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The arbitrability of antitrust disputes: a Chinese perspective
Qingxiu Bu*

ABSTRACT
The cornerstone of public policy debate opens the door for arbitral tribunals to deal with antitrust disputes. It has long been a controversial issue whether antitrust disputes related to commercial contracts could be arbitrable, given the lack of clarity under Chinese law. China’s Supreme People’s Court in Shell v Huili has seemingly provided important but paradoxical guidance on non-arbitrability. Arguably, the ruling may be incompatible with the doctrine of international comity in the current transnational dispute resolution mechanism. It is argued that the operation costs for all stakeholders would be considerably reduced if China could integrate into the established international track.

KEYWORDS: arbitrability, antitrust, public policy, second-look doctrine
JEL CLASSIFICATIONS: K2

I. INTRODUCTION
Firms can harm consumers through unfair pricing and inhibiting new entrants in an anticompetitive market.\(^1\) Antitrust law seeks to protect public interests by ensuring free and fair competition in markets,\(^2\) while arbitration is of a private nature and a creature of contract.\(^3\) The former is enacted to maintain competition among various businesses participating in a certain market segment,\(^4\) while the latter is characterized

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\(^1\) Apex Hosiery Co. v Leader (1940) 310 US 469, 493.
\(^2\) Japanese Antimonopoly Act art 1; Conceptually, antimonopoly and antitrust are interchangeably used throughout the study.
by its hallmarks of adaptability and access to expertise.\(^5\) Parties benefit from the efficiency of arbitration,\(^6\) which is attributed to there being only narrow circumstances for judicial review on limited grounds.\(^7\) Based on an orthodox divide between *right in rem* and *right in personam*, antitrust law is normally enforced through public agencies.\(^8\) With the boundary between public enforcement and private dispute resolution becoming increasingly blurred, the arbitrability of private antitrust actions has long been a highly debated topic. Disputes differ considerably in terms of suitability for arbitration, which could be further limited by the scope of the arbitration agreement at issue. Furthermore, private antitrust claims have long been thought non-arbitrable due to the public nature of antitrust law, though the scope of non-arbitrability varies from one jurisdiction to another. It is essential to explore a variety of inquiries in this controversial scenario. Is the lack of legislation explicitly a decisive obstacle to recognizing antitrust-related arbitration? Does the public nature of Chinese Antimonopoly Law (the AML 2008) preclude arbitration in the antitrust dispute’s resolution? The greatest challenge is how the Chinese people’s courts respond to the arbitration awards made by their counterparts in the USA and the EU in cross-border cases.

This study undertakes a comparative analysis on the arbitrability or non-arbitrability of antitrust disputes in China, the USA, and the EU. However, the focus will be on the Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC’s) ruling on *Shell v Huili*. The article starts with the evolutionary analysis of US law on the arbitrability of antitrust disputes. It then moves to the EU perspective on the basis of a judgment on *Eco Swiss* made by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The inconsistency of judgments in China’s lower courts was seemingly resolved when the SPC handed down a judgment in the *Shell* case on 21 August 2019. Primary criticisms are based on the SPC’s controversial reasoning, and China’s potential integration into the international arbitration regime. The article draws on a deterrence theory to propose an innovative basis for striking a balance between parties’ autonomies and limited judicial review of arbitral agreements. It concludes that the existing regimes are inadequate for protecting public policy and public interests, and it is imperative to make China’s approaches compatible with the international arbitration regime.

II. THE ARBITRABILITY OF ANTITRUST DISPUTES IN THE USA AND THE EU

The question of arbitrability has been settled conclusively in both the USA and the EU.\(^9\) The superseded *American Safety* doctrine previously allowed the courts to

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\(^7\) (2018) 5 USC ss 571–84.  
refuse arbitration of antitrust disputes. A variety of factors had been advanced to justify the courts’ refusals in the USA, including the overriding of public interest, complexities, and exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust disputes. In a groundbreaking ruling in \textit{Mitsubishi v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth}, the US Supreme Court held that if an international contract contained an arbitration agreement, it would normally be given effect to include submission of an antitrust dispute to arbitration. This sea change is not only manifested in this landmark case, but also in a first antitrust arbitration initiated by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DoJ). The ECJ’s ruling of \textit{Eco Swiss} represents a similar approach to that in \textit{Mitsubishi}, namely that no specific type of contract dispute had been pre-excluded from arbitration, thus supporting the arbitrability of competition disputes.

\textbf{Would arbitration affect antitrust law development?}

Initially, the US jurisdiction emphasized the nature of public law and held that antitrust-related disputes were not within the scope of arbitrable disputes. The legal landscape has changed enormously given that arbitration is playing an increasingly significant role in antitrust law disputes. A more specific question arises as to whether the increased use of arbitration will affect the development of antitrust precedent. The US’ validation of private arbitration began in 1925 when Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). If a commercial contract contains an agreement to settle controversies that arise from the contract through arbitration, the promise to arbitrate ‘shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ The FAA creates a presumption in favour of arbitration, which echoes the New York Convention, Chapter II. With only narrow grounds for judicial review of the resulting awards, the statute can be used to bar access to courts when merchants allege violations of antitrust laws. Antitrust disputes had long been not arbitrable in the USA. The Second Circuit in \textit{American Safety Equipment Corp v JP Maguire & Co} became the first Court of Appeals to hold that antitrust claims were not subject to arbitration. The doctrine of \textit{American Safety} was thus established prohibiting arbitration of antitrust issues.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{10} \textit{American Safety Equipment Corp v JP Maguire & Co (2d Cir1968) 391 F2d 821.}
\item \textbf{12} \textit{Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc (1985) 105 S Ct 3346.}
\item \textbf{14} \textit{Eco Swiss v Benetton Int’l Case No C-126/97 [1999] ECR I-3055 (ECJ).}
\item \textbf{15} (2012) 9 USC ss 1–200.
\item \textbf{16} Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) s 2; 9 USC s 2.
\item \textbf{18} FAA Chapter 2; 9 USC s 201.
\item \textbf{20} \textit{Am Express Co v Italian Colors Rest (2013)133 S Ct 2304; Mitsubishi Motors v Soler} (n 5) 614.
\item \textbf{21} \textit{Baxter Int’l v Abbott Laboratories} (7th Cir 2003) 315 F 3d 832.
\item \textbf{22} \textit{American Safety Equipment Corp} (n 10).
\end{itemize}
First, a theoretical basis lies in the fact that a claim under antitrust law could be of more than private interest.\(^2\) There was a concern regarding whether an arbitration tribunal can realize the ultimate legislative intent, that is, to address a scenario where a transaction substantially lessens competition under section 7 of the Clayton Act. Secondly and most importantly, arbitration normally does not create precedent in the same manner as do courts.\(^2\) A court ruling is normally made public, and provides valuable precedents for future cases.\(^2\) Arbitration, however, is typically confidential, and decisions are not disclosed in public domains.\(^2\) Given its confidential nature, the public may not be able to benefit from the collateral estoppel.\(^2\) In addition, arbitration does not adhere to the principle of stare decisis, which is fundamental to a common law jurisdiction.\(^2\) Arbitration awards do not hold the same weight of authority as that of a court ruling. Arbitration decisions are generally not subject to any substantive appeals.\(^2\) As such, merely resolving disputes in lieu of intending to make law, arbitral awards have little or no precedential value in future disputes.\(^2\) From the perspective of creating precedents, a court decision is preferable. A commentator even argued that increased use of arbitration will jeopardize the evolving of common law.\(^2\) A third concern might be that arbitral tribunals are unwilling to apply certain laws as accurately as courts would.\(^2\) For instance, arbitration may not be appropriate in merger cases involving multiple dispositive antitrust issues, or lack structural remedies.\(^2\) It remains uncertain as to whether merging parties would prefer an arbitration characterized by confidentiality to a proceeding in a public courthouse.\(^2\) Given the growth of cross-border transactions, the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi even initiated to consider whether Sherman Act claims could be decided by international arbitration tribunals.\(^2\)

