Strategic waiting in the IPO markets

Colak, Gönül and Günay, Hikmet (2011) Strategic waiting in the IPO markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17 (3). pp. 555-583. ISSN 0929-1199

[img] PDF - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial No Derivatives.

Download (616kB)


The paper analyzes the strategic waiting tendencies of IPO firms. Our game theoretic model shows why some high-quality firms may strategically delay their initial public offering until a favorable signal about the economic conditions is generated by other issuing firms. Survival analysis suggests that IPOs in the highest quality decile have significantly higher median waiting days (since the start of a rising IPO cycle) than the IPOs in the lowest decile. During the early stages of an expanding IPO cycle the average firm quality is lower than in its later stages. We find supporting evidence also from the IPOs of future S&P 500 firms.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: University of Sussex Business School > Accounting and Finance
SWORD Depositor: Mx Elements Account
Depositing User: Mx Elements Account
Date Deposited: 22 Feb 2022 10:57
Last Modified: 22 Feb 2022 11:00

View download statistics for this item

📧 Request an update