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Contesting the Logics of Protection in International Security: Modern-day Parrhesia Amongst Dissident Female Protectors

Doctor of International Relations

By Béatrice Châteauvert-Gagnon
University of Sussex

31st January 2018
Statements

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:…………………………………………

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I started thinking about acknowledgements months ago, promising myself that I would not write them at the very last minute, and would put time and care into them because they matter. And yet here I am, at the very last minute, trying not to forget anyone who made this thesis possible… Like many people, I do not usually read acknowledgements unless someone I know or myself figures in them. So, I am guessing if you are reading this, it is because you are somewhat personally involved, or unusually curious. I want to apologise if I forgot to name you in the hastiness of the finish line, but I hope you know how grateful I am if you contributed, in any scope or form, to the thesis itself or, more importantly, to my mental, and emotional stability while writing it.

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Summary

The thesis examines different international figures of dissident female protectors, who resist, challenge, disrupt and/or reinforce the multiple ‘logics of protection’ of/in International Security. Locating the existing approaches to, and explorations of, the notion of ‘logic of masculinist protection’ in feminist security studies, the thesis seeks to expand and pluralise this work by arguing that logics of protection are, in fact, plural and intersecting. It investigates how such logics rely on multiple power relations of not only gender, but also race, sexuality, (settler) coloniality, and so forth. From this point of departure, the thesis identifies and examines different practices and sites of resistance to such plural and intersecting logics. It focuses on the acts of iconic female protectors operating within and beyond official institutions of protection. Mobilising Foucault’s work on parrhesia, understood as a practice that involves speaking fearless truth to power, the thesis thus analyses the ways in which different female protectors become parrhesiastes, in their acts of ‘snapping’ in reaction to logics of protection, by speaking risky truths to their constitutive power. The thesis examines the cases of Malalai Joya, Chelsea Manning, the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More as parrhesiastic ‘snaps’ that problematise, disrupt, and/or reinforce logics of protection of/in International Security. Finally, the thesis concludes by reflecting on what such analysis means for our understanding of parrhesia as a political and ethical practice today in the context of international security, delineating its implications for feminist security studies and IR more generally.
# Table of Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Content</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER I: Introduction</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding Logics of Protection</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foucault, Logics of Protection and Parrhesia</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malalai Joya: Speaking Truth to Warlords</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelsea Manning: Radical Disclosures</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampat Pal and the Gulabi Gang: Pink Protection</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idle No More: Round Dance Revolution</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER II: Logics of Protection in International Security</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Security Studies and the Logic of Masculinist Protection</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Security Studies and The Ferocious Few</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Society of Defenders and the Feminist Ethics of Violence</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding the Logic of Masculinist Protection: Limitations and Points of Departure</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER III: Foucault, Logics of Protection and Parrhesia</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foucault and the Logics of Protection</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economies of Power</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logics of Protection From a Foucaulidian Perspective</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parrhesia as a Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Parrhesia</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parrhesia: Truth, Subjectivity, and Resistance</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parrhesia Today</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political, Judicial, and Ethical Modalities of Parrhesia</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operationalisation</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse Theory and Methodology</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER IV: Speaking Truth to Warlords: Malalai Joya’s Fearless Speech</strong></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan, the Graveyard of Empires</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Logics of Protection of/in Afghanistan</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial/Colonial Logics of Protection</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The War on Terror</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Logics of Protection</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joya’s Story</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malalai Joya and the Logics of Protection of/in Afghanistan</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joya’s Parrhesiastic Speech</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Elements of Parrhesia</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularities of Joya’s Parrhesiastic Speech</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parrhesia: Anti/Political Ways of Governing Otherwise</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Judicial Parrhesia: Speaking Truths to the Bullies’ Injustices .......... 111
Ethical Parrhesia: Uncompromising Modes of Being Otherwise .......... 112
Conclusion.................................................................................. 114

CHAPTER V: Chelsea Manning’s Double Disclosures: From Soldier to Female Whistleblower .................................................................. 115
Hetero/Homo Normative Sexualities and the Logics of Protection .......... 116
  Heteronormativity and the Production of Unprotectables ................. 116
  National Security and the U.S. Sexualised Logics of Protection .......... 120
  Homonormativity and Homonationalism: From Unprotectable to Protected to Protector ................................................................. 122
  ‘Being While Trans’: the Unprotectable Abjects ............................... 126
  Soldiering While Trans ................................................................ 128

Chelsea Manning’s Story .................................................................. 132
Chelsea Manning and the Sexualised Logics of Protection ................. 136
  Manning the Protector ................................................................ 137
  Manning the Unprotected/Unprotectable ....................................... 138

Manning’s Parrhesiastic Disclosures ............................................... 140
  Elements of Parrhesia ................................................................ 142
  Parrhesiastic Whistleblowing ...................................................... 144
  Parrhesiastic Coming Out .......................................................... 149

Political Parrhesia ......................................................................... 152
  Challenging the U.S. Logics of Protection Through Whistleblowing .. 153
  Challenging Transpatriotic and Homonationalist Narratives ............ 156

Judicial Parrhesia ........................................................................... 158

Ethical Parrhesia ............................................................................ 160
Conclusion...................................................................................... 163

CHAPTER VI: Pink Justice: The Gulabi Gang’s Pastoral Protection .. 165

India’s Logics of Protection .............................................................. 165
  Logics of Caste/Class, Gender and Sexual Protection ..................... 166
  India’s Logics of Protection: Colonialism, Tradition, and Modernity .... 170
  Feminist Colonial Logics of Protection .......................................... 176

Sampat Pal and the Gulabi Gang ..................................................... 177
  From Protected to Unprotected/Unprotectable to Protector: Sampat Pal and the Logics of Protection ......................................................... 179

The Gulabi Gang’s Parrhesiastic Acts: Speaking Truth to Logics of Protection’s Failures .......................................................... 180
  Five Elements of Parrhesia .......................................................... 182
  Techniques of Parrhesia .............................................................. 185

The Gulabi Gang’s Political Parrhesia: Making the State Live Up to Its Promises ....................................................................... 188
  Vigilantism and State Logics of Protection .................................... 189
  Governing Otherwise: Challenging Masulinist and Caste/Class Logics of Protection ................................................................. 191

Judicial Parrhesia: When the Subaltern Speaks ................................. 195
Ethical Parrhesia: Turning Oneself Into a Pastoral Protector ............ 198
  Challenging/Reinforcing Colonial Logics of Protection ................. 201

Conclusion...................................................................................... 204

### Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settler Colonialism in Canada</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settler Colonialism, Capitalism and the Land</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settler-Colonialism and (Hetero)Patriarchy</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools of Genocide: Residential Schools and the <em>Indian Act</em></td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous (Women’s) Resistance</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing legacies</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Settler Colonialism’s Logics of Protection</strong></td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Women’s Unbearable Position</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <em>Indian Act</em> and the Logics of Protection</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Women as the Unprotected</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Communities as Protectors</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereign/Coercive and Pastoral/Governing Powers of Settler Canada’s Logics of Protection</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Idle No More: The Resurgence of a Movement</strong></td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Idle No More as Parrhesiastic Resistance</strong></td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniques of Parrhesia</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Parrhesia: Speaking Truth to Governing Power</strong></td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging Canada’s Governing/Coercive Power</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging Indigenous (Gendered) Modes of Governance</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Idle No More Judicial Parrhesia: (Re)Claiming Justice/Judicial Power</strong></td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Idle No More Ethical Parrhesia: Speaking Truth to the Self</strong></td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong></td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER VIII: Conclusion</strong></td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logics of Protection: Contributions and Limitations</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parrhesia: Contributions, Limitations and Points of Departure</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REFERENCES</strong></td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I: Introduction

In 2003, the youngest member of the Afghan Loya Jirga (the Assembly convened to ratify the new Afghan constitution), Malalai Joya, gave a now famous three-minute speech denouncing the presence of warlords and war criminals in the Assembly, criticising not only their presence as elected officials but also the complicity of Western countries supporting them, as well as the intervention of International troops in her country.

In 2010, Private Chelsea Manning was arrested for leaking thousands of sensitive documents about the (mis)conduct of the American military in Iraq and Afghanistan and other diplomatic cables to Wikileaks. The whistleblower also came out as a (trans) woman.

In 2006 in India, Sambat Pal founded a group called the Gulabi Gang. The aim of the gang is to protect and defend the rights of women and other vulnerable communities against violence, injustice and police’s inaction and corruption. Their means of action include mainly mediation and dialogue but can escalate to protests, public humiliation and up to physical violence, using sticks to beat those reluctant to observe justice or to enforce the law.

In 2012, four Indigenous women, Jessica Gordon, Sylvia McAdams, Nina Wilson and Sheelah McLean in Turtle Island/Canada launched the #IdleNoMore movement, which would become one of the biggest organised Indigenous protest movements across Canada. The aims of the Idle No More movement were to protect waters, lands, and Indigenous rights against encroachment by the Canadian government, to denounce violence against Indigenous women, and to reassert Indigenous self-governance and nationhood.

The world is made of stories: the stories we hear from officials in positions of power; the dominant media stories; the fictitious stories and the ‘real’ stories and everything in between; the stories we hear over and over again and the unusual stories.
we have never/rarely heard before; the stories that were never told and the stories that got carried around the world; the secret stories whispered from ear to ear and the stories carried out loud by powerful voices; the stories we tell ourselves and the stories we tell about ourselves; and so on. All these stories shape the world around us as much as they narrate it. Which stories get to be told and heard, by whom and with what consequences, are all questions that matter. And they matter politically. Take International Security for example: who and what is considered a threat, what response should be brought to it, who gets to play the role of protector and whose safety is considered worth protecting are all questions that are being asked and answered through different/competing official, unofficial, media, and/or popular stories.

This thesis is about the four stories recounted above and their main protagonists: Malalai Joya, Chelsea Manning, the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More. They are stories of security, stories of protection and above all, stories of (gendered and sexualised) resistance.

What connects a woman standing up in front of a political assembly in Afghanistan, a (trans)woman/soldier disclosing military and diplomatic secrets in the U.S., a gang of women in pink saris enacting justice for the vulnerable in India, and women leading a national Indigenous movement of resistance against settler colonial powers in Canada? At first glance, these four stories and characters have little in common: they are located in very different contexts, the purposes and content of their discourses/actions are different, and they do not share the same modes of action. But at second glance, commonalities appear: all of the actors are women and identify as such; all are public figures that are known internationally and are thus part of international narratives; and all are implicated in situations that have to do with security. Would there be a way then to understand their actions, practices, and speeches as interconnected? What kinds of practices are these women engaged in and can the various practices they are engaged in be thought of as comparable or parallel even if apparently different (verbal, violent, gestural, whistleblowing, hunger-striking)?

This thesis argues that we can indeed understand these different stories as connected and as similar forms of feminist praxis. In fact, I argue that what these women have in common, above all else, is that they have all ‘snapped’: Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and the Idle No More activists each reached their breaking point in relation to the failures, lacks, exclusions, injustices and/or lacunas in the claims and deeds of local, national and/or international authorities to act on behalf of (their)
security. Not only did each of these women assume the role of the whistleblower or avenger or vigilante or protestor or activist to challenge these authorities, in so doing, they made three important moves.

First, each woman criticised (directly or indirectly) not only governmental authorities and other social actors, but also the dominant logics of protection that grounded these authorities’ claims to offer protection and security, at the local, national, and/or international levels. In other words, these women all seem to call into question the claims that they are being protected, that they are protectable, and/or that they are protecting (in Manning’s case for example).

Second, by doing so, each of these women not only disavowed the authority of governmental and social actors and the logics of protection that authorised them to protect. They also positioned themselves as protectors of the often unprotected or unprotectable – the barefoot Afghan people, the Indian low-caste women, the Iraqi and Afghan civilians, the indigenous Canadian women, Canadian land and water—as well as themselves.

Taken together, this means that Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and the Idle No More activists are all female protectors who do not occupy the position of an official protector or are not comfortably located within formal institutions of protection such as the military or the police, but who have claimed the role of female protector through their various forms of fearless speech and action.

Third, each woman enacted this critique by speaking back truthfully and fearlessly to the dominant institutions of protection and/or the social orders upon which they rely. Even though each of them acted in very different ways (by leaking documents, confronting politicians, protesting, hunger striking, beating policemen with sticks), I will argue that they all spoke fearless/risky truths to power and that this practice can be understood as a contemporary form of parrhesia, a practice in Ancient Greece consisting in speaking frankly to someone in a position of power and taking risks by doing so. Hence what connects the practices of these four figures is precisely the modality of action/discourse encompassed by the practice of parrhesia.

Grounded in the figures and acts of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and the Idle No More activists, this thesis takes Feminist Security Studies (FSS) debates about logics of protection as its point of departure in International Relations/Feminist literatures to think critically and more broadly about multiple logics of protection and how they are enacted, but also resisted, challenged, transformed, criticised, subverted,
by dissident female protectors in the contemporary world. In fact, many scholars in Feminist Security Studies have explored the issues surrounding protection, and most of them have used the framework of the logic of masculinist protection, dividing societies between the (masculine) protectors/Just Warriors, and the (feminine) protected/Beautiful Souls, to do so (Stiehm 1982; Young 2003; V. S. Peterson 1992; Tickner 1992; Elshtain 1995; Sjoberg 2009). But few have looked at how this logic gets resisted by different actors. Yet the women in this thesis’ stories did ‘snap’/resist. And they did criticise/challenge not only the gendered logics behind protection, but also other logics relying on different power relations such as settler/colonial, cis/heterosexual, and/or caste/class, as will be developed below. From this starting point, the thesis employs Michel Foucault’s work, more specifically on the practice of parrhesia, as its theoretical lens. This combination of cases, IR/Feminist literatures and critical theory allows me to ask three central research questions:

1. **In what ways might the ‘snap’ moments of these multiple types of female protectors be read as acts of parrhesia? How do these acts illustrate, problematise and disrupt multiple logics of protection and the power relations upon which they rely?**

2. **How might these cases critically recast and expand parrhesia as a framework, idea, and/or historically evolving practice that others have taken up in the social sciences?**

3. **How do these disruptions expand and/or refocus debates on protection and its logics in International Relations and Feminist Security Studies?**

To answer these questions, I will start by critically reviewing the Feminist Security Studies literature on the logic of masculinist protection to develop a broader conceptualisation of logics of protection in International Security. Second, I will develop a theoretical and methodological framework that connects my broader conceptualisation of logics of protection to Foucauldian conceptualisations of power/resistance, truth, and the subject before turning to Foucault’s work on the practice of parrhesia. Third, I will apply this theoretical and methodological framework to the four case studies of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and the Idle No More activists as parrhesiastic female protectors. Finally, I conclude by analysing the implications of this research for the mobilising of parrhesia as a framework to study
certain forms of resistance as well as its implications for International Relations and for Feminist Security Studies.

**Expanding Logics of Protection**

Specifically, my argument in Chapter two is that while Feminist Security Studies (FSS) literatures on the logic of masculinist protection that underwrites war stories and security narratives are important and inspirational, they not only undertheorise and simplify logics of protection that are in fact multiple, plural, and complicatedly intertwined, but they also offer little theoretical space to think, focus on, analyse and understand how different actors resist such logics. After having reviewed the FSS literature on the logic of masculinist protection as a point of departure, I make four general points about the limitations of this work and suggestions for expanding and complicating this body of work: the need to pluralise and complicate the logics of protection to look beyond the battlefield and the traditional focus of Security Studies on war, the armed forces and official security institutions; the need to complicate the binary either/or logic of this work; the need to think differently about alternatives to these logics, that is to say to think those logics as not necessarily all-encompassing and inescapable; and thus the need for more focus on, and theoretical tools to think the resistance to these logics of protection. If we are to make sense of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More’s stories of resistance, we need a theoretical framework that addresses these limitations and focuses on resistance to logics of protection.

The insights and shortcomings of Security Studies generally and Feminist Security Studies more specifically, then, both lead the way toward and demand a new theoretical and methodological framework for understanding logics of protection, but mostly for analysing the way they are resisted by dissident female protectors. What is needed is a conception of power/resistance and the subject positions they create/rely upon that can encompass the complexity, plurality, and flexibility of both the logics of protection and the nuanced ways in which they are resisted. More specifically, what is needed is a framework that can make sense of the specific ways in which those specific women—Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More water protectors—resist. In fact, what ties the different actions of these female protectors together is not only that they all problematise the logics of protection in which they are located, but
also that they all do so by speaking courageous truth to power: the women in these four cases all claim to ‘speak the truth’; these truths all take the form of a criticism towards power in relation to logics of protection; they all take risks in speaking/acting out; and they all do so out of a sense of duty to change for themselves and others how these logics operate. By doing so, they also all change/challenge/subvert their subject positions within such logics. Hence what is needed is a framework that can attest to the complexity of such particular forms of resistance in their relation to truth-speaking, subjectivity, and ethics.

I argue that Foucault’s work offers invaluable insights to develop such framework. First, his work on power/resistance (and its relation to truth and the subject) allows us to overcome the impasse of trying to ‘escape’ logics of protection by understanding resistance as always imbricated and coextensive to power, as the flip side of the same coin. It allows for a nuanced, flexible, and thoroughly contextualised understanding of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More’s parrhesiatic acts as necessarily located within multiple logics of protection, yet also opening up potentialities for their transformation, challenge, subversion and/or reinforcement at the same time. Secondly, and more importantly, Foucault’s work on parrhesia allows me to place the specific forms of resistance enacted by the women in my four case studies at the centre of the analysis, and to look in details at what these specific practices of truth-telling entail. Understanding these practices as parrhesia offers a sophisticated theoretical and methodological framework to understand these kinds of contemporary practices of resistance. In Chapter three, I develop this theoretical and methodological framework.

**Foucault, Logics of Protection and Parrhesia**

Chapter three is divided into three sections. In the first section, I analyse logics of protection using Foucault’s general work on power, truth, and the subject. In fact, I argue that logics of protection can be best understood as functioning simultaneously under the three economies of power analysed by Foucault: sovereign/coercive/judicial; disciplinary/normalising; and pastoral/governing. Through sovereign, disciplinary, and pastoral techniques of power such as judicial control, norm internalisation, and individualisation, these logics intend to produce the subject positions of the protectors and the protected but often produce the unprotected and unprotectable as well. Relying on and enmeshed with regimes of truth about gender, but also about race, coloniality,
the alignment of gender/sex/sexuality, and so on, circulating at not only state but also capillary levels, logics of protection create truths and norms about protection that define who position themselves/are positioned as protectors, protected, unprotected, and unprotectables. These ‘truths’ and the norms they enable and rely upon are in turn rendered invisible and internalised through particular modes of subjectivation. Logics of protection can thus be understood as creating the subjects, objects, and abjects of protection. For example, women will internalise certain norms about how a ‘beautiful soul’ is supposed to behave, how it is supposed to look like in order to deserve protection and avoid threats, while men will internalise the ‘normal’ ways to behave and use their body to exhume self-confidence and physical strength in order to fit the perceived role of a protector. Similarly, certain groups of people to whom protection is often denied by ‘officials of protection’ such as sex workers or racialised people in white-majority countries will learn to avoid police officers. The detail of how exactly different economies of power operate in relation to logics of protection needs to be studied empirically, which is beyond the scope of this thesis that rather focuses on the analysis of the resistive acts of parrhesiastic female protectors. Yet chapter three will start to explore what possibilities a Foucauldian framework open up to understand those logics and their functioning.

Hence this first section will focus mostly on how power produces and relies upon subjects and truths in order to ground the fearless speech of dissident female protectors in the larger context of logics of protection and understand how such logics function in relation to truth and the subject positions they produce and rely upon. This theorisation will also allow me to understand why the speech of these women is courageous in the first place: what makes their actions/speeches dangerous and/or involving a risk? What do they disturb/challenge/subvert so that it requires courage?

Upon the background established by this broad theorisation of logics of protection using Foucault’s work, the second section of chapter three will focus on the acts of dissident female protectors by developing a framework based on the practice of parrhesia to better understand and frame these specific acts of resistance. I will thus explore Foucault’s (and others’) work on parrhesia to understand these acts of truth-telling as a different mobilisation of truth and involving alternative modes of subjectivation than those involved in dominant logics of protection. This exploration of the practice of parrhesia and how to understand it in relation to my cases allows us to
grasp not only the political aspects of this form of speaking truth to power but also its ethical and judicial components. Indeed, I argue that the specific ways in which Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More resisted logics of protection can best be encompassed by using parrhesia as a framework against which to assess the ethical, resistive practices of these women who spoke truth to power. In fact, if the empirical chapters will dig deeper into how theirs actions resembled and differed from the practice of parrhesia itself, the ethical as well as political and judicial aspects of their truth-speaking to power that binds the subject to the truth about protection is best encapsulated by this specific theoretical framework. This will in turn allow me to assess how we can understand parrhesia in action in these contexts of gendered resistance. But before turning to these cases empirically, Chapter three will explore the in-depth theorisations of parrhesia by Foucault and others, the current attempts to use it in the current era and what we can retain from this work for my theorisation of the acts of dissident female protectors in relation to logics of protection. To do so, it will first look at what exactly parrhesia is and what it involves. Next, it will explore the relationship of parrhesia to truth, the subject and resistance, still using Foucault’s work. I will then look at different attempts to use it in contemporary settings and the challenges it raises.

Studied at length by Foucault at the end of his life, parrhesia refers to practice in Ancient Greece that translates in English literally to frankness or “free-spokeness” (franc-parler in French). It can be defined as follow: “parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognises truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself)” (Foucault 2001, 19). In Foucault’s exploration of the concept, he argues that parrhesia always involves five core elements: frankness, truth, danger, criticism and duty. But beyond those five elements that Foucault saw as constituting parrhesia, to better understand what the practice entails, I suggest looking at its relationship with three other major themes for Foucault, especially in relation to parrhesia: truth, subjectivity, and resistance.

First, in parrhesia, the truth is not epistemological (as understood since Descartes as requiring a certain observation of evidence contained in the nature of the external world), but political. Parrhesia is thus not about the content of the truth but about the act of telling, an act that involves taking a risk and thus requires courage. In other words, in parrhesia the truths are already there, there just needs to be someone
courageous enough to speak them (Ross 2008, 69). Second, parrhesia involves a specific relationship of the subject with herself. It is an act that binds the subject to the truth she is speaking. It is a pact freely made with oneself through which the parrhesiastes becomes “the person who tells the truth, who has told the truth, and who recognises oneself in and as the person who has told the truth.” (Foucault 2010, 68) Parrhesia is therefore first and foremost about the subject’s relationship to herself. Parrhesia has the potential not only to transform a situation but to also transform the subject herself through this pact made with oneself that profoundly binds the self to the truth spoken. Finally, parrhesia has to be explored in relation to resistance. As mentioned before, for truth-telling to be parrhesia one has to freely take the risks involved in speaking dangerous truths out of a sense of duty: a truth obtained under some form of coercion is not parrhesia. Parrhesia is also an oppositional practice rooted in criticism and disobedience. As Foucault puts it: “where there is obedience, there cannot be parrhesia” (Foucault 2011, 336). Yet it is also rooted and born out of power relations: parrhesia opens up possibilities to change a situation and change oneself, but consistently with Foucault’s conceptualisation of resistance, it also reproduces some aspects of power relations even while challenging them.

These relationships between parrhesia and truth, subjectivity, and resistance speak directly to the cases of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More. In fact, all of these female protectors enact a certain relationship to truth but they do not claim to reveal some hidden, unspoken truths about protection. After all, when Manning leaked those documents, the scandal of Abu Ghraib and the human rights’ abuses at Guantanamo Bay, for example, had already been widely publicised such that the abuses committed by the U.S. military during the ‘War on Terror’ were not exactly a secret. Similarly, Joya claims to speak truths that are already widely known by the ‘barefoot Afghan people’ and the same can be said of Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More. None of these actors claim to be revealing/uncovering the truth but rather to expose the ‘open secrets’ of different authorities and social orders claiming to enact protection. Hence what marks their relationship to truth is not a Cartesian observation of facts but the courage to speak the truth in the face of danger. Second, in speaking out, these women bound themselves to the truth they were speaking: they became the whistleblower, the vigilante, the activist, the water protectors, and so on, who spoke the truth about/to logics of protection. And through these acts, they also became protectors,
thus challenging their subject positions within logics of protection. Finally, the approach of parrhesia as resistance is consistent with my cases in that Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More do speak truth to the power of logics of protection but they do not do so from outside of those logics or ‘escape’ them altogether. They might not advocate a complete rejection or simple opposition to the logics of protection. Instead, they turn themselves into protectors while still challenging the dominant logics of protection and seeking to enact change. Parrhesiastic truth-speaking in these cases is undeniably rooted in disobedience to and criticism of dominant logics of protection while reproducing some of their ways of functioning at the same time.

The third section of this chapter will operationalise these theorisations into a specific methodological framework that will guide my analysis of the four case studies. Using this exploration of the different theorisations of parrhesia, I will thus develop a framework that will address my cases more specifically by arguing that we can denote three modalities of parrhesiastic speech that can be found simultaneously and to different degrees in these cases: political parrhesia, judicial parrhesia, and ethical parrhesia. More specifically, the framework through which each empirical case study will be analysed goes as follow: first, each empirical chapter will briefly explore the logics of protection in which the dissident female protector/s is/are located by focusing mainly on the subject positions and truths they create/rely upon. This first step will allow us to explore the different subject/object/abject positions these women occupied prior to their fearless speech and understand the context that render their speech both possible and risky. After this brief contextualisation, each chapter will look more concretely at the truth-telling acts of these dissident protectors in relation to parrhesia. To do so, I will proceed in two steps: 1- I will look at these instances of fearless speeches, what they consist of and, using the five core elements of parrhesia outlined by Foucault (frankness, truth, criticism, danger and duty), if/how they can be seen as contemporary forms of parrhesia. I will also detail the specific techniques the dissident female protectors use in enacting this fearless speech and the forms such acts take (whistleblowing, public protest, street theatre, and so on) 2- I will then use the three modalities of parrhesia outlined above (political, ethical, judicial) to analyse deeper how the cases relate to each modality, what they can tell us about these specific instances of parrhesiastic speeches, what space/possibilities they open up in terms of resistance to
logics of protection and how they relate to the different techniques of power of these logics (both as resistance to and reproduction of). This will allow for a more complete and thorough analysis of the mechanisms by which power and resistance to logics of protection are enabled and enacted by the parrhesiastic acts of dissident female protectors.

In Chapters four, five, six, and seven, I analyse each of my case studies respectively using the framework developed above.

**Malalai Joya: Speaking Truth to Warlords**

Chapter four analyses the case of Malalai Joya. In 2003, Joya stood in front of the Loya Jirga, the Assembly in charge of drafting the new Constitution of Afghanistan. In a ninety-second speech that would make her infamous, she denounced the presence in the Assembly of warlords and criminals. Since then, her life has been constantly threatened, which did not stop her from being elected to the Parliament in 2005, and banned two years later because of her refusal to stop speaking the truth frankly about the presence of warlords in the Parliament. She then started touring internationally denouncing the occupation of Afghanistan by U.S. and NATO forces and their complicity with the Karzai government. Located within the different masculinist and colonial logics of protection in Afghanistan, Joya was positioned as both the ultimate protected in need of salvation by the West (as a Muslim/Afghan woman), the unprotectable by the Taliban and warlords (as a woman occupying a position of power and as a teacher in illegal schools for girls) and as a protector (of knowledge and education for girls and of a familial and national tradition of resistance). The chapter argues that Joya’s repeated fearless speech contains three main criticisms: it denounces the impunity of warlords, Taliban, and other war criminals occupying positions of power as political representatives and the complicity of other politicians in keeping silent; it denounces the brutality of an international military intervention and the hypocrisy involved in both presenting it as liberation/benevolent protection, and of turning a blind eye to the atrocities committed by members of the Parliament and government in order to present this intervention as a success; and it also challenges the hypocrisy involved in celebrating the ‘liberation’ of Afghan women while the actual situation of women in terms of casualty and suicide rates as well as impunity in cases of violence, rape, and forced marriage, is still, she claims, as bad as under the Taliban regime.
Joya’s case of parrhesiastic protection is marked by the invariance of her speech in which she claims to speak the truth and never ceases to repeat that truth with a never-flinching constancy. This truth-speaking to power challenges mainly the hypocrisy of Afghan and international logics of protection whose official protectors present the main threats to the protected and leave large portions of the population unprotected and ultimately unprotectable, as well as, as I argue in the chapter, electoral democracy more generally. Through this parrhesiastic truth-telling, Joya becomes the protector of ‘the barefoot Afghan people’ who regularly visit/consult her in the hope that their truth will be carried to spheres of power and that she will protect them by speaking this truth (Mulvad 2006). Joya thus also becomes the protector of an invariant truth that needs to be protected against the complicity, hypocrisy, and impunity of parliamentarians and international leaders/politicians.

I argue that Joya’s parrhesiastic speech challenges/resists the sovereign/coercive power as well as governing power of logics of protection while also reproducing it by performing a form of pastoral care towards those ‘barefoot Afghan people’ she protects. As such, the political and judicial modalities of parrhesia come out strongly from the analysis, even though the ethical aspects are also very much present. This case uses strategies such as verbal exposure, parliamentarian speech, international touring, media interviews and personal encounters/consultations with laypeople, and more. It involves a parrhesiastes who is located within dominant institutions and uses this location as a weapon against the powerful. But what about those who do not stand comfortably within institutions of power/protection? And are there other instances of contemporary parrhesia that use different strategies than verbal exposure in the agora, in other words that depart further from the traditional Greek parrhesia? Can they also be considered parrhesia? What about parrhesiastic acts in which the ethical aspects take centre stage?

**Chelsea Manning: Radical Disclosures**

To answer some of these questions, chapter five turns to the case of Chelsea Manning. In 2010, Manning, an intelligence analyst for the U.S. military in Iraq became known to the world as the whistleblower who leaked thousands of diplomatic and classified documents to Wikileaks, exposing some of the human rights’ violations committed by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan. Arrested and held in detention conditions that have been characterised as torture, she went through a 1000-day martial
court trial that ended in her sentence of 35 years in a men’s military prison. At the end of her trial, she officially came out as a (trans) woman. The chapter argues that these two forms of truth-telling (the disclosure of U.S. military secrets and of her gender identity) have to be read together in that they are intertwined parrhesiastic acts that speak truth to the different logics of protection of/around the U.S. military.

The U.S. military claimed at the time to be protecting Iraqi and Afghan populations against their tyrannical regimes, the world from terrorism, as well as protecting democracy and freedom worldwide. But not only were the U.S. erecting themselves as protectors of the ‘free world’ through gendered/sexualised colonial logics of protection, the U.S. military was also positioning itself as the protector of a certain sexual, gender, and moral normative order within its ranks and within the U.S. population. In fact, Manning admitted joining the military in the hope that such a hypermasculine/gender-conforming environment would ‘cure’ her from her gender dysphoria. She is not alone in this case as many male-to-female transgender people join the military for similar reasons, as will be detailed in the chapter. At the time, transgender people were not allowed to serve openly in the U.S. military and faced not only discharge, but also potential legal charges if they came out. Hence the U.S. military can be seen as a form of protector of a social sexual/gender normative order, as a protector against the self when the self is perceived as deviant from norms.

Manning, who presented herself in the military as an openly gay man at the time, was having trouble integrating within her unit. She was thus both an official protector (as a soldier) but also unprotected within her unit (as a perceived openly gay man under the ‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’ Policy, still in place at the time) and unprotectable as a trans woman who could simply not be in the institution. Morally conflicted about what she saw and learned in Iraq about the conduct of the U.S. military, she began collecting data concerning the U.S. conduct in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the world. As the pressure caused by the stress of serving for an institution promoting/enacting conduct she felt morally conflicted about, the isolation within her unit, and the psychological stress caused by having to repress/hide her gender dysphoria mounted, Manning almost simultaneously came out to her supervisor and leaked the

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1 After 7 years in prison, President Obama recently commuted her sentence to four additional months and she was released on May 17 2017.
2 Trans* people in the U.S. military are now allowed to serve openly since the ban was repealed in 2016, although a recent tweet by President Trump suggests the ban could be reinstated.
documents to Wikileaks. I argue that this double disclosure can be read as parrhesia, both through her whistleblowing and her coming out as a (trans) woman.

Consistent with parrhesiastic truth as elaborated before, Manning did not reveal any radically hidden/new truths: the U.S. and the world already knew about the abuses committed by the U.S. military in its ‘War on Terror’; given the statistics revealing high numbers of trans* veterans, the U.S. military already knew there were many such people struggling with gender identity among its ranks; and the more general existence of gender dysphoria as well as the unstable, unfixed, performative nature of gender/sexual identity is not in any sense of the word ‘new’ or ‘unknown’. Yet logics of protection in the U.S. and beyond are about protecting these ‘open secrets’ from ourselves: institutions of protection offer alternative ‘truths’ (about being the Just Warrior/benevolent protector and about normative gender/sexual stability and/or essentialism) and we accept those truths in exchange for a feeling of normalcy/protection. Hence I argue that Manning’s parrhesiastic truth-telling is mainly about criticising the culture of secrecy and hypocrisy underlining these ‘truths’ and exposing/disclosing them for all to see.

We can thus say that contrarily to Joya, Manning was very uncomfortably located within the institution of power in which she could not speak/be. Her parrhesiastic truth-telling was about stepping out of the institution through transparent disclosure with a strong emphasis on the ethical dimensions of parrhesiastic self-relation. The ‘agora’ in this case was thus not the institution itself but the Internet as the public space in which she could speak/be. Using data leaks, Internet forums, coming out emails, and the likes, Manning’s parrhesia challenged the U.S. military logics of protection, while also reproducing some of its power and modes of functioning. But as parrhesiastic techniques, whistleblowing and coming out are still quite close to the traditional Greek techniques of parrhesia in that they are verbal/textual modes of speaking risky truth to power. Are there other techniques of parrhesia, other modes of speaking risky truth to power that can also be understood as parrhesia? In relation to dominant institutions of protection, does one have to be located from within to be able to speak parrhesiastic truths to them? And finally, is parrhesia always an individual act?

**Sampat Pal and the Gulabi Gang: Pink Protection**

Chapter six addresses some of these questions by analysing the case of the Gulabi Gang. Founded in 2006, the Gulabi gang, also known as the Pink Saris, aim to
protect and defend the rights of vulnerable communities, and especially women, against violence, corruption, government and police inaction, and injustices in general. It is run and led by its founder, Sampat Pal, in the province of Uttar Pradesh, one of India’s poorest and most populated region, and is said to include over forty thousand members (Berthod 2012, xii). Its means of action include the occasional use of violence (using sticks (lathis) to beat the ones reluctant to observe justice), which attracted a lot of media and academic attention. But the group uses mostly mediation/dialogue and an escalation of pressure tactics including public protests, street theater, public humiliation, official complaints, civil disobedience, occupations, and sit-ins. Created in reaction to the state’s inability/unwillingness to protect the rights and safety of the most vulnerable, the Gulabi Gang mobilises the power of numbers in enacting pressure/power but is very much centred around the personality, will, and centralised leadership of its founder, Sampat Pal. Born in Uttar Pradesh as a member of the Gadarias community (among the lower-caste groups, Gadarias are traditionally shepherds), Pal was married at twelve years old, had her first child at fifteen and four more in the few years that followed. In her biography, she relates how she has always been of a feisty, independent, and affirmative nature, which led her to become a leader among her community and soon created tensions with her family-in-law. She started organising with women in her communities on different projects such as sewing lessons so that they could be financially independent. Later, she became a social worker setting up self-help groups with women across the region to teach them about health and hygiene but soon quit that work to become what the Gulabi Gang’s website calls a ‘social crusader’.

Located within the complex logics of protection in India, Pal, as a low-caste poor woman occupied simultaneous subject/object/abject positions within those logics. Traditionally in the caste system, women are considered the protectors of their community’s honour and traditions as well as caste purity and boundaries while having to submit to their in-laws and husbands in exchange for protection by their communities. This dual position as both protector and protected relies on women’s submission to tradition, as well as family and caste hierarchies. Lower-caste women, and Dalit women in particular, are seen within the caste system as impure and are regularly victims of sexual and other forms of violence by upper-caste people, hence being positioned as the unprotectable. Colonial logics of protection further complicate this positioning by placing Indian women as the protectors of their culture and
traditions, which colonisers perceived as backward, barbaric, and unenlightened (despite having previously enforced the caste system to better dominate and control colonised populations), hence positioning women as in need of salvation from their culture (a logic that still persists today and is illustrated for example by some development discourses). Pal was positioned as both the protector of her family and community’s honours and traditions, and in turn protected by them; as the protected in need of salvation from an enlightened West; and as the unprotectable in relation to upper castes. Since she refused many times in her life to submit to such hierarchies and rules, she became the unprotected when her in-laws and community withdrew their protection in the face of her refusal to submit, as well as further becoming the unprotectable when she associated with Dalit communities and, through contact with them, became impure herself in the eyes of her own caste. She then turned herself into a protector of the unprotectables by founding the Gulabi Gang.

Pal/the Gulabi Gang’s fearless speech can be seen as a form of vigilantism in that they take the law into their own hands and attempt to apply it where it has been ignored and/or violated by corrupt government and police officials. But it also goes beyond vigilantism in their use of the wide range of tactics listed above, including forms of street theatre that rely on public shaming to challenge, problematise, and transform not only the state, but also social orders and people’s behaviours within them. As the unprotectable whose life is neither valued nor protected but rather threatened by the powerful, speaking truth is itself an act of courageous truth-speaking. By doing so, Pal and her gang challenge masculinist, caste/class, and colonial logics of protection by exposing/mocking the State’s inability and unwillingness to protect the most vulnerable, masculine ‘protectors’ as the main threat to women’s (and others’) safety and the ongoing injustices of the caste/class system despite existing laws to protect the Indian population against such discrimination and violence. The gendered transgression of women using violence and humiliating men in positions of power also subverts and challenges the masculinist logics of protection. What characterise their fearless speech are Pal’s (and the gang’s) incorruptibility, the use of the power of numbers to get their voices heard, and the pastoral care Pal and the gang perform towards their members and vulnerable communities, including by occasionally using violence.

Hence the case of Sampat Pal and the Gulabi Gang reflects on the many ways in which parrhesiastic resistance is imbricated and reproduces power relations while also
challenging/resisting/subverting them at the same time. Through a wide range of tactics including vigilantism, street theatre, and the power of numbers/the collective, Pal and her gang challenge logics of protection in India by using any means available for their voices to be heard. Using different techniques of power, including judicial, pastoral, and disciplinary ones, Pal/the Gulabi Gang thus mimics the State while also resisting different social orders. As the unprotectables, their political, judicial, and ethical parrhesia is enacted from outside institutions of protection but addressed directly to these institutions in ways that both transform and reinforce them. Thus it is a truth-speaking to power that, in a way, ‘wants in’ on the institutions of power/protection or at least is directed towards their reinforcement. We also see that the gang’s positioning as outside of such institutions comes with a diversity of tactics aimed at being heard as the subaltern/unprotectable who do not have direct access to the ‘agora’. In this case, using the power of numbers by mobilising large groups of women, as a way of increasing pressure and protecting oneself/others, is partially what makes their truth-telling possible/heard. Yet this case remains very much centred around the figure of one individual. Can parrhesia ever be a collective/polyphonic form of resistance/truth-telling? And are there practices of parrhesia that are not only enacted from outside the institutions of protection but that also do not ‘want in’ on such institutions?

Idle No More: Round Dance Revolution

In chapter seven, I attempt to explore some of these issues by looking at the case of Idle No More in Canada. In October 2012, the Canadian government, under Stephen Harper’s conservative party at the time, introduced the Omnibus Bill C-45 in the Canadian Parliament. Without any consultation with Indigenous leaders, the bill was proposing amendments to the Indian Act that would, among other changes, make it easier to lease reserve lands (L. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 389) and was lifting most environmental protections around waterways in Canada, most of which go through Indian reserves and/or are located on Indian territories. It is to sound the alarm on the bill’s many issues that Jessica Gordon, Sylvia McAdams, Nina Wilson, and Sheelah McLean led a ‘teach-in’ entitled Idle No More in Saskatoon to discuss it. In the weeks that followed, the Twitter #IdleNoMore spread, as well as the movement. It organised primarily against the Omnibus Bill but soon evolve to include other core issues of Indigenous resistance and self-determination. As Hayden King argues, the issues addressed by Idle No More included “the move to strip environmental protections from
most of this country’s waterways; a lack of consultation on amendments to the Indian Act” but also “the chronic failure to maintain and uphold treaties; the continued refusal to acknowledge the rights of those still without treaties” and “repeated calls for a national inquiry on missing and murdered Aboriginal women” (King 2014, 80). It involved different means of action including different ‘flash-mobs’ consisting in round dances in malls and streets, marches, rallies, road and railway blockades, protests, and hunger strikes, notably the one conducted by Theresa Spence, Chief of the Attawapiskat reservation, who occupied Victoria Island in front of the Parliament and started a hunger strike in support of Idle No More and to raise attention to the dire conditions of her reserve’s inhabitants.

To situate and understand this parrhesiastic movement, we have to locate it within the complicated and contradictory logics of protection born out of the history of settler-colonialism in Canada/Turtle Island (the Indigenous name for the territory today covered by Canada and the U.S.). All the mechanisms through which settler-colonialism was enforced relied on, and produced the positioning of Indigenous peoples and Indigenous women in particular as unprotectable, protected/unprotected, as well as protectors. In fact, Indigenous peoples were constructed through colonialism in general, and colonial sexual violence in particular, as the unprotectables, the not-fully-human whose lives do not count and are thus not worthy of protection. But, like elsewhere, settler-colonialism was also justified on a ‘civilising mission’ meant to ‘save’ the Natives from their ‘savage’ nature. In this scenario, Natives can thus be simultaneously constructed as the unprotectables (since they are always at risk of degenerating into brutal savagery and thus not-quite-fully-human) and as permanent children in need of the protection that can only be afforded by white civilisation through assimilation. The Indian Act, a piece of legislation meant to regulate all aspects of Indigenous lives, exemplifies this logic in that it is “a piece of colonial legislation by which, in the name of ‘protection’, one group of people ruled and controlled another.” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, n.d., 55) Through its enforcement of (hetero)patriarchal hierarchies, settler-colonialism also made women lose their positions of leadership and further become the unprotectables within their own communities. The consequences of such colonial/patriarchal logics is that Indigenous women are victims of the highest levels of violence in the country and thousands of Indigenous women and girls have disappeared or been murdered in Canada in recent years (see Amnesty
International 2008). Yet, like in other context such as India, Indigenous women have also been positioned as the protectors of their communities’ culture, traditions, and overall survival. Moreover, consistent with Indigenous cosmologies, epistemologies, and beliefs systems, Native peoples have not only occupied the position of the unprotectables, the unprotected, and/or the protected but have also been protectors of the land from the start of Europeans’ settlement. They have been consistently and are still today fighting to protect the environment and oppose predatory extraction and exploitation of resources. This also, in turn, positions Indigenous nations as threats to the colonial project of land exploitation and Indian dispossession.

The female protectors that led the Idle No More movement are thus complicatedly intertwined within those logics of protection. Through speaking truth to power, they not only reclaimed their positions as leaders of their communities and protectors of the land but by doing so, they challenged their positioning as the unprotectable/unprotected and/or protected upon whose silence/disappearance/assimilation the whole logics of protection rely. In fact, by speaking out in a country that consistently and systematically make them disappear and would prefer to believe that their whole people have indeed gone extinct, Indigenous women spoke truth to the failures of settler-colonialism by strongly reminding settlers that Indigenous peoples have not vanished and have not, in fact, been reduced to silence. They achieved this by challenging Canada’s narrative about itself, its national identity and its history through speaking truth to its past and ongoing settler-colonial injustices towards Indigenous peoples and their lands. In that sense, what characterises the movement is mostly that it consisted in ‘re-storying’ Canada and contesting its international and national image as ‘the good guy’ who champions and protects human rights. By speaking truth to Canadians who would rather believe that the genocide and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is located firmly in the past, Idle No More not only challenged Canadians’ subject positions as the protectors, but reversed such logic by positioning Indigenous peoples as the protectors of the land for future generations of Canadians as well, a position, as they reminded Canadians, they have always occupied.

Hence Idle No More was a set of very diverse, decentralised and non-hierarchical resistive strategies and acts that challenged many official narratives, grounded in logics of protection, about Canada’s history and identity. But the movement was also, and perhaps mostly, about ‘speaking in’ to Indigenous
communities themselves and constituting their own subjectivities through this speaking risky truth to power. They achieved this by using a wide range of strategies in order to be heard/seen in a country that preferred to believe they had all but disappeared. Such strategies included: round dances in public spaces to reaffirm their presence in Canada by using traditional cultural practices that have survived despite assimilation attempts; hunger strikes to use the body as a physical reminder of Canada’s continuing genocide of Indigenous communities; blockades of railways and roads to protest the capitalist accumulation of wealth through exploiting natural resources on Indigenous lands; marches and protests to use the power of numbers to remind Canadians of Indigenous communities’ presence and survival; internet organising to overcome the physical isolation faced by many communities through the system of ‘reservations’, and more.

**Conclusion**

Reading all these cases together lead us to a number of conclusions that have implications for International Relations and Feminist Security Studies. First, in relation to logics of protection, the brief overviews of the different logics in which each dissident female protector is implicated show that much more attention needs to be paid to the diversity and complexity of logics of protection and how they function. Second, more attention needs to be paid to resistance if we are to understand not only how power can be resisted but also how it functions as well through resistance. Taking resistance instead of power as the starting point and central focus of the analysis give us more tools to understand power in flexible, nuanced, and complex ways and show that power is never so totalising that it does not produce and make space for resistance. Third, the cases have shown the potential of using parrhesia as a framework to understand specific instances of speaking fearless truth to power. It allows looking at resistance, when it takes the form of speaking risky truth to power publicly, as intertwined with the power relations it criticises, but also to understand the political, judicial, and ethical components of these acts of resistance. Parrhesiastic resistance is about not just changing the power relations in which we are embedded but also changing who we are. Focusing only on the political and/or judicial aspects of resistance obscures the many ways in which such resistance encourages and opens up alternative modes of self-relation as well, and, as the cases show, it often means missing a big part of the picture. Hence using parrhesia as a framework is one way of avoiding such pitfalls.
More specifically, the cases show that positionality matters when it comes to studying parrhesia. As this thesis was concerned about gendering the practice of parrhesia, attention was paid to the social location of the parrhesiastes in terms of gender, coloniality, sexuality, class, and caste from where they spoke their truth. Hence I argue that a parrhesiastes not only need to be positioned ‘from below’ and speak to an ‘above’, as Foucault stated, but how much below/where she is located as well as to whom/where the speech is directed, are important to take into account in order to better understand how parrhesia functions today and what forms it can take. For example, in this thesis we had four figures positioned very differently in relations to dominant institutions of power: one that was speaking from within and to the institution itself (Joya), one that was very uncomfortably in the institution and moved out of it through disclosing its truths to the outside (Manning), ones that were very much outside the institutions but whose speech was directed at/towards it (Pal/the Gulabi Gang), and ones that were also very much outside but who offered alternatives/competing logics of protection directed towards their own communities and not just towards the institutions themselves (Idle No More). The cases seem to show that the further away from institutions of power/protection, the more diversified the techniques they use to enact parrhesia. In fact, if Joya’s speech was the closest to the Ancient Greek’s version of parrhesia and Manning’s whistleblowing also shown very close resemblance to its earlier versions, the Gulabi Gang’s and Idle No More’s parrhesia used a variety of techniques that involved gestural, symbolic, collective, and violent means to get their voices heard. Could this mean that the further away/the more marginalised from the institutions, the harder it is to be heard and hence the more creative and diversified the parrhesiastic techniques have to be? In any case, what these cases suggest is that more attention needs to be paid to the details of the social locations and positionality of the parrhesiastes to be better able to grasp and understand the forms and techniques that parrhesia can take today.

Yet using parrhesia as a framework the way this thesis has also shows limitations. First, it only allows the analysis of a very specific type of resistance rooted in public and risky truth-speaking to power such as ‘snap’ moments of dissident female protectors. It does not allow studying instances of less spectacular forms of resistance, for example perhaps more rooted in the everyday. More exploration needs to be conducted into the parrhesiastic practices encompassed by less visible acts of resistance
and if parrhesia can also help making sense of such practices. But also, it seems that, apart from the case of Idle No More, all instances of parrhesiastic practices in this thesis can be seen as relying on/reinforcing a form of ‘hero sanctification’ that Foucault was so careful to avoid (Foucault 2009). In fact, it seems that most of the parrhesiastic practices studied here end up relying on one individual, acting out of a sense of duty. But does parrhesia always have to be an individual practice? Idle No More seems to show that parrhesia can also be a collective movement of truth-speaking but more theoretical attention would need to be paid to such collective acts of truth-telling and how they might affect the way we think and theorise parrhesia. Focusing on collective or multi-local points of parrhesiastic resistance might help avoid the pitfalls of reinforcing a form of hero worshipping in the way we think about resistance.

The conclusion will thus explore what this thesis can bring to our understanding of logics of protection in International security; what it opens up in terms of analysing acts of resistance to those logics that take the form of fearless truth-speaking to power; the potential and limits/pitfalls of parrhesia as a framework to study such acts of resistance; and the overall political implications of taking on such an approach.
CHAPTER II: Logics of Protection in International Security

This chapter will explore what Feminist Security Studies’ literature has to say about the logic of masculinist protection and female protectors before taking this work further by exploring some of its limitations and elaborating ways to expand and complicate it. I will argue that not only are these logics in fact plural, intersecting, and that we occupy multiple positions within them at the same time, but resistance to them is not only possible but inevitable. This discussion will enable us to turn to the four female protectors’ acts of fearless speech as being born within, not outside, logics of protection. It will help us understand what makes their ‘truths’ dangerous in the first place; and it will enable my theorising of their ‘snap moments’ using parrhesia.

Feminist Security Studies and the Logic of Masculinist Protection

Feminist scholars in Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and beyond have developed substantial literature on the gendering of International Security and war. Many of them have concentrated of the power relations underlying security narratives and war stories. They argue that the majority of these war and security narratives rely on the logic of masculinist protection to justify the use of force or the maintenance of the status quo. This logic places (mostly) women in the position of “Beautiful Souls” in need of protection, while men are conceived as potential or actual “Just Warriors” protecting women (Huston 1982; Stiehm 1982; Elshtain 1995; V. S. Peterson 1992; Young 2003). This logic works at the level of the state, placing leaders and some professionals like police officers and fire fighters as the protectors and the rest of the citizens as the protected, while the protector of the state itself is the military. This logic can also take place between states as one state can position itself as the protectors of another state that is considered to be vulnerable and incapable of protecting itself, as will be detailed further below. The logic of masculinist protection and the gendered division between protectors and protected are thus the basis upon which most mainstream security narratives rely, both in the discipline of IR and in global politics in general.
Much work in Feminist Security Studies has explored this logic of masculinist protection and its relationship to war, security and gender. For example, Judith Stiehm, in an article published in 1982 on the logic of masculinist protection, argues that states are divided between those who protect (the military) and those who are protected. In this logic, men are the (actual or potential) protectors and women (as well as other groups excluded from military service) are the protected (Young 2003; Stiehm 1982; V. S. Peterson 1992). In a similar fashion, Jean Elshtain claims that society is divided between the “Beautiful Souls” and the “Just Warriors” who protect them. Men are compelled to aspire to this heroic identity of just warriors while women are encouraged to remain the passive, pure and somewhat naïve beautiful souls back home awaiting the warriors’ return from the warfront (Elshtain 1995). Through this gendered dichotomy: “Men fight as avatars of a nation’s sanctioned violence. Women work and weep and sometimes protest within the frame of discursive practices that turn one out, militant mother and pacifist protestor alike, as the collective “other” to the male warrior” (Elshtain 1995, 3–4). Femininity and masculinity are therefore co-constructed through this symbolic exchange and are thus both necessary for this logic to work because “‘real men’ cannot be heroes without “innocent women” to “save” and be heroes for” (Sjoberg and Peet 2011, 173). Both authors explored the relationships of protection between men and women and how states and militaries rely on this logic to justify war fighting and other security performances. This logic therefore serves as a justification for war and a strong motivator for military recruitment. Stiehm also argues that this relationship might even make violence worst since “the most murderous and unforgivable acts may require an ‘on behalf of’ justification” (Stiehm 1982, 370).

Iris M. Young and V. Spike Peterson also explored this logic of masculinist protection, especially concerning the relationship between the state and its citizens. Young claims that when the citizens of a state allow their leaders to act as a protector towards them, they become like the woman in a patriarchal household whose position is one of subordinated dependence and obedience: “the logic of masculinist protection positions leaders, along with some other officials such as soldiers and fire-fighters, as protectors and the rest of us in the subordinate position of dependent protected people” (Young 2003, 16). She argues that this logic can sometime resembles a protection racket. The expression comes partly from an article published in the 1970s by Susan Rae Peterson in which Peterson argues that in relation to rape, the state acts upon
women like a masculinist protection racket. In a traditional protection racket, gangs offer protection from other gangs to people in exchange for a fee. If some people refuse, they are “taught a lesson” that serves as a message to all the others who might have wished to decline their services as well. Susan Rae Peterson argues that the state functions the same way towards women by assuming and reinforcing through policies and laws the idea that a “good” woman should be placed under the protection and guidance of a man (S. R. Peterson 1977). Those who are too promiscuous and who refuse to exchange (sexual) freedom for protection are not only left without protection but often become targets of (sexual) violence and held responsible for it afterwards. In the end, as V. Spike Peterson similarly concludes, “not only do the protectors withhold protection from the women who claim autonomy, but they may become attackers” (V. S. Peterson 1992, 14). In terms of international security and war, this means that: “good victims allow men to save women who embody femininity, i.e. vulnerability, helplessness and naïveté, and bad victims allow men to ‘release’ their sexual energy, to build morale among armed forces and to blame their insecurities and anxieties on women who do not ‘behave’” (C. H. Enloe 1993; 1998; 2000 cited in; Nayak 2006, 55).

But Stiehm also explores how this threat from protectors can come whether or not the protected had been embodying the image of a ‘bad victim.’ In fact, the protector’s role itself might lead to such threats because if, at first, the role of a protector seems appealing, it can become draining and unsatisfactory:

When there is no real work or duty required of a protector the role is satisfying, it makes one proud. As role demands increase, and/or as the chances of fulfilling the role decrease, the practice of the role becomes less and less attractive. The protected become a nuisance, a burden, and finally a shame, for an unprotected protectee is the clearest possible evidence of a protector’s failure. (Stiehm 1982, 373–74)

In these cases, not only does the protector intensify control over the protected in order to “better protect” her, but he can also become the main danger to the protected.

At the level of the state, this means that states might not only withhold protection from those citizens who refuse to abide by the rules, give up some of their autonomy and/or pledge allegiance and obedience to the state in the name of security, but they can also become the main threat to their citizens (Young 2003; Wibben 2011; V. S. Peterson 1992). Young emphasises how this logic plays out even more in times of increased insecurity when the state becomes a ‘security state’: “one whose rulers
subordinate citizens to ad hoc surveillance, search, or detention and repress criticism of such arbitrary power, justifying such measures as within the prerogative of those authorities whose primary duty is to maintain security and protect the people.” (Young 2003, 8)

But the logic of masculinist protection does not always rely on threats, control and violence. There is instead a continuum between malevolent and benevolent protection: "With one tone, "protection" calls up images of the shelter against danger [...]. With the other, it evokes the racket in which a local strong man forces merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage—damage the strong man himself threatens to deliver. The difference, to be sure, is a matter of degree...” (V. S. Peterson 1992, 50)

Young similarly argues that masculinist protection does not necessarily entail submission to a “violent and overbearing bully” but often involves the happy deference to the loving protector’s judgment in exchange for the promise of security (Young 2003, 5). Just as this logic relies on a division between ‘good victims/women/citizens’ who embody the image of the ‘beautiful souls’ and ‘bad women/victims/citizens’ who misbehave, disobey and/or refuse to give up some of their autonomy, they also rely on a division between the ‘good men’ that are the Just Warriors/benevolent protectors and the ‘bad men’ ‘out there’ who are liable to attack and represent threats to the protected. Hence one state’s military, police force and political leaders are depicted as heroes following the (gendered) lines of this logic, while various ‘others’ are portrayed as enemies and threats to the security of the state and the protected. These dichotomies actually rely on their opposite terms to function: just as there can be no heroes without beautiful souls to save and no beautiful souls without ‘misbehaving/disobedient bad victims,’ there can be no heroes without enemies who embody all that they are not. As Stiehm puts it: “Those whose job it is to motivate men to violence know that one does not stress that the enemy is ‘just like’ us. In propaganda materials the enemy is dehumanised. He is referred to as an animal or evil incarnate.” (Stiehm 1982, 370) Like Elshtain then, Young underlines the fact that the protector does not necessarily resemble the bully-racketeer but instead invokes chivalry and honour. Again, between these two versions of masculinity/protection lays a continuum. V. Spike Peterson focused on the “trade-offs” involved in such ‘benevolent’ racket and how “apparent gains can mask actual costs” to the point that the systemic costs and insecurities of protection rackets are mystified (V. S. Peterson 1992).
Feminist scholars who have looked at this logic of masculinist protection condemn its profoundly unequal nature. As Stiehm puts it, in this asymmetric dynamic, the protectors have access to force, have dependents (the protected), possess knowledge about threats (often another nation’s protectors) and might even manufacture threats, while the protected rely on their protector, are therefore dependent towards him and have no access to force or knowledge about threats. (Stiehm 1982) The protected therefore gives up some of her autonomy and freedom in exchange for (a feeling of) security, as Young has also emphasised in relation to citizens and the (security) state. So even when the protector remains on the benevolent side of the continuum, the relationship between protector and protected remains one of dependency and inequality. Young, who explored this logic at work in justifications for the war in Afghanistan, also warns feminists that this relationship is not more equal when taking place between women than between men and women (Young 2003, 20); it is asymmetric and unequal in and of itself.

States also rely on such performances at an international level, where a powerful state can claim to be the masculine protector of another state in need of protection (hence feminised). This was the case, for example, during the First Gulf War in which: “Kuwait was feminised, Iraq was characterised as bad and dirty but masculine, and the United States as the masculine hero. The stories of the Gulf Wars are stories of "just warrior" states protecting "beautiful soul" states through sexualised warfare” (Sjoberg 2006, 14). The same logic was also underlined by scholars in FSS in relation to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan where the United States (and a few other states) invaded the countries in order to “liberate” their people and protect them, especially Muslim women, portraying themselves as benevolent protectors/Just Warriors against their malevolent leaders (Hunt and Rygiel 2006; Nayak 2006; Khalid 2011; Steans 2008; Sjoberg 2010; Hunt 2009; Sjoberg 2010; Young 2003). This international logic also serves to reinforce the internal logic of masculinist protection at the state level. In fact, as Young also emphasises, the logic of masculinist protection within security states has an internal and external aspect in that security states need an external enemy to justify increased militarisation and surveillance internally, while waging war outside the country against this ‘bad threat’ by appealing to their role as protectors (Young 2003; see also Tickner 1992; C. H. Enloe 2000 on militarisation). Hence, the international logic of masculinist protection often also relies on and reinforces the internal state logic
of masculinist protection which offers security only to some citizens: “Rather than offering security to all their citizens, states often threaten their own populations, whether through direct violence or through the structural violence that is reflected in its war-fighting priorities and embedded in its institutions” (Wibben 2011, 21).

To summarise, we can see how scholars in FSS and beyond have studied at length and from different angles how the logic of masculinist protection functions at personal, societal, state and international levels and how it relies on a gendered division between protectors and protected. But what about this logic when women protect? What does FSS have to say about the functioning of such a gendered logic when women occupy the role of the (masculine) protector?

**Feminist Security Studies and The Ferocious Few**

Most studies looking at female protectors in FSS have focused on the role of female soldiers and how they were portrayed in political and media narratives. First, most feminists recognise that “adding women and stirring” in existing protection roles (such as police officers, fire-fighters, the military, and others) cannot be considered an automatic step towards greater social justice and gender equality (V. S. Peterson 1992; Young 2003; D’Amico 1998; Elshtain 1995; Sjoberg 2007; C. H. Enloe 1993; 1990; 2000). The inclusion of women in the military, for example, does not bring about a change in the gendered nature of the institution because:

[… ] women who join war fighting and peacemaking do not do so in armies or negotiations that are suddenly gender neutral because they are willing to include women. Instead, they join groups whose terms, premises, and behavioural norms are already defined in terms of the masculine values that they have prized before the inclusion of women (Sjoberg and Via 2010, 6)

Most feminists in IR are therefore sceptical about the potential changes that can be brought by the inclusion of women in these institutions. It seems to mean that, as Eisenstein puts it: “the military remains misogynist despite the presence of females. […] The military will become more female, but not more womanly or gay” (Eisenstein 2007, 6).

Women, however, have always occupied such positions throughout history. From police officers to soldiers and beyond, what Elshtain called the “Ferocious Few” have always been present in historical narratives, but they are usually overshadowed by the overwhelming presence of the non-combatant many (Elshtain 1995). Most of the
time, they seem to be rendered invisible in narratives about security, war and protection. This was the case, for example, in the media narratives about the rescuers at Ground Zero after the events of 9/11 in the United States (Dowler 2002) and the media coverage of the so-called War on Terror: “Despite the fact that women serve in the U.S. military in record numbers, the stories about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were about male soldiers protecting their families back home.” (C. V. Scott 2006, 110; see also Sjoberg 2007; Steans 2008)

Beside the media coverage of female protectors and/or soldiers, a lot has also been written in feminist security studies about the bans excluding women from close-combat positions in the U.S. and British militaries. Justified by arguments such as the lack of upper-body strength or the negative impact on team cohesion, among other reasons, the ban was seen as a way of safeguarding the last bastion of male-only protective roles (Ahall 2013; M. Brown 2004). Women were precluded from occupying ‘frontline’ combat positions because they are either seen as physically and mentally unfit or because their participation in war would affect heterosexual men’s ability to do their job. This last argument often explicitly or implicitly relies on the logic of masculinist protection, arguing that men’s ‘natural’ role as protectors would endanger women because, as summarised by Carol Cohn: “Men will be demoralised by seeing women injured or taken prisoner; men will go out of their way to protect women, doing things that will unnecessarily tax or endanger themselves” (Cohn 1998, 135). But the main objection to women occupying these positions, expressed more often than any other argument, concerns the idea of women engaging in the act of killing. In a study of Congressional Hearings on the ban of women in close-combat positions in the U.S. military, Melissa Brown found that the opinion by members of Congress and top military officers voiced most often is their extreme discomfort with the idea of women as killers (M. Brown 2004, 13).

Therefore, what seems to be the main barrier for women occupying protector’s roles, especially in the military, is the use of violence and the challenge it poses to deeply ingrained ideas of women as Beautiful Souls (supposedly) incapable of violence. In a study about women’s proscribed violence, Laura Sjoberg and Carol Gentry state that women who commit violence are often depicted as irrational or unnatural: “Most of

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3 The ban has now been lifted in the U.S. in 2016 and the UK has also announced in 2016 that it will prepare to lift the ban, although it remains to be actualised.
the work on violent women attributes their motivation to a problem with a woman's biological make-up and rarely deals with a woman's intellectual capability to make deliberate choices, or the socio-political context in which those decisions are made” (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007, 14). Even if female soldiers, in principle, engage in what is usually seen as legitimate violence (as opposed to proscribed violence such as terrorism), they are still often portrayed as inherently nonviolent, remaining the beautiful souls in need of protection, “who can not escape the mould, even with a gun and a uniform” (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007, 86). What Enloe has named the idealised image of militarised femininity (C. H. Enloe 2000) therefore requires women in the military to remain innocent and non-violent, even as soldiers: “Women in the military are soldiers, but not combat soldiers; they have weapons, but are generally not expected to use them” (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007, 59). In fact, the training they receive seems to be perceived as self-defence, in case male soldiers are not there to protect them: “Generally, weapons and physical training are emphasised as self-defence preparation in the event the unspeakable should happen, that is, that male soldiers could fail to protect them and women might come face-to-face with the enemy” (D’Amico 1998, 123). The stories about Private Jessica Lynch are a clear illustration of such dynamics (see Sjoberg 2007; K. Hunt and Rygiel 2006a; Brittain 2006; Steans 2008; Sjoberg 2010).

Other studies have focused on the (sexual) violence faced by women in positions of protection, especially within the U.S. military, at the hands of their ‘brothers-in-arms’ (Eisenstein 2007; Herbert 2000; C. Enloe, n.d.; Whitworth 2004), showing how the masculinist logic of protection as elaborated by Stiehm and Young takes place even within those institutions. In fact, the high incidence of sexual violence against female soldiers within military institutions⁴ seems to rely on the logic that only (heterosexual) men get to be protectors and women who ‘misbehave’ by refusing the role of the ‘Beautiful Soul’ get punished through institutionalised sexual violence: “Given traditional expectations of virile, aggressive hypermasculinity, militaries are treacherous places for anyone who is feminised. […] However much female soldiers struggle to

⁴ According to different studies: “[…] between 43 and 60 per cent of female enlisted personnel experience some form of physical or sexual harassment or violence. Some 90 per cent of female patients at U.S. Veterans Administration facilities after the Gulf War reported experiencing frequent harassment during tours of duty and some 37 per cent reported being raped multiple times” (Whitworth 2008, 119).
prove and sustain their identification as sufficiently masculine, institutionalised patterns of male supremacy and sexual violence undermine their efforts” (Peterson, 2010, p. 24).

Overall, this discussion suggests that most studies in FSS that have looked at female protectors did so in relation to the framework of the masculinist logic of protection and focused mostly on female soldiers and on the question of violence (both as women perpetrating violence through their role as protectors and as victims of violence within institutions of protection). But if violence is such a widespread means by which women are kept out of positions of protection, what do feminist scholars have to say about the use of violence? In other words, what alternatives do feminist scholars offer to these narratives in relation to female protectors, protection in general and violence? Which leads us to another crucial question: if most scholars in FSS have done the important work of tracing the use and functioning of the logic of masculinist protection and its gendered dynamics even when women are protectors, what alternatives do they offer to such narratives? How do they think resistance to the dominant logic of masculinist protection, and how do they make sense of women who do protect despite the overwhelming work of numerous narratives trying to put them back in the ‘Beautiful Soul’s mould’?

A Society of Defenders and the Feminist Ethics of Violence

Few scholars have elaborated on possible alternatives to the logic of masculinist protection. Stiehm did, however, argued for a ‘society of defenders’ as an alternative to the protector-protected dichotomies, which she describes as follow: “a society composed of citizens equally liable to experience violence and equally responsible for exercising society’s violence.” (Stiehm 1982, 367) In such a society, she argues, defenders would share equal access to means of destruction/protection, knowledge about threats and would also be expected to share all risks and roles necessary to ensure society’s safety; the roles of the protector and the protected would thus cease to exist (Stiehm 1982, 374). She also reminds us that ‘any protective system’ is coercive (instead of voluntary) (Stiehm 1982, 375) and as such, defenders would have to be ready to ‘freely’ choose to defend one’s society. This other approach to protection would lead to greater gender equality since: “When women are defenders and no longer confined to the category of the protected they are able to shake off the disabilities which attend dependency: low esteem, low level of information, and little sense of responsibility. As defenders they should recognise that protection cannot be guaranteed,
and that the protected's role of providing justification, applause and magnification for the feats of protectors is not appropriate.” (Stiehm 1982, 374) She thus criticises the hypocrisy behind taking a stance against violence and for peace when one accepts protection at the same time: “Women seem too often to ignore the fact that much ‘successful’ nonviolence is related to having (1) a potential for violence to renounce or (2) having someone else use or threaten force for one.” (Stiehm 1982, 376) Hence it seems that a society of defenders would rely on a shared responsibility for one’s nation and its safety, as well as on sharing the means for violence.

Young briefly takes on Stiehm’s idea of a society of defenders, which, she suggests, “invokes an ideal of equality in the work of defence” (Young 2003, 22) but goes further by questioning what such ‘defence’ would mean on a global scale: “In the twenty-first century, in a world of organised and less organised military institutions and weapons capable of unimaginable destruction, it is hard to know what it might mean for world citizens to exercise collective self-defence” (Idem). Approaching more cautiously the question of war and political violence on a global scale, Young suggests that such defence might be more about limiting weapons and their use than sharing more widely the means of protection/defence. She herself offers the concept of democratic citizenship as a way to refuse the hierarchy of protector and protected which, at a global level, “would constitute a relationship of respect and political equality among the world’s peoples where none of us think that we stand in the position of the paternal authority who knows what is good for the still-developing others.” (Idem) So for Young, the alternative to the logic of masculinist protection is about equality in the decision-making processes (rejecting the stance of paternal authority) and potential collective disarmament, still within the society of defenders Stiehm suggested.

These two positions seem to reflect wider debates in feminist theory about the use of violence and its ethical implications. In an article on feminist ethics and political violence, Kimberley Hutchings argues that there are three broad feminist traditions on the use of violence: enlightenment feminism that challenges male’s monopoly over just violence and is based on universal standards of justice and freedom; ‘care’ feminism that argues for basing ethical conduct upon values found in the practice of care; and postcolonial feminism that emphasises the importance of recognising differences, pluralism and context in making ethical claims (Hutchings 2007). She highlights how the discussion around the ethical use of violence relies on the capacity to differentiate
between ethical means and ethical ends (Hutchings 2007, 97). Both enlightenment and postcolonial feminisms are more likely to condone the use of violence by making a distinction between the means and the ends in politics.

But more interestingly, Hutchings also exposes how this whole discussion is profoundly grounded in gendered dynamics and the masculinist logic of protection. She argues that in order for the rhetoric around the separation of means and ends to be effective, it relies heavily on the logic of masculinist protection in which the ‘good violence’ of the protector is differentiated from the ‘bad violence’ of the threat because the former sees violence as a mean to a noble end (protection) while the latter sees violence as an end in itself. (Hutchings 2007, 101) She also claims that enlightenment feminism “models the ethical subject on the just warrior, whereas care feminism models its ethical subject on the beautiful soul” (Hutchings 2007, 97). Hence she asks whether drawing a line between ethical and unethical political violence can ever be disconnected from the gendered dynamics of the logics of protection: “One challenge is to show how the necessary distinctions between ethical and unethical violence could be sustained in practice without relying on and reinforcing gendered hierarchies. The second challenge, if the first cannot be met, is to justify the trade off being proposed between the gendered implications of violence and the feminist ethical goals that it is being said to serve.” (Hutchings 2007, 102)

According to Hutchings then, it seems that ethical, political and moral questions surrounding violence in feminist studies are inextricably connected to the logic of masculinist protection, which both Stiehm and Young’s proposed alternatives to this logic seem to confirm. But beyond this relatively slim account of ways to think outside this logic, little has been said about resistance to these narratives. Yet before we move on to others ways to think resistance to the logic of masculinist protection, there are multiple limitations, pitfalls and blind spots that have to be raised concerning this body of literature on the masculinist logic of protection. In fact, in order to make sense of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More’s ‘snap moments,’ we need to expand, rethink and complicate further some of this important yet incomplete work on logics of protection in International Security.
Expanding the Logic of Masculinist Protection: Limitations and Points of Departure

FSS’s work exploring the inherently gendered ways in which protection is understood and narrated in discourses surrounding war and security narratives/performances was without a doubt essential to enrich the discipline of security studies and International Relations more broadly. Yet many issues remain unexplored and unquestioned about the logic of masculinist protection. This section raises some of these issues and limitations as well as expands on some ideas that would benefit from being developed deeper in order to enrich and further this discussion.