### The Supreme Court’s Mitsubishi ruling

The Supreme Court in Mitsubishi first applied the FAA to preclude litigation of a federal statutory right.\(^2\) A core inquiry before the Court was whether Soler’s antitrust claim should be resolved in court or through arbitration.\(^2\) Critically, it revoked

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29 5 USC § 580(d).  
30 Abramowicz and Stearns (n 24) 953, 1004.  
32 American Safety Equipment Corp (n 10).  
33 Lemley and Leslie (n 27) 1, 62.  
35 Mitsubishi Motors v Soler (n 5) 632–35.  
36 ibid 614.  
37 ibid.
rationales which, as cornerstones of the *American Safety* doctrine, had been used to render antitrust disputes non-arbitrable. The Supreme Court in *Mitsubishi* held that:

> the private right of action statute will remain just as viable in arbitration as in judicial litigation and thus as ‘the prospective litigant may provide in advance for a mutually agreeable procedure whereby he would seek his antitrust recovery as well as settle other controversies.’

As a strategy to avoid antitrust liability, some businesses impose arbitration agreements on their distributors and customers. For instance, they attempt to preclude class action litigation in their arbitration clauses. It is worth noting that this landmark ruling foreshadows the potential application scope in terms of domestic and international scenarios. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of ‘international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes... Even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context...’ This ruling confirms the role of the effective vindication doctrine in streamlining the use of arbitration of antitrust disputes, which, to some extent, strengthens the antitrust victims’ statutory rights. The *Mitsubishi* ruling indicates confidence in arbitrators’ willingness to enforce US antitrust law and their ability to deal with its complexity. This includes deterrence, which is often identified as the more important public benefit. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed that:

> so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.

Arguably, the Supreme Court did not reverse the *American Safety* doctrine, but rather distinguished its domestic application from that of *Mitsubishi’s* international

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39 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 USC s 15.
40 *Mitsubishi Motors v Soler* (n 5) 636.
44 *Mitsubishi Motors v Soler* (n 5) 629.
46 Resnik (n 3) 2939.
47 Scodro (n 19) 547, 607.
48 *Mitsubishi Motors v Soler* (n 5) 637.
focus. It explained that ‘the importance of the private damages remedy, however,
does not compel the conclusion that it may not be sought outside an American
court.’ More importantly, the Supreme Court did not leave aside the orthodox is-

having permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the
United States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to en-
sure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has
been addressed.

Apparently, the Court justified its ruling on the ground that arbitration awards
will receive scrutiny ‘sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the require-
ments of the statute at issue’. As Scodro observed, the Supreme Court struck a
proper balance between vindicating Soler’s rights effectively while enabling courts to
ensure arbitral cognizance of antitrust law when asked to enforce the award. In this
vein, a double-check mechanism was established through the second-look doctrine.

The DoJ antitrust division’s first antitrust arbitration

Antitrust legal proceedings could be viable through alternative mechanisms. The
Antitrust Division of the US DoJ explained that arbitration is favoured by federal pol-
icy and would offer ‘a speedier and less costly alternative to litigation’. In some sit-

A dispositive motion is playing a critical part in the development of antitrust law,
which has been influenced by several Supreme Court antitrust decisions. When
deployed properly, it can potentially reduce the time and expense of a case, which is
also consistent with the goals of arbitration. Justice Blackmun noted that:

[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and ex-
pedition of arbitration.

49 ibid 635.
50 ibid 638.
52 Scodro (n 19) 547, 607.
53 Alexandra Theobald, ‘Mandatory Antitrust Law and Multiparty International Arbitration’ (2016) 37 (3)
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1059, 1089.
55 American Safety Equipment Corp (n 10) 828. (2d Cir. 1968)
Arbitration International 397, 445.
58 James H Carter, ‘Dispositive Motions in International Arbitration and the Role of U.S. Courts’ in John
Norton Moore (ed) International Arbitration: Contemporary Issues and Innovations (Martinus Nijhoff,
59 Mitsubishi Motors v Soler (n 5) 628.
Expanding the use of arbitration for merger review cases could make federal antitrust enforcement more flexible and efficient. On 4 September 2019, the Antitrust Division filed a complaint in the US District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, challenging Novelis’ proposed US$2.6 billion acquisition of Aleris Corporation. At stake was a focus upon a narrow but dispositive issue regarding the relevant market definition. Both the Antitrust Division and the merging parties agreed on the parameters of a divestiture remedy, seeking to expedite the pathway to closing the transaction through binding arbitration. The result would determine whether Novelis would divest the overlap facility or whether the Antitrust Division would move to dismiss the complaint. On 9 March 2020, the DoJ prevailed in its first-ever arbitration of a merger issue in this landmark case.

