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A Philosophy of Home: 
A study on an alternative experience of domesticity

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Abstract

The major objective of this thesis is to provide an alternative to the predominant model of the Western urban home, arguing that it is more detrimental than beneficial to its inhabitants.

In order to achieve this, it first explores the development of home through a genealogical analysis. It then considers the concepts with which it is traditionally connected, such as those of identity, safety, privacy and satisfaction, supporting that the idealised home hides numerous issues of concern (e.g. class and sex inequalities, physical and psychological violence). In order to form a more comprehensive picture, the thesis draws on different philosophical approaches discussing the idea of home, while it explores a variety of contemporary habitation and home-making practices (e.g. smart and second homes, new technologies inside the house, home and consumerism).

The normative and overly-idealised domestic model, promoted in Western urban societies, is presented as detrimental both on a personal and on a social level. Therefore, alternatives are explored in Adorno’s ‘Hotel Room’, Jameson’s ‘Dirty Realism’ and Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘Nomadology’. The lack of viability characterising the abovementioned proposals leads to the examination of the Deleuzoguattarian concept of the Body without Organs; the home as a BwO provides the contemporary agents with the tools to reconstruct an autonomous space where they can recreate their personal discourse and influence the social ground accordingly.

Through the analysis of home this thesis explores how and why it has been appropriated by systemic forces and highlights a very serious issue: the fact that our personal space is no longer personal. Simultaneously, a common concern of feminist and post-structuralist background is addressed regarding the process of self-redefinition and the ways to approach it. The response entails a reconstructed autonomous home with a respective influence on the public sphere.
To my father
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Introduction: Home and Self

The present thesis is an analysis of home as an institution and an idea. It explores the domestic environment in which urban Western inhabitants have resided from the early days of urban life, and the ways that it influences and has been influenced by the social sphere. The thesis also examines the philosophical theories that have discussed the meaning of home and its importance for their respective eras. Different contemporary habitation patterns are scrutinised, to investigate whether the modern home can provide a shelter for individuals who wish to be actively and creatively involved in the social ground and whose discourse presents an alternative to the predominant one. In other words, the thesis probes into the capacity of home to become a creative, rather than a productive/reproductive space, one that promotes difference on a personal and social level.

At the core of this argument lies the idea that individuation is of vital importance to the creative social agents. This suggestion constitutes the driving force of this analysis regarding the capacity of the home to support the need for individuation. The answer to this question entails a multileveled approach to domesticity that will consider the human habitat as a complex establishment of personal and social worth. The scrutiny of home as a dynamic concept, will lead to the conclusion that today home is by no means a place that can uphold the individuation needs of the contemporary social agent, and the most prominent philosophical alternatives to the popular conception of domesticity will be examined. Finally, the re-appropriation of the domestic sphere will be proposed, as the main prerequisite of any activity which challenges the existing status quo.

The study will focus on the ideas of domesticity predominant in most western urban societies. While this habitation model is acknowledged as merely one amongst many around the world, this has been selected as the one most influenced by late capitalism and one globally idealised today. Since the concept is multifarious, appreciated differently by different individuals and socio-cultural groups, the study will primarily scrutinise the ideal of domesticity promoted in a western background, to obtain a more standardised version of the concept. In order to avoid oversimplification, home will be analysed from a genealogical perspective, as a
concept and an establishment of social and personal value, as the central idea of philosophical debates concerning its position in the private/public axis and as a postmodern institution implicated in several contemporary social and psychological issues.

Since the thesis is dealing with an institution which, while being private, it very much interacts with the public ground, it is important to refer to the interplay between agency and structure and how this is related with the domestic environment. Accordingly, the idea of the self will be explored through the individualist and collectivist perspective, primarily as an introduction to the parallelism of the home and the self. At the same time, this discussion will pave the way to the basic question of the thesis, which probes into the argumentation in terms of the location of home on the private/public axis.

Traditionally, individualism and collectivism are perceived not only as descriptive but also as constructive ideas, considered to be ontologically contradictory (Montuori and Purser 2000). Individualism, and specifically moral individualism, is the most traditional approach to the notion of the autonomous self, perceived as an asocial, single unit often found in absolute opposition to the communal practices that fail to foster one’s desires and personal well-being (Waterman 1981). In this regard, the home can be perceived as an institution removed from the public ground, capable of contradicting the social discourse and the power of the public over the individual. While moral individualism includes one of the ideas that the thesis will consider in terms of the domestic space – the thought of a home facilitating the agent’s disconnection from the structure – it fails to acknowledge the complexity of an establishment indubitably located in, and influenced by the social ground.

Although, there is common ground among the different strands of individualism, each of them focuses on a different aspect of the same thing, namely the agency. Expressivity individualism for example, underlies the creative side of a self that is dynamic but has been criticised for being distant and apolitical (Delanty 2003, p. 97). Likewise, the doctrine of the autonomous self considers the agent as a self-sufficient subject that negates social compromise and is connected with others in an open, social relationship. In a similar view, the principle of individuation as conceived by Giddens is based on the idea that subjects can regulate and control life and thus
shape it according to their will. Finally, collective individualism acknowledges the self as socially embedded, ‘rooted in a collective self’ (Delanty 2003, p. 97). Regardless of their divergent focal points, these doctrines are equally convinced of the agent’s centrality in human civilisation.

On the opposite side, the collectivist approach offers its own interpretation of the constitution and the maintenance of self and identity, shifting the focus to the social connections of the individual, supporting that the individual is embedded in the social collective through a relationship vital for one’s very existence (Dollinger et al. 1996; Montuori and Purser 2000; Waterman 1981). The goals and benefits of the collective in this case are perceived as substantially more important than those of the unit; hence, collective prosperity and social cohesion are deemed more significant than individual well-being (Gitlin 1995). As expected, this doctrine challenges individualism as a set of principles that jeopardise the community (Delanty 2003, p.92), while its supporters believe that by endorsing the principles of individualism one becomes a self-centred, self-serving person, who follows a course that, according to Slater (1976), turns the social whole into ‘a jungle of competitive egos’ (Waterman 1981, p. 762).

As a response to this conceptual impasse, contemporary scholars have urged that we discard this simplistic, disjunctive approach and reappraise the notion of the self as a composition of both individualistic and collectivist principles – which is the idea that the present thesis aims to explore regarding the domestic establishment (Bellah et al. 1985; Goncalo and Staw 2006; Montuori and Pusher 2000; Udehn 2002; Waterman 1981;). According to this third way of self theory, the subject, while being a single unit with unique traits that should be fostered and supported through the protection of his/her autonomy, cannot lead a life without social interaction and is in need of such contact as much as he/she is in need of individuation (Montuori and Purser 2000).

This perspective complements the debate by introducing the idea that the subject is born in an existing discourse and is thus already influenced by the social and cultural networks before understanding and critically assessing his/her environment. Furthermore, as Montuori and Pusher (2000) argue, the socially constructed dichotomy of autonomy and dependence, resulting from the opposition between
individualism and collectivism, is dissolved once the autonomous self is seen as actualised through his/her dependence on the natural, social and cultural environment. In this regard, one’s choices, actions and thoughts are realised according to the provisions and limitations of one’s own environment (Montuori and Pusher 2000). The interdependent relationship of the individual and the domestic environment is highlighted and is explored as an important element that will inform the thesis.

In the light of the third way approach, the debate has surpassed the limits of conceptual research and has reached the field of organisational behaviour, providing examples of the practical implementation of ideas originating from both sides. Although these studies focus on the optimisation of matters related to productivity and communication in an organisational framework, they have offered valuable insight regarding creative individualism, which is the place where the thesis aims to locate home in its role as a shelter of the contemporary creative agent.

A noteworthy study on creative individualism was inspired from the shift towards collectivism that occurred in several organisations, since they perceived that such values would enhance employees’ communication and productivity. However, after conducting empirical research, the authors concluded that in order to foster creativity the values of individualism had to be favoured inside the collective (Goncalo and Staw 2006, p. 105). Their findings came closer to the theoretical perspective of the third way, indicating that while a sense of group connectivity should be promoted, the failure to support the individual requirements of the group members hinders creativity and innovation (Goncalo and Staw 2006) two elements which are regarded as extremely important in certain organisational areas, and as it will be argued, in society per se.

A self that remains empowered, creative and autonomous, while being capable of genuine social interaction, seems indeed the point that has been overlooked in the polarised conceptualisation of the notion. On these grounds, one cannot fail to notice that such a person would be capable of fostering not only individual creativity but also social creativity, a term that might sound paradoxical on its own right (Montuori and Pusher 2000), yet one that the present thesis hopes to prove not only valid but also essential. For that reason, the research will unfold within
the framework of this third-way theorisation, in an attempt to investigate the ways and the extent by which the domestic environment today can be regarded as an institution which informing and informed by both the individual and the social ground.

By taking into consideration the vast literature available in the fields of psychology, philosophy and the social sciences, this study deems the interconnectedness and interdependency of agency and structure as a given and takes form in the context of the third way of the self-theory (Goncalo and Staw 2006; Joas 1998, p. 13; Montuori and Purser 2000; Udehn 2002). For this reason, the argumentation focuses on the analysis of the ways that the private and the public spheres influence the home and vice versa. For this reason, the philosophical theories that have been selected aim to provide deeper understanding of the aforementioned aspect by probing into the public/private role of the home.

The self as part of a whole

Adding to the already complex notion of the self, in postmodernity, the conceptualisation of selfhood is taken to an entirely different level. New theories have emerged, claiming that the unity of the self is an outdated concept; in its place, individuals are called to embrace the multiplicity of identities or else the rather decentralised human self (Sampson 1985, p. 121).

In this regard, contrary to the traditional appreciation of a centred ‘situated’ self, understood as a whole, the postmodern subject is now perceived as a polymorphous amalgamation of multiple selves (Frung 1999, pp. 92-3). In the field of psychoanalysis, one of the first scholars to explore the concept of the decentralised ego was Jacques Lacan, who contributed to the understanding of the decentralised self with the theory of the mirror stage (Bromberg 1996, p. 511), the fundamental process through which the child can grasp its physical existence1.

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1 For Lacan, while the child is able to perceive and experience its image as a unified whole, it simultaneously understands that it can only do so through the use of a medium outside an external medium (Frung 1999, p. 93); from which it derives that self-perception is largely formed according to the external responses to the self. Fragmentation of self-perception thus leads to the decentralisation of the self.
Another philosopher preoccupied with the decentredness of the self, Jean Francoise Lyotard, perceived the self as an integral part of the social whole, functioning as language and suggested that the collapse of the grand narratives in postmodernity had paved the way for the discursive fluidity and heterogeneity made available in our days (Haber 1994, p. 9). Accordingly, for Lyotard everything that applied to language did so to the self, since the latter is a territory of the former (Haber 1994, p.10). Ultimately, the self is nothing but ‘essentially fragmented, decentred, protean and incomplete’, just as postmodern discourse is (Haber 1994, p. 15).

Yet the postmodern condition engenders an additional difficulty regarding the implementation of the happy medium of individualism and collectivism. The mass culture and mass production, as the Frankfurt school and most poststructuralist theorists have pointed out, impinge upon the person’s distinctiveness, allowing space for a sense of fake individuation only to through the acquisition of commodities. The agent of a decentralised, fragmented identity (Joas 1998, pp. 10-11), the citizen of a competitive late-capitalist world, defined in terms of his/her belongings or else the principles of possessive individualism, is placed in a highly oxymorous situation, while the same applies to the postmodern home.

It is thus clear that the necessity to reform the self is part of the process of maturing and is a practice undertaken by those who realise that he/she depends on a language foreign to his/her self. As Caren Kaplan inquires, ‘how many people live today in a language that is not their own?’ (Kaplan 1987, p. 190). The answer to this question, as feminist theorists argue, is that anyone not belonging to the male, white, middle-class model is perceived as ‘difference’ in a pejorative way and is subjected to the normalising process that will help them reach the predominant model.

In this guise, the predominant male model is also under siege, since capitalism promotes models of individuality that are hard to reach for both men and women, thus inducing the sense of exclusion to anyone incapable of conforming to these models. It is on these grounds that this thesis aims to explore the existing model of home in its role as a normative institution that targets difference and imposes a sense of uniformity in home-making practices, thus not only excluding difference but also obstructing, if not prohibiting, the creative reformation of the self, according to one’s language of choice.
While the thesis is examining an institution that has preoccupied feminist studies it will not be heavily informed by feminist theory, since the focus is on the domestic environment in its capacity to shelter every social agent’s effort to creatively re-establish his/her own language. This however, is a common target of feminism with post-structuralism. Specifically, it is ‘not only the sense of a crisis in Logos, but also the need for renewed conceptual creativity and for politically informed cartographies of the present’ that both feminism and post-structural philosophies explore, in an attempt to ‘overthrow the pejorative, oppressive connotations that are built not only into the notion of difference, but also into the dialectics of Self and Other’ (Braidotti 2003, p.44). In this regard, the thesis also has a goal common to that of feminist studies, even if does not rely on feminist theory, as such.

A severe hindrance to the redefinition of the self is the unprecedented reliance on the logic of commodification, which is increasingly penetrating most interpersonal and social relationships. In Gilles Deleuze’s *Postscript on the Societies of Control*, for example, ‘man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt’ (1992, p. 6).

The man in debt is in a position of constant struggle to obtain material satisfaction, and thus the debt increases. Trapped in a vicious circle triggered by a general and indefinable sense of dissatisfaction, the subject resorts to consumption for the experience of an ephemeral sense of superficial pleasure. Zygmunt Bauman has repeatedly stressed that today we are not simply dealing with the Frankfurt School’s fears of mass production and consumption, but with a commodification that permeates the social fabric and becomes a prerequisite of personal and social existence (Bauman 2007).

Apparently, the dystopic expansion of the marketplace culminates in the adoption of the most problematic elements of both the individualist and the collectivist model. Social actors are currently required to adhere to both doctrines of self-theory, by following the rules and regulations of a collectivist society of consumption, governed by the marketplace, a sphere often acknowledged as the haven of individual opportunism. This polarised model of existence primarily entails the subject’s adherence to the trends of consumer ideology and by extension loyalty to the common goal of consumption and capital accumulation. Simultaneously, the self, devoid of authentic social interaction and active social involvement, influenced
by the individualistic values promoted in the marketplace, often endorsed by the latest cyberspace, hyper-reality trends experiences interpersonal relationships as faceless and frequently moral-less transactions.

In essence, what seems problematic today is the individual’s incapacity to disengage from the public sphere. While being constantly connected, one loses the right to disentangle from the predominant social discourse, remaining exposed to its influence. Devoid of any differentiating capacity, the individual is denied the right to dialectically formulate his/her own world views and uphold the duty to inform the social sphere with his/her dialectics; with no substantial counter-argument against the discourse of the public ground, agents are stripped off of their fundamental right to contradict forms of unfounded power.

It is within this framework that this thesis poses its main question, asking if the person, enmeshed in a contemporary reality that has adopted and continues to cultivate the worst of both words – individualistic opportunism and blind adherence to the collective identity of mass consumption – can be considered as an autonomous, empowered individual that can evolve through social interaction. In other words, the question is if and how individuals can protect their difference and creativity while interacting in a highly normative social environment.

The first answer that comes in mind is that one should secure both the time and the space demanded for the essential disentanglement from the public discourse. In this regard, one’s home could serve as the place where one can contemplate their experiential reality and alleviate the pressure of the social order. As several social theorists support, including Giddens, the disengagement from the public ground is an essential process that individuals should undertake so as to operate as a social being and achieve existential equilibrium (Giddens 1984). In addition, the perspective of creative individualism maintains that such attempts foster self-redefinition through the reappraisal of one’s relationships with people, ideas and objects. As it will be argued, this is one of the inherent aspects of habitation challenged in our days, but one that needs to be reclaimed for the benefit of the subject and society as a whole.

Without implying that home is the only environment that could support this process, this study will explore how the domestic sphere can respond to such a need, thus providing a counter-suggestion against a normative habitat that facilitates the
propagation of the social discourse. Interestingly, and although the self has often been
presented as a notion intertwined with the domestic environment, the role of the
habitat as an intermediary between agency and structure, will be given the value it
deserves.

Chapter outline and methodology

In order to explore the developments of the domestic sphere as an institution and an
idea, the thesis will study its course, from the first days of Western urbanisation, in
antiquity (Ancient Greece, Rome and the Byzantine Empire). The structure of the
home, the intradomestic relationships as well as its role in the social ground will be
analysed, and its connection with three social binaries (men-women, owners-non-
owners, belongers-non-belongers) will be revealed. The second chapter, scrutinising
the Medieval and Early Modern as well as Modern West, will follow the development
of the matters examined in the Ancient Greek milieu and will conclude with the
reasons for which the idealisation of home occurred. While the first two chapters are
considering the changes occurring in and in relation to the domestic sphere, from the
time of antiquity until modernity, they are not limited to a historical analysis, but they
attempt to unveil the forces laying behind those changes and the actual reasons for
which these occurred.

Following a genealogical approach to the study of domesticity, the study hopes
to challenge history, not so much with regards to its truthfulness, but mostly in terms
of its possible alternative readings, since events, problems and situations are
considered anew and are thus redefined as unresolved matters (Deleuze and Foucault
1977). Therefore, by following the Nietzschean-Foucauldian paradigm of genealogical
analysis, the first two chapters, besides introducing the concept of home to the
reader, aim at three distinct objectives. The first is to identify the origins of the specific
concept along with the transformations of its role and meaning, as these have become
evident from the first days of western society until today. This is expected to prove
that home did not have one single, but several points of origin across history, and that
through its development new definitions continue to emerge. The second objective is
to explore ‘the value of a value’ (Foucault 1995), in other words to understand the
reasons for which domestic existence has become synonymous with civilised existence, normality and morality. The last objective is to challenge the predominance of domesticity of home, especially as this is experienced in the western parts of the world.

In the third and the fourth chapter, the thesis considers home as an ideal supported by contemporary social discourse, from the individual and social perspective respectively. Having explored how home was transformed from a space of sustenance and shelter to a place entwined with psychological and social determinants, these chapters will study the literature documenting the idealisation of the domestic sphere today, and will attempt to juxtapose the ideal with the real. In each of these four chapters, the philosophical discussions on the home as a private or public space will be deployed, to deepen our understanding of home for each respective era.

Chapter five furthermore considers how the postmodern milieu, late capitalism and techno culture, influence home as a space of individual and social interaction, while innovative forms of habitation will be studied, together with their effects on the entire concept of domesticity. New home-making practices will also be explored, so that the dangers and limitations of contemporary habitation will be highlighted, on both a personal and a social basis. The sixth chapter will therefore deploy the philosophical theories that respond to the above-mentioned threats and will discuss their strengths and weaknesses, concluding that the home needs to be turned into a Body without Organs, to become the space of which the intradomestic relations and home-making practices will facilitate the individual to develop his/her own understanding of existing reality. Home will finally be proposed as a tool that can help the social actor experience life outside the dictums of the predominant social ground, by creating his/her unique discourse and, by influencing the social sphere through a discursive relationship in which he/she will voluntarily be involved.
Chapter One

Ancient Greece, the Roman and Byzantine Empires

The first of the two chapters, exploring the course of the domestic establishment through time, covers the periods of Ancient Greece, the Roman and the Byzantine Empires. It follows the developments which influenced the household together with the areas that it influenced, observing the interplay between the home, as structure and idea, and the social ground in which it was situated.

Beginning the analysis at the dawn of western urban civilization, the chapter sheds light on the idealisation of home, with the advent of the Classical Greek oikia. It further scrutinizes its role in the Ancient Greek society and its relationship with the city-state. Aristotle’s approach to the household is deployed so that a deeper understanding of the private-public interplay with the domestic sphere will be achieved. Furthermore, the household of antiquity will be studied in its relation with three significant binaries, the free man-slave, the man-woman and the rich-poor; which preoccupy the research not only until the end of the chapter but throughout the entire thesis.

Following the analysis of the Ancient Greek household the chapter continues with the examination of the Roman household, which presents several significant changes that follow the spirit of grandeur prevalent in the specific era, while the home in the time of the Byzantine Empire follows, as an institution guided by the Christian religion. As a continuation of the philosophical approach commencing from Aristotle, the chapter studies the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Just as Aristotle, for his own era, and the philosophers chosen in the following chapters, Aquinas is one of the few philosophers who not only dealt with the household and the issues with which it was correlated, but he also focused on its location on the private/public axis, one of the main issues of concern for the present study.
Ancient Greece
Pre-history

While the basic needs for shelter and security had already preoccupied our Western ancestors, it was not until the Mesolithic period that ancient Greeks attempted to form the first permanent settlements and not before the Neolithic age that the need for permanent habitation was further established (Theocharis 1973). Settlements in the area, dating from the Neolithic age, were surrounded by ditches or stone enclosures, in order to determine or protect their boundaries, thus indicating that the desire for permanence was added to that of sustenance (Theocharis 1973). During the Early Bronze period, the number of these settlements increased because of the Greek population’s growth and from that very early stage of western history, signs of infrastructure, such as roads and pathways, could be distinguished (Foundation of the Hellenic World n.d. a.) Three types of town planning have been identified and examined in the settlements to date: the irregular or extensional, the linear and the one occurring around a common centre, the most common of which is the first, due the population growth influencing the settlement structure of the era.

The first houses were mere huts, covering a ground of 30 to 50 square meters, consisting of a single room including hearths and kilns for cooking as well as stone benches for sleeping and food preparation (Foundation of the Hellenic World n.d. a). Regardless of the embryonic urban development that most settlements presented, the Minoan settlements of the time were significantly more advanced, and can be perceived as the first European attempt of urban and social segregation. In the Middle Minoan II period (2000-1550 BC), sophisticated habitation patterns provided a system of classification according to which the social status of the household would be projected through the habitat. Respectively, the palaces that appeared for the first time in Europe and other, smaller but still luxurious, establishments found in the area – the villas where the aristocracy resided – became the symbols of power and social division.

Yet, in the Geometric period, despite the classification evident in similar ancient settlements, the majority of the houses presented similar features, as they were commonly built with mud bricks on top of a stone foundation (Foundation of the
Hellenic World n.d.b). Over time, the ancient Greeks’ preference for permanent habitation was intensified. Although not as common as in the following periods, settling down emerged as a practice that increased the inhabitant’s sense of security through a safer and more sustainable style of communal living. Hence, while in the Geometric period, the formation of permanent settlements did not exclude temporary habitation, permanence was becoming increasingly popular and sought-after. Domestic structures and permanent buildings were understood as more long lasting and indeed most of the cities that have survived until today, like Athens, Argos and Knossos, did so precisely because of their concrete structure (Foundation of the Hellenic World n.d.c).

At this point, it is important to note that the household in the Geometric Period was gradually obtaining additional roles as it was the basic social, habitation and economic unit of the time. Its nucleus consisted of at least three generations of one family. In this regard, the successful household of the era would be entirely self-sufficient, in other words it would produce as much as necessary to support its inhabitants. Therefore, the more members a household counted the more important it was regarded; for this reason, inhabitants who were not part of the immediate family were also included, such as slaves, adopted members as well as friends and associates attached to the head of the family (Foundation of the Hellenic World n.d.d).

Permanent dwellings lead to the formation of cities and villages, constituting the point of the citizenship’s assembly, while the role of home stretched beyond the satisfaction of tangible needs. In the Archaic period, just before Classical Greece, the household becomes synonymous with the genos (the extended family) and is acknowledged as an institution associated with kinship and shared social, religious and political activities (Westgate 2007, p. 231). Although each family, and subsequently each household, had its own leader, rites and customs, families were connected through their common participation in worship and religion (Foundation of the Hellenic World n.d.e).
The Classical Greek *oikia*

During the Classical period (5th and 4th centuries B.C.), the household reached the zenith of its ancient course, one that rigidified its archaic role as a ground of family relations, religious involvement and leisure activities. The changes in people’s understanding of home, which will be thoroughly analysed below, were accompanied by the transformation of the one-room shelter – in or around which all domestic activities took place – into the courtyard house, the most common form of habitat during that era. With its own outdoor area, it consisted of more than one room, possibly two or three, each of which served a different purpose (Ault 2007, p. 260; Westgate 2007, p. 231). By the end of the 5th century B.C., the domestic space had increased from 55 square meters to 230, while tiled roofs and second storeys had already become common and in this regard, the physical structure of the house had already changed to an unprecedented degree (Ault 2007, p. 260).

![Image 1](image.png)

**Image 1:** Ground plan of three 5th & 4th century Classical dwellings on the side of the Areopagos hill (Camp 1992, p. 148).

The law of the *oikos*

The *oikos* was the basic productive unit of the Athenian *polis*, and one of great importance. It was owned by the male adult of the family, granted by the city – in the case of an *apoikia* (a settlement), or in that of land redistribution. Another way of owning land in Ancient Greece was that the family had obtained this land from time
immemorial and was therefore protected by community law, passing from one
generation to the next, through the male inheritors of the family (Cooper 1978, p.
162). There were different ways that the family estate would pass from one
generation to another, yet the most predominant one was that it was inherited by the
sons of the family, either divided or in its entirety. This is the primary reason for which
the male leaders of the family were always alert regarding their wife’s loyalty. If the
family did not have any male heirs, the oikos could be passed on to a grandson,
through the family’s daughter (p. 165). Additionally, it was not uncommon for a man
to adopt a son, so that the latter would become an heir although he would have to
give up any claims of inheritance from his own family (p. 165).

Practices relevant with family life, such as marriage, inheritance, divorce and
intrafamilial relationships were also governed by strict Athenian laws. The household
leader, the kyrios, had legal control and guardianship over his dependents, namely his
wife, minor sons and unmarried daughters (Phillips 2013, p. 138). A son became kyrios
when he reached adulthood and through marriage he became the kyrios of his wife;
the latter was never legally independent for she was always under the guardianship
of a kyrios (p. 138). A woman’s kyrios in the natal line was her father; when married it
was her husband and if the latter died she would be appointed a new guardian, who
could either be her father, or her brother (p. 138). Interestingly, a husband could
marry his wife off to another husband, while being alive or, by testament, after his
death (p. 139). It thus obvious that the law, and, as it will be also shown below the
social discourse of the era, considered women as passive individuals with very limited,
if any, control over their life and well-being.

Another important issue under the Archaic and Classical Athenian law and was
the wife’s dowry, which was transferred to the guardianship of the kyrios through
marriage, so that he could use it as profitable capital (Phillips 2013, p. 139). Almost all
Athenian brides were ‘accompanied’ with a dowry from their natal line kyrios, even if
the latter had to seek assistance from a third party to fulfil this obligation (p. 140). If a
marriage was terminated (most commonly because the wife would be seen with a
seducer, or if the marriage had been conducted between a citizen and a non-citizen)
the husband was obliged to repay the dowry to his wife’s kyrios in the natal line.
However, if the wife had died and had already given birth to a son, the dowry
remained in the household (p. 140). Interestingly the dowry remained a custom that lived on until modern Greece and is still criticised as a custom alluding to practices of women’s subjugation.

Finally yet importantly, another subject of paramount importance, regulated by the Athenian legislation, was that of citizenship. Citizenship is intertwined both with the law and the meaning of the oikos, since, just as property, it too was passed on from one generation to the next. First, it is important to note that only legitimate children – certified as products of a marriage – were eligible for Athenian citizenship (Phillips 2013, p. 175). Only by being an Athenian citizen, would a man obtain the right to own property in Attika, as well as participate in the city Council, the Assembly, and be eligible for political office and jury service (p. 176). It is thus obvious that the legal status of an oikos and the family to which it belonged was of paramount importance and had numerous repercussions, both on an individual and a communal level.

The meaning of the oikos

The fact that the domestic establishment was protected by minor deities, such as the goddess of Hestia, whose worship took place on a daily basis, indicates that the classical Greek home was of major significance to its members (Robinson 1933, p. 141). Simultaneously, such religious activity turned the home into a space in which spiritual connections were reinforced. Furthermore, the home was protected by Zeus Ktesios (Zeus with his power to protect the property) and Zeus Herkleios (Zeus with his power to guard the boundaries) (p. 140). Zeus Xeinos, the protector of strangers, was another form of Zeus associated with the household, who was honoured every time the household leader welcomed strangers in need of shelter (O’ Gorman 2007, p. 19). In this regard, philoxenia was a way for the Athenians to honour the God of

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2 The process through which a child was legitimised was very specific; the father, nine days after a child’s birth would hold a naming ceremony; later on, the child would be presented to the father’s phratry. In the case of a son, the latter was presented to be enrolled; daughters, if presented, were not eligible for enrolment as they were not eligible for citizenship. On his eighteenth birthday, the son would be presented to the father’s deme – a kind of municipality – to go through a test (dokimasia) by the Council of 500 – the parliament of Athens – and enrol as an Athenian citizen.

3 The word philoxenia (φιλοξενία) derives from the words philos and xenos, which in Greek stand for friend and stranger, and it means hospitality.
Gods, Zeus, while it was also a practice promoted by human law⁴ (O’ Gorman 2007, p. 19). The deities that protected the ancient Greek household represent the aspects of domesticity perceived as most important at the time, home as a property, as a delimited area of certain boundaries and as a shelter that should be shared when necessary.

It is thus clear that the Ancient Greeks were well aware of the particularities of the domestic establishment, especially with regard to its nature as a private space. However, while they did realise the tension between the home and the public ground, they did not consider the private and the public as two fields of contradictive activity. With this interconnectedness in mind, people’s view of the private sphere can be seen as interlaced with the transition of Athens into a direct democracy and the fact that the household was at that point perceived as an autonomous unit of production which prepares its members for their civil duties (Westgate 2007, p. 234). Finally, the idea that despite of their in-between tension, the oikos and the polis were not considered as mutually exclusive is also supported by the fact that the polis not only recognized individual interests, but also promoted the legislation that would protect the private realm from the intrusions of the public ground⁵.

Although, the private sphere was of little interest to men, with vital civic duties to attend to, the household was acknowledged as an important part of the city life, since it was the basic unit of production, while it was also the space of leisure (Foundation of the Hellenic World n.d.f). For the male adults the most common form of domestic entertainment was the symposium, a drinking party with activities such as singing, playing the lyre, competitions of impromptu verses compositions, word games and riddles. As part of the male population’s everyday life, often enough the symposia would lead to important philosophical and political conversations (Garland 1998, pp. 91-101). In this light, it could be suggested that ‘while the indoor man was regarded as a churl’ (Robinson 1933, p. 71), indoor activities such as the symposia, which brought the conversations of the public ground indoors, were of vital

⁴ Hospitality was considered an act of virtue, and was followed by a ceremony it was provided to every stranger, irrespective of the class they belonged. The stranger could stay in a special room called 'hostel'. Hospitality was an important social force because it could link people of any class, even ordinary citizens with kings.
⁵ The domestic space was protected by its legal status as an inviolable and sacred space.
importance to the social sphere, regardless of the fact that they occurred inside the domestic space.

The oikos was also connected with another area of importance for the Ancient Athenian community, namely the raising of children. Male children were engaged in outdoor activities mainly relevant to their education. In the first stages they would learn reading, writing and mathematics, and later literature, poetry and music, while they were also training for political and military leadership, gymnastic competitions and verbal contests (D’ Angour 2013, p. 294). Female children obtained a similar education, although the emphasis was shifted towards dancing, gymnastics and music (Cartwright2016). Therefore, while male children were being prepared for their life in the public sphere, female children were being prepared for their domestic duties, and predominately family rearing.

A great part of children’s lives was taking place in their homes, and their correct upbringing was considered integral to the well-being of both the city and the household. Accordingly, while children’s education and training was considered much more important than their leisure occupations, the fact that they were deemed as the future of the city-state added value to their intradomestic activities. Plato, Aristotle’s teacher, was one of the first philosophers to analyse the importance of children’s play, considering it as part of their upbringing and their culture, thus linking the private and the public through an interesting connection, as he argued that through the regulation of children’s play specific adult behaviours can be fostered or discouraged (p. 299).

Regarding the organisation of the household, it must be noted that it was strict and hierarchical, often perceived as the paradigm that the city should follow, since it promoted the values of philia (friendship) and autarky (self-sufficiency), both significantly valued by the city-state. Furthermore, the relationships formed between the household members, were held quite highly by many city leaders, due to their non-economic nature and their common purpose, which was the promotion of the establishment’s prosperity and the well-being of its master (Booth 1994, p. 211). This imagined community was therefore bound by a sense of philia that safeguarded its values, goals and accomplishments, and the household was the space and shelter of their common activities and interests (Booth 1994, p. 217). Athenians believed that
the same sense of *philia*, connecting the household members, was extended to the city’s inhabitants, which legitimised their weariness towards the non-citizens and anyone incapable of understanding and upholding the common purposes of the city’s inhabitants.

Regarding *autarky*, it should be once again highlighted that in Classical Athens the political, religious and moral integrity were prioritised against wealth (Booth 1994, p.215). Yet in order to achieve *autarky*, this much-admired trait of the domestic sphere that city leaders hoped to secure for their towns, the establishment (private or public) had to be financially independent, and to achieve this independence, it had to be prosperous. Thus, while Athenians were supposedly indifferent to wealth, they were unsympathetic to people or cities under poverty’s lash and harsh towards anyone obliged to surrender unconditionally to the sovereignty of the powerful other, whether that would be another individual, a master, or another city (Booth 1994, p. 221). To conclude, while financial well-being was not idealised, wealth was considered an important prerequisite of self-sufficiency and a basis upon which the ideal form of any Athenian establishment would be founded upon.

What most landowners deemed as unthinkable was having their land taken away. While land alienation was against the law until the late 5th century, if one could prove misfortune he was eligible to sell his land (Cooper 1978, p. 167). In this regard, Hesiod advised his contemporaries: ‘avoid falling into the misfortune of having to give up your *kleros*; rather, be in a position to make an offer for the *kleros* of someone else, who is forced to let it go for some reason’ (Cooper 1978, p. 167), thus insinuating the significance of *autarky* for his era.

It is thus reasonable that the habitat was perceived as a notion connected to the era’s idea of morality and citizenship. In this regard, what needs to be taken into consideration is that power was associated with outstanding moral or religious behaviour, rather than wealth (Westgate 2007, p. 230). As a result, while there was little need for the display of one’s riches, the demonstration of moral integrity was mandatory. Therefore, while homes did become more luxurious after the golden age of Pericles, in the 5th century B.C., they were still characterised by extreme simplicity (Robinson 1933, p.71). As Herakledes, a commentator of the time exclaimed: ‘Most of
the houses are mean, the pleasant ones few. A stranger would doubt, on first
acquaintance, that this was really the renowned city of Athens’ (Garland 1998, p. 83).

Apart from the fact that the building materials used in house constructions
were rather rudimentary (Westgate 2007, p. 236), the simplicity of the domestic
establishment can be mainly attributed to the fact that modesty was perceived as an
ideal that every exemplary citizen should uphold. This idea was rigidified in the late 5th
century B.C., when high white walls arose in the perimeter of the house, hiding the
dwelling behind them (Westgate 2007, p. 236). This practice, of a twofold importance,
would prove the household leader’s sense of moral duty, by keeping his female
relatives out of sight, while simultaneously it would contribute to the elimination of
distinctions between the houses of the rich and those of the poor. Hence, by physically
implementing Demosthenes’ ideal of homes that they are ‘no more splendid than
those of our neighbours’, a social background that attempted to resist stratification
was being established (p. 239).

While looking into the homed world of ancient Greece has provided important
information regarding the definition of the concept and its relation to the public
ground, it would be equally enlightening to examine how the non-homed of the era
organised their lives, and how such individuals were received by the public. Regardless
of the efficient infrastructure for the time, travelling was mainly considered to be a
burden, but the rather popular idea of the planomenon, of the thing that wanders
(πλανασθαι), suggests that individuals would not only travel from one point to
another, but they would also wander without any specific destination in mind
(Montiglio 2000, p. 86).

In fact, the adventures of wandering heroes, those of Odysseus and Heracles
for example, excited the imagination of the Greeks, even if, wandering was never
perceived as an entirely advantageous activity (Garland 1998, p. 205). Respectively,
wanderers were commonly regarded as unclassifiable and therefore as deceivers,
since their contemporaries were unable to certify their origin or identity (Montiglio
2000, p. 87). Moreover, wandering was always associated with pain and suffering,
since, famous wanderers were often condemned to a life without stability and
security, obliged to dwell in agony away from their homeland (p. 87).
At the same time, however, wandering was also intertwined with another notion, which was more favoured by the Athenians. What made wandering more appealing to the contemporaries of Socrates and Solon was that through the pains of that exact process, knowledge and wisdom would be conquered, making wandering more acceptable, if not even admired. When Solon, for instance, visited the court of Croesus, the king of Lydia, he admired the valuable knowledge and experiences he had obtained though his journeys (Montiglio 2000, p. 84). Although such examples could not guarantee a broader acceptance of wandering, they did enhance its reputation as an activity of those seeking knowledge and truth.

Aristotle (384 BC-322BC)

As it is obvious from the analysis of one of the first domesticated communities in the early stages of western civilisation, importance was placed on the constitution of the state and its well-being, whereas individuals and their private sphere were predominantly valorised as the basic ‘ingredients’ of the city-state. In this regard, home was understood as a household, in other words, as a productive-economic unit, rather than a space of private and familiar interaction. Regardless of the fact that the area of interest and the one of crucial gravity was that of the public space, the oikia was still deemed as a vital part of the city-state. This rather interesting relationship of the household with the private and the public spheres will be, at this point, further clarified through Aristotle’s philosophy of Political Naturalism, developed in his Politics (4th century B.C.).

In Book I of Politics, Aristotle explains that every form of human communication and collaborative activity constitutes a kind of partnership, which necessarily seeks the satisfaction of these partners’ benefit (p. 3). People, he argues, get and stay together to ensure that their daily needs are met and thus families, villages and the city-state are formed. In this theorisation lies the reason why Aristotle is defined as a Political Naturalist, since he considers man to be a political animal, in other words a being whose community and thus all forms of socialisation are necessary for his development. Accordingly, a ‘cityless’ man, as he specifically maintains, ‘is either low in the scale of humanity or above it’ (p. 9 & p. 11). By conceiving human society as the natural creation of the human political animal,
Aristotle strengthens the prevalent convictions of his era, which perceived wandering individuals either as wise philosophers or as outlaws struggling to survive away from their homelands. Hence, the very first ideal that can be extracted from his discourse is the one which perceives the home-less, and in turn city-less man, to be either positively or negatively extraordinary.

Aristotle, while acknowledging the natural origins of the relationships that form the human habitat, he devalues the notion of the private sphere, in his attempt to stress the importance that the democratic city held for his era. Even so, he could not deny the contribution of the oikos to the polis or their common characteristics when seen as organisational systems that support the well-being of their members. Therefore, throughout his theorisation he draws direct links between the methods of household and city maintenance and management, thus setting explicit indicators that normalise expectations in each filed.

In terms of the domestic sphere, Aristotle presents the perfect household as a system consisting of slaves and free men, thus excluding from the definition of a proper household any other arrangements of habitation. Slaves were considered as an integral part of the domestic space, and more specifically, as the tools that the household needed to support its productive processes. Aristotle clearly propounds that the idea of production is integral to its definition, hence, the ideal household, the one constituted by free men and slaves, animals and land, is designated as an area of production, a self-sufficient unit, which facilitates the cultivation of land and the accumulation of food (para. 39). It is in a similar vein that, according to Aristotle, the city-state needs to safeguard and accumulate wealth, not so much as to confirm its financial superiority, but to safeguard its independence and remain free from the reign of foreign, barbaric states. The productive capacity of the household, in this sense, similar to that of the city-state, is highlighted as a route to its members’ sovereignty, autonomy and independence, elements inherent to the ancient Greeks’ understanding of well-being.

Another interesting element of the Aristotelian discourse is the frequently referenced term oikonomia, commonly translated as economics and thus associated with the financial affairs of any organisational structure. As it is obvious from its Greek roots, the word oikonomia comes from the words oikos and nomos (house and law)
and in its literal sense it has little to do with the finances of an establishment. As its compounds hint, the term was used in relation to the regulations of household management, proving that the household processes worth of regulation were those entwined with its production output.

By favouring partnerships, association and communication it seems that Aristotle considers socialisation as a basic practice of survival, before anything else. The lonesome, stateless individual is presented as ‘abnormal’, either higher or lower than the rest, simply because he fails to conform to his ontological needs, but mainly because he is either too powerful to worry for his well-being, or in the second case, too uninterested in his own survival and by extension that of other inhabitants. In this regard, domesticated free men, slaves, land and animals are more significant than their wild counterparts, and indeed, as he goes on to explicitly argue, everything included in the domestic, and by extension state environment, is beneficial to man, in contrast to these elements which are unruly and hence beyond man’s control (Aristotle 1959, p. 13-14).

As it will be highlighted in the next chapters of the thesis, this Aristotelian idea will continue to preoccupy urban life until the present. It will vigorously come back to life in the 17th century, when the supporters of wild land privatisation and enclosure will argue that privately exploited land is much more valuable to the community than unenclosed or commonly shared land (Brace 2004, pp. 17-20). At the same time, it will introduce the idea that good (tamed and productive) and bad (wild and unproductive) nature can be associated with moral values of superiority and inferiority. The same argument will also constitute the mentality supporting the homes of the future, explored further below.

But while focusing on ancient Greece, the Aristotelian household – as every other association formed by the political animal, by satisfying the ontological desire for socialisation – also responds to another innate need, that of the creative interference with our surroundings. In other words, Aristotle perceives human relationships to bear an exceptional value, legitimised by their power to ameliorate living conditions through combined productive efforts of partnerships, irrespective to their size or nature (Aristotle 1959). In other words, human relationships are of importance, not because partnership and coupling are ontological needs that should
be naturally pursued, but because this seemed as the only possible way towards a
tamed and thus more productive approach to life, which would in turn strengthen the
city-state and ameliorate the living conditions of its citizens.

While Aristotle seems instrumental in his attempt to cloak the value of the
household behind the rather emphasised attributes of the city-state, possibly in order
to relax the tension between individual and communal interests, his analysis on
household management implies that he did not take the matter lightly. Carefully
formulated so as not to empower the individual, the Aristotelian discourse
accentuates the value of household management by promoting it as a science of three
separate domains. The first one is relevant to the relationship between the master
and the slaves, the second to that of the father and the children and the third refers
to the relationship of husband and wife (Aristotle 1959, p. 59). Each of these areas are
regulated according to different rules that specify, while normalising and idealising,
the relationships between the free members of the household. The reason for this is
delineated in paragraph 12 of Part V, where Aristotle explains that even though the
importance of the city-state is greater to that of the household, the quality of the latter
impinges upon that of the former (Aristotle 1959, p. 67). Accordingly, the relationships
of the free household members with each other should be of an outstanding quality,
since they have a direct impact on the ways city members enact their citizenship rights
and act as the city-state shareholders. By women being half of the free population and
children growing up to become active citizens of the state, the household obtains an
additional purpose, which is to safeguard the proper education of its members so that
the heightened value of the city would not be undermined.

Since the family occupies the middle ground between the individual and the
public sphere, and the latter is of the foremost importance, the family should ensure
that through appropriate education, its members will be able of upholding that very
idea. And as expected, it falls under the responsibilities of the household manager to
preserve this process, a duty which legitimises him as the sole ruler of the household.
This contrast between state and household management is the one which renders the
former as a democratic regime and the latter as a monarchic, for in the first case the
state is managed by the common contribution of free and equal men, whereas the
second is governed by a single ruler (Aristotle 1959, p. 29). Respectively, the major
difference between the household and the city-state is that the one becomes a unity under the single rule of the household master, whereas the other remains a multitude, or else a group of diverse individuals unified through its members’ active participation in the protection of common interests (Aristotle 1959, p. 77). These two contradicting processes are interrelated since the one guarantees the quality and existence of the other; therefore, the household needs to remain under the rigid reign of a single ruler so that its members’ educational quality will not be undermined.

Overall, Aristotle supported that an unrestricted mode of habitation could not safeguard survival and continuity, thus man and nature had to be contained in order to become productive. His Political Naturalism is in this regard an attempt to legitimise the aforementioned view and strengthen his argument that ‘enclosed’ people, people who belong somewhere, just as natural resources, are more beneficial both on an individual and on a communal level. Another point that needs to be stressed is that, for Aristotle, the habitat of his era is the base of the city-state and for that reason its members’ education and relationships depend on the household leader. To conclude, it can be inferred that, in Aristotle’s era, the domestic ideal represented a self-sufficient, autonomous production unit which nurtures society’s future citizens and safeguards, through its own well-being, the autonomy of the democratic city-state.

The three binaries of the Ancient Greek oikia

The analysis of the Ancient Greek oikia until this point, together with the scrutiny of a rather influential philosopher’s consideration of the matter, proves that the domestic establishment was contributing to the division and classification of the public according to their moral, social and financial qualities. As Westgate observes, ‘the household was the most important area in which these distinctions were articulated’ (2007, p. 234), in other words it was inside and in relation to the home that several social dichotomies were outlined.

One reason for this phenomenon was that the main economic sector, agriculture, was predominately depending on the produce of the household, hence, assets such as land and slaves were taken into consideration when considering its contribution to the city (Ault 2007, p. 263). Therefore, although the citizens who did
not own land were more than those who did – the aristocrats constituted only the 10 per cent of the city’s population – land ownership was still a criterion for the importance of a household, since it was an indicator of its productive value (Cooper 1978, p. 162). In this light, private property became a vital determinant of status separating the rich, who owned a third or more of the agricultural land and resided in large estates, from the rest of the people, granting them the supremacy that followed from their social position (Oliver 2006 p. 334).

Therefore, the Ancient Greek household did contribute to the distinction between the rich and the poor, even if not overtly, and although social coherence was to some extent guaranteed by practices such as the high walls mentioned above, social stratification was prevalent in the time. With domestic luxury looked down upon, wealthy households had adopted different means to demonstrate their economic superiority, for instance, the leaders of aristocratic families would gather during pan-Hellenic festivals in order to discuss the redistribution of agricultural surpluses and help those who had failed to produce the desired amount (Ault 2007, p. 262).

