A University of Sussex PhD thesis

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SUMMARY

Contemporary peacebuilding debates centre on questions of effectiveness, relevance, and sustainability, broadly contrasting a ‘liberal peace’ model and more ‘critical’ perspectives. The critical peacebuilding literature calls for a transformative approach addressing inequalities and systemic violence underpinning conflict, promoting ‘local’ engagement, and responding to ‘everyday’ priorities. Education systems play central roles in reproducing or challenging relations of power, privilege, and inequality associated with violent conflict, and represent key sites of ‘local’ and ‘everyday’ engagement. However, the critical literature has paid limited attention to education’s potential, and political, peacebuilding role. In this thesis, I explore the importance of education in peacebuilding and argue that peacebuilding scholarship should seriously engage with education. Using a case study approach and a critical cultural political economy framework, I explore links between education, inequality, and peacebuilding in South Sudan, through analysis of donor and government policies and interviews with 217 education and peacebuilding actors. I suggest that education policies and practices reproduce political, economic, and cultural inequalities and violence and undermine peacebuilding aims in three broad ways. First, education resource and service distribution reproducess, justifies, and institutionalises geographic and intergroup disparities and grievances associated with ‘real’ and perceived inequalities. Second, ‘local’ participation strategies based on ‘decentralised’ governance reproduce patterns of political exclusion, exploitation, and mistrust between ‘local’ communities and authorities. Third, formal education practices and informal narratives concerning identity and difference, in relation to inequality, conflict, and peace, reproduce colonial forms of oppression and violence. These findings demonstrate the complexity of education’s peacebuilding role, expanding critical discussions concerning inequalities, the ‘local’, and the ‘everyday’ and providing insight into specific sociopolitical processes through which these can be addressed, both analytically and ‘practically’.
I would like to thank the many people who have provided the support necessary for me to complete this thesis. First are my supervisors, Jan Selby and Mario Novelli. I am incredibly grateful for your guidance, encouragement, and patience over the past four years. Thank you for providing invaluable feedback and insights, asking challenging questions, and pushing me to develop my ideas and arguments, deepen my analysis, and explore new directions and perspectives.

At the heart of this thesis are the reflections of the students and young people, teachers, school managers, and representatives of government ministries, and international and national organisations who participated in interviews and discussions. I am grateful for your patience and generosity in sharing your time, experiences, suggestions, and questions. I thank the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (now Ministry of General Education and Instruction) of South Sudan for allowing this research to take place, particularly former Hon. Minister John Gai Yoh and Hon. Undersecretary Michael Lopuke Lotyam, as well as Victor Dut Chol and the Peacebuilding Technical Reference Committee. I also thank State Ministries of Education and county and payam education offices in Central and Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and Upper Nile, for supporting this research.

This research would not have been possible without the incredible support of UNICEF South Sudan, including former Country Representative Jonathan Veitch, former Chief of Education Phuong Nguyen, the PBEA team (Thelma Majela, Ticiana Garcia-Tapia, Lucy Lomodong, Genzeb Jan Terchino), and the Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and Upper Nile offices. I also thank UNICEF’s Eastern and Southern Regional Office, particularly Neven Knezevic, for providing the chance to conduct this research. A Doctoral Fellowship from Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council also made this PhD possible.

This process would have been infinitely more difficult without the wonderful Global Studies PhD community and your encouragement and reassurance (and commiseration), debates and discussions, and moments of escape from the thesis. Finally, to my parents, Ann Wheatley and Pierre-Yves Daoust: thank you, so much, for your love, encouragement, and support (and occasional concern) throughout this PhD and during all the steps before it, across multiple provinces, countries, and continents.
## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AES</th>
<th>Alternative Education System</th>
<th>GRSS</th>
<th>Government of the Republic of South Sudan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCSSAC</td>
<td>Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPE</td>
<td>Critical cultural political economy</td>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical discourse analysis</td>
<td>IMED</td>
<td>Improved Management of Education Delivery (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDs</td>
<td>County education departments</td>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>Central Equatoria state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNHPR</td>
<td>Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation</td>
<td>JAM</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>Cultural political economy</td>
<td>JMEC</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK Aid)</td>
<td>MoCYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education For All</td>
<td>MoEST</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Management Information System</td>
<td>MoFEP</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>MoGEI</td>
<td>Ministry of General Education and Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GER</td>
<td>Gross enrolment rate</td>
<td>NBS</td>
<td>National Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GESP</td>
<td>General Education Strategic Plan</td>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GESS</td>
<td>Girls’ Education South Sudan</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
<td>NPPR</td>
<td>National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Operation Lifeline Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPE</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBEA</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy programme (UNICEF)</td>
<td>TGoNU</td>
<td>Transitional Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>Pastoralist Education Programme</td>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and vocational education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians site</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent teacher association</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>SPLM-IO</td>
<td>SPLM-In Opposition</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Southern Regional Assembly</td>
<td>UNS</td>
<td>Upper Nile state</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDP</td>
<td>South Sudan Development Plan</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSLM</td>
<td>Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>South Sudan pound</td>
<td>WBG</td>
<td>Western Bahr el Ghazal state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPRC</td>
<td>South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission</td>
<td>WES</td>
<td>Western Equatoria state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Situating the Research: ‘The Problem of Peace(building)’</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Critical Peacebuilding Debates and the Relevance of Education</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Conflict, Peacebuilding, and Education Through the Lens of Inequality</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Overview of the Research: Questions, Methods, and Concepts</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Structure of the Thesis</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH CONTEXT: CONFLICT, PEACEBUILDING, AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH SUDAN</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Chapter Introduction</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Histories of Conflict in (South) Sudan</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Approaches to Governance and Peacebuilding</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Education and Violence in South Sudan</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Governance of the Education System</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3. PEACEBUILDING AND EDUCATION: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Chapter Introduction</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 ‘Liberal’ and ‘Critical’ Peacebuilding Perspectives</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 ‘Critical’ Peacebuilding and Education: A Gap in the Literature</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Education Literature: Insights for Critical Peacebuilding</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Chapter Summary</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Chapter Introduction</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Critical Theoretical Approach</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Critical Realism</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Critical Cultural Political Economy</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Considering Scales of Analysis</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 Chapter Summary</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY AND METHODS</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Chapter Introduction</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 A Case Study of Peacebuilding and Education in South Sudan</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Policy Document Review and Discourse Analysis</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Data Collection Approaches</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 Engaging Research Participants</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6 Data Analysis and Review</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Situating the Research: ‘The Problem of Peace(building)’

Peacebuilding, and the ‘problem of peace’, is a “critical research agenda central to International Relations” (Richmond, 2007a, p. 247) and a “subject of intense debate within contemporary [IR]” (Selby, 2013, p. 58). Recent peacebuilding debates centre on the effectiveness, relevance, and sustainability of contemporary approaches, broadly contrasting a so-called ‘liberal peace’ model and more ‘critical’ perspectives intended to inform just and durable peace. This critical peacebuilding literature\(^1\) suggests that peacebuilding analysis and interventions should adopt a transformative approach, addressing systems of violence and inequality underpinning conflict, promoting ‘local’ engagement, and responding to ‘everyday’ needs. Gaps and limitations associated with IR-dominated peacebuilding scholarship illustrate the importance of, and need for, “more interdisciplinary work in international relations and peace and conflict studies”, to inform “a better understanding of the variations of peace and its building blocks” (Richmond, Pogodda and Ramović, 2016, p. 1).

The critical peacebuilding literature lays out key critiques of ‘liberal’ frameworks and identifies directions for more transformative, just, and sustainable peacebuilding analyses and approaches. However, I suggest that this literature has not gone far enough in exploring these themes, due in part to its limited (and depoliticised) engagement with the role of social institutions, and with education systems and institutions in particular. In this thesis, I explore the importance of education in peacebuilding and argue that IR-centred peacebuilding scholarship should seriously engage with education as a sociopolitical institution, using the ‘case’ of South Sudan’s education sector to explore and expand critical peacebuilding discussions. I locate my research contributions within the wider tradition of critical peacebuilding scholarship, and aim to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of critical perspectives on peacebuilding and education’s complex and political role.

1.2 Critical Peacebuilding Debates and the Relevance of Education

Discussing the limitations and problems of dominant (‘liberal’) peacebuilding processes, the critical peacebuilding literature draws attention to three important

\(^1\) While acknowledging that critical peacebuilding scholars are not homogeneous, I consider this ‘critical literature’ as a body of literature engaging in critiques of the ‘liberal peace’ model.
debates, representing directions for ‘just’ and ‘sustainable’ peacebuilding. First, critical peacebuilding scholars contend that ‘(neo)liberal’ peacebuilding interventions ignore, reproduce, and widen patterns of marginalisation, exclusion, and inequality. They argue that peacebuilding should involve transformation of political, economic, and social ‘drivers’ of conflict, including systems of violence, oppression, and inequality (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Richmond, 2006a, 2006b, 2008b, 2009a, Newman, 2010, 2011; Cooper, Turner and Pugh, 2011; Pugh, 2011; Richmond, 2012; Sabaratnam, 2013; Richmond, 2014; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; Richmond, 2016).

Second, critical peacebuilding scholars claim that the ‘liberal’ model lacks attention to ‘local’ contexts and imposes externally defined norms, priorities, and definitions. They emphasise the importance of recognising ‘local’ ownership, knowledge, and priorities through opportunities, at multiple scales, for ‘local’ actors to define peacebuilding needs, strategies, and objectives (Pugh, 2005; Richmond, 2006b; Taylor, 2007; Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009a; Lidén, 2009; Richmond, 2010b; Mac Ginty, 2010; Autesserre, 2010; Jabri, 2010; Pugh, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Autesserre, 2011; Newman, 2011; Richmond and Mitchell, 2011; Richmond, 2012; Jabri, 2013; Newman, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2015; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016). Third, critical peacebuilding scholars suggest that externally driven ‘liberal’ peacebuilding fails to understand or represent individuals’ and communities’ day-to-day lives, activities, threats, and needs. They argue that peacebuilding goals can be realised through responses to populations’ ‘everyday’ needs, concerns, and priorities (Richmond, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c, 2010a; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Mitchell, 2011; Newman, 2011; Roberts, 2011b; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016).

These arguments draw attention to the transformative potential of peacebuilding, in terms of responding to underlying dynamics of conflict and engaging with, and responding to the needs and interests of, actors at multiple scales, from the ‘local’ to ‘global’. However, I suggest that these discussions involve three broad limitations, based on their limited attention to: 1) specific ‘social’ mechanisms or processes through which these critical peacebuilding issues (inequality, the ‘local’, the ‘everyday’) can be addressed, moving beyond the level of abstraction toward ‘practical’ and policy implications; 2) processes and institutions linking international or national level governance and ‘grassroots’ spheres; and 3) relationships between responses to ‘everyday’ concerns, ‘local’ engagement, and systems of/responses to violence and
inequality. I suggest that analysis of education systems can provide insight into mechanisms through which systems of inequality are reproduced or challenged and through which ‘local’ and ‘everyday’ engagement are facilitated or undermined as part of peacebuilding processes. This can also provide insight into relationships between these areas, interactions between scales of action and influence, and the ‘practical’ and policy relevance of critical peacebuilding debates.

Education systems, as key social (and political) institutions, play a central role in reproducing and entrenching relations and structures of political, economic, and cultural power, privilege, inequality, and injustice that contribute to intergroup grievances and violent conflict. They can also play important roles in challenging these aspects of violence and contributing to peacebuilding efforts. A small body of critical peacebuilding literature considers the role of social institutions and services, presenting three broad explanations for their (potential) peacebuilding contributions. First, some critical scholars suggest that social service provision represents a form of socioeconomic distribution, or a means of addressing social, economic, and political exclusion and promoting social and economic rights as sources of peace (Pugh, 2005; Lidén, 2009; Newman, 2011; Roberts, 2011b; Richmond, 2014). Second, they suggest that public service provision can address people’s ‘everyday’ needs and priorities and thus represents ‘local’ or ‘everyday’ forms of peace (Richmond, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c, 2010a; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Mitchell, 2011; Roberts, 2011b, 2012; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Newman, 2014; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016). Third, they suggest that social service provision can contribute to state-society relations by responding to ‘everyday’ needs and contributing to (democratic) participation and the legitimacy of the state and of peacebuilding interventions (Richmond, 2008b, 2009c; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Newman, 2011; Roberts, 2011b; Newman, 2014; Richmond, 2016).

Some inroads have been made with respect to engagement with education in the critical peacebuilding literature, through specific references to education ‘services’ in some publications and the inclusion of education-focused chapters in some edited texts on peacebuilding. However, references to education in the critical peacebuilding literature are generally peripheral or vague, and do not fully consider the complexity and political implications of education’s role in both violence and peace. Discussions of education and other ‘social services’ are limited by a largely depoliticised focus on service ‘delivery’ or ‘provision’ (education as a service or good to be delivered, rather than a complex political institution), assumptions about education’s ‘positive’
peacebuilding contributions, and limited attention to political, economic, and cultural violence and inequalities reproduced within and through education. The lack of engagement with education in the critical peacebuilding literature reflects wider disciplinary divisions, with limited consideration of education’s role and significance in the broader field of IR. This also reflects a view of education as largely disconnected from ‘political’ peacebuilding processes. Education is, however, “fundamentally a political matter” (Dupuy, 2008b, p. 158). Education ‘services’ “are never simply ‘services’”; rather, they ‘serve to govern’, reflecting and expanding political control and power (Ferguson, 1994, p. 253). As “the most public of public policies” (Samoff, 2003, p. 2), education represents “a highly political process, touching upon power relations, access to resources and ideological predilections [sic]” (Mkandawire, 2004, p. 11).

Critical scholarship, including peacebuilding scholarship, requires attention to different scales of analysis, “to the micropolitics of context, subjectivity, and struggle, as well as the macropolitics of global economic and political systems and processes” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 501). Engagement with education, as “a principal mechanism by which global forces affect the daily lives of national populations” (Tikly, 2001, p. 155), can provide insight into processes and institutions linking international- or national-level governance and ‘grassroots’ spheres. Education systems represent mediating sites between ‘local’ communities and national governments, as well sites of international intervention and influence. They represent “one of the most visible, far reaching forms of government” (Winthrop and Matsui, 2013, p. 4), “a central strategic platform for political actors” (Robertson, 2009, p. 542), and “one of the central… socialising institutions of the modern capitalist state” (Novelli, 2016, p. 849). Education systems are key institutions mediating, and providing insight into, relations of power operating from ‘intimate’ to ‘global’ levels (Peterson, 2016, p. 443). These include relations between the ‘public’ or ‘political’ and ‘private’ or ‘personal’, and between individuals and households, the state, international politics and institutions, and global political and economic structures, which are of central importance to understanding dynamics of violence, injustice, and peace (Tickner, 2001, pp. 63, 104; Sylvester, 2012, pp. 484–501; Fraser, 2013, pp. 33–4; Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 390–6, 593–636).

Education systems play central roles in transmitting and legitimising political ideologies that justify conflict or facilitate transitions to peace (Rappleye and Paulson, 2007, p. 255; Smith, 2010, pp. 17–8). They also legitimise and reproduce particular (national and global) political and economic structures and patterns of power (Olssen,
Education plays a critically important role in social transformation and peacebuilding, presenting an entry point for wider political transformation across multiple sectors (Dupuy, 2008b, p. 150; Smith, 2010, p. 23; Barakat et al., 2013, p. 127; Ellison, 2014, p. 191; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015, p. 15). It can serve as a ‘weapon of war’ (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000, p. 11; L. Davies, 2010, p. 491) and a ‘key player’ in perpetuating violence (Davies, 2005, p. 358), and is “almost always complicit in conflict” (Buckland, 2006, p. 7). Education systems reproduce, exacerbate, and legitimise structures and relations of power, exclusion, and domination (Harber, 2004, p. 60; Dupuy, 2008a, p. 29; Brown, 2011, pp. 192–6; Robertson and Dale, 2013, pp. 435–7). This challenges assumptions, reflected in the critical peacebuilding literature, concerning education’s positive, beneficial, or neutral role. In this thesis, I attempt to (re)politicise education’s peacebuilding role by moving beyond explanations that consider it as simply a service to be delivered and drawing attention to its complex role in both violence and peace and its implications for critical peacebuilding debates.

1.3 Conflict, Peacebuilding, and Education Through the Lens of Inequality

Attention to multidimensional inequalities represents the entry point for my analysis of education’s peacebuilding role, due to their significance in violent conflict and their implications for peacebuilding processes. ‘Post-conflict’ societies involve “a transformation of violence from large-scale warfare to other types of violence” (Cramer, 2006, p. 245), including ‘indirect’ violence that “tyrannises life in post-conflict spaces” (Roberts, 2011a, p. 2540). This draws attention to changing forms of violence and power in peacebuilding contexts (Cooper, 2007, p. 615), including structural violence and inequalities affecting peacebuilding. Ignoring inequality and injustice, and associated grievances, leads to peace agreements and processes that “paper over deep

Large multi-country quantitative studies report that intergroup and geographic socioeconomic and political inequalities (e.g. income, assets, representation) are associated with increased likelihood of armed conflict (Besançon, 2005; Regan and Norton, 2005; Bakke and Wibbels, 2006; Østby, 2007, 2008b; Østby, Nordås and Rod, 2009; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Buhaug et al., 2011; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011; Deiwiks, Cederman and Gleditsch, 2012; Bartusevičius, 2014; Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch, 2014; Fjelde and Østby, 2014; Cederman, Weidmann and Bormann, 2015). Several studies report that educational inequalities (e.g. in attainment) between ethnic and religious groups and subnational regions are associated with higher likelihood of civil war and communal conflict (Østby, 2007, 2008b, 2008a; Østby, Nordås and Rod, 2009; Bartusevičius, 2014; Fjelde and Østby, 2014; FHI 360 Education Policy and Data Center, 2015).
fissures in society, sowing the seeds for future conflict” (Keen, 2012, p. 771). Persistent inequalities and structural violence reproduce conflict dynamics and threaten peacebuilding goals (Newman, 2013, p. 318; Richmond, 2014, pp. 449–50). Additionally, peace interventions themselves “are disparate and divergent in their economic and social impacts… raising troubling questions about who they might leave behind” (Selby, 2008, p. 11). This illustrates the need for attention to global and internal inequalities between geographical regions and social groups, and their peacebuilding implications (Selby, 2008, pp. 18–9; Cooper, Turner and Pugh, 2011, p. 2006).

In this research, I am interested in the ways in which inequalities and structural forms of violence affect peacebuilding. Rather than identifying specific causes of violent conflict, I am interested in understanding wider forms and mechanisms of inequality and (structural) violence that affect and undermine peacebuilding processes. I explore interrelations between different forms of inequality or injustice, the ways in which these are reflected, reproduced, or challenged in education contexts, and resulting implications for peacebuilding. I frame education’s peacebuilding role in terms of its contributions to a ‘positive’ peace based on addressing underlying causes of conflict, including structural inequality and injustice (Galtung, 1969, p. 183).

I focus on horizontal inequalities, or systematic “severe and consistent economic, social, and political differences between… or groups with shared identities” (Stewart, 2008, p. 12). These are linked to broader aspects of structural violence occurring “as collective systematic processes and institutions of rule… as institutionalized systems of power and inequality” (Mohanty, 2015, p. 971). In exploring systematic inequalities as forms of violence, I consider a broad definition of violence involving direct as well as structural or indirect forms. These include the unequal distribution of power, resources, and opportunities, as well as exploitation, marginalisation, repression, alienation, and other forms of injustice affecting survival, wellbeing, and freedoms (Galtung, 1969, p. 171, 1990, pp. 292–4). I consider forms of violence (re)produced by structures, systems, and institutions that legitimise inequalities and shape material contexts in which people live (Anglin, 1998, pp. 145–7; Parsons, 2007, p. 180). In conceptualising structural violence and inequalities, I consider interconnected socioeconomic, political, and cultural aspects. *Socioeconomic* dimensions include distribution of and access to material assets or resources, employment opportunities and income, and services (e.g. housing, health, education). *Political* dimensions include representation or participation in decision-making and

Inequalities and structural violence are “experienced as injustice… at particular intersections of race, ethnicity, class, nationality, gender, and age” (Anglin, 1998, pp. 145–6). Inequalities aligning with group identities (e.g. ethnic, religious, geographic), associated with perceived deprivation relative to others or fears of loss of power and privilege, can drive collective grievances and mobilisation for conflict (Stewart, 2000, pp. 246–8, 2008, pp. 7–12, 2009, pp. 316–7; Østby, 2013, pp. 215–6). Grievances may be associated with ‘actual’ (e.g. observable, ‘measurable’) inequalities or with *perceptions* of inequality and injustice (Stewart, 2000, p. 250, 2008, pp. 7–18; Stewart, Brown and Langer, 2008, pp. 193–4; Brown and Langer, 2010, pp. 30–1). Assessments of inequality and injustice involve subjective and psychological as well as ‘concrete, physical’ dimensions (Piketty, 2014, p. 2).

Education systems are particularly important sites through which to analyse and address inequalities and structural violence, as inequalities and injustices in education opportunities and outcomes interact with and influence other forms of political and socioeconomic disadvantage and inequality (Cramer, 2003, p. 398; Stewart, 2009, pp. 323–7). Educational inequalities play a particularly strong role in collective grievances and mobilisation as they are more likely to result from systematic discrimination (Østby, 2008b, p. 155). By reflecting and reproducing different forms of inequality, education systems represent mechanisms of structural violence and contribute to its persistence and durability over time. Some education literature examines inequalities reproduced within and through education systems, implications for violent conflict, and entry points for transformation as part of peacebuilding. These include *economic* inequalities related to education resource and service distribution, *political* inequalities related to representation in decision-making and management and opportunities for participation, and *cultural* inequalities related to identity and difference in education structures and content (Harber, 2004; Degu, 2005; Smith, 2005; Dupuy, 2008a, 2008b; L. Davies, 2010; Tikly and Barrett, 2011; Power, 2012; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015). While these often intersect with historical patterns of marginalisation, oppression, and inequality, they also present possibilities for transforming systems underlying conflict. This can occur through the redistribution of resources and services,
decision-making arrangements challenging existing systems of representation, and recognition of identity and difference in forms and content of education.

In exploring these multidimensional inequalities, I consider the ways in which political, economic, and cultural influences, systems, and processes, at multiple scales, intersect to shape outcomes in particular contexts. This includes attention to the ways in which certain discourses and practices are privileged, ‘operationalised’, and reproduced in particular institutions or projects across different scales and sites (Jessop and Sum, 2001, p. 96; Jessop, 2005b, pp. 144–6; Jessop and Sum, 2010, p. 445; Jessop, 2010, pp. 338–46; Best and Paterson, 2010, pp. 12–7; Walker, 2010, pp. 225–6; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 49–51, 165–86). In relation to education, this requires attention to its ‘real’ politics, including links with wider political, economic, and ‘cultural’ structures and systems (Robertson and Dale, 2008, pp. 24–6; Dale and Robertson, 2009, pp. 1119–22).

I do not claim that education alone can address peacebuilding challenges or fill gaps in the critical peacebuilding debates. Education, on its own, does not produce or resolve conflict. Education systems are located within complex international, national, and ‘local’ contexts (Dupuy, 2008a, p. 25; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008, p. 481), and the nature and duration of conflict, social and economic environments, and political settlements affect education’s peacebuilding role (Ishiyama and Breuning, 2012, pp. 65–6; Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013, p. 203). I do, however, suggest that attention to the role of education can expand ‘critical’ debates on responses to systems of violence and inequality, ‘local’ engagement, and ‘everyday’ concerns and priorities. Detailed analysis of political, economic, and cultural dimensions of inequality and violence reproduced within and through education systems can also inform broader critical discussions of the nature and role of inequalities in peacebuilding.

When discussing the significance of inequalities, I do not suggest that violent conflict can be reduced to inequality-related ‘grievances’. Understanding conflict causes and dynamics involves attention to links between grievances and ‘greed’ (or between political and economic motivations) (Stewart, 2000, p. 246, 2008, p. 22, Cramer, 2002, p. 1853, 2006, pp. 134–5; Keen, 2012, p. 771) and between collective and individual identities, motivations, and actions at local and ‘supralocal’ levels (Kalyvas, 2003, p. 475). I also acknowledge the numerous factors influencing relationships between inequality, conflict, and peacebuilding: political conditions (e.g. state structure and institutions, political accommodations and opportunities, agendas of conflict actors), economic conditions (e.g. resource availability), and demographic factors (e.g. location
and size of populations, significance of intergroup ‘differences’) (Cramer, 1997, pp. 8–9; Regan and Norton, 2005, p. 333; Stewart, 2008, pp. 19–22; Stewart, Brown and Langer, 2008, pp. 288–96; Brown and Langer, 2010, pp. 31–2; Østby, 2013, pp. 216–7; Anderson and Rolandsen, 2014, pp. 547–51). In this thesis, I use the concept of inequality as the ‘lens’ of analysis but acknowledge that there are other dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding that are not explicitly addressed.

1.4 Overview of the Research: Questions, Methods, and Concepts

In this thesis, I explore the role of education in peacebuilding, with a specific focus on the reproduction and transformation of inequalities. I critically engage with this topic on two levels. First, I engage in an empirical analysis of education’s role in peacebuilding in South Sudan. Education has played a central role in dynamics of violence in South Sudan since the colonial period, with education distribution, management, and content used as mechanisms of power and violence. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed following decades of armed conflict between Sudan’s north and south, called for a process that “replaces war not just with peace, but also with social, political and economic justice” (p. 2). However, I suggest that current approaches to education policy and practice reproduce political, economic, and cultural forms of inequality and violence and undermine peacebuilding efforts. Second, I engage with the critical peacebuilding literature, using empirical findings to make broader arguments about the role of education.

This research addresses two central questions, the first more general and the second focusing on the specific case: 1) **What is the role of education in peacebuilding, and how is this influenced by forms of inequality?** 2) **What role does education play in peacebuilding processes in South Sudan, and how is this influenced by forms of inequality?** In addressing these central questions, I explore three sub-questions: 1) How are economic or resource-related inequalities reflected and reproduced in the education system, and what are their implications for peacebuilding? 2) How are political inequalities reflected and reproduced in the education system, and what are their implications for peacebuilding? 3) How are ‘cultural’ inequalities reflected and reproduced in the education system, and what are their implications for peacebuilding? These sub-questions explore different forms of inequality (and their peacebuilding implications) as ‘lenses’ or entry points for understanding the complex education-peacebuilding relationship. I address these three broad dimensions of
inequality in the three empirical chapters, which focus, respectively, on the ‘economic’ distribution of education resources and services, ‘political’ participation and influence in decision-making, and ‘cultural’ engagement with identity and difference. I consider each of these sub-questions in relation to the case of South Sudan, and in terms of their implications for the critical peacebuilding literature.

This research is based on a qualitative case study methodology involving primary data collection and analysis of donor and government policy documents. I conducted primary research in South Sudan over a 10-month period, which involved interviews and group discussions with 217 education and peacebuilding stakeholders.

Critical cultural political economy, informed by a critical realist ontological perspective, provides a framework for examining interrelated cultural, political, and economic factors informing the selection, implementation, and reproduction of discourses and strategies in education contexts, at multiple scales, and their implications for processes of violence and peacebuilding. This requires attention to the perspectives, experiences, interests, and influences of actors within and outside the education sector, at international, national and subnational, and ‘local’ school and community levels, and the relations between them. I consider Sabaratnam’s (2011a, p. 797–8) call for “direct engagement with the ‘recipients’ of these [peacebuilding] interventions”, examining “the ways in which people and groups… have interpreted or engaged the practices and agents of intervention”. This draws attention to connections between the ‘political’ and ‘personal’, between the global, national, and ‘local’, through attention to people’s perceptions, interpretations, experiences, and emotions concerning the politics of conflict and peacebuilding intervention (Sabaratnam, 2011a, p. 798; Sylvester, 2012, pp. 484–501; Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 270–4; Sylvester, 2013, pp. 2–5; Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 390–6, 593–636; Ahmed, 2014, pp. 9–28).

I examine formal and nonformal forms of education managed within South Sudan’s government system, focusing on primary- and secondary-level education (although I acknowledge that what is understood and experienced as ‘education’ varies widely). I examine education as an ‘ensemble’, considering collective structures, forms of organisation, and practices (Robertson and Dale, 2015 p. 152–7). I explore processes of education governance, or “the combination and coordination of activities, actors/agents, and scales, through which ‘education’ is constructed and delivered” (Robertson and Dale, 2008, p. 23; Dale and Robertson, 2009, p. 1117). This includes the coordination and division of responsibilities in education funding, ownership,

I consider peacebuilding, broadly defined, as actions or interventions to support a transition from war to peace and prevent the recurrence of large-scale violence (Barnett et al., 2007, p. 36). As noted above, I adopt a ‘positive’ or ‘sustainable’ understanding of peace involving responses to underlying (structural) causes of conflict (Galtung, 1969, p. 183). I do not consider ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding as “a discrete, identifiable sphere of activity” or “the dominant element of… war-ending practices” (Selby, 2013, p. 64). I consider the ways in which peacebuilding processes are “structured by the specificities of war-ending processes and the strategies and power dynamics that accompany them” (Selby, 2013, p. 78), with attention to wider political, economic, cultural, and historical contexts. I also challenge the artificial distinction between ‘war’ and ‘peace’, which obscures forms of non-war violence embedded in societies and global political systems (Cramer, 2006, pp. 215–6; Cooper, 2007, p. 615). Considering structures of inequality, injustice, and violence complicates the question of “when war ends and peace begins”, through attention to “features of life before, during, and after the event the war usually describes” (Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 638–9).

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

In this chapter, I have provided an introduction to the aims and contributions of this thesis research. In Chapter 2, I present an overview of historical and contemporary dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding in South Sudan and the history and governance of the education sector, providing a background for subsequent empirical discussions. In Chapter 3, I review the critical peacebuilding literature, focusing on key areas of debate concerning the ‘liberal peace’ model and its existing limitations, notably its limited engagement with education. I also discuss the contributions of the education literature to
these critical peacebuilding debates. In Chapter 4, I provide an overview of my guiding theoretical framework, based on a critical cultural political economy approach. In Chapter 5, I outline the case study methodology and specific approaches to data collection, and reflect on ethical issues associated with this project.

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 present the empirical findings of this research. In Chapter 6, I explore the ways in which educational resources and services are distributed in South Sudan. I examine processes, roles, and perspectives associated with resource and service distribution at national, subnational, and school and community levels, and show that the distribution of education resources and services reproduces, justifies, and institutionalises geographic and intergroup inequalities and associated grievances. In Chapter 7, I explore ‘local’ participation in education governance, focusing on the implications of ‘decentralised’ approaches to education and school management and connections to wider systems of political participation. I show that processes of ‘local’ participation institutionalised through ‘decentralised’ and ‘school-based’ education governance reproduce patterns of political oppression and exploitation. In Chapter 8, I explore questions of identification, difference, and ‘recognition’ within (and through) the education sector, focusing on education aims, content, and wider political narratives. I show that formal programmes and informal sector narratives reproduce colonial dimensions of oppression and violence. In each of these chapters, I explore, respectively, the implications of empirical findings for conflict and peacebuilding dynamics, and consider the ways in which they can expand the critical peacebuilding debates. In Chapter 9, I summarise and further reflect on these findings and discuss their wider implications for the peacebuilding literature, policy, and practice.
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH CONTEXT: CONFLICT, PEACEBUILDING, AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH SUDAN

2.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter provides a broad context for specific empirical analyses described in subsequent chapters. First, I provide an overview of historical and current conflict dynamics in South Sudan, including conflict between Sudan’s north and south and ongoing conflict within South Sudan, followed by an overview of contemporary government and peacebuilding processes. I then provide an overview of the history of the education system in South Sudan, including its central role in violent conflict, and approaches to education system governance, including key policy frameworks, the structure of the system, and sector financing.

2.2 Histories of Conflict in (South) Sudan

An analysis of peacebuilding in South Sudan requires an understanding of histories of conflict linked to patterns of marginalisation, oppression, and inequality. While acknowledging the complex pre-colonial history of what is now the state of South Sudan, I focus on colonial and post-independence periods, which provide the clearest insight into the role of education policy and practice in political violence and conflict. During the pre-colonial period, the region included Islamic, Christian, and so-called ‘pagan’ (‘indigenous’) kingdoms (Johnson, 2003, pp. 2–5; Idris, 2005, pp. 26–8). The Turco-Egyptian invasion of Sudan in 1820 marked the beginning of a first colonial regime. This period involved the exploitation of southern populations through systems of taxation and slavery, and the privileging of largely Muslim northern populations (Johnson, 2003, pp. 4–6; Idris, 2005, pp. 28–31; Mamdani, 2009, pp. 136–7). Northern Sudanese forces overthrew Turco-Egyptian rulers in 1885, marking the beginning of the Islamist ‘Mahdist’ period. This period of independence built on existing systems of exploitation of military and economic labour from the south, based on ‘racial’, ethnic, and religious categorisations (Deng and Daly, 1989, pp. 2–3; Johnson, 2003, pp. 6–7; Idris, 2005, pp. 31–2; Elnur, 2009, pp. 6–10; Mamdani, 2009, pp. 138–42).

The British imposed colonial rule on Sudan in 1898, marking the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period. Colonial development favoured the north,

3 The systematic exclusion of Egyptians from power sharing made Sudan ‘a de facto British colony’ (Sharkey, 2003, p. 6).

When Sudan gained independence in 1956, southerners were largely excluded from political processes and administration (Rolandsen, 2005, p. 22; de Waal, 2007, p. 3; Poggo, 2008, p. 36; Mamdani, 2009, pp. 178–9; Ayers, 2010, p. 160). Sudanese administration reflected colonial methods (e.g. ‘native administration’) and attitudes toward southern ‘backwardness’ (Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, pp. 610–20). Northern governments attempted to enforce state control and ‘national’ identity through the imposition of Arabic language and Islamic religion and law. The promotion of Islamist and Arab nationalist ideologies were presented as nation-building projects, necessary to create unity around religion, language, and ‘culture’ (Johnson, 2003, pp. 30–5; Idris, 2005, pp. 50–1; Poggo, 2008, p. 96; Mamdani, 2009, pp. 179–80; Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, p. 618). This was influenced by ties with Arab states, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia (de Waal, 2007, p. 4).


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4 For example, the Zande cotton scheme, implemented in 1926, involved the displacement and resettlement of nearly 50,000 people in the southern Equatorial region, to supply land and labour for commercial cotton and cloth production (Reinton, 1971, pp. 242–5).

5 Conflict explanations based on racial, ethnic, or religious differences and hostilities (e.g. northern ‘Arab’ Muslims, southern ‘African’ Christians) reflect essentialist and partial accounts. Conflict dynamics are shaped by legacies of colonial and postcolonial rule, geopolitical influences, and geographic and socioeconomic dimensions of exploitation and marginalisation (Johnson, 2003, pp. 1–2; Deng, 2005, p. 245; Idris, 2005, pp. 3–4; de Waal, 2007, p. 17; Ayers, 2010, p. 156).

In 1972, the GoS and SSLM signed the Addis Ababa agreement, resulting in the creation of a semi-autonomous southern region. This involved the establishment of a Southern Regional Assembly (SRA) with control over certain sectors (e.g. administration, internal security), although regional government efforts and autonomy were limited by a lack of funds and internal political divisions (Stevens, 1976, pp. 248–50; Kasfir, 1977, pp. 143–4; Rondinelli, 1981, pp. 612–22; Johnson, 2003, pp. 39–43; Rolandsen, 2005, p. 25; Poggo, 2008, pp. 187–92). Large-scale fighting began again in 1983, when the northern government revoked the agreement following the discovery of oil reserves in southern territories, tensions over regional borders, and the attempted construction of the Jonglei Canal (and extraction of southern water resources) (Duffield et al., 2000, p. 168; Johnson, 2003, pp. 44–9; Young, 2012, p. 46; Selby and Hoffmann, 2014, p. 366). However, periods of ‘war’ and peace were not clear-cut: periods of ‘peace’ (e.g. under the Addis Ababa agreement) involved continued violence, while certain areas were peaceful during periods of war.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by John Garang, emerged as the leading rebel force in the 1980s. The SPLM/A was driven by grievances over unequal distribution of power and development, control of land and oil resources in the south, and a stated aim of a unified, secular ‘New Sudan’ (although popular discourses reflected an aim of southern nationalism and independence).

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6 While $225 million were allocated to the Southern Region for 1977-1983, only 45 million had been disbursed by 1982 (Johnson, 2003, p. 44).

7 The SPLM/A initially reflected a Marxist orientation and rhetoric (linked to efforts to mobilise support from the Ethiopian Derg and wider communist bloc), but lacked a clear ideology (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 25; Young, 2012, p. 62). The post-Cold War shift to a liberal political agenda reflected adaptation to the changing international environment (Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 427) and access to American state and Christian/evangelical support.
Fighting during the first war centred in the south, but extended to northern regions during the second war. By the early 1990s, the SPLM/A controlled roughly two-thirds of southern territories (Hutchinson, 2001, p. 308).

The scale of internal conflicts within both north and south complicates narratives of ‘civil war’ in Sudan. In addition to fighting between the SPLM/A and GoS, armed conflict occurred between forces in the south, reflecting “a pattern of interlocking civil wars… fought on different levels” (Johnson, 2003, p. 127). A number of SPLM/A factions split in the 1990s due to disagreement over leadership and political agendas. Ethnic and tribal identities were politicised and mobilised, with GoS and SPLM/A factions mobilising and arming ‘tribal’ militias and targeting civilian populations along ethnic lines (Keen, 1994, pp. 222–3; Jok and Hutchinson, 1999, pp. 127–34; Hutchinson, 2001, pp. 317–21; Johnson, 2003, pp. 81–118, 151–2; Jok, 2005, pp. 153–5, 2017, p. 2; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 35–8; Young, 2012, pp. 52–7). By the late 1990s, fatalities due to violence between southern forces exceeded those from violence by the GoS army (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999, p. 127).

Regional and international involvement also complicates the ‘civil war’ narrative. During the first war, southern movements received military and financial support from Kenya, Uganda, and Israel, while the United States (US), Britain, and West Germany as well as Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia supported the GoS (Poggo, 2008, pp. 158–66; Ayers, 2010, p. 162). The US provided economic support to Sudan in the 1950s in response to the threat of communist expansion in the region, viewing Sudan as a strategic ‘bridge’ between the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Support was expanded to include military aid in the 1970s-1980s, with Sudan as the ‘regional anchor’ of US foreign policy and the single largest recipient of US foreign aid in Africa (Yohannes, 1997, pp. 322–30; Johnson, 2003, pp. 57–60). The US-Sudan relationship collapsed in the 1980s due to the ‘Islamisation’ of the Sudanese regime under Omar al-Bashir and alliances with ‘radical’ states (e.g. Libya, Iran) during the Gulf War. The US later supported the SPLM/A (and allies such as Ethiopia and Uganda), influenced by security and counterterrorism agendas in the Horn of Africa region, economic interests (including oil), and evangelical Christian lobbies (Yohannes, 1997, pp. 322–30; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 28–34; Young, 2005, pp. 103–4, 2012, pp. 37–8, 88–9; de Waal, 2007, p. 14; Ayers, 2010, p. 162). US involvement in Sudan was later
influenced by the post-9/11 focus on the ‘Arabisation of violence’ and narratives of violence by northern ‘Arabs’ against southern ‘Africans’ (Mamdani, 2009, pp. 64–71).

In 2005, following roughly 30 months of negotiations and decades of war during which an estimated 2.5 million people died and 4.6 million were displaced, the GoS (led by the National Congress Party, NCP) and SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA focused on power sharing, oil revenue, and security arrangements during a six-year transitional period prior to a southern independence referendum in 2011. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional body that included Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan, led negotiations. Some viewed the CPA as “a unique and unprecedented rare opportunity to make ‘peace’… in the Sudanese society” (Deng, 2005, p. 244). However, the CPA (undemocratically) legitimised the SPLM as the ruling party in the south and the SPLA as the official army, excluding other political actors and representing a minority of the population (Young, 2005, pp. 101–2; Thomas, 2009, pp. 12–4; Young, 2012, pp. 8–14, 109–16; Aalen, 2013, p. 176; Selby, 2013, pp. 73–4; Zambakari, 2013a, p. 19). The semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was formed in 2005, and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) was established following independence in 2011. South Sudan includes ten states: Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Western Equatoria (the Equatorial region), Western Bahr el Ghazal, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Warrap (Greater Bahr el Ghazal region), and Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei (Greater Upper Nile region).

Tensions between Sudan and South Sudan persisted after the CPA, linked to border demarcation and security, oil revenues (oil is exported through Sudanese pipelines), cross-border population movement, and mutual accusations of support for opposition forces (Jok, 2013, pp. 14–5; ICG, 2016, pp. 2–4). Violent conflict has also

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8 IGAD, originally the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification, was involved in peace negotiations in Sudan since the early 1990s (Johnson, 2003, pp. 101–2; Rolandsen, 2005, p. 43; Young, 2012, pp. 82–8).

9 52 per cent of seats in the national assembly and national executive in the Government of National Unity were allocated to the NCP, 28 per cent to the SPLM, 14 per cent and six per cent to other northern and southern political forces, respectively. In the south, 70 per cent of state-level legislative and executive positions were allocated to the SPLM, 10 per cent to the NCP, and 20 per cent to other southern political forces (CPA, 2005, pp. 20–37).

10 In October 2015, President Salva Kiir introduced an Establishment Order dividing the 10 existing states into 28 new states, largely along ethnic lines (Radio Tamazuj, 2015). In December 2015 Kiir removed the 10 existing state governors and appointed 28 new governors and in April 2016 an internal decree subdivided these 28 states into new counties (Radio Tamazuj, 2016b). The 28 states have not been accepted by the SPLM-IO, and the decision has not been recognised by UNMISS due its incompatibility with the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict. In this thesis, I use the names of the previous 10 states (and associated counties) in place during the research period.
persisted within South Sudan, involving fighting between government and non-state (rebel) forces, and intergroup or ‘communal’ conflict. Tensions and grievances are linked to inequitable geographic and ethnic distribution of political power and resources (especially oil revenues), internal border demarcation and territorial claims, economic and natural resource access and control, and inadequate services and economic opportunities (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 14–5; Young, 2012, pp. 291–325; Jok, 2013, p. 7; Pendle, 2014, pp. 237–40). The geography of violence has shifted since 2005. Pre-2011 conflict events were concentrated in southern Equatorial states, shifting to central and northern regions (primarily Greater Upper Nile) after independence (ACLED, 2015, pp. 1–3; Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 38–9). This geographical shift reflects dynamics of power and grievances: during the second civil war, most militia groups were based in Greater Upper Nile, historically isolated and marginalised by both northern and southern authorities (Sudd Institute, 2014, p. 8). Conflict between SPLM/A and southern rebel forces has persisted since 2005, linked to tensions over inequalities in geographic and ethnic political representation and long-standing tensions between SPLM/A factions and other southern movements (Young, 2012, pp. 295–325; Sudd Institute, 2013, pp. 7–12).

‘Local’ intergroup or ‘communal’ conflict also increased after 2005, involving over 100 ethnic and communal militia groups (ACLED, 2015, pp. 7–9). This includes conflict between ‘pastoralist’ (cattle keeping) and farming communities and between cattle-keeping communities, linked to disputes over local borders, resource (e.g. land, water) access and control, and cattle raiding and reprisal attacks (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 20–57). Local violence is often described as occurring between ethnic groups, sections, or clans. There are approximately 64 main ethno-linguistic groups in South Sudan (and significantly more when counting subgroups such as sections or clans). The four largest groups (Dinka, Nuer, Zande, Bari) represent roughly 65 per cent of the population and the largest 10 groups roughly 80 per cent (Marshall, 2006, p. 15). However, ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ explanations of conflict are overly simplistic and misleading. They involve limited attention to structural violence reflected in political institutions and policies (including inequalities in resource distribution and political representation), economic (e.g. poverty, rising living costs, lack of alternative livelihood options) and environmental pressures (e.g. delayed rainfall), and pre- and post-CPA instrumentalisation and militarisation of group identities by political and military elites
In mid-2013, President Salva Kiir dismissed Vice President Riek Machar and other government and party figures, prompted by internal leadership competition within the SPLM. Armed violence erupted in Juba in December 2013 and quickly spread to Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei. While the GRSS accused Machar of attempting a coup, others link the spreading conflict and mobilisation to the killing of Nuer soldiers and civilians in Juba by members of the Presidential Guard (Mamdani, 2014, pp. 6–19; Sudd Institute, 2014, p. 5; Rolandsen, 2015, p. 170; Young, 2015, pp. 15–6). The conflict involves some ethnic dimensions, with Dinka forces largely loyal to Kiir and many Nuer forces joining Machar’s SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO). However, the conflict is largely rooted in power struggles among SPLM/A elites, poor party leadership and cohesion, exclusion of internal opposition, militarised government institutions, and longstanding divisions and fractionalisation within the SPLM/A (Johnson, 2014a, pp. 302–7; Mamdani, 2014, pp. 6–28; Sudd Institute, 2014, pp. 2–7; Rolandsen, 2015, pp. 165–71; Rolandsen et al., 2015, p. 89; Young, 2015, pp. 10–6).

Numerous armed groups are active in different states, some aligned with government or opposition forces and some not. Members of different ethnic groups have been mobilised by government and opposition forces, linked to longstanding frustrations over inequitable resource, service, and security provision across geographic areas and pre- and post-CPA militarisation of communities (Mamdani, 2014, pp. 28–9; Sudd Institute, 2014, p. 7; Rolandsen, 2015, p. 166; Rolandsen et al., 2015, pp. 89–92; Jok, 2017, pp. 2–3). Armed forces have targeted civilians (abductions, destruction of villages, sexual violence, and killings) on the basis of ethnic and political allegiance and have obstructed humanitarian activities, restricting access to certain sites and targeting humanitarian property, personnel, and civilians receiving assistance (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014, 2015; Mamdani, 2014; UNMISS, 2014; OCHA South Sudan, 2016). As of December 2016, approximately 1.9 million people had been internally displaced and over 1.2 million had fled to neighbouring countries (OCHA South Sudan, 2016, p. 4). Armed conflict was initially concentrated in oil-rich Upper Nile and Unity states, and spread to Central and Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal in 2016 (ICG, 2016, p. 18).

Regional and international actors have been involved in the conflict, with Uganda providing military support to the government and Sudan reportedly providing
some early assistance to the SPLM-IO (HRW, 2014, p. 21; Johnson, 2014a, p. 301; Sudd Institute, 2014, p. 11; Young, 2015, pp. 53–4; ICG, 2016, pp. 4–7). China has supported the government, including through arms sales, linked to oil interests in the country (Large, 2016, pp. 37–41). These same states have been heavily involved in IGAD-led peace negotiations. The government and SPLM-IO signed multiple ceasefire agreements between 2014 and 2015, although neither party adhered to these agreements. The failure of initial talks led to the formation of ‘IGAD Plus’: IGAD along with Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa, as well as the African Union, UN, European Union (EU), China, US, UK, Norway, and the IGAD Partners Forum.

