friends. But I got that from extended family [...] like you are in the age of marriage, and if you do not do that now, you are not going to be able to do it later. You are not going to find people who have the same culture, have the same ideas, religion and that would make it much harder for you to find someone and to get married!

Nadine (Master’s)

It is the concept that really underpins all the other actions. It is when you look at women: is she a mom? is she married? Can she achieve this down the line? Versus if he is a man, does he have a career? What does he do in life?

Haya (Master’s)
The scenes described by unmarried participants capture the state of public panic to their decision to choose differently. Their decision to carry out PG studies in the UK queered the temporal and spatial mapping and organizing of their lives according to heteronormative common sense. The public scrutiny is presented using the velvet gloves and politics of care and love. The conversations were often using the pretext of concerns for the future. Ahmed (2004:147) reminds us that “compulsory heterosexuality works powerfully in the most casual modes of conversation.” I often returned to Ahmed’s writings as I was navigating these themes with participants and whether our conversations re-inscribe norms of heteronormativity. This chapter will address the second research sub-question: What social expectations framed their trajectories of international mobility and What were the affective modalities of these trajectories?

For unmarried participants, the marriage question and its related themes emerged as participants discussed negotiations with their families on living independently abroad (see Chapter Six) and the negotiations, assurances and reconciliations they made to convince their families of their mobility decisions. Moreover, the strong public reaction and the social persecution highlighted their “constant bargaining with normalcy” (Berlant, 2011:167) and brought the question of marriage to the centre of the conversation. Ahmed (2010:24) contends that:

Awayness might help establish the edges of our horizon; in rejecting the proximity of certain objects, we define the places that we know we do not wish to go, the things we do not wish to have, touch, taste, hear, feel, see, those things we do not want to keep within reach.

At the heart of this thesis is the understanding of how participants’ mobility decisions and journeys are influenced by a desire to escape the social pressures of heteronormativity, and in doing so, their trajectories queered the temporalities and spatiality of heteronormative organizing of their lives. The marriage question emerged as participants talked about the social backlash to their mobility decisions. The aggravating anxieties towards their decisions demonstrate the cruel attachment to heterofuturity (Edelman, 2007). The affective assemblage moved in circuitry via vertical and horizontal attachments. Their decisions were perceived as an affront to the intergenerational reproduction of normativity and parental wisdom (Berlant, 2011) and required negotiations, sacrifices, reconciliations, and concessions. This chapter will offer longer excerpts from conversations with unmarried participants as they reflect
on their journeys and how the temporal and spatial borders crossing informed their subjectivities and meaning making of their study experiences.

7.1 FLYING THE NEST

El-Saadawi dreamt of “fly[ing] in the air like a bird, far from this prison into which I was born” (El Saadawi and Newson-Horst, 2010:20). Participants became aware of the (im)possibilities of growing up as women in Egypt as they navigated their education trajectories. The hegemonic social pressure to get married and to settle down posed limitations to their aspirations for the future. The decision to carry out a PG study in the UK queered the temporality of compulsory heteronormativity.

7.1.1 THE ‘M’ WORD

Similar to El-Saadawi, Hamida yearned for escaping the prison she was born into. She says that her decision to stay in the UK did not surprise her family:

I think my mom already knew that I was trying to. I had lots of issues personally with just how life in Egypt is, especially with sexism, so I was not a big fan of that.

After finishing the exit exams (Thanawya Amma), it was time for Hamida to choose a study discipline for undergraduate studies. Hamida’s outstanding performance put her in a strong position to secure a study place in any of Egypt’s top universities that offer STEM subjects. From first appearances, Hamida embodies the ‘ideal’ female student to study STEM subjects in Egypt. Hamida’s childhood background, family’s level of education, socioeconomic status, and geographical location are believed to correlate with high probability for entry and progress in STEM studies (El Nagdi and Roehrig, 2020). Hamida grew up in an upper-middle-class family; both parents are university graduates who placed a high value on their education and spared no effort to provide emotional and financial support. Trans-local mobility was not an issue either. Hamida resided in Cairo, where most STEM universities are located, so there was a low probability to re-locate. In meritocratic sense Hamida possesses all the necessary qualifications and ability to achieve her dreams, although her gender entailed her making quite a few compromises.
First in study choice, after she learned that:

If I got into chemical engineering, I would not be in the field. I would most probably be put in office as opposed to being in the field, which I wanted to do. Because field jobs are for men and office jobs are for women.

Hamida’s study choices queered the legal and social restrictions on women’s entry into the labour market for some STEM fields (see Chapter Four). Nevertheless, this barrier did not deter Hamida from pursuing her dreams, only with a slight compromise to settle for chemistry instead. A decision that brought a different set of barriers: low employability prospects after graduation. Hamida recalls, “a lot of people were thinking; what are you going to do with that degree for? it is not going to probably get you a job.” Employability prospects became the measuring stick against which the role of higher education is evaluated. The value of higher education has been reduced to a vessel to meet the demands of the labour market (Morley, 2007; Giroux, 2014). In comparison, the shifting dynamics (supply and demand) of the labour market dictate the rationale for study choices instead of interest and intellectual curiosity.

While Egypt has a high rate of women students’ entry into STEM fields, as Hamida’s situation reveals, some are pushed to the STEM ghettos of the less-desirable study fields due to socio-legal and institutional barriers. This explains the low rate of women graduates employed in STEM in Egypt despite the high rate of HE enrolment. At times of doubt about her choice of study degree, Hamida sought parental wisdom from her father. Her pursuit to seek refuge in the familial cushions of safety and familiarity ended with a realization of a sombre reality:

Even my dad told me that you should study whatever you want to study. It is your college life and your college years. You should study something you are passionate about. You study whatever you love because, at the end of the day, you are not going to be the person who is making money, do not worry about it; study what you like.

Hamida’s father is offering an induction to her responsibility and place in the power hierarchy and structure of heteronormativity (Berlant, 2011). A crash course into sexual subjectivity to mark her ascension into social subjugation and discipline as a reproductive subject (Foucault, 1982). It is aimed to ensure the continuation of male entitlement and privileges across generation. The father’s view reflects general social attitudes and perceptions on women’s access to employment in Egypt, regardless
of gender and class. A recent survey conducted by UNWomen shows that 73 per cent of female respondents (compared to 68 per cent of male respondents) agree or strongly agree that it is more important for a woman to marry than for her to have a career. The same survey shows that 88 per cent of female respondents (98 per cent of male respondents) agreed or strongly agreed that when work opportunities are scarce, men should have access to jobs before women (UN Women and Promundu, 2017). Perhaps what is more pronounced in the father’s view is his compassionate attachment to patriarchal values that trumped any other familial attachments, for example, to his daughter. Hamida deplores the gift giving moment and the happiness gift of parental wisdom and the tendency to imagine her future in exclusive heteronormative terms:

It is kind of shit. It is kind of bad that even parents trying to encourage their kids to go into STEM have these conceptions at the back of their heads. They are not going to be the breadwinner of the house or can be an equal breadwinner, the husband is.

Hamida’s words convey feelings of being betrayed, cheated, and manipulated. She is walking blindfolded in land mines marked as safe spaces. She became aware of an adult world marked with strained fragility and ugly ordinariness (Berlant, 2011). A world where her future, citizenship, social membership, and sense of belonging can be easily snatched from underneath her feet by one word, the ‘M’ word (marriage) and with little to no trouble. She is now doubtful, pragmatic, cynical, suspicious, and distrustful that perhaps she misread the road signs of an uninhabited path to the good life. Her imaginations for the future are gripped firmly by the tentacles of heteronormativity. Her protests are muted by the social conventionality as a good girl, grateful daughter, dutiful wife, and obedient mother. She becomes a happiness alien (Ahmed, 2010) planning its escape. She explains:

How the thought process of family and friends on a lot of issues that you might not agree with kind of pushes you away to some extent. You feel like I want to go somewhere where people actually appreciate what I have to say, and where I can, I do not know...not being asked by every member of the family, are you married? have you met someone? This kind of questions you get in Egyptian weddings from everyone.

Hamida’s only wish was to be seen, to be recognized, to be heard as an equal, and not as a cog in the reproductive machinery of the heteronormative patriarchy. Yet, she is aware of the limitations to how far she can fly.
She admits her decision for choosing the UK:

I was looking either for the UK or the US, but the US is very geographically far away, and also time difference and everything and I thought that maybe for my first time travelling abroad I would take like a bit of smaller step, so I ended up in the UK.

Hamida is treading slowly into the new territories of her independence. She is in between tied with the emotional familial attachments and the struggle to break free from the psychic life of power (Butler, 1997). She is trying to convey that her decision to break away as a happiness gift to her parents, a continuation to gift-giving economy (Ahmed, 2010). However, she became aware of the velvet cuffs that are familial attachments. Hamida’s recalls a conversation between her parents:

My dad was not having a good time, he missed me a lot, because I was living at home before, so they were not dealing with it very well. My dad was telling my mom I should not have let her travel abroad and by letting her…it is just all in his hands like he can control if I go or if I do not, like let me travel as he approved of my travelling and he should not have approved of it.

Hamida’s mobility decision queered the spatiality of the united, happy nuclear family (father, mother and daughter) and the patriarchal power structure. The heterofamilial attachments are strings for the circular transference of affect (Ahmed, 2010). Hamida’s happiness led to the father’s unhappiness that eventually made her unhappy about her happiness. She is well aware that heterofamilial attachments are not about love but are forms of patriarchal control exercised on women:

It is just a lot of control you do not see with boys, like if a boy wants to travel abroad, oh yeah, go on honey, you going to have a good career, go get these degrees or whatever, but for women, it is just like oh you are travelling as a single woman as well that is tricky […] these are the constraints that oriental or middle eastern parents put on their female children. I would say just like living abroad or travelling abroad like a single woman is a big question mark back home for men, for fathers.

Hamida’s use of colonial terms such as ‘oriental’ in reference to her parents is another linguistic signifier that illuminates the struggles of being alienated postcolonial subject (Fanon, 2008; Mbembe, 2008). It is a form of queering the ‘othering’ discourse by challenging its hegemonic power, a form of interpellation by turning it around on its head (Butler, 1990, 2004, 2011). She is signalling her refusal to be cast as the dutiful daughter responsible for her parents’ happiness; it is their fixations and
attachments to notions of domesticity that are the sources of their unhappiness, not her decision for mobility.

### 7.1.2 UNHAPPY RECONCILIATIONS

The desire for mobility and study abroad was on Haya’s mind since she finished her undergraduate studies. Even though mobility was “an acceptable concept” by her family (i.e., both parents worked abroad), Haya admits she made several compromises and, “experienced a lot of, what they call it, opposition from my family at the very beginning of my start of mobility after university”. Haya recalls:

Right after undergraduate studies, I wanted to travel to Canada to do my masters and then they said no no, start working first and see what you want, you are too young for this, everybody who goes to Canada just not going to come back.

The family’s objection demonstrates Egypt’s intergenerational trauma of colonialism and the fear of lost generations to the colonizer, the West. The family’s way of swaying her decision and to reconcile their wants (to keep Haya at home) is by inviting her to membership in the ‘employed’ social group instead of pressuring her to get married (Berlant, 2011). Haya acquiesced to the family’s pressure and decided to postpone her plans for postgraduate studies. In doing so, Haya devised a “strategy” with two objectives in mind: a) to reduce the family’s anxieties towards her plans and b) to secure her financial independence. This meant finding a job first. Thanks to her world-class education, Haya was able to secure a job with “a very good offer” in a multinational enterprise in Egypt. The new job required Haya “to travel a lot, a lot in certain countries for three months, or six months and then come back.” A choice that reflects a determined mindset and determination to be mobile. Intervals of short mobility helped to “eased things in” for her family as “it was kind of gradual change, gradual acceptance, for them in their heads to gradually accept” her freedom to travel. Haya’s family was reassured because, as she claims they thought:

We know our daughter is based in Egypt; she is just not there, you know. But technically, I was living for the whole six months or nine months in another country, but the whole unconscious feeling that I am still based in Egypt was still there and make them comfortable.
Compromises require walking a tight rope, always. Ahmed (2010:149) observes that “a compromise is happy insofar as it is a compromise in what is wanted.” In Haya’s case, mobility compromises turned unhappy after she was assigned to work in a different country, this -in her words- was:

Basically the big hit. What is this? and blah blah [...] this is not good and then where are you going? you are going to live alone?

This time, Haya did not leave her job under the family’s pressure. Partly because Haya was in a stronger position (financially) to stand her ground and stick to her choice, she says that her family is exceptional in a way “they never tell me not to do something. They frown upon it, but they just do not try to impose any actions on you.” The family’s unhappiness with Haya’s globetrotting lifestyle is communicated not by explicit objection as earlier but by an implicit renunciation “frown upon”. The shift in power dynamics within the family as Hamida grew more independent ushered in new forms of negotiations and reconciliations. The tone of prohibition that was expressed earlier towards Haya’s plans for mobility after finishing her undergraduate studies is now laced in velvet gloves of parental love and care. Haya is grateful, after all, that her family do not (at least) prohibit her from travelling and asserts that:

For women, this has to be something that you give to your daughters, to travel, to explore and to see the world from different perspectives.

I often wondered why Haya coded the parents’ emotional bargaining concerning her decision for mobility as the ‘best gift you give your daughter’. On the one hand, her words convey feelings of gratitude to the patriarchal state presented in the figures of the parents and its gift economy; on the other hand, her words can convey a sense of reverse discourse and interpellations (Butler, 2004). I reckon, she is trying to convey her desire for breaking away from the vertical attachments of being responsible of her parents’ (un)happiness by rewriting the scripts of happiness. In a way, she is implicitly asserting her autonomy and agency by re-orienting her parents’ gaze and at the same time she is signalling that she is no longer waiting for permission or authorization to go on and live her life the way she sees fit. She is troubling the (un)happy moments by turning them around as gift giving moments and a parents’ duty towards their daughters. She is now not being “affected quite as
expected” (Butler cited in Ahmed, 2016:483) and her journey must be seen as a reason for celebration and pride.

Haya confesses that her decision to pursue postgraduates’ studies in the UK was welcomed by her family. A decision is perceived as a promise to get “another perspective in life” instead of constant travel for work. She is describing a familiar scenario of working too much that is often expressed to curb women’s aspirations under the pretext of care and love. She admits that choosing the UK was “kind of relieving” to the family because of its close geographical proximity and colonial familiarity. Haya reports:

London was a relief to them because it was very close. Language is ok for them to come over anytime. No time difference, so yeah. I think Canada, US, Australia or whatever that would have totally been received with the different reaction.

Haya acknowledges that her mobility trajectories are “unconventional” but are better than “just staying and going to the other route of getting married and having kids and obviously everybody around us is doing it and is not happy”. She is either signalling triumph over the dominant force of normativity or perhaps reassuring herself of the soundness of her decision. For others, reconciliations mean clipping your own wings. Nadine brings up a story of a ‘close friend’ whose family made the condition of getting married a prerequisite for their approval on her decision to study for PhD:

I have a friend, for instance, her family was ok for her going for masters, but then after that, she wanted to pursue a PhD, they told her you to have to get married before you go for a PhD. Eventually, she met someone, they got married, and she is doing her PhD now.