In this regard, while wealth was on no account a medium that led to political power, the aristocratic household, independent and _philanthropic_, was often perceived as the ‘ideal citizen house of the Classical period’ (Westgate 2007, p. 235). Perceived, as mentioned in Aristotle’s _Politics_, as a miniature of the state, the independent, productive household legitimised the city’s admiration and set an example to be followed (p. 235). Overall, it was clear that without land it was impossible for one to argue that he was the leader of a proper _oikos_, and accordingly, he could neither be considered a valued member of the Athenian society, nor could he prove his loyalty to the community (Gardner 1989, p. 57). One of the most common ways to increase a household’s land and power was through the marriage between two Athenian citizens; thus, certifying their alliance to and value for the city-state (Gardner 1989, p. 54; Humphreys 1978, p. 100; MacDowel 1989, p. 99).

The second quality according to which households were classified in higher and lower productive categories was slave ownership. A similar case to land ownership, slave ownership was an indicator that the household was adequately contributing to the agricultural produce of the city (Ault 2007, p. 263). Slavery was the most common form of labour at the time, thus the more slaves a household owned the more
respectable it was. Accordingly, those who failed to own slaves were automatically characterised as unproductive and inferior to the rest of the population (Oliver 2006 p. 332). For Aristotle, ‘a slave is a human being who by nature belongs not to himself, but to another person’ (p. 238), which indicated that slaves were deemed and used as property; through their ownership, their master would benefit and through their exploitation, households would become more productive and respectable. Slaves, as non-citizens and non-Athenians, were excluded from any rights or duties of the public space, and their value was equal to that of an asset of their owner’s estate (Oliver 2006 p. 327).

The third important form of discrimination stemming from the ancient household organisation, was one segregating its free inhabitants; namely men from women. This distinction was based on the premises that the former were privileged with their public duties, while the latter were expected to focus on the household, or else the activities taking place in the private sphere (Spike 2000, p. 14).

Looking at the belief system of ancient Greece, both male and female gods are equally powerful, with traits that equally certify their godly power. Notwithstanding the worship of female gods, however, Greek mythology was substantially more focused on admirable men, rather than women. The tales about the lives of Achilles, Orestes, Perseus, Odysseus and Heracles honoured such powerful men and their heroic deeds (Garland 1998, p. 204). On the contrary, women in myths, such as Medea and Clytemnestra, were notorious for their criminal behaviour; Medea killed her children as a revenge for her husband’s infidelity and Clytemnestra murdered her husband, Agamemnon, on his return from Troy (p. 205). The only female characters whose stories were admirable were those who exhibited an almost unreal devotion to their husbands, such as that of Alcestis, who volunteered to die in her husband’s place and that of Penelope, who had been waiting twenty years for Odysseus’ return (p. 205).

In such a misogynistic setting, being a woman in ancient Greece was not a very pleasant condition. Their moral status was far more precarious than that of men, and interestingly, the fact that there were laws prescribing death for adultery but not for rape is a rigid proof of this case (Gardner 1989, p. 52). As Gardner (1989) explains in his illuminating paper Aristophanes and the Male Anxiety, by analysing the Ancient
Greek playwright it is clear that there was a severe worry burdening men regarding the possibility of their wives taking lovers. Although women were generally looked down upon, their status could slightly ameliorate by giving birth; motherhood would guarantee a more positive approach by their husbands who would thereafter consider them more trustworthy and more capable of handling the affairs of their household (p. 54). However, if a wife was to be engaged in adultery and give birth to a child that did not belong to the leader of the oikos, not only the oikia but also the polis would be compromised. The lineage of every Athenian child had to be known since the child would later claim his/her citizenship as well as inheritance (p. 52).

With rigidly separate areas of everyday interaction and routine, women were commonly understood as a group detained inside the boarders of the private sphere, obliged to follow a rather harsh code of conduct, although this idea has been challenged, since there are both textual and non-textual sources that arguing the contrary (Nevett 1999, pp. 16-17). While the severance of their fields of activity is currently understood as rather rigid, at the time it was more of an ideal than a strictly practical rule, since women often had to visit the market to sell their products, while some were even occupied in part-time employment (e.g. midwives, wet-nurses) (Nevett 1999, pp. 16-17). The same applies to the separation of the space inside the house, distinguished between the andron, where men would reside and gather for their symposia and the gynaikon, an area of the house usually located on the second floor where male presence was not permitted (p. 18-19). While archaeological findings have indicated that the distinction between men and women was not as extreme as hitherto believed, a significant determinant did apply for the fundamental segregation and discrimination between the two sexes. The fact that men were involved in public matters and women were required to tend to their household duties resulted in the bolstering of the idea that men were dealing with issues of importance whereas women were capable solely for their attendance to the trivialities of life.

Thus, it can be concluded that in Classical Athens, the household was the point of origin of three major dichotomies, which, as this thesis will argue, are still prevalent today, even if under a different guise. The first is the segregation of the rich and the poor, the second that of citizens and slaves and the third is the discrimination between men and women.
Something worth mentioning, at this point, is that the discriminations observed above did not undermine the status of Athens as a great democratic city. This indicates that while the habitat did operate as a tool of segregation, its role did not have a substantial impact on the public affairs of the city (Spike 2000, p.14). Another interesting fact to be underlined is the rather unclear public response towards homelessness and nomadicism. Although the life of an outcast or that of a nomad was on no account idealised, its association with knowledge and wisdom elevated the wandering individual to the status of the philosopher, or to that of a wise man.

The Roman Empire
The Roman *domus*

The years that intervened between the Ancient era and that of the Middle Ages had a significant influence in the domestic field, since the re-evaluation of the private and the public boundaries, following the advent of the Christian religion, resulted in the re-appreciation of the social sphere in its entirety. As a result, this section will focus on the reconstruction of the domestic establishment and its alignment with the newly-founded ideals of the era’s predominant public discourse. Regarding the Roman Empire, it should be stressed that the main texts, sources and references studied are focusing on life of the elite, thus leading to the misinterpretation of the actual milieu of the time. This results from the fact that the lay people’s lives would not be commemorated by epitaphs or erected in inscriptions and thus remain largely undocumented (Kelly 2006, p. 113).

In terms of the greater picture of the Roman Empire, the majority of the inhabitants lived and worked on land, and the wealth of the Empire depended primarily on their produce (Kelly 2006, p. 110). Yet land was concentrated in the hands of the elite, with the richest 3.5% of the landowners holding the 21.3% of the land and the on the contrary the 14% of the landowners held just 3.6% of the holdings listed the records that survived from the beginning of the 2nd century AD.

As expected, the living conditions of the majority were rather challenging. As the statistics of the data filed from the 1st to the 3rd centuries AD prove death was
prevalent, specifically among infants and young children, while death from disease gravely affected most households (Kelly 2006, p. 106). The major causes of death in the time were ‘dysentery and diarrhoea; fevers such as cholera, typhoid and malaria; pulmonary illnesses such as pneumonia and tuberculosis’, ensuing predominately from the malnutrition, the low hygiene and the overpopulation of the urban space (p. 106).

Yet, the domestic model most thoroughly studied and most commonly considered as the ideal form of the household was that of the *domus*, which was predominately perceived as a symbol of status. Filled with sculptures, mosaics and frescoes, the *domus* was the ultimate artwork of its owner’s life, which, by incorporating luxury as an integral element of its architecture, it certified his position in the social hierarchy of the time (Van Dam 2010). Besides the decorations, another significant characteristic, again alluding to its inhabitants’ class, was space and, more specifically, empty space. Regardless of the fact that the most grandiose houses were owned by the aristocracy, a small house was still a house of around 1.000 square feet (Kaegi 2015). Accordingly, the architecture of the *domus* was predominantly focused on the large empty spaces of the house, rather than on its surprisingly small rooms. As expected, the *domus* was lightly furnished with the bare essentials, a few beds for
sleeping, small round tables for eating and some wardrobes (Veyne ed. 1992, p. 315). Finally, another domestic element that gathered substantial architectural attention was the entrance area of the house and its main door, signifying its owner’s power, status and ambition (Mitchell 2014).

As proved by the inhabitants’ interest in domestic luxury, the house was primarily a symbol of wealth, but even as a space of everyday life, the household of the Roman Empire was substantially different from its Ancient Greek predecessor. One of the houses considered a landmark for the era was the House of Menander, which occupies more than half a city block in the southern part of Pompeii (Kelly 2006, p. 95). As most other houses in Pompeii, this one too has been remarkably preserved, giving the opportunity to explore the everyday domestic life of the time, in detail. As many Roman Empire houses, this one too was built to impress.

Spacious and grandeur, with gardens and wall-paintings it imposed its owner’s significance upon the visitor. Likewise, its decoration had an additional purpose to serve, that of projecting how smart and well-educated its owner was (Kelly 2006, p. 100). In a similar vein, the houses of the elite – although not equally lavish to that of Menander – they also aimed to ‘show-off’ to the rest of the people; they were thus built inside the towns of the Roman Empire, rather than in secluded areas, so that the owner could prove his superiority (Kelly 2006, p. 102).

Household structure and organisation

In terms of its organisation, the household consisted of the paterfamilias, the elder man and leader of the household unit (patria potestas) (Rawson 1986, p. 8), his legitimate wife, their children, the slaves and around a dozen free men, the ‘clients’, who paid homage to the paterfamilias, on a daily basis (Garnsey and Saller 2014). Contrary to Ancient Greek men, who had extremely limited domestic responsibilities, the paterfamilias managed every activity of his household. He was the one to give orders to slaves, going over the household economics with the steward, and the one to regulate the domestic activities of the day (Kleiner 2016).

Women had as much power as their husbands would grant them; if the husband considered his wife trustworthy he would assign more important duties to
her than those assigned to the slaves (Grig and Kelly 2012). While the role of a woman was similar to that introduced in Ancient Greece, and daughters were met with less respect than that accompanying the birth of a son, as wives they were more independent than their Athenian counterparts, even if their legal status was similar (Rawson 1986, p. 19). The main difference was that wives in Ancient Rome were not completely financially dependent on their husbands (p. 19). First, just as the Ancient Greek wives, the money and property offered as dowry was reclaimable if the marriage was terminated. Secondly, a wife could have property remaining under her natal family’s legal authority, which continued to be hers even when married. Finally, women could follow several ways to free themselves from the legal and financial dependence of their husband, one of which was to give birth to three children if they were freeborn and four if they were freed (p. 19). Likewise, in the case of a ‘free’ marriage, the most common form of marriage in the late Republic and imperial times, the wife remained under the authority of her natal paterfamilias, provided that he was alive, or remained independent – she was not considered part of her husband’s family or authority (p. 19).

The conditions that most households were facing – namely poverty, high mortality rates, disease – had significant impact on the reproductive capabilities of Roman women, while hindering any efforts for reliable and long-term family planning (Kelly 2006, p. 108), although the longevity of the family name was one of the most important purposes of marriage and childbearing (Rawson 1986, p. 9). In this light, as the statistics of the time reveal, one third of children lost their fathers before reaching puberty, over half were left without a father before reaching 25, the average 10-year-old had a one-out-of-two chance to have one of his/her grandparents alive, and less than 1% of children in the age of 20 had a surviving grandparent (Harlow and Laurence 2002; Kelly 2006, p. 108). Here, it is important to stress, that the Roman Empire suffered from severely low birth rates, which besides the infertility of women derived from the everyday pressure of poverty, were relevant to the poor medical standards, political repression and, the liberation of women. Interestingly, women in the second century BC had already begun to protest against their social and domestic roles, having organised a demonstration for the repeal of anti-luxury legislation (the Oppian law) in
195 BC, while simultaneously rebelling against motherhood as their only purpose in life (Rawson 1986, p. 11).

Hence, the main demographic characteristics of the Roman Empire were its large number teenagers, its very few elderly people, as well as the big numbers of dead infants and orphaned children. As a result, the extended family that depended on and resided in one household often had an interesting composition since it extended horizontally to include same generation or younger offspring of previous families. A household from the 187-188 AD census for example consisted of a married couple and their daughter, an adult son and daughter from the husband’s two previous marriages and the wife’s son and daughter from her previous marriage (Kelly 2006, p. 108). However, this was a quite rare occurrence; the family was generally considered small, with no more than two or three children, who have managed to survive their infancy period (Rawson 1986, p. 8).

The Roman household lacked the organisation that its Ancient Greek counterpart displayed, since the living standards of each era were extremely different. Yet the structure of the family and the organisation of the household do resemble those of Ancient Greece, particularly with regards to the status of women and children, who were of inferior legal status to that of the paterfamilias (Rawson 1986, p. 8). Here, however, women would considered part of their natal family, even after marriage, contrary to Classical Athens, when a woman would belong to the legal regime of her husband in a similar case (p. 8). Furthermore, legitimate children would be seen as part of the husband’s family, and thus receive his name, while illegitimate children would be considered as part of the wife’s family and would thus bear her family’s name (p. 8).

Another interesting difference between the households of Classical Athens and Ancient Rome was relevant to the concept of privacy. For example, family life in Ancient Greece was classified as private and was thus scarcely ever discussed in public; on the contrary, in Rome, the family was an issue of the community and the family affairs were commonly considered by the familial circle. For example, one of the paterfamilias’ duties was to publicly denounce any misconduct performed by his family members, and especially in the case of adultery (Nagle 2013). Furthermore, the household could on no account be characterised as an affectionate environment and
little attention was paid to its children, especially to the unwanted. A child was considered a member of the family only if the paterfamilias chose to acknowledge it as such; those not having been chosen were often left outside the house to be taken by anyone interested (De Coulanges 2012).

To conclude, it is interesting to note the antithetical and almost contradictory approach to the role of the habitat as a symbol of status in Ancient Greece and Rome. In the first case, it has been clarified that while the home did contribute to the segregation of the inhabitants in a rather subtle way – i.e. through its production capacity – in Ancient Rome it did the same, though even more overtly. Since the social discourse of the time was heavily influenced by the ideas of luxury and well-being, it was to be expected that such ideals would penetrate the domestic environment, its practices and the idea *per se*. The fact that the domus was constructed according to such principles rigidifies the role of the habitat as a symbol of social distinction, which segregates the rich from the poor, and by extension, the good from the bad.

The Byzantine Empire
Home and the Christian ideal

Eventually, as Christianity became more prevalent than ever before, especially at the eastern part of the Roman Empire, wealth and luxury were once again the target of social discourse. But, regardless of this shift, rich families continued to enjoy the privileges of their status, inhabiting large houses with galleries, terraces and big halls, in an architectural format that followed the paradigms of the Roman domus (Bowes 2010). At the same time, the poor were located in multi-storied buildings, which housed several families, while the slaves and tenant farmers lived in huts within the estates of their landlords (Gregory 2010).

At that time, the Christian ideals did not seem to be imposing any kind of change on the habitation differences between the rich and the poor, while it has even been suggested that religious authorities endorsed the schism between them (Krueger 2010). Even though Christianity propounded asceticism, monasticism and a new morality of modesty and humbleness, it did not succeed in bridging the gap
between the rich and the poor. It did, however, influence both the private and the public spheres by pronouncing the social distinctions descending from antiquity.

While the differences between the Byzantine home and the Roman *domus* are practically negligible, a significant change in Byzantium would fundamentally influence the meaning of home bringing it closer to the one found in the Middle Ages. This change is no other than that of the belief system, a parameter that would gradually introduce unprecedented changes to the very fabric of society. The first and most important development in the domestic culture of the time was the introduction of the monastic life that provided yet another habitation option to the people. Many families devoted their children – especially the unwanted ones – to monasteries and many houses were transformed into monasteries, although, the most common location for a monastic establishment was the desert, since that was where the monks chose to reside (Mattingly 2013). Irrespective of its location, the monastery was regarded as a symbolic household, which sheltered the brotherhood of monks under the hegemony of the spiritual father, sanctioning the structure of the patriarchal household once again (James 2010).

In addition to the fact that the monastic paradigm came in absolute contradiction with every relationship formed between social and family members, it also undermined the importance of the urban environment of which the radiance and glory eventually withered (Wilson 2012). Cities, which had until then been the most significant locus of each country, were eventually overlooked, as the attention of the public shifted towards the monasteries and their religious communities (Mattingly 2013). This phenomenon can also be observed from a discursive perspective, in the change of the era’s prevalent ideals. The once celebrated idea of the ‘philopatris’, referring to the person who loves his country, in the Byzantine era changed into that of the ‘philoptochos’, in other words, the friend of the poor (Bury 2014).

Together with the aforementioned changes, an increased pressure against women is noticed, who were already confined not only inside the physical boarders of their homes, but also in the conceptual limits of their private sphere, by being denied any kind of interference in the public affairs of their communities. In Byzantium particularly, women were more excluded from social life than ever, since the ‘ancient imaginative boundaries between the sexes were re-emphasised’, with practices such
as the exclusion of menstruating women from the Eucharist ceremony (Rubini et al. 2014). In this regard, the Christian religion deemed the female population as *a priori* sinful and thus proceeded to the instrumental confinement of the entire gender as it did with everything classified as a potential threat or cause of temptation.

As it was the case with the mythology of Ancient Greece, in the Christian religion women were once again vilified. Eve was the one responsible for the downfall of mankind, Delilah was a traitor, Jezebel a murder (Walton 2005, p.9). In church, women were not allowed to speak, just as in Ancient Greece they were prohibited from speaking in the agora and other public areas. The Church’s attitude towards women can be summarised in the following sentences: ‘Let your women keep silence in the churches, for it is not permitted to them to speak’ and ‘if they will learn anything let them ask their husbands at home: for it is shame for women to speak in the church’ (Walton 2005, p.9).

Such were the social developments that permeated the domestic sphere, the most important of which was the advent of the Christian religion and its moral accompaniments. At this point, the household is still deemed as a proof of its owner’s social status, while the connection of the home with religion, further rigidified in the medieval years, is beginning to emerge. In order to explore more deeply the conceptualisation of home in this era, the study deploys the thought of Aquinas, who while grounding on Aristotelic thought, considers home, and its relation to the public ground from a Christian perspective.

Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

In the substantially different socio-cultural environment formed by the developments in the belief and the economic systems of this era, the theorisation regarding the human habitat and its surroundings seems to vary significantly from the foundations of the Ancient Greek philosophy. The philosopher, who accurately represents this shift of ideals is Saint Thomas Aquinas, and even though his own ideas are often acknowledged as an extension of the Aristotelian theorisation, one could argue that they actually originate from a very different starting point. The most important
difference between Aristotle and Aquinas, which penetrates their entire theorisation, is no other than the fact that the former perceives existence in its finite form, whereas the latter takes the transcendental aspects of existence as a given, in other words, he deems life as a gift from a world beyond our own (Owens 1993 p. 52). Endorsing the Christian principles, ubiquitous in the 13th century, he places the Christian God in the centre of everything natural and human, digressing completely from the thought of Ancient Greece.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas also perceives the household as a part of a greater whole, defining it as a type of community, comparable to other social formations, such as the clan and the village (Aroney 2007, p. 161). He, further agrees with Aristotle that these communities are interdependent and that the larger the community, the more self-sufficient it is, or should be, and respectively of greater importance to human affairs. However, what seems to be of significance here is that Aquinas clearly expresses his understanding of the household as an interdependent form of community, but, as he explains, this does not hinder its capacity to separate its activities and purposes from those of the public ground.

In his Commentary on Ethics he asserts that while the political community operates as a unified whole, a whole that brings the activities of its smaller parts together, the households can still function, and should be able to do so, independently, according to a different set of aims and responsibilities (Aroney 2007, p. 177). And there lies that major difference between the thought of Aristotle and that of Aquinas, one which is further clarified in the latter’s Commentary of the Politics, where he specifically maintains that human nature is not only political, but it is also domestic, or else conjugal (Aroney 2007, p. 178).

Aristotle, as was observed above, values the household as a productive unit, autonomous to the extent that is possible, in the micro-scale of its operations. Furthermore, he perceives it to be an establishment of which the members should necessarily maintain quality relationships with the state and with each other, since they are the shareholders of public affairs and their active participation in the public sphere would make a substantial difference to matters designated as political. On the contrary, however, in Aquinas’s reasoning, the household while maintaining to some extent the aforementioned role, it also obtains an additional, namely that of the family
estate. This way, and as expected in an era when the interference of the lay people with politics was far more restricted than in the time of antiquity, the household becomes a space of familial and conjugal interaction, while simultaneously these very relationships, the relationship between husband and wife and that of father and children are conceived as fundamentally important. In this light, Aquinas seems to be following both the medieval trend against direct democracy and the Christian ideals, which want the family house in the centre of a monotheistic social morality.

Accordingly, by acknowledging the multiple operations unfolding under the household’s roof, Aquinas separates the public community from the private, assigning to each a set of different functions, while referring to their occasional overlap. But, one should refrain from the assumption that this separation leads to the acknowledgment of the household as a home, or else as the space of private existence, for at this point, Aquinas is merely indicating that contrary to Aristotle’s belief, the household is not simply the supporting ground of the state. In this regard, the household, or in other words, the community of the family, is one in which people belong, while simultaneously participating in other public communities.

This realisation does not empower the individual in any way. On the contrary, while Aquinas stresses this division and the fact that one can be fulfilled through the interaction with different forms of communities (McInerny & O'Callaghan 2014), he simultaneously underpins that the value of the city-state is certainly superior to every other social formation, claiming that ‘the good of the nation is more divine than that of the city, family, or person’ (Aroney 2007, p. 187).

Aquinas thus builds on the foundations of Aristotle a definition of the household that shifted the importance of its purpose from the social ground to the private realm, and more precisely to its function as the family estate. Influenced by his era and the dominance of the monotheistic religion, Aquinas felt that it was necessary to invest in the conjugal relationship protected by the household, allotting to both institutions, i.e. the marital and the domestic, an almost sacred value. As the notion of individuality was not yet available for discussion and community members led almost interdependent lives, the domestic establishment was not yet ready to be defined as the haven of the individual. However, Aquinas did take home a step closer to the private realm by assigning to it the important role of the family shelter. In other
words, while for Aristotle the home was situated in the middle ground of the private and the public, Aquinas pushed it slightly further into the sphere of the first.

Conclusion

In the course of this chapter the initial hypothesis was constantly reaffirmed clarifying that any approach to the notion of the habitat needs to be embedded in an overall examination of the discursive forces operating in each of the era explored. The dichotomy of the public and the private in Ancient Greece, the former regarded as more important than the latter, is observed to be shifting through the Roman and the Byzantine eras, when the significance of the private becomes more prevalent. The role of the household is thus changing as well. Furthermore, the three distinctions shaped in Ancient Greece are also dominant in the following eras. Women, remain largely bound by their domestic duties, while home ownership, its location and physical structure endorse social stratification and moral valorisation.

Together with the social and economic circumstances that influenced the domestic sphere, this chapter explored the thought of two important philosophers, so that a more in-depth discussion of the notion of domesticity would be reached. In this regard, Aristotle and Aquinas were selected as philosophers who not only dealt with the idea home, but who also analysed the interplay of the private and the public in the domestic sphere. Aristotle’s theorisation regarding the household located the purpose of home clearly within the limits of the public realm, although he did allow some space for its private dimension. In Aquinas’s thought, the home gained more gravity as the family estate and was thus pushed further into the private sphere.
Chapter Two

The Medieval, Early Modern and Modern West

The Medieval household

The Medieval era covers an extended period, much of which remains undocumented or subjected to contradictory analyses, but the developments in the social and urbanisation practices of the time continue to influence our understanding of home today. Specifically, from the 12th century onwards, medieval societies underwent some significant changes that affected the habitat and its importance, while further and highly influential developments are noted at the end of the era, in the late 14th and 15th centuries. Since these major social changes took place in the newly formed urban centres of the western world, the focus will need to shift, in terms of location towards the western part of Europe and will particularly concentrate on Medieval England.

The general overview of the era identifies the social structure as predominately feudal, with – especially during the early medieval times – a principally agrarian economy and the majority of the population, 80 to 90 per cent, residing in villages and hamlets (Hilton 1982, p. 7). This 80 to 90 per cent, during the three centuries after the Norman Conquest, was working on domestic agrarian production and led lives governed by their landlords, who were powerful ecclesiastic or secular families profiting from the leasing of their holdings, namely houses and land (Hilton 1982, p. 8). Hence, the lay and church landowning social class had ensured a rigid income from the rents, fines and taxes burdening the populace, allocated to the consumption of luxurious commodities and the construction of castles, manor houses, or grandiose cathedrals and abbeys, as evidence of their wealth and status (Hilton 1982, p. 8).

Thus, the majority was striving to survive below the poverty line, with housing conditions which were primitive and inadequate, although several references indicate that this suggestion is not entirely accurate (Dyer 2000, p. 137). While it was believed that the predominant structure of a peasant habitat consisted of a long-house, which sheltered both animals and people, recent studies have proved that this was a
localised form of accommodation, since, in most of the 12th century Britain, animals were kept in yards or barns and the house was used as the shelter and working area of the family (Dyer 2000, p. 137).

Contradicting the idea of a widespread use of the long-house, archaeological research has found that the peasant domestic establishment actually included a number of buildings, such as a house, a barn and other premises for food and agricultural processing. In general. However, peasant houses in the 13th century – and for the poorer peasants in the 14th century too – were predominately made of wattle and daub, and were so unstable that burglars could enter merely by pushing down the walls (Hanawalt 1977, p. 7). By the end of the 14th century, however, peasant houses became more substantial, with courtyards surrounded by walls or ditches, including walls and ovens (p. 7). Such houses would usually count two rooms and two floors, which were covered by straw and were thus extremely flammable (p. 7). In the middle of the main room was a raised hearth, next to which children’s cradles were placed, together with kitchen equipment. The only furniture mentioned in that era were tables, chairs and beds. Doors and windows were open during the day to allow light and fresh air inside, while the rooms were candlelight by night, often leading to the entire house catching fire (p. 7).

Regardless of the exact structure, however, for the most part of the medieval era, residential and other buildings were rather temporary and poorly-built, a fact commonly attributed to the constant movement of the peasant population and their inclination towards migration (Dyer 2000, p. 137). During the 13th century, half of the peasant population residing in villeinages was facing heavier obligations than those imposed on free tenants (Dyer 2000, p. 134). While the latter were more disadvantaged, since their holdings were usually much smaller than those of the former, peasants in villeinages had to pay higher rents to their landlords, while they were also responsible for the maintenance of their domiciles, which was a cost further aggravating their financial condition. Additionally, villeins were often subjected to restrictions on their migration and marriage arrangements, alongside any other

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6 Tenure was regulated by the lord’s court. The Vassals villagers placed themselves under the protection of powerful landowners in exchange for full control of their life and work.
regulations that the landlords would impose in order to safeguard their tenants’ immobility and by extension their own interests.

Focusing more on the late Medieval family, the valuable study of Barbara A. Hanawalt, *Childrearing Among the Lower Classes of Late Medieval England* (1977), will be deployed here, to explore how lower class households and families were organised and how their children were raised during that period. Since, as expected, information on the lower classes could not be easily retrieved, the data analysed is found in the coroner’s inquests, namely reports in which conflicts among community members as well as accidents and assaults in the domestic environment were recorded (Hanawalt 1977, p. 3). First, these records indicate that the medieval average family size was around 4 people, with the nuclear family predominating (p. 5). However, in bigger urban centres like London and Oxford, households shelter transitional relationships with concubines and the nuclear family is limited to the husband, wife and the one child (p. 6).

The aforementioned living standards of poverty, disease and malnourishment resulted in households of which the members had minimum familial interaction, and the existing was limited to the productive role of the house. Hence, children were allowed to play, mostly unattended, until their eight year; from then onwards they were actively participating in the productive processes of the household (Hanawalt 1977). Their relationship with their parents was almost inexistent, and parenting was limited to the children’s education regarding their productive roles. Although the tasks that the two sexes undertook were not strictly divided into male and female categories man were more involved in heavy work than women, while children followed the examples of their parents, also according to their sex (Hanawalt 1977, p. 8).

Children were utterly neglected in the medieval household and were constantly in severe danger. From their birth until their first year, children were left alone for long periods, since their mothers were attending to their domestic duties, while often they peasant mothers were also nurturing other children (Hanawalt 1977, p. 14). Since they were being kept in a cradle next to the fire for warmth, children died by burning in the fire (50% female and 46% male). There is no proof that children were swaddled but they might have been (Hanawalt 1977, p. 14). Older children, in ages between one
and three who had escaped the cradle trap were faced with different dangers, since they commonly fell in wells, ponds and ditches around their homes (p. 15). Intradomestic accidents were also common, caused by hot surfaces, falling and playing with knives (p. 15). The disregard of the medieval offspring’s life is clear but the extent can be better understood through this hard-to-believe example, according to which a toddler drowned because she was left in the care of a blind woman while her parents were in the fields (p. 15).

A social reality of the Dark Ages, which cannot be disregarded, is the way society treated women, at the peak of the misogynism inherited from antiquity. From the 12th century onwards, until the feminisation of witchcraft during the 15th century, and its peak in the late 16th and 17th centuries, tens of thousands of women were burned as witches, as they were believed to be engaging in hellish congregations to which the secretaries are transported, and which they devote to the eating of babies, sex orgies, preparation of magical mischief, and – not least – obscene devil worship. (Murray 1976, pp. 63-64)

Interestingly, while in the 9th century these claims were considered stories to be believed by more naïve individuals, three centuries later such stories were not only believed by the masses, but also by churchmen in high places. The witch-hunt gained momentum in the late 16th and 17th centuries and it was predominately targeted on women (Jones and Zell 2005, p. 45). One of the reasons for which women were more susceptible to witchcraft accusations, and were thus more easily victimised as witches, was that by being the most dependent members of the community they were more likely to ask for charity. The guilt accompanying the refusal of charity would more than often result in witchcraft accusations (Jones and Zell 2005, p. 46).

Another reason for which women were more commonly accused of witchcraft was that the misogynistic milieu in which women were leading their lives, since the time of Ancient Greece had reached its zenith in the Middle Ages. Women were thus prosecuted for any kind of offense possible, while accusations of other ‘female’ offenses, such as scolding, prostitution and infanticide were also heightened (Jones and Zell 2005, p. 46). While women could accuse other women of witchcraft – often as a means of female social space control – in most cases women were prosecuted by men. Other reasons, besides the abovementioned include
men’s fear of impotence, male reactions to women’s real or imagined power as mothers and nurturers, or as attempts to suppress the independence of women perceived to be outside patriarchal control, as widows or as healers or midwives. (Jones and Zell 2005, p. 47)

Overall, witchcraft accusation is regarded a process of criminalising women, derived from the male desire to reign in the moral and social sphere (Jones and Zell 2005, p. 46), one which proliferated the misogynistic social discourse prevalent in the past. Women were thus expected to remain indoors, bound to their domestic duties, regardless of the hardship with which these were accompanied.

Home at the dawn of urbanisation

As the problems in the rural areas continued to increase, the emergence of new towns brought along hope of change and prosperity; as a result, after 1340, many villages were abandoned, in an irreversible decline, despite the landowners’ agony to prevent migration and maintain the attractiveness of their holdings (Dyer 2000, p. 37). Although towns attracted more people as rural life became harder, they were not ready to accommodate incoming migration; nonetheless, they evolved into large urban centres of habitation and commerce (Dyer 2000, p. 37). The Doomsday book of 1086 reported that, at the time, 7% of the population already resided in towns. This proves that from a very early stage, towns were part of the medieval landscape, and since London, Winchester and Bristol were not included in the Doomsday, the urban population could be more accurately calculated at around 8% (Dyer 2000, p. 242). Likewise, the boroughs mentioned in the survey indicate that certain areas were already exhibiting urban characteristics, allowing present day commentators to regard them as early towns.

Residents of these areas would usually belong to the lower social strata sheltered in small cottages, sometimes covering a floor area of 5x5 meters (Dyer 2000, p. 244). Although the development of cities was a gradual process spreading across the entire Medieval era, landlords quickly realised that their interests lay in areas of urban development and focused on the exploitation of that opportunity. Therefore, while some preferred to secure the profitability of their countryside holdings by

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7 Intervention of landowners, oppression, poverty, poor living conditions, high mortality rates.
prohibiting the migration of peasants to the newly formed towns, others focused on the creation of boroughs, promoting migration flows towards their urban holdings (Ottaway 1992, p. 155; Dyer 2000, p. 253). Migration was not only stimulated by the landlords that aspired to increase their profit and who would often promise to free their tenants from many of their feudal obligations once they moved to their urban holdings (Ottaway, 1992, p. 155). Much of the migrating population was already striving to survive in the rural parts of Britain, so many of them decided to move to towns of their own accord, hoping that there they would find a better setting for themselves and their families (p. 253).

With the urban development at full pace, a time of change pinned down around the 12th and 13th centuries, many new towns were established and other settlements were raised to urban status. Several of those were governed by religious authorities, since the church was the principal landowner, and were founded upon a base that would favour the ecclesiastical elite (Ottaway 1992, p. 17). In most new towns, although the rich and the poor would share a common urban space (Ottaway 1992, p. 171 & p. 199) their habitation conditions were under no circumstance egalitarian, while there were great inequalities in the housing conditions of different social classes mirroring the inequalities in the social structure of the time (Dyer 2000, p. 254).

The urban aristocrats, for instance, especially from the 11th century onwards, aspired to display their rank and status though their habitats by building larger homes, with more expensive materials and more sophisticated techniques (Ottaway 1992, p. 199). Wealthy enough to enjoy higher standards of domestic life by sheltering extended family and servants in their households, the medieval lords’ and gentry’s habitats would always be complemented by gardens that would highlight their supremacy (Dyer 2000, p. 114). Although almost every urban and rural house had its own garden, the gardens and the orchards of the aristocracy were intended for enjoyment and leisure, besides their function as a public display of their wealth. On the contrary, the gardens of the poor were valued mainly because of their horticulture production, of which most was consumed by the household, while the remaining was sold to supplement their income (p. 121).
In conclusion, the medieval house had three distinct functions that followed from the époque’s social practices and can be perceived as extensions of the three binaries taking form in Ancient Greece. The first was that it functioned as a shelter and a unit of production, contributing to the family’s agricultural produce and income. The second was that it continued to remain the area in which women were limited, while those failing to do so were frequently accused for witchcraft. The third is its role as a profitable commodity to be exploited and as an establishment that certified the aristocrat’s wealth and status.

The urban disillusion

The picture of Medieval England changed once again, since the once promising urban centres quickly turned into areas of poverty and limited resources for the inhabitants, whereas the landowners of urban houses saw their profits increase (McIntosh 1986, p. 221). The uneven accumulation of property in the hands of the few became a significant reason for the polarisation of the people, dividing them into those who profited from the upsurge of urban development and those who remained trapped in the status of the smallholder and the wage earner (p. 222). Regardless of the fact that much of the urban population had already been involved in trade and crafts since the late 13th century, their limited commercial endeavours could not bring in more than a meagre income (Dyer 2000, p. 257). In this milieu, the gap between the rich and poor widened, as the household size of the former expanded and that of the latter diminished (McIntosh 1986, p. 227).

While such social schisms were gradually shaping the late Medieval society, the influx of migration created additional problems to several market towns that failed to accommodate their growing population (McIntosh 1986, p. 227). Eventually, the problems caused by population density, such as the inadequate supply of clean water and an unprecedented rise in poverty, would accentuate the existing concerns, adding to an already heavily stratified society the discriminatory process of the incoming immigrants screening. This procedure would evaluate the immigrants’ capacity to work and live according to the city’s standards and it could cost one’s potential to enter the city.
Interestingly, the ones who would judge the worthiness of the prospective community members were the affluent members of society, militant in their ‘battle’ against poverty and determined to alleviate the implications of the phenomenon, through extremely thorough screening processes (McIntosh 1986, p. 229). Yet the fear that emanated from the poor’s social unruliness and the violent, immoral conduct that was understood as inherent in the behaviour of the underclass, had made local leaders dubious about immigrants (McIntosh 1986, p. 229). As a result, the deviant deeds of the non-belongers were more likely to be reported to the local authorities by the respectable members of the community (McIntosh 1986, p. 232). The scepticism which had emerged due to the frequency of such reports would quickly turn the underclass into a social threat and would later accentuate a general distrust in any form of social deviance.

Hence, home in Medieval England appears to be perpetuating all three of the binaries formed in antiquity. First continued to separate the rich from the poor, both as a sign of status and a piece of property to be exploited by the former. Secondly, women would remain subjugated to men since their role continued to be interlaced with the private sphere. Finally, the propertyless and the non-belongers, those who were not able to show any credentials for belonging to a certain area or social group would be allowed to access the community’s resources only if they were deemed as people willing to offer labour and services to the area’s kingship (McIntosh 1986, p. 228). According to this practice, this seeming legitimate discrimination, between the deserving and the undeserving propertyless, was founded upon the poorer population’s struggle for self-preservation and their agreement to remain in lifelong servitude (p. 228).

The Early Modern and Modern West
Home in the era of improvement

It has become obvious, until now, that the examination of the household entails the simultaneous scrutiny of the society in which it is located. Although the idea of the home reverberates with elements of privacy and individuality, it is actually more susceptible to developments in the socio-economic level, since this shapes the general
overtone that feeds into individual attitudes, needs and requirements. The end of the Dark Ages brought the western world, once again, on the brink of historical change. The study has thus reached the very important period of history that took society out of a prolonged stagnation, since from the 1500 onwards, the burgeoning economic, geographical and industrial activity had contributed to developments that could on no account leave the domestic sphere unaffected.

During the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the social hierarchy remained similar to that of the previous two centuries. While most sociologists acknowledge the pre-industrial social hierarchy as pyramid-shaped (the lower classes forming the bottom and the aristocracy at the top), Lawrence Stone proposes two alternative images that are seen as more accurate depictions of the social reality of the era (1966, p. 16). The first is comprised of a skyscraper on top of a podium, the skyscraper is the 5 per cent of the population, the wealthy and the podium is the remaining 95 per cent, the poor. The second, and even more accurate representation of the early modern society consists of ‘a series of vertical towers upon a hill’, in which the hill represents the unsegregated mass of the poor, while the towers represent the rather independent economic and status hierarchies of the land-owning, ecclesiastical, legal, commercial and governmental social categories (Stone 1966, p. 17).

The social hierarchy model of the Middle Ages was not to be overturned prior to the industrial revolution. The majority of the population was still underprivileged and had little chance to alter their living conditions, while the aristocrats continued to profit through the exploitation of the poor. The precursors, however, of the industrial revolution together with the ideals of the Enlightenment would gradually interfere with the social discourse, and lead to important changes in the public and, years later, in the private sphere of these centuries.

While the medieval home was more like a working space with little, if any, affectionate relationships between its inhabitants, with the advent of Puritanism, it became a space of major importance, a shelter for the family ideals promoted by the Church (Sammas 1980, p. 4). Although, familial warmth and affection would be gradually introduced in the family life of the late 16th century aristocracy, investment in domestic relationships would concern the lay people two centuries later. Notwithstanding the delays in the popularisation of such trends, the domestic
structure was already undergoing significant changes, in order to accommodate needs other than those of production.

The three changes observed in the late 1580’s, which can be perceived as indicators of the inhabitants’ pursuit of a more comfortable household, were according to the observations of William Harrison the increased number of chimneys, the replacement of mats by beds and that of wooden eating equipment with pewter ones (Sammas 1980, p. 6). Simultaneously, habitats were being restructured to incorporate strictly partitioned areas that would allow household members to enjoy some privacy without having to leave the premises of the house (p. 7).

Even though homes were becoming increasingly more comfortable, with beds and private rooms for at-will withdrawal, they were still far from being regarded as areas of relaxation and affective family life; ‘homes were to work, sleep, and, increasingly, to pray in, but no great centres for relaxation and recreation’ (Sammas 1980, p. 10). The home did not grant any space for relaxation and celebration, since such purposes were commonly served by the local alehouse and by feasts or celebrations that occurred outdoors (Sammas 1980, p. 11). While the house would remain devoid of a homely atmosphere, in the 18th century there was an upsurge of domestic consumption, with bedding, linen and pewter kitchenware quickly taking their place amongst the existing domestic products. As expected, in the larger cities of the British world, like London, domestic objects would reach inhabitants faster than they did in the rural areas of the country, as proved by the early 1700 eating and drinking equipment which was already being used by many East Londoners (Sammas 1980, p. 13).

It was only when eating and drinking became predominant domestic activities and beverages like tea could be easily prepared inside the household, that the domestic area expanded its definition to include in its purpose the accommodation of private and social leisure activities (Sammas 1980, p. 14). Accordingly, since food and drinks could be prepared at home, their domestic consumption was preferable to that taking place in alehouses and pubs. Likewise, the fact that more end-products became readily available for consumption proved a catalyst for the developments observed between the late 15th and 18th centuries families, who enjoyed more disposable income and, in turn, saw their standards of living ameliorating (Sammas 1980, p. 18).
As a result, families became more interested in transforming their houses into pleasant areas of habitation and as the idea of domesticity was slowly introduced, changes between the relationships and the status of family members became increasingly discernible. The advent of ready-to-use products would remove several of the primary production processes from the domestic sphere, allowing more time and space to the family and the self. This general shift of interest towards the house would necessarily be accompanied by the public’s gradual disassociation from pubs and alehouses, place that would eventually be perceived as anti-domestic, all-male environments, since their services would no longer interest the rest of the population (Sammas 1980, p. 19).

Such developments in the domestic sphere would also influence the role of women. Wives and mothers, hitherto confined in the boundaries of the domestic production unit, would have more opportunities to socialise, and look after themselves and their families (Sammas 1980, p. 18). Specifically, women’s role of servitude during the family meal was gradually changing since they were eventually welcomed at the family table to enjoy their meal, as the rest of the household members (Sammas 1980, p. 15). In this regard, while house of production was slowly turning into the home of the family and the individual, the relationships between the family members were also influenced. With more products available for consumption, female domestic labour was limited to processes such as cooking, sewing, decorating and cleaning, allowing women more time to socialise with other women, read the Bible and focus on childrearing. In other words, women would become less involved in primary production processes and more involved in the intermediary or final levels of production, which were by nature easier, less demanding and allowed them time for personal and familial occupations (Sammas 1980, p. 15).

While their role inside the house became slightly more bearable, their place in the public ground and their acceptance as equals showed little improvement. A group of women, however, which formed in congregation of the time, the Levellers, were determined to challenge the existing reality, according to the Christian principle that men and women are equal since they were all made in the image of God (Walton 2005, p. 15). Many of the women participating in that group – allowed to pray and speak during congregations – had their husbands in prison and were willing to address this
issue, together with their own concerns. They were therefore involved in interventions, petitions and marches for a number of reasons, and were in each case dismissed as subordinates who should not be involved in such matters. In 1642 and 1643 petitioners for peace were defined as ‘Whores, Bawds, Oyster women, Kitchen maids’ (Walton 2005, p. 15). Another response to the Leveller’s struggle for their husbands’ freedom was the following: ‘It was not for women to Petition, they might stay at home and wash the dishes’ (Walton 2005, p. 15). It is thus obvious that until that time, even if women were not experiencing domesticity as a form of slavery, they were still considered inferior to men, incapable of speaking publicly or about public issues.

**Aristocratic domesticity**

The domestic life of the late 17th century aristocracy was changing more rapidly than it was for the lay people, as the precursors of the Enlightenment’s ideals indicated that the domestic environment was to be seen in a more affectionate, rational and egalitarian way. Specifically for the domestic and social life of elite women, naturally perceived as irrelevant to the production process, there was a palpable connection of their private and the public spheres. In this respect, women of the aristocracy would develop relationships based on friendship and reason-based communication, thus being the first to introduce the notion of domesticity into the existing tougher domestic sphere (Brown 1982). From the analysis of aristocratic women’s approach on domesticity, Brown (1982) concludes that in the second half of the 17th century, one could witness the introduction of the ideas of the Enlightenment, according to which every human activity had to be reconsidered and re-appreciated (p. 415).

These novel ideas introduced by the elite would later on reach the houses of the middle class, working towards the relaxation of the firm patriarchal structure. Influenced by the predominant discourse of the time, the creators of domesticity, the women of the aristocracy pursued a more rational and affective approach to their domestic lives (Brown 1982, p. 416). As Brown observes,
stressing an essential equality of the sexes, the vision of humanity and family life called for the intellectual education of women, the moral education of men, the elimination of compulsory marriage, and a nurturing family environment. (Brown 1982, p. 417)

Many women who were widowed chose not to remarry, and an increasing number of women chose not to marry at all. More families were taking their size into their own hands and the average age of marriage for both men and women increased (Brown 1982, pp. 418-419). Additionally, it was more permissible for both sexes to choose their partners, a fact which legitimised friendship as a significant determinant of one’s will before moving forward with marital life. These changes would inevitably affect, not only the aristocratic class, which was enthusiastic about the rationality promoted by the theorists and philosophers of the Enlightenment, but they would eventually penetrate the lower classes, who would, in turn, slowly but steadily approach family life and domesticity in a more affectionate way.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

The British philosopher John Stuart Mill lived in the era heralding the promising ideas of modernity, together with the reforms that the predominant figures of the public space deemed as appropriate for the new egalitarian humanistic social constitution. In fact, he was one of the most prominent advocates of this change. Actively involved in philosophy, economy, as well as in moral and political theory, he has formulated some of the most emblematic theories in support of empiricism and liberalism. Being a scholar who focused to such an extent on individual freedom and human well-being, Mill could not disregard the private sphere of the household and the unjust practices with which it was connected.

For this reason, and as part of his more mature oeuvre, he published in 1869 The Subjection of Women, which will shed light on the relationships dominating the household of his era, the effects that these were considered to have on the social sphere and his proposals for counteraction. Interestingly, at approximately the same time, in 1843, Marion Reid published in Edinburgh the Plea for Women, which was a neutral and comprehensive report of what it meant to be a woman at that time (Walton 2005, p. 42). As she explained, being a woman at the time was restricted to
being attentive to husband, children and household. The education of girls was insufficient and prohibited them from obtaining a better and more rounded understanding of their world, while married women were living in a ‘shackled condition’ burdened with household chores that dulled and depressed them (Walton 2005, p. 42). Women of that period, as well as their labour and children, belonged to the man of the family, and were governed by him.