2.3 Approaches to Governance and Peacebuilding

As noted above, the GRSS was established upon South Sudan’s independence. It is effectively a one-party system (Podder, 2014, pp. 232–4), with the SPLM/A holding over 90 per cent of National Legislative Assembly (NLA) seats and nine of 10 state governorships after the 2010 elections (Knopf, 2013, pp. 23–5). These elections consolidated the position of the (undemocratically appointed) SPLM/A in the south, and were characterised by restrictions, intimidation, and violence against opposition candidates (Young, 2012, pp. 135–62; Aalen, 2013, pp. 174, 186; Selby, 2013, p. 1974). The CPA focused on ending conflict and facilitating self-determination rather than political reform and democratisation (Young, 2012, pp. 9–10; Aalen, 2013, p. 174; de Waal, 2013, p. 226), with elections intended to legitimise the agreement rather than democratise the government (Selby, 2013, p. 77). South Sudan’s system of government operates, in theory, as a decentralised system. Its ten states are divided into counties, further divided into payams (districts) and bomas (village-level administration). Under the CPA and 2009 Local Government Act, government functions and authority are meant to be devolved to three ‘local’ levels: county, payam, and boma councils.

The CPA focused on issues relevant to the two negotiating parties, and subsequent peace- and statebuilding frameworks focused on north-south conflict with little attention to deeper, structural roots of conflict or to conflict dynamics and grievances within the south (Thomas, 2009, p. 11; Aalen, 2013, pp. 174–6; Mamdani, 2014, p. 33). It did not address human rights abuses by both parties, inequalities linked to conflict, or mechanisms for justice and reconciliation (Young, 2005, pp. 102–3, 2012, p. 9; Selby, 2013, p. 74; Zambakari, 2013a, pp. 23–5). The 2005 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication,
prepared by the United Nations and World Bank in collaboration with the SPLM and GoS, guided CPA implementation. The 2008-2011 ‘Sustaining Peace through Development’ Plan developed by the GoNU and GoSS built on CPA and JAM priorities. In addition to security arrangements, these plans focus on strengthening governance through institutional reform, decentralisation, resource management, service delivery, and accountability. They also refer to the expansion of basic services, including education, to contribute to state- and peacebuilding by providing a ‘peace dividend’ (JAM, 2005, p. 43; GoNU and GoSS, 2008, p. 2). National peace and reconciliation bodies, including the (former) South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (SSPRC) and the church-led Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation (CNHPR), 11 have echoed these priorities, emphasising ‘good governance’ as well as access to education services.

Similarly, internal conflict dynamics are largely neglected in the 2012 Peacebuilding Support Plan guiding United Nations (UN) actions. Based on the Transitional Constitution and SSDP, priorities include ‘inclusive’ political settlements, security and justice, economic development, and basic service support (UNESC, 2012, pp. 9–10). The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), established in 2011 (replacing the 2005 UN Mission in Sudan), leads UN peacebuilding efforts. UNMISS’s original mandate focused on supporting peace consolidation and longer-term statebuilding, democratic governance and political participation, and conflict prevention, security, and rule of law (UNSC, 2011, pp. 3–5). Changing conflict dynamics have shifted the UNMISS mandate from peacebuilding to protecting civilians from physical violence (focusing on ‘Protection of Civilians’, PoC, sites around UN compounds), facilitating humanitarian assistance delivery, monitoring, investigating, and reporting on human rights violations, and supporting peace agreement implementation (UNMISS, 2017). However, UNMISS has failed to effectively respond to violence against civilians, including within PoC sites (CIVIC, 2016; MSF, 2016).

11 The government established the SSPRC in 2011 as an ‘independent’ body to oversee peacebuilding policies and initiatives, advise national and international peacebuilding actors, and develop local peacebuilding capacity (Ministry of Justice, 2012; SSPRC, 2013). The CNHPR was established by presidential mandate in 2013, operating as an independent body to transform intergroup relations and ‘mindsets’ and develop inclusive institutions (CNHPR, 2013). It replaced the former National Reconciliation Committee, led by Riek Machar. A National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation (NPPR) was established in 2014, involving the SSPRC, CNHPR, and Specialised Committee for Peace and Reconciliation (based in the NLA, responsible for overseeing peace and reconciliation legislation development and implementation) (NPPR, 2014).
In August 2015, the government and SPLM-IO signed an Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict, focused on power sharing and security arrangements. This agreement largely replicates pre-2013 political structures, follows the CPA power-sharing model, and does not address underlying conflict dynamics or ‘local’ conflict (Jok, 2015, pp. 8–9; Verjee, 2016, pp. 2–3). Both parties repeatedly broke the ceasefire, continuing to recruit soldiers, purchase arms, and engage in armed violence (Mamdani, 2014, p. 36). The Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) was established in April 2016, with Kiir as President and Machar as First Vice-President. A 30-member cabinet was appointed, with 16 ministries held by the SPLM/A, 10 by SPLM-IO, and four by other parties (Sudan Tribune, 2016). A second TGoNU was formed in July 2016, with Taban Deng replacing Machar as First Vice-President, following the outbreak of fighting between government and SPLM-IO forces and the targeting of civilians (CIVIC, 2016; ICG, 2016).

National and international actors, including government bodies such as the SSPRC, faith-based organisations such as the CNHPR and South Sudan Council of Churches, and UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and UNMISS, have supported ‘local’ peacebuilding interventions in response to ‘communal’ conflict. They have drawn on ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ approaches such as peace dialogues and conferences, bringing together representatives of conflicting communities and local government officials. However, government and international actors heavily influence the structure, content, and outcomes of these processes, and focus more on subnational government officials than communities. Peace conferences are often organised as ‘one-off’ events, rather than integrated into wider peacebuilding processes, and fail to address relevant (or structural) topics or effectively ensure implementation. Finally, international supporters often fail to consider local power dynamics or the role of ‘local’ governance structures in violent conflict (Agwanda and Harris, 2009, p. 47; Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 8; Da Costa and Karlsrud, 2012, pp. 58–61; Wilson, 2014, pp. 5–7; Jok, 2015, p. 3).

2.4 Education and Violence in South Sudan

The history of the education system in South Sudan reflects patterns of political, economic, and cultural marginalisation of southern populations by colonial and

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12 These critiques were also raised in interviews by some subnational government officials.
Sudanese authorities. This is illustrated by minimal education investment and development and the imposition of language and curriculum policies. Education policies were used to exert control over southern populations (Beshir, 1975, p. 88), and the unequal development of the south was “most clearly visible in the area of education” (Poggo, 2008, p. 26). During the British colonial period, Christian missionaries were largely responsible for education provision in the south. This separate education ‘system’ reinforced existing divisions and disparities, with southern education generally poorly coordinated, of limited quality, highly unequal in terms of access, and reflecting a religious ‘civilising’ mission. Instruction was mainly in ‘local’ languages, although English was later identified as the ‘official’ language of instruction (Akrawi, 1960, p. 261; Sanderson, 1963, pp. 233–4, 1980, pp. 158–67; Deng and Daly, 1989, pp. 169–70; Deng, 1995, pp. 83–4, 2003, p. 3; Johnson, 2003, pp. 14–5; Sommers, 2005, pp. 53–9; Kevlihan, 2007, p. 519; Poggo, 2008, pp. 27–9). The restriction of southern education services was also linked to colonial beliefs that formal education would disrupt or undermine ‘tribal’ customs underpinning ‘native administration’ systems (Johnson, 2003, p. 15; Leonardi, 2013, p. 67–8).

In the 1950s-1960s, the northern government imposed an Arabic-language, Islamic religious curriculum, closed or nationalised non-government schools, and expelled missionaries (seen as undermining government authority and representing foreign dominance) from the south (Sanderson, 1980, pp. 167–8; Deng, 2003, p. 4; Johnson, 2003, p. 30; Sommers, 2005, p. 61; Poggo, 2008, pp. 92–106; Rolandsen, 2011a, pp. 119–20; Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, p. 618). While this was explained as an effort to promote national unity and ‘citizenship’ (Poggo, 2008, p. 96; Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, p. 618), it restricted southerners’ access to education and government employment (Hutchinson, 1996, p. 281; Poggo, 2008, pp. 95–6). Education resource and service inequalities contributed to feelings of frustration, resentment, alienation, and exclusion in the south. This was a key factor leading to the outbreak of armed conflict (Breidlid, 2005, pp. 257–9, 2010, pp. 565–6), with the imposition of Arabic-Islamic education perceived as “a declaration of war” among southern populations (Poggo, 2008, p. 96). In the 1960s, schools were centres of political resistance, with students and teachers engaging in protests and joining armed groups following the disruption of education access (Poggo, 2008, pp. 70–100; Rolandsen, 2011b, p. 220, 2011a, p. 120). The SPLM manifesto (2008, p. 7) challenged the “unequal distribution of wealth… to
regions and peoples of Sudan” and the “skewed pattern of access to and distribution of the basic social services”.

Under the Addis Ababa agreement, control over education was not formally transferred to the SRA, although it did exert informal authority over service provision. English was re-established as the southern language of instruction, although implementation was limited (Stevens, 1976, p. 250; Kasfir, 1977, p. 162; Sommers, 2005, p. 62). Many new schools were opened, although a lack of funds, materials, and qualified teachers impeded education provision and management (Deng, 2003, p. 5; Sommers, 2005, p. 61; Poggo, 2008, p. 191). While access to education improved, inequalities between north and south intensified. Between 1960 and 1972-1973, the number of intermediate and secondary schools increased from 317 to 1,577 in the north and from 24 to 111 in the south (Oduho and Deng, 1963 and Yongo-Bure, 1993, cited in Deng, 2003, pp. 4–5). In 1980-1981, the enrolment rate was between 70 and 75 per cent in the north, compared to 11 to 20 per cent in the south (Gannon, 1965, p. 185).

In the 1980s-1990s, education was a site of political resistance through language of instruction (English or ‘local’ languages), secular curricula (drawing on Kenyan and Ugandan curricula), and ‘southern’ policies (Deng, 2003, p. 9; Sommers, 2005, p. 46; Breidlid, 2010, pp. 567–8). The SPLM/A established a Secretariat of Education as part of wider ‘civilian’ administration efforts and developed education policies (the 1992 SPLM Education Policy, 1998 New Sudan Education Policy, and 2002 Education Policy of the New Sudan) for southern regions. Schools were established under SPLM/A ‘humanitarian’ wings (the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association and similar associations established by SPLM/A factions). Education policies and practices were viewed as tools against northern oppression and central to southern liberation, identity and unity, self-reliance, and political resistance. In 1989, John Garang (2013, p. 150) stated that, as part of the SPLM/A’s political struggle, “we are establishing administrations in the areas under our control; we have established schools”. Implementation was, however, fragmented and limited by a lack of financial and human resources and administrative capacity (Joyner, 1996, pp. 70–1; Deng, 2003, pp. 9–14; Sommers, 2005, pp. 78–91; Kevlihan, 2007, p. 527; Breidlid, 2010, pp. 567–8, 2013, pp. 40–2). While conflict narratives often portray the ‘collapse’ of social institutions and services, and while the wars in Sudan were indeed destructive, the southern system of education persisted, albeit under significant constraints. This illustrates a way in which southern authorities maintained some autonomy after the Addis Ababa
agreement, with the SPLM/A taking on ‘state’ attributes such as territorial control, population government, service provision, and international aid agreements.

Given constraints on SPLM/A service provision, international actors were heavily involved in service delivery. From 1989 to 2003, international support was coordinated through the UNICEF-led Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). This UN-NGO consortium (an agreement between the UN, GoS, and SPLM/A) was established in response to famine in Bahr el Ghazal, with an Education Coordination Committee established in 1993. Aid delivery, including education support, involved collaboration between international agencies and the SPLM/A, resulting in a degree of international recognition. However, system-level support to education was limited, with few NGOs addressing education (due in part to the short-term emergency focus). Services were fragmented, unevenly distributed (concentrated in ‘stable’ areas), poorly coordinated, and lacked attention to southern socioeconomic realities. International aid also served as a means of advancing the political objectives of the SPLM/A, who controlled movement and aid distribution in areas under their control. SPLM/A factions diverted supplies through their relief wings, and targeted relief centres and distributions (Joyner, 1996, p. 71; Karim et al., 1996, pp. 5–8; Duffield et al., 2000, pp. 43–9, 181–207; Deng, 2003, p. 6; Johnson, 2003, pp. 150–4; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 49–53; Sommers, 2005, pp. 67–9; Young, 2012, pp. 71–3; Podder, 2014, pp. 229–30). Subsequent donor initiatives, focused on education access and enrolment, included USAID’s Sudan Basic Education Programme, launched in 2002, and UNICEF’s Go-to-School initiative, launched in 2006 (Sommers, 2005, pp. 82–9; Kim et al., 2011, pp. 285–6).

Under the CPA, the GoSS, through the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST), was identified as the southern education authority. A southern primary curriculum was introduced in 2007, followed by a new secondary syllabus (GoNU and GoSS, 2008, p. 53; Barakat et al., 2013, p. 136). English was identified as the official language of instruction, linked to efforts to establish ‘southern’ identity and autonomy (Kevlihan, 2007, pp. 514–35; Breidlid, 2010, p. 570). Between 2005 and 2013, primary enrolment increased from roughly 700,000 to over 1.3 million and secondary enrolment increased from 17,000 to nearly 47,000 (World Bank, 2012, p. 2; MoEST, 2014a, pp. 18, 23). However, decades of conflict resulted in high numbers of out-of-school children and youth: prior to the 2013 conflict, one to 1.3 million primary school-aged children were out of school (World Bank, 2012, p. 4; Watkins, 2013, p. v).
After the CPA, improved access to services, including education, was identified as a key expectation and indicator of peace (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 71; Leonardi, 2011, pp. 232–5; Mayai, 2012, pp. 1–4). Population surveys identified education as one of the most important priorities and daily concerns (along with food security, water, and health) (IRI, 2011, p. 16; Roberts, 2013, pp. 79–80). However, populations report low satisfaction with government provision of education (IRI, 2013, p. 25). South Sudan faces significant education provision challenges, with access indicators well below international averages. In 2013, 42 per cent of primary-aged children and two per cent of secondary-aged children were enrolled in education, compared to 75 and 37, respectively, in fragile/conflict-affected countries, 80 and 32 in low-income countries, and 96 and 90 in high-income countries (Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 26–7). Education access has worsened in recent years. The number of students in primary and alternative education dropped by four to five per cent between 2009 and 2013. Gross and net enrolment rates13 dropped by 14 per cent at primary level and by 18 and 37 per cent, respectively, at secondary level (Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 26–7). This decrease began prior to 2013, during a period of relative stability, drawing attention to factors beyond conflict shaping educational outcomes and inequalities. Post-CPA challenges, intensified due to the current conflict, include budget, infrastructure, material, and teacher shortages, low educational retention and progression, and gaps between policy formulation and implementation (Ratcliffe and Perry, 2008, pp. 91–4; UNICEF, 2008, pp. 29–46; Kim et al., 2011, p. 286; MoEST, 2015b, p. 12).

Despite efforts to expand education services, data analyses reveal clear inequalities in educational access, resources, and outcomes across states and counties and between rural and urban areas (Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 25–39). Geographic inequalities reflect intergroup inequalities, as administrative borders tend to reflect ethnic, ‘tribal’, and sectional ‘boundaries’ (Deng, 1995, p. 187; Johnson, 2010, p. 81; Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 40–1; Leonardi, 2011, p. 217; Zambakari, 2013b, pp. 15–6). Education and conflict data also reveal correlations between education inequalities and conflict: states with the lowest education resource (infrastructure, teachers) provision and poorer education outcomes (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have the highest occurrence of conflict since 2011 (Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 37–40). The

13 The difference between gross and net enrolment (all students enrolled versus school-aged enrolment) indicates a significant proportion of overage students. Most enrolled students are significantly older than official school ages (6 to 13 for primary, 14 to 17 for secondary). In 2013, 87 per cent of primary students and 91 per cent of secondary students were over-age (MoEST, 2014a, pp. 9–10, 44, 73).
mobilisation of armed groups is linked to longstanding frustrations over inequitable resources and service provision across geographic areas (Sudd Institute, 2014, p. 7).

The ongoing conflict has heavily affected the education sector. As of December 2016, over 30 per cent of schools had experienced attacks by armed forces, 70 per cent of schools in Greater Upper Nile were non-functional, over 17,000 children and adolescents had been recruited or abducted by government or opposition forces, and nearly 1.2 million had lost access to education due to conflict and displacement (UNICEF South Sudan, 2015, p. 1, 2016, p. 9; OCHA South Sudan, 2016, p. 5). Primary enrolment dropped by nearly 25 per cent between 2013 and 2015 (Novelli et al., 2016, p. 18). Government resources have been diverted from education to security sectors and donor resources from development to humanitarian response, affecting the amount and type of support to education.

2.5 Governance of the Education System

South Sudan’s education system is guided by policies and strategies centred on the 2012 General Education Act and 2012-2017 General Education Strategic Plan (GESP). These policies were developed within a broader national legal and policy context based on the 2011 Transitional Constitution, Vision 2040 national planning strategy, and 2011-2013 South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), and within a global policy context based on Education for All (EFA) and former Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), now Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Transitional Constitution and Education Act ‘guarantee’ access to free primary education and equitable services free from discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, religion, or ability (GoSS, 2011, p. 9; MoGEI, 2012, p. 51; MoEST, 2015b, p. 10). The GESP was developed with support from UNICEF and UNESCO. It draws on Vision 2040 and SSDP objectives, focusing on education access and quality, gender equity, learning outcomes, infrastructure and curriculum development, teacher recruitment and development, and leadership and management (MoGEI, 2012). A new General Education Sector Policy Framework is being developed and a new curriculum framework was launched in 2015, managed through the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and supported by UNICEF and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Its objectives include promoting national pride and identity, commitment to democracy, and unity, peace, and reconciliation (MoEST, 2015a, pp. 5–8). It builds on the Education Act, which identifies the goals of education as including
national unity and cohesion and individual and national social, political, economic, and cultural development (p. 2).

South Sudan’s education system includes primary education (eight years), secondary education (four years), technical and vocational education and training (TVET), and the Alternative Education System (AES). The MoEST\textsuperscript{14} is responsible for education service development, management, and provision. It includes seven directorates and one secretariat: Directorates of Planning and Budgeting, Administration and Finance, General Education, Alternative Education Systems, Technical and Vocational Education, Quality Promotion and Innovation (including Departments of Curriculum Development, Teacher Education and Training, and National Languages), and Gender Equity and Social Change (including Departments of Girls’ Education and Inclusive Education), and the Secretariat of Examinations.\textsuperscript{15}

South Sudan’s education system is meant to be decentralised (although this is not necessarily the case in practice) and includes a central MoEST, state education ministries, county education departments (CEDs), and payam education offices. The central MoEST is responsible for overall sector leadership and strategic planning, formulation of national education policies, standards, curricula, and examinations, annual budget development, and management of teacher training institutions and national secondary schools. State ministries are responsible for state-level service delivery (secondary education), resource distribution and financial management, teacher recruitment and deployment, policy dissemination, and county-level inspection. CEDs are responsible for county-level budget management, primary and alternative education delivery, and supervision of teachers and infrastructure (in collaboration with payam inspectors). School governing bodies are responsible for day-to-day school management. Each school is meant to have a parent-teacher association (PTA) and a school management committee (primary schools) or board of governors (secondary schools), responsible for school planning and budgeting (RSS, 2012, pp. 4–9; MoEST, 2014c, p. 5; MoEST and DFID-GESS, 2014, pp. 4–8). (See Appendix 1 for a detailed outline of roles and responsibilities.)

\textsuperscript{14}The post-CPA MoEST became the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI) in 2011, and was restructured as the MoEST in 2013. Under the 2015 Agreement, the ministry was renamed as the MoGEI. \textbf{I refer to the terms and structures of the ministry in place during the research period.}

\textsuperscript{15}A proposed MoEST restructuring includes three new secretariats: National Curriculum, National and Foreign Languages, and Teaching Service, Training and Management.
There are clear links between pre-CPA and contemporary education management (discussed in Chapter 7), although donors leading post-CPA development efforts often neglect the significance of historical systems and influences. In addition, political bargaining and settlements influence education sector management. For example, the NCP was responsible for the post-CPA southern MoEST. Under the first independent government, the former United Sudan African Party was responsible for the MoGEI while the SPLM controlled key ministries of cabinet affairs, national security, defence, foreign affairs, and finance (Africa Confidential, 2011; Stephen, 2010), which have the highest budgets. The limited power and resources accorded to the education ministry may mean that it is more likely to be ‘given’ to opposition parties, affecting resource allocation and perceived authority and legitimacy. Under the TGoNU, however, the education minister is from the SPLM/A (Sudan Tribune, 2016).

Since 2006, education sector allocations have accounted for five to eight per cent of total government expenditure. This is lower than in neighbouring countries (World Bank, 2013b, p. 10) and the GPE benchmark of 20 per cent of government budgets (MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). Allocations, as a proportion of the overall government budget, have dropped in recent years, from roughly seven per cent in 2009 to five per cent. In 2014-2015, five per cent of the national budget was allocated to education (SSP 603,643,900; USD 203,933,750), compared to 49 per cent to rule-of-law and security sectors (MoFEP, 2014). In the 2016-2017 draft budget, nearly 50 per cent of funds were allocated to the security sector and four per cent to education (Radio Tamazuj, 2016d). Security sectors have been allocated the majority of government funds since 2006, primarily for armed forces salaries. In 2013-2014, actual security sector spending was nearly 20 per cent higher than allocated (MoFEP, 2014), while post-CPA education budgets have been under-spent (World Bank, 2013b, pp. 11–2; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). While education allocations are minimal, an even

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16 Formal and informal political bargaining and settlement between political elites determines how power and authority is held and exercised and how resources are distributed, including the allocation (or ‘trading’) of government ministries. Ruling parties and elites often seek control of key ministries (e.g. foreign affairs, defence, national security), with opposition groups receiving less influential ministries (in terms of both power and resources) (Di John and Putzel, 2009, pp. 15–6; Cheeseman, 2011, p. 350). This shapes the form and roles of institutions and resource allocation.

17 Current allocations are also lower than in previous decades. Education accounted for 13 per cent of public spending in Sudan in 1970, dropping to eight per cent in 2000 (Elnur, 2009, p. 87).

18 USD amounts are calculated using the official exchange rate of SSP 2.96, from the 2014-2015 Budget Book (MoFEP, 2014, p. 8). The informal exchange rate reached 65 SSP in August 2016 and 100 SSP in November 2016, representing an inflation rate increase of over 800 per cent (Radio Tamazuj, 2016a, 2016c).
smaller proportion is actually disbursed (less than 60 per cent in 2013-2014) (MoFEP, 2014, p. 143).

Education spending is focused on primary education, which accounts for 47 per cent of the education budget (compared to 14 per cent to secondary and technical/vocational education, 26 per cent to higher/tertiary education, one per cent to alternative education, and 12 per cent to policy and systems development, capacity strengthening and quality assurance, and support systems). Nearly all education funds (85 per cent in 2014-2015) are allocated to recurrent costs, including salaries and operations (MoFEP, 2014). Primary-level per-student spending was roughly SSP 233.9 (USD 79) in 2014-2015 (Novelli et al., 2016, p. 45), well below the regional average (World Bank, 2013b, p. 10; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). There are limited funds available for ‘development’ efforts, including responses to inequalities, legacies of conflict, and peacebuilding needs.

Education financing is affected by broader economic challenges. South Sudan’s economy is dependent on oil revenues, representing roughly 98 per cent of national budgets between 2006 and 2010. Revenues dropped due to the global financial crisis in 2009 and oil production halted in 2012 following transit fee disputes with Sudan. Austerity budgets significantly reduced education sector allocations and while oil production resumed in 2013 following African Union-mediated agreements, revenue and financing pressures persisted due to reduced production and low global oil prices. Economic pressures have intensified due to the ongoing conflict, limited economic diversification, budget overspending (particularly in the security sector), and corruption and theft of public funds (including oil revenues) (Young, 2012, p. 325; World Bank, 2013b, pp. 3–7; Mamdani, 2014, pp. 39–40; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). Armed clashes in oil-rich Upper Nile and Unity states further disrupted oil production. However, oil revenues were identified as the source of 80 per cent of government funds in 2014-2015, compared to 11 per cent from non-oil revenue (e.g. taxes, fees, customs) and eight per cent from loan financing (MoFEP, 2014, p. 18). South Sudan’s GDP decreased by six per cent between 2013 and 2015-2016, while annual inflation increased by 700 to 800 per cent by 2016 (Radio Tamazuj, 2016a; World Bank, 2016).

The education sector relies heavily on international donors, who support nearly all development activities. In 2013-2014, external aid accounted for roughly 30 per cent of all education funding, focused primarily on basic education (accounting for 75 of funds). Bilateral donors provided roughly 67 per cent of external funds, including 55 per
cent from the UK (DFID), 38 per cent from the US (US Agency for International Development, USAID), and the remainder from Norway, Canada, and France (MoFEP, 2013). DFID is funding Girls’ Education South Sudan (GESS), a five-year programme promoting girls’ education and school development through capitation grants and cash transfers (DFID-GESS, 2015). USAID is funding Room to Learn, involving the establishment of community-based schools. In 2013-2014, multilateral donors provided 31 per cent of education funds (92 per cent from UNICEF, nine per cent from the European Union), with another two per cent from the Common Humanitarian Fund (MoFEP, 2013). UNICEF’s education programmes include the GPE19 (involving policy advocacy, curriculum development, school construction, and girls’ education), the (former) Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy programme (PBEA, involving life skills and peacebuilding education and policy advocacy), and Education in Emergencies. The EU is funding the Improved Management of Education Delivery (IMED) programme, supporting planning and management capacity development of central and state ministries.

The education sector, however, receives only a small proportion of international development and humanitarian funds. In 2013-2014, only six per cent of donor aid to South Sudan was allocated to education (MoFEP, 2013).20 While humanitarian aid to South Sudan roughly doubled to USD 1.3 billion between 2011 and 2015 (MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016), education funding accounted for under four per cent of requested funds in the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan (OCHA South Sudan, 2016, p. 3). National and subnational education resource and service distribution, and implications for violence and peacebuilding, are discussed in Chapter 6.

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19 South Sudan is a member of the GPE, managed by UNICEF and coordinated by UNESCO and USAID. A USD 36 million grant for 2013-2016 supports GESP implementation, including strengthening national systems, school construction and rehabilitation, curriculum development, and girls’ education (Watkins, 2013; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016, p. 1).

20 Education accounts for a small share of total overseas development assistance (ODA) from major donors: eight per cent of ODA from the UK, seven per cent from the World Bank, three per cent from EU institutions, and two per cent from the US in 2011 (UNICEF, 2015, p. 52).
3.1 Chapter Introduction

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the literature on peacebuilding and explore the ways in which the critical peacebuilding literature, in particular, engages with education. This chapter is intended to articulate (and justify) the relevance of this thesis research, to identify entry points for understanding the role of education and inequality in conflict and peacebuilding, and to provide a context for subsequent empirical contributions. I argue that while the critical peacebuilding literature addresses, to some extent, the role of ‘social services’, these discussions are vague and pay limited attention to the complexity of education’s role in supporting and undermining peacebuilding. I suggest that analysis of political, economic, and cultural dimensions of inequality and violence in education contexts can inform deeper engagement with some key critical peacebuilding debates and directions.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I provide a general overview of the peacebuilding literature, focusing on debates concerning the ‘liberal peace’ model and broad themes emerging from the critical peacebuilding literature. Second, I examine the ways in which the critical peacebuilding literature deals with education, considering existing perspectives, gaps, and limitations. Third, I explore the ways in which the education literature addresses conflict and peacebuilding, in terms of inequalities reproduced or challenged in and through education, and identify entry points for bringing education into critical peacebuilding discussions.

3.2 ‘Liberal’ and ‘Critical’ Peacebuilding Perspectives

In this section, I provide a general overview of dominant perspectives and debates in the peacebuilding literature. I first provide an overview of the ‘liberal peace’ model. I then discuss broad themes articulated in the critical peacebuilding literature, exploring the main critiques of ‘liberal’ models and directions identified in the critical peacebuilding literature, notably responses to systems of violence and inequality, promotion of ‘local’ engagement, and responses to ‘everyday’ concerns and priorities.

Recent debates in the peacebuilding literature centre on the concept of the ‘liberal peace’, considered by proponents and critics as the dominant framework guiding contemporary peacebuilding processes. The liberal peace discourse emerged in

The UN articulated key liberal principles in the 1992 Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), and these priorities are echoed in later UN peacebuilding documents (Annan, 1998, 2000; Ban, 2009; UN PBSO, 2010b) and other international and regional frameworks. The peacebuilding literature highlights the role and influence of external actors in national-level processes, referring to a ‘transnational peacebuilding class’ (Richmond, 2009a, p. 567) and an international or global peacebuilding ‘architecture’ (Zaum, 2012, p. 121; Newman, 2013, p. 311). Key actors include UN agencies, international financial institutions (e.g. World Bank), regional bodies (e.g. African Union), donors, and international and national NGOs.21 These actors shape the content and aims of peace agreements and peacebuilding strategies, provide technical and financial support for negotiation and implementation, impose aid conditions (e.g. specific policy reforms), and ‘legitimise’ peace agreements and interventions (Paris, 2002, pp. 642–5; Newman, 2013, pp. 312–4; Selby, 2013, p. 72). The study of peacebuilding processes requires attention to “cross-cutting governance networks involving state and non-state actors from the supranational to the local” and their roles, interests, and priorities (Duffield, 2001, p. 8).

21 The institutionalisation of peacebuilding objectives is reflected in the establishment of peacebuilding offices or programmes by many international and regional donors and institutions and the establishment of the UN’s new ‘peacebuilding architecture’ in 2006, consisting of the intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, multi-donor Peacebuilding Fund, and coordinating Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) (UN PBSO, 2010a).
The critical literature critiques the ‘liberal’ peacebuilding model for its failure to attain key peacebuilding objectives, including poor political and economic outcomes (e.g. limited democratisation and human rights) and continued violence and insecurity following ‘liberal’ interventions (Pugh, 2005; Autesserre, 2010; Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Newman, 2011; Zürcher, 2011; Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2012; Zaum, 2012; Newman, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2015; Nadarajah and Rampton, 2015). Critical scholars argue that ‘liberal’ models involve restrictive, normative understandings of ‘progress’ and peace and technical, depoliticised approaches that reproduce systems of inequality and injustice, and represent hegemonic power relations and interests with insufficient attention to ‘local’ contexts and priorities.

Before exploring these themes, it is important to critically consider the concept of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding itself. This model is often framed as near universal, embedded in most post-Cold War peace agreements and interventions. It is described as a global ‘peacebuilding consensus’ (Richmond, 2006a, p. 370, 2006b, p. 298), a “universal set of peacebuilding measures” (Lidén, 2009, p. 617), a standard peacebuilding ‘template’ (Miklian, 2014, pp. 498–9), and “the dominant form of internationally-supported peacemaking” (Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 20). However, both proponents and critics overstate the degree of liberalism and consensus in contemporary peacebuilding. In defining it as an essentially liberal project, they fail to consider peacebuilding as a strategic, context-specific process, often involving illiberal, non-democratic aims and outcomes (Selby, 2013, pp. 74–6). Critical peacebuilding scholars use ‘liberalism’ to explain different (and often contradictory) peacebuilding approaches and outcomes (Chandler, 2010b, pp. 137, 145; Lemay-Hébert, 2013, p. 243; Chandler, 2017, pp. 30–1), focusing on the ‘liberalism’ of interveners rather than empirical analysis of interventions (Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam, 2011, p. 3). This illustrates the need for “contextualised analysis of concrete peacemaking practices” (Selby, 2013, p. 59), involving attention to historical and contemporary factors influencing the implementation of peacebuilding interventions and their social and political outcomes (Tschirgi, 2010, p. 1; Hameiri, 2011, p. 192; Sending, 2011, p. 62; Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 270–4; Paffenholz, 2015, pp. 864–5; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 174).

The first broad theme emerging from the critical peacebuilding literature concerns responses to systems of violence and inequality. Critical scholars contend that ‘liberal’ peacebuilding ignores and reproduces systems of marginalisation, exclusion, oppression, and inequality. Neoliberal interventions (e.g. economic...


This is linked to the assumption that immediate ‘stability’ and security should take priority over political transformation or that political transformation could

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22 This advances a particular version of ‘statehood’, without considering ‘degrees of statehood’ (Clapham, 1998, p. 143) existing across different contexts.

In contrast, some critical literature argues that peacebuilding should involve transformation of political, economic, and social ‘drivers’ of conflict, including systems of violence, oppression, and inequality (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Richmond, 2006a, 2006b, 2009a, 2014, 2016; Newman, 2010; Sabaratnam, 2013; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). This involves “fundamental institutional changes” (Heathershaw, 2008, p. 602), a “radical restructuring of representation across political, social, professional, and economic spheres” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 570), and responses to “an array of local and global inequalities that cause direct and structural violence” (Richmond, 2014, p. 463). As Richmond (2014, p. 449) explains, inequality, from local to global scales, “weakens the links between… social justice, human rights and democracy”. Persistent inequalities reproduce conflict dynamics and threaten broader peacebuilding goals (Newman, 2013, p. 318; Richmond, 2014, p. 450).

Critical scholars refer to three broad aspects of, and responses to, inequality. First is the (re)distribution of economic or material resources and benefits, responding to socioeconomic inequalities in income, ownership, and opportunities (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008a, p. 396; Richmond, 2008b, p. 290; Mac Ginty, 2013, pp. 4–5; Richmond, 2014, pp. 458–63, 2016, pp. 5, 180; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, p. 315).
Second is the (re)distribution of political power and representation at multiple scales, responding to marginalisation and power inequalities in political institutions and processes (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 106; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008a, p. 391; Richmond, 2010a, p. 30, 2013, pp. 279–82, 2016, p. 5; Mac Ginty, 2013, p. 5). Third is the recognition of different forms of (collective) identity and attention to political dimensions of identity and boundaries of difference, as well as questions of ‘plurality’ and understanding (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 106; Richmond, 2013, p. 282, 2016, pp. 5, 33). In general, this critical literature does not explore in great detail specific dimensions or mechanisms of inequality, or associated responses and implications for peacebuilding. In a critique of ‘critical’ peacebuilding literature, Sabaratnam (2013, pp. 272–4) calls for a ‘repoliticised’ analysis of political, material, and epistemic dimensions of violence and impacts of peacebuilding interventions.

The second broad theme emerging from the critical peacebuilding literature concerns the promotion of ‘local’ participation and representation in peacebuilding processes. This literature argues that the ‘liberal’ model lacks attention to ‘local’ contexts and priorities. It imposes externally defined, ‘Western’ norms, priorities, and definitions of ‘peace’ through standardised interventions: a “flat-pack peace made from standardized components” (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 145). Critics describe such interventions as reflecting interests of ‘global north’ states and international organisations and as irrelevant, coercive, or alienating, undermining peacebuilding objectives and exacerbating conflict (Pugh, 2005; Richmond, 2006b; Taylor, 2007; Mac Ginty, 2008; Richmond, 2009a, 2010b; Mac Ginty, 2010; Autesserre, 2010; Jabri, 2010; Pugh, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Autesserre, 2011; Newman, 2011; Richmond and Mitchell, 2011; Sending, 2011; Richmond, 2012; Jabri, 2013; Newman, 2013; Millar, van der Lijn and Verkoren, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2015; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016).

Building on this critique, some critical literature describes ‘liberal’ peacebuilding as (neo)colonial and imperialist in orientation, reproducing historical systems of power and domination over ‘non-Western’ populations (Duffield, 2001, pp. 31–2; Heathershaw, 2008, p. 620; Richmond, 2009a, pp. 565–8; Darby, 2010, pp. 701–5; Taylor, 2010, p. 156; Pugh, 2011, p. 314; Jabri, 2013, p. 8; Richmond and Mac

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23 ‘Local’ is placed in inverted commas “to emphasize not only its construction through practices of representation but also the floating significations and ambiguity of the term in scholarly and practical use” (Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 435).
Interventions are “structured by and operating through a contemporary global colonial matrix of power” (Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 137), ‘ordering’ populations and expanding (Western) social and political projects, institutions, and rule (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999, pp. 414–6). This draws attention to ‘non-territorial’ dimensions of neo-colonial/imperial power, including the ‘civilising’ aims of peacebuilding projects focused on democratisation, good governance, human rights, and neoliberal market mechanisms (Wai, 2014, pp. 488–93). Paris (2002, pp. 637–8, 2010, p. 348), for examples, refers to a ‘mission civilisatrice’ transmitting standards of ‘appropriate’ or ‘civilised’ behaviour to states and populations.

The critical peacebuilding literature emphasises the importance of engaging with ‘local’ actors and recognising ‘local’ ownership, choice, knowledge, and priorities. This is intended to enhance the legitimacy and contextual sensitivity, appropriateness, and sustainability of interventions. The critical literature defines participation or engagement in terms of opportunities, at all levels of peacebuilding projects, for ‘local’ actors to define peacebuilding needs, strategies, and objectives. This includes the establishment of ‘grounded’ institutions and recognition of and engagement with ‘local’ (e.g. ‘grassroots’, ‘indigenous’, ‘traditional’) political and peacebuilding norms, practices, and initiatives (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 149; Lidén, 2009, p. 628; Autesserre, 2010, pp. 248–70; Mac Ginty, 2011b, pp. 47–67; Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2012, p. 6; Richmond, 2012, pp. 355–73, 2013, p. 271; Jabri, 2013, p. 5; Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 840). This also involves attention to agency, power, resistance, and influence in response to external interventions, including open or implicit rejection, obstruction, renegotiation, co-optation or appropriation of resources or processes, and initiation of ‘local’ efforts without external support (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 145, 2011a, p. 214, 2011b, pp. 6–7, 2015, p. 848; Richmond, 2010b, pp. 669, 685–6; Richmond and Mitchell, 2011, pp. 326–7, 339; Sending, 2011, p. 55; Chandler, 2013, p. 31; Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 270–2; Paffenholz, 2015, pp. 864–5).

Recent UN peacebuilding strategies stress the importance of ‘local’ and/or national ownership (Ban, 2009, para. 7, 2012, para. 44, UN PBSO, 2010b, pp. 6, 16, 2010a, p. 1; UN PBC, 2012, para. 3). However, the critical peacebuilding literature acknowledges problematic aspects of ‘local’ debates. First, the peacebuilding literature often presents a binary, essentialist, and Eurocentric distinction between the ‘local’, ‘non-liberal’, non-Western ‘other’ and the ‘international’ or ‘liberal’. Barriers to peace are linked to assumed political, economic, and cultural differences, rather than structural

The critical peacebuilding literature generally defines the ‘local’ (who is and who represents the ‘local’) in vague terms. Various actors are identified as ‘local’ agents or representatives: national or subnational state authorities, traditional or customary authorities, civil society or ‘grassroots’ actors, or ‘marginalised’ populations. The ‘local’ can be defined in relation to national and global scales, as a spatial or geographic location or bounded territory, a community associated with particular relationships and practices, or a sphere or action and relationships (Richmond, 2010b, p. 670; Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, pp. 423–4; Hughes, Öjendal and Schierenbeck, 2015, p. 818; Mac Ginty, 2015, pp. 850–1). Definitions of the ‘local’ are not neutral or apolitical, illustrating the need to examine “how representations of the local relate to political agendas in peacebuilding” (Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 422).

The third broad theme emerging from the critical peacebuilding literature concerns responses to ‘everyday’ concerns and priorities. This literature suggests that peacebuilding goals can be realised through ‘everyday’ practices and responses to populations’ ‘everyday’ needs, priorities, expectations, and understandings of peace (Richmond, 2008b, 2009a, 2009e, 2010a; Mac Ginty, 2011b; Mitchell, 2011; Newman, 2011; Roberts, 2011b; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016).
This is presented in contrast to externally driven, ‘liberal’ peacebuilding that “elevates elites and institutions over societies and everyday life” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 568) and fails to understand or represent individuals’ and communities’ day-to-day lives, activities, threats, and needs (e.g. poverty, shelter, basic services, economic opportunities). Liberal interventions are characterised by “the omission of everyday life, including its welfare aspects” (Richmond, 2010a, p. 30), with (neo)liberal concerns outweighing and displacing ‘everyday’ and welfare-related concerns (Richmond, 2009c, p. 152; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012, p. 6). According to Newman (2011, p. 1737), a lack of attention to such needs “can jeopardise overall peacebuilding objectives [and] obstruct the consolidation of peace”.

The ‘everyday’ is described as the day-to-day spaces, routines, practices, and strategies used by individuals and communities to manage life challenges, risks, and needs and enhance quality of life within particular ‘local’ (e.g. collective, material) environments (Richmond, 2010b, p. 670; Mitchell, 2011, pp. 1624–8; Roberts, 2011b, pp. 412–3, 2012, p. 369). These include “the everyday and familial social practices that constitute life” (Mac Ginty, 2014, p. 552), “routine mechanics of existence that… reveal what people prioritise and how they organise the realisation of their aspirations” (Roberts, 2011a, pp. 2542–3), and ways in which people “manage the gaps between constraints and aspirations” and “make their lives the best they can” (Roberts, 2011b, pp. 412–3, 2012, p. 369). Some critical scholars frame the ‘everyday’ in terms of ‘welfare’, referring to “individual and community-fostered well-being” (Pugh, 2010, p. 264), “optimising the life potential” of individuals and communities, and the means through which this is realised (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, p. 6; Cooper, Turner and Pugh, 2011, p. 2005).

Attention to the ‘everyday’ is said to contribute to a ‘popular’, ‘emancipatory’ peace (Richmond, 2006b, p. 301, 2009a, p. 561, Roberts, 2011a, pp. 2542–3, 2011b, p. 415) that prioritises and responds to needs defined and determined by ‘local’ populations. Such peace is concerned with “impact on the lives of… inhabitants of the state” (Richmond, 2007a, p. 265) and is “relevant… and legitimate to the everyday and to the majority of everyday lives” (Roberts, 2011a, p. 2542). Attending to the ‘everyday’ involves context-specific responses to individual and community lives, experiences, and wellbeing, and associated social and economic needs and rights, as sources of peace (Lidén, 2009, p. 621; Richmond, 2009a, pp. 558–62, 2010a, p. 30; Roberts, 2011b, pp. 412–4; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012, p. 337; Newman, 2013, p.
The concept of the ‘everyday’ draws attention to ‘social’ spheres of life, and enables analysis of different aspects of power and responsibility, interactions, structural or discursive forms of violence, and forms of agency and resistance (Richmond, 2009b, p. 326, 2010b, p. 669; Mac Ginty, 2014, pp. 550–2). Meeting ‘everyday’ or ‘welfare’ needs is linked to responses to inequality, involving “mechanisms of redistribution… and positive discrimination” (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, p. 6).

‘Bottom-up’, ‘everyday’ peacebuilding narratives and indicators may differ from those of international (or national) actors (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, p. 308). Participation and ownership are central, and necessary, to the ‘everyday’, with ‘local’ (rather than external) actors defining what the ‘everyday’ means and entails (Roberts, 2011a, p. 2538). ‘Local’ participation and ownership enables a focus on ‘everyday’ needs, inequalities, and ‘welfare’ issues central to peacebuilding processes (Richmond, 2009c, pp. 166–7, 2012, p. 373). This illustrates the links between ‘local’ participation and ‘everyday’ concerns, with participation as a means for encouraging and enabling responses to ‘everyday’ priorities. However, this raises questions about who defines ‘everyday’ issues, and the social and cultural assumptions and political and economic contexts shaping these definitions (Richmond, 2009c, p. 156). As discussed below, responses to ‘everyday’ concerns can be used to justify intervention, involving strategies of power and control by external actors (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1624). However, the concept of the ‘everyday’ may depoliticise or ‘banalise’ ‘local’ spheres and dynamics as “contrasted to the space of power” (Sabaratnam, 2011b, p. 797).


The critical peacebuilding literature draws attention to important and complex issues central to ‘just’, ‘sustainable’ peacebuilding: the transformation of systems of violence and inequality, ‘local’ participation and influence, and engagement with and responses to ‘everyday’ priorities and concerns. However, these discussions involve limited attention to: 1) specific ‘social’ mechanisms or processes through which these critical peacebuilding issues can be addressed, with implications for ‘practical’ application and policy relevance; 2) relationships between responses to ‘everyday’ concerns, ‘local’ participation, and systems of/responses to violence and inequality; and 3) processes and institutions linking international- or national-level governance and ‘grassroots’ spheres. I suggest that analysis of education systems can provide insight into mechanisms through which systems of inequality are reproduced or challenged and through which ‘local’ participation and ‘everyday’ responses are facilitated or undermined as part of peacebuilding processes, as well as the relationships between them and interactions between scales of action and influence.

3.3 ‘Critical’ Peacebuilding and Education: A Gap in the Literature

Having outlined the three main themes presented in the critical peacebuilding literature, I now examine the ways in which this literature has considered the role or contributions of education and of social institutions and systems more broadly. In this section, I examine existing perspectives on ‘social services’ in the critical peacebuilding literature, the significance of the limited attention to education, and potential reasons for this limited attention. While some critical literature acknowledges the potential peacebuilding roles or contributions of ‘social services’, broadly speaking, I argue that the lack of attention to education represents a gap in this literature.

The small body of critical peacebuilding literature that considers the role of social institutions and services presents three broad explanations concerning their peacebuilding role: service delivery as a form of socioeconomic (re)distribution, a response to ‘everyday’ needs and priorities, and a contributor to state-society relations. Before exploring these points in detail, it is important to address the language used in these discussions. Critical peacebuilding scholars generally refer to ‘service delivery’ or
‘service provision’ (and to ‘basic needs’ or ‘welfare needs’). This largely frames education as simply a service or good to be delivered to meet particular needs. However, the delivery/provision of education services is highly political, and much more complicated, involving both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ dimensions. It both reflects and reproduces dynamics of violence, inequalities, and power relations, which are neglected in the depoliticised language of ‘service delivery/provision’.

The first broad narrative describes social service provision as a form of socioeconomic distribution, providing a means of addressing social, economic, and political exclusion and promoting social and economic rights as sources of peace (Lidén, 2009, p. 621; Newman, 2011, p. 1750). Some critical scholars suggest that basic service provision (including education) represents a starting point for more sustainable and ‘inclusive’ peacebuilding (Newman, 2011, p. 1738; Roberts, 2011b, pp. 415–7) and an ‘alternative’ way to address social needs and inequalities (Pugh, 2005, p. 33; Newman, 2011, p. 1738). Some acknowledge challenges associated with institutional capacity, effectiveness, and disparities in public service provision (Lemay-Hébert, 2009, pp. 23–4; Campbell and Peterson, 2013, pp. 341–2). Richmond (2009a, p. 567) acknowledges that peacebuilding contributions require the “provision of... resources sufficient to meet the demands made upon it by its local, everyday, constituencies”. The failure of the state (as the expected service provider) to respond to public expectations can thus result in disappointment and dissatisfaction among populations, affecting peacebuilding contributions (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, pp. 319–20).