Nadine was happy for this close friend that she was “lucky” to find someone who shared the same plans to study abroad, get married and then pursue her dreams to study for a PhD. For Nadine’s friend, there is no possibility to escape the prison of heteronormativity except by taking it with her across spatial and geographical borders. The way out of family control turned into a re-inscription of those norms. The transition between PGT/PGR studies presented a point of time pressure that must not be only understood in linear terms but in discursive and intersectional (i.e., social class, age, religion, level of education and the family history of mobility).
Constructions and negotiating temporalities in academic life has been widely explored in scholarship on international higher education (Gibbs et al., 2014; Shahjahan, 2015; Morley and Lund, 2020). From participants' narratives, their awareness of time and temporalities of the postgraduate experience emerged as a point of pressure, source of shame and intensified anxieties. Participants reflected on the ways their experience of postgraduate studies queered the heteronormative notions of organising time according to 'straight time' (Muñoz, 2009). The logic of chrononormativity in organizing time binds and is binding their rationale and decision-making processes (Freeman et al., 2010). Examples from the interviews highlight those constructions of time and temporalities shaped and were shaped by multiple factors such as the level of study (PGT & PGR), the length of the postgraduate study programme, the social pressure to marriage and the constant border crossings between Egypt and the UK.

### 7.2.1 TRADING TIME

As discussed in Chapter Four, there is tremendous social pressure and expectation for women to get married earlier than men. The age consideration was important for Hanaa as she explains:

> Part of age consideration once you start a PhD, of course, is related to when I might want to have children [...] one of the factors I considered is the fact I am not married, so I do not have to worry about what I am going to do with the husband, for instance, I do not have children. I do not have to worry about obligations and family responsibilities.

On the one hand, singledom provided Hanaa with opportunities to free mobility with no attachments (i.e., husband, family etc.). Yet, there was a sense of urgency that affected Hanaa’s decision for mobility and choosing the UK:

> It was a calculation of I want to go for this now because I know I have the liberty to do it so now. I am not bound by a family that’s restricting my capacity to move [...] That’s a major reason why I picked the UK, the program is within a reasonable timeframe for me to be able to return to work without feeling I lost almost a decade of my life. Especially that I don't feel quite..., I'm not in my early twenties.
These opportunities are not cost-free, and anxieties affected Hanaa as time passes by. Throughout the interview, Hanaa referred to the PhD process as “a big opportunity/cost calculation” and “trade-off”. I asked her to explain:

It is the time you sacrifice stable income. But also, the time you sacrifice career progression in terms of your colleagues are getting promoted, and you are not. Your friends and family members are having children and buying houses. When I mean by friends buying houses and having children is that there is a tangible output to the three years you are doing a PhD whereas you are just working on a degree.

Hanaa is describing a scene from a temporal race where her decision queered its rules and regulations. While others are getting promoted and rewarded with tangible outcomes (i.e., job promotion, marriage and children), she is tied to a promise for a contingent future. According to this logic, temporal investment in postgraduate studies is simultaneously a step for achieving aspirational gains and a cause for anxieties. The complex dilemma of temporal investment is reduced to the simplistic calculation of either/or terms. As I listened to Hanaa, I was reminded of Berlant’s (2011) notion of ‘The Promise of Exchange Value’, which is perhaps the most accurate to explain Hanaa’s gamble on time. Berlant (2011:40) explains that “exchange value is not identical to the price of things but marks a determination of what else a thing can get exchanged for”; it is “the proximity of two kinds of cruel optimism fragmented into so many contradictory logics.” As such, time is the valuable currency Hanaa is hoping to fragment, gamble with, and offer as a sacrifice in exchange for happy futurity. However, the affective modalities colouring her voice are accentuated by anxieties of time passing by without bringing tangible outcomes (to borrow her expression). Moreover, the crushing weight of demands to the present moment and future is marked with increased precarity of academic lives. Nevertheless, Hanaa remains attached to the cruel promise of happiness, and says:

I am not saying that I regret the decision, but I am saying that this is a trade-off, and if you are not aware of the trade-off, then you probably do not really understand the PhD process.

Hanaa’s rationale is largely influenced by the heteronormative common sense of the neoliberal capitalist economy that equates success with job security, accumulation of wealth, and family etc. (Halberstam, 2011).
The situation tragedy begins to emerge in the realization that sacrifices made in the name of exchange value are “expressive and opaque” and “the affect attached to [this type of] optimism is either panic or numbness” (Berlant, 2011:37–43).

7.2.2 MISPLACED VALUES

The question on value brings the point of the general social attitudes towards women’s postgraduate education in Egypt that runs at the core of this argument and temporal calculations. Hanaa contends:

> It is not a secret that in Egypt, as in many societies, not just in Egypt, your success as a woman is measured on your marital status. That, if you are not married, irrespective of how much money you are making per year, or how many degrees you might have, or how successful you might be, or what you are managing, or what you have built, or what you have designed if you are not married or not with children, there is a perception that your success is incomplete. When I came back from my masters, the first question my aunt asked me after I finished a degree from [name of university] was did you meet someone?.

Haya agrees with this view and adds:

> Families - including mine by the way - and I am very open to this, by the way, is almost associating the success of women with marriage. It would take a great deal of change in mindsets and paradigm to look at a person, and you know, I do not want to say judge them, just assess them in terms of oh she is people, person, she is presentable, she is successful, she has achieved something, she has served the community and the people around here, she is a useful person, ok, rather than just looking at the person, oh look at that. She is thirty, and she is not married.

To unpack, by declaring her ‘openness’ to discuss this topic, Haya is giving me permission to access the intimate spaces of familial conventions. Furthermore, her choice of verbs such as ‘judge’, ‘assess’ reflect the prevalent duty of surveillance in the everyday life (Foucault, 1982). Moreover, her analogies reveal the conditionality of citizenship (Butler and Spivak, 2007) and reinforce binary divide in social memberships between happy productive citizens who are ‘people’s person, presentable, successful and of service to the community’, as opposed to the unhappy queers (Ahmed, 2010) who are thirty, unmarried and childless. Haya admits:

> Even us as women, we kind of sometimes subconsciously judge each other based on that. When I look at men, I do not care if he is married or not; I say, ok, tell me what you do in life? What is your career? It is a subconscious bias and unconscious bias, and it is always there.
The strain of irony in Haya’s words reflect the intersections of value systems across gender, class and age, and their complexities and idiosyncrasies. Haya also draws attention to the horizontal points of pressure between peers (us as women) which coalesce with vertical points of pressure from the patriarchy. These points map the geographies of affect (Ahmed, 2010) extending vertically (parents) and horizontally (peers). Haya argues that:

It takes a lot of awareness and paradigm shift, a huge awareness, success stories of other women and sort of empowerment from girl to girl, for everybody to just do the twist for human beings to not think what I do in life, just think of my value.

Feelings of fear, failure and anxieties are affected by the realization of the loss of value in the time invested in a degree. Haya’s point on it is always there caught my attention. There is a spatial-temporal permanence to the structure of affect. Permeance on time continuum of two cruel attachments with contradictory logics: either following getting married or pursuing a postgraduate degree. Each choice requires gambling with time in cruel hopes that someday, somehow, it will pay off (Berlant, 2011).

Haya’s words of ‘awareness’, ‘paradigm shift’ echo the tropes of the well-rehearsed mantras of the neoliberal capitalist economy of positive psychology (Ahmed, 2010) and bright-sided positive thinking (Ehrenreich, 2010).

Self-inflated narratives of success are handed like a torch from “girl to girl” with the promise of eventual transformative change that will liberate them all. But what about those failed subject, their narratives, journeys, and trajectories? And success according to whom and what? Queering tropes of success gained tremendous traction in queer theory (Bersani, 1987; Edelman, 2007; Halberstam, 2011). Halberstam (2011:207) asserts that “queerness offers the promise of failure as a way of life […], but it is up to us whether we choose to make good on that promise in a way that makes a detour around the usual markers of accomplishment and satisfaction.” During the interview, I was reluctant to mention to Haya that from what I gathered from her and other participants’ journeys, failure is inescapable, in some form or the other. And instead of escaping failure as an abject object, a key aim of this study is to embrace and celebrate our collective failure in internationalisation.
Failing to align with heteronormative organizing of spaces can turn moments of celebration to national mourning. Hanaa recalls a conversation during the wedding ceremony of her younger brother:

Both my siblings are married when my younger brother got married one of my uncles treated me like this was my funeral, I was like this is ridiculous, I do not care. He said, stay strong, I thought to stay strong for what!.

Hanaa’s failure to align with celebrations of heteronormativity turned sanitized spaces of public happiness into moments of public mourning (Ahmed, 2006). Hanaa confessed feelings of tiredness in the suffocating heteronormative scene “each time I am in Cairo, and I go to a wedding, and everybody is married, you think about it.” Ahmed (2004:147) asserts that “the everydayness of compulsory heterosexuality is also its affectiveness, wrapped up as it is with moments of ceremony (birth, marriage, death)” these moments of queer discomfort “get repeated over time and can be experienced as a bodily injury; moments which position queer subjects as failed in their failure to live up to the ‘hey you too’ of heterosexual self-narration.” Hanaa remembers:

Last year, I was in Egypt for my research and every family gathering or every wedding, engagement party, people ask, you know, I would feel really conscious of being around cousins my age, we were born in the same year all of us, they have their children, and they are being treated like being part of a different crowd, and then I am part of the young cousins’ crowd, but of course it is insulting.

Hanaa’s infantilized citizenship (Berlant, 1997) became the price she pays for her failure to align with the heteronormative organising of spaces and social relations (Ahmed, 2006). She is wearing a bull eye target on her back for social pity, scrutiny, suspicion and shame. She is read as “other” and thus “queered” on account of her transgressions of being “out of line” (Ahmed, 2006:66). Her failure to align materialized into fences to emphasize the spatial and temporal stretch of territory between the happily married and the unhappy queers. She is cast as a social “squatter” occupying the “terrifying nonplace” of singlehood (Berlant, 2011:177). Her otherness renders her as a terrorist figure (Puar, 2007) armoured with an explosive vest of negativity which can be detonated at any moment and blow the social, affective structure of performative happiness.
She is an affective alien (Ahmed, 2010) in a national culture of heteronormativity. Her presence is a nuisance, a fleck, a stain on the pristine imagined future of white wedding dresses and domestic bliss. Unhappy endings can also be the legacy/caution/promise to give others. For example, Hamida remembers her grandmother’s words:

> Oh, when are we going to be happy for you? Meaning when are you going to get married [...] she would always say I want to see you married before I pass away, which is like do not put a time constraint on me and do not make that a goal as well.

Hamida became responsible for the happiness of others who only see marriage as a happiness cause (Ahmed, 2010). Hamida is left with the sole responsibility to “reproduce the form of the family, which means taking up the cause of parental happiness as her own” (Ahmed, 2010:58). Her grandmother’s words project a legacy of unhappiness, a shaming by guilt that will live on to affect Hamida’s future happiness. She is also entrusted with the future reproduction of normativity by bearing the happiness duty with starting point (marriage) and no end (staying married till death do them apart). Hamida asserts the tenacity of the marriage ideology regardless of the parental open-mindedness, awareness-raising and shifting paradigms “even with the most open-minded parents, they would still be very keen on marrying off their children as soon as possible”.

### 7.2.4 THE HUNTING GAMES

Nadine contends that when it comes to the question of marriage, men and women in Egypt face the same pressure, yet at different times and stages in their lives:

> The expectation of women settling and men settling are bit different. Women are expected to settle from early 20. You start getting the marriage vibe, when are you getting married? For men, by early thirties, you start getting questions of why are you not settling? Why are you not having a family? They will face it at some point, but it just a bit shifted a bit delayed.

Hamida stresses that parents’ anxieties are intersected with an assemblage of misogyny, ageism, and sexism:

> It is very bad for women. I guess because also there is like you going to get older and no one is going to want you basically, kind of situation, so yeah. Tick-tock Tok, the clock is ticking; if you hit thirty and you are not married, what have you been doing with your life? It is a failure.
This partly explains the social pressure participants faced weddings and social gatherings. Choosing postgraduate studies queered this temporal organizing of life and brought social anxieties that by the time they finish their studies, they will miss the window of starting a family.

Fatin describes the social expectation that after she completes her PhD, she “will start hunting for a husband or living the normal life that is satisfying the expectations and checking the boxes that they have”. The mirage of normalcy is structured through the images of heterosexual domestic bliss (Warner, 2000). Fatin attests that “different is terrifying sometimes for people”, and in Egypt, society is used to women:

To live their lives in a certain way. When you show a different example, they are always afraid. Why is she doing this? We are used to girls getting married, having kids, living with their family, and it is only her husband who can travel for work, and she leaves her work to go with him, but the other way around so not common, and this sometimes is scary for people.

Cobb (2012) argues that fear of singlehood is not as much affected by feelings of loneliness as it is a source of public anxiety caused by the couple norm. Choosing and desiring differently bring as Fatin puts it, are ‘scary for people’ because refusing to see them as happiness causes threatens the heteronormative imaginary of these objects as happy (Ahmed, 2010). Marriage is affected both as a promise for inter-generational happiness and a caution against eternal (un)happiness. There is a vertical temporal circulation of effect across generations (grandmother, father, uncles) and horizontal circulation of affect across social circles (siblings, friends, colleagues) (Berlant, 2011). Sherry recalls encounters with friends:

My friends are a bit different than my Egyptian family and a little bit more like my mindset or at least they understand my own mindset, they were like encouraging, but you know things like yeah we knew this typical Egyptian path for working and getting married and family it is not for you, so that is why we encourage not because it is encouraging for a woman to go for her dream if it is this one but because we know for you this marriage thing is probably not suitable. It was also singled me out in a sense.

Sherry is queered among her peers on account of her postgraduate education, nationality and class bound positionalities that allowed her to choose differently. Sherry felt the, “tiredness of making corrections and departures; the pressure of this insistence, this presumption, this demand that asks either for a passing over (a moment of passing, which is not always available) or for direct or indirect
forms of self-revelation” (Ahmed, 2010:147). Sherry’s decisions are an affront to politics of normativity and “reproductive futurism” and is othered, queered for “not fighting for the children” (Edelman, 2007:3). Re-orientation towards happy objects then turns into a mission, an act of love, and of gift-giving moments as Fatin recalls:

> Sometimes, they are doing it may be, of course, it is bad for me, but with good intentions in terms of this what they know life should be, and they want the best for me, and this is the best sometimes.

Love and care became the social “bargaining tool for convincing others to join in making a life” (Berlant, 2011:181). Hamida protests this politics of parental love and social bargaining:

> What about what I want? What about whom I want to marry? Or is it I just get married to anyone just that my grandma can die happy? What are you going to be even happy about? If I am married, like what if it is a bad marriage.