My argument is that logics of protection are often more complex than this literature suggests for a number of reasons. First, talking about *the* logic of masculinist protection in the singular, as if there were only one, is misleading. This is both because this logic is itself plural (as will be detailed below) and because there are multiple logics of protection that intersect, coexist and sometimes clash in international relations. Gender is only one axis along which logics of protection operate: race, (settler) coloniality, class, sexuality, gender identity, and/or else are all power relations through which logics of protection also operate and rely. I argue that these systems of oppression are rooted in similar yet distinctive logics of protection that merit their own separate, thorough, yet interconnected exploration. In order to make sense of the four cases this thesis examines, we need a more thorough and systematic understanding of how different logics of protection operate at the same time. For example, how can we make sense of Chelsea Manning’s positioning as a female soldier without understanding better how cisgendered and sexual logics of protection operate? How can we understand Malalai Joya’s fearless speech without understanding how masculinist and colonial logics of protection operate in Afghanistan? How can we understand Pal and the Gulabi Gang’s fearless truth-speaking without understanding how caste, class, coloniality as well as gender play out in the context in which they are situated? And how can we understand the actions of Idle No More’s water protectors without a deeper understanding of settler-colonial, race and masculinist logics of protection in Canada? It is not sufficient to simply ‘add these power relations to the logic of masculinist protection and stir’; we need to understand, for example, how colonisers have positioned themselves as the protectors of various ‘others’ across geographical spaces while being the main threat to their safety/security, and how this plays out in specific
contexts and locations. In other words, we need to understand how gendered logics of protection operate alongside and through racial, colonial, caste/classed, sexual/cisgendered and settler-colonial logics of protection simultaneously.

This is not to say that scholars in FSS have all been blind to issues of race and colonialism in their exploration of the logic of masculinist protection. Most scholars who have worked on the War on terror and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, were thorough in their explorations of how islamophobia, racism, colonialism, orientalism and other similar tropes and systems of oppression were mobilised in the depictions of, narratives about and justifications for these wars (K. Hunt 2006; Khalid 2011; Young 2003; Puar 2007; Brittain 2006; K. Hunt and Rygiel 2006b; Zine 2006). The many works on the story of Jessica Lynch, for example, explored how racism played out in the depiction of Lynch as a (white feminine) Beautiful Soul in need of saving while her African-American and Indigenous colleagues with almost identical stories, Shoshana Johnson and Lori Piestewa, were almost completely invisible in media and the U.S. military narratives (Sjoberg 2010; Brittain 2006; Sjoberg 2007; Steans 2008; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007; C. Enloe 2010). Similarly, while not looking explicitly at the logic of masculinist protection, much work in FSS and feminist IR has studied militarised (and other types of) masculinities, exploring the hierarchical, relational and profoundly contextual ways in which hegemonic and subordinated masculinities are constituted and exercised in different contexts through gender, race, class and sexuality (Parpart and Zalewski 2008; Zalewski and Parpart 1998; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Hooper 2001). So while there is much work in FSS that has looked at some of these complexities and how race, class, sexuality and gender all operate alongside and through each other in war and security narratives, what remains to be done is to connect this work more explicitly and systematically to the logics of protection so we may understand what these intersecting systems of oppression actually do to the way we understand such logics. The result, I argue, is a pluralisation of the logics of masculinist protection as well as the explicit study of multiple different logics operating simultaneously in different contexts, will allow us to draw out the specific ways race, colonial, settler-colonial, cisgender/sexual and caste/class logics of protection function in and in relation to masculinist logics of protection.

First, as mentioned before, the logics of masculinist protection are themselves plural. This means that if we start from the gendered division between Just
Warriors/protectors and Beautiful Souls/protected, we have to explore how such logics do not always take the same form in all contexts. Instead, they are necessarily diverse and plural, while dependent on the cultural, social and political contexts in which they function. For example, the work on masculinities in IR has exposed many different forms hegemonic masculinities can take in different contexts while remaining on top of the (gendered) pyramid. Applied to logics of masculinist protection, this means that not all protectors embody the same ideals in all contexts: depending on their social positioning or on the context in which they are embedded at a certain moment in time and space, the protectors’ roles might take many different forms and be embodied very differently by different subjects and/or by the same person at the same time. The political leader, the nuclear strategist, the frontline soldier and the firefighter are all protectors; yet they do not embody the same masculinity and imagery of the protector. And the frontline soldier in relation to the enemy on the battlefield versus in relation to his teenage daughter, for example, does not embody the same type of protective role while exercising protection. But more importantly, what studies of masculinities have shown is how racialised and sexualised ‘others’ are constructed in relation to dominant and hegemonic masculinities as their constitutive opposites (Zalewski and Parpart 1998; Parpart and Zalewski 2008; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Hooper 2001). Hence not only does the figure of the Just Warrior/protector needs Beautiful Souls and demonised enemies against whom they can define themselves as heroes. They also need different types of subordinated and degraded masculinities alongside them, sidekick ‘others’ if you will, in order to define what a hero is and is not. What this also means is that, like masculinities themselves, what a ‘Just Warrior’ and a ‘good’ protector embodies/means is not the same in all communities and contexts. None of this is new in FSS, but applied more specifically to logics of protection, it allows us to begin to see how even within logics of masculinist protection, there is a need for more complexities to be teased out and explored in more detail. Moreover, we can only start to imagine what possibilities would be opened up if such a nuanced, complex and diverse understanding of the protector’s roles might be as we think more concretely about female protectors.

Similarly, even though there is much critical discussion of race and masculinities by FSS scholars, these same scholars too often leave un-interrogated the assumption that women are a uniform group of Beautiful Souls in need of protection. For example, many scholars have denounced the ways in which Afghan women, and
Muslim women more generally, have been portrayed as the uniform silent victims of oppression whose shadowy figure in need of salvation/liberation has justified the Western Just Warriors’ intervention in their country (Khan 2014; M. Butler 2009; Mackie 2012; Khalid 2011). Few studies though have gone further and actually looked at the diversity and plurality of perspectives, levels of agency and positioning among these women themselves. Differences among the protected nonetheless play an important role in the ways logics of masculinist protection are conducted. In fact, if FSS scholars have emphasised the fact that some women/citizens who do not conform to the ideal of ‘Beautiful Souls’ might be refused protection or even become targets for the protectors’ violence, little has been said about how not all women embody vulnerable femininity worth saving and fighting for in the first place. Yet a lot of women in particular, and citizens in general, are not offered protection at all and even become the main targets of violence and threats, not because they refuse the racketeer’s (or the benevolent protector’s) deal but because they were not offered a deal in the first place. This is also where the gendered dynamics of the logic of masculinist protection are intertwined with racialised/colonial/sexualised ones. Some women are not offered guarantees of protection because of their race, sexuality and/or gender identity, among other factors. The story of Jessica Lynch is one notable exception in which race was recognised as a factor that makes some women protectable and others invisible, aka to whom protection is not withdrawn because of a refusal/failure to behave/obey/submit but simply not offered in the first place. Similarly, the protecteds who ‘fail to do their gender right,’ who do not embody cis/heteronormative femininity and/or who do not align their gender/sex/sexuality in a manner deemed intelligible to protectors are often the main targets to their violence, as illustrated by the appalling levels of violence committed against trans women around the world, for example. They become the not-so-human to whom protection is not even on the table, the unprotectable, liable to attacks from protectors themselves usually in impunity. Differences among the un/protecteds and how these differences influence what specific people and what are being protected remains under theorised.

In other words, following the work of many postcolonial, Black feminist, queer, intersectional and other critical scholars, we have to acknowledge how gender can never be disconnected from race, sexuality, coloniality, cis/gender identity, and so on (Lewis and Mills 2003; Mohanty 2003; hooks 2014; Hill Collins 2000; Mendez 2015), even as
we conceptualise logics of protection. Moreover, even within the positions of the protected/beautiful soul, unprotected and unprotectable, women/citizens negotiate with, navigate through and subvert their subordinated positions with varying levels of agency. Therefore, reducing their positions as protecteds to blind obedience and complete dependency obscures the many ways in which people in positions of oppression create space for themselves, as will be elaborated further later.

Hence not only are logics of masculinist protection plural but they also rely on, function alongside, intersect and sometimes clash with a number of other logics of protection that have to be explored simultaneously. This means that logics of protection have to be contextualised: there is not a single/universal overarching logic of masculinist protection but many logics that cannot be disconnected from their contexts of emergence and operation. In order to explore the cases of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More, we have to understand the multiple logics of protection in which these women and their fearless speech are embedded.

In addition to how we might characterise different logics of protection (masculinist, colonial, casted/classed, and so forth), they are also multiple in terms of their actors, means, targets, and aims, as they play out in but also away from the battlefield. This entails that we also have to expand and deepen our understanding of how logics of protection themselves operate. By looking only/mainly at female soldiers and other official protectors, in other words, by confining the study of the logics of protection to traditional framework of security studies such as military power, war and political violence, aren’t we playing on the field/according to the rules of the dominant narratives we want to overcome, using the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house⁵? Put differently, is the protector always the one carrying the gun? Do logics of protection only encompass the use-of-legitimate-violence-to-protect-the-vulnerable by the military and police forces, as theories of war and the social contract would have us believe, or do they also operate away from the battlefield?

I argue that by only looking at official institutions of protection, we risk reproducing the same ontologies/epistemologies FSS and critical security studies more broadly have been criticising and trying to overcome. Importantly, this does not allow us to make sense of female protectors who stand outside, partially or uncomfortably within, on the fence, and so on of these dominant institutions of protection, such as

⁵ Using Audre Lorde’s words (Lorde 1984).
Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More. To make sense of these figures of female protectors and their actions, we also have to look beyond protection-as-the-use-of-legitimate-violence or just replacing/supplementing protectors with former protected. We must analyse how traditional logics of protection are resisted, denounced and challenged. And we have to ask: what might unofficial, dissident female protectors tell us about the potentialities to transform, subvert, challenge and/or reinforce traditional logics of protection?

Moreover, if logics of protection are about protecting (only) the deserving protecteds, it could be argued that what states/protectors are protecting are not only “beautiful souls” or law-abiding citizens but also a certain sexual/legal/social/moral hegemonic order as well. Hence these logics are not only about providing security to individuals in terms of military and state power but also about protecting social orders, the status quo, and the symbolic and actual borders that keep them in place. Thus women, as well as men, can at the same time be both protected and protector inside these logics of protection, and they can perform different kinds of agency/responsibility in maintaining/challenging the power relations underlying these logics. They can also occupy multiple subject positions across different logics at the same time, standing as the protector, protected, unprotected and/or unprotectable simultaneously. For example, white women might be embodying the image of the beautiful souls in relation to white men/the state while also constructing themselves as protectors of ‘Third-World women’ through international development or even transnational feminist movements (see Mohanty 2003 for example). A queer police officer might occupy an official position as a protector while also at the same time be unprotectable when it comes to cisgender social orders in different discourses and practices. Therefore, reducing gender to masculinity/femininity, men/women, and logics of protection to the protector/protected dichotomy, even when used to denounce their totalising and oppressive effects, tends to equate two fixed, binary terms, where blurred/moving plural terms better describe how logics of protection function. We need to avoid falling into the patriarchal divide-and-conquer trap that shapes and sustains power relations through binary oppositions. Because logics of protection do not function under an ‘either/or’ logic (as in, you are either protected or a protector, you are either protected or unprotected/unprotectable), we must analyse how people, and female protectors in
particular, can be both protected and/or protector and/or unprotected and/or unprotectable at the same time.

To accomplish this, we must complicate our understanding of logics of protection beyond FSS theorisations of how a masculinist logic of protection operates and we must overcome the major pitfall of FSS’s work on the logic of masculinist protection, which is the lack of work on how logics of protection may be and indeed are resisted. It is not enough to (again) point out the profoundly unequal nature of a masculinist logic of protection. What is called for and what I contribute to in this thesis is a sustained investigation of how female protectors do not merely reproduce but may also resist complex intersecting logics of protection.

Offering this analysis requires me to break from traditional FSS scholarship in three ways. First, this scholarship seems to imply that women can only reproduce logics of protection unless they are somewhat outside of them. We thus need a framework that allows thinking resistance as not necessarily outside of power/logics of protection, but as resistance nonetheless. Second, we need to go beyond the limited alternatives to the logic of masculinist protection offered by Stiehm and Young. Finally, we need to ask a new set of critical questions about logics of protection and female protectors that do not use binary logics.

In fact, as elaborated before, very little work in FSS has explored or focused on resistance to logics of protection. Many scholars did, however, focused on the profoundly unequal nature of such logics and pointed out that replacing men by women as protectors does not make such logics more equal, or lead to more gender equality. In fact, female soldiers always seem to be re-inscribed in the position of the Beautiful Soul in need of protection and logics of protection aren’t more equal when happening between women than between men and women. Scholars have also underlined the complicity of the protected in maintaining such logics when she uncritically accepts to defer decision-making around security to the protectors. In both scenarios, logics of protection seem to always be reinforced and reproduced, whether women are the protectors or the protected. Does it mean that resistance to such logics is pointless and/or unthinkable? Do women who protect only ever reproduce logics of protection? Is there no space to think resistance to such logics?

We have also seen what alternatives Stiehm and Young briefly offer to the logic of masculinist protection. Even though short articles cannot, of course, answer all
questions in depth, the concepts of a ‘society of defenders’ and ‘democratic citizenship’ leave many loopholes unaddressed, especially around questions of violence. In Stiehm, for example, war and political violence seem to be understood as inevitable. She thus denounces how claims to nonviolence within the current logic of masculinist protection can only be complicit in its perpetuation (see earlier discussion). Violence is thus understood as a necessary mean to a noble end (defending the nation). But as Hutchings’ discussion on the feminist ethics of political violence has highlighted, without questioning the use of violence and the ‘trade-offs’ it ethically relies upon, we end up reinforcing the gendered hierarchies upon which they rely and the very same logic of masculinist protection they seek to overcome. We thus find ourselves in a conundrum: how can we resist the logic of masculinist protection without reproducing the same means and ethical implications (the same ‘trade-offs’) from which the issues arose in the first place? In other words, can we ever ‘escape’ the logic of masculinist protection? Is such a positioning even possible?

I argue that these questions are misguided and necessarily lead to a cul-de-sac, which could explain why resistance remains mostly unthought-of and alternatives weakly theorised. In fact, these conceptions of the logic of masculinist protection rely on a view of power as fixed and involving zero-sum games: one either has power or has not (which is, for example, implied in the idea of ‘trade-offs’ and the dichotomised oppositions exposed earlier). Hence one can only be either a protector, with the means and knowledge and power to protect, or a protected, in a subordinated position of obedience and dependency. Not only does this conceptualisation not allow for the pluralisation and complexity highlighted earlier, but it also does not allow space for resistance within logics of protection. Trying to imagine alternatives ‘outside’ of such logics seem bound to fail as they reproduce the same ‘trade-offs’ they sought to overcome in the first place.

How can we make sense of women who do ‘snap’ and do resist, subvert, challenge and transform logics of protection such as Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More? In other words, these women might not ‘escape’ logics of protection altogether, they may reproduce some of their means, aims and functioning but that does not mean their actions cannot be understood as resistance or that resistance is useless. Again, creating a binary between either performing/reproducing logics of protection or ‘escaping’ them is misguided: there might not be an ‘outside’ to (the
power of) those logics but that does not mean they are not actively resisted. In order to make sense of the cases of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More and explore their resistance to logics of protection, we thus need to ask different questions and we need different theoretical and methodological ways of framing those questions.

It is here that Foucault’s work on power (and its relation to truth and the subject) might help us out of this dead-end: if we are to understand power as productive, relational, contextual, inescapable yet always co-substantial with resistance, as will be elaborated in the next chapter, then it allows us to frame the problem differently: there is no ‘outside’ to logics of protection but it does not mean that resistance to logics of protection is impossible or inexistent. On the contrary, the question is not ‘how do people ‘escape’ logics of protection?’ but rather ‘how do people subvert, challenge, destabilise, transform, and/or reinforce logics of protection?’ This reformulated question allows us not only to ‘see’ and understand Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More as female protectors but also to place their resistance to dominant logics of protection at the centre of the analysis.

More specifically, what is needed is a framework that can make sense of the specific ways in which those specific women—Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More water protectors—resist. In fact, what ties the different actions of these female protectors is not only that they all problematise the logics of protection in which they are located, is that they all do so by speaking courageous truth to power: the women in these four cases all claim to ‘speak the truth;’ these truths all take the form of a criticism towards power in relation to logics of protection; they all take risks in speaking/acting out; and they all do so out of a sense of duty to change—for themselves and others—how these logics operate. By doing so, they also all change, challenge and/or subvert their subject positions within such logics. Hence what is needed is a framework that can attest to the complexity of such particular forms of resistance in their relation to truth-speaking, subjectivity and ethics.

This is why I argue that Foucault’s work offers invaluable insights to develop such framework. First, his work on power/resistance (and its relation to truth and the subject) allows us to overcome the impasse of trying to ‘escape’ logics of protection by understanding resistance as always imbricated and coextensive to power, as the flip side of the same coin. It allows for a nuanced, flexible and thoroughly contextualised understanding of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More’s parrhesiastic
acts as necessarily located within multiple logics of protection, yet also opening up potentialities for their transformation, challenge, subversion and/or reinforcement at the same time. Second, and more importantly, Foucault’s work on parrhesia allows me to place the specific forms of resistance enacted by the women in my four case studies at the centre of the analysis, and to look in detail at what these specific practices of truth-telling entail. Understanding these practices as parrhesia offers a sophisticated theoretical and methodological framework to understand these kinds of contemporary practices of resistance.

Conclusion

Starting from the work scholars in FSS have conducted on the logic of masculinist protection, this chapter has tried to deepen and enrich our understanding of different logics of protection and how they operate in International Security. Arguing that the initial work on the logic of masculinist protection needed to be expanded and complicated in order to make sense of the figures of dissident female protectors such as Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More, I have argued that logics of protection are in fact plural (including not only masculinist ones but also (settler) colonial, casted/classed, sexual/cisgendered, among others) and involve more actors, means, targets and aims than initially theorised. I advocated for a wider and more nuanced understanding of the ways these logics operate and the multiple and simultaneous subject positions they encompass. More importantly, I argued that in order to make sense of the four figures this thesis is looking at, we need a theoretical framework that allows space for, and puts the emphasis on resistance to logics of protection themselves. In order to do so, I suggest using Foucault’s work on power, the subject and truth, specifically his work on/in relation to the practice of parrhesia.

What will be elaborated in the next chapter is thus a theoretical framework using Foucault’s work, first to develop a framework through which we can understand logics of protection as complex, plural and enabling both practices of power and resistance, and then by using his work on parrhesia to understand the specific acts of dangerous truth-speaking enacted by the four figures of dissident female protectors as a different mobilisation of power/truth and involving alternative modes of subjectivation than those involved in dominant logics of protection. Understanding female protectors’ parrhesia as resistance to, yet grounded in, logics of protection themselves, the next chapter will
develop a theoretical and methodological framework through which we can make sense of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More’s acts of fearless speech.
CHAPTER III: Foucault, Logics of Protection and Parrhesia

The last chapter explored the Feminist Security Studies’ literature on the logics of protection as a starting point from which we can elaborate, extend and complicate such work to understand better how logics of protection function and, more importantly, how resistance to such logics might take place and what it enables and reinforces in political, judicial and ethical terms. We thus established the need to develop a more nuanced, flexible and complex theoretical framework that would enable such an analysis. This chapter will thus proceed to develop such framework in three steps.

In the first section, I will analyse logics of protection using Foucault’s general work on power, truth, the subject and resistance. This first section will focus mostly on how power produces and relies upon subjects and truths in order to ground the fearless speech of dissident female protectors in the larger context of logics of protection and understand how such logics function in relation to truth and the subject positions they produce and rely upon. This theorisation also allows me to understand why the speech of these women is courageous in the first place: what makes their actions/speeches dangerous and/or involving a risk? What do they disturb/challenge/subvert so that it requires courage?

Upon the background established by this broad theorisation of logics of protection using Foucault’s work, the second section of this chapter will focus on the acts of dissident female protectors by developing a framework based on the practice of parrhesia to better understand and frame these specific acts of resistance. Indeed, I argue that the specific ways in which Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More resisted logics of protection can best be encompassed by using parrhesia as a framework against which to assess the ethical, resistive practices of these women who spoke truth to power. In fact, if the empirical chapters will dig deeper into how theirs actions resembled and differed from the practice of parrhesia itself, the ethical as well as political and judicial aspects of their truth-speaking to power that binds the subject to the truth about protection is best encapsulated by this specific theoretical framework. This will in turn allows me to assess how we can understand parrhesia in action in these contexts of gendered resistance. But before turning to these cases empirically, this chapter will explore the in-depth theorisations of parrhesia by Foucault and others, the current attempts to use it in the current era and what we can retain from this work for
my theorisation of the acts of dissident female protectors in relation to logics of protection. To do so, it will first look at what exactly parrhesia is and what it involves. Then it will explore the relationship of parrhesia to truth, the subject and resistance, still using Foucault’s work. I will then look at different attempts to use it in contemporary settings and the challenges it raises. Using this exploration of the different theorisations of parrhesia, I will then develop a framework that will address my cases more specifically by arguing that we can denote three modalities of parrhesiastic speech that can be found simultaneously and at different degrees in these cases: political parrhesia, judicial parrhesia, and ethical parrhesia.

The third section will operationalise such theorisation into a specific methodological framework in which to insert the four case studies. Using a wide range of qualitative methods grounded in discourse theory, this methodological framework will provide me with the necessary flexibility and rigour to critically assess how the parrhesiastic acts of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More both challenge, subvert, and change logics of protection while also reproducing and reinforcing some techniques and forms of power these logics employ.

**Foucault and the Logics of Protection**

This section aims to explore Foucault’s work on power, truth, the subject and resistance in order to better understand how logics of protection work and can be resisted. The detail of how exactly different economies of power operate in relation to logics of protection needs to be studied further empirically, which is beyond the scope of this thesis that rather focuses on the analysis of the resistive acts of parrhesiastic female protectors. Hence this section will offer a broad theorisation in order to be able to better contextualise these figures’ resistance, a theorisation that would merit further research in the future.

**Economies of Power**

Foucault’s work has certainly had a huge influence on how we understand power relations today. Foucault’s innovation in the field of theories of power was to argue that power is not only repressive but also productive, it does not only says ‘no’ but also functions through saying ‘yes’: “What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces
discourse.” (Foucault 1980a, 120) Power thus produces subjects, desires, norms, knowledge and pleasures.

Through this theorising of power as productive, Foucault was criticising what he saw as the main way in which political scientists and other theorists conceived power only in its sovereign form. Traditionally, sovereign power relates to the king’s power of life and death over his subjects, of taking life or letting live (Foucault 1990a, 136). It thus refers to the judicial power of the sovereign which functions mainly through coercion. It is a form of power firmly grounded in the state that is “exercised over a territory, associated with the state, and articulated in terms of law, whose preeminent form of expression is the execution of wrongdoers.” (Singer and Weir 2006, 451) In other words, sovereign power is about forbidding and punishing, about limiting and controlling behaviours through repression and commanding (Lilja and Vinthagen 2014, 122). While many theorists focus on this power and its evolution through the state, Foucault argued that this is only but one way in which power functions, circulates, and is enacted today. This led him to conclude, among other things, that power is everywhere and not just in the hands of the state. Power relations can be found at all levels of society, including in the micro levels of the everyday: “relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State. In two senses: first of all because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations.” (Foucault 1980a, 122)

Foucault thus studied different economies of power that would allow him to understand how power actually operates beyond its judicial/coercive/sovereign modalities. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues that sovereign power was gradually replaced at the beginning of the 18th century by a form of power that disciplines individuals, not through “majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of the state” but through pervasive and calculated ‘micro-techniques’ of power such as “hierarchical observation,” “normalising judgment,” and “examination” (Foucault 1995, 170). To illustrate this claim, Foucault uses the famous example of the panopticon, an architectural surveillance device in which individuals are always being watched and thus behave themselves without the actual intervention of the wardens and guards. Using the panopticon as a metaphor for this new modality of power, Foucault
highlights how this strategy of constant surveillance produces ‘docile and useful bodies’ (Foucault 1995, 136) that are being controlled, but ultimately control/monitor themselves by internalising the authority’s gaze: “Within the ideal panopticon design, compliance with institutional/organisational norms is ensured ultimately through the inculcation of self-policing as individuals come to interiorise the external gaze of authority” (Foucault 1980, 155).

Thus disciplinary power produces subjects through normalisation: it organises people in ways that make them constantly under the normalising judgment of authority’s gaze. But more importantly, it operates not only externally but also internally by producing norms and conventions individuals internalise, come to accept and end up conforming to, as simply ‘the way things are’ (Taylor 2004, 264). Hence modern subjects end up constituting themselves through the same norms that subjugate them, through a division between the normal and the abnormal, the sane and the mad, the delinquent and the ‘good’ citizen, and so on: “Disciplining subjects means channelling their behaviour in the “right” direction and defining other activities as abnormal, deviant. This power of normalisation is, for Foucault, diffused throughout society” (Hekman 2004, 201). By looking at the birth of the prison, Foucault therefore establishes that disciplinary power, which would come to define modern power, is ‘capillary’; “It does not emanate from some central source, but circulates throughout the entire social body down even to the tiniest and apparently most trivial extremities.” (Fraser 1981, 272) In short, as Brian C.J. Singer and Lorna Weir puts it, while sovereign power functions through the “extraction of taxes and labor”, the “enactment of law” and the “spectacular display of the monarchical sword”, disciplinary forms of power operate through “continuous surveillance of individuals”, “standardisations set through technically established norms”, and “a regime of visibility leaving the centre of power concealed”. (Singer and Weir 2006, 445)

The third economy of power studied by Foucault is pastoral/governing power, a form of power that nurtures and governs, governing being understood in a broad sense as the means to “form, transform and direct” the conduct of individuals (Foucault 2014, 23), to conduct the conduct of individuals on the “right path”. Rooted in Christianity in the West, pastoral power functions not through coercion or discipline, but through the care of the pastor, ready to sacrifice himself for his flock. It is also a form of power that guides the conduct of each individual during her entire life and “whose ultimate aim is
to assure individual salvation.” (Foucault 1982, 783) Foucault argues that what characterises this form of power is that it cannot function without a knowledge of people’s innermost secrets; it operates through knowing people’s minds and conscience, as highlighted by the practice of confession, for example. (Foucault 1982, 783) He argues that the church thus developed a form of power that takes the individual as its main object, which operates through individualisation in that it looks after each individual in particular, rather than the community as a whole. As he states, individualisation means that: “This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him.” (Foucault 1982, 781) Pastoral/governing power thus functions through individualisation but also through a constant extraction, interrogation and examination of people’s inner ‘truth’ about themselves. From the practice of confession in Christianity to the birth of the human sciences, pastoral/governing power never ceases to interrogate and extract the truth about/of individuals who, in turn, recognise and constitute themselves through this truth. Hence pastoral power constitutes individuals, who also constitutes themselves in the process, as subjects of their own conduct, leading Foucault to conclude that government can be understood as the “contact point where individuals are driven [and known] by others […] and the way they conduct themselves [and know themselves].” (Foucault 1998, 154)

**The Subject and Truth**

In this genealogical exploration of power relations, Foucault was mostly interested in how these different economies of power constitute people, but also how people constitute themselves (their identity, their desires, their behaviours, their conduct) through power. In fact, as he puts it himself, his work’s objective was not to study “the phenomena of power” but “to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” (Foucault 1982, 777) Foucault’s views on the relation between power and the subject is that subjects are not only constituted by power relations (externally) but also constitute their own identity through these power relations (internally): “There are two meanings of the word ‘subject’: subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.” (Foucault 1982, 781) As elaborated before on
pastoral power, power turns people into subjects while tying these subjects to their own identity; hence there are no subjects outside or prior to power. As Butler explains about Foucault’s view on power and subjectivity: “Power not only acts on a subject but, in a transitive sense, enacts the subject into being. As a condition, power precedes the subject.” (J. Butler 1997, 13) The different forms of authority studied by Foucault all have in common that they “attempt to impose certain relations of obedience by the imposition of a certain ‘truth’ on the individual” (Jobe 2014, 133). But Foucault makes a distinction between what will later be translated as ‘subjectification’ (assujettissement, being subjected/subjugated to) and ‘subjectivation’ (modes of self-relation) in that subjects are not only passive in the imposition of power/knowledge, but also actively engaged in the constitution of their own subjectivity. Hence we have to “understand the constitution of subjectivity in Foucault as always a form of individuation by power relations and an autonomous self-relation at the same time.” (Jobe 2014, 109–10)

Consistently with his understanding of power and freedom, while both processes take place within power relations and through normalised truths, hence ‘subjugate and make subject to’, it is also the site where individuals may transform, subvert and change such exercises through various modes of resistance. As summarised by Milchman and Rosernberg:

While assujettissement pertains to how one is produced as a subject through the exercise of power/knowledge, including the modalities of resistance through which that exercise can be modified or attenuated, subjectivation pertains to the relation of the individual to him/herself; to the multiple ways in which a self can be constructed on the basis of what one takes to be the truth. (Milchman and Rosenberg 2007, 55)

These modes of subjectivation/subjectification rely heavily on truth, another major theme in Foucault’s work. As we have seen, for Foucault, power essentially operates through truth: the truth about oneself that one has to confess, the truth about subjects that power extracts while at the same time using that truth/knowledge to constitute subjects, the truth about ourselves that we must then recognise, the organisation of this truth/knowledge in social science disciplines, and so on. As he puts it: “we are forced to produce the truth of power that our society demands, of which it has need, in order to function: we must speak the truth; we are constrained or condemned to confess or discover the truth. Power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth: it institutionalises, professionalises and rewards its pursuits.” (Foucault 1980b, 93) Hence Foucault’s philosophical move was to interrogate
not how truth is constituted but how the subjects are constituted through acts of truth (Mills 2015, 17).

For Foucault then, truth is not something that exists ‘out there,’ ready to be discovered and extracted but is always an effect as well as an instrument of power. Through his famous theorising of networks of power/knowledge, he asserts that: “truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it.” (Foucault 1980a, 133) Hence truth does not lie outside of power or without power, it is “a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power.” (Foucault 1980a, 132) This conceptualisation of truth as always already involved in relations of power that in return rely on truth to function thus implies that truth is always political. This is why Foucault talks about truth as a ‘regime’:

Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1980a, 132)

Therefore truth is understood as the rules, procedures, regulations and mechanisms, that produce, sustain, validate, regulate and valorise what is to be understood as true at a certain moment in time and space. The centrality of truth to modern power entails that we submit to truth not only ‘because it is true,’ but also because we commit to truth as a result of historical, sociocultural and ultimately political circumstances. As Daniele Lorenzini puts it: “according to Foucault, under every argument, every reasoning and every ‘evidence’, there is always a certain assertion that does not belong to the logical realm, but is rather a sort of commitment, a profession, and which has the following form: ‘if it is true, then I will submit; it is true, therefore I submit’. This ‘therefore' that links the ‘it is true’ to the ‘I submit' and gives the truth the right to say ‘you are forced to accept me because I am the truth’.” (Lorenzini 2013) Hence truth exercises power while power operates through truth; there is no truth without power and no power without truth.

We have here a completed circle in which power, truth and the subject are always already co-constituted; in which they all rely upon, constitute and reproduce
each other in such a way that we cannot detach who we are from the forms of power/knowledge that circulate in our society and vice versa. But Foucault also insists that these economies of power are never so totalising as encompassing the whole of human existence and possibilities. In fact, another major contribution of Foucault through this work on power was his conceptualisation of resistance.

Resistance

By criticising the juridical notion of power and exploring disciplinary and pastoral forms of power, Foucault also opened up a space to think resistance and freedom in different terms. In fact, as stated before, he understands power as relational: power is not something one can have but rather something that circulates, that people can exercise in relation to each other. Therefore for Foucault freedom is always already involved in power relations in that a relation where there is no freedom (like slavery for example) is not one of power but of violence (Foucault 1982, 789). For power to exist, there needs to be freedom and the capacity for subjects to choose from a different range of actions, including ones that resist power relations. Hence resistance is understood as ‘absolutely coextensive and contemporaneous to power’ (Foucault 2009, 126). Resistance always already exists where power can be found because there can be no power without resistance or resistance without power: “resistances exist within the strategic field of relations of power and relations of power themselves only exist relative to a multiplicity of points of resistance” (Davidson 2011, 27). Power evolves and emerges in relation to different points of resistance and resistance is in turn both born out of and feed into power relations. It thus entails that forms of resistance are always implicated within the strategies, techniques and power relations they oppose. Hence, for Foucault, “there is no single locus of great refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the ‘revolutionary’” (Foucault 2006, 86). This means that resistance takes place within relations of power and not ‘outside’, it does not constitute an ‘escape from power’ but rather a reconfiguration, as argued by Hekman:

The juridical theory defined power as restrictive, oppressive, productive of nothing. Thus freedom or liberation was defined as the escape from or absence of power. But if power is everywhere, producing the very elements of social life, then freedom must be defined in different terms. Resistance to power cannot, as in the juridical conception, be escape from the power of the sovereign but, rather, an attempt to reconfigure power. (Hekman 2004, 203)
Yet Foucault has often been criticised for offering relatively little theoretical insights into resistance and what concrete forms it would take. If the famous motto “where there is power, there is resistance” became a sort of intellectual emblem of Foucault’s work, many believe that he had more to say about how power functions than about specific forms of resistance (Death 2010, 236). Jessica J. Kulynych, for example, describes Foucault’s concept of resistance as “maddeningly indistinct” and “frustratingly indeterminate and underdeveloped” (1997, 328) while David Howarth also points to the “dearth of concrete analyses of resistance in Foucault’s writings.” (Howarth 2000, 83) Many have thus questioned the usefulness or “political efficiency of such an indeterminate concept” (Kulynych 1997, 329). But we can still point to what the somewhat under-theorised accounts of resistance in Foucault’s work allows and opens up in theoretical, if not empirical, terms.

One of the contributions of this approach is to destabilise conventional binaries opposing power to resistance. As Death argues, it allows looking at “how forms of resistance have the potential to reinforce and bolster, as well as and at the same time as, undermining and challenging dominant forms of global governance” (Death 2010, 236). A Foucauldian approach thus offers ways of understanding “how forms of resistance rely upon, and are even implicated within, the strategies, techniques and power relationships they oppose.” (Rose 1999, 240) Put differently, as Death claims, “we need to escape the dilemma of being either for or against” (Death 2016, 211). This approach thus offers a more nuanced understanding of instances of resistance that would maybe remain invisible from a traditional approach understanding resistance as only and completely the opposite/outside of power.

Another contribution of the concept of resistance in Foucault is to connect it explicitly to ethics, which for Foucault “concerns a self’s relationship to itself, how we relate to our own self; how we ‘govern’ our own conduct […].” (Milchman and Rosenberg 2011, 6) Hence for Foucault ethics refers to the ways in which subjects relate to and care for themselves and others and is not disconnected from politics but rather is the complement and necessary condition for its exercise. To look at the ways subjects relate to themselves and see these alternative forms of self-relation explicitly as resistance, re-establishing the notion of agency in Foucault’s theorising that has been so frequently critiqued (Davidson 2011, 32). The importance of connecting political and ethical forms of resistance stems from Foucault’s insistence that “the principal objective
today is not to discover but to refuse what we are” and to “promote new forms of subjectivity” (Foucault 1982, 785).

More concretely, we can connect Foucault’s account of the three different economies of modern power with his understanding of resistance by arguing that different economies and techniques of power will lead to (and are born out of) different forms of resistance. This is indeed what Mona Lilja and Stellan Vinthagen argue in an article that attempts to explore what specific forms of resistance would each economy of power entail. Aimed at offering more concrete tools to think resistance using Foucault’s work on different forms of power, they argue that sovereign, disciplinary, and governing economies of power correspond to different empirical forms and strategies of resistance. Sovereign power, for example, through its demand for absolute obedience, would lead to ‘openly defiant’ forms of resistance that challenge “through rebellions, strikes, boycotts, disobedience and political revolutions, by overthrowing kings, governments and regimes, with the attempt of ever more clever applications of violence, counter-power and strategies of power-play.” (Lilja and Vinthagen 2014, 113)

Resistance to disciplinary power, on the other hand, would entail strategies that ‘overtly or covertly’ refuse to “participate in the construction of new subjectivity/capacities/skills/organisations, or the de facto transformation of such social construction into something else—something not useful for power interests.” (Lilja and Vinthagen 2014, 114)

Finally, governing forms of power (and biopower in particular as argued by the authors of the article) lead to forms of ‘resistance culture’ encompassing “all the kind of biopolitical practices in which people question certain aspects of control over their lives and the conduct of their conduct”, aimed at avoiding the management of populations by “acting differently, in subcultures, and by cultivating a different set of values, practices and institutions.” (Lilja and Vinthagen 2014, 120)

Although such a schematic outline might not fit perfectly most situations in which multiple forms of power/resistance coexist and simultaneously shape subjectivities, practices, behaviours, and beliefs/truths, it raises interesting avenues to try to put resistance at the centre of the analysis and study more specifically how forms of resistance relate to, and interact with, different economies of power, as will be elaborated later in this chapter and in relation to the case studies throughout the thesis. But first, I will now turn more explicitly to logics of protection themselves in relation to this broad exploration of Foucault’s work on power and resistance.
Logics of Protection From a Foucauldian Perspective

What can we retain from this exploration of the concepts of power, truth, subject, and resistance in Foucault’s work for our understanding of logics of protection? Understanding power in this sense allows us to look at logics of protection differently and maybe find ways to avoid the conundrums identified in the previous chapter. First, such a conceptualisation allows us to understand logics of protection as relational and productive, hence allowing for more flexibility, nuances and complexity in the ways they operate and the positions one occupies within them. Also, following Foucault on state power, such a theorising allows us to look beyond the State and its official institutions of protection to make sense of logics of protection and female protectors: if power saturates the whole social body, then logics of protection do also take place within and through different social orders that might not be found in the military and other State institutions. And if power is not only repressive but productive and based upon, not opposed to, freedom, then we can start to understand how resistance can take place within logics of protection and does not have to be considered an ‘escape’ from them. Instead of focusing on ‘trade-offs’ between protection and independence/freedom, we can see how they are both always already coextensive to one another.

More specifically, I argue that logics of protection can be best understood as functioning simultaneously under the three economies of power analysed by Foucault: sovereign/coercive/judicial; disciplinary/normalising; and pastoral/governing. Through sovereign, disciplinary, and pastoral techniques of power such as judicial control, norm internalisation, and individualisation, these logics intend to produce the subject positions of the protectors and the protected but often produce the unprotected and unprotectable as well. Relying on, and enmeshed with, regimes of truth about gender, but also about race, coloniality, the alignment of gender/sex/sexuality, circulating at state and capillary levels, logics of protection create truths, norms, conducts, behaviours and desires about protection that define who creates themselves/are created as protectors, protected, but also unprotecteds (to whom protection is withdrawn or refused), or unprotectables (considered outside of the realm of protection altogether).

First, as noted by Young, logics of protection can be more usefully understood as pastoral power than as a form of power that represses only: it is often through the care of/for the protected rather than outright domination that the benevolent protector
provides protection, like the pastor ready to sacrifice himself for his flock (Young 2003, 6). But it also relies on disciplinary techniques of constant surveillance and normalised judgment in order to ‘better protect’. Modern panoptical techniques of power are definitely central to logics of protection, especially at the level of the State. CCTV cameras, enhanced surveillance technologies, evermore sophisticated security screenings, constant dataveillance, and the spying of citizens by their own governments are only some of the ways in which compliance and obedience of the protected is insured through an inescapable security ‘gaze’. These techniques create subjects who internalise certain norms about how to behave as a ‘good citizen’, aka as a ‘beautiful soul’ worthy of protection. And protective power operates through the never-ending collection of knowledge, data, and ‘truth’ about its subjects. As argued by Young about the security state, citizens accept these increasingly intrusive and further entrenched measures in exchange for a promise of security. After all, if one has nothing to hide, why oppose a pastoral power that promises ‘salvation’? Hence logics of protection produce ‘docile and useful bodies’ through the internalisation of norms and the accumulation of knowledge about its subjects through constant surveillance, with their compliance.

Beyond state security practices, logics of protection also involve the internalisation and circulation of certain norms at capillary levels about how one is supposed to conduct oneself in relation to protection. In fact, individuals constantly submit themselves to an internalised judgment about how they should behave according to such logics. Who is protecting whom and/or what, who requires/demands protection, and from whom protection is withdrawn or never offered in the first place vary from one context/logic to another but almost always involve a certain level of internalisation of norms of conduct each of these positions requires. In terms of gendered logics, for example, men will learn how to use their body to fight, and/or exude physical self-confidence in order to ‘fit’ the perceived role of a protector. Women, on the other hand, will internalise certain norms about how ‘beautiful souls’ are supposed to behave and look like in order to deserve protection and avoid threats. Internalised judgments about how a ‘good’ victim is supposed to conduct herself means that women will avoid certain clothing, locations and behaviours in order to conform to such ideals: taking a taxi home, avoiding unlit areas at night, dressing ‘soberly’, asking a ‘protector’ to accompany them home at night, and so on, are all ways in which women conduct their
own conduct in relation to logics of protection. Those who do not conform to one of
these two poles, who ‘fail’ to embody the protector or the protected figures whether by
action or design (the unprotected, the unprotectables and/or those who are considered
threats), will also internalise these norms and conventions by knowing not to count on,
and even to avoid, official ‘protectors’ and by developing a wide range of tactics to
insure one’s safety within the dominant logics of protection. Racialised individuals in
white majority countries, for example, will learn to avoid police officers and restrict or
modify certain behaviours in order to stay out of ‘trouble’, such as taping one’s driver’s
license to the wheel when driving in case of a police control to avoid having to reach
out to one’s pockets or car compartment, avoiding certain clothing such as hoodies or
sport clothes, turning the music down when seeing police officers to avoid being
stopped, and so on.

Logics of protection not only repress but also produce subjects, who also
produce themselves through such logics. To be more specific, logics of protection
produce the subjects of protection (the protectors), its objects (the protecteds) and the
threats; but also the ‘abjects’ of protection, those to whom protection is withdrawn,
refused or never offered in the first place. All of these different positions are intrinsic
and essential to logics of protection. For example, the abjects are useful to logics of
protection because they mark the borders of the domain of the subjects: they are needed
to make subjects ‘subjects’, as there is no ‘inside’ without the grey zones delimiting its
contours and populated with the ‘not-quite-yet’, ‘not-fully’ human. As Butler argues,
“This exclusionary matrix by which the subjects are formed thus requires the
simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet ‘subjects,’
but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject” (J. Butler 1993, 3).
Hence the position of the unprotectable is not coincidental to logics of protection but
fundamental to their functioning. Moreover, as argued before, the same person through
different contexts can occupy different positions simultaneously and/or alternatively.
Logics of protection are productive of subjects through their subjectivation
(assujettissement) to certain norms, practices, rituals, techniques and mechanisms of
protection, while also involving them actively through the internalisation of these
norms, behaviours, self-beliefs/truths, desires, energies by which they create themselves
(subjectivation) as subjects/objects/abjects of protection and conduct their own conduct
accordingly.
Yet, as argued before, protection can never be fully guaranteed and is always bound to fail. In fact, it regularly fails, as it is impossible to actually assure protection at all times: no matter how much data is collected, how many security measures are imposed at the airport, how many measures one takes to ‘behave’ according to the model of the ‘good’ citizen/protected, protectors can never predict and prevent all attacks on the protecteds. In other words, no matter how much knowledge/truth one collects and develops, protection can never be fully guaranteed. How then do logics of protection operate? They also function through an economy of fear that involves the obedience and submission of the protected towards the sovereign/protector in exchange for a promise of security/protection. After all, the protecteds often ‘know’ that their safety/security is never fully guaranteed, that it is actually impossible to always efficiently and fully protect populations and individuals, and the unprotected/unprotectables are usually fully aware of their positioning as the abjects of protection. Logics of protection still operate partly because of the internalised norms and modes of subjectivation/subjectification as argued before, but also because of the symbolic exchange/circulation of obedience and dependence for an alleviation of fear, a feeling of security.

It is thus not only through the production of subjects/objects/abjects positions, truths, internalised norms, and coercion that logics of protection exercise power but through a constant repetition of practices and performances of security intended to become what they purported to describe in the first place. Following Butler’s work on performativity, understood as “the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (J. Butler 1993, 3), we could therefore see logics of protection as performative in that they only ‘work’ or exist through a “ritualised repetition of acts, claims, discourses, ways of being” (J. Butler 1993) by which protection becomes the ‘truth’ it was supposed to describe all along. The logics of protection operate through the reiteration of performances of security to which the protected submit in exchange for a feeling of security (such as taking shoes off at the airport or having one’s bag searched at major events, for example). It is not only through the initial utterance of protection ‘I protect you’ that protection comes to exist as a norm, it is through a constant reiteration and repetition of acts, norms, conducts, discourses and narratives that protection becomes perceived as ‘real’. In other words, logics of protection constitute themselves as truths and the protected believe these truths
in exchange for (a feeling of) security, even in the face of counterevidence or, as Jasbir Puar would put it: “certain desired truths become lived as truths, as if they were truths, despite what counterevidence may exist.” Logics of protection therefore “produce the effects that they name and describe.” (Puar 2007, 39) To be protected is to be reassured by these constant performances that protection is being ensured. Put differently, under logics of protection, the game of truth is not only: ‘it is true, therefore I submit’ but rather ‘I submit, therefore it is true’.

This broad theorisation of logics of protection using Foucault’s work on power, truth, and the subject allows us to situate the resistance of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More in the context of the different logics of protection they are situated in and how such logics might function to create the multiple and potentially contradictory subject positions they occupy within them. We can also start to see how their acts of resistance might differ and take different forms according to the different economies of power their resistive strategies are seeking to address. Since logics of protection function under all three economies of power simultaneously, resistance to such logics should also adopt different forms linked to the mechanisms and techniques of the powers they seek to address, while also reproducing some of the same techniques and strategies as power itself. But, as mentioned in the previous chapter, what all cases have in common is that Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More all spoke courageous truths to power grounded in criticism, danger and moral duty. Hence what connects these cases is specifically the form of resistance that all actors enacted and that can be related to the practice of parrhesia. Indeed, I argue that the specific ways in which Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More resisted logics of protection can best be encompassed by using parrhesia as a framework against which to assess the ethical, political, and judicial practices of resistance enacted by these women who spoke truth to power.

Parrhesia as a Theoretical Framework

This section will thus proceed to explore Foucault’s and others’ work on the practice of parrhesia: what it consists of, how it relates to Foucault’s larger work on power, resistance, truth, and the subject, how it can be mobilised today, and what framework can be developed to address the specific case studies analysed in this thesis.
Understanding Parrhesia

Studied at length by Foucault at the end of his life, parrhesia refers to a practice in Ancient Greece that translates in English literally to frankness or ‘free-spokeness’ (franc-parler in French). It can be defined as follow: “parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognises truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself)” (Foucault 2001, 19). In Foucault’s exploration of the concept, he argues that parrhesia involves five core elements: frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty.

First, parrhesiastes are understood as the ones who speak frankly, without concealing anything; the ones who say as directly as possible everything they have in mind. Parrhesia, understood as frankness, therefore involves a particular relationship between the speaker and what s/he says that is clearly different from rhetoric or flattery: “For in parrhesia, the speaker makes it manifestly clear and obvious that what he says is his own opinion. And he does this by avoiding any kind of rhetorical form which would veil what he thinks. Instead, the parrhesiastes uses the most direct words and forms of expression he can find.” (Foucault 2001, 12)

Second, it refers to a certain relationship to truth: the speaker says what s/he believes to be true and it is true because the speaker knows it is true. In the Greek’s conception of parrhesia, there is an exact coincidence between truth and belief. Truth does not rely on a demonstration of factual evidence but rather on the personal qualities of the speaker. If there is some way of ‘proving’ that what s/he says is true, it is their courage: “such truth-having is guaranteed by the possession of certain moral qualities: when someone has certain moral qualities, then that is the proof that he has access to truth—and vice versa.” (Foucault 2001, 15)

Third, a parrhesiastes is someone who takes a risk, someone who has the courage to say the truth in the face of some danger, even death in extreme cases. It is the courage in the face of risk or danger that ties parrhesia to truth, as exposed above. This risk comes from the notion of criticism. In fact, parrhesia is a form of criticism addressed to someone in a higher position of power. In parrhesia, the speaker is always inferior to the one s/he speaks to: “The parrhesia comes from ‘below,’ as it were, and is directed towards ‘above’” (Foucault 2001, 18). This difference in power involves a risk that the parrhesiastes will be punished by the powerful for their fearless criticism.
Finally, parrhesia is also associated with a sense of duty to help others, to improve a situation. Speaking the truth had to be regarded as a duty by the speaker who was free to remain silent in the face of danger but chose parrhesia instead. A truth obtained under torture or other form of coercion is not parrhesia; it is therefore linked to freedom as well as duty. Speaking the truth is felt by the parrhesiastes as a moral duty towards truth, a duty towards others, and a duty towards oneself; as a way of being true to oneself as well as improving a situation. In short,

In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. (Foucault 2001, 19–20)

In studying the practice, Foucault was interested mostly in the problem of the truth-teller, of truth-telling as an activity or a role (Foucault 2001). Consistent with his genealogical approach, he looked at the practice’s historical evolution from the political spheres to the philosophical and ethical ones. In fact, he was interested in looking at how the political practice of parrhesia, which consisted in the right for some citizens of Athens to address the Assembly and was a way to ascend to power, became problematised. At first, parrhesia was understood as a political right in Athens held by citizens to address the Assembly⁶ (Foucault 2010). But the practice went into a crisis in democracy when there was no way to differentiate between the ‘good’ parrhesia and the ‘bad’ parrhesia, or ‘false truth-telling’ used by rhetoricians or demagogues to ascend to power by saying what the people wanted to hear (Foucault 2010). Hence parrhesia, and through it, democracy, were problematised. This ‘democratic parrhesia’ has to be differentiated from ‘monarchic parrhesia’, which consisted in an advisor speaking frank and uncomfortable truths to the sovereign in order to guide his governing.

After this crisis of parrhesia, the concept evolved towards a more philosophical practice, understood as the education of the prince by a philosopher: “Philosophical parrēsia is the education of the prince’s soul in the philosophical mode of life, askēsis, which is a government of oneself in order make the prince become a philosopher.” (Larsen n.d.) Under Socrates, it further shifted from the prince’s soul to the lives and souls of all the people he met. Socratic parrhesia became tied to the care for the self, as an ethico-philosophical way of living (Foucault 2010, 320). This philosophical meaning of parrhesia became further exemplified by the Cynics’ way of life later on in which

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⁶ Women, slaves, or non-citizens, a status acquired by birth, did not have the right to address the Assembly, thus did not have the right to parrhesia.
they would embody that fearless truth-speaking through their provocative conduct and everyday lives (see Foucault 2011). This philosophical duty to truth was a way to take care of oneself by speaking frankly despite the risks to one’s friendships, position, or safety. Parrhesia was then about being true to oneself and to others, a way of living a true life and to know oneself.

Through this exploration of the practice’s evolution, Foucault states that he was interested in discovering instances of problematisation: when a certain unquestioned practice “becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and indues a crisis in the previously silent behaviour, habits, practices, and institutions.” (Foucault 2001, 74) Moreover, Foucault was also interested in tracing the practice in politics and philosophy as both the origin of a critical attitude of ‘voluntary insubmission’ understood as the non-submission to authority (Foucault 2007a, 47) and of practices of self-knowledge such as the ones found in pastoral/governing power (see Folkers 2016; Rossing 2014; Jobe 2014).

**Parrhesia: Truth, Subjectivity, and Resistance**

Beyond the five elements that Foucault saw as constituting parrhesia highlighted above, to better understand what the practice entails, I suggest looking at its relationship with three other major themes for Foucault, especially in relation to parrhesia: truth, subjectivity, and resistance.

**Parrhesia and Truth**

The relationship between parrhesia and truth is a complicated one that has been explored in detail by both Foucault and other scholars. As we have seen, one of the core elements of parrhesia is truth. For the Ancient Greeks, parrhesia was in and of itself a mode of veridiction (a way of separating the true from the false) since there was an exact coincidence between belief and truth, the proof of which was provided by the moral qualities of the speaker. Foucault differentiates it from other modes of veridiction existing in Antiquity, such as *teckne* (the know-how or expertise, like teaching or scientific discourse in our days), prophecy (speaking in the name of someone else (often God) about a future yet to come, like preachers) and wisdom (telling the truth about the being of things and their nature, mostly practiced by philosophers), although these modes often combined (Foucault 2011). He therefore clearly stated that parrhesia as a mode of veridiction could not exist in our Cartesian epistemological framework. In fact, since Descartes, truth relies on the observation of evidence and facts, truth
‘corresponds’ to a material, observable reality: “For before Descartes obtains indubitably clear and distinct evidence, he is not certain that what he believes is, in fact, true.” (Foucault 2001, 15) Hence parrhesiastic truth is different from Cartesian and scientific truth. As summarised by Alison Ross: “Foucault distinguishes the moderns’ tests of verification in context-independent rules (science) or procedures of dubitability (Cartesian philosophy) from the ‘proof’ furnished by the sincerity of the parrhesiastes.” (Ross 2008, 62)

Hence the truth in parrhesia is not epistemological, as we find in Descartes onwards where “truth is an inner conviction of certainty concerning the nature of the external world” (Dyrberg 2014, 67), but political. As Torben Bech Dyrberg puts it, it is a political approach to truth that sees “truth as practical as opposed to epistemological, critical as opposed to analytical and as something which is enacted as opposed to something that is demonstrated.” (Dyrberg 2014, 73) Hence, as argued by Daniele Lorenzini, parrhesiastic truth does not contain any “logical truth-value”, it is neither true nor false but rather has to be looked at from a “strategic point of view” as “a force in a field of battle.” (Lorenzini 2015, 267) In sum, “parrhesia is not discursive, nor rhetorical, nor empirical. In fact, it is not anything to do with the internal quality of the truth. What is significant is the telling—and that the telling exposes the teller to a risk, or danger, from the person to whom the truth is told.” (Death 2016, 213)

In fact, as Foucault states, the idea in studying parrhesia is not to define what ‘truth’ is or what criteria are used to define what is true and what is not. It is rather an attempt to study parrhesia as a modality of truth-telling, to study “truth-telling as a specific activity, or as a role” (Foucault 2001, 169). Hence parrhesia is more than a mode of veridiction: it is an activity, an act, an event, a modality of truth-telling in which the act speaks for itself more then the content of the truths as such. Parrhesia is thus not about the content of the truth but about the act of telling, an act that involves taking a risk and thus requires courage. As Wim Vandekerckhove and Suzan Langenberg put it, parrhesia is an event: it is not about ‘me’ or ‘this,’ it is about “me saying this” and the fact that “once I have said it, there is no way back” [to a time when truth had not been spoken] (Vandekerckhove and Langenberg 2012, 8).

Contrary to Foucault’s earlier work in which truth was theorised as a relay, an instrument and an effect of power (Lorenzini 2015; Dyrberg 2014; Ross 2008), in parrhesia truth is not something to be extracted/excavated from the depth of one’s souls or that needs to be discovered, normalised and analysed by experts. Since they are not
epistemological truths, parrhesiastic truths require neither an experiential nor a scientific process of extraction in order to be ‘revealed’ or ‘discovered’, but rather the courage to speak the truth within a field of force. In other words, “the potential for transformative action then resides in the act of truth-telling rather than imploring the acquisition of that truth itself.” (Mills 2015, 29) The truths of parrhesia are already ‘there’, they just require someone with the courage to take the risks involved in stating them. As Ross puts it: “in the context of parrhesia, the truths told are there, what is needed is someone courageous enough to speak them.” (Ross 2008, 69)

This relationship to truth is one of the main aspects that speak directly to the cases of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More. In fact, all of these female protectors enact a certain relationship to truth but they do not reveal some hidden, unspoken truths about protection. After all, when Manning leaked those documents, the scandal of Abu Ghraib and the human rights’ abuses at Guantanamo Bay, for example, had already been widely publicised and the abuses committed by the U.S. military during the ‘War on Terror’ were not exactly a secret. Similarly, Joya claims to speak truths that are already widely known by the ‘barefoot Afghan people’ and the same can be said of Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More. None of these actors claim to be revealing/uncovering the truth but rather to expose the ‘open secrets’ of different authorities and social orders claiming to enact protection. In other words, these figures stated the equivalent of ‘the emperor has no clothes’ (Andersen 2015). Hence what marks their relationship to truth is not a Cartesian observation of facts but the courage to speak the truth in the face of danger.

Parrhesia and the Subject

Second, parrhesia involves a specific relationship of the subject with herself. It is an act that binds the subject to the truth she is speaking. It is a pact freely made with oneself through which the parrhesiastes becomes “the person who tells the truth, who has told the truth, and who recognises oneself in and as the person who has told the truth.” (Foucault 2010, 68) Parrhesia is therefore first about the subject’s relationship to herself. If the threat/risk of speaking comes from the outside and necessarily involves a relationship to an ‘other’, Foucault argues that “the parrhesiastes primarily chooses a specific relationship to himself: he prefers himself as a truth-teller rather than as a living being who is false to himself.” (Foucault 2001, 17)
the subject, truth, and herself is what makes parrhesia different from other forms of truth-speaking.

For example, Foucault analysed how parrhesiastic statements differ from performative utterances that rely on the status of the person speaking and usually involves codified effects known in advance. In parrhesia, the event of enunciating the truth may affect the person’s being and opens up effects that are not known (Foucault 2011). Hence while performative utterances do not tie the speaker to the truth she is speaking and produce effects that are known in advance, parrhesiastic utterances as a class of statement involves the speaker deeply with the truth she is speaking and open up possibilities that are unknown. To illustrate this further, Lorenzini uses the distinction between notional assent and real assent. Notional assent is when one adheres to a theoretical proposition in an abstract way, as in ‘the sky is blue’ or ‘2+2=4’ while real assent “involves the whole being” and commits one to something that might change her life (Lorenzini 2015, 267). Lorenzini thus argues that “parrhesia always requires that the speaker has already given a real assent to the statement he utters, while making it impossible for his interlocutor to give to that statement a simple notional assent.” (Lorenzini 2015, 267) This illustrates what Foucault calls the ‘dramatics of discourse’. Stripped from all “pathos from the word,” the dramatics of discourse concern precisely those instances when “the very event of the enunciation may affect the enunciator’s being” (Foucault 2010, 68). In other words, in the dramatics of discourse, the statement and its enunciation “modify, or affirm, or anyway determine and clarify” the enunciator’s mode of being, rather than the opposite. This is why, as Folkers argue: “the question that sums up the dramatics of truth-speaking is not the schoolmastery ‘What are your reasons?’ but the tyrannical ‘How dare you?’” (Folkers 2016, 8).

This relation to the self is also what makes parrhesia different from rhetoric truth-speaking because, as Foucault argues, the rhetorician “is perfectly capable of saying something completely different from what he knows, believes, and thinks,” while parrhesia entails a “strong, manifest, evident foundation between the person speaking and what he says.” (Foucault 2011, 13) Parrhesia’s main aim is not to convince or persuade: “it is a discourse which does not owe its strength (its *dunamis*) to the fact that it persuades. It is a discourse which owes its *dunamis* to the fact that it

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7 Foucault’s discussion of this differentiation helps us understand how the repetition of norms and practices of security/protection that reproduce Logics of protection, as discussed — i.e. the performativity of protection by protectors, as discussed before — differs from the parrhesiastes’ resistance/parrhesia.
springs from the very being which speaks through it” (Foucault 2010, 327). As Ross puts it, it is a speech that “do not aim to persuade but to tell.” (Ross 2008, 69) Hence even though persuasion might be part of it, “parrhesia is not simply about convincing others –here there is, of course, an affinity with rhetoric—but primarily about setting up a covenant of sorts. This pact goes beyond rhetoric and binds the individual to his or her statement and further to the political community.” (Dyrberg 2014, 89)

Hence parrhesia has the potential not only to transform a situation but also to transform the subject herself through this pact made with oneself that profoundly binds the self to the truth spoken. In relation to logics of protection, it means that through their parrhesiastic truth-telling, dissident female protectors have the potential to create themselves as protectors where they were positioned as the protected, unprotected, and/or unprotectable; they potentially turn themselves from the objects/abjects of protection into subjects of protection. By doing so, they reinvent and subvert these categories while at the same re-inscribing them in logics of protection. Parrhesiastic ‘snap moments’ can thus be conceptualised as ‘practices of freedom’ through which dissident protectors create themselves as subjects through an alternative mode of subjectivation against and yet within logics of protection. This point about subjectivity is thus another element that highlights the particularities of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang and Idle No More cases. In speaking out, these women bound themselves to the truth they were speaking: they became the whistleblower, the vigilantes, the activists, the water protectors who spoke the truth about/to logics of protection.

**Parrhesia and Resistance**

Finally, parrhesia has to be explored in relation to resistance. As mentioned before, for truth-telling to be parrhesia one has to freely take the risks involved in speaking dangerous truths out of a sense of duty: a truth obtained under some form of coercion is not parrhesia. Parrhesia is also an oppositional practice rooted in criticism and disobedience. As Foucault puts it: “where there is obedience, there cannot be parrhesia” (Foucault 2011, 336). It is thus a practice grounded in freedom, understood by Foucault as the possibility to change oneself, and disobedience. This differentiates it from other types of truth-telling and regimes of truth, such as avowal in justice, for example, based on the recognition of the truth about oneself obtained through the disciplinary and coercive measures of the medical apparatus (as expressed through the Leuret example in Foucault 2014). Parrhesia offers a form of subjectivation, of self-
relation, different from other modes of subjectivation. Parrhesia can be understood as a practice that is “both the product of and in turn produces an oppositional, disobedient self-relation.” (Taylor 2013, 96) Yet it is also rooted and born out of power relations: parrhesia opens up possibilities to change a situation and change oneself, but consistently with Foucault’s conceptualisation of resistance, it also reproduces some aspects of power relations even while challenging them. As Emily Mills argues, in parrhesia “the ‘governed’ speaks a frank, honest and politically useful discourse to ‘the governing’” (Mills 2015, 24) in that it challenges power to change and transform while also feeding into it.

This approach to parrhesia as resistance is consistent with the cases of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More in that they do speak truth to the power of logics of protection but, as mentioned before, they do not do so from outside of those logics or ‘escape’ them altogether. They might not advocate for a complete rejection or simple opposition to the logics of protection. Instead, they turn themselves into protectors while still challenging the dominant logics of protection and seeking to enact change. Hence they are part of and may employ the same strategies and techniques of power as those logics of protection: by turning themselves into protectors, they might very well aim to conduct the conduct of people, reproduce some of the norms under which those logics function, and use similar tactics and techniques. But they still seek to enact change and aim to subvert, denounce, transform, challenge, and/or change the logics of protection in which they are inserted, and who they are in relation to those logics. Parrhesiastic truth-speaking in these cases is undeniably rooted in disobedience and criticism of dominant logics of protection while reproducing some of their ways of functioning at the same time.

Parrhesia Today

Many scholars have taken on parrhesia to explore contemporary manifestations of fearless speech and courageous truth-speaking to power. Some scholars have focused on how to mobilise parrhesia to understand modern instances of resistance such as civil disobedience and rioting, by analysing for example Malcolm X (Novak 2006), the UK and Ferguson riots (Sokhi-Bulley 2016, 2015), or the Arab Spring (Sauter and Kendall 2011). Some also compared modern practices of whistleblowing to the ancient practice of parrhesia (Mansbach 2011, 2009; Vandekerckhove and Langenberg 2012) and more specifically looked at Wikileaks (Nayar 2011; Sauter and Kendall 2011) and Edward
Snowden (Mills 2015; Frey 2015) to see what such practices open up and how they relate to parrhesia as studied by Foucault. Others have also studied less spectacular and/or more mundane instances of speaking truth to power and how parrhesia can be mobilised to understand those instances, such as victims’ testimonies in the 9/11 commission (Simon 2005), critical race humour (Rossing 2014; Quévreux 2012), and even practices such as nursing (Perron 2013), trans coming out (T. R. Johnston 2013) or countering sexual violence (Taylor 2013). Located in different disciplines of the social sciences, from law to nursing to sociology or political science, such studies have mobilised parrhesia to understand this wide array of truth-telling practices in contemporary contexts.

Yet Foucault clearly states that parrhesia as a mode of veridiction could not exist in our Cartesian epistemological framework (Foucault 2001, 15). But he argued that although the parrhesiastic mode of veridiction disappeared as such, we can perhaps find it grafted on, or underpinned by other modalities of truth, such as teckne, prophecy or wisdom. For example, he states that revolutionary discourse, that he recognised as a form of prophetic truth-telling, can play the role of parrhesia “when it takes the form of a critique of existing society” (Foucault 2011, 30) and that “when scientific discourse is deployed as criticism of prejudices, of existing forms of knowledge, of dominant institutions, of current ways of doing things, it plays a parrhesiastic role.” (Idem)

Since Foucault was mostly interested in studying ‘how individuals are turned into subjects’ and claimed that resistance today should be about ‘refusing what we are’, parrhesia as an ethical, judicial, and political practice can certainly offer interesting insights for resisting modern forms of power. In fact, one might claim that his study of the Greeks was intended to offer insights into how to enact ethical resistance in today’s world. As he himself states: “among the cultural inventions of mankind there is a treasury of devices, techniques, ideas, procedures, and so on, that cannot exactly be reactivated, but at least constitute, or help to constitute, a certain point of view which can be very useful as a tool for analysing what’s going on now—and to change it.” (Foucault 1991, 361) Following this logic, it becomes not only legitimate but also potentially very useful to use parrhesia as a framework to understand contemporary instances of fearless truth-telling.

Many scholars in any case seem to think so. Frey, for example, argues: “it is not enough to simply know that parrhesia once existed and was discussed, practices, and institutionalised alongside democratic practices; rather, we must come to see it as an
active, if heretofore largely unnamed concept, alive and well in our everyday world, still seeking to enact change despite risk.” (Frey 2015, 85) She suggests that, while parrhesia as a term might not be “commonly used in current vernacular speech”, the practice itself is in fact ‘alive and well’ and draws from long and interconnected histories of resistance through truth-telling. Similarly, Huckaby argues that the practice might have evolved in its strategies and manifestations, but not in its nature:

As times and cultures change, parrhesiastes change as well, and contemporary parrhesiastes develop new strategies as previous ones became outdated or failed. Because of changes in the strategies of power, the circumstances of risks, discursive venues over time and across cultures, the activity of freely speaking, parrhesiazesthai, adapts. The nature and the role of the parrhesiastes, however, are today as they were nearly 2,500 years ago. (Huckaby 2007, 10)

While one ought to be careful not to suggest that the parrhesiastes’ nature and role are the same as they were for the Greeks, I argue that it is important to examine the current manifestations of parrhesiastic practices of fearless speech to power in contemporary politics and societies. If most of the works cited above, conducted by scholars who have used parrhesia to understand contemporary instances of speaking truth to power, constitute good starting points for my own research, they also show limitations. In fact, few have developed an in-depth, detailed, and critical understanding of how to use parrhesia as a framework and what exactly such a framework would entail; few have compared multiple case studies to analyse multiple instances of modern parrhesiastic speech; and few have mobilised gender as a core element in understanding resistive truth-speaking practices. Hence a more detailed understanding of parrhesia as a framework needs to be developed in order to better answer my research questions.

Political, Judicial, and Ethical Modalities of Parrhesia

More specifically, what can we retain from this exploration of parrhesia? I argue that we can trace three specific modalities of parrhesia that will be useful to understand my cases: political, judicial, and ethical. Of course, these modalities are all intertwined and interconnected: one is always involved in the others and vice versa. But it might be useful to detail all three as distinct, yet interconnected, aspects of parrhesia, especially for the cases I am concerned with, to better grasp the functioning and particularities of each case.

Building on Foucault’s work, political parrhesia refers to the act of speaking publicly to challenge/criticise power. It usually takes place within the polis and...
addresses the ways it is governed. In this area, parrhesiastic resistance can thus be understood as the “will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price.” (Foucault 2007b, 75) As Foucault argues about critique and resistance, it is not about the will not to be governed at all, but rather how not to be governed so much or not that way or not by them or not with those consequences. Political parrhesia is about speaking truth to power to address and problematise certain aspects of governance in the hope of enacting change. It might address the governing/pastoral, but also the sovereign and/or disciplinary techniques of power in their political forms. In this modality, parrhesia is also a game.

The parrhesiastic game, as Foucault states, takes place when the fearless speaker is ready to take the risks of stating uncomfortable truths to power in the hope that the receiver of that truth will be brave enough to hear and accept it (Foucault 2011, 12). The parrhesiastes are thus hoping that their words/actions will have a positive impact and that, because of this, the act is going to be met with respect instead of punishment (Walters 2014, 279). This is the challenge-blackmail game that Foucault refers to that could go along those lines: ‘I am telling you a truth you do not want to hear, but because I warn you that you will not want to hear it, I challenge you to punish me and prove me right about the truth and yourself’. Or, to put it simply: “if you punish me I was right about you not being able to accept the truth” (see Foucault 2011, 39). For example, Foucault looked at cases of parrhesia against one’s master, consisting of the “truth-telling of the person who must obey but who, faced with the master’s madness, is justified in opposing him with the truth.” (Foucault 2010, 161) He traced back in such cases what he called the parrhesiastic pact: “if he wishes to govern properly, the one with power must accept that those who are weaker tell him the truth, even the unpleasant truth.” (Foucault 2010, 163) It is this pact that offered some kind of guarantee to the parrhesiast or at least some hope that their fearless speech would not be met with punishment, and made of parrhesia a political game. Hence parrhesia is also a game and that is what makes its truth dangerous, but also what forces power to react in either rejecting that truth and punishing the truth-teller, or allowing the truth-claim to enter the political domain.