Education systems are particularly important sites through which to address different forms of inequality, although this is not clearly acknowledged in the critical peacebuilding literature. Education systems are “one of the most important institutions through which social inequalities along class, gender, ethnic, religious or other lines are created and maintained” (Brown, 2011, p. 192). Inequalities in education opportunities and outcomes interact with and influence other forms of disadvantage, in economic opportunities and income, living standards, political representation, and so on (Cramer, 2003, p. 398; Stewart, 2009, pp. 323–7). Inequalities associated with conflict are linked to the ways in which politically powerful actors allocate resources and opportunities (Fjelde and Østby, 2014, pp. 743–4), and educational inequalities play a particularly strong role in collective group grievances as they “are more likely to result from systematic group discrimination” (Østby, 2008b, p. 155). Dominant groups may, for example, use education policies to discriminate against certain populations or secure
advantages for privileged groups. This has implications for conflict, when education inequalities intersecting with group identities drive collective grievances and mobilisation. By reflecting and reproducing different forms of inequality, education systems contribute to their persistence and durability over time. This illustrates the importance of attention not only to education delivery, but also to how resources and services are distributed and delivered and the ways in which this reproduces and entrenches (not only ‘addresses’) inequalities.

The second broad narrative suggests that public service provision can address populations’ ‘everyday’ needs and priorities, representing ‘local’ or ‘everyday’ forms of peace (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 567–80, 2009c, p. 158; 2010a, p. 30; Mac Ginty, 2011b, pp. 81, 180; Mitchell, 2011, p. 1626; Roberts, 2011b, pp. 414–6; Richmond and Mitchell, 2012, p. 6; Newman, 2014, p. 193; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, pp. 308–9). Some critical scholars suggest that engagement with the ‘everyday’ involves attention to “the organization and mobilization of effective state delivery of public needs” (Roberts, 2011b, p. 414), with peace formation involving “a range of services necessary for everyday life” (Richmond, 2016, p. 135). ‘Welfare’ policies responding to ‘everyday life’ include the provision of (free) schooling (Richmond, 2008b, p. 291, 2009c, p. 158) and of public goods and services by government institutions, non-state (e.g. international) providers, and other formal and non-formal institutions (Pugh, 2010, p. 263; Roberts, 2011a, pp. 2542–3, 2012, p. 369).

Discussions of the ‘everyday’ raise questions about who defines ‘everyday’ needs and how this is used to justify intervention. The identification of “material welfare, modern education, or integration in national and international political processes as primary sources of peace” may illustrate externally- rather than locally-driven approaches (Lidén, 2009, pp. 620–2). ‘Welfare’-oriented interventions often reflect the visions of international interveners (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 268–9). By supporting social service provision and addressing ‘everyday’ needs, international actors can advance particular models of peace and extend ‘liberal’ values, norms, and objectives (Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 84; Mitchell, 2011, p. 1640; Roberts, 2011b, p. 416). The integration of social services into peacebuilding plans might “lead to even more interventionary strategies by international sponsors of peacebuilding… to exert further influence and conditionality” (Richmond, 2008b, p. 299). Responses to ‘everyday’ needs can serve as means through which external actors exert power and control at the ‘local’ level (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1624).
The third main narrative suggests that **social service provision can contribute to state-society relations** by responding to ‘everyday’ needs, providing opportunities for (democratic) participation, and contributing to the internal or ‘local’ legitimacy of the state and of peacebuilding interventions (Richmond, 2008b, p. 291, 2009c, p. 158; Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 137; Newman, 2011, pp. 1737–50; Roberts, 2011b, p. 416; Newman, 2014, p. 193). As Richmond (2016, p. 106) explains, the political legitimacy of the state is perceived as connected to service access and opportunities. The provision of (free) schooling and other public services is described in terms of “welfare policies necessary to... lead to democratic politics” (Richmond, 2008b, p. 291, 2009c, p. 158). Such policies, in theory, enable individual and collective relationships with government institutions and the state (Richmond, 2010a, p. 30). ‘Social welfare’ and ‘basic needs’ provisions thus contribute to a ‘social contract’ between society and state (Richmond, 2006b, pp. 311, 327–31, 2008b, p. 291; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, p. 6; Richmond, 2010a, p. 34; Pugh, 2010, p. 264; Roberts, 2011a, p. 2543).

The focus on state-society relations and a ‘social contract’ through service provision reflects a broader ‘paradox of liberalism’ in the critical peacebuilding literature. Critics identify ‘liberal’ priorities and approaches as sources of oppression, while presenting alternatives based on liberal principles (Begby and Burgess, 2009, p. 93; Paris, 2010, pp. 354–6, 2011, pp. 159–60; Roberts, 2011b, p. 416; Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 262–3; Newman, 2014, p. 193). Sabaratnam (2013, pp. 268–9) argues that the focus on a ‘liberal’ social contract and state-led ‘welfare’ and service provision presents a vision of peacebuilding “based on a particular [Western European] conception of state-led social democracy” and reinforces the rationale for intervention despite being presented as part of an ‘alternative’ model.

When discussing state-society relations and ‘local’ participation, the peacebuilding literature tends to focus on international- or national-level governance or on the ‘grassroots’ level, with less attention to processes and institutions linking them. Education systems are “one of the most visible, far reaching forms of government” (Winthrop and Matsui, 2013, p. 4) and key sites of contact between communities and state authority (Dupuy, 2008a, p. 65). This illustrates the central role that education can play in shaping relations between state and society and between the global, national and ‘local’. However, the critical peacebuilding literature pays limited attention to the complexity of these processes, the specific means through which they occur, and their potential for reproducing or transforming relations of power at multiple scales.
While the critical peacebuilding literature acknowledges some of the contributions of ‘service delivery’ to peacebuilding, references to education are generally peripheral or vague. With few exceptions, this literature has paid only superficial or abstract attention to education’s peacebuilding roles or contributions. These are addressed specifically and in detail in only a small number of publications. For example, Mac Ginty and Firchow (2016) identify the provision of basic public services such as education as an ‘everyday indicator’ of peace, while Richmond (2008b, p. 291, 2009c, p. 158) describes the provision of (free) schooling in relation to ‘welfare’ policies responding to ‘everyday life’. Some edited texts on peacebuilding include education-focused chapters, such as Maulden (2013) in Mac Ginty’s Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding and Pherali (2016) in Richmond et al.’s Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace. However, critical peacebuilding scholars themselves have demonstrated limited engagement with education. When education is mentioned, they generally present education provision/delivery as necessarily positive or beneficial or, at least, neutral. They do not explore the ways in which education systems intersect with, reproduce, and entrench patterns of inequality and structural violence and undermine peacebuilding aims.

I suggest that this represents a gap in the critical peacebuilding literature. Education systems play unique and critically important roles in reproducing, and thus transforming, political, economic, and cultural inequalities and structural violence. They represent mediating sites between ‘local’ communities and national governments, as well sites of international intervention and influence. Engagement with education’s complex roles can provide important insights into dynamics of inequality and ‘drivers’ of conflict, ‘local’ participation, and ‘everyday’ concerns prioritised in the critical peacebuilding literature. This can also facilitate understandings of the mechanisms through which these processes might occur.

Having discussed the lack of explicit attention to education within the critical peacebuilding scholarship, I now explore some potential reasons for this. First, the critical peacebuilding literature is IR-dominated and reflects wider disciplinary divisions. The field of IR, more broadly, does not seriously consider the role and significance of education. Education is described as “a marginal topic in international relations” (Müller, 2011, p. 1) and “ignored by IR scholarship in general” (Hartmann, 2015, p. 89). This is reflected in the peacebuilding literature (both ‘mainstream’ and ‘critical’). Discussions of education’s ‘international’ role are generally framed in
narrow, instrumentalist terms. These focus, for example, on education as an instrument of foreign policy (as a source or form of ‘soft power’), as promoting particular political and economic policy goals (Wojciuk, Michalek and Stormowska, 2015, pp. 298–314), and as transmitting hegemonic norms, values, and standards and contributing to global or transnational integration (Hartmann, 2015, pp. 90–8).

The second potential reason concerns the critical peacebuilding literature’s focus on and analysis of peacebuilding as a neoliberal project. Neoliberal agendas neglect ‘liberal’ aspects of (government-led) ‘public services and welfare activities’ and public ‘interest’ or ‘good’, focusing instead of aspects of ‘behaviour’ and ‘effectiveness’ of state institutions (Olssen, 2010, pp. 8, 14–5). The “adoption of neoliberalisation as a key framework for the liberal peace” (Richmond, 2010a, p. 27) informs critiques (of political and economic liberalisation) and discussions of ‘alternative’ peacebuilding directions. Finally, the peacebuilding literature appears to view education as largely disconnected from ‘political’ peacebuilding processes, reflected in the language of ‘service delivery/provision’. While acknowledging education’s potential contributions to political processes (e.g. democratisation), this literature does not explicitly acknowledge the political nature of education institutions and processes. Literature on the relationship between education, conflict, and peacebuilding draws attention to these political (as well as economic and cultural) dynamics.

3.4 Education Literature: Insights for Critical Peacebuilding

Having summarised the critical peacebuilding debates and explored existing gaps, I now examine the ways in which the education literature addresses issues of conflict and peacebuilding. This education literature contributes to the critical (IR-centred) peacebuilding debates in two main ways: by complicating and expanding explanations and assumptions concerning the role of education, and by providing insight into specific mechanisms through which to address inequalities (as underlying causes of conflict), ‘local’ engagement, and ‘everyday’ concerns within and through a specific sector. I argue that education should be brought into peacebuilding analyses and debates, and explore how this might occur. I examine three dimensions of inequality addressed by the education literature in relation to conflict and peacebuilding: the distribution of education resources and services, representation in decision-making and management, and recognition of identity and difference in education systems and content. These provide entry points for deepening arguments about education’s
peacebuilding role, drawing attention to mechanisms through which forms of inequality (and dynamics of violence) are reproduced or challenged in education systems.

A growing body of literature argues that while education systems are affected by violent conflict, they also play a role in fuelling or exacerbating conflict – as well as contributing to or undermining peacebuilding processes. Education is a ‘key player’ in conflict and violence (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000, p. 11; Davies, 2005, p. 358; Buckland, 2006, p. 7; L. Davies, 2010, p. 491), challenging the assumption that “education is necessarily and inherently a good thing” (Harber, 2004, p. 7). Explanations of the peacebuilding role of ‘social services’ in the critical peacebuilding literature generally present the provision of such services as positive, beneficial, or neutral. The literature described in this section provides a more nuanced understanding of education’s complex role in both violence and peace.

The education literature frames education’s peacebuilding contributions in different ways: as fulfilling a ‘basic right’, as ‘peace education’ (focused on changing attitudes and behaviours), as contributing to security (e.g. reintegration of ex-combatants) or poverty reduction, and through a focus on the implications of, and responses to, inequalities in education. I focus on the last area, which deals not only with education’s peacebuilding potential but also its contributions to conflict. Education intersects with multiple sociocultural, economic, and political dimensions of violence, and reproduces, exacerbates, and legitimises structures and relations of power, privilege, exclusion, and domination (Harber, 2004, p. 60; Dupuy, 2008a, p. 29; Brown, 2011, pp. 192–6; Robertson and Dale, 2013, pp. 435–7). Understanding education’s peacebuilding role requires attention to interconnected economic, political, and cultural dimensions of inequality. These include resource distribution, political representation, and recognition of identity and difference, as well as historical injustices affecting relations between social groups and between communities and governments (Tikly and Barrett, 2011; Power, 2012; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015; Novelli, 2016).

The first dimension of inequality addressed by the education literature concerns the distribution of education resources and services. Some education literature argues that resource and service distribution provides a tangible ‘peace dividend’, addressing conflict-related grievances. It also identifies state service provision as a means of responding to population needs and (re)establishing state legitimacy and public trust in government (Thyne, 2006, p. 750; Dupuy, 2008b, p. 156, 2008a, pp. 36, 84; Davies, 2011, pp. 161–2; Ellison, 2014, p. 191). However, the ways in which
resources (e.g. funds, infrastructure, materials, teachers) and services are distributed can reproduce inequalities in education access and outcomes between social groups and geographical regions, reinforcing historical patterns of marginalisation and exclusion. Peacebuilding analyses and efforts should therefore attend to the ‘politics of redistribution’, including the ways in which education resource and service allocation across different populations and regions intersect with, and respond to, existing inequalities (Degu, 2005, pp. 138–143; Smith, 2005, p. 379; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 28–38, 84–7, 2008b, p. 159; Tikly and Barrett, 2011, pp. 9–12; Power, 2012, pp. 476–87; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015, pp. 12–7).

Education’s peacebuilding role is affected by the ways in which resources are managed by actors at multiple scales, from the school to government level. Inequalities and grievances can be reinforced by resource misappropriation or diversion and political influence or nepotism in the distribution of services and opportunities (Smith, 2005, p. 379; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 38–9; L. Davies, 2010, pp. 492–3; Davies, 2011, p. 163). Education interventions may therefore focus on ‘good governance’, transparency, and accountability in sector management (e.g. planning, budgeting, expenditure) (Smith, 2010, p. 5; Davies, 2011, p. 164). However, such interventions generally reflect a technical focus on individual actions or organisational systems, rather than underlying dimensions of power, authority, and incentives (Davies, 2011, pp. 165–72).

The second dimension of inequality addressed by the education literature involves representation in decision-making and management concerning resource distribution, content, and service provision. This includes opportunities (for students, teachers, households, communities, and local authorities) to participate in and influence decision-making, from the school to national level (Tikly and Barrett, 2011, pp. 9–12; Power, 2012, pp. 476–87; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015, pp. 12–7). Education settings represent important sites of community participation in decision-making, which can challenge and transform dominant power relations (Shizha, 2005, p. 75). Education management reforms are identified as mechanisms for strengthening ‘local’ ownership and choice, responsiveness to ‘local’ needs, community-government relations, and transparency and accountability in service delivery. Key reforms include decentralisation (deconcentration, delegation, or devolution) of financing, administration, and decision-making to subnational levels as well as ‘participatory’ school-based management processes (Astiz, Wiseman and Baker, 2002, p. 70; Dupuy, 2008b, pp. 159–60, 2008a, pp. 58–88; Fuller, 2009, pp. 856–8).
While providing some opportunities for participation, these reforms can reinforce power structures and inequalities when decision-making processes exclude ‘marginalised’ (e.g. ethnic, geographic, socioeconomic) populations (Smith, 2005, p. 379; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 61–4; Brown, 2011, pp. 198–200). Management practices also communicate and legitimise particular norms, values, attitudes, and behaviours. For example, school and government practices can normalise forms of violence including unequal power and gender relations and militarised and authoritarian teaching, management, and disciplinary approaches (Harber, 2004, pp. 24–130; Seitz, 2004, pp. 26–7; Davies, 2005, pp. 360–3, 2006, p. 13, 2011, p. 162; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 44–56; Smith, 2010, pp. 15–6). The ‘devolution’ of responsibilities from state to subnational authorities and communities can increase the burden on populations (and non-state actors) to provide financial, material, and human resources (Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 62–5, 89; Brown, 2011, pp. 198–200). This is associated with neoliberal privatisation and commodification of education services, and can exclude lower-income groups, fragment or segregate education, and reproduce inequalities and grievances between communities (Rizvi and Lingard, 2000, p. 421; Tikly, 2001, p. 161; Harber, 2004, pp. 34–5; Robertson, 2007, p. 144, 2011, p. 286; Robertson and Dale, 2013, pp. 436–7).

Education governance arrangements have wider political implications, as they reflect and reproduce broader political structures and hierarchies of power and representation. Education reforms thus present an entry point for political transformation across multiple sectors (Dupuy, 2008b, p. 150; Smith, 2010, p. 23; Barakat et al., 2013, p. 127; Ellison, 2014, p. 191; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015, p. 15). Education systems can support political transformation by contributing to civic or political participation and ‘democratic’ values and practices. This involves, for example, civic and citizenship education promoting understandings of citizenship, citizens’ rights, responsibilities, and relationship to the state, and ‘democratic’ governance and institutions (Davies, 2004, pp. 239–42, 2006, p. 13, 2011, p. 170; Olssen, 2004, p. 263; Seitz, 2004, p. 81; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 76–7, 2008b, p. 160; Smith, 2010, p. 15). However, as discussed below, education systems can reproduce exclusionary or repressive versions of nationality and citizenship.

The third dimension of inequality addressed by the education literature concerns the recognition of identity and difference in education systems and content. Education systems contribute to political and cultural violence through repression or ‘non-recognition’ of identity and difference (cultural, ethnic, religious, etc.). The
transmission of essentialist or assimilationist conceptions of identity and ‘scapegoating’ or ‘othering’ of particular groups can (re)produce divisions, fear, and hatred (Davies, 2004, p. 229; Harber, 2004, pp. 85–96; Davies, 2005, p. 361, 2006, p. 13; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 41–54; L. Davies, 2010, p. 491). Education systems transmit dominant group (‘official’) knowledge and historical or national narratives that may omit, suppress, or be irrelevant to the historical experiences, perspectives, and practices of different groups (Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 40–1; Freedman et al., 2008, p. 675; Smith, 2010, pp. 17–8).

Educational segregation or integration (according to religion, ethnicity, language, socioeconomic status, etc.) influences intergroup dynamics and outcomes. Some argue that shared schools and instruction contribute to national identity, economic opportunity, and intergroup understanding, while separate services reinforce group divisions and create parallel education systems. Others argue that denial of education preferences affects access and attainment for minority groups, reproducing ‘cultural’ violence and socioeconomic inequalities. They suggest that recognition of preferences for separate approaches, content, and languages of instruction can strengthen educational access, outcomes, and recognition of identities (Harber, 2004, pp. 86–96; Davies, 2005, pp. 361–5, 2006, p. 13; Degu, 2005, pp. 131–44; Dupuy, 2008a, pp. 41–7; Smith, 2010, pp. 8–14; Brown, 2011, pp. 192–7; Novelli and Smith, 2011, p. 26).

Responses to forms of cultural violence involve recognising ‘marginalised’ identities and groups, respecting and affirming difference, addressing aspects of segregation, and ensuring content meaningful to diverse communities (Tikly and Barrett, 2011, pp. 9–12; Power, 2012, pp. 476–87; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015, pp. 12–7). Curriculum reforms provide opportunities for including multiple perspectives in historical and national narratives. However, representations of identity and history are highly political and require attention to which ‘official’ narratives are accepted and who is responsible for such decisions (Cole, 2007, p. 128; Dupuy, 2008a, p. 55; McCully, 2012, p. 156). The role of identity in conflict also raises questions about the extent to which difference “should be highlighted or obscured in educational settings” (Bekerman, Zembylas and McGlynn, 2009, p. 226).

These three areas of inequality are shaped by the multi-scalar nature of power and influence in education policy and practice. Discussions of education governance (ownership, organisation, provision, regulation, decision-making) draw attention to the influence of actors, interests, and priorities at multiple scales, on national and ‘local’ decisions and practices. These dynamics influence patterns of, and responses to,


Critiques of global education agendas and ‘hegemonic policy discourse’ (Knutsson and Lindberg, 2012, p. 806) reflect critiques of the ‘liberal peace’ model. Global policy agendas may ignore or undermine ‘local’ or national priorities, interests,

The multiple dimensions of inequality discussed in this section provide important insights for the critical peacebuilding literature. The points outlined above expand on and complicate critical peacebuilding discussions of the role of education (or ‘social services’ more broadly) as a form of socioeconomic distribution, contributor to state-society relations, and response to ‘everyday’ needs. They also provide entry points for exploring critical peacebuilding ‘themes’, notably responses to systems of violence and inequality, ‘local’ participation, and ‘everyday’ concerns. The education literature complicates the critical peacebuilding narrative of service delivery/provision as socioeconomic distribution (and as part of broader responses to responses to systems of inequality). Education’s peacebuilding role is not simply about the ‘delivery’ or ‘provision’ of services. It involves the distribution of wider educational resources (e.g. material, financial, human) as well as decision-making arrangements, structures and content, and underlying interests and agendas. Critical peacebuilding scholars also generally frame service delivery/provision as beneficial or neutral, a point that is challenged when considering the ways in which resource allocation, decision-making arrangements, structure, and content intersect with and reinforce historical, political, economic, and cultural inequalities. In these ways, service delivery/provision itself can contribute to conflict rather than peacebuilding.

The education literature contributes to and expands critical peacebuilding discussions of education’s contribution to state-society relations and of broader processes of ‘local’ participation and influence. It illustrates how participation processes
play out in a specific sector, at multiple ‘local’ scales (e.g. subnational governments, schools, households), including who participates and how. It also provides insight into processes and institutions linking international- or national-level governance and ‘local’ spheres. These illustrate entry points for understanding how power and influence might be (re)distributed in ‘local’ contexts – as well as ways in which inequalities are reproduced. This expands the focus beyond service delivery/provision, considering decision-making arrangements informing policy development, resource distribution, and management priorities. This is one way in which engagement with education illustrates relationships between ‘everyday’ concerns, ‘local’ participation, and systems of/responses to violence and inequality.

In addition to political aspects, the education literature emphasises ‘cultural’ dimensions of violence and inequality. When discussing the importance of responses to inequalities, some critical peacebuilding scholars refer to aspects of identity and difference. When discussing contributions of ‘social’ services, however, they focus mainly on socioeconomic and political issues, with little attention to ‘cultural’ dimensions or implications. While Richmond (2016, p. 123) identifies education as a potential area for ‘building bridges’ across groups and Lidén (2009, p. 621) refers to “culturally adapted provision of… education”, little detail is provided. The education literature explores in detail the reproduction and implications of ‘cultural’ violence and inequalities, expanding critical peacebuilding discussions of inequality by considering questions of identity and difference in education structure and content.

The critical peacebuilding literature suggests that interventions responding to ‘everyday’ concerns and priorities, including social services, can serve as mechanisms of external control and influence. The education literature provides insights into mechanisms of influence within a specific sector, describing ‘global’ influences on national education policies and the advancement of particular political and economic agendas. This illustrates the potential for education to advance externally- or elite-driven (neoliberal) priorities and interests, rather than contributing to ‘emancipatory’ or ‘popular’ peace. At the same time, while the points outlined above illustrate the ways in which education systems intersect with and reproduce inequalities and violence, they also provide insight into mechanisms for their transformation.
3.5 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have examined key themes articulated in the critical peacebuilding literature, focusing on responses to systems of violence and inequality, ‘local’ engagement, and ‘everyday’ concerns. Given the significance of education systems in reproducing patterns of violence, inequality, and power, I suggest that engagement with education can provide insight into: 1) mechanisms or processes through which these critical peacebuilding issues can be addressed; 2) relationships between responses to ‘everyday’ concerns, ‘local’ participation, and systems of/responses to violence and inequality; and 3) processes and institutions linking international- or national-level governance and ‘grassroots’ spheres, which are limited in critical peacebuilding discussions.

The critical peacebuilding literature is characterised by limited engagement with education and other social institutions. Existing discussions are limited by a depoliticised focus on service ‘delivery’ or ‘provision’, assumptions about education’s ‘positive’ contributions to peacebuilding, and limited attention to political, economic, and cultural forms of violence and inequality reproduced within and through social institutions such as education. The education literature addresses in detail the complexity of education’s role in conflict and peacebuilding, with a focus on multiple forms of inequality and their implications as well as possibilities for (and mechanisms of) transformation. This literature provides entry points for bringing education into critical peacebuilding discussions and (re)politicising these discussions through a focus on how services (and resources) are distributed across sites and scales, specific mechanisms of ‘local’ participation in education contexts, forms of identity and inequality privileged or neglected in policy and practice, and influences of wider political and economic reforms and interests.

‘Peacebuilding through education’ may represent a top-down, (neo)liberally oriented approach led by national and international actors, shaped by global, international, and national interests and representing a mechanism of social order and control. However, as one of the most widespread social institutions, education systems also represent a mechanism through which to understand and address ‘local’ and ‘everyday’ dimensions of inequality and injustice as part of peacebuilding analysis and intervention. While the critical peacebuilding literature draws attention to critically important questions of inequality, ‘local’ engagement, and the ‘everyday’, the lack of attention to education represents a significant gap. This thesis seeks to address this gap.
CHAPTER 4. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

4.1 Chapter Introduction

In this chapter, I outline the theoretical approach guiding this research. In the first section, I describe the broad critical theoretical perspective guiding discussions of inequality, violence, and peacebuilding processes within education contexts. In the second section, I describe a critical realist perspective, which provides an ontological framework for this research. In the third section, I outline a critical cultural political economy framework that draws attention to interrelated factors influencing peacebuilding and education processes, policies, and practices. In the final section, I discuss considerations of ‘scale’ in the analysis of these processes.

4.2 Critical Theoretical Approach

This research is guided by a theoretical perspective that critically examines existing social orders and institutions and considers possibilities for social and political change. Critical peacebuilding scholars emphasise the need for a critical perspective considering alternative orders and relations in order to address structural, political, and historical dimensions of violence (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Pugh, 2004; Heathershaw, 2008; Mac Ginty, 2008; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008a; Lidén, Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2009; Richmond, 2009a; Sabaratnam, 2013; Howarth, 2014; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). Some education literature also emphasises the need for a critical perspective challenging existing power relations and structural forms of violence, inequality, and injustice operating within and through education systems (Lopes Cardozo, 2008; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008; Bajaj and Brantmeier, 2011; Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013; Bajaj, 2015; Novelli, 2016). This involves locating education systems within wider political, economic, and cultural contexts and considering links to broader processes of (in)equality, (in)justice, and peacebuilding.

I draw on a theoretical perspective that broadly distinguishes between ‘problem solving’ and critical approaches. A problem-solving approach “takes the world as it finds it… as the given framework for action” (Cox, 1981, p. 128). Specific policy ‘problems’ are addressed within prevailing systems and relations of power, aiming “to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly” (p. 129). This sustains existing social orders and patterns of inequality, injustice, and oppression and associated political interests. In contrast, a critical approach aims to challenge existing orders of
power and promote change in social and political institutions and relations (Cox, 1981, pp. 128–30, 1994, p. 101, 2002a, p. 76). Rather than taking prevailing institutions and power relations for granted, this approach “calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox, 1981, p. 129). It considers constraints and opportunities influencing change, including political, economic, sociocultural, and historical factors and contexts (Cox, 1981, pp. 129–30, 1994, p. 101, 2002b, p. 32, 2002c, p. 59; Hoffman, 1987, p. 243; Devetak, 2005, p. 150). Critical analysis locates a given phenomenon “within its historical context, testing and teasing-out tensions between the phenomenon and the cultural, social, political, economic… institutions and struggles” (Rabaka, 2010, p. 15). This includes interactions between social forces, states, and world orders (Cox, 1981, pp. 137–8), as well as the “elaborate machinery” harmonising (peacebuilding and education) policies and ‘internationalised’ policy processes driven by international agencies (p. 145). Problem-solving and critical theoretical approaches are not, however, mutually exclusive, and “may be understood to address different concerns or levels within one overall story” (Sinclair, 1996, p. 6).

As Hill Collins (1998, p. xiv) explains, critical theoretical perspectives “actively grapple with the central questions facing groups of people differently placed in specific political, social, and historical contexts characterized by injustice”. Collins argues that what makes critical theory ‘critical’ is its challenge to ‘unjust ideas and practices’ and ‘commitment to justice’ (pp. xiv–xvi). In this research, I consider systems of power, inequality, and injustice associated with peacebuilding and educational institutions and processes. This involves attention to the ways in which these shape the experiences of different groups of people: those who are relatively privileged and ‘successful’, those in subordinate, precarious, or peripheral positions, and those excluded from economic and political systems (Cox, 1996, pp. 203–4, 2001, pp. 48–9, 2002a, pp. 84–5). This also involves attention to interactions between structures (configurations of ideas, material capabilities, and institutions providing frameworks for individual and group activity) and the agency of different ‘forces’ or actors (e.g. international organisations, governments, private agencies, civil society) (Cox, 1981, pp. 135–7, 2001, pp. 55–6). Critical theory aims to “shed light on the character and bases” of relations of dominance and subordination, and the approaches and ideologies that rationalise or obscure them (Fraser, 2013, p. 19).

My engagement with critical theory is grounded in broader debates about the use
of this theoretical perspective. This includes Jahn’s (1998) critique of the use of critical theory in international relations. She argues that instead of “analysing concrete phenomena in their historical and social totality” (p. 614), ‘critical’ theory often abstracts concepts, ideas, and objects from their social role and historical context. It thus represents a “reenactment of liberal idealism” (p. 614), rooted in assumptions about ‘universal’ values and norms (p. 637). Cammack (2007) also discusses the failure of ‘critical’ theorists to engage in historical and holistic analysis. He describes as simplistic and misleading the assumption “that problem-solvers are the mere instruments of existing interests, while critical theorists have a degree of distance, or autonomy, from them” (p. 5). He challenges assumptions that ‘dominant interests’ are ‘monolithic and unchanging’, and describes the failure of ‘critical’ approaches to engage in holistic analysis (pp. 6–13). My research is therefore rooted in holistic, historical analysis: to avoid ‘naturalising’ existing social orders, “critical theory… has to engage in historical analysis, thus revealing the historically contingent character of its objects” (Jahn, 1998, p. 616).

In studying education’s peacebuilding implications, I consider political, economic, and sociocultural processes beyond the education system, and its historical context. I also consider historical dimensions of inequalities and structural violence (and their links to conflict), including political and institutional legacies of colonial rule (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 652–3, 2003, pp. 136–40; Brown and Langer, 2010, p. 30; Anderson and Rolandsen, 2014, pp. 547–51). The “historically established social relations that lie behind… manifestations of inequality” are critically important in understanding their consequences (Cramer, 2003, p. 404).

‘Critical’ analyses (of peacebuilding and education, in this case) involve normative dimensions, “offering alternatives to what is (domination and discrimination), by projecting possibilities of what ought to be and/or what could be” (Rabaka, 2010, p. 20). This includes assessments or assumptions regarding particular rights and outcomes associated with social change (Cox, 2002a, p. 76) and definitions of ‘emancipation’ (Rengger, 2000, p. 160). However, ‘critical’ approaches to peacebuilding may rely on and reproduce assumptions about ‘universal’ definitions or forms of emancipatory peace (Richmond, 2006a, p. 370, 2008a, pp. 453–4). Assumptions about ‘universal’ values and norms undermine analyses of political issues: “because concrete political phenomena are located in particular times and places, they are particular and not universal” (Jahn, 1998, p. 637). Such assumptions also obscure and reproduce forms of inequality and injustice: “to suggest universal answers to global
problems can only mean to hide the particular relations of injustice… constituted in this relationship” (p. 638). In this research, I explore contextualised and ‘localised’ understandings and meanings of (in)equality and peacebuilding in education contexts in South Sudan and explore the ways in which these align with or challenge ‘global’ concepts, assumptions, and agendas.

I draw on critical feminist perspectives to inform a more comprehensive analysis of multiple dimensions and systems of power, inequality, and domination in education and peacebuilding. Feminist inquiry is concerned with “power in all of its visible and invisible forms”, including ‘boundaries’ and difference associated with relations of power and patterns of exclusion, marginalisation, inequality, and oppression (Ackerly, 2008, pp. 28–30). This involves efforts to explore, understand, and transform structures and relations of social, political, and economic violence, subordination, inequality, and oppression across multiple levels of analysis (Tickner, 1997, pp. 616–20, 2001, pp. 62–4, 2006, pp. 21–5; Ackerly and True, 2006, p. 246; Peterson, 2016, p. 514). I also draw on post-colonial perspectives to gain insight into global and historical dimensions of power and oppression. This informs an analytical approach challenging “the centrality of particular ideas about the international which naturalises forms of historic inequality… connected to the legacies, broadly understood, of European colonialism and the hierarchies of power… that it sought to institute” (Sabaratnam, 2011a, p. 784). Post-colonial scholars explore the continued effects and legacies of colonial practices implicated in contemporary relations of political, economic, and cultural power, authority, and advantage (Said, 1989, p. 207, 1994, p. 9; Bhabha, 1994, pp. 6, 171; Chowdry and Nair, 2002, pp. 11–2; Loomba, 2005, p. 16), thus politicising and historicising (global) inequalities (Jones, 2006, p. 10). It considers “traces of the past in the present”, “in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices” (Said, 1994, pp. 20, 9). This includes processes and relations of power manifested through education systems. (Neo)colonial processes occur “by continuing consolidation within education” (Said, 1994, p. 12). Education (or ‘schooling’) represents “institutional/cultural weapons” of (neo)colonial violence (Serequeberhan, 1994, p. 65), serving to “instill in the exploited a mood of submission and inhibition which considerably eases the task of the agents of law and order” (Fanon, 2004, pp. 3–4).

Feminist and post-colonial perspectives draw attention to “the personal and previously invisible spheres” of world politics (Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006, p. 7).
They inform an approach that begins with the lives of individuals and the social, political, and economic contexts and relations in which they are situated, challenging the separation of ‘private’ and ‘public’ or ‘political’ spheres (Peterson, 1992, p. 202; Tickner, 1997, pp. 616–21, 2006, p. 25). This highlights the ‘personal’ dimensions of political conflict and peacebuilding and relationships between ‘personal’ and ‘international’, between subjective experiences and international politics (Sylvester, 2012, pp. 484–501; Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 390–6, 593–636). Similarly, post-colonial theory draws attention to “the daily imposition of power in the dynamics of everyday life” and interactions between communities and institutions of authority (Said, 1994, p. 109).

4.3 Critical Realism

This research reflects a critical realist ontology, which suggests that the social world involves underlying structures and powers existing beyond what is ‘known’ through experience and observation (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, pp. 223–5; Bhaskar, 2009, p. 4; Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 9). Social, economic, and political worlds are understood as “too complex to be fully grasped in real time by… external observers” (Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 265). With respect to peacebuilding and education, “explanations… need to take into account those mechanisms and processes that are not observable but which have real effects” (Robertson and Dale, 2015, p. 150). Ontologically, critical realism distinguishes between the ‘real’, ‘actual’, and ‘empirical’, while emphasising their relational nature (Jessop, 2005a, p. 42). The world is viewed in terms of: 1) ‘real’ generative or causal structures and mechanisms existing independently of knowledge and providing conditions in which 2) ‘actual’ events and processes occur and are in turn 3) ‘empirically’ experienced or observed by social actors (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, pp. 223–5; Jessop, 2005a, p. 41; Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 46–7, 2011, p. 2; Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 9). Together, “the empirical and the actual provoke questions about the nature of the real” (Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 9). I move beyond empirical aspects of social reality (associated with inequalities and peacebuilding in education contexts) to explore conditions for these phenomena and forms of organisation (Danermark et al., 2002, pp. 96–7). This reflects an attempt to “reach beyond experiences to grasp the deeper generative causal properties that give rise to these experiences” (Jackson, 2011, p. 74). I am interested in understanding conditions or properties making possible social systems, relations, and actions shaping inequalities and peacebuilding implications within and through education.
A critical realist approach considers “why occurrences and phenomena are linked”, rather than simply noting they are linked (Jackson, 2011, p. 99). This involves attention to ‘causal’ factors, or “processes, structures or conditions... directing outcomes, actions, states of affairs, events or changes” (Kurki, 2008, p. 16). This considers both material (e.g. relations of power and production, resources) and discursive or ideational (e.g. social rules, norms, meanings) aspects of the world as having ‘causal’ powers and effects (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, pp. 223, 235; Joseph, 2007, pp. 351–4; Kurki, 2008, pp. 11–2, 206; Wight, 2012, pp. 267–70). These influence (constrain or enable) experiences and outcomes, avoiding a language of linear causation, determinism, or prediction. In complex, ‘open’ social systems, multiple external and internal forces interact to produce effects (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, pp. 229–32; Sayer, 2004, pp. 262–3; Kurki, 2007, pp. 364–5, 2008, pp. 204–5, Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 108–9, 2009, pp. 21–2, 71–2, 2011, p. 5; Scott, 2010, p. 88). These relationships “involve countless different and contradictory causal mechanisms, each mediated by countless further intervening factors” (Selby, 2014, p. 839). This is illustrated by Sayer’s (2004, pp. 260–4) distinction between (potential) ‘causal’ dimensions of power (individual, institutional, or relational forms), its ‘actual’ exercise, and its effects. Relations with other causal powers within open social systems influence their exercise and effects, and the same action may have different effects in different contexts (pp. 261–4). This approach accounts for complex interactions between social relations, structures, and contexts, which can help to understand (policy) decisions and change in relation to education and peacebuilding. Insight into ‘causes’ of patterns of violence, inequality, and domination is necessary to understand the nature of power maintaining them and possibilities for transformation.

Critical realism considers how social processes and events are shaped by ‘causal' powers of both structures (questions of context) and human agency (questions of self-determination), examining their interrelations without reducing one to the other. This approach considers ‘pre-existing’ structures or patterns of social relations in which agents are embedded, including positions, rules, opportunities, and resources influencing actions. At the same time, structural conditions are reproduced and transformed (intentionally or unintentionally) by agents’ actions. Structures may not equally constrain or enable all agents, drawing attention to skills and capabilities, knowledge and interpretations, desires and intentions, privilege and disadvantage, and other influencing factors (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, pp. 230–2; Scott, 2000, pp. 34–5,
Critical realism defines social structures as “internal social relations that tie agents to each other, their roles, and ideational and material resources”, constraining agents or providing opportunities, as well as positioning them in relation to one another within a hierarchy (Kurki and Sinclair, 2010, pp. 6–7).


Critical realism is guided by a view of knowledge claims or accounts as provisional, partial, contextualised, and open to critique. Explanations represent a particular interpretation or understanding within a particular social, political, and historical context, rather than an ‘objectively true’ account (Patomäki and Wight, 2000, p. 227; Scott, 2005, pp. 2–3, 2010, pp. 11–2, 80, Kurki, 2007, p. 370, 2008, p. 15; Bhaskar, 2008, p. 115, 2009, pp. 21–41; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 5–6).

4.4 Critical Cultural Political Economy

I draw on cultural political economy (CPE) as a broad, meta-theoretical framework for understanding relationships between inequality, violence, and peacebuilding in education. Drawing on a critical realist ontological perspective, CPE considers interrelated influences, at multiple scales, of cultural, political, and economic structures and systems on the selection, reproduction, and implications or effects of particular discourses, approaches, and strategies. CPE is meant to address the limitations of critical perspectives focusing on narrow conceptions of power (e.g. class, relations of production) by considering the role of ideas, identities, and discourses (Jessop and Sum, 2001, pp. 94–5; Schechter, 2002, pp. 5–13). This aligns with feminist concerns with interrelated structures of sociocultural, political, and economic power,
subordination, and oppression (Tickner, 2006, pp. 21–5; Fraser, 2013, p. 5) and post-colonial challenges to “dichotomies between political economy and materialism… [and] inflections of power/identity/culture/knowledge” (Jones, 2006, p. 6).

I draw on broad understandings of the ‘economic’ and ‘political’. This involves attention to relations between education and market and non-market economic activities, viewing the education sector “as a complex ‘economy’ in its own right” (Robertson and Dale, 2015, pp. 153–4). I also consider multiple aspects of governance as well as formal political institutions. Jessop and Sum (Jessop, 2004, p. 161, 2010, p. 337; Jessop and Sum, 2010, p. 415; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 152–3) define culture in terms of ‘semiosis’, referring to forms of intersubjective meaning within particular social and historical contexts. However, this pays limited attention to systems of norms, values, and understandings associated with particular experiences, practices, and relationships, as well as aspects of identity and difference (Jessop and Sum, 2001, p. 96; Sayer, 2001, p. 688; Jessop, 2004, p. 161, 2005b, p. 143, 2010, pp. 336–8; Best and Paterson, 2010, pp. 7–12; Robertson and Dale, 2015, pp. 153–4). I consider a broad understanding of the ‘cultural’, including discourses, ideas, concepts, beliefs, and meanings, as well as forms of identification and representation (Hall, 1997c, pp. 15–22; Loomba, 2005, p. 26) and aspects of difference and categorisation associated with ‘culture’ and identification (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 34–45; Said, 1994, p. 15; Appadurai, 1996, pp. 12–3; Hall, 1996, pp. 3–4). I consider configurations (and material dimensions) of power, inclusion/exclusion, and domination/subordination associated with ideas, identities, and other ‘cultural’ aspects. These include social status and treatment, patterns of privilege and oppression, and access to opportunities and resources (Said, 1994, p. 15, 2003, pp. 5–6; Mbembe, 2001, pp. 5–6; Chowdry and Nair, 2002, pp. 17–22; Loomba, 2005, pp. 50–1, 84–7; Appiah, 2006, p. 16; Fraser, 2008b, pp. 131–8, 2008a, pp. 12–8, 2013, pp. 162–79; Rabaka, 2010, p. 13).

CPE explores the ways in which cultural, political, and economic processes or domains of activity intersect to shape outcomes in particular contexts (Best and Paterson, 2010, pp. 12–7). While considering the specificities of each, the cultural, political, and economic are understood as interconnected rather than isolated or autonomous spheres. Practices and processes can be understood as simultaneously cultural, political, and economic without prioritising any one dimension (Jessop and Sum, 2001, p. 96, 2010, p. 445; Jessop, 2005b, p. 146; Best and Paterson, 2010, pp. 12–7; Walker, 2010, pp. 225–6; Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 22). This challenges
peacebuilding perspectives viewing politics, economics, and culture as largely independent of one another (Pugh, 2005, p. 31). Given their simultaneously cultural, political, and economic roles, education systems provide insight into relationships between the ‘symbolic’ and ‘material’. However, I acknowledge the potential for a ‘cultural’ focus to depoliticise understandings of political and economic questions (Best and Paterson, 2010, pp. 18–9; van Heur, 2010, p. 454; Staricco, 2016, p. 1). CPE aims to avoid reducing political and economic relations to ‘cultural’ understandings, considering ‘extra-cultural’ factors shaping actions and relationships and potential disjunctions between ‘cultural’ meanings and political or economic practices (Sayer, 2001, pp. 688–9; Jessop, 2004, pp. 163–5, 2005b, pp. 143–5, 2010, pp. 338–41; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, pp. 1155–7; Jessop and Sum, 2010, p. 445; Sum and Jessop, 2013, p. 98). This facilitates the holistic approach to critical analysis emphasised above.

CPE, using a ‘strategic-relational’ approach, explores how and why particular discourses, practices, or ways of understanding the world are privileged, selected, and retained by individual, collective, or organisational actors in specific contexts.24 It examines the ways in which these discourses, practices, or understandings are ‘operationalised’, retained, and reproduced in particular institutions or projects across different scales and sites (Jessop, 2004, pp. 162–6, 2005b, pp. 144–5, 2010, pp. 338–46; Sum, 2005, pp. 6–7; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, pp. 1157–60; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 49–51, 165–86). The selection, retention, and reproduction of political and economic policies and practices are influenced by discursive and material mechanisms. ‘Material’ aspects include structural mechanisms (e.g. policy networks, transfer mechanisms), technologies or instruments of power (e.g. policy or decision-making techniques), and individual and collective agents (Sum, 2005, pp. 1–2; Jessop, 2008, p. 51, 2010, pp. 339–43; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 165–7, 214–7; Jessop and Sum, 2016, pp. 107–8). The strategic-relational approach considers aspects of both structure and agency. It examines the ways in which structures or systems privilege and reinforce certain actors, identities, interests, strategies, and actions over others (thus reproducing particular economic, political, or social orders). It also examines the ways in which individual and collective actors take account of this ‘differential privileging’ to

24 Political and economic practices and policies are said to be shaped by discursive systems or ‘imaginaries’ framing collective perceptions of the world, giving meaning to particular fields of action and relations, and privileging certain activities as objects of intervention and governance (Jessop, 2004, pp. 162–6, 2005b, p. 145, 2010, pp. 344–6; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, pp. 1157–8; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 165–74).

In these ways, CPE provides a means of understanding “patterns of distribution and inequality, and the power relations that sustain and constrain them” (Best and Paterson, 2010, p. 22). It considers intersecting discursive and material aspects of disadvantage and oppression (p. 189). A strategic-relational approach informs analysis of the reproduction or transformation of relations of power, domination, and inequality. It draws attention to: 1) patterns and processes of domination, oppression, and exclusion associated with particular discourses and material practices; 2) actors and institutions legitimising, operationalising, sustaining, and reproducing these patterns and processes; and 3) ways in which discourses, practices, and institutions, and associated power relations, are directly or indirectly resisted, challenged, and changed (Jessop and Sum, 2001, p. 96, 2016, pp. 107–8, Jessop, 2005b, p. 161, 2008, pp. 157–8; Sum, 2005, pp. 21–3; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 172, 189).

CPE provides a useful framework for analysing education and peacebuilding, representing a “holistic approach to exploring and addressing inequalities in education in conflict-affected contexts… in multiple economic, cultural and political dimensions” (Novelli, 2016, p. 848). Robertson and Dale (2015, p. 154) propose a ‘critical cultural political economy of education’ (CCPE) exploring “ways in which the cultural, political and economic… work on, in, and through” education structures, institutions, and practices. CCPE is broadly guided by four ‘education questions’ (Dale, 2005, p. 141, 2006, p. 190, Robertson and Dale, 2008, p. 26, 2015, pp. 155–7; Dale and Robertson, 2009, p. 1120), exploring different aspects of education systems: 1) education practice and the distribution and circumstances of educational experiences (Who is taught what, how, by whom, where, and when? For what purposes and with what justifications? Under what circumstances and conditions, and with what results?), 2) education outcomes and consequences of educational practices, policies, and politics (What are the individual, private, public, collective, and community outcomes of ‘education’?), 3) education politics and relations between policy and practice (How, by whom, and at what scale, are aspects of practice problematised, determined, governed, administered, and managed?), and 4) politics of education and relations with political, economic, and cultural structures and ‘rules’ (In whose interests are practices and politics carried out? What is the scope of ‘education’? What are its relations with other sectors, scalar units, and national society?).
A critical approach to analysis moves beyond ‘actual’ practice, outcomes, and politics to focus on the ‘real’ politics of education (Dale, 2005, p. 139). CCPE considers complex dynamics of power and agency and the influence of broader projects and processes shaping educational strategies, policies, and programmes (Robertson and Dale, 2015, pp. 157–9). It provides a framework for examining the discursive and material aspects of relationships between education, inequality, and peacebuilding, with a focus on sociocultural relations, experiences, and practices, economic relations of production, distribution, and exchange, and political agendas and governance (Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015, p. 8).