Mill’s argumentation follows a similar line. His point of view regarding female subjugation presents two main counterarguments to the prevailing practices perpetuating a form of female slavery; the first is that equality between the sexes would make the female population happier and would meet the modernising ideals which his contemporaries aspired to uphold (Mill 1999, p. 52 & 95). The second is that by allowing women in the workforce and by giving them the same educational, training and employment opportunities as those being secured for men, society would benefit from the unique contribution of the former (p. 95). The main way through which the two abovementioned aims could be achieved, according to his theorisation, was the modification of the legislation regulating women’s rights. As he saw it, female oppression, a remnant practice of the past, continued to be endorsed by the laws which dictated women’s total dependence on their marital masters.

Mill observed that the slavery of the female gender might have seemed natural at the time, due to its hitherto unchallenged prevalence in the social and legal ground. Yet, the educational principles forging femininity and the fact that on every moral ground women were urged to devote their lives to the servitude of others, hindered the repudiation of this fundamentally unjust practice. As part of the vicious circle perpetuating the subjugation of the domesticated woman, he argued that since housewives were obliged to attend to their husband’s and household’s needs before even considering their own well-being, they were left with very little time and space in order to consider their own desires and figure the ways these could be accomplished (Mill 1999, p. 37). However, this is an optimistic reading of the 19th century domestic life, for as Mill observed, in marriage, a woman is obliged to obey her master’s wish, regardless of her personal desires, and is thus subjected to every possible mistreatment which would further attest to her husband’s superiority (Mill 1999, p. 42).
In this light, Mill argued that since marriage is for everyone, rather than for a selected few, not all men could handle the authority granted to them through secular and religious law. He thus considered problematic the fact that ‘men are not required, as a preliminary to the marriage ceremony, to prove by testimonials that they are fit to be trusted with the exercise of absolute power’ (Mill 1999, p. 42). Once again, there is a parallel between the family home and the state, for as Mill explained, unrestricted power leads to abuse; husbands given absolute sovereignty over their wives and children can scarcely foster a calm and respectful domestic environment, just as leaders do when they turn the social state into a totalitarian regime. He thus resembled the domestic regime with that of the political ground, and argued that in both cases a tyrant is capable of every form of terrible act he pleases to demonstrate his absolute and unchallengeable power (Mill 1999, p. 43).

In this case, notwithstanding the fact that familial ideals were held rather highly by his contemporaries, while family was idealised as a ‘school of sympathy, tenderness and loving forgetfulness of self’, it became rather obvious that the domestic haven of the family, in practice, was anything but the abovementioned (Mill 1999, p. 44). The family that Mill had most frequently encountered was the one where the wife and the children were treated as the husband’s belongings, rather than his equals. Therefore, without favouring the model of the leaderless family, for he maintained that no kind of society can exist devoid of leadership, he suggested that the married couple should be in control of different tasks, according to their capacities and their suitability for the role they undertake (Mill 1999, p. 48).

Accordingly, he argued that marital equality will not only contribute to the happiness of the couple, but it will also bring daily life to a higher moral level (Mill 1999, p. 51). Domestic equality is thus approached as an important parameter for Mill, similar to that of social equality; both considered to be naturally deriving from the principles of modern thought, while the former is also understood as the practice that will eventually overthrow the rule of command and obedience (Mill 1999, p. 52). Interestingly, in order to strengthen his argumentation, Mill also introduced a parallelism between the domestic and the public space, just as Aquinas and Aristotle did before him. He therefore maintained that the development of the domestic environment, understood as mundane and irrelevant to the social ground until then,
is a prerequisite to the evolution of society as such. ‘Equality’, he claimed, ‘is a measure extended to all’ (Mill 1999, p. 52); hence, by having the family home turned from a despotic realm into an egalitarian one, the former will indeed become ‘the real school of the virtues of freedom’ (Mill 1999, p. 53).

John Stuart Mill was one of the first philosophers to be concerned about the human habitat which, in his time, escaped legal and other social regulatory mechanisms. With an educational system teaching subjection to women and children and with men undertaking the role of the breadwinner – struggling in the public ground to support the family and thus rightfully demanding a household in his servitude – the home became a highly held ideal realised in a rather dystopic fashion. Yet Mill’s unease with domesticity did not only derive from the problems that women and children were facing in the domestic ground, for it is obvious that what mostly caught his attention were the social repercussions of this injustice on the social ground. He thus clarified that the dominance of one totalitarian ruler who had the productive resources of the household at his command could rigidify a principle of which the reproduction would challenge the ideals of modern society.

Industrialisation and the home

While the aforementioned changes, to the social milieu and discourse of the era, could have promoted a more comfortable and egalitarian domestic sphere, the process of industrialisation hindered their realisation. England, the current geographical focus, is a prime example of industrialisation, since it was one of the first countries to pass from an agricultural economy to an industrial one. The transition occurred during the 18th and 19th centuries, when the industry shifted from the cities to the countryside for technical reasons and in order to escape the restrictions imposed by communities and trade unions. As a result of the economic changes that the urban and rural population had experienced in England between 1760 and 1840, the communal lands around the villages were transformed into private farmlands (Eckardt & Hassenpflug 2003).

While land could be exploited more effectively, this transition gradually transformed the small owners into simple tenants or wage earners, most of which gained what was necessary for their mere survival. As a result, massive flows of
workforce were shifted towards the new industries, such as the textile industry, which was hitherto organised in the houses of the peasants. In this regard, the textile production once located inside the household where spinning, weaving and painting were performed by the family, was too static to meet the demands of the growing market, thus it was the first field to be industrialised (North 2018).

The development of the industries and their concentration in large factories attracted families from the rural areas of the south to the areas of the northern mines and the centre. These families moved from the isolated houses of their province to the densely populated neighbourhoods built near the factories. In a very short time new cities emerged and many of the old ones grew disproportionately (Moore-Cherry, Crossa & O’ Donnell 2015).

Under these new conditions, industrialists were counting on a stock of working hands that could be replaced at any time. Workers, on the other hand, found an unprecedented variety of choice in these cities, as well as the ability to be recognised and organised as a social class and to defend their common interests. In the meantime, trade requirements, and in particular the need to transport heavy or bulky goods, such as coal and ferrous minerals, contributed to the renewal of communication routes. Therefore, the development of certain cities was directly related to this new transport system and the ever-growing commercial activity of the time (O'Brien & Pike 2015).

The nature of these phenomena, namely, the upsurge in the residents and new housing in cities, the increase in industrial and commercial enterprises, new roads, channels, and ways of transportation just as the speed with which these changes were occurring were unprecedented. Cities were forming and doubling in one generation; industrial facilities, roads and channels emerged at great speed, mines opened at the heart of unexploited agricultural areas, and blast furnaces and chimneys appeared in the sky near cathedral towers (McBride 2017).

The city of Manchester: A case study of industrialisation

Another interesting example of an industrial city and the ways that industrial development influenced habitation was Manchester. At the beginning of the 14\textsuperscript{th} century, it acquired the title of the town, and it experienced particular development
during the Industrial Revolution, where the city became an industrial centre for the production of cotton fabrics (Muldrew 2016).

By the end of the 18th century and at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, Manchester was a small commercial city, of which the textile and cotton production were the predominant economic fields. The numerous small valleys in the north and east of the city, combined with the humid climate, proved to be ideal for the construction of watermills used to process the cotton. In 1292, the cotton trade laid the foundations for the subsequent development of the city as a “Cottonopolis”. By the end of the 16th century, the city had expanded to produce other fabrics such as wool, silk and raw cotton, fibres and yarns, while at the same time it was developed as a distribution centre for the textile industry. While Manchester was already at the core of trade and commercial transactions, it remained a relatively small centre until the late 18th century (Stearns 2018).

In the second half of the 18th century, Manchester had already obtained the title of a large provincial centre. The first large-scale cotton industry was opened in 1776 by Mr. N. Hall on the banks of the Tame River and soon after many factories began to operate in various areas north and east of the city. The cotton production process and the new mills required space for plants, factories and warehouses (Lamonte, Curshing & West 2015).

As a result, valleys and existing residential areas were transformed into commercial districts. At the same time, the workforce grew sharply during this period, while in 1830, the general population rose from 17,000 in 1760 to 180,000. Much of this increase derived from the process of internal migration, since many people moved from the countryside, mainly from Ireland, to other parts of the Britain, to explore new opportunities. The rapid growth of trade and exports was supported by cheap labour, while the expansion of transport connections contributed to its further development (Lamonte, Curshing & West 2015).

During this period, the number of factories, warehouses, offices and shops increased. In the mid-19th century, while cotton was still the basis of the economy, trade was also developed in other sectors such as metal and chemical processing. Simultaneously with the development of trade, relations with the surrounding cities (such as Stockport, Oldham, Rochdale, Bolton, Salford) improved and the distances...
between them were diminished due to the expansion of the transport networks. Thus, the size of the city’s economic and commercial services in the region transformed it into one of the largest shopping and production centres, and the city is now one of Britain’s largest (if not the largest) urban centres after the city of London (Jewson & MacGregor, 2018).

The economic activity was widened since the opening of the Manchester Canal in 1894 as well as the creation of the first major industrial centre in the world, the Trafford Park, in 1905. By the end of the 19th century, Manchester had the reputation of a modern industrial city of great scale and growth. However, in parallel with the thriving industry, the city had gained the reputation of a busy, crowded and highly unhealthy city. The high poverty rate and unfavourable conditions contributed to a low standard of living for the majority of its inhabitants. Hygiene conditions begun to improve around 1875, but the environmental damage continued with smog and atmospheric pollution being the major problems (Roberts, Thomas & Williams 2014).

In his work, Engels (1844) analyses the situation in the city of Manchester during the period of the Industrial Revolution. He describes the neighbourhoods of Manchester (at that time the city had 400,000 inhabitants), starting with the ownership of the land that was rented for 50-90 years to contractors, who build cheap housing for workers, with two rooms without kitchen or toilet.

(...) the worker is forced to reside in these unacceptable homes because he cannot pay the rent for better ones, or because there are no better ones near a factory, or because they belong to the industrialist and the latter only hires to work those who accept to live in them (p. 54)

The whole area is full of waste from nearby factories as they pour their wastewater into the city’s river and pollute the air with the exhaust gases they emit. Referring to the Oxford Road, he describes:

(...) in the two hundred small houses there are about 4,000 people, all Irish. The roads are dirty, without pavement and without sewers. There are huge amounts of rubbish, waste, mud and dirt everywhere. A crowd of children and women with rags are constantly wandering in the streets (...) there is only one toilet for 120 people, often inaccessible because of the dirt (p. 79)

The heavy industrialisation of urban centres such as Manchester made domestic life unbearable and resulted in widespread diseases, such as the 1854 cholera, while high
mortality for children, who were working the same hours as the adults, was also a reality hard to disregard.

Home as private property

Simultaneously, late 17th century Britain was under the influence of another important wind of change that would open the definition of home to the wider discursive category of private property. Although, property was always important to social life and the classification of the social space, it was at that historical point that property became ‘that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe’ (Brace 2004, p. 1). Such a belief would plant the seed for the first theories of objectification, aspiring to pin down the subject-object relationship, or in other words the individuals’ relationship with property.

As expected, this tendency would stress the importance of an existing relation, that between property and good citizenship (Brace 2004, p. 13). In this case, the idea argued as inextricable to private property was none other than that of ‘improvement’. In this regard, property owned was property that could and should be improved, be made productive (Brace 2004, p. 14). This belief — accentuated by John Lock’s assertions that property is the basis of self-preservation — found prosperous ground in the 17th century that experienced a general re-appreciation of landlordship because of significant demographic changes (Brace 2004, p. 16). With the 1650 English economy in crisis and the consumption of corn exceeding every foreseeable expectation, between 1605 and 1661 only in London, lands were rapidly enclosed and small farms were intensively developed to supplement the produce of those years. Improvement of property was promoted as a necessity and not as a choice, and it was that same necessity which brought more land in the hands of investors, detaching the peasants from their own enterprises (Brace 2004, p. 16).

During the 18th century property obtained a legal status, while relevant issues and debates gained momentum, rigidifying the pre-existing social distinction of the propertied and the propertyless into a value that has influenced the western world ever since. The Lockean ideals that viewed individuals as the leaders of their lives,
achieving self-mastery through property accumulation and labour, echoed the ancient Greek notion of *autarky* and became the regulators of civil society as such (Brace 2004, pp. 6-9). Accordingly, property owners were regarded as men who contributed willingly to the well-being of their community, whereas anyone who failed to own property was immediately recognised as a ‘subperson’, or a lesser individual, when compared to the propertied class (Brace 2004, p. 7).

As expected, the discursive implications of this phenomenon would obviously escape the narrow debate on property and would disperse in the public ground, with a significant impact on the practices of early modern England. The belief that the enclosed land was contributing to the benefit of the social whole, whereas wild wastelands were a loss to productivity, was not only a case against idlers but the foundation upon which the ideas of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nature were being based (Smith 1989, p. 211).

Specifically, as Smith argues, the bourgeois view of society, increasingly updated by the powerful argumentation of the era’s improvers, could be summarised in the following dictum: ‘the nature that can be dominated becomes good in contrast to those aspects of nature that are morally bad because they cannot be harnessed for human purposes’ (Smith 1989, p. 211). As this view became more popular, the belief that every individual conforming to the bourgeois ideals is of good nature was legitimised, leaving the unclassified others in the category of those of a bad nature (1989-1990, p. 211). In this regard, the propertyless, the nomads, the poor and the vagrants were straightaway discriminated as ‘bad’, since they were obviously placed outside the boarders of the bourgeois imagined community.

The naturalisation of poverty was therefore the very process that not only segregated the residents from the homeless, or the propertied from the propertyless into contradicting social categories, but it also fed into the underclass’ exclusion from their right to citizenship. By deeming the socially included as naturally able to participate in the community, the inability of the rest to uphold their duties immediately led to the removal of their rights (Smith 1989, p. 216). It would thus be accurate to note that, in Early Modern Britain, the ideals of property, domesticity and permanent residency were transforming the very perception by which the West would perceive the world.
In Victorian England, thus, vagrancy was perceived as a threat to the newly formed urban, early capitalist society, since it opposed the ‘fundamental valorisation of property on which capitalism is based’ (Brantlinger & Ulin 1993, p. 41). Additionally, the vagrant is willing to work as much as necessary for his/her own sustenance, but is unwilling to form any kind of relationships with property. In a similar vein, the fact that vagrants refused to become demographic subjects, and by extension more difficult to predict (Brantlinger & Ulin 1993, p. 44). At approximately the same period – the end of the 18th C – the emergence of anatomo-politics (Foucault 1973), as part of a greater shift towards rational science, gave rise to dichotomies and binaries, such as the normal/abnormal, male/female, national/foreign, sane/mad, healthy/ill, able-bodied/disabled (Ellis 1900, p. 5).

Consumption in industrial England

The result of industrialisation and private property led to the emergence of consumption as a widespread domestic activity. At the end of the 18th century with the rise of mass production, consumption began to take on huge proportions as the industrialisation and the development of capitalism filled the market with consumer goods. At this time, changes in production techniques coincided with changes in people’s tastes, preferences and desires, and consumption became a major factor in building social relationships. Consumption of goods, in addition to simple satisfaction of basic needs, had gradually become not only a part of everyday competition between individuals and families but also a basic means of mediating social relations at a macroscopic level. Conspicuous consumption and waste of wealth were a means of rising and building the social status of not only families but of entire social groups (Couldry, Livingstone & Markham 2016).

Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929), described in 1899 the importance of consumer goods as markets for social recognition and level of life. He also described the rise of an important new social class, the “nouveaux riches”, at the end of the 19th century America, who drew from their purchasing power to show off their riches and success. Veblen (2017) identified this practice of the new class (which became wealthy through
the management of industries) as an imitation of the upper classes of Europe’s aristocracy.

Aristocracy in turn, seeing these consumer practices and the industrial parade of money, constantly renewed its consumer activity to stay above this new social stratum. The consumer culture of *nouveaux riches* was also important as a division from the working class and as an enforcement instrument over it. In this way consumption gained an increasingly important role in society as it gave prestige and increasingly determined the new social hierarchy.

Georg Simmel, continuing Veblen’s work, focused on the importance of consumption and the creation of the modern social life of the early 20th century. In his work *Metropolis and Mental Life* (1903), he analyses how social relations emerge and become increasingly anonymous, based more on market rules and less on personal relationships. In a nutshell, the development of the city had affected contact, social life, social relationships, and the way people perceived their cohabitants. Simmel argued that it is through consumption that people were trying to cope with these changes and concluded that as city grew, consumption would eventually be the only thing satisfying the social and psychological needs of people, while fashion as a form of social change and renewal would become an increasingly important factor.

In this milieu, the leisure time and activities of the working class seemed to preoccupy the new bourgeoisie as they sought ways to maintain control over public life beyond the labourers’ working hours, to increase labour productivity and open up new markets for consumer products. They believed that consumer habits, involving excessive drinking of alcohol, bloody sports, prostitution and subversive conversations had to be eliminated from the public sphere, and should be replaced with new, healthier ones.

The result was the rise of Victorian philanthropy and political reform, primarily based on the enforcement of consumer practices, sanitation, domestic and private consumption activities within the family and the production of peaceful and productive workers. This was pursued in numerous ways; for once, there is a greater provision of libraries and museums, public baths, sewage systems, electricity and gas infrastructure. Furthermore, one witnesses the promotion of rational, acceptable and safe leisure activities, such as sports or wood sculpture. These plans for urban reform
were promoted by the industrialists who were trying to increase control over the working class so as to increase their profits. Hence, consumerism, as a culture in the mid-19th century, appears to be manifested through a series of efforts to domesticate the working class and to simultaneously exploit the public space and leisure time (Kirchberg 2016).

Karl Marx (1818-1883)

From the 17th to the 19th century the discourses of improvement and colonialism, which were both at full blow, together with the advent of capitalism and the expulsion of labour from the domestic sphere, deprived the household of its productive role, pushing it gradually into the realm of consumption and commodification. In this regard, the home seemed to be contradicting the very human principles that it was hitherto protecting. Godwin and Bentham, for example, were two of the theorists who referred extensively to the idea that private property thwarts human dignity, by generating poverty. Similarly, in the 19th century, when the capitalist system had already penetrated labour and civil society, the household was perceived as a space that promoted social stratification, and one that enslaved the weaker members of society, into a life devoted to the servitude of capital accumulation.

The most prominent theorist of the era, gripped by the negative accompaniments of private property was Karl Marx, who did not simply analyse the household as an institution adding to the problems brought forth by the privatisation of property, but saw it as the space endorsing the enslavement of its residents. As already mentioned above, the discourse of improvement had instilled the theoretical and the practical foundations of a relationship between man and nature perceived as relevant to the process of property accumulation and privatisation.

Respectively, class and eventually morality were enmeshed in the evaluation of property accumulated by a family or an individual, turning private property into a proof of one’s willingness to benefit the community. The logic endorsing the link of land ownership and moral superiority, as discussed in the section analysing Aristotle’s theorisation, not only prevails but is rigidified in the capitalist principles that designate everything domesticated and socially included as beneficial to man, while the rest is
deemed as harmful and substandard. In this light, individuals striving for property accumulation appear more interested in the common good and for that reason were held higher than those less capable of seizing land and power. As Marx argued, the aforementioned logic was a mere pretence under which individuals solely interested in their own well-being were not only allowed to act in this manner but were also appraised for the practices they followed, regardless of the fact that their activity had little to do with the common good (Romm 1991).

In terms of the way that modern society was shaped he claims that:

The owners of mere labour-power, the owners of capital and the landlord, whose respective sources of income are wages, profit, and ground rent, in other words, wage labourers, capitalists and landlords, form the three great classes of modern society resting upon the capitalist mode of production. (Smelser 1973, p. 15)

Yet, as he observes, even in England where modern society was highly developed at the time, the three aforementioned categories are connected with each other, in the sense that the capitalist separates the means of production from labour, thus creating larger groups of such means, transforming labour into wage labour (Smelser 1973, p. 15). Without insinuating that the feudal system was a classless one (Romm 1991), Marx suggested that the labourers’ disassociation from land and, by extension, their transformation into wage labour, becomes the main reason for which they are alienated from the resources of production, their own labour and in turn society as such.

As a result, property became one of the most fundamental issues that Marxism would discuss, in an attempt to prove that private ownership was interfering in human society, alienating people not only from each other, but also from their own selves. Primarily, the first impact of private property on civil society was that it separated those who have and those who have not, those who own and those who do not, and by extension the capitalists and the proletariat.

In Engels’s *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (1884), a publication based on the notes of Karl Marx to Lewis H. Morgan’s book *Ancient Society* (1877), it is claimed that

in most historical states the rights conceded to citizens are granted on a property basis, whereby it is directly admitted that the state is an organization for the protection of the possessing classed against the nonpossessing classes. This is already the case in the Athenian and Roman property classes. Similarly in the medieval feudal state, in which the extent of political power was determined by the extent of land-ownership. (in Smelser 1973, p. 15)
This observation has been thoroughly discussed in the present analysis, which has highlighted the relationship of the possessing classes with the ruling classes of different eras, a relationship that seems too rigid to overturn, although it was Marx’s predominant aim to find ways to achieve this.

In The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Critique (1956) Marx supports that ‘all treaties on political economy take private property for granted’, and thus the poverty generated as a side-effect becomes as natural as property itself (p. 46). Yet by his theorisation, he maintained that the two, although accurately acknowledged as interdependent, are not extensions to each other but the opposites of one another, since the wealthy, representing the necessity of property, and the proletariat, pauperised exactly because of it, have a fundamentally contradicting aim (p. 51). While the property holders are willing to maintain their wealth through the protection of their land, by keeping their social status and that of their labourers unaffected, the proletariat can only be benefited by the exact opposite, namely the abolishment of their status through that of private property (p. 51). Therefore, Marx defined the owners, those wishing to preserve, as the conservative side, whereas the proletarians were the destructive side, the ones aspiring to annihilate their oppressors and by extension the cause of their own disposition.

In terms of the idea of home, Marx was known to disagree with Hegel since the former believed that the family estate should rightfully belong to a family and should thus be passed from the father to the first-born son, in order to remain in the family property. Marx, on the other hand, supported that property should not only be free from the rules of civil society but it should also remain unaffected by state regulations (Avineri 1968, p. 28). The household, the family estate and any other form of privately exploited property is perceived by Marx as the main reasons for which poverty and the exploitation of human labour exists.

Social conflicts, he further explained, can on no account be tempered as long as private property regulates civil society and by extension the state (Brace 2004, p. 68). Thus, in short, the deterritorialised population, disassociated from its land, property-less and deprived of any form of dignified returns for their undervalued labour, is left with absolutely nothing but their own selves to offer (Brace 2004, p. 82).
In the industrialised world, private property is gathered in the hands of those who are capable of owing and exploiting it, limiting the options of the proletariat to the only one available, to become prey for the capitalists.

In addition to the intensified schism between the owners and the non-owners, Marx observed that privately held family estates and bourgeois homes were established on the ruins of the proletarian household (Brace 2004, p. 85). The externalisation of production from the boundaries of the home eventually took its toll on the proletarian family, transforming each of its members into a servant of the more powerful property-holding members of society. This, according to Marx, was the kind of labour that actually turned against the workers, as it became irrelevant to their well-being; a kind of labour proliferated exactly because private ownership is accepted. In Communism, Marx saw the abolition of private property and thus the abolition of labour alienation as a practice that would reconcile the workers with their work by making their occupation genuine and actually productive, something which would in turn make them active property holders (Brace 2004, p. 85).

Interestingly, another issue that preoccupied Marx and is intertwined with the idea and the institution of home is that of monogamy and its economic origins. In the *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884) there is another affirmation relevant to the analysis of the present thesis of Ancient Greece, supporting that the only reason for monogamy at the time was to validate the supremacy of the man and to ensure that his heirs would indisputably be his and would thus be eligible to inherit his fortune, as well as his citizenship.

In this light, Marx, just as the philosophers hitherto examined, draws a parallel between society and the household, according to which the antagonism between men and women in the monogamous marriage, stemming from man’s exclusive supremacy is a miniature of the antagonism embedded in class society (Smelser 1973, p. 25). Since man is considered the sole breadwinner of the family, he represents the bourgeois, who consider himself crucially important for production, as he is the one who possesses the means of production. The wife, by extension is the proletariat, who is obliged to work with the means of production provided by the husband, in the way that the husband desires (p. 30).
Another issue that Marx identifies as problematic, in the case of the modern family, is that the patriarchal, and by extension, monogamous family shifted the status of the household from public to private (Smelser 1973, p. 30). As it was observed until now, both through the socio-cultural analysis of the home as well as through the ideas discussed by the philosophers selected, the household gradually lost its relation to the public sphere. As a result, intrafamilial relationships and home-making practices lost their relevance to the social sphere; men became rulers, while women and children became unpaid private servants, excluded from every form of social participation, even in an indirect way (p. 31).

In this light, Communism sought to address the problem arising in the relationship between men and women, or husband and wife, but also that developing in the relationship between parents and children. In this guise, Marx saw the proletarian family as an institution dedicated to the servitude of the bourgeois, but he also underpinned some serious inequalities in the domestic sphere of the bourgeois family itself. As mentioned above, he claimed that the leader of the bourgeois family, the husband and father of the household, considered his wife to be an instrument of production. By presupposing that every instrument of production can and has to generate surplus value through its exploitation, the bourgeois household head applies this very principle on his domestic sphere; he treats his wife accordingly turning her into a domestic servant tending to his every need (Vattimo & Zabala 2014).

Likewise, the family, most commonly the proletarian and often enough the bourgeois, was perceived as an institution of child oppression, one that sold off its offspring in times of need, which was a rather frequent phenomenon. In this light, parental authority was understood as a force of exploitation, and as a practice setting a precedent which encouraged the exploitation of the weakest household members by the most powerful ones. This was a development that Marx and Engels found appalling, especially when considering that society is constituted by such forms of micro-societies in which inequality and the exploitation of the weaker was reproduced as a viable option and finally even as an ideal.

Since female productivity was limited to the boundaries of the house and women were mostly excluded from activities of social production, by being limited to and by their domestic duties, they lacked the necessary power to overturn this
unequal status quo. Yet, as Marx observes, male supremacy should no longer be validated, since men had lost their ostensible unique quality as breadwinners, as women too were at the time participating in large-scale industry (Smelser 1973, p. 29). Additionally, he claims that through Communism and the transfer of the means of production into common ownership, the family would no longer be regarded as a private institution and household management would become a social industry (p. 33). He further maintains that since childcare and education will be a public affair, the fact that every child, be it legitimate or not, will have access to the same resources, thus alleviating the pressure for monogamy and relieving the male anxiety stemming from this matter (p. 33).

The emancipation of women, Marx predicts, will allow them to have access to the social ground and thus be equally powerful to their male counterparts, therefore giving them the opportunity to marry out of love and not out of interest or duty (p. 39). Here Marx meets John Stuart Mill, who equally criticised the role and the education of women, considering such prevalent distorted principles as the reason of their inability to revolt against domestic injustice. And as Mill proposed the acceptance of women into the areas of employment and labour, Marx saw the Modern Industry and the possibility of female participation in the productive process, as a way for them to gain power and simultaneously earn a place in the social ground (Clarke 2016).

In contrast to Aristotle and Aquinas, who both saw the family and the household as a natural and necessary form of human relationship, John Stuart Mill and Marx were willing to challenge the role that domesticity had obtained in their respective eras. The latter, having witnessed the rise of capitalism and an unprecedented degree of social exploitation that seemed embedded in the one prerequisite which protects the very existence of the household, namely private property, identifies the solution in the abolition of the system of ownership and with it that of the household itself. Challenging the pretentiousness of the monogamous marriage, and the failure of both the bourgeois and the proletariat family, opposing the ideals of exploitation that had penetrated and were therefore re-enacted inside the household, Marx acknowledged private property as the root of all evils. Therefore, he suggested that private property and by extension, the household itself must be
abolished so that the proliferation of exploitation will be prevented. As expected, the idea of the domestic institution, hitherto perceived as naturally beneficial to the social sphere, was dented by its capitalist appropriation and utter privatisation.

State Housing and Intervention

From the first days of urban development, home was considered as more than just the shelter of the self and the family. It became a signifier of status, origin and social as well as financial condition. It thus became a symbol, which could be and was appropriated by different discourses, while it simultaneously obtained objective value, as a piece of property to be financially exploited.

Home and domesticity, would thus be involved in different power games initiated by governments and/or the powerful classes of different countries. Specifically, when a state wanted to enforce a certain policy, or, together with the elite of that society, aspired to promote a certain idea, the housing policy would often be altered so that the desired result would be reached. Examples of the aforementioned were referenced above, in the creation of the industrialised urban centres, or before that, when in the Medieval period, landlords led their tenants to locations that would generate more profit. Another accurate example of state intervention that cannot be overlooked is the case of Irish state housing, dating from the early 18th century. When Ireland was confirmed as an essentially agricultural economy, the redistribution of landownership to tenant-farmers became a necessity (p. 21), a reality not only acknowledged by the Irish governments of the time, but also by the British, since Ireland exported nearly two-thirds of the produce to Britain.

The 1841 Irish Census proved, as it was common in many agricultural areas of England too, that the housing conditions were inhuman, for the main bulk of the population:

470,000 dwellings, around 40 per cent of the rural housing stock, had only one room. These hovels were commonly known as ‘cabins’, and were poorly constructed with walls usually of wattle and mud, and roofs of turf or thatch. Most had straw floors since livestock were kept indoors, and chimneys and windows were rare. (p. 22)

Another 42% of the housing stock were cottages of two to four rooms, where the living conditions were significantly better. In 1870, the Liberal government responded such
problems with the first wave of Irish Land Acts, thus giving greater protection to tenure and allowing dual landownership. Despite this and the following Land Acts of Ireland, the lower classes continued to suffer from the appalling living conditions in which they resided. Interestingly, grievances regarding the housing issue would be heard with the rule of the Conservative party, which hoped to prove their allegiance to Britain, from 1893 to 1905 (p. 30).

The second phase of the Labourers Act was enforced by the Liberal government, on an entirely different premise than that of the Conservative party, and came at an era that the demand for improved housing was lower than ever before, due to rural depopulation and emigration (p. 41). A much easier task than before, rural housing reform became a priority for the ruling Irish Party, and became part of their portfolio of achievements. In any case, the second phase of the Labourers Act from 1906 onwards, did result in the improvement of rural housing, with increased state subsidy and raised housing standards (p. 45). Interestingly, the example of Ireland has until now provided sound proof that regardless of the fact that most people were suffering from inhuman living conditions and were in need of policies and reformations that would ameliorate their status, the governments dealing with the issue were doing so merely for political ends.

Similar to rural housing, even if not equally significant, was the issue of urban state housing in Ireland, which until the First World War was one of the most volatile political concerns of the era (p. 61). As it will be shown below, the Irish well-off classes had the desire to move to the suburbs, thus leaving the city centres (of the only two big Irish cities, Belfast and Dublin) to deteriorate. Additionally, the fact that urban housebuilding had ceased, in the case of Dublin, for example, for several decades, resulted in housing of substandard conditions (p. 66). Finally, another side-effect of housing shortage, to be expected, was the fact that rents were high, and in most cases much higher than necessary.

In this milieu, neither public nor charitable interest would show any concern for the urban housing conditions of Irish city centres such as Dublin. However, with the outbreak of the cholera epidemics, in 1848/49, the issue of substandard housing became a priority. In this regard, an important housing scheme in the 1850s, commenced by employers for their workforce (p 69). At approximately the same
period there is heavy semi-philanthropic activity, mostly following philanthropic models available in Britain, which was also involved in the urban housing issue, but deteriorated and finally collapsed in 1907, when the matter became one of municipal concern and new houses were built especially for the working classes (p. 74). However, in this case also, the main reasons for such municipal activity were intertwined with political gain, rather than with any concern for the urban inhabitants. Here too, the Irish Party aspired to obtain and maintain a municipal hegemony, while highlighting their capacity to respond to the needs of the working-class, and by extent rendering the formation of an independent working-class political party obsolete (p. 80).

Another example, illustrating the aforementioned, indicates how a 19th century Cork region, namely, Prosperity Square, became part of the ‘civilising process’ which aimed to exclude socially unstable agents from proper residential areas. At that time, the houses of Prosperity Square were privately managed by the Improved Dwellings Company (Keohane 2002). The list of the criteria qualification of future tenants specified that these houses would be allocated to families of church and sober habits, with school-going children and with at least one carer in full-time permanent employment. In 1875, during the company’s annual meeting, their ‘beneficial work’ in terms of ‘the moral effects in the neighbourhood’ was stressed and the company was praised for its social contribution (Keohane 2002, p. 395). Obviously, any responsible family carer would prefer such a neighbourhood, or any other safe and respectable residential area, as long as they had the capacity to make that choice. Yet, the criticism against such practices of exclusion focuses on the fact that social agents are rewarded for their material achievement and their efforts to maintain a spotless image, whereas people who fail to conform to such principles are regarded as undeserving and unworthy, ostracised as moral impurities (Keohane 2002, p. 396).

Ireland was chosen as the example of an area where the issue of housing has proved to have extreme political significance and has thus been a subject that political parties and different types of authorities hoped to appropriate – e.g. State, municipal, private and philanthropic. At the same time, the people whose luck was affected, together with the living standards they experience and their entire understanding of domesticity are simply side-effects of the House Wars occurring in the background.
Much later, in mid-20th century Britain, as research indicates, state housing policies are still intertwined with all of the issues mentioned in the case of Ireland. First, it is observed that housing policies are relevant to political demand and are frequently enforced as a response to political struggle. Another reason for housing policies is connected with the needs of the capital, which urges such policies to meet the needs of a healthy building and real estate industry. At the same time the reproduction of the labour force becomes another parameter, since housing shortage leads to labour shortage and policymaking aspires to reverse this, and finally housing policy is linked with the promotion of particular political ideology, since for example, property holders oppose change when their interests are being prioritised by one political party, rather than another (Kirby 1981, pp. 1296-7).

There is another interesting example of state intervention, however, which influenced the home-making practices of the period during and immediately after World War II. In Britain, during the post-World War II period, the Labour government’s approach to women had to be specific so that women would be lured back from the workplace to their homes, in order to free the positions in the forces of production for the returning male population (Dean 1991, p. 270). Having been urged to leave their homes during the War, they were now required to return to their domestic routines, and, although, many married women wanted to do so – as long as their husbands had secured employment with a reasonable wage – the fact that women would return to an isolated domestic environment seemed to rather problematic. At the same time, younger women, who were more career oriented, were much less inclined to follow this course, therefore the Government of the time had to take these issues into consideration.

In order to achieve a smoother transition, housewives received sympathy and understanding, while men were urged to take courses which would inform them in issues such as child-care and domestic management, so as to become more sympathetic and helpful to their wives (Dean 1991, p. 271). Another reason, for which domestic management was important for a devastated Britain trying to rebuild itself, was that well-run homes were regarded as immediately and dynamically correlated to the prosperity of the nation; a view corresponding to that of the philosophers hitherto considered.
However, when in 1947, the economic situation of Britain was in need of new sources of labour the one demographic group that was immediately targeted was that of young mothers, who were once again encouraged to enter the industry (Dean 1991, p. 275). Women were then asked to respond to their patriotic duty, just as they did during the War and as an incentive, the Report of the Royal Commission on Equal Pay was published and there was a shift towards the improvement of education for women. Simultaneously, different female role models became available, including that of the ‘clever’ girl, while the state promoted an egalitarian spirit of a socialist Britain, providing different role female role models (e.g. a mixture of married and unmarried teachers), and promoting the role of the female care-giver, who nurtures men and women, as mothers, wives and teachers (p. 281). The ideal stemming from the abovementioned developments, as the next section will show, was that of the suburban home, indicating that, for purposes juxtaposing the needs of its inhabitants, certain domestic models are appreciated more than others.

The Suburban Ideal

With capitalism at full blow, the main issues with which urban inhabitants were forced to deal led to another significant change that would inform the domestic ideal with new context. On the one hand, a series of troubling concerns accompanied the home, relevant with the inhuman conditions which residents had to tolerate in their urban environment. On the other hand, the industrialisation of the forces of production, the manipulation of the workforce as well as mass production, which allowed households to enjoy a cheaper and much wider range of products than before, gave rise to the new middle class, allowing them the capacity to ‘migrate’ to better housing conditions, such as for example the suburbs.

The domestic imagery created and promoted from the 1800s onwards in the western world (mainly the UK and the USA) was no other than that of the suburban household (Blunt & Dowling 2006, p. 100). The construction of this ideal can be traced back to the separation of the private and the public spheres in late Victorian Britain and the desire of the middle classes to practically separate their leisure space and time from their work space and time. In this case, while in the 19th century, urban dwellers
located their homes close to the city centre and their jobs, the issues discussed above, urged some of the wealthier households to distance themselves from the urban environment (Blunt & Dowling 2006, p. 101).

At the same time, the desire of the male breadwinner of the family to pull away from the city and separate his work and leisure time, also strengthened the idealisation of the suburbs (Johnson & Johnson 2008, p. 492). The urban environment and the quick pace of modernisation that individuals were required to process proved to be severely detrimental for all sexes and social classes. Hence, as research indicates, the urban lifestyle in which, even the bourgeois, men and women were trapped, had both physical and psychological consequences on their well-being (Bresnahan 2003, p. 170). While different in nature both men and women exhibited neurasthenic behaviours that required treatment. Men suffered from mental fatigue and the stress of business life, while many women were shocked by their entering the marketplace and the fact they overlooked their roles as mothers and housewives.

Significantly more difficult was the domestic reality that lower social classes were experiencing. As the records of the West Riding Pauper Lunatic Asylum indicate, female patients, more often than male, were institutionalised due to illnesses attributed to their domestic environment, including unbearable poverty, grief, marital relationships and intradomestic violence (Levine-Clark 2000, p. 341). Almost 1,500 women were admitted to the West Riding Pauper Lunatic Asylum, over the course of eighteen years, who experienced severe mental breakdowns caused by a number of factors relevant to their households (p. 342). As Wright underlines, women were predominately challenged by the anxiety following the process of industrialisation, a fact that also daunted women of upper and middle classes, patients of the Ticehurst Asylum in Sussex (p. 343). Other stressful events that women had to process were relevant to the death of their husbands or children, as well as with shattered expectations of conjugal life (pp. 347-351). Yet one of the most important reasons for women’s institutionalisation was connected with prevalent intradomestic violence they experienced, which was exacerbated by the poverty, the unemployment and the alcohol abuse of their husbands (p. 353).

Despite of this grim domestic reality, home obtained additional importance as it was the only space where many individuals could withdraw from the devastating
marketplace that capitalism had created (Bresnahan 2003, p. 172). As a result, the distinction of the public and the private spheres became mandatory while the idealisation of the private sphere ensued. The idealisation of the suburban home gained momentum and was promoted as the best place to live. However, many were the women who while accepting their domestic role as one of great importance, were reluctant to abandon the city centre for the suburbs, since they had better access to services and conveniences relevant to their household and were more in touch with the public sphere (Johnson & Johnson 2008, p. 492).

Likewise, in the US of the early 1900, there was an obvious struggle between the male and female approach to the location of the household, yet men, who were not only desperate to find shelter in their private sphere, but were constantly encouraged to become more involved in their domestic and family environment, saw masculine domesticity as a role developing only in the suburbs (p. 494). The struggle resulted in the fact that men would agree to be more devoted to their family duties as long as they would be allowed to envision and create their dream homes in the suburbs, and in the 1920s the suburban home became a symbol of true happiness and led large migration flows towards the suburbs (p. 496). The social discourse that encouraged the idealisation of the suburban home promoted motherhood as a sacred role and showed young girls that it was a matter of choice to obtain this wonderful and hugely important duty.

While the role of the mother and suburban home-making was idealised, with the initiative of men and the consent of women, it did not take long for the discourse to change once again, freeing men from their marital and parental responsibilities. Magazine stories and advertisements promoted the idea that it was a woman’s duty to keep her husband satisfied and thus at home, for if he strayed, ‘it was [her] poor sexual, childrearing, or housekeeping skills, chapped hands, dry skin or unpleasant breath that was the cause (quoted in Marsh 1990, p. 139 – Johnson & Johnson 2008, p. 497).

The suburban discourse was once again changed during the 1950s, when wartime propaganda aspired to lure city dwellers away from the cities, as they hoped to reduce urban population density and to clear the slums, not only in order to improve the urban living conditions, but also as a way to reduce any casualties in case
of an attack (p. 499). Likewise, in Australia, the idealisation of the suburban house ensued as part of a policy which was enforced for the increase of the national birth rate (Blunt & Dowling 2006, p. 104).

Besides the very significant reasons mentioned above for which governmental housing policy and propaganda resulted in the idealisation of the suburban home, it is also obvious that the suburban home is a space in which every normative ideal of home and home-making can be realised, thus facilitating the reproduction of the predominant social discourse of each era. Urban homes, for example, are seen as unfit to shelter a family, while they appear to be preferred for non-familial gender relations. Additionally, their architecture and their location (eg. high rise apartments) are believed to be insensitive to the needs of a child-rearing and familial activities (Blunt & Dowling 2006, p. 107). In this regard, the suburban home, ‘private rather than public, a haven for the middle class, feminine (the sphere of women) and socially exclusionary’, becomes the model that is idealised, regardless of its location (p. 112). In this light, although urban, high-rise and often expensive apartments are perceived as elitist and thus have gained respect, the domestic ideal, as the following two chapters will prove, remains intertwined with that of the suburban household.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the ways that the social and political milieu of the Medieval times, and furthermore that of the Early Modern and Modern England, changed the meanings with which the home was connected. While the three binaries (men/women, belongers/non-belongers, properties/propertyless) continue to be intertwined with the household, an important change significantly alters the status of home; the fundamental and structural division of private and the public spheres, which imbues the private sphere with new meanings and ascribes new roles to individuals. In this regard, the household, hitherto balancing on the threshold of the private and the public spheres is pushed further into the private zone, thus loosening its connection to the social ground. While this phenomenon preceded the Industrial Revolution, it was intensified in the dawn of capitalism, since the stressful experience
of these socio-economic changes made individuals seek refuge in their houses, validating the privatisation of the modern home.

The home, behind closed doors and with diminishing relevance to the social ground, became a space of unregulated familial interaction that would permit the exertion of an increased amount of violence and injustice on its weaker members, an issue highlighted by John Stuart Mill, who suggested it should open up to the public discourse and the ideas prevalent in his time.

Yet the ideas of modernism did not strengthen the society of the time equitably. On the very contrary, as Karl Marx observed, individuals were turning into labour slaves, while the human habitat was becoming an additional burden for the social agent. The home was more than ever valorised as private property and as the foundation of classed society. As a result, he urged for the re-appropriation of the household as an equivalent of the re-appropriation of the forces of production, through Communism.

In this regard, the appropriation of home, which commenced in Modernity, by numerous socioeconomic forces, has created a mythology worth scrutinising. As it will be presented in the two following chapters, in the core of the domestic discourse today lies the idea that our homes are the prerequisite of our existence, and should thus be protected and supported as institutions of great importance and value. It thus remains to be proved whether this belief is accurate and to what extent.
Chapter Three

Deconstructing the Domestic Ideal: The Psychological Dimension

Home as a Place

The previous chapters provided the background of the definitions of home, its idealisation and the developments it underwent as an institution and an ideal, from the advent of Western urbanization until the early modern époque. This chapter will thus approach the meaning of home today and the validity that its idealisation holds in juxtaposition to the reality of the domestic experience.

Prior to the analysis of the contemporary domestic sphere in its private and social extent, it is important to examine the place theories which have significantly enhanced the comprehension of a very complex relationship, that of the individual with his/her environment, which have only been recently developed, since the complexity of this relationship was both less prevalent and relevant to the experienced social reality of the past. Therefore, the most recent explorations of the term place originate in the field of environmental psychology – an interdisciplinary academic area taking shape after the end of WWII – and will constitute the preamble to the more focused discussion of the relationship between the home and the social agent.

With respect to its characteristics, place has been regarded as an experience-based environment that is influenced by a diversity of spatio-empirical parameters and is updated by the physical and the socio-psychological dynamics of the environment. As a term, it is used to describe a ‘qualitative, total phenomenon, which cannot be reduced to its individual components without losing its concrete nature’ (Pennartz 1986, p. 136). In a more detailed analysis, Canter argues that our sense of place develops in relation to the activities that occur in a particular environment, the value of such activities to the agents involved, and the physical properties of the space itself. Accordingly, only a third of the term is related to corporeality, whereas the other two are connected with the personal and social dimensions of dwelling, a fact that will be revisited in the section scrutinising the pragmatics of home. In agreement with
Canter, Steadman (2002) maintains that place, ‘a social-psychological model of human-environment interaction’ is usually experienced according to its symbolic meanings, our attachment to it and our satisfaction with its physiological attributes (p. 563). It can thus be surmised that people are bound to a place not only through their cognitive understanding or the aesthetic appreciation of a spatial configuration, but also through affect; in other words, through the experiences, the memories and the feelings associated with that environment.

Although the abovementioned definitions of place inform our understanding of the human habitat, it should be stressed that home is more than just a place as it is very different from any urban or rural area to which we might feel attached, due to its binary nature, comprised of its private and social role. Respectively, the complexity of the domestic sphere seems to be the primary obstacle to an attempt for a coherent definition of home, while efforts to pin down its meanings are hindered by the fact that home is experienced differently by different individuals. For that reason, the interpretation of home varies according to the age, gender, cultural and socio-economic backgrounds of each person, while it has been argued that even within each of these categories the testimonies regarding the domestic experience can be substantially diverse (Mallet 2005, pp. 68-69).

At the same time, Manzo (2003) argues that there is an evident tension between the theoretical concepts and their empirical application, due to the fact that while home is frequently perceived as the haven to oneself, the reality presents a contradiction (p. 49). Having identified the lack of accuracy in the representations and analyses of home, social scientists prompt researchers to concentrate on the negative elements of domesticity so that a more well-informed picture of the concept will be achieved. While this study acknowledges this necessity, it is not the intention of the specific chapter to produce a concrete and coherent definition of home, as it is obvious that there is none to be found. The aim is rather to elucidate the multifarious roles of home in the private and social life of its occupants as a place that extensively influences both dimensions in variable ways.