Secondly, ethics is a core component of parrhesia. For Foucault, ethics involves the self’s relationship to itself, the ways in which subjects relate to and care for their own selves. Parrhesia, as mentioned before, is based on a pact the speaker makes with
oneself in relation to truth, and thus has the potential to change the enunciator’s being. Hence parrhesia can also be seen as a technique of the self which Foucault defines as techniques by which individuals “effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conducts, and way of being, so as to transform themselves […]” (Foucault 1988) Parrhesia therefore involves an ethical self-relation rooted in courage, criticism, and truth, potentially different from modes of subjectivation offered by normalising/disciplinary forms of power. Parrhesia, through ‘disobedient’ truth-telling, thus has the potential of producing subjects in terms that “do not set the soul over the body, that do not make the relationships of self-formation into techniques of discipline, and that do not result in a ‘knowing subject’ developed in reference to a body of knowledge (savoirs).” (Luxon 2008, 384–85)

But even though the pact is with oneself and with the truth that the parrhesiastes establishes, the ethos it promotes reaches beyond her own self. As elaborated before on Lorenzini’s work, parrhesia makes it impossible for the receiver of the truth to give a simple notional assent to parrhesiastic acts. In other words: “through his own way of living and being, the parrhesiast shows us that it is not possible to consider true what he says without feeling the need to change our ethos.” (Lorenzini 2015, 267) By promoting a particular ethos grounded in courage, freedom, and critique, parrhesiastic resistance therefore also opens up potential for ethical change beyond the speaker herself. In fact, as argued by Nancy Luxon, parrhesia “allows the audience to cultivate and exercise scepticism towards authority, and yet finishes with an enabling self-cultivation and trust rather than a disabling paralysis and dependency.” (Luxon 2004, 485)

Finally, in his last lectures, Foucault also looked at what he called judicial parrhesia: the fearless speech of someone “in a profoundly unequal situation” who denounces the injustices committed by the strong and powerful (Foucault 2010, 154). Using mostly the case of Creusa as related in the play Ion, Foucault describes this instance of parrhesia as the “cry of the powerless against someone who misuses his own strength.” (Idem) In the play, Creusa has been seduced (raped?) by Apollo and gave birth to an illegitimate son that she had to abandon. At some point in the story, she decides to publicly speak truth to him and reveal the injustice he has committed. At this point in the play, she states: “Where shall we go to demand justice when it is the iniquity of the powerful that destroys us?” (Foucault 2010, 135) In this type of
parrhesia, as Foucault explains, “a powerful person has committed an offense; this offense is an injustice for someone [...] who cannot really fight or take revenge, and who is in a profoundly unequal situation. So, what can he do? He can do one thing: he can speak, at risk and danger to himself he can stand up before the person who committed the injustice and speak. And at this point his speech is called parrhesia.” (Foucault 2010, 134) Through this modality of parrhesiastic truth-telling, the aim is to speak truth to injustices committed by the powerful. It is thus directly linked to the administration of justice as it addresses impunity, injustices, and inequalities. In this sense, judicial parrhesia speaks to judicial forms of power, but can also address its governing/pastoral and disciplinary techniques, as long as it criticises the powerful on their mis/administration of justice from the position of someone towards whom an offense has been committed, someone in a marginalised and/or profoundly subordinated position who demands access to justice.

Judicial modalities explicit parrhesia’s relationship to truth as detailed before since here it is clear that the truth is not something to be discovered but something to be courageously told. In fact, it is about speaking truth to someone who very well knows the truth since they are the one who committed an offense, as exemplified by Creusa’s case. Foucault makes this aspect of truth as already there/known explicit when he highlights: “Creusa’s confession is made to the one who knows, and who knows better than anyone, since Apollo himself seduced her and is the father of her child. She thus turns back against Apollo a truth that he knows full well.” (Foucault 2010, 121)

If the terminology is problematic (here Creusa ‘has only her tears’, is ‘weak and powerless’, ‘cannot really fight’, and is in a ‘profoundly unequal situation’; yet between being ‘powerless’ and ‘powerful’, as well as between ‘only one’s tears’ and the ‘capacity to fight’ lay a continuum in terms of power and strategies for resistance that would merit more nuances), this modality of parrhesia is interesting for my cases because it focuses on the positionality of the parrhesiastes as a member of a marginalised and/or subordinated group. In fact, if Foucault was mostly looking at the fearless speech of free men, other scholars have explored the potential parrhesia offers for marginalised populations for whom the very act of speaking is already a challenge to established norms and conventions, and for whom parrhesia might be the only means available to demand/enact change and justice (Frey 2015; Sokhi-Bulley 2015; Rossing 2014). In these cases, parrhesia involves breaking one’s assigned position of silence and
marginalisation. The courage to speak the truth in the face of an injustice committed by the powerful might come not only from the game detailed above (the hope that the act will be met with respect instead of punishment) but might also come from “a sense of urgency and duty to speak truth when the security of silence is no longer viable” (Rossing 2014, 22), that is to say when the subalterns’ existence is threatened to a point where speaking truth about the injustices of the powerful becomes a matter of survival.

Yet who can speak and in whose name is an important question when it comes to positionality. Foucault’s definition of parrhesia includes the moral duty to speak to improve one’s and others’ situation, imply that the powerless who is speaking the truth often also speaks in the name of others. Most of my case studies also involve a parrhesiaste who is speaking for others as well as for oneself: as we will see, Joya speaks for the ‘barefoot Afghan people’; Manning speaks in part for the Iraqi and Afghan victims of the U.S. military’s crimes and abuses; Sampat Pal speaks in the name of the vulnerable people she defends/protects. In this sense, the truth-teller is also in a position of power towards those in whose name she speaks the truth. There are political implications in ‘speaking for’ others: it involves that the speaker turns herself into a truth-teller against dominant powers, but also positions herself ‘above’ those in whose name she speaks the truth. The event of speaking fearlessly to power is thus an ethical, judicial, and political practice grounded in risk out of a moral duty. But it would be misguided to ignore the effects it has in constructing the subject as one who can and does speak for others as well as for herself. As raised by Alcoff in an article about the issue with ‘speaking for’ others, the practice is “often born out of a desire for mastery, to privilege oneself as the one who more correctly understands the truth about another’s situation or as one who can champion a just cause and thus achieve glory and praise.” (Alcoff 1991, 29)

In speaking truth to power for others as well as for oneself, the subject creates herself as a truth-teller but also participate in constructing these others’ subject-positions. Foucault did recognise that the original political form of parrhesia could not be practiced by anyone: only select members of the Assembly got to speak and ‘ascend’ within the agora. Yet he did not expand much on what it involves in terms of the truth being spoken: as in representative democracy, the parrhesiast speaking inconvenient truths in front of the agora is not only speaking for herself but is representing the
interests of those others who are hurt by the assembly or the Prince, yet cannot speak truth for themselves or be heard speaking the truth. Hence we cannot leave aside the political effects of the ‘moral duty’ upon which one speaks and the moral superiority it thus confers. How much ‘below’ can the parrhesiast be in relation to the ‘above’ and how does that affect the practice of fearless speech to power? The empirical chapters will aim at answering this question by looking at how the resistance of dissident female protectors is always embedded in the logics of protection their address and the economies of power upon which they rely, including by reproducing them through their own positioning as protectors who speak for others.

**Operationalisation**

We have seen how parrhesia as a practice involves different core elements and has a particular relationship to truth, the subject and resistance as well as involving different modalities, namely political, judicial, and ethical modalities. What is left to do then before we can turn to the actual case studies of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More, is to turn this theoretical framework into an operational methodological framework that can be applied to these cases.

**Discourse Theory and Methodology**

Where does this theorisation of logics of protection and parrhesia leave us in terms of operationalisation? Consistent with Foucault’s work, this thesis’ methodology and epistemology are rooted in discourse theory. As David Howarth argues: “discourse theorists are concerned with how, under what conditions, and for what reasons, discourses are constructed, contested, and changed.” (Howarth 2000, 131) In fact, this thesis looks at how logics of protection are contested and changed by figures of dissident female protectors in different contexts: its aim is not to explain and predict but rather to “describe, understand, interpret and evaluate [those] carefully constructed objects of investigation” (Howarth 2000, 139). In other words, the thesis aims at understanding how parrhesiastes *problematise* logics of protection. For Foucault, problematisation occurs when a certain unquestioned practice “becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behaviour, habits, practices, and institutions.” (Foucault 2001, 74) Foucault’s strategy of problematisation is thus “a matter of analysing, not behaviour or ideas, nor societies and their ‘ideologies’, but the problematisations through which being offers
itself to be, necessarily, thought—and the practices on the basis of which these problematisations are formed” (Foucault 1990b, 11). This approach to problematisation led me to ask these three research questions:

1. In what ways might the ‘snap’ moments of these multiple types of female protectors be read as acts of parrhesia? How do these acts illustrate, problematise, and disrupt multiple logics of protection and the power relations upon which they rely?

2. How might these cases critically recast and expand parrhesia as a framework, idea, and/or historically evolving practice that others have taken up in the social sciences?

3. How do these disruptions expand and/or refocus debates on protection and its logics in International Relations and Feminist Security Studies?

Taking a Foucauldian approach to truth, subjectivity, and power/resistance, the aim of this thesis is not to decide whether these women were right or wrong in doing what they did or if what they are saying is in fact ‘true.’ The point is to try to see if/how parrhesia offers a perspective through which we can illuminate the processes of subjectivation entailed in their speeches/actions and their resulting relationship to justice, ethics, and politics. That is to better understand what such fearless speech does to the way we understand logics of protection, how it politically destabilises them, and what it can tell us about resistance to such logics. In other words, this is not about ‘them’ or ‘this’ (the content of their speech), it’s about ‘them saying this’ and what this act or event did and/or might do to themselves and to the world.

In fact, narratives are always both limited and enabled by the contexts in which they are embedded. As Molly Andrews and al. further state: “we perceive reality in terms of stories, and ultimately how we construct, interpret, digest, and recount for others our own experiences bears a strong relationship to the story-lines that are already ‘out there’” (Andrews and al. 2007, 100). In other words, these narratives “[do] not reveal a pre-existing ‘truth’ about the world, but, rather, create meanings about the world through representing it.” (Khalid 2011, 16) “Telling stories”, as Laura Shepherd argues, is central to the construction of our ideas and ideals about the world, our place in it, and even ourselves (Shepherd 2013). As such, narratives both “enable and limit representation” that, in turn, shapes our conception of the world and what possibilities
we have inside it (Wibben 2011, 43). These stories are never fixed but are always in an unstable contest for meaning. Narratives/stories can therefore both support and challenge world politics and existing relations of power. (Welde 2003, 7)

Taking the problematisation of logics of protection by different figures of female dissident protectors as its starting point, this thesis uses parrhesia as a framework to understand and analyse these resistive practices that take the specific form of dangerous truth-speaking to power. Parrhesia as a framework allows us to put acts of resistance at the centre of the analysis and start from there, without losing sight of their connections with power, as elaborated before on Foucault’s understanding of discourse as both an instrument of power and a mean of resistance.

Collecting Empirical Data

To answer the research questions, I chose to conduct a comparative (qualitative) case study analysis. Comparing different case studies allows me to achieve two aims: it allows the exploration of a multiplicity of diverse logics of protection in different contexts as well as the diversity of resistive practices to such logics; and it also explores if and how parrhesia as a framework can be mobilised in a diversity of contemporary instances of speaking truth to power. But, consistent with a discourse theory approach, each case needs to be explored in its own right and situated within its own context, as will be elaborated further below. This means that the number of cases has to be limited, as argued by Pamela Palmater and Andre Gingrich: “since the cases are compared in their complexity, the number of cases have to be kept low.” (Palmeter and Gingrich 2013, 96) Palmater and Gingrich further argue that the number of cases tend to be situated between two and four, which “allows the researcher comprehensively to examine the context of each case.” (Palmater and Gingrich 2013, 99) This is why the thesis will be limited to four cases in order to be able to explore and analyse them in depth. Furthermore, since the aim is to explore the plurality and multiplicity of logics of protection and instances of resistance, cases have been chosen because of their differences, and not despite them. This is what Howarth calls “maximum variation cases”, which involves choosing a number of cases “precisely because they are as different from each other as possible” (Howarth 2005, 330). In this case, this allows to really explore how different logics of protection intersect and function in a wide variety of contexts as well as applying parrhesia to diversified instances of speaking dangerous
truths to power to see what it might bring to our understanding of parrhesiastic acts today.

The criteria for case selection are as follow: 1-The female protector(s) identify as female. 2-They “snap.” By snapping, I mean being parrhesiastes in the form of vigilantes, whistleblowers, protestors, activists, and so forth. It constitutes a performance of speaking truth to power addressed to, in reaction to, or being linked to the perceived failures, lacks, exclusions, and injustices of dominant institutions/actors of protection. This means that these protectors are a) positioned from ‘below’ directed towards ‘above’, that they have less power than the institutions/logics/groups they are criticising; b) they act/react not only for their own sake but for the sake of others as well, to help/protect/improve other people’s situation as well as their own; c) the ‘snap’ involves taking a risk: it breaks some rules, norms, truths, and subject positions of dominant logics of protection and as such requires courage; d) the ‘snap’ is expressed through ‘speaking the truth’ (in whatever forms this speech may take); 3-These ‘snap’ moments illustrate/address one or many logics of protection. It shows potentiality for disturbing or destabilising these logics. 4-These snap moments are made publicly, they find their ways into public discourses. The sources used to access these different instances of speaking dangerous truth to power are primary and secondary sources either written by/with, or closely about, the female protectors and their fearless speech such as (auto) biographies, journal articles, blog posts/articles, video and/or written interviews, court proceedings, official websites, and so forth.

**Analysing Data**

The analysis of the collected data will proceed in three main steps: 1- each case will be historicised, meaning that each main figure (Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More) will be located within the historical, social, and political contexts of the logics of protection in which they are embedded. 2- Using qualitative content analysis, each case will be explored to see if/how it encompasses the five core elements of parrhesia as elaborated by Foucault (truth, frankness, criticism, duty, and danger) and what patterns emerge in the techniques employed and forms taken by their dangerous fearless speech. 3- To be able to critically assess mechanisms of power and resistance in each case as well as their ethical consequences in terms of subjectivity, narrative analysis as well as discourse analysis will then be applied to the cases, using the three modalities of parrhesia as developed in the precedent section.
In terms of contextualisation, Howarth argues that to conduct comparative case-study analysis from a discourse theory perspective, each of the cases have to be “described, analysed, and interpreted on their own terms, as singular instances with their own unique specificity,” because the aim of comparison within this approach is not to “construct generally applicable laws of social and political behaviour” but to “further our understanding and explanation of different logics of identity formation and hegemonic practice in different historical conjunctures.” (Howarth 2000, 139) Palmater and Gingrich similarly state that qualitative comparative analysis has to do “justice to the context in which the different cases are embedded” (Palmater and Gingrich 2013, 96). This is why each figure of dissident female protectors has first to be grounded in the historical, political, and social contexts within which they are situated. Hence each empirical chapter will start by exploring the logics of protection in which the dissident female protector/s is/are located by focusing mainly on the subject positions and truths they create/rely upon. This first step will allow us to explore the different subject/object/abject positions these women occupied prior to their fearless speech and understand the context that rendered their speech both possible and risky.

After this contextualisation, each chapter will look more concretely at the truth-telling acts of these dissident protectors in relation to parrhesia. To do so, I will first look at these instances of fearless speeches, what they consist of, and, using the five core elements of parrhesia outlined by Foucault (frankness, truth, criticism, danger, and duty), if/how they can be seen as contemporary forms of parrhesia. I will also detail the specific techniques dissident female protectors use in enacting this fearless speech and the forms such acts take (whistleblowing, public protest, street theatre, and so forth) and try to see if/what patterns and similarities might emerge.

To proceed to this part of the analysis, I will use qualitative content analysis. It is a research method that is widely used both from positivist and post-positivist perspectives, and has been mobilised by many scholars across different disciplines in social sciences (Hermann 2008; Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Schreier 2013). For the purpose of this research, qualitative content analysis can be defined as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes and patterns.” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1278) It thus consists in “systematically describing the meaning of qualitative data” (Schreier 2013, 171) by developing a coding frame that can be applied
to the data under study. There exist many different approaches to content analysis but in this thesis I will use a mix between a directed approach using pre-established codes (namely the five elements of parrhesia outlined above), and a more conventional approach using free coding (to identify potential patterns and themes). A directed approach starts from an existing theoretical framework (in this case, parrhesia) from which initial coding categories are identified and then refined and revised as the analysis goes. The goal is to “validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1281). A conventional approach, on the other hand, starts with reading the data to extract coding categories directly from their content. In this approach, the coding frame is thus derived from the data and not from pre-existing theory. (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) In this thesis, this would mean reading the empirical material and looking at the different techniques and forms taken by parrhesiastic acts of fearless speech such as whistleblowing, vigilantism, or else that come out of the data and seeing if different patterns emerge within and between the different cases.

Yet such a method is insufficient for answering the research questions fully because its goal is mostly descriptive, but also because it is “ontologically and epistemologically ‘naïve’,” since the material is “taken for granted”. (Schreier 2013, 182) The stories contained in the primary and secondary sources collected on the empirical cases cannot be taken at face value as a unified, single, and/or coherent narrative. It is not enough to look at the context and apply coding frames to see emerging patterns and meanings because such meanings are always political and have to be critically assessed. We thus need a more critical approach to identify the different workings of power and resistance within each case.

Using a narrative approach, consistent with broader discursive theory methodologies, allows to “explore how people story their lives” (Esin, Fathi, and Squire 2014, 204) and, more importantly, claims that subjects “are performed into existence during and by their narrative telling” (Esin, Fathi, and Squire 2014, 207). As Andrews and al. argue, “the stories that people tell about themselves are about many selves, each situated in particular contexts, and working strategically to resist those contexts.” (Andrews et al. 2007, 104) Hence narrative analysis of direct and indirect accounts of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More’s lives and actions can tell us more about how they build themselves as subjects while also allowing for the complexities and contradictions to appear. Which means that in analysing the empirical
data, I argue that there is no ‘pure’ access to my characters’ thoughts: all sources we might have to access these protectors’ insights, whether they are primary or secondary, are necessarily after-the-fact narratives that have to be inscribed within their own contexts and constraints. No discourse exists outside of the context in which it takes place. In fact, as Perry states in his work about whistleblowing:

whistleblowing incidents are explicable not as the manifestation of prior ontological certainties or universal truths, but as constituted in and through the social order that generates them, the discourses that articulate them and the subject positions which realise them. (Perry 1998, 239)

Nor are there any neutral, objective or truer narratives about their life and actions, only different stories they and others have built around their actions and words as well as the multiple ways in which we can interpret them. This approach allows to look more specifically at the different subject positions articulated in and produced by these different narratives.

It is here that the empirical data will be analysed more profoundly by using discourse analysis to understand, identify, and critically analyse the relationships between the parrhesiastic acts of dissident female protectors and broader mechanisms of power and resistance, as well as their relationship to subjectivity. To do so, I will use the three modalities of parrhesia outlined before (political, ethical, judicial) to look deeper into how the cases relate to each modality, what they can tell us about these specific instances of parrhesiastic speeches, what space/possibilities they open up in terms of resistance to logics of protection and how they relate to the different techniques of power of these logics (both as resistance to and reproduction of). This will enable a more complete and thorough analysis of the mechanisms by which power and resistance to logics of protection are enabled and enacted by the parrhesiastic acts of dissident female protectors.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to elaborate a theoretical and methodological framework using Foucault’s work to further understand both logics of protection and resistance to them, more specifically by mobilising parrhesia as a practice of fearless speech potentially enacted by the four case studies. Throughout this chapter, I have argued that logics of protection can be best encompassed by looking at the three economies of power studied by Foucault (sovereign, disciplinary, and pastoral/governing). I argued that such logics, while aiming at creating the subject
positions of the protector and the protected also produce the categories of the unprotected and unprotectable. All of these subject/object/abject positions are not only enforced through coercion and/or pastoral care, but also internalised through the circulation of norms, desires, conducts, and so on. Logics of protection also function through economies of fear from which compliance/obedience is exchanged for (a feeling of) security. But, as with other forms of power, those logics create (and emerge from) forms of resistance challenging, subverting, changing, while also recreating and reinforcing them. In the cases of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More, such resistance takes the form of speaking dangerous truth to power out of a sense of duty to transform a situation of injustice. Hence the practice of parrhesia can be usefully mobilised to make sense of such instances of resistance. The chapter developed a theoretical framework around such practice using Foucault’s and other scholars’ work. Exploring the relationship of parrhesia to truth, subjectivity, and resistance, this chapter has argued that it can best be encompassed by three interrelated, yet distinct, modalities: political, judicial, and ethical. Therefore, I have turned this theoretical exploration of parrhesia into a methodological framework through which each case will be analysed.

We can now turn to the empirical cases of Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More to explore and analyse these contemporary instances of parrhesiastic practices and what they do to logics of protection politically, ethically and judicially.
CHAPTER IV: Speaking Truth to Warlords: Malalai Joya’s Fearless Speech

My name is Malalai Joya from Farah Province. By the permission of the esteemed attendees, and by the name of God and the martyrs of the path of freedom, I would like to speak for a few minutes. My criticism of all my compatriots is why you are allowing the legitimacy and legality of this Loya Jirga to come into question due to the presence of those criminals who have brought our country to this state. Why would you allow criminals to be present here? They are responsible for our situation now! [...]

They should be prosecuted in the national and international courts! Even if these criminals were to be somehow forgiven by our people – the barefoot Afghan people—our history will never forgive them. Their names are all recorded in the history of our country... (Joya 2011, 71)

Thus spoke Malalai Joya in front of the Loya Jirga, the Assembly in charge of ratifying the new Constitution of Afghanistan, in 2003, before her microphone got cut off and the explosive reactions in the room covered the sound of her voice. Since that in/famous ninety-second speech, her life has been constantly threatened. She later got elected as the youngest member of the Afghan Parliament in 2005, before being banned from the institution two years later for refusing to stop speaking the truth about the presence of warlords and criminals in the Parliament. She has also spent those years touring internationally to denounce the occupation of her country by U.S. and NATO forces and their complicity with the Karzai government. From that initial discourse to her banishment from Parliament and in all her international interventions, Joya has kept the same constant, inflexible, and fearless speech: she calls out the impunity of warlords and criminals who sit in democratic institutions without having been judged for their past and ongoing crimes, and she denounces the hypocrisy and complicity of members of government and international actors for turning a blind eye on those crimes in the name of the democratisation of Afghanistan. To understand the gravity of her words and the courage involved in speaking them, one has to understand the historical, social, and political context in which her parrhesiastic act of dissent occurred.

This chapter will therefore start by exploring the different local, national, and international logics of protection in which Joya was embedded at the time of her fearless speech, before turning to that speech itself and analysing it from the framework developed in the previous chapter.
Afghanistan, the Graveyard of Empires

Our history teaches that if you betray our people and try to occupy our country by force of arms, you will meet our resistance and you will fail. This lesson was learned by the British Empire; it was learned by the Soviet Union; and today, unfortunately, it is being learned the hard way by the NATO countries. (Joya 2011, 228)

Afghanistan, the “land of Afghans” is located along the Silk Road, on the route from the Mediterranean to Asia. Although never formally colonised, its strategic location has attracted many interests from successive empires throughout history, and the foreign implications and interventions in Afghanistan have been numerous. For example, from the mid-19th century to the end of the First World War, the country was the theatre of three Anglo-Afghan wars during which the British Empire attempted, unsuccessfully, to seize control of the land. During this period, which was named ‘the Great Game’. Britain was trying to counteract the influence and power of czarist Russia in the region. The borders of Afghanistan, as Nazif M. Shahrani argues, “drawn by Britain and czarist Russia during the onset of this ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia in the closing decades of the 19th century—were gerrymandered to split members of ethnic groups between or among different neighbouring states.” (Shahrani 2002, 718) The most infamous example of this external interference in the delimitation of Afghanistan’s borders is the Durand Line. Drawn between Afghanistan and Pakistan (then British-India), its explicit goal was to lessen the influence of the Pashtun tribes and clans living on both sides of the border, placing most of the region’s Pashtun population on the Indian/Pakistanis’ side. The Durand Line is still contested today by Afghanistan, who sees it as a colonial imposition it was coerced into accepting three years after the end of the second Anglo-Afghan war (Schu 2013, 178). Yet, facing fierce resistance on the ground and having already suffered many casualties in its colonial wars, notably in colonial India, Britain failed to turn Afghanistan into a formal colony.

Aside from its borders, the modern Afghan state with its power centralised in Kabul was created with interference from Britain, notably in its arming and financial support of Emir Abdur Rahman. Rahman was a local ruler from a Pashtun tribe/clan,8 who, in the 1880s, proceeded to brutally submit all other tribes and regions under its

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8 Although his ties to the Pashtun communities as well as the thesis of Pashtun dominance through the course of Afghanistan’s history is being contested, as will be developed later (S. M. Hanifi 2016).
control in what has been characterised as a campaign of ‘internal colonialism’ (Schu 2013; Shahrani 2002; Hyman 2002). In fact, Afghanistan is home to many different ethnic groups, including the Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Hazaris, Turks, and Tajiks, who used to live in semi-autonomous mountainous areas around the country. It is under the brutal two-decade-long regime of Emir Rahman, whom Britain nicknamed the ‘Iron Emir,’ that the different regions of Afghanistan were placed under the central power of Kabul, and that Afghanistan as a centralised state was created. With the financial and political support of Britain, Rahman thus submitted all other tribes to his rule, including Pashtun communities who did not belong to the same clan, as well as other ethnic groups around the country who resisted his campaign and were severely punished, such as the Hazaris living in the centre of the country. As Shahrani states, Rahman “laid the ground for the enforcement of century-long policies that were nothing but a crude form of internal colonialism run by the ruling clique in Afghanistan.” (Shahrani 2002, 719)

Following Rahman, a number of rulers took power, usually by fighting their way to the throne with the help of external resources until being overthrown by the next ruler. Hence, the creation of the ‘modern’ centralised state of Afghanistan cannot be disconnected from external influences and internal communal violence. As Shah Mahmoud Hanifi argues:

In reviewing the history of Afghanistan, a basic pattern emerges: Rulers take local power in relation to external resources, which prompts the voluntary or forced migration of local political opponents, many of whom receive refuge and asylum from (perhaps the same) external powers that routinely provide resources to exiles. To complete one phase of a repeating pattern, a collusion of interests between powerful ‘host’ external actors who want to advance their peripheral interests combine with those of the deracinated dependent ex-elite ‘guests’ to facilitate the repatriation of diaspora elites. (S. M. Hanifi 2016, 396)

The power in Kabul was thus alternatively held by a number of monarchs, usually with the help and support of external powers trying to gain influence and secure access to resources across central Asia. When the king Zahir Shah who had been in power for thirty years in a period of relative stability was overthrown in 1973, a new cycle of wars and foreign interventions began in the midst of the Cold War. The King’s cousin, Muhammed Daoud, overthrew his regime with the help of communist military officers who, five years later, killed Daoud and massacred his whole family to install a communist regime. In the face of fierce popular resistance, the communists ‘invited’ the Soviets to invade the country in 1979, marking the beginning of Afghanistan’s forty-year-long war. (Shahrani 2002, 719) Local populations organised themselves militarily across the country’s different regions and provinces to resist the Communist invasion
that they perceived as a foreign invasion, but also as a threat to Afghans’ religious values and ways of life. In fact, the Communists’ attempt to turn Afghanistan into a secular-rulled country under the power of the U.S.SR was met with strong opposition from the ground and was seen as a colonial foreign imposition. Facing this major resistance on the ground, the war against Soviet occupation lasted until the end of the Cold War.

During this time, American President Jimmy Carter signed off what would become the CIA’s biggest covert operation to support Afghan fighters against the U.S.SR. Successive administrations would funnel weapons, funds, and other forms of support through the ISI, the Pakistani’s secret services, in charge of recruiting, training, and arming Afghan fighters in Pakistan. By 1986, the U.S. had channelled more than $3 billion to the mujahedeen, an investment matched by Saudi Arabia also supporting Afghan resistance against the Soviet. (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002, 342) Critics of the CIA operation would point out that much of the U.S. aid was used to finance fighters who were part of the most radical, extreme, and conservative Islamic groups, including the Taliban led by Ousama bin Laden and an extremist group headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyara, known to have thrown acid in women’s faces when they refused to wear the veil. When questioned about their financing and support of Hekmatyara, a CIA official in Pakistan apparently answered: “fanatics fight better.” (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002, 343) By the end of the Cold War, and as an indirect consequence of the U.S. operation, the region along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan had become home to the largest production of heroin in the World and a large marketplace for arm smuggling. (Idem) Yet when the Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, the U.S. also followed and left the country to its heavily armed warlords and mujahedeen’s factions.

In 1992, after the flight into exile of the last Soviet “puppet,” Kabul fell under the control of a non-Pashtun ruler, Burhanuddin Rabbani, for the first time in 300 years. Many commentators argue that this event was perceived as a humiliation by different Pashtun forces that, with the support of Pakistan, tried to regain control over Kabul militarily. (Schmeidl 2002; S. M. Hanifi 2016; Shahrani 2002; Hyman 2002; Schu 2013) The country thus sank further into a brutal civil war marked by ‘unimaginable crimes’ (Shahrani 2002, 719) committed by all sides of the heavily armed and wealthy warlords. This led scholar Ahmed Rashid to state that “the country was divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought, switched sides and fought again in a
bewildering array of alliances, betrayal and bloodshed.” (Rashid 2002, 21) In 1996, the Taliban emerged victorious from the civil war when they seized Kabul and established their rule over the country.

Coming mostly from the Pashtun communities, the Talibans are an extremist religious faction of young men raised in the madrasas, religious schools financed in a large part by Pakistan, which aimed at unifying Afghanistan under a fundamentalist version of Islam. In that endeavour, they fought different resisting factions of warlords such as the Northern Alliance, or United Front against the Taliban, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum, that controlled about thirty percent of the population in Northern Afghanistan. The infamous Taliban’s rule, known for its violations of human rights, and women’s rights in particular, lasted until the U.S. launched the operation “Enduring Freedom” and invaded Afghanistan, along with other NATO countries and in association with the Northern Alliance. Since then, the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the Karzai government have been the object of numerous reports by international organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for the continuing violence and insecurity, high civilian casualties, violation of human rights, impunity, corruption, poverty, and so on, that constitute the everyday lives of Afghans today. This means that any Afghan born from 1978 onwards, such as Malalai Joya, has never experienced a war-free Afghanistan.

**The Logics of Protection of/in Afghanistan**

*We are now under the “protection” of armed forces from forty-three countries yet we are still living with war, brutality, poverty, and crime. (Joya 2011, 217)*

**Imperial/Colonial Logics of Protection**

Afghanistan is described as the place “where empires come to die” (Manchanda 2017) due to its population’s continued and fierce resistance against foreign invasions and the subsequent failures of both the British and Soviet empires (and now some would argue the U.S. empire as well) to submit, colonise and control the country. If this enduring resistance against foreign threats to their sovereignty is a source of national pride and identity for Afghans, the unrelenting foreign interferences with, and indirect intervention into, Afghan politics have placed the country into a state of “quasi colonial” statehood: “a state that was formed by colonial diktat but not occupied by colonial order, as it were.” (Manchanda 2017, 390) In fact, as Nivi Machanda further argues, “Afghanistan confounds mainstream postcolonial discourse, which draws its
theoretical and empirical significance, research agendas and critiques largely from the experiences of major colonies such as India (for Britain) and Algeria (for France).” (Manchanda 2017, 399)

Yet, when looking at the recent work of Ann L. Stoler on imperialism, we might find ways in which the Afghan experience is in fact not an exception, but the norm of imperial encounters that rarely fit the definition offered to understand colonial India and Algeria, for example. In fact, Stoler argues that rather than talking about empires as such, it might be more helpful to think of them as “imperial formations.” As she argues, “some imperial forms are marked by distinctly rendered boundaries, transparent transfers of property, and even clear distinctions between coloniser and colonised. But these represent only one end of the spectrum and a narrow range of their orientations” (Ann Laura Stoler 2006, 137). Hence, understanding colonialism/imperialism only as the occupation of one’s country by a foreign power limits our understanding of the multiple forms they take, including in such cases as Afghanistan. Stoler further argues that we can think of imperial formations as “scaled genres of rule that produce and count on different degrees of sovereignty and gradations of rights.” (Ann Laura Stoler 2006, 128) As such, while Afghanistan has never been formally colonised or occupied, we can see how ‘different degrees of sovereignty’ apply to its case in relation to the British empire, but also the Soviet and American empires.

However, what is notable about imperial formations is that they usually rely on (gendered) logics of protection to exercise and justify their reign. In fact, Stoler, along with many other postcolonial feminist scholars, has highlighted how empires/imperial formations rely explicitly and implicitly on gendered logics of protection to justify their domination. In her more recent work, she thus argues that imperial formations “thrive on turbid taxonomies that produce shadow populations and ever-improved coercive measures to protect the common good against those deemed threats to it.” (Ann Laura Stoler 2006, 128) Hence, through producing ambiguities, calculated or not, imperial formations are fundamentally rooted in logics aimed at protecting the ‘common good,’ usually understood as the interests and safety of imperial powers from ‘othered’ threats and shadow population that serve as their constitutive outside. In this quote, she notes the coercive/sovereign nature of imperial power that underlines these logics of protection.
Stoler’s earlier studies on sexuality and European colonialism have also shown how different logics of protection were at the centre of colonial rules. She explores the relations of colonialism with sexuality and morality and the evolution of such conceptions throughout different periods of colonial rules. Consequently, she exposes the simultaneous positioning of women as both the objects of protections and the protectors of a moral order, the interdependence of the construction of European womanhood and local womanhood in sexual terms, the moving character and changing nature of these logics of protection, as well as the use of protection (of women and of moral order/respectability) as political tools to enforce colonialism and imperialism throughout time. (Ann L. Stoler 1989) White women themselves and (some) Western feminisms also relay those dichotomised and binary constructions of white womanhood and “third-world” womanhood, as the work of Chandra Mohanty highlights. As she states, West and Western feminists tend to portray women from the global south as monolithic victims of oppression in need of rescue as opposed to an image of Western women as liberated:

“This average third world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being 'third world' (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimised, etc.). This, I suggest, is in contrast to the (implicit) self-representation of Western women as educated, as modern, as having control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the freedom to make their own decisions.” (Mohanty 2003, 95)

Mohanty thus shows how such representations allow Western women to establish themselves as liberated subjects who get to protect these constitutive “others” in need of salvation.

Gayatri Spivak, in her famous piece Can the Subaltern Speak, also explores how the protection of colonised women by coloniser men was mobilised by the British empire in India to impose and justify imperialist measures or, as she puts it, “white men saving brown women from brown men” (Gayatri C. Spivak 1988). She further argues that this protection was central to the establishment of a ‘new’ kind of society by the coloniser: “the protection of woman (today the 'third-world woman') becomes a signifier for the establishment of a good society.” (Gayatri C. Spivak 1988, 94) With Spivak then, we see that the protection of colonised women can be seen as central to the establishment of a colonialist or imperialist order.
Spivak, Stoler, and others, similarly to Young, object the view that this imperial order is necessarily enforced through pure force, violence, and domination, but rather relies on the figure of the benevolent protector. According to Spivak, “[t]he most frightening thing about imperialism, its long-term toxic effect, what secures it, what cements it, is the benevolent self-representation of the imperialist as saviour” (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 1999, 54). Through discourses of benevolent protection, the coloniser establishes itself not as the sovereign who enforces power through force, violence and coercion, but rather as the one who protects through forms of pastoral care and governing power. Hence, imperial logics of protection can be seen not as opposing sovereign/coercive and disciplinary forms of power to pastoral/governing ones but rather as relying on pastoral justifications to enforce coercive and disciplinary measures based on surveillance and punishment.

In order to establish themselves as benevolent protectors, imperial formations rely heavily on discourses of exceptionalism: not only do they represent themselves as exceptionally good for women/the protected, but they do so by distinguishing their rule from those “other” imperial formations who rely on force and violence. As Said argued in Orientalism in 1978: “Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilise, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort.” (Said 1979, xxi) In the same vein, Stoler thus argues that “discourses of exceptionalism are part of the discursive apparatus of empires themselves” and extends Said’s claim, stating that “imperial states by definition operate as states of exception that vigilantly produce exceptions to their principles and exceptions to their laws.” (Ann Laura Stoler 2006, 140) Therefore, discourses of exceptional benevolent protection are inherent to imperial/colonial logics and go in hand with coercive and disciplinary practices of colonial intervention: “Appeals to moral uplift, compassionate charity, appreciation of cultural diversity, and protection of 'brown women and children’ against 'brown men,’ were based on imperial systems of knowledge production enabled by and enabling of coercive practices. These were woven into the very weft of empire — how control over and seizure of markets, land, and labour were justified, worked through, and worked out.” (Ann Laura Stoler 2006, 133–34) We can then see how imperial formations use discourses and practices of pastoral forms of power centred on
protection and based on (gendered) forms of moral superiority and exceptionalism to justify and enforce disciplinary measures of surveillance and coercive forms of power.

Imperial and gendered discourses of benevolent protection and exceptionalism saturate the discourses on Afghanistan, especially since the beginning of the ‘war of terror’ in 2001, as will be elaborated below. But the way Afghanistan is pictured and its history narrated can also be read through such gendered/imperial logics of protection and discourses of exceptionalism. In fact, Nivi Machanda argues that Afghanistan is presented both as the ‘graveyard of empires’ and “where exceptionally bad things happen” (Manchanda 2017, 386). Presented as a space of exception, the country is thus seen as both an inherent threat to imperial formations and a victim of exceptionally bad fate. Since multiple empires have tried in vain to impose their rule, yet have constantly and successfully interfered with Afghan politics and internal affairs, the country is simultaneously portrayed as victimised by external and internal imperial forces, and a threatening menace to them, while also being blamed for the ultimate failure of its state building.

The discourses around ‘state failure’ are particularly telling in that regard. In fact, Afghanistan is usually presented in gendered terms of fragility and weakness in relation to state building while also being presented as a threat to regional and global stability/security: “There is no doubt that Afghanistan exemplified a weak and fragile modern nation-state prone to failure. When challenged by a leftist coup d’état and later invaded by the former Soviet Union, the frail state apparatus collapsed and the country was turned into an arena for proxy wars, eventually becoming a safe heaven for global terrorism.” (Shahrani 2002, 720) In this quote, we see how Afghanistan is simultaneously positioned as ‘weak,’ ‘fragile’ and ‘prone to failure,’ as the passive and victimised ground upon which proxy wars were fought, and as a ‘safe heaven for global terrorism,’ hence an inherent threat to global security. These somewhat contradictory discourses depict Afghanistan in both hypermasculine terms as a space of deviance, savagery and Islamic fundamentalism, and in highly feminised terms through discourses of state failure, fragility and collapse. As such, the country is presented as weak and ‘spineless,’ as Machanda argues, always susceptible to be invaded and hijacked by terrorists and thus “as a zone of exception and of permanent crisis” (Manchanda 2017, 387). Afghanistan is positioned as both incapable of protecting its own citizens and borders, and therefore in constant need of the protection offered by Western powers and
as ultimately unprotectable because of its “morally, socially and politically bankrupt” nature (Manchanda 2017, 389). Through these discourses, Afghanistan often ends up being blamed for its own troubles (Shahrani 2002, 717), and thus end up being presented ultimately as the unprotected; who refuses protection or to behave as the submissive and grateful protected, hence to whom protection is withdrawn. By refusing the benevolent protection of imperial powers through local resistance to foreign invasions, corruption and immorality, Afghanistan is responsible for its own constant instability and failure to govern its citizens. It is also presented as the unprotectable which corrupted, backward, barbaric, and brutal nature is ultimately responsible for its “unsalvable” nature, an inherent threat to global safety and stability.

In recent years, the Afghan-Pakistan border in particular has been presented as “the foremost site of brutality and criminality” (Manchanda 2017, 391) and as a sort of ‘no-man’s-land’ figured as the site of threatening others and ‘shadow populations’ against whom the ‘common good’ needs to be protected. Discourses around the Durand Line, as argued by Machanda, “distinguish between ‘enemy’ populations and the liberal (Western) subject residing at ‘home’, but, more crucially, it separates the ‘civilian’ populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the ‘border’ populations, simplistically conceived as tribal terrorists and mad jihadis.” (Manchanda 2017, 196) As a result, by locating the threat to a specific region, discourses of imperial protection can present Afghanistan as simultaneously the protected and the threat, the unprotected and the unprotectable, thus mobilising the need for disciplinary measures (constant surveillance), coercive practices (drone attacks and other military interventions) as well as pastoral/governing forms of power (benevolent protection). In dividing the population between threatening, irrational, and hypermasculine “tribal terrorists” and “mad Jihadis”, and innocent civilian populations (usually represented by women-and-children, and presenting Afghan women in particular as the ultimate victims in need of saving), such discourses allow foreign powers to construct themselves as the ‘Just Warriors’ benevolently offering protection. This is why discourses of liberation in modern Afghanistan “have haunting resonances for anyone who has studied colonial history” (Abu-Lughod 2002, 784).

This use of contradictory positioning of Afghanistan by foreign powers along the lines of gendered imperial logics of protection thus predates the current war, but was
particularly explicit in the justifications and discourses surrounding the ‘War on Terror’ and the need to intervene in the early 2000s.

The War on Terror

The masculinist and imperial/colonial logics of protection were indeed central to the discourses and justifications of the West to invade Afghanistan in 2001. Many scholars in FSS explored how these logics were played out in relation to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan where the United States and allies invaded the countries in order to ‘liberate’ their people and protect them, especially Muslim women, against their malevolent leaders, men, and culture. A large number of works in FSS has exposed the imperialist nature of many narratives and representations surrounding the War on Terror (K. Hunt and Rygiel 2006b; Nayak 2006; Khalid 2011; Steans 2008; Sjoberg 2010; K. Hunt 2009; Sjoberg 2010; Young 2003), exploring how it paralleled the logics of masculinist and imperial protection on an international level by: “demot[ing] the people of Afghanistan and Iraq to wards or protectorates of the international system, and in the family of nations the U.S. can at times be usefully viewed as the patriarchal father offering guarantees of security” (C. V. Scott 2006, 112). In these narratives, Muslim women have become central figures representing the ultimate symbol of the passive victims of oppression in need of rescue by an enlightened West. With the invasion of Afghanistan, they also became the perfect incarnation of the damsel in distress at an international level, the ‘beautiful souls’ in need of protection and rescue from their barbaric culture and men, sometimes even from themselves (when they refused to express silent gratitude and/or unveil for the foreign ‘saviours,’ for example). In these representations, the West is constructed through patriotic discourses of gender exceptionalism, with the complicity of some western feminists.

More specifically, these logics have put Afghanistan at the centre of international attention since the main rhetoric used to justify U.S. and other NATO countries’ intervention relied explicitly and heavily on the notion of liberating/saving/protecting Afghan women from the Taliban. Western media relayed and repeated this narrative, portraying Afghan women in articles, stories, pictures and images as silent and distant figures gratefully awaiting their liberation by Western soldiers. The iconic images of Afghan women in a burqa became the central symbol of the war and, after the invasion of the country, scenes and metaphors of ‘unveiling’ were regularly used by journalists to celebrate the intervention as liberation. A wide body of literature emerged in reaction
to these discourses, criticising the use and instrumentalisation of women’s suffering under the Taliban, until then very much ignored by Western media, to justify a foreign military operation (M. Butler 2009; Daulatzai 2008; Khan 2014; Mackie 2012; Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002; Abu-Lughod 2002). Without going into detail, we can regroup these accounts under three major critiques.

First, Afghanistan’s complex history and situation were reduced to single-dimensional, oversimplified explanations pertaining to “culture” and religion. Experts were “being asked to give religiocultural” explanations “instead of political and historical” ones (Abu-Lughod 2002, 784), in order to achieve “a neat scapegoating of the Taliban for all that was unfortunate in Afghan society, particularly with respect to women” (Daulatzai 2008, 421). Hence Western responsibilities through past interventions were erased from the story. Afghan women’s lives and subject position were similarly reduced to timeless and ahistorical account using stereotypical imagery floating with no or little context and locating their oppression within local barbaric patriarchies (Khan 2014, 101). Hence, “Instead of being portrayed as complex individuals with varying sensibilities, affects, as well as abilities and inabilities to remake themselves and others, Afghan women are frequently reduced to the unidimensional figure of a passive, oppressed woman who is forced to wear a veil.” (Daulatzai 2008, 425)

Second, this Western obsession with the veil/burqa speaks to longer colonial histories of orientalism while obscuring more pressing issues faced by Afghan women. More specifically, the Western obsessive attention to the veil is rooted in longer histories of Orientalist fantasies of uncovering the exotic Muslim woman, echoed through the multiple images of unveiled Afghan women that circulated in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion (Mackie 2012). Most importantly, this focus on ‘unveiling-as-liberation’ and the Taliban regime, reinforced by many Western feminists, obscured the most pressing issues faced by Afghan women living under conditions of war. As Mahmood and Hirschkind summarise: “Why were conditions of war, militarisation, and starvation considered to be less injurious to women than the lack of education, employment, and, most notably, in the media campaign, Western dress styles?” (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002, 345) This reduction of their subjectivities to a lack of agency and subordination encompassed by the veil also has the effect of ignoring Afghan women’s continuous resistance against the violence of decades of war: “In a
sense they are veteran resistance fighters who have struggled for safety, education, health care, and food security for themselves and their families.” (Daulatzai 2008, 107)

Finally, authors denounced the instrumentalisation of women’s suffering by States’ authorities and military strategists to gain support for war through logics of protection relying heavily on the ‘White Saviour Complex’. As Abu-Lughold argues, projects of salvation often tell more about the saviour’s own subjectivities than the actual situation of the ‘victims’: “It is deeply problematic to construct the Afghan woman as someone in need of saving. When you save someone, you imply that you are saving her from something. You are also saving her to something. […] Projects of saving other women depend on and reinforce a sense of superiority by Westerners, a form of arrogance that deserves to be challenged.” (Abu-Lughod 2002, 788–89) Such portrayals position Muslim women as the ultimate protected, happily deferring to their protectors’ salvation, and Muslim men and cultures as the barbaric “others” against whom protection is required.

Hence, the discourses surrounding the invasion of Afghanistan and the ‘War on Terror’ were saturated with references on the gendered logics of imperial protection. They positioned Afghan women in particular as the ultimate protected, justifying coercive measures against the ‘barbaric’ threats posed by their backward cultures and men. This new/old discourse aimed at presenting military intervention as humanitarian benevolence thus relies heavily on gendered imperial logics of protection where the sovereign who ‘makes die and lets live’ is also the governing pastor who, by guiding the flock towards liberation, ‘makes live and lets die’. This dual mobilising of sovereign/coercive and pastoral/governing forms of power through discourses and practices of war-as-liberation was nowhere better illustrated than through the controversial decision of the U.S. to drop food alongside bombs (Schmeidl 2002).

**Internal Logics of Protection**

To understand Joya’s position within the logics of protection of/in Afghanistan, we also need to look beyond imperial experiences, and explore the internal logics in which she evolves. Before turning to local and internal logics of protection in Afghanistan, we must first recognise the imperial encounters’ impact on the knowledge we have of Afghanistan. In fact, many Afghan scholars denounce what they see as an inherently colonial knowledge that still pertains the way we talk and ‘know’
Afghanistan today (S. M. Hanifi 2016, 2012; J. Hanifi 2004). Hanifi in particular challenges the highly militarised knowledge of the country that tends to uncritically reproduce essentialised colonial narratives about Afghans and Afghanistan dating back from the Anglo-Afghan wars. He argues that the academic literature about Afghanistan is particularly scarce in comparison with India and Iran (S. M. Hanifi 2016, 389) and that: “the gaps and inconsistencies characterising the normative forms of colonial knowledge about Afghanistan have become intellectually standardised and globally institutionalised”. As a result, “the majority of actors in and observers of Afghanistan are trapped in a colonially constructed intellectual black hole.” (S. M. Hanifi 2012) More specifically, Hanifi aims at questioning the thesis of Pashtun dominance over Afghanistan placing Pashtuns as “somehow exclusively responsible simultaneously for making and breaking the state because of their ethnicity.” (S. M. Hanifi 2016, 389) He argues that the tendency to vilify Pashtuns in particular for the failings of Afghanistan comes from “colonial biases structured by military frames of reference” (S. M. Hanifi 2016, 389) that reproduce a “colonial tendency to militarise and weaponise knowledge about other cultures” (S. M. Hanifi 2016, 387) and is re/produced with the general absence of Pashtun voices in the literature. Hence one can wonder how the internal logics of protection in/of Afghanistan within a colonial frame of reference could really be understood, with its tendency to essentialise and exaggerate ethnic divisions based on reified colonial narratives. Considering the fact that there has never been a national census in Afghanistan (Hyman 2002, 309), all knowledge about/of the country, in particular about its tribal and ethnic divisions, is therefore tainted and marked by its colonial undertones in the context of military interventions, making it inevitably militarised and politicised.

Nevertheless, we can identify different ways in which logics of protection play out in terms of the subject, object, and abject positions of Afghan people and women in particular. Most writing on Afghanistan tends to present its national political history as a long sequence of internal colonialist campaigns meant to submit all different tribes and ethnic communities to the central power of Kabul, usually understood as being under the dominance of Pashtun leaders (although, as just mentioned, the ethnic dimension of the Pashtun dominance thesis is contested). As argued by Shahrani: “the transformation of tribal structures and ethnic differences into social fragmented groups along ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian cleavages was the direct consequence of the
policies of centralising governments.” (Shahrani 2002, 717) This history has thus tended to present the country as divided mainly along ethnic and tribal lines, arguing that a common national identity is fairly recent and weak in comparison to clan and tribe-based forms of identity. As stated by Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont in their work on Afghan refugees in Pakistan: “The image of Self and Other, or social identity in Afghanistan, rested not on an idea of nation and citizenship, but on a feeling of appurtenance both to a supranational entity, the Islamic community or umma, and to an infranational one, the regional, tribal, or ethnic community.” (Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1988a, 142) Hence, we could argue that logics of protection in Afghanistan do not rely on a national logic in which citizens expect protection from the state. Rather, they rely on local, regional, tribal, and ethnic communities offering protection to kin members, often against the threats posed by the centralising state, as well as a supranational logic relying on a religious/Islamic community as a form of protection.

In fact, as stated before, after the Communist coup and during the Soviet invasion, starting in 1978, the attempt to enforce a secular form of governance was at odds with Afghans’ beliefs and ways of life. As a result, Islam became the ideology of resistance: “The upheavals following the communist coup brought on a sudden awareness of a gulf separating Islam and atheism. It is no coincidence that almost all parties and resistance movements declare themselves Islamic.” (Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1988b, 86) Understood both as the object of protection (protecting Islam from foreign impositions of secularity) and as a form of protection in itself (through the Pan-Islamic community as a network of solidarity providing protection from outside threats), this logic has to be understood within the context of imperial invasion and resistance strategies.

Yet, the ongoing war raging in Afghanistan for over 40 years has had consequences that go way beyond ethnic divisions and religious belonging. First, it

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9 Yet, again, we must question how much colonial/imperial forms of scholarship influence the ways in which we represent Afghanistan. For example, in a study on Afghan nationalism, Hyman writes: “As with all tribally based peoples, theories and traditions about their race and descent have been extremely important. Traditional ideas about Afghanistan’s past have concentrated on genealogies and ‘ancestor worship’ rather than history writing as such.” (Hyman 2002, 302) As with the rest of this article, it is hard here not to question the colonial undertone presenting Afghans as inherently ‘others’ to the rational, enlightened West writing ‘history as such,’ while questioning the basis upon which authors can claim such statements in the absence of ethnographic studies that have not been conducted by early British colonisers.
means that communities tend to organise locally along different geographic, ethnic, religious, and clan lines of loyalty, depending more on survival strategies than strong ethnic or tribal rivalries. For example, if some analysts attribute the Taliban victory to their belonging to a dominant Pashtun identity, others note that the main loyalty of most Afghans is local. Hence, the Taliban insurrection, for example, cannot be understood as an ethnic phenomenon but rather as a ‘network of solidarity networks’ implanted locally between relatively homogenous groups that are based on geographical as well as tribal factors. (Schu 2013, 183) The Taliban ideology thus transcends ethnic and tribal logics: it is based on a fundamentalist Islamism that places itself at odds with Pashtun’s tribal structures and has attacked traditional tribal institutions such as the jirgas (assemblies) as well as sometimes contradicting traditional Pashtun interpretations of the Koran, for example on women’s rights to inheritance (idem). As such, neither religious nor tribal or ethnic factors suffice to explain the logics of protection of/in Afghanistan.

More importantly, the division of Afghanistan between violently competing warlord fiefdoms in the 1990s and beyond means that security and loyalty are necessarily shifting, resulting in a lack of stability in which local populations have little other choice than to rally under the strongest. In fact, Shahrani argues that, as a result of internal colonialism followed by decades of war, the state of Afghanistan was never ‘governmentalised’ but remained stuck into a “rigid framework of the problem and institution of sovereignty.” (Foucault 1991, 98-104, cited in Shahrani 2002, 720) He thus argues that governing/pastoral forms of power that Foucault identified with modern forms of governmentality have not reached Afghanistan, where leaders rely on sovereign and coercive forms of power which, as Foucault stated, are “not so much to increase the wealth of the country as to allow the ruler to accumulate wealth, build up his treasury and create an army with which he could carry out his policies.” (Foucault 1991, 98, cited in Shahrani 2002, 721) In fact, we could argue that Afghan logics of protection under the overwhelmingly sovereign/coercive power of heavily armed warlords tends to lie on the ‘bully’ side of the logics of masculinist protection spectrum, and resembles more a protection racket than any other forms of protection. It is true particularly for women who usually have little choice but to accept the offer of a racketeer’s (relative) protection rather than face his wrath in cases of refusal, as will be developed later.
Therefore, we can see how different imperial, masculinist, tribal/ethnic, and religious logics of protection are co-constructed and intersect, often in reaction to one another. The understanding of Afghanistan’s context thus cannot be reduced to only one of these factors. Taking this complexity into account, we will now study Joya’s parrhesiastic speech in relation to logics of protection.

**Joya’s Story**

Malalai Joya was born in April 1978, three days before the beginning of the war against the Soviets. She spent her first years in the city of Farah, in the province bearing the same name, on the border of Iran. In a country divided along ethnic lines, she refuses to describe her ethnic background: “I prefer not to play into the hands of those who would use religious and tribal differences to divide us. A divided country is easiest for outsiders to control and that is something I have fought against all my life.” (Joya 2011, 9) Her father fought with the mujahedeen against the Soviets and lost a leg on a landmine before being forced to go into exile in Iran, leaving his family behind. When she was four, because of the police harassment they faced due to her father’s political activities, her family fled first to Iran to reunite with her exiled father, then Pakistan where Joya grew up in more liberal Afghan refugee camps. Her education was provided by a boarding school set up in her camp with funding and support of the Revolutionary Association of Women in Afghanistan (RAWA). By the eighth grade, she started to teach other women and girls in the camp and in 1998, she joined the Organisation for Promoting Afghan Women’s Capabilities (OPAWC). The organisation then asked her to collaborate on a project to start classes for girls in Afghanistan, in defiance of the Taliban’s edicts in force in the province of Herat. She thus moved back to Afghanistan with her family to run clandestine classes for girls. At 25 years old, she was named director of Western Afghanistan for OPAWC and opened a free clinic in her native province of Farah, as well as an orphanage.

What made Malalai Joya famous, however, was her participation in the Loya Jirga, more precisely her outspoken speech denouncing the presence of warlords and criminals within it. She had been elected as one of the eight representatives from her region to participate in the Assembly, then in charge of approving and ratifying a new constitution (Joya 2011, 60). From this speech on, her life has been constantly

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10 RAWA has been running as an independent organisation since the 1970s to promote women’s rights, human rights, and social justice in Afghanistan. http://www.rawa.org/rawa.html
threatened. She has survived multiple assassination attempts, thus having to constantly travel with bodyguards and under a burqa to insure her safety. In 2005, at the age of 27, she was elected as the youngest member of the Afghan parliament where she kept on ‘speaking the truth’, refusing to compromise with the presence of what she considered warlords and criminals in the Parliament. Her fearless speech finally got her suspended from Parliament two years later after she claimed in an interview that the institution resembled a zoo (Joya 2011, 143). After she was elected, Joya also started to tour internationally to ‘spread the truth’ about Afghanistan, opposing the occupation of her country by NATO forces, and denouncing their complicity with the Karzai government and the Northern Alliance. She has received considerable attention worldwide and the Time Magazine placed her in 2010 on their list of the hundred most influential people in the World.

Malalai Joya and the Logics of Protection of/in Afghanistan

We can see how Joya’s story can be read through the logics of protection developed above. Before her fearless speech, Joya was occupying multiple positions within such logics. First, in relation to the imperial logics of protection of the War on Terror, she was positioned as a Muslim/Afghan woman and as such, as the ultimate protected in need of liberation from an enlightened West. She was also a protected under international logics of protection because of her status as an Afghan refugee in Iran and then Pakistan, yet potentially perceived as the abject of protection/unprotectable in the eyes of local Iranian and Pakistani populations who came to see Afghan refugees as pariahs and threats. As she states about her time as a refugee in Iran: “Afghans, in general, were seen as second-class humans by the Iranian government. We were called ‘dirty’ by camp guards and forced to work the most difficult jobs for lower wages” (Joya 2011, 17).

By refusing to disclose her ethnic background, we can also say that she resisted different logics of protection, both imperial, and ethnic/tribal ones. As such, she positioned herself as the unprotected (to whom protection is withdrawn) for refusing to respect ethnic/tribal logics of protection and to reinforce an imperial narrative based on a divide-and-conquer accumulation of militarised knowledge about tribal divisions in Afghanistan. Also, by going to school in the refugee camps and by becoming a teacher

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11 At the swearing-in ceremony in December 2005, for example, she offered “her condolences to the Afghan people” for the presence of warlords, drug lords, and criminals in the Parliament. (Bernard 2010)
to other students, she positioned herself again as both the unprotected (for not conforming to purdah in the eyes of those who sought to enforce it in the most fundamentalist camps and refugee communities) and the unprotectable (for example in the eyes of the Taliban and other fundamentalists, first in the camps as an educated woman, and then by defying their radical version of Islamic fundamentalism by teaching girls in underground schools).

We can also say that she was already positioning herself as a protector, both within a national and familial legacy of resistance, located within logics of protection positioning Afghans as protectors of their country’s freedom against invaders, and as a protector of human rights, democracy, and (girls’) education. In fact, her name is a direct heritage to this history of resistance: the name Malalai was given to her as a tribute to Malalai of Maiwand, a young Afghan woman who died while leading and motivating men into battle against the British in 1880. She claims that her parents named her after Malalai of Maiwand because her father was “a strong supporter of democracy and human rights at a time when these values were also under siege.” (Joya 2011, 9) She describes him as an activist for democracy and human rights who was both against the monarchy and against Soviet invaders before joining the fight against the latter. She also describes her grandfather and uncle’s bravery in the face of police harassment and torture, as a result of her father’s political activities. She thus starts her autobiography by grounding herself and her actions into a patriarchal legacy of resistance and struggle for democracy and human rights. By claiming that legacy to herself, we can say that she both transgresses masculinist logics of protection placing Afghan men in particular as brave protectors of the country’s freedom and sovereignty, while also reinforcing such logics by inscribing herself within it. Yet she became a protector mainly through her teaching to women and girls. Consequently, she also challenged such masculinist logics of protection by empowering women through education, positioning herself not only as a protector of human rights and Afghan’s democracy, but of women and girls’ education and freedom in particular.

Consequently, we can say that before her parrhesiastic speech, Malalai Joya was already positioned as both protected, unprotected, unprotectable, and protector within the complex and multiple logics of protection in/of Afghanistan, and that she both challenged them and reinforced them at the same time through her actions. It is against this background that we have to read Joya’s subsequent fearless speech as parrhesiastic resistance.
Joya’s Parrhesiastic Speech

The content of Joya’s fearless speech was fairly simple and remained constant throughout her multiple parrhesiastic speeches: the Afghan Parliament is filled with warlords, drug lords, and criminals who should be prosecuted. Anyone supporting them are complicit in their crimes, including many violations of human and women’s rights. Her speech thus contains three main criticisms: it denounces the impunity of warlords, Talibans, and other war criminals occupying positions of power as political representatives, and the complicity of other politicians in keeping silent; it denounces the brutality of an international military intervention and the hypocrisy involved in both presenting it as liberation/benevolent protection, and of turning a blind eye to the atrocities committed by members of the Parliament and government in order to present this intervention as a success; and it also challenges the hypocrisy involved in celebrating the ‘liberation’ of Afghan women while the actual situation of women in terms of casualties and suicide rates as well as impunity in cases of violence, rape, and forced marriage, is still, she claims, as bad as under the Taliban regime. These three different sets of truth all challenged the official narratives about logics of protection in/of Afghanistan: about internal/state logics of protection, about international logics of protection and about the positioning of Afghan women as passive victims in need of salvation. In doing so, she turned herself into a dissident protector, one who was recognised as such precisely because of her parrhesiastic truth-telling. In fact, Joya claims to be speaking in the name of ‘the barefoot Afghan people’. In her own accounts, she keeps referring back to the ‘voiceless’ in the name of whom she speaks the truth: “Fate and history have made me in some ways a “voice of the voiceless,” the many thousands and millions of Afghans who have endured decades of war and injustice” (Joya 2011, 3) and whose “voices needed to be heard” (Joya 2011, 61). Through speaking truth to power, she is not only protecting the ‘barefoot Afghan people’ in the name of whom she speaks, but she is also protecting an invariant truth against the hypocrisy of national and international actors.

In fact, the core of Joya’s speeches lies in criticism of the people in power in Afghanistan, and the atrocities of their past and present crimes. As detailed earlier, she is not the only one to hold these accusations; many research and reports (including from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) have detailed the crimes many parliamentarians and other politicians in Afghanistan committed during the civil war in the 1990s and beyond (see Human Rights Watch 2005). But Joya’s position is
interesting in that she spoke these truths from inside the institutions of power, directly to those concerned. By calling these members of Parliament (and of the Loya Jirga earlier) out, she did not state anything new or extraordinarily original, but the act itself of ‘her saying this’ in that context and despite the risks confronted the Parliament and the public with uncomfortable truths they had to react to. These truths can be directly related to the logics of protection described in earlier sections: in denouncing those who occupy the official position of protectors as being the main threat to Afghans’ security, we can argue that Joya in fact challenged the whole state logics of masculinist protection.

The other set of truths she made visible by her fearless speeches concern the hypocrisy and responsibility of the United States and its allies in the continued insecurity and impunity reining in Afghanistan. If her speech at the Loya Jirga was directed towards the members of the Assembly, it seems that the targeted audience was ‘the world’ and not ‘the barefoot Afghan people’. It was clear from the start that the main targets of her parrhesiastic acts were as much the warlords as the U.S. and NATO countries supporting them, a point she made clear in her international speeches around the world and in her different narratives about herself. The ‘truths’ she spoke about the U.S. concern mostly the ‘betrayal’ that their support of the warlords constitutes, but also the hypocrisy of their intervention in the name of protection. Her fearless speeches were fierce denunciations of the foreign invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the ‘lies’ upon which it relied through the use of logics of protection.

As stated in the very first page of her biography: “The Afghan people have been betrayed once again by those who are claiming to help them. More than seven years after the U.S. invasion, we are still faced with foreign occupation and a U.S.-backed government filled with warlords who are just like the Taliban.” (Joya 2011, 1) This denunciation is aligned with the way she criticised those who compromised internally with warlords, becoming complicit in their crimes by doing so. In exposing to the world the ‘truth’ about whom the U.S. and other Western governments were really supporting in Afghanistan, Joya intended to speak truth not only to the warlords’ power but also, and perhaps mostly, to the Western power(s) that made it possible. As she explains: “It is bad enough that war criminals wear the mask of democracy and sit in our Parliament, […] [b]ut what is perhaps more disgusting is that, due to the silence of almost all the Western governments, these criminals have won impunity at the international level as well.” (Joya 2011, 201)
Her parrhesiastic speeches went further, denouncing the hypocrisy, failures and ‘lies’ of an occupation justified through logics of protection. It is here that the denunciation of the figure of the ‘benevolent protector’ projected by the U.S. and other Western countries’ official narratives about the war in Afghanistan plays out. First, Joya’s fearless speech confronted the public with the uncomfortable truth of the failure of the intervention in terms of security/protection: like many others, she pointed out to the hypocrisy of trying to ‘save’, ‘liberate’ and protect Afghan people through continued air strikes and war violence whose victims are the same people supposed to be protected. In Joya’s words: “We are now under the ‘protection’ of armed forces from forty-three countries yet we are still living with war, brutality, poverty, and crime.” (Joya 2011, 217) She further refuses to accept the discourses based on logics of protection by claiming that they are nothing more than “dust in the eyes of the world.” She speaks out against the hypocrisy of covering what she sees as a self-interested operation under narratives of protection:

For successive U.S. governments, their own military, regional, economic, and strategic interests have been considered before everything else and they have been ready to sacrifice millions of Afghans to meet these interests. Their nice words about “human rights,” “justice,” “freedom,” “liberation,” “democracy,” and so on are nothing more than lies. (Joya 2011, 208)

The last set of uncomfortable truths Joya raises concerns the discourses presenting Afghan women as passive and silent victims of oppression in need of rescue and salvation by an enlightened West who can then constitute itself as their superior opposite, as has been argued by a number of scholars and elaborated earlier. Continuing the critique of U.S. and other western powers and the hypocrisy and lies behind their intervention, Joya condemned the instrumentalisation of women’s rights to justify the occupation of Afghanistan: “Not only are women still denied their rights in Afghanistan, but also, in a cruel irony, the cause of women has been used to justify and perpetuate a brutal occupation of my country.” (Joya 2011, 178) Her fearless speeches first aimed at exposing how the situation of women had not been made better after the fall of the Taliban but worse in many aspects: “For all intents and purposes, the position of Afghan women is the same now as it was under the Taliban. In some respects, the situation is worse, with higher rates of suicide and abduction, and total impunity in cases of rape.” (Joya 2011, 189) She thus challenged again the logics of protection by pointing out to both the hypocrisy and the failure of using Afghan women’s protection as a justification for war through speaking the truth about their continuing insecurity.
Five Elements of Parrhesia

I argue that Joya’s repeated fearless speech can be best understood as a form of parrhesia. In order to explore if/how Joya’s speech relates to the Greek practice of parrhesia, let us start with the five core components Foucault attributed to its practice: frankness, truth, criticism, danger, and duty. Throughout her biography and from most other sources, Joya expresses all five concepts fairly clearly: her narratives about herself and her story are filled with references to each of them, particularly truth. As she frames it: “The truth involves a lot of bad news, yet the truth must still be told.” (Joya 2011, 155) At the centre of her initiatives and actions thus lies truth. And her relation to truth is how she explains the decision to speak out at the Jirga: “My mission would be to expose the true nature of the Jirga from within it” (Joya 2011, 61). But also lies at the core of fearless speech to the world:

In Afghanistan, we have a saying that is very clear to my heart: the truth is like the sun: when it comes up nobody can block it out or hide it. I hope that this book, and my story will, in a small way, help that sun to keep shining and inspiring you, wherever you might be reading this, to work for peace, justice, and democracy. (Joya 2011, 5)

Like in parrhesia, Joya here says what she believes to be true and expresses her ‘personal relation to truth’ instead of falsehood or silence. As in parrhesia, it is not about revealing or uncovering a truth but about having the courage to speak a truth that is already there: “Everyone knew that a truly democratic election could not take place under the shadows of guns, and we knew that the majority of the delegates would surely be warlords or pro-U.S. puppets. Someone had to get inside this corrupt assembly and condemn it to the world.”(Joya 2011, 61 italics added)

It is also intimately linked to a sense of duty, very central to her accounts as well: “For me, telling the truth was not a choice. I did not want the fame or special recognition, but I had to speak out. It was my duty and my responsibility to the people who voted for me, who gave me their trust.” (Joya 2011, 71) This sense of duty, which Foucault opposes to self-interest and moral apathy, is extremely present in the way she justifies her words and actions as she repeatedly says how she ‘had to speak out’ despite the risks for her life. It echoes the way in which parrhesia is linked to freedom in that the speaker could have remained silent in the face of danger but chose to speak out instead. As she states in an interview: “people tell me, be more diplomatic more careful, but [speaking out] is the best chance to make a change.” (Motlagh 2009)
Frankness is more implicit in her accounts of her fearless speech, yet is very much central to her story if we understand frankness, like Foucault contends, as “saying everything without concealing anything” in the most direct words and forms of expression. We can see how she chooses ‘frankness instead of persuasion’ in the way she refuses to compromise: “I know that because I refuse to compromise my opposition to the warlords and fundamentalists or soften my speeches denouncing them, I, too, may join Malalai on the long list of Afghans who have died for freedom. But you cannot compromise with the truth.” (Joya 2011, 2) Despite being constantly criticised for the straightforwardness of her words, she continues to use the frankest and most direct way to express her message: “How can we be diplomatic with criminals who do not understand the meaning of diplomacy?” (Joya 2011, 151)

This frankness is also directly linked to her criticism, again at the heart of her speeches and actions. One can hardly deny here that she ‘chooses criticism instead of flattery’, the reaction to her fearless speech of those in positions of power confirming this point (see, for example, the way she was attacked in Parliament after denouncing once again the criminals and warlords within the Chamber or the reaction to her speech at the Loya Jirga, both events available online to watch12). Her criticism extends not only to those whom she deems warlords, fundamentalists, drug lords, and criminals, but to anyone who compromises with them: “In a country like Afghanistan, those who compromise with such brutal people in fact share the responsibilities for their crimes.” (Joya 2011, 151) To illustrate her point, she uses in her biography a quote from Brecht, again linking it back to truth: “He who does know the truth is only a fool. He who knows the truth and calls it a lie is a criminal.” (Joya 2011, 76) Shortly after her speech at the Loya Jirga, when the U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalizad stated, according to Joya’s account, that “everyone who wants to talk at the Jirga must talk in the framework of politeness and respect, and they should not insult each other”, she reacted by sending him this message:

If these criminals raped your mother or daughter or even your grandmother, or killed seven of your sons, let alone destroyed all the moral and material treasure of the country, what words would you use against such criminals and puppets that will be inside the framework of politeness and respect? (Joya 2011, 83)

This anecdote illustrates how, despite the consequences, Joya remained extremely inflexible in the ways she would express herself and her determination in telling the truth to power.

Which leads us to the last elements of parrhesia: danger. Joya claims to have survived four assassination attempts at the time she wrote her autobiography. This notion of danger is also very present in the accounts she gives of her life and actions, and is tied back to duty and truth. Referring to her speech at the Loya Jirga, she states:

From that moment on, I would never again be safe. At the time, I was not thinking about this, but rather I was pleased that I had been able to expose the true nature of the proceedings. I also began to realise just how much words are powerful weapons and that I had to continue speaking the truth for the sake of the Afghan people who have been silenced for so long. (Joya 2011, 73)

Like parrhesiastes in Ancient Greece, her acts are very much centred around courage in the face of danger, exemplified not only by her refusal to leave Afghanistan despite having to live under constraining security measures (including having a permanent security team around her and covering herself not to be recognised in public for security reasons), but through her accounts as well. In many interviews, she states how, despite the burqa and bodyguards, she is not safe and has to move houses constantly (Democracy Now 2011), but that it will not stop her or push her to leave Afghanistan despite the danger. This courage in the face of death is fuelled by a sense of duty that is very central to her narratives: “I am young and I value my life; I don’t want to be killed. But I don’t fear death; I fear remaining silent in the face of injustice.” (Joya 2011, 228), “I am not afraid of an early death if it would advance the cause of justice.” (Joya 2011, 2), “I’m not frightened, because one day everyone will die. I want to serve my people, especially the women, who are the worst victims.” (Strong 2007) Hence we can see how duty, danger, truth, criticism, and frankness can all be found quite strongly through her account of why she spoke, and keep speaking, fearless truth to power.