4.5 Considering Scales of Analysis

CPE explores the ways in which political and economic ideas, systems, and activities are ‘operationalised’ and reproduced across different sites and scales, and considers interactions between different sites and scales of action (Jessop, 2004, pp. 162–6, 2005b, pp. 145–52, 2010, pp. 344–6; Sum, 2005, p. 9; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, pp. 1157–9). The importance of examining roles, relationships, interests, and power between and within global, international, regional, state, and ‘local’ (e.g. community, household) levels is emphasised in critical literature on peacebuilding (Manning, 2003; Richmond, 2006a, 2009a, 2010b, 2013; Hameiri, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011a; Sending, 2011; Zaum, 2012; Heathershaw, 2013; Paffenholz, 2015) and education (Dale, 2005; Robertson and Dale, 2006, 2008; Mundy, 2007; Rappleye and Paulson, 2007; Lopes Cardozo, 2008; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008; Dale and Robertson, 2009; Moutsios, 2010; Robertson, 2011; Knutsson and Lindberg, 2012).

Scales involve physical and social dimensions. I consider aspects of geographical, territorial, or spatial place or location as well as sociocultural, political, and economic arrangements, networks, interactions, and activities, and the relations between these dimensions (Massey, 1993, p. 67; Agnew, 1994, pp. 55, 71–7; Cox, 1998b, pp. 2–3; Brenner, 1999, pp. 40–1; Marston, 2000, pp. 220–1; Brenner, 2001, p. 599; Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 26; Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008, pp. 393–5). Education systems, for example, are ‘physically’ organised according to geographic location and administrative levels. At the same time, these spaces and scales intersect with wider patterns of social identities and relationships and aspects of governance (Bray and Thomas, 1995, pp. 474–5; Noyes, 2013, p. 112). I consider vertical or hierarchical dimensions of scale (different activities taking place at different scales, from local to
global, in the same place) and horizontal or spatial dimensions (similar activities taking place at similar scales in different places) (Collinge, 2005, pp. 189–90; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, p. 1159; Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008, p. 393). I also consider actors operating across multiple spatial scales (Jessop, 2008, p. 46), and differences, tensions, and conflicts within scales (Massey, 1993, p. 69; Sum, 2005, pp. 10–2). While separating ‘local’, ‘national’, and ‘international’ or ‘global’ actors, contexts, and influences for analytical purposes, I do not assume a clear divide between them. Rather than viewing scales as fixed, bounded, and mutually exclusive, I consider scales in a relative sense, with attention to their interrelations, interconnections, fluidity, and flexibility (Massey, 1993, p. 68; Agnew, 1994, pp. 66–7; Cox, 1998a, pp. 41–2; Brenner, 1999, p. 53, 2001, pp. 605–6; McDowell, 2001, p. 230; Swyngedouw, 2004, pp. 34–5; Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008, pp. 393–5).

Questions of scale are associated with relations of power, advantage, representation, domination, and subordination (Massey, 1993, p. 67; Robertson, 2006, p. 313; Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 425). Scalar analysis requires attention to different centres of power and opportunities for representation, decision-making, and action and the ways in which arrangements privilege certain interests and opportunities (Massey, 1993, pp. 62–3; Cox, 1998a, pp. 43–4, 1998b, pp. 15–6; K. T. Jones, 1998, p. 28). Analysis of inequalities and structural violence also requires attention to the ways in which these “extend from the household to the global” (Tickner, 1997, p. 626). I consider the ways in which scalar aspects and relations are reproduced, negotiated, and contested (Brenner, 2001, pp. 605–6; McDowell, 2001, p. 230), within particular socio-political, geographical, and historical contexts (K. T. Jones, 1998, p. 28; Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008, p. 395) and in “multiple, mundane domains” of ‘everyday’ practices (Ferguson, 2006, pp. 110–1). This involves movement of actors, resources, and information across different scales, and shifting relations of power within and between scales (Cox, 1998b, pp. 2–17; K. T. Jones, 1998, p. 27; Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 70, 2004, pp. 26–35). I consider ‘downward’ shifts in power to ‘local’ actors and institutions and ‘upward’ shifts to inter- or supranational organisations and institutions (Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 70). This does not assume an erosion of the state as a pivotal site and agent of power and activity; rather, it reflects a relative understanding of the influence of national, subnational, and supranational scales (Brenner, 1999, pp. 52–3; Swyngedouw, 2000, pp. 68–9).
4.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter outlines elements of the broad theoretical framework guiding this research. A critical theoretical perspective informs analysis of existing orders of power and inequality in education institutions, policies, and practices. I draw on feminist and post-colonial perspectives to inform a more comprehensive analysis of multiple dimensions and systems of power, inequality, and domination. Critical cultural political economy, informed by a critical realist ontological perspective, provides a framework for examining interrelated cultural, political, and economic factors informing the selection, implementation, and reproduction of discourses and strategies in education contexts, at multiple scales, and their implications for violence and peacebuilding. A theoretical framework drawing on critical cultural political economy and critical realism provided a means of interpreting ‘real’ structures (underlying ‘causal’ factors) shaping policy decisions and processes, roles and relations between actors (and associated power and opportunities), and subjective perceptions and experiences. The role of this theoretical material is briefly discussed in each empirical chapter.
5.1 Chapter Introduction

In this chapter, I outline the methodology and methods used in this thesis. This qualitative research integrates case study and critical discourse analysis approaches to gain insight into cultural, political, and economic dimensions of education, inequality, and peacebuilding at ‘local’, national, and international scales. First, I describe the methodological approach, including the case study approach and critical discourse analysis. I then describe specific data collection and analysis methods as well as research participants and sites. I conclude the chapter by reflecting on ethical considerations central to the research process.

5.2 A Case Study of Peacebuilding and Education in South Sudan

This research is based on a qualitative case study approach examining the relationship between education, inequality, and peacebuilding in South Sudan and using these findings to inform broader contributions to the critical peacebuilding literature. Case studies involve rich, detailed, in-depth exploration, description, and analysis of particular issues within a ‘bounded’ setting or context (Creswell, 2007, pp. 73–6; Gerring, 2007, p. 49), such as a particular system, institution, or country (Collier, 1999, pp. 4–5; Gerring, 2007, p. 19; Klotz, 2008, p. 43; Simons, 2009, pp. 3–4, 2014, p. 457). They involve analysis and interpretation of subjective experiences, perceptions, and meanings, examining multiple perspectives to gain insight into the complexity of a particular ‘case’ (Gerring, 2007, pp. 70–1; Simons, 2009, p. 4, 2014, p. 461). Case studies examine places, groups, activities, events, relationships, interactions, and experiences within particular political, economic, social, cultural, historical contexts (Yin, 2003, p. 13; Stake, 2005, pp. 444–54; Simons, 2014, pp. 455–7) and are useful in exploring dynamics and processes of change (Simons, 2009, p. 23).

Case studies are useful when examining complex phenomena (e.g. violent conflict, peacebuilding), involving interactions “among large numbers of actors across multiple levels of analysis” (Bennett and Elman, 2007, p. 171). Vavrus and Bartlett (2006, p. 95) outline a ‘vertical case study’ approach “comparing knowledge claims among actors with different social locations… to situate local action and interpretation within a broader cultural, historical, and political investigation”. This multilevel approach examines interactions between local, national, international, and global scales,
and enables “grounded, particularized analysis linked with larger, even global, economic and political frameworks” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 501). It considers processes, interactions, and interpretations among different ‘stakeholder’ groups involved in a particular policy or institution (Vavrus and Bartlett, 2006, pp. 96–9). The ‘case’ can be understood as a field of difference and contestation emerging “from the ways in which individuals and groups articulate… different needs, desires and interests – how they join forces [or] struggle against each other” (Schostak, 2005, pp. 44–5).

Understanding dynamics of inequality and structural violence requires attention to interactions between scales of analysis, between the ‘personal’ and ‘international’, between people’s experiences and international politics (Sylvester, 2012, pp. 484–501; Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 390–6, 593–636). I explore broad policy discourses and political and economic processes as well as personal experiences, perceptions, meanings, and emotions. War and peacebuilding “cannot be fully apprehended unless… studied up from people’s physical, emotional, and social experiences, not only down from ‘high politics’ places that sweep blood, tears, and laughter away, or assign those things to some other field” (Sylvester, 2013, p. 2). This involves attention to “physical and emotional connections with war that people live – with their bodies and their minds and as social creatures in specific circumstances” (p. 5). I understand conflict and peacebuilding “as not only caused and practiced, but lived and experienced” (Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 593–4), examining social, political, and historical dimensions and implications of individual and collective experiences, emotions, perceptions, and interpretations of the politics of conflict and peacebuilding (Sabaratnam, 2011a, p. 798, 2013, pp. 270–4, Sylvester, 2012, pp. 484–501, 2013, pp. 2–5; Sjoberg, 2013, pp. 390–6, 593–636; Ahmed, 2014, pp. 9–28).

The ‘vertical case study’ approach enables analysis of “what ‘ought to be’ based on policy pronouncements and… what ‘is happening’ as recounted by local actors” (Vavrus and Bartlett, 2006, p. 98). However, I do not aim to present the policy narratives as ‘ideal’ with gaps between policy and practice illustrating (or responsible for) the ‘failure’ of peacebuilding. Rather, I am interested in understanding the ways in which policy discourses frame the relationship between education and peacebuilding and the ways in which these claims are challenged and undermined by ‘actual’ education practices, experiences, and perceptions. Data collection methods provide opportunities to examine differences, tensions, and similarities between ‘official’ policy discourses and practices, as well as different perspectives and interpretations (e.g.
development actors and ‘local’ communities) regarding interventions (de Sardan, 2005, p. 4). I explore the gaps between policy and practice, as well as “the broader political significance of interventions” (Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 5).

Case studies draw on multiple sources of information or evidence (Yin, 2003, pp. 85–97; Creswell, 2007, pp. 73–6; Simons, 2014, p. 461). I draw on a range of data sources, including policy and strategy document analysis, interviews and group discussions with education and peacebuilding stakeholders, and some observation of ministry, school, and donor contexts. These methods and sources provide insight to different perspectives and experiences and connections and divergences across sources (Barakat et al., 2002, pp. 995–8). I conducted primary research over 10 months, from November 2014 to August 2015. I conducted this thesis work concurrently with data collection for a study commissioned by UNICEF’s Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office, which focused on education sector governance, inequality, conflict, and peacebuilding in South Sudan. This involvement with UNICEF enabled access to documents (e.g. letter of invitation) necessary to obtain an entry visa for South Sudan as well as registration with the national Directorate of Immigration and subsequent visa renewals. This also facilitated access to research sites, contacts with key government and donor stakeholders, and access to security resources during the fieldwork period, including UNMISS security training and updates.

Critical realist analyses of ‘causal’ factors emerge through detailed examination of particular events, processes, and experiences, which are shaped by specific structural and contextual factors. Case studies necessarily involve detailed exploration of events, processes, and experiences within a particular case or place, and enable contextualised analysis of underlying structures shaping political, economic, and sociocultural relations, roles, power, and resources (as described in Chapter 4). Data collection methods such as interviews and group discussions enable the ‘observation’ of empirical experiences and forms of agency at multiple levels and sites within the education system, while policy analyses as well as interviews/discussions provide insights into

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25 This thesis and the research report prepared for UNICEF ESARO draw on the same set of interview and focus group data. During the data collection process, I informed participants (through information sheets and verbal explanations) that the data would be used for these two projects. Some similar themes concerning the relationship between education governance, inequality, violent conflict, and peacebuilding are discussed in both this thesis and the UNICEF report. However, in contrast to the UNICEF report (intended to inform UNICEF policies and strategies), the findings in the thesis are analysed in significantly greater detail and through a different (theoretical) framework, and are located in the context of wider, academic peacebuilding debates.
‘actual’ policy and practice-related decisions, processes, and ‘events’. The use of these multiple data collection methods supports ‘causal’ analysis based on multiple perspectives or interpretations of underlying ‘reality’, as well as insights into various types of structures shaping particular events and experiences. A case study approach also facilitates CPE analysis, enabling the tracing of discourses (on education, peacebuilding, and inequality) vertically and horizontally, supporting analysis of the ways in which these discourses are understood, operationalised, reproduced, or contested across different scales and sites. Interview, group discussions, observation, and policy analysis methods provide access to perspectives and experiences on ‘actual’ education practice, outcomes, and politics, which inform the interpretation of ‘real’ underlying ‘politics of education’.

5.3 Policy Document Review and Discourse Analysis

I draw on a critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach to examine narratives of peacebuilding, education, and inequality reflected in government and donor policy and strategy documents and interview data. ‘Discourses’ refer to “the language associated with a particular social field or practice” (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 179–80). They involve particular representations and interpretations of the world, ways of acting and interacting, and identities or ways of being, reflected in written, spoken, and visual ‘texts’ (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 269–86, 1995, p. 135, 2004, p. 121, 2005, pp. 924–5, 2013, pp. 179–80; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2010, pp. 1214–5). These include official texts (e.g. policy documents, curricula, textbooks, administrative announcements) and aspects of speech, writing, and interaction (e.g. meetings, interviews) (Luke, 1995, p. 28; Rogers et al., 2005, pp. 378–83). These discourses involve specific framings or definitions of problems, situations, and solutions (Gasper, 1996, pp. 37–9; Gasper and Apthorpe, 1996, pp. 6–9; Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p. 3).


Discourse analysis… makes it possible to trace connections between the visible and the hidden, the dominant and the marginalised, ideas and institutions. It allows us to see how power works through language, literature, culture and the institutions which regulate our daily lives.

CDA examines the ways in which discourses are: 1) articulated and become dominant in particular contexts; 2) disseminated, recontextualised, and interpreted across structural, scalar, and institutional boundaries; and 3) ‘operationalised’ (in ways of being, acting, and interacting) and ‘materialised’ (in physical spaces or resource distribution) (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 109–66, 1995, pp. 97–8, 2005, pp. 932–4, 2013, pp. 182–3; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2010, pp. 1215–6). This involves micro-level analysis of ‘texts’ and macro-level analysis of their contexts (Fairclough, 1989, p. 25, 2013, p. 178; Luke, 2002, p. 100). CDA examines relationships between texts, including differences or similarities in how they articulate particular discourses (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 270–2, 2005, p. 920) as well as “gaps or inconsistencies between the ‘saying’ of policy documents and the ‘doing’ of practice” (Stepputat, 2012, p. 442). These have important implications for the reproduction of forms of inequality and violence operating within and through education contexts.

Policy and strategy document analysis provides insight into dominant peacebuilding and education discourses in South Sudan, including priorities, objectives, and approaches articulated by national and international actors. I reviewed policy and strategy documents developed by national government bodies (and supported by international donors and organisations), including peacebuilding and development strategies, education sector policies and plans, and programme and curriculum
frameworks. I also reviewed strategic plans developed by bilateral and multilateral education donors and development agencies (e.g. UNICEF, DFID, USAID) as well as other relevant institutional or organisational policy documents addressing peacebuilding and education issues. These provided a basis for examining (dis)connections between policy discourses and practice and guided the development of interview questions.

5.4 Data Collection Approaches

The critical literature on peacebuilding (Cooper, 2007; Richmond, 2007a, 2008a, 2009a; Lidén, Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2009; Newman, 2011; Sending, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2012; Millar, van der Lijn and Verkoren, 2013; Sabaratnam, 2013, 2017; Paffenholz, 2015) and education (Lopes Cardozo, 2008; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008; Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013) emphasises the importance of examining the perspectives of actors involved in and targeted by policies and interventions. This involves attention to the ‘lifeworlds’, experiences, interpretations, and responses of intended recipients of peacebuilding interventions (Sabaratnam, 2011a, pp. 797–9, 2013, pp. 270–4). Interviews and discussions provide insight into people’s “understandings of the nature and functions of intervention”, with responses representing “expressions of political consciousness” of historical and contemporary dimensions and conditions of intervention (Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 44).

I conducted individual interviews and group discussions with 217 participants in South Sudan (see Table 5.1). At the national level, I interviewed officials from MoEST directorates in Juba and from the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MoCYS), Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MoGCSW), and SSPRC. I also interviewed representatives of international and national education and peacebuilding organisations in Juba, including donors, development agencies, NGOs, and civil society organisations (CSOs). I used semi-structured interviews, with open-ended questions, enabling participants to determine answers based on their own experiences, perspectives, interpretations, and level of comfort. Interviews involved active interaction and in-depth dialogue and provided opportunities to follow up on points identified by participants as well as other issues relevant to the research topic (Mason, 2002, pp. 205–6; Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, p. 109; Mertens, 2010, pp. 370–3; Creswell, 2012, p. 218; Brinkmann, 2013, pp. 21–5, 2014, pp. 286–8).

At the subnational level, I interviewed state-level MoEST, MoCYS, MoGCSW, and SSPRC officials, county and payam education officials, and primary and secondary
school managers in seven research sites. I conducted group discussions with one group of county officials and one group of payam officials. I also interviewed representatives of national and international education and peacebuilding organisations at state and county levels. I conducted focus group discussions with members of youth organisations, primary and secondary school teachers, PTA members, and students. Group discussions provided insight into both collective and individual perspectives and experiences, including commonalities and differences. I could observe interactions and dynamics between participants, including the ways in which they discussed issues of interest. Participants could also assume greater control over the discussion. Group discussions allow a large amount of data to be collected in a short period of time, particularly for participants facing time constraints (such as teachers or students) (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, p. 109; Mertens, 2010, pp. 240, 370; Creswell, 2012, p. 218; Brinkmann, 2013, p. 26, 2014, p. 289; Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2014, pp. 324–8).

Table 5.1. Summary of research participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central MoEST officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other government ministry officials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-level MoEST officials</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County-level education officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payam-level education officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School managers (headmasters, principals)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers, union representatives, and PTA members</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students and youth representatives</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education partner representatives (international, national, and subnational agencies and organisations)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society representatives</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding actors (national and subnational)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviews and discussions were guided by a series of open-ended questions (see Appendix 2 for interview guides and transcript excerpts). This enabled some consistency across interviews and discussions, and flexibility in responding to emerging issues. I adapted questions based on initial interview experiences and participants’ area of focus (e.g. budgeting, alternative education, peacebuilding). I used follow-up questions to explore specific topics and elicit additional information (e.g. ‘Could you please tell me more about that?’ ‘Why do you think that is the case?’). When requested, I provided participants with a copy of the questions prior to our interview, to allow them to familiarise themselves with the topics. Interviews and group discussions lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. I asked participants to choose the location and time, to
All ministry officials chose to be interviewed in their offices. Interviews with school managers, teachers, and students were conducted at the school, either in the head teacher’s office or an empty classroom. Interviews with organisation representatives were held in their offices or at local restaurants identified by participants.

Although English is the official language in teaching and education management in South Sudan, language differences affected engagement with participants in some research sites. This varied across geographic regions. For example, in Central and Western Equatoria I was able to conduct all interviews in English, while in Upper Nile and Warrap discussions with some teachers and students were facilitated in Arabic or Dinka with the help of a translator. While translators enable access to a wider range of participants, they also influence the nature of the data collected (Hermann, 2001, p. 83; Barakat et al., 2002, p. 993). Data might reflect translators’ interpretations of questions and responses, or translators might try to ‘help’ participants answer questions (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 97). Translators also gain access to sensitive information about participants (Zwi et al., 2006, p. 267). I tried to mitigate these challenges by clearly explaining the aim of the research, emphasising the importance of confidentiality, and observing participants’ body language when responding to questions. Interviews with all government officials were in English.

During discussions with students, I distributed paper and coloured pencils and asked them to draw pictures representing their ideas or understandings of peace, violence, and (in)equality (see Figures 5.1 to 5.3 for examples). Arts-based research approaches represent alternative, and engaging, forms of expression or communication. For young people, drawing can provide a means of organising, interpreting, and communicating experiences, perceptions, and feelings. It gives them more control over data collection processes and enables them to share a large amount of information in a short time (Hart and Tyrer, 2006, pp. 31–2; Fargas-Malet et al., 2010, p. 183; Farokhi and Hashemi, 2011, pp. 2219–23; Chilton and Leavy, 2014, p. 403). The use of arts-based methods can mitigate risks associated with sensitive research topics, allowing students to determine the focus of their drawings and express as much or as little as they wish. I was unable to use this approach with all groups of students due to time constraints during some discussions, but it appeared to be well received by participating students. They were very focused on the activity, paying close attention to the presentation of their drawings (erasing mistakes or redoing their drawing if they were...
unhappy with the first version). I noted that students who were hesitant to engage in verbal discussions appeared more comfortable and engaged when using drawing materials. Some provided written descriptions or notes on their drawings to illustrate key points.

*Figure 5.1 Drawing by a female student*
Figure 5.2 Writing by a female student

Figure 5.3 Drawing by a male student
Involvement with UNICEF enabled me to attend national and subnational meetings and workshops organised by the MoEST, UNICEF, and other international organisations, as well as education partner working group meetings. Working within UNICEF offices in Juba and field sites allowed me to observe daily interactions, discussions, and activities. I was able to hear the ways in which different stakeholders discussed conflict and education ‘problems’ and solutions and to observe interactions between different actors (e.g. governmental and non-governmental, ‘national’ and international). I also conducted observation during visits to central and state MoEST offices. I made repeated visits to introduce the research project and schedule and conduct interviews, and spent significant time in national and subnational MoEST offices, waiting to meet with various ministry officials or waiting for UNICEF transport (in Upper Nile, where I was unable to take public transport or walk due to security concerns). This provided opportunities to observe physical spaces, settings (including ‘visible’ distribution of resources across different sites, directorates, or departments), and interactions. This also provided opportunities for conversation with ministry officials, during which I would usually be offered a cup of tea. During these informal conversations, officials were generally more open in sharing their opinions on education policies, conflict and peacebuilding, and relationships between the MoEST and donors and between different MoEST offices. I made repeated visits to schools, although I limited school and classroom observation to avoid disrupting school routines.

Observational approaches shifted across sites and activities, involving elements of participant and non-participant observation. During meetings and workshops, for example, I was involved in activities in the setting being observed, while visits to ministry and school settings involved more passive observation. These forms of observation provided insight into patterns of activity and interaction, physical settings or spaces, and organisation of people, communication, and relationships (formal and informal, verbal and non-verbal) (Sánchez-Jankowski, 2002, p. 148; Angrosino, 2005, p. 741; Mertens, 2010, pp. 367–9; Creswell, 2012, pp. 214–6).

5.5 Engaging Research Participants

When identifying participants, I purposefully approached individuals who could help to develop a detailed understanding of the research topic. To represent as many
perspectives as possible, I tried to engage participants from a range of different settings (geographic sites) and different roles or position within the education system (e.g. central and subnational government officials, international and national organisations, school managers, teachers, students). Within these broad categories, participation was often based on convenience or availability of individuals (e.g. teachers, students). I asked participants suggested other people to contact based on their knowledge of the study topic. The sampling process was ongoing, occurring before and during data collection and adapted to opportunities and constraints in different research sites.

Before beginning data collection, I obtained a letter of approval from South Sudan’s central MoEST (see Appendix 3). I obtained permission to access subnational education sites and schools at multiple levels: from state ministries, county and payam offices, and school managers. UNICEF facilitated contact with key central MoEST officials (e.g. Undersecretary, Peacebuilding Reference Committee) and state ministry officials (e.g. Ministers, Directors General, DGs). Following these initial introductions, I independently scheduled meetings to further explain the research, conduct interviews, and obtain introductions to or contact information for other officials. These ‘independent’ meetings helped to establish (to the greatest extent possible) my thesis research as separate from UNICEF. In each site, I contacted (by telephone or in person) MoEST officials from as many directorates or departments (e.g. general education, planning and budgeting, AES) and administrative levels (e.g. DGs, state inspectors, county directors, payam supervisors) as possible. I invited them to participate in an interview or to recommend another representative. For international and national organisations, I contacted (by email or telephone) the heads of education and peacebuilding programmes or executive directors or chairpersons of CSOs. I invited them to participate in an interview or to recommend another representative.

To engage teachers and students in the research, I asked school managers to extend a general invitation to participate in a focus group discussion. I attempted to involve equal numbers of women/girls and men/boys in teacher and student discussions. In some cases this was not possible, such as in schools with few or no female teachers. In most schools, student participants were members of peace clubs or student governments. While this presented some potential for bias, due to their familiarity with UNICEF’s ‘peacebuilding’ language, they were also more likely to feel comfortable expressing themselves in English. I followed school protocols for student research participation, with school managers (considered responsible for students in school
contexts) serving as ‘gatekeepers’.

Identifying research participants “necessarily involves… political and ethical choices about which voices are heard” (Goodhand, 2000, p. 12). I did not aim to engage a fully ‘representative’ sample; rather I was interested in “[revealing] different and competing ideas” (Ackerly, 2008, p. 34). When approaching potential participants, I tried to represent as wide a variety of perspectives as possible. The diversity of experiences and perspectives across and within communities in South Sudan influences responses provided by research participants. Perceptions, experiences, and expectations of education services and peacebuilding processes differ widely between ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographic, or livelihood communities, as well as between people who have returned from East Africa, Sudan, North America, or Europe, and those who remained in South Sudan prior to the CPA and independence. However, access to such diverse perspectives strengthens the findings of the study.

5.6 Data Analysis and Review

Before beginning interviews, I asked participants if they consented to the conversation being audio-recorded. For those who provided explicit consent, interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. During unrecorded interviews and group discussions, I took handwritten notes. Following a ‘template coding’ approach, I identified initial codes and themes through the analysis of a sample of data, and used these to organise the remaining data for more in-depth analysis. Analysis of transcripts and notes involved reading through the data to identify and reflect on general ideas and gaps, coding (labelling and categorising) the data, and identifying broad themes and patterns, with attention to expected, unexpected, and contradictory findings (Mertens, 2010, pp. 424–8; Creswell, 2012, pp. 237–52, 2014, pp. 197–200; Saldaña, 2014, pp. 583–8). I began analysis while data was being collected, moving back and forth between data collection and analysis. I took note of patterns of experiences, understandings, and explanations shared by different participants (Quinn, 2005, p. 43) and of ‘unique’ statements, considered part of “an ongoing dialogue with… other interview subjects” (Ackerly, 2008, p. 36). In addition to formal coding and categorising, the analysis process involved deriving meaning and insights by rereading transcripts and ‘puzzling’ over statements and observations (Simons, 2009, pp. 117–8).

I drew on different strategies to verify the accuracy, reliability, and credibility of data and interpretations. I examined consistency and variations in data from different
sources and methods, but did not discount ‘inconsistent’ findings. Examining difference, contradiction, and complexity is central to avoiding the ‘appropriation’ of participants’ experiences to meet researchers’ interests (Opie, 1992, pp. 52–60). Competing and contradictory narratives provide insight into explanations, interests, understandings, and incentives of different actors (Perera, 2017, pp. 42–4). “Information which is messy and difficult to triangulate can itself be a valuable source of… knowledge” and is critical to understanding dynamics of conflict (p. 42). I discussed emerging findings with participants and colleagues in South Sudan, to assess the accuracy, fairness, and nuance of interpretations and representations. The length of the research period provided opportunities for sustained conversations about data and interpretations with national and subnational UNICEF and MoEST representatives as well as the Director of the University of Juba’s Centre for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS, a partner for the UNICEF study). This provided opportunities to critique and refine interpretations and examine similarities and differences in perspectives and interpretations.

I presented preliminary research findings during two national workshops in August 2015, organised as part of the UNICEF-commissioned study. Government and partner representatives (MoEST, SSPRC, UNICEF, UNDP, DFID, and others) provided feedback during a workshop organised in collaboration with UNICEF and the MoEST. Civil society and university (faculty and student) representatives provided feedback during a workshop held at the University of Juba, organised in collaboration with the CPDS. While these workshops focused on findings emerging from the UNICEF study, some of the same key points are addressed in this thesis. These discussions provided opportunities to explore different perspectives, interpretations, and recommendations concerning inequality, violence, and peacebuilding in education contexts.

It was not always possible to verify the ‘truthfulness’ of statements shared during interviews and discussions: “What is most important is that these statements and opinions reflect local perceptions of situations… these perceptions are reality” (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 97). My research approach involves taking experience and perception seriously as elements of knowledge (Jacoby, 2006, p. 161). In the following chapters, I share numerous participant quotations, centering “people’s ideas, thoughts, and memories in their own words” (Jacoby, 2006, p. 161). However, I acknowledge the ways in which data analysis is “an exercise of power, of delimiting boundaries, of appreciating relationships” (Ackerly, 2008, p. 36). I integrate
participants’ words with my own insights and analyses: knowledge is “actively created through questions and answers… coauthored by interviewer and interviewee” (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015, p. 63). I attempt to represent the complexity of views (including similarities and tensions) emerging from the data, but acknowledge that certain views, understandings, and interpretations are excluded in analysis and writing (Schostak, 2005, p. 84).

5.7 Research Sites

I collected data in seven sites in five states in South Sudan: Juba in Central Equatoria state (CES), Yambio in Western Equatoria (WES), Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBG), Kuajok and Tonj East in Warrap, and Malakal and Wau Shilluk in Upper Nile (UNS) (see Figure 5.4). I selected sites representing, to the greatest extent possible, different geographic, demographic, and conflict contexts. These sites are characterised by significant differences in socioeconomic, demographic, conflict, and education conditions (see Table 5.2), representing different geographic contexts (e.g. northern and southern states, urban and rural communities, distance from Juba), demographic factors (e.g. diverse ethno-cultural and linguistic groups, population displacement), and contemporary and historical conflict dynamics. However, in conflict-affected contexts, site selection is determined “by what is practically possible (in terms of access and security)” (Barakat et al., 2002, p. 992), and site selection and follow-up visits were affected by on-going violence. I identified specific research sites with guidance from UNICEF, based on security assessments as well as transport options. Certain sites, such as Malakal and Wau Shilluk, were accessible only by UN transportation (e.g. World Food Programme Humanitarian Air Service, UNICEF boat), and all travel was dependent on formal approval from UNICEF and the UNMISS Department of Safety and Security. I was able collect data in one state (Upper Nile) affected by on-going government-opposition violence, where I spoke with government and NGO representatives as well as members of displaced communities. The research sites are described in the following paragraphs.
Figure 5.4 Map of South Sudan

Source: OCHA, 2012 (http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Pages%20from%20map_0.pdf)
Table 5.2. Socio-demographic and educational profiles for research sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/county</th>
<th>Ethnic majority</th>
<th># conflict events (2011-14)</th>
<th>Education indicators (primary level, 2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Equatoria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>Bari</td>
<td>186</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Equatoria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yambio</td>
<td>Azande</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau</td>
<td>Fertit, Jur-Chol</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gogrial West</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonj East</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakal</td>
<td>Shilluk</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Novelli et al., 2016, with data from MoEST, 2014a

Table 5.3. Socio-demographic and educational profiles for research sites (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/county</th>
<th>Pop’n density (person / km²)</th>
<th>Poverty rate 28</th>
<th>% pop’n in rural areas</th>
<th>Agriculture as primary livelihood source 29</th>
<th>Paid employment</th>
<th>Literacy rate (age 15+) 30</th>
<th>Never attended school (age 6+)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Equatoria</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>44-55%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Equatoria</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>33-45%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yambio</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>34-35%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrap</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13-16%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gogrial West</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonj East</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>28-45%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakal</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Novelli et al., 2016, with data from NBS 2012a, 2012b; SSCCSE 2010a, 2010b

26 Data obtained from South Sudan’s Education Management Information System (EMIS). While EMIS covered over 90% of known primary and secondary schools in 2013 (MoEST, 2014a), reliability is affected by conflict and insecurity impeding data collection and inflation of enrolment figures by school or administrative authorities (to obtain additional teachers and resources).

27 Figures are for 2008-2009. Figures calculated based on census data are affected by under-estimation of 2008 census data due to population return during the census period. For certain indicators (e.g. rural population, livelihood source, literacy rate), county-level figures were not available.

28 Estimated percentage of the population in each county or state with per person consumption below the poverty line (72.9 Sudanese pounds in 2008) (NBS, 2012b).

29 Crop farming or animal husbandry (breeding/raising livestock) (SSCCSE, 2010a; NBS, 2012a).

30 Ranges reflect differences in reported literacy rates between SSCCSE reports (2010a, 2010b).
**Central Equatoria:** CES is home to the national capital, Juba, also the state capital. Counties have benefited to varying degrees from investment (e.g. infrastructure, economic development, services) in and around Juba (UNMIS, 2010b), and the greater Equatoria region serves as a corridor for importing goods to South Sudan/Juba from East African countries (Small Arms Survey, 2016a). In 2008, CES’s estimated population was 1.1 million, with the highest population density of all states (SSCCSE, 2010b). However, population estimates do not include returnees from neighbouring countries during and after the census period. Between 2004 and 2008, over 220,000 displaced South Sudanese people returned to CES (SSCCSE, 2010b; UNMIS, 2010b). CES is home to roughly 14 ethnic groups, including Bari, Mundari, Kakwa, Lokoya, Pajali, and Makaraka (UNMIS, 2010b). CES includes six counties: Juba, Lainya, Morobo, Kajo-Keji, Terekeka, and Yei. I collected data in two payams in Juba county.

During the 1983-2005 war, CES was split between the GoS and SPLM/A (UNMIS, 2010b). In recent years, conflict has occurred between ethnic communities (e.g. Bari and Mundari groups) within the state, and cross-border conflict (e.g. between Mundari in CES and Dinka in Lakes state) has been linked to tensions between ‘pastoralist’ and agricultural communities (UNMIS, 2010b). CES has been heavily affected by displacement resulting from the current conflict. The 2013 violence in Juba involved the targeting of Nuer civilians and soldiers by predominantly Dinka forces (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014), causing significant displacement. In August 2016, there were over 65,000 internally-displaced persons (IDPs) in CES (UNOCHA, 2016), with over 40,600 (mainly Nuer) living in UNMISS PoC sites in Juba (IOM South Sudan, 2016). In July 2016, fighting broke out between SPLA and SPLA-IO forces following Machar’s return to Juba. Civilians, including PoC residents and humanitarian workers, were targets of violence, including killings and sexual violence (United Nations, 2016).

**Western Equatoria:** In 2008, WES had a population of roughly 620,000, with over 160,000 returnees between 2004 and 2008 (SSCCSE, 2010b). WES’s population includes eight main ethnic groups, including Azande, Avokaye, Balanda Baka, Beli, Fertit, Moru, and Mundu (UNMIS, 2010e). Livelihoods are based primarily on farming, with rich agricultural production (the main economic activity) and lower livestock ownership than other states (Poggo, 2008, p. 12; UNMIS, 2010e). WES includes ten counties: Mundri West, Mundri East, Maridi, Mvolo, Ibba, Yambio, Ezo, Nzara, Nagero, and Tombura. I collected data in Yambio, the state headquarters.
Participants in WES described insecurity in border counties, including land ownership disputes and conflict between farming communities and cattle-keepers from neighbouring states. WES borders Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). In previous years, attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army along state borders have driven population displacement and insecurity (UNMIS, 2010e). WES is home to refugees from DRC and refugees fleeing conflict in CAR. Nearly 9,500 refugees were residing in WES in November 2015 (UNHCR, 2015), along with nearly 96,000 IDPs (UNOCHA, 2016). Although people in WES emphasised their history of peace and stability (one MoEST official referred to the state’s ‘peaceful culture’), tensions in WES increased after 2013. Armed clashes occurred prior to the signing of the 2015 peace agreement, including in Yambio. Frustrations with Juba’s political elite were exacerbated by the dismissal of the state governor, South Sudan’s only independent governor and frequent government critic. Clashes have occurred between government forces and armed groups (such as the recently established South Sudan National Liberation Movement), some of which have aligned with SPLM-IO, and government forces have targeted civilians. The Arrow Boys, community defence groups originally mobilised to protect civilians, have also been accused of involvement in armed violence (Small Arms Survey, 2016a; Schomerus and Taban, 2017).

**Western Bahr el Ghazal:** In 2008, WBG had a population of roughly 333,000, the smallest of all states although it is the second largest geographically, with the lowest population density (SSCCSE, 2010b). Between 2004 and 2010, an estimated 122,000 South Sudanese returned to WBG from neighbouring countries (UNMIS, 2010a). WBG’s population includes three main ethnic groups: Jur (Luo), Fertit (including multiple subgroups), and Dinka. Although WBG is home to a larger Muslim community than some other states, Christians are the dominant religious community (Poggo, 2008, p. 11; Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 19; UNMIS, 2010a). Livelihoods are based on small-scale farming supplemented by cattle herding (Poggo, 2008, p. 11; UNMIS, 2010a; IOM, 2013b). The state includes one municipality (Wau Municipality) and three counties: Wau, Jur River, and Raja. I collected data in Wau Municipality, the state headquarters.

Participants in WBG described tensions associated with inter-group conflict between Dinka, Fertit, and Jur communities during the 1983-2005 war. Dinka and Jur communities were associated with and protected by the SPLM/A, while Fertit were supported and armed by the GoS (UNMIS, 2010a). Wau remained under GoS control.
until the CPA (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 19). Participants also described conflict between farming communities and cattle-keeping communities from Warrap state and disputes over land ownership, and insecurity along northern borders due to the targeting of Sudanese rebel groups by the GoS. WBG borders CAR to the west and Sudan’s South Darfur to the north, and the presence of the SPLA, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and other armed groups along the border contributes to insecurity (UNMIS, 2010a). Since 2015, civilians have been targets of violence and killings by the SPLA in and around Wau, as part of government operations against Fertit ‘rebels’ (HRW, 2016).

In August 2015, over 111,000 IDPs were living in WBG (UNOCHA, 2016) and by April 2017 Wau was home to over 70,000 IDPs, including over 46,600 in a PoC site (IOM South Sudan, 2017).

**Warrap:** In 2008, Warrap had a population of roughly 973,000 (SSCCSE, 2010b). The population is predominantly Dinka (Jieng), with minority groups including Luo (Jur Chol, Jur Mananger) and Bongo. Warrap is home to many returnees and refugees from Sudan due to its proximity to the north (UNMIS, 2010d; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012b), with 180,000 South Sudanese returning between 2004 and 2008 (SSCCSE, 2010b). Warrap has historically been the most ‘under-developed’ state in South Sudan (UNMIS, 2010d), a point emphasised by numerous participants in the state. In 2008-2009, Warrap was home to over 1.6 million cattle and 88 per cent of households owned livestock (NBS, 2012a). Livestock represent the dominant livelihood source, although some communities also engage in small-scale agriculture. Delayed rainfall and drought in recent years have increased food insecurity and affected access to water and grazing land. Counties and *payams* in Warrap include a range of permanent and temporary or nomadic settlements (UNMIS, 2010d; IOM, 2013a). Warrap includes six counties: Twic, Gogrial East, Gogrial West, Tonj North, Tonj East, and Tonj South. I collected data in Kuajok, the state headquarters, in Gogrial West County, and in three *payams* in Tonj East County.

Participants in Warrap reported conflict along eastern borders, between groups from Warrap and Unity or Lakes, over cattle raiding, contested and poorly demarcated borders, and control of water points and grazing land (particularly during the dry season). Similar conflicts, and cycles of reprisal violence, occur between groups (e.g. different Dinka sections) from different *payams* and counties in Warrap (UNMIS, 2010d; Saferworld, 2011; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012b). Participants described the role of *gelweng*, youth often armed with small weapons and responsible for
protecting family, communities, and cattle and, according to some government representatives, often engaged in violent intergroup conflict. Warrap borders Sudan’s South Kordofan as well as the contested Abyei area. Insecurity has been associated with seasonal movement of communities and conflict-related displacement, as well as attacks from northern rebel and militia groups and the border presence of both the SPLA and SAF (UNMIS, 2010d; Saferworld, 2011; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012b).

**Upper Nile:** In 2008, UNS had a population of roughly 964,000, with nearly 166,000 returnees between 2004 and 2008 (SSCCSE, 2010b). The state is home to three main ethnic groups, including Shilluk (the largest group in the state), Dinka, and Nuer (including Jikany and Gajaak sections), as well as Berta, Burun, Anuak, Dajo, and Mabani, with each county dominated by particular groups (Poggo, 2008, pp. 11–2; UNMIS, 2010c; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a). Communities rely on cattle herding and agriculture, although livelihoods have been affected by unpredictable rainfall patterns and increased flooding (Poggo, 2008, pp. 11–2; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a). UNS includes 13 counties: Akoka, Bailey, Fashoda, Longochuk, Maban, Maiwut, Malakal (Makal), Manyo, Melut, Luakpiny/Nasser, Panyikang, Renk, and Ulang. I collected data in the state headquarters of Malakal, including in Malakal PoC, and in Wau Shilluk, both in Malakal (Makal) County.

UNS has historically been economically and politically marginalised due to limited state and ethnic representation in the SPLM/A hierarchy. After the CPA, for example, UNS was the only state with a governor from the NCP. As a base for armed groups (including SAF, SPLM/A factions, and other armed groups) due to its proximity to the north, UNS has been disproportionately affected by wartime violence (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 17; UNMIS, 2010c; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a; Small Arms Survey, 2016b). Significant oil deposits are located in the state, making it politically and economically valuable. However, communities have not benefited from the state’s oil resources, either through oil revenue allocation or local development initiatives (BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a). UNS has experienced frequent conflict over county border demarcation, access to grazing land and water points, and seasonal movement toward rivers (between, for example, Lou Nuer and Jikany Nuer groups, and between Dinka and Nuer and Dinka and Shilluk groups). Cross-border conflict (including cattle raiding and border disputes) occurs between communities in UNS and Jonglei. Tensions have been affected by the targeting of Shilluk and Nuer communities during SPLA civilian disarmament campaigns (UNMIS, 2010c; BCSSAC,
SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a; Breidlid and Arensen, 2017). UNS borders Ethiopia to the east and Sudan to the northeast. Insecurity has been linked to the presence of the SPLA and SAF along the northern border and movement of groups from Sudan and Ethiopia due to dry season migration and conflict-driven displacement (UNMIS, 2010c; BCSSAC, SSPRC and UNDP, 2012a).

As the centre of SPLM-IO activity, UNS is one of the states most affected by ongoing conflict. In 2013, most Nuer security forces in UNS joined the opposition, which largely targeted Dinka and Shilluk civilians. Several military commanders have split from both government and opposition forces, with some forming new forces (such as the predominantly Shilluk Tiger Faction New Forces). Nuer ‘White Armies’ (mainly youth-based civilian defence groups) have fought with the SPLM-IO against government forces, and Dinka militia groups have supported the SPLA (while operating largely outside of its command) (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014; Small Arms Survey, 2016b; Breidlid and Arensen, 2017). Government and opposition forces have battled for control of oil-producing sites and Nile riverbanks (to control river transportation), and Malakal has changed hands multiple times. Ongoing clashes have occurred in and around Malakal and Wau Shilluk, with groups targeting humanitarian aid deliveries and workers (Small Arms Survey, 2016b). On-going fighting in the state has resulted in mass population displacement. In August 2016, there were roughly 293,000 IDPs in UNS (UNOCHA, 2016), with over 33,000 people (primarily from Dinka and Shilluk communities, as well as some Nuer) living in Malakal PoC (IOM South Sudan, 2016). In February 2016, suspected SPLA and Dinka (Padang) militia members attached the Malakal PoC, killing or injuring at least 130 Shilluk and Nuer residents (Small Arms Survey, 2016b). There are also nearly 133,000 refugees (mainly Sudanese) from neighbouring countries in UNS (UNHCR, 2015).

5.8 Research Ethics in a Conflict-Affected Context

Prior to collecting data, I obtained ethical approval from the University of Sussex Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities Cross-School Research Ethics Committee. However, research in conflict-affected contexts requires attention to emerging ethical issues at every stage of the process; ethical questions are not ‘settled’ once institutional approval is obtained (Shaw, 2008, p. 401; Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 12). The significance of ethical considerations is mediated by the specific research context (Simons and Usher, 2000, pp. 1–3), and is intensified in conflict-affected settings
Research in conflict-affected contexts requires attention to potential risks for ‘vulnerable’ participants who have experienced social, economic, physical, and psychological consequences of violence (Collogan et al., 2004, p. 363; Newman and Kaloupek, 2004, p. 383; Seedat et al., 2004, pp. 263–4). Research participation can result in emotional discomfort or distress (e.g. anger, shame, fear) and ‘re-traumatisation’ associated with painful memories. It can also provide opportunities to share personal experiences, stories, and opinions in a safe, non-judgmental context (Collogan et al., 2004, pp. 366–7; Newman and Kaloupek, 2004, pp. 383–4; Seedat et al., 2004, pp. 262–4; Hart and Tyrer, 2006, p. 18; Zwi et al., 2006, p. 268; Campbell, 2010, p. 4). To address these concerns, I encouraged participants to control the direction of our conversation according to their level of comfort, avoided direct questions about experiences of violence, and provided the option to refuse to answer certain questions or end the interview at any time. Ethnicity, political critique, and other potentially sensitive topics were discussed only when introduced by participants. However, psychological or emotional risks associated with the research were not necessarily greater than those encountered by participants on a daily basis. Researcher interest, non-judgment, and empathy are critically important when discussing sensitive topics (Sands, Bourjolly and Roer-Strier, 2007, pp. 367–9; Morse et al., 2008, pp. 201–4), and my prior training and experience in social work practice and research (including interviewing and counselling on violence and other sensitive issues) informed interactions with participants.

Association with researchers can draw public attention to participants and result in suspicion or risk (Collogan et al., 2004, p. 367; Newman and Kaloupek, 2004, p. 384; Seedat et al., 2004, pp. 262–4; Hart and Tyrer, 2006, p. 18; Zwi et al., 2006, p. 268; Campbell, 2010, p. 4). Confidentiality is thus critically important, referring to the protection of participants’ identities and the information they provide, during and after data collection. To protect participants’ anonymity and ensure data protection, I removed identifying information (e.g. names, specific roles, locations) from interview and discussion notes and transcripts to ensure that individuals could not be identified or associated with specific data. I stored materials (e.g. notes, transcripts, forms, recordings) on a password-protected computer or in a locked cupboard.

Prior to each interview and group discussion, I obtained informed consent from participants. I explained (in writing and verbally) the nature and purpose of the research,
including objectives, anticipated outcomes, potential risks, and confidentiality and anonymity provisions (see Appendix 4 for the information sheet and consent form). I obtained either written or verbal consent, to accommodate varying levels of literacy and concerns about anonymity. Certain participants preferred not to record their name on a consent form and chose to provide verbal consent. I ensured ongoing consent with participants before and after each interview and during subsequent meetings. I obtained explicit consent from each participant prior to audio-recording interviews. Numerous participants stated that they did not wish to be recorded but gave permission to take handwritten notes. If they expressed any hesitation, I did not record the interview.