Even though, most studies of place tend to be divided into three kinds, following Sixsmith’s (1986) three-component approach, analysing separately its psychological, social and physical meanings, the physical category will be incorporated into the other
two for the purposes of this study. Therefore, the subject of physicality will be studied throughout the chapter, as it will arise in the discussion of issues pertinent to the private and social dimensions of the home. The literature review will thus focus on the binary nature of home, which besides being responsible for the creation of a unique establishment governed by two contradicting forces it also becomes the essential parameter that differentiates it from every other place.

Staying Safe

A significant notion correlated with home, which by Young belongs to the four habitation values that should be accessible to every person, is that of safety (Blunt and Dowling 2006, p. 5). For several commentators, safety is also the primary reason for which the domestic sphere has been perceived as the shelter of the individual. To explore this assertion more thoroughly the physical attributes of the domestic space will be examined, keeping in mind that, commonly, the house is nothing but a spatial configuration of four walls and a roof, which divides space into areas that are accessible to some and strictly inaccessible to others.

This clear division of space into personal and communal is an inherent aspect of habitation and a primary function of the domestic building (Bachelard 1994; Blunt & Dowling 2006, p.18; Terkenli, 1995;). The house draws a bold line between the I and the they, which as interrelated as they might be, some argue that they should be experienced as separate states of being (Hamilton 1990, p. 399). The structural particularity of the habitat immediately renders it as the shelter of the individual and substantial amount of research has begun with this hypothesis, taking for granted the seemingly undeniable protective function of the home as a building. Access to people and objects within its boundaries is restricted to the public and are therefore considered safe from such interference; by extension, the home becomes the space which upholds the preservation of the person and society per se (Kawash 2000, p. 197; Korosec-Serfaty and Bolitt 1986, p. 329; Newell 1995, p. 90; Smith 1994, p. 37).

Interestingly, the sense of safety is often interconnected with individuals’ familiarity with their surroundings and their ability to influence or control their environment. Research in this area has revealed that in most homes there is a prevalent, ongoing struggle over the control of the space, defined as territoriality
Territoriality is a behavioural pattern manifested in places particularly valuable for the individual, while domestic territoriality becomes for many people a substitute for their inability to exert power over other environments – a fact deriving from the early stages of industrialisation explored in the previous chapter (Harris and Brown BB 1996). In these cases, individuals tend to understand home as ‘the only place where they feel a sense of control’ (Marcus 2006, p. 65). In turn, one’s sense of safety could be perceived as relevant to one’s control over the habitat which by becoming controllable it simultaneously becomes a stress-free zone and therefore more pleasing. The territorial struggles in the human micro-environment usually conclude when the subject’s control over a certain domestic area is acknowledged and respected by other household members.

Notwithstanding the success of such endeavours, territorial conflicts can be long-lasting processes that culminate in some members’ sense of dissatisfaction or discomfort (Marcus 2006, p. 153) and can constitute one of the main reasons for domestic haggling, for as Miller supports: ‘the private is more a turbulent sea of constant negotiation rather than simply some haven for the self’ (Miller 2001 in Reimer and Leslie 2004, p. 189). Once domestic control has been achieved – either in equal terms or rigidified as an unequal status quo – the resulting sense of satisfaction and safety legitimises the subjects’ preference for that controlled and regulated environment. This tendency however, has been criticised by several theorists, as allusive to conformist, conventional and even hedonistic behaviours (McCarthy 2005, p. 113), stripping agents of their inquisitive and creative nature.

While such criticism is well-grounded, today another absurd phenomenon needs to be taken into consideration: even if home continues to be commonly acknowledged as the safest dwelling environment, it often fails to grant this sense to its inhabitants. People who have experienced burglary, for example, have witnessed the ease by which ‘the protective home breaks down’ and how its function as a shelter is instantly annulled. As a reaction to such events, many civilians attempt to remove even the slightest suspicion of danger from their residential and neighbourhood areas. This is also one of the reasons for which the suburban home was promoted as the safest place to raise a family. Both in an urban and a suburban context, inhabitants
reinforce their homes with alarms, locks and armoured doors, turning them into small fortresses. Hence, people’s fixation with security issues results in practices that render security as an end in itself, a goal to be attained, even at the expense of neighbouring and interpersonal relations. Correspondingly, albeit it goes without saying that the will to keep one’s self and loved ones safe is understandable, the contemporary conceptualisation of the safe house appears to be creating more problems that it resolves.

The issue of safe housing has also been a concern for the less affluent members of society, but from a different angle. As the World Health Organisation reports, the dangers that residents might be facing due to poor housing conditions are many, including: ‘respiratory and cardiovascular diseases from indoor air pollution; illness and deaths from temperature extremes; communicable diseases spread because of poor living conditions, and risks of home injuries’ (World Health Organization, (WHO) 2010). The organisation claims that in the developing world approximately 2 million people die from indoor air pollution caused by the burning biomass or coal in leaky stoves. Yet, in Britain, 25,000 deaths have been reported due to the direct effects of cold, faced by poor households with inadequate insulation and heating (Wilkinson, Close & Crabbe 2016). Other fatal intra-domestic problems that preoccupy the developed world include carbon monoxide poisoning (40 deaths and 250 hospital admissions in one year), dampness and mould, falls and accidents as well as extreme temperatures (Wilkinson, Close & Crabbe 2016). Jake Eliot in his article adds overcrowding to the list, since the latest reports mention that three million people in the UK live in a home with at least five other individuals. Overcrowding also poses a serious threat for children’s health, who are more likely to contract respiratory or other diseases, such as meningitis.

The most unfortunate and extreme example of the consequences of poor housing conditions is that of the Grenfell tower fire, the 25-storey building in North Kensington, UK, which caused the deaths of approximately 80 people (BBC 20 July 2017). The tragedy has immediately shifted the public’s attention to the building materials used in the recent refurbishment of the council property, since the rapid spread of the blaze was accelerated by the claddings of the building’s exterior (Stoye 2017). It has been argued that in order to cut corners, the Royal Borough of Kensington
and Chelsea (RBKC) used non-fire retardant materials, rather than their existing fire retardant alternatives, even though such materials have been linked to similar accidents in France, Australia and Dubai (Stoye 2017). At the same time, the RBKC is accused for cuts made to the way the gas risers fitted inside Grenfell’s internal corridors as well as for £60,000 worth of intended works to duct panels and ventilation grills for the risers, which according to the financial records that the Guardian revealed, were omitted (Booth & Evans 2017). In this regard, houses might not simply be unsafe but an actual danger to its inhabitants.

In addition, and despite the obvious futility of the obsession with security, social discourse promotes security as a synonym of civilised existence (Kawash 2000, p. 195), implying that on a national, social and personal level individuals are expected to sacrifice rights, such as that of privacy, in the name of their security. This recent fixation has been argued to imbue personal relationships with fear and intolerance; strangers seem more untrustworthy and suspicious than ever, while household members withdraw deeper in the confines of the ostensibly protective habitat (Kawash 2000, p. 214). For these reasons, the need for safety as experienced by the contemporary social agent results in xenophobia, claustrophobic behaviours and our self-inflicted confinement in well-guarded environments (Blunt and Dowling 2006, p. 169; Marcus 2006 p. 113).

Home and Privacy

Another element associated with the ‘home as a haven’ dictum is that of privacy, which adds value to the domestic establishment as it is the only physical structure that permits one’s withdrawal and disengagement from the social ground. For psychologists, sociologists and legal scholars the necessity for, or the right to privacy is an almost ubiquitous practice interrelated with the very existence of human society. However, privacy is a concept that, like home and place, defies coherent definition (Newell 1995; Solove 2008). Specifically, as Solove claims, ‘privacy (...) is a concept in disarray’ and he goes on to explain that ‘nobody can articulate what it means’ (2008, p. 1). Yet from the study of the literature exploring the term, one could
support with certainty that ‘a minimum degree of desired privacy is a fundamental requisite of a healthy residential environment’ (Oseland and Donald 1993 p. 252).

To specify the meaning of this esteemed privilege, as well as its relation with the domestic sphere, one should primarily consider its definitions. Fisher’s understanding of the term, for example, indicates that in the private space ‘phenomena unfold in new ways, thus facilitating personal growth and development’ (1971 p. 154). In a similar vein, it has been maintained that many human activities are rooted in the private sphere of the individual, including contemplation, self-realisation, self-reliance and concentration, activities which as discussed above are integral to the identity-construction process (Chemayeff and Alexander, 1963, p. vi & p. 38; Westin 1967, p. 39). To safeguard and construct an identity people tend to temporarily limit others’ access to themselves and according to Westin’s theory of privacy, they simultaneously attempt to muster the necessary strength to adjust to the requirements of everyday life (Westin 1967) while for Altman, privacy delineates the ‘selective control access to the self (1975, p.24). Hence, privacy can be perceived as a course of action undertaken for the protection of the self, perceived as a fundamental element of habitation and valued for its personal and public importance respectively.

In 1989, Jed Rubenfeld discussed the definitions of privacy by analysing court cases that were protected by the relevant legislation. Interestingly one of the themes upon which his definition was based, delineated that the specific doctrine refers to the protection of all the choices that constitute and affirm one’s sense of personhood (p. 751). In this regard, he argued that ‘the right to privacy is (...) a right to self-definition’ (Rubenfeld 1989, p. 753). He furthermore maintained, and thus insightfully contributed to the definition of the right to privacy, that the right to self-definition ‘must most strongly defend: the right to define oneself even in opposition to widespread, traditional, ‘normal’ values’ (p. 756), thus stressing that privacy is one of the rights that endorses our humanity by supporting difference and freedom of choice. In sum, the right to privacy dictates that the state or any other agency should not interfere with one’s personal choices, time and space – commonly protected by the sphere of domesticity – as these are valuable for both the psychological and the

Indeed, domestic privacy is a highly appreciated right of the individual, as a 2003 survey proved, in which 73% of the participants claimed that it is ‘extremely important’ to be in control of who watches or listens to them, while 62% defined as ‘extremely important’ to not be disturbed at home (Kasper 2005, p. 81). Yet as expected, privacy is a right not always granted unconditionally, especially in households with two or more members. Hence, privacy must be managed, in the sense that various mechanisms must be deployed, both at a specific time and over time, so that the desirable levels of privacy are attained (Marshall 1972, p. 389). In this light, as indicated in Manzo’s study (2005), activities that require absolute privacy are often pursued beyond the domestic ground; specifically, 60% of the participants to his study admitted that when they needed to think and reflect they went to places outside their homes, and 58% of them preferred a natural setting (p. 76). In many cases, as Westin and Altman surmised, individuals attempt to regulate the levels of privacy, although occasionally such attempts can be unsuccessful (Margulis 2003, p. 246).

Keeping in mind that privacy preferences are mainly subjective (Marshall 1972, p. 104; Newell 1995, p. 97) individuals, even in their personal sphere, deploy privacy management mechanisms in order to create and maintain their personal accessibility boundaries (Pedersen 1999, p. 398). Failure to correspond to one’s desire for privacy, as happens in cases where individuals are found in environments that allow them either no privacy at all or an extrinsically predetermined amount of private space and time, results in the individual’s inability to function properly in a number of interpersonal and social activities (Margulis 2003, p. 247).

Regardless of the indisputable significance of the term, any attempt at its critical exploration should stress that the desire and right for seclusion is mostly favoured by the industrialised Western culture, as is the entire ideal of domesticity (Korosec-Serfaty and Bolitt 1986, p. 329). Paradoxically however, privacy today is considered ‘not simply dead’ but ‘dying over and over again’ (Solove 2008, pp. 4-5). With the advent of domesticated technology and the burgeoning media intrusion into our personal space (Kasper 2005, p. 80; Solove 2008, pp. 4-5), one’s desire to
disentangle from the public ground, such a vital prerequisite of personal and social equilibrium, is often unmet. On the contrary, it is today, more than ever, that the boundaries of the private and the public spheres are blurred to the extent that our private lives feel more authentic when exposed to the public eye rather than when they remain private. As peculiar as that might sound, one could argue that while there is an overt and often exaggerated concern over the privacy of our private sphere, the intrusions experienced today continue almost unobstructed.

Domestic Satisfaction

The analysis has hitherto revealed that home needs to correspond to people’s safety and privacy needs if a satisfactory domestic experience is to be attained. However, domestic satisfaction depends on a number of parameters specific to the relationships of the household members with each other and with their residential space (Hayward 1977; Pennartz 1986, pp. 137; Tognoli 1987). Smith’s research, for example, highlighted that although the sense of security is commonly associated with the physical attributes of the house, what emerged as the most influential determinant of security satisfaction were the relationships established inside the house and not the building itself.

Additionally, another important parameter of the domestic experience is the atmosphere of the home, perceived by environmental psychologists as a comprehensive ‘inherent aspect of habitation’ (Pennartz 1986, pp. 135-136). The domestic experience produces and is produced by the domestic atmosphere, a double-sided process which interrelates with the inhabitants’ moods, in the sense that it influences and is influenced by their emotional states (Pennartz 1986, p. 136). Pennartz’s study on domestic atmosphere revealed eight themes relevant to the pleasantness of the home, five relevant to its non-spatial dimension (communication, accessibility, relaxation, freedom, absence of boredom) and three of a spatial nature (arrangement of rooms, size of rooms, shape of rooms) (Pennartz 1986, p. 150).

In this regard, the domestic atmosphere, the main by-product of intra-domestic interactions, does not only affect the household members’ experience of their home, but it can also be seen as an influential element in the visitors’ perceptions of the entire household. Therefore, it can be surmised that the evaluation of the
domestic life as a pleasant one is primarily determined by indefinable sentiments and the glistening course of interpersonal interactions, subjected to processes that cannot always guarantee the actualisation of ideal domesticity.

Another significant determinant of satisfaction, according to place theories, is the tangible dimension of space, since specific domestic activities occur inside explicitly designated areas and are valued according to space available for their pursuit. For example, since the bedroom is a private area it could be smaller than the living room or the kitchen, which are rooms characterised by their mixed purpose, used both in private and social occasions (Oseland and Donald 1993, p. 252). The restriction of respective activities by the physical attributes of the house may result in space dissatisfaction, although the relation of the size of a room to space satisfaction has been found to vary according to personal preferences.

As a result, despite the fact that many individuals would prefer their house to be different in terms of the available space or even its structure – often influenced by the dream home imagery – Oseland and Donald (1993) have argued that that domestic satisfaction is more pertinent to the quality of the intra-domestic interaction, rather than the physical attributes of the house. Commencing with the hypothesis that more space would satisfy one’s needs of privacy to a greater extend and possibly increase one’s sense of domestic satisfaction in general, their study proved that domestic satisfaction is only loosely connected to the spatial attributes of the home. Specifically, the participants’ testimonies revealed that the reduction of the dissatisfaction regarding space was not necessarily analogous to the dissatisfaction that the occupants experienced in terms of other personal needs (Oseland and Donald 1993, p. 258). As a result, it can be argued that the satisfaction gained through the inhabitation of a certain domestic environment is mainly relevant to the relationships of the occupants, rather than their number or the amount of residential space at their disposal (Oseland and Donald 1993, p. 259).

In this light, the domestic experience is delineated as a very complex phenomenon, having established numerous practical concerns to be capable of obstructing the unconditional recognition of home as the haven of the individual. Together with the abovementioned difficulties of (co)habitation, research has underpinned that the domestic sphere does not always safeguard one’s physical
integrity, since individuals are often in danger inside their domestic space, victimised by other household or family members (Mallet 2004). On these grounds, feminist researchers draw attention to those women who are often subjected to threats implicit in their domestic environment (Oakley 1974 and Eisentein in Mallet 2004; see also Gender Domesticity and The Feminist Perspective). For such individuals, home is experienced as a place of violence and fear (Manzo 2003, p. 50), since they are more endangered inside their domestic environment rather than outside of it, and home becomes synonymous to insecurity, anger and shame. As Wardaugh explains, abused women and children likely to feel ‘homeless-at-home’ – a sentiment that often leads to actual homelessness – could under no circumstance agree with the romanticised and metaphorical idea of home conveyed by much of the theoretical literature (1999, p. 91). For a woman experiencing violence, domestic satisfaction can be challenged to such an extent that she will be forced to leave home and become a ‘domestic refugee’ (Wardaugh 1999, p. 93). Such a decision derives from the fact that women feel safer anywhere else than in their own homes.

The exclusion, isolation and deprivation of the household are factors that influence the levels of violent behaviours expressed inside the house, thwarting the experience of a satisfactory domesticity. Geographical isolation, for instance, plays an important role in the triggering of abusive behaviours, as the victim is devoid of the supportive networks, such as extended family and neighbours, so the perpetrator feels free to act at will (Parker et al. 2016). Another factor that often leads to the exclusion of the household is substance abuse and is considered an aetiological factor in the economic and emotional problems a household might be facing. In such cases, violence is often a reality, while dependence is used as an excuse for the unhealthy conditions developing inside these homes (Pahl 2016).

However, even when the domestic ground is free from abusive behaviours, negative domestic experiences can turn home into a trap, as it often happens during family breakdowns, divorce or in the aftermath of a household member’s death (Manzo 2006, p. 220-221). For many individuals, home might not be entwined with violence or despair, but it might be perceived as the space of the mundane, an environment governed by an inescapable routine (Manzo 2003, p. 51). Household chores and domestic duties commonly resist Bachelard’s efforts to beautify their
necessity, coming across as the most trivial, if not highly problematic, aspect of inhabitation. Overall, empirical research has proved that the negative side of domesticity is actually inherent in the process of (co)habitation. In a single research, 90% of the participants had undergone a negative, and often emotionally painful, experience in a present or past residence. As McCarthy (2005) maintains, the reassuring familiarity of the domestic environment cannot guarantee that the intimacy nurtured amongst the household members will be pleasurable or beneficial (p. 117).

Home and Felt Identity

Home, as an establishment that responds to the personal needs of the individual, has been commonly explored through its relationship with its inhabitant’s identity, be that in the felt, the displayed or the ideal sense. The unquestionable fact that the domestic environment interacts with our sense of selfhood, while fostering the needs for safety and privacy, constitutes the fundamental reason for which it is perceived as an inseparable aspect of human existence. For that reason, the first element that will be explored is the most commonly discussed notion in relation to the psychological dimension of the domestic sphere, that of the ‘felt identity’.

Important research in the disciplines of environmental psychology and humanistic geography views home as the place most closely associated with one’s ‘felt identity’ (Cooper 1974; Dovey 1978; Duncan 1981; Hayward 1977; Mallet 2004; Moore and Graefe 1994; Relph 1976; Relph 1997; Sixsmith 1986; Terkenli 1995; Tognoli 1987). In this light, it has been argued that identity develops in relation to a certain place of residence (Manzo 2005) and that home, as a physical and experiential entity, is entwined with the inhabitants’ overall sense of selfhood. The development and understanding of one’s self has been extensively discussed in the premises of place attachment, according to which prolonged interaction within a specific environment makes it part of our self-definition, a definition which could not be complete had the reference to that environment been omitted (Ryden 1993; Stedman 2002). Home is thus presented as source of identity, which becomes available to the individual during the first stages of identity formation and it frequently retains this role for the rest of one’s life (Mallet 2004, p. 83).
Gaston Bachelard attaches an extraordinary value to his definition of home, by imbuing maternal qualities (1994, p. 7). He thus claims while we are ‘cast into the world’ (Bachelard 1994, p. 7), we are lucky enough to be cast into a home, instead of being lost in an alien world; thus, ‘life begins well, it begins enclosed, protected, all warm in the bosom of the house’ (Bachelard 1994, p. 7). In Bachelard’s approach, since the first steps of the objectification process usually occur within the boundaries of the home, the domestic environment is undeniably interlaced with one’s sense of personhood (Mallet 2004, p. 74; Manzo 2005, p. 78; Stedman 2002, p. 564) and is quite accurately defined as the self’s ‘first universe’ (Bachelard 1994, p. 4).

On these grounds, home is expected to respond, if not to all, at least to most of our fundamental private needs. Empirical research, however, presents a somewhat different reality. An activity that is theoretically believed to be part of the identity construction process, commonly perceived as a predominately domestic activity (i.e. reflection and undisturbed contemplation) seems to be pursued beyond the domestic boundaries, as a significant number of people turn to places outside their habitat to reflect on life (Manzo 2005, p. 76). In Manzo’s study, (2005) although all participants felt that it was important to have access to places that could support their need to ‘be themselves’ and to explore their identities, 60% sought their places of reflection in the outside, while 58% of those respondents preferred natural settings for such pursuits (p. 72).

Indeed, the hypothesis that home does not always respond to our personal needs can be confirmed by considering that its role depends on a variety of factors, which differ according to the type and quality of the familial and interpersonal relationships developing in the habitat. For example, in a household with children, the adult occupants, most commonly the parents, face a larger amount of housework and increased responsibility, which alters their perceptions of domesticity and by extension their relationship with their private sphere (Smith 1994, p. 126). Accordingly, the influence of the domestic environment in one’s identity is determined by the household members’ role in the organisation of the domestic sphere. As feminist scholars have observed, for example, women whose role is decidedly intertwined with housework and childrearing, suffer extensive interference in their sense of selfhood, since their ‘felt identity’ is often thwarted by their domestic

Although attachment to the habitat seems predominantly dependent on the often unpredictable culmination of everyday domestic routines and interaction, the fundamental attachment to our residence is reinforced by the fact that our home is always there, as a physical point of departure and return, or a corporal centre of our otherwise scattered being in the world. Home is thus understood as much more than a mere shelter; it is a fixed centre around which one’s routes of mobility are arranged, it insinuates micro-tactics of belonging and becomes a primary territory, or else a physical centre of rootedness (Dovey 1978; Hayward 1977; Robinson 2010, p. 37; Smith 1994, p. 32; Tuan 1980). Humanistic geographers such as Relph (1976) have also acknowledged that home is an ‘irreplaceable centre of significance’ for the individual (p. 39). The habitat is therefore perceived as a place of vital importance for the development of the individual’s identity, not only as an affective environment, but also as a physical reference, ‘an anchoring point though which human beings are centred’; in other words the ‘known’ from where humans reach out to the ‘unknown’ (Terkenli 1995, p. 325).

The literature hitherto explored has confirmed that home is a vital point of reference, as both an affective and a physical entity, in the life of an individual and an essential parameter of the continuous process of identity construction; therefore, the multileveled sense of loss felt in the aftermath of homelessness is rather self-evident. However, it would be useful to briefly consider the implications of one’s separation from one’s habitat defined as a traumatic and extremely disorienting experience for the subject. Research on the issue indicates that homelessness means much more than just not having a place to live, since it entails the loss of one’s sense of identity, self-worth and efficacy. As the homeless have no legal right to designate their private space, they exist deprived of an ability to delineate personhood and identity, ‘trapped on the street and being at risk of losing themselves’ (Hodgetts et al. 2010, p. 285). Although, it has been proved that homelessness is experienced according to the specificity of each situation (age, gender, reasons for dislocation and period of homelessness) as an event, it jeopardises one’s sense of personhood. Furthermore, as a process, it commonly results in the agent’s disassociation with vital identity-making
factors, i.e. networks centred on the domestic environment such as family and friends, further challenging the person’s ‘felt identity’ (Boydell, Goering and Morrell-Bellai 2000; Smith 1998; Stec 2006, p. 321).

Home and the Ideal Self

Interestingly, the important role of the habitat exerts a powerful influence throughout the subject’s life, since it is not only relevant to one’s subjective perception of personal identity, but as Hayward (1977) claims, it also becomes a symbol of how people want others to see them (Mallett 2004; Seamon 1979; Smith 1994). Home-making practices and the material creation of the home constitute dynamic processes which aim to enforce our sense of selfhood onto our physical surroundings, for the creation of a place that could even be perceived as the spatial extension of the self (Blunt and Dowling 2006, p. 23; Terkenli 1995, p. 330). The house is thus transformed into a concept of great significance through its alignment with the life of its inhabitants (Ingold 2000, p. 185; Terkenli 1995, pp. 326-327). The display of objects symbolising one’s felt identity renders home, to both inhabitants and visitors, a field of semiotic interaction, which certifies the identity of the inhabitant, while projecting it to the outside world (Alison and Blunt p. 27; Smith 1994, p. 33); a fact accurately exemplified by the house of Menander in ancient Rome. Home and self are moulded together on a daily basis through an interplay that results in the presumption that home is the mirror of the self and vice versa.

Based on the existing tendency of individuals to communicate their identity through their interaction with their environment, the tangible side of the residence, namely, the design, the furnishing and other household goods, gained additional value in the post-Fordist era. In the age of mass production, home was expected to mirror the inhabitants’ status, style and taste, rendered as the only area which can and should be personalised according to its inhabitants’ (consumption) choices, in other words their sense of selfhood. As a result, the endeavour to create a home that would highlight and simultaneously display its inhabitant’s identities becomes a legitimate adult concern (Mallet 2004 p. 67-68), and the habitat, already a space of large
economic investment, is transformed into an ideal, a home-to-be, and often even the core of the agents’ financial expenditure.

The images of the ideal home and the exaggerated tendency of self-improvement suggest the belief that by adding value to the habitat one adds value to oneself. Home-making practices are thus acknowledged as successful when the acquisition of certain domestic goods has been achieved, shifting the focus towards the tangible dimension of domesticity, which, as noted by several environmental psychologists and place theorists, is of little importance to one’s relationship with one’s habitat. However, identity formation through consumption is neither a new nor an underexplored phenomenon; sociologists have considered the two as intertwined since the dawn of the industrial era, conceptualising consumption as an important medium of identity formation, which supports specific narratives of the self through those of various commodities (Reimer and Leslie 2004; Woodward 2003).

Accordingly, the pivotal assertion that ‘we constitute ourselves as a self who chooses, a consumer’ (Reimer and Leslie 2004, p. 191) shows that consumption is indeed intertwined with identity construction and the communication of that identity. Similarly, with respect to domestic consumption, the acquisition of domestic goods seems integral to the household’s attempt to form and communicate a coherent identity. Individual and collective domestic consumption – not always in agreement, but not entirely at odds – is therefore a way for inhabitants to construct a household identity as coordinated as possible with their own, which can be projected to the social ground through tangible domesticity.

An informative empirical research which focused on the domestic consumption tendencies of Australian middle-class inhabitants has not only proved the aforementioned hypothesis, but it has also identified two different trends (Woodward 2003). The first establishes that high class individuals are more likely to associate their domestic environment with their social status. Analysing the high-class respondents’ testimonies – a group generally inclined to consume the idea of a commodity rather than its utility – the author surmised that wealthy inhabitants hope to declare their superiority through the display of exceptional aesthetics and unique style (p. 394). For that group the ideal home is akin to the images found in home decoration magazines, while their goal is excitement through every novel and
ostensibly empowering purchase (p. 399). The second prevalent domestic consumption tendency was of a middle and lower-class origin, formulated by the testimonies of the participants who focus less on the image and more on the utility of their purchases. From their responses, it was deduced that they felt the necessity to create a ‘clean and tidy’ home or an ‘easy to maintain’ domestic area, which would provide comfort and relaxation, but not necessarily aesthetic coherency (pp. 403-404). In this sense, these two different approaches indicate that purchases of domestic goods aim to support the inhabitants’ felt identities, often associated with one’s social class, and to create a domestic environment as close to their ideal as possible.

Yet the ideal home, the space where one could be fulfilled, is often an unattainable goal, which positions the actual living space in a tense opposition to the imagined. Inhabitants are therefore criticised for their futile butterfly chase, a practice appropriated by the market and endorsed by contemporary trends of consumer ideology. The dream house has respectively been criticised as a symbol of ‘material comfort and pseudopastoral beauty’ and has been perceived as a tactic of the real home’s valorisation (Mallet 2004 p. 69). As domestic discourse continues to dictate that home ownership is one of the highest achievements of the social agent, the notion of the ideal home, in other words the suburban, detached, with a beautiful garden, safe house, is rigidified as a symbol of the individual’s material, and by extension overall, sense of achievement. In this light, the domestic mythology does not only legitimize the assumption that (ideal) home and (ideal) self closely intertwines, but also that one’s home is by definition one’s haven, even though, as will be proved by the end of this chapter, this a priori association of home with safety can be effortlessly overturned.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)

The philosopher who has most intensively discussed the relationship of the home and the homeworld with our self-definition and felt identity is Edmund Husserl, who focused on the meaning of being human, by taking into consideration every experience or object influencing actions and interactions (Seamon 2000, p. 158). For Husserl, home plays a significant role in the dichotomy of one’s perception, formed
according to one’s position as a subject or an object. He further adds that one understands the environment and everything familiar or alien according to the side one chooses or is forced into. As subjects the world is experienced with a contemplating, critical view, in a constant attempt to make sense and give meaning to experiences, but as objects one serves as the tool of the sense-making processes of others (Husserl 1970, p.20).

By specifying that one’s experience of the world is shaped according to one’s intentionality, he analysed two other concepts important for his phenomenological enquiry, the lifeworld and the place, which both constitute areas that influence one’s approach to one’s surroundings (Seamon 2000, p. 161). While place has already been examined thoroughly in the first chapter of the study, it is important to note that Husserl’s own understanding supplements the ideas already mentioned, by acknowledging that place is indeed the centre of embodied existence and although it is only one part of the lifeworld, it should still be considered as a ‘central ontological structure of being-in-the world’, to quote Merleau-Ponty’s own phenomenological consideration on the issue (Seamon 2000, p. 162). Yet, since place is part of the lifeworld experience, it is be more appropriate to examine this broader category first.

The lifeworld is of vital importance for the phenomenological inquiry as a basic phenomenological structure that includes everything created and experienced by man organised in a certain noematic way, which facilitates everyday life and interaction. Simultaneously, it is a sphere of existence that individuals scarcely ever consider in depth, for it is predominately delineated as the area of the mundane. Hence, while from an individual point of view the lifeworld is frequently perceived as one of little significance, from a phenomenological perspective it is a space full of meaning. But, the lifeworld does not only constitute the plane of all interaction and experience, since it fortifies another certainty that seems essential for one’s being, namely, the fact that the world pre-exists, or in Husserl’s words that ‘the world is pre-given to us’ (Husserl 1970, p, 50). The fact that the lifeworld is a given does not only make everyday life easier, but also possible.

Husserl specifies that experiences of lifeworld objects and the entirety of the lifeworld can vary substantially, yet remain interdependent, and notes that it is through this interrelated experience of the lifeworld and its objects that personal
existence obtains meaning, leading to the formation of the ego (Husserl 1970, p. 34). To be more precise, in his publication *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (1970), he specifies that one’s self-concept and one’s definition derives from one’s interaction with objects and subjects of his/her lifeworld (p. 34). By accepting the familiar environment as an integral part of the lifeworld, and by defining it as one’s homeworld, Husserl highlights that the household, or else the human habitat, is of critical importance to one’s sense-making process and by extension, one’s course to self-conceptualisation. Although he claims that the *I* under the category of Nature and Consciousness has different characteristics from those presented when it is considered as a Cultural element, in the lifeworld, the *I* is experienced and presented as a sum of these characteristics, or else as ‘an embodied, encultured, experienced body’ (Seamon 2000, p. 167).

It is therefore obvious that since the experience of the lifeworld gives meaning to individual existence, it also gives meaning to everything surrounding this existence and thus becomes a useful area of analysis. Additionally, the lifeworld per se, obtains meaning from the different world views, or in Husserl’s words ‘world representations’ (Walton 1997, p. 2). Yet one’s world-representation can and must be challenged, expanded and even appropriated by the different representations one will encounter in his or her life (Walton 1997). While individuals set off from their own lifeworld, or to be precise, homeworld, with a world representation that has been constructed according to the information and experiences of this sphere, by growing older and communicating with others, either from the sphere of the homeworld or not, they continuously inform their world representation with new data. Thus, in Husserl’s view, by being ‘born within the community, I owe the content of my particular world-representation to the constant communication with other subjects’ (Walton 1997, p. 8).

In this regard, my home and in a more extended sense my own community, provides me with the information that will help me construct my idea on the world, while my communication with other subjects facilitates the expansion of my views and enhances my understanding of the world as such (Walton 1997, p. 9). Of course, as expected, when communicating with the other, one cannot always come into an
agreement and the result, which Husserl considers vitally important, is a ‘common representation or an average world-representation’ (Walton 1997, p. 9).

Thus the home, in Husserl’s dialectics, obtains a position of vital importance, regardless of its actual formation, structure, political, social or economic status; it becomes the one of a two-pole way of understanding the world and reality, which through its impact with the second pole, the alien, gives sense and creates meaning to one’s surrounding environment and existence. The relationship of these two seemingly opposing spheres, in Husserl’s work, takes the form of a ‘co-relative and co-constitutive’ structure, of which the existence of the former depends on that of the latter (Steinbock 1994, pp. 208-209). Specifically, the processes of appropriation occurring in the homeworld, such as that of ‘repeating, ritual, communication, narration, renewal’ while developing and rigidifying the sphere they simultaneously create and delineate the space of the alien world (Steinbock 1994, p. 209).

Hence, by creating and acknowledging a plane of existence as familiar or normal, in the sense that it is permeated by values, norms, ideas and traditions which are known to the individual, the remaining ground of human activity is immediately defined as alien, unfamiliar or abnormal (Steinbock 1994, p. 209). The position of the subject during homeworld creation is thus a liminal one, since by creating the homeworld one simultaneously gives life to the alien world. Accordingly, Husserl infers that this position is of a transgressive nature, since by partaking in the creation of the lifeworld one is by definition participating in the creation of the alien world (Steinbock 1994, pp. 210-211).

This is the line of Husserl’s thought which leads to his notion of intersubjectivity, one in which the home and the alien, or else the homeworld (Heimwelt) and the alienworld (Fremdwelt) are two absolute prerequisites. Since the world is seen as constituted by subjects and objects, of which the very existence depends upon one’s own perception, as phenomenologists argue, Husserl clarifies that there are three stages of intentionality, each of which provides three different ideas of the world (Steinbock 1994, pp. 210-211).

In the first stage, the world is experienced as a sum of psycho-physical objects that are acknowledged as intelligent and sentient but are still regarded as objects. In the second stage, the others are recognised as subjects who follow the same
processes of understanding the world we do and are equally able to regard us as a part of the world. In the final stage, we experience the world as an intersubjective whole, a whole of which the parts, through discussion and the exchange of ideas, create common images of the world. In the third stage, an intersubjective appreciation of the world becomes possible, as subjects are willing to alter their world image, or their world representations through the intervention of the alien other.

For Husserl the question of the habitat escapes the debate of its value as a social institution, for he perceives it as an unquestionable prerequisite of human existence. Home delineates the zone of the familiar and it becomes the womb of human subjectivity until the subjects are ready to get in touch with the alien other. Accordingly, the alien other is formed precisely because of the existence of the homeworld, since by creating and delineating the boarders of the familial the alienworld obtains a substance of its own. It is through the transcendental activity of human subjects that the experience of the world becomes smoother, as the interaction of subjects coming from different homeworlods results in the intersubjective creation of the world, an understanding of life and the surrounding environment that is essential for the social existence of the subject.

Conclusion

Home, both as a concept and as a physical establishment, is a vital aspect of human life. As it has been shown in this chapter, home is an institution that certifies our human nature; intertwined with our sense of selfhood, it shelters our livelihood and fosters our physical and psychological existence. It is a prerequisite of personal wellbeing, a place of privacy and a symbol of identity, both felt and projected. Edmund Husserl, the philosopher selected to support the importance of home proves its significance by supporting that the public-private binary axis, per se, exists due to the existence of home. Husserl further acknowledged one’s need to familiarise with one’s surroundings, as a means of survival, and thus rendered home and the homeworld as absolute necessities of an embodied existence; home is the prerequisite of living and the basic tool of understanding the lifeworld. In this regard, Husserl places the value
of home exactly in the middle of the private-public axis rendering it as a dynamic establishment responsible for the very existence of an intersubjective, human society.

Simultaneously, however, the idealisation of home as a place sheltering and supporting the self can on no occasion be taken for granted. Therefore, although home is perceived as a prerequisite of Western civilised existence, in its present form, it poses a threat to some essential attributes of our well-being, such as our capacity for individuation and uniqueness, while it fails to provide the secure, private and satisfying space that the ‘happy phenomenology of home’ purports. Having explored the relation of home, as a space and an idea, with the self today, it is now important to scrutinise how home interacts with the social sphere of the present.
Chapter Four

Deconstructing the Domestic Ideal: The Social Dimension

Home as a Social Institution

The social side of domesticity, palpable even during the discussion focused on the private sphere, has been acknowledged as equally important with its role in its inhabitants’ private life (Tognoli 1987). In this respect, Sixsmith (1986) argues that a place is turned into a home precisely through social and interpersonal interaction and quoting Hayward, she explains that home is realised when ‘the person’s own opinions, actions and moods are accepted, if not always welcomed’ (p. 291). Respectively, the process of home-making obtains a social importance, when the element of socialisation being accepted is introduced as an integral and equally vital parameter of the domestic reality.

Reproducing and being reproduced by the narratives of the public ground, home is rendered as a micro-society, regulated by the rules, habits and routines that facilitate its members’ interaction and socialisation process (Blunt and Dowling 2006, pp. 22-23; Papastergiadis 1996). A healthy domestic environment is thus expected to be in tune with the social discourse of its place and era, since its creation, organisation and maintenance are interdependently bound with social and cultural paradigms, stereotypes and behaviours which the household members ordinarily reproduce. If home is perceived as an institution that prepares individuals for social interaction, while sheltering humanity’s future, it is obvious that society’s best interests lie with the well-being of the household. Yet, seen as an establishment permeated by public discourse, the home is currently an amplifier of the discursive practices which promote uniformity and social cohesion, since, as several theorists argue, social discourse echoed in intra-domestic interactions pushes social agents towards a uniform comprehension of reality.

With respect to the social dimension of the habitat, the first aspect that will be explored is its function as a family home, a space which shelters children as social
actors and in which their socialisation begins. The second manifestation of its social dimension is relevant its role as a gendered space, and the last point that will be examined in this section, explores its role as a signifier of social status (Baum and Hassan 1999, pp. 25-26; Birdwell-Pheasant and Lawrence-Zuniga 1999, pp. 3,9; Blunt & Dowling, 2006 pp. 92, 117; Kawash 2000). Juxtaposed with the social dimension of the domestic ideal, home will be studied as a determinant of social exclusion, with which a number of rights, like citizenship, community participation and inclusion, are intrinsically associated. In this light, Friedrich Nietzsche’s argumentation on the ways that domesticity has impinged on human capacity to excel will be deployed, as part of the study’s approach to a philosophical conceptualisation of the issue. Finally, Martin Heidegger’s conceptualisation of the home will be explored, together with his critique on the contemporary ways of habitation and his own suggestion of the meaning and value of dwelling.

The Family Home

Several years ago, the traditional family model dominating the social discourse of modernity delineated the relationship of:

a married heterosexual couple with children, based on a sexual division of labour, where the husband as breadwinner provides economic support for his dependent wife and children, while the wife cares for both husband and children. (Segal 1983, p. 13, in Bernardes 1993)

Some of the sociologists who have discussed the normative value of this statement include Cheal (1991), Barret (1980) and Gittins (1985), acknowledged the definition as an extremely limiting one. While the universality of the nuclear family has been questioned on similar grounds (Settles 1999, p. 215), the most recent UK statistics on the matter disprove the hypothesis that the nuclear family is a pattern of the past. In 2016 out of the 18.9 million families residing in the UK 12.7 million were married or civil partner couples, rendering the married nuclear family the most predominant type (Revise Sociology 2016). However, only 35 per cent of these families had dependent children (Office for National Statistics 2016), while another factor that should be taken into consideration is the fact that ‘cohabiting couple families were the fastest growing family type between 1996 and 2016, more than doubling from 1.5 million families to
3.3 million families’ (Revise Sociology 2016). In this light, the nuclear families of today can be quite different from those of the previous century.

The family home in its ideal form is the suburban home of the nuclear family, in which heterosexual, middle-class, ‘happy’ inhabitants follow the normative routines that respectable social members are expected to (Blunt & Dowling 2006, p. 114). In this light, it is considered its residents’ sanctuary, since it is equated with ‘security, certainty, order, family and femaleness, while outside or journey becomes synonymous with risk, strangeness, chaos, masculinity and the public realm’ (Wardhaugh 1999, p. 96). Accordingly, it provides its members with a sense of stability, comfort and peace.

Furthermore, the family home is the space which most importantly shelter’s the family’s offspring, and is considered one of the most important environments for a child’s upbringing and, by extension, socialisation. In other words, it safeguards ‘the process by which we learn to become members of society, both by internalising the norms and values of society, and also by learning to perform our social roles’ (Scott and Marshalls 1994, in Frønes 2016, p. 2). As it will be examined below, the family home, and more specifically the family’s home-making practices, constitute powerful forces which decisively inform a child’s socialisation process. That is not to say of course that children are simply objects to be moulded in a reality different than their own, yet their domestic environment influences not only their own understanding of domesticity, but their conception of who they are.

Since the family home is the first space in which a child receives its basic education, it is important to refer to Bernstein’s understanding of the relationship between education and social control:

> How a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates educational knowledge it considers to be public, reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control. From this point of view, differences within and changes in the organisation, transmission, and evaluation of educational knowledge should be a major area of sociological interest. (Bernstein 1972, p. 42 in Jenks, 2005, p. 12)

In this regard, the family home, just as the school and other educational organisations, obtain a social importance that cannot be disregarded. The process of socialisation beginning inside the home – the fact that the child is born in a specific cultural milieu, as well as the fact that in this environment the child obtains the necessary tools and
information to become a social actor – is one of the most important social processes of one’s transition to adulthood (Jenks, 2005, p. 13).

Bachelard, for instance, considered the family home a good reason to part with the philosophy of phenomenology, since by contradicting the belief that being is thrown into the world, he claimed that we are introduced to our environment through the experience of our first habitat. The social dimension of the family home has drawn the interest of theorists since the late 18th century; Mill (1869) and Wollstonecraft (1790), for example, perceived the household as a political community, responsible for the production of ‘rational and liberal citizens’ (Fenton 2005, p. 188). This theorisation, which originated in the dawn of industrial society, supported that the human habitat is the mediator between the private and the social and a shelter of the socially unequipped humans’ transformation into future social agents (Mallet 2004, p. 68).

Based on that approach, Fenton (2005) conducted a theoretical study on the expanded conception of citizenship, or else the exercise of rights and duties in areas beyond the public ground. Maintaining that ‘the making of private space is of equal significance for understanding the practices and meanings of citizenship’ (Fenton 2005, p 182), he focuses on the qualities of the family house that endorse ‘a foundational form of community, one that prepares its members for participation in the broader society’ and claimed that by situating the practice of citizenship in the private ground, family members obtain an enhanced understanding of citizenship per se (p. 190).

Furthermore, according to Miller’s article Designing the Home for Children, the family house should be organised to meet its young inhabitants’ needs and stimulate their cognitive and social development. The spatial structure of the home should primarily ensure that some of its areas can be perceived as safe and welcoming by any child (Marcus 2006, p. 43). Likewise, while being a space of sociability and stimulation, two elements essential for the cognitive development of the child, it should also include private areas to which the child will be allowed to withdraw in response to his/her need for individuation (Marcus 2006, p. 44-45; Parke and Sawin 1979). In addition, the domestic space should include areas that correspond to the child’s felt identity, for even during childhood the individuals feel closer to themselves, in an
environment that can be associated with their, in that case, emerging sense of selfhood (Marcus 2006, p. 45). Finally, in specific areas of the home the child’s desire to enact its identity should be recognised and accommodated by granting the chance to personalise and control such areas according to its will (Manzo 2003, p. 52; Marcus 2006, p. 45).

Yet, while children are the key inhabitants of the family home, they are frequently faced with a series of unfortunate situations, which affect them both in a physical and a psychological way. For instance, children are frequently allowed very little space to express themselves or act according to their own self-definitions and perceptions, since their home is governed by a set of rules and practices that they must or must not follow (Wood & Beck 1994, p. 1). Additionally, for children who tend to disagree with the discursive practices or the home-making routines of their parents, the family home can often become a space of struggle and unrest. For example, many young members of the LGBTQ community, who are faced with the daunting task of understanding and supporting their self-perception, do not consider their homes as havens, while they are frequently urged to abandon their family homes, due to the fact that they experience threatening behaviours to their physical and psychological being (Blunt and Dowling 2006, p. 115). Hence, while children should be perceived by the familial environment as social actors, in other words as ‘beings’, rather than objects or ‘becomings’, they are frequently deprived of this privilege (Lee 1988, p. 469).

Their dependence on carers and homes they have not actively and voluntarily selected diminishes the already limited space they are allowed to act, interact and react. Young children, for example, are often distanced from the family home – through spatial organisations to which they are obliged to adhere. The occasional division of the family home in zones, in which children do or do not have access – when the garage, the attic or the basement, are transformed into children’s space – can lead to the distanciation, or even alienation of the children not only from their own home, but also from their own family (Blunt and Dowling, 2006, p. 115). Furthermore, as more activities are transferred from the neighbourhood or the yard and the garden inside the house, children seem to be further confined in their bedrooms, engaging ever more willingly with indoor activities such as computers and video games (p. 115).
In that sense, the spatial dimension of domesticity becomes relevant to the child’s development, since, by disrespecting its spatial needs it simultaneously discourages the formation of the child’s emerging identity. Although it was hitherto observed that the intangible side of domesticity is more salient to the process of identity construction, in childhood, space plays an equally vital role to that of intradomestic relationships. Children who are disallowed to modify their environment can develop submissive and introvert traits that might further obstruct their socialisation (Marcus 2006, p. 45). Furthermore, tangible aspects of domesticity, which are not directly connected to the children’s cognitive development, have been acknowledged as influential elements to their cognitive skills. As a recent research from the University of Michigan claims, our cognitive skills are influenced by non-cognitive determinants. The organisation and the efficiency of the family home are closely connected to the cognitive development of children, since the findings of the study indicated that ‘children raised in ‘clean’ or ‘very clean’ homes had an average of 1.6 more years of school than those raised in ‘not very clean’ or ‘dirty’ homes’ (Fisherman 2001, p. 28).