It is not also a question of getting married, but life afterwards as Hamida explains, “once you also got married back home it is like when are you going to start popping out kids, it is just like ‘what do you want? This is my life’”. Hamida asserts:

> There is a lot of pressure from that as well. I mean not from my mom up to this point in time because I am 24 now; I am assuming when I am thirty and still not married, she is going to start asking a lot. I assume that is going to be the case. That does not mean she does not ask every now and then, have you met someone bla bla?.

Hamida’s eruption to reclaim the narratives of her life ‘this is my life’ symbolizes some of the affective instabilities and “practices in which [she] scavenge[s] toward a sense of authentic social belonging by breaking from their parents’ way of attaining the good life” (Berlant, 2011:166).
Participants contested the marriage scripts and its invasive and pernicious manipulation of their bodies, identities, and sexualities. Their resistance to the heteronormative logic queered the spatiality and temporality of the marriage scripts.

7.3.1 IT IS WRITTEN IN THE STARS, IT IS YOUR ‘NASEEB’

Sherry explains Egypt’s highly complicated view on marriage and coupledom:

The thing is, in everything else in life they argue with destiny, and you know (naseeb) and all of this but when it comes to marriage they act as if it is all in your own hands somehow, and that it is your own fault that you are not getting married.

This line of thinking aligns with the neoliberal ideology that places happiness and the good life as an individual responsibility (Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011). According to this logic, Sherry’s failure to attain the good life (i.e. find a husband, start a family) are her own doing. Sherry further explains:

It is very complex thought but like, basically in a nutshell what they believe or what most people believe is because I am not married, I study more as an excuse to say like I am studying that is why I am not getting married.

The public imaginary on women’s motivations for postgraduate education is reductive, ignorant, and loaded with misogyny. In a way, it ties back plans for postgraduate education to the marriage question, as Sherry explains:

To them is only a cover-up for not being married while it is actually the other way around. I do not want to get married because I want to do this first for me, and I will see about marriage. Whenever it happens, it happens, but I think a lot of people think women do it because they are unable to get married.

This brings us back to the point made earlier about failure and unmarried women being cast as the ‘other’ who is a failed subject ‘covering up’ being unloved, undesired, uncoupled and unhappy. The social discourse is also met with subversiveness and dissidence. Fatin mentions that in the past, this type of social pressure:

It used to annoy me. Again, when I was in Egypt because I was hearing this all the time. Those kinds of personal questions; are you getting married now? Are you getting married soon? were always being said but now because I only hear
them when I get in touch with those people, which is not very frequent, I do not care anymore. Even now when I hear it, I feel sorry for them because they do not know better. It is fine if they choose to live their life this way, but they should know that there is no right choice for everyone. Everyone has his own path, and that is what I chose.

Fatin is returning the gift of unhappiness, the moments of collective mourning on lost futures and turn it on its head. She is taking control of the narrative. She is resisting to be the case as the unhappy other and turns the perceived unhappiness into moments of liberation from the suffocating prison of heteronormativity. She is refusing to be cast as the object of pity as the unloved, undesired, abject ‘other’. She is offering a gift of open possibilities to alternative futures. Futures that celebrate the multiplicity of choices and re-organising the structure of affect, its direction and subjects.

7.3.2 STARS DO NOT SEEK THE SHADOW

There is an old Egyptian proverb that goes like “a shadow of a man is better than the shadow of a wall” (Golia, 2008:180). Participants talked about challenges of being Egyptian postgraduate women and finding compatible partners. The everydayness of compulsory heterosexuality in Egypt feeds on archaic notions such as security, for example. Haya gives a brilliant and nuanced view on the concept of security as it factors in the marriage question:

I think it is again the same concept, we both feel that you are secure if there was a man available with you [...] if you live alone what if you need something, there is always kind of a sort of perception, or some sort an idea that only men can do and achieve stuff and take care of the household, carrying your bag and change your lamp and take your gas meter reading and this kind of thing.

For Haya, the necessity to get married is not out of fear of loneliness “I would not say any reason that is related to issues of being alone” but “I would say it is kind of sort of security”. Haya’s admission reveals how anxieties are being affected through repetition and reproduction of fantasmatic scenes of the good life (Berlant, 2011), regardless of whether they are true or not. Security occupies the site of fantasy to the good life. However, Haya rejects this fantasy “if you are looking at marriage as something nice and having a friend and an apartment and someone living with you, it is nice, right?” however, the normative ways marriage in Egypt is “imposed on people by our society” is troubling to Haya.
There is an awareness in Haya’s mind that having companionship and familial attachment will mean limited freedom of mobility of, “going around and travelling and doing this on my own; it totally was easier; if I were married, it would have been awful right?.” This brings us back to the promise of the exchange value of two contradictory logics—singlehood or coupled. Haya is confronted with two kinds of cruel optimism: coupledom and its promises of companionship, security etc., or singlehood, abject loneliness etc.

Hanaa lays out the challenges of being an Egyptian postgraduate woman in Egypt’s marriage market:

> We come from a society that is filled with dumb men, no offence, but you understand what I am saying, conservative mentality, who might be intimidated by the thought of a successful woman who has a degree [...] then you have an issue of how much money you make and the issue how the degree and the level of success you have and the issue of social compatibility and class compatibility [...] I think in a lot of societies it is the same. I think a lot of men universally are intimidated by the idea of successful women. It is not something that’s unique to the Middle East or unique to the Arab world. I think that a lot of men here that I know, the idea of being with a woman that has a higher degree than them is not necessarily appealing either.

Sherry disagrees with Hanaa’s view to some extent:

> So being a woman who lives here alone no family supervision in the same country, for Egyptian men, let us say someone you would be dating, or so, he would have concerns of me whether I drink or whom I socialise with, if I am a virgin or not, whereas European men it is the opposite. They ask me, ok, you are Muslim, so what does that mean to you? Please tell me, what kind of boundaries there are so I respect them so in a sense, yeah, I do not know it is a very complex topic.

The constructions of masculinities, in Sherry’s view, remain tied to heterocolonial legacies and binaries (Hearn, 2004; Morrell and Swart, 2005). Moreover, her words reveal the spatial negotiations of territories, boundaries and limits across contexts (Lefebvre and Enders, 1976; Foucault, 1979; Lefebvre and Nicholson-Smith, 1991). Haya explains that when it comes to the issue of compatibility, religion is:

> The hardest bit at all if you ask me did you enjoy everything so far in different countries, in different city whatever, yes, it was absolutely fine, but this very point that you mentioned is really one of the things that for a lot of restrictions, how I can put it? I am a Muslim girl, or a Muslim woman, or Muslim female or whatever; this puts me under a lot of restrictions; I do not say that I am not happy about it, if you are not happy, you can just drop it, I do not want to drop it, that is my choice, right? But the thing is, this is for me, maybe one of the very
huge challenges getting a Muslim girl to find a partner in western society. Because it is kind of very pool of choice if you want to continue with your beliefs and everything.

Haya talks about the constant negotiations and reconceptualisation of her subjectivities as she crosses across spatial and temporal borders. Her religion is the sort of attachment that binds and is binding to the positionality and meaning making of her journey of mobility. She refuses to give away part of her identity, while simultaneously being tormented by awareness of its existence. In post 9/11 world, this awareness is surrounded by negativity and a source of restrictions (Khan, 2019; Crossouard et al., 2020). Hamida elaborates on the double standards of the social views on Muslim women marrying out of religion:

In Islam, men can technically marry women who are not of the same religion, but for women, it cannot be the same, so I am assuming if I picked someone who is Christian, and I wanted to marry them my parents would be against it. The double standards are very clear. [...] For example, say if I met like a German guy, and I decided to get married, I do not know how much focus they would put on his religion in that case, like he is not one of us [...] they would be putting a lot of pressure on how you are going to raise the kids?, what religion?, it has to be yours, I do not think it would be a clear and strict no as it would be on an Arab man for example.

The ‘double standards’ exemplify mimicry and abjection in the construction and sense of the self (Bhabha, 1984, 2013). Hetero-familial attachments through marriage is sought to bring “imaginary security” and “class upward mobility” that requires constant bargaining and negotiations (Berlant, 2011:180). At this point, marriage becomes the site where Hamida is expected to fantasize about the good life and to the affective intensity “to feel normal is created by economic conditions of nonreciprocity” (Berlant, 2011:181).

### 7.3.3 BREAKING AWAY

“Exposure is important” began Fatin as a suggestion to break from the shackles of heteronormativity. She further explains:

You live your entire life thinking about your culture, and your religion, the way you are living in the centre of the universe. This is how life should be, and then when you are exposed to a different culture, you see different other cultures and ways of life, and people are surviving.
Exposure to alternative forms of social arrangements dissipates the fear surrounding the failure of not fitting in the exclusively heteronormative mould. It is a promise for survival; as Fatin explained, ‘people are surviving’. Survival requires creativity and reimagining of the future (El Saadawi and Newson-Horst, 2010). Haya says that she is “totally against the whole marriage process in Egypt”, and this was “my way of thinking since I was in university, so it is not something that came to my head when I started to travel”. However, Haya also agrees with Fatin’s point on the importance of exposure “when I started to travel, and I saw different people from different cultures etc. I started to be more assertive of this belief.” Haya believes that the marriage process in Egypt is “so much messed up”.

Haya considers herself lucky that her family is “not so much uptight about this”; however, she feels inclined to follow the tradition - to an extent - as a gift of “courtesy to the family.” Haya says that she would just “accommodate, in case I was having different marriage, just try to accommodate the absolutely important thing that my family would be happy to have” this should not mean that Haya will follow the whole process of marriage “whole process going to the family, then like approval of every single person that happens to be on the streets, that kind of thing, it is not my cup of tea since a long time ago.”

Fatin criticizes the neoliberal fantasy that panders for women the ‘having it all’ trope and its biopower through attachments:

> Even feminists in the Middle East or Egypt, not all of course, they want the best of everything that makes their situation better. We want equality in sharing household duties if people are married, but they still want the man to be responsible for everything. It does not work this way. You cannot combine every benefit in the world. We need to equality further to approach the idea of equality from both sides. If we want equality in the roles we play in society, it has to be in everything.

Picking from where Fatin’s words led the discussion to the imaginings of breaking away from the psychic attachment to the powerful discourse of normativity. Such attachments, as Butler (1997) contends, are impossible to break. Especially given that these attachments to normativity are psychically appealing in the neoliberal capitalist economy (Ruti, 2017).
As shown in this chapter, the public reactions to participants’ decision to choose different lifestyles (study instead of settling down) revealed anxieties and projections of doomed, grim futures characterised by abject spinsterhood and miserable loneliness of eating dinner for one, forever. Furthermore, compromises offered promises of happy reconciliation between different wants (Ahmed, 2010). However, they presented moments of convergence and divergence between what participants imagined their future to be, in contrast to what others (i.e., parents, friends and extended family) imagined their future. As shown in the scenes earlier, participants occupy that affective space of in-between-ness. They reside in this liminal space of neither completely opting out of the heteronormative discourse nor are they able to embrace it fully.

For some participants, the marriage script was to be set ablaze completely, while for others, there remain possibilities for perhaps re-writing with different ink. The power of the marriage script, in participants’ views, lies in its vertical and horizontal attachments (family, friends, society etc.). Moments of compromises presented a break from vertical (parents, grandparents) and horizontal attachments (friends, colleagues) (Berlant, 2011). The feelings of tiredness, exhaustion, fear, dread, shame, and failures of constant self-revelation. (Un)happy compromises were made (Ahmed, 2010). These compromises entailed sacrifices by unmarried participants in negotiating their decision to pursue postgraduate study in the UK. I find deploying the term ‘compromise’ to be slightly misleading in the sense that it may imply an equal dynamic of power exercised by each party (daughters/parents). One of the more significant findings to emerge from this chapter is the degree to which unmarried participants shared similar experiences concerning the marriage question despite the striking difference in their life trajectories. This is not to undermine the impact of social class, level of education, age, and religion; however, as it shows here, the ideology of marriage and its affected feelings of anxieties circulated intensely among participants regardless of differences. In the next chapter, I will move to the experiences of married participants as they negotiate their decisions for mobility and their responsibilities as wives and mothers.
The rapid increase in academic mobilities has led to the emergence of new forms of families; transitional family (Larsen, 2016), the astronaut family (Waters, 2012) and moveable family (Lazarova et al., 2015). Participants’ narratives revealed that the decision to relocate among married couples is a discursive and multi-layered process of endless negotiations. These negotiations were not only confined within the frame of the family (i.e., husband, wife) but extended to the broader social circles (friends, colleagues). The family emerged as “a happy object that binds and is binding” and “through the work that must be done to keep it together” (Ahmed, 2010:45). This chapter will discuss the type of negotiations participants made during their journey addressing in particular the expectations of motherhood that framed their trajectories. It will extend the response to the second research sub-question: What social expectations framed their trajectories of international mobility and What were the affective modalities of these trajectories?

In this chapter, I will address participants’ obligations towards family and motherhood as a further, related axis of these social expectations, and its influence on participants’ rationale for choosing the UK as study destination and the affective modalities of their trajectories. The married relationships referred to in this Chapter are exclusively of the opposite-sex, and the narratives highlight the extent to which married women’s mobility decision for postgraduate studies in the UK queered and disrupted some of the heteronormative notions and assumptions based on their gendered and classed positionalities.

8.1 COOKING DINNER FOREVER

Duggan (2002:189) describes homonormativity in neoliberal capitalist as ‘political sedative’ and suggests that “first we get marriage and the military, and then we go home and cook dinner, forever.” I expand on Duggan’s biting remarks to refer to the hegemonic discourse of assimilation in neoliberal capitalist economy an excellent point of departure to start my discussion. In this first part, I will present some participants’ narratives on the social expectations placed on them as married women on the move and the type of negotiations, sacrifices and pressures they encountered during their journeys.
8.1.1 UNCONVENTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

“The first reason is that my husband lives in the UK and I was staying in Scandinavia. So it was like a chance to be in the UK,” said Sohair. She came to the UK to pursue a PhD degree in STEM after finishing a dual postgraduate taught programme (Master’s) from Northern Europe. For Sohair, the plans for undertaking PhD studies were non-negotiable; the most stressing question was where? In her case, the choices were limited by her marital status as a married woman and a desire to reunite with her husband, who is working as a medical doctor in the UK. Thanks to her outstanding performance she was offered a generous scholarship from her university - where she did her master’s - for PhD study; however, it was “not much of a motivation” because of “social status to be with [her] husband”.

I was curious to know whether her desire to be reunited with the husband intensified by the social pressure during her master’s studies. Sohair confesses that during this period, times were indeed “challenging”, and “it remains challenging even when I came to the UK”. The reason behind Sohair’s dilemma is that despite her attempts to be reunited with her husband, they now live in two different cities and have a long-distance commuter relationship (Smith and Viviani, 2013). Living separately as a married couple was not an easy decision to make, as Sohair admits:

I have to live in [city], and my husband has to go to work in [different city], but at least we can see each other at the weekend.