The Antitrust Division’s willingness to deploy an alternative dispute resolution (ADR), but also an opportunity for merging parties to avoid a trial by using alternative remedies, like arbitration, to decide dispositive issues. The case of Novelis signals not only the Antitrust Division’s willingness to deploy an alternative dispute resolution (ADR), but also an opportunity for merging parties to avoid a trial by using alternative remedies, like arbitration, to decide dispositive issues.

The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA 1996) allows a federal government agency to ‘use [an alternative] dispute resolution proceeding for the resolution of an issue in controversy that relates to an administrative programme, if the parties agree to such proceeding.’ The legislative intent of ADRA 1996 is to alleviate the court’s burden via the ADR. Despite the theoretical existence of the Act for over two decades, it is the first time that the DoJ has used arbitration as an alternative in order to resolve a merger challenge case. The case of Novelis witnesses to the fact that ADR mechanisms are no longer just a theoretical means of resolving antitrust investigations. However, the question arises as to whether the availability of arbitration will be limited to cases in which the issues in dispute are well-defined and discrete. It may be too early to affirm whether this case portends a larger shift in the Antitrust Division’s approach. However, this ground-breaking practice exemplifies a potential model for the DoJ to follow when resolving future antitrust disputes. The exploration of the EU’s approaches may shed more light on the extent to which arbitration is used as a competition law dispute resolution mechanism.

The EU and the US share similar approaches

Competition disputes are arbitrable under EU law. The position was mirrored by the ECJ in *Eco Swiss v Benetton*. Although the ruling of *Eco Swiss* does not
distinguish between different breaches of EU competition law, the ECJ accepts the arbitrariness of EU antitrust disputes. The DoJ’s use of arbitration in *Novelis* and the increasing acceptance of international arbitration to determine EU competition law issues demonstrate that arbitration can be a useful tool for settling their antitrust disputes.72

In *Eco Swiss v Benetton*, an arbitral tribunal ordered Benetton to make compensation for the damage suffered by Eco Swiss.73 Benetton applied for annulment, alleging that the contract in question was inconsistent with the principle of public policy.74 The question before the ECJ was:

if the court considers that an arbitration award is in fact contrary to Article 85 of the EC Treaty, must it allow a claim for annulment of that award if the claim otherwise complies with statutory requirements?75

The ECJ affirmed in *Eco Swiss* that the national courts in the EU should grant annulment of any award where ‘its domestic rules of procedure require it . . . for failure to observe national rules of public policy.’76 It is implied that an arbitral award shall be enforced, if the competition issue does not go against public policy or involve a hard-core violation under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).77 Otherwise, a competition claim would fall outside the jurisdiction of arbitrations. The case of *Eco Swiss* is the first case where the ECJ indirectly admitted the arbitrability of competition claims.78

*Eco Swiss* establishes the duty of the arbitral tribunal to apply the EC Treaty ex officio.79 It demonstrates the possible annulment of arbitration agreements by EU national courts in cases of infringement of the TFEU, on the grounds of public interests.80 In the ECJ’s ruling in *Achmea*, similarly, an arbitration agreement was nullified due to its incompatibility with EU law.81 It is notable that the ECJ in *Eco Swiss* does not require national courts to undertake a greater level of review in respect of EU competition law than they would where other public policy arguments are triggered.82 Furthermore, the ECJ qualifies EU competition law as a matter of public policy within the meaning of Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. As Blanke observed:

74 TFEU art 85.
75 *Eco Swiss* (n 14).
76 ibid s 41.
78 *Eco Swiss* (n 14).
79 ibid s 40.
80 ibid.
81 Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment, Case C-284/16 (6 March 2018).
it imposed an obligation on EU member state courts in their capacity as supervisory courts to perform a full substantive review of international commercial arbitral awards to ensure their compliance with EU competition law.83

As such, *Eco Swiss* signals that arbitration is a competent forum for addressing EU antitrust issues.

Although arbitration has traditionally played a marginal role in antitrust enforcement, the USA and EU’s approaches exemplify its increasingly significant role in the future resolution of antitrust law disputes. The role of international arbitration in competition law disputes will continue to grow across jurisdictions.84 The abovementioned affirmative judgments are reflective of the arbitrability of competition claims from both the EU and the US perspectives. The ECJ’s ruling in *Eco Swiss* epitomizes the EU’s attitude towards arbitrability and ensures the continued attractiveness of arbitration to an EU-based business.85 To avoid any asymmetrical gap between China and the EU and USA, it is worth exploring the approaches of China’s SPC in *Shell v Huili*.86

**III. DIVERGENCES IN CHINA’S APPROACHES IN SHELL V HUILI (2019)**

The controversy over the validity of arbitration clauses in antitrust disputes has been a long-standing issue in China. The inquiry goes further as to whether an arbitration clause in the contract can exclude the court’s inherent jurisdiction to hear an antitrust dispute. The SPC has responded on the issue, but left scope for ambiguity. Seeking to address the arbitrability of antitrust claims, the SPC made a landmark ruling in *Shell v Huili*, concerning Shell’s objection to jurisdiction in an antitrust lawsuit. One of the key procedural issues is whether antitrust disputes are arbitrable or not, given that neither the China Arbitration Law 2017 nor the AML 2008 provides expressly whether monopoly disputes may be resolved by arbitration.