**Particularities of Joya’s Parrhesiastic Speech**

What marks Joya’s particular parrhesiastic speech is her inflexibility, the uncompromising nature of her speech and its constancy. Through unflinchingly repeating those dangerous truths to both internal and international publics, Joya performed a particularly inflexible form of parrhesia. The invariability is what makes her truth both fearless and dangerous. One could say that in the political context of Afghanistan and its history marked by constantly shifting allegiances, loyalties, and
foreign interferences, speaking an uncompromising and unflinching truth is in and of itself a form of resistance to the dominant narratives, forms of power and logics of protection in/of Afghanistan. We could thus say that this constancy is a strategy of resistance as well as an integral part of her speech. It is also a way of protecting such invariant truth against internal and international actors who would prefer it buried.

In terms of techniques used to get her speech heard, Malalai Joya employs strategies such as verbal exposure, parliamentarian speech, international touring, media interviews, and personal encounters and consultations with laypeople. In fact, she spoke those truths directly from within the Parliament and/or Assembly where she was elected as a representative, and, while she was touring internationally, she also spoke from within different international and/or Western organisations. Hence much of her fearless speech is about ‘speaking from within’, using verbal exposure and public denunciations based on the ‘truths’ collected during her personal consultations with the people she represents, as will be elaborated below.

**Political Parrhesia: Anti/Political Ways of Governing Otherwise**

As we can see, Joya’s speech is very close to the Greek’s version of it: she is speaking within the Agora/Parliament/Loya Jirga, speaking a dangerous truth as a duty to change a situation for herself and others. Like in Ancient Greece, she uses verbal exposure as well as the institution of the Parliament/Loya Jirga in order to conduct her parrhesiastic acts. Her parrhesia also problematises democracy in Afghanistan, as will be argued below. In a sense, it is therefore resolutely anti-political in that it refuses to ‘play by the rules’ and accept to compromise, and remain strategically silent in exchange for political power, privilege, and protection. Indeed, we could say that the parrhesiastic game in this case goes as follows: ‘I will tell the truth about the Parliament, the criminals within it and the complicit silence of the others, and if you punish me/kill me for my fearless speech, you will prove to the world that you are the tyrant I know you to be and not the democratic pastoral sovereigns you pretend to be. And if the democratic leaders remain silent in the face of the truths I am saying, they will prove to Afghanistan and the World that they are merely puppets to external powers, seeking to further their own interests before those of the Afghan people they claim to represent.’

In fact, Joya’s refusal to compromise (and harsh denunciation of those who do as complicit in the crimes of warlords) can thus be seen as a refusal to follow the rules
of electoral democracy and the form of governing power it promotes. In electoral democracies, governments and elected officials often play the role of the benevolent protectors presenting themselves as the only alternative against those dangerous “others” outside and within the nation, and as the caring protectors of the nation’s rights, democracy and freedom. In this case, those she was denouncing pertained obviously more on the ‘violent and overbearing bully-racketeer’ side of the logics of protection’s continuum than that of the benevolent and chivalrous protector. But, as Peterson argued: “the difference, to be sure, is a matter of degree.” (V. S. Peterson 1992, 50) What Joya argues is that between warlords who made their way into Parliament through coercion and corruption, and the other members of Parliament who choose to compromise with them in exchange for the privileges and protection offered by their positions of power, ‘the difference, to be sure, is a matter of degree.’ Hence by speaking out she challenges not only the warlords, but also the whole institutions of power that allowed them in. The truths she was saying ‘to the public’ were not only that there were warlords in the Parliament but that “democracy is only a mirage” in a “land ruled by the gun and powerful interests” (Joya 2011, 84); in other words, that the simulacra of a Parliament performing pastoral/governing modes of power only serves as a smokescreen to the actual sovereign/coercive violent power it relies upon and exercises over the population of Afghanistan. Her criticism against a “Parliament [that] remains a den of thieves and killers” also extends to electoral democracy itself. At some point in her biography, she states: “There is a famous saying in the West: If voting changed anything, they would make it illegal. In many ways, my two years of experience in Afghanistan’s Parliament confirmed this bleak outlook.” (Joya 2011, 127)

One anecdote in her biography illustrates this claim: when she met with the then-President Hamid Karzai, she recounts how she got the impression that he agreed with her on everything she said, even tearing up at some points of her narrative, while avoiding making any commitments. She concluded that “[h]e was very respectful but I think that he wanted to charm me in hopes that I would stop my harsh criticism of his government” and that his tears were “merely crocodile tears” (Joya 2011, 106–7). She mainly criticises Karzai because “for him, following orders from the White House was more important than looking after the well-being of the Afghan people” (Joya 2011, 107) and for being a “U.S. puppet.” We could then say that she is denouncing not only Karzai’s hypocrisy, but also the fact that he reproduces forms of sovereign power aimed
at furthering his own interests (in relation to the U.S.) rather than performing the caring forms of pastoral power expressed through his tears.

Hence, we can see how her fearless speech was very much about problematising democracy by denouncing the hypocrisy and impunity underlying electoral democracy in Afghanistan and beyond. Yet her parrhesia is also political in that it speaks directly to the sovereign and governing power of political institutions and uses some of the same/similar tools as they do (parliamentary speech and electoral representation for example). In fact, Joya also reproduces forms of pastoral/governing power in speaking in the names of the ‘barefoot Afghan people’ who elected her into Parliament and the Loya Jirga. As she argues: “in any land ruled by the gun and by powerful interests, where democracy is only a mirage, it is nonetheless crucially important to use whatever rotten institutions exist to spread awareness and to tell the truth to the public.” (Joya 2011, 84) We could thus say that her parrhesiastic speech is a pragmatic one that seeks to reinforce the same institutions she is criticising. In fact, if she criticises electoral democracy, she simultaneously endorses it through embracing her position as an elected representative. We could thus say that her parrhesia aims at improving democratic institutions, and reinforce their pastoral forms of power rather than opposing them. She thus also reproduces the State logics of protection by positioning herself as a sort of pastor taking care of her flock and defending its truths. As illustrated in the documentary Enemies of happiness, among other sources, Joya is regularly visited by people who sometimes walk days to tell her their stories of injustices and ask for help in standing up to warlords. In many cases, young girls and their families ask Joya for protection against forced marriages by powerful warlords (Mulvad 2006; Strong 2007). She then accompanies them to register their complaint to the police and uses those testimonies as a basis for her truth-speaking in the Parliament. We can thus see how she positions herself as a pastoral protector of ‘barefoot Afghan people’, reproducing some of the forms of pastoral power underlying electoral democracy’s logics of protection. Thereby, her speech and actions are both anti-political, but also very political at the same time.

By speaking fearless truths to power, Joya is challenging not only state but also imperial logics of protection underlying democratic institutions, and the forms of coercive power upon which they rely despite claims to pastoral governance. In fact, ‘the public’ she is addressing does not seem to be the Afghan people themselves. As stated earlier, she considered herself the ‘voice of the voiceless’. Hence, the public she is
confronting is not the ‘barefoot Afghan people’ in whose name she speaks, since they already know their situation and experience those truths, but an external audience: “Everyone knew that a truly democratic election could not take place under the shadows of guns, and we knew that the majority of the delegates would surely be warlords or pro-U.S. puppets. Someone had to get inside this corrupt assembly and condemn it to the world” (Joya 2011, 61 italics added). It thus seems that the audiences she is speaking truth to are not internal but mostly international ones, especially in the U.S. and other western countries.

In relation to this public, as elaborated before, Joya’s parrhesiastic speech was about denouncing their interference with Afghan politics as well as the hypocrisy of claiming to be performing pastoral forms of benevolent protection while reinforcing warlords and criminals’ power and exercising military forms of coercive violence in the name of liberation. Hence, her speech was also anti-political in relation to international politics in that she refused to accept Western sovereign interventions over Afghanistan and condone their ‘white saviours complex’ in exchange for (a promise of) security, by vocally and strongly opposing their presence and military interventions in her country. By speaking openly about the ‘truths’ of the failure and hypocrisy of their intervention in Afghanistan, Joya is thus challenging Western powers through a parrhesiastic game that could be expressed as follows: ‘I dare you to silence me and/or ignore my speech and prove to your citizens and the world that you already knew/do not care, and show them your hypocrisy and the false claims under which you hide the coercive nature of your imperial power over Afghanistan.’

When Joya tours internationally and asks NATO countries to immediately withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, her speech is addressed not only to the elected officials and people in positions of power in the West, but mostly to their citizens. Here, the parrhesiastic speech is aimed at making the western citizens and laypeople know the ‘truth’ about Afghanistan in the hope that they would oppose their government’s military interventions and put pressure on them to withdraw from her country: “Even if I am killed, people around the world now know what is happening here”. (Motlagh 2009) In that sense, Joya’s speech is also political in that it relies upon and reinforces the belief that liberal democracy is a way to make change happen, and that this form of electoral democracy actually works in the West as opposed to Afghanistan. This position also reinforces imperial logics of protection and forms of power. Indeed, it implies a form of reliance on a benevolent international community that would
somehow intervene in Afghanistan, not through military violence but to enforce justice and re-establish real democracy in the country. As argued by Shahnaz Khan: “Despite her strong rejection of all international forces (which she considers occupiers) in Afghanistan, Joya’s comments contain an expectation that the disarming of warlords will be done by foreigners.” (Khan 2014, 107) Therefore, we see how Joya’s fearless speech, when addressed to an international public, both challenges and contradictorily reinforces forms of imperial/Western power over Afghanistan.

**Judicial Parrhesia: Speaking Truths to the Bullies’ Injustices**

In relation to judicial parrhesia, Joya’s speech is very much about demanding justice and denouncing the injustices committed by the powerful. Yet, if we could argue that Joya as a woman in Afghanistan is herself among the unprotected/unprotectable, especially given her refusal to submit and obey (first the Taliban, then the rules of the Parliament) in exchange for protection, she herself as a member of the Parliament and an international public figure is not exactly powerless. But she claims to be speaking in the name of those who do not have the power to speak to the powerful, the ‘barefoot Afghan people’. As such, her speech is an indirect one in which she represents/speaks for others, less powerful unprotectables. In that sense, she takes the role of the sovereign in demanding/administering justice for others/her subjects and thus reproduces some of the same aspects of sovereign power she is also denouncing.

Joya’s whole parrhesiastic speech is about constantly and repeatedly denouncing the injustices committed by powerful warlords in the Parliament and beyond, and the impunity they enjoy on a national and international levels. But through speaking truth to U.S. and Western power about the increased violence and insecurity their ‘protection’ caused, we could argue that Joya is also denouncing the injustices committed by the powerful Westerners who claim to be benevolent protectors: “It was not only ironic that Cheney should be among the war criminals, but fitting as well. I believe that all of them should be prosecuted for their crimes.” (Joya 2011, 125) In this statement, she clearly aligns U.S. power with the warlords, positioning them among the war criminals. By doing so, she challenges their perceived role as benevolent protectors and speaks truth to the injustices and crimes they committed in Afghanistan. Her parrhesiastic speech is thus about enforcing justice/judicial power in the face of the powerful’s coercive violence.
Yet Joya, as an Afghan woman who will not behave as the grateful protected and will simply not stop speaking the truth in the face of injustices, is very much positioned as the unprotected and unprotectable, as elaborated before. Her life is constantly threatened and we can thus say that she represents the ‘powerless’ speaking truth about the injustices of the powerful. But the crimes she denounces were not committed against herself per se, but against the ‘barefoot Afghan people’ in the name of whom she speaks. Since her speech within the Loya Jirga, Joya has become quite a powerful figure that is recognised by others as a pastoral leader protecting their truths. In fact, through her consultations with laypeople, she performs and enacts the role of a pastor individualising each person’s plight and taking care of her community by speaking their injustices for them in the face of the powerful. As she summarises herself: “My enemies, they have money, guns, power. But I have the powerful support of the innocent people of my country. This gives me the will and courage to go on.” (“Defense Committee for Malalai Joya” n.d.) Hence we can see how Joya’s parrhesiastic speech both challenges and reinforces judicial forms of pastoral power in relation to logics of protection.

**Ethical Parrhesia: Uncompromising Modes of Being Otherwise**

As for ethical parrhesia, Joya promotes an ethical self-relation based on inflexible honesty, integrity, and courage. She challenges not only her subject/object/abject positions within dominant logics of protection by taking on the role of a protector, she also promotes a different way of doing politics, of being a politician. By speaking truth to power and choosing risk instead of silence, she changed herself into a protector of truth, a protector of the barefoot Afghan (as said before, through exercising a form of pastoral power), a protector of justice. She also changed her position in international logics of protection from the would-be silent and grateful victim to the protector of her country’s independence and peace.

In fact, as stated before, after she spoke out at the Loya Jirga, people travelled from all over the country to confide in her and ask for her advice, guidance and support. In *Enemies of Happiness*, for example, we follow a family who went to her asking for help in resisting the forced marriage of a young girl to an old and powerful man. She accompanied them to the police to make sure their complaint would be registered. Joya also recalls this story in her biography, writing: “When Strong [the filmmaker] asked Bashira why she came to see me, she said, while crying bitterly, ‘Because she speaks
Similarly, in an article published in the Telegraph recounting a meeting between Joya and a group of men who had come to meet her and tell her their stories, they stated: “We support you because you tell the truth.” (Strong 2007) In a country where corruption, violence and impunity reign, Joya became for many the only protector to turn to for guidance, help or protection. But it is precisely because of her role as a truth teller, because of her parrhesiastic truth-telling that people recognise and treat her like a protector.

Her speech binds her to the truth she is speaking, but also demands that those who hear it reflect on themselves. By challenging Afghan leaders on their compromising with criminals and on their complicity and hypocrisy in letting their crimes go unpunished, Joya thus challenges those politicians and officials to change themselves as well, inviting a certain self-relation based on integrity, justice and courage, one that refuses hypocrisy and the safety of silence. She thus promotes integrity and courage and opens up different modes of subjectivation that go beyond either victimhood or complicity and violence. Similarly, by challenging the official ‘War on Terror’ narratives about Afghanistan, presenting war as liberation for Afghan people and women in particular, she also challenges Western populations to question their own modes of subjectivation in relation to justice, truth, and integrity. By questioning the ways in which Westerners construct themselves as benevolent saviours, she thus invites them to rethink their own relation to their selves and the violent premises upon which they rely.

By incarnating the figure of an uncompromising protector who will not stop speaking the truth despite dangers, she directly challenges the image of victimised Afghan womanhood and thus also challenges Western women and feminists’ modes of self-relation relying on ‘othered’ women as inferiors. In fact, by speaking the truth about Afghan women’s realities and agency, Joya confronts us with uncomfortable truths underlying imperialist and masculinist logics of protection: not only has the situation of women in Afghanistan not been made better by the international interventions launch in the name of their protection against their barbaric men and culture, but much of the West’s media and public were complicit in relaying a reductive, simplistic, and monolithic image of Muslim/Afghan women for militaristic purposes. Malalai Joya’s acts of fearless speech thus confront us with the uncomfortable truth of our own complicity and compromises with the bully-racketeer protector through
rendering Afghan women the constitutive ‘others’ to our own subjectivation, built on an illusion of heightened agency and empowerment.

On an international level, however, a certain fringe of leftist elites welcome her criticism and sees in her capacity to speak openly and critically a success of the liberal narrative of Afghanistan’s liberation, and of Afghan women in particular. In fact, by speaking out, she also became, in a way, a symbol of Afghan women’s liberation, women who can now speak when before (under the Talibans) they had no voice. This positioning can thus be seen as reinforcing narratives around Afghan women being so empowered and free since U.S. and NATO’s interventions that they can now speak dangerously around the world. The fact that she is still alive, that she is ‘winning’ in a way the challenge-blackmail game against the Afghan state, proves Liberals’ point that democracy has successfully been implemented in Afghanistan, thanks to the benevolence of International, and mostly Western, saviours. Hence the fact of ‘her saying this’ in itself contradicts the content of her fearless speech and allows the liberal positioning of the West as the ultimate protectors of democracy in general, and of Afghan women in particular, to remain un-punctured. Joya’s ethical parrhesiastic speech promotes alternative modes of subjectivation and challenges the power of local and national logics of protection, while indirectly reinforcing international ones.

Conclusion

I argue that Joya’s parrhesiastic speech challenges and resists the sovereign/coercive and governing powers of logics of protection, while also reproducing them by performing a form of pastoral care towards those ‘barefoot Afghan people’ she protects. As such, the political and judicial modalities of parrhesia come out strongly from the analysis, even though the ethical aspects are also very much present. This case uses strategies such as verbal exposure, parliamentarian speech, international touring, media interviews and personal encounters and consultations with laypeople. It involves a parrhesiaste who is located within dominant institutions and uses this location as a weapon against the powerful. But what about those who do not stand comfortably within institutions of power/protection? And do other instances of contemporary parrhesia exist that use different strategies than verbal exposure in the agora, departing further from the traditional Greek parrhesia? Can they also be considered parrhesia? What about parrhesastic acts in which the ethical aspects take centre stage?
CHAPTER V: Chelsea Manning’s Double Disclosures: From Soldier to Female Whistleblower

“I feel like a monster”, typed Chelsea Manning, referring partly to her gender identity but mostly to her job as an intelligence analyst in the U.S. military. Morally conflicted by what she saw and read while serving in Iraq, especially regarding the conduct of the U.S. military in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Manning would act on that feeling in the weeks to follow by leaking hundreds of diplomatic cables, videos and other documents to Wikileaks, as well as coming out as a (trans) woman. Manning therefore acted on this feeling by disclosing multiple ‘truths’: about the violent and/or immoral conduct of the U.S. military through its War on Terror; about the presence of and grim realities facing trans* soldiers in the U.S. military; about the unstable, unfixed and performative nature of the alignment between gender, sex, and desire; and about the complicity of homonormative and transpatriotic subjects in uncritically participating in and relaying such ‘open secrets’. In fact, consistently with parrhesiastic truth as elaborated previously, Manning did not reveal anything radically new or hidden from public knowledge: the U.S. public (and the world) already knew about the abuses committed by the U.S. military in its ‘War on Terror’; given the statistics revealing high numbers of trans* veterans, the U.S. military already knew there were many such people struggling with gender identity among its ranks; and the more general existence of gender dysphoria, as well as the unstable, unfixed, and performative nature of gender/sexual identity is not in any sense of the word ‘new’ or ‘unknown’. Logics of protection in the U.S. and beyond are about protecting these ‘open secrets’ from ourselves. Institutions of protection offer alternative ‘truths’ (about being the Just Warrior/benevolent protector and about normative gender/sexual stability and/or essentialism). We accept those truths in exchange for a feeling of normalcy and protection. Chelsea Manning thus confronted the public with different uncomfortable

13 There are many ways to understand trans* identities and identity politics. Here, I will refer to trans* or transgender as an “umbrella term used to describe a range of identities and experiences, including but not limited to pre-operative, postoperative, and nonoperative transsexual people; male and female cross-dressers; intersex individuals; and men and women, regardless of their sexual orientation, whose appearance, behaviour, characteristics are perceived to be different than that stereotypically associated with their sex assigned at birth” (Nan D. Hunter et al., 2004), while transsexuals refers to “one group of transgender people who choose to live permanently as the other sex and make physical changes to their bodies with hormone-replacement therapy and surgeries; however, individuals differ in their transition interests, and not all transsexuals seek full physical transition” (Yerke and Mitchell 2013, 437).
‘truths’ about the secrecy, impunity, and hypocrisy underlying such tacit acceptance of logics of protection, and risked her freedom and safety in doing so.

In this chapter, I argue that the two parrhesiastic acts/disclosures cannot be read separately: Manning’s whistleblowing and coming out can be seen as simultaneous and interconnected acts of parrhesia. In fact, as a trans woman in the military, Manning could simply not ‘be’. Through speaking truth to power, Manning turned herself into a subject (of protection) by transgressing/dissenting to both military codes of conduct and normative codes of gender/sex/sexuality. This case is interesting because, by transgressing these codes, Manning made visible those discourses of power pertaining to who counts as a subject and as a citizen as well as to international logics of protection and, by doing so, opened up a space for their contestation.

**Hetero/Homo Normative Sexualities and the Logics of Protection**

The previous chapter explored the workings of colonialist/imperialist logics of protection in the context of Afghanistan and the War on Terror. We have also explored in chapter two how masculinist logics of protection play out in International Security. But to understand Chelsea Manning’s case, we also need to explore how logics of protection based on normative sexualities function to define who is protected, who is conceived of as protector and who is left unprotected and unprotectable. In particular, we need to explore the U.S. context in relation to such sexualised logics of protection, especially pertaining to issues of National Security and the U.S. military.

**Heteronormativity and the Production of Unprotectables**

The concept of compulsory heterosexuality, developed by Adrienne Rich and Monique Wittig, among others, sustained that heterosexuality is an institution which, far from being ‘natural’ or a choice is in fact compulsory, imposed on people either forcibly or subliminally (Wittig 1992; A. C. Rich 2003). Starting from this concept, Judith Butler went further to explore its relation to gender/sex. For Butler:

The institution of a compulsory and naturalised heterosexuality requires and regulates gender as a binary relation in which the masculine term is differentiated from a feminine term, and this differentiation is accomplished through the practices of heterosexual desire. The act of differentiating the two oppositional moments of the binary results in a consolidation of each term, the respective internal coherence of sex, gender, and desire. (J. Butler 1990, 30)
According to this, the alignment of gender, sex, and (heterosexual) desire in one body is what actually ‘creates’ subjects, for there are no pre-existing subjects behind performative expressions of gender/sex. Exploring how the regulatory norms of ‘sex’ serve to “materialize sexual difference in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexual imperative” (J. Butler 1993, 2), she argues that sexed identity is inseparable from norms of ‘compulsory heterosexuality’. It is only through repetitive performance that gender is created by appeal to a set of regulatory norms that enforce coherence between gender, sex, and sexuality. Heteronormative ‘identities’, therefore rely upon a regulated and performed coherence between expressions of (hetero)sexuality and the binary relation of gender/sex. In fact, individuals who ‘fail’ to do their gender in accordance with these norms are regularly punished (J. Butler 1990).

More recently, the concept of heteronormativity has been used to describe the subtler ways in which norms of heterosexuality are mobilised. Heteronormativity can be defined as:

[… the institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent – that is, organised as a sexuality – but also privileged. […] It consists less of norms that could be summarised as a body of doctrine than of a sense of rightness produced in contradictory manifestations – often unconscious, immanent to practice or to institutions. (L. Berlant and Warner 1998, 158)

This definition allows for acknowledgment of the contradictory ways in which structures of power are actualised. Like masculinity, whiteness, ‘Western-ness’, and other things, normative heterosexuality can take many guises. But one thing remains: its association with power and morality.

As a subject, to be protected and/or protector is to ‘coherently’ align with and ‘successfully’ perform your gender, sex, and desire. Queers14, and all those who are situated outside of these normalised sexualities, are not only excluded from logics of protection but also seen as threat to the social and moral order. Gayle Rubin, in her study of U.S. legal framing of sexualities, argues that a hierarchy is apparent with those who have a respectable (heterosexual, procreative, marital, ‘vanilla’, and so on) sexuality at the top, and the ‘others’ she groups under the name of ‘sex perverts’, beneath them. According to Rubin, the great numbers of laws pertaining to sexuality in

14 Queer here is used, following Annemarie Jagose’s definition, as “an umbrella term for a coalition of culturally marginal sexual self-identifications,” that is used to “dramatise incoherencies in the allegedly stable relations between chromosomal sex, gender and sexual desire.” (Jagose 1996, 1–3)
the United States have often been justified in the name of the protection of children. In this way, ‘sex perverts’ are portrayed as not only dangerous for the social order but a direct threat to the safety and wellbeing of children. By positioning them as threatening, ‘sex perverts’ and sex workers are also placed in a vulnerable position as they are portrayed as unworthy of protection or made invisible altogether and are therefore ‘unprotectable’:

The ideologies of erotic inferiority and sexual danger decrease the power of sex perverts and sex workers in social encounters of all kinds. They have less protection from unscrupulous or criminal behaviour, less access to police protection, and less recourse to the courts. (Rubin 1992, 160)

In other words, ‘sex perverts’ are simultaneously positioned as threatening and as unprotectable in the face of violence and/or ‘criminal behaviour’, in part because of this positioning.

To understand the sexualised logics of protection we need to address, using Butler’s work, the question of not being, of the impossibility of ‘being’ while/as queer, of what it means to not ‘be’ a subject/not taken to be a subject. As Butler puts it, those who fail to do their gender right, to ‘coherently’ align their gender, sex, and sexuality are constantly put outside of the category of ‘human’, as the abject other that allows the category of subjects to exist:

This exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet ‘subjects’, but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject. The abject designates here precisely those ‘unlivable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the subject, but whose living under the sign of the ‘unlivable’ is required to circumscribe the domain of the subject. (J. Butler 1993, 3)

Hence, for Butler, it is not enough to ask how human subjects are constructed “for the construction of the human is a differential operation that produces the more and the less ‘human,’ the inhuman, the humanly unthinkable” (J. Butler 1993, 8). Those abject beings are then regularly punished for their transgression/failure to do their gender ‘right’, but also for making visible the existence of the boundaries themselves as well as the “persistent possibility of their disruption and rearticulation” (J. Butler 1993, 8). This leads her to ask:

What counts as a person? What counts as a coherent gender? What qualifies as a citizen? Whose world is legitimated as real? Subjectively, we ask: Who can I become in such a world where the meanings and limits of the subject are set out in advance for me? By what norms am I constrained as I begin to ask what I may
become? What happens when I begin to become that for which there is no place in the given regime of truth? (J. Butler 2006b, 184)

In relation to the last question in particular, what Butler is asking is what happens to those whose bodies and selves are situated outside of the codes of intelligibility, outside of what is defined as being human. As she herself states, these bodies are consistently ‘punished’ for their transgression, not only for their failure to ‘be’ a normative gendered subject but also to make the boundaries of the domain of subjects appear for what they are: fluid, unstable, changeable.

As developed in chapter three, a major part of Foucault’s work was on modes of subjectivation, or how humans are turned/turn themselves into subjects (see Foucault 1982). His studies on sexuality are particularly interesting in that regard. The normative social order of sex/gender/sexuality in which our sex, gender, and sexuality have to be ‘coherently aligned’ is indeed an area that is highly codified and normalised and in which truth and modes of subjectivation are intertwined through forms of biopower. This order thus relies on multiple regimes of truth and technologies of power and the self that then hide their own functioning. In order to be intelligible as a subject, one has to understand and communicate her sense of self through the rigid and highly codified gender/sex binary. If Foucault was interested in modes of subjectivation, the ways in which we are turned and turn ourselves as subjects, Butler rather asked the question of: “what it is not to be, or what it is to occupy the place of not-being within the field of being, living, breathing, attempting to love, as that which is neither fully negated nor acknowledged as being, acknowledged, we might say, into being” (J. Butler 2006b, 184). Those abject bodies ‘not fully acknowledged into being’ are thus positioned as the unprotectables whose lives/safety are beyond the scope of logics of protection, but also as threats to social orders and the perceived stability of subjectivities of gender/sex/de
desire.

Institutionalised logics of protection, like other institutions of power, therefore function through and with heteronormativity as a way of enforcing the alignment of sex/gender/desire. They rely heavily on disciplinary power to regulate, monitor and enforce normalised/internalised ways of being that are not only gendered, but also sexualised through heteronormativity. What all this means for our exploration of the logics of protection is that what might be protected by these logics is not only the multiple subjects/objects of protection but also the institutions of heteronormativity, the
safeguarding of normative sexualities in which sex, gender, and desire are coherently aligned. But further than sexual orientation, what is at stake here, as exposed above, is also gender/sex identity as a whole and the questioning of its binary boundaries when the expressions of gender/sex/desire are incoherent or discontinuous.

**National Security and the U.S. Sexualised Logics of Protection**

The U.S. has a long history when it comes to the problematisation of homosexuality in relation to National Security. In fact, many scholars have studied the period of the ‘Lavender Scare’ after World War II during which thousands of suspected gays and lesbians were fired from government agencies. Although the U.S. military was already questioning the ‘perversion problem’ within their rank and the potential harm that could be caused by ‘perverts’ in the 1920s and 1930s – a time when homosexuality was starting to be diagnosed as a sign of a ‘psychopathic personality’ following trends in European sexology (Canaday 2009) – it was not until after WWII that homosexuals began to be explicitly associated with threats to national security and homophobia became institutionalised. McCarthy’s infamous association between homosexuality and communism in the 1950s is often seen as a distinguishing moment in the witch-hunt against queer people within the U.S. government and beyond. Yet the ‘Lavender Scare’ comes mostly from the Huey Report published in 1950 (Johnson 2009). This report established that homosexuals were “intrinsically weak, cowardly, unstable, neurotic, and lacking in moral fibre” (Johnson 2009, 112) and led federal security officials to characterise homosexuals as “gregarious” and possessing “a great desire to talk”, “confess”, and “name names” (Johnson 2009, 8). In fact, it was believed that homosexuals “could be more easily blackmailed or coerced into divulging state secrets for fear of being publicly revealed.” (Bean 2014, 55) Hence homosexuals have been constructed in National Security discourses as an inherent threat to the nation’s safety both because of their ‘pervasive nature’ and due to fear that the necessity to ‘hide’ this perversion puts them at risk of blackmail. Therefore queers are constructed as likely to be traitors and thus threatening because of their perceived inherent weakness, cowardice, and disloyalty. These myths have established an enduring connection between homosexuality and ‘security risks’, encompassed by the idea of “queer psychopathology—an ill-defined condition that presumably makes homosexuals prone to disloyalty and emotional instability, and, therefore, more likely to spill secrets.” (Bean 2014, 53)
Until 1993, gays were banned from openly serving in the U.S. armed forces, thus precluded from occupying the position of protectors of the nation. In 1993, as a result of a political compromise by the Clinton administration in an attempt to lift the ban, the U.S. enforced the ‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’ (DADT) policy. Under the regulation, homosexual members of the military were allowed to serve unless they: made a statement that they were homosexual or bisexual; attempted to marry a person of the same sex; or got caught attempting to, soliciting another to, or engaging in a homosexual act. (Department of Defense 1993) It was argued under the Title 10 of the United States Code that: “the presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability.” (Department of Defense 1993) Therefore we can see how the DADT policy continued the connection between homosexuality and security risk. It is estimated that thirteen thousands people left the military because of the regulation, reaching a peak in 2001 with one thousand two hundreds and seventy-three members discharged, and then seeing a fall in numbers being discharged due to the increased demand for troops to fight the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. (Gates 2010)

If such discourses have evolved and recent developments such as the repeal of DADT and other policies favouring the integration of (certain) queer people within the U.S. security apparatuses seem to locate the ‘Lavender Scare’ well in the past, authors such as Hamilton Bean argue that the connection between homosexuality and security risk/treachery remains. In fact, he argues that, even if gays are not portrayed as ‘psychopathic’ anymore, the fact that they might be and often are victims of homophobic abuse makes them particularly vulnerable to emotional distress, marking them as “weak, fragile, and unstable.” (Bean 2014, 60) Hence: “Whether members of GLBTQ communities are characterised as innately pathological […] or emotionally damaged due to abuse […], the implication is clear: Members of GLBTQ communities continue to represent a “security risk.” (Idem) Yet in recent years, some LGBT people have been entering the domain of the subjects as both the protected and, more recently, the protector and are thus being included in regimes of the normal through what scholars have called homonormativity and homonationalism.

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15 For more information and discussion on the DADT policy’s roots and consequences, see (Gates 2010; C. Rich, Schutten, and Rogers 2012; Cohn 1998; Shilts 2014; Hillman 2008).
Homonormativity and Homonationalism: From Unprotectable to Protected to Protector

In recent decades, it could be argued that some members of the LGBT communities have been portrayed more and more as the protected (in need of, and deserving of, the protection from the state and society more generally) and have been officially and openly ‘accepted’ into institutions of protection such as the military. What has changed is thus that ‘homosexuals’ are not necessarily seen as (only) perverse security threats but have also been portrayed in recent decades as victims in need of protection by the state, as well as legitimate protectors of the state, under certain conditions. Such logics rely on two relatively ‘new’ militarised queer figures: the victim of homophobia requiring the state’s protection (the protected) and the queer patriotic soldier (the protector).

In fact, many scholars have recently analysed the collusion of certain homosexual identities within dominant normative/national identities, what has been conceptualised as homonormativity. According to Lisa Duggan in her work on American neoliberalism and gay right-wing activists, the term relates to: “a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilised gay constituency and a privatised, depoliticised gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption.” (Duggan 2012, 50) Hence, certain LGBT subjects have recently been included into ‘regimes of the normal’ in the U.S., an inclusion that is always contingent to and conditional on these subjects’ upholding of heteronormative norms, assumptions and institutions.

Other scholars have explored the connection between homonormativity and nationalism, or what Jasbir Puar calls homonationalism. Puar argues that U.S. nationalism is now accompanied by “homonormative ideologies that replicate narrow racial, class, and gender national ideals” (Puar 2007, xxv). Puar analyses how this limited inclusion serves, in the context of the ‘War on Terror’, the purpose of casting the terrorist-other as homophobic and backward, while still disciplining queer and/or sexually perverse bodies that fall outside of this homonational normativity. Hence, this inclusion relies on the simultaneous exclusion of ‘others’ who do not fit the mould of these newly recognised homonormative subjectivities, an exclusion very often relying on and reinforcing gender, class, race, and able-bodied ideals of ‘normalcy’. Those ‘domesticated homosexual bodies’ are thus deployed to reinforce U.S. patriotism, both
within the nation and abroad. Through orientalist depictions of ‘threatening others’, such as the figure of the terrorist, these discourses are used to break LGBT citizens apart from racialised and sexualised others (Puar 2007, 38–39) and to justify military interventions in those ‘other’ spaces of barbarity and perversion. Drawing on postcolonial feminist work denouncing the ‘white saviour complex’ underlying discourses of American gender exceptionalism aiming at ‘saving brown women from brown men’, as detailed in the previous chapter, Puar extends the analysis to American sexual exceptionalism, which conceives of the U.S. as exceptionally enlightened and protective of LGBT lives and thus in charge of saving/protecting those subjects from their barbaric cultures. (Puar 2007, 2006; Puar and Rai 2002)

What this means is that these new logics of protection create certain LGBT subjects figured as the ‘hate crime victim’, ‘the persecuted homosexual’, ‘the gay rights-holder’, and so on, that require the extended intervention of the state’s institutions of protection against those backward threats now understood as homophobic. As argued by Dean Spade, it entails that: “The figure of the gay hate crime victim operates domestically to pass laws expanding prison sentences and police budgets, and the figure of the hanged homosexual operates to justify military intervention overseas.” (Spade and Willse 2014, 14) We see here how the sexualised logics of protection which rely heavily on forms of disciplinary power and biopower now intersect with the mobilising of pastoral and coercive forms of power justifying the “targeting of queerly raced bodies for dying” (Puar 2007, xii) to ‘make live’ those privileged LGBT subjects afforded the benevolent protection of the state. Reflecting on the racialised violence and infinite war that followed the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. in her book Precarious Lives, Butler similarly argues: “Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. Other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as ‘grievable’” (J. Butler 2006a, 32).

What emerges from these writings are precisely the intersections of different logics of protection mutually relying on and reinforcing each other in placing certain bodies as the unprotectables in order to reinforce dominant logics of protection and their reliance on race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, coloniality, and so forth, especially when it comes to ‘defending the nation’ and national security narratives. To summarise, using Mia Fischer’s words:

As we find ourselves at a juncture in contemporary sexual politics where certain racially and economically privileged, homonormative, able-bodied, middle-class
gays and lesbians are now gaining access to rights associated with citizenship and their ‘humanity’ is recognised, a whole group of non-subjects is simultaneously created. The granting of constitutional rights to certain queer bodies and identities comes at a time in which the United States is in a condition of perpetual war, waged predominantly against bodies of color at home and abroad. (Fischer 2016, 575)

These logics also rely on another figure: the queer patriotic soldier. In fact, mainstream LG(BT) associations have celebrated the repeal of DADT in 2011 as a victory for the inclusion of gays and lesbians into the military and in society in general. LGBT organisations such as the HRC understood the repeal of DADT as in keeping with narratives of progress and inclusion, presenting the state as the ultimate enabler and protector of equality (Fischer 2016, 581). Yet critical queer scholars have challenged the arguments advanced in favour of the repeal of DADT rooted in a form of queer liberalism (see, among others, Eng 2010) promoting “the incorporation of certain queer bodies into civil rights frameworks” while ignoring “the imperialist workings of the military-industrial-complex” and “implicitly affirming imperialist U.S. foreign policy.” (Fischer 2016, 570–72)

Indeed, critical queer scholars criticise the fact that campaigns for the repeal of DADT ignored oppressive intersectionalities and the violence entrenched within military institutions. For example, while the focus of both mainstream LGBT rights association and media and political attention had been placed on (white) gay male soldiers affected by DADT, women were disproportionately affected by the regulation as they represented up to a third of those discharged under the regulation despite representing only fourteen percent of the force (Lehavot and Simpson 2013). Minorities have also been heavily impacted, as the number of discharges of white members declined while those of racialised members remained stable or even increased (Gates 2010), making women of colour the front-line casualties of DADT. Read through the logics of protection, this means that certain bodies were perceived as the actual or potential protectors, allowing their (temporary, conditional) inclusion in regimes of militarised normalcy, while others were refused such positions and punished for not

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16 As will be developed below, trans* people were still not included under the repeal of DADT and the ban against them serving openly in the armed forces has just recently been lifted in 2016, although even more recent political statements by current U.S. President Donald Trump seems to show that this lift might be revised in the near future.

17 Human Rights Campaign, according to its website, is the largest civil rights association in the U.S. advocating for LGBTQ equality that has been very active in the campaign to repeal DADT. See https://www.hrc.org/hrc-story.
‘fitting in’ because they did not embody the image of the hetero/homonormative masculine white protector. In fact, what statistics about DADT discharges seem to highlight is that embodying the figure of the protector relies as much on gender as it does on normative sexuality and race. Hence, as argued by Spade:

The mainstream gay groups that invented the sympathetic gay soldier figure […] had as its sole goal inclusion in military service for lesbians and gay men. It did not include support for those people when they face the realities of being in the military; in fact, it required ignoring the actual conditions of being a soldier and participating in a pro-war patriotic fantasy of U.S. military service, which hides its dangerous and gruesome realities. (Spade and Willse 2014, 17)

But mostly, what many queer scholars argue is that the repeal of DADT cannot be read without the context of the imperialist War on Terror and the need for wider recruitment of military personnel to feed into the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Spade and Willse 2014; Bean 2014; Fischer 2016; Puar and Rai 2002). This partial and conditional inclusion of certain queer bodies into the state institutions of protection thus relies on a reinforcement and expansion of imperial logics of protection in relation to the War on Terror. Thus we can see how imperial logics of protection, as developed in the previous chapters, now intersect with sexualised logics constructing the U.S. as the ultimate protector through sexual exceptionalism that allows some queer bodies to be portrayed as victims in need of saving (the protected) and as patriotic soldiers (protectors). To summarise using Spade and Willse words: “in the end, to be pro-gay is not only to be pro-military, but gay affirmation is militarised and anti-gayness is posed as not just culturally backwards, but a security threat. This has been the work of the long War on Terror, to make cultural difference (or ethnic/racial/geopolitical difference, depending on the valence demanded by context) a security threat.” (Spade and Willse 2014, 12) But before turning to Manning’s case, we need to explore what it means not only for lesbian and gay military members to be perceived simultaneously as the protected, the unprotectable and the protector, but also what it means for trans* soldiers to occupy the contradictory position of the unprotectable protector.
‘Being While Trans’: the Unprotectable Abjects

Trans people’s positioning within sexualised logics of protection have to be understood within the context developed above, yet cannot be reduced to it, as trans identities have been particularly central to the demonisation of queers as perverted, abnormal, not-fully-human, and/or threatening. In fact, the Gender Identity Disorder (GID)/Gender dysphoria\(^{19}\) diagnosis is an illustrative example of how biopower functions in shaping subjects through this regime of truth about the gender/sex binary while constantly rendering it invisible and naturalised: “That is to say, the medicalisation of the trans experience has created both a legible trans identity and a specific script for discussing trans experience, all while occluding its own functioning as a historically contingent apparatus of biopolitical power.” (T. R. Johnston 2013, 86)

In order to have access to the treatment that will render them ‘intelligible’ in the sexualised order of things (while often being bound to fail as the medicalisation of their experience already places them as abject others), transsexual people are subjected to the psycho-medical apparatus’ (disciplinary) power through the DSM diagnosis of GID or gender dysphoria that, in turn, relies solely on the person’s confession about her sense of self. The GID diagnostic paradoxically reinforces the gender binary:

GID assumes that we are, in our deepest interiority, always already male or female. This is a clear example of how biopolitical power both creates subject positions and in so doing strengthens the logic within which biopower operates; the diagnosis reinscribes and naturalises the gender binary upon which it depends. (T. R. Johnston 2013, 90–91).

\(^{18}\) The subtitle above refers to an article “‘Being while Black’: Resistance and the management of the self” in which the author, Laura J. el-Khoury, argues that ‘being while black’ constitutes an ‘everyday revolution’ because Black people in the United States resists through their day-to-day ‘being’ in the world, through the management of their selves, the disciplinary/panopticon technique that constitutes ‘racial dressage’ (el-Khoury 2012, 85). While one system of oppression does not in any case translate directly into another and cannot be transposed on top of another as a direct addition or correlation, there is a similarity here in the way I wish to address ‘being while trans’ through Foucault’s work on practices of the self and everyday resistance to modes of subjectivation.

\(^{19}\) In the DSM5, the GID diagnosis has been replaced by Gender Dysphoria in an attempt to depathologize transsexuality and transgenderism by removing the term “disorder” (qualifying all trans people as mentally ill), while recognising the psychological distress it can cause. It still uses similar criteria for diagnosis including: a strong and persistent cross-gender identification; persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of inappropriateness in the general role of that sex; the disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition; the disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning (DSM-IV 2000, 535 and DSM 5, [http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%20dysphoria%20fact%20sheet.pdf](http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%20dysphoria%20fact%20sheet.pdf)). However, the DSM 5 was published in May 2013, just before the court martial trial began on June 3 and after Manning had been ‘diagnosed’, hence, in court, the use of both GID and Gender dysphoria were used and in Manning-Lamo chat conversations, which took place in 2010, Manning uses GID. This chapter will thus use both terms, depending on the context in which they were used.
But even while going through the psycho-medicalisation process of transitioning to the ‘other’ gender, hence having to reinforce the gender binary in order to have access to treatment, transsexual people have pushed back against these psycho-medical discourses through diverse means of resistance, such as learning and practicing the narrative in advance\textsuperscript{20}. Living as/being transgender, failing to do one’s gender ‘right’ or actively seeking to change one’s perceived sex/gender in a society obsessed with a naturalised sexual binary could in itself be seen as a form of everyday resistance to the way one’s conduct is governed in relation to gender/sex/sexuality.

Understood in the context of state logics of protection, this means that trans people’s lives are not considered for protection but are the ‘abjects’ of protection, not worthy of protection or grief. Worst of all, because of their position as less-than-human, as outside of the domain of subjects, people who fail to ‘do their gender right’ (or do their gender just right but by doing so challenge the essentialist alignment of sex and gender) are constantly the target of violence, often from the very people in charge of protection, as shown by the alarming rates of daily violence they face from the police, and the lack of protection provided by the authorities (for a review of this violence in the case of the United States, see Currah, Juang, and Minter 2006 and Stotzer, 2009). Trans people (and trans women in particular) are also often portrayed as gender (and/or sexual) ‘deceivers’, preying on heterosexual men while concealing their ‘real’ sex/gender. (Serano 2007) This portrayal of trans people as treacherous, untrustworthy, cheating, and lying has often been used to justify (and in fact blame them for) the transphobic violence they face\textsuperscript{21} (Bettcher 2007). Hence, similar to the connection between homosexuality and security risks, trans bodies are securitised and seen as dangerous and suspect (Shepherd and Sjoberg 2012), positioning them simultaneously as unprotectable and as the threat.

\textsuperscript{20} In fact, when the first textbook on transsexuality was released (Harry Benjamin’s \textit{The transsexual phenomenon} in 1966), transsexuals used to pass it from hand to hand and learn the script they had to perform in front of psycho-medical professionals to obtain access to surgery. It took several years for researchers to discover the reason why Benjamin’s criteria matched so perfectly the transsexuals’ narratives! (Stone, 2006, 228) Similarly, female-to-male transgender people in San Francisco are often ‘coached’ by other FTM ‘dramaturges of transsexuality’, as Butler calls them, on how to perform the essentialist narrative in front of psycho-medical professionals to get access to surgery (J. Butler 2006b, 191).

\textsuperscript{21} Similarly to the ‘gay panic’ legal argument stating that homophobic violence and even murder is caused and justified by an impulsive reaction from heterosexual men to advances and flirtation by gay men, implicitly shifting the blame to queer men for the violence they suffered, many attorneys have tried to mitigate their clients’ guilt in cases of transphobic violence and murder by claiming that being ‘cheated’ or ‘lied’ to about someone’s ‘real’ sex/gender causes impulsive and ‘understandable’ reactions from the cis-heterosexual men involved (see Bettcher 2007).
As stated before, the violence trans people face might not be due only to their transgression of gender norms but also because they make visible the necessary failures of the heteronormative system and the impossibility of ever fully regulating gender/sex/sexuality in line with its norms. What transgender people resist is not only the perceived alignment of gender/sex/sexuality but also the huge pressure put on individuals to ‘do their gender right’ and the necessary fragility of such an alignment. As Julia Serano argues:

transphobia is first and foremost an expression of one’s own insecurity about having to live up to cultural gender ideals. The fact that transphobia is so rampant in our society reflects the reality that we place an extraordinary amount of pressure on individuals to conform to all of the expectations, restrictions, assumptions, and privileges associated with the sex they were assigned at birth. (Serano 2007, 12)

The risks of life as a trans person are particularly high for trans women (and trans women of colour in particular), who are situated at the intersection of transphobia, cissexism and mysogyny (and racism), and suffer from specific forms of violence because of their expression of femininity and femaleness, seen as particularly threatening for its challenge to male supremacy and masculine superiority. Serano’s work on transmisogyny puts this as follow:

In a male-centred gender hierarchy, where it is assumed that men are better than women and that masculinity is superior to femininity, there is no greater perceived threat than the existence of trans women, who despite being born male and inheriting male privilege “choose” to be female instead. By embracing our own femaleness and femininity, we, in a sense, cast a shadow of doubt over the supposed supremacy of maleness and masculinity. (Serano 2007, 15)

Hence, in logics of protection, trans women are often situated outside the confines of protection, as unprotectable, since their position as abjects or not-so-human place them beyond the realm of the protectable.

Soldiering While Trans

If trans people are the abjects of protection whose lives are unprotectable, they were also not allowed, in 2013 at the time of Manning’s disclosures, to occupy the position of protectors of the nation. While eleven countries at the time allowed transgender people to serve in the armed forces, in the United States they have only recently been allowed to serve openly in the military. Indeed, (openly) transgender

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22 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Israel, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom and Uruguay. (Yerke and Mitchell 2013, 446)
people were usually precluded from serving and deemed unfit for duty for psychological reasons (transsexualism was listed as a psychosocial condition, a type of paraphilia such as exhibitionism or voyeurism) and/or medical reasons (including any “history of major abnormalities or defects of the genitalia” such as sex change) (Kerrigan 2012; Yerke and Mitchell 2013). People who entered the military and later began to openly identify as transgender could be discharged for similar reasons as listed above, but also risked criminal charges through the Uniform Code of Military Justice under Article 133 for “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” and the infamous article 134, criminalising any conduct that might cause “prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces” or “bring discredit to the armed forces” (in Yerke and Mitchell 2013). This last article, often criticised for potentially criminalising any atypical behaviours, would affect not only transgender people, but also any individual who did not perform their gender ‘right’, no matter how they identify.23

Yet, a report on the National Transgender Discrimination Survey concluded that transgender Americans were twice as likely to serve in the armed forces than in the general population (Parco, Levy, and Spears 2015, 223). Another study concluded that male-to-female (MTF) transsexual people counted as thirty percent of veterans, a prevalence that is three times higher than in the general population (in Yerke and Mitchell 2013, 439–40). Trans people thus seem to be overrepresented in the American armed forces, despite (or because of) their official rejection. This is true in particular of many MTF transsexuals who join the military in an attempt to overcome their struggles with gender identity (G. R. Brown 2006; Parco, Levy, and Spears 2015). Many, like Manning, acknowledged that they joined the hypermasculine environment of the armed forces in the hope that it “would make a man out of them” (Parco, Levy, and Spears 2015) as a last resort at resolving their gender identity ‘disorder’ (G. R. Brown 2006). Many FTM individuals in turn acknowledged joining the military for “its perceived culture of gender irrelevance” (Yerke and Mitchell 2013, 229). This is an interesting choice of words since “gender irrelevance” in such an environment would not necessarily apply to people whose gender is feminine/female. As Serano argues, while trans people on the FTM spectrum face discrimination for challenging gender norms,

23 The «toleration» of trans people within the military did occur, however, as some were accepted by their units and superiors who turned a blind eye to military regulations, while others had a very difficult experience. Trans activists had also been wondering how the changes in the DSM would affect the ban on transgender people in the military, as the abandonment of the term “disorder” theoretically removes transgenderism from the list of psychosocial or medical “conditions.”
their expression of masculinity or maleness itself might not face the same level of ridicule as that of trans women’s femininity, due to trans-misogyny (Serano, 2007, 14). In this context, and especially in the context of a hypermasculine environment such as the military, it is not only the transgression of gender norms that constitutes a risk but also any expression of femininity. Coming out along the MTF spectrum might thus be less likely to be accepted or tolerated, and constitute an even riskier behaviour.24

While there are many reasons to join the military, many of which are the same for trans and cis people (expressed by Manning, for example the desire to save lives and protect people), the perceived rigidity of gender roles and hypermasculinity within the armed forces seem a determinant factor for many transsexual people who decide to enrol. Butler, as stated before, asks what counts as a citizen. In a militarised country such as the U.S., being a citizen is traditionally closely linked to ‘serving one’s country’. As illustrated in this quote from Yerke and Mitchell about the eleven states that allow transgender people to serve in the military: “By utilising their nation’s resources for this purpose, these countries honor transgender people as citizens who are just as deserving as others, rather than treating them as second-class citizens, as they are usually considered in the United States” (Yerke and Mitchell 2013, 447), the connections between citizenship, subjectivity and military service are still deeply entrenched. As Fischer argues: “For transgender veterans, patriotism indicates not only a cultural and social belonging within the nation, but the right to represent and exemplify the nation itself as a patriot.” (Fischer 2016, 579) Maybe, then, it should not come as a surprise that such a high proportion of transgender people join the military. Given the impossibility of ‘being’ in a society whose modes of subjectivation depend so much on a strict and rigid gender/sex binary, perhaps ‘serving one’s country’ is an attempt to qualify as an equal human, to enter/remain in the domain of the subjects and citizens, despite the deep conviction of one’s self-perceived gender. Since being ‘out’ was not an option, the military might have offered, in the United States, a space in which one can “count as a subject” and “qualify as a citizen” while the norms by which

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24 This is illustrated in the case of Logan Ireland and Laila Villanueva, a transgender couple in the U.S. military whose story has been told in an article and a short documentary in the NYTimes online (Dawson 2015). While Ireland, a trans man, has been accepted by his unit and superior officers and is allowed to serve presenting himself as a man, his fiancée Villanueva, a trans woman, was discharged after coming out and did not benefit from the same support and recognition. This is of course just one case, but as the military evolves and more trans people get ‘accepted for who they are’ in the U.S. military, we can wonder how much gender and sexism play out in defining which trans bodies and subjectivities get accepted or tolerated, and which ones do not.
one is constrained are so rigid that one “cannot begin to ask what one may become.” (J. Butler 2006b)

Yet, Fischer argues, the recent ‘acceptance’ and inclusion of openly transsexual members in the military has led to a form of transpatriotism. As homonationalism reinforces heteronormativity and state logics of protection, she argues that, similarly, transpatriotism does not question cis-normativity and the gender binary but rather reinforces them by relying on gendered and raced discourses of sexual exceptionalism, allowing certain normative subjects to join their gay and lesbian siblings in regulated ‘regimes of the normal’. In fact, she defines transpatriotism as “a form of jingoism characterised by an unwavering devotion to the state, and specifically by an adherence to the gender binary. Engendered through exceptional forms of transnormativity, transpatriotism is grounded in an unmarked whiteness that incorporates certain previously stigmatised transgender bodies into the folds of U.S. Empire.” (Fischer 2016, 569) Hence, while “both homonationalism and transpatriotism ruthlessly police boundaries of acceptable racial, gender, sexual, and class formations by exceptionalising certain subjectivities […] transpatriotism specifically functions to (re)assert the gender binary, negating any fluidity. To be a true transpatriot one must adhere to and pass within the binary.” (Fischer 2016, 579) This inclusion of some exceptional trans subjects who follow and reinforce the biopower script of GID/GD and its reinforcement of the gender binary relies on the exclusion of ‘perverts’ who, whether willingly or unwillingly, question/challenge the gender binary, fail to embody the militarised ideal of the (hyper)masculine white protector, and/or question the state and its imperial logics of protection.

What all this means in terms of the logics of protection is that the U.S. military represents not only the protector of the nation (and of the ‘free world’) and, increasingly, the benevolent protector of ‘persecuted queers’ abroad but also, and perhaps mostly, the protector of a certain moral and social order based on a strict gender binary, (hyper)masculinity, (implicit) whiteness, heteronormativity, and so on. Some queer bodies will be included within its ranks as a result of, and not despite, such moral and social orders. This inclusion serves to uphold and reinforce those disciplinary norms presented as pastoral forms of benevolent protection (sometimes protection from oneself, as shown by the MTF transsexual individuals signing up in the hope of getting rid of their ‘gender dysphoria’). Such inclusions will be accomplished on the backs of those who will not or cannot comply with such norms of behaviours and subjectivities,
and who will face increasing coercion for not performing their selves within the new/old ‘regimes of the normal’. Logics of sexualised protection are thus reinforced and not challenged by the inclusion of LGBT members, and the U.S. military becomes the site where those logics are safeguarded and protected against those who threaten the stability, fixity and ‘naturalness’ of binary, normatively-aligned gender/sex/desire. These logics also cannot be read outside of imperial logics of protection, since those newly included queer bodies must adhere to, perform and reinforce U.S. patriotism in its unending War on Terror justified as benevolent protection through discourses of gender and sexual exceptionalism. Hence to ‘be’ a subject of protection, a protector of the nation, is to embrace U.S. patriotism and its militarised forms of homo/trans/hetero normativities.

**Chelsea Manning’s Story**

Manning was born in 1987 in Crescent, Oklahoma. Her dad was a manager of computer programmers at Hertz Corporation after having worked in the military as an intelligence analyst. Her mom was originally from Wales and married her father while he was stationed in a Welsh air force base. Manning described her childhood self to Lamo as: a short, very intelligent and very effeminate boy who was always glued to the computer screen and a “science fair buff.” (Hansen 2011) Hence she said she “was an easy target by kindergarden”, was “pretty messed up at school… ‘girly boy’ ‘teacher’s pet’, etc.” Life at home was also difficult, as she described to Lamo: “home was the same, alcoholic father and mother… mother was very nice, but very needy emotionally… father was very wealthy (lots of nice toys/computer stuff), but abusive.” (Idem) Her parents got divorced when she was fifteen and she then moved with her mother to Wales, where she lived for four years, completing her education. At nineteen, she moved back to the U.S. to live with her father, who found her a job at a local software company. After an altercation with her father and stepmother, she left and lived in her car, working a series of low-waged jobs between Tulsa and Chicago before moving in with her aunt in Maryland. She enrolled in a local community college, but soon dropped out, before deciding to join the Army. Around the same time as this

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25 Manning’s life story is based on the way Manning introduced herself in her chats with Adrian Lamo as well as on (Madar 2012) and (Maxwell 2015). Most of this chapter relies on the chatlogs between Lamo and Manning that has been published in full on wired.com and can be found here: [http://www.wired.com/2011/07/manning-lamo-logs](http://www.wired.com/2011/07/manning-lamo-logs) (Hansen 2011)
decision, she created for herself a circle of gay college student friends in the D.C. area and spent a lot of time around hackers’ communities.

In 2007, Manning enlisted in the U.S. Army and was sent for training in Fort Wood, where she was allegedly bullied and harassed. She was soon placed in the ‘discharge unit’ for enlistees, about to be kicked out of the institution. But in 2007, recruitment numbers were low and the need for recruits with IT skills was high; therefore, Manning was brought back to active duty as an intelligence analyst. After her training as an analyst was completed, she was deployed to Fort Drumm, upstate New York. There, her supervisors reported regular angry outbursts, during which she threw chairs around and screamed at higher-ranking soldiers. Her supervisor recommended against her deployment in Iraq but she was nonetheless deployed in October 2009 to the isolated base of FOB Hammer, about fifty kilometers from Baghdad, as an intelligence analyst. One month later, she was promoted to the rank of specialist, with top security clearance.

In November 2009, she sent an email to her supervisor entitled ‘My Problem,’ in which she came out as a trans woman. A month later, after another outburst incident during a counselling session, a supervising master sergeant had the bolt of her rifle removed, out of concerns over Manning’s mental health. In early 2010, Manning started sending documents to Wikileaks (after first contacting the Washington Post and the New York Times) that would total thousands of files, including the Collateral Murder Video exposing the killing of unarmed civilians and two Reuters journalists by a U.S. Apache helicopter crew in Iraq; the Afghan and Iraq war logs that revealed, among other violations of International Law, that the U.S. had widespread knowledge of the use of torture by the Iraqi authorities; and a set of U.S. diplomatic cables, later known as ‘Cablegate,’ revealing the role played by corporate interests and spying in international diplomacy. In April 2010, Wikileaks released the Collateral Murder Video, leading to widespread media coverage and attention. In May 2010, Manning was demoted from Specialist to Private First Class after punching her supervisor in the face, but kept her security clearance. Later that month, she started chatting online with Adrian Lamo, renowned hacker confined under house arrest by the FBI for breaking into the NYTimes computer system. Two days into their chat, Lamo contacted the federal authorities and started working as an informant. A few minutes into their first conversation, Manning told Lamo that she was ‘pending discharge for ‘adjustment disorder’ in lieu of ‘gender
identity disorder.’” She quickly opened up to and confided in Lamo, revealing everything about her leaking of the documents and her gender identity.

On May 29 2010, Manning was arrested by military police and detained in Kuwait for a year before being transferred to a maximum-security detention facility in Virginia. She stayed in detention for over 1000 days before her trial began, under conditions arguably classified as torture (she was forced to sleep naked, kept in solitary confinement for long periods of time and forced to report verbally to the guards every 5 minutes, for example). At the beginning of her trial, Manning’s attorney tried to use the gender identity disorder (GID) diagnostic as proof that she had ‘diminished capacities’ and therefore could not be charged in line with the ‘Aiding the enemy’ statute, the most serious charge held against her. In this narrative, she was presented as an emotionally unstable, isolated trans woman who had tried to get help from her supervisors but had not received it. She had been suffering from a psychiatric disorder and hence could not be held responsible for her actions or show the ‘intent’ necessary to prove she was ‘Aiding the enemy’. This line of defence was strategically trying to shift the blame from Manning to her supervisors for not acting on evidence of Manning’s mental health issues and calls for help, and attempting to avoid the judge issuing Manning with the death penalty or life imprisonment sentences arising from charges of ‘Aiding the enemy’.

As the trial went on, Coombs (Manning’s defence lawyer) dropped this line of defence and changed his strategy to adopt a more classical whistleblowing defence, portraying her instead as a courageous, yet naïve, whistleblower who was conscious of her actions, motivated by a political conscience and morally justified in doing so because of the immorality of U.S. military actions in Iraq and beyond (for a more detailed account of the rationale of the defence strategy and the consequences of using the GID defence, see Porta 2013). Yet even this line of defence used psychological ‘diagnosis’ to portray Manning as an inoffensive, young, and naïve soldier. For example, Dr David Moulton, the defence’s expert on forensic psychiatry who reviewed Manning’s medical records and history, confirmed the diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder, but also added that she “displayed some ‘narcissistic traits’, such as ‘grandiose ideations’, and ‘arrogant and haughty behaviour’” when stressed. He said that Manning had “‘post-adolescent idealism’, a relatively normal focus on making a difference in the world and enacting social change, for those aged 18-24.” (N. Fuller 2013b) Therefore, in the second narrative, though Manning was presented as a
whistleblower conscious of her actions, her political motivations were also reduced to merely a symptom of ‘post-adolescent idealism’.

The prosecution, in turn, attempted to portray Manning as narcissistic, but also as an egotistical anarchist, with no allegiance or respect for her country and fellow soldiers, who was seeking fame and attention to the detriment of the U.S. safety, and had sought to leak every document she could find the moment she had set foot in Iraq (N. Fuller 2013a). In this narrative, the GID diagnosis is implicitly pathologised as an attention seeking, narcissistic trait that proves Manning “only cared about [her]self,” “put [her]self before [her] country,” and was proud of her violations (Idem). Coombs summarised these two positions in his closing argument:

Is PFC Manning somebody who is a traitor, who has no loyalty to this country, or the flag, and wanted to systematically harvest and download information as much information as possible for his true employer, WikiLeaks? Is that what the evidence shows or is he a young, naive, good-intentioned soldier who had human life, in his humanist beliefs, central to his decision, whose sole focus was to maybe, I just can make a difference, maybe make a change? Which side of the version is the truth? (N. Fuller 2013a)

Many media outlets adopted the government’s position, describing Manning as a traitor who had put the U.S. safety at great risk. Within these narratives, Manning’s gender identity and struggles with gender dysphoria were either dismissed, ignored or ridiculed (with many in media refusing, even after her official public coming out at the end of the trial, to use her preferred pronouns, see DiLalla 2013), or used as a way to pathologise Manning and her actions, similarly to the prosecution and defence’s strategies in court. In this last narrative, Manning’s treatise to the state is reflected through and/or explained by her gender dysphoria, seen as a mental health disorder (read: crazy, unstable, weird, or sick) and/or deception (read: liar, manipulative, or untrustworthy). Some similarly argued along those lines that she leaked these documents out of personal and self-serving motives, such as a desire for revenge for being bullied in the military or ‘delusions of grandeur’ (see Maxwell 2015).

On the other side of the debate, Manning’s defenders reacted by focusing solely or mainly on the political and moral justifications for her actions (the public’s right to know and ideals of democracy, truth, and justice) while disregarding her struggles with gender identity/sexual orientation as personal, private, and/or irrelevant to the story. In this line of argumentation, Manning belonged to a long line of American whistleblowers and didn’t differ from them in her motives or moral quality (see
Greenwald 2013; Lee 2013; or Madar 2012). The use of GID is seen as a smoke screen distracting us from the political issues Manning had wished to raise by blowing the whistle. In order to honour Manning as the hero she is, according to these narratives, her gender identity/sexuality should remain outside of the story, as something personal and private.

A court martial ultimately sentenced Manning, on August 21st 2010, to thirty-five years in an all-male military prison. The day after the trial ended, Manning publicly announced that she preferred to be referred to as Chelsea Manning and by the use of female pronouns.

**Chelsea Manning and the Sexualised Logics of Protection**

We can see how the trial and some media narratives relied on and used the narratives around “queer psychopathology” that “makes homosexuals prone to disloyalty and emotional instability” and explains her compulsive need to “spill secrets” (Bean 2014, 53). Similarly to arguments advanced during the Lavender Scare, Manning here is presented as unstable, neurotic, and ‘lacking in moral fibre’, whether this emerges from her own identity and moral character and/or from the bullying she faced within her unit, confirming Bean’s argument that, whether victimised or demonised, queer people are still seen as a threat to National Security. (Bean 2014) The use of GID by both the defence and the prosecution during the trial was criticised by many trans activists for attempting to reignite the ‘trans panic’ argument highlighted before. Through this line of argument, Manning was also portrayed as untrustworthy, unstable, and treacherous because of her gender identity, reinforcing sexualised/gendered logics of protection portraying trans women as threatening and unprotectable. Finally, portraying Manning as a brave and patriotic whistleblower whose gender identity is irrelevant reinforces some of the homonormative and transpatriotic logics relying on the upholding of liberal heteronormative values, norms, and institutions, such as separating the public from the private and locating sexuality and gender within the private sphere, as will be developed below.

26 In January 2017, President Obama commuted her sentence to four additional months to the seven years she had already served, and Manning was released on May 17, 2017. Her years in prison were marked by her fight to get treatment for transitioning (partly granted by the use of hormone therapy after years of legal struggles, but she still had to follow the male grooming codes of conduct by keeping her hair short, for example, and was denied sex-reassignment surgery) and harassment from guards (who, for example, punished her for such trivial things as keeping a tube of toothpaste past its expiration date). These conditions led her to attempt suicide twice in 2016. [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/us/chelsea-manning-sentence-obama.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/us/chelsea-manning-sentence-obama.html)
But, even before the trial, Manning was already complicatedly intertwined with the sexualised logics of protection developed before. In fact, as she presented herself in the military as an openly gay man at the time, thus having trouble integrating within her unit, Manning was positioned both as an official protector (a soldier) but also unprotected within her unit (as a perceived out gay man under the DADT, still in place at the time) and unprotectable as a petite trans woman who could simply not be in the institution.

**Manning the Protector**

When Manning joined the military, she had a certain adherence to the military logics of protection, presenting herself in terms of a responsible and benevolent protector who joined the forces in order to ‘save lives’. In fact, when she first joined the military and was stationed in Fort Drumm, Manning started communicating online with a young person from Chicago (then Zach Antolak) who was posting her thoughts as a drag queen on Youtube (Zinnie Jones, who has now transitioned and identifies as a trans woman and queer activist), to whom she opened up about herself and her experience in the military. In one of these exchanges, she stated: “I feel a great responsibility and duty to people […] I’m more concerned about making sure that everyone, soldiers, marines, contractor [sic], even the local nationals, get home to their families.” (Pilkington 2011)

Later in these exchanges, she also wrote: “what’s even better with my current position is that I can apply what I learn to provide more information to my officers and commanders, and hopefully save lives… I figure that justifies my sudden choice to do this[.]” Thus, at first, she seemed to express a certain degree of loyalty to and sense of belonging in the military, which she portrayed in relatively positive terms, although she was never completely uncritical of the organisation. As she told Zinnie Jones:

> I actually believe what the army tries to make itself out to be: a diverse place full of people defending the country... male, female, black, white, gay, straight, Christian, jewish, Asian, old or young, it doesn’t matter to me; we all wear the same green uniform... but it’s still a male-dominated, Christian-right, oppressive institution, with a few hidden jems [sic] of diversity.

We can thus see how, even though she expressed an awareness of the power dynamics within the institution, this last quote illustrates that she, at first, seemed to accept homonationalist discourses portraying the U.S. military as an inclusive and diverse environment in which she could protect and ‘save lives’, thus embracing the position of a protector within the U.S. military logics of protection.
This initial enthusiasm for the role of protector soon faded away, partly as a result of her inability to be recognised as a protector or simply to ‘be’ as a subject within the military due to her gender identity. But, disillusionment also arose as she started to learn more and more about the ‘dirty secrets’ and ‘ugly truths’ of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and started feeling morally conflicted by what she saw and read, as will be detailed below. By the time she started chatting with Adrian Lamo, there were no more traces of the ‘few hidden jems of diversity’ she had valued before: “im in the desert, with a bunch of hyper-masculine trigger happy ignorant rednecks as neighbors…”

Manning the Unprotected/Unprotectable

In an email that she sent to her supervisor, Manning expressed, like many other trans female soldiers before her, how she joined the military in the hope that such a hypermasculine environment would help her get rid of her “problem”: “I thought a career in the military would get rid of it. … I’ve been trying very, very hard to get rid of it by placing myself in situations where it would be impossible.” Indeed, joining the military placed her in an extremely stressful situation, as she was living in an “openly hostile environment”, as stated by one of the counsellors who testified at her trial (N. Fuller 2013b). Not long after she first joined the military, she told Zinnie Jones online that: “being around my platoon for 24 hours a day … it took them awhile, but they started figuring me out, making fun of me, mocking me, harassing me, heating up with one or two physical attacks … which I fended off just fine, but it was scary.” As she presented herself in the military as an openly gay man at the time (Manning made little attempt to conceal her queerness from her fellow soldiers, posting openly on Facebook against the DADT policy and keeping a fairy wand on her desk), she was often harassed or simply ignored by her fellow soldiers. As she told the court in her statement: “I lacked close ties with my roommate due to his discomfort regarding my perceived sexual orientation”. And, as a five feet two inch, relatively petite soldier, she was referred to as the “runt” of her unit (Madar 2012). As she herself told Lamo: “im way way way too easy to marginalize.” As someone who couldn’t ‘do’ militarised masculinity ‘right’, she was indeed marginalised. In short, she was extremely isolated, suffered from constant bullying and was under a lot of stress. She could not simply ‘fit in’. For example, she related her experience of passing as female during a short leave home from Iraq, and how this positioned her as the ‘other’ to the ‘normal’ soldiers. It
also provided her with certainty about her gender identity: “i mean… 99.9% of people coming from iraq and afghanistan want to come home, see their families, get drunk, get laid… i… wanted to try living as a woman, for whatever reason… obviously, its important to me… since there were plenty of other things i could’ve done.”

What her experience in the military also illustrates is how Manning was left unprotected by her supervisors and the military establishment in general. Despite multiple incidents in which she had “angry outbursts” in reaction to her extreme isolation and bullying, despite the coming out email to her supervisor in which she clearly expressed “it” was causing her a lot of pain, despite many disturbing incidents in which she clearly expressed emotional distress in front of counsellors and supervisors, Manning was left to her own devices.

The Internet provided her with the only “safe place [she] seemed to have.” In court, when she talked about her conversations with Assange/Nathaniel (his pseudonym), she stated:

For me, these conversations represented an opportunity to escape from the immense pressures and anxiety that I experienced and built up throughout the deployment. It seems that as I tried harder to fit in at work, the more I seemed to alienate my peers and lose the respect, trust, and support I needed.

Yet even that space turned out to leave her unprotected. At the beginning of their conversations, Lamo presented himself as both a journalist and a minister: “I’m a journalist and a minister. You can pick either, and treat this as a confession or an interview (never to be published) & enjoy a modicum of legal protection.” How Manning interpreted that comment is unclear, but she replied to it later in the discussion by turning it down: “im not a source for you… im talking to you as someone who needs moral and emotional fucking support.” Support she would not find in Lamo, who turned her in to the authorities. Even the online exchanges with Assange, in which Manning also felt they were developing a friendship, ended up leaving a bitter taste. As she stated in court: “In retrospect, I realize that these dynamics were artificial and were valued more by myself than Nathaniel.” Even after her arrest, she did not benefit from the existing legal protections around whistleblowing, nor did she receive the legal protection from torture and around humane detention conditions. Manning was, in other words, unprotectable.
Manning’s Parrhesiastic Disclosures

*I prefer a painful truth over any blissful fantasy.
*I think i’ve been traumatised too much by reality, to care about the consequences of
shattering the fantasy.