My approach to research interactions considered aspects of mutual responsibility, recognising participants’ knowledge, judgment, and agency in making decisions about their lives and accepting potential research-related risks. This challenges assumptions that external researchers can anticipate all possible consequences of research participation, suggesting that participants can better foresee context-specific, subjective risks (Kovats-Bernat, 2002, pp. 214–5; Wood, 2006, p. 380; Campbell, 2010, p. 3; Jayawickrama, 2013, p. 30; Traianou, 2014, p. 63). Considerations of vulnerability, agency, and consent are particularly significant in research involving young people. While recognising young people’s real vulnerability, it is also important to provide them with opportunities to voice their perspectives, experiences, and suggestions, as well as respecting their decision to participate in research (David, Edwards and Alldred, 2001, pp. 351–3; Hart and Tyrer, 2006, pp. 5–9).

Young people are social actors, and research participation provides them with the chance to influence “the creation or production of knowledge about them” (Doná, 2011, pp. 39–40). In engaging with students, I followed guidance from the MoEST and UNICEF, who are familiar with working with young people in South Sudan. I followed school protocols for students’ research participation, provided students with clear written and verbal explanations about the research, and focused on older students in Primary 6 and above. I asked young people about daily activities, experiences, and concerns relevant to their educational experience, to avoid creating ‘risk’ beyond what might be encountered on a daily basis. The use of drawing activities enabled students to share as much or as little as they wished.

Questions of ethics and ‘risk’ require attention to people’s prior experiences of research (Smith, 2008, pp. 42, 99). Research projects “take place in a milieu that has already experienced previous interventions which have left their mark” (de Sardan,
2005, p. 139). In contexts such as South Sudan, communities may be approached by numerous researchers and repetitive research experiences result in psychological, emotional, and time burdens (Collogan et al., 2004, p. 367). While in South Sudan, I noted that frequent short-term research-based projects (e.g. needs assessments, programme evaluations) commissioned or supported by UNICEF’s country office nearly always involved the same sites and schools. To avoid adding to this research burden, I tried to engage with different schools (beyond those supported by UNICEF’s PBEA programme), based on suggestions from county and payam officials.

5.9 Negotiating Research Sites and Relationships

Research involves negotiating systems of power and authority: “the multiple positions of any given research informant and the multiple positions of any given researcher make the terrain of research itself a terrain of power” (Ackerly and True, 2006, p. 257). Researchers must consider visible and invisible relations of power, hierarchy, and obligation at micro and macro levels (Zwi et al., 2006, p. 268; Ackerly, 2008, pp. 28–32; Robinson-Pant and Singal, 2013, p. 444), as power relations between researchers and gatekeepers, gatekeepers and participants, and national and international institutions and participants affect participation and consent (Thomson, 2009, p. 7; Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 4). Access to sites and participants is facilitated by, or dependent upon, collaboration with local, national, and international actors, including government authorities and organisations serving as ‘gatekeepers’. People’s decisions to participate in research are influenced by the power of both government authorities and international organisations. It can be difficult to ensure voluntary consent in contexts of political oppression and limited freedoms. People may feel that they do not have a choice, fearing reprisal if they refuse to participate (Beyrer and Kass, 2002, p. 249; Shaw, 2008, p. 405). Ethical challenges also arise when access to research sites and participants is negotiated through (or dependent upon) political authorities responsible for violence against populations (Goodhand, 2000, p. 14; Thomson, 2009, p. 5; Hutchinson, 2011, pp. 82–93).

Educational research, in particular, requires multiple levels of permissions, from central and subnational governments to schools, classrooms, and students (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, p. 85; Mertens, 2010, p. 329). Research in education settings also involves specific relations of power, and managers, teachers, and students may feel obligated to participate in research approved by higher authorities (e.g. central or
subnational ministry officials, school managers) (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, p. 49; Heath et al., 2007, p. 413; Fargas-Malet et al., 2010, p. 178; Gallagher et al., 2010, pp. 478–9). In contexts where people rely on international organisations to meet basic needs, research may be perceived as tied to aid or service delivery and expectations of assistance, fear, or desperation may influence participation (Goodhand, 2000, pp. 13–4; Collogan et al., 2004, p. 366; Zwi et al., 2006, p. 266; Thomson, 2009, p. 10; Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 3; Jayawickrama, 2013, p. 30). These dynamics of power can enhance the effects of ‘social desirability’ on participants’ responses: participants may provide answers they think researchers expect or which portray their institutions (ministries, schools) in a positive light.

I secured approval for this research from the central MoEST and obtained ministry permission to access subnational education sites at state, county, payam, and school levels. These protocols were particularly significant at subnational levels. Many county and payam officials expressed frustration when higher levels of government and donors bypass ‘official’ channels (see Chapter 7), and I wanted to avoid undermining ‘local’ authority during my research. Officials from one payam office, for example, told me they were glad I had asked for their permission to approach primary schools under their authority, explaining that the state ministry and international donors often fail to do so. I was aware of limitations on ‘voluntary’ decision-making in schools and ministry offices. I also tried to establish, to the greatest extent possible, a sense of independence and impartiality from the MoEST and UNICEF. I directly contacted, and established my own relationships with, participants rather than relying on MoEST or UNICEF to facilitate contact. I did not schedule interviews during UNICEF visits to ministry offices or schools, to avoid having my research perceived as tied to UNICEF support. Reciprocity and transparency can help to establish a sense of comfort and trust (Jacoby, 2006, p. 166), and I began each interview or discussion by asking participants if they had any questions for me (e.g. about my role, experience, and intentions). I was clear, honest, and consistent when describing the research objectives and potential contributions to participants, explaining that despite research affiliation with UNICEF, I could not influence provision of material resources.

In an attempt to minimise ‘obligatory’ participation and social desirability, I explained to all participants that confidentiality applied to those who agreed or refused to participate, and that individual decisions regarding participation would not be shared with others. I tried to maximise safety and comfort by taking handwritten notes rather
than audio-recording if a participant expressed any hesitation. I explained that the research focused on exploration, not evaluation, and worded questions to ask about people’s own definitions of peace, (in)equality, and other key concepts. Indeed, many MoEST officials emphasised that they were sharing their individual perspectives. For example, when discussing benefits and challenges of decentralised education governance, one central official stated (laughing) that, “That’s what I’m thinking. That’s my own thinking, but I don’t know what’s the thinking of the ministry”. Finally, as Pottier et al. (2011, p. 15) suggest, “trust may come from informants’ independent observations that the information they have divulged so far to the researcher has been treated confidentially and responsibly”.

Considerations of researcher safety and security are important in conflict-affected settings. To mitigate risks, I made decisions about research sites, mode and timing of travel, and so on in consultation with MoEST and UNICEF colleagues in Juba and different states. My involvement with UNICEF enabled access to UNMISS security training (Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments course) and security information. Consultation and conversations with colleagues and participants at national and local levels informed awareness of changing conflict dynamics, security risks, and broader political, socio-cultural, and historical contexts. They provided guidance and feedback on research approaches (including the relevance of research objectives and questions), behaviours, and ethical concerns.

The securitisation of international organisations and agencies has affected and restricted ‘field research’ approaches. UNICEF’s country and field offices exemplify South Sudan’s ‘gated aid complex’: fortified compounds, enclosed offices and accommodation, and security protocols and restrictions constraining movement (Duffield, 2010a, p. 455, 2014, pp. 85–8). Security training and protocols “normalise risk-aversion and the necessity, even desirability, of defensive living” (Duffield, 2010a, p. 453), representing “the antithesis of fieldwork as the art of being in the world” (2014, p. 86). I tried to establish independent research contacts and relationships, operating outside UNICEF’s procedures to the greatest extent possible. This included spending extended periods of time in ministry buildings and schools, and walking to meetings and interviews or taking public transportation such as motorbike taxis (this was not possible in Upper Nile due to security restrictions). By walking through different neighbourhoods and marketplaces, greeting or talking to people along the way, asking
for directions when necessary, and stopping at roadside breakfast stalls and ‘local’ restaurants, I was able to gain some sense of ‘place’ in the different sites that I visited.

5.10 Reflecting on Positionality

As social actors, researchers observe the world from particular geographic, cultural, and epistemological positions (Scott, 2005, p. 3, 2010, p. 13). As Said (2003, p. 10) explains,

No one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life, from the fact of [their] involvement (conscious or unconscious) with a class, a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society… There is such a thing as knowledge that is less, rather than more, partial than the individual (with [their] entangling and distracting life circumstances) who produces it. Yet this knowledge is not therefore automatically nonpolitical.

This draws attention to the contextualised nature of all knowledge claims and the need for reflexivity about one’s own practices, values, attitudes, and judgments (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, p. 1157; Sum and Jessop, 2013, pp. 7–8). Empirical claims are grounded in the practices of knowledge production, which cannot be separated from the researcher’s social position (and social conditions, distinctions, and implication in sets of social relations) (Jackson, 2011, pp. 157–60). This is particularly important in conflict-affected contexts, considering the ways in which identity and positionality intersect with aspects of conflict and security (Jayawickrama, 2013, pp. 34–5; Jayawickrama and Strecker, 2015, pp. 133–8). It is also significant in research crossing cultural, racial, geographic, socioeconomic, and other boundaries, which affect research roles, relationships, and power (Sands, Bourjolly and Roer-Strier, 2007; Jayawickrama, 2013; Oikonomidoy and Wiest, 2015).

Reflexivity involves attention to the effects of personal background and identity (e.g. race, nationality, gender, age, class) on research interactions and interpretations. It involves reflection on personal beliefs, biases, values, and ideological, ethical, and epistemological assumptions and preconceptions about contexts and communities (Griffiths, 1998, pp. 96–7; Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005, p. 305; Bogdan and Biklen, 2007, pp. 94–8; Creswell, 2007, pp. 178–80, 2012, p. 18, 2014, p. 186; Mertens, 2010, p. 261; Bhavnani, Chua and Collins, 2014, pp. 171–2). In my case, this involved reflections on my role as a white researcher from a British university in South Sudan, and the (neo)colonial dimensions of this form of research engagement (discussed below). This also involved reflections on my role as a female researcher. This presented
particular gendered vulnerabilities, including physical risks faced when walking alone in more isolated or distant areas. It also presented forms of privilege and access, including potentially being perceived as less ‘threatening’ when negotiating interactions with government officials.

Given the scale of global inequalities, “the social worlds of critical IR scholars and those we wish to serve are so vastly disconnected” (Murphy, 2007, pp. 131–2). While I made efforts to establish a research role separate from my work with UNICEF, I acknowledge my own position as a member of the ‘international’ community that I critically examine: “there is no position from which I can analyse the circuitry of project and policy processes… which does not place me within it as a member of the ‘communities’ I describe” (Mosse, 2005, p. 11). I was acutely aware of the aspects of privilege that I represented and carried with me as I navigated research contexts. My day-to-day life in South Sudan was generally characterised by comfort, safety, and security (in housing, transport, workspace, and so on) as well as freedom of movement, access to multiple physical and social spaces, and engagement with national government and international donor ‘elites’. I could selectively engage with spaces outside these zones of comfort, and was very conscious of this throughout the research process. I also know that “immense quantities of social, political, cultural, and economic phenomena – many of them doubtless highly significant – pass unnoticed” (Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 4) in my research, due to my position as an ‘outsider’.

Critical theoretical scholarship challenges the belief that it is possible to adopt a neutral stance, suggesting that ‘neutrality’ is characterised by “an effective complicity with the world as it [is]” (Rengger and Thirkell-White, 2007, p. 6) and “is at best a ‘harmless’ naïveté, and at worst a pernicious subterfuge for hidden agendas” (Serequeberhan, 1994, cited in Rabaka, 2010, p. 21). Critical research intended to contribute to understandings of (in)equality and (in)justice and possibilities for social change involves taking a position of the nature of social justice (Griffiths, 1998, p. 85). As such, my research reflects certain normative assumptions about the nature of (in)equality and oppression and ‘ideal’ peacebuilding processes. It can also be difficult to maintain positions of neutrality in politically (and emotionally) charged conflict-affected contexts (Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, pp. 12–3). Research in conflict-affected contexts “cannot be regarded as a ‘neutral’ activity” (Barakat et al., 2002, p. 991). Hutchinson (2011, p. 92) questions the possibility (and morality) of adopting a ‘position of political neutrality’, which would effectively support the status quo:
“Violence is the kind of subject that makes it difficult to maintain the illusion of research impartiality, especially when one becomes aware of the ramifications of the violence on those who are most vulnerable”. However, this does not mean that researchers cannot produce nuanced research, that they must ‘take sides’ or allow personal biases to affect research processes, or that a given political and conflict situation “is easy to read in terms of its rights and wrongs” (McCandless and Bangura, 2007a, pp. 80–1; Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 10).

When collecting data, I tried to adopt a position of relative ‘neutrality’. While I have opinions regarding conflict and political dynamics in South Sudan, I did not express them during interviews or discussions (although I was able to share and challenge my own perspectives during informal conversations with colleagues and some participants). This thesis (as well as the study produced for UNICEF) does, however, involve critique of government policies, decisions, and actions in peacebuilding and education sectors, and their implications for systems of violence. I also engage in a critique of the practices and perspectives of international donors and organisations. While I did not agree with the views of all participants, I have tried to represent a range of perspectives, not only those with which I agree (Jacoby, 2006, p. 160). This required attention to my own emotional responses to research data and experiences (e.g. affinity, excitement, discomfort, unease, doubt, sorrow), which represent a central aspects of subjectivity and inform, obscure, or distort analysis and understanding (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000, p. 4; J. Davies, 2010, pp. 1, 25; Levy, 2016, pp. 40–1).

Considering ‘risk’ and power in research relationships involves attention to the representation of people and places: “The moment these communities share their stories… this establishes an unwritten agreement that the researcher will respect and do justice to these stories” (Jayawickrama and Strecker, 2015, p. 148). Critical reflectivity requires attention to the (neo)colonial dimensions of research and the ways in which “scholarly practices… are inscribed in relations of power”, including those associated with “the production, distribution, and consumption of information and ideas” about ‘non-Western others’(Mohanty, 1991, pp. 53–5). This involves attention to the potential of research questions, processes, and reports to reproduce stereotypical, essentialised, stigmatising, or deficit-focused representations and narratives (Said, 1989, pp. 212–3; Osaghae, 1999, p. 63; Goodhand, 2000, p. 15; Rizvi, Lingard and Lavia, 2006, p. 252; Shaw, 2008, pp. 409–10; Smith, 2008, pp. 42–3).

Post-colonial literature emphasises the role that scholars play in reproducing
colonial discourses and descriptions (Said, 1994, p. 9, 2003, p. 12; Loomba, 2005, p. 45), considering how research and writing about ‘other’ cultures, societies, peoples…

feed into, connect with, impede, or enhance the active political processes of… domination” (Said, 1989, p. 218). Research can reproduce oppressive, ‘paternalistic’ narratives about people and places, perpetuating representations of ‘otherness’, difference, and Western ‘superiority’ (Mohanty, 1988, pp. 80–1). Examples include narratives of particular people or communities as having ‘‘needs’ and ‘problems’, but few if any… ‘choices’ or the freedom to act” (Mohanty, 1988, p. 72), reproducing images of ‘Third World cultures’ rooted in “powerlessness, passivity, poverty, and ignorance” (Escobar, 1995, p. 8). Other examples include using violent conflict as the primary reference point or lens through which to represent communities. This reproduces discourses of ‘risk’, ‘danger’, and ‘insecurity’ associated with, for example, African contexts (Osaghae, 1999, pp. 63–4; Goodhand, 2000, p. 15; Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 2).

While in South Sudan, I noticed that statements by many donor and NGO representatives – as well as some government representatives – focused on ‘needs’, absences, and challenges rather than assets, strengths, and agency, emphasising the ‘pathology of vulnerability’ (rather than reasons for vulnerabilities, such as inequality) (Jayawickrama, 2013, p. 29; Jayawickrama and Strecker, 2015, pp. 140–1). I found that I had to consciously work to avoid adopting the language of international actors (which may still be reflected in this thesis). Empirical research can challenge prevailing understandings and assumptions about conflict, violence, development, and peacebuilding, including social, political, and economic influences on inequalities and tensions. This can inform more nuanced understandings of the effects of conflict on individuals and communities as well as the development of alternative policy responses (Osaghae, 1999, pp. 69–70; Collogan et al., 2004, p. 364; King and Sall, 2007, pp. 11–5; Thomson, 2009, p. 2; Pottier, Hammond and Cramer, 2011, p. 7; Bush and Duggan, 2015, p. 3). This involves efforts to understand specific historical contexts and their continued effects on different sectors of society (McKeever, 2000, p. 102).
CHAPTER 6. “THEY ARE DEPRIVING THE OTHER COMMUNITY”: THE DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION RESOURCES AND SERVICES

6.1 Chapter Introduction

As noted in Chapter 3, the critical peacebuilding literature calls for responses to inequalities through resource (re)distribution, as part of the wider transformation of systems of domination, oppression, and inequality. The uneven distribution of resources and services, including education, across regions and groups represents a form of structural violence, and ‘just’ peacebuilding thus involves equitable resource and service distribution (Galtung, 1969, pp. 171, 183). Some critical literature has suggested that the provision of social services, including education, can play a peacebuilding role by promoting social and economic rights and equality, responding to ‘local’ and ‘everyday’ needs and priorities, and strengthening state-society relations. In this chapter, I aim to expand these understandings of education’s peacebuilding role by examining the distribution of resources and services in South Sudan. I aim to present what Sabaratnam (2013, pp. 273–4) describes as a ‘repolitised’ understanding of peacebuilding processes through attention to their distributive dimensions and people’s interpretations of their economic and material effects. This is particularly significant given the links between education resource inequalities, structural violence, and conflict in South Sudan. This illustrates the need to examine the ways in which education resources are distributed, managed, and intersect with dynamics of conflict.

I draw on empirical findings concerning resource and service distribution processes and implications in South Sudan to inform contributions to the critical peacebuilding scholarship. I critically engage with formal government and donor policy statements on educational distribution and peacebuilding and present a three-step critique of these policy statements. First, I argue that existing resource and service distribution procedures, at multiple scales, reproduce, depoliticise, and justify geographic and intergroup inequalities linked to conflict and undermine policy statements about the peacebuilding role of education service provision. Second, I argue that education’s potential peacebuilding role does not simply involve the ‘actual’ distribution of resources and services. Rather, community and school-level perceptions of exclusion from resource distribution produce and entrench tensions and grievances between communities. Third, I argue that neither the government (represented by the MoEST) nor donors address the redistribution of resources and services, privileging
certain forms of inequality over others and entrenching distributional inequalities.

In making these arguments, I draw upon the CPE framework to explore ‘causal’ factors underlying approaches to education resource and service distribution, and the ways in which particular processes and patterns of inequality are legitimised and reproduced by different actors and institutions. This framework provides insight into the influence of neoliberal logics or ideologies underpinning and legitimising policy decisions (including ‘decentralised’ financing and a focus on ‘individualised’ dimensions of inequality) that shift service provision costs and responsibilities from the state to communities and households and limit redistributive responses to collective dimensions of marginalisation and inequality. Resource distribution processes may also be shaped by mechanisms of regime maintenance and elite reproduction by the SPLM/A, which influence budget decisions that prioritise military and security sectors, as well as the appropriation and diversion of subnational education resources by political elites. These patterns are also shaped by a structure of education governance that positions actors in relation to one another within a clear hierarchy, providing power in the form of control over allocation of resources.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I examine the ways in which policy and strategy documents produced by the government of South Sudan and international donors describe the role of education resource and service distribution. I provide an overview of key policy narratives, which focus primarily on education as a ‘peace dividend’, contributor to state-society relations, and response to past inequalities. Second, I examine the ways in which resources are distributed by central and subnational government authorities, at the school level, and by donors. I describe existing resource flows and management and the ways in which these intersect with and reproduce geographic and intergroup inequalities. Third, I explore the experiences and perceptions of school-level actors and communities regarding education resource and service distribution, and the implications of perceived exclusion and inequalities. Fourth, I examine government and donor responses to educational inequalities at the policy and programme level, with a focus on their redistributive dimensions. Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings for the critical peacebuilding literature.

6.2 Education Distribution in Government and Donor Policies

In this section, I examine the ways in which policy and strategy documents produced by the government of South Sudan and international donors have described
the role of education in peacebuilding. These policy statements involve three broad narratives: education as a ‘peace dividend’, contributor to state-society relations, and response to current and past inequalities. These statements echo the contributions of social service provision set out in the critical peacebuilding literature. They reflect “a perception not simply of ‘good government’ (efficient and technically functional institutions) but of a government that is ‘good’ (morally benevolent and protective of its people)” (Ferguson, 2006, p. 85). The ‘politics of distribution’ is thus central not only to individual wellbeing but also to “the political life of the state” (p. 47).

Post-CPA strategies, including the 2005 JAM Framework, 2008 GoNU and GoSS report on peace and development, and 2011-2013 SSDP, identify expanded education service and resource provision (particularly primary and alternative education enrolment and school construction and rehabilitation) as a peace and development priority. The first broad policy narrative, reflecting a short-term ‘post-conflict’ focus, suggests that improved education access represents a ‘peace dividend’ or tangible peace outcome. The JAM (2005, p. 43) and GoNU and GoSS report (2008, p. 2) identify the delivery of immediate, ‘tangible’ benefits to the population as critical for consolidating peace. The GoNU and GoSS report refers to projects “to achieve quick peace dividends, like schools” as critical to “cement peace at the state and local levels” (p. 2). Education policy documents echo this narrative. The GESP identifies rapid expansion of education services and infrastructure as “a great dividend from the peace” (MoGEI, 2012, p. 66). Similarly, international strategy documents identify education services as ‘peace dividends’. For example, a UNESCO (2011, p. 2) policy paper identifies the delivery of a ‘peace premium’ through education as a foundation for democracy and security, responding to public expectations and demonstrating ‘that peace delivers’.

The second policy narrative suggests that improved education access can strengthen state legitimacy and state-society relations. The JAM Framework (2005, p. 24) suggests that expanded education access contributes to a ‘social contract’ between authorities and populations and enhances confidence in governance institutions. The SSDP describes government resource management to meet public expectations, including service delivery, as “legitimising the state in the eyes of the population” (GRSS, 2011, p. 10). Donor strategies echo this narrative. UNICEF’s (2012, p. 7) country programme document identifies management of state revenues for basic service delivery as contributing to perceived state legitimacy, while USAID’s (2011b, p. 43) transition strategy for South Sudan refers to “a stable and democratic state… contingent
on the receipt of essential services by the public”. Other donors suggest that service provision meeting popular expectations supports the development of state legitimacy and state-society relations (including public confidence in the state) (DFID, 2010b, p. 23, 2010a, pp. 13, 34, 2013, p. 9; GPE, 2012, pp. 15–22).

The third policy narrative suggests that ‘equitable’ education resource and service delivery can address historical inequalities. The SSDP calls for “efforts to address the political, social and economic legacies of the conflict period… as well as the historical legacies of South Sudan’s colonial past” in order to consolidate peace (GRSS, 2011, p. 381). The JAM Framework (2005, p. 43) suggests that expanded education access “redresses one key dimension of the historical neglect of the people of the South”. Similarly, the 2015 Curriculum Framework, citing the 2012 Education Act, calls for “equitable access to learning opportunities… to redress past inequalities in education provision” (MoEST, 2015a, p. 2). The GESP refers to the need for equitable education resource distribution between and within states, responding to specific needs and ensuring delivery of the same level and quality of education services. Donors echo this narrative. For example, a UNESCO (2011, p. 12) policy paper calls for equitable, needs-based education resource allocation across states and groups. Other donors also draw attention to the need for equitable education delivery and emphasise the role of education in reducing inequalities (DFID, 2010a, p. 56, 2010b, p. 13, 2014, p. 17; USAID, 2011a, p. 14; GPE, 2012, p. 22; UNESCO, 2014, p. 26; UNICEF, 2015, pp. 28–39). Based on empirical findings outlined in the subsequent sections, I argue that these policy narratives are challenged or undermined by existing resource distribution, community perceptions of distributive inequalities, and a failure to consider redistribution in policies and programmes.

6.3 Distribution and Flows of Education Resources and Services

Understanding education’s peacebuilding implications involves examining the ways in which resources and services are allocated and managed by actors across multiple scales. This section presents the first part of my critique of the policy statements described above. I examine the ways in which resources are distributed by central and subnational government authorities, at the school level, and by international donors. I argue that existing resource flows and service distribution intersect with and reproduce geographic and intergroup inequalities, while depoliticising and justifying these inequalities through resource allocation procedures. At the central government
level, resource flows are constrained by the underfunding of the education sector and inequitable geographic distribution. At subnational levels, tensions between levels of government, resource shortages, and diversion of available resources impede responses to context-specific education needs and inequalities. At the school level, resource shortages and the transfer of financing responsibilities from government to communities and households reproduce geographic inequalities. Among international actors, resource allocation contributes to the reproduction of inequalities through uneven geographic distribution of partners and projects, allocation criteria that reproduce geographic inequalities, and limited consultation with the MoEST.

I begin by examining resource distribution at the central government level. Policy statements about the peacebuilding role of education services assume that sufficient resources will be allocated to the sector. However, resources are constrained by the long-standing underfunding of the education sector (as noted in Chapter 2) and existing resource distribution involves inequitable geographic allocations. At all levels of the education system, financial resource shortages present one of the most significant challenges and sources of frustration – which are intensified when education is prioritised in government speeches and policies but not in budgets. “The government gives lip service to education”, explained a group of university professors: political speeches are “putting education as a priority, as the first priority in the country... saying that education is very important and the key to everything, but [there is] little attention in practice”. A payam official reported that, “Every year, we hear that... education is number one in the budget, but when we see the budget, education is less”.

The 2015-2016 budget speech (Athorbei, 2015, pp. 10–3) and 2014-2015 budget book (MoFEP, 2014, p. 15), for example, refer to improved education delivery allocations. Although nearly one-quarter of the government budget was allocated to subnational transfers, the education sector received only 14 per cent of these transfers (versus two-thirds for organised forces salaries). In total, five per cent of the national budget was allocated to education. “The Ministry of Education is the last ministry in South Sudan... because the government is not taking education seriously”, stated a teacher’s union representative. This illustrates tensions between ministries and between government levels, with implications for legitimacy and trust within the government. This represents a dimension of state ‘legitimacy’ and ‘trust’ neglected in policy statements, which focus on relations between states and populations.
Central and subnational MoEST officials explained that the diversion of government funds to the security sector due to the current war has caused education resource shortages. According to one central MoEST official, “There are no resources. Teachers aren’t being paid… The money’s not there… We are no longer a priority; the priority is the war. All the resources are going to the war”. Reduced social spending to sustain huge military budgets is, according to Tickner (2001, p. 62), a form of state violence. The framing of war-driven resource scarcity as a ‘new’ problem depoliticises and justifies the prioritisation of the security sector at the expense of social sectors. The ‘crisis’ narrative ignores the long-standing marginalisation of the education sector and concentration of funds in the security sector since (and prior to) 2005. It depoliticises the problem as a ‘lack’ of resources rather than a result of government policy choices (Ferguson, 2006, p. 60). The ‘wartime crisis’ becomes “a perennial state of exception that turns into a rule” through “the production and management of truth” (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, pp. 149–50) rationalising budget allocation decisions. This is significant given that government spending on military and security sectors can be understood as representing not only a focus on practical war-related concerns, but also as a means of distributing resources and opportunities to maintain and reward loyalty (including from former militia commanders and groups integrated into the SPLA).

Central budget flows affect subnational resource distribution. Central government funds are transferred and distributed to states and counties in the form of general block grants and conditional (salary and operating) transfers earmarked for education salary payments and operating costs (MoFEP, 2014, p. 14). Transfers vary by state and county, based on the number of schools and personnel. For both state and county operating transfers, 60 per cent is allocated equally between states/counties and 40 per cent is allocated based on the number of schools in the state/county (MoEST, 2014c, pp. 11–2). Allocations are not necessarily proportional to population size, student enrolment, actual service provision costs, level of need, or historical marginalisation. ‘Official’ allocation procedures thus justify and institutionalise distributive inequalities. Per-student spending varies widely across states, ranging from SSP 143.5 (USD 48.5) in Warrap to SSP 394.9 (USD 133.4) in Upper Nile in 2014-2015 (see Table 6.1). There are also variations in the proportion of funds actually disbursed (versus allocated) across states (MoFEP, 2014).
At subnational and ‘local’ government levels, responses to context-specific education needs and inequalities are constrained by standardised, centrally determined allocation guidelines, tensions between levels of government, resource shortages and the shifting of financing responsibility to subnational levels, and diversion of available resources. According to the Local Government Act (LGA), local governments are responsible for planning and budgeting based on central government transfers and local revenues (GoSS, 2009). Education funds are transferred from the centre to states and then to counties, payams, and schools. When discussing the distribution of financial resources, state-level MoEST officials described adherence to standardised, centrally determined procedures and limited participation in decision-making. This impedes responses to ‘locally’-specific needs and contributes to the reproduction of geographic resource and service inequalities. “[We] allocate the schools based on the criteria that the national ministry [sets]... The approach is coming down from up top”, explained a state MoEST official in Warrap, discussing the allocation of school construction projects. A MoEST official in Central Equatoria described the reproduction of geographic inequalities through standardised resource allocation procedures:

It is not equitable... The allocation sent to Tombura county, it’s bigger than that of Ibba county. Ibba has five payams, when Tombura has three payams. Now the small [amount for] Ibba will be divided and will not be sufficient, and the one for Tombura, now they divide it and it will be higher than that of Ibba... The small allocation for the county with five payams, when it is divided it is very less compared to the county that has only three payams.
Even when state-level officials have some influence over subnational budget distribution, insufficient transfer amounts restrict contextualised resource distribution. State and county transfers do not currently cover operating and development costs, leaving little or no possibility for ‘redistributing’ resources in response to geographic inequalities. As a state MoEST official in Western Equatoria explained,

_The transfers are just... salary transfers and then another transfer is the operating transfer, which goes right to the counties, which we have been allocated from the headquarters. They come just through the account of the ministry and we make the transfer to counties. Then for the salaries, also the same: they come, we transfer. The only thing we can decide upon is the operation costs, which is a limited amount that we use for running fuel, vehicles, everything... We have to prioritise, because the money is not enough... We have to prioritise fuel, we have to prioritise vehicle maintenance, we have to prioritise Internet use, we have to prioritise airtime._

The ‘shortage’ of government funds for education means that responsibility for resource mobilisation is transferred to subnational levels (as part of a wider ‘decentralisation’ agenda). A statement by one central MoEST official illustrates constraints resulting from central budget allocations, and the shifting of education financing responsibility to the state level: “_We want the states themselves to top up that money... The budget gets fixed because our budget also here has not been increased at the national level_.” In theory, states are meant to ‘top off’ transfer funds through local revenues, to support education provision. As a state MoEST official in oil-producing Upper Nile explained,

_We get part of the conditional grant for the budget, and the state has to put because they have oil revenue and the local revenues. They have to put also to the conditional grant... because there are ways to collect money._

State and county governments can generate revenues from taxes (e.g. property, land, or animal taxes), trade (e.g. cattle, small arms), markets (e.g. livestock), and fees (e.g. licenses, permits, auctions) and fines (e.g. administrative or court fines).\(^{31}\) Certain states and communities also have access to oil revenues.\(^{32}\) In practice, however, many states

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\(^{31}\) The LGA outlines different revenues (e.g. taxes, fees and fines) to be generated by local governments (GoSS, 2009, p. 37). However, it does not set tax rate or allocation guidelines (Kameir, 2011, p. 18) and revenues are limited due to a reliance on non-commercial livelihoods, low population density in rural areas, and collection systems operating outside formal structures (Hutton, 2014, p. 32). State and county revenues rarely trickle down to _payams or bomas_ (Podder, 2014, p. 233).

\(^{32}\) Under the 2012 Petroleum Act and 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Bill, two per cent of revenues are allocated to oil-producing states and three per cent to communities (local governments). The Petroleum Act calls for development plans to improve local communities, including school construction (GRSS, 2012, p. 39). However, policies provide no clear definition of ‘affected’ communities and no clear revenue management and disbursement procedures are implemented. Conflict is linked to exclusion.
do not generate their own revenues and rely on central transfers for education provision. States, counties, and payams have differing access to revenue sources, entrenching geographic inequalities.

Resource flows, and implications for resource and service inequalities, are influenced by relationships (and tensions) between central and subnational governments and between ministries. This illustrates the significance of within-government relations for state ‘legitimacy’ and ‘trust’. Some MoEST officials described limited trust between levels of government, particularly central and state ministries. Some central officials, for example, suggested that subnational resource shortages result from the neglect of education or diversion of transfer funds by state-level authorities. Statements by two officials illustrate the framing of resource shortages as state-level problems:

*There’s no political will in the lower level of governance, because if the states prioritise education, that means from their own local revenue collection they can top up, from their own generation of resources... But they don’t want to. Instead, from what we sent, they deduct it for their own use.*

*We are sending the money according to the number of the teachers they have, to those states. But when these states receive this money, they go and pay their local staff instead of paying teachers. The little money that goes to the teachers, the state government uses it for other things.*

Relations between government ministries influence resource distribution. Resource flows “depend so much on relationships with government as a whole, with the Ministry of Finance”, explained one donor representative. Education funds are transferred from central to state Ministries of Finance (MoFEP) and then to state MoESTs. Central and state MoEST officials reported a lack of communication, delayed disbursement, and diversion of education funds by the MoFEP. Discussions of MoEST-MoFEP relationships (at central and state levels) were characterised by mistrust and ‘finger pointing’, as illustrated by a state MoEST official in Upper Nile:

*Those who are transferring the cash from Juba, the national Ministry of Finance, they don’t provide us with copies of the transfer, so sometimes we don’t know if this money is transferred... How can we go and ask the Ministry of Finance that we have money here if we don’t have some paper...? That is why sometimes we don’t know what is going on. Is this money going to the counties or not? No, we don’t know.*

As a payam official reported, corruption by state-level MoEST and MoFEP officials is rampant due to impunity and a lack of accountability: “You are allowed to continue”. This can be connected to patterns of resource diversion and theft on a wider (e.g. from oil revenue allocations and mismanagement by political and military elites (Patey, 2010, pp. 628–31; Kameir, 2011, pp. 30–1; Savage, 2013, pp. 4–5; Cordaid, 2014, pp. 17–9; Deng, 2015, pp. 7–8).
national) scale, include the diversion and theft of public resources (e.g. oil wealth) by central government elites and nepotism and clientelism in allocation of government opportunities (de Waal, 2014, pp. 348–58; Mamdani, 2014, pp. 39–42; Pinaud, 2014, p. 194). The institutionalisation of these patterns can legitimise ‘localised’ corruption.

Patterns of appropriation and diversion affect not only funds available to subnational education authorities but also the distribution of available material resources, which can contribute to tensions and grievances associated with conflict. Teachers, payam and county officials, and donor and NGO representatives described political influence over resource distribution (e.g. school construction, distribution of materials). Through these allocation processes, “economic things [are] converted into social and political things” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 46). Educational resources are diverted, appropriated, and ‘redistributed’ to secure political support and loyalty. National and subnational authorities (e.g. ministry officials, county commissioners, payam administrators) may ensure that schools are constructed in a particular location in order to mobilise, secure, or reward political and military support from community members and leaders. According to a central MoEST official, “Some politicians were saying, ‘No, in my constituency there is no school’... They want a beautiful school there, so that now people can vote for [them]”. One MoEST official in Central Equatoria made direct connections between this ‘(re)distribution’ and conflict:

If I’m an education manager and I monopolise every resource that is supposed to be used, I say, ‘No, take this to my payam, don’t take to payam Z, don’t take to payam Y, I want every resource’, what will happen? I’m trying to create an environment for conflict.

MoEST officials were hesitant to discuss this issue in depth. During one interview, a central official explained that, “[Politicians] build a school where there is no population, no students... They just want to take the school to their own place so it is known that it is they who have done this”, but quickly stated, “It is too political, we can’t go further than this” and changed the topic.

The diversion of scarce resources is particularly significant when linked to ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ grievances over perceived exclusion from resource distribution (discussed in the following section). However, while such diversion was frequently

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33 This illustrates education’s role in South Sudan’s ‘political marketplace’, in which political elites secure loyalty of local leaders and communities through patronage systems and resource distribution (de Waal, 2013, pp. 224–5). Government elites are faced with “demands... to redistribute state resources through networks of kinship and ethnicity” (Leonardi, 2011, p. 233), providing resources to kinship networks and communities to sustain loyalty and power (Leonardi, 2011, p. 228; Awoliich, 2015, p. 4).
described as ‘corruption’ for personal gain, it was also described as ensuring collective benefits for communities by ensuring access to resources and services such as schools, representing “an informal redistribution of funds and resources” (Richmond and Mitchell, 2011, p. 335). This demonstrates the ways in which resource and service distribution supports political loyalty and authority through a combination of coercion and consent – at the level of individual ‘local’ political elites rather than the ‘state’ or ‘government’ (although these networks are not purely ‘local’, and are often connected to national-level political and military elites). This also echoes historical processes of bargaining, brokering, and negotiation between ‘local’ authorities and governments (including through forms of patronage) in (South) Sudan during and after the British colonial period (Leonardi, 2013, pp. 49–59). This also reflects aspects of ‘divide and rule’ strategies through strategic distribution of valued resources and services.

Having discussed approaches to resource distribution and management at the subnational level, I now turn to resource mobilisation and management processes at school and community levels. School-level resource shortages and the shifting of financing responsibilities from the government to communities and households reproduce geographic inequalities and undermine policy statements concerning state-society relations. This has implications for peacebuilding given the links between education resource inequalities and conflict in South Sudan. Service delivery funds are transferred to primary and secondary schools in the form of capitation grants (under the MoEST-DFID GESS programme). These grants, managed by PTAs, are intended to finance basic operating costs (e.g. infrastructure, maintenance, supplies, volunteer teacher incentives) and enable provision of ‘free’ primary education. This is meant to widen access and respond to socioeconomic inequalities between households and individuals, as a donor representative explained:

> The idea of the capitation grants is that they should remove the registration fees [that] poor people often couldn’t pay... They’re not supposed to pay registration fees. They can contribute in kind to community projects, we don’t want to undermine that, but that is one fee they’re not supposed to pay as a result of capitation grants.

Capitation grants are based on student enrolment, described as a ‘fair’ and ‘transparent’ approach to allocation. However, school managers and teachers explained

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34 In 2015, primary school grants included a fixed amount of SSP 5,000 plus SSP 36 per pupil (SSP 78 in ‘hard to reach’ areas). Secondary school grants included SSP 10,000 plus SSP 80 per pupil (MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). 25 per cent of the grant is allocated to physical improvement (e.g. school construction and maintenance), 25 to inspections, and 50 to learning processes (e.g. materials, textbooks).
that grants are not sufficient to cover projects such as classroom or office construction. Primary teachers in Warrap, for example, reported that capitation grants “*have helped a lot, but not enough*” due to small amounts, the value of which is further reduced in a context of currency devaluation and rising prices: “[You] *can’t even build a tukul because things are now very expensive*”. Enrolment-based allocation presents challenges for schools with fewer students, reproducing geographic inequalities in resource access when low-enrolment schools in remote communities receive smaller grants. The diversion of capitation funds by ministry officials and school managers also reduces available resources. A group of primary teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal, discussing capitation grants, explained that, “*When the money reached the bank here, we don’t know where it went… Was the money lost in the Ministry of Education? The state government? We don’t know*”. A donor representative described the ways in which diversion of school funds reflects higher-level resource diversion:

> The corruption and misuse of funds is something which has struggled a lot, especially at the top level, but it also filters down to middle level… You find heads, for example, embezzling funds from capitation grants or cash transfers.

These funding shortages mean that households and communities must cover basic school operating and service provision costs, compensating for government budget ‘constraints’. They are “charged with attending to those responsibilities that the state cannot or will not… accept” (Ferguson, 2015, p. 68), shifting financing responsibilities to communities and households. This reflects a neoliberal framework in which “individual ‘responsibility’ increases as social services… fail” (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p. 103). Although the Transitional Constitution and Education Act state that primary education is to be free of charge, families cover costs such as ‘school development fund’ contributions (registration fees, in practice), examination fees, and school materials.

The MoEST and international organisations explicitly encourage community responsibility for school financing. For example, while the GESS programme states that capitation grants will remove financial barriers, its School Governance Toolkit identifies teachers, parents, and community members as responsible for ‘stimulating’ and sustaining school improvements (MoEST and DFID-GESS, 2014, pp. 6–11). School governing bodies (and thus parents, teachers, and community representatives) are responsible for providing school and classroom infrastructure and equipment, employing part-time or contract teachers, supporting teacher development and welfare,
and mobilising funds and resources. MoEST officials’ descriptions of community ‘support’ to education involves not only contributions to school functioning but primary or sole responsibility for constructing learning spaces, paying and housing teachers, and other core aspects of service provision. As one primary head teacher explained,

_The government is not doing anything for education. Parents are the ones furnishing the school. They pay a little fund to run the school, for maintenance of tables and chairs, chalk. All is from the contributions of the parents._

A state MoEST official in Upper Nile described the ways in which responsibilities are assigned to PTAs, as representatives of households and communities:

_If there is any problem in the school also, [the PTAs] solve the problems, and also if there is a need, like we want to have a teacher’s house of something like that... If they want their children to be taught or to learn, they have to also construct a house for the teacher... If we are constructing these temporary learning spaces, they have to also participate in this._

PTAs may have to increase school ‘fees’ to meet school needs, increasing the financial burden on households with fewer financial resources:

_Most of the schools are without teachers... The school management committee with the PTA, they increase the school fees in order to generate money to employ secondary school leavers to support the system, to support the schools._

Another way in which financing responsibility is shifted from the government to households is through the privatisation of education services. Donor representatives reported an increasing number of private schools in South Sudan, including church-, NGO-, and community-run and for-profit schools.35 This is another way in which households compensate for government budget ‘constraints’, financing education through private school fees. Indeed, a state MoEST official in Western Bahr el Ghazal described this shift as compensating for the lack of government funds for education:

_The community... takes it for granted that children are children of the government and the government will do the whole job. But the government has put the policy, and is not having any funds to support the policy. It is only the parents who could support the policy._

In some areas, private schools account for the majority of enrolment, illustrating the scale of (and geographic differences in) reliance on household financing. For example, non-government schools accounted for 52 per cent of primary schools in Juba county in 2013 (MoEST, 2014a). A payam official in Central Equatoria reported that it

35 According to the MoEST (2015b, p. 34), private schools are meant to “bring about school competition, leading to improvement in quality delivery, increase in access to education, [and] reduction of congestion in public schools”. Between 2009 and 2011, the number of private primary and secondary schools increased from 117 to 275 and 30 to 59, respectively. In 2013, 74 and 62 per cent of primary and secondary schools, respectively, were government run or aided, while 26 and 37 per cent were private or community managed (Ministry of Education, 2010; MoEST, 2014a).
would be impossible to meet education needs without private schools: “We don’t know where we would be without the church and community... The government doesn’t have any power to do anything by itself”. Forty-nine of the 55 primary schools in that payam were private (including both church- and community-run schools) and over 19,500 children were registered in private schools (compared to 6,600 in government schools). Reliance on community and household financing reproduces inequalities between wealthier and ‘poorer’ households and communities. Wealthier communities are better able to finance and maintain services, while ‘poorer’ communities face challenges in ensuring service provision. A school manager in Warrap explained that their PTA is “unable to do anything... as you have seen the area, people are very poor”. Similarly, a group of primary teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal reported that, “This school is not helped by the community”.

This contributes to the segregation of education services when geographic and socioeconomic ‘boundaries’ intersect with ethnic identification, reinforcing divisions and tensions and impeding peacebuilding efforts. Reliance on community and household financing also creates tensions between communities and government over responsibility for service provision and contributes to grievances associated with inadequate resource and service provision, particularly when linked to the government’s failure to deliver anticipated post-CPA ‘peace dividends’. This reinforces grievances related to long-standing reliance on community education financing, illustrating the need to consider these dynamics in historical context. Describing approaches to education provision in Sudan in the 1980s (and illustrating the entrenched nature of these challenges), Hajjar (1983, p. 188) reports that,

Local participation has a discriminating effect as the poorest local communities do not have the means of making up the difference between the government’s contribution and the total cost... Less prosperous communities could end up with poorer or fewer facilities.

When examining education resource flows, a focus on government resources represents only a partial account. International actors are central to education provision in South Sudan and heavily influence resource distribution. “The government doesn’t have any power to do anything by itself”, stated one payam supervisor. This undermines policy arguments about strengthening state legitimacy and state-society relations through government service provision. Resource distribution practices among international actors contribute to the reproduction of inequalities (and limit context-specific distribution) through the uneven geographic distribution of partners and
projects, allocation based on criteria that reproduce geographic inequalities, and limited consultation with the MoEST. Donor resources are often allocated to geographic areas based on the presence of NGOs or other implementing partners. The distribution of development and humanitarian actors and projects across states and counties affects resource and service distribution. Organisations and projects are often concentrated in particular locations, with gaps in geographical coverage. This entrenches resource and service disparities as well as perceptions of deprivation. An INGO representative described the significance of disparities in the geographic coverage of international actors and projects, with certain regions experiencing long-standing gaps in support:

*We have partners but in a handful, just a few pockets of locations. Some of the locations have not had the kind of responses... What has always been a problem is that in some of the locations good partners are able to take on the activities. In some of the locations there are no partners.*

In November 2015, emergency education partners were concentrated primarily in Upper Nile, Jonglei, Lakes, and Central Equatoria, with significant variations across counties. For example, partners were operating in four of six counties in Central Equatoria and six of 12 in Upper Nile (OCHA South Sudan, 2015). Funding constraints require the prioritisation of ‘high need’ areas (e.g. communities most affected by armed violence), and access to geographic areas depends on security, physical access, and negotiation with opposition forces. However, international actors may also focus on “needs that might ‘realistically’ be met, given a set of constraints” they are unwilling to challenge, legitimising the near absence of interventions in certain areas (Keen, 1994, p. 185). Donor allocation of humanitarian and development resources may reflect their own agendas or definitions of ‘needs’ due to limited consultation with government officials. For example, a state MoEST official in Upper Nile described a lack of ministry consultation among donors and partners:

*Sometimes [the NGOs] don’t consult the ministry. They just go and do their things there. When we go there, we found the schools are well built and there is not enough children. They’re supposed to ask the ministry and then we show them that where there is a big population, this is where you can build a school.*

While certain MoEST officials reported some (limited) influence over donor resource distribution, this varied by donor. This limits responses to context-specific needs, and is also perceived as undermining government authority and frustrating ministry officials. As one official explained,

*Room to Learn is a US funded programme. They wanted to do their activities behind our back but we are now very strong... so we’ll be getting a hammer.*
tried carrot and then we tried the stick, but still we go for hammer... We need to know exactly what do they intend to invest the money on... We completely don’t have a say... The first cooperation that we are beginning to see ourselves as partners, recognising that we are already a government, it is the DFID and GESS programme. This is where we have a say... Some partners are beginning to listen.