**Shell v Huili**

The case was initially heard by the Hohhot Intermediate People’s Court and was appealed to the SPC by Shell. The dispute arose from an agreement between Shell China and Huili, one of its Chinese distributors. The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against Shell before the Intermediate People’s Court of Hohhot for violation of the AML 2008. Huili alleged that Shell had organized a horizontal monopolistic agreement among its distributors and colluded in the bidding process.87 The defendant Shell insisted on excluding the court’s jurisdiction because of a pre-existing arbitration clause, which allowed the parties to settle

84 Theobald (n 53) 1059, 1089.
86 *Huili v Shell* (Supreme People’s Court, No 47, 29 August 2019).
disputes by arbitration in lieu of litigation. Failing to have the argument sustained, Shell then appealed to the SPC and reiterated the valid arbitration clause which stipulated that all disputes were to be resolved by arbitration. In its verdict, SPC pointed out that the AML 2008 is silent as to the arbitrability of antitrust disputes. The issue was whether Huili’s claim fell within the scope of the arbitration clause contained in their distribution agreement. The Hohhot court rejected the jurisdictional challenge on the grounds of public interests and the lack of explicit statutory basis for the arbitrability of monopoly disputes. Based on the same reasoning enshrined in the China Arbitration Law 2017, Shell argued that the People’s Court should honour the contractually agreed arbitration clause as being valid and binding, because of the lack of explicit preclusion against arbitrability. The SPC held that antimonopoly cases involve the public interest and, in the absence of an express rule allowing arbitration of such private disputes, an arbitration clause may not serve as a basis for jurisdiction in a dispute between private parties. Thus, the SPC clarified that a contractual arbitration clause cannot exclude the jurisdiction of the Hohhot Court in adjudicating alleged horizontal monopoly arrangements.

The grey area of arbitrability

There is no inherent bar to the private enforcement of competition law by way of arbitration. The controversy stems largely from the fact that both the Arbitration Law 2017 and the AML 2008 are silent on the matter. Arbitration is not specifically stipulated in the AML 2008 as the means of resolution of antitrust disputes. In terms of the scope of arbitrable disputes, the Arbitration Law 2017 provides that ‘contractual disputes and disputes arising from property rights may be put to arbitration.’ The parties ought to be able to settle the claim by arbitration, since plaintiffs are free to refrain from suing after a violation has occurred. Following the SPC’s position, arbitration clauses should not exclude people’s courts’ jurisdiction over antitrust civil disputes, because the SPC held that the case between Shell and Huili was a monopoly-related civil dispute rather than a contractual dispute.

Hypothetical challenge vis-à-vis objective cognizance

A rationale behind the SPC ruling is that arbitration clauses cannot directly exclude the court’s inherent jurisdiction to hear antitrust cases. It further explained that the AML 2008 stipulates expressly that monopoly-related cases are to be resolved either through civil litigation or by administrative authorities. The AML 2008 does not make a reference to arbitration. In furtherance of its reasoning, the SPC referred to the Arbitration Law 2017, saying that a people’s court has jurisdiction over a dispute if:

i. One of the parties has already filed its claims in a court; and
ii. The dispute is not related to contractual rights or other property rights.

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89 Huili v Shell (Supreme People’s Court, No 47, 29 August 2019).
90 The China Arbitration Law 2017 art 2.
91 Scodro (n 19) 547, 607.
92 The AML 2008 arts 10, 50.
93 The China Arbitration Law 2017 art 2.
The SPC blocked the arbitration of competition claims partly due to the lack of explicit provisions covered by the scope of arbitration in the Arbitration Law 2017. Arguably, civil disputes caused by monopolistic behaviour are disputes between two equal parties, the issue of which is tort liability. Antimonopoly disputes are usually viewed as a public policy matter. Following the reasoning of standing and eligibility, it seems paradoxical that public enforcement is to be implemented by antitrust authorities and private enforcement by Chinese courts or arbitration tribunals. Impliedly, antimonopoly disputes between contractual parties with equal standing are thus out of the scope of arbitration enshrined in the Arbitration Law 2017. As such, the absence of existing provisions explicitly allows antitrust disputes to be settled via arbitration, which seems to lead to the invalidity of the arbitration clauses. Therefore, they should not exclude the court’s jurisdiction over disputes concerning horizontal monopoly agreements.

The scope of review for statutory claims is, prima facie, the same as for arbitrated claims. The enforcement relies primarily on regulatory agencies. There is no explicit legal provision to bar arbitration from being used for antitrust disputes. Article 50 under the AML 2008 does not exclude the feasibility of arbitral dispute resolution. The law provides that one party shall be liable for the damage where another party suffers loss due to the underlying monopolistic conduct, but does not explicitly stipulate that only the courts have jurisdiction over antitrust disputes. Another three provisions define the scope of arbitrable matters, none of which negates the arbitrability of antitrust issues. In addition, Article 2 of the Arbitration Law 2017 provides that:

contractual disputes and other disputes over the rights and interests in property between citizens, legal persons, and other organisations that are equal subjects may be arbitrated.

It seems that statutory disputes relating to antitrust matters can be within the scope of arbitration. From a dialectical perspective, the non-arbitrable subject matters stipulated in the Arbitration Law 2017 do not include competition claims.

**The blurred scope of review: statutory claims vis-à-vis arbitrable claims**

The SPC has clarified Chinese people’s courts’ jurisdiction over antitrust disputes, and they may only be resolved through civil litigation or administrative sanctions, despite an arbitration clause existing in the contract concerned. However, it has not addressed monopolistic arbitrability from the angle of jurisprudence. Inconsistent rulings have been made on the issue of the arbitrability of antitrust disputes. In *Songxu Technology v Samsung (China)*, the Jiangsu High People’s Court emphasized that:

96 The China Arbitration Law 2017 art 2.
97 The AML 2008 art 50.
98 The AML 2008 arts 2, 3, 65.
the AML 2008 is a matter of public law and that since the law does not clearly stipulate that the AML-related disputes can be resolved through arbitration, the courts should have jurisdiction, given the public law nature of the AML and the underlying public interest.99

In contrast, Shell v Shanxi Changling concerned an antitrust dispute based on an allegation of abuse of dominant market position. The Beijing High People’s Court held that ‘a jurisdiction over a case should be determined by the existence of a valid arbitration clause in the contract, regardless of the basis on tortious liability or breach of contract.’100 The court considered that it had no jurisdiction over this abuse of dominance dispute arising from a contract with a valid arbitration clause. This ruling took a similar position to that of the UK High Court’s decision in Microsoft Mobile v Sony.101 The UK court held that the claim should be applicable under the Arbitration Act 1996 when considering the application of an arbitration clause in a tortious claim arising from allegations of anticompetitive conduct.102 The UK High court normally recognizes the positive benefits of arbitrating competition disputes and holds that anticompetition claims are arbitrable provided that the petition alleging an infringement falls within the ambit of a contractual arbitration clause.103 The reasoning of the High Court in the Microsoft Mobile case was drawn from the Attheraces judgment.