Regardless of the fact that adults often separate themselves from the young family members, research has proved the importance of the relationships formed within the family home when the members of the household spend their, little but, valuable leisure time in the house, together. In this regard, the way a family chooses to spend their leisure time can provide the tools to understand how this family functions while the specific issue can have both beneficial and negative effects for the family members and the intrafamilial relationships (Schanzel and Carr 2016).

On the one hand, activities that are practiced collectively can form a very strong bond between the family and improve communication. Children are especially benefited, since by spending time with their parents and siblings they grow emotionally, cognitively and socially, and as research indicates, those who engage in educational and social activities with their families become more sociable, confident and considerate (Schanzel and Carr 2016). On the other hand, spending leisure time can also lead to stress, arguments and conflicts, especially when there are pre-existing problems between the members of the family.
Another significant role of the family home is that it is the space in which children obtain an understanding of the world, society and their own selves, being educated by their parents in terms of feelings management and expression. Unless parents have shown their children how to express their feelings and emotions, these children will most probably have a difficult time doing so as they grow up first in the family home and later on in their adult life. Teenagers, for instance, who often demonstrate unexplained mood swings, show high levels of anxiety or are unwilling to engage in activities – at home or school – need to feel that they are safe in their home and that they can trust their parents. Likewise, emotional support from the parents towards the younger members of the family is crucial for their development at all levels. Parents who are understanding, flexible, thoughtful and most of all willing to communicate with their children, have the ability to understand better any possible problems that their child may face inside or outside the household and therefore to respond to it faster and more efficiently. On the contrary, aggressive and challenging behaviour stems from and leads to lack of effective communication and can be avoided if the parents allocate sufficient time to their childrearing responsibilities (Coleman 2012).

For the abovementioned reasons, the family home has been the focus of developmental psychologists and economists, as the environment that determines the child’s upbringing and development (Lugo-Gil and Tamis-LeMonda 2008). This hypothesis is continuously tested and proved by recent empirical studies (Bradley, et al. 2001; Lugo-Gil and Tamis-LeMonda 2008; Tendulkar et al. 2010) and has in turn allowed the family home a special legal treatment, as it is handled with extensive care when found vis-à-vis with the law (Fox 2005, p. 202). Like every habitat, the family home too is an environment that influences and is influenced by intradomestic relationships, but such relationships in the family home play an additional role since they constitute a paramount determinant of children’s upbringing. Intradomestic relationships and their quality are often determined by the financial resources of the family, the parents’ capacity to respond to the family’s needs and other socio-cultural determinants, like the cultural and educational background of the parents.

As a recent study suggested, the most significant parameter with a direct effect on childcare is the household economics, since stressed and overworked parents are
usually less inclined to respond to their children’s needs, while conflicts and other marital problems tend to be intensified during periods of economic hardship. In Coleman and Hendry (1999) the economic pressure which is usually linked with stress and depression was studied as a vital obstacle in parental responsivity (p. 188). In Bradley et al. (2001) the domestic environment and its relation to the development of children was scrutinised from a variety of perspectives and the household’s financial status was revealed as the most important factor influencing childcare. ‘Poverty affects nearly every aspect of children’s home lives,’ they claim, including their cognitive development, their socialisation, their transition into adulthood and as expected their adult life as such (Bradley et al. 2001, p. 184).

Further research on the influence of the family home with the upbringing and the socialisation of children has brought to light that an abusive domestic environment predicts the social maladjustment of adolescents and young adults. Specifically, child abuse has been associated with antisocial behaviour, delinquency, arrests for violent crimes and physical aggression. In the same research, high levels of sibling conflicts, a common disruption of family life, were established as predictors of substance use and arrests for violent crime (Bradley et al. 2001, p. 210). As the authors support, when parents hurt or fail to protect their children from hurting themselves and each other, they actually fail to create an environment which can adequately respond to their needs and to provide them with the necessary skills to pursue a healthy social life (Bradley et al. 2001, p. 211).

Furthermore, children who experience or witness domestic violence, are significantly affected, thus exhibiting ‘high levels of cognitive, emotional, behavioural and social problems, the cumulative effect of which may be carried into adulthood and can contribute significantly to the cycle of adversity and violence (Holt, Buckley and Whelan 2008, p. 802). Specifically, as the literature on the subject indicates, domestic violence has a severe developmental impact on a child’s life, manifested according to the age it was experienced. For example, toddlers who are fully dependent on their caregivers exhibit irritability and regressive behaviour in terms of language and toilet training (p. 802). For pre-schoolers, the problems are more evident and overarching, interfering with their psychological development. In such cases, the effects are amplified, therefore behavioural and social problems, post-traumatic stress
symptoms, difficulty developing empathy and poor self-esteem are manifested. Finally, older children are experiencing severe damage on their self-esteem and self-concept. It is thus clear that a violent domestic environment seriously hinders a child’s socialisation process, since it impinges upon the ways that they perceive their environment and their own selves (p. 803).

Another crucial example of the way that children’s socialisation develops inside the family home is highlighted in research relevant to alcohol use. In this case, empirical studies prove that ‘parent substance use and abuse is directly related to youth initiation and continued substance use through both genetic influences and modelling of parent behaviour (Tidesley and Andrews 2008, p. 327). Specifically the research of Tidesley and Andrews, aiming to explore the relation between parenting alcohol use and their children’s intentions to do so, proves that ‘parent alcohol use, decreased parent monitoring, and higher inconsistent discipline increased children’s intentions to use alcohol (Tidesley and Andrews 2008, p. 335).

Finally, the family home is also perceived as a decisive parameter for one’s perception of home per se, since, by taking into account the basics of place theory, one should anticipate that the experience of one’s first residence will be imprinted as a memory that will substantially shape his/her expectations of domesticity (Manzo 2005, p. 78). Therefore, the first residence often influences an individual’s views on and appreciation of the current residence, as well as the picture of the ideal habitat (Manzo 2005, p. 80). For many, the family home is an ideal they strive to reproduce, both as an image and as a set of habitation practices. Yet for those who have experienced a traumatic family life, the idealised image of home falls to pieces from an early age, demystifying the domestic myth and making such individuals expect less from their domestic life (Manzo 2005, p. 80).

Gendered Domesticity

It is obvious, from the analysis until this point, that women have been burdened with a role they neither chose nor wish to continue holding. In Ancient Greece women were predominately shut off from the public ground and were legally considered as their husband’s dependents, a fact which entailed a series of injustices. They were not considered free citizens, their participation in public activities was scarce and limited
to activities of religious nature, when married they were necessarily accompanied with dowry, and their husbands could marry them off to a man they had selected. Their most important role was relevant to the domestic sphere and their children’s upbringing, a role for which they were prepared since their childhood.

In the Roman Empire their role was slightly improved, mostly due to the fact that households were more loosely organised than those of Classical Athens. In this regard marriages were ‘more free’, wives were less dependable on their husbands, both legitimate and illegitimate children could live in the house and both legitimate and illegitimate could be left outside to be taken by anyone interested. In addition, women had already started questioning the fact that their duties were limited to motherhood and were exploring ways to overturn it. In the Medieval and Early modern period, women were burned as witches, hunted down for their mere existence in the public space, while they were still obliged to remain under their husband’s reign, while his power would be exercised in any way he wanted. Even when production was removed from the domestic space and women joined the workforce, their role was still associated primarily with their domestic duties.

Yet with every progress in the field of women’s rights, the a priori connection of women and home is undermined, so one would expect that many decades of female struggle against this axiom would have by now achieved its repudiation. Although it has been noted that there is often a disparity between feminist critiques of home and women’s testimonies regarding their domestic experiences, in many cases both empirical and conceptual studies continue to highlight the rigidity of the gender-split domestic sphere (Birch, Le and Miller 2009, pp. 23-24; Coltrane 2000; Kroska 2003, p. 472; Mallett 2004, pp. 75-76).

While the division of household labour is relevant to the demographics of the household (age, educational and social background, financial contribution, etc.), feminist scholars stress that in most cases housework burdens the female members of the family (Blunt and Dowling 2006, pp. 15, 95 & 126). Domestic duties are often experienced as an obligatory accompaniment to the female gender which often obstructs the development of women’s social potentials. In research conducted in rural areas of Greece, where gender discourse remains traditional and strong, it was observed that regardless of the fact that women gradually contributed more to the
household income by working in tourist stores and hotels, they remained as socially
disempowered as before (Costa 2005).

Sociological research on the issue of gendered home-making has indicated that,
regardless of many socio-demographic factors, the care and the maintenance of family
and household are considered primarily female responsibilities, while some domestic
chores, such as cooking and ironing, are commonly perceived as absolute feminine
duties; family nurturing and everything associated with the process, for instance,
predominately falls under the specific category (Smith 1994, p. 126; Valentine 1999,
p. 493; Kroska 2003). In this sense, even if women today are not burdened with the
amount of housework they were in the past, they are still regarded as the ones to
cater for the family’s well-being, often by prioritising their partner’s and children’s
preferences over their own (Valentine 1999, p. 493).

Such literature supports that the domestic environment is indeed a space of
gender re-enactment; a space where social and more specifically gender discourse is
reproduced. Interestingly, it has also been argued that house and family work are even
correlated with the moral image that women have and project for themselves, making
it extremely difficult to disengage from the specific discourse (Ahlander & Bahr 1995).
Thus, even today, recent studies demonstrate that women are still more burdened
with housework than men, which leads to the conclusion that the socio-demographic
changes that were expected to influence the patterns of household activities have
failed to challenge the predominant distribution of housework chores (Auspurg,
Iacovou & Nicoletti 2017; Birch, Le and Miller 2009; Coltrane 2000; Kroska 2003;
Valentine 1999).

In May 2017, the Guardian published the comic of French comic artist, feminist
and computer science engineer, Emma, which illustrated the concept of the ‘mental
load’ that women are facing as housekeepers and mothers. In this illustration Emma
argues not only that women are still the ones responsible for the majority of the
housework, but also that they are burdened with the responsibility of planning and
remembering numerous things relevant with their household (Emma 2017). She also
highlighted the way that girls are raised to become housewives and mothers, together
with the fact that girls’ toys seem to be preparing them for these very specific roles.
At the same time, Auspurg, Iakovou & Nicoletti (2017) published a study which explored the reasons why household chores continue to be predominately a female responsibility. The results indicated that men and women preferred to contribute equally in the housework and experienced higher levels of domestic satisfaction when this happened. However, they observed that the predominant trend remained unchallenged. In this light, the researchers suggested that one of the reasons why women continue to be burdened with more housework duties could be related to the fact that women score higher in the attribute of agreeableness, especially when confronted with a marital problem, when they appear more agreeable and less antagonistic (Auspurg, Iakovou &, Nicoletti 2017).

Furthermore, male attitudes towards housework are not only influenced by the traditional discourse, but they are also seduced by popular representations of idealised manhood, ‘a global Indiana Jones type’, that legitimises their irrelevance to the domestic ground (Pink 2004, p. 136). Regarding idealised femininity, on the other hand, it is the process of home-making that has obtained increasing gravity, a responsibility which is promoted as more enjoyable and empowering than housework, but one that perpetuates the idea that women are connected with the domestic sphere much more than men (Pink 2004, p. 112). Specifically, as suggested by Dorfman’s study (1992), women’s association with family preservation is mainly reproduced through the food industry, women’s magazines, cookbooks and advertisements, all of which endorse the idea that the most successful woman, one deserving to lead a happy, healthy family life, is the one who succeeds in her household duties.

Female social disempowerment has been frequently experienced as an oppressive and diminishing reality (Mallett 2004, p. 75). In this respect, by envisioning a life beyond the boundaries of their home, women often undergo the experience of identity disparity, since their felt identity is at odds with what is socially acceptable or expected.

As she made the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover material, ate peanut butter sandwiches with her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts and Brownies, lay besides her husband at night, she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent question – ‘Is this all?’ (Schneir, 1996, cited in Blunt and Dowling, 2006)
The ‘Is this all?’ question has been a recurring female concern that has driven many women towards feelings of isolation and depression (Pink 2004, p. 88) and although today more women disentangle from their domestic shackles, the struggle for equality, or a de-gendered society, is far from achieved.

As long as the ideology of domestic femininity proliferates, many women are susceptible to domestic violence and abuse. During family collapse, women are usually blamed, since when working outside the home, they are considered as inadequate mothers, but when focusing on their domestic duties they become inadequate caregivers failing to contribute financially to their household (Miles and Finn 1996, p. 237). Yet more importantly, women are sometimes subjected to their husbands’ violent outbursts since the latter expect their domestic haven to be utterly stress-free and are disturbed if their tranquillity is disrupted (Dobash and Dobash 1981, p. 565; Price 2002).

According to empirical research, there is a number of factors that seem to correlate with the emergence of abusive behaviour, such as the age and number of children, death in the family, infidelity, career change or abandonment, are associated with the malfunctioning of the family, which can often descend to violence (Hoff 2016). As it was seen in the section discussing domestic satisfaction above, the parameters that influence domestic satisfaction are also those affecting the intra-domestic relationships leading to a traumatic experience of domesticity.

Another abusive behaviour that women could be facing as part of their domestic reality is sexual abuse or conjugal rape, in other words the compulsion for participation in sexual intercourse, as well as the adoption of modes of sexual behaviour, not only unacceptable, but also repulsive for the woman (Davins et al. 2014).

Educational and/or professional inequality between spouses has been shown to play a decisive role in the emergence of violence. If a woman is successful and prevails over the man in the above, it is possible that the man develops feelings of inadequacy and incapacity, since he is unable to perform his role as the head of the family. The research by Parker et al. (2016) showed that inequality in education and occupation triggers abusive behaviour in couples, which occurs mainly in the form of psychological violence and less in the form of physical violence and a threat to life.
Nonetheless, intradomestic violence and the fact that numerous women feel homeless-at-home, proves the ‘tension between the binary opposites of safety and risk, security and fear, privacy and invasion’, which is often part of the female domestic experience (Wardhaugh 1999, p. 93). Many of the female ‘domestic refuges’ who flee intradomestic violent situations, are called to survive in a space hitherto being acknowledged as predominately male, namely, the streets, where they are obliged to manage their body in relation to space and their extreme exposure and vulnerability. As Wardhaugh highlights, the role of the body in homelessness obtains increased importance as the only thing that separates and protects an individual from the dangers of the public world (1999, p. 102). In order to escape visibility or attention, many women disappear at night, either by dressing as men, or by befriending male companions for protection. Women, in this case, disaffiliated from families or kin groups, as individuals in the streets are commonly perceived as public women, prostitutes (p. 102).

The Feminist Perspective

As it appears from the analysis so far, home is a space closely related with its inhabitants’ sense of identity and selfhood, yet even today this is a largely problematic area for its female inhabitants. In the previous chapters, women were seen as domestic slaves, obliged to live in the servitude of their homes, husband and children, prohibited from any interaction with the public sphere. Since the Age of Enlightenment in Europe, women were gradually taking such matters in their own hands and were significantly pressing for the acknowledgement of their equal rights in areas inside and outside their households. In the first part of the 20th century, their struggles led to civil and legal equality, even if mostly in theory, while the First World War gave to many women the opportunity to work and thus disengage, to some extent, from their domestic role (Walton 2005, p. 86).

However, as it is obvious from feminist critique of the late 20th century, many women are still lacking the capacity to define themselves both in the private and public spheres. Since the present study is focusing on the idea of domesticity developing in the Western urban world, it will be limited to the feminist critiques.
dealing with women living in the specific milieu. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that women living in other parts of the world, or in rural Western areas, and those who live in urban centres but belong to specific minorities, face their own particular challenges, not only in terms of their self-definition, but also in their everyday life.

In this regard, women are still struggling to define themselves and their relationship to their home, which often has a double and opposing signification. On the one hand, as it is expected, home, for women, is what it is for any other inhabitant; a place to enjoy their privacy, relax and distance themselves from the public ground. On the other hand, however, home continues to signify a space of work and inequality that remains bound to their own self-definition. Laurent Berlant, for instance, claims that women are obliged to leave their homes behind and focus their intervention on the public space, to make it safer for women (Berlant 1988, p. 253). Likewise, Caren Kaplan’s approach endorses the idea that since women are anyway deterritorialised, in other words excluded, from their own language and home, it is their duty to ‘leave home, as it were, since our homes are often sites of racism, sexism, and other damaging social practices (Kaplan 1987, p. 194). While this specific quote will be an issue of deeper analysis in the last chapter of the thesis, at this point it suffices to say that many feminists have urged women to take their struggles in the public sphere, often considering the home a front that has been lost irrevocably to patriarchy, racism and sexism.

Feminists today continue to acknowledge the inequalities that women are facing, even in Western late capitalism. Natasha Walter, in The New Feminism (1998), argued that women are ‘still poorer and less powerful than men’, calling for action in this field. Meanwhile, Germaine Greer’s angry response in The Whole Woman (1999) criticised lifestyle feminists for their fixation with money and power, explaining that equality is so much more than the month’s pay check, and Naomi Wolf’s Fire with Fire (1983) urges that women should stop complaining and start acting (Walter 2005, p. 137-139). The numerous and variable approaches not only to feminist action but also to the definition of feminists and women, while in most cases essential, can also be disorienting and divisive.
Interestingly, while this thesis cannot and should not be regarded as contributing centrally to feminist studies, even if its issue of concern is the domestic environment, it does however share significant common ground with feminist critique. The question that is common in both areas, namely the post-structuralist background of this thesis and contemporary feminist critique is how one deals with home. A point that should be taken into consideration here is the fact that this thesis argues that many individuals today, including men, are struggling with exclusion the same way women have hitherto done so. Late capitalism and the age of information are establishing a discourse that is daunting for most Western urban inhabitants who struggle to maintain their relevance to the predominant social discourse. Many men are part of the marginalised groups hitherto marginalised by the dominant models of masculinity.

An interesting example here would be the phenomenon of the recent economic crisis in Greece, which has changed the employment status of thousands of Greeks and is, as a result, challenging the existing intra-domestic routines and hierarchies to a significant extent. In the four years between 2008-2012 male employment dropped by 19.1 per cent while female employment by 14.3 per cent. The number of unemployed men, thus, increased by 3.3 times while that of unemployed women by 1.6 (Karamessini 2014, p. 170). At the same time fiscal policies and work-related developments are diminishing and even removing the privileges that the male-dominated parts of the workforce were enjoying, while there is a push towards a more flexible employment status, that was hitherto associated with a more feminine style of employment (Karamessini 2014, p. 183). The male breadwinner families have been heavily influenced by such changes, as well as dual-earner households. The fact that the number of unemployed men has increased to such an extent in these four years has begun to shift the power relations between men and women, but predominantly it is tampering with the way that a great number of men see themselves.

In the recent research of Economou et al. (2013) dealing with the impacts of the Greek financial crisis on the health and the mental health of the population it was shown that male individuals were the group with the highest risk of attempting suicide, since their social role was more closely correlated with their employment
status. Other factors include the stress induced by job loss and income reduction, together with the fact that Greek men are less socially integrated and more emotionally isolated. It is becoming increasingly evident that in times of grave financial insecurity both men and women are facing serious challenges regarding their self-esteem, but as it appears in the case of Greece, men are facing the most important consequences, since the notion of masculinity is commonly informed by their breadwinning capacity, hence their failure in that area can be severely detrimental to their own health.

Accordingly, as this thesis also supports, men and women are now facing, to some extent, the same oppressor, namely capitalism. In a similar vein, the Marxist feminist approach considered patriarchy to be a side-effect of capitalism and claimed that the dismantling of capitalism would result in the end of patriarchy (Gardner 2006, p. 138). While the relationship between capitalism and patriarch is significant there is a multitude of inequalities that women are facing, such as domestic violence and sexual oppression, which seem to be irrelevant with the politico-economic sphere, as non-Marxist feminists argue. However, as the case of Greece has indicated, the systems of capitalism and patriarchy are indeed intertwined and reinforce each other, allowing space for feminist critique and action in this regard, as Heidi Hartmann recommends (Gardner 2006, p. 140). Likewise, Katrina Irving (1989, p. 643) offers an interesting view that approaches the proposal of this thesis and thus strengthens its validity:

Feminists, blacks, and other marginal groups must avoid the temptation to find accommodation within the existing order. Rather, rejecting the rotting houses proffered by hegemony, we must work toward deconstructing them and reconstructing others, accepting our erstwhile exile within the existing order.

The contemporary fragility of hegemonic masculinity as a powerful concept may be challenging to decipher, particularly for men. However, this reality is expected to be gradually understood by more individuals, leading to a domestic environment that should be turned into an autonomous zone that men and women should not only reclaim, but also reconstruct according to a more human, equal and rightful approach.
The power relations originating in the very existence of the habitat transcend the domestic boundaries. Studies that have scrutinised the social dimension of home have argued that it is entwined with the principle of classification embedded in our perception of society, highlighting the segregation that originates in the habitation patterns of different social classes (Pratt, 1982; Saunders 1984). While home ownership alone contributes to social class cleavage, since home owners were even in the 20th century regarded as the main holders of production and wealth, the fact that affluent households are distinguished from the rest by being situated in the maintained and well-guarded areas adds to the existing segregation. Middle and high-class occupants, are able to reach the seemingly unattainable ideal home, by selecting their dwelling neighbourhood and space, in contrast to the lower social classes that are obliged to reside in cheap and usually impoverished urban regions.

By taking into account the ‘home as a mirror of the self’ axiom, an interesting paradox arises. People who have limited capacity of choice in terms of their habitats are often subjected to moral criticism because their residential conditions are unnerving to the public eye. Interestingly, dispossessed individuals are often regarded as morally degenerate and unclean, since the public fails to take into account the fact that the former neither choose depraved areas nor prefer them. In fact, their residential status was never a matter of choice for them. Based on the same naiveté, mobile tribes and mobile homes are equally disregarded as inappropriate, maligned as ‘trailer trash’ people and negatively portrayed as inferior to ‘normal’ habitats.

In this regard, it has been established that the public tends to be judgemental towards individuals who fail to demonstrate some kind of progress (Greve & Currie 1990, p. 17; Snow & Anderson 1987). Concomitant with the persistence of dominant discourse against the social underclass, from modernity onwards there has been an overt glorification of the domestic ideal and every notion with which it is associated. As Smith (1998, p. 178) maintains:

in North America, the idealised home has been socially and culturally moralised not only in gendered terms but also in terms of physical spaces designed to express the prosperity and stability associated with middle-class status.
The ideal home emerges once again; this time not as a signifier of identity and gender, but as a symbol of social and moral recognition. The ‘normal’ home is thus presented as an establishment that does not only connote the spending power of its inhabitants, but it also signifies their ‘quality’. The ideology that prevailed through the post-war period until today supports that home means ‘heterosexuality, sexual reproduction, work ethic, individual responsibility, sobriety, consumption’ (Kawash 2000, p. 185), while the lack of decent housing implies at least, moral degradation, one’s incapacity to assume adult responsibilities and one’s inaptitude for citizenship duties and rights. Precisely because the domestic establishment plays the role of status signifier the homed and the homeless, the locals and the foreigners, the belingers and the non-belingers are expected to dwell in areas as separated as possible from each other. The domesticated population, the respectable and proper citizens are thus placed against the homeless, the poor and the underachievers; a social dichotomy, which does not only divide people into social classes but also into moral categories, i.e. in the worthy and the worthless, or in crude terms the good and the bad.

Smith (1990, p. 11) argues that through the ideology of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nature, integral in liberal ideology, the orderly are classified under the first category and the disorderly under the latter. This moral binary, by disregarding any other attribute of the individual, denominates the socially excluded as non-citizens, grounding on the assumption that ‘good nature’ is included in the social boundaries and interacts with the marketplace and other social institutions, working for the common welfare. ‘Bad nature’, on the other hand, is by default placed outside the margins of society; its unruly character is deemed as the reason for which the poor, people of ‘bad nature’, fail to prosper financially and legitimises the result, namely their disconnection to the marketplace. Accordingly, their physical and practical distatiion from the social core is translated in their overall exclusion from political or citizenship activities. Bauman (2016), who has also focused on the exclusion of the underclass on the basis of their limited purchasing power, highlights that in today’s consumption society, the gap between the ‘consumers’ and the ‘non-consumers’ widens to unprecedented extents, allowing an extremely limited space of social existence for the ‘flawed consumers’ (p. 67).
As expected, groups that fail to exhibit the necessary points of references which would tie them with the social (consuming) whole, devoid of social characteristics, are turned into *homo sacer*; individuals, as Georgio Agamben explains, stripped off of their social definition who become *bare life*, nothing but flesh. Agamben deploys the term *homo sacer* which in ancient tradition referred to the person who was not pure enough to be sacrificed: ‘*homo sacer* on whom this curse falls in an outcast, a banned man, tabooed, dangerous’ (Agamben 1998, p. 79). In the sphere of sovereign power, the *homo sacer*, the physically and notionally excluded, today’s homeless, refugees, immigrants and poor, by losing their social significations, they lose their right to social and public rights, and overall the right to be treated as human beings.

Agamben’s notion of the homo sacer can be clearly observed in Greece, a country that has been experiencing massive refugee flows from the East and the Balkans, especially since 2010. The solution that the state proposed was the establishment of detention facilities that would host refugees and immigrants until their status and identity was clarified. At least 30,000\(^8\) allegedly irregular migrants

\[\text{Image 3: Police scuffle with Afghan migrants as they block the entrance of the Elliniko refugee camp during the visit of Migration Minister Ioannis Mouzalas. AP PHOTO / THANASSIS STAVRAKIS (Howden 2017)}\]

\[\text{Image 8 Although this is the maximum capacity of the detention centres, the fact that they are overcrowded indicates that the numbers of inmates are clearly larger.}\]
were held in these detention facilities, defined by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT 2011), as totally inappropriate for the lengthy detention of the migrant population, particularly those located in Aspropyrgos, Petrou Rali and Filakio.

Detainees of the Filakio Special holding facility reported ill-treatment while the CTP observed bloodstains on the walls of the so-called visit room. At the Athens airport detention centre, detainees claimed to have been sexually intimidated, verbally insulted and beaten, often in front of young children and their mothers. While similar circumstances were encountered in all the detention centres visited, in none of them were the inmates given any clear information on their situation; the only document they had received was in Greek and stated that they could be held in detention for up to six months. In October 2010, the UN’s Refugee Agency recommended urgent measures so that the serious humanitarian needs encountered in the detention centres of the Evros region would be met (UNHCR 2010), and on March 15 2011, the ECT issued a public statement regarding the country’s failure to address the issue in a lawful manner (CPT 2011).

Groups and individuals who fail to prove a connection with a home or a home country, considered as bare life, can trigger the State of Exception status, since they constitute a threat to the security of a country, or area. In Greece, for example, references to ‘public security threats’ are more than ample in relation to the foreign
national population, primarily on the premise of their legal and hygienic delinquency. Simultaneously, the liminality of their status has endorsed the authorities’ wariness, and has even granted racism a place in the Greek parliament, with the inclusion of the right-wing party Golden Dawn. Accordingly, in the state of exception, Agamben argues that life, or more precisely bare life – life stripped off from its political and cultural characteristics – is frequently perceived as a threat to the sovereign and is thus subjected to exclusion and even elimination (Agamben 1998, p. 131).

The refugees, the stateless persons, the asylum seekers and every foreign national who resides in the liminal inertia of his/her inconclusive citizenship status, ‘break the continuity between man and citizen’ and tantalise the sovereign (Agamben 1998, p. 131). In the unofficial Greek state of exception, thirty detention camps were established so that those insulting the continuity between man and citizen would be punished. The detention conditions in these facilities certify that they are indeed ‘outside the rules of penal and prison law’ (Agamben 1998, p. 169). Legislation has absolutely no bearing on whatever goes on inside these facilities, for as Agamben explains, ‘whatever or not atrocities are committed depends not on law but on the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign’ (Agamben 1998, p. 174).

Since the flows of migrants and refugees towards Greece – a country in the middle of a deepening economic recession and officially in a state of a severe humanitarian crisis – have multiplied, the detention centres were never emptied.

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9 The sanitary provision of the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity, which has not been published yet so as to come into force, aims, according to the explicit declarations of the Ministers of Citizen Protection and Health in their joint press conference on 1.4.2012, to take steps ‘to protect public health from risks posed by the uncontrolled flow of illegal immigrants in city centres’ (Christopoulos, et al. 2012)

10 Daily migrant and refugee arrivals, which once topped 10,000, have averaged 45 during the first months of 2017. Of the 1.03 million asylum seekers who have entered Greece since January 2015, only 62,000 remain, according to government figures. This total is inflated according to the U.N. refugee agency, while some European officials and Greek observers believe the real number is nearer 45,000 (Howden 2017)
While the rest of the neighbouring countries were closing their boarders thousands of refugees were being stranded inside the Greek boarders (Howden 2017, p. 5 of 47).

Image 5: Migrants and refugees after crossing the border from Greece in October 2015. AP PHOTO / BORIS GRDANOSKI (Howden 2017)

Some were transferred to the notorious detention centres, where their status changed from temporary detainees to indefinite. The conditions remain the same, the complains numerous and the detainees, homeless and countryless, are faced with their greatest fears. However, a series of initiatives are observed in the refugee camps in Athens and other areas of Greece, which aim at the pain relief of the refugees, the education of the children, the integration and acceptance of these people in the local communities where they have found themselves (Howden 2017, pp. 10-13 of 47).

Nonetheless, the marginalisation experienced by refugees and immigrants is still palpable and underlies social tensions, fosters national conflicts and undermines democratic traditions and freedoms. Immigrants cannot join the social fabric, but are subjected to ghettoization and become isolated from the lively and creative movements of society. Xenophobic behaviours due to skin colour or religion in the workplace and in everyday life contribute to the marginalisation of immigrants and immigrant women coming mainly from Albania and secondly from Africa and Asia (Legrain 2014). The risk of marginalisation for women is even higher, especially those
who are single parent families, unemployed, elderly, sick, disabled, and victims of trafficking (Kraal & Vertovec 2017).

Just as migrants and refugees hope to find a new place to call home, another disadvantaged group is in a similar process. Homelessness is a global, mostly urban phenomenon, which proves the effects that home, or the lack of it, have on the individual. In 2016 The Guardian published an alarming article that the number of people sleeping rough in any one night in England has increased by thirty per cent in one year (Gentleman 2016). In the US the numbers are equally shocking; over half a million people are homeless and fifteen per cent of that population is chronically homeless (Social Solutions 2016). The effects of homelessness extend beyond the fact that these people lack a shelter, since individuals report that they lose their sense of identity, self-worth and self-efficacy (Boydell, Goering & Morrell-Bellai 2000, p 26).

Being homeless in a society fixating with home gives rise to reactions that consider such individuals as problematic, due to cultural deprivation, inferiority and depravity, while the tend to be acknowledged as a threat to society, since they are thought to be connected with criminal behaviour, contamination and demoralisation (Snow & Anderson 1987, p. 1137). It is thus obvious that having or not having a home can have a sever effect on the way an individual is being perceived and on how one perceives oneself.

The nullifying power of the ‘civilising process’, which has been fortified by the appropriation of the habitat as a measure of social and moral capability, has been criticised not only as crude and unfair, but also as psychologically problematic. Quoting Freud, Keohane suggests that the obsession with hygiene and normality provokes anti-social and neurotic behaviours, such as obsessive compulsive intra-domestic conduct and hysterical drive for consumption (Keohane 2002, p. 400). It thus appears that obsession with hygiene has similar side – effects with the contemporary fixation with security, all secured alone. In this light, the glorification of the proper home culminates in paranoid reactions towards ‘change, difference, alterity’ or ‘depression and the normal culture of quiet desperation’ (Keohane 2002, p. 400). Along with a variety of different contemporary issues that arise as derivatives of society’s obsession with ‘normality’, such behaviours gnaw normality away, or else
de-normalise the well-respected, proper inhabitants to the extent of their own degradation (Keohane 2002, p. 400).

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

Having explored how the idealisation of home practically influences the social ground, it would be interesting to approach this ideal from a Nietzschean perspective. For this purpose, the main publication that will be considered here is his On the Genealogy of Morality (1998), in order to prove how the society of the weak has imprisoned man in the domestic sphere and what the consequences are on a social scale.

Nietzsche is notorious for his disbelief in marriage and domesticity, but is most commonly referenced for his obscure stance towards women (Abbey 1997). However, this will not be an issue of primary consideration here since, his aversion towards domestic life has little to do with his opinion about women. Rather, what could be seen as a more significant motive for his anti-domestic position is his idea of a morality divided into Master and Slave, according to which the place of domesticated men is under the second category. The informative table in Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy (2006, pp. 136-7), which untangles the complexity of this binary moral model, distinguishes the quality of the will to power into affirmative and negative, perceiving the first as influential to those defined as Masters, i.e. people who manage to prioritise their actions above reactive forces. The second category, the one of the Slaves, gathers those who are unable, or rather not strong enough, to act upon their impulses and are thus governed by reactive forces, such as ressentiment, bad conscience and the ascetic ideal. The kind of people populating the two categories are divided accordingly; for instance, Nietzsche considers the artist, the noble, the sovereign individual and the legislator as symbols of the Master type, or else as men powerful and capable of digesting their experiences (Nietzsche 1998, p. 93), strong and able to ‘bear a true biography’ (Nietzsche 1998, p. 100).

On the contrary, in the category of the Slave, Nietzsche classifies the accusers, the pain-multipliers, the guilty, and all those who internalise pain, in other words domesticated men and the followers of the ascetic ideal. Hence, it becomes obvious that his enmity towards domesticity stems from a much deeper belief than that pertinent to the married couple or to the nature of women per se. For that reason,
instead of discussing his quite wobbly thesis on women, the analysis will focus on the reasons for which the human habitat became entangled in his definition of Slave morality.

In order to achieve this, his definition of Slave morality and how it has managed to prevail over western civilisation should be explored. In the very beginning of the First Treatise in the *Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche clarified that Slave and Master morality were made to swap places in the value systems of men struggling with the unjustifiable aspect of existence (Nietzsche 1998, p. 19). As explicated in Deleuze’s table, Slave morality is born out of ressentiment a term used by Nietzsche in reference to those sentiments men fail to either manage or act upon. Such withheld sentiments escape enactment and by turning inwards, the pain and suffering that preoccupies all men, but sickens the feeble, increases. With the support of culture and religion (Deleuze 2006, p. 124) Slave morality feeds on man’s fear of a purposeless life and dominates over human society correlating prudence with nobility rendering the ‘primary condition of existence’ (Nietzsche 1998, p. 20). Prudent men negate the pleasure deriving from a ‘good fight’ with a worthy opponent and are unable to stand up to ‘an outside, to a different, to a not-self’ (Nietzsche 1998, p. 20).

This unwillingness to embrace life, this constant no-saying is by Nietzsche the only creative aspect of Slave morality, and of course, one that on no account justifies the idealisation of Slave morality (Nietzsche 1998, p. 19). So, in terms of home as an idea or as a social institution, Nietzsche supported that prudence, the basic ingredient of Slave morality, is the force dominating the domestic sphere, while home, in other words the secular temple of Slave morality, has even come to be seen as ‘the primary condition of existence’ Nietzsche 1998, p. 19).

On the other side of the binary is what Nietzsche defined as Master morality, which, as mentioned above, characterises individuals who act beyond the limitations of the predominant understanding of good and evil. They are the ones that Nietzsche considered to be wild animals, uninterested in the concealment of their anger, pain, desire or instincts; they are hero material, unpredictable and unforeseeable in their reactions, proud of ‘their indifference and contempt toward all security, body, life, comfort’ (Nietzsche 1998, p. 22). How could such a man be confined inside the house, ‘the place of impurity’, which Buddha, as other philosophers before and after him
abandoned (Nietzsche 1998, p. 22), by turning their backs to the prerequisite of Slave existence and the impediment to their own? The will to power that Nietzsche perceived as a vital ingredient of all life, both Master and Slave, is each living being’s instinctive desire to reach the conditions that will not only permit but also endorse one’s maximum potential (Nietzsche 1998, p. 75). Accordingly, the domestic environment could never provide such a framework of existence, at least not for everyone, and for that reason, it has been wrongfully acknowledged as the basis of existence.

Thus, the decision of whether one would agree to the rules of the domestic life should be one’s own to make. But by promoting domestic-based existence as the basis of moral existence, Slave morality extended its domination over the population idealising a space which kills desire and with it the human potential for an extraordinary life. In this respect, Nietzsche inverts Aristotle’s logic, who perceived the lack of a habitual basis as a proof of one’s deviation from an average norm, explaining that in order for one to reach an exceptional status, or else, the optimum conditions of existence, the habitat ought to be removed from the equation of social preconditions.

With culture working its way towards a tamer human animal and widespread asceticism turning ‘life against life’ (Nietzsche 1998, p. 85) the domestic haven, the sacred home of the family is propagated as the one establishment that can shelter and protect its members from the wilderness and the unpredictability of the immoral predators jeopardising their tranquillity. While this sounds like a valid reason for the beneficial value of the habitat to be acknowledged, it would not be sufficient, on its own, to safeguard the necessity of domestication. As Nietzsche observed, a significant social influence strengthening the domestic ideal is that of the ascetic priest, who promotes social inertia for the continuation of such practices.

The priest takes advantage of man’s existential anxieties and the often unbearable burden of their gratuitous being (Nietzsche 1998, p. 117), and becomes the leader of the herd by claiming that he can soothe man’s pain, a pain he actually further aggravates by locating it inside man himself. By making man responsible for his own misery, the ascetic priest elevates prudence and propriety in the place of an ideal, promising to those who follow the enlightened path to immortality a favourable
afterlife (Nietzsche 1998, pp. 92-3). The tamed, domesticated, sick man goes into ‘hibernation’ (Nietzsche 1998, p. 95) and leads a mechanic life of ‘absolute regularity, punctual unreflected obedience, [having] one’s way of life set once and for all’ (p. 97). Slave morality prevails and so do the ideals that endorse it.

Nietzsche’s social psychology deals with a number of issues and most importantly with institutions that have been challenged by several social theorists before him. Even though some of his ideas develop and vary across his oeuvre, he remains overtly and rigidly positioned against the domestic environment and its restrictive function. Either viewed as a social institution which gradually turns strong men into a tame, domesticated version of themselves, or considered as the haven of morality, properness and religious obedience, domestication is approached as an insult to man’s superior nature, i.e. as an establishment that hinders evolution and more importantly the will to power. In stark contrast to Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy and his idea that men are naturally drawn together, although he does agree on the second part of his belief that a ‘cityless man is either low in the scale of humanity or above it’ (Aristotle 1959, p. 9), Nietzsche maintained that ‘the strong strive just as naturally and necessarily away from each other as the weak strive towards each other’ (Nietzsche 1998, p. 98). As a mouthpiece of asceticism, the domestic ideal promotes a dull, uninteresting and puny life, which leads to the next worst thing than the death of one’s will, which is no other than the will to will nothing (Nietzsche 1998, p. 118).

Against Aristotle’s naïveté and Aquinas’ obsequiousness, more determined for a definite solution than John Stuart Mills and a step closer to the abolishment of home from Marx, Nietzsche was not afraid that the wild nature of the human animal would harm existence, as long as one’s will to power would be strong enough to prevail. He thus considered home in a broader perspective classifying it with other institutions that suppress humankind. For Nietzsche, the human habitat is nothing but the shelter of the weak man, whose will-to-power wills nothingness, a shelter of the man whose actions are merely reactive, repressed and resentful; a space where routine seems the prerequisite of survival and one which fails to produce the conditions for the realisation of humanity’s full potentials. In short, it would not be too blunt a statement to say that according to Nietzsche the human habitat is against life per se.
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976)

With the same critique to that of Nietzsche as his starting point, Martin Heidegger provides a different approach to the domestic sphere. He begins from conceptualisation of Being (Dasein), which uncovers what Being really is, what forms it takes in the modern époque and the ideals it should uphold in order to stand closer to its substance. In *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* (1971) he explores the notion of dwelling as an existential aspect of the Being. Specifically, he links the basic question of philosophy – what is Being – with the basic question of architecture – what is the Building – in an effort to expose how intertwined these two ideas actually are. At the same time, Heidegger reaches the depths of the embodied Being and its very constitution, when he primarily highlights the obvious connection between building, dwelling and thinking, maintaining that any distinction between the three or any attempt to experience them separately would jeopardise each of these concepts as well as Being itself. In his view, present day building methods, dominated by technicalities, scientific discourse and mechanics promote a kind of dwelling that is irrelevant to Being, as he perceives it (Heidegger 1971).

By taking into account one of his main conceptions, that of existential angst, what can be inferred is that the safety the modern building, and by extension the dwelling practices, seem to be offering, is merely a false one. Heidegger considers that the only certainty a mortal Being can be granted by the world is that of death. This realisation creates the sense of non-belonging which leads to the determination of reaching our true home, which, by Heidegger, is the essence of our being. The kind of dwelling commonly valued today is the one that seeks to soothe this anxiety by providing the comfort of pseudo-safe environments, which conceal every hint of one’s personal temporariness.

The existential angst that Heidegger perceives as the driving force of the Being in *Being and Time* (1996) is similar to the feelings experienced when dwelling occurs in unfamiliar, alien territory. This very feeling is for Heidegger the voice of consciousness, a voice that needs to be heard so that one’s course towards the meaning of one’s existence continues. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger also discusses the relationship of the home and the alien by referring to the notion of the homeland one which he
juxtaposes with the idea of freedom. By considering that the only homeland an individual should know is one’s own essence, one’s own being, Heidegger maintains that only when one is free will one reach the essence of one’s being. In this regard, homeland and freedom, often perceived as antithetical and contradictive terms, are in Heidegger’s thought loosely connected.

Heidegger of course does not assert that the course leading to one’s being is necessarily a physical one, since the essence of being is not to be found in the physical space but in the cognitive. It is through the process of thinking – which is also the purpose of philosophy – that one comes closer to one’s Being. In short, as beings, we always feel displaced due to our existential fears of death; this anxiety emancipates our desire to find our topos of belonging. Accordingly, building is caused by dwelling, but it is not a prerequisite of dwelling. The only prerequisite of dwelling that Heidegger recognises is thinking, which should, by extension, permeate the way we build. Any other relationship amongst dwelling, building and thinking is perceived as detrimental to the world and life as such.

In order to highlight the difference between the contemporary understanding of residing with his own notion of dwelling, Heidegger poses a very interesting question at the beginning of his lecture. ‘Today’s houses may even be well planned, easy to keep, attractively cheap, open to air, light and sun, but – do the houses in themselves hold any guarantee that dwelling occurs in them’ (Heidegger 1971, p. 1). His response to this question begins in the linguistic sphere, with the word *Bauen* (building), which is found to have a common meaning with the verb *bin* (to be). Both *Bauen* and *bin* can also be translated as to dwell, a fact which indicates that building, being and dwelling are three closely related concepts. Heidegger explicates that although we tend to consider building as one of the by-products of dwelling, with the contribution of language, it appears that this is not the case. He thus reaches his first conclusion that ‘we do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, because we are dwellers’ (Heidegger 1971, p. 3).

Looking deeper into language, he comes across the Old Saxon word *wuon* which like bauen means to remain, to stay in a place. But wuon gives an additional quality to the notion of dwelling, for it specifically means to remain in peace and the word for peace, *Friede*, means the free (Heidegger 1971, p. 1). The free, those who are free or
are freed, are the ones who are spared, but as he explains to not harm in its positive sense means to protect. Hence, he reaches his second conclusion, which is that men dwell and build by protecting and safeguarding ‘each thing in its nature’ (p. 3). ‘The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving’, he finally underlines (p. 3).

These first steps of Heidegger’s argumentation make the meaning of the word bauen much clearer. Primarily, it appears that building is dwelling since humans build as they dwell – dwelling is an integral part of our existence. The second meaning of bauen is that dwelling is the ontology of mortal life on earth. The third sense of bauen refers to the kinds of building encompassed in building-as-dwelling which are divided in the cultivation of growing things and the erection of buildings (Heidegger 1971, p. 2). The home for Heidegger is not an institution or an establishment that one can do away with, as it is part of our very being as dwellers on the earth, as dwellers under the sky. Here Heidegger introduces the four elements according to which dwelling should occur, namely, the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals, which in connection to each other make up what he defines as the fourfold.

During their dwelling on the earth and under the sky, while respecting the nature of the fourfold, mortals must protect and safeguard the nature of each element. The earth needs to be cultivated but not exploited, the sky should be allowed to signify the day and night which are to be respected and not tampered with. Human beings dwell with the hope of divinity in their hearts and with the deities they hold dear in their misfortunes, while at the same time they dwell by initiating their own nature, ‘their being capable of death as death – into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good death’ (Heidegger 1971, p. 4). But how can dwellers ensure that their dwelling is indeed respecting the nature of the fourfold? What kind of buildings would they need to erect in order to guarantee the connection of these four elements?

Heidegger introduces the example of the bridge, which he considers as an ideal building since it gathers in its structure all four components of the fourfold, and it does so by creating a site for it – the location it occupies does not exist before it, but appears by virtue of the bridge. Having stressed the significance of the bridge structure as a ‘thing’ that stems from human dwelling and one that becomes a location and
therefore allows space to exist (Heidegger 1971, p. 10), he goes on to examine the relationship of human beings and such structures. Buildings, as he already mentioned, relate with individuals through dwelling and dwelling’s purpose is the preservation of the fourfold, ‘to save the earth, to receive the sky, to await the divinities, to escort mortals’ (Heidegger 1971, p. 9). Since this is the nature of dwelling, buildings should share the same purpose. ‘Only if we are capable of dwelling’, he explains, ‘only then can we build’ (Heidegger 1971, p. 10). Houses, the kind of buildings in which dwelling should actually occur, must follow the same principles. As the farmhouse in the Black Forest that Heidegger exemplifies in order to elucidate on the ideal of the dwelling, so should the habitat ensure that it can protect and simultaneously organise the fourfold, a process that, as insinuated by Heidegger, does not necessarily happen automatically, but it occurs through thinking.