Sohair acknowledges that not having children and “these kinds of attachments” made the arrangements for living separately negotiable with her husband for the time being. She admits that her husband “is Egyptian as well, but he is open-minded,”. This is an interesting observation that reveals the fragmentations of cosmopolitan identities; between nationality by passport (Egyptian), gender roles (husband) and gendered views on mobility (Calhoun, 2008; Chalk, 2014). Although the decision to live separately required tremendous negotiations, she confesses that economic conditions steered the husband’s acceptance to their unconventional living arrangements:

Especially like he knows it is hard for us to stay in Egypt, so we have to support each other in a way. The main example is job opportunities, to have proper support to our family and to live in good standards that’s the main reason.
The husband’s agreement is conditioned on the promise of exchange values (temporal and spatial) and aspirations for endless upward social mobility (Berlant, 2011). The different formations of the self (i.e., open-minded, cosmopolitan, Egyptian) derive its meanings from a fantasy of mobility as a site for developing the cultural and social capital necessary for climbing up the social ladder in the neoliberal capitalist economy (Skeggs, 2004). At the heart of these negotiations, Sohair is reclaiming some of her temporal and spatial autonomy against the blurred lines of married life. She admits that:

To be honest, this way, I have the whole week to be dedicated to my studies and at the same time I have my weekend to spend with my husband. I took it in a good way, it was in my favour, and it was not the opposite.

Sohair’s words implicitly show subversiveness to the social pressure of keeping a ‘united family’ and a desire to escape the tenacity of compulsory communal living that is socially imposed on married couples in Egypt, and elsewhere. She is taking a break from the repetitiveness of married life that is crowded with domestic duties and cooking dinner forever. She discloses that such unconventional living arrangements have subjected the couple to social scrutiny and constant questioning:

They ask why aren’t you living together? [...] colleagues would say when will you live together? this causes me stress. I feel like I am coming short, or I did something wrong.

This point brings us back to the reproduction of compulsory heteronormativity through questioning and casual conversations (Ahmed, 2010). As described by Sohair, the scene reveals how shame is gendered and pointing at her. Its affective structure relies on mechanism that means “happiness for some involves persecution for others” (Ahmed, 2010:96). She admits, “the pressure is not only from one person but from many.” Berlant (2011:209) asserts that “shame is the trace of disavowed class anxiety, the darker side of aspiration’s optimism”; a price that Sohair and her husband paid for their aspiration to the good life by agreeing to live in a long-distance commuter relationship during her studies. The geographies of shame span across spatial and temporal borders and boundaries. Munt (2008:80) argues that “shame is a powerfully spatial emotion, effecting displacement, and effacement in its subjects.” Sohair says that:

We have to explain that because of university regulations, I cannot. We keep using university regulations as justification, but we do not say that I can have an exception to move, but it will be difficult for me.
Shame is engendering constant effacement, manoeuvring, and circumventing. Sohair and her husband - the modern Adam and Eve - have “fallen” from the “higher status” at the heteronormative ladder to the “perceived lower, adverse one,” as queered subjects (Munt, 2008:80) who are under constant surveillance, interrogation, and shaming. Their cruel optimism to mobility as a site of fantasy for endless upward class mobility is their shield in the face of criticism, shame and adversaries, and their hopes that sacrifices will eventually pay off are the last strings that keep them attached to it (Berlant, 2011).

8.1.2 WHO DOESN’T WANT CHILDREN?

“I was very excited about the experience of doing it alone” said Horeya. Her decision for mobility queered the temporal and spatial transitions in Egyptian women’s lives (from father’s house to the husband’s) and the heteronormative logic for organising women’s lives in a strict trajectory (i.e., marriage, childbearing, and childrearing). Horeya confesses that not having children and these sorts of attachments made her experience more enjoyable:

I did not get to live alone throughout my life, so it was very good to be distant and reflect upon my positionality when I go back to Egypt.

Her mobility decision queered the normative transition most Egyptian women in her age go through. It presented her with a room of her own to reflect on her positionality; an act that terrifies the patriarchal state (El Saadawi, 1995; Eltahawy, 2016). It allowed for moments of possibilities, of seeing, seeking, and desiring differently. Yet, she remains tied with feelings of gratitude to the patriarchy’s gift economy and considers herself “lucky enough” because her husband is “not the typical Egyptian patriarchal male”, and he is “very supportive” and “very open in terms of my rights as a woman and my career advancement”. Horeya was very insistent on reminding me that despite the high share of Egyptian women on funded scholarships who come to the UK for postgraduate studies, this should not be taken as:

An indicator for saying women in Egypt are very capable of doing this because we are a very little percentage of a huge percentage of women who are not given the opportunity. For instance, the highest percentage of women who study abroad are not married, are not in relationships because if they are married,
there are many restrictions on their liberty to travel aboard and to spend a year outside.

To some extent, Horeya’s views are similar to those shared by unmarried participants (see Chapter Seven). However, her words convey a certain fantasy to the lives and freedoms of singlehood, which as discussed in the previous chapter are highly gendered and single participants explained the tremendous social pressures to their decision for mobility and during their journeys. Yet, I do agree with Horeya that marriage poses further barriers (i.e., legal and institutional) to women’s mobility. For example, a husband can still prohibit his wife from travelling by obtaining a court order (Tadros, 2016, 2018, 2019). While Horeya says that she receives the support of her family and her husband, it should not mask the vertical and horizontal social pressures she experienced in negotiating her decision. For instance, she recalls comments made to her by close relatives:

Oh, you should have children by now. You should not be travelling to go for your masters. This should not be your priority now. Now that you are married, you have to have kids.

Egypt’s heteronormative ideologies are not only limited to pressure women into marriages, but to ensure the continuation of reproductive hetero-futurism through childbearing and child care (Edelman, 2007). The image of a happy family is populated by children who became “a pressure point, as being necessary for a good or happy life” (Ahmed, 2010:46). The mobility decision and the promise of upward social mobility can - to some extent - be a buffer against the pressure women face during their journeys. For example, Horeya talks about her mother-in-law:

She was very happy with me getting this prestigious opportunity to study just because of the social status, but she does not fully believe this will add up to me as much as having kids and being a mother.

The social taken-for-granted assumptions that all women want to be mothers infuriates Horeya, as she elaborates:

Out of their narrow perception of life and goals. They think what a woman would want to be other than being a caregiver to their children, which is very reductionist and very essentialist to the role of women.

Horeya deplores the parental tendency in Egypt to “interfere in their children’s lives” under the pretext of “what is good for you, so out of love.” The ideology of domesticity is presented as a gift of
happiness and rejecting this gift makes her a feminist killjoy (Ahmed, 2010). In a heteronormative society, transgenerational reproduction of normativity is handed down through familial attachments and parental love and care (Berlant, 2011). They become the cuffs that tie Egyptian women from pursuing postgraduate studies and shaping their futures. Horeya admits that:

I would not expect them to think differently because this is how they were raised, and they have these internalised norms about the role of women since they were young. And they do not have any sort of social exposure.

Horeya is the happiness alien who queers the national cultural references of norms and traditions (Ahmed, 2010). Her words reveal set of binary logics and demarcations in social memberships (i.e., cosmopolitan and the parochial, the well-rounded global citizens and abject local subjects). At the time of the interview, Horeya was approaching the end of her study in the UK, and the prospect of going back to Egypt was looming on the horizon. There was a sense of dreadful anticipation in her voice:

Because I was always saying I do not want kids until I get my masters, and for them it was ok, now go get your masters and then now your only excuse is gone, you have to start considering the idea of having kids.

The temporalities of her mobility decision in the UK queered some of the heteronormative logics and imaginations of her future. The temporary deferral of having children engendered anxieties and fear from the future. Even though Horeya, at the beginning of the interview, described her husband as open-minded when it comes to the question of children, she admits that:

I still think this might be problematic because while he is as gender-sensitive, he still has these patriarchal notions in his head that can pop up every now and then, so I expect there might be a bit of contingency between him and me when I return.

Horeya is talking about the emotional and intellectual labour, married Egyptian women have to make on daily basis. Her efforts entail constant negotiations, concessions, compromises and promises. Furthermore, her words reveal the transactional processes that married Egyptian women make in negotiating their mobility decisions. For Horeya, sticking to her part of the deal is the challenge she would face after her return to Egypt, that is if she ever returned.
8.1.3 THE CRAZY ONES

For some, aspirations for mobility are shared between married couples. Hanem admits she faced the same social scrutiny and pressure to settle down and start a family after she got married. Newly married for just less than a year, she came to the UK to undertake a PhD programme. She describes the social panic and anxiety as she shared the news with extended family and friends:

It was the question of having children. when will we get to have children? are you going to postpone that for three years?.

Hanem describes her husband as “very understanding”, and they both share the same vision of carrying out PhD studies abroad, “he is not academic, but he did his master’s degree and looking to do his PhD abroad as well.” At the time of the interview, the husband was in another European country while she was in the UK. She describes the social frenzy towards their international long-distance relationship:

They treat us like crazy. They are telling us; we have to settle down. We have to focus on our marriage and giving birth to children, and I do not know, this stuff.

Hanem’s transnational marital arrangements became the subject of suspicion, surveillance, and questioning. The united family became the ultimate measuring stick, against which Hanem’s marriage lost its status, and became ‘lesser than’ what is expected from a ‘normal’ marriage. The gnawing anxieties justified intervention in the forms of advice and shaming in hopes for re-orientating Hanem and her husband towards happy promises of heteronormativity (i.e., settling down and having children). She describes some of the challenges women in Egypt face in their trajectories in and out of higher education:

They finish their undergraduate level because they had to finish it and they are married or doing nominal jobs. They just go to school or university to chat and then get the degree with pass even without putting any effort on that to get married to someone who is good with a good job. So, a university degree is a qualification to get married. Some of them describe me as a nerd, and it was quite funny for me because I am not a nerd at all. I have a very good social life, but I do not know. Sometimes they told me so.
Hanem declares that despite the social pressure and antagonism, her journey was inspirational to some of her colleagues:

I think I motivated others to do postgraduate studies. For example, I have a very good friend of mine who did it after she saw me doing a PhD.

This perhaps explains the social panic towards women’s progress in education: the domino effect. It is threatening to the nation’s hetero-futurity that sees women’s education with extreme suspicion out of fear to abandon the heteronormative myth of domestic bliss (Edelman, 2007). Hanem deplores this tendency to think of education as a route to heteronormative domesticity:

They do not understand us. They really do not understand us. For us, we are on the right path of what we want to do as well. He might go back to Egypt or stay there; I do not know. He has lots of plans. We meet for like two months and then for nine months. Anywhere on the planet.

In short, for some participants, the decision to study in the UK brought a release from the shackles of the dull, rancid, and vapid everydayness of compulsory heteronormativity. It disrupted the routinised politico-affective normative narratives of the united family as an object of desire. The decision also brought high levels of anxieties, social panic, and dread of the future. The negotiations some participants made challenged some of heteronormative logics and binaries in shaping temporalities and spatiality of internationalisation discourses.
8.2 THE ENDURING LIFE OF THE TRAILING WIFE

The desire to keep the family united meant career disruptions, renunciation of desire, narrowing horizons and shrinking aspirations (Ahmed, 2010). The familial attachments were constraining in terms of choice of study location, mode of study and duration. For some participants, the options for mobility came as part of their marital status and obligations to join their spouses in the UK.

8.2.1 STARTING OVER

“I have a passion for education,” said Lana enthusiastically as we were discussing her motivations to undertake postgraduate studies in the UK. Before coming to the UK, Lana worked as a teacher and “wanted to do something that will help reform education in Egypt.” Lana left her job behind to join her husband, who was awarded a scholarship to undertake postgraduate studies in the UK.

Scholarship on global mobilities often shows that female trailing spouses often suffer the loss of belonging, career progress, and support networks (Slobodin, 2019). However, in this case, Lana does not regret her decision to leave her job in Egypt and follow her husband to the UK. In fact, Lana considers it a “very good opportunity”, against which all sacrifices are made and believed to eventually pay off (Berlant, 2011). After coming to the UK, Lana had to start over and began doing voluntary work in Sunday school. She acknowledges the support and encouragement from her husband, whom she describes as “big support” who was constantly “pushing me hard.” She applied for a master’s at the same university as her husband and recalls:

When we first came to [city in the UK]. He came earlier because he started his PhD and once, he found accommodation for us, we came. He said I found where the faculty of education is, go there and make sure you go see what the programmes are and whatever thing you can start.

The desire to keep the family together meant sacrifices, losses, as well as gains and achievements.

There is a tendency in the global mobilities scholarship to view the female trailing spouse in a negative light (Slobodin, 2019), however, in Lana’s case, it opened up possibilities to come and study in the UK that would not have been possible otherwise. Thanks to the support at home, Lana applied for master’s programme and was accepted in the same university as her husband and then began a PhD
programme in a fully funded scholarship. I was curious to know if Lana considered applying elsewhere in the UK:

To be honest, as an Egyptian, a wife and a mother, I think it was just convenient. Maybe if I were living in a remote place in the UK, I would have looked for another place to do my PhD.

Lana’s trajectories of mobilities are shaped and mapped by her marital status. She stresses the importance of a united family:

It is different when you have a family. It is also of great support. I know some people would feel very lonely. Many of my friends who are single and staying in students housing from Egypt, after a while, might feel a bit lonely because they are not used to it. They are used to living with their families in Egypt. Usually, you live with your family in Egypt until you get married. It is not like European cultures.

The contrast is striking in imagining the single life as the abject miserable ‘other’. It is an imagination that reflected the biopower of heteronormativity to espouse singlehood with loneliness, misery, and lack of love (Cobb, 2012). The importance of staying a united family came to test one year after Lana started her PhD. After her husband finished his PhD programme, it was time for the family to return to Egypt. Lana -always the optimist- tried to look at the glass half full in her second year and took it as an opportunity to do her fieldwork in Egypt while agreeing with her husband to return to the UK for the final year. Lana describes this as “a very interesting year” as the family spent the year between two parents separated in two countries (UK & Egypt):

I had my daughter with me, so she spent part of the year with me and part of the year with my husband and my son was in Egypt. They were going and coming this last year. It was very hard for me because I was not used to this level of isolation and living on my own.

After finishing the PhD, Lana returned to Egypt and the family was united again. However, her journey reveals the male entitlement in mobility and the sacrifices most women make to keep the family united. While Lana’s sacrifices of her career to join the husband were perceived as the norm, a duty to keep the family together, the same logic did not apply on her husband who returned to Egypt after the end of his studies in the UK. Lana’s future plans after completing her PhD were to return to Egypt because of “family ties”. Lana contends that re-settling for her children was the overriding factor “we are happy here with the kids settling in. It took a while for the kids to settle and to get used
to their school”. While the familial ties were crucial for Lana, she admits that “my brother is now in the US and he is enjoying his time there, but it is different.”

### 8.2.2 THE COSMOPOLITAN HUSBAND, EDITED

It took Zeinab seven years to finish her PhD. I was curious to learn how Zeinab, who is married with one child, negotiated the temporal pressures to finish her studies within a specific timeframe, to which she replied:

> Nobody cared how much it was taking to do my PhD as long as I was not asking my husband to travel where I was studying. I have to go wherever he goes. I could not say, it did not cross my mind, oh by the way, why don’t we travel for my PhD and this so the case.