Beijing High People’s Court and the SPC successively rendered different rulings on the jurisdiction issues in two antitrust cases related to Shell.104 The two conflicting judgments are reflective of the divergences in China’s judicial practices. The SPC’s ruling is pertinently applicable to monopolistic agreements. However, in another decision by the SPC, it held that ‘whether the arbitration clause stipulated in the contract can exclude the court’s jurisdiction should be determined based on the specific circumstances of the antitrust dispute.’105 Thus, the SPC itself is not strictly bound by its prior judgement. Although the SPC regards a court as an appropriate avenue for addressing monopolistic conduct,106 such a position has not been sufficiently justified in terms of the AML 2008’s remedial and deterrent functions. Given the SPC’s subtle justification, the ruling in Shell v Huili leaves considerable room for further interpretations in cases involving other types of antitrust disputes.

The divide between public law and private law

The SPC justifies its ruling on the underlying issue with public law nature beyond personal disputes.107 The Court explained that the subject matter involved in Shell v

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99 Songxu Technology v Samsung, Jiangsu High People’s Court (Civil Court, No. 00072, 29 August 2016).
100 Shell v Shanxi Changling, Beijing High People’s Court (Civil No 44, 2019).
101 Microsoft Mobile v Sony [2017] EWHC 374 (Ch).
102 Arbitration Act 1996 s9; ibid ss 45–46, 72–73.
103 Attheraces Limited v British Horseracing Board [2007] EWCA Civ 38.
104 Changlin v Shell (Beijing High People’s Court, No 44, 2019); Huili v Shell (Supreme People’s Court, No 47, 29 August 2019).
105 VISCAS v SGCC Shanghai Electric Power Company (Intellectual Property Bench of the Supreme People’s Court, No 356, 1 December 2019).
107 Huili v Shell (Supreme People’s Court, No 47, 29 August 2019).
Huili goes beyond the rights and obligations between the private counterparties of the contract, and thus falls outside the scope of arbitrable matters. As such, the SPC made a judgment that Shell China could not rely on the arbitration clause to exclude the court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. The case indicates that the arbitration clause should not negate the court’s jurisdiction over antitrust civil disputes. It is conceivable, however, that there could be some leeway for arbitration in this arena, given that some of antitrust disputes do not necessarily impact on public policy or public interests.

**Public policy/interests vis-à-vis privity of contact**

The SPC refusal to relegate the court’s authority and render antitrust disputes arbitrable is attributable to two-deeply rooted factors. First, the Court referred to the AML’s legislative intent, which is to prevent monopoly behaviour, maintain free competition and protect consumer interest and public interest in society. A main rationale behind the SPC ruling is that the AML 2008 in nature falls within the ambit of public law. The law, in principle, seeks largely to protect competition instead of the competing parties, whose interests do not necessarily align well with public interests. They should go beyond the privity of contract and in turn render the competition claims inappropriate for arbitration. It addresses a unique area of public interest, which enforcement actions serve the public interest by seeking to maintain competitive markets. The application of the AML 2008 can be analogized to a prosecutorial action on behalf of consumers. From the SPC’s perspective, it is more appropriate for either an administrative organ or a court to evaluate allegations of anticompetitive conduct. The SPC distinguishes antitrust disputes from a contractual one, of which the former falls squarely within the sphere of public law. An SPC Judicial Interpretation provides further authority to address the ambiguous controversy:

[w]here a plaintiff directly files a civil lawsuit with the people’s court or files a civil lawsuit with the people’s court after a decision of the antimonopoly law enforcement authority affirming the existence of monopolistic conduct comes into force, if the lawsuit satisfies other conditions for lawsuit acceptance as prescribed by law, the people’s court shall accept the lawsuit.

108 The China Arbitration Law 2017 art 17 (1).
110 The AML 2008 art 1.
112 The AML 2008 art 15 (4); art 28.
113 American Safety Equipment Corp (n 10) 828.
114 ibid 826.
116 SPC, Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conduct (Beijing, SPC, 1 June 2012) art 2.
The SPC’s Judicial Interpretation implies that the scope of public interests goes beyond the privity of a contract. Antitrust claims normally reach beyond the rights and obligations of individuals, impacting the society as a whole.\textsuperscript{117} They should not be limited to the narrow confines of arbitration.\textsuperscript{118}

Secondly, China is generally concerned that certain public law rights will not be handled properly in private arbitration, and doing so would be to the detriment of the public at large. Arbitrators are empowered to give effect to the parties’ intent under the contract, not to advance public policies embodied in antitrust statutes.\textsuperscript{119} Another counterargument lies in the high likelihood for potential imbalances in resources between litigants in antitrust actions given defendants’ position as potential monopolists.\textsuperscript{120} An arbitrator’s background may be correlated to arbitration outcomes.\textsuperscript{121} Since arbitrators are frequently experts drawn for their business sphere, it hardly seems proper for them to determine these issues of great public interest.\textsuperscript{122} Arbitrators are not nearly as insulated from undue pressures, and resulting bias may influence their decisions.\textsuperscript{123} Fleming noted that the bias problem may allow defendants to exploit arbitration for their own benefit to the ultimate detriment of the public.\textsuperscript{124} Thus, denying private contractual parties of their standing in antitrust claims seems consistent with the legislative purpose.\textsuperscript{125}

Nevertheless, a balance needs to be struck between the public interest and other factors, like efficiency, cost savings, flexibility, and confidentiality. In most cases, arbitral tribunals are required only to calculate the amount of awardable damages.\textsuperscript{126} Ostensibly, a large proportion of competition claims that involve cartels or price-fixing practices inevitably affect public interests.\textsuperscript{127} In Shell v Huili, the contractual clause is primarily binding on the contract parties, whereas the setting up of supply obligations by the defendant to the plaintiff may pertain to competition concerns, but only affects the parties under disputes.\textsuperscript{128} In addition, the Arbitration Law 2017 actually provides a safeguard provision, which allows an arbitral award to be nullified in case of violations of public interests or public policy.\textsuperscript{129} Therefore, it is untenable that the SPC has invoked the absence of precedents recognizing the arbitrability of antimonopoly disputes. A court should avoid overriding the boundary between state justice and private autonomy, given the nature of arbitration, such as privity and independence.\textsuperscript{130}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Katherine Stone and Alexander Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic (Economic Policy Institute, 7 December 2015) <https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/>
\item \textsuperscript{118} Brewer (n 11) 91, 126.
\item \textsuperscript{120} American Safety Equipment Corp (n 10) 827; Fleming (n 115).
\item \textsuperscript{122} American Safety Equipment Corp (n 10) 826, 827.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Lemley and Leslie (n 27) 1, 62.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Fleming (n 115).
\item \textsuperscript{125} Theobald (n 53) 1059, 1089.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Buxbaum (n 94) 219, 263.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Zhou (n 88).
\item \textsuperscript{129} The China Arbitration Law 2017 art 58.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Jan Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Overriding Mandatory Laws in International Arbitration’ (2018) 67 (4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 903, 930.
\end{itemize}
Law’s intrinsic resilience applies equally to China’s law evolution