Some MoEST officials described donor relations as reflecting pre-2005 interactions between international partners and the SPLM/A as a rebel movement. The importance of historical patterns of donor involvement with authorities should be considered, as they influence current frustrations and concerns when reproduced in contemporary donor-government interactions. A paper co-authored by the MoEST Undersecretary refers to “a tendency within the humanitarian actors of undermining the responsibility, leadership and ownership of local and national authorities” (Lotyam and Arden, 2015, pp. 7–8) during the pre-CPA period. As one central MoEST official explained, “We were still a rebel movement. You don’t have a say ... It just becomes like some of the workers only who are told what to do”.

Some donor and NGO representatives described the use of ‘transparent’ criteria for resource distribution (e.g. school construction, capitation grants, school feeding), intended to avoid tensions and political influence (and to encourage communities to improve their schools to access resources). Criteria include accessibility (e.g. presence of roads, mobile networks), security, school facilities (e.g. latrines, kitchen), functioning school governing bodies, and record keeping and reporting. These entrench inequalities when schools and communities, particularly in hard-to-reach or conflict-affected areas or those with few financial resources, struggle to meet criteria and access resources and support. Efforts to promote ‘transparency’ in resource distribution can therefore entrench inequalities between communities and justify and legitimise inequitable distribution patterns, suggesting that schools or communities cannot access resources because they do not meet required criteria rather than due to structural factors.

The ways in which education resources and services are distributed, managed, and mobilised at multiple scales, from the central government to schools, contributes to the reproduction of inequalities across states, counties, and payams, and between rural and urban areas. Geographic inequalities intersect with other group dimensions (e.g. ethnicity), illustrating interconnections between different dimensions of inequality as well as the significance of education resource and service inequalities for conflict. Quantitative analyses of education data in South Sudan (Novelli et al., 2016, pp. 32–6)
reveal clear geographic inequalities in educational resources and services, with Greater Upper Nile experiencing the lowest access to school facilities and resources (e.g. classrooms, teachers, drinking water, latrines). Inequalities in the distribution of teachers and facilities exist across counties, with southern counties generally having more adequate school resources than central and northern counties. Administrative borders in South Sudan (e.g. states, counties, payams, bomas) tend to mirror ethnic, tribal, and sectional boundaries, reflecting legacies of colonial ‘native administration’. Geographic resource and service inequalities are thus linked to inequalities between ethnic groups or sub-groups/sections. These must be considered in a historical context characterised by tensions associated with border demarcation and the role of subnational borders in colonial and post-colonial violence and conflict. This must also be considered in relation to the significance of administrative (territorial) units, such as counties, payams, and bomas, in driving public expectations of government services and resources. As Leonardi (2013) explains, decentralisation policies outlined in the Local Government Act resulted not only in increasingly “territorialised and ethnicised definitions of locality and community” (p. 182), but also the linking of access to government (or NGO) services and resources with ‘territorial locality’ (pp. 185–6).

In this section, I have explored how education resources and services are distributed and managed in South Sudan, from ‘international’ to ‘local’ levels. Resource and service distribution reproduces and entrenches inequalities across geographic communities. This has peacebuilding implications due to links between geographic inequalities and violent conflict and the shifting of financing responsibilities from the government to communities and households. Depoliticised explanations for distributive inequalities illustrate “the normalization of poverty and precarity” associated with neoliberal governance (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p. 29). These resource flows challenge policy statements about the ‘peacebuilding’ role of service provision, not only in terms of ‘actual’ distribution but also in terms of perceptions and interpretations.

6.4 Perceptions and Interpretations of Resource and Service Distribution

Having discussed the ways in which education resources and services are distributed and managed at different scales, I turn to the second part of my critique. In this section, I examine interpretations, experiences, perceptions, and emotions associated with resource and service distribution among those intended to benefit from them: people in schools and surrounding communities. I argue that education’s
peacebuilding role does not simply involve ‘actual’ distribution of resources and services: frustrations and grievances associated with perceived exclusion from resource distribution undermine education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role. This is linked to the government’s failure to provide expected ‘peace dividends’ in the form of education services, and perceptions of deliberate exclusion from government and donor resource distribution. Donor and government policy statements discuss public perceptions only in relation to perceived state legitimacy and authority, but do not consider the ways in which people experience and perceive processes of resource distribution.

Emotions, perceptions, and experiences are located in historical contexts, “[taking] shape through the repetition of actions over time” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 4). Experiences, emotions, identities, and roles “produced by one set of war experiences affect people in the future and their memories of war and peace” (Sylvester, 2012, p. 502). These have important social and political effects, including the ways in which they ‘produce’ demands for collective responses (Ahmed, 2014, pp. 9–28). This is particularly significant in relation to people’s expectations of access to services as benefits of independence, peace, and development – and as ‘rewards’ for supporting the liberation struggle. Expectations of ‘peace dividends’ are “grounded in past suffering and past contributions that require redress or compensation… understood as both collective and inherited across generations” (Ferguson, 2015, p. 55). The failure to deliver expected (and promised) resources and services can intensify grievances and undermine peacebuilding efforts, shaping community confidence in the government (and donors) as well as perceived responsiveness to needs and obligations. The significance of educational inequalities (both real and perceived) must be considered in relation to historical patterns of conflict in (South) Sudan. As discussed in Chapter 2, education resource and service inequalities in southern Sudan contributed to feelings of frustration, resentment, alienation, and exclusion, and were key factors leading to the outbreak of armed conflict in the 1950s-1960s.

Explicit statements about increased service provision made by political leaders raise community expectations, and take on particular significance given the historical marginalisation of specific geographic regions. During the ‘war of liberation’ and CPA negotiations, Garang stated that the southern government would “take the towns to people in the countryside” through development and service provision (including education) (2013, p. 180, 2014, p. 150), referring specifically to “equality in social services and their distribution in all the southern areas” (2014, p. 188). Garang
described the provision of social services as “payback… to the Sudanese people who fought and sacrificed”: “the peace dividend that they expect as individuals and as communities and for which they have fought… will be provided” (2014, pp. 140, 176). Post-CPA government and donor strategy documents describe increased education provision as a tangible peace outcome (‘dividend’) for populations, and access to education and other services were popular expectations of post-CPA peace and development (Deng, 2005, p. 247; Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 71, 247; Mayai, 2012, p. 1). However, highly anticipated ‘peace dividends’, including education, have been limited or non-existent (Leonardi, 2011, p. 232; Mayai, 2012, pp. 1–4; Jok, 2013, p. 2; Awolich, 2015, p. 10). Promised ‘dividends’ have not materialised, illustrated by the continued marginalisation of rural and remote communities. “The money is still in Juba and is not going to the periphery”, stated a South Sudanese CSO representative.

This has driven community-level frustrations, grievances, and anger. A South Sudanese state-level peacebuilding representative described the failure to meet people’s expectations: “All hope was placed on peace dividends… [but] until today people are squeezed into a corner… Children are learning under trees, there are no teachers”. Subnational MoEST officials, teachers, PTA members, and students expressed frustration over the lack of sufficient government resources for education. “They don’t even give a piece of paper to the school”, stated one payam official. A group of secondary students explained that when the government does not provide necessary resources, communities are ‘exposed’ to risks (associated with poverty and a lack of services and opportunities) and will blame the government. The government’s failure to meet popular expectations represents not only a failure to deliver required services, but also a failure to ‘compensate’ for wartime contributions. In some communities there is the sense that, “We contributed during the struggle, but what now do we have? It is too late for this government”. A state MoEST official in Warrap explained the ways in which failure to address these expectations undermines state-society relations:

*When people are fighting, they complain, ‘We need this, we need this, we need this’. When they don’t get it... there will be conflict between the community and the government and then there is going to be a lack of trust between the government and the community, because we were promised last time, ‘Your children will be educated’.*

36  In recent national opinion surveys, 68 per cent of adults were dissatisfied with government education provision and 60 per cent believed education delivery had worsened (IRI, 2013; World Bank, 2015).
Frustrations and grievances associated with the failure to deliver expected services are affected by the transfer of responsibility for school financing to communities and households. Not only are communities not receiving promised services, but they have to finance these services themselves. Perceptions of the government’s failure to deliver expected ‘peace dividends’ must also be considered in historical context, in relation to post-CPA promises of services as well as similar prior experiences. Promises of CPA ‘peace dividends’ echo expectations following the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. As one southern minister then explained, “people who have returned to their homes from bush or exile now expect to be provided with a welfare state, particularly in regard to health and education” (Stevens, 1976, p. 251). As noted in Chapter 2, education resource and service expansion during this period were limited. The post-CPA process echoes this prior failure to meet popular expectations. These historical dimensions are not acknowledged in policy documents, despite their influence on perceptions of government commitment and responsiveness.

Resource distribution across communities can result in perceptions of deliberate marginalisation or exclusion by political authorities and international actors. This has implications for conflict in terms of grievances associated with geographic and historical inequalities. This is particularly significant given the deliberate use of education resource and service distribution by colonial and Sudanese authorities as mechanisms of power and control. Geographic inequalities overlap with other dimensions of identity and inequality, including ethnicity and socioeconomic status, which intensify perceptions of deliberate marginalisation or exclusion from resource and service distribution. A state MoEST official in Warrap described the significance of perceptions of exclusion from development projects:

*If the ministry was to sit and say, ‘Okay, we are going to take [the schools] to Tonj South’ or ‘We are going to take them to Tonj East or to Gogrial West’, leaving the other counties, then the tension rises there, between the local politicians [and] the community. They say, ‘Okay, the ministry here, the donors, they are depriving the other community’.*

Similarly, a central MoEST official described the ways in which resource distribution drives grievances and conflict:

*They identified one county and then jumped another county and then identified another one there and then jumped and identified. Now this county that is jumped, we can say, ‘Is it because... so and so there is from this county?’ That’s already brought a tribal conflict here, meaning you are not representing us all.*
Perceptions of exclusion and inequalities reinforce intergroup and state-society divisions and tensions when framed in ‘us and them’ terms: resources and services are viewed as being provided to one group or community to the exclusion of others. People “judge their own peace benefits in direct comparison to that of other groups”, reinforcing a sense of deliberate exclusion (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 71). Discussing perceived marginalisation from school construction programmes, a group of primary teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal illustrated this point: “The places where they build concrete schools are better than us”. Resource distribution is interpreted as tied to group membership and status. This is reinforced by the diversion of education resources by political authorities to secure or reward loyalty, discussed above. This reproduces historical exclusion from entitlements linked to geographic and ethnic origin among southern communities under Sudanese rule (Ahmed, 1988, p. 8). A South Sudanese non-governmental peacebuilding actor described how perceived (and actual) benefits of or marginalisation from distribution are tied to group representation:

The system of governance is politically loaded... The reason why people celebrate is that Mr X is made minister in the government and his community will feel they have been rewarded... ‘We have our man in government who will bring services closer to us’... What about the other communities who don’t have a man in government?

Perceptions of deliberate exclusion from resource distribution are shaped by patterns of communication among governments and international donors. This includes explicit or implicit commitments to service support and a lack of communication of decision-making procedures. Explicit or implicit commitments made by government and international agency representatives during visits to communities and schools (for needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation, etc.) influence resource and service expectations. Teachers, PTA members, and students in different states expressed frustrations when donors and development partners visit communities and schools, conduct assessments, raise expectations, and fail to provide expected resources. A South Sudanese INGO representative described the problem of donors raising expectations by visiting communities while failing to provide material benefits:

You will go and generate a need and an interest in the community and you move out, so it will kind of cause a frustration in the community because UNICEF came and UNICEF has gone out with nothing that they have left on the ground.

A group of secondary students in Warrap reported that international organisations “come for assessments and needs, but nothing is done... [This] creates expectations but
“nothing is done”. Similarly, a group of teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal described frustrations when expectations are raised but unmet by donors:

UNICEF has come to this school several times. They have seen the challenges, the problems with the school environment... Why do they not provide just one thing for this school...? They come to ask at the school for [our] needs... but are just giving counselling to us... So many NGOs come to the school, make promises, and don’t come... so many empty promises.

This intensifies frustrations and perceptions of exclusion when communities observe that resources are distributed to others. When people hear or see (on the radio or television, for example) that other schools or communities have received resources (e.g. materials, latrines) while their own school or community has not, this intensifies perceptions of relative deprivation, exclusion, and inequality. An education official in Tonj East explained that when community chiefs travel to other states and counties, they observe differences between communities: “‘We want to be like that county, that state’... they see that things are coming through education”. “When certain geographic areas don’t have secondary schools, this can bring conflict because less attention is paid to them”, explained a group of secondary teachers and PTA members in Central Equatoria. Feelings of frustration and anger are intensified given the significance of material resources and facilities for communities, school managers, teachers, and students, as reflected student drawings (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2).

Figure 6.1 Drawing by a female student
Perceived inequalities are compounded by limited communication of decision-making procedures. Some payam officials and school managers stated that they do not know how donors make decisions about resource allocation: why some schools receive resources while others do not, or why donors decide to stop providing support to some schools. As noted above, perceptions of exclusion and inequalities are often framed in ‘us and them’ terms. The group of teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal illustrated this point as they described reactions to resource distribution:

[We] see that UNICEF has been helping other schools in South Sudan, especially in other states... [We] see on TV that in some states UNICEF is the one to represent all these things... When services are provided to some places, others will think, ‘Why? What about us...? We think that we are not important.

Even when communities are aware of donors’ reasons for resource distribution, perceptions of exclusion persist, linked to perceived ‘rewarding’ of particular forms of violence through humanitarian aid and neglect of others. While people understand why international responses are concentrated in ‘crisis’ areas, the significance of perceived exclusion (and associated frustrations and anger) should not be underestimated, nor should the perceived ‘rewarding’ of violence (or provision of ‘conflict dividends’). This has frustrated authorities and communities in (formerly) ‘stable’ states (e.g. Western
Equatoria) and in counties experiencing effects of armed violence. “Where there is fire, more water will be thrown... If you are okay, no one takes care of you,” claimed one central MoEST official. A state MoEST official in Warrap described the ways in which communities perceive ‘benefits’ of conflict: “It’s telling people if they are not getting the same support, then the concern is that, ‘Okay, can we fight so that we get other support?’” Another official in Warrap explained that aid delivery to sites of fighting between government and SPLM-IO forces neglects the effects of conflict in other states:

Sometimes you don’t get the resources because you may find the donors’ funding is dictated to certain areas... Donors shift from these other areas, they call it ‘non-conflict affected’ areas, and then they take three states of Upper Nile, that’s the most conflict areas... Donors shift from that place to others, when actually the effect of that conflict is the same. For example, Warrap is housing the IDPs from Unity state, and when there is fighting in Unity state they come... But [donors] say, ‘Okay, in this place, it is only experiencing conflict through other places, but not directly, conflict is not taking place’. But then I say, ‘Okay, how do you define conflict...?’ The same to Tonj South when they fight themselves, the same to Tonj North when the fighting comes from Unity state and then affected them. It’s all the same danger. And all the children are affected no matter what... When you say, ‘Okay, this is not for your place, it is for emergency only’, then [communities] say, ‘Okay, our children ran away from this fighting. How do you define your emergency?’

In this section, I have described how education resource and service inequalities are perceived as deliberate forms of marginalisation or exclusion among communities and school-level actors. This illustrates the significance of perceived, as well as ‘actual’, distributive inequalities. It raises questions about the ways in which government and donors address intersecting inequalities and grievances in policy and practice.

6.5 Policy and Programme Responses to Resource and Service Inequalities

In this section, I present the third part of my critique, examining government and donor responses to educational inequalities at policy and programme levels. I argue that neither the government (represented by the MoEST) nor donors consider questions of ‘horizontal’ redistribution of resources and services, thus entrenching forms of inequality linked to conflict. Donors heavily influence education policy agendas, funding policy development and providing ‘technical expertise’. Specific policy and programme responses focus on (and privilege) ‘individualised’ dimensions of inequality (specifically girls’ education and students with disabilities, reflecting global education agendas) and fail to systematically address geographic inequalities in resource distribution. In addition to contributing to the reproduction of geographic and
community-level inequalities, this undermines broad policy narratives about ‘equitable’ responses to ‘local’ needs and existing (and historical) dimensions of inequality.

This critique does not suggest that girls’ education (or gender equality) and ‘inclusive’ education are less significant than geographic inequalities. Rather, I argue that policies and programmes fail to respond to ‘collective’ dimensions of inequality linked to conflict and undermining peacebuilding aims. This illustrates a ‘ranking’ of inequalities and the implicit (or explicit) acceptance of inequalities linked to geographic or community-level resource distribution. Certain inequalities are considered ‘unacceptable’ (by donors, for example) and others, such as wealth and resource distribution, are considered ‘acceptable’ (Richmond, 2014, pp. 450–1). The distribution of educational resources across geographic regions is intensely political, as it intersects with ‘local’ dynamics of political (and ethnic) representation and loyalty and histories of mobilisation and conflict. Government bodies and donors may be unwilling to explicitly address these highly political dynamics. Broad policy statements emphasise the importance of educational equality, but specific policies and programmes selectively respond to ‘neutral’ forms of inequality and neglect more ‘political’ forms. Policies call for “greater equality without any tackling of the problem of… persistent redistributive failure” (Mkandawire, 2004, p. 5).

There were marked differences between the ways in which MoEST and school representatives described resource inequalities and desired responses, and specific inequalities addressed in policies and programmes. When discussing resource and service distribution and implications for conflict, MoEST and school-level actors emphasised the significance of distributive inequalities across geographic areas (e.g. counties, payams, communities), located within historical contexts of marginalisation. While some MoEST officials defined ‘equality’ as the provision of the same resources across all areas (e.g. counties, payams), others called for responses to context-specific needs and disparities. Statements by two state-level MoEST officials in Central Equatoria and Warrap, respectively, illustrate arguments about the need to respond to geographically specific needs and disparities in education resources and infrastructure:

The central point is looking at what are the needs of these counties, in specific. The needs of Terekeka county may not be the same as the needs of Yei county, and the needs of Yei county may not be the same as the needs of Kajo Keji county or Juba county... When it comes to resource allocation, if Terekeka says, ‘Our priority area is teachers’, then Kajo Keji says, ‘Our priority area in learning space’, and then Morobo says, ‘No, we want capacity building on
education managers’... We need to make sure that all the needs of these counties are met... This is the equity I am trying to express.

We see how many payams have a permanent structure, and then we also see how many payams have a semi-permanent structure. The payam that has nothing completely, then we say that [school] has to go to this payam... We also see the most isolated places that are really marginalised, the places that also have conflict.

Educational inequalities and responses must be considered in historical context, particularly given the role of education resource and service distribution in colonial and post-colonial dynamics of oppression and violence. ‘Peacebuilding’ efforts involve not only the distribution of resources or delivery of services, but also the redistribution of resources and services to address long-standing inequalities. For example, a state MoEST official in Upper Nile described the significance of historical inequalities and the need for ‘special attention’ to disadvantaged areas:

The counties who have some difficulties, like Maban... since the time of the old Sudan, they have a lot of difficulties... It’s a remote area, so the people there are not more educated. In fact, those who are educated, they are very few in number. This is why that place needs special concentration.

A donor representative drew connections between historical inequalities and conflict, but stopped short of calling for redistributive approaches to resource allocation:

The history of the country is very much that of patchy development and inequalities... It’s partly historical development, and so you’ve got these inequities, much of which are shown in remote rural areas especially, but not just there, but I do think it is contributing to the conflict.

While some MoEST and donor representatives acknowledged historical service disparities, no specific policies or programmes address these inequalities in any systematic way. Discussions of historical inequalities focused on the marginalisation or exclusion of the south by colonial authorities and Sudanese regimes, rarely addressing the current government’s (and donors’) role in reproducing patterns of marginalisation.

MoEST and school-level representatives described education resource and service inequalities in geographic terms, connected to current and historical conflict dynamics. However, no systematic government and donor initiatives address questions of ‘redistribution’ in response to context-specific, conflict-related geographic or community-level inequalities. When international donors, rather than populations themselves (or their government ‘representatives’), drive policy agendas, this undermines policy statements about responses to ‘local’ needs and inequalities. While some actors (and donor strategy documents) acknowledged the significance of
geographic inequalities, discussions of educational ‘equality’ – and, more importantly, policy and resource responses – address ‘individual’ rights-based dimensions.

Equality-focused education policies and programmes focus specifically on educational access for girls and children with disabilities: “In terms of equity, girls’ participation is the most glaring issue”, stated one donor representative. This echoes priorities outlined in donor education frameworks and policy documents (DFID, 2010a, pp. 23–5; GPE, 2012, pp. 9–15; USAID, 2013b, p. 3; DFID, 2014, p. 17). Specific equality-focused policy and programme initiatives include the Girls’ Education Strategy for South Sudan, launched in 2015 and developed with UNICEF funding and the DFID-funded GESS programme, the only large-scale donor programme ‘redistributing’ educational resources to a particular population (through cash transfers37 to female students). A National Inclusive Education Policy is being developed for students with disabilities, funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. A Directorate of Gender Equity and Social Change exists within the MoEST, responsible for promoting education of girls and children with disabilities.

No comparable policy, programme, or institutional efforts address inequalities affecting historically marginalised geographic areas (e.g. counties, payams, rural or remote communities). Existing equality-focused policies and programmes pay little attention to these disparities. While some components address geographic or community-level issues, these are not systematic, targeted responses. For example, the GESS programme, intended to address social, cultural, and economic barriers to education, refers to supporting ‘hard to reach’ schools. Per-pupil capitation grant amounts are higher in ‘hard to reach’ areas (MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016), but as noted earlier, allocation criteria reproduce disadvantages for schools in particularly isolated areas. At the government level, the AES aims to “increase access to education for disadvantaged communities or groups”, including in rural communities (MoEST, 2014b, p. 9). The AES includes six non-formal basic education programmes, targeting children, youth, and adults who have missed out on education due to conflict, poverty, or livelihoods. Programmes include Community Girls Schools (CGS) “in villages that have no schools” and the Pastoralist Education Programme (see Chapter 8). However, these do not systematically address inequalities in resource and service distribution, and

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37 Girls in upper primary and secondary (P5 through S4) receive cash transfers (SSP 125 per year in 2015), based on regular school attendance. The programme also includes community awareness and mentoring components.
are undermined by a lack of funding. Although the AES is meant to be allocated 10 per cent of the total education budget (MoEST, 2014b, p. 13), in 2014-2015 it received one per cent and in 2013-2014 only 21 per cent of allocations were disbursed (MoFEP, 2014). A central MoEST official acknowledged this gap between rhetoric and practice:

_The government has tried, that’s why we have the Department of Alternative Education, that’s why where you are seated is also a Department for Gender and Equity and Social Change... I think the ministry is trying but the action has never taken place._

Responses to distributional inequalities are not solely due to resource ‘shortages’, but also to choices or decisions about how and where available resources are allocated. The marginalisation of equality-focused domains in MoEST budgets illustrates not just funding shortages, but a failure to prioritise responses to educational inequalities. The low priority assigned to alternative education is articulated (and legitimised and institutionalised) in the Education Act, which states that, “education through the [AES] shall be provided subject to availability of resources” (UNICEF, 2008, p. 18).

The lack of systematic, formalised responses to context-specific, community-level dimensions of distributive inequality undermines policy statements about ‘equitable’ responses to ‘local’ needs. This is due in part to reliance on donor funding for policy and programme development and implementation, the marginalisation of ‘equality-focused’ programmes within MoEST budgets, and the shifting of responsibility for action from one scale of action to another (often to ‘local’ governments and communities). One central MoEST official acknowledged the failure of policies and programmes to respond to context specific needs: “Sometimes, politically, we found the direction is that equity is just a blanket. They are not based on the real needs”. Reliance on donor funds to address educational inequalities limits responses to inequalities prioritised by government bodies and ‘local’ communities. Donors are the primary funders of programmes intended to address educational inequalities. For example, DFID largely funds the GESS programme, while USAID and BRAC are responsible for CGS development. MoEST representatives described limited consultations or influence in donor resource distribution. “Donors direct resources to their areas of intervention”, reported one central MoEST official.

Government and donor discussions about responses to geographic or community-level inequalities are also characterised by the shifting (or ‘passing off’) of responsibility from one scale of action to another – and ultimately, context-specific or ‘local’ inequalities remain unaddressed. By passing responsibility to ‘local’
governments and communities, governments and donors justify the absence of ‘equitable’ resource and service distribution responses. Some donors argued that the government should be responsible for responding to geographic inequalities, with one donor representative suggesting that the persistence of inequalities is due to the government’s failure to act: “Within government circles they talk about it but they don’t sit down and decide how to manage inequality, even on a geographical level”. This reflects the role (and complicity) of international actors in failing to respond to distributive inequalities. Donors and NGOs “fill the space vacated by shrinking states” but do little “to challenge the receding tide of public provision or to build political support for responsive state action” (Fraser, 2013, p. 221).

Conversely, government officials may feel that donors are responsible for addressing issues not covered by government budgets. As a state MoEST official in Warrap explained,

The donors or aid is seen as a permanent kind of thing and so the government sometimes is reluctant, the ministry sometimes is reluctant. They say, ‘Okay, it can be dealt with by the partners, by the donors’... Donors are now, to my own thinking, they are now the one driving this thing.

At the same time, central government officials shift responsibility to subnational levels. While MoEST officials discussed the significance of historical marginalisation, they rarely addressed the government’s role in reproducing these inequalities. Many argued that inequalities result from problems or ‘deficiencies’ (e.g. lack of education or awareness) within communities rather than inequitable resource distribution. This illustrates another way in which educational inequalities are depoliticised, by identifying communities as ‘responsible’ for resource and outcome disparities – and thus responsible for redressing them. With respect to teacher allocation disparities, for example, one county education official explained that, “The government doesn’t isolate these areas... These payams don’t have educated children to become teachers”. State and central MoEST officials shared similar explanations for material and human resource shortages. Many officials explained that geographic disparities result from ‘local’ ignorance or lack awareness of the value and importance of formal education. These ‘cultural’ narratives (discussed in Chapter 8) define educational inequalities in terms of ‘awareness’ or ‘attitudes’ rather than unequal resource and service distribution. Such narratives are particularly common among central MoEST officials, illustrated by an official who explained ‘marginalisation’ in terms of ‘knowledge’ and ‘tradition’:
This place has been marginalised... It’s actually a place that the community are not very much in knowledge of the value for education... It’s very marginalised and it’s only because the community are following much of their own tradition.

Other MoEST officials explained the failure to respond to geographic inequalities as resulting from ‘logistical’ factors such as distance, poor transportation, and insecurity. For example, as a state MoEST official in Central Equatoria explained,

_We are thinking of the many payams outside Terekeka, where we need to meet their needs, but... we cannot go there easily, because it’s not easy to access the area because the roads are not there... How will these materials come to this place, for building of schools?

While such factors do affect possibilities for addressing distributive inequalities, these explanations depoliticise and justify both inequalities and the lack of response. The failure, on the part of the government and donors, to systematically address inequalities in resource and service distribution through ‘redistributive’ approaches to existing inequalities undermines broad policy statements about education’s peacebuilding role.

### 6.6 Chapter Summary and Implications

The findings in this chapter illustrate some limitations of formal policy statements and objectives, and of the critical peacebuilding discussions above, and the ways in which they are undermined through existing distribution contexts and practices. First, rather than serving as a means of ‘redistribution’, resource flows (at multiple scales) intersect with and reproduce geographic and intergroup inequalities in resources and services. Second, ‘transparent’ resource allocation criteria justify and institutionalise distributional inequalities. Third, the lack of redistributive policies and programmes illustrates the ‘acceptance’ of inequalities linked to geographic or community-level resource distribution among donors and government. Actual and perceived geographic resource and service inequalities (and thus future political and economic opportunities) intersect with other dimensions of inequality, including socioeconomic class and ‘ethnic’ identity, and contribute to maintaining and intensifying tensions and grievances linked to historical and contemporary violence. However, these dynamics are omitted from policy narratives – and are paid little attention in the critical peacebuilding literature.


The critical peacebuilding literature does not explicitly explore these processes in relation to the role of ‘social services’, or in terms of community perceptions and implications. The findings in this chapter expand critical peacebuilding discussions by
further illustrating ways in which the shifting of education financing responsibilities to communities and households is perceived as representing the state’s failure to provide anticipated ‘peace dividends’ and respond to ‘everyday’ needs and priorities. This contributes to grievances associated with inadequate resource and service provision and resulting intergroup and geographic inequalities, with clear implications for conflict when perceived by communities as involving deliberate marginalisation or deprivation.

The ways in which the critical peacebuilding literature frames the potential contributions of ‘service provision’ pays limited attention to the links between education resource distribution and management and wider political and economic systems. The findings described in this chapter illustrate some ways in which education resource management advances wider neoliberal agendas, and associated implications for inequalities and peacebuilding. Taylor (2007, pp. 556–8, 2010, pp. 154–62) describes peacebuilding interventions in Gramscian terms as hegemonic political and economic projects operating and consolidated through domestic and external political and bureaucratic frameworks and policies. This requires “a form of politics that insulates elites and dissipates resistance… a ‘politics of support’ as well as a ‘politics of power’”, with neoliberal reforms presented “as the only sensible response which political leaders and policy-makers [can] possibly make” (Taylor, 2010, pp. 159–60, 167). This chapter illustrates specific ways in which this occurs, and specific narratives used, within and through education systems. Reliance on community financing is presented as the inevitable solution to economic challenges (that is, ‘emergency’ budget shortages due to the war), marginalising or silencing discussion of alternatives (Pugh, 2005, p. 31; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, pp. 2–3; Taylor, 2010, p. 167).

This chapter illustrates the need to consider not only formal service ‘provision/delivery’ and ‘actual’ distributional inequalities, but also how communities perceive distribution. Some critical peacebuilding scholars acknowledge that the state’s failure to respond to public service expectations and ‘everyday’ needs can result in disappointment and dissatisfaction among populations (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 561–7; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, pp. 319–20). Some critical scholars also acknowledge resulting implications for state-society relations. As Richmond (2014, p. 457) notes, “where the state and international community cannot mitigate inequality in order to distribute a range of peace dividends” (through, for example, socioeconomic redistribution), “citizens… begin to question the point of the state and its legitimacy”. Sabaratnam (2017, p. 132) explains that fragmentation (resulting from international
intervention) “negatively impacts the interactions of citizens and the state, because public services… become erratic, unpredictable and unreliable”. However, questions of perception and experience are largely neglected in this literature. This chapter illustrates the significance of community perceptions of marginalisation or exclusion (by political authorities and donors), reinforcing intergroup tensions and grievances when framed in ‘us and them’ terms. They also illustrate the intensification of these processes in relation to specific historical conflict and peacebuilding contexts, not explicitly addressed in critical peacebuilding discussions.

The CPE framework informed these analyses and the identification of potential ‘causal’ factors underlying approaches to education resource and service distribution. Events, processes, and experiences identified in empirical data illustrate the influence of neoliberal logics or ideologies underpinning and legitimising policy decisions (including ‘decentralised’ financing) that shift service provision costs and responsibilities from the state to communities and households. This is linked to a focus on ‘individual responsibility’ and ‘self-reliance’ that reproduces and widens distributional inequalities and intensifies perceptions of ethnic and geographic marginalisation and exclusion among community members. At the same time, a neoliberal focus on ‘individualised’ forms of inequality informs an ‘acceptance’ of these collective dimensions of marginalisation and limits redistributive responses. Resource distribution processes may also be shaped by mechanisms of regime maintenance and elite reproduction by the SPLM/A. Budget decisions that prioritise military and security sectors, as well as appropriation and diversion of subnational education resources, can be understood as guided by efforts to secure and reward loyalty in order to maintain existing structures of power and authority. These patterns, along with tensions between levels of government, are also shaped by a structure of education governance that positions actors (e.g. national versus subnational officials) in relation to one another within a clear hierarchy, providing power in the form of control over allocation of resources (financial, material, and human). In these ways, the theoretical framework informs my arguments about the political structures underlying largely depoliticised explanations for inequalities in education resources and services, the ways in which these inequalities are reproduced and ‘legitimised’ at multiple scales, and the ways in which these shape both community perceptions and formal policy responses.
CHAPTER 7. “WE MADE IT AND WE OWN IT AND WE RUN IT”:
DECENTRALISATION AND PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATION CONTEXTS

7.1 Chapter Introduction

The critical peacebuilding literature emphasises the importance of ‘local’ participation and representation, to provide ‘local’ actors with opportunities to influence peacebuilding definitions and strategies and to promote responses to inequalities and ‘everyday’ needs through the (re)distribution of opportunities for political participation. Some of this critical literature suggests that social service provision can attend to ‘local’ priorities, contribute to ‘democratic’ politics and state-society relations, and strengthen legitimacy of peacebuilding interventions. Participation and representation in decision-making communities and processes are understood as representing ‘political’ dimensions of social justice (Fraser, 2013, p. 195). Analyses of specific aspects of ‘local’ administration and service delivery provide insight into how governance agendas play out at ‘local’ levels (Mohmand and Loureiro, 2017, pp. 4–8). This requires attention to meanings and practices associated with participation, to “who is participating, in what, and for whose benefit” (Cornwall, 2008, p. 269). In this chapter, I explore these points in order to contribute to an expanded understanding of education’s peacebuilding role through the analysis of ‘local’ participation strategies and experiences in the education system.

To inform my contributions to the critical peacebuilding scholarship, I draw on empirical findings concerning issues of participation and representation in education discourse and practice (specifically through ‘decentralised’ approaches to governance) and their implications in South Sudan. I critically engage with government and donor policy statements concerning participation in education and peacebuilding, and present a three-step critique of these statements. First, I suggest that education governance practices, as perceived and experienced by subnational actors, maintain centralised decision-making power while undermining trust in higher government levels. Second, I suggest that wider political systems and ‘cultures’ undermine possibilities for ‘local’ decision-making. Third, I suggest that while ‘decentralisation’ (through school-based management) is described in terms of ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’, communities and households are defined as providers of resources and labour rather than participants in decision-making processes.
I draw upon the CPE framework to explore the ways in which discourses, practices, and understandings of decentralisation and participation are operationalised and reproduced across different scales and sites, and the ‘causal’ factors underlying approaches to ‘decentralised’ or ‘school-based’ education management. Events, processes, and experiences identified in empirical data illustrate the influence of neoliberal logics or ideologies underpinning and legitimising policy decisions that shift service provision costs and responsibilities from the state to communities and households, widening distributional inequalities and intensifying frustrations among community members. Governance processes may also be shaped by mechanisms of regime maintenance and elite reproduction by the SPLM/A, with rigid, hierarchical, and militarised management and communication procedures limiting opportunities to influence decision-making and maintaining existing structures of power and authority within and through educational institutions. These patterns are also shaped by a structure of education governance that positions actors in relation to one another within a clear hierarchy across scales of authority.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I examine the ways in which policy and strategy documents produced by the government of South Sudan and international donors describe ‘local’ participation in education and peacebuilding. I provide an overview of key policy narratives, which focus on providing opportunities for ‘local’ participation, improving service delivery, and strengthening state-society relations. Second, I describe the ways in which education officials and other actors perceive and interpret the concept of decentralisation, and associated opportunities for participation, across scales of education governance. Third, I explore the ways in which existing political systems constrain opportunities for ‘local’ participation and influence. Fourth, I explore the experiences and perceptions of school-level actors and communities, focusing on tensions between ideas of ‘participation’ and ‘responsibility’. Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings for the critical peacebuilding literature.

7.2 Participation and Representation in Government and Donor Policies

In this section, I examine how policy and strategy documents produced by the government and international donors describe the role of ‘local’ participation in education and peacebuilding. Government peacebuilding and development policies and strategies identify ‘local’ participation and representation, generally through decentralised governance, as necessary for political transitions and peacebuilding. These
policy statements involve three broad narratives concerning the devolution of power and decentralisation\(^\text{38}\) of decision-making: providing opportunities for ‘local’ participation, improving service delivery, and strengthening state-society relations.

The first broad narrative suggests that decentralisation provides opportunities for ‘local’ political participation. The CPA (2005, pp. 11–3, 47) refers to decentralised administration based on ‘significant devolution of powers’ to state and local levels, with “involvement and participation of the people of South Sudan at all levels of government and national institutions” central to national unity. The Transitional Constitution and LGA established a system of decentralised governance based on the devolution of power and authority to state and local governments, with ‘local’ referring to counties and *payams* (GoSS, 2009, 2011). The School Governance Toolkit identifies school-based management as a form of decentralisation involving “redistribution of decision-making authority… to head-teachers, teachers, parents, students and community members” (MoEST and DFID-GESS, 2014, p. 6). School governing bodies include primary school management committees and secondary school boards of governors, who report to and are part of PTAs. According to the General Education Act, cited in the School Governance Policy, school governing bodies “are the authority in all matters… in schools” (MoEST and DFID-GESS, 2014, p. 8). Donors such as USAID (2011b, p. 2) also refer to ‘citizen participation’ and responsibility for service delivery, including through parental involvement in school management.

The second narrative suggests that decentralisation can strengthen and improve service delivery and resource management. The CPA (2005, p. 47) cites “a commitment to devolution of power and decentralisation of decision-making in regard to development, service delivery and governance”. This involves delivery of public services by “the level of government close to the people” (p. 42). The State and Local Government Guidelines for the education sector suggest that funding provision to ‘local’ government improves services “through more effective budgeting, spending and reporting” (MoEST, 2014c, p. 2). International donors also describe decentralisation as a means of ensuring effective service delivery (World Bank, 2013a, p. 21).

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\(^{38}\) Decentralisation involves the transfer of power, responsibility, and finances from central to subnational levels of government (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008, p. 7). Different types of decentralisation involve different objectives, decision-making authority, and degrees of subnational autonomy (Hartmann, 2008, p. 171). These range from *deconcentration* (administrative decentralisation), involving redistribution of financial and management responsibilities among subnational branches of the central government to *devolution* (democratic decentralisation), involving transfer of decision-making authority, resources, and management responsibilities to quasi-autonomous subnational or local governments (Manor, 1999, p. 5).
The third narrative suggests that decentralisation strengthens state-society relations. The JAM (2005, p. 24) identifies local participation through devolution as a means of “restoring the social contract between the authorities and the citizens” and enhancing confidence in governance institutions. The national curriculum framework emphasises education’s role in developing “good citizens of South Sudan”, as “active participants in society” and committed to democracy (MoEST, 2015a, p. 5). Drawing links to democratisation, international donors suggest that education contributes to democratic governance and transitions by promoting respect for democracy (DFID, 2010b, p. 11; USAID, 2011a, pp. 2–3; UNESCO, 2014, p. 14). Based on empirical findings outlined in the subsequent sections, I argue that these policy statements are challenged or undermined by existing ‘decentralised’ governance processes and practices, perceptions of opportunities for participation across scales of governance, and community perceptions of ‘participation’ as ‘responsibility’ for service provision.

7.3 Perceptions and Experiences of Decentralisation

This section presents the first part of my critique of government and donor policy statements. I examine how the concept of decentralisation and associated opportunities for participation are defined, perceived, and experienced across scales of education governance. I suggest that current governance processes and practices maintain centralised decision-making power while undermining trust in higher levels of government among county, payam, and school representatives. Education actors described decentralisation, in an idealised sense, as addressing some of the most significant challenges and concerns facing communities: opportunities for involvement in decision-making, access to and management of social services and resources, and geographic isolation and access. These assumptions and expectations concerning decentralisation, as well as the lack of ‘real’ decentralisation in practice, must be considered in historical context, in relation to processes (and perceived promises and benefits) of reform associated with ‘liberation’, peace, and independence.

Education officials at all levels of government, as well as some peacebuilding, civil society, and international actors, suggested that decentralised education governance could, ideally, contribute to strengthening decision-making processes, improving resource and service management, and addressing geographic access challenges. These represent some of the most significant concerns facing communities in South Sudan, as well as reflecting factors associated with historical and contemporary
patterns of conflict (described in Chapter 2). With respect to decision-making, education and civil society actors suggested that decentralisation could encourage needs-responsive decision-making, strengthen government visibility and legitimacy, and provide opportunities for ‘local’ political participation, ‘ownership’, self-reliance, and self-determination. For example, a state MoEST official in Central Equatoria described possibilities for political expression through decentralisation:

*The most important thing is always to allow for democratic space. Let people express what they want within a bigger system... because if you know what are priorities of the people, then you will be able to address their problems.*

Many MoEST representatives described decentralisation’s (potential) benefits in terms of informing decisions responsive to popular needs and situations, based on more ‘localised’ presence and communication. As a CSO representative explained, decentralised governance enables decisions to be made by people who know the context: “[This] gives responsibility to people of the state: ‘I know my state, my people, the language that people take... I have many skills necessary to work here’”. A state MoEST official in Western Bahr el Ghazal drew attention to possibilities for increased government presence and communication: “This decentralisation of education is that they want to get near to the community or to grassroots, because it should be helping the flow, going up and coming down”.

People responsible for ‘up and down’ communication include ‘local’ (county, *payam*) education officials and school-level actors (school managers, teachers, governing bodies such as PTAs). School-level actors are important mediators between governments and communities. They serve as “agents who constitute the... interface between an intervention and those to whom it is destined”, mediating contact between populations and public (or international) institutions (de Sardan, 2005, pp. 166–7). As a government official in Western Bahr el Ghazal explained, PTAs play critical roles in mediating school-community relations: “*The PTA’s role is to relate the school with the community... They can be a mediator between the community and the school. They are the eyes of the community at the schools [and] can bring school needs to the community*”. As a state MoEST official in Upper Nile explained, decentralised education governance, including school-based management, can encourage community members to take initiative in decision-making and management:

*When we decentralise the powers, it’s good. This will make all the people concerned to participate with their ideas... They will not stay idle. They will not just wait for the instruction. They need to participate.*
With respect to resource and service management, education officials suggested that decentralisation could increase efficiency, accountability, and sustainability and encourage needs-responsive allocation. A state MoEST official in Central Equatoria explained that decentralised governance could enable context-specific, equitable, and accountable resource allocation, in addition to promoting cooperation and ownership:

> There are so many benefits, one of which there is an equitable sharing of resources based on the needs of each county... The rights of each county are granted according to what they demand, so in a way, there’s democratic space that is always allowed, to make sure that everybody becomes participatory. There’s a state of ownership because we made it and we own it and we can run it, so that is the benefit. It also promotes a lot of teamwork, people go together... It’s all about saying, ‘Okay, if these are the resources, then we need to divide these resources accordingly’, so that it allows for proper accountability.

An INGO representative described the role of PTAs in school-level planning and resource management. This includes community engagement in governance, responding to specific needs and priorities, and ensuring accountability:

> The chair of the PTA or the school management committee is the principal signatory for the [capitation grant] account, so before that money goes we have to help the school develop a plan. ‘What’s your plan, as a school?’ ‘We want to dig a pit latrine, we want to fix a window... This is our plan’... The money goes to the school and the PTAs ensure that the money is used properly.

Similarly, a donor representative described school-based management as strengthening ‘accountability’ in resource management:

> Strong community involvement in education needs to be maintained and strengthened, especially in terms of reducing misuse of funds and facilities by officials... Having a stronger community watchdog mentality and stronger involvement in the oversight of budgeting and planning will be healthy, and there’s a lot trying to do now with the school management committees... [There’s] a bottom-up process being encouraged.

Decentralisation could also strengthen sustainability in resource management, explained a state MoEST official in Central Equatoria:

> Our vision should be towards granting people to be self-sustaining, so that they can be able to develop... People can develop when they are given democratic space, when they can be allowed to manage their resources [and be] accountable.

With respect to geographic access, education and civil society representatives suggested that decentralisation could facilitate access to remote geographic communities. “Decentralisation might be good as it can give accessibility to the most rural communities”, suggested one South Sudanese non-governmental peacebuilding actor.
Similarly, a state MoEST official in Upper Nile explained that decentralisation might help to address geographic service and representation inequalities:

[Decentralisation] will help that a lot, because some people are very far from the centre. Like Maban here, it is very difficult because of poor communication. If they are given all of their own things there and they can make their own affairs, this is well and good... This will be good because the country is very large and other places are very far from the centre.

The statements above illustrate the expected benefits associated with decentralisation. In practice, however, subnational education officials described very different experiences of ‘participation’ and ‘representation’. The ways in which ‘decentralisation’ is experienced and perceived by ‘local’ officials and school representatives provides insight into tensions between ‘official’ aims and associated assumptions and expectations, and ‘actual’ implementation of decentralisation. This affects trust in higher levels of government, in terms of representing ‘local’ interests, responding to needs and concerns, and communicating policy information. This challenges and undermines formal policy statements as well as anticipated benefits. For example, a group of primary teachers and PTA members in Western Equatoria felt that decentralisation was meant to increase budgets allocations to states and schools, including construction of more schools, but is not implemented by the government.

Subnational education officials explained that the central ministry and donors develop policies with limited, if any, input from subnational ministries. Even when provided with opportunities to ‘participate’ in decision-making, school managers, teachers, and county and payam officials are generally limited to approving decisions made by higher-level authorities, rather than influencing policy processes based on their stated needs and priorities. Some subnational officials described involvement in national policy reviews and state-level policy and budget development (based on national guidelines). Others described initiatives to facilitate communication of information to schools, such as meetings and workshops for managers. For example, one county education official explained that meetings are organised for inspectors, supervisors, and head teachers to communicate information about policies and decisions (such as school calendars). However, these occasions generally involve being informed of and ‘rubber stamping’ decisions made by central or state governments, rather than opportunities to influence decisions. They represent tokenistic forms of ‘participation’ with little to no transfer of power and control (Cornwall, 2008, p. 270). “The issue is [that] everything is put in Juba. It's not sent to the state... Every money, every resources, every decision,
only in Juba”, explained a state teachers’ union representative. A state MoEST official in Upper Nile explained that central ministry decisions are sent to state ministries and passed down to schools with no opportunities to influence the policy content:

*The national ministry in Juba is always the one who plan. After they plan, they give us the final plan and the information required from us at the level of the state... and from there we come down from the level of the ministry to the county, payam, up to the schools.*

*Payam* and school representatives, in particular, reported few (if any) opportunities to influence policy development and decisions, and are often unaware of processes or decisions at the central level. School managers and teachers in different states described inconsistent transmission of policies from the MoEST to schools, affecting trust in the ministry. They reported that they do not receive information about education policies or that information is significantly delayed, causing confusion and frustration. “*Up to now, we don’t have a clear policy. This is confusing us... What we want from the ministry is the curriculum and the plan,*” reported a group of secondary teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal. Similarly, a state teachers’ union representative explained how this lack of communication affects confidence in the ministry: “*The Ministry of Education has its policy, but we don’t know what happens inside the office... Without transparency, there is something moving in the darkness. You will not see*”.

