SethHohwy_Doerig_comment_SUBMITTED[77].pdf (190.27 kB)
Predictive processing as an empirical theory for consciousness science
The theories of consciousness discussed by Doerig and colleagues tend to monolithically identify consciousness with some other phenomenon, process, or mechanism. But by treating consciousness as singular explanatory target, such theories will struggle to account for the diverse properties that conscious experiences exhibit. We propose that progress in consciousness science will best be achieved by elaborating systematic mappings between physical and biological mechanisms, and the functional and (crucially) phenomenological properties of consciousness. This means we need theories for consciousness science, perhaps more so than theories of consciousness. From this perspective, ‘predictive processing’ emerges as a highly promising candidate.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Journal
Cognitive NeuroscienceISSN
1758-8928Publisher
Taylor & FrancisExternal DOI
Issue
2Volume
12Page range
89-90Event location
EnglandDepartment affiliated with
- Informatics Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2021-09-21First Open Access (FOA) Date
2021-12-07First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2021-09-20Usage metrics
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