The SPC seems to be less willing to embrace arbitration, which mirrors the approach taken by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). In *Claymore Dairies*, the CAT emphasized the public law nature of the Competition Act (CA 1998), which is to protect the public interest via the CAT. As to the above analysis, two limbs of the reasoning seem to justify the SPC’s ruling, which reflects the absence of explicit statutory inclusion under Article 2 of the China Arbitration Law 2017. The SPC’s position also resembles the American Safety Doctrine established by the US Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1968, which held that courts are the appropriate avenue for resolving antitrust disputes. The US courts had long adhered to the doctrine, which limited the arbitrability of domestic antitrust disputes. Arguably, the SPC focuses more on vertical restraints. Neither the AML 2018 nor the US Sherman Act expressly bars parties from arbitrating monopolistic conducts. But both China’s SPC and the US Second Circuit concluded that antitrust disputes warranted public adjudication. The SPC in *Shell* has seemingly addressed the non-arbitrability of antitrust civil disputes and held that they are not within the scope of arbitration. Its ruling, to some extent, is helpful to settle a split among lower courts and offered plausible clarity for companies with operation in China. Nevertheless, the SPC may have lost an opportunity to make a milestone ruling to address the intersection of arbitration and antitrust. As the highest tribunal as well as the final arbiter of the law in China, the SPC’s mission is to ensure justice by law. First, China does not have a tradition of precedents, since it belongs to a civil law system, and thus the common law doctrine of *stare decisis* does not exist in China *stricto sensu*. Secondly, the SPC’s Judicial Interpretation plays a semi-statutory role of law-making in China. The unique SPC Judicial Interpretation constitutes *jurisprudence constante*, which has factual binding effect in China’s judicial system. In this regard, China may merely need a landmark case, like the EU’s *Eco Swiss* and the US’s *Mitsubishi*, which would establish a ground-breaking SPC Interpretation that renders antitrust disputes arbitrable thereafter. As Lemley and Leslie observed:

old doctrines may give way in light of legal developments that change the underlying environment and undermine the original policy arguments upon which the old common law is based.

131 *Claymore Dairies v OFT* [2006] CAT 3.
133 *American Safety Equipment Corp* (n 10).
134 Scodro (n 19) 547, 607.
135 *American Safety Equipment Corp* (n 10).
136 *American Safety Equipment Corp* (n 10) 826, 828.
This notion has been manifested in the US Supreme Court’s ruling of Mitsubishi. The law’s intrinsic development and resilience apply equally to the Chinese law’s evolution in this arena, despite its traditional civil law system. Despite the lack of precedent tradition, Chinese People’s Courts will refuse to enforce contractual provisions mandating arbitration of antitrust disputes following the case of Shell v Huili. In such circumstances, public authorities may be inclined to step in to protect domestic distributors with less bargaining power against local subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations. Even so, the SPC still leaves room for distinguishing between contract and antitrust claims, in particular, between parties with more equal standing. The more a dispute is closely related to contractual performance, the more it is arbitrable.

In sum, the divide between public and private enforcement is, to some extent, overread in antitrust disputes. As long as a prospective litigant can effectively vindicate its statutory cause of action in arbitration, it should be free to refrain from addressing the claim by arbitration. Following the second-look doctrine, the court can monitor over the enforcement of arbitral awards, which ensures that public policy will be protected.

IV. ADDRESS THE CHALLENGES IN CROSS-BORDER ARBITRABLE ANTIRUST DISPUTES

Economies are inextricably interdependent despite the current debate on decoupling. There is a place for arbitration, since competition law tolerates private enforcement. Arbitrability of competition law, in substance, is only with respect to the civil aspect of antitrust law. An arbitration tribunal seeks to issue an enforceable award, which goal is embodied in some institutional rules. A challenge arises as to how to protect fair competition given the potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions. Arguably, the global challenge does not rest with the issue of arbitrability, but with how to redefine the scope of public policy to avoid the triggering of the refutation by national courts.

143 Kai-chieh Chan, 'China’s Top Court Says No to Arbitrability of Private Antitrust Actions' (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 23 January 2020).
146 Rogers (n 69) 1, 58.
150 The ICC Rules art 41.
Safeguarding procedures embedded in the institutional design

Public policy is a critical factor in denying the arbitrability of antitrust disputes in the case of *Shell*. Applying antitrust law has become mandatory for any arbitrator seeking to render an enforceable award. They are supposed to *bona fide* apply substantive law, and endeavour to ensure procedural fairness and substantive justice. Failure to do so would make an award susceptible to challenges on public policy grounds. Rights should not be surrendered when a party agrees to arbitrate and that judicial review, though limited, is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators are in compliance with law. The second-look doctrine allows courts to review the antitrust dispute at the award enforcement stage to ensure that any lawful interest had been properly addressed.

**Second-look doctrine**

There are adequate legislations as well as international soft law in place to safeguard against any abusive use of arbitration. The UNCITRAL Model Law explicitly provides that an award can be set aside where the court holds that the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration. It is similarly safeguarded under the New York Convention that recognition and enforcement of the award can be denied on the grounds of public policy. The New York Convention entails sufficient control on the observance of the public policy behind antitrust laws, which is viewed as a ‘second-look doctrine’. Article 5 reserves to each signatory country the right to refuse enforcement where the ‘recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.’ As such, a national court has the opportunity to look at the award and determine if it comports with the state’s public policy.

The doctrine is echoed in the USA. FAA which states ‘the court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award.’ In *Mitsubishi Motors*, the Supreme Court held that:

Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed.