In addition to problems with top-down policy communication, *payam* officials, school managers, and teachers expressed frustration with bottom-up communication. They described a lack of representation in decision-making at school and ministry levels, explaining that their concerns and suggestions are rarely communicated ‘up the chain’ or considered by higher authorities. For example, *payam* officials in Warrap reported that they have no opportunities to influence central or state policy decisions or planning. They make recommendations at the *payam* level, but state officials “*don’t see our decisions as something important*”. As a *payam* supervisor explained,

*[Central ministry officials] are supposed to meet us because the work is done down here in the schools... [We] are supposed to go and plan together but they don’t do it. They just do it up there, and just pass the information to us. We are not involved in planning, but we should be.*

Similarly, a head teacher in Central Equatoria described the lack of opportunities to provide input on policy decisions or communicate concerns:

*We are not able to communicate these concerns, to say, ‘This is wrong’, to make suggestions for change to the state ministry or the central ministry... We can say*
things sometimes in meetings, but it doesn’t go further... They make [the policies] there and bring to us. We have to implement without knowing how good it is.

County and payam officials and school managers reported that they frequently attempt to communicate specific needs, concerns, and suggestions (regarding, for example, financial or human resources) to state ministries, donors, and INGOs. However, there is rarely any feedback and never any increase in resource allocations. This intensifies frustration and decreases confidence in the government and international actors.

Central and state MoEST officials and donor and INGO representatives are often themselves responsible for undermining existing opportunities and procedures for communication and participation in decision-making. This is illustrated by limited consultation with MoEST on the part of donors in relation to resource allocation decisions, discussed in Chapter 6. Additionally, county and payam officials expressed disappointment and frustration when government officials and international actors bypass their offices when approaching schools, while school managers and teachers expressed disappointment and frustration when government and international officials fail to engage them in planning.

Some subnational officials were frustrated with the way in which donors engage with different ministry levels in project planning and implementation. As one payam supervisor explained, donors ought to involve payam and school managers when making decisions involving schools: “They should involve us... They don’t know what happens down here if they make meetings ‘up there’”. Another payam official in Warrap emphasised the expectation that people will pass through proper channels and respect payam authority when contacting schools: “If anyone comes from higher authority to go to the school, they can’t bypass our office. It has to pass through our office... If anyone wants to support a school, we are the one to go into schools”. However, some donors approach schools directly without involving payam offices. I observed this during the research period: higher-level MoEST officials and UNICEF representatives would move straight from the state ministry to schools without officially informing county and payam offices prior to school visits. Payam officials in different states expressed frustration when government officials and partners engage only with state and county authorities, or when they approach schools without passing through the payam. A payam official in Warrap described feelings of frustration that result when ministry or NGO representatives bypass their office and undermine their authority:
There are people who... bypass the payam, go to the school direct... It is like in the family and someone goes direct to your children without consulting you as the head of family... I feel as somebody who does not know anything... I cannot feel as I am a responsible person.

While county and payam officials reported that donors and government officials bypass their offices when approaching schools, school managers and teachers in different states expressed frustration when donors and partners engage only with subnational government authorities. They suggested that direct communication with schools is necessary to ensure the representation of community voices and concerns. A group of primary teachers and PTA members in Warrap explained that donors used to go directly to schools to ask about challenges and provide materials, but that since 2011 there has been no direct relationship between donors and schools. Instead, donors approach the MoEST to identify challenges and needs. These teachers felt that donors should engage directly with schools: “When you come direct to the school... information will be correct”. Similarly, a head teacher in Central Equatoria explained that, “If donors are supposed to be serious, they shouldn’t go only straight to the ministry. They should go to schools to see what is happening first”.

In these ways, government officials and donors undermine the limited authority and responsibility that local government and school officials feel they have, and exert their own authority over subnational ministry offices. This illustrates a clear gap between policy statements emphasising the importance of ‘decentralised’ administration and ‘local’ participation, and actual engagement with ‘local’ representatives. ‘Decentralised’ procedures and practices thus maintain and reinforce vertical, scalar hierarchies (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, pp. 982–4), through “multiple, mundane domains of bureaucratic practice” at the ‘everyday’ level (Ferguson, 2006, pp. 110–1).

Discussions of school managers’ and subnational officials’ ‘participation’ were often framed in terms of ‘failure’ to fulfil roles and responsibilities. Central MoEST and donor representatives focused on their ‘lack of capacity’, ‘limited understanding’ of responsibilities, and ‘ignorance’ or ‘lack of awareness’. For example, as one international organisation representative stated,

*Headmasters don’t know what their roles are. School supervisors are just by name. The majority of people sitting in the government and the Ministry of Education, they are called inspectors but you need to ask them, ‘What does an inspector do?’*

These perspectives reflect a focus on ‘formal’ definitions and expectations of knowledge and capacity required for participation and influence – such as the ‘capacity’
to mobilise community-level financial resources. They also reflect (neo)colonial denial of ‘local’ management abilities and approaches rooted in the context-specific knowledge and years (and decades) of education sector experience. These framings depoliticise, justify, and legitimise limited opportunities for decision-making involvement and influence, reflecting a view of local officials and school managers as “unable to play a constructive role because they effectively lack ‘capacity’ in building formal liberal order” (Richmond, 2009c, p. 153).

To understand decentralisation processes and implications, historical dimensions and contexts must be considered. Beliefs, assumptions, and expectations tied to decentralisation, and barriers to implementation, should be considered in relation to processes (and perceived promises) of reform associated with ‘liberation’, peace, and independence – as well as implications for conflict. Discussions of the maintenance of centralised authority echo historical tensions and frustrations over political authority and control in southern Sudan. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, under the Addis Ababa agreement in the 1980s, the southern administration did not formally control education, undermining aspects of autonomy. Additionally, frustrations over top-down imposition of decisions about education policy and practice on the part of Sudanese authorities were implicated in dynamics of violent conflict between north and south. During the ‘war of liberation’, Garang described the centralised power of the Khartoum regime as injustice, explaining the collapse of the Addis Ababa agreement thusly: “That arrangement did not stand the test of time because it did not redistribute power at the center” (2013, p. 194). During CPA negotiations, he repeatedly referred to the establishment of an inclusive, representative, and democratic system of governance, identifying ‘strong local governments’ as central to peace (2014, pp. 104, 149–50, 164, 196). He called for a national development strategy that would “effectively deliver social services through devolution and decentralization of power and empowerment to the people” (p. 128). Current grievances associated with the lack of ‘real’ decentralisation of authority in South Sudan must be considered in relation to these statements, and the ways in which decentralisation has been (in theory, at least) tied to processes of liberation and peace. This raises questions about the ways in which existing political ‘cultures’ and interests undermine, rather than support, the redistribution of power and influence.
7.4 Wider Political Dynamics of Education-Sector ‘Decentralisation’

This section presents the second part of my critique. I explore broader political factors and contexts influencing processes and experiences of decentralisation at subnational and school levels. I suggest that these wider political systems and ‘cultures’ limit and undermine possibilities for ‘local’ participation and influence in decision-making. As discussed above, county, payam, and school-level actors (managers, teachers, PTA members) experience limited involvement in decision-making processes. Numerous obstacles restrict their participation, including hierarchical communication procedures and protocols, ‘militarised’ and patronage-based institutional cultures, and a lack of subnational financial resources. Together, these challenge policy statements as well as popular expectations described in the preceding section.

The decentralisation agenda can be understood as a means of redistributing power. It also provides “a powerful means of maintaining relations of rule” (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p. 5), “allowing rulers to dodge more meaningful political reforms” (LeVan, 2015, p. 20). Subnational and school-level education actors described barriers to participation illustrating the maintenance of existing political hierarchies and relations of power, as well as the influence of wider political contexts. Contemporary ‘decentralisation’ should be considered in historical context rather than as a ‘new’ (e.g. post-CPA) process. The contemporary system is based on subnational ‘civilian’ administration structures established (but inconsistently implemented and characterised by continued military control) by the SPLM/A in the 1990s39 (Branch and Mampilly, 2005, pp. 6–7; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 54–8, 114–6, 150–66, 2007, p. 5; Podder, 2014, pp. 225–8; Awolich, 2015, pp. 10–2). These reforms drew on systems of ‘indirect rule’ established during the colonial period and decentralisation policies enacted by Sudanese regimes since the 1960s (Johnson, 2003, p. 105, 2014b, p. 21). ‘Decentralisation’ processes described by subnational and school-level education actors illustrate the persistence of some of these historical dynamics.

Education governance approaches cannot be considered in isolation from wider political norms and ‘cultures’. Existing communication procedures and protocols between different levels of the MoEST limit opportunities for ‘local’ officials and school actors to influence decision-making or voice needs and suggestions. They also

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39 This was considered a means of extending control over rural areas, communities, and resources and gain support from different ethnic communities (Branch and Mampilly, 2005, pp. 4–6; Rolandsen, 2005, p. 114; Thomas, 2012, pp. 31–2; Podder, 2014, pp. 226–7) and from international supporters, aligning with INGO agendas (Rolandsen, 2005, p. 54; Hirblinger and Simons, 2015, p. 427).
entrench and legitimise the centralisation of authority under the guise of formal ‘procedures’. It is difficult to communicate concerns or suggestions to higher levels of government as there are so many steps involved: school to payam, payam to county, country to state, state to centre. Central and state MoEST officials emphasised the importance of this hierarchical chain of communication, illustrating the ways in which ‘decentralisation’ maintains existing political hierarchies. “The [payam] supervisor will come and report to the county director, the county director reports to the state director general. That’s the link... The state head is the centre”, explained a central MoEST official. School or payam representatives “cannot jump from the payam to the state ministry, or from the ministry to the payam”, reported a payam supervisor. This limits opportunities for communication of (and responses to) needs and concerns, as communication ‘up the chain’ may depend on individual relationships and interests. For example, if a head teacher’s concern is considered important by the payam supervisor it may be transmitted to the county office, but “if the payam doesn’t consider it or value it, it stops there”. Payam officials in Warrap reported that if their suggestions do not serve the interests of or benefit higher-level authorities, their suggestions are ignored: “We cannot bring them something, so they don’t accept”.

While these officials cannot directly approach higher ministry levels, central or state officials can bypass county and payam offices (to transmit or collect information directly to/from schools, for example). This illustrates unequal possibilities for action across scales of MoEST administration. For those at central or state levels, positions in the ‘vertical hierarchy’ provide “the privilege of a particular kind of spatial mobility” (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, p. 987). The ways in which individual officials exert agency within this system should also be considered. For example, while central and state-level ministry officials oversee hierarchical systems of communication that limit opportunities for ‘local’ officials, individuals at each ministry level control upward and downward information flows. These processes illustrate how power “is remade at various junctures within everyday life” and the ways in which education actors “consent to (and reproduce) those tacit and covert relations of power” in ‘everyday’ institution contexts and relations (Butler, 2000, pp. 13–4). Education officials at different levels of education governance (state, county, payam) and school-level actors described frustrations and tensions associated with existing governance arrangements, but also described the ways in which they work within (and reproduce) these arrangements.
Decentralisation can be understood as a means of redistributing decision-making power or maintaining existing power relations. Subnational MoEST officials’ descriptions of their ‘decentralisation’ experiences illustrate ways in which education governance (and opportunities for participation) are shaped by, and replicate, wider structures and dynamics of political authority at national and subnational levels. These include hierarchical and militaristic relations of power, as well as systems of patronage and loyalty in government institutions. These wider political dynamics challenge policy statements concerning improved participation and accountability through decentralisation.

First, hierarchical and militaristic relationships between school-level and ministry actors and within the MoEST influence communication and participation opportunities. Civilian political and administrative structures remain highly militarised, reflecting the SPLM/A’s military origins and the presence of former armed group members in positions of authority in the MoEST. Military personnel occupy many senior government positions, and management approaches are characterised by centralised authority, militaristic language, use of threats and force, and intolerance of dissent (Blunt, 2003, pp. 133–4; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 64, 155–6; Knopf, 2013, p. 23; de Waal, 2014, p. 348; Hutton, 2014, p. 16). These factors are reflected in education leadership practices. Education and donor representatives explained that local education officials ‘work on orders’ and often feel unable to voice suggestions: “You don’t give ideas to the boss. You just salute”. “The government is a military government and people work on orders”, noted one CSO representative. Supervision and management are often based on rank, threats, and intimidation of teachers and school managers. For example, a donor representative observed, “I think the relationship between [school] heads and supervisors must be affected to some extent by the fact of rank... certainly ranking and depending on what kind of powers do you have in reality”. Even when formal policies and procedures guide administration, institutional ‘culture’ exerts a clear influence on decision-making opportunities and influence.

Systems of patronage, authority, and loyalty in government institutions influence dynamics of participation at subnational levels, and complicate assumptions about ‘local’ representation and accountability. Decentralisation enables “a localised power grip over resources”, with subnational authorities acting (in theory, at least) in the interest of their constituencies (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 38–9). Local government administrators (including education officials) are often appointed on the

Decentralisation, in tying access to government services and resources to a particular administrative (territorial) location, contributes to what Leonardi (2013, p. 120) describes as ‘the production of locality’ by “tethering people to their chiefs”, under British colonial rule and in contemporary South Sudan.

MoEST officials and teachers described patronage, nepotism, and tribalism in education sector hiring and promotion practices. For example, primary teachers and PTA members in Western Equatoria explained that state ministries hire members of their network so they can receive salaries: “The ministry employs only one tribe or county and this leads to conflict... [With] tribal employment at the ministry level, other counties or tribes cannot benefit”. “People are employed for their interests... People receive money but we don’t know how or when they were recruited. We just find them there”, reported a payam official. Systems of patronage and authority influence access to information and ‘participation’. For example, a group of primary teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal described the allocation of opportunities to attend training and policy development events:

*When there is training in Juba, the ministry does not choose those who are in the field... they choose people in the ministry to go for training, even for training on something that is very important for teachers, they just choose those in their office, they just choose themselves.*

Systems of patronage and authority complicate assumptions about ‘local’ representation and accountability through decentralisation. As one INGO representative noted, school managers may feel that their loyalty lies with state ministries, rather than payam or county offices: “Most of the places don’t have PTAs, just a headmaster... You know he’s close to the county education director... He’s just posted to the school and that’s it". Appointment through patronage networks can mean that ‘local’ representatives are more accountable to their ‘patrons’ (at state or central levels), upon whom they rely for their position and salary, than to their communities or schools. A state MoEST official in Central Equatoria described the ways in which patronage-based appointments influence dynamics of loyalty, accountability, and representation:
If we go by appointments systems... I am answerable to you because I want to make sure my position is maintained... The people whom I lead, I disregard them because... they will not take me wherever they want... Because Gabrielle appointed me, I should do more in her area where she’s from than in my own.

This raises questions about the representativeness of ‘local’ voices, given that aims and expectations associated with decentralisation focus on ‘local’ representation and accountability. Local authorities do, however, ‘redistribute’ education resources to their own constituencies (described in Chapter 5), illustrating, in a sense, how decentralisation models are “ignored, resisted, ‘consumed’ or tactically used” by subnational officials (Mosse, 2005, pp. 16–7). This draws attention to the multiple roles that ‘local’ education actors (e.g. county and payam officials, school managers) play, balancing multiple dimensions and scales of representation and accountability, from ‘local’ school and community to ministry and government levels. This also echoes historical processes of bargaining, brokering, and negotiation between ‘local’ authorities and governments (including through forms of patronage) in (South) Sudan during and after the British colonial period (Leonardi, 2013, pp. 49–59).

Finally, a lack of resources at subnational levels limits ‘decentralisation’ of management and decision-making opportunities. As noted in Chapter 6, resource distribution procedures constrain context-specific allocation possibilities, and no specific policies address redistribution across geographic areas. Statements about the expected benefits of decentralisation are based on the assumption that service delivery resources will be available, and the failure to deliver expected benefits can undermine communities’ trust in the government. Disparities in ‘benefits’ of decentralisation across geographic regions may drive tensions and grievances, linked to differences in financing sources, geographic barriers impeding decentralised governance, and so on. Geographic inequalities in resources and representation are particularly significant when they intersect with ethnic boundaries. As noted earlier, Leonardi (2013) explains that decentralisation policies outlined in the Local Government Act resulted not only in increasingly “territorialised and ethnicised definitions of locality and community” (p. 182), but also strengthening expectations of access to services and resources linked directly to ‘territorial locality’ (pp. 185–6). In this context, perceptions of the ‘failure’ of decentralisation have particular significance. A group of primary teachers and PTA members in Western Equatoria explained that while decentralisation could, in theory, enable greater access to government resources and services, this is not the case in practice: “Decentralisation was supposed to be good... It was supposed to ensure that
more budget was given to the state and to schools... but it is not implemented by the government”. Decentralisation of financing responsibility from central to subnational levels government can also entrench existing inequalities in material and human resources. A central MoEST official acknowledged the limitations of the decentralisation agenda, suggesting that it could actually widen resource inequalities given geographic access disparities:

The issue of decentralisation does not work... My fear is that the moment we decentralise education we cripple the education and we make it more disabled... because there are areas that are not yet having qualified teachers, so if you are emphasising decentralisation, how will you get the teachers?

Decentralisation depends on communication and interaction between multiple levels of government, and between ‘local’ ministry officials and schools. In the previous section, MoEST officials suggested that ‘decentralised’ education governance can extend the government’s reach to and relationship with remote, rural areas. However, as the examples below indicate, the mere presence of ‘local’ officials does not translate to improved information flows. School managers and local officials described communication that was infrequent at best, due to poor transport infrastructure and resources and intermittent mobile networks – which were experienced first-hand during the fieldwork period. 40 Payam and county education officials (e.g. supervisors, inspectors) are responsible for visiting schools to assess administration and management, identify needs and challenges, and communicate policies and directives. As government transfers rarely cover anything but salaries, a lack of resources limits opportunities for bottom-up and top-down communication. A county education official in Upper Nile reported that to visit payams and schools, they use their own money to pay for transportation or travel by foot for up to four hours: “There is no car. I have to go on foot, you see, but if there were cars, I would just go by car and then come back in a short time”. Unreliable or non-existent telephone and Internet networks in some areas leave few options for communication: “Some counties, they don’t have these networks, so it is sometimes very difficult, because you cannot give a report verbally... It is very

40 For example, the journey between Kuajok and Tonj East (both in Warrap), travelling directly with UNICEF, took two days and required passing through an adjacent state (Western Bahr el Ghazal), as there are no direct roads between Kuajok and Tonj. The journey was dependent on the weather, with rain making parts of the road impassable. (Many subnational MoEST authorities do not have access to vehicles capable to navigating the difficult roads, relying on motorbikes or bicycles.) In Tonj East, there was no Internet connection and the one mobile network was only intermittently accessible.
difficult in some places”, explained a central MoEST official. A state MoEST official in Western Equatoria described these challenges in detail:

> When the network is poor, you will fail to get in touch with a particular county. In case we have a hard copy of the policy we want to disseminate to the counties, that’s where we have problems because there is no mailing system so we have to look for an individual and say, ‘Please help us’. Sometimes the person might forget and then we have to send the same document twice. And the information required, we might not get it in time because of the issue of our mailing system and inefficiency... Secondly, the network, Internet connection is not available. We might have Internet here, but Internet connections are not in the counties, so communication of information is difficult.

At the same time, geographic isolation and challenges to communication systems mean that county and payam officials, school managers, and teachers have some autonomy from direct control, and more ‘independent’ decision-making.

Experiences and perceptions outlined in these sections suggest that, contrary to policy statements about decentralised decision-making and devolution of power, subnational education officials experience governance processes as involving little space for participation. This is linked to hierarchical communication protocols, wider political norms and cultures, and resource shortages impeding communication and engagement. Together, these affect ‘local’ trust in higher levels of government, in terms of representing their interests, responding to needs and concerns, and communicating policy information. The gap between policy statements and experiences of ‘decentralisation’ is further highlighted by approaches to ‘decentralisation’ through school-based management, involving the (re)definition of community and household ‘participation’ as responsibility for education financing.

7.5 Interpretations of Decentralisation: ‘Participation as Responsibility’

This section presents the third part of my critique, examining interpretations, experiences, and perceptions associated with ‘participation’ in education management and decision-making in schools and communities. I argue that while ‘decentralisation’ through school-based management is framed in terms of ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’, communities and households are defined as resource and labour providers rather than participants in decision-making. In theory, school governing bodies are mechanisms for community participation and redistribution of authority. In practice, they serve neoliberal agendas involving reduced public spending on education and shifting of financing responsibilities to communities and households. This illustrates the
instrumentalisation of ‘participation’ to achieve other aims and interests (Cornwall, 2008, p. 274). This builds on findings in Chapter 6 concerning frustrations and grievances associated with government failure to deliver expected services and shifting financing responsibility to communities and households. School managers and teachers in different states described the importance of ownership over school functioning, resources, and internal decision-making. However, MoEST and donor discourses blur the line between ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’, and primary or sole responsibility for school financing. This undermines the positive (‘peacebuilding’) effects of efforts to ‘decentralise’ management responsibility and increase community participation, of particular importance given expected education improvements (via decentralisation) as peace dividends and benefits of ‘post-conflict’ reforms.

As discussed in Chapter 6, school governing bodies (primarily PTAs) are responsible for collecting funds to support education provision. This reflects the direct transfer of responsibility (or burden) for financing from the government to ‘local’ level. Communities and households are responsible not only for contributing to school functioning but are assigned primary or sole responsibility for constructing learning spaces, paying and housing teachers, and other central aspects of education provision. Community and household responsibility is not just about financing: it involves taking on a wide range of education management and administration roles, representing multiple forms of labour as part of ‘decentralised’ school-based management. The School Governance Toolkit assigns numerous roles and responsibilities to school managers and governing bodies, requiring multiple areas of expertise: school development planning, budgeting and management of school funds, human resource management, supervising teaching and classrooms, supporting teacher conduct and development, promoting student achievement, monitoring school progress, and mobilising local school development support (MoEST and DFID-GESS, 2014). As a state MoEST official in Upper Nile explained,

*The budget of the school, if there is collection of money, they should know how that money is used, and they must monitor the teachers, whether they are teaching, they are doing work. And they must see the result of the examination, they must analyse the results ... They should visit the school from time to time to know the situation of the school, how this school is functioning.*

Similarly, an INGO representative explained that school managers are expected to take initiative in fulfilling multiple management responsibilities:
Getting the PTA involved in the governance of the school... they should not wait for an inspector from the state capital. ‘You’re in Maridi... why should you wait for the inspector from Yambio?’ So we tell the PTAs, ‘If you are supposed to be the boss, you know how the school should run, should be run properly [to] ensure that the teachers come on time’.

These statements illustrate the multiple forms of responsibility and labour assigned to communities and households. MoEST and INGO representatives described (and justified) community and household responsibility for school support and financing in different ways, drawing on two main narratives: promoting ownership and investment, and demonstrating ‘care’ for children. This reflects (neoliberal) assumptions that communities and households will only value (or feel ‘ownership’ of) education if they are paying for it. This also reflects ‘naming power’ through policy discourses: the transfer of financial responsibility is reframed in a language of ‘ownership’ and ‘care’.

With respect to the first narrative, MoEST and INGO representatives described responsibility for school support as promoting ownership and investment and enabling communities to feel that schools ‘belong’ to them. “We encourage the PTA and the other parents to participate in the school because we want them to feel that that school is belonging to them, not to the government”, explained a state MoEST official in Upper Nile. Another official in Upper Nile discussed this reasoning in more detail:

> The organisation like UNICEF comes to construct learning spaces and the community is not participating. They will say, ‘This school belongs to UNICEF, it does not belong to the community. This school belongs to UNICEF or belongs to the government there’. This is what the community will say, but if they are participating in constructing, ‘This is our school. This is ours’.

Similarly, an INGO representative described financial ‘contributions’ as ‘reminding’ parents of their responsibility for school management:

> They just probably think maybe [it’s] making a contribution to the school or seeing how the progress of the children is going, and probably it’s a forum where parents meet to make contributions to the school, more money to the headmaster for particular work or increasing registration fees. But many of them did not know exactly that the school belongs to them, that they have to ensure that they run the school.

With respect to the second narrative, MoEST and INGO representatives described community and household responsibility for school financing in terms of ‘caring for children’. For example, as a state MoEST official in Upper Nile stated, “If they want their children to be taught or to learn, they have to also construct a house for the teacher”. Similarly, an INGO representative described material contributions (e.g. school construction) as illustrating commitment to children’s education:
We have to tell people the school does not belong to the government, because people think the government comes and constructs the school... No, we are telling them, 'The school belongs to you. The government is not here'. That alone changes peoples' mind that the school will not belong to the government... And also asking people to get involved in the education of their children... [If] the school lacks desks or doesn’t have a pit latrine, what will you be able to do to the school to make the school, using the UNICEF buzzword, ‘child friendly’ so that your children can come and learn?

This illustrates the way in which “the notion of responsibility is deployed by neoliberal discourses in terms of personal responsibility… and self-preservation” (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p. 105). Communities or households unable to contribute materially to education provision “are represented as incompetent, lazy, and… shamefully irresponsible” (p. 105). When education contributions are defined in terms of ‘care for’ and ‘commitment to’ children, a failure to contribute financially is framed as personal and moral failure to properly ‘care’ for, or value education of, children – rather than a failure of government resource distribution and service provision. For example, a state MoEST official in Western Bahr el Ghazal described communities’ failure to ‘look after’ schools as a failure to value education:

The community, they open schools and they are not serious of [looking] after them... They don’t contribute positively. They do not know the importance or contribution towards the education of their children.

This raises questions about the extent to which enforced responsibility involves a participatory, empowering, or even voluntary concept of ‘ownership’. The ways in which many MoEST and donor officials described community and household roles in education financing and provision focused on compliance (framed as ‘participation’) rather than choice. The enforcement of responsibility was clearly illustrated by a central MoEST official who described a forceful approach to ‘participation’:

When we were still in the war, I went to the area where the mother of my mother was and I told the head man, ‘Please, your area has no school. You need a school here. So do like this: organise all your community, do this, do this, do this’... He said, ‘No, the NGOs are building everything from the beginning. We are busy, we need to produce food’... I said, ‘I cannot allow these children of ours to go uneducated because you are busy. If you don’t begin the work tomorrow, I’m going to send 10 soldiers to teach you how to do the work’... He started calling me, ‘No, I have already organised the community, they are already collecting the stones’... Watsoever you can do as a community, do it without any payment, and how much money the NGO has to buy what you cannot do, let the NGO buy it... So we build a lot of schools using threat, carrot and stick.
These narratives raise important questions about what ‘participation’ actually means for communities and households. The ways in which MoEST and donor officials discussed ‘participation’ through school-based management illustrates the ways in which discourses and processes of participation “can both conceal and reinforce oppressions and injustices” (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, p. 13). This depoliticises processes of decentralisation, through a focus on the means or modes rather than meaning of participation and ownership. When material contributions to school functioning are identified as the primary (or only) means of ‘participation’ and ownership, these concepts are “stripped of any association with a transfer of power and control and invoked to describe the need for people to make contributions in cash or kind” (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p. 7). This focus on the means, rather than meaning, of participation presents participation and ownership “as a de facto conclusion” (Leal, 2010, p. 95) to school-based management processes, rather than challenging underlying systems of power and influence.

As noted in Chapter 6, reliance on community and household financing reproduces inequalities between wealthier and poorer households and communities, between those who can mobilise resources and those who cannot. Wealthier communities are better able to finance and maintain services, while poorer communities face challenges in ensuring service provision. By framing participation and ownership as financing responsibility, donors, INGOs, and the MoEST reproduce and legitimise these inequalities. This approach to ‘development’ reproduces, rather than reduces, disparities between populations. This reproduces pre-CPA processes of ‘local participation’ in education based on community and household provision of resources and labour (Hajjar, 1983, p. 188; Joyner, 1996, p. 72; Deng, 2003, p. 14; Sommers, 2005, pp. 103–5), as well as resulting service disparities.

At the community level, these processes contribute to grievances associated with inadequate resource distribution and create tensions between communities and government over service provision responsibility. On one hand, the government expects communities to maintain schools because schools are ‘for the people’. On the other hand, communities feel that schools should belong to the government, particularly when government and donors emphasise the importance of education as a ‘peace

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41 In a public opinion survey (IRI, 2011) of adults aged 18 and older in South Sudan’s 10 states, 79 per cent felt that national or state-level governments are responsible for building schools.
dividend’ and contributor to ‘national’ development. For example, a group of primary teachers and PTA members in Western Bahr el Ghazal reported that their community established a school but once the school was formally registered with the MoEST the community felt the school had been ‘released’: it now belonged to and should be supported by the government, not the community. The government, however, “are saying that the school belongs to the community and not to the teachers or to the government”. This represents a key tension associated with the current form of ‘school-based management’ (as financing and service provision), and illustrates how ‘participation’ efforts can undermine peacebuilding aims associated with strengthening state-society relations and responding to ‘local’ needs and expectations. ‘Local’ expressions of dissatisfaction with ‘participation opportunities’ (and resource flows described in Chapter 6) can be understood as expressions of agency or ‘resistance’. School, household, and community representatives demonstrate such resistance through a lack of compliance with expected roles as ‘beneficiaries’ of ‘participation’ or services.

While ‘decentralisation’ through school-based management is described in terms of ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’, in its implementation, ‘local’ communities and households are identified as sources of resources and labour rather than participants in decision-making. Communities and households, through school governing bodies, finance school operations but are not provided with opportunities to influence the policies they are responsible for implementing. As one head teacher explained, “We are not able to communicate these concerns, to say ‘this is wrong’”. This illustrates a neoliberal framing of ‘decentralisation’ focused on reducing state costs and responsibility rather transferring power or enabling ‘democratic’ participation in decision-making (Mosse, 2001, p. 17; Cornwall and Brock, 2005, pp. 5–7; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008, p. 12). Rather than expanding participation opportunities, school-based management reforms secure ‘new’ sources of financing and labour. However, in discussing the shifting of responsibility to the community and household level, it is important to consider potential opportunities for agency and influence: while experienced as a source of burden and frustration, it also presents opportunities for controlling school resource allocation and use. Roles and responsibilities as core providers of education can also represent a source of agency and pride for communities and households. This complicates simplistic understandings of oppression or exploitation versus agency and action.
7.6 Chapter Summary and Implications

In this chapter, I have explored empirical findings concerning processes and implications of decentralisation and participation. I critically examine government and donor policy statements on participation, representation, and ‘decentralisation’ in education and peacebuilding, focused on improving ‘local’ participation opportunities, service delivery, and state-society relations. These narratives are echoed in some critical peacebuilding literature. Discussing the importance of responses to systems of inequality underlying conflict, some critical scholars refer to the (re)distribution of political power and representation at multiple scales, responding to marginalisation in political institutions and processes (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 106; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008a, p. 391; Richmond, 2010a, p. 30, 2013, pp. 279–82, 2016, p. 5; Mac Ginty, 2013, p. 5). Some suggest that ‘service provision’ can contribute to state-society relations by contributing to democratic participation and state legitimacy (Richmond, 2008b, p. 291, 2009c, p. 158; Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 137; Newman, 2011, pp. 1737–50, 2014, p. 193; Roberts, 2011b, p. 416).

The findings in this chapter illustrate some limitations of formal policy statements and objectives, and of the critical peacebuilding discussions above, and the ways in which they are undermined through existing ‘decentralisation’ processes. First, hierarchical education sector management and communication practices (as formal decentralisation ‘protocols’) entrench and legitimise rather than redistribute (centralised) authority and influence. Second, policy statements (and donors shaping them) abstract education from wider political dynamics and fail to address the ‘informal’ aspects of governance that permeate and are reproduced through education systems. Third, the transfer of education financing responsibilities to communities and households, framed as ‘participation’, reproduces ‘distributional’ (geographic) inequalities in service delivery rather than contributing to ‘representational’ equality. Together, these represent a failure to deliver anticipated ‘benefits’ of decentralisation, negatively affect relations and trust, and contribute to grievances between communities and the government and between levels of government.

These findings echo critical peacebuilding discussions concerning ‘local’ participation in externally- (or elite-) driven interventions and the reinforcement of power through ‘participation’. Mac Ginty (2011b, p. 45), for example, notes that the focus on strengthening ‘local’ ownership and participation “is often marginal and does not involve a fundamental rethinking of the meaning and location of power”. Similarly,
Pugh (2010, p. 273) describes a form of ‘participation’ that “reinforces the power of those facilitating participation to ‘contain’ it within the bounds of the existing order”. This chapter confirms and advances these discussions by illustrating specific means and practices through which patterns of authority are reinforced within a social institution that effectively extends authority and influence from central to ‘local’ levels. Some critical peacebuilding scholars refer to ways in which ‘participation’ discourses are used to transfer responsibility, rather than power, to ‘local’ populations, as part of a wider neoliberal project, contributing to the reproduction of existing power relations. For example, Mac Ginty (2015, pp. 846–7) explains that,

> The local turn… in sections of the policy world chimes with neoliberal notions of the rollback of the state as a political unit responsible to its citizens and charged with providing services… [The] government are able to tap into popular narratives of individuals and communities taking responsibility for themselves… to find their own ‘solutions’ to problems… Community responses are supposed to take over and utilise local knowledge and resources.


The findings in this chapter echo these discussions and provide more detailed insight into how education financing and provision responsibility is transferred to communities and specific narratives used to encourage and legitimise this process. For example, they illustrate the ways in which household and community responsibility for education financing and provision is framed in ‘moral’ terms, focusing on ‘care’ for children and their education. This illustrates what Taylor (2010, pp. 159–60) describes as the advancement of a hegemonic (neoliberal) peacebuilding project requiring a ‘politics of support’ and a ‘politics of power’. This prevents resistance or discussion of alternatives (Pugh, 2005, p. 31; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, pp. 2–3; Taylor, 2010, p. 167), particularly when framing a lack of material support provision as a ‘moral’ failure to care and provide for children.

The ways in which the ‘local’ is framed in this chapter echo some definitions presented in the critical peacebuilding literature (national or subnational state authorities, ‘conflict-affected’ populations) but identify some precise actors and locate their role at the ‘border’ between state and community. Subnational education officials,
school managers, teachers, and PTA members are identified as critically important ‘local’ actors, as both representatives of their communities and mediators between governments and populations. These findings add to critical peacebuilding discussions of the ‘local’ by illustrating some of the tensions and multiple loyalties and forms of accountability affecting ‘local’ actors. The findings in this chapter also draw attention to the ways in which the (re)centralisation of authority and transfer of financing and provision responsibility are experienced and perceived by ‘local’ actors and communities. This is of particular importance in relation to expected education service improvements (via decentralisation) as peace dividends and benefits of ‘post-conflict’ reforms. However, questions of perception and experience are largely neglected in the critical peacebuilding literature, illustrating the contributions of these findings to critical peacebuilding discussions concerning the implications of the ‘local’.

Finally, the findings in this chapter illustrate some implications of the maintenance of existing relations of authority and transfer of responsibility to populations, specifically in terms of the reproduction of, and relations between, forms of inequality. This advances critical peacebuilding discussions, which rarely explicitly examine connections between aspects of the ‘local’, ‘service delivery’, and inequalities. For example, this chapter illustrates ways in which existing ‘decentralisation’ processes entrench distributional (geographic) inequalities in service delivery rather than contributing to ‘representational’ equality, and ways in which decision-making influence is linked to resource access.

The CPE framework informed these analyses and the identification of potential ‘causal’ factors underlying approaches to ‘participation’ in education contexts. Events, processes, and experiences identified in empirical data illustrate the influence of neoliberal logics or ideologies underpinning and legitimising policy decisions (including ‘decentralised’ management) that shift service provision costs and responsibilities from the state to communities and households. This is linked to a focus on ‘individual’ (or household) responsibility and care that reproduces and widens distributional inequalities and intensifies frustrations toward the government among community members. Education governance may also be shaped by mechanisms of regime maintenance and elite reproduction by the SPLM/A. Rigid, hierarchical, and militarised management and communication procedures limit opportunities to influence decision-making among ‘lower level’ actors, and serve to maintain existing structures of power and authority within and through educational institutions. These patterns, along
with tensions between levels of government and between government and schools, are also shaped by a structure of education governance that positions actors (e.g. national and subnational officials, ministry officials and school actors) in relation to one another within a clear hierarchy, providing power in the form of control over allocation of resources and control over other actors, as well as different possibilities for movement between scales of authority. At the same time, individual education officials and school managers demonstrate agency in the ways in which they navigate and negotiate these structures of power. In these ways, the theoretical framework informs my arguments about the political structures underlying education governance practices, shaping relations between actors at different scales of the education system as well as their possibilities for decision-making, and producing experiences of ‘local ownership’ as responsibility rather than ‘participation.’
CHAPTER 8. “IT’S NOT EASY TO EDUCATE SUCH A COMMUNITY”: IDENTIFICATION AND RECOGNITION IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

8.1 Chapter Introduction

The critical peacebuilding literature emphasises the importance of recognition of and responses to ‘local’ and ‘everyday’ priorities, norms, and knowledge. Some of this literature also argues that peacebuilding processes ought to involve recognition of ‘cultural’ diversity and consideration of identity categorisations and exclusion as part of wider responses to (and transformation of) social inequalities and systemic oppression. Some of the critical peacebuilding literature suggests that social service provision can provide a means of responding to different forms of inequality and exclusion, as well as responding to ‘local’ contexts and priorities. Insight into the peacebuilding role of social institutions such as education can be informed by the analysis of the symbolic and material ways in which education systems (as key ‘socialising’ institutions) engage with specific dimensions of ‘identification’ and ‘difference’, and the specific ways in which they support or undermine processes of recognition.42

To inform my contributions to the critical peacebuilding scholarship, I draw on empirical findings concerning issues of identification and difference in education discourse and practice and their implications. I critically engage with formal government and donor policy statements concerning ‘identity’ and ‘diversity’ in education and peacebuilding in South Sudan. I present a three-step critique of government and donor policy statements on education and peacebuilding and identify three broad points undermining these policy statements. First, I argue that government and donor representatives’ informal narratives about ‘cultural’ and livelihoods communities contradict formal policy statements about ‘tolerance’ and ‘respect’ by using discourses of ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ to explain, justify, depoliticise, and institutionalise inequalities. Second, I argue that explanations of education’s peacebuilding role focus on pacifying and controlling communities through ‘cultural’ and livelihood changes, without considering the roles of such processes in colonial and

42 ‘Recognition’ is understood in relation to processes of social differentiation, status and privilege, subordination and domination, and respect and valorisation in representations and interactions – which are institutionalised in social relations, policies, and practices and linked to questions of distribution and representation (Fraser, 2008a, pp. 12–8, 2008b, pp. 131–8, 2013, pp. 162–79). (Mis)recognition is not only a question of ‘cultural inferiority’ but also of political and economic inequality (Ferguson, 2006, p. 33), associated with ‘real’ material or social effects in terms of power, resources, and opportunities (Chowdry and Nair, 2002, p. 17; Loomba, 2005, p. 106; Fraser, 2013, pp. 176–9).
post-independence patterns of violence. Third, I argue that government and donor policies and programmes fail to explicitly ‘recognise’ and engage with collective or ‘cultural’ aspects of identification and difference and that discourses of ‘recognition’ are applied only to certain dimensions of identification. Together, these points support a broader argument that both informal narratives and formal education objectives reproduce (neo)colonial approaches to particular communities in South Sudan, entrenching structural forms of violence and undermining peacebuilding aims.

During the data collection process, government, donor, NGO, and school representatives used terms such as ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, and ‘pastoralist’ (livelihoods) when discussing aspects of identification and difference. They used these terms to both describe communities and explain their actions. The use of these terms illustrates the complexity and difficulty of analysing issues of identification and difference – not only in terms of defining the meaning of these concepts, but in distinguishing between the terms people use and what they are actually talking about. The findings presented in this chapter draw attention to descriptions, assumptions, interpretations, representations, and classifications associated with identification and difference (Hall, 1996, p. 4, 1997a, pp. 1–4; Appiah, 2006, pp. 16–7; Fraser, 2013, p. 179). I do not consider ‘identity’ or ‘culture’ as fixed, ‘settled’, stable, or homogenous. Instead, I understand them as ‘historically constituted’ (Said, 1989, pp. 224–5), ‘complex and multiple’ (Appiah, 1992, pp. 178–9), and changing over time, shaped by political, economic, and social forces (Appiah, 1992, pp. 178–9; Hall, 1996, pp. 3–4; de Sardan, 2005, p. 83; Amin, 2009, p. 7). For this reason, I use the term ‘identification’, focusing on processes of construction or articulation, rather than ‘identity’, which implies a stable and essentialist concept (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 44–5; Hall, 1996, pp. 2–6).\footnote{Similarly, ‘difference’ can be understood as drawing attention to interactions, contestation, and ‘moments of differentiation’ in everyday life, compared to ‘diversity’, which focuses on “recognition of pre-given cultural contents and customs” or “separation of totalized cultures” (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 34–5).} I am interested in how aspects of (collective) identification and difference are “produced in specific historical and institutional sites” (Hall, 1996, p. 4) and linked to particular socioeconomic and political institutions (Said, 2003, pp. 5–6; Mohanty, 2010, p. 530). Rather than providing definitions of ‘identity’, ‘culture’, or ‘difference’, I consider how people use these terms or concepts and their implications for peacebuilding.

I draw upon the CPE framework to understand how particular processes and patterns of identification and inequality are constructed, legitimised, and reproduced by
different actors and institutions. Events, processes, and experiences identified in empirical data illustrate the influence of colonial logics underpinning persistent narratives about ‘cultural’ identification and difference, and resulting explanations of education’s ‘civilising’ role. This is linked to underlying assumptions about the role of formal education as ordering and ‘disciplining’ populations, as well as liberal ideologies of individual ‘inclusion’ in education. Education provision across geographic and livelihoods communities may also be shaped by mechanisms of regime maintenance and elite reproduction by the SPLM/A, with the strategic provision or restriction of education as a means of exerting control over populations and maintaining existing structures of power.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I examine the ways in which government and donor policy and strategy documents describe the role of education in peacebuilding, specifically in relation to identification and difference. I provide an overview of broad policy narratives, including differences between government and donor statements on identification and difference. Second, I explore ‘informal’ narratives of identification and difference among government and international actors, specifically in relation to explanations for educational inequalities and conflict. Third, I examine the ways in which education actors explain education’s peacebuilding role, framed as addressing and transforming ‘cultural’ practices and difference. Fourth, I consider government and donor responses to forms of identification and difference in education policy and practice, focusing on aspects of recognition and relevance. Finally, I discuss the implications of these findings for the critical peacebuilding literature.

8.2 Identification and Difference in Government and Donor Policies

In this section, I examine how policy and strategy documents produced by the government of South Sudan and international donors describe issues of identification and difference in relation to education’s role in peacebuilding. Government peacebuilding and development documents repeatedly identify respect for different aspects of ‘identity’ and ‘diversity’ as contributing to nation-building and peace. These policy statements involve four broad narratives: promoting respect for diverse aspects of identity, ensuring the relevance of education to diverse communities, responding to historical dynamics of oppression, and contributing to ‘national’ identity. Donor policy statements more commonly describe identification and difference in terms of ‘barriers’ to education, illustrating tensions in contemporary policy discourse.
The first broad government narrative focuses on respect for aspects of ‘identity’ and ‘diversity’. The CPA (2005, p. 2) emphasises the need to consider the cultural, ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic diversity of the Sudanese population in governance systems. The Transitional Constitution states that the education sector should “recognize cultural diversity and encourage such diverse cultures to harmoniously flourish and find expression through education” (GoSS, 2011, p. 12). More recently, the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict refers to the need to “[respect] ethnic and regional diversity and communal rights, including the right of communities to preserve their history, develop their language, promote their culture and expression of their identities” (IGAD, 2015, p. 46). Education policies echo these statements. The GESP, citing the General Education Bill, refers to “respect and tolerance for other cultures, traditions, opinions and beliefs” (MoGEI, 2012, pp. 51–2). The national curriculum framework refers to the need to “value diversity and respect people of different races, faiths, communities, [and] cultures”, pride in “the diverse nature of South Sudanese society”, and respect and tolerance (MoEST, 2015a, pp. 8–10). The AES Policy also refers to the need to “promote unity, pride and respect for South Sudan’s diverse cultural heritage” (MoEST, 2014b, p. 10). Calls for recognition were central to SPLM/A ‘liberation’ and ‘peacebuilding’ rhetoric. Garang (2014, p. 111) called for a state “in which all different ethnic groups, different tribes... are equal stakeholders with equal opportunities in the political, economic and social fields”. He suggested that “failure to appreciate the wealth in diversity is a major cause of our national woes and crisis”, emphasising efforts for “preserving and protecting the rights of... different ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic groups” (pp. 152, 164).

The second government policy narrative focuses on the ‘relevance’ of education for diverse communities. The JAM Framework (2005, p. 43) emphasises the need to “make learning content contextually and culturally relevant”. The GESP describes the need “to empower people by grounding education in South Sudan’s local cultures and traditions”, considering ‘relevant and inclusive curriculum’ for diverse learners (MoGEI, 2012, pp. 51–2, 66). Similarly, the curriculum framework refers to curricula “set within [young people’s] own experiences, locations and cultures”, enabling the development of ‘strong identities’ and appreciation for cultural traditions and beliefs (MoEST, 2015a, p. 9). The AES Policy aims “to provide equitable access and relevant quality learning opportunities”, referring to “unique and cultural differences, livelihoods and learning needs” (MoEST, 2014b, pp. 6, 9). The third government policy narrative
focuses on responding to historical (colonial) patterns of oppression and violence. The SSDP emphasises the importance of addressing ‘residual tensions’ and “historical legacies of South Sudan’s colonial past”, to consolidate peace and strengthen national unity (GRSS, 2011, p. 381). The GESP frames recognition of difference in relation to historical dimensions of ‘cultural’ marginalisation and alienation:

The dawn of Sudan’s formal independence from colonial rule in 1956 did not bring an end to concerted assaults on the cultures and traditions of its indigenous people… Systematic policies and programmes were enacted to suppress, and eventually alienate, some cultures and traditions (MoGEI, 2012, p. 36).

The fourth broad government policy narrative focuses on education’s role in promoting national identity and unity. The SSDP refers to “the building of a strong and cohesive national South Sudanese identity which unifies all the people and takes precedence over and above tribal and clan loyalties” and to “a national identity that fully respects and promotes ethnic and cultural diversity” (GRSS, 2011, pp. 40, 94). Similarly, the Transitional Constitution describes governance approaches “that reflect the unity of the people of South Sudan while recognizing their diversity” (GoSS, 2011, p. 15). In education policy, the curriculum framework emphasises the development of ‘good citizens of South Sudan’ based on patriotism and national pride and identity (MoEST, 2015a, pp. 5–8). The construction of a collective, shared identity and unity are identified as central to South Sudan’s post-independence nation-building project (Jok, 2011, pp. 2–4; Zambakari, 2013b, pp. 21–3). This builds on SPLM (2008, p. 6) criticisms of the failure of Sudanese regimes to support “nation-building based on Sudan’s multiple diversities”, referring to “unviable unity… rooted in the economic, political and cultural hegemony… that exclude other groups”.