I argue that Manning’s double disclosure can be read as parrhesia, both through her whistleblowing/leaking of the state’s secrets, and her coming out as a (trans) woman. First, I argue that these two sets of disclosure ought not be read separately. In fact, many media and judicial narratives exposed earlier rely on an either/or dichotomy that is not only unhelpful to understand the case but also highly problematic. Focusing only on the trans/gender identity aspect and/or on Manning’s emotional and psychological distress as the main cause or explanation for her actions ignores or diminishes her own very clear statements about the moral and political motives for leaking the documents. Similarly, focusing only on the political and moral motives ignores the importance and meaning of Manning’s struggles with gender identity and what these can do to one’s position in the world. This dichotomy functions to present both sides as mutually exclusive: as if emotional, psychological, or mental health issues erase or undermine the rationality and morality of one’s actions; as if one’s (trans) gender identity is an all-encompassing identity marker that erases all other aspects of who ‘we’ are and suffices to explain everything we do; or as if the political and moral aspects of whistleblowing belong to the public domain, while the whistleblower’s subjectivity and subject position are private matters disconnected from or irrelevant to their actions. It implicitly relies upon and reinforces gendered dichotomies such as rational/emotional, public/private, hysterical/collected, mad/sane, distraught/controlled, or balanced/impassioned. Following Ahmed, I argue that “We need to contest this understanding of emotion as ‘the unthought’, just as we need to contest the assumption that 'rational thought is unemotional” (Ahmed 2004, 170).

Most of all, such a dichotomisation of Manning’s coming out as trans and her whistleblowing ignores or contradicts her own narratives about her actions. In fact, on multiple occasions in the chat logs with Adrian Lamo, she makes it clear that the leaks of U.S. ‘secrets’ and her process of gender transitioning are intimately intertwined: “still gonna be weird watching the world change on the macro scale, while my life changes on the micro.” She also suggests how this double subject position (as a trans(itioning) woman and a whistleblower) causes emotional and psychological stress that derives
from both ‘messes’ at the same time: “im sorry, im a total mess right now… :'( and little
does anyone know, but among this “visible” mess, theres the mess i created that no-one
knows about yet,” “waiting to redeploy to the U.S., be discharged… and figure out how
on earth im going to transition… all while witnessing the world freak out as its most
intimate secrets are revealed… such an awkward place to be in, emotionally and
psychologically.” These quotes seem to reflect two main points that have to be taken
into account to make sense of Manning’s case: that the emotional and the psychological
aspects of the case are intertwined with the political and moral ones through the double
subject position created by her acts of truth-telling; and that her coming out as a trans
woman and her leaking of the documents also cannot be read separately but rather as
intimately intertwined. Hence we need to embrace Manning’s narratives for what they
are: complex webs of meanings composed both by psychological and emotional
distress, and political and ethical considerations.

The link between her tarnished sense of self and the importance of disclosing the
truth were thus inextricable: “i just… couldnt let these things stay inside of the
system… and inside of my head…” Her head and “the system” were both tarnished by
these uncomfortable truths and the truth needed to come out in order to take care of both
her “head” and “the system.” This preference for a painful truth is inextricably linked to
her subject position as someone who never ‘fitted in’, who did not ‘do her gender right’
or failed to align her gender/sex/sexuality ‘coherently’ according to dominant social
norms. Hence, for Manning, there has never been a blissful fantasy: “I think ive been
traumatised too much by reality, to care about consequences of shattering the fantasy.”
Mentions of the “fantasy” and how she “has been traumatised too much by reality” also
refer to the trauma that arose from her role in the U.S. military and the ‘truths’ she
uncovered: the “fantasy” refers directly to the double sets of truths she revealed about
herself and about the conduct of the U.S. military and diplomats. This double reading is
also consistent with the sexualised logics of protection developed before: if we can not
read discourses of homonationalism and transpatriotism outside of the context of the
War on Terror and the imperialist logics of protection they rely upon, then it also makes
sense to understand Manning’s double disclosures, about the U.S. conduct in relation to
the War on Terror and about her own gender identity, as interconnected.

Second, I argue that Manning’s parrhesiastic truth-telling is mainly about
criticising the culture of secrecy and hypocrisy surrounding the U.S. military and the
War on Terror. More specifically, I argue that her parrhesiastic disclosures challenged
three main sets of discourses in relation to logics of protection: the official discourses of the U.S. as benevolent-protector-of-the-free-world in relation to the War on Terror and beyond; the construction of the U.S. military as protector of a sexual/gender social and moral order, both in protecting its vulnerable members and in enforcing/protecting a sexualised logic strictly aligning sex/gender/sexuality; and discourses of homonationalism and transpatriotism in refusing to hide the gruesome realities of both serving while queer and of the War on Terror, thus challenging the collusion of queerness and imperial violence. Manning’s disclosures made her unprotectable precisely because she became the ‘other’ in all of those discourses, therefore receiving the violent treatment that ‘other’, usually brown, bodies receive in the context of the War on Terror. But before going through these arguments in more detail, we have to explore if/how her risky truth-speaking relates to the five core elements of parrhesia.

Elements of Parrhesia

First, Manning’s relation to truth was central to her actions. In fact, her relation to truth, as well as how this truth was central to her understanding of herself as a subject, were made explicit both in the chat logs with Lamo and in her statement in court:

I am the type of person who likes to know how things work, and as an analyst, this means I always want to figure out the truth. Unlike other analysts in my section or other sections within the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, I was not satisfied with just scratching the surface and producing canned or cookie-cutter assessments. I wanted to know why something was the way it was, and what we could to correct or mitigate the situation.

As an analyst and as a person, Manning described herself as someone who wanted to “figure out” the truth, and it is this depiction of herself that she uses to explain her actions. In her own words: “I prefer a painful truth over any blissful fantasy.” For Manning, the public’s right to know was central to her decision to leak the documents: “I want people to see the truth… regardless of who they are… because without information, you cannot make informed decisions as a public.”

Similarly, frankness, understood as “saying everything without concealing anything,” can also very much be read as central to Manning’s parrhesia, since the radical disclosure of thousands of documents that “belongs in the public domain” and “should be free” was a call for open diplomacy. As she puts it in her court statement:

I once read [unavailable] a quote on open diplomacy written after the First World War [about how] the world would be a better place if states would avoid
making secret pacts and deals with or against each other. I thought these cables were a prime example of the need for more open diplomacy.

By leaking secret documents without concealing anything, she made frankness, alongside truth, a moral principle central to her actions.

And these principles of truth and frankness were directly linked to her criticism of the culture of secrecy and hypocrisy she was challenging. Criticism thus lies at the core of Manning’s decision to speak the truth to the power of the U.S., by criticising its conduct in relation to other nations: “I soon began to think the documented backdoor deals and seemingly criminal activity didn’t seem characteristic of the de facto leader of the free world.” And by criticising the conduct of the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan more specifically: “They dehumanised the individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value human life, and referred to them as quote-unquote “dead bastards,” and congratulated each other on their ability to kill in large numbers.” Her decision to leak those documents was directly linked to her criticism of these instances of dehumanisation and unlawful conduct. As shown before, she also directed criticism at the U.S. military as an institution full of ‘hyper-masculine trigger happy ignorant rednecks’.

Making these criticisms, and the decision to leak those ‘ugly truths’, was eminently risky, making risk central to her radical disclosure, as was dramatically illustrated by her severe initial sentencing, of thirty-five years in prison. In fact, the risks of leaking the state’s and the military’s secrets and blowing the whistle on their misdeeds were also drastically high, as has been demonstrated by the consequences of her disclosures themselves. As most studies and investigations on the fate of whistleblowers have shown, even in places where legislation exists to offer them legal protections, most whistleblowers have ended up losing their jobs, and/or suffering from diverse negative consequences, from blacklisting to having their mental health and sanity questioned to long-lasting effects on their health, finances and personal lives (cited in Perry 1998, 237). Moreover, the risks of coming out as a trans woman within the armed forces at the time, as illustrated before, were very high, both because of the legal consequences and discharge from the military that would ensue, but also because of the high risks facing trans women in society in general. We could hardly deny that these risks were relevant in Manning’s case.

Finally, the risks of disturbing transpatriotic and homonationalist narratives, if maybe less obvious, were also real, since this could lead (and in Manning’s case indeed
did lead, as will be demonstrated) to ostracism from the trans and/or queer soldier communities, the mainstream LGBT organisations, and society in general, whose acceptance relied on the reinforcement of heteronormative and transnormative values and discourses. Hence, Manning’s disclosures can be seen as courageous. As she herself states: “im not so much scared of getting caught and facing consequences.” Hence we can see how Manning’s truth-speaking was very much about choosing ‘the risk of death instead of life and security’.

She nevertheless decided to speak fearlessly to power out of a sense of moral duty. In fact, Manning’s narratives are saturated with a sense of moral duty and it is clear that the goal of her disclosures was to provoke change: “it’s important that it gets out… I feel, for some bizarre reason. It might actually change something.” She specifically blew the whistle in order to “correct or mitigate the situation.” When Lamo asked her why she didn’t sell the information to another country she replied: “It belongs in the public domain… Information should be free… It belongs in the public domain.” Moral duty and principles were thus central to her truth-speaking and were motivated by a desire to change a situation and by ‘moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.’

Hence Manning’s parrhesiastic truth-telling about the secrecy and hypocrisy of U.S. protection and power can be seen as centred on risk/courage, truth, criticism, frankness and a sense of duty. More specifically, in Manning’s case, her parrhesiastic speech consisted of two different techniques of truth-speaking that can be read as parrhesia: whistleblowing and coming-out. We will now examine how both of these practices relate to parrhesia.

Parrhesiastic Whistleblowing

Whistleblowing can be broadly defined as “insiders who 'go public' with their claims of malpractices by, or within, powerful organisations” (Perry 1998) or, more specifically, as “the disclosure by a person working within an organisation of acts, omissions, practices, or policies by that organisation that wrong or harm a third party. The objective of such disclosure is to stop the harmful behaviour and to prevent such conduct in the future.” (Mansbach 2009, 365) It has been studied widely, especially among organisation studies scholars, and many have studied it as a modern form of parrhesia in relation to Foucault’s work on the concept. (Mansbach 2009, 2011; Vandekerckhove and Langenberg 2012) This is because, in its mere definition and
conduct, whistleblowing can be perceived as the form of speaking out closest to the concept of parrhesia which exists in contemporary society. Whistleblowers fulfil all the five elements of parrhesia listed above, since their purpose is exactly to disclose uncomfortable truths to organisations and/or people in positions of power out of a sense of duty, risking their jobs and other sanctions by doing so. Like parrhesia, whistleblowing is an act intended to change the actions and decisions made by more powerful actors or institutions. Furthermore, like parrhesia, whistleblowing isn’t so much about the content of the truths spoken but rather “a speech act in which the act itself speaks” (Perry 1998, 253).

For whistleblowers, remaining silent in the face of injustice or criminality is just not an option, as it is an issue of identity/sense of self. Mansbach argues that whistleblowers only stop being obedient to the organisation when it asks of them to be associated or complicit with, or participating directly or indirectly in, illegal, immoral, and/or illegitimate activities (Mansbach 2011, 19). Because of the strong source of identification the workplace demands, blowing the whistle is an act that seeks to re-appropriate one’s sense of self (both her self-image and how she is identified by others) and speech (that had been confined/negated by non-disclosure agreements and other compliance measures by the organisation). It is this re-appropriation of speech/identity, coupled with the conviction that the public have a right to know, that “morally justifies and explains whistleblowing” (Mansbach 2011, 21). By blowing the whistle, the whistleblowers bind their identity there and then to the truth that is being said; they become that person who has said this: the whistleblower.

Whistleblowing, like parrhesia, is political because of the space it opens up for contestation, disobedience, and other forms of collective dissidence. According to Vandekerckhove and Langenberg, “The spoken truth opens up space for exchange, negotiation, and debate. It is an event that in and of itself constitutes information upon which action has to be taken.” (Vandekerckhove and Langenberg 2012, 12) Similarly, Joyce Rothschild and Terance D. Miethe’s more Marxist reading of whistleblowing argues that “an individual’s original observations” can turn “into a public issue,” initiating more widespread political change (Miethe and Rothschild 1994). In a study on national security and whistleblowing in relation to International Law, Roslyn Fuller similarly concludes that whistleblowing allows for the creation of a space where actions can be taken: “by releasing information to the public, external whistleblowers ensure that groups and individuals can take action on a domestic level.” (R. Fuller 2013, 6)
Yet whistleblowing cannot be seen as only and always subversive in nature: it could also be seen as a way to re-establish the status quo. By demanding accountability from the (governmental or private) organisation for their immoral or illegal actions, whistleblowers are not always necessarily challenging the organisation itself, the wider system that allowed the actions to take place, or the modes of subjectivation that turn workers into subjects, but might instead reinforce them to certain degrees. By demanding the ‘correction’ of the wrongdoings, the whistleblower might in fact reinstate a status quo in which power has adapted but not necessarily been challenged. With the legal protection of whistleblowing and in contexts in which it is even officially encouraged by organisational policies, whistleblowing might also reinforce dominant discourses of power and modes of subjectivation. For example, in a study of whistleblowing in relation to neoliberalism, Brita Bjørkelo and Ole Jacob Madsen argue that: “whistleblowing may not necessarily serve as political resistance against neoliberalism. It can also serve in perfect compliance with the individualised neoliberal ideology that masks structural changes and transforms them into individual worker’s problems.” (Bjørkelo and Madsen 2013, 36)

In the chat logs with Adrian Lamo, as well as through her statement in court, Manning provided many explicit examples of how her actions are consistent with the literature on whistleblowing, as will be shown below. But if the case of Chelsea Manning in many ways resonates with parrhesiastic whistleblowing, there are other ways in which it contradicts or complicates the picture as well. First of all, in his work on whistleblowing, Mansbach argued that the subject position of whistleblowers within the organisation was “special” in that whistleblowers tend to be found usually among employees who are extremely loyal to the companies in which they work and have “stronger than normal allegiance to organisational as well as extra-organisational principles and norms” (Mansbach 2009, 368). As we saw earlier, Manning could indeed be described as having “stronger than normal allegiance to extra-organisational principles and norms” (such as a commitment to truth, and a sense of duty towards people and freedom of information), but she can hardly be described as extremely loyal or having “stronger than normal allegiance” to the organisation.

Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the typical whistleblower usually stumbles across information in the course of their work that they then decide to disclose in order to “stop the harmful behaviour and to prevent such conduct in the future” (Mansbach 2009, 365). In Manning’s case, she went way further than disclosing the first incident
that triggered her whistleblowing: she actively started researching, digging up, and collecting thousands of documents not only about the war in Iraq (the object of her work) and the war in Afghanistan, but also diplomatic discourses and conducts. In other words, her need to “know how things work” and “why something was the way it was” pushed her to actively go beyond the scope of her work and the organisation itself (the military) to reveal the whole culture of secrecy and hypocrisy that she perceived, as indicated through the cables, as permeating U.S. behaviour as a state in the international sphere. The information she learned about not only shook her vision of the military and its role as a protector, but also made her “rethink the world” and “see things differently”. Hence, the scope of her whistleblowing and the aim of it concerned not only the U.S. military, but also a whole social and international order. When she said she would “officially give up on the society we have if nothing happens”, she is calling upon a transformation not merely of the military, but of the social order as a whole. As Lida Maxwell puts it in an article about Manning, truth-telling, and gender identity, while whistleblowers might be portrayed as “restoring the social world by putting an end to deception”, Manning’s whistleblowing (that she calls “transformative truth-telling”) “seeks – at least in part – to imagine and build a new world.” (Maxwell 2015)

Finally, if Manning has been seen as a whistleblower by most observers (and mostly sympathisers), her case also differs from it because of her anonymity at the time of the leaks. Can anonymously leaking documents be understood as whistleblowing or does anonymity contradict the practice of whistleblowing? For example, Bean argues that:

National security “leaking” is a communication strategy that relies on anonymity. Such anonymity, ideally, preserves one’s career while permitting public scrutiny of organisational wrongdoing. “Whistleblowing,” on the other hand, evokes images of urgency, intensity, and publicity. A whistleblower usually draws public attention to oneself in the process of revealing organisational malfeasance. “Leakers” do not wish to “go public.” (Bean 2014, 72)

‘Leaking’ also conveys a different impression of the political significance of the act (as Bean further contends, “rhetorically speaking, national security ‘leaking’ is espionage’s close cousin, as both evoke images of anonymity and disloyalty”, (Bean 2014, 56)) than ‘whistleblowing’ does, and thus helps us to understand the government’s strategy in portraying Manning as an immoral leaker and a threat to national security. However, I am not convinced that we can draw a clear line between leaking and whistleblowing.
After all, considering the risks involved and the little legal protection enjoyed by whistleblowers around the world, most do not purposefully wish to ‘draw attention to themselves’ or ‘wish to go public’ and many do ‘leak’ documents to the press and/or other organisations in one way or another, with a sense of ‘urgency’ indeed, but not necessarily seeking ‘publicity’ (famous cases such as that of Edward Snowden seem to confirm this as well).

Manning thus leaked those documents anonymously, contradicting some of the ways in which we understand whistleblowing. Yet she seemed very aware of the likely possibility of being caught or ‘outed’ as a whistleblower. As she told Lamo: “i’m quite possibly on the verge of being the most notorious ‘hacktivist’ or whatever you want to call it…” Nor did she ignore the possible consequences associated with this outing. But her main fear, in having her identity revealed, was not of being punished for her truth-telling to Wikileaks: “i wouldn’t mind going to prison for the rest of my life, or being executed so much, if it wasn’t for the possibility of having pictures of me… plastered all over the world press… as boy…” She later reiterated this sentiment, stating once again the importance of ‘being’ in the world as herself: “im not so much scared of getting caught and facing consequences at this point… as i am of being misunderstood, and never having the chance to live the life i wanted to…” Hence, what these contradictions highlight is the fact that Manning’s disclosures of state secrets cannot be understood without taking into account the other disclosure about her gender identity.

In Manning’s case, the value of anonymity, which making disclosures over the internet offered, was in providing a space in which she could exist safely as a subject: “the only safe place i seem to have is this satellite internet connection.” As she stated in her court statement: “The anonymity provided by TOR and the Jabber client and the WLO’s policy allowed me to feel I could just be myself, free of the concerns of social labelling and perceptions that are often placed upon me in real life.” The reliance on anonymity probably has more to do with her gender identity than with her whistleblowing. Perhaps Wikileaks, the different forums Manning attended, and her online conversations, provided spaces in which parrhesiastic acts could happen. Maybe we could see the Internet as the equivalent of the Greek agora: a space in which someone who cannot ‘be’ in the world has the existential possibility to speak fearlessly to power. This is the point Nayar is making in an article about Wikileaks as a form of digital parrhesia. He states that what is at risk in the battle over Wikileaks (WL) is a “digital space as parrhesiastic space”: “WL can be read as marking the arrival of a
digital parrhesia, or truth-telling” in which the “task at hand is to create the agora where parrhesia can take place” (Nayar 2011, 9, 11). For him, ‘virtual’ means “something with the potential to become real” (Nayar 2011, 8). The Internet might then constitute a space that provides the potentialities of the world in which Chelsea Manning as a female truth-teller could become real.

**Parrhesiastic Coming Out**

In an article about trans coming out and parrhesia, Tim Johnston argues that coming out as trans can be seen as a form of parrhesia. (T. R. Johnston 2013) By coming out, the person takes a risk because she reveals herself as contradicting the status quo. The risks that coming out entail vary according to multiple factors but the notion of danger is very concrete, especially for trans people, when we look at the alarming rates of violence they face every day. Here, the power to which truth is spoken is the psycho-medical order enforcing particular alignments of gender/sex/sexuality, which places certain people outside of, yet constitutive of, the domain of the subject. Parrhesia comes into play when we read coming out as a courageous act of fearless speech that challenges this order, when it does so out of a sense of duty towards oneself and others. Like whistleblowing, coming out binds oneself to the ‘truth’ that is being spoken: you become that person who has come out, who becomes the subject of the ‘truth-telling’ in a potentially alternative mode of subjectivation. By being courageous enough to tell the truth about oneself, one binds oneself to the truth that is being told, despite the risks, out of a sense of duty towards oneself and others.

Seeing coming out as parrhesia does not necessarily entail supporting the idea that there exists a ‘pure’ self, or substance within oneself waiting in the closet to be discovered/disclosed, as there is no subject existing outside of gender. But this does not mean that the belief someone has about themselves is any less ‘real’ or ‘true’. In other words, the content of the coming out narrative, the content of the utterance, is never outside power itself or the norms that define us as subjects. It is still shaped by the very narratives it seeks to criticise. And it is part of the parrhesiastic game, meaning that the parrhesiast seeks to be heard and understood by the audience it criticises/speaks the truth to. In order to do so, the content of the coming out narrative might be more or less complicit in these orders that denied its subjectivation in the first place (i.e. I can come out as a woman/man in a way that presents gender as stable, fixed, and so on, because I need the public to read me as a woman/man in order to comprehend my narrative). But
what parrhesia allows us to do is look at the act of coming out itself as an event of courageous fearless speech. Again, it is not about me, or this, it is about me saying this and the fact that me saying this binds me to myself and to the ‘truth’ about myself. I create myself as a subject in a way that does justice to the deeply felt convictions I have about myself. As Johnston summarises:

What is unique about parrhesia is that it allows us to situate coming out as a specific and confrontational reaction to a specific set of institutional, social, or linguistic powers. [...] Parrhesia offers a way to understand a trans person’s self-identification or disclosure, not as the product of these institutions, reinforcement of the gender binary, a blurring of their identity, or an acquiescence to biopower, but instead as an act of freedom, of rebellion against the rigidity of their situation. (T. R. Johnston 2013, 84)

Yet, as developed before on transpatriotism, coming out can also reinforce the gender binary and the forms of biopower it relies upon. Coming out to your doctor by following the script imposed by GID might reinforce the mode of subjectivation inherited by pastoral/disciplinary power. Similarly, the recent inclusion of some queer subjects in the institutions of state protection makes certain ‘coming outs’ not only legitimate but celebrated, and appropriates the narratives into frames of normalcy, imperialism, and patriotism. Thus, even if coming out can be read as parrhesia, it does not automatically translate to ‘risky truth-telling out of moral duty’. It is the contexts in which such truth is spoken that can help us determine if/how it consists a parrhesiastic practice.

Manning’s case illustrates, as well as challenges, such readings of coming out as parrhesia. First, as she told Lamo, there was “just such a disconnect between myself, and what i know… and what people see” – her need to come out was intimately linked to truth (what she knew [about herself] compared to what people saw) and frankness (being true to herself and to others about herself). As someone who had always wanted to “know how things work” and figure out the truth, she similarly wanted to “figure herself out”, to be true to herself. Like whistleblowing, this was also motivated by a concern for herself: “I dont like this person that people see… no-one knows who I am inside.” Coming out, we could argue, was a way to “like this person that people see.” As she told Lamo: “i just wanted enough time to figure myself out… to be myself… and *not* be running around all the time, trying to meet someone else’s expectations.” Being true to herself was thus a moral imperative which, through following, she would become a subject, defined in opposition to obedience and subjectification (meeting
someone else’s expectations), despite the risks. Coming out in this sense resonates with Foucault’s understanding of freedom as contained in the possibilities of “changing ourselves, our subjectivity”, challenging the ways in which we conduct ourselves and how our conducts are conducted in relation to gender/sex/sexuality.

Yet Manning’s narratives about her own identity and experiences are coherent with many of these accounts of transsexuality, power, and subjectivation. When she first came out to her supervisor in 2009, she sent him an email entitled “My problem,” with a picture of her wearing a wig (presenting her gender expression as female). It went as follows:

This is my problem. I’ve had signs of it for a very long time. It’s caused problems within my family. I thought a career in the military would get rid of it. It’s not something I seek out for attention, and I’ve been trying very, very hard to get rid of it by placing myself in situations where it would be impossible. But, it’s not going away; it’s haunting me more and more as I get older. Now, the consequences of it are dire, at a time when it’s causing me great pain it itself. (Manning 2013)

This narrative aligns with many other trans women’s experience in the military, as discussed before. This account also seems to provide elements that confirm the Gender Dysphoria diagnosis such as “a strong and persistent cross-gender identification” (“I’ve had signs of it for a very long time,” “it’s not going away”) or “clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning” (“It’s caused problems within my family... Now, the consequences of it are dire, at a time when it’s causing me great pain it itself.”). In her conversations with Lamo, Manning similarly expressed the certainty of her gender identity, how she was “not comfortable” with herself as she was then or who she appeared to be:

i mean, i don’t think its normal for people to spend this much time worrying about whether they’re behaving masculine enough, whether what they’re going to say is going to be perceived as ‘gay’… not to mention how i feel about the situation … for whatever reason, im not comfortable with myself … i mean, i behave and look like a male, but its not ‘me’ :L

But the context of this coming out, to Lamo, was not exactly the same as the one to her supervisor. In these conversations, there was not a need to frame her coming out in terms that would be understood and heard by the military establishment, that is to say that would follow the script of the GID diagnostic. It is impossible to know how/if the GID diagnostic consciously shaped the format of the email to her supervisor. And the point is not to question the ‘validity’ or ‘veracity’ of one narrative over the other.
Yet the context and format of these two narratives varied and necessarily
influenced the rigidity and format of the coming out. With Lamo, she could challenge
the psycho-medical apparatus: “I had an hour session with my therapist … I didn’t say
word for like 30 minutes … I just sat there, and he took notes … I’m an awkward patient
… it’s difficult to communicate with therapists … I try to explain something, and they
twist it around … and then they ask why I don’t want to say anything.” Manning could
tell Lamo how she resisted, using long silences, when the therapist was waiting for
‘confessions’ that followed certain scripts or could be turned into the right narrative
(“they twist it around”). She could also show more flexibility with the timeline of the
narrative about her gender identity: “8 months ago, if you’d have asked me whether I
wanted to identify as female, I’d say you were crazy … that started to slip very quickly,
as the stresses continued and piled up …” While the GID diagnostic does not allow for
any uncertainty on the part of the person being diagnosed, and demands a long-term
frame of reference (“I’ve had signs of it for a very long time”), many people’s
experiences in relation to gender identity are more flexible and less rigid, without being
any less ‘real’, certain or ‘true’.

What is also interesting about this last quote as well is how the need to come out
and publicly identify as female came with the increasing amount of stress Manning was
facing, and coincided with her deployment (“8 months ago” corresponds to the amount
of time she had been deployed in Iraq at that time). The stress she talks about likely
refers to the pressure she felt to “behave masculine enough,” not say something that
“would be perceived gay,” the anxiety linked to her own concerns about her gender
identity and the extreme isolation she faced in Iraq. But we can not ignore the emotional
stress caused by what she saw and read about the Afghan and Iraq wars and diplomatic
cables, which she referred to explicitly on many occasions. Hence in Manning’s case,
coming out cannot be interpreted without her other disclosures, i.e. her whistleblowing.

Political Parrhesia

I want people to see the truth… regardless of who they are… because without
information, you cannot make informed decisions as a public.

In terms of political parrhesia, Manning’s whistleblowing was about challenging
the governing/sovereign/disciplinary power of a military institution claiming to protect
not only vulnerable people in need of protection/salvation, but also moral values such as
freedom, democracy, and gender/sexual normativity. In disclosing the ‘ugly truths’ about the War on Terror and diplomatic bullying tactics, Manning was challenging the official narratives relegating the atrocities committed to the activities of a few isolated ‘bad apples’ in order for official logics of protection to hold true. But the parrhesiastic game, in the case of Manning, is not only about daring to speak in the hope that the act will be met with respect instead of punishment, which of course is part of it, but also about disclosing open secrets in the face of the institution’s failure to protect her. In other words, we could frame Manning’s parrhesiastic game as follow: if you cannot protect me from my self/truth, then I will not protect you from your truth. Therefore, Manning’s political parrhesia was about challenging the disciplinary power of the U.S. logics of sexualised protection. It was also, indirectly, speaking truth to the collusion of certain normalised LGBT subjects with the imperialist project of the War on Terror, and thus to their complicity in these disciplinary forms of power. But it was mostly challenging the coercive power of the U.S. over Afghanistan, Iraq, and other smaller nations in which it had a military and/or diplomatic presence. In particular, Manning’s parrhesia challenged the brutality of U.S. military regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and their pretention to engaging in pastoral forms of power that justly governed both its serving U.S. soldiers and the local people they claimed to be liberating.

**Challenging the U.S. Logics of Protection Through Whistleblowing**

In relation to Manning’s parrhesiastic disclosures, we can see how leaking military and diplomatic documents was meant to challenge the ways in which the U.S. governs or conducts itself in relation to the world, by showing the ‘dark side’ and ‘dirty secrets’ of its War on Terror. First, there is the first event that triggered her becoming a whistleblower. As she narrates it to Lamo:

i think the thing that got me the most…that made me rethink the world more than anything…was watching 15 detainees taken by the Iraqi Federal Police … for printing ‘anti-Iraqi literature’… the iraqi federal police wouldn’t cooperate with U.S. forces, so i was instructed to investigate the matter, find out who the ‘bad guys’ were, and how significant this was for the FPs [Federal Police] … it turned out, they had printed a scholarly critique against PM Maliki … i had an interpreter read it for me … and when i found out that it was a benign political critique titled ‘Where did the money go?’ and following the corruption trail within the PM’s cabinet … i immediately took that information and *ran* to the officer to explain what was going on … he didn’t want to hear any of it … he told me to shut up and explain how we could assist the FPs in finding *MORE* detainees …
It is this incident that made Manning “rethink the world more than anything”, not only because of the immoral ‘truths’ she discovered about the ‘bad guys’ she was in charge of investigating, but also because she was part of it: “I was a part of it … and completely helpless.” As Mansbach’s studies show, as elaborated above, whistleblowers stop being obedient to the organisation when it asks them to be associated with, complicit, or participating directly or indirectly in illegal, immoral, and/or illegitimate activities (Mansbach 2011, 19). The demand placed on Manning to “shut up” and “explain how we could assist the FPs in finding *MORE* detainees” made it clear to her that not only would her superiors not act on the ‘truths’ she felt morally conflicted about, but they were demanding her increased involvement in hushing them up. Manning’s sense of self and vision of the world both were tarnished by this incident, which seems to have been a turning point in her story: “everything started slipping after that… I saw things differently… I had always questioned the way things worked, and investigated to find the truth… but that was a point where I was a *part* of something… I was actively involved in something that I was completely against…” When she later typed “I feel like a monster” multiple times on her computer, referring partly to her gender identity but mostly to the job she was required to do, it is likely that it was this incident she was (partly) referring to. In her statement in court, she stated that the things she uncovered about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan “burdened her emotionally” and that she felt “helpless” and how blowing the whistle made her feel as though she “had accomplished something that allowed [her] to have a clear conscience based upon what [she] had read about and knew were happening in both Iraq and Afghanistan everyday.” She was hoping the leaks would lead to “worldwide discussion, debates, and reforms.”

In fact, Manning stated how she felt more and more conflicted about the documents she leaked, precisely because they were revealing the contradictions between official narratives, portraying the U.S. as the protective leader of the ‘free world’, and its behaviours described in the war logs and ‘Cablegate’. She stated in her court statement: “The more I read, the more I was fascinated by the way we dealt with other nations and organisations. I soon began to think the documented backdoor deals and seemingly criminal activity didn’t seem characteristic of the de facto leader of the free world.” This was even more explicit when she talked about the Iraq and Afghan war logs. The ‘collateral video’ and the incident related above about the Iraqi political prisoners confirmed that the U.S. military in Iraq were not the protectors and freedom
fighters they claimed to be. As the Iraq and Afghan war logs also revealed, the “seemingly criminal activity didn’t seem characteristic of the de facto leader of the free world.”

By leaking documents that specifically called the official narratives about protection in Iraq and Afghanistan into question, but also documents about the conduct of the U.S. towards smaller ‘feminised’ nation like Iceland and Haiti, or “how the first world exploits the third, in details, from an internal perspective”, Manning was problematising the taken-for-granted ways of governing and tacit acceptance of ‘ugly truths’ in the name of protection. Hence we can say that her parhresiastic disclosures meant to question modes of governance based on secrecy, impunity, and the hypocrisy of the U.S. Empire. They challenged discourses of U.S. exceptionalism by making it clear the coercive/sovereign modes of power used by the U.S. in its War on Terror, which mercilessly ‘let live and make die’ under the guise of (discourses of) pastoral care and protection towards those vulnerable ‘others’ in need of U.S. enlightenment and protection. In her statements, we can therefore see how Manning was rejecting “a normalisation of war in the post-9/11 context. She also points to the ways in which vulnerable soldiers are tasked with the dirty work of empire.” (Spade and Willse 2014, 19)

Through exposing and challenging the coercive, disciplinary, and pastoral power of the U.S. as protector of the world, and the cultures of secrecy and hypocrisy underlying these modes of power, Manning was also challenging the internal logics of the U.S. military. In fact, as explained before, the U.S. military agreed to turn a blind eye to one’s gender identity and/or sexuality (through policies such as bans on certain people serving and DADT), while the vulnerable soldier agrees to pretend not to notice their co-optation into imperialist violence and the ultimate failure/unwillingness of the military to actually enforce the norms through which it claims its right to govern. It is in this second sense that Manning’s disclosures were also challenging modes of governing because she also challenged the homonationalist and transpatriotic narratives that relied upon and reinforced such norms, and the tacit complicity that such narratives demand from queer soldiers. As Bean argues about the collateral video, “Manning’s hope was that the crewmembers’ sickening callousness would undermine the “convivial relations” between queerness and war machines. […] Manning’s plea—largely ignored—was for
Americans to be more responsible for the killing and destruction conducted in their name.” (Bean 2014, 53)

Challenging Transpatriotic and Homonationalist Narratives

In terms of homonormativity and transpatriotism, as elaborated in Manning’s coming out narratives, there are ways in which her story both challenge and reinforce biopower norms of coming out as a trans woman. But when she first leaked those documents, she was still referred to and known as Bradley Manning, the gay soldier. Within the LGBT community, reactions to Manning’s disclosures were divided. Some praised Manning as a hero of the community: “That Bradley voiced [her] concerns proves [s]he was the least unstable and most moral of all the members of [her] team. That [s]he happens to be gay or transgender gives our community a new hero who brings great credit to the moral force of our people in this world.”27 (Daniel Choi, cited in Porta 2013, 333) Choi also made the connection between Manning’s truth-telling and identity as a gay man/trans woman: “I’m proud of [her], as a gay soldier, because [she] stood for integrity ... the gay community is [the] only one that bases its membership ... on integrity and telling the truth,” as other commentators also pointed out: “queer activists have long known, there is power and transcendence in choosing truth, even when that truth makes others uncomfortable.” (Gray 2012) In this narrative, Manning is not only a hero, but a hero because of her gender/sexuality, which gave her the moral strength and conviction to tell the truth. This is partly illustrated by Manning herself, when she states that she prefers ‘a painful truth to a blissful fantasy’.

Yet there are many ways in which Manning also contradicts those accounts. This may be why none of the mainstream U.S. LGBT organisations came out to support her, as many observers were quick to point out. For example, in an opinion piece in The Guardian, Christopher Carbone argues that if LGBT rights groups such as the HRC or GLAAD28 remained silent about the case, it is because Manning did not conform to these “upwardly mobile, white, polished, virile male stereotypes.” (Carbone 2013) In fact, “with [her] slight frame, lower-class background, questioning of her gender identity, inability to hold down a typical job, general dorkiness and dysfunctional family

27 When this piece was written, Manning had not come out officially yet, hence the use of the male pronouns by the author.
28 Formerly known as the Gays and Lesbians Alliance Against Defamation, GLAAD “works through entertainment, news, and digital media to share stories from the LGBTQ community that accelerate acceptance.” (“GLAAD” n.d.)
life, Manning does not fit the poster boy image that GLAAD or the HRC would hold up and promote.” (Douglas-Bowers 2014, 135) In other words, Manning was too ‘queer’ to be held up as a gay hero by the mainstream LGBT rights groups, precisely because she clashed with the image of gay and lesbian soldiers built up to get society’s acceptance through a reinforcement of heteronormativity. Manning did not embody militarised masculinity, nor could she stand among the brave white middle-class patriots ‘serving their country’ despite the discrimination they still faced.

It is not only because of her figure or her background that Manning could not be portrayed as one of those ‘poster boys’, but also because of her refusal to respect the pact mentioned above, that allows some queer soldiers to operate within the realms of normalely/protection as long as they remain silent about the military’s ugly secrets. In fact, as mentioned before, the inclusion of certain queer soldiers within the institution “required ignoring the actual conditions of being a soldier and participating in the pro-war patriotic fantasy of U.S. military service, which hides its dangerous and gruesome realities.” (Spade and Willse 2014, 17) Manning’s disclosures thus exposed not only the U.S. military’s international and internal ‘ugly truths’ (about the failures, secrecy, and hypocrisy of logics of protection), but also the LGBT rights groups’ complicity in consistently ignoring the realities for vulnerable soldiers serving within the institution in exchange for an inclusion into ‘normalcy’ and the full citizenship afforded to those ‘serving their country’. Hence, as argued by Spade and Willse:

In Chelsea Manning’s story, two forms of normalisation coalesce in reinforcing waves: a normalisation of gayness and a normalisation of imperial war. This is not accidental. The normalisation of gayness was drawn from the latter, in the sense that in its normalising drive, gayness has aligned itself with patriotism and the imperial nation. […] The forces of patriotic nationalism are strong and no doubt they are coming for trans bodies next. (Spade and Willse 2014, 18)

And we could argue that they indeed came for trans bodies next…

Trans* rights organisations, especially those associated with military inclusion campaigns or defending trans* veterans’ rights, did not support Manning either. For example, Brynn Tannehill, director of advocacy for SPART*A, an organisation defending the rights of trans men and women to serve in the military: “If you’re wondering if she’s being embraced as a hero in the military trans community, she is absolutely not … People in our group can empathize with the strain that being transgender and closeted in the military causes, but we do not in any way, shape, or
form think this excuses or mitigates what she did.” (Roller 2013) Similarly, Denny Meyer, a spokesperson for TAVA (Trans-gender American Veteran’s Association) stated that: “[d]espite all of our discrimination, I don't think that it occurred to any of us once to sell out our country because of that. . . . We're not supporting him . . . or her.” (Klasfed 2012) Kristin Beck, former navy SEAL and trans woman author of her memoir *Warrior Princess: A U.S. Navy SEAL’s Journey to Coming out Transgender* (Beck and Speckhard 2013), consistently misgendered Manning and portrayed her as “a liar, thief, and traitor, who came out as transgender in order to stay alive in prison—in order to be shielded from those who had been given ‘minor sentences, but [were] still loyal to American interest[s].” (cited in Fischer 2016, 578) In this version of the story, Manning is a traitor to her country, and by using her gender identity to try to mitigate or excuse her actions, she is also a traitor to the trans* community, especially those serving within the U.S. military.

It is interesting to note how most of these accounts also refuse to recognise Manning’s gender identity, or present it as unstable, self-interested, and unreliable, reinforcing narratives of Manning as untrustworthy, treacherous, and deceptive. This seems to support Fischer’s argument, elaborated above, on transpatriotism: it seems indeed that the trans veterans’ rights activists cited above reinforce cis-normativity and the gender binary by policing whose gender gets to be recognised as legitimate. Such gate keeping of the gender binary for worthy trans patriots thus depends on an uncritical embrace of U.S. patriotism. As argued by Spade and Willse: “Now, in the exact moment when the trans military inclusion campaign is formulating and introducing the figure of the proud, brave, palatable trans soldier, Manning is a potential liability—a trans military figure who cannot be ignored, but who utterly fails to line up with the uncritically patriotic, promilitary talking points that military inclusion campaigns require.” (Spade and Willse 2014, 6)

**Judicial Parrhesia**

> We’re human... and we’re killing ourselves... and no-one seems to see that... and it bothers me

_Apathy_

> Apathy is far worse than the active participation.

In terms of judicial parrhesia, although it is not the main modality in Manning’s story, it is still very much present in the narratives she tells about why she leaked those documents, claiming to be acting in the name of the un/protected, those who have less
power and against whom the U.S. military and government committed injustices (such as civilians unjustly killed by U.S. soldiers, or Iraqi political prisoners transferred by the U.S. military to the Iraqi police, known to conduct torture, and less powerful nations such as Iceland). As such, she also challenged the judicial power of the U.S. military and claimed judicial power for herself in punishing (through disclosure where exposure stands for justice) the powerful.

In her court statement, Manning talked at great lengths about the “collateral murder” video (in which you can see U.S. soldiers shooting and killing innocent Iraqi civilians) and how the behaviour of the soldiers in it showed a lack of respect for human life:

They dehumanised the individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value human life, and referred to them as quote-unquote “dead bastards,” and congratulated each other on their ability to kill in large numbers. … The aerial weapons team crew members sound like they lack sympathy for the children or the parents. Later, in a particularly disturbing manner, the aerial weapons team crew vocalises enjoyment at the sight of one of the ground vehicles driving over one of the bodies.

This particular video became one of the most infamous documents she leaked and attracted a lot of media and public attention, but was also the one that most “burdened her emotionally”. In relation to this video, she stated that she “couldnt let these things stay inside of the system... and inside of [her] head…” Through disclosing such a video, she claimed she was hoping to show the American public that “not everyone in Iraq and Afghanistan were targets that needed to be neutralised, but rather people who were struggling to live in the pressure cooker environment of what we call asymmetric warfare.” Therefore, Manning was not only speaking truth about the injustices of the powerful against the powerless, she was also exercising a form of pastoral care by enacting justice-through-truth in the name of the powerless. In fact, in trying to humanise people in Iraq and Afghanistan and show the truth of their ‘pressure-cooker environment’, she was speaking in their name and enacting a form of justice for the powerless.

Yet we can also claim that Manning represented the unprotected/unprotectable within her institution and that her double disclosure also consisted in ‘the cry of the powerless’ against the powerful, who committed an offense, by failing to protect her from her bullying colleagues and from herself/her gender identity. Thus Manning was also confronting the injustices of an institution that would not let her speak/be. In the
coming out email to her supervisor, the emphasis on the great pain that her “problem”
was causing could be read as one of her multiple calls for help. Since joining the
military had “proven to be a disaster”, in her own words, and given that she felt “like a
monster”, “emotionally fractured”, a “mess”, disclosing the military’s secrets can also
be seen as way for her to claim justice for herself from an institution that consistently
ignored her distress.

Ethical Parrhesia

I don’t know... im just, weird I guess
I can’t separate myself from others
I feel connected to everybody... like they were distant family
i... care?

Ethical parrhesia is perhaps the modality that stands out most strongly in this
case. Manning chose to bind herself to the truth she was disclosing, becoming
simultaneously the whistleblower and the (trans) woman she knew herself to be. She
thus chose a relationship to herself grounded in truth, as a way of being an agent
of/living the truth against and through the normative/judicial/pastoral power of the U.S.
military. Through this alternative mode of subjectivation, she turned herself into the
female protector she could not be within the U.S. military. She promoted a form of
ethical self-relation based on transparency, frankness, and truth that challenged the
audience to see the multiple open secrets of U.S. logics of protection and to fight the
culture of secrecy and hypocrisy upon which they rely.

In relation to both whistleblowing and coming out, we can say that Manning’s
disclosures are almost a textbook case of ethical parrhesia in that they profoundly
promote modes of self-relation based on truth, courage, and duty. As we have seen,
coming-out can be seen as a practice of the self, meant to turn oneself into a subject of
truth: by coming out, Manning told the truth about herself and became that person who
has told the truth, that person who has come out. By doing so, coming out as a trans
woman also has the potential of “changing the social, cultural, and political conditions
and the apparatuses in which we contingently find ourselves” (Milchman and
Rosenberg 2011).

Similarly, whistleblowing relates to parrhesia through the ways in which it
constitutes an alternative mode of subjectivation: one that requires being ‘true’ to one’s
values and beliefs, and taking care of the polis by taking care of one’s integrity and
identity, tarnished by the organisation. It is a way of creating oneself as a subject
through ‘ethical dissent’, by fashioning the self through a practice of freedom, an alternative way of being a subject, within and beyond the organisation that provides one’s identity as a worker. As Mansbach argues: “truth-telling in the workplace is a practice of resistance generated by, and in reaction to, a process of subjectivation involving questions of identity and identification.” (Mansbach 2009, 367) It constitutes a “typical case of resistance to what Foucault calls the process of subjectivation” (Mansbach 2009, 369) If the act initially takes place self-sufficiently and independently, it also opens up a space in which action has to be taken. What parrhesiastic whistleblowing does, therefore, is open up a space in which action can be taken, hence opening up the possibility/potentiality for (social/political) change.

In cases involving National Security Whistleblowing such as the cases of 9/11 families’ testimonies (as cited in the theoretical chapter, see Bean 2009) but also of Edward Snowden and, of course, Chelsea Manning, the issue is not only to turn oneself into a subject through dissent from one’s workplace but through dissent from the nation as a form of civil disobedience (for a comparison between whistleblowing and civil disobedience, see Elliston 1982). In this context, whistleblowing concerns one’s identity as a citizen and how the alleged criminal or immoral activities have tarnished one’s sense of identification to the nation, but also the nation’s identity on an international scale and its national identification by others. By leaking ‘truths’ that concern violations of human rights and/or other inappropriate or criminal violations of International Law, whistleblowers such as Chelsea Manning challenge not only the state institutions targeted by the leaks but symbolically the nation as a whole in its relation to other countries. This involves the questioning of the state’s identity in the international sphere and how it conducts itself in relation to International Security and International Relations. What is at stake in this type of whistleblowing is not only how to turn oneself into a (moral) citizen-subject of the State/the World, but also how it challenges the public to examine themselves, as citizens and as a nation as well: “such information [classified material] is, by its very nature, not only sensitive to its proprietary owners, but to the nation as a whole and all of its citizens, especially vis-à-vis their relations with other States.” (R. Fuller 2013, 1) Such forms of whistleblowing demand the self-examination of the nation as a whole.

Through this double disclosure, we can thus assert that Manning turned herself into the protecting subject she could not be in the military; and by doing so, she challenged Americans to change their selves as well. But Manning also reinforced
modes of subjectivation rooted in logics of protection by turning herself into a benevolent pastor who cares for those ‘others’ in whose names she leaked the U.S. secrets. Indeed, as stated in the quote above, she felt “connected to everybody” and “cared.” We can argue that, while denouncing the lack of care, and thus the ‘lies’ and failures of the U.S. to actually protect and care for the vulnerable, she turned herself into a protector who did indeed care, enacting a form of pastoral power that would protect the vulnerable, without questioning the logics underlying such forms of (imperialist) protection. In other words, by denouncing the coercive and violent forms of power the U.S. enacted in Afghanistan and Iraq, she also reproduced forms of pastoral power, indirectly reinforcing forms of imperial logics of protection. In fact, as elaborated in chapter four in relation to Joya, the discourses around the War on Terror were rooted in imperial/colonial logics of protection positioning the U.S. and the West as enlightened saviours of Iraqi and Afghan peoples from their backward and barbaric cultures. By blowing the whistle, Manning challenged and subverted such discourses, showing that ‘barbarity’ could in fact be found on the U.S. military side as well, as illustrated by the ‘Collateral murder’ video for example. Yet by leaking those documents, she also positioned herself as the benevolent protector of those peoples, victims of both the U.S. military’s and their own government’s barbarity. Manning thus turned herself into the ‘real’ benevolent protector that she first thought joining the U.S. military would allow her to become.

Lastly, if Manning’s disclosures were about raising awareness and attention of the political issues raised by the leaks, they also inadvertently made her the centre of attention. As Bean contends: “Ellsberg and Manning exemplify how leakers who forgo anonymity (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) inevitably draw public attention to themselves and away from institutional wrongdoing.” (Bean 2014, 69) The narrative then turns on them, their subjectivities, and their motivations, rather than on the content of their leaks. This was exacerbated, we could argue, by Manning’s coming out which, willingly or not, made the parrhesiastic acts not about “her saying this” but more about “her” than “this”. In fact, as already demonstrated, the risks involved in coming out as a trans woman are great, but we can argue that the personal risks of not coming out are also great, perhaps even greater. Presenting herself as an openly gay man at the time who ‘failed’ to do her masculinity ‘right’, Manning was often bullied and harassed, but also (and perhaps mainly) consistently ignored. In fact, in her conversations with Lamo, she regularly expresses how she felt that “no-one ever took notice of [her],” how she
was regularly ignored and felt like a “ghost”. Coming out in this case allowed Manning to finally exist: “I’m kind of coming out of a cocoon… it’s going to take some time, but I hopefully won’t be a ghost anymore.” As a trans soldier, Manning could not ‘be’. In such a context, parrhesiastic coming-out might have been a way to exist and finally ‘be’. But it also created a form of parrhesia that was very much about herself. Manning’s own subjectivity could therefore be perceived as reinforcing forms of disciplinary and pastoral power that individualise the self through a constant examining of the truth about oneself by different apparatuses of power, while also allowing the public to ignore the plea for a change in the nation’s own self-relation.

**Conclusion**

What we can conclude from this thorough analysis of Manning’s parrhesiastic disclosures is that her case is profoundly queer in that it does not neatly ‘fit’ into any normative narrative. As Bean argues: “In the same way that queer theory resists homo/heterosexual categorisation, Manning’s rhetoric defies clear-cut labels; it can be interpreted as heroic and misguided, selfless and selfish.” (Bean 2014, 61) Manning’s case highlights the complexities involved in speaking truth to power when one’s own existence and being are also inextricably tied to the parrhesiastic act. Through her radical disclosures, Manning was both reclaiming justice for herself and justice for others; aiming to act out against an institution for not protecting her and speaking truth about their violence towards, and dehumanisation of vulnerable ‘others’; her actions were both self-motivated and self-less; grounded in courage and also in vengeance. In other words, Manning’s case escape easy readings and conceptualisations and highlights the ambiguous nature of contemporary instances of parrhesia in relation to logics of protection.

Hence we can say that in contrast to Joya, Manning was very uncomfortably located within the institution of power in which she could not speak/be. Her parrhesiastic truth-telling was about stepping out of the institution through transparent disclosure with a strong emphasis on the ethical dimensions of parrhesiastic self-relation. The ‘agora’ in this case was thus not the institution itself but the Internet as the public space in which she could speak/be. Using data leaks, Internet forums, and coming out emails, Manning engaged with the U.S. military logics of protection in ways that both challenged and reproduced some of their power strategies and techniques. But, as parrhesiastic techniques, whistleblowing and coming out are still quite close to the
traditional Greek techniques of parrhesia, in that they are verbal/textual modes of speaking risky truth to power. Are there other techniques of parrhesia, other modes of speaking risky truth to power that can also be understood as parrhesia? In relation to dominant institutions of protection, does one have to be located from within them to be able to speak parrhesiastic truths to them? And finally, is parrhesia always an individual practice?
CHAPTER VI: Pink Justice: The Gulabi Gang’s Pastoral Protection

Founded in 2006, the Gulabi gang, also known as the Pink Saris, aims to protect and defend the rights of vulnerable communities, especially women, against violence, corruption, government and police inaction, and injustices in general. It is run and led by its founder, Sampat Pal in the province of Uttar Pradesh, one of India’s poorest and most populated regions, and is said to include over forty thousand members (Berthod 2012, xii). Its means of action include the occasional use of violence (using sticks (lathis) to beat those reluctant to observe justice), which attracted a lot of media and academic attention. But the group uses mostly mediation/dialogue and an escalation of pressure tactics including public protests, street theatre, public humiliation, official complaints, civil disobedience, occupations and sit-ins. Created in reaction to the state’s inability/unwillingness to protect the rights and safety of the most vulnerable as well as in opposition to caste/class social orders positioning lower-caste women as the unprotectables, the Gulabi Gang mobilises the power of numbers in enacting pressure/power to ‘take the law into their own hands’ and enact justice for the unprotectables.

This chapter argues that the Gulabi Gang’s parrhesiastic actions aim at speaking truth to the logics of masculinist and caste/class protection underlying the state and social orders’ inability/unwillingness to protect, while also challenging colonial logics of protection. Through the occasional use of violence but mostly through their use of a diversity of tactics using the power of numbers to protect the vulnerable, Pal and the Gulabi Gang conduct their own pastoral logics of protection marked by incorruptibility. This chapter thus begins by exploring the logics of protection in the Indian context before situating Pal/the Gulabi Gang within them before turning to their fearless speech as a form of parrhesiastic action.

India’s Logics of Protection

The Indian context encompasses multiple overlapping, contradictory, and/or competing logics of protection articulated around caste/class, gender, coloniality and sexuality. These logics work through forms of coercive/sovereign power (including the use of sexual violence against Dalit and lower-caste/class women), disciplinary power (creating and regulating norms around caste identities and their boundaries through
gender and sexuality, for example) and pastoral/governing power (such as colonial benevolent governance aimed at producing a ‘good’ society through ‘protecting brown women from brown men,’ for example). This section will explore how through the caste hierarchies, which are always gendered, classed and sexualised, as well as mediated by histories of colonialism and their ongoing legacies, Indian women are positioned alternatively and/or simultaneously, as protected, unprotected, unprotectable and protectors.

**Logics of Caste/Class, Gender and Sexual Protection**

Caste is a complex system that is located at the intersection (and productive) of many different power relations such as gender, sexuality and class. Shaped and reshaped by different political encounters, from colonialism to decolonial struggles and nationalist movements, it is a political, social and religious phenomenon that can not be reduced to a single or simplified meaning. Moreover, regional variations and the vast cultural diversity within the Indian context should not be underestimated. For the purpose of this chapter, we will focus on the gendered and sexualised aspects of caste, particularly how it can be read through the framework of logics of protection. Hence, it will be argued that women from different castes are positioned differently and simultaneously as the protected, protectors and unprotected of the caste system. These different subject positions are not only gendered, but also heavily sexualised. I will explore how these dynamics play out concretely to position women from different castes along the lines of these logics of protection.

Leela Dube argues that caste, or *jati* (a birth-status group) relies on three main characteristics: separation (maintaining distinctions of caste through rules around marriage and contact), hierarchy (differentiation of status through order and rank), and interdependence (division of labour that is based upon and perpetuated by the two other principles of separation and hierarchy). These principles are enforced not so much through individuals but ‘through units based on kinship’ (Dube 2005, 223), hence the family and the household are very central to caste and transgressions of rules or norms pertaining to it “leads to the ostracism of the domestic group of the offender unless s/he is disowned by the household.” (Dube 2005, 224) Beyond its role in the religious sphere, the caste system is integral to social and political relations as well (for example, people who converted to other religions did not necessarily escape the caste system and the principles underlying it). It is because caste, like social class, is not only a system of
oppression but also conveys a sense of belonging and identity to its members (Dube 2005, 227). Therefore caste also constitutes a mode of subjectivation, of being a particular subject in the world. Rao argues along similar lines that caste is a “religio-ritual form of personhood” but adds that it is “a social organisation of the world through the phenomenology of touch” (Rao 2005a, 5). The modalities of caste subjectivation have to be understood as inherently embodied and located within biological experiences and metaphors. According to her, caste must be understood first and foremost as “a form of embodiment, i.e., as the means through which the body as a form of ‘bare life’ or a mere biological surface is rendered expressive and meaningful. Caste ideologies draw on biological metaphors of stigma and defilement to enable differentiated conceptions of personhood, and to render the body a culturally legible surface.” (Rao 2005a, 5) These embodied modes of subjectivation are inextricably gendered and enforced through the regulation of kinship and sexuality. Hence gender relations are “fundamental to the broader ideologies of caste” so that understanding “the multiple and changing manifestations of caste in Indian society” can not be dissociated from understanding “the particular forms in which gender inequality and sexed subordination are produced” (Rao 2005a, 5).

Through the notions of im/purity and pollution, caste boundaries are reproduced and enforced through the norms surrounding the manipulation of food, but mostly by regulating women’s sexuality. First, the caste ideology relies upon the belief that women and men’s sexuality is fundamentally different. Through the periodical pollution incurred by menstruation and parturition, women are seen as inherently less pure than men of their own caste (Dube 2005, 231). Additionally, women’s bodies are seen as being internally polluted through (hetero)sexual intercourse, while (heterosexual) men are polluted externally only. External pollution can be washed off easily but one is polluted permanently by internal pollution (Dube 2005, 232). Upper-caste women are seen as especially vulnerable to permanent pollution compared to lower-caste women. These unequal levels of purity vary between castes because “among the lower castes, women’s substantial contribution to the process of earning a livelihood along with the sharing of impure tasks by both men and women makes the gender division less unequal.” (Idem) Gender segregation and the control of women, especially widows, have indeed been traditionally more enforced upon women from the upper castes. There is thus a pervasive, if misguided, notion that gender relations are more equal within the lower castes (for a critique of such position by Western ethnographers, see John 2005),
yet the unequal level of im/purity between men and women are inherent to all castes. Since the lower castes and the non-castes (Dalits) are inherently associated with impurity and pollution, caste, gender, and sexuality are intimately intertwined.

Caste rules surrounding kinship and sexuality thus maintain strict boundaries between castes through metaphors of pollution and impurity. Given the strict rules surrounding upper-caste women’s sexuality and the domination of the upper castes upon Indian society (what feminist scholars have called Brahmanical patriarchy), their subordination has been the object of much scholarly attention. In an analysis of Brahmanical patriarchy in early India, Chakravarti studies the Manusmriti (Laws of Manu, a foundational Hindu scripture) and explores how gender and sexuality were constituted as central to the maintenance and regulation of caste boundaries within the text. She investigated how upper-caste women in particular were the objects of strict sexual control not only to maintain patrilineal succession like in all patriarchal societies, but also to maintain caste purity (Chakravarti 1993, 579). In fact, upper-caste women were seen as in need of control and protection from the threat posed by their own sexual desires and against lower caste male sexuality. Hence these women needed to be carefully guarded from themselves and from the risk of inter-caste ‘pollution’ and pregnancy. (Chakravarti 1993, 579) This ‘protection’ relied on three different levels as proposed by Manu: the women needed to carefully guard themselves from their own sexual impulses of desires and internalise the mechanisms of control over their own sexuality; the husband also had the right and duty to use violence if necessary to control their wives’ sexuality; and as a last resort, the king could intervene in cases where a woman “who though aware of ‘the greatness of her relatives’ (i.e., of their high status) violates the duty she owes to her lord” (Chakravarti 1993, 584). Hence Chakravarti explores how in early India, the social order relied on the compliance of upper-caste women which was obtained through “a combination of coercion and control” (Chakravarti 1993, 584). In this foundational text, we can see how women are simultaneously seen as both in need of protection, as they themselves are a threat to caste purity and boundaries, and also as protectors of those boundaries. Hence women are seen as “primarily responsible for maintaining the purity of caste and its boundaries and calls for proper control over her sexuality” (Dube 2005, 233). Moreover, a transgression of these rules and norms, especially by an upper-caste woman, will mean that her whole kinship will carry the blame and shame and will thus be in charge of punishing or repudiating the woman who failed to protect her jati from dishonour,
withdrawing the protection offered by communal and kinship ties and making her the unprotected. Hence women from all castes are simultaneously positioned as the protected (by her husband, caste/jati and community), unprotected (if this protection is withdrawn due to a transgression on her part of caste boundaries and norms) and protectors (of caste boundaries and purity).

On the other side of the spectrum, Dalit women (who are considered outside of the caste system since Dalits are out-castes) are very much the unprotectables within the caste logics of protection since their status as impure and polluting and their position below the caste system makes their bodies particularly vulnerable to abuse, both by men of their own caste and by men of the upper caste. While (hetero)sexual intercourse between lower-caste men and upper-caste women are the most regulated and forbidden encounters and the rape of upper-caste women by Dalit men the worst transgression, the rape of, and violence against, Dalit women is not only common but does not carry the same stigma in relation to pollution and touch: “Rape, as elsewhere, is an act of power through sexual violence. The assertion of dominance is claimed as a right by upper castes.” (Dube 2005, 241) As argued by Rao, “the reason for this is obviously the fact that even the fantasy [of Dalit men raping upper-caste women] is perceived as posing a lethal threat to the perpetuation of the caste system, while the actually ongoing rapes and murders [of Dalits] are perpetuating it.” (Rao 2005b, 294) Hence, while all women are responsible for maintaining the boundaries and purity of the caste system (and some more strictly than others) and thus play the role of protectors, not all women are considered objects of protection: lower caste women are on many levels unprotectable.

Since caste is also intricately imbricated with class, Dalit and low-caste women are assigned the most degrading, demanding and low-paid type of work in the country, usually under the control and domination of upper-caste bosses and landowners. In rural areas, the agrarian system also organises people along class and caste lines by ruling land ownership and labour in favour of upper-castes. As Dube points out: “It is not only difficult for low caste men to protect their women against the lust and desire of their upper caste masters and superordinates in the agrarian hierarchy, but there is also a tacit acceptance of upper caste ‘seed’.” (Dube 2005, 241) Since the caste hierarchies rely on sexual boundaries and are based on birth, and since pollution is located within women’s bodies rather than men’s, upper-caste men’s ‘seed’ is tacitly ‘accepted’. This also means that patriarchal logics of protection which place women under the protection of husbands, in-laws and jatis also rely on class logics of protection that make the
seclusion, control and surveillance of upper-caste women through domesticity a pre-requisite for their protection. Since lower-caste women have to work outside of their homes, often in dangerous settings, they are positioned as the unprotected/unprotectable to whom protection cannot be assured/offered.

The different positioning of women along caste lines in terms of protection is well illustrated by examining the case of early and child marriages. If the Indian law puts the legal age of marriage for both genders at 18 years old, the practice of early/child marriages is still widespread, although unevenly so across different parts of India. Uttar Pradesh, Sampat Pal’s province, is “reputed for continuing the practices of child marriage, female infanticide, and son preference; and for the mortality rate of its young brides during childbirth” (Arnold et al. 1998, cited in Sen 2012) and “registered one of the highest rates of dowry demands and deaths, as well as of domestic and sexual violence against village women of all castes” (Srivastava 2003, cited in Sen 2012). These practices have to be understood in relation to what has been exposed above, and to the logics of caste protection: since the control of sexuality is seen as ‘a pre-requisite for socially sanctioned’ marriage and motherhood, a girl’s puberty marks a moment of emphasised “need for protection and vigilance” (Dube 2005, 235). According to Dube, child marriages are a way to ensure that a girl is married while still a virgin (the consummation of marriage usually waits until later) so that her honour and that of her kinship community is safeguarded. Early marriages are thus a form of protection, especially for lower caste families, in which they happen most frequently: “It is significant that while castes and families who can afford to keep their girls secluded and protected tend to marry them off after puberty, other castes who require that their daughters work in the fields or away from home prefer to marry them before puberty.” (Dube 2005, 236) Early marriages are also a way to make sure caste boundaries and purity are maintained by ensuring that pre-marital sex does not occur but also that girls do not end up choosing their own partner by spending time with young unmarried men that might be of lower castes/classes (Dube 2005). Hence gender, sexuality, caste, but also class intersect here to justify the practice since having to work outside, away from the protection of the home and the family, makes lower-caste girls and women particularly vulnerable to attacks, contrary to upper-caste women/girls.

India’s Logics of Protection: Colonialism, Tradition, and Modernity

We have seen in previous chapters how colonialism relies in a large part upon
gendered and sexualised notions of protection to justify its reign. It is no different in the Indian context; in fact, most of the scholarship on post/colonialism emerged from/about India. We will explore in this chapter how colonialism and nationalist struggles for independence in India casted and re-casted women as the bearers of tradition and culture, making them both the protectors and the protected of Indian-ness. Moreover, these colonial logics of protection were particularly explicit (and therefore studied) in the debates around sati (the burning of widows on their deceased husband’s pyre). We will thus explore the position of Indian women along caste and class lines within these logics through colonialism and anti-colonial struggles and briefly look at the case of sati to show how these dynamics played out in this particular case.

In India, as elsewhere, colonialism relied on processes of ‘otherness’ in which the colonised came to stand for everything the colonisers were not, in order to justify the ‘civilising mission’: backward, barbaric, ignorant, uneducated, and so forth. In the Indian context in particular, the place of ‘culture’ as opposed to modernity came to be a dominant dichotomy in the colonising narrative: “The colonial state used the categories of ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ to buttress its own claims to being an improving, modernising force, as well as to disable or dispossess natives from claiming parity with their colonisers.” (Rao 2005a, 15) Hence the dichotomy of culture/modernity became a central one in organising and justifying the British rule. Since the British Empire in India proclaimed, at least at the beginning of the occupation, a policy of non-interference in local matters and personal law (although the actual application of this ‘non-interference’ official policy was contested by historians of gender and others), colonialism in India and the culture/modernity dichotomy relied heavily on a distinction between the private and the public. Yet, as we will see with the example of sati, these politics of non-interference came to an end specifically because the private became seen as in need of reform and ‘modernisation’ and this need was specifically tied to gendered logics of protection. This division between the private and the public was also relying on the British class system defining the upper-class/bourgeois private sphere against both the British proletariat and the colonised. Hence: “In opposition to the reigning bourgeois conceptions of the private as the realm of freedom and interiority, the colonial state in India understood the private sphere in the colony as the space of a ‘barbaric’ tradition that required redemption.” (Rao 2005a, 15) This redemption would be achieved in particular in the name of protecting women from their barbaric culture, or as Spivak has famously put it: “white men saving brown women from brown men”
Hence in India, the centrality of tradition or culture, located within the private sphere, against modernity and progress found in the public sphere dominated by the colonisers, lay at the core of the colonising ideology. The consequence of this was that ‘modernity’ came to stand for the West while Indian culture came to stand for everything that is not modern: “This means that in discussions on/descriptions of what is ‘modern’, culture provides the contrast case of that which is not-modern, that which is traditional and is outside the processes of westernisation that then comes to stand in for modernity.” (Niranjana 2010, 231) The law became a central element upon which this tension was played out. This dynamic was of course heavily gendered and the law became “a particularly salient symbolic site where patriarchy was reconstituted” (Rao 2005a, 15). Women, as elsewhere, stood for the private sphere and were thus heavily associated with culture and tradition. The law was also a site where caste divisions were reinforced and aggravated by the ruling powers: “legal reform over the course of the nineteenth century reinforced caste distinctions that were in fact more fluid than Anglo-Indian law understood them to be” (Rao 2005a, 15). Colonialism then played a big part in casting women, and especially upper-caste women, as the bearers of Indian culture and traditions, understood as barbaric and in need of reform.

Consequently, nationalist and anti-colonial movements and struggles reclaimed Indian culture as opposed but superior to the West and women were ‘re-casted’ (Sangari 1990) in the 19th century as the bearers of such superior culture against the West and the British. As argued by Mary E. John: “A major consequence of the initiatives of social reform during the 19th century was that the middle-class upper-caste women became the bearers of Indian culture over/against the West.” (John 1998, 199) This was also intertwined with caste and class dynamics, so that “the spheres of the middle-class home and the family were protected, refined and contested as the privileged sites of nationalist culture and often through equally far-reaching processes of distinction from the women and men of other groups and classes” (John 1998, 199). What this implies is that (upper-caste) women, standing for the private sphere and as carriers of Indian-ness, were constituted as both the protectors of Indian culture, traditions, and authenticity, and had to be protected against the colonising West and the kind of ‘modernity’ it was standing for. Through identifying culture as the main site of difference and superiority in relation to the colonisers and the West, Indian women thus became figured in certain ways that would later become naturalised and seen as obvious (Niranjana 2010, 230).
This gendered dichotomy between culture and modernity that was historically specific and constituted thus became seen as natural and have had long-lasting legacies in the way women are still perceived today. As Niranjana exposes:

When nationalists in the non-Western world signal a relationship of conflict between modernity and culture, what is being implied is that women are part of that which is cultural and therefore authentic. They cannot therefore be part of the modern, or, as is more common, can only have a highly mediated relationship to modernity. So when women behave in ways associated with modernity (read assertive, individualistic, ambitious, etc.) they are seen as challenging their place in Indian culture and therefore undermining that culture itself. (Niranjana 2010, 231–32)

Hence, while many men adopted westernised forms of clothing and other ‘modern’ habits and behaviours, women had to be protected against similar marks of modernity because the whole Indian culture was at risk; a logic that is still continuing today, particularly within nationalist discourses. There is thus an enduring legacy of the dichotomies between public/private, culture-tradition/modernity and the identification of women-family-home as the sites in need of, and in charge of, protection of what comes to stand for Indian-ness. John, for example, warns feminists to be cautious of discourses around community that reproduce “the patriarchal equation of the private familial sphere as the privileged site for the reproduction of culture, not, as in the past, against a colonial power, but now in the name of preserving our culture diversity.” (John 1998, 202)

The place that education has occupied within post/colonial discourses is illustrative of these dynamics and has been central to both discourses of liberation by the West (in their civilising mission, educating the colonised was often presented as a way to elevate them to the Western standards of modernity) and against the West (as a way to elevate the Indian people through knowledge-power against the alleged superiority of the colonisers). In fact, the link between ‘the decline of education and the decline of a people’ was apparently a common argument of 19th century reformers in their self-determination struggles (Chakravarti 2005, 170). But education was also seen as a way to fight against caste hierarchies. Since knowledge and education, especially in relation to religion, had been traditionally reserved to Brahmmins and upper-castes, education and access to knowledge was seen as a privileged way to ‘liberate’ lower-castes, and women from lower-castes in particular, as advocated by Phule for example (a social reformer and activist from the end of the 19th century) (Chakravarti 2005). As illustrated in a conversation between Phule and his sister related by Chakravarti,
education was seen as way to combat Brahmanical dominance: “The lack of learning is nothing but gross bestiality” she told her brother. “It was the possession of knowledge that gave the Brahmanas their superior status. Learning has a great value. One who masters it loses his lowly status and achieves the higher one” (Chakravarti 2005, 172).

Hence one of the areas of Phule’s reformism in relation to women became a focus on the achievement of empowerment for lower-caste women through education (Chakravarti 2005, 173). As will be seen in the debate around sati, education was framed in terms of logics of protection by the colonisers, but also reclaimed by Indian reformists as a way to empower lower-caste women.

One example of these gendered dynamics in relations to colonial logics of protection that has attracted much scholarly attention is the debates surrounding the practice of sati. Spivak, for example, explored how this practice being rendered illegal by the British rule became a signifying moment in turning the mere civil society into a ‘good’ society (Gayatri C. Spivak 1988) in the name of women’s protection. As she states: “the protection of woman (today the 'third-world woman') becomes a signifier for the establishment of a good society which must, at such inaugurate moments, transgress mere legality, or equity of legal policy. In other words, this one item in Hindu law jumped the frontier between the private and the public domain.” (Gayatri C. Spivak 1988, 94) With Spivak then, we can see that the protection of colonised women was central to the establishment of a colonialist/imperialist order.