Zeinab’s nomadic life status as a trailing wife offered her few options for postgraduate research studies. She explains her rationale for deciding to do her studies part-time in the UK:

> I did part-time because that was the only option, I was offered from the university to do it remotely. I was in Egypt when I applied, and I lived in the US in one year in the middle and then lived in the UK for one year.

In choosing online mode of study, Zeinab had few options and her choice for the UK as study destination was guided by its reputation and quality frameworks for online education:

> First of all, the UK when you study an online degree, it is whether the university is acknowledged, in the US they have these institutions for profit, and they are not good in education. In the UK, every university is certified for quality of teaching and research quality. They have all these standards.

Zeinab is fully conscious that ranking and standardised quality framework should not be understood in absolute terms as indicators of quality: “I do not believe the standards tell the truth of what is happening, but there is a system.” The tendency to equate UK education with trust and value reflect some of the perpetual colonial fantasies among the colonial elites and the desire to minimise risks and justify sacrifices. Both, the choice of mode of study and study destinations reveal another aspect to how gender, class and colonial power discourses intersect and shape the international mobility decision among participants. For Zeinab, being a trailing wife and simultaneously seeking a postgraduate degree came with a few hiccups, and glitches to the fantasy of endless upward mobility (Berlant, 2011).
First in navigating visible and invisible geographical and spatial borders. She explains:

I had visitor’s visa for five years which the one I applied for. Nobody at the embassy understood why this is happening. They asked why you don’t need a students’ visa? you should have students’ visa. At some point, I was on [spouse] work permit visa. So, my husband was working, and I was dependent on him. At one point, I had four different UK visas on my passport for different reasons. It was not a big problem, at the borders they had to decide which visa you require to enter.

Accordingly, being a trailing spouse not only determines access to spaces but also the types, terms, and conditions of said access. The continuation of male entitlement in mobility meant that Zeinab risked losing some aspects of her agency and autonomy. In general, the concept of mobility was acceptable in Zeinab’s family. Nevertheless, as she explains, there are several factors to why the husband’s mobility took precedence over hers:

Not just because of the culture but also because my husband is a medical doctor, and it is very difficult for medical doctors to be licenced in different parts of the world. Unlike me, my degree is recognised worldwide […], So if I want to get a job anywhere in North America or Europe right now, I could apply for it. It is not the same for him.

This may hold some fact to it in terms of credit transfer and employability prospects for skilled migrants (Ho, 2011; Kõu et al., 2015; Grigoleit-Richter, 2017). Nonetheless, my understanding is that Zeinab’s husband was able to secure a working placement in the UK at some point during her PhD journey and that licensing was a non-issue. Without stressing this point, I shared my curiosity with Zeinab, to which she replied:

It is just cultural. It is just difficult for an Egyptian man to accept to go to a different country because his wife has worked there, and it may not work; obviously, you could negotiate with him to benefit from that trip, right. The idea in general of prioritising women’s career, even if I do not like that, is not possible.

I do understand why Zeinab was reluctant to make this statement earlier. Firstly, she is talking about her husband to a stranger (me) and there is a level of sensitivity on how I will interpret and present this data (Mason, 2018; Leaney and Webb, 2021). Secondly, I reckon there was an element of ‘himpathy’, which means “the disproportionate or inappropriate sympathy for a man who behaves in misogynistic […] or entitled ways” (Manne, 2020:134). She further explains the social hypocrisy and double speak
common among privileged and elite men with higher level of education in Egypt (El Saadawi, 1997) when it comes to gender equitable relationships and women’s rights for mobility:

About educated Egyptian men, my husband has a doctorate as well, is that they speak the feminist talk, so my cousins would say things that would support me and that they are feminists, but they do not do that with their wives. And so, my husband’s sister she did that, she actually went with her husband somewhere, it is done. It is done within my own family. But I know the psychology of my husband it will not work.

Studies on masculinities show that certain types of hegemonic masculinities are performed in manners to ensure the perseverance of power structures and hierarchies (Hearn, 2004, 2014; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). A recent study on masculinities in Egypt concludes that social class, level of education and family socio-economic status shape men’s views on gender equitable relationship (UN Women and Promundu, 2017:8). However, Zeinab’s journey reveals that social class does not operate in a silo but is closely tied with gender, history of mobility, family dynamics. It demonstrates the insidious and complex way patriarchal power discourses operate, intersect, and shape each other.

8.3  GRATEFUL MOTHERS DO NOT GO ABROAD

Keeping the family together was repeatedly cited as a pressure point for women to renounce their desire to study abroad and their decision for international mobility. The family is imagined as “a point of inheritance”, a site “where the child is cultivated, where the child learns the right habits, which, in turn, render some objects as happy for the child” (Ahmed, 2010:48). Breaking the family became the patriarchal shaming technique du jour to prevent some participants from pursuing their postgraduate degrees abroad. Motherhood and childcare responsibilities emerged as attachments that bind women to domestic life. Prospects of mobility meant sacrifices, making hard choices, and breaking away from the velvet handcuffs of patriarchy.

8.3.1  HARD CHOICES

Tokka (see Introduction Chapter) says that studying abroad has always been a “dream since I was so young that I wanted to study abroad.” By the time she realised this dream, she was at a time in her life where ties to other attachments (marriage & children) needed to be re-negotiated. Thanks to
outstanding performance in her studies, an impressive academic record as an assistant lecturer, and a strong PhD proposal, Tokka secured a fully funded scholarship in more than one prestigious university in the UK. Tokka mentions that her reasons for choosing the UK were due to family considerations:

It was either the UK or the US. I felt the States are too far away. So, I thought the UK will be more closer.

Even though Tokka’s family (i.e., parents and siblings) supported her decision, her decision meant the eventual break of the united happy family after her husband refused to join her. She describes that her family’s happiness to her decision was conditioned and they:

Were very happy that we two girls [one of her closest friends was also an awardee of a PhD scholarship] are travelling abroad together not alone to support each other. However, my friend was single, but I was married, so it was not that easy to convince my husband that I do a PhD abroad.

Tokka says that her husband was fully aware of her intentions to study and was supportive during the application process. However, although she has never said so directly, I guess that he was not expecting that she would actually be offered not one but several scholarships from prestigious universities in the UK. Tokka details two main reasons behind her husband’s objection to the notion of relocating:

The first reason he simply does not want to travel abroad, and he wants to remain in Egypt. The second reason, he is worried about our child. She was very young at the age of five years old, and he was worried that when she goes abroad, she will find this fancy lifestyle, and when she goes back to Egypt, she will look down on her own people.

Despite Tokka’s multiple attempts for the husband, who also works in the same field, to change his mind, “I told him that would be a good opportunity for you as well, he was not interested in many reasons”. Tokka’s attempts exemplify the duties of the happy wife to keep the family together, shrink their achievements, narrow their horizons, and renounce their desires (Ahmed, 2010). Moreover, the husband’s weaponisation of the child and her future illustrate the oppressive tendency of patriarchy to use the children to advance their heteronormative ideologies (Edelman, 2007). Furthermore, there is a fantasmatmic imagination of life in the UK as a ‘fancy’ lifestyle and a site of fantasy (Berlant, 2011), which according to the father, women are not entitled to have or aspire to attain. In pursuit of
reaching a middle ground, Tokka reconciled her want to make everyone happy (Ahmed, 2010). She reached an agreement with her husband that required tremendous sacrifices on her behalf:

I will be travelling between Egypt and UK, so I still can do my PhD, but at the same time, I can fulfil my role as a wife and a mother. It was very expensive. I paid all my salary on the aeroplane tickets. I think approximately four times.

Beside its devastating outcomes on Tokka’s physical, and psychological well-being, I often wondered about its dire ecological consequences by leaving a heavy carbon footprint via over-dependence on transnational flights (Nevins, 2014). Furthermore, the series of the husband’s demands continued, and Tokka was not to travel unaccompanied:

My father travelled with me for the first time, and he stayed with me for ten days or something to make sure the accommodation and everything are safe.

The agreement illustrates the infantilisation of women under a patriarchal state and the male entitlements from fathers to husbands. The harshest part of this bargain for Tokka was to leave her young daughter behind in Egypt:

I left her [the daughter] in Egypt because the plan was I come here while she stays in Egypt. She stayed in her school and so on. My husband and my mother used to take care of her. She used to go to school, and at weekends, she would go to my mother to take care of her and so on.

I can still hear the raw anguish and bruises in Tokka’s voice as she recalled the story, despite the passing of the years since the events took place. As the words came out of her, I can picture the family convening in their living room, trying to avert the crisis: the dissolution of the family. The agreement between men according to which the circulation of unpaid labour (childcare responsibilities) across generations (mother, daughter) continued, and that mobility for some means being stuck for others (Morley et al., 2020). Despite her best efforts, the arrangements proved futile and unworkable, as she admits:

After less than a year, I had some problems with the arrangements of coming and going. My supervisor was not that supportive as she promised, and I had to come and settle here in the UK. And then I had to bring my daughter with me.

Although Tokka insists that the long-distance commute and the stressful situation at home did not affect her academic performance and progress, she could not find out the reasons behind the supervisor’s dissatisfaction. In other interviews, I constantly heard stubborn insistence, primarily by
participants who are married with children, that despite the tremendous challenges at domestic life (childcare, marital negotiations), the progress in their studies was hardly affected. Granted, most of them have successfully graduated on time; however, I often wondered whether narratives of toxic productivity in the neoliberal universities have engendered contagious gendered anxieties, shame and guilt. Their fear of falling short in juggling different roles of being a doctoral student, a wife, and a mother transformed into silences and fear of admitting the heavy toll of carrying monumental burdens to meet unrealistic expectations. At least for Tokka, there was some positive outcomes:

As a person, I changed a lot through this experience, and I became more strong actually. When I was in Egypt, I was the kind of person who was not social at all. I was not confident. I didn't have much confidence in myself. [...] Now, I want to have a leadership position. It is hard for me not to have leadership position. So, it changed me a lot. It taught me that you don't know until you step forward and try, you will never know. [...] I learned not to be afraid to be different. What's wrong with being different? You will do other stuff that people are not able to do?.

8.3.2 WHY CAN’T YOU BE GRATEFUL?

“It is not acceptable at all even moving abroad. But I moved abroad, I was married at that time, and that was why it was acceptable,” says Faiza (PhD). She was describing the social resistance to the notion of Egyptian women’s mobilities. Faiza contends that both her parents were supportive of her decision to study abroad and were very helpful during the application process. However, in her situation, the main concerns were around the idea of being a single mother travelling abroad on her own. To negotiate her decision, Faiza devised an exit strategy to convince her mother:

I thought if I got married, she is going to accept it. So actually, before I got married, I knew he lived in the UK as well, and he is British even though I did not come here as a spouse, I came here with a student visa because I wanted to leave him [...] In my mind, it was ok, my mom would be happy that I am married and would support that.

Faiza’s strategy is by turning the family from a site of limitations to a site of opening possibilities. By presenting the image of a united, happy family, Faiza used it to avert the criticism and tear into pieces the choke collar of public scrutiny. Marriage is presented as a gift-giving moment across generations as Faiza recalls:
Ok, let us make her happy and make me happy as well. I thought about it; maybe I would need this kind of support abroad”.

Faiza is trying to psych herself into believing that marriage as another site of fantasy by reminding herself of such as security, and companionship (Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011). Her words reveal the biopower of the patriarchy in its penetration in the deepest recess of the psyche (Foucault, 1976). The words present a world populated by moments of doubt, fear and anxiety affected by violent and dominant discourse that equates marriage with safety, companionship, and security. Throughout her postgraduate studies trajectory, Faiza admits that she faced immense social pressure. For example, Faiza’s mother-in-law would remind her regularly:

They made fun of me saying you are not gonna cook for your husband of course because you are studying. They asked, why can’t you be grateful. You have a daughter, focus on her and be a mother. I just do not understand what this has to do with being a mother and being a student; what is the problem about that. For them, it was like ok masters fine let her have some fun. but PhD, oh you want to be the doctor. You want to be better than your husband.

Faiza holds the view that, in general, the hostility towards women getting a postgraduate education is not only in Egypt but in MENA and comes down to the social fear of educated women:

You will always find someone in the Middle East who pushes you back because they think, you are a woman, you should not be educated because if you are educated you will be more assertive, you will have more agency, and they do not want to see women doing that. Lots of Egyptian men or Arab men I have known in my life just want to see the women in need and they like it, as soon as she is independent, they do not want to look at her again, and it is not just there, sometimes here as well. It is everywhere.

Faiza sums it up very nicely. The fear of independent women is the overriding objection to progress in education and study mobility. This fear is affected through multiple mechanisms, either explicitly through laws, regulations, traditional and cultural norms or implicitly by tying women with childcare responsibilities.
8.4 THE SUPERMOM BURNS HER CAPE

The question of childcare responsibilities shows that decisions to relocate require constant negotiations and reconceptualization among married couples with children. Some participants became acutely aware of the persistent imbalance and division in labour as they negotiated childcare responsibilities.

8.4.1 FAIRLY TRADITIONAL

Neemat recalls a story from a female Egyptian colleague:

I was very shocked that one of my colleagues at the time who was doing a PhD as well. She finished and became a fellow lecturer or something. She is the main breadwinner; she was an academic in Egypt and came to the UK, so her husband came over with her. I do not think he was educated to the PhD level; I think he was working at McDonald’s or something, yet the expectation was she would do everything in the house. He was making these ridiculous demands and rules, and she felt obviously obligated to comply with certain things. That for me was a bit of a shock to see that example.

Neemat stresses that is perhaps an “extreme example” and “quite shocking to see that somebody so well educated and achieved so much in her professional life and yet personally was almost inferior or being dictated by the husband.” While she argues that this example should not be taken as a “generalisation” for Egyptian women living abroad and that indeed other living arrangements “are a bit more balanced than that.” The search for balance between different roles can be excruciating, especially if it is carried out across spatial and temporal borders. Neemat describes the negotiations and dynamics in the household, as follows:

It’s fairly a mixed situation for me, on the one hand it’s fairly traditional in that my husband has a full-time job, he’s the main breadwinner that takes kind of priority over stuff I need to do or attend, like if I said I’m at university there is a talk, and he has a meeting at work, so who is going to take care of the children, so obviously my talk is not going to impact the family as him missing an important meeting for example.

Socio-economic status inside the household shapes the negotiations between the two parents. In light of the global gender gap in employment and pay, it is most likely that men will maintain more powerful positions inside the family. Neemat elaborates further about her family situation:

What’s less conventional or traditional is that he’s very involved at home so you know if I’m busy I didn’t have time to cook or to do something in the house,
then I can say to him i didn’t have time for this, can you make something, can you do this, can you do that. He is very hands on and involved as far as possible and that’s what allowed me to do a PhD, especially in the final stages when I’m writing up and its very intensive.