In his final thought about present-day building practices, Heidegger concludes that the only way for mortals to safeguard the essence of dwelling is to think and contemplate on our dwelling on the earth. In this regard, Heidegger’s thought on the human habitat does not merely consider the organisational parameters or the problems that arise under the roof of the household, but it presents an ideal model of habitation open to the broader spectrum of existence. Rather than simply locating the place of home on the horizontal private-public axis, Heidegger introduces a second vertical one which intersects the first and thus places the home right at the point of their intersection. At the same time, he implies that the problems which challenge the modern habitat are encountered due to the location of the household on the horizontal axis and the fact that frequently enough dwelling fails to take the fourfold into consideration.

In an age that very little thinking goes into dwelling, when life on the earth and below the sky resembles a hybris, building and dwelling fail to withstand the passing of time exactly because of their wobbly location. Besides identifying an important problem of our times, Heidegger’s theorisation calls for the in depth exploration of the contemporary habitat and the responses that have been considered for the alleviation of its problematic structure, something that will be attempted in the following chapters, where the ideas permeating the postmodern habitat will be scrutinised.
Conclusion

This chapter has explored the social dimension of home and the ways it is influenced by, while simultaneously influencing, the social sphere. Primarily the household has been analysed as a space of familial interaction and one in which children’s socialisation begins. In this case, home becomes a set of rules, routines and practices which are imposed on its younger inhabitants, often with negative consequences that affect them both at the time they are experience and for the rest of their lives. In a similar vein, criticism of the ‘happy phenomenology of home’ (Wardhaugh 1999, p. 93) considers the ways that the domestic ideal and the predominant discourse, from antiquity until our days, undermine women, by limiting them in the domestic sphere and ascribing them roles that have not been selected voluntarily. Women are thus equally experiencing home as space where gender discourse is perpetuated and feminist discourse has been deployed to study the academic responses to this reality. Last but not least, the chapter considers the excluding capacity of home, through the discrimination of the homed and the non-homed into belongers and non-belongers, worthy and worthless, subjects and objects.

Nietzsche’s theorisation on the domestication humanity is deployed as a counter-suggestion, favouring homelessness over the pettiness of homed existence. According to his thought, the domesticated agent needs to challenge the ideals proved detrimental to the development of a strong ‘Master-type’ individual, otherwise one will be faced with the withering of one’s will to power and will thus be turned into a tame, sick animal. The home is for Nietzsche, as it was for Marx, a space that promoted the interests of a sick social whole, or one that reproduced the ideas of those who were in control – who by Nietzsche, were not the powerful and strong, but the tame and the absent.

While Nietzsche criticises home and its limited place in the private sphere, Martin Heidegger keeps the place of home right in the middle of the private-public axis, while introducing a second axis. The four dimensions now present in the definition of home’s value are in a sense the points of Heidegger’s fourfold. The private-public axis expands to become the human-nature axis, while the second one...
introduces the points of the earth and the sky, or else those of the mortals and the deities. Heidegger considers home on the point of these axes convergence; he argues that one should dwell by respecting the earth and the sky, meaning other mortals and the deities, while protecting the natural and the human world. To achieve this, one has to think. Only by contemplating on dwelling will one be able to come closer to one’s true home, which is no other than the essence of being, he argues.
Chapter Five
Postmodern Dwelling

The human habitat and the ways it is perceived are nowadays shaped so that past, present and future homes appear to be diverging greatly (Bredenoord, et al. 2010). Home, for instance, has always been regarded as a symbol of social and financial status, it has served as an ideal, which the majority of the western population hopes to realise and uphold, regardless of the fact that the safe, private and relaxing haven of the self often fails to produce such results. As it is argued in this thesis, the main causes of change in the domestic sphere lie in the politico-economic environment that, in turn, influences the private ground. Accordingly, the analysis of the postmodern home, as this is experienced today and is projected in the future, entails the exploration of the ways our present is influenced by the ideas and developments currently dominating the public sphere.

Primarily, what this chapter aims to show is how the postmodern socio-economic milieu has impinged upon present and future types of dwelling and home-making practices. Since Western society today is considered to be characterised by a semi-global descent into a capitalist, high-tech, consumerist reality that influences human activity on a variety of levels (Badmington, 2003; Malpas, 2005), the evolution of the human habitat has emerged as a necessity and more traditional domestic models have already been superseded by their contemporary counterparts. For example, the postmodern domestic discourse is currently dominated by a perfection-oriented, hi-tech vocabulary that fosters a sense of borderless domesticity, penetrated by specific forces operating in the public ground, while ostensibly protecting the inhabitant of ‘undesirable’ intrusions. The domestic model that will initially be scrutinised as one accurately representing the influence of capitalism and techno-science on the human habitat is the smart home; the second example is the global adobe – in which second homes and mobile dwelling are included. These models are lately seen as popular alternatives for households in need of a solution to the dwelling problems arising from the globalised job market.

Furthermore, some of the forces challenging the domestic space derive from, but simultaneously shape, the sphere of social interaction, affecting inhabitants’
home-making practices to an unprecedented degree. Despite zooming into the postmodern home, the forces operating in the economic sphere will once again be encountered. The focus of this section will therefore shift to the ways that technology, the media and consumerism have influenced home-making practices, creating a space of neither consumption nor production, neither leisure nor work, neither seclusion nor communication, but one which welcomes the amalgamation of such antitheses.

The post-urban condition

The study of the post-urban condition draws attention to the fact that the environment of the urban dweller is deeply influenced by the over-arching power of the late capitalist system. But, before proceeding with the exploration of the ways that the postmodern economical ground challenges the existing models of domesticity, the basic characteristics of the term late capitalism should be delineated. Coined by Ernest Mandel and broadly deployed by Frederic Jameson in reference to the third phase of the capitalistic system, late capitalism features:

the new international division of labour, a vertiginous new dynamic in international banking and the stock exchanges (including the enormous Second and Third Word dept), new forms of media interrelationship (very much including transportation systems such as containerisation), computers and automation, the flight of production to advanced Third World areas, along with all the more familiar social consequences, including the crisis of traditional labour, the emergence of yuppies, and the gentrification on a now global scale. (Jameson 1991, xviii-xix)

As it is obvious from Jameson’s definition, late capitalism should be predominately perceived as a system in an interdependent relationship with techno-science and capital accumulation (in other words, profit), two elements in a causal relationship that will be constantly, met throughout the chapter (Heise 2004). Specifically, it should be mentioned that techno-science is not merely a sector that merely endorses the proliferation of late capitalism, but it is the one element without which the powerful capitalist appropriation of an ever-increasing number of areas and human activities would be impossible (Heise 2004).

From a similar perspective, Manuel Castells and his three-volume The Information Age (Vol. 1, 1996; Vol. 2, 1997; Vol. 3, 1998) approaches the politico-economic system of our days with his focus shifted on the role of information and the networks through which it is channelled (Webster 2006, p. 100). Castells argues that
the term *informational capitalism* defines the present era more accurately, since it identifies the importance that information and knowledge have in present day society, while acknowledging that traditional capitalist relations are still powerful in the fields of production and exchange (p. 100). In this light, he holds that society is globally changing, due to the omnipresence of information technology and its networks, while it simultaneously remains on the well-established tracks of capitalism. Castell’s ‘network society’ (p. 123) will be proved to be the basic driving force of change in the domestic environment and its role as a social institution.

Focusing on the post-urban reality, Henri Lefebvre, who has devoted much of his work on the notion of urbanisation, considers cities worldwide to be in a critical phase, located at the far left side of an axis depicting the transition from the agrarian to the urban (Lefebvre 2003). At the opposite pole, he places the political city of ancient Greece, followed by the Mercantile and the Industrial city. Regarding the development of the urban sphere, in relation to the rural, he observes an ongoing rural exodus which results in the extension of the urban fabric and the complete subordination of the agrarian to the urban (Lefebvre 2003, p. 15), elements that have clearly contributed to the condition of the contemporary cities, on a global scale.

He further explains that the postmodern urban condition renders the city as a framework in which different elements and agents co-exist, for the sole purpose of their profitable exchange, through channels of interaction formed for that exact purpose (Lefebvre 2003, p. 117). In this sense, the urban space is nothing but a value-generating field, which strengthens the relationships endorsing this target (Lefebvre 2003 p. 117). Lefebvre adds that capital generation and accumulation are urban affairs of significant magnitude, prioritised by public planning authorities and private developers. Simultaneously, the fetishism of space and the respective expansion of the real estate sector have fortified this profit-oriented approach, and have facilitated the appropriation of the urban space by today’s production-consumption system (Lefebvre 2003, p. 159). The domestic sphere is equally influenced by the profit-oriented approach, and is thus turned into a space of consumption reigned by the logic of the marketplace.

Another approach to the post-urban environment, that of Edward Soja (1997), has also focused on the developments occurring in the urban environment of the
present and has coined the term *postmetropolis*\(^{11}\), which is divided in six strands. The importance of these six categories lays in the fact that they can serve as indicators for the evaluation of the changes the global urban landscape is undergoing, both from a practical and from a conceptual perspective.

The first discursive area, *flexcity*, deals with the restructuring of the urban political economy into a more flexible sphere of production, and concentrates on those changes that endorse flexibility and production. Accordingly, flows of employees are channelled in cities like London and New York, being promised professional development and success. Such urban centres transform areas of the professional and the habitation space so that they are capable of promptly receiving and removing these flows, whenever necessary.

In the second category, the *cosmopolis*, the primary role is played by the globalised capital, labour and culture. As seen in the case of the *flexcity*, urban centres accumulate large amounts of capital and labour, with the help of aspiring professionals. The fact that these cities attract individuals from across the globe has turned them into cosmopolitan centres that reward their inhabitants with spectacle and all kinds of pleasures, in order to provide them a sense of completion. Their provisions, of course, are also marketed to anyone aspiring to experience the cosmopolitan city and its delights.

The third area he considers, the *expolis*, is relevant to the expansion, development and reshaping of the urban ground through the growth of edge cities, outer cities and post-suburbia\(^{12}\).

Under the title of *metropolarities*, Soja focuses on the restructuring of the social fabric, alongside the deepening and widening social gap, and the emerging of new social polarities and inequalities. Urban ghettos and urban polarisation, according to which the houses of one street are expensive and ‘safe’, while real estate prices drop significantly a block away and the neighbourhood is considered ‘dodgy’ exemplify what Soja defines as *metropolarities*.

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\(^{11}\) The prefix “post” thus signals the transition from what has conventionally been called the modern metropolis to something significantly different, to new postmodern forms and patternings of urban life that are increasingly challenging well-established modes of urban analysis’ (Soya 1997, p. 20)

\(^{12}\) In this case the city has lost its traditional qualities and urbanisation expands beyond the city boarders.
The fifth, ominously denominated discursive field, studies the city as a *carceral archipelagos*, drawing on the reality of fortress cities, surveillance technologies and ‘the substitution of the police for polis’ (p. 25). With crime and more recently terrorism espoused as a justification, entire cities are now under surveillance, with advanced CCTV technology heralded as the best way to keep their inhabitants safe.

Finally, the sixth strand probes the phenomenon of *simcities*, in other words, the appropriation of the urban landscape by advanced technology and the hyperreal augmentation of the urban ground. In the *simcity* simulations and surrealism are prevalent in urban life for numerous reasons, and most importantly for advertising purposes. On Monday 17th July, for example, White Walkers\(^\text{13}\) descended in London to promote the beginning of the 7th season of the TV series *Game of Thrones*, producing a reality on the threshold of imagination (Image 6).

This brief reference to Soja’s work is of importance for this chapter, as it exposes the ways through which capitalism influences the development of cities, and by extension, homes, although not all the changes he refers to are mirrored in the domestic establishment. For this reason, I will not attempt to juxtapose the urban

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\(^{13}\) Fictional characters of the TV series *Game of Thrones.*
advancements he describes with those occurring in the domestic ground, but I will rather focus on the areas of urban change that directly influence the domestic sphere and concentrate on their analysis and clarification.

High-tech Urbanisation

In 2014, 54% of the total world population lived in cities, while the global urban population is expected to grow by approximately 1.84% per year from 2015 to 2020, 1.63% per year from 2020 to 2025, and 1.44% per year from 2025 to 2030 (WHO 2017). In this regard, research interest has concentrated on the sustainability of the urban environment and the solutions to problems ensuing from its overpopulation. With this in mind, many researchers have focused on the application of information technology, verifying their hypothesis that the paradigm of the digital city could be the best and most plausible solution to the specific concerns.

The digital city was a term first met in the America-On-Line cities of the early 90s, where virtual networking environment would provide digital transactions and chatting possibilities; in other words digital cities are geographic spaces that offer various applications and e-services, deploying information and communication technologies (Anthopoulos, Ipsilantis & Kazantzi 2016). Although the most advanced forms of the digital city, or the Urban Dos (the urban digital operating system), are still in the works, the major urban European centres are already experiencing an unprecedented, ongoing and conspicuous technological appropriation. Through mere observation, one can witness a city’s transformation, as billboards are replaced by LCDs, flat screens are installed in buses, cars, taxis and the subway, free broadband internet access points mushroom, and the use of electronic devices is burgeoning. Swipe cards, fob keys, alarms, security cameras, CCTV, debit, credit cards and contactless cards add to an already extensive technological takeover, where the real mingles with the virtual in an extraordinary way.

The Commodification of the Public Space

Another significant parameter to be considered in relation to the ways late capitalism has affected the urban landscape is the shrinkage of the free public space. By being
practically required to spend their outdoor time in areas designated as private (restaurants, bars, malls, shopping centres and theme related facilities) or other, ostensibly public spaces (buses, subways, squares and parks) (Murphet 2004, p. 122), urban dwellers are left with only one, supposedly, unmonitored space to inhabit, that of their home. Yet, even so, the level of freedom inhabitants experience away from the public gaze is arguable, and, for that reason, this issue will be thoroughly explored in the section dealing with the social role of the postmodern home.

Here, it suffices to highlight that urban privatisation is not a practice devoid of a specific agenda. Privately owned space is more controllable and can thus be shaped according to the preferences of its owner, which, many a time, derive from the amount of profit an area can generate. Hence, the goal public space remodelling is desirability, often in accordance to by the requirements of mega-events and other commercial activities, such as the Olympic Games, world summits, filming for movies and the like (Chaplin & Holding 1997). In this guise, as Lefebvre claims, ‘the space is no longer only an indifferent medium […]. It becomes the product of social labour, the very general object of production, and consequently of the formation of surplus value’ (2003, p. 154). The privatisation of the public space then becomes a precondition for the planning and completion of such projects that will make the city appear more alluring while increasing its market value. Consequently, the city or parts of it, are owned, produced and can be hired or even sold, just as it happens with any other commodity or product.

Urban Aestheticisation

According to the aforementioned, the postmodern fascination with aesthetically appealing, and, by extension, more easily consumable images flourishes in the guise of ‘a sexy new architecture no longer merely functional, but ‘aestheticised’ for pleasurable consumption’ (Murphet p. 122). Although the city is supposed to be the creation of its inhabitants, in both its appearance and its essence, the predominant tendency today attempts to replace the spontaneity of urbanism with the sterility of urban planning and development, so that ‘destitute neighbourhoods’ will be substituted by ‘desolate perfection’ (Akkerman 2000, p. 269).
As a result, the imperative aestheticisation principles dominating contemporary urban centres and the postmodern fixation with design and beauty allow very limited, if any, space for anything old, tired and worn out, targeting people and objects alike. As Bauman observes, in the coerciveness of the perfectly planned city, groups and individuals – the homeless and the disadvantaged, immigrants and refugees – who ruin the urban image envisaged by city planners and other developers, are distanced from the social ground (Bauman 2013). Therefore, without being conscious of the fact, urban residents, by their very presence or absence, are responsible for the surplus value generated by a city, vindicating Lefebvre’s view regarding the commodification of space.

The privatisation, technological appropriation, and aesthetic remodelling characterising the post-urban are thus becoming important factors for the production and consumption of the urban space, and are frequently referred to as the McDonaldisation and Disneyfication processes leading urban development. According to the former, the planners aspire to produce efficient, predictable and easily controllable areas, permitting risk only to sustain visitors’ and inhabitants’ suspense (Chaplin & Holding 1997, p. 127). Similarly, Disneyfication denotes a more extreme version of the zoning practice, by which urban areas are themed according to elements that excite their visitors and, by extension, are turned into more appealing destinations. As a result, by looking the changes that contemporary urban centres undergo, it is obvious that the distortion of the residents’ relationship with their built environment is fundamental, and challenges the understanding of urban dwelling, both on a public and a private level.

New types of dwelling
The Smart Home

One of the greatest achievements of the techno-scientific revolution, the World Wide Web, has provided an extraordinary sense of flexibility that currently permeates every type of interaction. This newly-found sense of freedom in the disregard of physical restraints, namely space and time (Malpas 2005, p. 1; Webster 2006, p. 108), has given a new lease of life to business, political and economic conduct. Teleconferences, 24-
hour news coverage, instant updates on global developments, access to a vast amount of information, instantaneous capital transfer, speedy transactions and new investment services and products, create the conditions for a ‘word computerised to the teeth, a push-button world’ in the service of the capital (Colomina 1991, p. 17).

In 2016, 3.26 billion people (40 per cent of the population) were using the internet, while by 2017 mobile and Wi-Fi devices are expected to generate 68 per cent of all internet traffic (Stevens 2016). In this increasingly mixed material/virtual world, the home becomes ever more penetrable, while its role as an anchoring point of everyday life is significantly challenged (Vilhemson and Thulin 2008, p. 603). Having already mastered the use of the internet in every type of action and interaction, personal or interpersonal, business or leisure, legal or illegal, developers and users have proceeded to Internet of Things. The applications of the Internet of Things are believed to be numerous. Machine-to-machine communication will be achieved through the connection of billions of electronic and electromechanical devices to the internet, allowing remote control, when and if necessary. Increasingly there are showcases and press conferences in which the biggest names in technology ‘demonstrate the escalating trend of gadgets that talk to each other, learn from each other, even control each other’ (Cui 2016).

In the domestic ground, technology has been propagated as the medium through which inhabitants can achieve a more egalitarian and relaxed experience of
domesticity. For instance, the first electrical appliances that were introduced in the household promised to relieve the housewife from some domestic chores, warranting an easier and more flexible everyday reality for every household member, and most importantly for those encountering difficulties in their domestic life (Blunt & Dowling 2006, pp. 52-53).

Likewise, the domestication of the first personal computer in the early 1980’s, was heralded as a development that would guarantee the satisfaction of the expanding labouring and communication needs of modern inhabitants. In 1982, the TRS-80 personal computer became Time’s Man of the Year, proving that technology was becoming accessible to a wider audience; a reader praising the Time’s selection, wrote, ‘I had never imagined that Time’s Man of the Year would be living in my house’ (Badmington 2003, p. 12-3). Yet, contemporary demands, a step ahead of what could be expected by the modern home, seem to be rushing the domestic sphere to ‘play an even more central role’ than it ever did before (Spigel 2005, p. 404).

The investments in the promise of an advanced domestic model with an even more central role than that of its predecessor, culminated in a pioneering dwelling complex defined as the smart home:

network house where appliances interact with each other, adapt to dwellers and allow residents, via the internet, to communicate with the outside world and to speak to the home while away at work or travel (Spigel 2005).

It appears that the Internet of Things has found the space for one of its basic applications, that of the domestic ground. In this regards, the home is rendered as a space of connection and communication between intra and extra domestic intelligent agents, of which the nature – whether they are subjects or objects, for instance – poses absolutely no limitation.

Since the smart home entails practices that challenge the existing routines, its promotion would naturally have more impact if targeted to people keen on change, troubled by their domestic reality. The two most underprivileged groups, approached for this purpose, are women and people with disabilities (Spigel 2005, p. 407). As with other homes of tomorrow, and with every change that the domestic discourse was required to undergo for interests other than those of its residents, the premise upon
which the promotion of the smart home is based is an enticing domestic experience that facilitates life on a variety of levels (Johnson & Johnson 2008).

In the ideal smart home, the residents will not only enjoy a stress-free domesticity, but they will also manage to improve their lives through the numerous options that will open up on every level of their social and personal existence. While intelligent integrated appliances will perform the main household chores, the smart home will also undertake managerial and caretaking roles, substantially enhancing women’s lives, still burdened with such duties. The most recent showcases present the capabilities of the smart homes, full with appliances and furniture, even décor and toys that operate themselves in the role of the housekeeper or the babysitter\(^{14}\) (Cui 2016). In addition to those responsibilities, the smart home would also become more involved in its residents’ well-being by offering fashion consultation through its smart closet, while a smart toilet would email one’s doctor if their urine analysis causes concerns (Spigel 2005, p. 409). In this regard, parts of the home would communicate on their own initiative with intra or extra domestic intelligent agents, human or not, as their caretaking role would prescribe.

While, as observed in the previous chapters, many philosophers consider the home to be a vital point of communication and interaction between the private and the public spheres, the smart home takes this relationship on an entirely new level. Not only is there an obvious upsurge of communicative action between the private and the public, but one could argue that the home (private sphere) is now incorporated in the information network systems (public sphere) of our epoch. In this regard, the home and its inhabitants are rendered as information transmitters, sharing data that can be read and analysed by other network users. The value of such information for the interested parties appears to be quite high, since for the first time in human history personal information (such as those of one’s health condition, nutritional preferences, domestic schedules and routines) will be available without the agent’s intervention. Personal data will be thus disclosed to the interested parties,

\(^{14}\) With robotic vacuum cleaners and lawn mowers, coffee makers that have coffee ready before you wake up, umbrellas that predict storms, forks that alert one when eating too fast and chopsticks that warn when the food is unsafe the smart home of the future (Cui 2016), for the time being seems to be a space full of warnings.
most likely for marketing purposes but not necessarily just for such; no survey, questionnaire or other interviewing methods will be needed for the obtainment of this valuable knowledge. Unmediated, undistorted, in numerical clarity, our lives will be presented to the interested parties for their consideration.

It is thus becoming clear that the communication currently developing between the home and its residents is significantly different from that hitherto experienced, which was predominately unilateral, in the sense that while inhabitants could interact with or through their homes, the latter had no capacity of transmitting any form of feedback whatsoever. The advent of the smart home and its possible popularisation, could bring us in front of a completely new form of human/non-human interaction, one endorsing the ‘melting of silicon and flesh’, which according to Spigel (2005) is the first and foremost prerequisite of ‘post-human domesticity’ (Spigel 2005). The fusion of subject/object is here exhibited in its highest degree, as homes take up more active responsibilities and human agents are increasingly required to follow the advice of their own creations (p. 409); yet this should not be the sole side-effect of concern in this case. The ease with which the market place will be accessing data and information hitherto confined in the walls of the habitat is at least unnerving and at most dangerous. Maybe we should pause and ask ourselves whether the stipulated ease and flexibility that come along with the smart home are worth making us renounce the last bits of privacy and individuality we hold for an advertisement-like every day existence.

Second Homes, Global Adobes, Air BnB, CouchSurfing

Techno-science, the main constituent of late capitalism, has made the smart home popularisation possible, thus smoothing the antithesis of the human/non-human and the private/public experiences. While these binaries have been considered as vital elements of western habitation, the permeation of technology, media and social media in our daily reality is nowadays challenging the traditional aspects of domesticity, giving shape to new forms and ideals of home-making processes. Second homes, global adobes as well as the phenomena of Air BnB and CouchSurfing will be explored so that the influence of these new trends in the contemporary model of
habitation will be clarified, starting from the phenomenon of the Second Homes\(^{15}\), which is the most traditional of the above-mentioned.

While the aristocracy would always have a cottage where they would spend their holidays hunting or participating in other leisure activities, second homes were popularised after World War II, when free time from five-day work and paid leave was ensured, coupled with the widening of the possibilities of traveling with private means and the economic prosperity that the middle economic strata of the population developed gradually. The developments at the social and cultural level were also important. J. Urry states that in the western societies, during this period, the need for recreational travel and holidays emerged for the recovery of the soul and body’s vigour (Urry 2005).

The function and the motivation to acquire a second home respond to the needs of urban populations arising from the objective living conditions in a city, from various social conditions and constraints, but also from established practices that shape a particular way of life, within highly recognisable cultural standards, which managed to crystallise them in the image of a second home through the formation of a personal or collective fantasy (Halfacree 2012, p. 214). At the same time, in the modern context, the second home appears to play a number of additional roles that are directly related to the changes that have been recorded in recent years: globalisation of the economy, free flow of capital and huge credit expansion, along with changes in cultural and consumer models of western societies and economies that have allowed the change of the various consumption practices and production of consumption means (Halfacree 2012, pp. 211-213).

The main features of the new types of second homes include their much closer connection with the tourism and leisure industry at an operational level and the fact that their construction has been increasingly cut off from the presence and care of the owner and today is usually purchased as a complete product (Paris 2009, 2011). Also, the proportion of foreign origin owners, has also increased and continues to grow thanks to both the reduced cost of air travel and the establishment of legal frameworks that make it easy to obtain land in foreign countries, especially in

\(^{15}\) ‘an occasional residence of a household that usually lives elsewhere and which is primarily used for recreational purposes’ (Sucksmith 1983, in Halfacree 2012, p. 214)
countries belonging to economic and monetary unions, such as the EU (Couch et al. 2007).

The concise literature analysis on the phenomenon of second homes provided by Quinn (2004) offers a classification of the main reasons for owning or renting a second home. Drawing on Kaltenborn (1998, p. 123), the motives of second home acquisition include: identity management (contrast to modern everyday life, status symbol); recreation and mental/psychological maintenance (contact with nature, social networks); and more pragmatic reasons (fits with life phases, children, etc., inexpensive holidays, capital investment). According to this categorisation, second homes are commonly posed in a kind of antithesis to the standard residence, albeit often merely a symbolic one, since, for instance, the maintenance of both main and second homes requires the same sort of home-making practices and routines (Quinn 2004).

Another important parameter for the acquisition of a second home is relevant to more pragmatic, rather than symbolic purposes, since it is obvious that the need for such a dwelling arrangement derives from the kind of lifestyles adopted in postmodernity. Whether individuals feel the urge to distance themselves from a hectic and unfulfilling everyday reality, or they are simply obliged to approach dwelling from a more flexible perspective responding to the demands of their job, or their partner’s job, the second home is now an appealing habitation model, accountable for an important shift in the dwelling practices of our times. Consequently, the notion of home that is progressively becoming more popular, and in many cases more appropriate for the needs of the individual, is that of the global adobe (Molz 2008, p. 327), which entails the agents’ capacity to feel at home, even when they are away from their base, through the use of social media platforms that connect them with their social network.

Another dwelling pattern, prevalent today is that of ‘dwelling-in-travel’ (Clifford 1997), which refers to the always-on-the-move lifestyle that an increasing number of individuals and families adopt. In this regard, the two innovative online platforms operating in this filed are Airbnb and CouchSurfing. Primarily, these platforms are considered innovative in terms of their operation, since they are categorised as ‘user-generated brands’, i.e. brands of which the content and quality is
obtained through the consumers’ active involvement (Yannopoulou, Moufahim & Bian 2013, p. 86). At the same time, they are innovative with regards to the services they offer; Airbnb is a platform where users can rent their residential houses to tourists and visitors and CouchSurfing is a platform through which individuals can find homes willing to host them for a number of nights. In these cases, the collapse between the private and the public is more than obvious, since strangers gain access to one’s household, thus tantalising its status as private space (Yannopoulou, Moufahim & Bian 2013, p. 88). Certainly, in both cases there are regulations that ensure the safety of both parties, therefore the element of danger is to some extent alleviated. However, the fact remains that tourists and visitors, non-members of the household, obtain the privilege of an unprecedented access to the private sphere of their hosts.

The facilitation of global travelling and our expanding familiarity with other cultures – predominantly through mediatised representations of tropical and faraway lands – have culminated in a ‘global sense of place’, which has informed both the academic research on issues of mobility and locality and the popular perceptions of the term (Quinn 2004, p.4). From Jameson’s late capitalism and Castells’s informational capitalism, referenced above, it can be inferred that localities no longer hold the importance they did, albeit they cannot be entirely disregarded. Specifically, in Castell’s discussion of the nation state and its current role, although information networks are thought to have undermined the role of the nation state, the latter is not yet regarded as completely irrelevant (Webster 2006, p. 102). In addition, the remarkable speed and flexibility, characterising the business world, promote activities that are not restricted to a certain geographical basis; in the era of globalised connectivity, every part – irrespective to its location – is connected in an interdependent mode of existence (Malpas 2005, p. 1; Webster 2006, p. 108).

Of course, globalisation has not only affected the business realm, but it has also impinged on the comprehension of being home and away, influencing habitation as well as tourist destinations and purposes (Molz 2008; Quinn 2004). In tourism, for instance, the impact of globalisation is evident in the choices that Western inhabitants make regarding their holidays, since places that were until recently considered remote
and exotic are now more accessible, and even equally affordable to other short-haul destinations (Quinn 2004).

Such phenomena, while rendering the ideas of space and belonging problematic, open up the notion of dwelling to a diversity of practices. In Halfacree’s (2012) informative paper it is obvious that not only is there a collapse between the boundaries of mobility and stability, or residing and travelling, but there is a gradual dissolution of the binary between first and second homes, since the second home has often been perceived as an integral element of home, for example (p. 217). In this regard it is the idea of home that obtains a plurality which is no longer contradictory with the experience of home.

On a Cosmopolitan Basis

The undercurrent ideology, making the idea of geographical and cultural mobility more acceptable is that of cosmopolitanism, which is increasingly gaining ground as new data are fed into the system of our world-perception (Molz 2008, p. 327). Cosmopolitanism originated in a time when institutions and organisations with common interests had to stress the dire necessity for a global approach to issues, such as environmental concerns, which were not restricted to the national borders of a country (Kendall, Skrbis and Woodward 2008, p. 402). Respectively, the high level of interconnectedness has brought forth a transnational world, which impedes attachment to a specific country or nationality (Kendall, Skrbis and Woodward 2008, p. 403). Yet, although cosmopolitanism and the ensuing acknowledgement of the term citizen of the world, might seem associated with rootlessness, it has been argued that it should be more accurately understood as one’s capacity to form a ‘universal circle of belonging’, which liberates from the restrictions of ‘kinship and country’ (Cheah 2006).

Interestingly, from a purely theoretical perspective, the groups considered as the most prominent examples of the cosmopolitan discourse are the exiles, the migrants and the refugees (Kendall, Skrbis and Woodward 2008, p. 408). While such a parallelism seems to be making absolute sense to anyone looking at such groups from a distance, the association of cosmopolitanism with populations that are unwillingly
displaced, in the most intimidating and diminishing way, has been heavily criticised by several commentators (e.g. Skrbis et al. 2004), as a romanticised, and rather crude, approach to their predicament.

At the same time, a phenomenon emerging in Los Angeles – a city already facing a severe affordable housing crisis– is the influence of short-term lets on the renting prices of property. On these grounds, it has been argued that while Airbnb has benefited the tourist sector, it ‘herms neighborhoods, distorts the housing market, undermines labor unions, and exacerbates Los Angele’s affordable housing crisis’ (Lee 2016). The positive relationship between the increase in the number of Airbnb properties and the increase in property values has also been observed in New York; the doubling of Airbnb listings is associated with an increase of 6 to 11 per cent in house values (Sheppard & Udell 2016, p. 39). Interestingly, it appears that the forces of exclusion operating in capitalism are affecting urban dwelling in various ways, sometimes overtly and others covertly.

With respect to the understanding of the postmodern home, the notion of cosmopolitanism can be considered as one directly influencing the contemporary appreciation of habitation patterns. Furthermore, it has most certainly paved the way for the inclusion of many individuals and families, who refrain from rooted living, in the popular social discourse. Accordingly, it has provided the theoretical background so that concepts such as the *global adobe* and the second home will be incorporated in the discourse of postmodern lifestyles, rendering them equal to any other habitation paradigm. In this regard, cosmopolitanism has, to some extent, increased our awareness regarding the escalating need to consider dwelling from a more unconventional perspective.

New home-making practices
The Domestication of ICTs and the Media Bang

The domestication approach originated both from anthropology and consumption studies to study how goods and possessions enter the private sphere and what symbolic meanings they carry (Haddon 2011, p. 312). With regards to ICTs (Information and communications technology), the questions asked include the
meaning that such services have for the domestic experience of contemporary inhabitants and the roles they play in our lives (p. 312). As shown in the previous section of the chapter, ICTs, and more specifically mobile phones, the Internet and personal computers, have obtained a central role in our lives, with potential for conquering even more space in our tangible and intangible private sphere (p. 317).

One of the reasons why ICTs became a part of our everyday domestic reality thus challenging the distinction between the private and the public is relevant to the fact that working from home is currently a widespread phenomenon, which eliminates the division of professional and domestic life (Venkatesh, Stolzoff, Shih & Mazumdar 2001). As it has been recently observed, office work is increasingly undertaken in a variety of places, including one’s home, thus allowing the overlap of two spheres which were hitherto perceived as conflicting (Fonner & Stache 2012, p. 242).

According to the Worldat Work report (2011):

> telework is becoming a prevalent work arrangement, and the term as such covers any kind of paid work carried out at home, mainly by computer, which is then transmitted to a client or an employer via the Internet or on a diskette (Tremblay 2002, p. 159).

Current research in the field proves that teleworking is increasingly popular in Western developed countries, while there is a clear indication that such a working arrangement mostly appeals to female employees (Halford 2005, p. 22-3; Ng 2010, p. 137). Specifically, women were found to be more involved in tele-working and at-home work by 2-5%, especially those who were married and had pre-school or school-aged children (Golden 2008, p. 103). It is obvious that the women choosing this as preferable are often required to do so in order to be able to manage their home/work responsibilities, especially when they were employed in conventional work places that are so sharply separated from home (Tremblay 2002, p. 167).

The reason why telework seems to appeal to an increasing number of employees is relevant to the fact that it has been associated with a lower work-life conflict and less stress from work-related interruptions (Fonner & Stache 2012, p. 242). Additionally, the high levels of satisfaction experienced by teleworkers are commonly attributed to the flexibility of their schedule, their capacity to avoid commuting and stay closer to their family (Golden 2008). In this regard, the most frequent portrayal of a teleworker presents the image of a smiling individual working
at a laptop in an idyllic home office, often with a child at his or her side (Wilson & Greenhill 2004, p. 207). In other words, telework is endorsed by a discourse that idealises the conditions of this arrangement, just as the model of the smart home idealises a hassle-free domesticity. While telework ostensibly decreases the work-life conflict, it does cause a different kind of tension, particularly for the women who predominately work from home and who are required to they juggle the competing demands of their home and a type of work with no physical and clear-cut boundaries.

Yet, in terms of its relation to domesticity, teleworking still cannot be perceived as an undisputedly ideal arrangement. To begin with, this arrangement is not always chosen, but it can be frequently perceived as the only possible solution, especially for women who are required to manage childcare and income earning on their own (Wilson and Greenhill 2004, p. 212). Furthermore, the employees’ flexibility to engage in work regardless of time and space restrictions can and has been often translated by the employer as one’s constant availability to the organization (Wilson and Greenhill 2004, p. 212). As a result, teleworkers are often struggling to juggle the contradicting tasks of being at home and working, while they can experience high stress levels due to work-related interruptions that impede on their family or alone time (Shields 2005, p. 96).

Telework is, therefore, an interesting development of postmodernity, which fosters the hybridisation of the domestic sphere (Venkatesh, Stolzoff, Shih & Mazumdar 2001), introducing new domestic routines, both practical and conceptual, around which new models of habitation are formed. In this guise, telework has decisively intervened in the postmodern home, shifting priorities, practices and definitions around. Yet the future implications of such a practice remain to be explored, since teleworkers, who willingly sacrifice their psychological, social and physiological well-being over their employment, set a private (for their families and children) and social (for employees, colleagues and friends) precedent, as individuals ready to prioritise their work over everything else (Shields 2005, p. 96).

The second driving force, for the embrace of ICTs by the household, concerns the younger members of the household and predominantly their education (Venkatesh & Vitalari 1992). By extension, children seem to be the main bearers of change, in the domestication of ICTs; today, in an interdependent relationship with
technology in which the former is shaping the latter and vice versa (Venkatesh 2006, p. 192). Here, one should take into consideration that computer skills have become a prerequisite in every sphere of interaction, and most commonly in the workspace, often regardless of one’s vocation. Accordingly, the process for computer skills acquisition commonly begins early on, so that the future social agents will be sure to meet the requirements of their education and employment. But even in terms of leisure, when compared to television and other forms of leisure activities, the internet and the PC, were initially seen as more productive, educational and, often enough, safer pursuits (Orleans & Laney 2000).

The Internet was and still is a technological revolution that has emerged to meet the needs for direct and two-way communication. Opinions about the potential of Internet technology as a source of information and as a means of communication are numerous (Stankovic 2014). Yet, while it does provide great ease of communication through its new forms of communication, its role as a communication tool may have been overstated, since it often fails to facilitate the production of views in the environment of an electronic screen (Dillman et al. 2014).

Mobile technology is another significant innovation that has obtained a vital role in every day routines and practices. The fact that today mobile telephony provides Internet access has increased the potentials of mobile communication, while it tantalises the limits of the private/public to an unprecedented extent (Dillman et al. 2014; Jara et al. 2013).

![Image 7: Nomophobia: the phobia of not having a mobile phone (Pritchard 2013)](image.png)
The mobile phone frenzy has influenced interpersonal relationships to an unprecedented level, both in the private and the public sphere and resent research indicates that mobile and especially smart phone use, ‘has significant impact on mental health and well-being. Overuse has been associated with stress, anxiety, depression and addiction’ (Kuss 2017). Additionally, the most recent anxiety correlated with mobile phone usage, nomophobia, is a term coined in a research commissioned by the UK Post Office, regarding the various anxieties that mobile phone users are facing and is relevant to one’s anxious reaction to the possibility of not having one’s mobile phone at an arm’s length (Pritchard 2013). While in 2013 the anxiety was still attracting some ridicule, recent research indicates that nomophobia is an existing anxiety that can be assessed and treated (Yildirim & Correia 2015).

The impact of ICT domestication on residents’ everyday life has been studied by Vilhemson and Thulin (2008), who have focused on activity and time use patterns of a panel of urban youth living in Gothenburg, Sweden. Their research indicates that young people are experiencing a substantial increase in the time and type of activities spent online, which by extent, contributes to the increase of the time they spend at home (Vilhemson and Thulin 2008, p. 613). It thus becomes obvious that since most ICTs are home-based activities – the capacity to use them outdoors seems for the time being to be a supplementary feature, rather than a fundamental one – their more enthusiastic users, commonly today’s youth, end up leading lives centred on virtual domestic-based activities. Having displaced several outdoor and face-to-face interactive pursuits, such as travelling, they remain confined in their private space, in which case they tend to disregard traditional patterns of socialisation with their friends and family (p. 615). Finally, as it has been indicated by the study results, individuals who favour online socialisation interact more with people at remote areas, rather than with those in close proximity, thus opening up their perception of community into a broader geographical field.

Another side-effect deriving from the domestication of ICTs relates with the incorrect use of the Internet by individuals, which can lead to serious consequences on their personality (Cotten et al. 2013). In particular, online games can shape the personality of individuals in such a way that they seek power, dominance, control, or even violence in their everyday lives (Vigdor et al. 2014). At the same time, it has been
argued that constant engagement with the Internet deprives individuals of the ability to develop close interpersonal and real friends or contacts, with their peers, which are important in shaping the personality of individuals (Slater et al. 2017).

Virtual Socialisation

The online interaction platforms available in the 1990’s were heralded as important emancipators of communication amongst citizens, groups, organizations, and communities with common interests (Kraut et al. 2002) and until today, there is much ambiguity regarding the social outcomes of internet usage for the purposes of communication. In a second edition of his publication, The Rise of Network Society (2000), Manuel Castells argued that ‘the Internet will expand as an electronic agora’, since it incorporates the fundamental elements of a truly interactive society (Castells 1996 in Webster 2006, p. 106); however, he later curbs his optimism by claiming that the kind of social connectivity made available through the internet is not the one ‘a genuine sense of community’ requires. Virtual communication is founded on entirely different principles to those of traditional, face-to-face interaction since it is characterised by high levels of fragmentation, primarily text and image-based language, the agents’ capacity to connect and disconnect instantly through the pressing of a button, and focuses predominately on entertainment-oriented issues of concern. Yet, while Castells’s arguments have already been validated by the virtual communication trends of our days, one cannot overlook the fact that the internet communication is indeed a form of communication.

To clarify the issue of virtual social interaction, Kraut et al., (2002) conducted an empirical study, which found that participants who already possessed the skills required by face-to-face interaction tend to use the internet as a tool to expand their traditional socialisation practices and satisfy their communication needs (p. 69). However, for participants defined as introvert, the use of the internet did not expand their community or social involvement, although it did make them feel better by giving them the chance to enhance their computer skills and get in touch with their family (p. 67).
Additionally, the findings of the study support that even though the social interaction of internet users varies according to their personality, age and other background parameters, the psychological effects of internet usage can be somewhat problematic, since many participants experienced a sense of stress and hassle, which was interpreted as a side-effect of the time participants spent online, instead of dealing with their everyday duties. In this light, it was noted that, in the long run, the enjoyable use of such technologies could be detrimental for the social agent, an inference that confirms results of previous studies, such as those reached by Huston, et al. (1992) and Putnam, 2000 (p.70). Today, this phenomenon has become particularly relevant, since people are online on smart phones and tablets rather than on desktop or even laptop PCs, so technology is really being used constantly as people carry out different tasks, from walking to eating or meeting with friends.

Regardless of this important and possibly problematic shift in youth leisure preferences, adults, as the main regulators of the postmodern household, have been rather eager to approve of ICT use, although they are cautious of their children’s unmonitored exposure to the contents of the World Wide Web (Venkatesh et al. 2001). Specifically, parents are increasingly preoccupied with internet overuse and online gaming addiction, of which the latter has been associated with anti-social behaviour ever since the late 1990s (Venkatesh et al. 2001). At the same time, they are worried that their children’s online exposure could lure all kinds of unwanted attention from online unlawful parties, making young cyber dwellers susceptible to criminal conduct ranging from paedophilia to business scams (Stields 2005, p. 98). Yet, regardless of the parents’ attempt to regulate their own and their children’s online interactions, virtual leisure continues to be perceived as one of the most popular (adolescent) pursuits worldwide (Stields 2005, p.94).

The technologically dominated private sphere of the family and the individual of our times has been described as a ‘virtual tsunami’, which does not only challenge the idea of home, but also that of being human (Toronto 2009, p. 118). As it can also be inferred from the discussion so far, the Internet and everything it can offer is now considered an integral part of the western culture, proffering ‘an unreal environment comprised of instant connection and gratification’ (Toronto 2009, p. 117). The ease by which instant gratification can be achieved has given rise to the notorious disorder of
‘Internet addiction’, with symptoms similar to those of drug and alcohol addiction. Obviously, the fact that internet misuse is not prosecuted by law implies that Internet addiction is not considered as severe a disorder as its counterparts, albeit, as research shows, it should be equally alarming, both from a social and a psychological perspective (Toronto 2009).

It would be absurd to suggest that the Internet phenomenon only has negative effects on the family and the individual, since it has been observed that it also offers a unique opportunity for individuals to access an unimaginable amount of information, which can be then deployed for personal, professional and academic development. In a similar guise, it has been argued that because of the internet, the interconnectedness, communication and integration of families and individuals have entered a new era, with innumerable possibilities and conveniences. In any case, virtual interactions have made an impact of significant magnitude in the domestic sphere, either by challenging the home as an environment at odds with the workspace and the market, or by offering access to a virtual, and possibly substitute world, which often displaces the actual world we live in. Hence, the inference that can be drawn here is that the disregard of time and space characterising this virtual reality located beyond the demands of ‘real time, genuine emotion and meaningful engagement’, corresponds to the requirements of the capitalist system, which is perpetually challenging the existing speed and space limitations, to maximise its returns.

Regardless of the limitations of on-line socialisation, Chat Rooms are a particularly popular way of communicating today. In these virtual social spaces common interests are shared, views and ideas are discussed and exchanged, while individuals obtain a sense of social connectivity (Wolfe 2007). Their original form included communication only through written texts that users exchanged in real time and who were able either to share with all the other users who were connected at that time - that is, a public debate - or to make more personal conversations with fewer users or even with only one user (Boyd and Ellison 2007). Over time the chat rooms evolved, enhanced their image with more elaborate visual environments and trendy graphics, and then upgraded their services with forums, virtual message boards, and online games that users can use during their discussions.
In recent years, the chat rooms that use text-based communication tend to disappear altogether, as more sophisticated and newer forms of communication are now replacing them, offering both voice and/or visual communication (via web microphones and web cameras), while providing the ability to the users to create their online, virtual and 3D form, which is called an avatar. The most advanced and modern form of a chat room is the one that essentially represents a virtual world in which each user has the ability to play a certain chosen role (Boyd and Ellison 2007).

In this fantasy world, which is represented by some very successful sites, like the Second Life, the user creates a new character, with specific personality and the desired appearance traits, and then experiences a different, virtual life and everyday life, which includes the house where the avatar resides, the profession practiced and the other characters with which the user interacts. The artistic environment of websites such as the Second Life is highly upgraded with sophisticated 2D and even 3D graphics while basic services are primarily available free of charge. It is worth noting that its success is so great that the average number of users over a two-month period exceeded 1,140,000 (Second Life 2013).

Another platform of virtual socialisation which is currently on the brink of dominating a great part of the Western world is Facebook. The statistics are too huge to ignore, just like Facebook itself. There are currently over 1.94 billion monthly active Facebook users for March 2017, which is an 18 percent increase year over year (Zephoria Digital Marketing 2017). Additionally, the number of mobile daily active users reached 1.15 billion for December 2016, which is a significant increase of 23 percent year-over-year. On Thursday, 22\textsuperscript{nd} June 2017, Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook announced the new mission statement of the company: ‘give people the power to build community and bring the world closer together’ (Zuckerberg 2017). Facebook is now a global phenomenon, which preoccupies many Western citizens on a daily basis. It is a greatly personalised online platform where people can connect, interact and communicate, or in other words a social space inside our personal sphere. As stated by the founder and CEO of this massive phenomenon, the purpose of Facebook was to help connect people worldwide and facilitate their communication.