In a detailed study of the debates surrounding sati, Lata Mani similarly argues that in these debates, “The widow nowhere appears as a subject. If she resisted, she was seen to be dominated by hindu men. If she conceded, she was considered victimised by religion. […] Women were cast as either pathetic or heroic victims.” (Mani 1987, 129)

The official discourses around sati thus exclude any possibility for the women to have agency, which is precisely what makes possible the justifying of intervention in the name of ‘civilising’ colonial mission (Mani 1987, 130). Like Spivak, she notes how rescuing women became central for the British in their civilising mission but also how, “for the indigenous elite, protection of their status or its reform” became “an urgent necessity, in terms of the honour of the collective – religious or national.” (Mani 1987, 153) We can see here how the re/casting of women as bearers of culture and tradition was also playing out in these debates along the lines of logics of protection. Mani indeed explores how women came to stand for ‘tradition’ on all sides of the debate and were either “viewed as the weak, deluded creatures who must be reformed through
legislation and education, or the valiant keepers of tradition who must be protected from the first and be permitted only certain kinds of instruction” (Mani 1987, 152–53). What Mani’s article illustrates are the close ties between tradition/culture, women and protection.

Yet the main point argued by Mani is not only that women in these discourses and debates were precluded from having any kind of agency in the name of their protection, but rather that these debates where in some sense not primarily about them but about ‘what constitutes authentic cultural tradition’ and argues that “contrary to the popular notion that the British were compelled to outlaw sati because of its barbarity the horror of the burning of women [was] […] a distinctly minor theme” (Mani 1987, 121–22). She argues that the debates were not really about women, but focused mainly on the scriptures and their ‘traditional’ and ‘legal’ status. And this debate around religious power-knowledge relied not only on gendered logics of protection but caste ones as well. Indeed, the British perceived that Brahmin pundits, who were considered ‘corrupt and self-serving’, solely held the knowledge about the scriptures, which they equated with religion. Hence the “official conception of colonial subjects held the majority to be ignorant of their ‘religion’. […] The civilising mission of colonisation was thus seen to lie in protecting the ‘weak’ against the ‘artful’, in giving back to the natives the truths of their own ‘little read and less understood Shaster’”’ (Mani 1987, 127). Hence the ‘weak’ and ‘subordinated aspects of culture’ were seen by the British as in need of protection and salvation against the ‘corrupt manipulation by the strong and dominant’ (Mani 1987, 121). Because of the close connection between women and tradition but also because the debates were not really about them but about the ‘true’ meaning of the scriptures, Mani argues that women became the sites upon which different interpretations of scripture, tradition, and law were constituted and debated. She thus concludes that “neither subject, nor object, but ground – such is the status of women in the discourse on sati.” (Mani 1987, 153)

What this discussion around sati illustrates are the complex, contradictory, and contested ways in which logics of protection take place and intertwine to constitute women as at the same time protectors, protected, unprotected, and unprotectable, but also the ground upon which such logics are constructed and debated. It gives us a sophisticated framework through which we can understand Sampat Pal and the Gulabi Gang’s vigilantism in relation to colonial logics of protection.
Feminist Colonial Logics of Protection

As we have detailed in previous chapters, feminist scholarship is often complicit in re-producing the colonial discourses around ‘Third-World women’ as the oppressed in need of salvation and protection from an enlightened West, which (some) Western feminists come to stand for. This colonial logic relies on enlightenment narratives of linear progress that are simultaneously stories about historical time and stories about spaces where “‘advanced’ cultures and states coexist with the ‘backward’ across the world” (Hutchings 2007, 93). Hence these ‘Third-World’ women stand in for ‘our’ past that is located within ‘another’ space. Time and space collapse in locating backwardness in specific locations, as has been studied at length by scholars of colonialism (Hoad 2000; Agathangelou and Turcotte 2014; Mohanty 2003; Doty 1996).

Beyond a West/rest feminist dichotomy, we can see similar dynamics reproduced within the Indian context and Indian feminisms through hierarchies of caste, location and class. Within Indian feminisms, Dalit women have criticised what they perceive as Brahmanical feminism’s privileged position of being able to articulate feminism outside of caste and their reluctance to articulate gender and caste together (“the possibility of denying caste as a problem of gender”) (Rao 2005b, 279). The ongoing discussion about the problem of ‘speaking’ and voice, as articulated by Spivak among others, is also central in debates within Indian feminisms: “Perhaps Indian feminism too is guilty of holding a set of un-interrogated assumptions about whom it speaks for, who forms its constituency, and the life-worlds and situations it assumes as normative while developing strategies for feminist intervention.” (Rao 2005a, 29) Hence caste relations are also central to the way feminist discourses are elaborated and debated within the Indian context. As elsewhere, positions in terms of location (urban/rural dichotomies, for example) and social class also impact the ways in which certain speeches and voices are perceived and judged against others. For example, Uttar Pradesh is often presented as one of the poorest, least developed and ‘most backward regions of India’ (Shagun Rastogi 2014), and as a place where, especially in rural areas, “the country’s high-tech advances in the past decade, the progress made in women’s rights in the south of the country and enlightened Indian laws are no more than a distant rumour” (Zisner 2013). Hence in many discourses, poor lower-caste women from the rural regions of Uttar Pradesh come to stand in for the ‘oppressed’ and the ‘most subaltern of the subalterns’ (Rao 2005b, 279).
Sampat Pal and the Gulabi Gang

‘The world is changing, sister, but if you don’t change what will happen?

Today there are laws to protect you.

No upper caste, no lower caste, women have the same rights as men.

But if you’re insulted, if you’re harassed or beaten and you say nothing, who will protest for you? (Battle Cry, Berthod 2012, 133)

According to its website, the Gulabi Gang aims to “protect the powerless from abuse and fight corruption to ensure basic rights of the poor in rural areas and discourage traditions like child marriages” (“The Gulabi Gang Official Webpage” n.d.). It also has for mission to “support and train women to enhance their skills to become economically secure and develop confidence to protect themselves from abuse through sustainable livelihood options.” (“The Gulabi Gang Official Webpage” n.d.) The Gulabi gang can thus be seen as enacting a form of pastoral/governing power, as will be explored further in this chapter. Only women are allowed to join the gang and, dressed in pink saris, they keep a watch on all community activities and protest loudly in cases of injustice or malpractice (Idem). They carry lathis (bamboo sticks) and learn how to use them for self-defence.

Yet there is no Gulabi Gang without its founder and uncontested leader Sampat Pal. In fact, the charismatic leader is single-handedly leading the group’s activities and it is therefore hard to distinguish between the group and Pal herself. She was born in 1958 in a family of shepherds living in the Banda district of Uttar Pradesh. As a member of the Gadaria community (among the lower caste communities, Gadarias are a caste of shepherds), she grew up taking care of cattle and goats until one of her uncles noticed her interest in reading and writing and enrolled her in school, which she attended for two years. Married at twelve years old, she had her first child at fifteen, and four more in the few years that followed. In her biography, she relates how she has always been of a feisty, independent and affirmative nature, which led her to become a leader among her community and soon caused tensions with her family-in-law. She started organising with women in her community on different projects such as sewing lessons so that they could be financially independent. Later, she became a social worker, setting up self-help groups with women across the region to teach them about
health and hygiene. She soon quit that work to become what the Gulabi Gang’s website calls a ‘social crusader’.

One day, she is said to have witnessed a man beating his wife. She pleaded for him to stop but he apparently abused her as well. She then returned with a group of other women and gave him a beating with sticks. This incident is related on the website as having been the catalyst for the development of the gang because as the news of that incident spread, women started reaching out to Pal for help on matters not only of domestic and familial violence, but any other situation of injustice. After having conducted many collective actions like these ones, as well as intervening with local magistrates and police officers in cases of corruption or malpractice, she officially founded the Gulabi Gang in 2006 and adopted the pink saris as a way for members to recognise each other and be recognised as a group. The choice of the colour pink is said to have been primarily because all other colours were already affiliated with political parties, hence the gang took care from the start to avoid being politically affiliated.

As will be explored further below, the gang uses a variety of tactics such as mediation, street theatre, public protests and humiliation, and the occasional use of violence, to make sure that existing laws protecting the most vulnerable (Dalits, lower-castes, poor people, and/or women) are being respected. They achieve this aim both by fighting corrupted, unprofessional and/or indifferent state officials and police officers, and by challenging abusive husbands or in-laws and other individuals responsible for performing/perpetuating patriarchal, caste-based, and/or classist social orders and behaviours. The Gulabi Gang cannot therefore be reduced to one tactic (violence) or a single cause (domestic violence, corruption or other) but is rather using a diversity of tactics to ‘take the law into their own hands’ in any situation of injustice, from forced marriage, to police corruption, to caste discrimination. While their occasional use of violence attracted a lot of attention, dialogue, solidarity, and peaceful protests remain the most common strategies used by Pal and her gang to ‘make their voices heard’. To summarise using Pal’s own words: “Everything I had obtained, from husbands, pradhans, policemen and magistrates, I had simply demanded in the loudest voice supported by the voices of other women.” (Berthod 2012, 105–6) These parrhesiastic practices of speaking truth to power against injustices and discrimination will be
analysed further below but before, we have to situate them within the logics of protection of/in India.

From Protected to Unprotected/Unprotectable to Protector: Sampat Pal and the Logics of Protection

Sampat Pal’s story has to be read through the complex web of power relations and logics of protection detailed below. We can indeed see how Pal’s stood up to and challenged many of these logics, which in turn determined her subject positions in relation to logics of protection. More specifically, I will argue that by refusing to conform to gender and caste power relations/social orders, she, in a certain way, refused to be a protector of caste boundaries and Indian tradition/culture which led her to lose the protection offered by her jati and household. From this position as the unprotected, she then established herself through fearless speech as the protector of the vulnerable.

In her biography, Sampat relates how from a young age she would stand up for herself and against situations of injustice. After she got married and moved to her husband’s family home, she tells how her mother-in-law grew increasingly irritated at her strong character and manners. She relates one such anecdote when she uncovered her head and looked in the eyes of a Brahmin priest who had come to her house and made advances to her. When her mother-in-law saw her actions, she scolded Sampat Pal for not respecting caste and gender norms and rules (Berthod 2012, 34). In another instance, she tells how she refused to hand a mat to a Brahmin asking for it, contrary to what was customary in the region (lower castes have to obey Brahmin’s demands for services and material). The man became furious and a big scene ensued. Other women harshly criticised Pal for this incident because she had “endangered the community” (Berthod 2012, 36). Pal became increasingly defiant of the caste system and gendered assumptions about women’s submissiveness and subordination to a point where she and her husband had to move out of the family home into their own house. A panchayat (village council) where all the Gadarias were conveyed was organised to proceed to a separation of property from her family-in-law. As she states about the incident: “My fate had been sealed from the beginning. Recalcitrant daughters-in-law are always in the wrong, particularly those who dare to challenge the caste hierarchy.” (Berthod 2012, 40) This defiant attitude towards the Brahmins’ power culminated to an incident in which she hit a Brahmin man who was abusing a Chamar boy (a sub-caste of the Dalits). After the incident, in order to thank her, the pradhan (the equivalent of a local mayor) invited
her to his house and she ate with him in celebration. But the man was Chamar himself and eating food prepared by Dalits is seen as polluting for the other castes. After this incident, Sampat tells how she became a pariah for her own community and people refused to drink at the same well or touch her. This culminated to an incident (which will be analysed in more detail later) when a dada (professional killer) was hired to kill her and she thus had to move to another town with her family. A short while after this incident, she officially founded the Gulabi Gang so that she and other women could ensure together that their safety, dignity, and rights were respected against both social orders and corrupted and incapable state officials.

Through this line of events, we can see how Sampat Pal occupied simultaneously and/or alternatively the positions of being protector of her community’s honour and traditions to being unprotected by that community when she ‘endangered’ them through her refusal to submit to caste and gender norms and roles, to being the protector of the Chamar, which in turn turned her into the abject of protection that needed to be eliminated. In this narrative, we see the work of logics of protection in which those in charge of protecting often become the main threats to protection: Pal’s community went from offering the protection granted to members of the kinship to withdrawing that protection, to becoming the main threat to her safety. Similarly, as elaborated before, as a woman Sampat Pal was in charge of protecting her caste’s boundaries and purity but became the main threat to it when she refused to follow caste logics of protection. Ultimately, she constituted herself as a subject of protection by defending the Chamar, positioning herself both as equal to them by refusing to follow caste notions of pollution and stigma (by eating their food, for example), while at the same time positioning herself above them when she became ‘the heroine of the Chamar’ as will be detailed later.

The Gulabi Gang’s Parrhesiastic Acts: Speaking Truth to Logics of Protection’s Failures

Sampat Pal thus founded the Gulabi Gang to put her experiences, skills, sense of justice, and feisty personality at the service of other vulnerable people (and herself) in defending their rights, dignity, and safety in the face of the state’s and social orders’ failure to protect them. In fact, we can understand Pal/the Gulabi Gang’s actions as a form of fearless speech to power understood as parrhesia. More specifically, I argue that Pal/the Gulabi Gang’s fearless speech can be understood as challenging three main sets
of truths in relation to logics of protection. First, it challenges ‘truths’ about the patriarchal caste/class system and the protection it is supposed to offer those who obey and submit to it, while positioning low-castes (women) as the unprotectables. In other words, the Gang challenges caste/class and gender norms by refusing to conform to modes of behaviours and ways of being expected of them due to their position as both poor/low-caste and women, while speaking truth to the on-going injustices of these social orders despite existing laws against caste, class, and gender discrimination. Yet Pal’s discourses of exceptionalism tend to reproduce certain caste/class hierarchies by positioning herself as the pastoral protector of the unprotectables, hence reproducing certain social orders while challenging them/others. Second, the Gang challenges truths about state (masculinist) logics of protection by speaking out against its corruptibility, inefficacy, and unwillingness to actually protect its most vulnerable citizens. This truth is widely known among the unprotected/unprotectable and the population in general, but that the Gulabi Gang makes it visible by mimicking the state through vigilantism and protesting its inaction. In doing so, they do not position themselves as against the state but rather as making it live up to its promises, hence reinforcing certain sovereign/pastoral forms of state power while challenging them at the same time. Finally, the women of the Gulabi Gang challenge truths about (internal and international) colonial logics of protection placing ‘third-world’ women, and poor/low-caste women from Uttar Pradesh in particular, as the voiceless victims and/or bearers of backward and undeveloped cultures and traditions by speaking courageous truths to the power of the state and social orders. Pal’s parrhesiastic acts/speech both use the inter/national attention she and the gang attract to achieve her aims, while also reinforcing certain discourses about Uttar Pradesh and low-caste/class women’s subaltern status.

By challenging these different sets of truths, Pal and the Gulabi Gang both challenge and reinforce governing/pastoral, sovereign/coercive, and disciplinary forms of state and social power while also offering alternative modes of self-relation that offer alternate ways of governing and being, while also reproducing social hierarchies and forms of power. All this will be explored further in relation to political, judicial, and ethical modalities of parrhesia but let us first explore in more details the relationship of the Gang with the five core elements of parrhesia, as well as what parrhesiastic techniques they use and what characterises their specific instances of parrhesiastic speech/acts.
First, let us go back to the main elements central to parrhesia and how, if at all, they are expressed by Sampat Pal. We can indeed find in her biography and interviews many expressions of truth, frankness, risk, criticism, and moral duty.

Truth and frankness are often quite implicit; yet saturate Sampat Pal’s stories about her gang and herself. Their vigilantism is often justified not only by doing what is right but also by ‘telling the truth’ to policemen and government officials about their corruption. In many of the anecdotes related in her biography, Sampat also uses the most direct language to put her points across, as Foucault detailed about the element of frankness in parrhesia (telling everything without concealing anything, in the most direct way possible, frankness being opposed to persuasion or rhetoric). One episode in particular illustrates these two elements of truth and frankness. In her biography, Sampat Pal tells how she confronted a policeman who would not file their complaints about government officials diverting public funds. The exchange is related as having gone this way:

‘As you very well know, for months now we’ve been investigating this diverting of public funds. Many people have already tried to complain individually at the police station in their village. Each time your officers have thrown them out or refused to file their complaint. You policemen are like all the other officials, rotten to the core!’

‘I won’t have you speak like that!’

‘You won’t have me speak the truth, yet you allow the police in this district not to do their jobs.’ (Berthod 2012, 4)

As this exchange illustrates, the tireless denunciations of corruption and police inaction in the face of corruption and abuse is very much framed by Sampat Pal as ‘a personal relationship to truth’ in which there is an exact coincidence between beliefs and truth. But this exchange is also typical of most of the Gulabi Gang’s speeches and actions in that Sampat Pal expresses herself in the most direct and blunt way possible (‘you policemen are like all other officials, rotten to the core!’), illustrating the frankness that seems to be central to her and the gang’s discourses. Furthermore, we can see how criticism is central to Sampat Pal/the Gulabi Gang’s mission. In fact, criticism is at the
basis of vigilantism itself, a point that is made pretty clear in the discussion that precedes and hence does not necessarily need to be elaborated again here.

The two elements that are both central to parrhesia and to Pal/the gang’s vigilantism that makes a convincing case in seeing Sampat as a parrhesiastic vigilante are the notions of risk and moral duty. In fact, her own personal story is filled with danger, threats, and the risk of death, making it clear that courage is central to her fearless speech. First, Sampat relates an incident that happened to her when a ‘dada’ (hired killer) came to her village to assassinate her. Since they were related, she invited him to her house without either of them knowing she was the target. When they discovered what was going on, he agreed not to fulfil his contract by killing her but she and her family had to flee their village and community since she did not know who exactly had hired the dada. (see Berthod 2012, 61) In her biography, she tells about this incident “how people had wanted to kill me, how they wanted to punish me when all I wanted was to help others.” (Berthod 2012, 63) In a video interview, she also explains how after she started fighting for women’s rights “people started threatening [her] as they felt [she] was turning into a leader” (NewsX 2013). Hence even before founding the Gulabi Gang, Sampat’s fearless speech to powerful groups in her village already involved risk, a risk that followed her later on and that made the Gulabi Gang’s vigilantism fundamentally centred on courage. At some point in her biography, she states: “It takes courage to wear a pink sari, the courage to reject social conventions and to assert one’s beliefs.” (Berthod 2012, 152) In this quote, both the aspect of courage and the notions of ‘speaking fearless truth to power’ are asserted (‘to assert one’s beliefs’) as foundational to the gang’s philosophy. We could argue here that there is a correspondence between beliefs and truth, as well as the notions of risk and the courage that derive from it.

Tied to this notion of risk, courage is thus also very central to her story. We could even argue that the centrality of courage is perhaps what ties Sampat Pal/the Gulabi Gang most strongly to parrhesia and makes their speech and actions a form of parrhesia. Among other similar stories, one instance in particular demonstrates the notion of courage. After an incident in which she intervened single-handedly to stop a truck from embezzling food rations destined to the poor, she was held at gunpoint. About this incident she writes: “My heart was beating wildly, but I refused to be
intimidated. I said: ‘Listen, if you carry on insulting me I’ll call my gang to back me up. Have you heard of the Gulabi Gang? Well, we know all about you. I don’t care whether the police help us or not. We’ll give your arse a good kicking anyway.’” (Berthod 2012, 115) Later on, when the sub-magistrate was called to sort out the situation, he told Sampat to watch out because if she carried on that way, she would get herself killed. Her reply was: “So what? Thousands of people are dying of hunger in this district. If I have to die to save them, it’s worth it, don’t you think?” (Berthod 2012, 120) This incident clearly illustrates the risks involved in her vigilantism, but also the courage she relates to have demonstrated in the face of those risks, a courage bordering on bravado.

In an interview in which she was told how risky her vigilante actions were for her life, she replied: “What I say is we can die only once… So I’ll die, big deal!” (Al Jazeera English 2008) Sampat Pal regularly makes such claims in which she clearly chooses ‘the risk of death instead of life and security’ and how this risk/courage is at the core of her actions.

The last element of parrhesiastic truth-telling, duty, is also very clearly expressed by Pal as the main reason motivating her fearless speech to power. She often claims that the reason motivating her vigilantism and the risks she takes while doing so is this notion of ‘doing what is right’, in other words, duty (“I do what I think is right” (Journeyman Pictures 2010)). Also framed as a fight against injustice, her vigilantism is often presented as a duty grounded in morality: “I couldn’t help it [intervening in favour of women in Badousa]; all injustice disgusted me and drove me to action” (Berthod 2012, 98) or “I can’t stand injustice and that’s what made me go.” (Berthod 2012, 73) She thus regularly justifies her actions out of a strong sense of moral duty to act in the face of injustice. And she also connects this sense of moral duty to the risks she is ready to take: “I know my case is just, and that certainly strips me of fear” (Berthod 2012, 5). When talking about the risks of being betrayed by her own gang members, leading her to take precautions for her safety, she further asserts that “these precautions are the price one pays for being a gang leader. But it is compensated to a great extent by the satisfaction one derives from doing one’s duty.” (Berthod 2012, 143) Hence moral duty is what justifies the risks involved in speaking truth to power.

It is thus clear that she frames her actions in terms very similar to those defining parrhesia. We can conclude that she indeed uses her “freedom and chooses frankness
instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.” (Foucault 2001, 19–20)

**Techniques of Parrhesia**

Pal/the Gulabi Gang’s fearless speech can be seen as a form of vigilantism in that they take the law into their own hands, violently if necessary, and attempt to apply it where it has been ignored and/or violated by corrupt government and police officials. It is in fact how the Gulabi Gang is most often referred to in academic and journalistic writings: as a vigilante group (Sen 2012; Pratten and Sen 2007; Aaronette White and Rastogi 2009). Vigilantism is a contested concept whose definition is constantly debated and shifting. Drawing attention from many different disciplines, from law and criminology to sociology and the study of social movements, the ways in which vigilantism is defined and perceived vary greatly not only across disciplines but according to the case study under focus as well. Since vigilantism is tied to its empirical realities, vigilantism is, as Sen puts it, a “shifting concept that articulates to ever-changing social realities.” (Pratten and Sen 2007, 19) Nevertheless, vigilantism is commonly understood as a group of citizens who, in the face of the (perceived) State’s inaction or ineffectiveness, have to ‘take the law into their own hands’. Hence, Ray Abrahams defines vigilantism as: “an organised attempt by a group of ‘ordinary citizens’ to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts.” (Abrahams 2007) Similarly, Lee Johnston argues that there are six necessary features that define vigilantism: 1-premeditation and planning, 2-voluntary engagement by private citizens, 3- the use (or threat of the use) of force, 4- it is a social movement, 5- it emerges from the threat posed to social order by a potential, actual or imputed transgression of norms and 6- it seeks to control crime or other infractions by offering protection or guarantees of security to participants and beyond. (L. Johnston 1996, 220) However, if these definitions might sound intuitive, scholars disagree as to whether vigilantism really constitutes a social movement, if it always has to be extra-legal, exclusively by ‘ordinary citizens’, organised, premeditated, violent and/or directed only towards crime (Aaronette White and Rastogi 2009, 315). Hence no element of the above definitions seems to reach consensus.

Other scholars also wonder how much the ideology matters to understand
vigilante groups and vigilantism (Pratten and Sen 2007, 8). Since vigilantism is often associated with conservatism and often serves the purpose of delimiting/guarding the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of a community (in cases of right-wing nationalist vigilantism for example), scholars wonder if ideologies matter in distinguishing between different types of vigilante ‘justice’ or groups. In India, for example, women’s vigilante groups are often associated either with left-wing ideologies or extreme right associations (Sen 2012, 2). The Gulabi Gang is thus very often studied alongside, or compared to, the Mahila Aghadi, a women’s vigilante group within the Shiv Sena, a radical nationalist party of Western India responsible for many instances of communal violence (for a fascinating account of this case study, see Sen 2007). The question whether extreme-right groups such as Shiv Sena can be compared to independent, non-affiliated and/or ‘left-wing’ groups such as the Gulabi Gang and if these distinctions in ideologies matter for defining the concept are up for debate. In any case, we can see how the Gulabi Gang’s actions can be understood as forms of vigilantism as defined above.

But the Gang’s fearless speech also goes beyond vigilantism in their use of a wide range of tactics, including forms of street theatre that rely on public shaming to challenge, problematise and transform not only the state, but also social orders and people’s behaviours within them. The Gulabi Gang thus uses a wide and strategic range of tactics at their disposal to be heard that also rely upon and use to their advantage the visibility and publicity they attract, as both a weapon and a protection. As attested by a journalist in an article about the Gulabi Gang: “Pal’s method of operation in such cases makes intelligent use of the public character of Indian life, which she exploits to create highly effective street theatre.” (Zisner 2013) In the same article, it is related how Pal once waited outside a culprit’s house until a crowd of curious onlookers formed so that she could afterwards scold him publicly in front of the audience, thus using the public as a weapon to put pressure on the man. (Zisner 2013) Pal thus uses creative methods to make her fearless speech heard and encourages women to similarly ‘make their voices heard.’ The attention she receives from the media and the gang’s growing notoriety are also often used to the group’s advantage and it is not unusual for Pal to bring journalists with her to file complaints to the police or other governmental officials, using media presence to apply pressure and be heard.
Sampat Pal also states in her biography that humiliation is often a tactic used by the gang in trying to be heard by the authorities. For example, she recalls a protest by the Gulabi Gang when they marched on the streets with stray dogs they had painted in pink and made to walk with them. When the officer at the police station asked what these dogs were about, Sampat replied: “They’re the new recruits. We’re showing them their new assignments.” “I don’t understand,” said the officer. “It’s perfectly simple. When we call upon you to provide protection, you don’t come and when we ask you to arrest a thief, you run away. But if we ask a dog to ‘attack’, it attacks. Dogs are much more loyal than you, so we’ve engaged them to replace you.” (Berthod 2012, 122) Sampat then wrote: “the memory of this public humiliation would remain etched in people’s minds for a long time to come.” (Idem) As this example shows, public humiliation is a tool used by the pink vigilantes to mock the state and denounce its failure to protect. Acts of civil disobedience are also common as well as other demonstrations and public protests. For example, in one instance, Pal and a group of women from the gang regrouped in the middle of the night and dismantled a brick wall with their bare hands that had been built illegally in the middle of the road, blocking access to the village to poor farmers and villagers. (Berthod 2012, 99)

If the story of the violent husband’s thrashing remains one of the most related ones and is presented on the website as a founding moment, in her biography Pal avoids reducing the gang’s activities to the simple use of violence. In fact, she relates only one instance of using violence against a policeman who was allegedly mistreating her. She rather puts the emphasis on the diversity of tactics used by the gang: from dialogue to protests to public humiliation, Pal sustains that the lathis are mostly used for self-defence and as a deterrent strategy: “The aim is not to thrash anyone at the drop of a hat, but to use the lathi as a weapon of dissuasion.” (Berthod 2012, 128) Hence she justifies the use/threat of violence as a means to an end in the rare cases when it is necessary, while using mostly the language of protection and self-defence to justify it. As she states in an interview: “We beat people to protect ourselves. Now they are scared of us so we don’t need to use our lathis. Only if necessary.” (Al Jazeera English 2008) She thus argue that she does not need to use violence anymore because of her reputation and because the potential use of violence is enough of a deterrent to seldom have to carry out the threat. As she puts it herself: “Beat one man up and ten others will mend their ways. Automatic!” (Shagun Rastogi 2014) Mostly, as will be detailed in a subsequent
section, her/their use of violence is fundamentally grounded in masculinist and state logics of protection and is thus justified as a necessary mean to get heard and insure one’s protection within the gendered, class, and caste power relations one is embedded in.

Beyond the lathi, the weapon mostly used by Sampat Pal and her gang is the power of the collective. As she states in a video interview: “If you fight your battles by yourself, nothing can be done. So find ten other women who will stand with you.” (Journeyman Pictures 2010) Much of the philosophy and the strength of the vigilante group are based on solidarity and collective action. The power of numbers is thus often used to apply pressure and get officials to file complaints or mend their ways. As Pal relates in her biography: “The policeman looks down his nose at me, but I know he will file our complaint. Because, while it may be easy to send one woman packing, it’s impossible to get rid of two hundred.” (Berthod 2012, 4) Hence when someone reaches out to Sampat Pal in reaction to a situation of injustice, she assesses the situation, tries to dialogue with the culprits and if that does not work, rounds up women from the gang and uses different means of pressure that often rely on the power of the collective. As she herself puts it: “One woman alone can do nothing. Several women can apply pressure, overturn power relations and even halt the corrupt administrative machine.” (Zisner 2013)

What thus characterises the Gang’s parrhesiastic speech/actions is the diversity of tactics they use, way beyond the verbal exposure of Joya’s fearless speech and Manning’s Internet disclosures, as well as their incorruptibility with respect to political and social norms.

The Gulabi Gang’s Political Parrhesia: Making the State Live Up to Its Promises

In terms of political parrhesia in relation to the state, Pal/the Gulabi Gang’s fearless speech can be seen as challenging the sovereign power of the state by defying its monopoly over violence. By mimicking the State through vigilantism, the gang speaks truth to the power of state logics of protection by underlying its failure/unwillingness/inability to protect its citizens, hence also challenging its pastoral/governing claims to power over its population. Yet as a protector and a leader who takes care of her community, she also reproduces forms of governing/pastoral
power similar to that of the state. It can also be argued that the Gang is not against state power but rather aims at reinforcing their governing power over the population by making it live up to its promises. But since their actions go beyond targeting the State, we can say that the Gulabi Gang also challenges the pastoral/governing power of caste/class/gender social orders by offering alternative modes of governance based on different forms of protection than the jati/community, showing the inability of those forms of social hierarchies to actually protect the vulnerable, particularly women.

Vigilantism and State Logics of Protection

Vigilantes are often perceived as challenging the state’s exercise of power and enforcement of justice. In other words they are often placed against the state, being critical of its functioning, boundaries, and/or exercise of power, more specifically when it comes to policing practices. As such, as Sundar would argue, “vigilantism by definition presupposes a state against whose monopoly over violence (cf. Weber) vigilante violence is measured” (Sundar 2010, 116). Beyond violence, it is the whole sovereignty of the state in its authority over its citizens that vigilantism can be seen as challenging. By acting as or masquerading the state (Sundar 2010) through policing practices, vigilantes can thus be seen as mocking or humiliating the state in its failure or unwillingness to protect its citizens. In terms of the logics of protection, vigilantism thus directly challenges the state’s logics of protection and role as the sole legitimate protector of its citizens as well as the monopoly over the citizens protection and provisioning of security. In cases of women’s vigilantism such as the Gulabi Gang, the masculinist logics of state protection are additionally targeted. In a study of women’s vigilantism in India using the Gulabi gang’s example, Ayatree Sen argues that these groups “further emasculate the malfunctioning state by highlighting its paternal failure to protect vulnerable women.” (Sen 2012, 9) In relation to the state, vigilantism is also always already gendered in that it challenges the masculinist protection the state aims to offer its (feminised) citizens.

In such conceptualisations (where the state is masqueraded, humiliated, and/or emasculated), vigilantes are often positioned as ‘outside’ the purview of the state (Sen 2012, 9), their actions being directed against it. But this relationship has to be further complicated because vigilantism also depends on the state for its existence and cannot therefore be read as ‘outside’ or completely ‘against’, but rather as co-constituted and dependent on the state itself. Hence, as argued by Abrahams, “vigilantism cannot exist
alone but only alongside and, typically, on the frontiers – structural and/or cultural – of state power.” (Abrahams 2007, 423) As in Sundar’s argument about Robin-Hood style vigilantism, Abrahams similarly argues that vigilantism is “typically more critical of the state’s actual performance than of the state itself” (Abrahams 2007, 423). In this analysis, vigilantes do not necessarily (or exclusively) act against the state but rather in collaboration with it. They are seen as ‘stepping in’ when the state can not enforce law and order, yet without questioning “what the law is or where the rights to legislate and, normally, to jurisdiction lie” (Abrahams 2007, 427). Vigilantism can thus be seen as reinforcing the state’s authority rather than challenging it. In this scenario, whether right- or left-oriented, vigilante groups are rather conservative as they are more concerned with re-establishing the status quo of the law and order under the state’s authority than challenging and overthrowing it. Vigilantism is seen as a temporary yet necessary measure to make the state live up to its promises of protection and security.

Alternatively, David Pratten and Ayatree Sen offer an analysis of contemporary vigilantism as grounded in and complicit with neoliberalism and the neoliberal state. Their analysis locates vigilantism, contemporary and historical, as bound with state policing: “Non-state or self policing has a very long historical trajectory to which the history of state policing, not just state failures, has contributed in large measure.” (Pratten and Sen 2007, 7). Thus when looking at contemporary instances of vigilantism, while recognising that vigilantism answers to its own logics and historical trajectories, Sen and Pratten make the argument that neoliberalism “has created unparalleled opportunities and motives for citizens to take the law into their own hands” (Pratten and Sen 2007, 2).

In fact, the politics of deregulation, outsourcing, decentralisation and privatisation of government services that are the signposts of neoliberal policies have affected policing practices around the world. States have indeed facilitated and encouraged the outsourcing of policing practices, which “contradict our common understanding of the state’s provision of security, its monopoly of force, as the essential function of government” (Pratten and Sen 2007, 2). By letting private groups and individuals take charge of what used to be the sole and main function of the state: policing, neoliberalism blurs the line between public and private but also questions the complicity of the state in its own ‘failure’ to protect its citizens and the subsequent need to ‘take the law into their own hands’. In this version of the story, vigilantism is both challenging the role of the state by blurring the boundaries around its sovereign power.
to protect, and reinforcing the logic of the neoliberal state by providing individual flexibility and self-help in the administration of justice. In other words, “vigilantism is a cheap form of law enforcement” (Pratten and Sen 2007, 3). Pratten and Sen thus conclude: “vigilantism does not solely involve the desperate falling back on their own physical resources in the face of state failure, but a more complicated process in which the state becomes one of a range of options which citizens can purchase.” (Pratten and Sen 2007, 15)

**Governing Otherwise: Challenging Masculinist and Caste/Class Logics of Protection**

Similarly, many claims made by Pal in her biography seem to confirm Sen and Pratten’s argument about neoliberalism and vigilantism. Whether intentionally or not, it seems that the Gulabi gang’s vigilantism reproduces and reinforces discourses of neoliberal (self)governance that outsources to citizens the responsibility for policing and protection. As she states in a passage about helping women to get organised: “My aim was to get into their heads that they shouldn’t wait for the government to help them and that they could improve things for themselves.” (Berthod 2012, 84) This quote is a good illustration of the ambiguous effects of neoliberal governmentality: through a discourse of empowerment (they could improve things for themselves), this quote also simultaneously reinforces the logics of self-management, flexibility and self-sufficiency from the state at the core of neoliberalism (‘they shouldn’t wait for the government to help them’).

Yet Sampat Pal is not passively unaware of these dynamics as she herself expresses how her and her gang’s actions play out well for the police because they provide a cheap form of law enforcement: “Some [policemen] really value the work I do. They know I have nothing against them, that I’m just trying to sort out problems before they get worse. In a way, I’m doing them a favour. […] No police, no bribes! It’s cheaper for the complainants and less work for the police. In other words, everyone wins.” (Berthod 2012, 139) In this quote, Pal is both aware that she is ‘doing them a favour’ while recognising the benefits of vigilantism that are both ‘cheaper for the complainants’ and ‘less work for the police’. Therefore in this version of the story, it seems that Sampat Pal and the Gulabi Gang are complicit in the continuing dynamic they are denouncing in the first place (police inaction and corruption) by providing an alternative to state policing that is not outside or against the state but complementary and even complicit to its pitfalls.
What this overview shows is that vigilantism in the case of the Gulabi Gang is maybe all of these at the same time: it is not either against/outside the state or complementary and complicit to it, it is all of these at the same time, alternatively and/or contradictorily. What Sampat expresses in interviews and her biography is the complexity of the position vigilantes occupy in relation to the state: while remaining determined to challenge and criticise its inability/unwillingness to protect its citizens, it reproduces and reinforces the state’s power of protection by masquerading it while offering a complementary and sometimes complicit approach to its policing. The parrhesiastic game in this case can be expressed as follows: ‘We will do your job for you/use your power against you/mimic you and if you punish us, then you have to do your job yourself and thus prove my point that you were not doing your job before… And if you hurt us as low-caste/poor women, you will confirm that you are actually the main threat to our safety.’

Beyond the state, the Gulabi Gang challenges and subverts social orders by speaking truth to men’s power and masculinist logics of protection, including, but not limited to, the way these logics are embodied through the state. For example, Pal’s decision to recruit only women in her gang is mostly justified in terms of women’s solidarity as strength and the collective power it provides. For Pal, women are inherently more united than men and this is partly what explains her choice to have a gang of women only. As she states in her biography: “That’s why I set up the Gulabi Gang two years ago: to apply pressure and demand justice. Why a gang of women? Because it’s through them that society will change. They are the most vulnerable of people, but also the strongest, because they are more united than men will ever be.”

This belief in the strength of solidarity that would be particular to women is justified not on a shared ‘nature’ but rather on shared experiences of oppression: “That’s women’s strength: they support each other. None of them knew the woman with the complaint, but they all knew what it is to be humiliated because you are considered to be the weaker sex.” On the contrary, Pal quite bluntly argues that men do not show the same kind of commitment, solidarity, or selflessness: “Most of them are selfish and act only in their own interests. They never put themselves at the service of any ideology or commit to any cause.” Hence the question of the women-only rule of the Gulabi Gang is mostly justified as a strategy for effective resistance on the basis of a superior ability of women to
empathise and thus to organise in solidarity. Women’s standpoint as the unprotected/unprotectables is what gives them the power to offer alternative modes of governance based on solidarity, incorruptibility, and efficiency.

In fact, the exclusion of men from the group and Pal’s justifications of it is interesting in that it subverts the masculinist logics of protection by deconstructing the image of men as ‘actual or potential protectors’. In fact, she regularly questions their courage: “Men’s bravery is all show. In reality they’re cowards.” (Berthod 2012, 150) Or, as she states about her gang, “It takes courage to wear a pink sari, the courage to reject social conventions and to assert one’s beliefs. Men aren’t ready for that yet.” (Berthod 2012, 152) Such statements produce women’s subject position as associated with courage and bravery over men’s cowardice. To assert themselves, women, according to Pal, have to acknowledge that men’s bravery is ‘all show’ and this power-knowledge is accomplished through the act of speaking truth to the power of men. And this speaking truth to power is also successful because of the ‘surprise effect’ it relies upon: “Where I come from, men are not used to women trying to intimidate them. It never crosses their minds that women might use the same tactics they do – and that makes them weak.” (Berthod 2012, 101) Hence Pal’s discourse around men is explicitly using the patriarchal power relations of masculinist logics of protection to her advantage, as a strategy to achieve justice by using men’s monopoly over the use of force and fearless speech against them.

But this challenge to masculinity logics of protection is also used strategically not only because female vigilantism is seen as ‘emasculating’ the state in its incapacity to protect vulnerable women, but also because women’s alleged vulnerability might protect them from the abuse and arrests facing male resistance to the state and the police. Explaining why she did not ask men to help the gang in their attempt to dismantle a brick wall in protest, Sampat Pal says: “I realised that knocking down a brick wall was very hard work, but I had a very good reason for turning to the women rather than their husbands. If the police came, the women would not risk much, whereas the men might immediately be arrested and thrown in jail. Women’s fragility has its advantages!” (Berthod 2012, 99) She thus sees men as “very easy targets for the police during raids and demonstrations” (Berthod 2012, 151). The banning of men is thus also strategic and used against the state’s masculinist protection, while simultaneously reinforcing, in a way, the gendered norms upon which it relies.
Furthermore, the reversal of the logics of masculinist protection is achieved by positioning men as the protected. Pal explains that despite men’s alleged pitfalls and cowardice, “that doesn’t stop me from defending them as aggressively as I do women. Today many men, from dispossessed farmers and shopkeepers who are victim of extortion to low-caste officials suffering discrimination, call on my gang’s services.” (Berthod 2012, 152) In this quote, men are turned into the object of Pal’s protection in a symmetrical reversal to the masculinist logics of protection. In this scenario, she becomes the benevolent protector who courageously and ‘aggressively’ defends those in need of protection, who in turn happily defer to their protectors for help. Beyond subverting masculinist logics of protection, this form of pastoral care and protection Pal offers vulnerable communities thus also speaks truth to caste/class logics of protection not only because she refuses to abide by the disciplinary norms imposed by the caste system and class inequalities, but also because she speaks truth to the failure of the caste/class system to protect the most vulnerable.

We could argue that through this subversion of masculinist/caste/class logics of protection, she/the Gang offers alternative modes of governance based on women’s solidarity that are more effective in protecting communities than the current social orders/state power. This is why Sampat Pal/the Gulabi Gang’s vigilantism seems to be recognised and respected by the local communities in whose name it is conducted. In a video interview, one man whose village received the help of the vigilantes in stopping the embezzlement of food rations for the poor by corrupt officials was asked for his comments about being helped by a woman (we will come back to the implications behind such line of questioning later): “Let good come be it through men or through women. We have to survive, it has not been raining!” Another man in this interview also claims: “In our village today, no village headman, Brahmin or low caste, has worked for our progress.” (Al Jazeera English 2008) We will see later how Sampat Pal’s positioning in relation to her gang and those she protects reproduces and reinforces certain social hierarchies and the disciplinary power upon which they rely, but in terms of governance in relation to logics of protection, we can see how Pal/the Gang offer alternative ways of governing/protecting that both challenge and reinforce the state’s pastoral and sovereign power and the masculinist, caste/class logics of protection upon which it relies.
Judicial Parrhesia: When the Subaltern Speaks

‘What the Brahmin did is unjust, but what can we do? We’re powerless. No one will listen to us.’
‘Together we have power.’
‘What do you want us to do?’
‘Make your voices heard. Come with me!’
(Berthod 2012, 55)

The gang’s parrhesia is also profoundly grounded in judicial modalities in that they literally enact/perform/demand justice for the ‘weak’ where the powerful have committed offences and faced impunity. But more than speaking the truth about the injustices they face, the Gang also performs forms of sovereign/judicial power in place of the state by punishing the culprits themselves, thus both challenging and resisting its judicial/sovereign power, as elaborated before. This is because their fearless speech does not place the injustices they face under the responsibility of flawed laws but of unjust social orders and corrupted officials that stand in the way of justice and existing laws. As the unprotectables, Pal/the Gulabi Gang’s parrhesiastic speech represents the subalterns taking their voices back in demanding justice. The use of violence thus has to be understood within this positionality as the unprotectables. Taking the law into their own hands can thus be seen as the enacted and embodied way for the powerless to speak truth to the injustices committed by the powerful when “the security of silence is no longer an option” (Rossing 2014, 22). Yet Pal positions herself in terms of power as both ‘below’ the powerful and very much ‘above’ those in whose name she demands justice.

First of all, as elaborated before, Pal makes clear that the state’s inaction and inability to enforce the law is the reason why it is necessary for her/the Gang to act: “Nobody comes to our help in these parts. The officials and the police are corrupt and anti-poor. So sometimes we have to take the law in our hands.” (Biswas 2007) According to a report from Transparency International conducted in 2003, seventy-five percent of respondents from India reported that they felt the police was corrupt to extremely corrupt, and so were sixty-five percent of public officials and civil servants. Moreover, sixty-two percent reported having paid a bribe to the police in the last 12 months, sixty-one percent to the Registry and Permit Services, fifty-eight percent to the land services and thirty-six percent to the Judiciary. (Transparency International 2013)
Regional variations exist of course but these statistics seem to confirm that a majority of the Indian population shares Sampat’s perception.

Therefore Pal does not question the law itself, nor where the power of jurisdiction lies. Most of her actions are aimed at ‘making the state live up to its promises’ and making sure the police and other officials are doing their job the way they are supposed to (as illustrated by the many instances where she goes to the police and higher officials and make sure complaints are registered: there is no question here about the system of complaints itself and its effectiveness if implemented correctly). The gang’s vigilantism is thus not only a way to speak truth to the state’s inaction and other injustices but to show how it should actually exercise its judicial power. Hence the Gang’s actions are also a form of alternative judicial power and often an occasion to ‘teach a lesson’ or ‘punish’ the culprits. In such cases, Pal is not only ‘taking the law into her own hands’ by acting to protect vulnerable women and people, but also acting as judge and jury in legislating in the name of duty in the face of injustice: “I don’t care if he knows a minister. Even if he knows the prime minister, if he’s done something wrong he should be punished!” (Berthod 2012, 92) As she states about an incident when she stood up to a racket of protection: “I can’t stand injustice and that’s what made me go. Also, I couldn’t resist the prospect of teaching those petty tyrants another lesson.” (Berthod 2012, 73)

The responsibility for the failure to protect and enforce the law, especially for women, is thus not entirely attributed to the state itself. If police and government officials’ corruption and inaction are blamed in a large part, Pal also points the finger to social institutions, beliefs, and practices making it difficult to enforce the laws surrounding women’s rights: “We live in a free country, with modern laws, and the constitution gives us the same rights. […] But the laws that are supposed to protect women cannot be implemented” because, as she states a few sentences later “Social sanctions bear no relation to legal sanctions.” (Berthod 2012, 81) In this quote, she makes it clear that the target of her vigilantism is not only the state but also other social institutions responsible for not implementing the law (as is also illustrated by her interference in cases of forced marriage, domestic violence and abuse from in-laws that do not always involve the police or government officials). This opposition between legal and social sanctions positions the law on the ‘good’ side of protection while
society is on the other side. In this scenario, the law is not to blame but should rather be set as an example to follow if only society would respect it.

Sampat Pal also clearly grounds that question of what speech gets to be heard not only in terms of vigilantism’s relationship to the state but mostly within gendered dynamics. As she bluntly puts it in her autobiography: “I’m a woman and to make myself heard I have to make more noise than the rest – peacefully whenever possible, and with the help of my fists if I must” (Berthod 2012, 5). Her position as a woman located alongside and not within the official locus of power necessarily determines the form and strength her speech has to take to be heard. From this perspective, it is thus possible to conceive the Gulabi Gang’s violence as a form of truth-telling itself, as instances in which violence becomes the speech because it might be the only speech available to that particular subject in that particular context. Talking in an interview about the incident in which she beat up a violent husband along with other women, she tells the journalist: “At first I tried to reason with him, and then scolded him. He hurled obscenities at me. I realised that he had to be taught a lesson and the only language he understood was that of violence” (Dasgupta 2010). In that example, we see that violence is perceived as a language and as the only means available after the use of different tactics has been exhausted. And what ‘language’ and in what ‘voice’ the fearless speech will be heard inevitably depends on one’s social position and social context. As highlighted by Scweta Vashani in the introduction to Sampat Pal’s biography: “what options does one have if the state machinery is not supportive and in fact perpetrates and promotes injustice?” (Berthod 2012, x–xi)

Yet Pal’s sense of justice is not only about speaking truth to the injustices she is facing but also about positioning herself as the protector of the unprotectable. Hence she is not only situated ‘below’ and speaking to an ‘above’ but also speaking for/in the name of those below and turning herself into a pastoral protector by doing so. This positionality in relation to the other members of her gang and the people she is helping is constantly reinforced by exposing how she intervenes ‘on behalf of’ women with a corrupt official or a violent husband (Berthod 2012, 58) but also by how her vigilantism to improve these others’ situation positions her as a saviour. In her biography, she relates an incident during which a Brahmin in her village was harassing and attacking a Dalit. She intervened on behalf of the Dalit by hitting the Brahmin in the face. About this particular instance she states: “After this incident I became the heroine of the
Chamars. It was the first time someone had fought on behalf of a member of their community. The other communities in the village were also impressed. They had all realised that a Brahmin could be made to back down.” (Berthod 2012, 58) This anecdote is interesting to understand this power dynamic involved in speaking truth to power on behalf of others: we can see this particular incident as parrhesiastic since her fearless ‘speech’ was clearly directed towards an above (the Brahmin) from below (she is a Gadaria, among the lowest castes in India). Yet in relation to the Chamars (one of the Dalit communities), she was positioned from above and her act had the effect both to challenge the powerful and the logics of un/protection but also to make her ‘the heroine of the Chamars’ on behalf of whom she spoke truth to power. This incident touches the core of the ambivalence involved in parrhesia and the power relations it both challenges and reinforces.

**Ethical Parrhesia: Turning Oneself Into a Pastoral Protector**

In terms of ethical parrhesia, Pal’s whole life story and actions promote a form of ethical self-relation based on justice, autonomy, incorruptibility and courage. She turned herself into a pastoral protector after having been ostracised by her community for her fearless truth-speaking to the injustices of the caste/class/gender social orders. She also challenges colonial logics of protection that would position women like her as the silent victims and/or bearers of backward practices. But, through performing forms of pastoral power, she also reinforces certain forms of subjectivation grounded in hierarchical relations of class/caste and colonial power: as the literate among the illiterates, the Gadaria among the Dalits, the ‘pastor’ among the ‘flock’, the enlightened among the ‘backwards’, she also turns herself into a protector by reproducing some of the normalised hierarchical modes of subjectivation/subjectification.

The central aims of the Gulabi Gang’s parrhesiastic resistance, as developed before, is for women to ‘get their voices heard’ and dare to ‘defend themselves’ in the face of injustices, taking the law into their own hands if/when necessary. By challenging both state and social orders’ logics of protection, the Gang also challenges the norms which constitute low-caste/poor women as the unprotectables, hence promoting alternative modes of self-relation and subjectivation, ways of being otherwise, in relation to gender, caste, and class. Sambat Pal in particular embodies this challenging of disciplinary power by refusing her positioning as the protected/unprotected/unprotectable and turning herself into a protector. In changing her
own subject position within logics of protection, in living a life grounded in incorruptibility, independence, and solidarity, she also challenges people to change their own subjectivities and ethos. Through her own relationship to truth and moral duty as well as through her actions and words, she encourages others to ‘dare to act’ in reclaiming their voice and demanding justice for themselves and others. As she puts it: “The main thing is to dare, which women rarely do. For generation after generation women were gagged. Over time they accepted the barriers that tradition imposed on them. Today the law gives them the same rights as men, yet they don’t dare defend themselves.” (Berthod 2012, 105) Hence she claims that: “It was my duty to use my gift. […] It was my job to give them the initial push by getting them to organise.” (Berthod 2012, 106) Pal’s parrhesiastic speech thus encourages others (and women in particular) to ‘dare to act’ and change who they are.

Her fearless speech is also a way to constitute herself as an exceptional pastoral protector/leader. In that sense, her speech can be seen as directed at incompetent and/or corrupted government officials and police officers, encouraging them to build their subject position as protectors on different modes of self-relation, ones rooted in incorruptibility, moral duty and justice. For example, she repeatedly compares herself to other exceptional figures such as Ghandi, Jesus or Mohammed: “Jesus, Mohammed, Ghandi… all who have fought against injustice have been in danger and sadly even their closest collaborators ought to be corrupt.” (Berthod 2012, 143) Ghandi in particular is used as a comparison figure that serves both to positively cast her fearless speech in line with that of a respected national and international hero-figure, and to differentiate herself from him. She thus creates this figure of herself as both Gandhiesque and singular: “I salute Ghandiji, he was the father of our nation. But my style is different.” (Journeyman Pictures 2010) Or, as she states in her biography: “that’s what I want – to change the world. Nothing more, nothing less. In my own small way, I feel that I’m a bit like Mahatma Ghandi. He too fought for the people with small actions that seemed nothing much at the time but finally led to the country’s independence. The only difference between us is that my face will never be printed on a twenty-rupee note!” (Berthod 2012, 201) Hence we can see how she grounds her fearless speech within and not outside a lineage of political leaders, encouraging others, in a way, to also enact the same sense of justice and purpose and change the world. Yet this is achieved by elevating herself above those in whose name she speaks the truth, and thus also reproduces and reinforces certain forms of power/logics of protection.
First, as she puts it quite bluntly in an interview: “there is no gang without me” (Zisner 2013). Hence despite counting over 20 000 members across Uttar Pradesh, the Gulabi Gang is still highly centralised around the uncontested leadership of Sampat Pal. Aware of the implications of such centralisation, in her biography she explains in greater length this position and its consequences for the Gulabi Gang as an organisation: “I find it hard to delegate. As a result, I’m continually being called upon and I’m overwhelmed by the demand. What would happen to my gang if I died?” (Berthod 2012, 142) As she further puts it: “The problem is, I don’t really trust anyone. I’ve never found the qualities that my right-hand woman should have even among the keenest members of my gang. No doubt my expectations are too high, but I dare not get it wrong. In my position the smallest error could be fatal.” (Berthod 2012, 142) In this last quote, we can see how the subject position she has constituted for herself is reiterated in her incapacity to find the necessary qualities of her ‘right-wing woman’. Worrying about the future of her gang if she dies and stating that ‘in her position’ the ‘smallest error could be fatal’ are also ways in which her subject-position in created and reinforced.

This position of power is grounded in her personal narrative that positions her above other ‘ordinary’ women: “Like so many others, I could have become a victim. But one day I said no to the law of men. It wasn’t easy but I managed to choose my own life. Today I’m a leader of a gang and I defend all victims of injustice: the despised of society, the poor and exploited, victims of extortion, appropriation, arbitrary violence and corrupt officials.” (Berthod 2012, 5) In this statement, Pal constitutes herself as a subject that, unlike many others, is not a ‘victim’ since she managed to ‘choose her own life’. In many ways, it resonates with Foucault’s understanding of freedom as “the possibilities of changing ourselves, our subjectivity, changing the social, cultural, and political conditions and the apparatuses in which we contingently find ourselves” (Milchman and Rosenberg 2011). Yet this practice is necessarily grounded in an opposition to ‘others’ who do not have the ‘possibilities of changing oneself’. In Sampat Pal’s case, she secures her subject position as a parrhesiastic truth-teller through the opposition to those on whose behalf she is speaking fearlessly: ‘the despised of society, the poor and exploited, victims of extortion, appropriation, arbitrary violence and corrupt officials.’ It is interesting to note that Sampat Pal has herself faced many of these situations of injustices. Yet this statement clearly positions herself as not ‘a victim’ but someone who ‘chose her own life’ rather than letting these experiences
define her subjectivity as victimised. She both encourages others to follow her path and recognises the injustices she had to face, while also distancing herself from those ‘other’ women in order to claim the position of a pastoral protector/leader. This complicated dynamic can also be read through colonial logics of protection and Pal’s relation to education.

**Challenging/Reinforcing Colonial Logics of Protection**

In terms of colonial logics of protection, many feminist scholars reproduce the logics highlighted before quite explicitly by comparing the actions of the Gang ‘there’ with similar vigilante actions in the West ‘then’. More specifically, a number of articles on female vigilantism compare the Gulabi Gang with a group called ‘The Regulars’. The Regulars were a group of people in the 1750s in New Jersey, who were reported to dress in women’s clothes, paint their faces and visit the houses of alleged violent husbands. They would strip the abusive culprit and whip him with rods while singing “Woe to the men who beat their wives” (Sen 2012, 2). In these narratives, present-day India comes to stand for New Jersey in the 1750s and the Gulabi Gang is compared to the Regulars in using the same tactics against abusive husbands: “In present-day India, for example, women have literally fought back against abuse, employing tactics similar to the Regulars of the 1750s” (Law 2011, 19). The use of this comparison achieves exactly what postcolonial feminists have denounced by constituting the women in pink saris as the backward past of the West, who ‘literally fought back against abuse’ using tactics that ‘we’ have not had to use since the 1750s. If the members of the Gang are recognised in these narratives as ‘taking protection into their own hands’ and acting as subjects of protection instead of pathetic victims in need of salvation (objects of protection), it nonetheless situates them in a position of temporal and actual inferiority in relation to the West.

Sampat Pal and her gang have also received a number of criticisms and judgments both from Indian and Western feminists that have tended to reproduce colonial logics of protection. More specifically, many discussions have tried to judge the (level of) feminism that Pal and the gang testify. For example, Sampat Pal has been criticised for marrying her own daughters at the age of 12, for often advocating for the return of women to their abusive husbands and families, for having adopted the language of human rights and self-defence in order to gain legitimacy, for having entered the domain of electoral politics, and for using violence as a means to an end.
Without going into each of these assertions in detail, what is interesting to note is how many of these claims often assume a position of moral high ground or superiority similar to that of Spivak’s ‘retreating intellectual’ who constitutes experience as transparent and self-knowing. According to Spivak, this position assumes that the oppressed can and will speak for themselves and that their speech will necessarily be liberatory and serving their ‘true’ interests; in other words, it “essentialises the oppressed as a nonideologically constituted subject” (in Alcoff 1991, 22). Without minimising or dismissing the legitimacy of the critiques addressed to Pal and the Gulabi Gang, it is interesting to note that some of them seem to reproduce the assumptions underlined by Spivak. In fact, perhaps the mere fact of posing a judgment on one’s level of feminism and ethical stance constitute a way to build oneself as the enlightened subject in relation to those ‘other’ vigilante women of the Gulabi Gang.

India’s relation to education through colonial and caste logics of protection also echoes this discussion. In fact, as discussed above, education is central for the caste and de/colonial logics of protection as a site of power-knowledge that holds the key to empowerment for lower caste women. Similarly, Pal argues that education is rooted in logics of protection in that literacy is a way to protect oneself: “An illiterate woman can’t write an official application, she can’t make a claim for land or check what is written on her food ration card by crooked officials. She can be made to sign anything, with no means of protecting herself.” (Berthod 2012, 85) We could argue that by using the Gulabi Gang to offer these women protection but also by giving them means to protect themselves, Pal questions and combats this ‘education logic of protection’ and the hierarchies it involves. Yet she is adamant throughout her biography as well as in many interviews in emphasising her short but significant school attendance in her childhood. To position herself as the protector, she needs to differentiate herself from the ‘illiterate women’ with ‘no means of protecting themselves’ by emphasising her literacy as opposed to these ‘other’ women she is protecting. In her biography, she further relates an incident in which her brother described her as ‘illiterate’ to a foreign journalist: “it was like a dagger in my heart. […] Being reduced in that way to a person with no education reopened an old wound.” (Berthod 2012, 161 emphasis added) Like many other logics of protection, it therefore seems that Sampal Pal contradictorily both challenges and reinforces the status of education in relation to protection and power.
This relation to education and colonial/internal logics of protection is also expressed through Pal’s general mistrust towards men. As she states: “I’m not ready to recruit them as members of my organisation. For one, they are very easy targets for the police during our raids and demonstrations. But more importantly, I don’t trust them. It would take years to educate them!” (Berthod 2012, 151) What is interesting in the way she frames that distrust is that the expressed need to ‘educate them’ constitutes Pal and women in general as the ‘enlightened’, reversing both colonial and masculinist logics of protection which would place ‘Third-World’ women in a subordinate position for their lack of knowledge and education. Yet this reversal is never complete or absolute, mostly because Pal also needs to position herself as separate and above those she protects and the other members of her gang. She thus admits that men are sometimes needed and/or welcome and provide some form of security and protection, but blames it on the ‘other’ women in her gang: “Deep down I know that no one can stop me from doing anything. But it is true that the women in my gang find the presence of men reassuring.” (Berthod 2012, 151) Hence, in order to position herself in the subject position of the protector who speaks truth to power on behalf of others, she also has to position herself as different and above those in whose name she speaks.

Having to accommodate patriarchal realities is thus acknowledged but rejected by outside constraints that do not question/challenge Pal’s own subject-position as the dominant protector: “We need them [men] and not just because their presence affords us at least a minimum safety. In all towns where the Gulabi Gang has a presence, I need trustworthy helpers who can read, write and count to do things like maintaining the local register of members and taking orders for saris. Unfortunately, in my generation only the men have been to school.” (Berthod 2012, 151) As already exposed before, Pal places an important emphasis on her short but significant school attendance as to differentiate herself from the ‘illiterate’ women of her gang. In this last quote, she reproduces that distinction since contrary to the rest of her generation, she has been to school like the men. Yet the power-knowledge claims exposed earlier are not completely overthrown by this quote since men still ‘need to be educated’ (by her), but have had the privilege to attend school (like her) and can thus be strategically used for the gang’s purposes. Pal is thus simultaneously positioning herself above the other women of her generation and equal to men in regards to having attended school, yet still remains the uncontested leader who needs men’s help on her own terms and for administrative purposes only. We could thus say that the subversion of the
masculinist/colonial logics of protection here is complicated further with Pal’s own attempts to constitute herself as a parrhesiastic protector.

We can see how Pal can be seen both as a parrhesiastic truth-teller and a protector. Yet if we are to further explore the implications of parrhesia as a form of ‘speaking for’ that constitute the subject as a truth-teller, we have to look at the ‘others’ and their subject-positions that are simultaneously constructed through this mode of subjectivation/modality of truth-telling.

Conclusion

Hence the case of Sampat Pal and the Gulabi Gang reflects the many ways in which parrhesiastic resistance is imbricated and reproduces power relations while also challenging/resisting/subverting them at the same time. Through a wide range of tactics including vigilantism, street theatre, and the power of numbers/the collective, Pal and her gang challenge logics of protection in India by using any means available for their voices to be heard. Using different techniques of power, including judicial, pastoral and disciplinary ones, Pal/the Gulabi Gang mimics the State while also resisting different social orders. As the unprotectables, their political, judicial, and ethical parrhesia is enacted from outside the institutions of protection but addressed directly to these institutions in ways that both transform and reinforce them. Thus it is a truth-speaking to power that, in a way, ‘wants in’ on the institutions of power/protection or at least is directed towards their reinforcement. We also see that the gang’s positioning as outside such institutions comes with a diversity of tactics aimed at being heard as the subaltern/unprotectables who do not have direct access to the ‘agora.’ In this case, using the power of numbers by mobilising large groups of women, as a way of increasing pressure and protecting oneself/others, is partially what makes their truth-telling possible/heard. Yet this case remains very much centred around the figure of one individual. Can parrhesia ever be a collective/polyphonic form of resistance/truth-telling? And are there practices of parrhesia that are not only enacted from outside the institutions of protection but that also do not ‘want in’ on such institutions?
CHAPTER VII: The Round Dance Revolution: Idle No More, Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Resistance

On November 10 2012, four women, Jessica Gordon, Sylvia McAdams, Nina Wilson and Sheelah McLean, organised a teach-in in Saskatoon, Canada, under the hashtag #IdleNoMore to raise issues about the Omnibus Bill C-45. In the weeks to follow, Canada would experience the biggest Indigenous resurgence/resistance movement since the Oka crisis at the end of the 1990s. From flash-mob round dances in shopping malls and streets, to marches, rallies, protests, hunger strikes and blockades, thousands of Indigenous peoples across Canada heard the call to be #IdleNoMore and, led mostly by Indigenous women and youth, stood up and spoke out. If Indigenous activists were quick to remind the public that they had in fact never been Idle, as will be explored in this chapter, the scope, range and strength of the movement surprised many. Indeed, this latest wave of Indigenous activism/resistance would shake many Canadians’ assumptions and beliefs about Indigenous peoples, but also about their country and themselves. Speaking truth to settler-colonialism’s power, Idle No More was a parrhesiastic movement of resistance articulated around protection of the land that unsettled multiple sets of uncomfortable truths.

To situate and understand this parrhesiastic movement, we have to locate it within the complicated and contradictory logics of protection born out of the history of settler-colonialism in Canada/Turtle Island (the Indigenous name for the territory today covered by Canada and the U.S.). Settler-colonialism is fundamentally a territorial project centred on the accumulation of land that requires the disappearance of Indigenous peoples in order for the settlers to claim the rightful ownership of the land. Settler-colonialism is thus inherently a genocidal project. In Canada, this genocidal logic went from overt physical extermination (through massacres and the voluntary spread of fatal diseases by early colonisers, for example) to policies of assimilation through structures such as reserves, the Indian Act, residential schools (and now the

29 As argued by Patricia Monture: “Aboriginal, Indian, Indigenous, First Nations, and so on, are all terms of colonial imposition. Depending on whom you talk to, any of those names can get you into trouble. There is no “right” choice.” (Monture 2008, 159) Hence this chapter will use all of these terms alternately, trying to stay close to the authors’ preferred choice of words. But readers should note that no terms are “neutral” in English but always of colonial origin.
foster care system) and, some would argue, politics of ‘recognition’ and ‘reconciliation.’ This chapter will thus explore briefly the history and present of Canada’s settler-colonialism, its relation to land and capitalism as well as (hetero)patriarchy, more precisely by exploring the racist, sexist and overall genocidal provisions of the Indian Act and their ongoing consequences. It will also look at Indigenous resistance throughout this history and Indigenous women’s resistance to the Indian Act in particular, before proceeding to explore how this story is framed through complicated and contradictory logics of protection placing Indigenous peoples, and women in particular, in the position of the unprotectable and un/protected, but also as protectors.

It is through this contextual background that Idle No More will then be positioned as a parrhesiastic movement that spoke multiple sets of uncomfortable truths to Settler-Canadians about Canada and Indigeneity, but also to Indigenous peoples themselves. In fact, by speaking fearlessly not only about Canada’s abusive relationship towards First Nations, but also about their own traditions, cultures, beliefs, and modes of governance, Indigenous nations across Canada were speaking truth both to Canadians and to themselves. Hence through a variety of techniques of resistance, Indigenous women and other Indigenous activists within Idle No More reclaimed their position as protectors, opening up new modes of subjectivation grounded in Indigenous modes of governance, and spoke fearless truth to Canada’s ongoing imperial/colonial power over Indigenous communities and lands. Through political, judicial and, mostly, ethical modalities of parrhesia, the movement thus challenged Canada’s dominant logics of protection in relation to Indigenous nations.

Before we start, it is important to note that there are over six hundred different Indigenous communities living on the territory of Canada from many different nations. Which implies that the diversity within First Nations is extremely rich and varied: if these nations share some beliefs and epistemologies and are united through their shared experiences of oppression under Canada’s settler-colonialism, each community possesses its own culture, traditions, and history. This diversity of perspectives is exemplified by the many debates and tensions within Indigenous movements, including Idle No More, on what should constitute priorities for Indigenous self-determination struggles. The scope of this chapter does not allow us to do justice to such a wide diversity of perspectives and explore these divisions in more detail, but it is important to
remember that what is presented here is a summary of many different viewpoints, experiences and opinions that do not all harmoniously fit together.

Settler Colonialism in Canada

“In this unending colony the truth stood naked, but the settlers preferred it hidden away or at least dressed: the Natives had to love them and all they had done, something in the way a cruel father is still loved by the children who are wounded by his selfish hands.” (Alfred 2014, ix)

Other chapters have explored the gendered, sexualised, and racialised logics of protection underlying colonialism in different contexts. While the Canadian case offers some similarities with these other colonial projects, it also differs in one major way: Canada is a case of settler-colonialism that necessarily marks power relations, bodies, and violence in a particular way. Historically, the process of ‘settling in’ has demanded a different relationship to the colonised and to the territory than in other imperial/colonial projects, therefore leading to/requiring different strategies of exploitation and domination. Moreover, the main point raised by many Native scholars and activists about settler-colonialism is that it is an on-going project that cannot be situated in the past. Despite many people’s beliefs, colonialism has not been ‘settled’ (as in finished, completed, or overcome) in Canada. It may take ‘softer’ or ‘subtler’ forms in contemporary politics but the project to assimilate Indigenous peoples and exploit their traditional territories and resources is far from over.

Settler Colonialism, Capitalism and the Land

As Audra Simpson defines in her book on Mohawks’ resistance in Kahnawà:ke:

[…] settler colonialism is defined by a territorial project—the accumulation of land—whose seemingly singular focus differentiates it from other forms of colonialism. Although the settler variety is acquisitive, unlike other colonialisms, it is not labour but territory that it seeks. Because “Indigenous” peoples are tied to the desired territories, they must be “eliminated”; in a settler-colonial model, “the settler never leaves.” Their need for a permanent place to settle propels the process that Wolfe calls, starkly, “elimination.” (A. Simpson 2014, 19)

As exposed in this definition, what differentiates settler-colonialism from other forms of colonisation is its inherent reliance on the disappearance of Natives from the conquered territory in order for settlers to establish themselves as the ‘true’ inhabitants of the land. In order to claim legitimacy over this land, the settlement of Europeans in Turtle Island was founded on the idea of terra nullius (virgin land). This image is still
ingrained in today’s imaginaries and narratives about Canada’s history (think, for example, of claims that Columbus ‘discovered’ the Americas) that portray the territory as empty and free to be claimed and exploited. Therefore, in order to be legitimately occupied and exploited, Natives must be erased from the land. Hence, settler-colonialism is inherently a genocidal project. As Andrea Smith argues: “Native peoples are entrapped in a logic of genocidal appropriation. This logic holds that indigenous peoples must disappear. In fact, they must *always* be disappearing, to allow nonindigenous people’s rightful claim over this land.” (Smith 2010, 53) Settler-colonialism thus relies on narratives of, and actual, genocide of Native people in order to ground the legitimacy of their existence on the land. In other words, “Colonial wealth is based on land, colonial power is based on land and, even more pivotally, the very legitimacy of settlers is based on their erasure of Indigenous peoples to lay claim to ‘virgin’ land, *terra nullius*.” (Ritskes 2014, 259)

This myth therefore relies on the symbolic and actual erasure of Native peoples, but it also constitutes a mode of exploitation rooted in capitalism that is greatly at odds with Indigenous spiritualities, practices, and beliefs. In fact, Indigenous spiritualities are land-based (Smith 2005a, 121), meaning that they are rooted in a deep reciprocity between humans, nonhumans, and the earth and cannot be disconnected from the specific land they are based upon. As stated by Vanessa Amanda Watts, humans and non-humans alike have agency and can ‘negotiate and participate in governance’ and “these worlds and their capacities for agency are delineated by territory. Our agency, as humans and non-humans, is actively affected by where we come from and the territories that we traditionally occupy.” (Watts 2016, 3) Therefore, the land is not seen as something to subdue and exploit but as a “system of reciprocal relations and obligations” that demands that we “[live] our lives in relation to one another and the natural world in nondominating and nonexploitative terms” (Coulthard 2014, 13). Watts further argues that for most indigenous peoples, “our truth […] conceives that we (humans) are made from the land; our flesh is literally an extension of soil.” (Watts 2016, 45) Thus for many Indigenous peoples, it is inconceivable to exploit and/or sell the land as the relationship between peoples and the land is one of stewardship rather

Andrea Smith is a controversial figure within Native studies for her claims to be of Cherokee origins, claims that have been disproved many times in the past by Indigenous communities who called her out for lying about her origins. Yet, her work on sexual violence as a tool of genocide against Native peoples in the U.S. context (in particular ‘Conquest’, Smith 2005a) has been foundational and continues to be very influential for Feminist Native Studies. For a glimpse at the controversy, see: https://moontimewarrior.com/2015/07/01/no-andrea-smith-is-not-the-native-american-rachel-dolezal/
than ownership (McCarthy 2016), one that cannot be encompassed by a liberal rights framework grounded in ownership, private property and property rights. As narrated by Anishnaabe elder Fred Keller:

Wherein Euro-Canadians talk about property rights we talk about territory. It is the closest relationship. And it’s the relationship to Mother Earth. So therefore if you understand Sacred Law and the Great Law, that you are an integral part of Grandmother Earth, then is it conceivable that you could sell her? Firstly, to sell her is tantamount to selling yourself. Can you do that? Not under Great Law, not under Sacred Law. So therefore, you can’t sell your Grandmother. It’s just not allowed. Let me put it another way - it’s unconstitutional. It’s against the law - it’s illegal. So under Indigenous law it is not possible to sell any part of Grandmother Earth, because we have a sacred relationship to her. You are a part of that. (Fred Keller, cited in Watts 2016, 44)

Hence the humans, non-humans and land/territory are implicated in a deep relationship according to Indigenous cosmologies that is completely at odds with capitalist and liberal modes of governance and of relating to the territory and the land. This relationship is also profoundly gendered since land is understood as female, as the ‘First Woman’ (Watts 2016, 45). This is why, as we will see below, violence against Indigenous women and violence against the land cannot be disconnected.

