There has been a long-standing yet largely unreported intersection between video-gaming and violent extremism, spanning across jihadist, far-right, and other types of ideologies. Within this framework, until late, scant attention has been paid to the concept of “gamification”; i.e. the application of gaming and game-design principles within non-gaming environments. This paper contributes to this newly emerging area of study by exploring the theoretical underpinnings of gamification and applying these principles to a prominent empirical example: the Christchurch attack in New Zealand in 2019. With a particular focus on the (“setup,” “rule,” and “progression”) “mechanics” of gamification, this article explores two aspects. The first considers how the assailant (intentionally or otherwise) designed and constructed the game; undertaken through an empirical analysis of their manifesto, live-stream video, and original post on the imageboard 8chan (or Infinite Chan). This will be complimented by the second aspect which explores how the game was, in turn, “gamified” through audience reaction to and interaction on the original 8chan post. The article concludes by discussing whether the gamification of the Christchurch attack serves as a framework for future attacks.

Forming part of its wider counter-terrorism apparatus, the United Kingdom’s “Prevent duty” imposes a legal requirement on various sectors to show “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. Since its introduction in 2015, the duty has been subject to increasing empirical research, with a particular focus upon the education sector. There has been, however, a distinct lack of scholarly works that specifically explore the issue of far-right extremism within this context, reflected in the often-reluctant policy development in this area. This article directly addresses this gap in research by drawing upon the qualitative experiences of 39 respondents with responsibility for the implementation of the duty within various schools and colleges across Sussex. Thus, through an empirical exploration of the challenges and complexities attached to its enactment, this article is one of the first to offer insights into educators’ negotiations of the duty in relation to far-right extremism. Within the data, three themes were particularly dominant: the normalisation and mainstreaming of far-right narratives; the associated challenges with the implementation of Prevent duty on the ground within classrooms; and considerations around the effective enactment of the duty. The findings demonstrate that addressing far-right extremism within schools and colleges is predictably problematic and closely reflects developments in wider society. It is also argued here that although addressing far-right extremism needs urgent attention, there should be a concerted effort to avoid the same oversights experienced with previous attempts at Prevent-related counter-terrorism.

This article contributes to the growing literature on extremist and terrorist online ecologies and approaches to snapshotting these. It opens by measuring Twitter’s differential disruption of so-called “Islamic State” versus other jihadi parties to the Syria conflict, showing that while Twitter became increasingly inhospitable to IS in 2017 and 2018, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham retained strong communities on the platform during the same period. An analysis of the same groups’ Twitter out-linking activity has the twofold purpose of determining the reach of groups’ content by quantifying the number of platforms it was available on and analyzing the nature and functionalities of the online spaces out-linked to.

Since the introduction of the Prevent duty, there have been serious anxieties expressed concerning its potential to be discriminatory and counter-productive in nature. Further, various erroneous referrals have illuminated how oversights can vilify innocent people, including children. Through the analysis of empirical data collected within schools, colleges and other public sector organisations across Sussex, this article explores how some tasked with the duty’s implementation enact agency when attempting to alleviate these concerns. In this regard, this article is the first to apply a social capital framework to better understand the role played by informal relationships in respect to people’s duty to identify and refer those considered to be “at risk of radicalisation” or “being drawn into terrorism”. As Prevent is not evenly distributed across the county in terms of people’s confidence, knowledge, training and depth of awareness, some respondents were accessing wider informal support and guidance when required. The findings also indicate that those who engage in these informal relationships – both internally within schools/colleges and externally with public-sector agencies – speak of higher levels of confidence and less apprehension with the duty. Further, informal relationships appeared to have the potential to affect perceptions and actualities of erroneous referrals.

Jack Katz: Seductions, the Street and Emotion is comprised of six chapters from recognized authors in the field, who take up this important theorist’s work from a variety of perspectives. The text begins with Keith Hayward's interview with Katz in which he describes the personal and professional development of his ideas, work, and personal growth as a researcher. The subsequent chapters in this collection take up various aspects of Katz's work and discuss its current relevance to the discipline of criminology. Contributors Baggaley and Shon critically re-examine certain aspects of Katz's work initially discussed in his seminal offering, Seductions of Crime; while King and Maruna explore the unrecognized relevance of Katz's contributions, which they see almost as a bridge between academic criminology and the public. The final three chapters of this collection focus on current examples of violent extremism that has become all too normalized within the current contemporary landscape. Kaplan explores the journey of the doomed antihero, which leads to violence and self-destruction. Polizzi explores the relationship of violent domestic extreme from the phenomenology of righteous slaughter offered by Katz in Seductions of Crime, and Lakhani and Hardie-Bick discuss the ways in which excitement becomes a central motivating feature within the phenomenology of violent extremism. This book is a timely re-introduction to the work and life of one of criminology's more respected theorists, Jack Katz, to the next generation of thinkers in this field. For nearly 40 years, his work has offered an alternative philosophical perspective to study crime and criminal behavior that is not defined by quantitative method or approach.

This report seeks to contribute to public and policy debates on the value of social media disruption activity with respect to terrorist material. We look in particular at aggressive account and content takedown, with the aim of accurately measuring this activity and its impacts. Our findings challenge the notion that Twitter remains a conducive space for Islamic State (IS) accounts and communities to flourish, although IS continues to distribute propaganda through this channel. However, not all jihadists on Twitter are subject to the same high levels of disruption as IS, and we show that there is differential disruption taking place. IS’s and other jihadists’ online activity was never solely restricted to Twitter. Twitter is just one node in a wider jihadist social media ecology. We describe and discuss this, and supply some preliminary analysis of disruption trends in this area.

This article contributes to public and policy debates on the value of social media disruption activity with respect to terrorist material. In particular, it explores aggressive account and content takedown, with the aim of accurately measuring this activity and its impacts. The major emphasis of the analysis is the so-called Islamic State (IS) and disruption of their online activity, but a catchall “Other Jihadi” category is also utilized for comparison purposes. Our findings challenge the notion that Twitter remains a conducive space for pro-IS accounts and communities to flourish. However, not all jihadists on Twitter are subject to the same high levels of disruption as IS, and we show that there is differential disruption taking place. IS’s and other jihadists’ online activity was never solely restricted to Twitter; it is just one node in a wider jihadist social media ecology. This is described and some preliminary analysis of disruption trends in this area supplied too.

There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that there has been a determined effort by Al Qaeda, and more recently Islamic State, to recruit petty and street criminals into their networks. Despite this, and increasing global concern, there exists very little scholarly literature exploring this phenomenon, particularly empirically grounded. This article directly addresses this gap in research, and is one of the, if not the, first to present an analysis underpinned by qualitative empirical interview data, collected from former extremists and active grassroots workers in the United Kingdom. The article determines that through religious and social justifications offered to reduce moral concerns, extremists encourage criminals to continue, intensify, and diversify their criminality, with intentions to fund violent extremist activity, or to create social unrest within society. Rather than attempting to change behavior, this is about reconstructing criminals’ motivations; a consideration that has wider implications for counterterrorism policy and operations.

This article examines the implementation of the UK’s ‘Prevent Strategy’ for countering terrorist risks and threats. Informed by qualitative data, it critically assesses the perception and reception ‘on the ground’ of Prevent Strategy policies amongst those individuals who are, in many ways, the focus of such interventions. It is found that there are a number of grievances held, though three are of particular concern and revolve around funding issues, confusion of the overarching aims of the strategy, and suspicions of intelligence gathering and spying within Muslim communities.