156 UNCITRAL Model Law art 34.
159 New York Convention 1958 art 5 (2).
161 Federal Arbitration Act s 207; (2012) 9 USC s 207.
162 *Mitsubishi Motors v Soler* (n 5) 614, 638.
These statutory and judicial approaches may partly reflect the concern that antitrust disputes are too complex to be dealt with by arbitrators. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the second-look doctrine has not been brought into play as was plausibly expected. The doctrine has not been substantially put into practice during the past decades. As Korzun observed, it may not have entailed something more substantial than the New York Convention public policy scrutiny.

Meanwhile, the ECJ in *Eco Swiss* held that national courts were entitled to set aside an award that violates EU competition law on public policy grounds. In terms of legal convergence between *Mitsubishi* and *Eco Swiss*, the doctrine has been implemented to varying extents in different jurisdictions. As mentioned above, the judicial review regime regarding arbitral awards under relevant Chinese law is aimed to address public policy issues as well at the stage of award enforcement. It was further anchored in a latest revision draft of the China Arbitration Law 2021. This is equivalent to the second-look doctrine adopted in the EU and the USA. Apart from the statutory approaches, it remains to be seen whether the Chinese SPC, through Judicial Interpretations, could establish a more robust framework for its own second-look doctrine. It is sensible for the courts to strike a balance between the polices enshrined in the cases of *Mitsubishi, Eco Swiss, Shell*, and the mandatory requirement in favours of robust antitrust law.

**Recognition of arbitrability of antitrust disputes ≠ derogation of public policy**

The recognition of the arbitrability of antitrust disputes does not deviate from the nature of public policy. The US Supreme Court has stipulated that public policies shall not be grounds for prohibiting arbitration as an ADR settlement. The current legal regimes provide adequate safeguards for arbitrators to resolve a variety of claims, after all, it is the court that has the power to enforce arbitral awards. Arbitration clauses impose a duty on arbitrators to identify and apply the law in good faith. Arbitrators have a contractual duty to apply the law as courts would in good faith and to the best of their ability. As such, the inequality of economic power does not induce the inequality of legal subject status. It could be concerned that arbitrators may not hold contractual parties to standards of substantive law as the court does, which would reduce the expected value of an antitrust claim. Without the duty, arbitration would materially undermine the antitrust law’s

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166 *Eco Swiss* (n 14).
168 The China Arbitration Law (2021 Draft) art 82.
169 Theobald (n 53) 1059, 1089.
170 Sopata (n 43) 595, 617.
171 Guzman (n 154) 1279, 1334.
172 Scodro (n 19) 547, 607.
174 Mehra (n 106) 275, 284.
deterrent effect.175 Given the second-look doctrine embedded into the regime, arbitrators’ failure to satisfy their duties to apply the law in good faith would permit courts to overturn the resulting awards.176 The judicial review ensures that an arbitration award will not be contrary to public policy.

Concerns about SPC’s reasoning

The Chinese SPC in *Shell* held merely in an abstract way that a ‘public interest’ would be jeopardized if an antitrust dispute were to be arbitrable. An antitrust-related arbitral award rendered by a foreign arbitration institute is likely unenforceable in a Chinese court, on the grounds of either the public policy discourse, or the non-arbitrability as argued above.177 The hypothetical reasoning would be further complicated in a scenario where an arbitration involves Chinese parties but seated in a jurisdiction that allows arbitrability of antitrust issues. The New York Convention provides grounds to China, as a signatory State from 1986, for the merits of a case that may lead to the refusal of such enforcement.178 This provision is embodied in China’s Civil Procedure Law, which provides that a People’s Court shall issue an order to invalidate an award if the enforcement would be against the public policy.179 The Arbitration Law 2017 also provides that a court has the exclusive jurisdiction over setting aside an arbitral award.180 A Chinese People’s Court will nullify an arbitral award if the court finds *ex officio* that the award is contrary to the social public interest. In view of the above EU and the US practices, it can be inferred that rendering competition claims arbitrable may not necessarily involve elements that jeopardize a state’s public policy.181 Notably, neither Article V(2)(b) under the New York Convention nor the ruling of *Eco Swiss* clarifies public policy elements that trigger a national court to refuse the enforcement of an arbitral award.182 As such, the challenge may switch to redefining the ‘tipping point’ above which an arbitral award should be rejected. Furthermore, the foremost purpose behind antitrust law is deterrence,183 which is to deter those wrongdoers from causing damage not only to individual entities, but also to the society as a whole.184 Arbitration of monopolistic conducts does not affect the public interest by diminishing deterrence.185 Giving private parties the right to arbitrate to protect their own substantive rights lessens the government’s burden in enforcing antitrust laws.186

175 Scodro (n 19) 547, 607
178 New York Convention art C(2).
179 The China Civil Procedure Law art 237.
180 The China Arbitration Law 2017 art 58.
181 New York Convention art C (2) (b).
184 Scodro (n 19) 547, 607.
185 Loureiro (n 45) 978, 1005.
Would the US/EU model be transplanted into China’s legal regime?

Major jurisdictions, like the USA and EU, have recognized the arbitrability of antimonopoly disputes, considering that refusal to recognize and enforce such arbitration awards may violate the principle of international comity.\(^{187}\) As discussed above, the arbitrability of antitrust issues has been recognized in the EU via the seminal judgment in *Eco Swiss*.\(^{188}\) The ruling in *Mitsubishi* not only confirms the competence of arbitration, but also foresees its indispensable role in the transnational business disputes resolution.\(^{189}\) The US Supreme Court interprets an arbitration clause expansively, allowing arbitrators to enforce federal antitrust law alongside judges.\(^{190}\) After all, the professionalism of arbitration is sufficient to handle antitrust issues properly.\(^{191}\) The landmark cases signal the start of a worldwide trend of recognizing the arbitrability of certain antitrust disputes.\(^{192}\) According to the New York Convention, Chinese courts shall recognize and enforce the arbitration awards in disputes over ‘contractual and non-contractual commercial relations’ in accordance with Chinese law.\(^{193}\) In 1987, the SPC promulgated the *Circular on Implementing the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards*. It defines ‘contractual and non-contractual commercial relations’ as relations encompassed in relevant Chinese law.\(^{194}\) In this *Circular*, an antimonopoly dispute is not excluded from the scope of arbitral awards that can be recognized and enforced in China.