Canada’s wealth has been built mostly on exploiting natural resources and thus, as Native scholar Taiaiake Alfred would put it, on “a predatory economy that is entirely at odds with the deep reciprocity that forms the cultural core of many Indigenous peoples’ relationships with land” (Alfred 2008, 171). Not only were Native peoples erased from the imagined land claimed by settlers, but their resistance against the exploitation of its resources stood in the way of colonial power and wealth. Hence most of Canada’s wealth would have not been possible to accumulate without the exploitation of Indigenous labour and territories, while Native resistance to it has also shaped Canada’s economic history: “Indigenous peoples’ labour and lands have shaped the political economy of Canada, from the time of the fur trade to bankrolling industrialisation with their lands and resources and today, by confronting neoliberal policy in the form of continental restructuring and intensified resource grabs.” (Pasternak 2014, 42)

First Nations’ relationship with the land stood/stands in the way of settlers’ capitalist ambitions, justifying the genocidal logic that ensued/s. Many argue that this has not changed and is actually at the core of colonialism’s continuing existence. As argued by Andrea Smith: “without wanting to fashion too simplistic a dualism, I would
suggest that the primary reason for the continuing genocide of Native peoples has less to do with ignorance and more to do with material conditions. Non-Indians continue to oppress Indians because Indians occupy land resources that the dominant society wants.” (Smith 2005a, 121) By extension, this means that Indigenous peoples remain and will remain the target of settlers’ state violence “as long as they continue to stand in the way of theft of Native land.” (Smith 2005a, 69)

**Settler-Colonialism and (Hetero)Patriarchy**

Secondly, to understand settler colonialism in Canada, we must also look at its relationship with (hetero)patriarchy. As exposed previously, colonialism is inherently gendered and sexualised. We will see below how sexual violence was used in the North American context as a tool of genocide and how it turned indigenous peoples as a whole, and indigenous women in particular, into the dehumanised unprotectables whose lives are unworthy of protection. But the specificity of the Canadian context also lies in the fact that, before the arrival of the Europeans, many scholars argue that most Indigenous communities were not inherently patriarchal. Native feminist scholars argue that, if men and women were seen as fundamentally different and had specific roles and responsibilities within the community (‘separate but equal’ status), women used to occupy leadership positions, both political and spiritual; lineage was matrilineal and matrilocal; sexual, domestic and physical violence were not unheard of but were considered serious crimes; and two-spirited individuals were seen as a pride and privilege for the family (Gunn Allen 1986a; Smith 2010, 2005a; Barker 2006). Moreover, modes of governance and leadership within most Native communities were not particularly hierarchical.

The work of Paula Gunn Allen explores the ways in which enforcing (hetero)patriarchy on Native communities was central to the settlers’ colonial strategy. She argues that colonisers understood that if they wanted to subjugate Indigenous nations, they would have to subjugate their women. Looking at the encounter between the Jesuits and a Montagnais community in Canada, Gunn Allen relates how in order to submit the Montagnais and turn them into ‘civilised people’, the Jesuit settlers had to “convince both men and women that a woman’s proper place was under the authority of her husband and that a man’s proper place was under the authority of the priests.” (Gunn Allen 1986a, 38) Thus, as Andrea Smith further argues, “in order to colonise a people whose society was not hierarchical, colonisers must first naturalise hierarchy
through instituting patriarchy.” (Smith 2005a, 23) This was best achieved through patriarchal violence used to ‘impart’ hierarchy and domination, and through the system of residential schools, as will be explored below, but also through the gendered education focusing on domestic skills for Native girls. Still according to Smith, “the primary role of this education for Indian girls was to inculcate patriarchal norms into Native communities so that women would lose their place of leadership in Native communities.” (Smith 2005a, 37) So not only would colonialism dehumanise Indigenous peoples and women through sexual violence and other gendered and sexualised means, but patriarchy as a value and a system also had to be forced upon these communities in order to enforce the value of hierarchy, a necessary step for ‘assimilation’ to succeed, to turn ‘Savages’ into ‘civilised people’. This would be imposed through successive colonial institutions and structures of power. As summarised by Joyce Green: “Colonial institutions, including the Indian Act, the church run schools and then the provincial education system, and mainstream popular culture, taught generations of indigenous youth to incorporate colonial norms, one of the most fundamental of which is patriarchy.” (Green 2001, 725)

Many scholars argue that the main manifestation of this naturalisation is the internalisation of sexism within Indigenous communities. Despite some claims by Indigenous men and women to the contrary, some feminist activists assert that sexism is now not only “a residue of the colonial past but an agent of social relationship today.” (Barker 2006, 149) As mentioned before, colonialism was imposed partially by instituting (hetero)patriarchy. Hence as Anishinaabe scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson argues:

> It is not enough for us to say “patriarchy was not part of our traditions” because the pervasive and insidious nature of heteropatriarchy means that for hundreds of years Indigenous children have been taught to uphold these systems. Thanks to imperialism and conquest, heteropatriarchy is a worldwide phenomenon. It is impossible for Indigenous communities to be immune from it. (L. B. Simpson n.d.)

What this means is that heteropatriarchy cannot only be located within the colonisers, as an outside force from which Indigenous communities would have somewhat been immune, and thus that any return to traditional Indigenous modes of governance and relationships would make it disappear. It means that struggles against sexism and heteropatriarchy cannot be limited to issues such as the Indian Act or violence against
women outside communities because heteropatriarchy is now also found within the communities themselves. As Leanne B. Simpson furthers argues:

Discussion around gender are often centred around either violence against women, or gender inequality in the Indian Act—both worthy causes, but the discussion cannot end here. I see the expression of heteropatriarchy in our communities all the time—with the perpetuation of rigid (colonial) gender roles, [...] the lack of recognition for women and LGBQ2’s voices, experiences, contributions and leadership, and narrow interpretations of tradition used to control the contributions of women in ceremony, politics and leadership, to name just a few. (L. B. Simpson n.d.)

Yet many deny that sexism is an important issue to address within Indigenous communities and movements. They either claim that it will automatically disappear with decolonisation since it is not traditionally Indigenous, or that attempts to confront sexism should wait ‘after’ self-determination has been achieved and survival has been secured. These claims rely on and reinforce the belief that issues of Indigenous self-determination and women’s rights are mutually exclusive and politically opposite.

Therefore, we can see how settler colonialism, in order to ‘succeed’ in its attempt to assimilate/eliminate Indigenous nations relied in particular on two systems of oppression to achieve its aims: capitalism and patriarchy. These two systems were fundamentally antagonistic to indigenous traditional spiritualties, relationships and modes of governance. They also intersected through sexual violence. The work of Andrea Smith in particular has explored how white settlers used sexual violence as a tool of genocide. She argues that we must understand sexual violence not only as a tool of patriarchy but also as a tool of colonialism and racism from which whole communities are thus victim. In other words, we cannot disconnect the issues of gender, race and colonial oppression when sexual violence is committed against Indigenous women (Smith 2005a, 8). Smith contends that settler colonisers use(d) sexual violence as a way to dehumanise Native people, to destroy their sense of self, and mark them as inherently ‘rapable’: “sexual violence is a tool by which certain peoples become marked as inherently ‘rapable’. These peoples then are violated, not only through direct or sexual assault, but through a wide variety of state policies, ranging from environmental racism to sterilisation abuse.” (Smith 2005a, 3) The bodies of Native peoples were also depicted in the colonial imagination as inherently ‘dirty’, impure and polluted by sexual sin, which is partly how they were rendered inherently ‘rapable’ because “the rape of bodies that are considered inherently impure or dirty simply does not count” (Smith 2005a, 10).
By extension, Smith argues, Native lands are also seen as inherently violable (Smith 2005a, 12). Hence sexual violence not only marked whole peoples as ‘rapable’ but also made their lands inherently violable. Understanding sexual violence that way highlights its centrality as a genocidal tool for settler colonialism and how capitalist exploitation through land theft and cultural genocide were both achieved through colonial sexual violence that targeted Indigenous women in particular as the symbol of Indigenous survival. As Smith summarises: “the goal of colonialism is not just to kill colonised people but to destroy their sense of being people. It is through sexual violence that a colonising group attempts to render a colonised peoples inherently rapable, their lands inherently invadable, and their resources inherently extractable.” (Smith 2010, 61)

Tools of Genocide: Residential Schools and the Indian Act

The residential schools, along with the Indian Act, were the two pillars of Canada’s assimilation policy. In order for assimilation to succeed, children had to be taken away from their communities and properly ‘civilised’ under the strict control of religious authorities in residential schools across the country. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada estimates that over a hundred and fifty thousands children were put in residential schools whose main explicit goal was to break their ties to their culture and identity (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, n.d., 3). The Commission was set up to investigate allegations of abuse from many alumni and uncovered the widespread use of neglect, sexual violence, physical abuse and other forms of torture, some of which have led to thousands of deaths of Native children buried in unmarked common graves on many of these schools’ sites (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, n.d.). It is for a large part through these residential schools that whole Native communities were made to ‘disappear or assimilate’ and constructed as ‘inherently rapable’.31

Parallel to this system of dehumanisation through sexual violence and demonisation exemplified partly by the residential schools system, Canada’s settler colonialism and assimilation/cultural genocide of Indigenous peoples were also achieved through legal means. As such, the Indian Act as a colonial institution is a telling example of the ways in which land dispossession and imposition of patriarchy were achieved in Canada. The Indian Act is a body of laws adopted in 1876 that has

31 For more information on the residential schools, the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission makes for a gruesome but necessary read and can be found online: http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/index.php?p=905
since then regulated every aspect of Indian life in Canada. It established the system of reserves (small pockets of territories assigned for self-government to certain recognised Indians), band governments (with limited rights to self-determination over these territories) and crystallised the legal category of ‘status Indian’ and rules determining to whom it would be accorded or withdrawn (under what circumstances one could lose its status). In short, it intended to regulate and administer every aspect of Indian life under the control and governance of the settler society, albeit promoting notions of ‘self-government’ on reserves. This notion of self-government was not coincidental. Joyce Green asserts that the term ‘self-government’ in the Indian Act constitutes a reconceptualisation by Canada of the right to self-determination that has been at the core of Indigenous resistance to colonial domination from the first encounter with Europeans. In the Act, it seems that ‘self-government’ has reduced the notion of self-determination to a point where it “in practice appears to mean self-administration by status Indian bands of limited powers on reserves lands.” (Green 2001, 722) In fact, under the Indian Act the Canadian government could veto and override band councils’ decisions and depose its leaders (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, n.d., 2). This limited political autonomy also only applies to a minority and spatially circumscribed portion of the Indigenous population. Through the creation of ‘status Indian’ as a legal category, the settler society was thus able to “create the fiction of a Native person who was by law no longer Native, whose offspring could be considered white.” (Lawrence 2003, 8) This divide-and-conquer strategy would recognise rights and responsibilities over the land (circumscribed to the reserve territories) of only a fraction of ‘status’ Indians living on reserves, to the detriment of non-status and/or off-reserves Indians as well as Métis (‘mixed-blood’) peoples. The Act also outlawed a number of Aboriginal spiritual and cultural practices. Hence the Indian Act “was designed with the explicit intent of assimilating Indians into Canadian society as hard-working, tax-paying, Christian citizens.” (Lawrence 2003, 131) Therefore, according to

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32 Who would be recognised as ‘Indian’ under the Law and be entitled to the exemptions and obligations it determined.
33 Note that the Indian Act is different and independent from the many Treaties signed before and after the establishment of the Act itself between the Crown and different Indigenous nations, recognising (some) Aboriginal Titles over the land and establishing a nation-to-nation relationship between Canada and Indigenous nations.
34 Métis usually refers to communities in Manitoba and Saskatchewan descending from Louis Riel and other Métis people. If, at first, it referred to individuals of mixed ancestry between Indigenous and white settlers, it no longer refers to anyone with mixed origins but rather to those with historic ties to the original Métis communities.
Kathleen Jamieson, the Act “was never intended to be more than an administrative device reflecting succeeding government policy which had one unifying thread—the goal of eventually phasing out Indian status by assimilation.” (Jamieson 1979, 168)

But the Indian Act is also infamous for the crystallisation of sexist provisions that predated the act itself but were incorporated into it and were only repealed after long-fought legal battles by Indigenous women in 1985. Indeed, the 1869 Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians established for the first time the legal category of ‘status’ and ‘non-status’ Indians and stipulated that Indian women marrying white and/or non-status men would automatically lose their Indian status, including the rights and benefits that came with band membership such as the rights to reside, own property, or be buried on reserve. Their children would also be automatically ‘disenfranchised’ (Lawrence 2003, 7). This 1869 Act also denied Indian women the right to vote in band government elections (they would recover that right only in 1951), participate in formal band politics or receive inheritances from their husbands. (Coulthard 2014, 84) It also established that women whose husbands were disenfranchised (Indian men would irrevocably lose their status and be considered ‘assimilated’ if they served in the Canadian military or were educated in a public school (Barker 2006, 131)) would automatically lose their status as well as their children’s. An earlier Act had also clearly established patrilineal descent in the recognition of ‘Indian-ness’, (Coulthard 2014, 84) in contradiction with traditional Indigenous practices.

In short, the Indian Act, “as with all assimilation policies, was based on an inherently racist and sexist assumption that Indian governance, epistemologies and beliefs, and gender roles were irrelevant and invalid, even dangerous impediments to progress.” (Barker 2006, 131) As such, the Act was a way to officialise/bureaucratise the imposition of (hetero)patriarchy and formal hierarchy as well as land dispossession, with the ultimate aim of assimilating Indian peoples into oblivion. This legal strategy rendered thousands of Indian ‘unrecognised’ and disenfranchised. As Bonita Lawrence underlines: “Taking into account that for every woman who lost status and for the most part were permanently alienated from Native culture, the scale of cultural genocide caused by gender discrimination becomes massive.” (Lawrence 2003, 9) Hence the assimilation and cultural genocide of Indigenous nations were rendered possible, in part, through the sexist creation of legal ‘rights’ and boundaries of inclusion/exclusion disproportionately targeting Indigenous women who had to pay particularly high a price for settler colonialism. As Johanne Barker argues:
Although there was certainly much violence and discrimination directed at Indian men within Canada, the social roles and responsibilities of heterosexual Indian men within bands and on the reserves was systematically elevated over that of women and nonheterosexuals by the institutions of Christianity, capitalism, sexism, and homophobia. The Indian Act’s provisions for status encapsulated this social formation. (Barker 2006, 133)

Yet it would be misguided to understand the Indian Act only as a set of legal policies that can be easily rejected and opposed. First, because in determining the category of ‘status’ Indian, it created a legal category that would define and circumscribe recognised Indigenous identity, and in confining those recognised as status Indians into secluded spaces (the reserves), it enclosed this identity spatially. The Indian Act thus had a major impact on peoples’ individual and collective sense of self and led to deeply internalised ways of understanding Indigenous identity: “Bodies of law defining and controlling Indianness have for years distorted and disrupted older Indigenous ways of identifying the self in relation not only to collective identity but also to the land.” (Lawrence 2003, 4) But the act also had the effect of, while restricting and redefining Indian identity, protecting such an identity by fixing its meaning in a context of extreme politics of assimilation and elimination: “the apartheid nature of Canadian life and the rigid controls over Native life exerted through the Indian Act allowed for a fairly cohesive sense of native identity as a highly distinct, and for the most part reserve-based phenomenon.” (Lawrence 2003, 21) Hence Indigenous peoples were not just ‘brainwashed’ into accepting the Indian Act and its impact on their collective identity (nor did they passively accept such changes as will be developed in the section on Indigenous resistance): it also provided real tangible benefits and increased chances of insuring their cultural survival (Lawrence 2003, 12). As homelands of sort, reserves were indeed the only portions of territory upon which Indigenous communities could have some control and exercise some form of circumscribed yet recognised sovereignty and thus protect their culture, traditions and identity.

Indigenous (Women’s) Resistance

From the beginning of the colonisation, Native peoples have resisted colonialism, the encroachment of their lands and assimilation/extermination attempts by successive Canadian governments. This resistance has taken multiple forms centred on their constantly reaffirmed right to self-determination, sovereignty and titles over land secured by multiple treaties with the British Crown. This chapter does not allow for a full historical overview of this resistance but we can not understand the context from
which Idle No More emerged without raising a few watershed moments of Indigenous, and Indigenous women in particular, resistance and activism in Canada’s recent history.

The first event that has shaped Native activism was the 1969 White Paper, a policy document proposed to Parliament by the Trudeau’s government that was the latest attempt to get rid of the ‘Indian Problem’ and assimilate Indigenous nations once and for all. It proposed to abolish all previous legislature regarding Indians (including the Indian Act and the treaties) and assimilate them fully into the Canadian state. The widespread First Nations’ opposition, backlash, and sustained resistance to the White Paper led to its withdrawal a year later. This backlash can also be seen as a good illustration of the ambivalent reaction towards the Indian Act: Indigenous peoples fought for it to be maintained as an expression of their sovereignty in opposition to the proposed alternative of complete assimilation with no legal protection for their rights and culture.

Yet the Native activism born out of this resistance did not stop there and a few years later, Aboriginal title and treaty rights were partially recognized by the Supreme Court decision in the Calder v. British Columbia in 1973 (Coulthard 2014, 4). Meanwhile, the oil crisis in the nineteen seventies led to an aggressive push by the state and industries to exploit Canada’s natural resources on Indians’ ancestral territories. The constitutional negotiations during the seventies and eighties (particularly the Meech Lake Accord of 1982) also fuelled the growing Native resistance. This activism escalated throughout the eighties with many blockades, marches, rallies and occupations, culminating in the Oka crisis in 1990. The Mohawk people of Kanehsatà:ke near the town of Oka, Quebec, had blockaded a road in protest against the construction of a golf course on their traditional sacred land, including on a traditional burial site. The situation escalated into armed resistance in the following weeks and involved the Quebec Security Police and the Canadian military. The crisis’ aftermath led to the launch of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Affairs in 1991, which came up with a twenty-year agenda for implementing change. The main conclusion of the Commission’s Report was that, in short, “the main policy direction, pursued for more than 150 years, first by colonial then by Canadian governments, has been wrong.” (“Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples - Volume 1 (1996)” 2016, p.x)

It is in this context that we have to ground Indigenous women’s activism and resistance to the Indian Act. While an inherent part of the wider movements of
Indigenous resistance, Indigenous women were excluded from participating in most negotiations with the Canadian government throughout the seventies and eighties, and were generally excluded from meaningful political participation within national Aboriginal associations such as the Nation Indian Brotherhood (that later became the Assembly of First Nations) (Jamieson 1979). Yet women were active in all movements of resistance and soon developed their own activist organisations and raised issues around their interests and specific rights. Throughout the seventies and eighties, Indigenous women’s activism resulted in three foundational legal cases that challenged the sexist provisions of the *Indian Act*: Lavell v. Canada in 1971; Bédard v. Isaac in 1972; and Lovelace v. Canada in 1981. (Coulthard 2014, 85) Without going into the detail of each case, the women in the first two cases were claiming that the *Indian Act* was discriminatory against Native women for alleging that Indian women marrying non-Indian men lose their status while the same did not apply to Indian men, and was thus against the Canadian Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court decisions rejected both women’s claims. In fact, according to the judgments, by becoming ‘disenfranchised’ through marrying non-status-Indian men, Indigenous women were ‘gaining’ full Canadian citizenship, resulting in full equality with other Canadian women, hence were not discriminated against. (Coulthard 2014; Barker 2006; Jamieson 1979) The third case was launched by Sandra Lovelace, a Maliseet woman who had married a non-Status man from whom she later separated, and was refused housing after returning on her reserve in Tobique, New Brunswick. She decided to plead her case in front of the United Nations Human Rights Committee who ruled in her favour and forced Canada to change the sexist provisions within the *Indian Act*. The result has been that from 1985 onwards, all women discriminated against in the *Indian Act* and their children could ask for their status to be reinstated, not without tensions with band councils, as will be elaborated below.

**Ongoing legacies**

The colonial structures and institutions such as sexual violence, the *Indian Act*, residential schools and land dispossession/exploitation have of course had catastrophic consequences on Indigenous communities across Canada and left scars and legacies still deeply felt today. More importantly, the ongoing settler-colonial relationship between Canada and First Nations continues to take its toll on Indigenous peoples.

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35 For more details around the cases and Indigenous women’s legal activism, see Barker, 2006.
across the land. Yet Indigenous nations and their cultures have survived, and are surviving. Recognising that resilience is not only a way of honouring the vitality and strength of Indigenous resistance but also a sign of the failure of settler colonialism to achieve its goal: the disappearance of Native peoples from Native lands. As Audra Simpson argues, enduring Indigenous resistance highlights “colonialism’s ongoing existence and simultaneous failure. Colonialism survives in a settler form. In this form, it fails at what it is supposed to do: eliminate Indigenous people; take their land; absorb them into a white, property-owning body politic.” (A. Simpson 2014, 7) Hence any account of contemporary Indigenous politics needs to find a balance between these two realities: Indigenous ongoing resistance, and the legacies and enduring reality of settler colonialism.

A full overview of the legacies and consequences of centuries of settler colonialism and assimilation policies is beyond the scope of this chapter and has been exposed many times before, including in the RCAA’s report. As summarised by the Commission:

Aboriginal people in Canada endure ill health, insufficient and unsafe housing, polluted water supplies, inadequate education, poverty and family breakdown at levels usually associated with impoverished developing countries. The persistence of such social conditions in this country—which is judged by many to be the best place in the world to live—constitutes an embarrassment to Canadians, an assault on the self-esteem of Aboriginal people and a challenge to policy makers. (“Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples - Volume 1 (1996)” n.d.)

Yet many of these consequences are not only the result of past abuses but of the ongoing colonial structures still in place between Indigenous nations and Canada today.

For example, it is clear that the systems of residential schools have had impacts on communities, one of which is the internalisation of sexual and other forms of gender violence within Indigenous communities that we will explore more deeply below. These communities are also struggling with many other social and interpersonal issues as a direct result of this system, from substance abuse and alcoholism, to alarming rates of suicide, to child abuse, but they also have to face the impact these systems have had on their cultural practices and identity. As stated by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Affairs, the residential schools, on top of the consequences caused by widespread physical, mental and sexual abuses, have had deep cultural impacts including: “the loss of traditional ways of being on the land, the loss of parenting skills through the absence of four or five generations of children from Native communities, and the learned

Yet many argue that child welfare services are reproducing the same practice of abducting Native children from their homes to ‘civilise’ them by placing them in (white settler families) foster care instead (Smith 2005a, 42). In fact, the National Household survey conducted in 2011 revealed that 48% of the thirty thousand children and youth placed in foster care across Canada are Aboriginal, while the total Aboriginal population makes up only 4.3% of the population. (Aboriginal Children in Care Working Group 2015, 7) The root causes of this large proportion of placements include culturally insensitive norms for placement from child welfare services to plain racism; systemic poverty leading to poor housing conditions and alimentation; neglect due to substance abuse and domestic violence; all of which can be traced back to settler colonialism and its impact. Hence for many Indigenous activists and communities, this is one of the ongoing manifestations of settler colonialism since placing children in settler families is seen as another way to assimilate Indigenous populations, in continuity with the boarding school system.

**Settler Colonialism’s Logics of Protection**

Understood through the framework of logics of protection, it thus implies that Native peoples were constructed through colonialism in general, and colonial sexual violence in particular, as the unprotectables, the not-fully-human whose lives do not count and are thus not worthy of protecting. But the logics of protection underlying settler colonialism in Canada go beyond the dehumanisation of Native peoples that places them in the position of the unprotectable. Like elsewhere, it also relies on logics placing white men as the ultimate protectors of white women and ‘brown women from brown men’. So, even though Indigenous women were made inherently ‘rapable’, they also occupied the position of the protected in a somewhat twisted logic placing white men in the position of the protectors and Native men as the threat.

In fact, the dehumanisation that occurred through sexual violence relied on depictions of Indigenous peoples in the colonial imaginary as ‘savages’. These depictions, like in other contexts of colonialism, portrayed Indian peoples as uncivilised, animal-like and brutal. Colonisers actually depended on such depictions in order to frame themselves not as the oppressor but as the protectors of ‘savages’, saving them from their backward and brutal societies: “Ironically, while enslaving women’s
bodies, colonisers argued that they were actually somehow freeing Native women from the ‘oppression’ they supposedly faced in Native nations” (Smith 2005a, 23). Yet the first accounts of settlers’ encounters with Indigenous nations lamented women’s influence over their husbands and societies, as well as the absence of physical abuse (see Gunn Allen). In the absence of patriarchy and hierarchy and the overall peacefulness of many Indigenous nations, depictions of brutal savagery in the colonial imaginary became all the more important to justify the ‘civilising’ mission in settlers’ minds, and in white women’s minds especially.36

Indeed, as developed in previous chapters, Ann L. Stoler studied how white women were central to colonising missions as both the protectors of ‘white values’, order and purity, and as the objects of white men’s protection (Ann L. Stoler 1989). In the case of Indigenous nations, white women had to be convinced that Indian men constituted a threat, and that white civilisation was superior in their treatment of women in order for them to play their role in the civilising mission. As argued by Gunn Allen: “It was to the advantage of white men to mislead white women, and themselves, into believing that their treatment of women was superior to the treatment by the men of the group which they considered savage. Had white women discovered that all women were not mistreated, they might have been intolerant of their men’s abusiveness.” (Gunn Allen 1986b, 23) Demonising both Native women and Native men thus had the effect of maintaining white men’s superiority and control over white women. This was achieved through logics of protection by convincing white women that they needed white men to protect them from savages, both in terms of Native men’s brutality and Native societies’ uncivilised nature. In short, the logic pretended that: “Native women can only be free while under the dominion of white men, and both Native and white women have to be protected from Indian men, rather than from white men.” (Smith 2005a, 23)

Another strategy to achieve this goal was to portray Natives not as brutal savages but as permanent children in need of civilisation, thus justifying the ‘civilising’ mission of white settlers and frame their genocidal mission and land grab in benevolent terms. In fact:

Within this colonial imaginary, the Native is an empty signifier that provides the occasion for Europe to remake its corrupt civilisation. Once the European is

36 Andrea Smith researched, for example, how a number of white women made prisoners by Indians were surprised to be treated without sexual violence and to observe the power Native women had within their communities. She claims that many of these women decided to stay in their captors’ communities upon liberation. (Smith 2005a)
remade, the Native is rendered permanently infantile or — as mostly commonly understood — an innocent savage. She cannot mature into adult citizenship, she can only be locked into a permanent state of infancy — degenerate into brutal savagery or disappear into ‘civilisation’. (Smith 2010, 51)

In this scenario, Natives can thus be simultaneously constructed as the unprotectables (since they are always at risk of degenerating into brutal savagery and thus not-quite-fully-human) and as permanent children in need of the protection that can only be afforded by white civilisation through assimilation. But, as Stiehm argues about the protector’s role, it may become draining and the protected thus becomes a nuisance (Stiehm 1982). This is why genocidal logics of disappearance through assimilation and/or violence cohabit with logics of protection placing Natives in the position of the eternally protected. As expressed by a Canadian government official in 1920:

“I want to get rid of the Indian problem. I do not think as a matter of fact, that the country ought to continuously protect a class of people who are able to stand alone… Our objective is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian question, and no Indian Department.” (Campbell Scott 1920)

Here we see quite clearly how the genocidal logic of disappearance through assimilation is co-constructed with logics of protection placing white (male) settlers as the benevolent and patriarchal protectors of Indigenous people as eternal dependents. Growing tired of this ‘white man burden,’ some white settlers pushed for assimilation policies. And Indigenous women bear the heaviest brunt of these policies because of their connection with land and Indigenous political orders and modes of governance.

**Indigenous Women’s Unbearable Position**

Indigenous women were both constructed as the unprotectables and the protecteds through the demonising of Indigenous peoples; and white women were constructed as the protecteds under the protection of white men. But Indigenous women were also built as a threat to colonial orders because of their political positions within their communities. And because what they represented was threatening, they had to be eliminated or subjugated so that Indigenous political orders would disappear. As argued by Audra Simpson about Indian women:

“They were the inverse of the settler colonial woman, they had legally mandated authority and power, and so, they represented an alternative political order to that which was in play or was starting to be in play in the late 19th Century. They embodied and signalled something radically different to Euro Canadian governance and this meant that part of dispossession, and settler possession meant that coercive and modifying sometimes killing power had to target their
bodies. […] So they had to be killed, or, at the very least subjected because what they were signalling or symbolising was a direct threat to settlement.” (A. Simpson 2016, 9)

Standing as a symbol for Indigenous nations as a whole, Indigenous women were thus the targets of coercive and violent strategies meant to make Indigenous modes of governance disappear because of the threat they posed to settler colonial social and political orders. In other words, it is partly because Indigenous women’s position within their communities was a threat to heteropatriarchal modes of governance that they became the target of violence and assimilation policies.

Indigenous women are still very much considered ‘inherently rapable’ and unprotectable within the colonial/patriarchal logics of protection. In Canada, Indigenous women and girls face rampant levels of violence as illustrated by the cases of hundreds, if not thousands, of missing and murdered Indigenous women whose cases are often left uninvestigated and unpunished. The Native Women Association of Canada has created a database of missing and murdered Aboriginal women and girls and concluded that they represent approximately ten percent of all female homicides and Canada while constituting only three percent of the population (National Women’s Association of Canada 2010). In the province of Saskatchewan, 59 percent of cases of missing women and girls are of Aboriginal ancestry and across the country, Aboriginal women are “almost three times more likely to be killed by a stranger than non-Aboriginal women are” (National Women’s Association of Canada 2010). A report entitled Stolen Sisters, released by Amnesty International in 2004, also sounded the alarm on the shocking rates of violence against Indigenous women in Canada. On top of addressing issues of racial discrimination and the factors of vulnerability these women faced due to their social and economic marginalisation resulting from colonialism, the report also raised “the frequent failure of police and the justice system to provide adequate protection to Indigenous women; and evidence that some men are exploiting this vulnerability to specifically target women for acts of extreme brutality.” (Amnesty International 2008)³⁷

³⁷ Two shocking examples of this widespread violence and impunity are illustrated by the case of Robert Pickton who confessed to murdering 49 women near Vancouver in his “piggy farm,” most of whom were Indigenous. He was finally apprehended after years of inaction by local authorities in the face of the disappearance of Indigenous women, which led the police chief of the city, Jim Chu, to issue a public apology. In the same province, the Highway 16 that stretches across British Columbia has been nicknamed ‘the highway of tears’ after at least 18 women, mostly Indigenous, disappeared between Prince Rupert and Prince Georges. (A. Simpson 2016)
So Indian women are still today the unprotectable/abjects of logics of protection that literally make them disappear. This unbearable positioning cannot be disconnected from what they represent in relation to Indigenous lands, political orders and survival. As summarised by Simpson:

Indian women ‘disappear’ because they have been deemed killable, rapeable, expendable. Their bodies have historically been rendered less valuable because of what they are taken to represent: land, reproduction, Indigenous kinship and governance, an alternative to heteropatriarchal and Victorian rules of descent. As such, they suffer disproportionately to other women. Their lives are shorter, they are poorer, less educated, sicker, raped more frequently, and they “disappear.” (A. Simpson 2016, 16)

This positioning of Indigenous women as unprotectable has also been internalised within Indigenous communities, that show high levels of domestic and sexual violence against women and children: “Indian women suffer death rates because of domestic violence twice as high as any other group of women in this country. They are clearly not surviving as long as issues of gender violence go unaddressed.” (Smith 2005b, 121–22) But this represents only a fraction of the violence Indigenous women face at the hands of settler perpetrators but also from state violence, both directly from law enforcement agents and indirectly from the failing to prosecute and act upon assaults against Indigenous women and children.

The *Indian Act* and the Logics of Protection

The *Indian Act* can also be understood through logics of protection. In fact, protection was central to the colonising narrative around the *Indian Act*: it claimed to be protecting Indian culture and identity by assigning to status Indians portions of territories to self-govern. Like most logics of protection, far from establishing an equal relationship between protectors and protecteds, it rather allowed for the normalising and justification of the colonisers’ domination through a narrative of benevolent protection. As stated by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: “The *Indian Act* was a piece of colonial legislation by which, in the name of ‘protection,’ one group of people ruled and controlled another.” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, n.d., 55)

Yet the State’s power to indeed protect or harm makes it function as a racket: by refusing the State’s offered protection, it becomes the main threat to your sovereignty and safety; hence by accepting its colonial ‘protection’, you are indeed safer than if you refuse. Therefore reserves, while being a colonial tool towards assimilation and dispossession, were also the only protected enclaves of Indian identity and sovereignty.
Audra Simpson captures this paradoxical and hypocritical logic by calling reserves “protected spaces of ‘unfreedom’” and argues that: “we need to situate reserves as manifestations of the colonial imperative to disappear Indians as polities, acquire their territory, and then reserve what is left in order to protect and assimilate them into spaces on Crown land held in trust for them.” (A. Simpson 2014, 187) As such, the question of who gets to live on the reserve, to share its resources, that is to say the question of membership and belonging, becomes fundamental for Indigenous politics as it becomes an expression of their sovereignty through its protection from the ‘outside’. Through logics of protection, the Indian Act has, in short, shaped the way people think about who is Native and who gets access to Indian land, and has created in some communities “strongly protectionist attitudes towards preserving Native culture as it is lived on reserves at present, where outsiders may be seen as profoundly threatening to community identity.” (Lawrence 2003, 15) For Indigenous communities, protecting this identity by keeping control over the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion thus becomes core to resisting assimilation and colonialism. For many Indigenous peoples then “to lose control over even a colonially shaped Native identity is to lose the last vestiges of Native distinctiveness, the last defence against the colonising culture that some Native activists refer to as ‘the Predator’.” (Lawrence 2003, 21)

As mentioned earlier, this logic of protection around reserves was built on explicitly sexist provisions meant to erase and assimilate Indigenous peoples by undermining Native women’s power, leadership and belonging to their communities. Simpson, speaking about the Iroquois nations, goes as far as stating that “the move to patrilineal/patriarchal governance in Indian territories was a legal femicide of a sort—but not of fleshy bodies, of political form, as women are the political form of the Iroquois Confederacy.” (A. Simpson 2016, 10) The Indian Act thus relied on an explicitly patriarchal logic of protection “invested in establishing and protecting the status and rights of Indian men over Indian women.” Following this patriarchal logic of protection, Johanne Barker argues that Indian men over time indeed “found the law affirmed, legitimated and protected their expectations” and thus, “though relative to Canadian men they were altogether disenfranchised and discriminated against as Indians, status Indian men found in the Indian Act system a relative position of power to which they came to feel and legally be entitled.” (Barker 2006, 133) This logic has had deep, long-lasting consequences for gender relations within Indigenous communities.
This is why activists also focus on re-claiming women’s leadership and power positions within Indigenous communities by denouncing the patriarchal structures of governance imposed by the Indian Act and other manifestations of patriarchy within their communities. For example, Indigenous feminist scholar Dory Nason calls out the masculinist logics of protection performed by some Indigenous men in relation to missing and murdered Aboriginal women: “I would humbly ask all of us to think about what it means for men, on the one hand, to publicly profess an obligation to ‘protect our women’ and, on the other, to take leadership positions that uphold patriarchal forms of governance or otherwise ignore the contributions and sovereignty of the women, Indigenous and not.” (Nason 2014, 187) In reaction to this quote, Coulthard illustrates the inequality behind such logic of protection by underlying the “symbolic violence of assuming that Indigenous women are ‘ours’ to protect.” (Coulthard 2014, 178)

Indigenous Women as the Unprotected

The women behind the legal cases that challenged and changed the Indian Act and their supporters faced intense criticism and backlash from many within Indigenous communities and political organisations. They were seen as traitorous to their communities and their use of feminist arguments about individual women’s rights was perceived as a confirmation that their struggle was inauthentic and alien to Indian culture. Moreover, they were seen as undermining Indigenous sovereignty struggles. As Barker relates:

Demonising an ideology of rights perceived to be based on selfish individualism and personal entitlement, and damned for being “women’s libbers” out to force bands into compliance with that ideology, the women and their concerns […] were dismissed as embodying all things not only non- but anti-Indian. Indian women’s experiences, perspectives, and political agendas for reform were perceived as not only irrelevant but dangerous to Indian sovereignty movements. (Barker 2006, 127)

As has been the case in other decolonial movements around the world, women’s concerns and struggles have been built against the collective struggle for liberation and self-determination. As Coulthard concludes, the result of this narrative has been “a zero-sum contest pitting the individual human right of Indigenous women to sex equality against the collective human right of indigenous peoples to self-determination” (Coulthard 2014, 91). Presenting sovereignty and women’s rights as political opposites forces the argument that a choice has to be made between the two. The following consequence is that “because gender has been understood to be subordinate to
sovereignty, Indian women have been perceived as putting their own selfish, personal interests before those of the collective.” (Barker 2006, 150) Green also contends that the right claims made by women were sometimes rejected as untraditional, contrary to tradition and ‘unAboriginal’ as well as counter-productive to Indigenous liberation from colonialism (Green 2001, 728). Moreover, the National Indian Brotherhood and the Canadian government, by ignoring women’s concerns and demands for inclusion in the negotiations and talks in the seventies and eighties also made their concerns unprotected by making them appear irrelevant, secondary or only complementary to those of Native men, “as if in the protection of band reserve rights, women are naturally being protected” (Barker 2006, 150).

Both through the Indian Act and through the rejection of women’s right claims by many, Indigenous women were thus positioned as the unprotected within their own communities. The legal struggles around the Indian Act and the membership debates that followed placed women as individuals to whom the protection afforded by band reserve rights and community belonging was withdrawn and subsequently refused by some band leaders. The Indian Act already positioned Native women as the unprotected (to whom protection is withdrawn) by removing their Indian status and the legal, material and cultural (relative) protections that came with it, in cases of intermarriage. But beyond the Act itself, the women who contested its sexist provisions were also rendered unprotected even after membership’s legal protections were reinstated in 1985 onwards because their struggles were pitted against the communities’ self-determination struggles. As such, it is precisely because these women used legal discourses to claim their rights that they did not enjoy the protection afforded to other members of Indigenous nations. Ironically, both the state and band governments used rights discourses when it suited them (Green 2001, 737) yet withdrew protection to women who used similar discourses to frame their own struggles.38 Therefore, many Native feminist activists and scholars denounce such false dichotomy between women’s survival/sovereignty and communities’ survival/sovereignty by arguing that “attacks on

38 However, the intense debates around membership triggered by the reinstatements of women and their children who had lost their status have to be understood as more than the single expression of blatant sexism. Although internalised sexism was certainly part of the problem (Department of Defense 1993), the defence of the sexist provisions in the Indian Act by certain communities has to be understood in a more nuanced way: these debates express deeper concerns around preserving Indian identity against very real attempts to make it disappear. As Lawrence argues: “to simply regard this issue as one of sexism ignores how constant colonial incursions into Native spaces generate almost unimaginable levels of violence, which includes, but is not restricted to, sexist oppression.” (Lawrence 2003, 5)
Native women’s status are themselves attacks on Native sovereignty.” (Smith 2005a, 138)

**Indigenous Communities as Protectors**

As stated before, Indigenous peoples’ relationship to the land places them greatly at odds with Canada’s capitalist exploitation of natural resources and land. The logics of colonial/capitalist exploitation that place Indigenous communities/women/lands as unprotectable and expendable mean that most environmental disasters, toxic wastes and overall destruction of nature caused by resource extraction happens to and on Native lands, causing Indigenous peoples to bear the biggest burden of capitalism’s often catastrophic consequences (see Smith 2005a). And since that land is understood to be female, there is a deep relationship not only between all Indigenous peoples and their territories, but women in particular and what they represent in relation to this land. Yet it also means that Indigenous peoples, and Indigenous women in particular have not only occupied the position of the unprotectables, the unprotected and/or the protected but have also been protectors of the land from the start of Europeans’ settlement. They have been consistently, and are still today, fighting to protect the environment and oppose predatory extraction and exploitation of resources, a role that is very well illustrated by Idle No More, as we will see. This is because, as stated before, for Indigenous peoples land has claim to them as much as they have claim to her: “Therefore, we belong to her. In this relationship of belonging arise obligations and responsibilities to ensure her survival, and ultimately, our survival.” (Watts 2016, 3–4) This is thus another aspect of the logics of protection pertaining to Native peoples in Canada: by protecting the land, they are protecting themselves, since one’s survival depends on the other’s, hence protecting the land is a responsibility and an obligation if Indigenous peoples wish to survive and exercise sovereignty.

**Sovereign/Coercive and Pastoral/Governing Powers of Settler Canada’s Logics of Protection**

Here, like in the previous cases of imperial/colonial logics of protection, we see how the coercive power of the sovereign who has the power to ‘let live and make die’, coexists with forms of pastoral/governing and biopower that ‘makes live and lets die’. As argued by Stoler and mentioned in earlier chapters, imperial formations are
fundamentally built upon “appeals to moral uplift, compassionate charity, appreciation of cultural diversity, and protection of ‘brown women and children’ against ‘brown men’,” that are “enabled and enabling of coercive practices.” (Ann Laura Stoler 2006, 133) Rather than seeing pastoral/benevolent forms of power/protection as contradictory to predatory logics of exploitation and coercive power/control, it is may be more useful to see them as two sides of the same coin. In modern Canada, this dual logic is often represented by the liberal discourses of ‘recognition’ and ‘reconciliation’ saturating modern political discourses, coupled with predatory neoliberal economic policies aimed at aggressively extracting resources from the soil amid environmental destruction and Indigenous opposition (the extraction of oil from Tar sands in Alberta is one expression of this), while aiming to situate sovereign/coercive forms of power against Indigenous peoples firmly in the past.

Recent political discourses focusing on recognition and reconciliation rather than overt assimilation policies have in fact contributed to the impression both that settler-colonialism and its overt violence are things from the past and that Canada is now the benevolent/pastoral/governing power it claimed to be from the start. Indigenous scholars and activists have developed substantial literature that challenges such discourses. As argued by Glenn Coulthard:

In settler-colonial contexts such as Canada where there is no formal period marking an explicit transition from an authoritarian past to a democratic present state-sanctioned approaches to reconciliation tend to ideologically fabricate such a transition by narrowly situating the abuses of settler colonisation firmly in the past. In these situations, reconciliation itself becomes temporally framed as the process of individually and collectively overcoming the harmful legacy left in the wake of this past abuse, while leaving the present structure of colonial rule largely unscathed. (Coulthard 2014, 22)

As such, discourses of reconciliation are seen as a way to achieve this artificial transition in order to deny the colonial present. This approach also has for effect of holding Indigenous peoples responsible for their impoverished conditions and struggles, demonising them for ‘clinging’ to the past when raising the issues of ongoing colonialism. (Tseghay 2014, 290) As Audra Simpson puts it: “The settler state is asking to forgive and to forget, with no land back, no justice and no peace.” (A. Simpson 2016, 26) But more than just ignoring the ongoing exploitation of Indigenous lands and resources at the expense of Indigenous peoples and the extremely dire living conditions that ensue, this discourse of ‘reconciliation’ locating coercive/sovereign power in the
past also ignores the ongoing violence of settler colonial policies. As Simpson further contends:

Those good policies and intentions perform a kind of historical reckoning, but through Truth and Reconciliation commissions, discourses of “healing”, Apologies – in general, the performance of empathetic, remorseful, and fleetingly sorrowful states. But states that are built upon violence and still act violently, either at a bureaucratic level, at an economic level […], or through a violent indifference. (A. Simpson 2016)

It also ignores the fact that Indigenous women are still killed at alarming levels. In other words, the settler state was founded on violence and this violence is on-going, not only symbolically but literally, as expressed by the hundreds of Indigenous women’s bodies disappearing today.

Similarly, many Indigenous scholars take issue with current discourses of ‘recognition’ that they see as the continuation of settler-colonial policies that “promise to reproduce the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power” (Coulthard 2014, 4). Described as the “gentler form, perhaps, or at least less corporeally violent way of managing Indians” (A. Simpson 2014, 20) or “a seemingly more conciliatory set of discourses and institutional practices,” (Coulthard 2014, 5) liberal discourses of recognition are seen as little more than a cover-up for a continuing colonial exploitation.

This is why many Native scholars and activists argue that Indigenous’s decolonial resistance and resurgence have to be grounded not only on struggles for nationhood and self-determination that are based on traditional modes of governance and spiritualties (Alfred 2008), but also that any meaningful decolonial movement also has to be anti-capitalist. For many activists then, Indigenous resistance has to reject the State’s neocolonial liberal discourses but should also be firmly against capitalism. In the words of Glen Coulthard, Native struggles “must challenge the relationship between settler colonisation and free-market fundamentalism in ways that refuse to be coopted by scraps of recognition, opportunistic apologies, and the cheap gift of political and economic inclusion. For Indigenous nations to live, capitalism must die. And for capitalism to die, we must actively participate in the construction of Indigenous alternatives to it.” (Coulthard 2014, 173)

**Idle No More: The Resurgence of a Movement**
The Idle No More movement’s beginning months did just this: created acts of visioning for Indigenous people worldwide, and from this created Shki-kiin, a New World. In this New World it is possible to break free from colonial thought and speak what you know is true. In this New World you are able to express yourself culturally in public places, strengthening your own sense of the power of expression and the very beauty and joy of declaring your culture after a history of colonial powers silencing and denying such things. In this New World peoples use their individual and collective strength to protect their children’s futures by acting today, and use their strengths to protect Mother Earth against the powers that wish to destroy her. (Belleau 2014a, 352)

In October 2012, the Harper government introduced the Omnibus Bill C-45 in the Canadian Parliament. The four hundred and fifty seven-page budget bill was proposing drastic changes to many Canadian laws, including the Indian Act, the Fisheries Act, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, and the Navigable Water Act (L. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 389). Without any consultation with Indigenous leaders, the bill was proposing amendments to the Indian Act that would, among other changes, make it easier to lease reserve lands (L. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 389) and was lifting most environmental protections around waterways in Canada, most of which go through Indian reserves and/or are located on Indian territories. It is to sound the alarm on the bill’s many issues that Jessica Gordon posted the first Twitter message using the hashtag #IdleNoMore in early November. A few days later, she, along with three other women (Sylvia McAdams, Nina Wilson and Sheelah McLean) led a ‘teach-in’ entitled Idle No More in Saskatoon to discuss Bill C-45. In the weeks that followed, many more teach-ins were organised across the country using the name Idle No More. The name also spread all over social media through blogs, Facebook and Twitter to a point where, on December 21, a university researcher, Rachael Peterson, reported that the hashtag #IdleNoMore had over thirty-six thousand mentions from sites across North America (L. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 395).

Beyond social media, the movement spilled over onto the streets when, on December 10, an ‘Idle No More’ National Day of Solidarity and Resurgence was held with tens of thousands people participating in rallies and gatherings across the country. The rallies, gatherings and marches would go on throughout the whole winter and beyond. Meanwhile, several leaders and Chiefs from the Assembly of First Nations had attempted to enter Parliament to discuss the bill with the federal government but had been stopped by security on December fourth, and held a rally in reaction on the front steps. That day, Chief Theresa Spence of the Attawapiskat First Nation announced that she would go on hunger strike, which she did on December eleventh on Victoria Island,
in front of Parliament Hill. Consuming only tea, lemon water and fish broth, Chief Spence was requesting a meeting with the Prime Minister and the Governor General David Johnston to discuss treaty violations. She was joined by other Indigenous leaders who also began fasting in solidarity, as well as hundreds of people across Canada who would join for day or weeklong fasts to stand with her over the following weeks. On December fourteenth, Bill C-45 was passed through the Senate and became federal law known as the Jobs and Growth Act, 2012.

The movement continued to grow to include many flash-mob round dances held in malls and on streets across the country, including one that momentarily shot down Canada’s busiest intersection in Toronto. Many blockades were also held, shutting down roads, rails and bridges across Canada, including a rail blockade near Sarnia, Ontario, held by members of Aamjiwnaang First Nation, that lasted for two weeks and led to the criminalisation of one of its leader, Ron Plain. On December twenty-first, a gathering was held on Victoria Island in Ottawa which thousands of peoples had travelled to attend, followed by a march to Parliament Hill. Idle No More rallies and solidarity events were also held over the winter around the world, including in Mexico and New Zealand.

On January fourth, Prime Minister Harper announced that he would host a meeting with Aboriginal leaders on January eleventh to discuss treaty relationship, and aboriginal rights and economic development (L. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 397). The Governor General, however, would not be attending, nor would the Bill C-45 be up for discussion. Chief Spence thus announced that she would not attend the meeting because a representative of the Crown was not going to be attending. Many leaders also boycotted the meeting due to its lack of transparency, exclusivity, and narrow agenda (L. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 400). On January eleventh, the meeting was nevertheless held between Stephen Harper, Shawn Atleo of the Assembly of First Nations and sixteen other leaders. In reaction, an International Day of Action was held under the banner #J11 and rallies and protests were held outside the meeting and on Parliament Hill, but also across the world. Twitter registered fifty-six thousands nine hundred and twenty-four tweets that day using the hashtag #IdleNoMore, its highest level of activity. (L. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 400) On January eighteenth, Stephen Harper made his first public comments on Idle No More, stating: “People have the right in our country to demonstrate and express their points of view peacefully as long as they obey the law, but I think the Canadian population expects everyone will
obey the law in holding such protests.” (L. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 401) Chief Theresa Spence ended her fast on January twenty-third after a brief hospital stay. The movement nevertheless continued with different actions, protests and many more teach-ins held across the country well into the summer and beyond.

What this timeline of events illustrates is that “what had begun in the fall of 2012 as an education campaign designed to inform Canadians about a particularly repugnant and undemocratic piece of legislation had erupted by mid-January 2013 into a full-blown defence of Indigenous land and sovereignty.” (Coulthard 2014, 160) According to Coulthard, “Canada had not seen such a sustained, united and coordinated nationwide mobilisation of Indigenous nations against a legislative assault on our rights since the proposed White Paper of 1969.” (Coulthard 2014, 160)

Although the movement was decentralised and actions sprung independently and simultaneously across the country with different focuses, objectives and time spans, it organised primarily against the Omnibus Bill but soon spread to include other core issues of Indigenous resistance and self-determination. As Hayden King argues, the issues raised by the Bill and addressed by Idle No More included “the move to strip environmental protections from most of this country’s waterways; a lack of consultation on amendments to the Indian Act” but also “the chronic failure to maintain and uphold treaties; the continued refusal to acknowledge the rights of those still without treaties” and “repeated calls for a national inquiry on missing and murdered Aboriginal women” (King 2014, 80). Some actions and activists would focus on one or more of these issues while many did all at once.

**Idle No More as Parrhesiastic Resistance**

>*No amount of hatred, racism, sexism, misconceptions, or stereotypes should act to bring us back to the false safety of silence. Our voices are being heard. And the unwinding from Silence’s strong hold, round and round, our hands entwined with others, was not so hard after all. Let’s move and speak, from the first sound forward. Madwewewin.*

(Belleau 2014b, 181)

Idle No More was fundamentally about truth. In that sense, I argue that the movement can resolutely be understood as an expression of parrhesiastic dissidence and resistance. Many of these truths were directed at Canadians about settler colonialism’s ongoing power and legacies that they would prefer hidden, which also spoke to Canadians about themselves and who they thought they were. But the movement was
also speaking truth to Indigenous communities about themselves. Through the practice of speaking out, the movement was thus also about ‘speaking in’. In short, Idle No More spoke four sets of uncomfortable truths that will be explored in further details below: they challenged the myth that settler-colonialism is located in the past by speaking truth to Canada’s ongoing policies and practices of dispossession, assimilation and death (by neglect or failure to prosecute murder against Indigenous women); it spoke truth to the resilience of Indigenous peoples/women in the face of settler-colonialism and hence to its failure to make them disappear; it spoke truth to Canada’s image of itself as ‘the good guy’ by ‘re-storying’ Canada through the violent and ongoing history/legacy of colonialism and it spoke truth to Indigenous communities themselves about their own internalisation of colonial modes of (patriarchal) governance and sense of self.

Beside its relationship to truth, the movement also relates explicitly to parrhesia through notions of frankness, duty, criticism and danger. In fact, many activists who took part in Idle No More formulated quite clearly the sense of duty that motivated their involvement. As stated by Sylvia McAdam, one of the four women who started the movement: “Needless to say, I was angry and stunned. Fortunately, the other ladies and I connected; we realised we had the same concerns, so we made a decision not to stay silent. We had to reach people.” (McAdam 2014, 66 emphasis added) She also relates how she went with the other women to see the elders within their communities who advise them to follow their own law of ‘Nahtamawasewin’ which means: “to defend for the children, all human children; it’s also a duty to defend for the non-human children from the trees, plants, animals, and others.” (McAdam 2014, 66) We will come back to the implications of this for logics of protection and the connection with the land but what we can conclude from her testimony is the importance of duty behind their parrhesiastic act of speaking out. Other activists similarly expressed a “sense of responsibility to speak out” (L. B. Simpson 2014a, 154) and a strong feeling that something had to be done: “We cannot stand by and watch the devastation of our lands, the contamination of our waters, and the deaths of our young ones. We need to take action and make the change we want to see.” (McMahon 2014a, 138)

Secondly, the notions of frankness and criticism were expressed through the many uncomfortable truths spoken by Idle No More activists, as will be developed
below. But I argue that references to frankness (saying everything without concealing anything) in relation to criticism can also be read through the many references to silence, the move from silence to fearless speech, and the reactions it caused. As expressed by the excerpt at the beginning of this section, overcoming ‘silence’s strong hold’ was core to the movement and many others framed their resistance around this issue of silence: “It is radical to some people when we speak because the silence was so comfortable and easy and quiet, that the soft sounds of our voices creates a humming and drumming along the edges of people’s consciousness and awareness that is unwelcome and troublesome to the colonial comfort zone.” (Belleau 2014b, 181) This last quote also illustrates the notion of criticism inherent to the act of speaking out and how Idle No More can thus be seen as a form of parrhesiastic dissidence: through breaking the silence, through speaking uncomfortable truths to the ‘people’s consciousness and awareness’, the movement challenged the ‘colonial comfort zone’.

Lastly, the notion of danger and, through it, the centrality of courage for Idle No More parrhesiastic truth-telling was expressed in multiple instances and ways throughout the movement. The most obvious example is probably Chief Theresa Spence’s hunger strike through which she risked her life out of a sense of duty to improve her community’s situation. We will come back to the truths she (silently) spoke by fasting, but the fast itself can be seen as an act of dissidence that spoke fearlessly to power and resonated within Indigenous communities who focused on the courage at the centre of her parrhesiastic act: “What I know is that Chief Theresa Spence’s hunger strike has inspired a generation of Indigenous youth to stand up, organise, and speak out. ‘She is prepared to die for us’, one young man explained. Whether or not she is a good chief to her reserve is irrelevant to the fact that she is a courageous and inspired symbol for our people.” (Richard and Gazan 2014, 135) Others who joined her in fasting also demonstrated the danger of speaking out through embodied resistance.

Courage was also central to other activists’ actions. Blockades, for example, involve risks, as they constitute a direct disruption of economic activity that has in the past been quick to call for governmental reaction. As Alfred argues: “If history has shown us anything it is this: if you want those in power to respond swiftly to Indigenous peoples’ political efforts, start by placing Native bodies (with a few logs and tires thrown in for good measure) between settlers and their money” (Alfred 2008, 36). The
example of the Oka crisis being fresh in many memories, those who blockaded roads, rails and bridges were indeed taking risks for their safety and freedom. Indeed, the leader of the Aamjiwnaang nation who blockaded railway tracks, Ron Plain, was the only person to be officially criminalised for his participation in Idle No More. His case was filled with irregularities, misconducts and injustices from law enforcement agents, but finally ended when CN (Canadian National, the country’s main railway company) officials agreed to drop their legal complaints if Plain would sign an agreement stating that he would never block tracks again. To which Plain replied: “If my community decides to block the tracks, I will stand with my community. I can not sign a paper saying that I won’t.” (Cox 2014, 209) This example illustrates not only the individual courage of Ron Plain, but also, by extension, the courage of all the activists who decided to conduct blockades knowing the risks involved for their safety and freedom.

Beyond these more visible and explicit showcases of courage, we could also argue that all activists who openly and actively took part in Idle No More were displaying courage, especially Indigenous women. This claim derives from the logics of protection detailed throughout this chapter placing Indigenous peoples and women in particular in the position of the unprotectables. Considering the incredible amount of violence they encounter in Canada, the act of speaking out necessarily involves courage. A fact that was violently reminded to Indigenous women and activists after a woman from the Nishnawbe-Aski nation in Ontario, ‘Angela Smith’ was abducted and sexually assaulted by two men on December twenty-seventh. The men, during the assault, made references to the Idle No More movement and told her: “You Indians deserve to lose your rights.” (L. Kinonda-niimi Collective 2014, 396) Since settler colonialism depends on the continuous disappearance of Indigenous nations using sexual violence, among other strategies, any public indication that Indigenous peoples have not, in fact, disappeared, puts them, and women in particular, in a particularly dangerous position given their ongoing positioning as the unprotectables whose lives do not really matter. Hence we could argue that courage, risk and danger were at the heart of any action undertaken during Idle No More that would disturb that image and break the silence. Therefore, we can understand Idle No More as a parrhesiastic movement of

39 For more details about his case, see Cox 2014.
40 Not her real name to protect her identity but the name she became known under in the media.
resistance/dissidence because of its relation to truth; duty; frankness and criticism instead of silence; and danger, risk, and thus courage.

Techniques of Parrhesia

The particularity of Idle No More as a movement lies not only in its content but also in its form: “Idle No More adopted a radically decentralised character, having no single individual or group ‘leader’. Instead, communities would join together for different purposes, temporarily or for long-term activism. Events were local, regional and wide-scale. [...] Idle No More [...] was inherently different. It defied orthodox politics.” (T. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 23) What this underlines is basically that one has to look beyond the mere content of the movement’s demands, but look also at its format and what it tells us about the truths it spoke, as well as the logics of protection it unsettled. In fact, Idle No More’s activists used a wide range of strategies in order to be heard/seen in a country that preferred to believe they had all but disappeared. Those included: round dances in public spaces to reaffirm their presence in Canada by using traditional cultural practices that have survived despite assimilation attempts; hunger strikes to use the body as a physical reminder of Canada’s continuing genocide of Indigenous communities; blockades of railways and roads to protest the capitalist accumulation of wealth through exploiting natural resources on Indigenous lands; marches and protests to use the power of numbers to remind Canadians of Indigenous communities’ presence and survival; internet organising to overcome the physical isolation faced by many communities through the system of ‘reserves,’ and more.

While we will explore further what these techniques signified in terms of political, judicial, and ethical modalities of parrhesia, it is worth noting that these diverse parrhesiastic techniques were in and of themselves speaking truth to the ongoing, yet failed, settler-colonial power over Indigenous lives. The flash-mob round dances in shopping malls, for example, were speaking truth to the role played by capitalism over Indigenous dispossession, to the gap between Indigenous and (white) settler-Canadian lives in terms of material conditions, as well as to the ongoing resilience/resistance of Indigenous communities and women in particular whose lives and traditions have not disappeared. As expressed by Jarrett Martineau: “Striking simultaneously at the heart of capitalist consumerism at the height of the holiday shopping season and at the contemporary state of Indigenous absence in the public
imaginary […] Idle No More signalled a collective rejection of colonial abjection and dispossession, a communal return to presence.” (Martineau 2015, 231) The round dances thus “disrupted the quotidian rhythms of the colonial-capitalist status quo by calling attention to asymmetries of power and the irrepressible spirit of Indigenous presence.” (Martineau 2015, 234) The importance of social media was also key to the movement’s success, both in terms of organising and in terms of Indigenous sovereignty because: “This was the first time we had the capacity and technological tools to represent ourselves and our perspectives on the movement and broadcast those voices throughout Canada and the world—we wrote about the movement while it was taking place.” (T. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 25) Hence social media was a way for the movement to control the narrative and retake power over the definitions of the self: “That’s why social media was so critically important. Because we could write and create our own blogs and our own stories, everything was ours and nobody could take it or use it against us.” (King and Kappo 2014, 70) As such, by making themselves visible in numerous ways, by using a diversity of tactics, and through its decentralisation, the movement not only spoke truth to power, but also performed alternative ways to be in a settler-colonial setting relying on Indigenous disappearance.

Political Parrhesia: Speaking Truth to Governing Power

Challenging Canada’s Governing/Coercive Power

Politically then, we can say that Idle No More’s parrhesia was about challenging Canada’s claim to sovereign, disciplinary, and governing power over Indigenous populations. It was resisting and contesting the continued colonial domination and dispossession by Canadian’s authorities over Indigenous lands and communities. It did so in different ways. First, it spoke truth publicly to the ongoing nature of settler colonialism and the dire consequences of its coercive/governing power for Indigenous peoples and, by doing so, it challenged Canada’s image of itself as the ‘good guy’. Hence we could argue that the audience of this parrhesia was not the government itself but rather a national and international public upon which the Canadian government relies to perform its sovereignty. In fact, Canada’s legitimacy and reputation on a national and international level relies in part on a national identity and narrative as ‘the good guy’. By speaking truth to the open secrets of its colonial past and present, Idle No
More was thus challenging the bases upon which Canada’s sovereign/governing power partly relies, while also resisting the attempt to separate the two economies of power.

This challenge posed by Idle No More to Canada’s image of itself to its citizens and to the world deeply connected capitalist predatory modes of governance with coercive/sovereign economies of power that make Indigenous bodies and lands disappear. As Martineau claims: “Idle No More promised an affirmative politics of presence in resistance to the imminent encroachment of death by neglect wrought by the destruction of our lands, waters and air through large-scale, transnational corporate development and resources extraction; and institutionalised forces of colonialism advanced by Settler governments through legislation and policy.” (Martineau 2015, 231) But it also challenged the liberal discourses of ‘reconciliation’, meaning the pastoral/governing modes of Canadian power. Idle No More was in fact “an indication of the ultimate failure of [the] approach to reconciliation. After forty years the subtle lure of Canada’s vacuous gestures of accommodation has begun to lose their political sway.” (Coulthard 2014, 163) To the nation and international public, it was thus showing how, under the guise of “supposedly good policy and good intentions”, (A. Simpson 2016, 4) Canada was still seeking to ‘settle’ the land through Indigenous dispossession and murder. As Simpson puts it:

In spite of those present-day discourses from Canadian political scientists and policy makers that imagine a process of equality through the space afforded to Indigenous political orders as the ‘third order of government’, the evidence suggests that Canada is quite simply, a settler society whose multicultural, liberal and democratic structure and performance of governance seeks an ongoing ‘settling’ of this land. […] This settling thus is not innocent – it is dispossession, the taking of Indigenous lands and it is not over, it is ongoing. It is killing Native women in order to do so and has historically done this to do so. (A. Simpson 2016, 1)

In terms of the parrhesiastic challenge/blackmail, the Idle No More activists were thus challenging the Canadian state to punish them/let them die for their fearless speech and prove to the world that settler-colonial violence and dispossession was not in the past but still ongoing. This parrhesiastic game can thus be expressed as follow: ‘I dare you to punish us/let us die of hunger, ignore our pleas and prove to the World you are the tyrant we know you to be and not the good guy you think you are’. Theresa Spence’s hunger strike, in particular, embodied this parrhesiastic game and, as argued
by Simpson, “were she to have died, her body would have been in fact, the eliminatory logic of the state laid bare, and made all too real.” (A. Simpson 2016, 16–17)

To the settler Canadian public in particular, activists were speaking truth about Canada’s relationship with Indigenous nations, claiming that “the status quo isn’t working.” (Vowel 2014, 310) Many activists also denounced the harmful beliefs, prejudices and wilful ignorance of Canadians towards Indigenous peoples. While doing so, they thus confronted Canadians with uncomfortable truths about their government: “To say that the government treats Aboriginal people well ignores its wilful neglect, and its failure to negotiate in good faith and settle the hundreds of outstanding, now intergenerational, land claims.” (Turner 2014, 122) In that sense, Idle No More reminded “Canadians (yet again), that the federal government has failed to live up to its fiduciary obligations.” (Turner 2014, 123) Another way this strategy was performed by Idle No More was by warning Canadians that Indigenous peoples might be ‘canaries in the coalmine’ of citizenship rights; that is that if the Harper government was ready to violate Indigenous rights with such impunity, there was nothing stopping it from doing the same to other Canadians: “If we overlook one section of the constitution does that mean that others are in similar jeopardy?” (Kinew 2014a, 97) The logic thus went as follow: “If our government do not respect Indigenous and treaty rights, then the very legitimacy of the Canadian state—and thus of all our citizenship rights—is in doubt.” (Denis 2014, 219)

Hence through these examples, Idle No More activists were directly challenging Canadians on the truths of their own democracy’s gaps and failures. For example, when the media and politicians started questioning the integrity of Chief Theresa Spence during her hunger strike and all Indian Chiefs, accusing them of being corrupt and freeloading, the movement responded through Twitter by the launch of the #Ottawapiskat. Using humour “as a weapon of truth” ((compiled by)King 2014, 257), activists turned the accusations around to point at Canadian politicians’ own corruption and freeloading: “In #Ottawapiskat, unelected elders make huge salaries for no useful work. They call it the Senate.” (King (compiled by) 2014, 239) The tweets thus spoke uncomfortable truths about Canada’s democracy: “You can become the majority leader of #Ottawapiskat with only 33% of band members voting for you,” and played on the many accusations against the Harper government in Canada: “I heard the #Ottawapiskat chief is corrupt, withholds info. from his ppl & doesn’t consult them when making
decisions affecting them,” or “in #Ottawapiskat the Chief yields absolute power and muzzles his council. They cannot display dissent. We must teach them democracy!!” They also referred to earlier political scandals “Chief of #Ottawapiskat used #robotcalls to win an election and has yet to be held accountable for election fraud.” (King (compiled by) 2014)

This had the political effect of placing Indigenous activists as the potential whistleblowers on Canada’s democratic failures, positioning them as the protectors in another reversal of the colonial logics of protection. They also challenged settler Canadians on their inaction towards such issues, reminding them of their own responsibility in letting their government get away with it: “What Idle No More highlights in part is not simply neglect and actions of the Harper’s extreme legislation is only possible because successive generations of settler Canadians have normalised looking to government rather than themselves to resolve ‘the Indian problem’.” (Irlbacher-Fox 2014, 223) By doing so, the activists were positioning themselves as protectors while also calling settler Canadians in, inviting them into the movement, challenging them to hear the truths they were speaking.

Yet this picture has to be complicated by the Canadian political landscape at the time: the Conservative Harper government was already seen as breaking this image of Canada-the-good-guy on a national and international scenes by breaking up with the liberal narratives that had dominated the political landscape before. In fact, there were already political discussions going on about how Canada’s international reputation was changing/suffering under Harper’s rule. Therefore, some of Idle No More’s truth-speaking indirectly established a division between Harper’s coercive/sovereign mode of governing as particularly predatory/violent as opposed to traditional Liberal modes of governance exercising forms of pastoral/governing power. Spence, for example, described the Conservative political party in power as “particularly aggressive and the Prime Minister Stephen Harper as exceptional in his willingness to withdraw the care and compassion that is supposed to mark a 21st century liberal, democratic state.” (cited in A. Simpson 2016, 6) Liberal governments are thus seen as exercising pastoral/governing power, which is understood as better than the overtly coercive

41 This was illustrated, for example, when freshly-elected Justin Trudeau stated in a 2015 rally that Canada was ‘back.’ http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/were-back-justin-trudeau-says-in-message-to-canadas-allies-abroad
Conservative government whose violent indifference is particularly damaging for Indigenous peoples. This discourse of liberal exceptionalism could be seen as having the effect of reinforcing settler Canadians’ national identity narrative by placing Harper’s Conservative government as inherently different and worse than Liberal governments, a glitch in Canada’s history that would soon be restored and that could thus be (temporarily at least) blamed for Indigenous’s dispossession and suffering. Many Idle No More activists were careful not to excuse or exclude past governments’ responsibility as well as pointing to the hypocrisy of liberal discourses that pretend to protect and care for, while still violently dispossessing and assimilating Indigenous peoples. But Canada’s political landscape at the time allowed many to see the Harper’s government as exceptionally bad for both Indigenous and Canadian communities and lands, thus shifting the blame from settler-colonialism more generally to its current political expression.