Again, there is an element of gratitude that exemplifies the dynamics of the gift economy and the constant pressure on women to be grateful and thankful to the men in their lives (Manne, 2020).

8.4.2 THE PRICE YOU PAY

“I think this I paid the price later on when I got the stroke. I felt the stroke-like my body was telling me enough, you are putting a lot on yourself enough” Lana revealed her diagnosis as she reflected on her experience as a postgraduate student who is also a wife and a mother. Earlier in the interview, Lana mentioned she suffered from health issues during her postgraduate studies journey; however, since this is a personal matter, I decided not to pursue it further. As we approached the end of the interview, I reckon Lana was more confident of returning to this point and offer more details revealing the physical and mental toll of childcare responsibilities during the PhD process:

I think, as an idea, I wanted to do everything in the best possible way. I wanted to be the best mom, and I wanted to make sure the kids were in the park, I wanted to make sure they had activities all the time, I wanted to make sure we had plans, I wanted to make sure that I had everything for my PhD.

Sole childcare responsibilities can be the price women pay for their decision to relocate for their studies. Lana was stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, while the husband was very encouraging and supportive of her plans for postgraduate studies, this should not necessarily mean that household and childcare responsibilities were shared equally. Lana explains:

I think there is a difference in culture between the UK and Egypt. I think about the role men play in the family. Men in Egypt, they work so hard, they support in the house, maybe I come from a social class in Egypt where I can have someone who supports me in the house, like a nanny, cook or a driver, my husband would not have to worry about helping me domestically in the house. This was not an option in the UK because this was very expensive. We were only able to get a cleaner once a week for two hours, and I have to help her while she does the cleaning, which is not the case in Egypt.

Lana is making two important observations, a) the impact of spatial and temporal border crossings on social class positionalities and b) the ‘himpathy’ to male entitlement to unequal division of domestic labour (Manne, 2020). Lana agrees that the pressure to be the super mom, the “best mom”, was
damaging her physical and mental health and eventually it was she “who has to pay the price at the end”. Now back in Egypt, she admits the duties of the supermom are endless and she is “back again to this cycle of running running.”

Bahia admits that coming to the UK with two young children was a “challenge for me to start my PhD in a country where I have no family and no friends, and my two little boys accompanied me”. The pressures and anxieties from being solely responsible for the family were intensified by the rigours demands of PhD programmes and a desire to prove herself, as she says, to be a:

Good researcher and that I am doing well, that I am progressing well in my PhD because it will be monitored from the scholarship funders so every six months you have to provide an evidence from your supervisor confirming that you are progressing ahead and that you are attending and you are expected to finish your PhD on time.

She soon realised that being a single mother with two young children in a foreign country was not an easy undertaking. The lack of social support brought challenges such as; finding appropriate accommodation for the family, finding the right schools and managing finances, as she explains:

How to manage your finance in general, for me it was a new thing. I did not know how much I will need every month to support my family. I did not know the prices; I did not know all these things.

Taking responsibility of household finances is another example of male entitlement and is a crucial mechanism of asserting power under patriarchy (Manne, 2020). The biggest challenge for Bahia was the long-distance commute every three months:

The kids and I, we used to go back to Egypt every Easter, Christmas, and summertime to visit the husband. Thanks to being in a sound financial position, Bahia could cover “the expenses of travelling back and forth to Egypt. I cannot say it was a very easy thing for all of us. We all suffered including my kids, but it paid off. I finished my PhD on time, and my husband settled here in the UK.

There is a light at the end of the tunnel, at least in Bahia’s case. The reunion of the family is the reward after the sacrifices made during her PhD journey. The husband’s settlement in the UK is the last piece of the ‘happy united family’ puzzle.
Zeinab describes childcare responsibilities while writing a PhD as “very, very challenging”. However, as she affirms, there were valuable lessons there, and she learned new skills of how to juggle between the two roles as a mother and a PhD student:

So, what I would do, she was very small, the important thing was to keep thinking about what I wanted to write all day long and then as soon as she went to sleep to write it very quickly.

Zeinab contends that this routine of writing was necessary because “having a child you do not get this to focus on anything ever” and developing such skill made her “a very good writer”. She says that “nobody understood why I do my PhD remotely, so nobody understood why I needed to leave and start work on my computer.” The family’s acknowledgment, however, came at the end of her studies (in the sixth year) and the family, “started to give [her] a break or babysit [her] child while [she was] doing something” in relation to her studies. By family, Zeinab was specifically referring to other female members (mother and mother-in-law) to signal how household labour continues to transfer across female generations (wives, mothers, mothers-in-law, daughters, or female domestic help). The second lesson was becoming aware of the guilt and shame affected on academic women concerning childcare responsibilities and household chores:

I think most moms, and especially professional career moms, have a sense of it anyway, regardless of whether someone is helping you or not, as a mom, you think, maybe I should be doing that. There is a little bit of that stigma, but it is kind of there, especially among older people and more traditional people, and men, but they know in our social circles, they can say it in kind of subtle way, it is kind of ‘oh look she got sick because of day-care’ and then that no matter where you are that would be a problem, someone would say she is sick because of the day-care.

Zeinab is drawing attention to the gendered and affective structure of the household and caring responsibilities as she internalizes “putative obligations to care for others at the expense of herself” (Manne, 2020:134). Moreover, she refers to her social class positionality that may have allowed her the capital and privileges to delegate household and caring responsibilities. Yet, it did not exempt her from social scrutiny, shame, and guilt. The affective structures operate in claustrophobic mechanisms...
by trapping and tying women in stuck positions that shame them from seeking help or admitting the need for support.

8.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I again addressed the social expectations framing married participants’ mobility trajectories, turning more specifically to the questions of living arrangements and motherhood. These decisions, negotiations and sacrifices queered some of the heteronormative assumptions and notions of the ideal mobile subject, the proper family and good’ parenthood. In negotiating their decisions for mobility, participants relied on the mobilisation of social and cultural capitals. Their journeys revealed the extent to which gender, class, age, marital status, religion, nationality, and geographical location are in constant operation in shaping their decisions. Marriage was one site of endless negotiations, reconciliations, compromises, and sacrifices. Some participants expressed gratitude and appreciation to their husbands for agreeing to their mobility decision and negotiating living arrangements. This further illustrates that affective assemblages of the gift economy operate in circulations and the form of gift-giving moments from fathers to daughters and husbands to wives. The outcomes of their negotiations highlight the restrictions on their rights to mobility and are painful reminders that women in Egypt remain - legally and institutionally - treated as “incompletely human in the eyes of the law” (Munt, 2008:80).

Furthermore, participants journeys queered the linear chrononormative organising of married lives. Children, or the lack thereof, become the measuring stick against which marriage eligibility was constantly evaluated, monitored, and regulated. Some were queered for residing on the periphery and not fighting for children. They are cast as abject others and outsiders whose resistance was an affront to Egypt’s reproductive hetero-futurism (Edelman, 2007). Shame emerged as patriarchy’s most potent mechanism and disciplinary technique to confine women within the clausrophobic domains and spaces of domesticity. However, shame was “not necessarily negative emotion and feeling” (Munt, 2008:3), and for some participants, it gave them the necessary motivations to complete their degrees on time. Moreover, queering the heteronormative notions of a united, happy family afforded some
participants, more than others, with possibilities and opportunities to focus on their studies and
opened up possibilities and freedoms for mobility. The ways participants made sense of their sacrifices
point to the crushing gendered expectations from women under global patriarchy. Their meaning-
making of journeys and sacrifices suggest -as well- a level of passionate attachment to mobility as a
happy object and the fantasy of the good life, even if -at times- these sacrifices came with fatal
consequences to their well-being. The outcomes of their decisions should not necessarily be
understood in binary terms of good or bad, but that mobility decisions and negotiations are expansive,
multi-layered, and complex processes.
9 CONCLUSION

9.1 INTRODUCTION

To view internationalisation as fundamentally an abject object would be a colossal error and misreading of this thesis. My aim in subjecting internationalisation discourses to critical scrutiny was to queer its embedded normative notions and taken-for-granted assumptions and destabilise its mechanisms for gendered erasures, disappearances, and heterocolonial domination. The findings of this thesis show that internationalisation must not be understood as a zero-sum game according to the binary logic of winners and losers but instead seek to disrupt and queer these binary categories and their promises of happiness. Exploring the journeys of Egyptian women postgraduates in and out of UK higher education serves this purpose as it demonstrates the affective assemblages, economies and structures of internationalisation discourses (Morley et al., 2019, 2020). The theoretical, methodological, and analytical decisions I made during this journey were guided by a desire to explore internationalisation discourses as discursive, expansive, and fluid spaces. By drawing on concepts of affect (Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011), my goal was to highlight how participants' journeys queered the linear notions of border crossings of geographical, historical, political, economic and cultural spheres. Relying on Berlant’s notion of cruel optimism, this thesis shows how internationalisation works as a site of class fantasy for endless upward mobility and its affective assemblage of anxieties, fear and failure (Berlant, 2011). By paying particular attention to outward mobility as a happiness discourse, this thesis demonstrated the impact of colonial legacies on orienting the nation’s imagination towards particular happiness objects (Ahmed, 2010).

It is crucial to underscore that the overall objective of this thesis is not to suggest a specific object or path of happiness for women or to inscribe a set of binaries (i.e., good vs bad etc.) of what is hoped to bring happiness. I aimed to interrogate the dominant happiness scripts and their effects on shaping participants' rationale and decision-making processes. Moreover, I was keen to understand the types of social and cultural capital necessary for outward mobility and its gendered and class-bound sacrifices, negotiations, pressures, reconciliations, and compromises participants made during their journeys. My
main goal was to bring to light some aspects of the affective structures of their journeys and highlight these stratifications in intersection with different levels of gender, class, nationality, religion, age, and disability. Following the footsteps of Ahmed (2010), I began this journey by following the terms around. In Chapter Two, I began to explore Egypt's earlier efforts to internationalise its higher education and the state-sponsored study missions to parts of Europe. The earlier forms of internationalisation in Egypt's higher education queered the global discourse of knowledge production on the topic. While internationalisation brought a few positive outcomes for women's education by introducing alternative forms of secular education such as vocational training, it also served as an apparatus for erasures, silences, and colonial dominance. It introduced new forms and frameworks of exclusion and marginalisation by introducing a set of binaries across the lines of race, gender, and class. The epistemic violence that Egypt experienced as part of its embrace of western and modern knowledge remain felt today and shape its gender regimes, class structures and race relations. Furthermore, Egypt's civilisation anxieties drove its logic for imitation, mimicry, and Europeanisation. Proximity to heterosexuality and whiteness were held as happy objects (Ahmed, 2010) and means to attaining the good life (Berlant, 2011).

In Chapter Three, I discussed Egypt’s postcolonial afterlives and its efforts to assert its sovereignty and independence under the shadows of British colonialism. Nationalisation efforts became Egypt's new happiness project, and its reverse discourse put the country in confrontation with colonial powers. What began as an ambitious plan to reduce social inequalities and colonial dominance turned into a project of homogeny and hegemonic accumulation of power (Salem, 2020). Indeed, Egypt's nationalisation efforts yielded few dividends in terms of massification of higher education and the growth of the public sector. However, it also destroyed Egypt's social fabric and engendered gendered, classed and racialised inequalities. Embracing neoliberal policies became Egypt's new happiness project starting in the 1970's and signalled the renewed aspirations for internationalisation. At the advice of international development organisations, Egypt’s policies were geared towards re-joining the global markets and took forms in terms of privatisation and deregulations. The impact of embracing neoliberal capitalist policies in Egypt had devastating gendered and classed outcomes on women in
Egypt and their prospects for mobility (El Saadawi, 1995, 1997; Assaad and Arntz, 2005). With the introduction of benchmarking, rankings, and global comparisons, Egypt’s higher education that was once regarded with prestige in the region and globally became a source of shame and failure (Elsaid, 2015). The national discourse in Egypt became overcrowded with narratives of crisis that required individual and collective sacrifices. More importantly, the internationalisation discourse brought Egypt back to seek the support of the UK to guide its efforts to internationalise its higher education, thus moving the country in a full circle and back “to modes of life to which they rarely remember consenting, at least initially” (Berlant, 2011:52). Taking note of these dynamics is crucial in understanding the factors that shape the rationale and decision-making processes among participants.

In Chapter Four, I demonstrated that Egyptian women often find themselves at crossroads between conflicting and contradictory dominant scripts that pander to a particular type of happiness. Egyptian women often face tremendous social pressures to follow heteronormative paths such as marriage, childbearing, and childrearing. The heteronormative ideology in Egypt and its notions of reproductive hetero futurism remain the key driver to steer the social views and attitudes towards women’s access to and progress in higher education. Restrictions to freedom of mobility present women with barriers to higher education and decisions for studying abroad. Nevertheless, the colonial legacies still shape directions and geographies of mobilities and the construction of UK higher education as a happiness object against which all sacrifices will be made. Against this historical, political, and cultural backdrop, my thesis explored Egyptian women's rationale for pursuing postgraduate studies abroad, their reasons for choosing the UK as a study destination, and how the temporal and spatial border crossings informed their subjectivities meaning making and lived experiences. The following section offers how this thesis answered the key research questions and will provide a brief commentary on the theoretical and methodological limitations.
9.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This section offers answers to the three overarching research questions. The central question of the thesis is: **How can we understand the complexities of international mobility for Egyptian women postgraduates?** The structure of this section begins by addressing each of the two sub-questions. The findings chapters revealed that accruing the necessary social and cultural capital and a nexus of pragmatic, ideological, and institutional factors shape the rationale among participants to carry out postgraduate studies in the UK. Furthermore, their negotiations during their journeys reveal how their decisions queered notions of citizenship, belonging, social membership, social class, the family, parenthood, and strict spatial, temporal organising of women's lives in Egypt.

1. **What made international mobility possible for Egyptian women postgraduates?**

One of the more significant findings to emerge from this thesis is the different ways participants queered notions of mobility, nationality, citizenship and belonging and highlighted the need to understand internationalisation as discursive, fluid, and an expansive discourse. Participants from privileged and elite backgrounds often referred to their decisions for postgraduate studies abroad as a normal stage in their education trajectory that is expected and typical among their peers. Their views correspond to a broader literature on internationalisation in higher education that point to class privileges as crucial factors in shaping geographies of mobilities and providing the necessary social and cultural capital to make the decisions for mobility (King et al., 2010; Brooks and Waters, 2011; Larsen, 2016). Examples from their journeys show that colonial education remains associated with value and prestige among the colonial elites. While they relied on indicators such as global rankings and assessments to inform their decisions, it was clear that colonial legacies are still the overriding element that steered their rationale and decision-making processes for undertaking postgraduate studies abroad. Other factors such as the history of mobility, world-class education and financial support from the family were instrumental in shaping their decisions and equipped them with the necessary skills and competencies to apply and compete for postgraduate education in the global knowledge economy. As for participants from lower socio-economic backgrounds, expectations for
upward social mobility and class anxieties justified the investments and sacrifices they made during their journeys. They often rationalised these types of investments which, as they hoped, would eventually pay off and bring the change necessary for attaining the good life (Berlant, 2011).