To some extent this has been actually achieved. A recent study exploring the use of Facebook by college students indicated that the participants mostly used
Facebook in order to maintain or strengthen relationships which were already formed in the non-virtual world (Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe 2007). In this regard, Facebook has been seen as a medium through which social capital is formed and maintained, thus adding to the actual well-being of its users. Additionally, the positive accompaniments of social capital are relevant with better public health, lower crime rates and more efficient financial markets (Adler & Kwon 2002). In this regard, Facebook could be regarded as a medium which enhances our sense of well-being, while making us feel comfortable at home anywhere around the world, as long as there is access to our Facebook page.

Yet at the same time, there is a serious cost of this sense of at-homeness, which has been certified by empirical research and is a common concern of our era. Facebook, and other similar platforms are often regarded as mediums which decrease, rather than increase social capital, and challenge an individual’s sense of self-esteem and well-being. The 1,104 undergraduate men and women who participated in a relevant study proved that Facebook made them engage with ‘greater social comparison and greater self-objectification, which, in turn, was each related to lower self-esteem, poorer mental health, and greater body shame’ (Hanna et al. 2017). Such spaces of virtual socialisation, endorse the formation of what Bauman defines as ‘cloakroom communities’, i.e. communities that are connected solely for the duration of a spectacle (Bauman 2004, p.31). According to Bauman (2004, p. 30) a deeper and more analytical look into the phenomenon of virtual socialisation unveils a new kind of global hierarchy, with two opposing poles. Those found on the pole, ‘can compose and decompose their identities more or less at will’ while on the other, subjects have extremely limited access to this process and ‘are burdened with identities enforced and imposed by others’.

An additional reason why these increasingly popular platforms of virtual socialisation are of concern to this study of home is that much of this activity takes place inside the domestic sphere and, as this chapter argues, it heavily affects the experience of domesticity. However, the fact that it is not necessarily limited inside its confines influences our sense of at-homeness to a great extent. Users can now feel more at home anywhere there is an Internet connection, since they maintain their links with their virtual community. At the same time, their private space is severely
penetrated by images of the public ground, which, as seen above, can both increase and decrease inhabitants’ sense of well-being. Overall, it is important to note that nowadays, whether at home, on the street, or away in a country different to that of one’s residence, individuals have a sense that they are always connected to an imagined, online, virtual community; a fact which can be greatly damaging to their individuality per se.

Advertising and Consumerism

Advertising, a phenomenon of modern origins, has been an issue of scrutiny for numerous reasons. According to Iain MacRury (2009, pp. 16-7) advertising is fortifying an economy based on over-priced and not necessarily high-quality products, often against consumers’ interest. Furthermore, advertisers have replaced the value of tangible product characteristic with a symbolic one, thus managing to create difference between products even when there is none. In addition, as it has been frequently and thoroughly discussed, advertising sustains a system according to which consumer lifestyles are favoured over other types, while individual spending is favoured as a way of self-valorisation.

Simultaneously, advertising leads to ‘anxiety about consumer-driven commercial colonisation of real and virtual spaces, cities, towns and ultimately, eroding inhabitants’ sense of place, while at the same time it nullifies cultural diversity (MacRury 2009, p. 17). Last, but not least, advertising has been perceived as a contributor to the decline of the public interest in political issues and their capacity to produce sound political judgement, due to the fact that people are often disoriented by ‘commercially driven journalism and other public broadcasting’ (p. 17).

From a psychological perspective, advertising has been criticised for presenting unrealistic images of self, home, beauty and wealth, with which viewers compare themselves and which they constantly aspire to attain (Watson, Wells and Hudson 2011, p. 408). This is the field of social comparison theory, according to which there are three types of social comparison; (1) upward comparison, i.e. when one compares with a superior or generally better; (2) downward comparison, when the opposite is happening and (3) Similar comparison, when one compares with someone of equal or
similar attributes (p. 409). In the case of advertising, the type of social comparison deployed is the first, through which viewers will compare themselves with the faultless imagery promoted and in their struggle to attain this reality they will, unavoidably, purchase the product advertised.

Yet upward comparison, especially when experienced through advertising, results in a reduced self-esteem as well as sense of well-being (Watson, Wells and Hudson 2011, p. 409). The gap between the self that one acknowledges as his/her own and the ideal self, presented in the advertisements, is according to self-discrepancy theory identified as a source of negative motivational and emotional states (p. 409). In other words, the most common result of advertisements, besides the promotion of a product, is a sense of inferiority, and a blow at an individual’s mostly precarious sense of self esteem. For example, as Bessenoff’s (2006) study indicates, when individuals with high levels of body image self-discrepancy are exposed to thin-ideal advertisements they are naturally experiencing negative consequences due to the upward social comparison process in which they engage, so by extension they are prone to negative consequences in their mood and their self-esteem (Watson, Wells and Hudson 2011, p. 409).

It appears as if advertising has very little to offer to the contemporary social actor and yet we are exposed to fascinatingly huge numbers of advertisements, both inside and outside our homes. In a recent article in the Times, the author expressed her concern regarding the omnipresence of advertisements in our everyday life:

supermarket eggs have been stamped with the names of CBS television shows. Subway turnstiles bear messages from Geico auto insurance. Chinese food cartons promote Continental Airways. US Airways is selling ads on motion sickness bags. And the trays used in airport security lines have been hawking Rolodexes. (Story 2007).

The alleged reason behind this daunting ad frenzy of our days is that, according to the marketers’ conclusions, contemporary consumers follow routines, programmes and preferences so disperse that obstruct their targeting. In other words, the modern individual, by being always on the move, encumbers his or her location by the marketing industry so that a successful communication channel will be established. As a result, we are bombarded by advertising messages placed ‘anywhere an eye can see’ (Story 2007). The approach to online advertising is more or less the same, whatever is happening to the real public space is also happening in the cyber public space.
The new methods of advertising becoming available through the internet are even more powerful, accurately targeted and with easily analysed results (e.g. hits per page, reference to cookies etc). Online advertising can be conducted on a one-to-one basis (through newsletters or spam), while it can also reach mass audiences through ad placement on search engines, such as Google and Yahoo, and social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, which are used extremely frequently by most of their users. High technologies have increased the immediacy of both the medium and the message, through tactics including keyword or behaviourally targeted search engine advertising (Tuten 2008, p. 3). This empirically translates in the fact that internet users are shown advertisements of goods or services relevant to the keywords they use when browsing online, or according to the type of web pages they most commonly visit. Naturally, advertisements that are closer to our actual interests will have more impact than those randomly thrown our way and are thus preferred more conventional styles of advertising.

Likewise, developments in the TV industry and technology have also instigated changes in the advertising industry on TV. In this regard, similar to the genre of Reality TV explored above, another genre, named adversoral, is currently a popular and innovative form of TV advertising, which blurs the boarders of advertising and television programme (Zinkhan and Watson 1996, p.164). A precursor of this genre would be the show Main Floor (September 1994), in which viewers were visiting department stores to be introduced to the most recent trends of fashion and beauty (p. 164). In the end, viewers would be informed about the brands being promoted, while they are given the opportunity to subscribe to a newsletter with information about the products featured in the show (p. 164). In this light, theorists of consumerism and commercialism have always claimed that advertisers are always trying to include ad messages anywhere possible, yet as it is evident from the analysis until this point, the domestic sphere appears to be one of the best places to do so.

With advertising on the lead, the logic of consumption and commodification floods the domestic ground, making it also safe to conclude that there is an obvious overlaps of the private and the public spheres, predominately because the boundaries between them have collapsed and many activities once occurring in the former now do so in the later (e.g. intimate conversations occurring in the public space on mobile
phones) and the contrary (e.g. shopping once available only in the public space is now equally accessible in the private sphere). Due to the permeation of market-based activities and mentality in the private sphere, and specifically in the domestic ground, the logic of the marketplace, what Habermas has defined as the colonisation of the lifeworld, becomes a significant reason for which the private can no longer be clearly differentiated from the public (Graham 2002, p. 228). In this light, the domestic sphere can no longer be perceived or studied as an area outside the market, since many of the practices and processes developing within its borders are of a transactional nature.

Accordingly, the introduction of telecommunication technologies in the domestic ground has given the inhabitants the chance to engage in transactional activities even if they are located in a space traditionally defined as non-commercial. Telemarketing and teleshopping, for instance, have been the leaders of the commercial intrusion in domestic life (Shields 2005, p. 96). With the introduction of internet technology, such intrusions have been simplified and therefore occur in significantly larger numbers. While the promotion and purchasing of goods through the post and the telephone are still quite common in many parts of the western world, the commercial capacities offered by the internet have dwarfed the value of earlier sales and marketing tools.

Additionally, as seen above in new television experiences available to viewers, consumers, having embraced the ‘democratic’ facet of the media industries are often more than happy to create and co-create content (Tuten 2008, p.4). New phrases such as crowdsourcing, digital dialogue, citizen marketing and brand democratisation indicate the fact that media consumers become producers (prosumers), but also that several activities occurring inside the home are now effortlessly linked to the logic of the marketplace.

‘As capital has progressed, more intimate and intricate facets of human activity have become formally commodified’ and as a result, in the modern and postmodern world, the term ‘consumer’ is more frequently used than ever before as a way of describing a member of the capitalist society (Graham 2002, p. 228). In this light, since advertising and consumerism have permeated the private sphere and the colonisation of the lifeworld is now a fact, one of the main ideas, being reproduced inside the
postmodern home is that we need to keep working in order to keep spending, and thus be considered successful, while at the same time, we need to keep working in order to safeguard our home-based existence, by ensuring that we will not end up like the homeless we pity during our city strolls (Pollay 1986, p. 44).

TV and the Illusion of Choice

The fact that today households can afford more than one TV sets, while, in many cases home theatre systems, currently even with 3D technology, are more popular than ever before lead to the formation of a private and personalised viewing zone that significantly alters inhabitants’ viewing experience (Guins 2001, p. 352). One of the greatest novelties launched by contemporary television is reality TV, a genre not only interesting in terms of its innovative style, but also for the way it tantalises the hitherto rigid binary of viewers (leisure consumption) and performers/broadcasters (work and production).

In Giles’s (2002) informative article, for example, audience participation, a key element of reality TV, is seen as a force that shifts the balance between leisure consumption and production, forever changing the ways we tend to watch, or rather interact while watching, television. It is a fact that with the advent of reality TV the increasing call for audience participation through votes of confidence can be regarded as the main reason for which consumers and producers appear to be converging into one category, the prosumer16. In other cases, the viewers are eligible to show their preference for the line the story of a series might follow, or for the way it might end, thus being allowed to project their fantasy on the screen, rather than having the screen projecting the television world’s fantasy on the audience.

While this appears intriguing and empowering for the contemporary television viewers, it is a change that was to be expected, since the public discourse of the postmodern capitalist era calls for more individuation and choice, two options bounteously offered to postmodern audiences today. Realities or real life shows are programs that show the real life of real people at real time, inspired by dramatic or

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16 A person who consumes and produces an product (Wikipedia 2018)
humorous events. The first reality shows were the ones that monitored the whole life of the players in a certain place (Big Brother, Survivor, etc.). Then there were the talent shows (Fame Story, Dream Show, X-Factor, Next Top Model), where players were invited to compete using their basic talent while at the same time, their lives were also monitored (Scharrer & Blackburn 2017). Of great success, are the reality shows that offer participants free plastic surgeries or other products and services in order to change their appearance and feel attractive and desired (e.g. Extreme Makeover, The Swan, Nanny 911, On Your Own). In a similar vein, other reality shows monitor the process of home renovation (With the right, House from the beginning). Of lower popularity are the reality shows that make people undergo superhuman trials (UMAN) and those that deal with metaphysical phenomena (Fear Factor, Scare Tactics) (Sobchack 2014).

Audience participation in reality TV shows and other similar postmodern interactive genres, together with the empowerment accompanying the capacity to select what, when and how many times one will watch a programme has made television viewing more flexible and therefore pleasant. For this purpose, the notion of control is quite commonly reference, especially when scholars and professionals in the field of visual culture assign value to domestic viewing (Guins 2002, p. 353). In this regard, a significant by-product of the evolved television experience is the fact that it grants extensive control to the viewer, and by extension it creates the impression that the viewer is actually in an advantageous position, especially compared to his/her role in the public space (p. 357). These new systems of media consumption thus provide domination of the viewer over his/her surroundings, and are described as new user centred and user incorporated freedoms (p. 358).

The voluntary confinement of the viewer in his/her personal space, at the ‘driver’s seat’ as promised by Cox Digital TV (p. 358) leads to the isolation of the individual, defined as inward privatisation, a term that will also be seen below. However, if one wanted to look deeper into the side-effects of this practice, one would need to acknowledge that this is the way by which today the mechanisms of control succeed not by directly handling the body but mostly by mapping its visual environment (p. 359). For this reason, Guins stresses that: ‘the heterotopic place
Virtual Mobility

One of the fields severely influenced by the abovementioned changes is our comprehension of space, a fact which also challenges our understanding of the domestic environment. Specifically, the most important development, which allows the changes hitherto mentioned to be realised, is the introduction of virtual mobility, which is now available to individuals through the use of ICTs, such as computer-mediated communication, the Internet and mobile phones, just to mention the most predominant ones (Vilhelmson and Thulin 2008, p. 602).

There are three types of spatial behaviour, namely, (1) physical, face to face communication and physical transportation by car, foot, train etc.; (2) virtual mobility, contacts and two way interpersonal communication available through computer, Internet and mobile phone use; (3) media-related communication, which is a one-way mass communication though media such as the television, the radio etc. (p. 604). The combined form of these types of mobility, hyper mobility, also prevalent in our times, occurs when the abovementioned mobilities are used simultaneously, for example when one uses the Internet via mobile phone to watch a film while being on a train. As expected, these new forms of mobility allow individuals to communicate in different ways while being at home, to the extent that the notion of home is being challenged. While the use of ICTs speeds up interpersonal interaction and makes it impervious to geographic restrictions, it also influences all kinds of everyday activities as well as their planning and coordination (p. 604).

The element that is defining these activities today is the fact that they are experienced in an extended time-geographical model, since they are no longer restricted by time and space (p. 604-5). In stark contrast to the classical time-geographical model, according to which there is physical movement in time and space, the extended one appears to be displacing some of the activities occurring in the classical model, thus prompting change not only on a personal level, but also on a socio-spatial one (p. 605). Therefore, according to Vilhelmson and Thulin (2008, p.

called home can be both a disciplinary carapace and site of imaginary evasion within a larger network of control’ (2001, p. 361).
activities that were commonly experienced as part of the classical model are being gradually replaced by virtual ones, developing the following model:

- In-home versus out-of-home activities;
- Social versus solitary activities;
- Local versus regional and global interaction;
- Virtual contact versus physical movement; and
- ICT use versus media consumption

A common example that many of has experienced is the fact that one can become absorbed by Internet use and as a result he/she could end up spending more time at home than expected (p. 606). As seen above another interesting example is e-shopping and the fact that individuals are now able to shop online for anything they want, any time the want and wherever they want, since e-shops are clearly not restricted by their location or their opening hours. While this might seem somewhat handy for many of us, it does conceal several dangers, such as the phenomenon of inward privatisation or internet and mobile phone addiction.

At the same time, the permeation of ICT in daily routines has resulted in individuals multitasking or fragmenting their activities (as seen in the case of telework) (Hubers, Schwanene and Dijst 2008). For example it is common for individuals to commute and eat a snack while browsing the Internet through their mobiles or palmtops. Or as seen in the case of telework analysed above, the fragmented and multitasking nature of this type of employment can increase the stress levels an individual is experiencing, rather than diminish them.

Conclusion

In the exploration of the ways by which late capitalism has intervened with the developments shaping contemporary urban habitation, two models of the postmodern home have been studied as key examples. The first, that of the smart home, emanates with a utopic/dystopic imagery of the ‘melting of silicon and flesh’, and is presented as an alluring alternative to a more rigid, inflexible and unfair mode of habitation. The dissolution of the human/non-human binary ensuing from the possible popularisation of the smart home, will most definitely establish a new
relationship between the habitat and the inhabitant and calls for the postmodern inhabitants’ critical response.

In terms of the global adobe, presented as a response to the advanced habitation demands of the global dweller, this alternative to domesticity it contradicts the idea of home as a fixed point of reference, from which our sense of belonging usually ensues (Molz 2008). This is the second modification in the role and perception of the human habitat encountered in the analysis, which distances home from its hitherto traditional definition as a ‘static, fixed location’ (Molz 2008, p. 326).

Having explored the ways by which late capitalism, as the predominant financial system of the postmodern West, has informed contemporary dwelling patterns, the chapter continued with the analysis of the ways by which home-making practices and intradomestic conditions are also being influenced. In this regard, it became clear that the domestic sphere is currently permeated by the forces operating in the marketplace, thus gradually endorsing the reproduction of a mentality regulated by profitability and logic (Deetz 1992). The fact that the forces operating in the marketplace influence social and interpersonal relationships connotes the ease by which capitalism now accesses the private sphere, through the channels of social interaction currently considered essential for our socialisation (Foucault 1977; Bauman 2013).
Chapter Six

Postmodern Condemnations and a Solution

The postmodern home, in its actual and ideal form, has been explored in this thesis as a rather problematic institution, since certain readings of its role, as well as its value and importance, have challenged its idealisation in westernised society. Interestingly, notwithstanding these voices of criticism, the domestic ideal continued to be held as a prerequisite of being and a fundamental medium of sense making, as the phenomenological approach, examined in the previous chapters, suggests. On the other hand, the social discourse that gained momentum in the Industrial Revolution and peaked in the Age of Information, confirms the same principle, by stressing the importance of domesticity in its connection with the values of security, privacy, individuation, family and personal well-being.

Until recently, the necessity to challenge popular forms of domesticity might not have been as dire as the present study suggests. Yet, the developments emerging in the domestic sphere today – the most important of which were highlighted in the previous chapter – demand its fundamental and radical re-appreciation, both as a structure and as an institution. Voices of anti-domestic lifestyles have arisen in the postmodern sociological and philosophical ground and have presented this civilization cul de sac with a number of options worth considering. Alarmed by the contemporary forms of dwelling, theorists such as Adorno, Jameson and Deleuze and Guattari have offered their critique on home and their recommendations regarding the available alternatives. This chapter will therefore follow these three postmodern philosophical approaches, which challenge the predominant notions of domesticity and will evaluate their contribution to the subject-matter of the present study.

At this point, it is important to stress that there are three specific reasons for having selected these theories. First, they all begin their critique on domesticity on the premise of an overarching capitalist system, which interferes with the existence of the individual to an unprecedented and unbearable degree. While this thesis has considered the forces that have appropriated the domestic sphere, since antiquity, in
the fifth chapter, the focus shifted towards the influence of late capitalism in the urban and, by extension, domestic environment.

In this regard, these three theories share a common, fundamental argument with the present thesis, although while they agree, to different degrees, in the abandonment of home as a private space, this thesis considers that prior to any abandonment or any change imposed on the domestic sphere, the necessity of its reclamation as the private space of the individual. This is the second reason for which these theories have been selected for the study of anti-domestic postmodern approaches.

The third reason for choosing the juxtaposition of Adorno, Jameson and Deleuze and Guattari’s Nomadology, is that each of these theories have been planning the seeds for the idea of the home as a BwO, but neither of them can be considered or deployed on its own accord. In this light, they all propose a set of practices that can be regarded as important for the transformation and the sustenance of home as a BwO. However, as this thesis suggests, prior to any such endeavour, it is important to reclaim the home as our private space, in order to ensure that inhabitants will be able to undertake any action necessary, to redefine themselves and their surrounding environment.

Adorno’s Hotel Room

Adorno was interested in the idea of the interior and its critique, from his first publication, *Kierkegaard – Construction of the Aesthetic* (1933) (Steiner 2010). Specifically, he criticised the importance that the late 19th to early 20th centuries placed on the interior, or the home, as a result of the general distrust in the public sphere – also explored in the second chapter of this thesis. Additionally, Adorno argues, at that time the home obtained unprecedented significance and simultaneously it was pushed into a positive relationship with the individual’s inner world, thus by extension rendering the private sphere as a ‘privileged locus of meaning, a refuge’ (Steiner 2010, p. 137).

Adorno recognises that Kierkegaard is capable of enjoying the privacy of his home – often while acknowledging the separation of the inner and the outer, the
domestic and the urban – due to the fact that his living standards were quite high due to a very large inheritance on which he depended (p. 138). As a result, Kierkegaard is being identified as the ‘ideal-typical bourgeois homemaker, withdrawn from the world, building up a self-sufficient universe of which he is in complete control’ (p. 139). The idea of the comfort zone, the process of inward privatisation of the bourgeois and later that of the working class, prevalent until today, the illusion of control and well-being, when one is inside the home, in contrast to the feelings and thoughts that arise when one is in the outside world. This is the starting point of Adorno’s critique, and one that continues to preoccupy the present thesis, even if it is being written many years later.

Furthermore, the over-reliance of the subject on his/her domestic space, in which change, mobility or multiplicity, was, for Adorno, accompanied with feelings of strangulation. Such a reaction was fortified by the additional fact that the 19th century bourgeois produced an idea of home that was impossible to attain, for most of the population (Lewis and Cho 2006, p. 71). Here Adorno reveals another paradox of the idealised bourgeois home, the fact that while the alienation experienced by individuals stems from the practices and the ideas incorporated in private property and ownership, one’s desire to escape these facts leads one back to the space considered as privately owned, namely the home. The anxiety induced by the bourgeois, traditional home leads him to the definition of the unhomely home, which is filled with ghosts that deprive the occupant of a pleasant domestic experience.

The idea of the unhomely, uncanny home and the anxiety accompanying the impenetrable private zone became a popular theme of the late 1980’s cinematography in films such as Blue Velvet (1986), True Stories (1986) and Peggy Sue Got Married (1986), Something Wild (1986). David Lynch’s Blue Velvet for example, hopes to provide a penetrating look inside the homes of the middle-class, in order to uncover the perverted and unnerving scenarios unfolding in their everyday domestic reality. Although, it could be criticised as an exaggerated approach to intradomestic routines, it does raise concern regarding the ghosts of the private sphere and what by some could be perceived as part of their normality. Through such movies, the myth that the domestic sphere is the only secure, ethical, familial environment collapses
and its representation as unhomely and uncanny insinuated the meaning to which Adorno referred, more than thirty years before (Deniz 1988).

Furthermore, in *Minima Moralia* (1951, 2005), the unswerving criticism of the capitalist system and the bourgeois ideology, Theodor Adorno formulates his critique of the modern home as an institution that no longer upholds its hitherto specific and fundamental role as the haven of the self (Lewis & Cho 2006, p.70). Commencing his critique at the time when standardisation and commodification had already started to influence both the urban and the domestic ground, he observes that one can neither experience domestic satisfaction in the modern, technologically mediated homes of the present, nor can one return to the homes of the past (p. 73).

Interestingly, at his time of writing, the habitat had not been turned into the hub of connectivity it currently is, nor was it flooded with the plethora of technologies it is today. In this sense, Adorno was ahead of his time, since he foresaw that home would no longer be sufficient to separate the *self* from the *other* signs could indicate this course. That is not to say that, in the recent past, the domestic environment was devoid of external intrusions, as it had already been contaminated by the two fundamental aspects of capitalism, namely standardisation and commodification (p. 72). The house, as Adorno saw it, had become ‘intolerable’ (p. 72); caught in a reverse relation to the increasing permeation of consumerism and public discourse, it had already lost its function as the private space of the individual and the family.

The *intolerable* home emerges as a hyper-sanitised structure that aims to eradicate the traces of human dwelling from the site (Lewis & Cho 2006, p. 73); thus, increasing, rather than alleviating the pressure in the dwelling/dweller relationship. Either as the result of the postmodern inhabitants’ manipulation by the media and the ensuing desire to re-create dream homes to the letter, or as a side-effect of the postmodern trends of habitation governed by the doctrines of flexibility, time-saving and ease, modern inhabitants seem to be losing touch with their domestic environments. Fully-furnished, pre-decorated and highly equipped contemporary flats mushroom in the large urban centres of the West, prohibiting the residents’ personal input, in other words, obstructing the development even of a rudimentary home-making process, that of turning space into place, house into home.
As it has been stressed throughout this study, home-making practices constitute a vital aspect of a rewarding domestic life, one that fortifies the inhabitants’ sense of at-homeness. The erection of pre-prepared domiciles, no matter how modern and luxurious they are, the neutrality and the homogeneity of the decoration, the standardisation and the commoditisation of the habitat threaten the already challenged dwelling-dweller relationship. Less attached to their homes, inhabitants are freer than ever to move from one place to another, as their dwelling environment facilitates their flow through unclogged routes that lead them where they are mostly needed by the global financial system. Homes are thus stripped of personal input, devoid of memories and warmth, ‘living cases’ as Adorno notes, ‘manufactured by experts for philistines, or factory sites that have stayed into the consumption sphere, devoid of all relations to the occupant’ (Adorno 2005, p. 38) In short, the contemporary home is nothing but the prosumers’ shelter, a space of reproduction governed by the predominant social and economic discourses of our times.

Simultaneously, Adorno claims that the modern obsession with an enhanced – and even augmented – reality has also taken its toll on our dwelling experience. In this regard, the less the inhabitants engage with the home-making process, the more they relinquish the control of their privacy. Hence the dwelling-dweller relationship has shrunk to a minimum, while it has also suffered severe qualitative modifications:

The ability is lost, for example to close a door quietly and discreetly, yet firmly. Those of cars and refrigerators have to be slammed, others have the tendency to snap shut by themselves, imposing on those entering the bad manners of not looking behind them, not shielding the interior of the house which receives them. (Adorno 2005, p. 40)

What Adorno is hoping to underline with this example is that the microcosm of the habitat is changing at all levels, creating a feedback loop of passive interactions with a significant impact on society and human interpersonal relationships. The profit-oriented, capitalist approach, to the contemporary home has gradually introduced inhabitants to new conformities, gadgets and facilities that promise the enhancement of domestic life and therefore an increased sense of well-being for every resident willing to embrace the future. Yet, as it became obvious in the previous chapter, this innovation-frenzy distorts the dwelling experience while severe side-effects emerge along the way.
Although the obsession with functionality and ease, as Adorno explains, is heralded as the ministrant angel of contemporary habitation, idealised to the extent it has become a must, the repercussions of such an effortless domestic life guarantee the alienation of home from its role, through the transformation of ‘the interior space for contemplation and individual development into the unconscious materialisation of Fascist dehumanisation’ (Adorno 2005, p. 75). Adorno’s understanding of the predominant forms of habitation, attests to the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter, in the sense that the contemporary dwelling establishment currently operates as an instrument that initiates and facilitates homogeneity, critical numbness and indifference. Home is now a space irrelevant to its inhabitants and their needs, one which diminishes their desire and possibly even their capacity to separate from the public ground, so as to contemplate and develop through their own understanding of their environment. Accordingly, postmodern habitation trends impinge on the dwelling-dweller relationship by hindering one’s connection to oneself, while opening more channels of association with the public ground, and by extent, the predominant social discourses. In response to this increasingly intimidating reality, Adorno sought for ways through which inhabitants could escape from the grip of contemporary domestication and its capitalist corollaries.

One of Adorno’s key points throughout his critique of modern society remains his belief that ‘when men are forbidden to think, their thinking sanctions what simply exists’ (Adorno 1973, p. 85). In this regard, critical thinking is considered a mandatory activity against the disproportionate and unconditional ‘externalisation of the super-ego’ manifested today (Adorno 1973, p. 274), and prevails as the only route towards the true possibility of democracy. As his biographer, Stefan Müller-Doohm observes, Adorno considered the critique to be best practiced from the margins; in other words, he advised individuals to distance themselves from the public ground and learn to think autonomously, challenging the conventions and the status quo of their time (Mariotti 2008, pp. 463-464). A self constantly immersed in the collective is no longer a self and can on no account provide the community with an original and honest account of ideas, thoughts and critique. In this light, given that homes today bear resemblance to hubs of social connectivity, allowing very little room for separation from the social and predominant discourse, very few opportunities are given to
critique and understand their environment autonomously. In the postmodern habitat, self-government and self-determination appear more difficult than ever before.

This train of thought led Adorno to the conclusion that the only possible way for an individual to respond to his political duties would be through one’s utter separation from the bourgeois tradition and its overarching grasp. One’s break from conventional lifestyles could, on the one hand, induce feelings of exclusion and homelessness, while, on the other, it could be perceived as a leap towards autonomy and freedom (Mariotti 2008, p. 463). It is this basic liberating attribute of one’s breaking free from the public ground that Adorno promotes as an essential element of dwelling in the late modern world. Specifically, in response to the concerns raised by the trends of contemporary dwelling, he suggests that homes are frequently substituted with random hotel or rented rooms, which can be either temporary gateways or permanent alternatives to one’s primary residence (Adorno 2005, p. 79).

‘It is part of morality not to be at home in one’s home’ (Adorno 2005, p. 39).

As a result, Adorno’s position can be encapsulated in his belief that ‘the attempt to evade responsibility for one’s residence by moving into a hotel or furnished room, makes the enforced conditions of emigration a wisely chosen norm’ (Adorno 2005, pp. 38-9). This approach, he argued, would produce two fundamental side-effects which could destabilise the normative models of habitation. On the one hand, the temporality of the rented room would contradict the sense of ownership correlated with one’s permanent habitat. As a ‘shelter without the hassle of ownership’ (Lewis and Cho 2006, p. 70), this temporary form of dwelling would urge one to experience the discomfort and estrangement of non-belonging. By going through the loss of ownership and a respective distancing from the bourgeois security of belonging, Adorno would expect the bourgeois resident to gradually reconsider his/her own condition.

The second accompaniment of this approach, interrelated to the former, would be the loss of privacy, since the bourgeois subject would be required to occupy a space that is not inhabited by a single individual, but by many non-permanent residents. In this regard, an intrinsic aspect of domesticity, the one element responsible for the modern conceptualisation of the home as a haven of the self, the idea of privacy, is challenged. The residence as a place of non-belonging becomes one
that disquiets, alerts and activates awareness and thought. As Adorno sees it, only when individuals are freed from the sense of ownership and privacy derived from their home, will they be able to meet their moral duty to not be at home or at ease.

The solution that Adorno puts forth is quite compelling, since it could indeed produce the aforementioned results, while disrupting the predominant norm of habitation (Lewis and Cho 2006). However, it also gives rise to certain questions that challenge its efficacy today. First and foremost, to occupy a hotel room one needs to set aside a budget for the increased living expenses that residing, away from home entails. As an alternative to one’s existing habitat, the hotel room doubles the expenditure for this certain period, since one is required to spend money both on the life away from home and on the sustenance of the home temporarily left behind. With the only exception that this endeavour would be pursued with the smallest budget possible, which could possibly cause such a discomfort that individuals would have to prioritise their basic needs over any intellectual preoccupations, this solution does indeed seem rather elitist.

On the same grounds, there are other impractical concerns raised by Adorno’s proposal that immediately classify it as one extremely hard to pursue. Given the current fixation with the domestic culture, and the specific, very demanding rhythms of modern life, it would be literally impossible for most urban residents to leave home for a substantial amount of time, while continuing to make a living. The time designated for such a pursuit is during one’s holidays, which is the only period when most of us are able to rent a hotel room, disengage and relax. It is however, rather obvious, that this has nothing to do with what Adorno advocates. Hence, this high-cost suggestion becomes harder to practically perceive.

Furthermore, if the extent of attachment most of our contemporaries feel for their homes is taken into consideration, it becomes quite obvious that those who would finally decide to follow Adorno’s advice, would eventually need to overcome certain ‘withdrawal’ symptoms, such as homesickness. Such sentimental reactions would not contribute to one’s attempt to disengage from home, since they frequently ensue from romanticism of the element of which the lack has triggered this feeling of nostalgia (Lewis and Cho 2006, p.70). Without implying that an alternative to domesticity should be an easy way out of our domesticated existence, it is important
to underline that the more implausible a suggestion appears to the majority, the less probable it becomes as a solution. It is stacked up in the minoritarian pile of theoretical anti-domestic solutions and is allowed very little, if any, impact on the real world.

Frederic Jameson’s ‘Dirty Realism’

Far closer to the postmodern milieu, as he is living it rather than foreseeing it, Frederic Jameson’s *The Seeds of Time* (1994) provides a discussion on spatial and ideological developments in late capitalism, focusing on architectural and literary depictions of *dirty realism*. In architecture the term had already been introduced by Liane Lefaivre on the works of Gehry and Koolhaas, while with regards to literature it was used by Burford in his discussion of the literary style that depicts ‘the transformation of everyday life by the penetration of a corporate mass culture into its utmost recess and crannies, with the consequent colonisation and elimination of any of the residual enclaves that have hitherto remained exempt’ (Jameson 1996, pp. 147-148).

Dirty realism has been defined as a genre, which as Barthes explains in his approach of the reader in *The Pleasure of the Text* (1973) as an abolition of ‘all barriers, all classes, all exclusions’, thus producing contradictive results, devoid of consistency, logic and accountability (Dobozy 2000). As a literary genre, dirty realism is conscious of the contradictions made available in such texts, while it acknowledges the same rules it aims to disregard (Dobozy 2000).

This is the exact characteristic that Frederic Jameson adopts, both in his critique of the capitalist system. Through the analysis preceding his first reference to *dirty realism*, Jameson explores the antinomies of postmodernity in a deep and illustrative way, drawing a rather disturbing, yet realistic picture of postmodern Westernised cities. He reaches the conclusion that today, terms, definitions and connotations are used in a variety of, often self-contradictive, ways. In this semiotic upheaval, the urban itself has lost its meaning, as the difference between the urban and the rural is diminishing, since lifestyle, consumerism and cultural choices are becoming increasingly homogeneous, notwithstanding their space of practice (Jameson 1996, p. 28). To strengthen his argumentation, Jameson proves that the established postmodern Zeitgeist does not only consider such semiotic disturbances as given, but it has succeeded in ‘training’ individuals to accept and abide to a number
of antinomies ‘with no sense of their incongruity, let alone their logical incompatibility’ (Jameson 1996, p.52).

While underlining the antitheses of the theoretical and physical space of postmodernity, Jameson argues that, as several other binary opposites, the binary of private and social space has collapsed due to the dissolution of both these terms and practices. With regards to the former, Jameson explains that ‘the space into which a postpolitical collectivity is supposed to withdraw ... is vacuous and utterly colonised by consumption and its codes and languages’ (Jameson 1996, p. 62). Also the point where Adorno’s critique and the conclusion of the previous chapter converge. With Adorno and Jameson touching upon the problem of postmodern domesticity and the previous chapter of this thesis providing specific and focused examples of the magnitude of the problem, it is obvious that the capitalist tampering with our domestic environment should not only raise concern but should be perceived as a call for immediate action.

In a similar vein, Jameson notices the discursive and practical collapse of the public ground, analogous to that of the private sphere. A strong driving force of change is that, late capitalism demands the demolition of everything outdated, such as the big narratives and their equally big side-effects, so as to prepare us for ‘a purely fungible present in which space and psyches alike can be processed and remade at will’ (Jameson 1996, p. 14). At the same time, the concurrent disdain for anything traditional, such as the traditional family for example, and the prevalent distrust in anything labelled as public, push individuals towards the lifestyles favoured by and favouring late capitalism.

The result, as Jameson claims, is an ‘unparalleled rate of change on all levels of social life and an unparalleled standardisation of everything’ (Jameson 1996, p. 15). Ceaseless and perpetual change in the guise of fashion has penetrated social and psychic reality rendered as the sole well-guarded value of our days (Jameson 1996, p. 17). However, notwithstanding our submission to the volatility of postmodernity, actual change appears increasingly harder to achieve. Postmodern agents are thus faced with yet another paradox;

the persistence of the Same through absolute Difference – the same street with different buildings, the same culture through momentous new shedding of skin – discredits change,
since henceforth the only conceivable radical change would consist in putting an end to change itself. (Jameson 1996, p. 18)

In this light, neither the private nor the public spheres can be understood or analysed according to their hitherto dominant definitions. Taking this into consideration, Jameson hopes to revive the postmodern individual’s trust in the public sphere, as he posits that his solution to this paradoxical experience of postmodernity proves ‘the Utopian character of all collective experience (including those of fascism and the various racisms) but stresses the requirement of an existential choice of solidarity with a specific concrete group’ (Jameson 1996, p. 43). Furthermore, he adds that through the historical development of this approach a harmony will be reached between ‘a specific social content and the fullest development of group or collective structures’ (Jameson 1996, p. 44). While he recognises the relationship between dirty space and the literary examples provided by Burford, he adds that the term also alludes to the cyberpunk culture of our days and, more specifically, to Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982).

The cyberpunk sub-culture is a bright example of the volatility governing the social sphere of our time; it is a postmodern statement of the fact that there are just as many punks as there are yuppies, while members of the former can easily infiltrate the latter and vice versa (Jameson 1996, p.152), something that can be observed in most categories and areas of classification, today. Accordingly, he sees further, exciting applications of the public space depicted in Blade Runner in the paradigm set by the ‘great non-Western civilisations’; an imagery of people fusing with swarms of information, technology and products, in an inside with no outside labyrinth-like landscape (Jameson 1996, p. 157). While acknowledging the end of civil society (Jameson 1996, p. 153) and the appropriation of the private sphere by the forces of late capitalism, he urges his readers to consider the space of dirty realism ‘as a collective built space, in which the opposition between inside and outside is annulled’ (Jameson 1996, p. 155).

For Jameson, dirty here means the collective as such, the traces of mass, anonymous living and using. The traditional values of privacy have disappeared nor do we any longer approach this collective mass within the stark terror of the earlier inner-directed bourgeois individuals, for whom the multitude threatened a fall, as in naturalism, where collective space seemed radically unclean in the anthropological sense. (p. 158)
In this regard, it is obvious that Jameson, is exploring the positive side of postmodern living, where the collapse of binaries paves the way to the ‘new city’; a collective space of ‘cooperation, community and hybridisation’ (Lewis and Cho 2006, p. 87). Following Negri and Hardt’s mentality underlying the Empire (2000), Jameson argues that the city will be developing and changing to such an extent that the individual will be able to experience a nomadic life without having to move.

Lewis and Cho (2006) have extended Jameson’s application of the dirty space to the domestic environment, arguing that this could be the response for which the critiques to contemporary dwelling have been searching. The home, seen as a dirty space, is exposed to a number of stimuli from the outside, as it no longer constitutes a hermetically closed and private establishment. Following the course of philosophical modernism that calls for light travel, urging individuals to ‘leave those suitcases behind, do without the cumbersome foreign bodies of our inherited or unconscious presuppositions’ (Jameson 1996, p. 38), Jameson suggests that contemporary inhabitants turn their homes into utopian spaces of collectivity on the ‘fertile soil of the thousand plateaus of the present’ (Lewis and Cho 2006, p. 89).

On these grounds, Lewis and Cho, in accordance with Jameson’s approach to dirty living, provide a solution to the unhomely homes of the present, not through the abandonment of home as Adorno suggests, but by suggesting homelessness at home. Interestingly, one cannot overlook the return to Adorno’s discussion of how our moral responsibility as critical social agents entails a break from at homeness. In Jameson’s work, the goal appears to be the same, but approached from a different angle; rather than abandoning home, inhabitants are advised to simply strip their homes of every characteristic safeguarding their sense of at homeness.

Lewis and Cho (2006) regard Jameson’s suggestion as a promising alternative to contemporary domesticity, which will not only liberate social agents from the tentacles of capitalism, but which could even turn home into ‘a revolutionary space for collective politics and adventurous possibilities’ (p. 89). Consistent with the proposal put forth by this thesis, the authors claim that the domestic sphere can indeed be turned into a space of revolutionary practices which could further expand in the social ground. Yet are not our homes already ‘dirty spaces’, open to numerous interferences from the public ground? Could it not be suggested that homes are, in a
sense, spaces of connectivity and collectivity, as we are seldom ever alone, even when being on our own?

The critical point of Jameson’s proposal in this point, and the one rendering his theory not only minoritarian but also utopian, is the fact that as he sees it, an existential affiliation with a specific concrete group is essential. This thorny detail suffices to wither the strength of an otherwise powerful alternative to dominant domestic. First and foremost, contemporary inhabitants appear to be increasingly daunted by a long-lasting relationship, let alone by the adherence to a specific existential group, theory or practice. At the same time, it has been noted that the forces intruding and colonising the private sphere are much stronger than their counterparts, thus rendering their exclusion from the domestic sphere seemingly impossible. If a home opens up to a specific group it is very likely to be inviting a series of intrusions by several unwanted forces. While the internet, for example, with its social networks, its media and its innumerable possibilities is a tool of connectivity and knowledge, it can easily become a space of manipulation, profit and control governed by the same forces a household might want to keep at a distance. At the same time, as seen in the case of Airbnb and CouchSurfing, the home as a dirty space is already beginning to take shape, although the side effects noted (see Second Homes, Global Adobe, Airbnb, CouchSurfing etc...) can be detrimental to the community.

Another significant point of criticism against the dirty home is what this thesis hopes to argue, namely that while postmodern theory and practice promote contemporary inhabitants should be working towards the elimination of privacy from the private sphere, the solution is very likely found in the exact opposite approach. As it was delineated in the previous chapters, our homes have already become dirty, with the dirty sense of the term; it thus appears that another of the hopeful prospects of postmodernity has been lost, with very little change of being reclaimed. Contemporary homes opening to the public ground nowadays are very unlikely to be influenced in an effective or constructive way.

Accordingly, the focus at this point should be shifted towards the reclamation of our private space, in the first place, so that it is both practically and semantically ours to use. It thus appears that both Adorno and Jameson are aiming at the dissolution of privacy, as they set off from a common ground but follow reversed
practices. Equally, this thesis has the same starting point found in Adorno and Jameson, but it aims for a proposal based on the increase rather than the decrease of privacy in the domestic environment.

Furthermore, another important difference between the proposal of this thesis and the ones hitherto examined is that the present study hopes to refrain from forming a domestic model that would be normative and rigid, since the normativity and the idealisation of home distort the very process of home-making. It thus appears that while both Adorno and Jameson have provided helpful and insightful discussions on the matter of domesticity, they have failed to offer a viable solution. As a result, it is important to explore another theoretical anti-domestic approach that could possibly inform the present discussion with an alternative perspective of responding to the problem of postmodern dwelling.

Deleuze and Guattari’s Nomadology

In the critique against the capitalist system, presented in Deleuze and Guattari’s two-volume publication *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1977, 1987), the human habitat is analysed as an institution that reinforces the capitalist system in a multi-levelled way. Either as a shelter of the neurotic/paranoid self and family, or as a striated space of power reproduction, the home is seen as a space appropriated by capitalism system and the forces that endorse it. Accordingly, the most straightforward and seemingly adequate response to the criticisms of domesticity appears to be Deleuze and Guattari’s Nomadology. It should be mentioned that any fair analysis of their work calls for the study of Nomadology as an integral part of their approach to the term Body without Organs.

In order to shed some light on the obscure and minoritarian concepts of the Deleuzoguattarian theorization it is necessary to start from the beginning, at the exact point where the authors claim that desire flows constitute the basis of our existence, underlying every kind of activity. This is the ontological basis of their theorisation and the foundation of their ideas. Desire is channelled through different assemblages, or else, through the breaks and connections of desiring-machines.

Desiring-machines are binary machines, obeying a binary law or set of rules governing associations: one machine is always coupled with another ... This is because there is always a
flow-producing machine, and another machine connected to it that interrupts or draws part of this flow. (Deleuze & Guattari 2004a, p. 5)

The infamous example they use in this case is the mother’s breast and the baby’s mouth, coupled for the purpose of feeding. This, they claim, is the basic principle of production:

the productive synthesis, the production of production, is inherently connective in nature: ‘and...’ ‘and then...’ This is because there is always a flow-producing machine, and another machine connected to it that interrupts or draws off part of this flow (the breast-the mouth). (Deleuze & Guattari 2004a, p. 5)

Desiring-machines are thus connected and disconnected according to a certain set of aims and purposes, appropriated by the State and the capitalist system from the beginning of our lives (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 406). Yet, the channelling of desire in areas valued by the system of social production does not begin with one’s socialisation but with one’s birth, as the number of desiring-machines combinations permitted is rather limited and thus delimiting. The conjunctions and disjunctions allowed are passed on as given from generation to generation and the possibility of escaping them is extremely small. By allowing or prohibiting the connection of certain desiring-machines and, therefore, by controlling the desire flows channelled through each coupling, these flows are constantly reterritorialised in the system of social production. On these grounds, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the organism into which we are transformed through the established desiring-machines is one that merely focuses on production.

Deleuze and Guattari claim that familialism and domestication, built on the Oedipal Triangle, set the foundations for desire flows de- and reterritorialisation. On the premise that the child desires the mother, a desire flow prohibited and wrong, Oedipalisation introduces the law of the father, an authoritarian figure that in the system of social production can be replaced by the boss, the supervisor or any other authoritative individual (Deleuze & Guattari 2004a, pp. 301-302). This authoritative figure is responsible for the redirection of the desire flow towards an aim that is more ‘correct’ and acceptable, and the validation of his role by religion, social discourse and predominant ideology has influenced every kind of desiring-machine in the sphere of social interaction. Only individuals who have yielded to the law of the father are considered normal, only those who have undergone their Oedipalisation can move on
to their socialisation, only those who recognise the authoritative figures of desire as guardians are accepted in the social ground.

In their first publication, *The Anti-Oedipus* (1977, 2004), Deleuze and Guattari respond to the limitations and the predesigned structure of desire flow channelling by proposing schizoanalysis, which entails the utter eradication of the *ego* as the base and guiding force of the agent (Deleuze & Guattari 2004a, p. 24). It is in this framework that Deleuze and Guattari refer to the process of *becoming* as a liberating activity that should allow every individual to *become* literally anything (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 11). Accordingly, becoming a schizo does not imply that agents should not resemble to or act as schizophrenics, but they should manage to absorb and be absorbed by the schizoid subject’s attributes in order to escape their neurotic, oedipalised nature which restrains their desire flows (Deleuze & Guattari 2004a, p. 24). This results in deterritorialised desire flows that obstruct their reteritorrialisation and thus obstruct their assimilation by the capitalist system, defined as *lines of flight* (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, pp. 559-562).