Challenging Indigenous (Gendered) Modes of Governance

The movement was also about reclaiming governing/sovereign power for Indigenous people themselves by grounding its critiques in notions of self-governance and claiming sovereign power over the land. As elaborated before, the *Indian Act* has had deep impacts on the ways Indigenous communities govern themselves. Therefore one of the uncomfortable truths spoken by the movement also had to do with denouncing the unfair structures of governance inherited from colonial power through the *Indian Act*. This was raised mostly in the wake of the January eleventh meeting between Stephen Harper and Indian Chiefs from the AFN, which many regarded as an act of backstabbing the movement. In fact, in light of the widespread boycott by Chief Spence and many others, Alo White argues: “the truth is a very small handful of opportunistic individuals decided to take advantage of their own people. They were not the ones who were hunger striking, they didn’t earn the meeting, and there would have been other meetings. That’s the truth of it.” (Alo White 2014, 161) While not all activists were ready to condemn the Chiefs so harshly, many lamented the consequences such meeting had on the internal political order: “the events surrounding the emergence of Idle No More have resulted in one fundamental change: it irrevocably damaged the legitimacy of *Indian Act* chiefs to speak on behalf of First Nations.” (Turpel Lafond 2014, 336)
Many activists also argued that Idle No More was a way of performing Indigenous self-determination, as expressed by Tara Williamson: “For me, Idle No More is about nationhood. Not nation-state-hood, but nationhood—the ability to take care of the land, our children, and our families in the way we best know how.” (Williamson 2014, 153) We will see how that was a truth spoken in, to Indigenous communities themselves, but it was also a (performed) truth spoken out to settler Canadians about their own nationhood. It opened up possibilities to question the bases of statehood and the principles it relies upon. In a sense then, Idle No More was speaking truth to power about state modes of governance, asking if there were indeed “other forms of governance we can create that are not based on domination and control” (Smith 2005b, 128) and thinking “beyond nation-state as the appropriate form of governance for the world.” (Smith 2005a, 184) In fact, from Indigenous perspectives, “Once land is not seen as property, then nationhood does not have to be based on exclusive control over territory. If sovereignty is more about being responsible for land, then nationhood can engage all those who fulfil responsibilities for land.” (Smith 2010, 62) This position challenges the systems of oppression upon which states rely, such as heteropatriarchy, because once the basis for belonging are not based on property of the land, then “[t]his vision also challenges the presumed heteronormativity of national belonging because it demonstrates that the presumption behind a heteronormative nation is a relationship to land as commodity that must then rely on boundaries to include and exclude. These articulations point to alternative modes of national belonging that are not definitionally exclusivist.” (Smith 2010, 63) Therefore, we could argue that Idle No More, by performing alternative modes of nationhood, were challenging state-based governing power with alternative modes of belonging and governing. In Audra Simpson’s words, it meant “holding these nation-states in a position of doubt, sometimes interrogation and sometimes refusal. Their political posture is, in short, saying I am not playing with you. You are not the only political or historical show in town, and I know it.” (A. Simpson 2016, 25)

This discourse about establishing a nation-to-nation relationship with Canada (T. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 22) was strategic in reclaiming political agency, opening up alternatives modes of governance, and questioning the legitimacy of nation-statehood as the only good and possible political mode of governance. But it was also indirectly reinforcing a form of governing power that simultaneously homogenises and
individualises people into a single ‘nation’. While most activists were careful to recognise the diversity of Indigenous nations, political organisations (the Iroquois Confederacy, for example) and multiple political belongings (one can simultaneously identify with the Mohawk, Haudenosaunee and First Nation communities, for example), the nation-to-nation claim tends to present two sides with clearly defined boundaries where plurality stands. On the Canadian side, for example, the fact that two competing colonial powers disputed the territory, and that the descendants of the defeated French colonists were consequently also marked by politics of assimilation, complicates the picture. Canada’s politics of multiculturalism and discourses/practices around immigration also makes it harder to see it as a united nation: where do (recent) immigrants, non-Indigenous racialised people and/or descendants of slaves (or other Canadians who were forced into the land) stand in relation to the identity of settlers? While these questions and issues have been explored by many scholars of Indigeneity (Veracini 2015; Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995; Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis 1995), the elaboration of which is beyond the scope of this chapter, the question still remains concerning which nation Idle No More is seeking to address exactly, who within that nation its truths are directed at, and what kinds of power it reproduces and reinforces while also challenging it? This speaks to the complexities of resisting and challenging forms of power and governance without reinforcing the political basis upon which they are built and rely.

But another aspect of Indigenous governing power that Idle No More challenged through its fearless speech in relation to Indigenous modes of governance was their inherited patriarchal modes of political leadership. Indeed, Idle No More, having been led mostly by women and young women in particular, reminded communities of the truth about the effect of colonialism on Indian women: “Once we start to unravel the truth of whatis colonization has done to us and understand why behaviours are the way

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42 For example, Radha Jhappan and Daiva Stasiulis highlight the limits of the ‘white-settler society’ narrative around Canada by underlining the pitfalls and difficulties in addressing Canada as a unified political project. Scholars also sometimes disagree on whether im/migrants are settlers like other white Canadians who benefit from Indigenous dispossession (and this raises the issue of which Canadians and if only the descendants of British colonists are to be entered into that category) or if they are also, if differently, positioned as the ‘other’ to settler-Canadians who define themselves as the norm and benefit from those others’ dispossession and labour (Stasiulis and Jhappan 1995). This conversation is also complicated by the fact that assimilation policies and discourses towards Indigenous peoples have often taken the form of positioning them as ‘another minority’ among the many communities that needed to assimilate within Canadian society by embracing multiculturalism, as demonstrated by the White Paper bill in 1969.
that they are, people are going to understand how important the role of women is and how we need this more than ever.” (Richard and Gazan 2014, 135) Idle No More was also ‘a radical remembering of the past’ in which women’s traditional leadership was recognised and celebrated. And this was achieved by enacting that leadership in the movement: “They remind us that our traditional governments were based on clan systems with clan mothers. These powerful women chose the leaders, people like headmen who speak for the people during treaty making. Idle No More inspired women to re-enact their traditional roles and responsibilities and to carry this with honour and dignity.” (Richard and Gazan 2014, 134) So, many activists claimed that this female leadership was nothing new but rather that “Indigenous women have always been leaders in our communities and many took a similar role in the movement. As they had done for centuries when nurturing and protecting families, communities, and nations, women were on the front lines organising events, standing up and speaking out.” (T. Kino-nda-niimi Collective 2014, 23)

Hence they were challenging modern (heteropatriarchal) modes of Indigenous governance, and thus their pastoral/governing, disciplinary and sovereign powers, inherited by centuries of settler-colonialism, to perform/reclaim alternative modes of governance grounded in Indigenous traditions and cultures. Many also spoke about the novelty this leadership represented in contemporary Indigenous movements and the potential it held for change: “And the new leadership, forged in large part by young women with their own grievances from living under the existing power order, represents a different kind of leadership with the creative potential to change the course of history.” (Turpel Lafond 2014, 336) In enacting female leadership and power within the movement, the leaders of Idle No More were embodying/performing the truths both about traditional indigenous modes of governance that were not based on patriarchy, and the fact that contemporary governance structures inherited from the Indian Act were. Many underlined the significance of female leadership for the vitality of their communities: “Our women are vital to healthy communities. Our nation is strong only when our women strong. And between Chief Theresa Spence and the four women who started Idle No More—Sheelah McLean, Nina Wilson, Sylvia McAdam and Jessica Gordon—our nation is strong indeed.” (Nason 2014, 186) These female leaders were thus also vocal in calling out male power and domination within the current modes of governance in Indian communities: “We knew that Indigenous movements in the 70s
were forefronted exclusively by men, and our group (which is made up mostly of strong-minded women) were definitely not going to have any of that! Women were (and continue to be) the leading force both in our actions and others that took place in Denendeh.” (Allooloo and Simpson 2014, 197) As testified by other Idle no More activists, young women, by taking and making power, were challenging current male-dominated modes of organising and stepping up to offer an alternative: “I have especially seen young women stepping up and speaking to leadership saying: “Your leadership is not working and maybe it’s time to try something else.” (Richard and Gazan 2014, 134) As another explains: “The burden these younger women have assumed is significant, and they do not accept a jackboot political approach or the expectation of blind loyalty from their leaders.” (Turpel Lafond 2014, 339) The female leadership of Idle No More was also an enactment of uncomfortable truths spoken to the power of men within their communities.

Therefore, many Native women joined other activists in calling for struggles for Indigenous nationhood and self-determination that are grounded in traditional modes of governance, putting emphasis on the need to restore women’s traditional leadership roles within Indigenous communities. But some have criticised this approach in the past, as well as the claims that traditional Native societies were gender equal and non-patriarchal: they see these ideas as romanticising the past and relying upon a utopian and quite naïve belief that it is actually possible to reproduce or return to the precolonial social structures and realities, as if we could emerge “untouched” from centuries of colonial shaping of the world. Yet Andrea Smith shows the radical potential of actually remembering a past that was “not necessarily structured through hierarchy, oppression, or patriarchy.” She claims that:

Although these remembrances should be critically interrogated and not romanticised […], our understanding that it was possible to order society without structures of oppression in the past tells us that our current political and economic system is anything but natural. While these visions may be critiqued for being utopian or romanticising, their importance today is not so much that they were true of all Native communities or that Native communities were perfect. Rather, the fact that any memories of alternative social organisation exist at all helps denormalise our current social structure. (Smith 2010, 50)

Hence instead of taking claims about traditional Indian societies at face value, Smith invites us to look at their performative potential and what such claims can achieve, whether ‘true’ or not. The resurgence of Indigenous resistance awakened in 2012 with
Idle No More drew from such a “radical remembering of the future” (Manu Meyer, cited in Smith 2005a). It was also a manifestation of how all these issues, histories and struggles came together to provoke once more parrhesiastic performance of Indigenous resurgence/resistance. Hence Idle No More challenged the inherited patriarchal character of Indigenous modes of governance, denouncing and subverting the governing, sovereign and disciplinary power underlying these modes by performing alternative forms of governance, based on ‘a radical remembering of the future’.

Idle No More Judicial Parrhesia: (Re)Claiming Justice/Judicial Power

In terms of judicial parrhesia, we can argue that Idle No More was very much the cry of the powerless against the injustices of the powerful. Indigenous female protectors reminded Canadians of the systematic violence they face and the unwillingness/failure of the Canadian government to exercise its judicial power over Canadian citizens when it comes to protecting the unprotectables. The continuing demands for Canada to address the hundreds of murdered and disappeared Indigenous women through a national inquiry was about criticising Canada’s judicial power over Indigenous lives and speaking truth to the failures/lies surrounding its narrative of pastoral power over/care for Indigenous communities. This aspect of Idle No More parrhesiastic speech was thus about making visible the coercive and violent nature of settler Canada’s power over Indigenous peoples and women in particular.

Chief Spence’s hunger strike to sound the alarm on her reserve’s housing crisis and in support of Idle No More, for example, was a stark reminder of Indigenous peoples’ deplorable living conditions and slow death: “her strike is symbolic of what is happening to First Nations in Canada. For every day that Spence does not eat, she is slowly dying, and that is exactly what is happening to First Nations, who have lifespans up to 20 years shorter than average Canadians.” (Pasternak 2014, 40) Her fast was a symbolic act that spoke truth to power about the urgency of Native dire living conditions, an uncomfortable truth many Canadians prefer to deny: “Ogichidaakwe Spence challenges Canadians because no one wants to believe this situation is bad enough that someone would willingly give up their life.” (L. B. Simpson 2014a, 156) Since the subaltern cannot speak (see Spivak, as developed in earlier chapters), Spence’s silent yet powerful performance of truth-telling centred on courage and spoke
loudly and fearlessly to power, while also building symbolic courage in her communities, as argued before.

But as days went on, Spence’s hunger strike was met with indifference by Stephen Harper and his government, but also scorn by some commentators who criticised her governance (seen as corrupted and greedy, as highlighted above with the Twitter thread #Ottawapiskat), but also because she was drinking fish broth43 (hence some said it was not a ‘real fast’), while others criticised her body for being ‘too fat.’44 As argued by Audra Simpson, these allusions about Spence’s ‘fat’ body spoke to Indigenous women’s positioning as the unprotectables because it signified her refusal/failure to disappear: “Why this link between fat, her fat in particular, and a resistance or refusal of domination? Because what she is required to do, with or without the starvation, is die.” (XXX, p.8) As she further argues, Spence’s body became the symbolic site of the violence faced by Indigenous women: “Spence fleshy body was not seen as a sign of resurgent Indigenous life to white Canada, it was not seen as a stubborn, resolute, and sovereign refusal to die, staying alive to have that conversation about Crown obligations, about housing and about historical obligations—it was read as a failure to do what it was supposed to do—perish.” (XXX, p.14) Hence Spence’s stubborn, quiet, and embodied parrhesiastic speech spoke truth to the violence of Canada’s ongoing settler-colonialism but also its failure to make Indigenous women (and the political orders, modes of governance, and indigenous existence more broadly that they represent) disappear. We can say that this act in particular embodied the fearless speech of the powerless who denounces the injustices committed by Canada’s coercive/governing power to make/let die Indigenous peoples/women in general indifference and scorn. Her speech did not make that violence go away, we could say it even provoked it, but it had the simultaneous effect of making it visible to settler Canadians and the world. Her visible and fasting body also spoke truth to disciplinary power in challenging the gendered norms expected of women (thinness) and Indigenous women in particular (quiet disappearance). We can thus say that Spence’s round body

43 The use of fasting as a parrhesiastic act of resistance spoke both to Canada but also to Indigenous’ communities because of the spiritual and symbolic resonance of the practice of fasting in many First Nations. What has been labelled in Canadian media as a cheat (fish broth) has a symbolic significance rooted in some communities’ history and spiritualities. See (L. B. Simpson 2014a) for more details.
44 As reported in a Huffington post article, Senator Brazeau made fun of her body claiming that he had lost more weight having the flu than Spence through her hunger strike, leading one heckler to scream that she was indeed fatter than before she started fasting. http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/01/31/patrick-brazeau-theresa-spence_n_2589799.html
and her sovereign decision to stop eating was symbolically challenging both Canada’s coercive and governing power over Indigenous bodies as well as its disciplinary power through normalised ways of being and expected behaviours of Indigenous women, that is, their quiet submission into oblivion. It thus symbolised the fearless speech of the speechless who denounces injustices committed by the powerful, even when such injustices are ongoing through indifference and scorn, making them visible for the world to witness.

Other activists also spoke truth to Canada’s judicial power by denouncing the dire living conditions of many Indigenous nations: “the government forces native people to choose every day between living conditions out of a World Vision advertisement and hopelessness on one hand, and the pollution and social problems of short-term resource exploitation projects on the other.” (Mainville 2014, 112) They also framed these truths in relation to human rights and the failure of the Canadian government to exercise and deliver justice to Indigenous peoples. In the words of Mary Ellen Turpel Lafond, Idle No More “speaks a bitter truth about Canada—it has failed to deliver on human rights and equal opportunity for Aboriginal peoples.” (Turpel Lafond 2014, 340) But mostly, the movement’s repeated calls for a national inquiry into the missing and murdered Indigenous women across Canada were another way to denounce the injustices of the powerful and demand justice. It thus challenged Canada’s judicial power by highlighting its failure to protect and to enact justice.

Yet on this issue, demanding a national inquiry can also be seen as a way to reinforce Canada’s judicial power by asking for injustices to be addressed, and justice to be exercised, by the Canadian government. While other issues addressed by Idle No More were very much about walking away from Canadian institutions of protection to reclaim other logics of protection grounded in Indigenous self-governance, sovereignty, and cosmologies, on the issue of violence against women the judicial aspects of Idle No More’s parrhesiastic speech can be seen as a way to challenge as well as reinforce Canada’s judicial power.

Feminist scholars and activists have long denounced the state logics of protection, particularly by showing scepticism towards using the law as a way for Native women to access protection from violence. Many activists are thus quite critical of the inherent contradiction in “relying upon the state to solve problems it is
responsible for creating.” (Smith 2005a, 139) As lamented by Sarah Hunt: “We continue to appeal to the Canadian legal system to address physical violence, calling for more policing or better laws, while knowing this system is set up to oppress, rather than help us. The same colonial mentality that created the Indian Act to privilege the rights of men over women [...] serves as the foundation for the Canadian legal system.” (S. Hunt 2014, 191) These activists see the Canadian state not only as responsible for the internalisation of patriarchy and patriarchal violence within their communities, but also as itself a manifestation of patriarchal power and violence. Patricia Monture’s work in particular speaks of this contradiction. As Coulthard paraphrases: “For Monture, when Native women seek legal protection from the patriarchal colonial state as a means of ameliorating the gendered violence that the state has disciplined into the minds and bodies of our citizens through the Indian Act, they risk reifying the subjective and structural relations required for their continued domination both as Indigenous women and as members of Indigenous nations.” (Coulthard 2014, 159) Hence the conflicted issue of demanding a national inquiry both reinforces Canada’s judicial power by asking for its protection, while challenging it by making visible its continued failure to actually exercise justice and protection for Indigenous women, despite claims to the contrary.

**Idle No More Ethical Parrhesia: Speaking Truth to the Self**

*How it’ll turn out in the end is anybody’s guess—but, by continuing to reject the old narrative, Idle No More has already won. [...] In facing the cold winds of governmental indifference and societal projection, their fight speaks to the importance and the power of wearing the cloth of self-knowledge. (L. B. Simpson 2014b, 294)*

Like other parrhesiastic practices, Idle No More was a movement that was not only about speaking truth to power, but also very much about speaking truth to themselves about themselves: building new modes of de/subjectivation, performing alternative modes of governance, reinvigorating traditional beliefs, practices and leadership modes, decolonising the self and ‘healing’, and so forth. While different people instilled different meanings and priorities into the movement and while many debates occurred within communities about what should constitute the heart of Indigenous resistance/resurgence movements, many focused on the radical effect Idle No More was having on Indigenous communities and sense of self, how it was a process of decolonising the self as much as speaking truth to power. The sense of
community, belonging, and collective identity was thus at the core of the movement: “For me, it meant the arrival of my time to step in and join my Indigenous sisters and brothers in breathing life into our collective sense of being; to raise ourselves up and support one another in asserting our vitality as Indigenous peoples; and to take up our power in our own hands.” (Allooloo and Simpson 2014, 195) And it was also about unsettling what appeared to be normal: “The coming together of Idle No More contributed to a growing sense of community and even a resurgence in starting to think about nationhood, our identity and what happened to us, historically. Suddenly everything that had seemed normal wasn’t anymore.” (King and Kappo 2014, 69) In that sense, the ethical modalities of Idle No More’s parrhesiastic speech were also about challenging norms established through Canada’s disciplinary power about who is ‘Indian’ and what that subjectivation/subjectification means.

As argued by Coulthard, using Fanon’s work, it is through struggle that colonised subjects can achieve a “strategic desubjectification” and “shed their colonial identity.” (Coulthard 2014) Struggle is thus not only about ‘taking up power into one’s own hands’, but also about desubjectifying oneself by reclaiming one’s ‘collective sense of being’. For example, in Peace, Power and Righteousness Alfred sustains that: “We cannot preserve our nations unless we take action to restore pride in our traditions, achieve economic self-sufficiency, develop independence of mind, and display courage in defence of our lands and rights” and that, in order to do so, “we must turn away from the values of mainstream North American society and begin to act as self-determining peoples.” (Alfred 2008, 9) Similarly, many Idle No More activists focused on the importance of performing self-determination and self-governance, which had to come from themselves: “This could be one of the most tremendous gifts of Idle No More: we have in front of us the perfect opportunity to re-invigorate and re-invent our governance practices from the ground up. The best way to demand self-determination is to be self-determining.” (Williamson 2014, 153) Hence for many Idle No More activists, “The answer lies in the repossession, the protection, and the resilience of our identity, spirit, freedom, and sovereignty. Our freedom cannot be negotiated. We are free human beings governed by our own definition of our reciprocity to the land and to one another.” (Mainville 2014, 115) As stated by Martineau, “Idle No More embodied the corporeal represencing of our peoples in a collective becoming together enacted through the Indigenous reoccupation and reclamation of public space.” (Martineau, P.231) We
could argue that Idle No More achieved exactly that and constituted “the affirmative enactment of another modality of being, a different way of relating to and with the world.” (Coulthard 2014, 169) By doing so, it also reinvigorated Indigenous epistemologies: “The movement exhibits a post-Cartesian Indigenous ethos where the mind, body, spirit, and emotions are engaged together.” (Nanibush 2014, 342)

These truths about Indigenous identity, ethos, self-determination and ways of being in and relating to the world were therefore not only directed to an outside but also to an inside. In other words, the movement was not only speaking out, but speaking in: “The Idle No More movement is not only about unsettling the larger Canadian population but it’s about unsettling ourselves as Indigenous Peoples. It’s my opinion that the aim of the movement must be to continue unsettling ourselves as Indigenous Peoples—the hard work of decolonisation is happening right in front of us in real time, on Twitter, Facebook, and in shopping malls.” (LaDuke 2014, 142) For some activists, the main goal of the movement was not necessarily to reach Canadians and gain their attention, but mostly to regain control over their own voices, hence retaking power over their definition of selves and narratives about the world: “In the beginning of the movement, people were saying, ‘Media isn’t paying attention, media isn’t paying attention.’ But why do we need them to? We don’t need them to. This isn’t about them, this isn’t about getting anybody’s attention but our own and putting our own voice out there in our own way.” (King and Kappo 2014, 70) Self-representation was crucial to many in speaking their own truths to power.

By retaking this control over self-representation and self-definition, Idle No More unsettled the normalised and internalised colonial definition of the self and by doing so, many argued that the movement was also about healing: “It’s taken 150 years to get here. We are going to have our ups and downs and change is not going to happen overnight. Our people need to heal and that is what we are doing by being involved in Idle No More—it’s healing us as we go.” (Alo White 2014, 162) Thus for some, “the essence of the movement is not about gender, class, race, belief, etc., it is about healing.” (Oja Jay 2014, 108) This healing was epistemological, and it was about identity and subjectivation, but it was also intensely political: “The Idle No More movement is beginning to reawaken the spirits of the People. We have a lot to unlearn. We have to find our place in the circle and Idle No More is calling people back to the
circle. We’re in the process of repairing ourselves as individuals, families, communities, and Nations. Everything we do is political—we are Anishinaabe.” (McMahon 2014a, 142)

Few actions expressed all of this relation to the self and the truths about collective self-determination and governance better than the round-dance flash-mobs. As Martineau argues:

The Round Dance Revolution was both a representational gesture of Indigenous resistance and performance, and a self-affirmation of Indigenous continuity, presence and struggle. It operated at both levels and frequencies simultaneously, making visible the disparity between Settler colonial realities and the lived experiences of Indigenous peoples, dispossessed from our homelands and territories. The round dances were an evocative interimage of indigeneity that territorialised Indigenous presence beyond the normative borders in which it is often inscribed (reservation and rural communities), or otherwise erased. (Martineau 2015, 232)

Hence the flash mobs were a way to speak truth to the colonial power of the settler society and to the self by performing a traditional ritual in the face of Canadians’ beliefs that Indigenous peoples have disappeared; and in the face of racism, sexism, and capitalism that positioned Indigenous peoples as the unworthy of protection and white settler as superior. It was a truth about pride, resilience, resurgence and resistance. And it was a truth about power, both about Canada’s oppressive power but also about Indigenous power: “the Round Dance Revolution reminds us the power of our drums. As much as they are a reminder to others that we’re still here, they are also a reminder to ourselves. […] I believe the long-term success of Idle No More will be seen in a resurgence of Indigenous knowledges, cultures, languages and pride.” (Nason 2014, 186) Many saw in the round dances a perfect manifestation of this resurgence, and a powerful tool for self-definition and identity: “It has reinvigorated and re-inspired our People. It has lifted the spirits of thousands. The act of the “flash mob” can be called “Political/Guerilla Theater” but it’s not politics in and of itself. It’s a glimpse into who we are. It is perfect.” (McMahon 2014b, 100) Hence the Round Dance performances were a perfect illustration of parrhesia in Foucault’s sense, as both a political and an ethical practice. In an Idle No More activist’s words:

For the first time, I saw genuine sense of love for each other and for ourselves. Even if it was only momentary it was powerful enough to awaken in them what needed to be woken up—a remembering of who we were, who we are. And as for the second point, the non-Native people at the mall that day, people who
were just doing their Christmas shopping, there was nothing they could do. They had no choice but to stop and wonder, and to see us, really see us. And it was amazing. (King and Kappo 2014, 71)

For women in particular who took positions of leadership within the movement and beyond, Idle No More was a way to turn themselves into truth-tellers, leaders, and protectors. Many activists within Idle No More positioned themselves as the protectors of the land, not only for their communities’ survival and well-being, but also for all Canadians’ future. By speaking truth to settlers’ power, Indigenous peoples, and women in particular, turned themselves from the unprotectables into the protectors, a position they claimed to have always occupied but that was now directed at colonial power. Therefore, this reversal of the colonial logics of protection constituted both one of the uncomfortable truths spoken by the movement, and one of its effects. It is through the act of speaking truth to power that Indigenous women/activists became protectors of the land and of their nations. But one of the truth they thus spoke was also that they had in fact always been protectors in the face of the colonial genocidal logic that wanted them disappeared and positioned them as colonial society’s unprotectables.

These claims surrounding protection also had to do with masculinist logics of protection and reminding both colonial and Indigenous societies that Indigenous women were not only the unprotectables, but had also played, and still play, a central role in protecting themselves as well as their communities, resources and lands:

Specifically, women in the #IdleNoMore movement seek to protect the waters, the environment and the land from the threat of further destruction. Indeed, they seek protection not only for themselves but for those values, practices and traditions that are at the core of Indigenous women’s power and sovereignty — concepts that have been, and remain under attack, and which strike at the core of a settler-colonial misogyny that refuses to acknowledge the ways it targets Indigenous women for destruction. (Nason 2014, 187)

The movement spoke uncomfortable truths about settler colonial misogyny and about women’s traditional roles as protectors, and enacted these truths and protections by doing so. The movement also went further to position Indigenous women as the protectors not just of their own communities but of all communities: “Women teach us about the protection of life, water, land, and how we are all walking towards that good life that’s not just for First Nation, but for all.” (Richard and Gazan 2014, 134) This female leadership was for many both a question of retaking political leadership, and of retaking a spiritual role and the spiritual knowledge that women traditionally carried:
“Women traditionally hold the teachings and the meanings of why the movement is much more than current governmental policy exposure and resistance.” (Wilson 2014, 108) Some activists thus raised the role that women held in traditional spiritualities and beliefs, framed in terms of protection, care and life: “We know we are now in that place of prophecy, because the women stood up, and they stepped forward with a gift, so we could all live. […] Kisikew Iskwew, the Woman Spirit, is taking back her power, so the children will live.” (Wilson 2014, 108)

Indigenous peoples’ protection of the land was not only about/for themselves: Canadians also needed the protection offered by First Nations for their own survival. As claimed by Pamela Palmater, a Mik’maq lawyer and activist: “First Nations, with our constitutionally protected aboriginal and treaty rights, are Canadians’ last best hope to protect the lands, waters, plants, and animals from complete destruction—which doesn’t just benefit our children, but the children of all Canadians.” (Palmater 2014, 40) By speaking truth to power and turning themselves into protectors of the land, Idle No More activists also reversed the colonial logics of protection by turning themselves into the protectors of Canadians. These claims to protection also relied on another sets of uncomfortable truths that most Canadians prefer to ignore: that environmental destruction will have an impact not only on indigenous communities, but on us all. As Andrea Smith argues, “Native peoples, the expendable ones, are situated to suffer the brunt of environmental destruction so that colonisers can continue to be in denial about the fact that they will also eventually be affected.” (Smith 2005a, 58) Indigenous peoples, as the unprotectables, often face the most immediate effects of environmental destruction. They also witness first-hand that “nature is not so easy to subdue and control,” (Smith 2005a, 57) a ‘truth’ grounded in their traditional beliefs and traditions. Therefore, Idle No More, by resisting the government’s attempt to lift environmental protections, reminds Canadians that “as a people we cannot continue to devastate the very things needed to sustain humanity—our lands and waters—for the generations to come” (McAdam 2014, 67) and that, even though the most dire consequences are experienced on Native territories, they will not be able to escape environmental consequences. Through this truth act, they are performing again their role as the experts in (and last hope for) protecting the environment. This led another activist to claim that Indigenous’ expertise in protecting the environment was the reason why Canadians should support their struggles and movements of resistance: “Empathy and remorse are
great reasons to act to dismantle this ugly system of expropriation. But an even better reason is that Indigenous nations present the best and only partners in taking care of our environment. Protecting our rivers, lakes, forests and oceans is best done by people with a multi-millennial relationship with the land.” (Mainville 2014, 112)

Through all of these truth claims, Idle No More was, in a way, brandishing a mirror in front of Canadians’ eyes, forcing them to see themselves, their national history, economy, government, and identity, through the uncomfortable truths spoken by the movement. The movement was simultaneously denouncing settler Canadians’ blindness, complicity and idleness around such issues, but they also called them into the movement by appealing to their sense of truth: “I am asking for the help of Canadians to combat these ugly lies. […] These lies allow people to throw up their hands in disgust and claim that native people are free-loading whiners who need to shut up and go away. These lies allow a nation to ignore its own history, to erase its own volition, to believe that someone else will fix this problem.” (Vowel 2014, 131) So, consistently with other cases, the ethical modalities of Idle No More’s parrhesia invited Indigenous people to change theirselves and appealed to settler Canadians’ ethical relation to truth and to theirselves as well, in ways that made it impossible for them to hear those truths and not question theirselves and ethos.

Conclusion

The female protectors that led the Idle No More movement are complicatedly intertwined within Canada’s logics of protection. Through speaking truth to power, they not only reclaimed their positions as leaders of their communities and protectors of the land but by doing so, they challenged their positioning as the unprotectable/unprotected and/or protected upon whose silence/disappearance/assimilation the whole logics of protection rely. In fact, by speaking out in a country that consistently and systematically make them disappear, and would prefer to believe that their whole peoples have indeed gone extinct, Indigenous women spoke truth to the failures of settler-colonialism by strongly reminding settlers that Indigenous peoples have not vanished and have not, in fact, been reduced to silence. They achieved this by challenging Canada’s narrative about itself, its national identity and its history through speaking truth to its past and ongoing settler-colonial injustices towards Indigenous peoples and their lands. In that sense, what characterises the movement is mostly that it consisted in ‘re-storying’
Canada and contesting its international and national image as ‘the good guy’ who champions and protects human rights. By speaking truth to Canadians who would rather believe that the genocide and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is located firmly in the past, Idle No More not only challenged Canadians’ subject positions as the protectors, but reversed such logic by positioning Indigenous peoples as the protectors of the land for future generations of Canadians as well, a position, as they reminded Canadians, they have always occupied.

We can thus see how Idle No More’s parrhesiastic speech, through re-storying Canada, denouncing the ongoing injustices of settler-colonialism, and reclaiming their traditional positions as protectors of the land through ethical self/other relations, was about challenging Canada’s dominant institutions of protection and the national narratives upon which they rely. It used parrhesiastic techniques that can be associated with the unprotectable/subaltern whose silence is the condition upon which logics of protection function, such as hunger strikes and the power of numbers. Apart from the issue of violence against Indigenous women, we can argue that the Idle No More’s water protectors were situated very much outside of dominant institutions of protection, and were also ‘walking away’ from them by trying to perform/enact alternative and competing logics of protection in relation to the land.
CHAPTER VIII: Conclusion

This thesis told four very different, yet somewhat similar stories. It told the stories of an Afghan woman speaking up to warlords and the hypocrisy and complicity of those who turn a blind eye to their crimes; stories of a soldier who leaked the American military’s dirty secrets for the world to see; stories of a group of incorruptible Indian women and their leader taking justice into their own hands; and stories of Indigenous women claiming their voices back and protecting waters by doing so. In other words, stories of women who have had enough and decided to speak/act out against the injustices, abuses, exclusions, lacks and failures of logics of protection. Through these acts of fearless speech to power, these women disturbed a number of official and unofficial stories: political stories, media stories, stories we tell ourselves, and stories about ourselves. They disturbed stories of security and protection, and the security/protection of stories.

This thesis thus added a few more voices to the competing narratives/stories making sense of, and shaping, International Relations and Security. It did so by building upon other stories previously told in IR, in Security Studies, and in Feminist Security Studies (FSS) more specifically. In fact, many scholars before me have attempted to make sense of the injustices, incoherencies, lacks, failures, exclusions, and abuses of dominant voices and actors in International Relations, especially in relation to International Security. Critical Security Studies have long challenged and problematised dominant narratives making up the ‘status quo’ defining and delimiting what counts as security and whose lives are un/protected within it. Scholars in FSS, for example, have questioned the gendered nature of narratives, discourses, actors, and institutions claiming to offer protection and security.

Indeed, important work has been conducted in FSS to both highlight the power involved in ignoring gendered issues, and how power works to enforce gendered orders and their intersections with other systems of oppression globally. We now have a rich and broad understanding of how different forms of power operate in global politics and how gender shapes and is shaped by such power. More specifically, FSS scholars have explored how the logic of masculinist protection divides society into those who protect (masculinised) and those who are protected (feminised). The masculine, chivalrous, and benevolent ‘Just Warrior’ is in charge of providing protection to the feminine ‘Beautiful Soul’ deferring judgement and decision-making about threats and security to her
protector, thus exchanging some of her autonomy for (a feeling of) safety (Stiehm 1982; Young 2003; Elshtain 1995), as detailed in chapter two. Some scholars have also looked at how such a logic was racialised in the context of the War on Terror (Brittain 2006; K. Hunt 2006; Sjoberg 2010; Young 2003; Zine 2006), while others’ important work on militarised and hegemonic forms of masculinities explored the nuances, contradictions, and complexities of how ‘Just Warriors’ are constructed across race, class, sexuality, and other systems of oppression. Feminist scholars have also looked at how dominant discourses and practices have re/positioned women, subverting gendered orders into traditional roles/stereotypes such as mothers, monsters, or whores, to explain away their dissident acts of violence, for example (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007).

Yet a lot remains to be explored in Security Studies about how people, and women in particular, disobey, subvert, and/or challenge power, while also being shaped by it. How do people around the world problematise the positions/roles assigned to them within gender, class, caste, race, colonial, and other systems of power in relation to protection and security? What does that problematisation do to power structures, institutions, and discourses and how can we make sense of it when it takes place in, and challenges, the (hyper)masculine world of International Security? This thesis aimed at answering those questions and highlighting not only the works of (gendered) powers but also, and mostly, the truth-speaking to those powers by women who have had enough of the status quo and decided to take action against it.

Rooted in FSS work on the logic of masculinist protection, this thesis started by looking at this work in more depth and explored how it could be expanded, complicated, and pluralised to encompass the multiple intersecting logics of protection that position people in contradictory ways as the protector, the protected, the unprotected, and the unprotectable within such logics. Using Foucault’s work on power/resistance, truth, and the subject, I elaborated an alternative framework to understand logics of protection before turning to the practice of parrhesia, as studied by Foucault and others in the social sciences. I then developed a framework based on parrhesia to analyse my case studies, arguing that we can understand Joya, Manning, Pal/the Gulabi Gang, and Idle No More’s actions as contemporary forms of speaking risky truths to power. After proceeding to the analysis of each of those cases using such frameworks and conceptualisations, what can be taken away from this thesis? Looking back at each chapter individually and together, I argue that this thesis makes two major contributions to IR and FSS: it historicises and pluralises logics of protection, and it
offers ways to use parrhesia as a framework to understand instances of problematisation, dissidence, and/or resistance in International Relations. I will reflect back on both of these claims, exploring what my thesis brought to the field of FSS and IR, what can be taken away from the empirical cases, as well as the limitations and points of departure of such explorations.

**Logics of Protection: Contributions and Limitations**

One of the main contributions of this thesis is its complication of logics of protection. In fact, I have argued in chapter two and throughout the thesis for the need to look not just at the logic of masculinist protection (singular), but also at the multiple logics of protection in which people are complicatedly embedded. The empirical exploration of different case studies confirms this need. In fact, the analysis of the multiple logics of protection in which each of the subjects in this thesis is located show the importance of deepening and complicating our understanding of logics of protection underlying International Security, as will be detailed below. My exploration of the different empirical cases did confirm most of my intuitions into the need to pluralise and historicise logics of protection, as well as regarding the validity of using Foucault’s work on different economies of power to understand the workings of those logics, even if only prematurely explored. However, there are also conclusions that we can draw from reading the empirical cases together that were not necessarily foreseen but that point towards interesting avenues for future research. This section will explore what the case studies confirmed, opened up, and could not achieve in relation to logics of protection.

First, this thesis pluralised logics of protection by looking at how each of the dissident female protectors under study was located within different competing/intersecting logics, placed within their specific, historicised contexts of emergence. This allowed me, for example, to see how Joya is complicatedly located within the logics of protection of/in Afghanistan. We saw how the colonial logics of protection portray the Afghan people, and Afghan women in particular, as both in need of the protection of white colonial saviours, but also as unprotected for their refusal to submit to those colonial protectors, and as ultimately unprotectable because of their supposedly dangerous, backward, barbaric nature/culture. We explored how such logics were played out in relation to the British Empire, and how they were reproduced and reframed through discourses around the War on Terror. Exploring the Gulabi Gang also
allowed us to understand better how colonial logics of protection are enacted in the context of India. We saw how they led to the positioning of women as both protectors of Indian traditions and culture and in need of protection and enlightenment from their backward culture and men, or against ‘modernity’ and colonisers in Indian nationalist discourses. Hence, we explored through these two chapters how colonial logics of protection position women as the protected, protector, and/or unprotected and unprotectable, and thus how colonial logics always already intersect with gendered and sexualised ones. This exploration also highlighted how gendered colonial logics show similarities, yet, how they also differ from one context to another.

The case of Idle No More showed the complexities involved in settler-colonial logics of protection which function in somewhat similar, yet very distinct ways from colonial/imperial ones as seen with Joya and the Gulabi Gang. In fact, since the aim of settler-colonialism is to claim the territory as one’s own and therefore to make local populations disappear, it is an inherently genocidal project, thus placing Indigenous people, and Indigenous women in particular as the dehumanised abjects/unprotectable, as illustrated by the alarming numbers of missing and murdered Indigenous women across Canada. But, like elsewhere, settler-colonial logics of protection in Canada also had to turn settlers into benevolent protectors, therefore portraying Indigenous men and cultures as threatening, Indigenous women and peoples as in need of salvation, and white men as paternal protectors.

In all three contexts, I also explored how those gendered and sexualised colonial/imperial and settler-colonial logics are intertwined with internal logics of protection that are both independent from, and inextricably related to, external ones. In Afghanistan, for example, internal logics of protection, along clan/tribe, ethnic, political, and religious lines were explored, while recognising both the impossibility to disconnect those internal logics from the international colonial ones, and the difficulty of accessing any knowledge of/about Afghanistan outside colonial frames of references. In the case of the Gulabi Gang, we also explored how gendered and sexualised caste/class logics of protection intersected with colonial ones, positioning people, and women in particular, differently along caste and class lines. Women are thus positioned as both protectors (of caste purity and boundaries), unprotected (if refusing to protect those social orders, hence disavowing the protection of their jati/community) and unprotectables (especially low-caste women whose bodies are already considered impure and thus liable to assaults). In the Canadian context, we also saw how settler-
colonial logics affected internal Indigenous logics of protection, placing women as unprotected and/or unprotectable within their own communities, but also reclaiming Indigenous roles as protectors of the land and of their culture and peoples’ survival.

Finally, the case of Chelsea Manning also exposed the colonial logics underlying the War on Terror from within institutions of protection in the U.S., but also the sexualised logics of protection encompassed by hetero and homo normative logics. Such logics position queer people, and trans women in particular, as unprotectable/abject (as not-fully-human because of their refusal and/or failure to align their gender/sex/desire ‘coherently’) and unprotected (when failing to uphold the gender binary). But they also increasingly position (some) queer subjects as protected (through discourses of sexual exceptionalism placing the US as the protector of LGBT rights-holders internally and internationally) and as protectors, under certain conditions (certain bodies being integrated within dominant institutions of protection as long they withhold and reinforce normative discourses such as the gender binary and U.S. patriotism and imperialism).

Hence, this thesis helped develop a sophisticated understanding of what different logics of protection empirically look like in different contexts, demonstrating the need to, and the importance of acquiring more knowledge on how multiple logics intersect in different historicised contexts. The empirical cases contributed to pluralise and historicise different logics of protection, from colonial/imperial ones, to settler-colonial logics, to homo/hetero normative ones, and how they intersect with gendered and sexualised logics. Yet although this thesis gave an overview of what the exploration of all those logics might look like in specific contexts, more research needs to be conducted into the empirical specificities of different logics and their modes of functioning. In fact, since the focus of this thesis was not on logics of protection themselves but on dissident female protectors who problematised and resisted them, more work is needed on the workings of each logic and how they function through, with, and against each other empirically. In fact, each chapter could have itself been developed into a full thesis exploring in more depth the intersections, contradictions, and complexities of plural, historicised logics of protection. Much was left unexplored about, for example, how gendered caste/class logics of protection in India intersect with hetero/homo and cis normative logics or about how class is mobilised alongside as well as through caste and colonial logics regionally, nationally, and internationally. There is still much to explore about the roles played by ethnic, tribal, and religious logics of
protection beyond, against, and within colonial logics in Afghanistan, or about the changing impact of refugees’ logics of protection on local and diasporic Afghan communities, as well as on neighbouring nations, along the Pakistani border for example. Queer critiques of transpatriotism are still in their infancy, and more would need to be said about how trans/cis normative logics of protection intersect and interact with other logics internationally as we see more trans people join official institutions of protection; and more work is also needed on how heteropatriarchal logics of protection rely upon and reinforce both gender, sexual, and settler-colonial logics in Canada.

Some conclusions can also be drawn from reading all the cases together on what happens when such logics are challenged, subverted, and problematised. In fact, the empirical chapters also contributed to understanding how these logics might get subverted and/or reinforced at the same time by the parrhesiastic speech of dissident female protectors. More specifically, what seems to come out of reading all those different cases together is that, while each figure succeeded in questioning, challenging, subverting, and potentially changing logics of protection, many logics also remained unpunctured by their speech. We could even argue that their fearless speech sometimes reinforced, inadvertently or not, certain logics of protection. In fact, as has been argued in the specific chapters, Joya became somewhat the symbol of Afghan women’s newly liberated access to ‘free-speech’ in the West, despite the content of her speech claiming the opposite. Manning’s highly mediated trial somewhat overshadowed the revelations she disclosed, leading to some quite pessimistic conclusions by some scholars. For example, Hamilton Bean argues that Manning’s plea remained “largely ignored” by the American public and that “readers of this article will find little potential” in Manning’s ambition that disclosing ugly secrets would lead to such outrage that reform would ensue (Bean 2014). Pal and the Gulabi Gang, if enjoying a certain level of success in accessing justice for the vulnerable, also became a sensation in the West as symbols of strong, resilient, and resistant women while also reinforcing certain colonial discourses placing India as the backward, undeveloped, and lawless place that ‘we are not anymore’. These discourses also tended to focus on the very few occasions when they did use violence to achieve their aims, hence focusing on the more sensational aspects of their resistance to the detriment of the multiple techniques they are actually using, and sometimes eclipsing the message that the Gang wishes to carry through their fearless speech. As for Idle No More, they danced and fasted and blockaded and it did achieve the disruption of certain discourses around settler colonialism in Canada as well
as rebuilding a sense of self and of self-governance for Indigenous communities. But it also allowed the dissociation of Stephen Harper and his government from the rest of the political elites and of the population in general by portraying him/them as ‘un-Canadian’ and as particularly cruel and insensitive, a glitch in Canadian liberal history rather than a continuation of historical settler-colonial processes of exploitation and genocidal policies and practices.

What do these partial disruptions and reinforcements tell us about the logics of protection? It seems that, while masculinist/sexualised logics were overall punctured, challenged, and subverted by all of those figures, colonial ones remained in a large part un-punctured despite the parrhesiastes’ efforts and speeches. Old and new discourses of coloniality pitting women’s liberation against their own cultures and presenting gender equality as located solely in the West might be partially to blame here. In fact, women who speak courageous truth to power within colonial contexts tend to be read through those colonial logics of protection as only confirming discourses of Western superiority and enlightenment. It seems that women resisting their positioning as protected, unprotected, and unprotectable succeed in disrupting masculinist logics of protection often at the cost of reinforcing colonial ones. Whether intended or not, most of the female figures in this thesis found themselves read as symbols of liberal discourses of colonial liberation or praised for their (gendered) courage while the colonial logics of protection were safe from the challenge their parrhesia might have led to. It would be interesting to explore this claim in more depth in future research, looking in more detail at these cases and/or others, to see if and how colonial and masculinised logics of protection can be punctured and/or reinforced in relation to one another.

The chapters therefore offer interesting insights and avenues for future research in terms of exploring logics of protection empirically. But beyond this empirical exploration of logics of protection themselves, I also claimed in chapter two that more attention needed to be paid into their modes of functioning. I suggested that using Foucault’s work offers interesting avenues for understanding how those logics function under the three economies of power Foucault studied and how they produce the subject, object and abject positions within such logics as well as invoke resistance to them. Young opened up a space to think about the continuum lying between the benevolent-loving protector, functioning under pastoral forms of power, and the bully-racketeer one. But there still is a need to think about how they sometimes exist within the same person/actor/institution: sometimes the bully is also the benevolent and the disciplining
protector. Hence I tried to look at how pastoral, disciplinary, and coercive economies of power *simultaneously* shape the ways in which logics of protection function in different contexts.

As hinted at above, the case studies in this thesis seem to confirm how colonial/imperial and settler-colonial logics, for example, function both through pastoral techniques based on benevolence and loving sacrifice, and coercive/sovereign ones enforced through violence and more open domination, while also relying on disciplinary/normalising techniques ensuring compliance through internalised norms and conventions. Many examples came out of the empirical chapters on how such different economies of power simultaneously shape the ways in which multiple logics of protection function: dropping food alongside bombs in Afghanistan; promoting discourses of ‘reconciliation’ and ‘recognition’ in Canada without changing predatory logics of capitalist extraction and trying to locate settler-colonial violence in the past; claiming to protect LGBT rights-holders worldwide as well as sexual orders/the gender binary within the military institution while leaving vulnerable service members to their own faith when they ‘fail to do their gender right’; enacting laws against caste/class and gender discrimination in India while failing/refusing to enforce them against entrenched social orders; being just a few examples.

More specifically, looking at all those cases together, it seems that in each case study, the parrhesiastes challenge the hypocrisy of ‘open secrets’ concerning logics of protection, but more specifically, each parrhesiast seems to challenge and critique the coercive and violent techniques of power underlying discourses and claims to benevolent protection. What the parrhesiastic speeches of these dissident female protectors seem to point out is that the pastoral/governing forms of power underlying logics of protection (the types of power that guide each individual through conducting their conduct and through sacrifice for the salvation of the flock) are actually supplemented or complemented strongly by sovereign/coercive and disciplinary forms of power that use violence, surveillance, and coercion to ‘better protect’, usually in the sovereign’s own interests. It seems that the more pastoral/governing forms of power and discourses surrounding dominant logics of protection apply to those who can remain within the confines of the protector and the protected’s roles, while coercion is what is reserved to those unprotected and unprotectable. Each of the figures under study in this thesis seems to denounce, criticise, and speak to the hypocrisy of dominant logics of protection that leave most people outside of its scope, that rely on violence, coercion,
and surveillance under the guise of pastoral protection, and that end up reinforcing and/or producing injustices and imbalances of power through discourses of benevolent protection. Each of these figures thus seems to speak truth to the impossibility of pastoral forms of governing to truly protect (all of) the unprotected and unprotectables. In other words, the parrhesiastes’ speeches in this thesis all seem to call for people to resist the lure of dominant logics of protection that offer promises of protection to some, while placing others under the violent reign of the sovereign. Hence we can see how the chapters and the actors studied within them pointed out some of the ways in which different economies of power function with and against each other to enforce and maintain dominant logics of protection.

Yet the empirical chapters could only really provide a glimpse of how logics of protection function in relation to economies of power. In fact, since the exploration of the different logics in each case served primarily to set the background and contextualise the parrhesiastic acts of the four figures I studied, the governing/pastoral, sovereign/coercive, and disciplinary/normalising forms of power through which each logic functions needs more theorising and empirical exploration. The necessarily limited scope of this thesis did not allow me to develop fully the Foucauldian theoretical framework relating to power and the functioning of logics of protection. For example, how discourses of pastoral protection intersect with coercive/sovereign forms of power in Canada, not only in the past but currently (especially under the leadership of Justin Trudeau who does not spare tears about the atrocities of past settler-colonial violence, yet still allows and encourages contested pipeline projects and tar sand extraction on Indigenous lands), and how one actually depends upon the other and vice versa, are questions that deserve to be answered in more depth. So is the question of how normative/disciplinary forms of power function within that picture to frame what it means to be a ‘good’ Indigenous woman and a ‘good’ settler-Canadian in relation to such discourses.

The same goes for each empirical chapter. More research is needed to explore how the overwhelmingly sovereign/coercive forms of power of internal logics of protection in Afghanistan functioning through the protection rackets of warlords and fundamentalists are reinforced by, intersect, and/or clash with pastoral discourses of protection. Such discourses should be studied not only in relation to the U.S. justifications for invasion and war, but also in relation to the pastoral discourses of humanitarian actors working on the ground that rely on normalising/disciplinary forms
of power to determine who is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Afghan civilian deserving of assistance and protection. We need more reflection on how the evolving discourses of U.S. sexual exceptionalism and pastoral protection offered to ‘good’ queers, hence depending upon normalising/disciplinary forms of (bio)power in relation to gender and sexuality, also rely upon and reinforce coercive/sovereign power unleashed against the mostly brown and black queer bodies punished for their transgressions, either through imprisonment and/or violence and/or death. And finally, we need to study how enduring gendered caste/class social orders functioning through coercive and disciplinary forms of power to place low-caste women as the target of violence and discrimination are contradicted, yet also reinforced by pastoral forms of protection expressed through official laws and governmental discourses. These are all issues that were mentioned but not developed fully within the scope of this thesis. More work needs to be conducted on how precisely each Foucauldian economy of power would function together and against one another in different empirical cases. More specifically, if the exploration of those cases allowed for (the beginning of) an understanding of how pastoral and sovereign forms of power function together and against each other, the disciplinary forms of power that make them both possible would need more scholarly attention.

**Parrhesia: Contributions, Limitations and Points of Departure**

Which leads us to another important contribution this thesis brought to FSS and IR: the use of parrhesia as a framework to study instances of fearless speech to power. One of the implications raised by this thesis is the importance of putting acts of resistance/dissidence/problematisation at the centre of our work. Politically as well as theoretically, if we are to deconstruct the gendered discourses and imbalances of power in Global Politics, we need to devote more of our time and energy to figuring out what forms resistance might, and do take, in the face of such power. I argued in this thesis that looking at how people problematise dominant discourses normalised into a status quo is a good place to start thinking about resistance and the space it opens up to challenge, subvert, change, and deconstruct dominant narratives. More specifically, I argued that parrhesia offers a useful framework to achieve this aim because it allows us to understand not only the intertwining of power and resistance in relation to truth and the subject, but also how resistance always involves not only political aspects but also judicial and ethical ones, as will be developed below. More studies using parrhesia as a central framework should be conducted in FSS and IR, as they would provide us with
more solid empirical and theoretical grasps on resistance and power. We will see below what parrhesia as a framework brought to the thesis and could potentially bring to the discipline as a whole, what came out of the case studies analysed separately and together that could enrich our understanding of contemporary instances of parrhesia, and what limitations the thesis has in relation to parrhesia, as well as points of departure for future research.

The case studies suggest that looking at parrhesia helps us understand the different layers and angles implied in speaking dangerous truths to power: it allows us to understand the political, judicial, and ethical implications of resistance. In fact, resistance is never only political; it is also about in/justice, as well as about how we relate to ourselves and to the world, and how we can change who we are. Using the framework developed in this thesis, taking the three aspects of parrhesiastic resistance (political, judicial, and ethical) into account, helped to broaden the scope of each figure’s resistance and parrhesiastic speech. What comes out of the analysis of each case using these three modalities of parrhesia is the relevance of understanding resistance as always already about politics, ethics, and justice. It raises the question of whether or not it is possible to understand the actions of female protectors without taking into account both the political, ethical, and judicial aspects of their cases. For example, we saw that to understand Manning’s radical disclosures, it is not enough to focus only on the political aspects of her truth-speaking. We also need to take into account the ethical implications and motivations behind her speech, understood here as a self relationship to oneself. Also, differentiating between judicial and political forms of Manning’s dissident speech allowed for more depth in the exploration of both the political critiques addressed to the institution in which she was inserted (in terms of how it governs/is governed in relation to logics of protection) and the need to speak truth to the injustices she witnessed and experienced (both in relation to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and within the US military). The same goes for each case study. Joya’s fearless speech was about how to govern otherwise (without the hypocrisy of compromises exchanged for power and privileges), it was about speaking truth to the injustices of the bullies’ crimes and demanding justice, and it was about uncompromising ways of being otherwise (demanding justice and speaking truth despite the dangers involved). Pal and the Gulabi Gang’s fearless speech was also about governing otherwise by making the state live up to its promises, it was about speaking truth to the injustices faced by the subalterns but also punishing those who commit
injustices or fail to protect vulnerable people against the powerful, and it was about incorruptible and courageous ways of being otherwise by taking matters into one’s own hands and ‘daring to act’ in the face of injustice. The Idle No More activists were also speaking truth to the governing power of settler-colonial Canada and its effects on Indigenous modes of governance, they were reclaiming justice for Indigenous people and women by speaking truth to the on-going coercive nature of settler-colonial violence, and they were ‘speaking in’ to their selves and communities about building new modes of de/subjectivation, performing alternative modes of governance, reinvigorating traditional beliefs, practices and leadership modes, decolonising the self and ‘healing’, and so forth. Hence resistance in these four cases is about criticising the injustices of the powerful, the ways we are being governed, the ways we govern ourselves, who we are because of it and how we can change who we are in relation to power. It highlights the importance and the relevance of using the three modalities of parrhesia to fully make sense of these different acts of resistance.

More specifically, reading all those chapters together in relation to parrhesia, what comes out is that positionality matters when it comes to problematising, criticising, subverting, and/or resisting dominant logics: it seems that the further away one is located in relation to institutions of power, the more diversified the techniques one uses to be heard. For example, Joya, being located from within the institution of political power, uses mostly verbal exposure to get heard, like the Greek practice used to entail. She uses parliamentary speech, political representation, and consultation with constituents as techniques of, yet against, the political institutions in which she speaks. Manning, being very uncomfortably located within the institution of power because of her impossibility to really be in it, uses the Internet to leak her disclosures as an alternative ‘agora’ in which she can be and from which she can speak. Yet, as developed in the chapter, whistleblowing still remains quite close to the Greek practice of parrhesia. Coming out as trans, if constituting dangerous speech in itself, can both reinforce and/or challenge the biopolitical institutions/discourses one criticises. The Gulabi Gang and Sampat Pal, being located outside the institutions of power, use a wide variety of techniques to get heard, including the power of numbers, (threats of) violence, and other tools to gain public visibility in order for their speech to reach their intended targets in positions of power. In fact, this case is marked by the variety of techniques used as well as the collective and public character of their speech. If this parrhesiastic speech remains quite centred around Sampat Pal, the use of a large
numbers of women in order to get voices heard is noticeably different from the first two cases. Finally, Idle No More being not only outside of institutions of power but made invisible to them (their disappearance being a requirement for the good functioning of those institutions), also use a wide variety of techniques to break the silence, including hunger strikes and round dances which rely on the use of bodies as speech. These embodied forms of parrhesia speak to the impossibility to speak and be heard conventionally for Indigenous women in Canada. Contrarily to the Gulabi Gang though, in the case of Idle No More, the goal is not to get the institutions to do their job better but rather to disturb their normal functioning by putting oneself in the way of their undisturbed operations of power.

Through these four distinct cases, we see that the further away from power, the more numerous, diversified, and collective the techniques used to speak and be heard. Despite the fact that all of these cases were located within officially ‘democratic’ states, whose voices are heard and who has access to the ‘agora’ depends on how close you are to power. This argument is not new: Spivak and other feminist and/or postcolonial scholars have long asked the question of if/how the subaltern can speak/be heard. It seems rather obvious that being positioned as the unprotectable limits your access to the agora and the reach your speech can have if using only verbal exposure as the Greek parrhesiastes did. Hence the mere fact of speaking for most of those figures already speaks truth to liberal discourses around democracy and ‘free-speech.’ Yet the issue matters because current work on parrhesia, while acknowledging the potential of using it as a framework to study resistance from the most disadvantaged and marginalised populations (Frey 2015; Huckaby 2007; Novak 2006; Rossing 2014), has yet to study in more details how much ‘below’ in terms of power one can be in order to speak truth to ‘an above’ and how those differences in terms of positionality affect the forms and techniques one’s parrhesia can take. More comparative studies should be conducted in order to dig deeper into what this thesis seems to suggest: that the more subaltern the position, the more creative, diverse, and embodied forms the parrhesiastic speech takes. It would be interesting to understand parrhesia in more nuanced and refined ways: how much does positionality matter when one speaks dangerous truths to power? How does it affect the techniques, forms, means, aims, and scope one’s parrhesiastic speech might take? These questions would be interesting points of departure for future research using parrhesia as a central framework.
Yet if parrhesia offered, I argued, a strong theoretical framework through which we could make sense of my case studies, it also showed some limitations that deserve to be raised. First, parrhesia focuses on a very specific form of resistance: that which takes the form of publicly speaking dangerous truths to power and taking risks by doing so out of a sense of duty. This is quite narrow in the scope it opens up to think resistance, in that it does not (at least in the way I developed parrhesia as a framework in this thesis) really offer tools to make sense of more mundane, everyday, private, invisible, forms of resistance. Nor does it help us understand the functioning of longer-term movements of resistance such as social movements or other long-lasting, organised, and evolving practices of dissidence/resistance. I theorised parrhesia as moments of speaking truth to power in a way that presents those moments as localised in time and space, not as networked, lasting, long-term, organised practices. This has the advantage of capturing the urge and compulsion to act/speak out against injustices and make sense of the ‘snap’ moment when someone decides to act despite the risks, thus focusing on courage and on ethics. But there is a lot left in the shadows of these stories, in those moments that have not happened and that, perhaps, could never happen without the more subdued, lengthy grass root work of activists and other actors who resist power in its multiple forms.

For example, Joya’s speech could never have happened without the work of RAWA, OPAWC, and other women’s and human rights associations in the country and beyond who had already prepared the ground for those truths to be told and heard. Without transnational networks of resistance against the war in Afghanistan, she never could have toured internationally, and her truths might not have been heard as widely as they were worldwide. Similarly, the Gulabi Gang and Pal would not have been able to speak and act if previous struggles fought by lower-caste women and movements of resistance had not prepared the ground for their truths to be spoken. They would probably not have been able to grow in strength and number without already established networks of solidarity among women and lower-caste/class communities. The media attention they received both locally and internationally also relied on previously raised awareness and campaigns ran by different social movements and activists in India and beyond. Hence parrhesiastic acts rely upon already existing resistance networks to initially take place, to gain traction and for the challenge-blackmail game to be minimally effective. We thus need to recognise that parrhesia only exists upon the background of larger and multiple other forms of resistance.
This means that more work needs to be conducted in order to better understand what kind of resistance parrhesia actually consists of and/or what kinds of resistance parrhesia as an ethico-political practice of subjectivation enables. This thesis only briefly touched upon Foucault’s work on power and resistance to get to the discussion and specification of parrhesia; it did not engage with the vast literature on resistance, both from traditional perspectives on social movements in global politics and critical approaches using counter-conduct, everyday resistance, contentious/unruly politics, and weapons of the weak frames (Death 2010; Odysseos, Death, and Malmvig 2016; J. C. Scott 2008; Sivaramakrishnan 2005; Aminzade et al. 2001, to name a few). Such explorations go beyond the contours of this thesis, but future research could focus on the relationship between parrhesiastic ‘snap moments’ and resistance from those different perspectives, opening up interesting avenues to better understand what kind of resistance parrhesia actually is, what kinds of resistance it enables, and what kinds of resistance it potentially restricts in global politics.

This last point leads to other issues raised by the case studies in relation to parrhesia: besides Idle No More, all of my case studies seem to rely on an individual figure resisting ‘in the name of’ other, more vulnerable, actors. This raises two different, yet interrelated questions. First, is parrhesia mostly an individual practice? And, second, does parrhesia reproduce a form of hero-worshipping that Foucault was so careful to avoid when coming up with the term ‘counter-conduct’ in Security, Territory, Population (Foucault 2009)? The first question seems to be partly answered by the case of Idle No More but it raises the issue of how to theorise the practice in the future, especially from a feminist perspective. While Foucault mostly looked at individual (white male) Greek citizens practicing parrhesia, others have applied parrhesia to more collective and diversified forms of contemporary fearless speech (Huckaby 2007; Frey 2015; Perron 2013). Yet most studies of parrhesia (like mine) still focus on individuals such as Edward Snowden or Malcolm X, and very few have explored the gendered implications involved in speaking truth to power. Following feminist critiques of liberal thought, focusing on individuals and individualism often tends to reinforce the myth of a disembodied, rational, autonomous and competitive citizen (see Pateman 2014; W. Brown 1992, among others). If this thesis and the work of many other feminist studies scholars debunked such myths, is our work not contradictory in still putting individuals at the centre of our analysis? More studies need to be conducted on the more collective practices of parrhesia from a feminist perspective because there is a lot to be gained by
better understanding the roots and potentials of collective (feminist) resistance taking multiple forms of fearless speech to power.

As for the second question, it is true that focusing on individuals also tend to reify a form of hero-worshipping by positioning those figures as exceptional in their courage and actions. As I argued in this thesis, some women also positioned themselves as above and/or exceptional in relation to those in whose name they speak. Even the collective and decentralised movement Idle No More tended to elevate Chief Theresa Spence to the status of a hero (Kinew 2014b). Of course such discourses have to be read in context and take into account the emotional needs underlying any movement of resistance, be it individual or collective. In fact, the hero narrative often serves to inspire courage and raise hope in others as a mobilisation strategy. I myself confronted this desire to provide (feminist) hope while writing this thesis, which initially hindered me from reading my cases critically.

But this hero-worshipping also serves to elevate the figure and isolate her and her actions, which allows others to remain impermeable to the ethical self-relation that parrhesia is supposed to open up, encouraging people to “dare to act” (Luxon 2008) and change their ethos (Lorenzini 2015). It also tends to reinforce discourses of liberal-individualist exceptionalism upon which many dominant logics of protection rely and reproduce. The problem resides in the fact that parrhesiastes, intentionally or not, tend to focus attention upon themselves rather than (or in addition to) the injustices they are trying to denounce. In relation to Manning’s case, Bean uses Lauren Berlant’s concept of Diva Citizenship (“when a person stages a dramatic coup in a public sphere in which she does not have privilege”, (L. G. Berlant 1997; cited in Bean 2014, 69)) to conclude that leakers such as Manning “inevitably draw public attention to themselves and away from institutional wrongdoing.” (Bean 2014, 69) Citing Berlant again, he argues that: “their testimony remains itself personal, specifically about them, their sensations and subjectivity” (Idem). While this thesis attempted to contest the separation of one’s subjectivity from one’s action and the division between personal/public and ethics/politics, the question still needs to be asked: does parrhesia inadvertently reproduce the focus on the exceptional individual rather than the collective workings of power and resistance through its hero-sanctification? In other words, does the individual speaking dangerous truths to power ‘steal the show’ from the critique they are formulating, precluding effective change to happen both in people’s own subjectivities and in judicial and political discourses/institutions of power? I will let readers of this
thesis answer this question for themselves, but I think we need to be careful in using parrhesia in ways that do not reproduce the very same mechanisms we are trying to overcome.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the main limitations raised by this thesis in the current context of Global Politics might lie in relation to truth to change. In fact, all figures studied in this thesis speak out of the hope that, when faced with horrible truths, people will be outraged and that this outrage will then lead to changes in power and the ways we are governed/govern ourselves. All dissident female protectors studied here seem to rely on the idea that having the courage to speak the truth will force people to resist their government and change their selves. On that front and in light of the case studies’ analyses, I cannot help but agree with Bean that there is little potential to support such view. Both Bean in relation to Manning and Martineau in relation to Idle No More use the concept of “communicative capitalism”, as developed by Jodi Dean, to explain this bleak observation. According to Dean, communicative capitalism:

designates that form of late capitalism in which values heralded as central to democracy take material form in networked communications technologies. […] But instead of leading to more equitable distributions of wealth and influence, instead of enabling the emergence of a richer variety in modes of living and practices of freedom, the deluge of screens and spectacles undermines political opportunity and efficacy for most of the world’s peoples. (Dean 2009, 55)

In fact, she argues that the development of communication technologies have led to the dense circulation of content that “relieves top-level actors (corporate, institutional, and governmental) from the obligation to respond” (Dean 2009, 102) because instead of responding to the critiques of activists, they can counter them with their own contribution to the flow of communications. The “fantasies” of political participation and struggles are reduced to contributing to the circulation of content within communicative capitalism. Hence the parrhesiastic figures in this thesis might disclose uncomfortable and dangerous truths to power, but the impact of such truth-telling is limited to the public’s reaction to it: after all, for the parrhesiastic challenge-blackmail game to work in favour of the parrhesiast, the powerful need to feel that their power is threatened by those truths, or at least that punishing the parrhesiast for her truth-telling will lead to such outrage that their power might be threatened. Yet at a time when people are constantly bombarded with information and content to be outraged about, are the truths disclosed by the parrhesiastes simply lost in the ever-increasing flow of the circulation of content in spaces of communicative capitalism? Without adopting the
whole argument on hegemony/counter-hegemony that Dean suggests which has the effect of grounding power and resistance in an either/or relationship, there is still a question here that deserves to be raised: what potential do parrhesiastic practices of resistance really offer us today, in the midst of increased circulation of content within private capitalist networks of communication?

On both of these last two points, the recent #MeToo movement online where thousands of women around the world disclosed their experiences of sexual harassment and assaults might offer interesting avenues to study a collective instance of fearless speech from a feminist perspective that worked precisely by harnessing the “deluges of screens and spectacles” (Dean 2009) in order to enforce change. What might the courageous truth-speaking of millions of individual women tell us in relation to parrhesia as a practice, especially as these are women who did not know each other, yet who all spoke out in the hope that their speech would be met with respect instead of shame, in order to provoke change for themselves and others? It differs, for example, from Idle No More’s resistance that was localised in terms of space and scope, addressed a specific locus of power in Canada, and organised around a common identity as Indigenous Canadians. It also differs from the Gulabi Gang that is physically grounded in a certain region of India and rely upon a collective identifying as part of lower-caste/class communities as well as gender identity. The #MeToo movement, in comparison, transcends many boundaries not only in terms of space (beyond nationhood and geographical locations) and identity (even though the majority of the hashtags came from people who identified as women, not all of them did and the movement also transcended many boundaries in terms of race, nationalities, sexualities, classes, and ethnicities45) but also in terms of targets and aims (not targeting a specific government or institution of power but a whole system of impunity and structural sexual violence).

Similarly to Joya or Manning, the movement was addressing the impunity and hypocrisy of silence and open secrets. But unlike Joya, Pal or Manning, the women who sent their #MeToo hashtag and spoke out courageously, encouraged by the thousands of other unknown voices speaking truth at the same time, were not talking in the name of others. They were rather disclosing injustices committed against themselves to highlight the scope of the issue collectively. Is the #MeToo movement an example of a case that

45 Although how much so remains to be studied as it was carried by mostly Western women who could afford the connectivity of social media and the risks involved in disclosing such assaults/harassment stories (for example, lower-class women who experience harassment at work might not have been able to share their stories the same way Hollywood actresses have).
did harness the ‘flow of communications’ in ways that enforced change while also contributing to the circulation of content within communicative capitalism, or will those truths also get lost in that flow? It might be too soon to understand fully the #MeToo movement and what it enabled and foreclosed in terms of power/resistance, but it offers an interesting example through which to potentially examine collective forms of (feminist) parrhesia, while parrhesia might offer a particularly useful framework to analyse this case in relation to its political, ethical, and judicial components.

Lastly, in the current political context in which the term “fake news” was named as official word of the year 2017 by some dictionary, there is another issue raised by parrhesia in relation to truth and resistance: what potential does parrhesia as a praxis offer us when the appeal to ‘truth’ is becoming elusive at best and irrelevant at worst? I have argued in this thesis that the political take on truth underlying parrhesia offers interesting alternatives to Cartesian understandings of truth as empirical evidence to be extracted. Understanding truth, not as something that needs to be discovered and extracted but as emerging from someone courageous enough to speak, parrhesia offers us the potential to think feminist resistance outside of androcentric and masculinist views of the world and of truth. But now that the relationship between truth and power seems to be shifting and that scientific ‘truths’ in the forms of facts and evidence seem to be losing the power they held over people’s thinking and lives, what does it mean to speak dangerous truth to power out of a sense of moral duty?

Within this changing political context, maybe parrhesia can be seen precisely as a practice we desperately need in the time of fake news. If parrhesia allows us to see truth not as it corresponds to reality, but as a commitment to a truth through which individuals turn themselves into ethico-political subjects, parrhesia might indeed be a powerful tool for people to remain vigilant of political formations, populist claims, and ‘rackets’. While discourses around ‘real’ and ‘fake’ news are potentially changing the regimes of truth characterising the circulation of content within ‘communicative capitalism’, turning oneself into a subject through an ethico-political practice of courageous truth-speaking might indeed offer potential avenues to resist dominant narratives. In fact, if the impact of ‘fake news’ is that people start being vigilant of truths coming from an ‘above’ and start questioning the authority truth holds over certain national and international narratives, grounding truth in an ethico-political practice that aims at improving a situation for oneself and others might therefore be a way of strengthening and enabling resistive practices to power rather than stifling them.
Yet another recent phenomenon has to be taken into account if we are to keep using parrhesia as a framework. In fact, speaking dangerous truths to power today is increasingly being claimed (mostly in the West but not only) by (neo)fascist and/or extreme-right nationalist forces, presenting themselves as the marginalised victims of neoliberal elite cosmopolitanism whose ‘truths’ have been ignored and/or suppressed by dominant actors and discourses. While the ‘alt-right’ and other neo-Nazi groups and factions claim to be speaking dangerous truths to power in order to improve a situation, in other words, to be parrhesiastes, how might we think again about the transgressive potential of speaking dangerous truths from ‘below’ to an ‘above’? Is the parrhesia of marginalised groups politically distinct and ethically different when coming from neo-fascist discourses? How do these new/old discourses of white supremacists’, which are made as if they are claims to parrhesia, affect the ways we think and understand the relation between ethics, justice, and politics? What future does parrhesia hold in changing the ways we are governed, the ways we govern ourselves and who we are in the face of the rapidly growing power of neo-fascist groups?

The ‘agora’ seems to be changing and shifting again, delimiting new/reframed spaces where ‘truthful truths’ are being contested, recasted, debated, reaffirmed, and held accountable. It might be too early to analyse where new political formations are taking us in relation to truth, power, and the subject, but we should remain careful not to overlook these new developments and their implications for our understanding and mobilising of parrhesia as a theoretical framework and a resistive practice. For example, in the U.S. the ‘alt-right’ aims at re-storying different national narratives, to redefine boundaries of (national) belonging, and logics of racialised protection, using discourses around ‘fake news’ to help achieve their aims. In reaction to and in parallel to those discourses, we have also seen other forms of ‘truth-speaking’ to power aimed at ‘re-storying’ national narratives to highlight, challenge, subvert, resist, and contest the historical, on-going, and structural forms of exclusion and oppression upon which dominant national narratives rely. These other acts of parrhesia have been rejecting both the ‘alt-right’ narratives and the attempts by political elites to re-inscribe and reinforce foundational national myths such as the melting pot or the American dream. From the take down of Confederate flags and statues around the country to Kolin Kaepernick’s (and now others’) ‘take a knee’ stance, multiple instances of parrhesia took place that centred truth on courage. The silent parrhesia of kneeling down for an anthem and the spectacle of confederate statues being taken down speak truth to power in ways that do
not rely on notions of ‘fake’ or ‘real’ truths, nor on rhetoric or persuasion, but on the ethical, political, and judicial commitments to truth as resistance to power. Yet the question remains as to what differentiate these parrhesiastic practices from those of the ‘alt-right’. Perhaps here lays the task of scholars who would like to mobilise parrhesia in future studies: to critically analyse such claims and narratives and evaluate their effects of, and resistance to, power. The framework I provided in this thesis, rather than being a liability in the face of far-right’s claims to parrhesia, might on the contrary provide a useful basis to explore truth-claims in all of their complex, interrelated, and/or contradictory political, judicial, and ethical implications. Hence maybe parrhesia as theory and praxis is precisely what we need to explore the complexities around issues of truth, power/resistance, and subjectivation in Global Politics today.
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294


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