The availability of scholarship and funding opportunities was another crucial motivation for postgraduate studies abroad among participants. Overall, participants reported the lack of funding opportunities for postgraduate education in general, and especially for PhD degrees. The change in the funding and scholarship landscape illustrates the direction of Egypt’s internationalisation efforts that remain disproportionately geared towards inward mobility. Furthermore, it revealed stratifications by type of education (public vs private), levels of study, the choice of study discipline and type of funding. Participants who graduated from state-owned public universities reported challenges in proving their proficiency in the English language and accreditation that hampered their chances to apply for study programmes and compete for scholarships. This example further proves the degree to which internationalisation remains a site of linguistic imperialism, inequalities and exclusion (Morley et al., 2020). Taken with other frameworks of socio-economic discriminations and inequalities, Egyptian women from lower-socio-economic backgrounds face tremendous challenges in access to scholarships and pursuing postgraduate studies abroad.

The desire to learn in specific fields and flexibility in the structure of study programmes were vital factors that steered the motivations among participants. For example, the availability (or lack thereof) of state-of-art facilities at home universities and the study discipline informed participants’ choices, rationale, and decision-making processes. Among participants in STEM disciplines, access to technology and research facilities informed their decisions for choosing a study destination and the university. For participants in non-STEM disciplines, especially those specialising in gender studies, Egypt's deteriorated state of academic freedom meant a tremendous risk of persecution and imprisonment to carry out their studies at home universities. Moreover, escaping the social pressures to follow the heteronormative logic of marriage and childbearing, especially among unmarried participants, informed their motivations and decision-making processes. Participants expressed a strong desire to lead independent lives separate from the family and away from the social surveillance,
scrutiny, and pressures. The degrees to which participants negotiated their decisions with their families highlight some of the gendered and classed stratifications.

For instance, most participants agreed that women in Egypt face tremendous challenges in convincing their families of their mobility decisions and leading independent lives. However, they pointed out that the family's history of mobility, class positionalities and concerns about safety are of high importance and must be taken into consideration when thinking about these barriers. To explain the contradictions in social attitudes and views towards women’s national vs international mobilities, participants highlighted that the colonial legacies and the promises of upward class mobility still shape the national imaginaries in constructing specific spaces as safe for women and justified the family's acceptance and sacrifices.

In describing their rationale for choosing the UK as a study destination, participants have more often used terms such as ‘close’, ‘nearby’, and ‘familiar’. The spatial and temporal constructions of the UK in familiar light demonstrate Egypt’s colonial afterlives and its cruel attachment to British education as an object of desire. My findings suggest that, generally, participants preferred to study in 'Main English-Speaking Destination Countries' (MESDCs), a term coined by the British Council (Brooks and Waters, 2011). However, their preferences for UK’s higher education revealed strong ties that run along the lines of colonial history, class, and gender. While studying and living in a predominately-English speaking country were incentives to participants, they also engendered feelings of failure, fear and shame that intensified their awareness of their class-bound positionalities.

Furthermore, participants reported other factors such as prestige, safety, and family situations to take precedence over language in shaping their rationale for choosing the UK. The value of British education was often associated with prestige and regarded as a happy object (Ahmed, 2010). This is partly linked with the colonial ties and history, especially among the colonial elites (Gilroy, 2005) and partly due to the marketing and rebranding efforts of universities to maintain the colonial images of the UK as a multicultural and post-racial society (Madge et al., 2009; Bhopal, 2018).
The construction of the UK as a safe place for women was another critical factor that added to its attractiveness as a study destination and informed participants’ decisions and negotiations with their families. Participants reported various degrees of feelings of being safe during their journeys. While they explained that navigating public spaces in the UK remains relatively safer for women than in Egypt, this should not mask the incidents of sexual harassment they experienced during their journeys. It is equally important to highlight the types of violence that participants experienced (i.e., physical, and epistemic), and their views provided more nuanced iterations to women's safety inside higher education. Some participants expressed feelings of shock and frustration about the lack of safeguards for protecting women from incidents of harassment inside and outside of higher education. This speaks to the pernicious and malicious epidemic of gender-based violence and sexual harassment that transcends barriers and boundaries. Another form of violence was epistemic, which further exemplified internationalisation as a site of hegemonic colonial dominance and its effects on different levels of gender, class, race, age, nationality, religion, and disability. Various kinds of epistemic violence took forms regarding whose right to access specific spaces and which bodies were cast as the other (Ahmed, 2012, 2013). In navigating across spaces, participants often negotiated and reconceptualised their classed positionalities.

Among married participants, while the social view still holds notions that women are expected to be more flexible to relocate, their journeys show the discourse of trailing female spouse must not be understood in simplistic terms, and there were efforts to queer, disrupt and subvert. For some participants, the choice for the UK came about because of the partner’s mobility. However, this should not be understood exclusively as bad or negative. Despite the sacrifices they made career and familywise, some participants regarded this as a rewarding experience that allowed them to pursue studies in the UK. Other participants revealed the painful and stressful negotiation processes of their decisions for mobility and are extensively discussed across scholarships on the topic (Uhly et al., 2015; Zippel, 2017, 2019; Cangià, 2018). In cases where the husband refused to relocate, some participants opted for online degrees, and the choice of the UK stemmed from the perception of high quality in online education and value for money. For other participants, the breakup of the family was inevitable
and subjected them to social scrutiny, pressure, and shame. Feelings of shame and anxieties must not be always be understood in negative terms (Munt, 2008), as some participants reported how these painful experiences changed their perspectives in life and offered them opportunities for more growth, autonomy and agency.

2. **What social expectations framed their trajectories of international mobility and What were the affective modalities of these trajectories?**

In Chapters 7 and 8, I illuminated the social expectations of marriage and motherhood and how they framed participants' decisions and trajectories. Interrogating the temporal and spatial border crossings enumerates the ways participants queered the heteronormative discourses of Egypt’s reproductive futurism and the heterocolonial discourses of internationalisation. Their journeys queered a few assumptions that are being made concerning boundaries and borders. In a world of mobility that is primarily governed by passports privileges, participants meaning-making of their trajectories queered notions of infantile citizenship (Berlant, 1997), sacrificial citizenship (Brown, 2016), and affective citizenship (Mookherjee, 2005). By challenging gendered notions of nationality and nationalism, some participants signalled their refusal to adhere and comply to ideologies of confinement within national borders. They perceived their identities to be more encompassing and broader than what is inscribed by the national discourse. In a way, they asserted their class positionalities and queered the stereotypically gendered misconceptions that dictate what Egyptian women can or cannot do. Their sense and meaning making to notions of identity, nationality, citizenship and belonging shaped and were shaped by their journeys and attest to the complexity, fluidity, multiplicity, and contradictions embedded in these notions and discourses.

For unmarried participants, the choice for postgraduate education in the UK subjected them to immense social pressure and scrutiny. The public panic towards their decisions exemplifies the passionate attachment of society to the marriage script in Egypt and the social penalties for temporal acts of transgressions. Participants reported feelings of tiredness, exhaustion and dread from constant interrogation and self-revelations (Ahmed, 2004). They also appreciated the freedom from any hetero-familial attachments that offered them the autonomy of mobility without being tied with marriage and
childcare responsibilities. Their constructions and meaning-making of time demonstrate the different mechanisms of temporal reification and commodification inside the neoliberal university (Shahjahan, 2015, 2020; Morley and Lund, 2020).

Furthermore, examples from their journeys highlighted the overall social perceptions towards the value of women’s postgraduate education in Egypt and its complexities and idiosyncrasies. Their decisions for mobility queered the linear logic of organising the lifecycle according to heteronormative logic. While these acts of transgression brought a sense of liberation and freedom, they also engendered feelings of anxieties and shame. Moreover, the duration of the study programme influenced the social acceptance to the decision of mobility. For example, a one-year master’s programme was perceived in a more favourable light and as an acceptable mobility duration for women than a 3-5 years (full time) PhD programme. As for married participants, time was tied closely to shame (Shahjahan, 2020), and participants were often in positions where they had to make constant negotiations and reconciliations. The most significant portion of household chores and childcare responsibilities fell on their shoulders and brought awareness of classed and gendered positionalities as they crossed borders. With the lack of family support and help at home, many married participants found themselves in complicated positions trying to balance between their duties as wives and mothers and the demands of their studies. For some, this led to fatal consequences on their physical well-being and mental health. Shame was instrumental in curbing their aspirations for postgraduate studies abroad or for seeking support and help. While some participants found creative ways to dissent, subvert and resist the stereotypical gendered roles, others were tied by the patriarchy’s chokehold collars of the united happy family, proper parenthood, and good motherhood.
My thesis makes important and noteworthy contributions to the research on gender and internationalisation in higher education. This is the first study to create a discursive space for Egyptian women postgraduates from universities in the UK to talk about their experiences of international mobility. Furthermore, by drawing on concepts from queer feminist theories to interrogate a supposedly non-queer topic such as internationalisation (Mikdashi and Puar, 2016), this thesis makes several significant contributions to the field by furthering our understanding of the discursive constructions of internationalisation as a site of class fantasies, privileges, anxieties, and cruel attachments. Inspired by efforts of postcolonial feminists (El-Saadawi, 1992; Eltahawy, 2016) and black queer feminist theorists (Cohen, 1997; Lorde, 2003), this thesis sought to further the epistemic usefulness of queer theory beyond a single framework of analysis: sexuality. Moreover, it aims to bring to light the affective intensities of internationalisation as it intersects with gender, social class, nationality, religion, language, disability, race, ethnicity, history of mobility and geographical location. As such, this thesis underscores the significant usefulness of developing queer sensibilities in interrogating internationalisation and its potential for opening up possibilities to disrupt the linear, flattening discourses which typify the ways in which internationalisation processes in higher education are often understood. To this end, my efforts sought to disrupt, queer, and resist any presupposed assumptions or common-sense in the iteration and articulation of internationalisation as an ‘object of happiness’ to be had (Ahmed, 2010). Moreover, it offers alternative ways of understanding internationalisation as discursive processes that are co-constituted by the enduring strength of colonialism and the crushing weight of the global neoliberal capitalist economy.

The narratives of participants as articulated in the findings chapters of this study problematise the framing of internationalisation processes as linear, neutral and disembodied (Morley et al., 2018). By exposing the insidious ways in which forms and frameworks of exclusion operate in the neoliberal knowledge economy, this thesis invites the re-thinking of internationalisation beyond the narrow and restrictive binaries of national/international, winners/losers, local/foreign, etc. As such, this thesis
aims to contribute to emerging debates and constructs of the affective assemblage of internationalisation (Morley et al., 2020) that seek to disrupt the hegemony of its constructions in association with prestige, excellence, career advancement, and exponential monetary growth for nations and universities (Brooks and Waters, 2011). Moreover, this thesis shows that the promise of endless upward mobility that resides at the heart of neoliberal ideology is immersed in heteronormative common-sense (Halberstam, 2011) that asserts a type of narrowness and linearity to class mobility. By acknowledging the gendered and affective assemblages of internationalisation, this thesis highlights the normative and coercive practices and the epistemic violence embedded at the core of its processes. While this thesis benefits from exploring both gender and internationalisation beyond the restrictive geographical boundaries of nationalism (Tudor, 2017), it contributes to this emerging scholarship and growing debates on the topic by highlighting the contentions, antagonisms, and anxieties that transcend temporal, spatial boundaries.

By weaving theoretical strands together of postcolonial theory (Bhabha, 1984; Said, 2003; Fanon, 2007), postcolonial feminist theory (El Saadawi, 1995; Eltahawy, 2016), and queer theories of affect (Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011), this thesis engaged in creating a conceptual tapestry or a constellation to understand the plural dimensionalities of internationalisation, its processes and mechanisms, which has not been done before in the context of Egypt. The theoretical engagement with these concepts was not often straightforward, and was affectively loaded with tensions, anxieties, and complexities. However, these tensions offered innovative ways of reconceptualisation, reappropriation and resignifications that, in turn, enriched the design, development and analysis of this thesis.

Furthermore, it elicited a form of reflexivity that not only recognises the “the messiness of social life, and the place of the research/researcher in (re)creating it” but also the extent to which this thesis “can provide a place for those who otherwise tend to be marginalised, disenfranchised and excluded in the process” (Browne and Nash, 2010:14).

The development of queer sensibilities through which to interrogate the discourses, processes, and mechanisms of internationalisation required constant negotiations of visibility and power as co-constituted by my class positionalities, privileges, and anxieties. By recognising the plurality of my
minoritised identities as a queer doctoral researcher from the Global South (Egypt) in an elite university in the Global North, this thesis offers reflections from my experience in and out the field writing about the intersection of gender and internationalisation. While the success of my efforts is indebted - to a significant part - to the constellation of different theoretical strands, this should not gloss over or negate the epistemic splitting, tensions and complexities engendered as part of these endeavours. As highlighted in the methodology chapter (see Chapter Five), while the reliance on concepts from queer theory has offered useful methodological tools and instruments to interrogate supposedly non-queer topics such as internationalisation, and its promises of happiness, there were considerable methodological complexities in their use and application, especially in a context such as Egypt. These were particularly with respect to the promise of endless social upward mobility associated with internationalisation and its depictions from euro-centric perspectives of queer exceptionalism (Puar et al., 2007).

In developing postcolonial queer feminist sensibilities to interrogate the discourse of internationalisation, I often felt the affective load of epistemic and existential splitting. At times, a reconciliation between postcolonial, queer and feminist concepts seemed ontologically and epistemologically impossible (Rao, 2020). At other times, these tensions opened up possibilities to embrace these tensions as complex, fluid, with ambiguities that refuse to be named or attached to identifiable categories. In other words, the efforts exerted in the use of various theoretical strands with all their complexities, rather than inhibiting my attempts to highlight the injustices and inequalities in internationalisation, it has instead enriched the analysis and the presentation of findings of this thesis. As such, it offered a point of reference for future research on gender and internationalisation, which recognises the potential of using multiple theoretical strands such as postcolonial, postcolonial feminist and queer theories in ways that do not reduce it to a single framework of oppression but instead ties it to other categories such as class, race, religion, disability etc. To this end, this thesis contributes to the ongoing efforts to decolonise assumptions of the ideal mobile candidate, and the typified notions of who is best positioned to research and write about gender and internationalisation in higher education. Moreover, it offers substantial and robust evidence on the usefulness of infusing
postcolonial impulses with queer sensibilities in order to resist the hegemony and homogeneity of internationalisation discourses, its processes, and mechanisms.