On 2 July 2019, China signed the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil and Commercial Judgments in the 22nd Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.\(^{195}\) It stipulated that international civil and commercial judgments related to core cartel behaviours, such as price-fixing, will be recognized and enforced in China.\(^{196}\) However, both arbitration law and competition law were transplanted from western jurisdictions to China only a decade ago. Due to the relative lack of legislative and judicial parameters in this area, it may take longer for the Chinese People’s Court to reconsider the arbitrability of antitrust disputes. Like the US Supreme Court and the ECJ giving green light to antitrust arbitration, China may need to shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration.\(^{197}\) With China’s anticompetition framework being further developed, arbitration may be bound to be a preferable forum as an alternative to litigation. China may follow

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187 Theobald (n 53) 1059, 1089.
188 *Eco Swiss* (n 14).
189 Buxbaum (n 94) 219, 263.
191 Brewer (n 11) 91, 126.
192 Sopata (n 43) 595, 617.
197 *Mitsubishi Motors v Soler* (n 5) 638.
standards over antitrust issues during the judicial review of recognizing and enforcing arbitration awards. At stake is the need to strike a delicate balance, after all, any addition to the Arbitration Law’s narrowly circumscribed grounds for review would seem at odds with the legislative intent.198

Potential evolution of the arbitrability of antitrust disputes

Competition policies always evolve with the development of a specific jurisdiction’s legislation as well as its economy.199 The growth of Chinese cross-border transactions will be compromised if China insists that all antitrust disputes must be resolved in people’s courts,200 let alone the gap of technical expertise of lower court judges as well as the impartiality and judicial independence. The arbitrability of antitrust issues will help China fill the gap and integrate its framework into the internationally-established track.

People’s courts vis-à-vis arbitrators: an ‘elephant in the room’

In the context of trade war and plausible decoupling, it is essential to strategically resort to arbitration to settle disputes. Not doing so runs counter to the impartiality goal of China’s framework of dispute resolution. This is particularly sensible with key issues considered, such as independence and impartiality of China’s judges. In addition, some of China’s lower-court judges are not able to address complex antitrust arbitrability that requires technical expertise.

Furthermore, China’s judiciary is subject to a variety of controls that limit its ability to engage in independent decision-making.201 Local protectionism represents one of the principal problems facing its judicial systems. Although the Chinese Constitution provides that the courts are not subject to interference by administrative organs, local governments are able to exert undue influence on judges because the former control judicial budgets.202 Both the SPC and National People’s Congress need to conduct major structural reforms to combat the problem of local interference in the courts. Despite judicial independence as a key reform goal, China has taken limited steps to enhance the autonomy of China’s judges and courts. There is still a long way to go for China to have sensible shifts in institutional balances of power, so that judges’ independence, courts’ professionalism, and institutional legitimacy will be enhanced. However, arbitration remains largely independent from judicial and administrative interference, which is provided in Article 8 of the China Arbitration Law 2021 (Draft). It is essential to promote China’s position as an arbitration-friendly destination.

198 Scodro (n 19) 547, 607.
Multipronged approaches: the latest development

Given the general trend, like the USA and the EU’s approaches in recognition of arbitrability of antitrust disputes, China may change its stance in future towards the issue. On 2 January 2020, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) issued the Announcement of the SAMR to Seek Public Comments on the Revised Draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law (hereinafter referred to as SAMR Draft 2020). It is said that SAMR will be designated by the State Council to enforce the AML.203 The SAMR Draft remains silent on whether antitrust issues could be resolved by arbitration, yet neither does it preclude arbitrability. Despite the SPC’s Shell decision, this silence demonstrates that it is inappropriate for the SAMR to prohibit explicitly the arbitrability of antitrust issues. With the increased use of arbitration in cross-border transactions, it is imperative to interpret the resolution of anticompetition claims in a broadly framed arbitral framework.204 There is no need for the courts to deny ex ante the arbitrability of antitrust disputes.205 The SPC’s ruling in Shell v Huili confirms the court’s jurisdiction and seemingly draws a line for resolving antitrust disputes in commercial contracts containing arbitration agreements. It is, however, worth noting that China is not a common law jurisdiction. The SPC judgments are not legally binding on lower courts, although they play a similar role to precedents in that they tend to be followed by lower-level courts in practice.206 The arbitrability of antitrust claims and enforceability of relevant domestic and foreign arbitral awards are still subject to further clarification.

V. CONCLUSION

Arbitration plays a significant role in antitrust disputes with a particular regard to a public policy consideration. The Chinese SPC in Shell v Huili held that the antitrust disputes are not arbitrable and should be settled by courts or administrative authorities, despite Shell’s challenge of a court’s jurisdiction based on a pre-existing arbitration agreement. The SPC justifies its ruling on the ground that antitrust law is designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy. Paradoxically, such a ruling is untenable given the lack of adequate statutory basis. The AML 2008 and the Arbitration Law 2017 do not refer to resolving antimonopoly issues by arbitration, nor do they explicitly preclude the ADR. The SPC has seemingly addressed the inquiry concerning the arbitrability of competition claims in China. Nevertheless, this does not mean the end of the nexus between antitrust issues and arbitration in China. The SPC’s stance is in contrast to the USA and the EU, which have recognized the arbitrability of antitrust issues. The introduction of the ‘second-look doctrine’ ensures the efficient operation of a safeguard mechanism. In view of the evolution in the intersectional debate, the public nature of a given law is no longer regarded as the determinant of the arbitrability of antitrust disputes in major western jurisdictions.

Considering the pace of development and the ever-increasing inflow of cross-border investments, it is argued that China should change its stance and adopt

203 SAMR Draft 2020 art 11.
204 Bookman (n 6) 1119, 1196.
205 Sopata (n 43) 595, 617.
206 Wang (n 139) 96, 135.
practices that are consistent with other primary jurisdictions, such as the EU and the USA. This will also respond to the nature of interoperation of resolving transnational antitrust disputes. Arbitration is increasingly advocated by parties in cross-border transactions in China, and there should be leeway for competition issues falling within the purview of arbitration. It is worth exploring the possibility of whether there is room on the grounds of the public policy, particularly where the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned. Thus, the SPC should initiate a ground-breaking approach, launching a milestone Judicial Interpretation, which will facilitate integration of Chinese law reform into the global dispute resolution regimes.