In their second publication, *A Thousand Plateaus*, they develop the schizoid model into that of the nomad. The nomad is always mobile, just as the schizoid entity swaps identities and is thus never in one place. Regarding the nomad space, Deleuze and Guattari explain, that ‘the nomad space is localized and not delimited. What is both limited and limiting is striated space’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 420). Therefore, they divide space in two categories; the first, sedentary space, is striated with walls, enclosures and roads. This is space in its most common form, for most urban inhabitants; in other words, space organised and hierarchised according to the authority responsible for the specific area (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 420). On the other hand, smooth space bears markings that are effaced and displaced, while it offers variability and polyvocality in the courses and directions that one can follow. The State, as Deleuze and Guattari refer to the authorities responsible for the striated space which provides the dwelling environment of most inhabitants globally, is not only in charge of the existing space, but it also strives to assimilate more space into its striated boarders. This phenomenon has been encountered in numerous occasions in the past and the present thesis has discussed it thoroughly until this point. At the same time, the State is not only polemically against nomadicism, but it is also endeavouring
to control every kind of population flow and migration (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 425). In this light, one could argue that the State is cautious of any kind of flow that defies teleology, a target or a purpose.

Nomadism, one of the most popular additions to the discourse of postmodernity, has become a widely-discussed area, considered both as a promising alternative to the impasse of habitation and as an empty theoretical trick with negative practical applications, if any. The heated debate on its impact includes strong opinions and equally interesting points supported by each side.

As observed in the previous chapters, nomadic lifestyles are a very popular tendency of our days, not limited to trends of habitation but expanding in every area of thought and activity. Unconventional theorists who aimed to perturb and even shock the conventional academy would commonly support an avant-garde concept, such as Foucault’s conceptualisation of madness, although the success that Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of nomadism is facing has made it one of the most influential ideas in the field of contemporary philosophy (Pels 1999, p. 65). Meanwhile, this theoretical background has been complemented by actual, everyday life developments and advancements which have facilitated mobility. The first modern nomads have appeared within a social system that hitherto struggled to exclude them. Discursive changes both in the academy and in the social ground now perceive nomadism more favourably and eventually such lifestyles are even projected as ideal, the way second homes and global adobes are.

Nomadism is thus perceived as an integral part of postmodern dwelling, which has liberated social agents from the restraints of space and everything it entails, namely, discourse, trends, fashions and the like. The postmodern nomad is able to disentangle from the tentacles of routine, habit and by extension, as Adorno suggested in his own approach, critical numbness. As Pels acknowledges, in a publication heavily criticising the postmodern obsession with nomadism, ‘there is some room for an epistemological ‘praise of marginality’ because, presumably, social and conceptual innovation (in the above sense of heretical, code-breaking change) is usually born at the margins’ (1999, p. 78).

Yet, contemporary forms of nomadism are not limited to purposes of sense-making. Pel’s criticism of the intellectual-nomad is a good starting point for a train of
thought that can be extended to most practical and theoretical adaptations of the term. As he maintains ‘we live in a world of flux, where mobility, experimentation and transgression have turned into core signifiers of the daily management of lifestyles’ (1999, p. 63). Accordingly, contemporary discourses, favouring the postmodern nomad disdain anything rooted or immobile as an unfashionable and possibly unworthy element of society, thus increasing the tension between the fixed and the flux, the rooted and the mobile binaries (Pels 1999, p. 64). Apparently, regardless of the fact that nomadism, volatility and flexibility seem to dominate the postmodern vocabulary, it is rather obvious that our binary perception of things has not been challenged in any way.

Simultaneously, to use the term nomad in reference to inhabiting, lifestyle or even intellectual pursuits one needs to acknowledge and respond to the great challenge posited by the dual signification of the notion. While, on the one hand, nomads are being idealised as the trouble-makers of an increasingly conformist and well-settled world, the term still reverberates with its connection to immigration, exile and unwanted wandering. ‘real-life migrants, refugees, guest workers or illegal aliens’ are only some of the groups represented by the term nomad (Pels 1999, p. 73). To aspire and even occasionally achieve identification with such disadvantaged groups and individuals, at the process of practicing our privilege of self-definition, while the real nomads are deprived of this very right, can at best be described as insensitive. Hence, the heedless use of the term nomad becomes an extremely important, and at the same time, delicate matter of concern that should preoccupy the academy and the intellectual elite to a greater extent.

Apparently, among the different shades of the term nomad used in our days there are very few which seem to approach the thought of Deleuze and Guattari. The one that appears to be closer to the notion of nomadism as this unfolds in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, is that captured in Baudelaire’s poem L’Etranger, (Baudelaire in Stamelman 1993). In fact, the Stranger can be seen as the Deleuzoguattarian nomad; two individuals, or rather models of a life in deprivation, who have ‘either refused or been refused the conventional realities of social order: home, family, community, society itself’ (Stamelman 1993, p. 119). According to the analysis of the poem provided by Richard Stamelman (1993, p. 119):
the stranger has for home only the changing landscapes of his wandering, for companions only the echoes of his own footsteps, for possessions only the absence of possessions. The stranger is a nomad, a pariah, an exile, a man or a woman on and of the Outside, to whom all communal acts, all common activities, the most simple human verbs – to have, to belong, to speak – are foreign

This is the extent of estrangement that an individual should undergo in order to be defined as a nomad; to experience estrangement on an ontological basis. It thus becomes arguable whether contemporary ‘nomads’, intellectuals or otherwise, can actually be defined as such, while they fail to truly free themselves from the social elements that bind them.

In this guise, nomadology cannot be fully understood or applicable if analysts, theorists and philosophers fail to consider it as an integral element of the Body without Organs. In a similar vein, it should be stressed the schizo, the nomad, the war machine are all connected through and relevant with the Body without Organs and should not be explored separately, since such, often simplified and crude explorations result in misinterpretations of their work thus inciting criticism even from groups and individuals that could benefit from the Deleuzoguattarian thinking.

As a result, the exciting grounds opened up by Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of nomadism in a postmodern milieu ready to both practically and theoretically accept it, regardless of its eccentricity, have not been fully explored until today. Contemporary nomadism is only a shadow of the one conceptualised by Deleuze and Guattari, as agents fail to cause the necessary trouble to the system of social production, ostensibly challenged by nomadic existence. At the same time, the partial acceptance of the term diminishes its impact and promotes the idea of the semi or part-time nomad, an individual who can both be and not be identified as such. In this regard, the notion has been dented and discredited, since it no longer bears the power that its cleaner Deleuzoguattarian version does.

More public in the private?

Adorno’s Hotel Room, Jameson’s Dirty Home and Deleuze and Guattari’s Nomadology consider the interference of the capitalist system in the urban and domestic environment and thus explore ways to redefine or deconstruct the home. As it derives,
these approaches to the domestic environment fail to acknowledge the importance of its role as a private space. Proposals such as the ones explored above seem to disregard that, in postmodernity, homes are neither fixed nor private. Additionally, it can be argued that the more our homes open up to the public ground the more they lose their capacity to protect inhabitants from the systemic forces that continue to colonise the social sphere. In a postmodern reality of global adobes, second and smart homes, nomadic lifestyles and hybridisation, the solution to the problems of domesticity, which by extension influence the social sphere, could hardly be to fortify these tendencies, for the dangers involved appear to be more than the contemporary agent can handle. Had it been the other way round, the worries and concerns expressed by this thesis, as well as those put forth by several critical theorists and philosophers would not be sufficient causes of alarm. It thus appears that in this postmodern chaos of fluid definitions and flux practices social agents are in dire need of a space to withdraw to and to reclaim as their own. The significance of challenging, re-thinking and re-acting towards a pre-prepared, ready-for-consumption reality served in the public ground can no longer be undermined.

How to turn home into a BwO (and Why?)

As the previous chapters revealed, postmodern dwelling trends are dictating that contemporary homes are augmented to respond to the needs of a late capitalist society. At the same time, theoretical approaches urge the domestic ground to open up to the public sphere, in order to escape the bourgeois connotations of privacy and ownership, blamed for a number of maladies associated with the domestic ideal – such as the exaggerated fear of strangers, the obsession with security and safety, the pursuit of an ideal home capable of representing the status of its owners. Yet at this point, the changes that postmodern theory and practice demand fail to strengthen the domestic qualities that could foster an environment which supports creative and autonomous individuals. On the contrary, the lack of privacy and the appropriation of the private space by the marketplace and the public discourse are two issues associated with an experienced lack of freedom to separate and distanciate, physically and intellectually, from the public ground.
There are severe consequences to an individual’s private and social being from one’s constant connection to the public ground, the most significant of which is the elimination of individuality; although this is concealed by the postmodern fixation on the principles pseudo individualism prevalent today. The predominant mass mentality, assimilating individuals in an anonymous whole, results in the social agents’ inability to envision, create and experiment with their own sense of reality, thus losing their capacity to offer alternatives to the existing, vastly pre-prepared realities promoted in the social sphere. The importance of one’s capacity to create one’s vocabulary and discourse, and by extension, to be able to evaluate and comprehend their social and personal reality according to their own terms is an issue analysed in Richard Rorty’s Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (1989). It will be useful at this point of the discussion, since it strengthens the thesis argumentation that a vital prerequisite for the redefinition of one’s vocabulary is one’s personal space.

In this publication, Rorty argues that both in philosophy and in everyday life, there is a ‘contest between an entrenched vocabulary, which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises great things’ (p. 9). The former is linked to metaphysical theorisation, which practically translates in the fulfilment of one’s aspiration to reach the existing truth through knowledge. This practice presupposes that a single truth actually exists; reaching it depends merely on its discovery. Rorty adds that contrary to the metaphysicists, the individuals, unwilling to adopt the existing vocabularies, are more likely to believe that truth is constructed, rather than found. For these individuals, what he defines as a ‘final vocabulary’ – i.e. the set of words employed for the justification of actions, beliefs and the prospective or retrospective reference to our life course – entails an antithesis, for it is constructed through the individual’s opposition to the entrenched vocabularies, which are irrelevant to their being (1989, p. 73).

Individuals who oppose the metaphysical, or else commonsensical discourse, and fulfil three conditions are defined by Rorty as ironists. In this regard, an ironist is radically and continuously challenging the final vocabulary used, even by oneself. Secondly, ironists acknowledge that their own final vocabularies will never suffice to underwrite or dissolve their doubts on the matter. The third characteristic of an ironist is that, as long as one philosophises about one’s situation, they do not consider their
final vocabulary closer to reality than others’. The basic way, according to which ironists choose their final vocabulary, is that it juxtaposes those which, to their minds, have been exhausted (Rorty 1989, p. 73). As Rorty specifies,

the ironist worries that she has been initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game. She worries that the process of socialisation which turned her into a human being by giving her a language may have given her the wrong language, and so she turned into the wrong kind of human being. (p. 75)

In other words, ironists sense their rootlessness, and acknowledge that the final vocabulary they use will never be able to actually represent their condition; for the ironist the final vocabulary deployed does not imply that all doubts about that very vocabulary are put to rest (Rorty 1989, p. 75). In this light, Rorty argues that irony, in other words the process of (self-) redefinition, is an activity best practiced behind closed doors as it comes in a crude contrast with a large number of social agents, who avoid both to be redefined and to redefine themselves (p. 88).

Accordingly, he supports that the private and the public sphere should be perceived and experienced as two separate grounds, rather than as areas of which the boundaries are breaking down. He further insists on the fact that this distinction strengthens the two separate kinds of activities that occur in each realm; in the private, for instance, the ironists are able to follow the processes which help them perceive themselves as their own creation (Rorty 1989, p. 109). On the other hand, an individual’s duty in the public sphere is not to be oblivious to the pain and humiliation others might be experiencing – whether in the commonsensical or the ironic side (Rorty 1989, p. 141).

While the present thesis is opposing Rorty’s approach to the ironists’ role in the social ground, it is obvious that the basic idea put forth in his publication – the fact that the private sphere needs to remain separate from the public ground, so as to respond to the ironists’ need for redefinition – strengthens the argumentation hitherto followed. As it was mentioned in the section of the third chapter analysing privacy, Rubenfeld, in 1989, considered privacy as one’s ‘right to define oneself even in opposite to widespread, traditional, ‘normal’ values (p. 756). The right to privacy, ostensibly protected by the domestic space, is predominantly important for the ironist’s redefinition.
Hence, paradoxically, Rorty’s ironist and the Deleuzoguattarian thought, deployed here as a response to the problematic domestic sphere, have a very important idea in common. They equally perceive contemporary individuals as being strangers to their own language. In other words, the language deployed for their own definition and for that of their surroundings is a language that fails to represent them, it is not their own (Kaplan 1987). In this regard, Rorty’s discussion offers an excellent starting point, as strange as this might seem, to the far more radical Deleuzoguattarian approach regarding the necessity of experimentation, especially as the prerequisite of self-redefinition and reconstruction.

Rorty has been criticised of having failed in his attempt to reconcile liberalism with radical pluralism, ‘or what he calls ironism’, for as Haber observes ‘he forgets to be ironic about his liberalism, and the consequences of this are damning for his ironist insights’ (1993, p. 61). While acknowledging this undisputed reality, it is impossible to disregard, even in the light of this paradox, the fact that Rorty considers the ironists as nominalists who express their disbelief regarding the intrinsic nature or real essence of things; thus, by extension, they regard ‘final vocabularies’ as unjustified, in need of replacement (Bignal, Bowden and Patton, 2015 p. 147). Agreeing with Deleuze and Guattari’s theorisation, Rorty’s ironist pursues the creation of new vocabularies, which result from experimentation and constant redescription; vocabularies in the process of becoming (Bignal, Bowden and Patton, 2015 p. 147).

The point in which Rorty becomes utterly antithetical to the Deleuzoguattarian conception of experimentation, as well as to the present thesis, is his belief that the ironist’s ethics should remain confined in the private sphere, thus remaining irrelevant to public morality and politics (Haber 1993, p. 61). Obviously, in his attempt to safeguard the liberalist ideas he propounds he sabotages the importance of his ironist, by confining him/her in the private sphere. His aim to reconcile liberalism and ironism encapsulated by his argument that ‘we must side with the Romantics and do our best to aestheticise society, to keep it safe for poets in the home that the poets may eventually make it safe for everybody else’, is juxtaposed by his own failure to undertake the responsibility of siding with the Romantics,

the attempts of leftist intellectuals to pretend that the avant-garde is serving the wretched of the earth...is a hopeless attempt to make the special needs of the intellectual and the social needs of the community coincide. Such an attempt goes back to the Romantic period,
which in this case is perceived as erroneous (Haber 1994, p. 57). The thesis chose Rorty’s ironist as a concept that could be perceived as a realistic starting point for the process of vocabulary re-definition. Additionally, while Rorty valorises the disjunction of the private and the public spheres, the present study has argued that in a space like the home this is an unrealistic suggestion, since the home is the actual space on the threshold of the two sphere, and is thus influencing and being influenced by both. Accordingly, it is utopic to believe that irony can be confined inside the private sphere and liberalism inside the public, since in spaces such as the contemporary home these spheres intertwine. In this light, the present thesis sides with the ironist discourse and urges for its, rather urgent, dispersion in the public space.

Prior to such a move, however, the reclamation of the private sphere from the forces of public is a necessity, since experimentation – essential for the ironist’s redefinition – is commonly unwelcome in the public ground. As Deleuze and Guattari stress, ‘the State inhibits experimentation’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 403); ‘the State regulates movements of flows’ (p. 406); ‘the State renders space homogeneous (but not smooth)’ (p. 408). In other words, the State, today the late capitalist system, has eliminated the space where experimentation with desire flows and desiring machines can occur, since only the desiring-machines which serve a productive aim are accepted.

A palpable example of the constricting power of the State, which can be immediately understood, is the way it utilises science; by extracting only the elements that can be deployed for the protection and the promotion of its own interests, the State prohibits activities that can be turned against itself (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b p. 401). The exact same methodology is applied in every other area of human activity, including the sphere of the lifeworld, with flows deterritorialised and reterritorialised according to the needs of the system. It thus derives that the State acknowledges experimentation as a valuable component of progress, and disallows its utter. Experimentation is thus appropriated rather than excluded, for it is acknowledged as a vital and inextricable constituent of production, as long as it is carefully monitored and appropriately deployed.

Two questions can be raised at this point: (1) Why is experimentation with desire flows important and (2) How can this be achieved. The main purpose of Deleuze
and Guattari’s proposition is to respond to the maladies of the late capitalist society by pursuing and exhausting the fundamental human need for creativity. They argue that desiring-machines – i.e. organic or mechanic fragments – should be constantly rearranged in ‘new and different patterns or configurations’ devoid of aims, purposes, production or the end-product per se (Deleuze & Guattari 2004a, p.7). The circumvention of production entails significant counter-action against the forceful and violent impositions of systemic rules and purposes, which many philosophers before them have defined as damaging and problematic.

Accordingly, experimentation with desire flows and desiring machines has a series of wider benefits not only for the individual but for society too. As it has become obvious from the critiques and analyses that the present study has taken into consideration, society is currently in dire need of creative members who are willing to differentiate from the mass, since the concealed homogeneity characterising the era has proved to be safeguarding the interests of the systemic world, rather than those of the social and civic ground. From Nietzsche to Foucault, from Bauman to Rorty and the entire Frankfurt School this realisation has been analysed in different contexts and through different examples; over and over again it has been stressed that contemporary social agents lacks autonomy, individuation and creativity more than anything else. As the theory of creative individualism, underlying the present thesis (see Introduction), supports the subject should be a creative and autonomous individual, who does not delimit his/her creativity inside the private sphere, but who recognises the need for social creativity and is willing to contribute in such endeavours.

In the hypothesis that an individual would like to consider Deleuze and Guattari’s proposals, they would quickly realise that the kind of experimentation the authors suggest is scarce in the social ground; in other words, the Deleuzoguattarian approach to experimentation implies the dissolution of everything hitherto familiar. The kind of experimentation they propose is what they have defined as an absolute line of flight, a becoming that will turn the experimenting subject into anything different, other, foreign to itself. Yet in order to obtain a clearer picture of what Deleuze and Guattari define as lines of flight, it is essential to discuss their notion of
the Body without Organs, where such experimentation, valuable both for society and the self, could be achieved and flourish.

In the *Anti-Oedipus* they refer to the formation of the Body without Organs according to a set of practices that aim to abolish the system of productivity, claiming that ‘the full body without organs is the unproductive, the sterile, the unengendered, the unconsumable’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004a, p. 9). While it belongs in the realm of anti-production – and therefore it does not produce – the Body without Organs needs to be produced ‘at a certain place and a certain time’ and has specific characteristics so that it will be able to resist the productive principles of the desiring-machines coupling around it and to stand against the practices of the environment in which it is formed. Once produced, then it is expected to prevent production. Its smooth, slippery, opaque and taut surface, Deleuze and Guattari explain, disallows striation, i.e. classification and organisation, while it permits the creation of *absolute lines of flight* (Deleuze & Guattari 2004a, p. 10). Put simpler, the BwO is the plane of which the very specific nature fosters absolute experimentation.

Years later, in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987, 2004), Deleuze and Guattari analyse the BwO in more depth, specifying the three main characteristics that the BwO must exhibit (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p.176). The first is that the BwO shall prevent organisation, or else deter the predetermined conjunctions and disjunction that allow the flows of social production. Interestingly, it is not the organs that damage the smooth space of 0 intensity on and through which anything can happen, but their organisation, i.e. their pre-determined conjunctions and disjunctions for the purposes of production and re-production.

The organism, they propose, is required to be organised so as to qualify as an organism, because in any other case it loses its sovereignty, its clarity, its articulation. The counter suggestion here is not disorganisation but non-organisation; ‘unlike disorganisation, non-organisation is completely different from organisation and it is beyond the ‘negative/positive’ distinction that follows from the reduction of disorganisation to organisation. Whereas organisation is reactive in its relation to that which is not already organised, non-organisation is active and creative. Whereas organisation is characterised by its inclination to defend itself against non-organisation, non-organisation is characterised by its ability to create powerful forces
of excess that are beyond purpose, disrupt the boundaries and processes of organisation, and whose entire force, potential or genuine sense of desire can never be fully known’ (Thanem 2007, p. 207). In other words, the path from organisation to non-organisation, contrary to that leading to disorganisation, is a conscious choice, achieved through a number of different acts, some of which will be discussed below.

Quoting Claude Lévi-Strauss’s reference to the *bricoleur*, Deleuze and Guattari claim that to avoid organisation, one needs to exercise a constant rearrangement of fragments into ‘new and different patterns or configurations’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004a, p. 7). The result will not only set an obstruct toward production, the creation of an end-product or the achievement of an aim, but simultaneously it will challenge the existing processes of production while paving the way to new and unexplored paths, with uncertain destinations.

The second attribute of the BwO is that it disallows interpretation and it is posed directly against significance. In this regard, the BwO is unproductive, sterile, unengendered, unconsumable (Deleuze & Guattari 2004a, p. 9); as an unproductive organism it cannot derive significance from its purpose. In this regard, the BwO needs to remain devoid of meaning, to be neither a signifier nor a signified, to disallow interpretation and discharge its role as an interpreter. Moreover, due to the fact that it is always in the process of becoming, the BwO is not a finished object, nor does it produce finished objects. It is placed against teleology, therefore, desire flows are constantly invested into the experimental practices occurring on its surface.

The third element that Deleuze and Guattari propose as a main characteristic of the BwO, interrelated with the second one, mentioned above, is that it remains against subjectification, in other words, it is against continuity and coherence. The BwO is fluidity, processuality and change; as a result, it is anonymous and against articulation. In other words, the BwO must work against subjectification, so as to obstruct the validation of the one subject with continuity and coherence, and to counter-suggest the erratic desubjectified being devoid of singularity, unity and substance.

Before proceeding to explore how these elements can be incorporated in the domestic environment it is vital to refer to Deleuze and Guattari’s proposals of how the Body without Organs can respond to these demands. Primarily, it should be
mentioned that the BwO can only be formed within a plane of consistency. Regarding the plane of consistency, Deleuze and Guattari propose disarticulation (or n articulation) as its property, experimentation as its operation and nomadicism as its movement (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 177). Specifically, disarticulation or n articulation as the property of the plane of consistency hinders the organization of the BwO. At the same time, experimentation as its operation disallows signification and interpretation, while nomadicism as its movement demands that the BwO is in a continuous state of movement, even when static. Through the nomadic and constant reinvention of the BwO desubjectification will be achieved.

Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology extending in A Thousand Plateaus is based upon the division of the virtual and the actual, the former being referred to as the plane of consistency and the latter as that of stratification. To make the authors’ thesis clearer, it is important to refer to their argument that all ‘natural or worldly processes are always and only actualisations, that is, they are processes of actualisation structured by virtual multiplicities and heading toward an actual state they never quite attain’ (Smith & Protevi 2012). Every concrete system is therefore composed of intensive processes that either move towards the (virtual) plane of consistency and/or toward (actual) stratification. The BwO, can be therefore perceived as a steam roller which lodges onto a stratified plateau, a stratum, and through its gradual destratification it forms the plane of consistency necessary for it to exists (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 178).

At this point it is vital to explore how the aforementioned characteristics of the BwO can be incorporated in the domestic environment, and whether such practices would be feasible or beneficial to the inhabitants. Starting with the first characteristic, it is obvious that the home as a BwO should prevent organisation. Interestingly, the idea of organisation is one of the most commonly correlated with the domestic environment. A well-organised home, as seen in advertisements and as promoted by the social discourse, is vital for the self-esteem and the dignity of any inhabitant; therefore, standing against domestic organisation would per se be a very intimidating pursuit.

The practices that could be exercised inside the domestic environment, whether its inhabitants are singles, couples, or a family are numerous and should all
be exercised with caution, for as Deleuze and Guattari exclaim ‘how necessary is, the art of dosages, since overdose is dangerous’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 177). Accordingly, the authors explain that if the attack to the organisation leads to the organisation’s death, the entire project is rendered as futile. Hence, the practices that will be followed in the attempt to promote domestic non-organisation, should be exercised in dosages so as not to kill the organism, which is vital for the continuance and the establishment of minoritarian existence. Therefore, more specifically, how can one transform one’s domestic environment into a non-organised Body without Organs? What activities could one follow in order to achieve this? Primarily, if willing to stand against an organised institution one of the things one could easily do is to temper with the routines occurring under its roof.

For example, a routine that inhabitants tend to consider important is that of eating. Commonly, families tend to eat together, whenever possible, and the family table is a well-guarded symbol of family life. The practices relevant to the family table can, therefore, be tampered with so that this routine will be challenged. Instead of dinning as an average family tends to do, which is a frequent phenomenon, families could explore dinning practices of different cultures around the world and, thus, open up to different experiences of the same practice. This could also be extended to other domestic habits, such as sleeping for example.

Another interesting practice that could facilitate the non-organisation of a rather too organised institution is role and vocabulary swapping. Becoming-child, becoming-woman, becoming-cat could be fascinating experiences for inhabitants to approach a minoritarian becoming that could lead not only to domestic non-organisation but also to de-signification and de-subjectification. This is a practice that should clearly be pursued in careful dosages, and should be limited to the adult inhabitant of the household, except if younger members are involved in a more playful way.

A concept that demands, at this point, to be explored in more detail, namely becoming-woman, is one that has incited both positive and negative reactions especially in the area of Feminist Studies. Rossi Braidotti, in her *Becoming Woman or Sexual Difference Revisited* (2003) claims that feminism and post-structuralist philosophers share a common goal, i.e. ‘the need for renewed conceptual creativity
and for politically informed cartographies of the present’ (p.44), a goal that can also be found at the nucleus of this study. The interesting aspect that Braidotti finds in Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming-woman, is that the feminine subject – perceived as a multiple complex process – becomes the prerequisite for other becomings (pp. 46-47). Therefore, while Deleuze and Guattari, on the one hand, include the feminine in the category of minoritarian elements, such as the nomad, the BwO, the molecular, the process of becoming-woman can at the same time be acknowledged as a paradigm of the course that any becoming should follow. As the author claims:

masculinity is antithetical to the process of becoming, and it can only be a site of deconstruction or critique. On the other hand, the becoming-woman is a fundamental step in the process of becoming, for both sexes. (p. 49)

As this thesis suggests the process of becoming-woman entails the deconstruction of the binaries regulating the domestic space and simultaneously it does away with subjectivity, gender and dualities, inviting dispersion, multiplicities, interconnectedness and fluidity (p. 50). At the same time, and something that should be highlited here, is that the notion of becoming for Deleuze and Guattari is correlated with a becoming-minoritarian, becoming something or someone placed beyond the white, middle-class, male world of supremacy. The swapping of roles and other carnival-like activities that will be proposed bellow are practices that could set such becomings on their course to realisation.

It is a fact, however, that exploring different lifestyles and becoming-minoritarian do sound like play in the first place. Interestingly, it is important to stress that play is a set of practices through which children find and construct themselves and could thus be vitally important for the reconstruction of the adult self. Experimenting with difference in adult life can be seen as a farce or as the formation of a caricature character, hoping to re-enact aspects of difference he/she is not even familiar with. However, this kind of play – no matter how silly it might appear for adults – can have similar importance for adult life, with the one holding for children. Play is the way through which children learn about their abilities, limits, bodies and minds and the same way adults could possibly re-define their abilities, limits, bodies and minds. Incorporating play in everyday domestic life is a severs disruption of the
organised concept of domesticity that could eventually lead to the aspired *lines of flight*.

Other practices that could be considered for the purposes of absolute experimentation could be inspired by the carnivals of the Middle Ages. Not necessarily focusing on the grotesque elements of these carnivals, although Deleuze and Guattari do call for this approach, the Medieval carnivals could inform the becoming a BwO with the temporary dissolution of the existing hierarchy, role swapping, celebrations of the obscure and the ridiculous elements of domesticity, changes in the prevalent domestic connections and playful interactions with the idea of space. Such activities would create a stance against the teleological notion entwined with domesticity and the sense of at-homeness, while they would challenge the domestic hierarchies formed over time as well as the given structures entrenched in the domestic sphere.

The home, as a BwO is then required to obtain two more characteristics, as mentioned above; it needs to stand against significance and against subjectification. These two characteristic are relevant to the ways the environment perceives the home and result from the habitation processes that a household follows in order to become a BwO. For example, if a household follows experimental and more deviant home-making and habitation practices, it is to be expected that its significance as well as its status as a single domestic unit will be compromised. Inhabitants should not only be ready to accept such criticism, but should celebrate the achievement. The process of becoming a BwO is one that needs to be visible from the rest of the social ground, for it needs to interact with and within the plane of consistency. It needs to find other BwOs, or even tantalise some to become BwO, otherwise it will be marginalised and obsolete. However, it is important to once again stress that some of the organism needs to be kept, as well as small supplies of significance and subjectification, so that these will hold the BwO in touch with the demands of dominant reality.

The aforementioned practices and activities either actual or linguistic, playful, carnivalesque or utterly deconstructive are what Deleuze and Guattari define as the War Machine. The war machine is the tool that the movement of the plane of consistency demands in order to ensure that it continues its nomadic course (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 461). In other words, the practices that were until here suggested by this thesis to be pursued for the home to be turned into a BwO are mutations; they
have two equally possible outcomes, the one is that of an appropriated weapon (military warfare, work, science) the other is a tool of pure possibility (free action, lines of flight, becoming) (p. 445). The war machine has been appropriated by the State, as the authors explain and has been turned against the nomad, its creator (p. 461). This can be easily applicable to the domestic routines and other home-making practices, which instead of representing the actual intentions of inhabitants are dictating specific courses, leading not only to the appropriation of the practices per se, but to that of the inhabitants. It is thus of vital importance to reclaim one by one these tools of pure possibility and bring the war machine closer to the purposes of the nomadic move of a BwO.

The nomadic move that the BwO necessitates is a paradoxical notion in terms of the domestic sphere, for a number of reasons. Primarily, the presupposition of the home as a fixed point is an argument hard to juxtapose, since nomadicism has been discursively associated with a series of negative connotations (e.g. the homeless, the immigrants). Furthermore, in its idealised form, it appears as a privilege of elite social groups that experience it as part of their cosmopolitan lifestyle, rather than a life-altering and challenging condition. In this guise, Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology has been heavily criticised as a theory of the elite. Closer to Aristotle’s view of the wanderer as an individual of either too high or too low a moral status, the nomad seems to be failing to escape the aforementioned binary. Yet as it has already been stressed, the nomadic move is the last step in one’s becoming a BwO, therefore on its own right, it bears very little significance as an alternative mode of voluntary existence. The BwO is following a nomadic move as part of its becoming, and not any type of organism, a priori antithetical to the Deleuzoguattarian thought. Nomadic move is thus the move of the War Machine destratifying the BwO, further adopted by the BwO in its course through the social space.

The present thesis recognises nomadic move as an essential part of becoming, in both an actual and a metaphoric, or virtual, way. Consequently, on the one hand, nomadic move can be achieved, even in a physically static condition, especially through the reappropriation of the virtual space (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 177). The home as a BwO can traverse entire regions of virtual space connecting with other BwOs found on the same ground. At the same time, however, from a physical
perspective, the evacuation of home as a BwO is also favoured in this thesis, providing that the self will continue his/her becoming a BwO, even on his/her physical nomadic course. Hence, while the study does not consider physical nomadicism as a prerequisite of the BwO, it does acknowledge that it is its utmost realisation, the last step to be taken.

The transformation of the home into a BwO the latter is not without its own limitations. Deleuze and Guattari stress the importance of caution throughout this process, which needs to be ongoing, for the BwO is never a finished product. The wide destratification of the stratum on which the BwO will be produced would only cause the opposite from the desired results (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 178). There are BwO that Deleuze and Guattari consider detrimental; thus, they wonder ‘how can we fabricate a BwO for ourselves without it being the cancerous BwO of a fascist inside us, or the empty BwO of a drug addict, paranoiac or hypochondriac’ (p. 181). Hence, they specify that there are limits of the things that can be produced on the plane of the BwO. If this is applied in the case that this thesis is aspiring to make, it stems that there are activities that could permanently damage the process of becoming a BwO, which should be completely abandoned; ‘even within a BwO we must able to distinguish what can be composed on the plane and what cannot’ (p. 183).

Interestingly, this is a serious limitation, since the becoming-BwO appears to be demanding excellent self-awareness, critical capacity and control, even when the existence of these elements can sabotage the process of becoming per se. In order to overcome this severe obstacle, it is suggested by this thesis, just as it is underlined by Deleuze and Guattari that the processes leading to a BwO need to occur gradually and cautiously, allowing time and space for the existing stratum to exist.

Another limitation that the suggested practice needs to address is the fact that it appears to be limited to a small number of Western urban households. The reason for this realisation is that households dealing with serious domestic problems would be totally disinterested in such endeavours. Financial problems, a limited amount of free time and space, overpopulated households, families with very young children, homes dealing with painful experiences of loss and others dealing with physical or psychological health problems are immediately excluded from the group of homes that could and should pursue the becoming of a BwO. However, no matter how limited
the number of the households that could indeed experiment with alternative modes of habitation is, it remains vital that these homes attempt to open up to the possibility of change through the aforementioned practices.

Although such an approach to habitation demands large amounts of time, space and energy to be accomplished, the analysis until this point has proved that the domestic environment of our days is in dire need of change, if we are eager to see social change occurring. The proposed approach is therefore not so much a normative model of habitation, with rules by which households should abide. On the contrary, it is a very ambitious target to be reached; one that can have an impact on inhabitants, homes and society, even if it is not. The process of becoming alone, the effort put into the decision to change one’s dwelling and home-making practices, by turning them against the systemic principles that homes currently and blindly follow, is on its own right an important and decisive move against the late capitalist discourse colonising our private space, time and relationships. In other words, as this thesis maintains, the practices that the attempt to turn the home into a BwO are of immense value, since they incorporate experimentation, challenge of the existing status quo, play and ridicule into a daily existence commonly devoid of such elements.
Conclusion

Home as an autonomous zone of existence

Home has been analysed, in this thesis, as a point in space and time which claims to safeguard and meet our basic human. Its meaning appears to be equivalent to the one the ego holds for psychoanalysts, psychologists and other professionals within the social sciences and the humanities, since empirical and theoretical research have indicated that it is entwined with our sense of selfhood, our comprehension of the familiar and the alien, the hows and the whys of our very being.

Yet, the domestic sphere, entwined with patriarchy, violence, routine, consumerism and other maladies of the western civilisation, has inspired scepticism since the early days of modernity. While the aforementioned issues continue to afflict the domestic environment, today it is simultaneously required to address a series of unprecedented challenges, relevant with the demands and changes that both the social and the private sphere are undergoing in late capitalism. As the boundaries between the private and the public, the consumer and the producer, the human and the machine are collapsing, the domestic establishment is left undefended, loot for the systemic forces governing not only the market place, and increasingly the public and private spheres.

The responses to the severe problems plaguing the domestic space are numerous and range from a non-home-based dwelling experience to various domestic configurations, suggested as more appropriate for the contemporary inhabitant. Aiming to answer to both the practical and the theoretical problems arising in late capitalist societies, the postmodern approaches to domesticity have failed to provide a well-grounded frame of habitation capable of challenging the concerns discussed above. Although the critiques of postmodern habitation are comprehensive and accurate analysis of the western Zeitgeist, they all commit a significant logical fallacy. They argue that privacy, owing and belonging are concepts that should be separated from our sense of dwelling, since their appropriation by capitalism has rendered them detrimental to individuals and their habitats. However, as this study has revealed, the private space is no longer private anyway and privacy is one of the privileges that postmodern inhabitants enjoy the least. Privacy, owing and belonging are nowadays
only loosely correlated with postmodern dwelling, and yet the problems tantalising the domestic sphere are not only prevalent but also burgeoning.

In this regard, the present study aspired to provide an alternative model of habitation that does not necessarily exclude privacy from its definition. Hence, in conclusion, while appreciating the value of privacy, simultaneously I acknowledge two other significant parameters; first, that both too much and too little privacy can be problematic and secondly, that private space and time need to include, amongst other parameters, some very specific processes that will provide individuals with the necessary skills to act and interact in a unique and creative manner. Accordingly, the home that I propose is on no account a normative model based on a single theory that is deemed more appropriate than any other. Neither a dirty space, nor a place to run from, the domestic establishment needs to be acknowledged as a point in space and time that safeguards its inhabitants’ desire for a creative, fulfilling and rewarding private and, by extension, social experience.

It is a fact that this theoretical proposal might sound particularly difficult or utopic, while its practical realisation can be somewhat challenging. The base of this domestic model, hoping to balance on the boundaries of the I and the not I, is Deleuze and Guattari’s Body without Organs, but it is not limited to or by it. As mentioned in the previous chapter the idea of turning one’s home into a BwO is a target, but the process of doing so is a success against the mentality of the market place colonising our private sphere.

Besides the serious concerns raised by most contemporary critical thinkers condemning the concealed uniformity characterising our times and the overarching side-effects of this reality, in Richard Rorty’s Contingency, Irony and Solidarity one can find a valid reason for which our private space should be acknowledged as one of vital importance. According to his analysis, the only space where individuals can discover who they truly are is their private sphere. That is where they will be able to withdraw, contemplate on and challenge all the labels attached to them by the various authoritative figures defining their lives, namely past and present social networks, social discourse, institutions and establishments. The extreme degrees of codification each of us experience in every form of social interaction can only be challenged during our private and most intimate space and time. While Rorty does not limit his definition
of the private sphere to the domestic environment, and neither does this study, his approach endorses the conclusion that this research aims to reach; while one’s private sphere is not limited to the boundaries of the home, one’s home, as part of one’s private sphere, should be able to qualify as a space where such revolutionary actions can develop.

Interestingly, if we are not lucky enough to be born in such a domestic environment, most of us will have to create it for ourselves. A valid question at this point is how an individual can reach the point of realising that the deconstruction of self and home are vital processes for one’s active socialisation and maturity. Unfortunately, the answer to this question is beyond the limits of this research, although Plato’s cave allegory could be perceived as a satisfactory response. In any case, what this study has underlined and stressed is on the one hand that the deconstruction of the self calls for a simultaneous deconstruction of the home, and on the other, that every revolutionary action or act of defiance against the predominant structures of our times demands an equally revolutionary and defiant shelter of the self.

Setting off from the Deleuzoguattarian concept found in their more mature publication, *One Thousand Plateaus*, it appears that a solution for the problem of postmodern domesticity can be found. The notion of the Body without Organs is one that has been applied in several areas beyond that of philosophy, such as the theatre and organisational theory. Deleuze and Guattari have delineated in detail what the notion entails and how one can turn one’s self into a BwO, therefore their suggestions can be equally applied on the domestic sphere.

It has become obvious from the study that home should be turned into a BwO so as to escape its striated and heavily organisational structure. To do so one needs to take into account that although the term BwO hints a repulsion towards the organs, Deleuze and Guattari clarify that the organs are not the BwO’s enemies. What they struggle against is the organism formed, therefore if the concept is to be applied in the domestic environment, it should be noted that what needs to be changed are not the organs as such, but the fact that their rigid relations form an organism (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 176). Therefore, the first aspect that the home as a BwO needs to practice is the disconnection and reconnection of its organs in different relations and
configurations so as to avoid becoming an organism. This entails experimentation, differentiation and constant movement. Inhabitants thus become nomads in their own homes ‘keep moving, even in place, never stop moving, motionless voyage, desubjectification’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 177). This is where the notion of nomadicism can and should be incorporated, not as a practice on its own right but as a complementary action to that of turning home into a Body without Organs. In this regard, the home ceases to be one more home, but it becomes a living entity always in the process of becoming. Deleuze and Guattari, while describing the process of desubjectification, urge that this needs to be undertaken cautiously and in dosages; ‘dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself’ (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b, p. 177).

The second aspect that an alternative domestic model should challenge is significance. The home is required to liberate from the significance and the signification it hitherto held. Such changes should also be applied with caution, in order to avoid a radical approach that could lead to its collapse. The predominant notions and meanings haunting the home have been thoroughly discussed in this research and these are should be taken into consideration throughout their dwelling experience. Even today, the domestic environment continues to be associated with female unpaid domestic labour, while other forms of monetary transactions are currently intertwined with our habitats. These are only some of the ideas that are linked with domestic significance that require effort to change and should have strength and willingness allocated by all inhabitants in order to be reversed or even subverted.

Another important parameter that Deleuze and Guattari have explored is how one BwO connects with others and this is something that is equally important for the longevity of the BwO. It is a significant element of turning one’s home into a BwO that bears equal significance to the vitality of the BwO and to the ways that it affects and influences its surrounding environment. In this light, a BwO is required to explore its environment and make allies with other BwO, so that it will not be marginalised and rendered obsolete. A collectivity comprised of BwO can have a strong impact on society and can inform the social ground with ideas and practices that can foster creativity.
Turning one’s home into a BwO is not as farfetched as it might sound, since our habitats today are already BwOs in a sense, but the self-destructive doubles of the BwO inhabitants should try to achieve. The practical implementation of these ideas in the domestic sphere presented in the previous chapter can be used as a tool of experimentation, creativity, socialisation and contemplation. What should be addressed at this point is how these practices can inform the social ground. It is evident through this study that inhabitants tend to diminish the revolutionary principles hidden in their daily life. Revolutionary action is commonly correlated with large protests, clearly delineated fights against systemic oppression, and in most cases, such endeavours seem to be occurring in the public space. The different perspective that this study offers is that successful and well-grounded public struggle calls for substance and substance stems from the self-awareness of the individuals who form the group determined to fight against systemic oppression. In this light, any struggle against the system demands a balance between the private and the public. Hence, an unconformist, challenging, experimental and deviant experience of the private sphere seems a much better vantage point for public battle than the contrary. The contemporary home, however, does not call for change merely to support battles occurring in the public ground, as it is a battle filed on its own right.

The home is an institution that has been appropriated by systemic forces and, as the first chapters highlighted, this practice occurs from the very early days of urban life. While social discourse, the market place and the systemic forces of capitalism grasp the opportunity of exerting control to inhabitants through their own private sphere, inhabitants fail to recognise that their homes have become the space wherein struggle against these forces of appropriation must occur. For many inhabitants the home is the mirror of themselves, their shelter, their ostensibly private space, the place where they can feel free and relaxed, but, for the capitalist system, the home is a place of which the control guarantees the control of its inhabitants.

This thesis has therefore shed light on this extremely important element that seems to be utterly disregarded today. The inclusion of experimentation, challenge of hierarchy, ridicule of existing operating forces and play in the domestic sphere will hopefully transform the home into a living and dynamic area, that will thereafter
unavoidably influence the social ground – since homes are influenced and influence society due to their liminal location on the private public axis.

Hence, one of the contributions to academic and philosophical knowledge of this study is to prove that a good starting point for one’s struggle against the appropriation of the capitalist system is one’s private sphere and more specifically one’s home. Feminist studies\textsuperscript{17}, together with modern and postmodern philosophers urge subjects to abandon their homes in order to oppose to the existing systemic yoke. On the contrary, this study claims that inhabitants should retain and strengthen their relationships with their homes and reclaim their power over their private space.

The second contribution of the present thesis is that it has provided evidence on two important issues. The first is the fact that the domestic environment has been a space of systemic appropriation since antiquity and has been hitherto correlated with hierarchy, patriarchy, as well as projections of belonging and superiority, being turned into an area detrimental to the creative social agent. As a result, the second issue on which this thesis has shed light is that the home as a heaven of the self and a highly esteemed social institution is nothing but a myth that proliferates the valorisation of a space hostile to its members well-being. This argument was strengthened by the analysis of the postmodern home, which concluded with the idea that the more our homes are opening up to the systems of technological innovation and consumerism, i.e. the public ground, the more problematic they become.

The third important parameter that this thesis has addressed is relevant to the heavily criticised theorisation of Deleuze and Guattari, presented in \textit{Capitalism and Schizophrenia}. While Deleuze and Guattari consider the concepts presented in their work as interconnected, analysts often extract a part of their thought and study it separately and out of context. Nomadology cannot be explored without referring to the Body without Organs and even the War Machine. For this exact reason a nomadic way of life cannot be considered as an alternative to domestic habitation if the home is not turned into a BwO, for nomadic move is the move of that exact plane of

\textsuperscript{17} Caren Kaplan (1987) urges women to leave home, ‘since our homes are often sites of racism, sexism, and other damaging social practices’. Yet this study claims the exact opposite. The home is an imaged and experienced space that should be reclaimed from the forces of appropriation that have conquered it. Both men and women should consider this struggle their ethical duty.
consistency. By applying Nomadology on any random institution or individual, practically or virtually, the result is a caricature version of their thought, that should indeed be criticised.

In this regard, as this thesis supports, the home is turned into a BwO with very specific attributes through a series of extremely cautious processes, it operates as a plane of consistency of which the move is nomadic and it holds the war machine as its weapon. Disentangling these concepts can be understandable, as they are too challenging to grasp; yet, this should serve as a tool in the hands of those scrutinising their thought and not as the basis of analysis. Hence, criticism of each concept, when handled as an autonomous entity should be avoided, as it incites misconception in terms of the Deleuzoguattarian contribution to minoritarian philosophy.

The conclusion of this thesis, in other words, signals and calls for further research on a number of issues that this multi-levelled and interdisciplinary study has touched upon, but of course, due to the limitations of its nature could not exhaust. Additional research could be useful in the area of postmodern home-making practices focusing on the uncovering of deviance, to the extent that this exists. How do deviant social groups, for instance, understand and experience domesticity, and how could this be related to dominant home-making practices. Empirical research would also be important on the subject of smart homes, provided that these have covered a respectable market share appropriate for the study. Women studies could reconsider not only the notions of Deleuze and Guattari that have hitherto appeared antithetical to their approach, but they could and should further explore ways to turn the domestic ground into a space of struggle for actual equality and well-being, rather than focusing predominately on the role of women in the public space. Overall, this research is setting a fundamental stone in the structure of anti-domestic theory by exploring the opportunities that home as our private sphere can offer for the struggle against uniformity, oppression, mass culture and consumerism. Further theoretical and empirical studies can fortify the argumentation and inspire individuals to reconsider their approach towards the emblematic sign of the mundane, the home.
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