By interrogating the temporalities and geographies of internationalisation, this thesis contributes to the growing scholarship on chrononormativity of academic life in the neoliberal economy (Morley and Lund, 2020) and its interrogation from southern perspectives (Shahjahan, 2020). By illustrating the diverse and multi-layered narratives of participants’ experiences with international mobility, it offers a novel approach and much-needed space for thinking of the discursive constructions of time and temporalities beyond linearity and upwaredness (Berlant, 2011). Furthermore, by refusing the hegemonic discourse of toxic productivity in academic life, this thesis offers a fresh perspective to formulate our understanding and thinking of time beyond positivist transactional processes of exchange values and affective modalities of waste and deficit (Berlant, 2011). To this end, this thesis achieves its objective in answering the research questions and makes several important contributions to the field. First, it disrupts the notions and embedded assumptions of internationalisation processes and geographies as linear, neutral, and disembodied. Second, it challenges the hetero-colonial masculinist depictions of the ideal mobile subject. Finally, it queers the heteronormative commonsense of understanding the temporal and spatial constructions of internationalisation and mobility.

In the following, I will highlight some of the theoretical and methodological limitations in drawing on Berlant’s notion of Cruel Optimism (2011) and Ahmed’s conceptualisation of Promises of Happiness (2010). As it pertains to Ahmed’s (2010) iterations on dominant scripts of happiness, my efforts were guided by a curiosity about how happiness is imagined, located, and pursued among participants. More specifically, by critically looking into the construction of internationalisation as happiness discourse, I was determined to show its affective intensities and the impact of colonialism and neoliberal ideologies. The journeys show that resistance to dominant scripts of happiness varied among participants and on different levels. I found Ahmed’s four figures, the feminist killjoy, the unhappy queer, the melancholic migrant, and the radical revolutionary, to be extremely useful in capturing the affective lives of some participants who rebel, queered, and resisted the happiness scripts; however, this is not to suggest that these efforts were shared equally and unequivocally
between all participants. Furthermore, while Ahmed left the possibilities for these figures to overlap and for an individual to occupy more than one space at once, I was left wondering whether our attachment to categories in queer studies is inescapable and our attachment to categories always brings us back to what drove us away from it at the first place (Butler, 1997).

One of the critiques of Berlant’s notion of Cruel Optimism is her reliance on generalisation, by presuming “the experience of or reaction to destruction can always be shared, consistent, or mutually identified” (Ryan, 2016:no page). I agree that, despite her best efforts, Berlant’s analysis on cruel attachment lacked the postcolonial sensibilities and gendered, raced, and classed stratifications. Her iterations of the affective attachments under neoliberal ideologies lacked the nuanced iterations to the multiple levels social class interacts with race, gender, age, nationality, and disability. To suggest a universality or commonality in the reaction to the destruction ignores the colonial legacies and frameworks that remain the source of gendered inequalities in gender and education today (Crossouard and Dunne, 2021). By deploying the notions of cruel optimism, I was aware of its theoretical limitations and methodological challenges. Berlant's notion of cruel optimism may portray an image of stupidity, naivety and lack of agency, even though Berlant explicitly warned against (mis)understanding and (mis)reading her ideas as such and emphasised that cruel optimism does not “manifest[s] an aim to become stupid or simple” but rather “the risk of attachment taken in its throes manifests an intelligence beyond rational calculation” (Berlant, 2011:11). This type of (ir)rationality, according to Berlant, is affected, and our “attachments are made not by will, after all, but by an intelligence after which we are always running” (Berlant, 2011:125). I find this framing helps explain Egypt's passionate and sometimes irrational attachment to internationalisation in higher education. The affective assemblage of anxieties and shame that Egypt experienced after waves of colonialism engendered this form of intelligence that associated value with the international and abject with the national. Furthermore, Berlant's framework of individual agency relied on western/euro-centric fixed notions of citizenship, nationality, and belongings that can sometimes ignore its fluidity, multiplicity, and plasticity, as highlighted in this thesis. Moreover, in Egypt, where women do not enjoy equal citizenship rights and face tremendous legal and institutional barriers to their mobilities (Tadros, 2016,
2018, 2019), it is imperative to constantly question notions of agency, autonomy, citizenship and belonging.

In response to the Butlerian iteration on the psychic attachment to power (Butler, 1997b), Berlant (2011:184) argues that the most complicated task is “understanding the difficulty of unlearning attachments to regimes of injustice.” I agree with this view to some degree and further suggest broadening our understandings and the ways we define regimes of injustice. For instance, in this thesis, I highlighted the different mechanisms and frameworks of injustices and inequalities embedded in internationalisation discourses. However, that is not to say or suggest that participants agreed that internationalisation is a regime of injustice or perceived it as such. Granted, for some more than others, the decision for mobility entailed tremendous sacrifices and mobilisation of resources, yet it was not a lose/lose situation, and the experience also brought benefits and positive outcomes to participants that must be acknowledged. I do agree with Berlant’s (2011:185) point that “we have consented to consent to a story about the potentialities of the good life around which people execute all sorts of collateral agreements”. In this thesis, I hope to disrupt and queer these stories, collateral agreements, and fantasies.

Finally, several limitations to the data collection efforts need to be considered. First, there is a pressing need for available and reliable data on postgraduate education in Egypt in general and the number of postgraduate students abroad (Cantini, 2020). Second, gender-disaggregated data on international mobility from MENA countries remain scarce. Despite the best efforts in recent years, there remain challenges in collecting gender-disaggregated data in the region (El-Fek, 2014). Third, the available data on mobility by gender collected from international development organisations (i.e., the UNESCO, WES and the World Bank) often follow a binary logic of headcount (male vs female), and there remains a huge gap in data by age, gender, disability, geographical location, race and in intersection with the direction of mobility, type and duration of degrees. Finally, access to data remains a crucial barrier to researching this area, and more collective efforts are needed to make data accessible for all.
9.4 FINAL REMARKS

In July 2020, a few months into lockdown, CHEER hosted an online seminar on the *Post-COVID Topography: What new land do we inhabit?* (see http://www.sussex.ac.uk/education/cheer/events). The overarching theme of the seminar, as the name indicates, was to provide a space for critical exploration and intellectual exchange on the future of higher education in the post-pandemic. The seminar was part of a series that aimed to address the affective structure of the COVID-19 global pandemic and its impact on higher education. More precisely, it was an opportunity for senior academics and early-career researchers to come together and engage in debates, exchange views, reflections, thoughts, and aspirations away from the noise of loud neoliberal megaphones of toxic productivity and business as usual. As it pertains to internationalisation in higher education and international mobility, we were confronted with a new set of binaries (i.e., essential vs non-essential) and inequalities (i.e., digital inequalities) that begged for a reconceptualisation and understanding of the topic. Our debates and conversations in these seminars reflected the level of affective structure as we discussed the anxieties and fears on how the pandemic will shift the landscape of international higher education.

Personally, as I was immersed in the data analysis and writing phase, thinking about international mobility sounded bittersweet considering that a trip to the supermarket required negotiations with family and the state under the current circumstances. As the state expanded its power of surveillance and Orwellian governmentality, our lives became a series of episodes in Foucauldian dystopia (Foucault, 1982). The global pandemic queered notions of free movement that are the pantheon of European Union values and lie at the core of its euro-exceptionalism and its global pride. At times, writing about internationalisation and mobility under lockdown restrictions sounded like an act of holding into the past of jet-setting and globetrotting. In a sense, it queered the temporality and spatiality of the present moment. By reflecting on the ways all rules of border crossing have drastically changed, and access to the vaccine, health passports and PCR tests introduced new binaries to our lives that set new boundaries between vaccinated and non-vaccinated, healthy and diseased. Countries that once set the global rules of mobilities and dominated the global ranking of powerful passports
(i.e., USA, UK) became on the list of red zone countries. The intersections of my identity made me acutely aware that we are NOT in this together and that decades of social inequalities under neoliberal ideology will continue to intensify during and post the global pandemic. While women were risking their lives every day to save lives (For instance, the global share of women working in the health and care sectors is as high as 70 per cent (Boniol et al., 2019)), white male stupidity (Halberstam, 2011) held a tight grip on leadership and their denial to the pandemic brought fatal consequences. Moreover, our awareness of race inequalities intensified, with more BME fined for breaking the lockdown rules (Frazer-Carroll, 2021), and after the murder of George Floyd, it became clear that black lives only matter after they cease to exist.

During the last two years of writing this thesis, I often thought about research participants and their journeys during the pandemic. I found myself asking whether the overall objective of this thesis and its research questions will remain relevant to them and others in post-COVID 19 topographies. In trying to answer these questions, I found myself in epistemic splitting between the pragmatic policy analyst voices and the queer feminist researcher I have become. As we are now gradually coming out of lockdown, I understand -amid the increasing uncertainties - the comfort some may find by addressing the challenges ahead of us by suggesting clear and neat solutions, strategies, and policy recommendations. I am aware of the type of reassurances this approach brings sometimes and its ‘hand holding’ step-by-step mechanisms. Nevertheless, I am also cognizant of the discursive, messy, and entangled powerful discourses that underline these challenges and their affective assemblages and structures. To suggest a set of policy recommendations would be another happiness promise that I refrain from making. However, and as a way to reach a sort of a middle ground, I will conclude this chapter with a few thoughts that are hoped to pave the way for future research directions on gender and internationalisation.

First, we need collective efforts to disrupt and destabilise any form of normativity (i.e., hetero/homo) and its frameworks of exclusion and marginalisation. Participants often reported feelings of being out of time and place. In his memoir, Said (2012:299) called for embracing being “not quite right and out of place”. Embracing failure and being constantly out of time and place gained tremendous traction
among queer theorists who have called for a pedagogy of failure (Bersani, 1987; Edelman, 2007; Muñoz, 2009; Halberstam, 2011). The resistance participants faced during their journeys show that the field of internationalisation in higher education remains a gendered, classed, and racial apartheid. Like any apartheid regime, questions on access to spaces and the rights to access follow visible and invisible lines and rely on social and cultural capital. The exercise of power manifests itself through frameworks of subjugation, exclusion, and marginalisation. In a world where every day a new term is challenging the dichotomy of hetero/homo binaries (i.e., demi-sexuality, pansexuality, homie-sexuality), participants highlighted the ways they struggled to resist, subvert, and escape binary logics and frameworks embedded in internationalisation discourses. Their journeys attest to the urgent need to continue our intellectual investments to queer, deconstruct and decolonise our knowledge on gender and internationalisation.

Second, we must continue the resistance against the neoliberal assault on higher education and acknowledge that BME researchers are disproportionately affected by its negative impact. For instance, as recent as last year, in the funding round on investigating the impact of Covid-19, £0 of the awarded £4.3 million by the UKRI - one of Britain’s major funding institutes- went to research led by Black academic leads to explore Covid-19 and its disproportionate impact on BME communities (Inge, 2021). Our approach for widening participation should not only be limited to access but extended to the trajectories and progress across different levels of higher education (Arday and Mirza, 2018).

Third, we must gear our efforts collectively to ensure physical and epistemic safety in and outside higher education. In February 2020, CHEER hosted a seminar “Rainbow Laces and Safe Spaces! Queer Eyes on Absences, Erasures and Distortions in Higher Education” that addressed this particular issue (see http://www.sussex.ac.uk/education/cheer/events). The discussions revealed different expectations to what people understand as safe spaces, and these expectations are closely tied with gender, race, class, religion, nationality, and disability. Moreover, safe spaces must not continue the hegemonic heterocolonial power discourse of discrimination and othering, but to continue the resistance towards locating and embodying danger in certain bodies, identities and places (Ahmed, 2013)
Finally, at the present moment, there is a renewed debate around academic freedom and freedom of speech that is closely linked to the issue of safety in higher education. I could not stress more the importance of upholding the values of freedom of speech and academic freedom. However, I also agree with the view that academic freedom requires formal, infrastructural and psychic freedoms (Boden and Epstein, 2011). The world of academia remains primarily characterised by precarity that impedes any possibility for freedom (Leathwood and Read, 2020). Furthermore, upholding these values must transcend national boundaries. We should hold universities accountable to uphold the same values when doing internationalisation and branching out campuses in countries with the worst records of human rights violations and increased hostility towards academics’ freedom and freedom of speech. We must constantly strive to (un) do internationalisation and for upholding and maintaining ethics that guard our rights for are equality, equity, freedom, and justice. We need to constantly reflect on the impact of our international work not only to societies, communities, individuals but also for the environment.

This thesis is an invitation to broaden our understanding of gender and internationalisation to encompass the persisting systemic and institutional inequalities. It is a call to disrupt binaries and normativity that shape our understanding of time and space. It underscores the need for collective radical and transformative change in the landscape and ethics of internationalisation as a site of inequalities, marginalisation, and exclusions. This thesis is only a tiny piece in a giant puzzle, but it is not the end…it is only the beginning…
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11 APPENDICES

11.1 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Interview Schedule

Background
1. Where did you complete undergraduate studies (Egypt, Abroad)?
2. What was your job before starting postgraduate studies? How long have you worked in this institution?
3. Did you have any experience working abroad? If yes, for how long? What was the nature of these posts (study, short or long term, teaching posts, incoming/outgoing mobility)? If no why not?
4. How did you learn about study opportunities in UK (University, British council, word of mouth, recommendation by colleagues, professors)?
5. What support was available to you in completing university application?

Motivations for Mobility
6. What were your main motivations for carrying out postgraduate studies in UK? What made you decide to move country for study?
7. E.g. necessity, career development (or both or something in between)?
   a. If career development, how did you feel mobility would benefit you?
   b. If necessity, what were the factors at play? Labour market issues in home country? Conflict, Financial issues/standard of living? Partner of another mobile academic
8. How did you finance your study? Was the availability for scholarship a factor in choosing UK & university?
9. What were the main criterion for choosing universities and discipline?
10. Why did you decide to study in this particular (private) university?
11. Have you experienced any pressure/ encouragement/ discouragement to be internationally mobile and from whom/where?

Experiences to date (positive and negative)
9. What were the main challenges in transnational mobility (visa applications, leaving your job, negotiating family relationships)?
10. What were the main obstacles or difficulties adjusting in host universities?
11. How do you describe your relationships with peers and supervisors?
12. What type of support were available to you as international student? Who has provided this support (Universities, Egyptian Embassy or Higher education Exchange Council - Egypt, funding bodies)?
13. Can you give an example of any interventions to support your internationalization that you’ve experienced – good or bad - and what you thought about them? E.g.
   a. Practical guidance e.g. visas, finances, accommodation, healthcare?
   b. Specialised inductions?
   c. Mentoring/buddying and line management?
   d. Support with childcare and caring responsibilities? Flexible working?
   e. English academic writing?
   f. Help with networking and socializing?
   g. Support in the event of discrimination or interpersonal problems?
   h. Other?
14. What career benefits have you experienced from completing postgraduate study in UK? Could you provide a concrete example(s)?
15. What have been the detrimental effects of being mobile (e.g. losing touch with contacts, or particular research cultures and practices, personal upheaval, job insecurity,?) Could you provide a specific example?
16. Looking back to your experience, what are the main personal specific outcomes as a result of this experience?

Identity and mobility

17. From your experience, what type of person do you think is the most likely to be able to be successfully internationally mobile? (gender, age, career stage, discipline, other demographic factors). Why do you think that this is the case?

18. What advice would you give to people contemplating becoming internationally mobile?

Any other comments?

Is there anything else you’d like to add about your experiences of mobility?

Thank you for your participation.
Appendices