Government policy documents (developed with support from international actors) explicitly refer to the recognition of ‘identity’ and ‘difference’. Some global donor strategies also refer to tolerance of difference and social cohesion through education (DFID, 2010a, pp. 7, 56, 2010b, p. 9), including support to peace education (USAID, 2011a, p. 14), as important approaches in conflict-affected contexts. However, donor strategies more commonly use a language of ‘barriers’, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘disadvantage’ when discussing ‘cultural’ identification and difference. For example, GPE’s global strategic plan refers to overcoming ‘barriers’ and ‘marginalisation’ associated with ethnicity and culture, while DFID’s (2010b, p. 25) education strategy refers to the needs of ‘educationally disadvantaged’ groups such as ‘nomadic peoples’ and ‘root causes of marginalisation’ including ethnicity, language, and location.
USAID’s (2013a, sec. 3) Room to Learn strategy for South Sudan suggests that promoting equitable education access involves “focusing on the most vulnerable such as… ethnic minorities”. DFID’s GESS (2015, pp. 5, 10) strategy refers to the need to address social and cultural barriers to education. Based on empirical findings outlined in the subsequent sections, I suggest that government policy statements of recognition, tolerance, and respect are challenged or undermined by existing discourses of and approaches to identification and difference, both in formal policies and programmes and informal political narratives. Donor policy statements concerning ‘barriers’ are reflected and intensified through informal narratives and formal programme responses.

8.3 ‘Informal’ Narratives of Identification and Difference

This section presents the first part of my critique of government and donor policy statements. I examine ‘informal’ narratives about identification and difference (rather than those formally presented in policy documents) among government and donor representatives. These were repeated during interviews, informal discussions, and meetings and workshops with government, donor, and NGO representatives. I argue that dominant informal narratives about identification and difference reproduce, institutionalise, and depoliticise patterns of subordination, oppression, and alienation within the education system, and undermine policy statements about respect and recognition. They foreground particular representations of ‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ identification and livelihood practices (focusing predominantly on ‘pastoralist’ or cattle-herding communities), presented in negative, essentialising, and depoliticised terms as both descriptions of communities and practices and explanations for inequality and conflict. Narratives of ‘traditional’ beliefs and practices and ‘local’ violence also fail to address changing political and economic realities and wider dimensions of conflict. These informal narratives are important because they legitimise and entrench assumptions and perceptions about different communities and frame material responses. Government, donor, and NGO representatives hold positions of influence and authority and their statements have significant power in communities, schools, and classrooms. ‘Authoritative’ discourses and interpretations enable claims to be made about (or against) particular groups (Fraser, 2013, p. 57), and representations and classifications of identification, difference, and ‘otherness’ serve as techniques of power, organisation, and regulation (Mudimbe, 1988, pp. 57–105; Hall, 1997a, pp. 1–5).
As discussed in Chapter 6, significant education disparities exist across states, counties, and payams, linked to patterns of resource and service distribution. MoEST officials in different states frequently explained (and depoliticised) education challenges and inequalities across ethnic and geographic communities in terms of ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, or livelihoods. They focused predominantly on ‘pastoralist’ or cattle-herding communities, referring to broad groupings such as Nuer communities in Upper Nile or Toposa in Central Equatoria. They suggested that educational inequalities result from ‘traditional’ attitudes or practices and lack of awareness or understanding of the value of formal education. These explanations link livelihood practices (‘pastoralism’) with particular ‘cultural’ attitudes and values. For example, state MoEST officials in Upper Nile and Central Equatoria described overlapping geographic and ethnic inequalities as resulting from livelihood practices and associated ‘cultural’ attitudes and values:

*The eastern counties of Nuer, where the rebels are now, they are very poor, just because they don’t stay in one place. Some of them are children of pastoralists, they are moving with their cattle, you know, they go to the Ethiopia borders and the education there is not existing well.*

*Terekeka in Central Equatoria is the most need... It seems to be part of the state where education didn’t go deeper, for reasons that these people are basically pastoralists, so they keep animals and it’s not easy to educate such a community. Because of that, there’s too much illiteracy and they devalue education so much. So today if someone tells me, ‘Which is the worst situation in Central Equatoria for education provision?’ I would mention Terekeka.*

When discussing ‘cultural’ dimensions of educational inequality, MoEST officials occasionally acknowledged legacies of historical, colonial practices (although this was not accompanied by arguments for redistributive responses). For example, one central official described colonial effects on educational inequalities, focusing specifically on ‘pastoralist’ communities,

*The British, they closed us, kept us away, without educating us. So how do people know the importance of education while they are just used to their cows? What do they know [when] their nearest resource is cow? Now, when you go to one community and you say, ‘Okay, let us build a school’, you will see the community seems not more eager to do that... ‘School for what? Our children are just pastoral’... Convincing them to participate is one of the biggest challenges. Not only political will, but the community knowledge of the importance of education... The community are not very much in knowledge of the value for education here, so it’s very marginalised and it’s only because the community are following much of their own tradition.*

International donor and NGO representatives also presented ‘cultural’ explanations for educational inequalities, illustrating the role of international actors in reproducing and
legitimising reductive narratives of identification and difference. A conversation with one donor representative illustrated the reproduction of essentialising (and colonial) narratives about particular communities:

*The Toposa, the group there, it’s always been very isolated and has had a war-like reputation, so even the British and the other people circumvented it... So they’ve retained their way of independence, but they’ve also their traditional attitude which has often been anti-education, whereas the Nuer, who were also pastoralists originally embraced education... as a kind of liberation from the Arabs. So it is interesting that although they’re both pastoralists and they both have very common attitudes towards land, cattle, marriage, their attitudes towards education are completely different.*

Explanations for violent conflict also focused predominantly on cattle-herding communities. Government, donor, and NGO representatives in all states repeatedly identified these communities as driving conflict and insecurity. Their (depoliticised) explanations centred on ‘cultural’ or ‘traditional’ norms and practices (a ‘culture of revenge’, a ‘war-like’ tradition) and livelihood practices, notably seasonal migration across payam, county, and state borders (leading to conflict with other ‘pastoralist’ or farming communities). A donor representative clearly articulated this explanation:

*It is contributing to conflict... Obviously, without education, a lot of attitudes tend to be cemented, the kind of revenge attitudes and practices of pastoralist groups... Quite war-like traditionally, reluctant to change.*

A conversation with a South Sudanese peacebuilding actor in Western Bahr el Ghazal illustrates how conflict is explained as resulting from livelihood practices and linked to narratives of ‘otherness’ and ‘unbelonging’ (‘they are not from this state’):

*So many problems happen here in Wau now between the cattle keepers and the farmers... Those of the cattle keepers sometimes they used to move from place to place and many in Western Bahr el Ghazal here, they don’t have cattle. They used to cultivate their crops here locally, and when the cattle came they just go to their farms and destroy everything there... That’s a big problem here because most of the cattle keepers, they are not from this state... They just take their cattle to the farms and destroy everything there, and the people they live in anger for that reason.*

As with inequalities, violent conflict was often described as resulting from ‘ignorance’ or a lack of (formal) education, individualising conflict and abstracting it from its political-economic context. These explanations reflect interpretations of experience, identification, and difference centred on ‘absence’, ‘deficiency’, or ‘lack’ (of knowledge, of education) in political and economic practices (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 1–4; de Sardan, 2005, p. 119). As a state MoEST official in Upper Nile explained,
Due to lack of education, some people, some other tribes from other places are not educated. Their behaviours here is different... He is somebody who likes fighting, has got concern in the mind to go to other payam or to other county to take something or to loot... The problem is because people are not well educated.

A South Sudanese INGO representative echoed this binary assumption of ‘educated/peaceful’ versus ‘uneducated/violent’:

If we would compare those who are in the cattle camps and those who are in the school, I think there is a bit of difference, like those who are in the cattle camp who misbehave in a different setting compared to the others, especially if you compared the cattle keepers and the other communities in South Sudan.

The narratives above illustrate how inequality and violence are attributed to ‘cultural’ or livelihood practices or attitudes and to a lack of (formal) education. This assigns responsibility for educational inequalities and conflict to individuals and specific communities. Similarly, ‘peace’ was explained in ‘cultural’ terms. For example, a payam official in Warrap suggested that, “those who know peace are those who have been educated... others do things violently”. A government official in Western Equatoria explained that the state “is the first state that has maintained peace after independence of South Sudan... because of the culture of the people here”. He identified people from other states, including seasonally migrating cattle-herding communities, as causing ‘local’ conflict. In previously ‘stable’ regions (such as Equatorial states), discussions of conflict and peacebuilding often blamed ‘other’ ethnic, geographic, or livelihood groups for violence. For example, teachers may refer to conflict among ethnic groups in other states as examples for students: “If the teacher is talking and explaining... [they] need to give examples so children can understand... For example, in Jonglei, Upper Nile, states are not in peace, there is insecurity, killings”, explained a payam supervisor in Central Equatoria. This contributes to ‘us versus them’ (‘peaceful’ versus ‘violent’) intergroup perceptions and entrenches existing stereotypes. This also illustrates the significance of narratives of identification and difference articulated by people in positions of authority and influence within ministry and classroom contexts. This can be understood as a way in which these individuals construct and assert their status as ‘modern’, ‘urban’, and ‘educated’ in contrast to ‘traditional’ communities, as a means of asserting political authority (Leonardi, 2013, p. 148).

A focus on ‘cultural’ or ‘livelihood’-based explanations for inequality and conflict ignores broader systems and contexts of violence (including economic pressures on cattle-keeping communities) and the role of political elites (and the state)
in patterns of violent conflict. The informal narratives above place responsibility for inequalities and conflict on members of particular communities. Inequality and violence are presented as ‘internal’ – not just to the state but also to communities – without fully acknowledging wider political, economic, and historical dynamics of violence. For example, these explanations pay limited attention to political and military authorities’ roles in ‘local’ conflict. National and subnational authorities politicise and mobilise identity and provide arms to communities in order to secure political support and advance political and military interests (during current and previous wars, as described in Chapter 2). For example, a South Sudanese non-governmental peacebuilding actor drew attention to links between ‘local’ conflict and higher-level political interests and power struggles: “Political differences are not tribal differences, just political differences at the top... Conflict is not among tribes. It starts at the political level and then goes to the tribes”. Similarly, a South Sudanese peacebuilding actor in Western Bahr el Ghazal explained that,

In the village they are just thinking that these people in the town, they are the ones who are causing the problems and making them suffer from it... The politicians, what they are saying, their political problems sometimes may cause tension within the people in the community.

However, these narratives often reproduce assumptions about communities’ ‘ignorance’ and lack of formal education (as causing vulnerability to mobilisation by political or military authorities). For example, describing the effects of ‘elite’ conflict on ‘local’ communities, a state-level government peacebuilding representative explained that,

Most of the people who are on the ground level, they are the ones who are affected [rather] than the other people who are in the higher level... Everything that happens in the towns, it will go back and affect them, and most of them are ignorant, they are not educated, so they can change automatically according to negative ideas.

Similarly, a central MoEST official described the role of political elites in ‘local’ conflict, emphasising the ‘lack of education’ facilitating community mobilisation and the strategic ‘withholding’ of education:

What concerns us much is really the tendency of some people, very much educated people, who are not willing to change the lives of their people... wanting to keep a big chunk of their people not educated so that if they go for arms then they can easily take up the arms to protect [the politician’s] interests... So no matter how much we really want our people to be educated, there are others outside who want their people not to be educated so that they can listen to them... The politicians get their money, take it back to the villages to buy cows, buy guns, give to their siblings to go and raid more cows.
While these narratives acknowledge the role of political elites, they do not fully acknowledge wider (structural) political and economic dynamics of violence, including inequitable opportunities and resource distribution and broader systems of inequality and domination, which are not specific to particular communities or regions. They also fail to acknowledge the role of state policies in ‘local’ conflict, including expropriation and fragmentation of territory and resources (e.g. grazing land, water points, migration and market routes) due to oil production, agricultural projects, dam construction, and land tenure policies (Fahey and Leonard, 2007, p. 14; Casciarri, 2009, p. 71).

Narratives about cattle-herding communities illustrate tensions between the historical and contemporary value of cattle resources and simultaneous devaluing of cattle-herding livelihoods in formal educational and economic narratives. While government officials blame cattle-keeping livelihoods and ‘cultures’ for conflict, cattle themselves are highly valued (by political elites) as political, economic, and military resources. 44 Cattle ownership patterns involve accumulation of large herds by government officials and military commanders, as sources of wealth and status (Fahey and Leonard, 2007, p. 4; Pinaud, 2014, p. 201). President Kiir, for example, owns at least 3,000 cattle, of such value that they are transported “using trucks guarded by heavy armed soldiers” (Sudan Tribune, 2015). Government officials and elites (themselves part of South Sudan’s colonial history) are part of the system they criticise, which challenges ‘us’ and ‘them’ (‘modernity’ versus ‘tradition’) narratives. They critique ‘cultures’ and livelihoods of particular communities but rely on these same communities as political constituencies. These depoliticised narratives serve strategic purposes. By presenting conflict (and inequalities) as ‘cultural’ or ‘traditional’ in nature (and thus ‘irrational’ and apolitical), elites mask their involvement (and that of the state) and remove themselves from political responses. This also delegitimises political or distributive claims made by communities through violence (Chandler, 2010a, pp. 373–4), including claims to political representation or government resource access.

The narratives described above frame identification and difference in ways that reproduce simplistic, essentialised, fixed representations of identity, beliefs about

44 Cattle were critically important resources during the colonial period and conflicts between (and within) Sudan’s north and south, including for the SPLM/A. They provided sources of economic wealth (through taxation and confiscation for sale) and were used to reward loyalty and feed troops (Gonda and Mogga, 1988, pp. 73–8; Deng and Daly, 1989, p. 187; Keen, 1994, pp. 19–41, 220; Hutchinson, 1996, pp. 14–5, 2001, pp. 318–9, Deng, 1999, p. 31, 2010, p. 238; Jok and Hutchinson, 1999, p. 133; Johnson, 2003, pp. 10–1, 151–2; Jok, 2005, p. 157; Young, 2005, p. 109).
‘otherness’, and binary oppositions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (particularly along lines of ethnicity and livelihoods). These narratives construct identities ‘through difference’, as “the product of the marking of difference and exclusion” (Hall, 1996, p. 4). This reflects and reproduces colonial discourses of ‘tradition’ versus ‘modernity’, ‘customary’ versus ‘civilised’, and ‘developed’ versus ‘underdeveloped’, with violence, aggression, and ‘irrationality’ defined in opposition to ‘civilised’ peoples and cultures (Mudimbe, 1988, p. 17; Said, 1989, p. 207; Escobar, 1995, pp. 10–6; Loomba, 2005, pp. 91–3). This entrenches ethnic or tribal stereotypes and divisions, and undermines peacebuilding efforts intended to strengthen inter-community relations. This reflects long-standing perceptions and narratives, echoing views among colonial and Sudanese authorities of particular (southern) ethnic and livelihood communities as ‘backward’, ‘uneducated’, and resistant to change and ‘progress’ (Deng and Daly, 1989, p. 172; Keen, 1994, p. 58; Rolandsen and Leonardi, 2014, p. 612). Disparities in political representation and education were “explained in terms of cultural differences or differences in ‘mentality’” (Johnson, 2003, p. 18), and this is reproduced in contemporary narratives.

Government and donor explanations of inequality and conflict link livelihood practices with particular ‘cultural’ attitudes and values. While cattle serve important social and cultural roles, reliance on ‘cultural’ labels fails to consider their economic and political dimensions and contexts. These explanations also reproduce (misleading) assumptions that ‘pastoralism’ is a traditional practice. While cattle-keeping livelihoods involve so-called ‘traditional’ dimensions (in terms of knowledge and expertise transmitted over time), the use of the term in government and donor discourse presents identities and practices as homogeneous and unchanging and “reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and fixes ‘difference’” (Hall, 1997b, p. 258). This fails to acknowledge variations, contradictions, and changes within ‘cultural’ or ‘collective’ identities (Said, 1994, p. 15; Hall, 1997c, p. 45; Mbembe, 2001, p. 4; de Sardan, 2005, p. 77). Those using the term ‘pastoralist’ paid little attention to people’s actual and changing practices and integration into regional and global economic systems. Cattle-herding communities’ actual practices challenge ‘traditionalist’ assumptions: “far from being merely

45 Cattle are central to communities’ social, cultural, and economic systems, representing a primary livelihood and food source and source of wealth, as well as having social and cultural value. They are directly linked to status, pride, and identity and their exchange is central to community rituals and kinship and inter-communal ties (Evans-Pritchard, 1940, pp. 18–9; Gonda and Mogga, 1988, pp. 65–6; Deng, 1995, pp. 186–7, 2010, p. 237; Hutchinson, 1996, pp. 59–61; King and Mukasa-Mugerwa, 2002, p. 4; Catley, Leyland and Bishop, 2005, pp. 7–8; Poggo, 2008, p. 13; Schomerus and Allen, 2010, pp. 54–5; Ryle, 2011, pp. 83–4).
‘traditional’, contemporary livelihoods across the Sudans are hybrid, dynamic, globally integrated and… distinctly ‘modern’” (Selby and Hoffmann, 2014, p. 365). In addition to serving particular (political) interests, ‘traditionalist’, ‘culturalist’ narratives may also reflect the ‘internalisation’ of particular (colonial) beliefs about identity, difference, and the relative value or inferiority of forms of knowledge and livelihoods (Said, 1994, p. 249; Fanon, 2008, pp. 4–9).

This section illustrates how government and donor representatives use aspects of identification, ‘culture’, and livelihoods to classify people and communities, make predictions about their behaviours, and guide their treatment (Said, 2003, pp. 41–2; Appiah, 2006, p. 16). It illustrates how ‘culture’ is used as both description (‘this is what they do’) and explanation (‘this is why they do it’). Informal narratives linking educational inequalities and conflict to aspects of identification and difference inform explanations for education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role, discussed in the following section.

8.4 Explanations of Education’s ‘Peacebuilding’ Role

This section presents the second part of my critique. I examine narratives concerning education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role and argue that these explanations focus on pacifying and controlling communities through ‘cultural’ and livelihood changes, without clearly considering the roles of such processes in colonial and post-independence patterns of violence. Some education and peacebuilding actors discussed the importance of recognising identity and difference, echoing broad government policy statements. More frequently, however, MoEST and international actors described communities and ‘culture’ as things to be secured, controlled, and changed through education (building on explanations for inequality and conflict described above). They described education as a means of supporting stability and security by changing ‘cultural’ norms, practices, and identities and ‘civilising’ and ‘modernising’ populations. These explanations reproduce reductive, negative, and colonial representations of identification and difference. They contradict government policy

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46 Many communities described as ‘pastoralist’ combine herding and cultivation activities and those identified as ‘agriculturalists’ also own cattle. Communities temporarily or permanently shift between livelihood activities due to political, economic, and environmental pressures and opportunities (Deng, 1995, pp. 186–7; Catley, Leyland and Bishop, 2005, p. 3; Poggo, 2008, p. 13; Leonardi, 2011, p. 220; Ryle, 2011, pp. 83–4; d’Errico, Kozlowska and Maxwell, 2014, p. 12). ‘Traditionalist’ narratives ignore the complexity of livestock market networks in South Sudan. They ignore the commercialisation, liberalisation, and regional and global dimensions of cattle production and the integration of ‘pastoralist’ communities in the capitalist market economy (Aklulu, 2002; King and Mushasa-Mugerwa, 2002; Catley, Leyland and Bishop, 2005; Fahey and Leonard, 2007; Ciascarri, 2009; Onyango et al., 2015).
statements about ‘respect’ and ‘recognition’, and echo and intensify donor policy statements about ‘cultural barriers’ to education and peace.

MoEST, donor, and NGO representatives frequently described education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role in terms of ‘cultural’ change, reducing tension and conflict by eliminating ‘harmful’ cultural practices and attitudes about education. These narratives reflect a ‘modernising’ paradigm of development (de Sardan, 2005, p. 70), with ‘modernity’ defined as liberation from collective ties (Mouffe, 2005, p. 1) and from “the authority of faith and tradition” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 10). MoEST and international actors often described education’s role in terms of ‘enlightenment’, teaching ‘civilised’ behaviours, and removing ‘cultural barriers’. One INGO representative, for example, suggested that education can break ‘cultural bondage’ or ‘chains’, while a central MoEST official described education’s role in the following way:

The role of education is really to try and bring enlightenment to the children who are growing, to show them the sense of belonging, the acceptance of each other... Education is a key, of course, to making you understand and be able to analyse issues. And if you are not educated, certainly you will be involved in thinking in your own way, so I think it is an enlightenment or it is a key or a road towards putting people together.

Similarly, a state MoEST official in Upper Nile described education’s ‘civilising’ role:

If people are well educated, all these things which is happening now should not happen because education can open the mind, can make you civilised, aware, to avoid doing evil things. People can come together when there is knowledge in their mind. People can be aware, they can respect themselves, they can work together... If people are well educated, people can sit and negotiate and even talk to each other and understand.

Some officials described education as ‘teaching’ communities to resist mobilisation by political and military authorities, again using a language of ‘enlightenment’. “If you give communities enough enlightenment and awareness, you can create a situation where they can resist the ones who are recruiting to use them for war”, explained a South Sudanese peacebuilding actor in Central Equatoria. More specifically, MoEST and donor representatives described education’s peacebuilding role as teaching people to resolve conflict in ‘non-violent’ ways, transforming ‘traditional’

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47 The assumption that ‘educated’ means ‘peaceful’ is challenged by patterns of conflict in South Sudan’s current war and previous north/south wars, described as a ‘war of the educated’ driven by elites politicising ‘local’ tensions (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999, pp. 31–5). However, the assumption that being educated leads to peace was questioned during only two interviews. For example, a South Sudanese non-governmental peacebuilding actor explained that, “Education may not necessarily be a guarantee to peace. Some people who went to school cause more trouble than those who never went to school”.
ways of interacting, and eliminating ‘cultures’ of violence or aggression. “They also need to know how to act or to react with these people peacefully, not by violation or by revenge”, explained a South Sudanese peacebuilding actor in Western Bahr el Ghazal.

A state MoEST official in Western Equatoria described this in detail:

*We have been at war for quite a long time, and you have a huge number of the population who have not been to school at all so their thinking pattern is different. So it is good to try to change their mindset... The culture of the people was affected by the war period. Everybody was aggressive, so if you want to tell me any nonsense, better that I either kill you or beat you... When you educate people on how to live peacefully, now somebody will at least try to change from that culture of aggression, warrior’s behaviours, to a culture whereby he adopts peace and he lives peacefully with his neighbourhood. And this can be mainly through education.*

Education sector actors identified curriculum content (including ‘peacebuilding and life skills’ education) as central to education’s peacebuilding role, by shaping intergroup attitudes and relations and teaching ‘correct’ (‘non-violent’) behaviours. These conversations illustrated the ‘civilising’ or ‘disciplining’ role of curriculum content focused explicitly on changing individual attitudes and behaviours. A state MoEST official in Western Bahr el Ghazal described this approach:

*[Children] have to be taught with that behaviour... That's why the curriculum is being planned by good planners in the government and the experts of education, because you want to shape your child. A child is like a tree. You can make a tree that will become very, very straight. You can make a child to be straight. You can bend it this way and bend it this way according to your wishes... You can create a child to become right from the very beginning.*

Education was described not only as a means of ‘disciplining’ and controlling individual students’ knowledge, behaviours, and practices, but those of families, communities, and wider ‘cultural’ or livelihood systems. As one central MoEST official suggested, “If [students] are educated and they go home to educate their parents, I think it will bring understanding to their parents and some unity can be achieved”. Similarly, a state teachers’ union representative explained that, “Teachers... pass information through the learners, the learners will also convey the information through their parents, that is their mothers and fathers, and within the community”. In addition to changing interpersonal attitudes and behaviours, education was described as changing ‘cultural’ and livelihoods practices by encouraging permanent settlement among cattle-herding communities and removing children from community influences. According to
some MoEST officials, formal education can reduce (or prevent) cross-border movement and limit intergroup contact driving conflict, illustrating a clear ‘disciplinary’ focus in explanations of education’s role. As one central MoEST official explained,

The communities keep migrating from one area to another. They are not stable. And how do we develop, how do we really sustain and promote peace if we are throughout migrating, on the move...? It’s very difficult to do that, unless the communities are settled, stable... We want our communities to be stable. They need to settle... I’m talking about targeting the Greater Upper Nile and the Bahr el Ghazal... We need those communities to settle.

Some MoEST officials described education as a means of separating children from the ‘negative’ influence of families and communities. According to one central official:

Here, in terms of priority, what is it? It’s education, or I mean awareness. It’s maybe giving support in private schools, in terms of boarding, making sure that children are kept in the fence, not allowed to go out, because once they go out, they may not come back. They may be following their parents with the cows.

An education official in Western Equatoria shared a similar perspective:

Most of the parents are illiterate, so some of them will tell you, ‘I am not educated, why should you expect my child to be educated, because my child should what I do. I’m a farmer, my child should be a farmer.’ That’s why it needs awareness raising, to show them the importance of education. When parents are aware then they can send their children to school so that children will not [remain] in their families... With time, we will have a society that we want, through education.

While education can play a positive role in shaping ‘non-violent’ behaviours, attitudes, and relations, equating ‘education’ with peace and ‘civilisation’ (and lack of formal education with ignorance and ‘violent cultures’) stigmatises, subordinates, and alienates particular communities and their social, political, and economic systems. These narratives echo and intensify donor policy statements about ‘cultural barriers’ to education and peace. Explanations of education’s peacebuilding role described above do not simply address specific ‘cultural’ barriers to education. Rather, they challenge and aim to transform, discipline, and manage ‘cultures’ and livelihoods themselves. The narratives described in this chapter also fail to acknowledge education ‘development’ as a system of violence, including historical dynamics of control through education in (South) Sudan, as discussed in Chapter 2. This is particularly significant given the ways in which colonial and Sudanese authorities used education provision and content as a means of exerting control over southern populations. These narratives reflect colonial and post-independence Sudanese views on education, as ‘civilising’, ‘developing’, and

Education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role can be understood as a means through which political authorities exert control over populations seen as threatening systems of power and authority. Simplified, essentialising representations of identification and difference can be deployed and exploited “in the interest of state policies” (Said, 1994, p. 36). The use of aspects of identification, ‘culture’, and difference to explain educational inequalities and conflict, focusing on particular communities, echo colonial “ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination” (Said, 1994, p. 9), to justify “systems of administration and instruction” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 70). Specific communities are defined as targets of intervention when ‘traditions’, practices, and ‘attitudes’ are perceived as threatening existing political orders and control over territories, populations, and resources. These narratives justify and legitimise what Duffield (2002, p. 1053) describes as the governance and reform of ‘borderland’ spaces and populations:

[Descriptions] of borderland conflict destroying a nation’s social fabric, entrenching generations of hatred, targeting civilians, and so on, provide a powerful justification. At the same time, the veiling and separating of ‘their’ irrational violence from the restraint of ‘ours’ provides a legitimation… Such forms of justification and legitimation combine to establish a will to govern the borderlands.

Education is described a means of securing ‘threats’, of incorporating or integrating (‘including’) communities into the dominant political and economic order, and maintaining post-CPA systems of status and power. This occurs through a ‘benevolent’ approach to meeting people’s ‘needs’ (e.g. education). This echoes colonial use of social policies “designed to alter the moral behavior of the colonized… behind the ideological mask of benevolence” in order to produce “a pacified and policed society… for maintaining domination and… ensure subordination” (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 31, 38). This is reflected in narratives of and approaches to education policy and practice.

8.5 (Mis)Recognition in Education Policy and Practice

Having discussed ‘informal’ narratives concerning identification and difference in relation to inequality, violence, and education’s peacebuilding role, I now move to...
formal policy and programme strategies. This section presents the third part of my critique, examining how aspects of recognition and relevance are addressed in the development and implementation of specific education policies and programmes, as well as the ways in which informal narratives described in the preceding sections are ‘operationalised’ through education practice. I argue that government and donor policies and programmes fail to explicitly ‘recognise’ and engage with collective or ‘cultural’ aspects of identification and difference, and that ‘inclusion’ in education services can reproduce patterns of oppression and violence against particular communities. Only certain identities are ‘recognised’ in education policy and practice, and only certain knowledge and skills are deemed ‘practical’ and ‘productive’. In addition to reproducing forms of oppression, violence, and inequality, these systems link economic and political objectives, with promotion of ‘productive’ training and ‘cultural’ change serving security interests and vice-versa.

Parents and young people in cattle-herding communities may consider formal education as important or necessary to facilitate access to economic and political opportunities at national and subnational levels. Formal education has long been perceived as a means of facilitating knowledge, understanding, and navigation of formal government systems and bureaucracy, including during the period of British colonial rule (Leonardi, 2013, p. 87, 126–8). It may be perceived as a means “to obtain knowledge of the regulation and procedures that might offer security and protection” (political, legal, or otherwise) (p. 147). However, geographic context, community priorities and interests, and livelihood patterns and responsibilities affect education access, experiences, and outcomes. For example, during the dry season communities move away from established schools, seeking grazing land and water. During the rainy season when cattle camps are established close to towns, school timetables overlap with cattle supervision schedules. “If [children] are sent to school, who will be looking after the animals?”, questioned one central MoEST official. Even when young people access education services, education form and content reproduce patterns of ‘non-recognition’, oppression, and violence. The strategic distribution of specific forms of education can be used as a means of changing community practices. Formal, fixed-location schools can ‘discipline’ young people through rules, routines, and content focused on individual behaviour change and separation from families and communities. The geographic location of services areas can force parents to send their children outside the community for schooling, driving cultural and livelihood change and operationalising
‘peacebuilding’ narratives. “They will be forced to get their children to towns, and the children live outside their parents’ life”, explained a central MoEST official.

Communities, families, and students may be hesitant or resistant to engage with education services perceived as irrelevant to ‘local’ needs and contexts or as trying to change ‘cultural’ norms and livelihood practices. These factors reproduce and entrench disparities in education access and outcomes (and subsequent economic and political opportunities) across communities. The use of education to contribute to ‘peacebuilding’ by transforming (or eliminating) ‘cultural’ practices and identities illustrates a form of structural violence institutionalised in the education system, involving alienation or ‘desocialisation’ from communities (Galtung, 1990, p. 193). Even programmes tailored to particular cultural or livelihoods communities may hold limited relevance. While the AES Policy emphasises the importance of education relevant to learners’ contexts and livelihoods, programme content aligns with the formal curriculum framework to ensure transition to formal education and qualifications (MoEST, 2014b, p. 10). ‘Alternative’ education programmes are extensions or adaptations of formal programmes (and curricula) rather than necessarily ‘alternative’ or ‘relevant’ opportunities.

Members of cattle-herding communities may prioritise the development of knowledge and skills essential to meet immediate livelihood and protection needs, individual development and life transitions, and wider community obligations. This involves long-standing knowledge of cattle supervision, health, and production, and community protection, history, and cultural, economic, judicial, and political systems. ‘Traditional’ approaches to education exist, and are of great significance for communities. For example, young people gain knowledge and skills necessary for cattle supervision and protection roles within their communities by living and working in cattle camps, practicing and demonstrating skills and gradually assuming responsibilities (Deng, 1987, pp. 304–5, 1995, p. 196). Leonardi (2013) emphasises the importance of oral histories or narratives in the transmission of historical knowledge in (South) Sudan, including knowledge of territory and population movement, relations between communities, forms and structures of authority, and strategies for security. These and other ‘traditional’ approaches to education represent a challenge to the ‘centralisation’ of (and monopoly over) knowledge (Leonardi, 2013, p. 28).

However, this knowledge, and the systematic community-based teaching and learning approaches and systems through which it is transmitted, are not acknowledged
in formal education programmes. Even ‘alternative’ education programmes, including the Pastoralist Education Programme (PEP),\textsuperscript{48} intended to facilitate access for children in cattle-herding communities, are extensions or adaptations of formal programmes (and curricula) rather than necessarily ‘alternative’ or ‘relevant’ opportunities. The Policy for Alternative Education Systems (MoEST, 2014b, pp. 5–8) refers to ‘traditional barriers’ and ‘traditional cultural practices’ as detrimental to education outcomes, and does not mention the potential value of long-standing community knowledge. This reflects the exclusion, rather than recognition or valorisation, of different (‘traditional’ or informal) forms of knowledge. Formal schooling can undermine livelihood systems and ‘de-skill’, disconnect, and alienate young people from their culture, family, and community. As a senior MoEST official noted during a presentation at a MoEST-UNICEF conference in 2014, communities believe that “children belong to the people”. Parents and communities may view formal education as undermining, fragmenting, or suppressing sociocultural, kinship, economic, and political systems (Cowan, 1983, p. 84; Leonardi, 2011, p. 227), reinforcing tensions and mistrust between communities and governments or international organisations providing education services.

In these ways, ‘inclusion’ in education can itself be a form of oppression and violence when programmes and content deny, dismiss, or suppress particular knowledge and practices. This is justified precisely in terms of ‘inclusion’, as a response to ‘exclusion’ from formal education and from “the presumably ‘benign’ and ‘protective’ encompassment of the modern liberal state” (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p. 86). However, community members may not respond as intended by policy makers, challenging assumptions about ‘submissive and passive’ communities reduced “to the oppression to which they are subjected” (de Sardan, 2005, pp. 47, 78). As one non-governmental peacebuilding actor noted, “communities will agree that ‘all children must go to school’, say what donors want to hear, in order to get resources or funds”. Communities and households may selectively engage with education services: for example, parents in cattle-herding communities might send certain children to school while others remain to supervise cattle. “If there are four sons of a father, according to tradition two can go to school [and] the others take up the cattle”, explained a group of

\textsuperscript{48} The PEP involves mobile primary schools intended to integrate schooling into cattle herding schedules, with teachers and materials moving with cattle camps and programmes structured around camp activities. The PEP provides a four-year primary curriculum, intended to enable students to continue in traditional primary schools or ALP (MoEST, 2014b). Implementation challenges are linked to insecurity and difficult working conditions for teachers as well as limited budget allocations.
secondary students in Warrap. This balances education with livelihood needs, protection of family wealth, and community obligations, reflecting a form of resistance to and adaptation of opportunities (while also, however, excluding some children from education opportunities). This illustrates differences between policy discourses and what happens in practice, and ways in which individuals and communities demonstrate agency within structures of oppression.

Existing education programmes reflect a focus on so-called ‘productive’ economic activities driven by market-focused education agendas, facilitating integration into formal economic systems. As noted above, ‘pastoralist’ livelihood systems are complex, formal, and ‘modern’ – but are not described as such as in government and donor policy discourse. Development discourses represent (rural) livelihoods as ‘low productivity’ and therefore in need of ‘modernisation’ (Escobar, 1995, p. 162). Technical and vocational training (TVET) programmes may hold limited relevance for diverse livelihood or geographic communities, as they generally focus on ‘modern’ commercial trades such as construction, carpentry, welding, masonry, auto mechanics, computing, and tailoring. Government and international actors’ discussions of ‘practical’ and ‘productive’ skill development focus on these trades or professions: “We should include practical subjects that can develop the [learner] to become self-reliant… Maybe carpentry, maybe computer lessons, so that the [student] evolves”, suggested a state MoEST official in Central Equatoria.

In this way, only certain knowledge and skills are deemed ‘practical’ and ‘productive’, presenting other knowledge and skills as inferior. This reflects (neo)colonial discourses of ‘custom’ versus ‘modernity’, ‘tradition’ versus ‘productivity’, and so on (Mudimbe, 1988, p. 17), reproducing ‘insulting’ colonial views of the ‘poverty’ of cattle-herding communities in South Sudan (Deng and Daly, 1989, p. 179). Education programmes and content devalue unpaid productive work generally carried out by women or members of rural communities, including cattle herding, small-scale agriculture, and household production. This orientation of young people toward formal ‘productive’ employment can also distance them from their livelihoods and communities, contributing to ‘disciplining’ and ‘civilising’ aims

49 In the 1980s and 1990s, donors and NGOs maintained generally negative views of cattle-herding communities in southern Sudan. They viewed pastoralism as a ‘non-viable’ system (Keen, 1994, p. 184) that “did not align well with common international agency approaches” due to patterns of movement and authority (Sommers, 2005, p. 122). These perceptions are maintained (or at least unchallenged) in contemporary education policy discourse.
discussed in the previous section. This reflects links between economic and political objectives, with the promotion of ‘productive’ training through ‘cultural’ and livelihood change serving security interests and vice-versa. This, again, depoliticises inequality and conflict, presenting them as “fundamentally a problem of production” with the solution being to bring people “into the world of production” (Ferguson, 2015, p. 36).

This has implications for inequalities and conflict when ‘productive’ skills and trades are not compatible with ‘local’ labour markets. A visit to one community in Warrap illustrated this challenge. A group of young people had received carpentry training through a UNICEF-funded project but were unable to work as there were no wood, nails, or other required materials in the county market. Wood needed for building furniture is not available in (or near) Warrap, and the remote location and poor road conditions limit transportation of goods. “We don’t have timbers, not even enough to practice... If there were timbers we could be working now... We don’t have varnish, not in the market... even nails are not in the market”, explained one group member.

Education and training programmes oriented to the formal market economy can fuel grievances when knowledge and skills are not aligned with existing economies and opportunities and when ‘promises’ of economic benefits are not fulfilled. Young people are trained for jobs that are not available or profitable in their communities, but are disconnected from community livelihoods and economies through formal education or training. Resulting frustrations and a lack of other livelihood and survival opportunities can drive involvement in conflict. While some education and peacebuilding actors acknowledged this issue, they described it as a problem of limited job opportunities rather than of educational relevance or structural barriers, as illustrated by a state MoEST official in Warrap:

> It is going to invite the future crisis problem because... they go and they are raiding cattle now, the young men from the village, from the rural areas. They are taking the cattle of other people, and why? Because the market is not attractive to them. They want to buy the good things for themselves, but where to get, unless they go and take it by force from another person who has accumulated rewards?

Narratives of ‘livelihood change’ are also challenged by the role of the government and international actors in supporting so-called ‘unproductive’ ‘pastoralist’ livelihoods. Post-CPA peacebuilding and development strategies identify strengthening rural livelihoods, including ‘pastoral’ activities, as key to peace and economic growth (JAM, 2005, pp. 26, 41–2; GoNU and GoSS, 2008, pp. 101–3, 110–1; GRSS, 2011, pp.
The Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries includes an Animal Production Directorate supporting livestock health and management and dairy production (MoFEP, 2014, pp. 250–7) and donors such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (2015) provide support to livestock health (e.g. vaccines, surveillance) and milk production.

Some government and international actors acknowledged the importance of adapting education services to geographic and ‘cultural’ contexts. As one central MoEST official explained, referring to the national curriculum framework, “It should address the needs and relevancy of the people of South Sudan”. A youth representative in Warrap provided examples of ‘relevant’ training content, suggesting that young people in rural areas are looking for training on agriculture or livestock rather than, for example, small business training. However, discussions of ‘cultural’ or ‘contextual’ relevance may reproduce narratives of superiority and inferiority and ‘educated’ versus ‘ignorant’. For example, a state MoEST official in Upper Nile framed the adaptation of education to ‘local’ needs in terms of a ‘lack of capacity’ in rural communities:

Curriculum needs to be all the country... When you give it to somebody in the village, you cannot just teach somebody in the village something about computer or whatever. They need to address some features in the environment... If you bring higher technology just to a student, a pupil in the village, he will not understand [it].

Statements about contextual relevance can also reproduce narratives of ‘cultural’ or livelihood change and improving ‘productivity’, as illustrated by a donor representative:

For pastoralist communities, people have been suggesting a combination of literacy, life skills, and labour skills, particularly perhaps how to convert pastoralism into an agricultural productivity approach where you could see them as livelihoods, cattle as property goods, markets... It’s really looking at innovative ways to reach these marginalised groups and to change their attitudes towards the education.

The assumption that ‘formal’ education or training is not relevant to certain communities reflects a binary distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, cultural and economic systems and practices. Linking relevance solely to ‘traditional’ livelihoods and knowledge (without considering other perceived social, political, and economic benefits of education, formal or otherwise) reifies identities and livelihoods, neglecting their dynamic and changing nature. It also overlooks changes to the political economy of communities discussed above.

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50 There is also a need to challenge uncritical or romanticised conceptions of ‘respect’ and ‘tolerance’, to consider what precisely is being ‘respected’ or ‘tolerated’. Relations of oppression and inequality (e.g. gendered oppression) within different communities may be ignored and reproduced through a focus on ‘tolerance’.
A focus on ‘relevance’ and ‘recognition’ in education can (re)produce forms of oppression and division by ‘institutionalising’ and fixing or reifying identification and difference, romanticising ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’, and elevating ‘difference’ above ‘unity’. A focus on ‘difference’ can reproduce problematic (and colonial) ways of thinking, through what Said (1989, pp. 213–4) describes as the “fetishization and relentless celebration of ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’”. Policy and programme responses can ‘institutionalise’ ethnic, cultural, or livelihoods differences when they demand that people “identify themselves in essentialist terms… imprisoned by the language and the logic of colonial thinking” (Idris, 2005, pp. 94, 100), reducing “the whole reality of a person’s life… to a single feature” (Escobar, 1995, p. 110). New forms of oppression emerge when policies and services require that individuals or communities organise their lives around a particular aspect of identification. This also echoes historical aspects of colonial (‘native’) administration that, as discussed in Chapter 2, determined access to entitlements and resources on the basis of ‘fixed’ tribal or ethnic identities. This reflects aspects of ‘divide and rule’ strategies through strategic distribution of valued resources and services. ‘Recognition’ thus becomes “not liberating but oppressive” (Appiah, 2006, pp. 20–1). This illustrates what Sjoberg (2017, p. 164) calls ‘the violence of inclusion’ involving “enforcement, replication, and naturalization of… identities”. This illustrates the extremely complex challenge of ‘recognition’ through education. On one hand, ‘inclusion’ in education can be a form of oppression and violence when programmes and content deny, dismiss, or aim to suppress particular forms of knowledge and practices, as described above. On the other hand, the reification and ‘enforcement’ of difference can also serve as a form of oppression and violence.

The denial of difference can drive oppression and grievances. However, a focus on difference, ‘relevance’, and ‘recognition’ in education programmes and content can solidify rather than challenge boundaries, reifying and elevating ‘difference’ above commonalities (although the two are not mutually exclusive) and entrenching divisions between communities. Broad government policy statements refer to balancing recognition of diverse identities and ‘cultures’ with efforts to develop national identity and unity, as part of wider peacebuilding processes. Some education and peacebuilding actors described the importance of education in contributing to national identity and unity. For example, a South Sudanese non-governmental peacebuilding actor described education’s role in contributing to national unity through appreciation of different communities: “[We] want to let children know who are the people occupying South
Sudan, show them the faces of different people so they begin to appreciate people who are just like them”. A South Sudanese peacebuilding actor in Western Bahr el Ghazal described education’s role in ‘validating’ the importance of different communities in response to current and historical conflict:

Our country was in conflict for a long time and most of our people are affected... It caused a lot of problems between our people, and also our people are still having grievances... So many conflicts, violence, between the people, the tribes, and the communities, even the areas, these things affected our community and... until now it is difficult for these people of South Sudan to be as one nation because so many events created the differences between them... But we want to tell them that, ‘You are important in this country’.

The importance of a sense of national identity and unity was reflected in student drawings (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2).

Some officials described national identity and unity as emerging through recognition of difference, as illustrated by a central MoEST official:

You want education that includes all of us. No one... will be left out of education and everyone, every citizen of South Sudan must feel that he’s in there. These were the ones who have been fighting all the years, because we were not included in the curriculum done by the North. We don’t see ourselves in there.

Other MoEST and school-level representatives discussed tensions between ‘locally’ responsive and ‘national’ education approaches. Some suggested that centrally defined, consistent curriculum content can ensure ‘equality’ in education experiences and outcomes and contributes to a sense of national identity. A group of secondary students in Warrap stressed the importance of studying the same curriculum and subjects, both in terms of equality across different schools and in promoting unity: “It is important because we are one country... [You] won’t separate those who are studying the same curriculum”. A state teachers’ union representative described the ways in which curriculum content can contribute to national identity and unity:

We have one system in the country, one system, one calendar, one curriculum... so that we realise those factors that are promoting nationalism and those things that are promoting brotherhood. ‘I can see you, you are South Sudanese only, I don’t want to know your colour, I just want to see that you are South Sudanese’... To look to it that education is for all, regardless of religious background, regardless of ethnicity, regardless of race.

This presents an important challenge: how to engage with questions of ‘recognition’ without reproducing “the liberal manipulation, adjudication, tolerance, and governance of difference” (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, p. 86), how to balance between belonging to and respect for difference and plurality, and commonality,
solidarity, and “belonging to the political community” (Mouffe, 1995, pp. 100–1). These tensions are of particular significance in South Sudan given the historical imposition of ‘national’ identities (including aspects of language, religion, and ‘culture’) by Sudanese regimes. As discussed in Chapter 2, these were framed in terms of ‘nation-building’ but were experienced as forms of marginalisation, oppression, exclusion, and violence by southern communities, processes that can be reproduced – or challenged – through representations and recognition of identities within education contexts.

*Figure 6.1 Drawing by a female student*
In this chapter, I have outlined how questions of identification and difference, ‘culture’, and livelihoods intersect with educational, and wider economic and political, inequalities. However, as noted in Chapter 6, systematic policies and programmes promoting equality and ‘rights’ in South Sudan focus on girls’ education and students with disabilities. There are no targeted, comprehensive policies or strategies that systematically address context-specific educational inequalities facing different ethnic or livelihood (e.g. cattle-herding) communities – despite attention given to these issues in informal and formal peacebuilding policy discourses. Inequality-focused education policies involve little, if any, focus on intersecting dimensions of identification and difference, and relevant programmes are undermined in funding and implementation. For example, the Inclusive Education Policy refers to the inclusion of ethnic and cultural ‘minorities’, but specific strategies and actions focus only on learners with
disabilities (MoEST, 2014d). The Girls’ Education Strategy refers to ‘cultural’ factors affecting gender inequalities (in ‘pastoralist’ communities, for example) and responses such as community sensitisation with traditional leaders and mobile schools in ‘pastoralist states’ (MoEST, 2015c). However, the policy contains no other references (or responses) to gendered experiences in specific ‘cultural’ or livelihood communities.

Some ‘cultural’ dimensions of identification, difference, and inequality are addressed by AES programmes targeting children and youth who have missed out on education due to ‘livelihood responsibilities’, including the PEP. However, these programmes are undermined by budget allocations and expenditure and distributional disparities. The AES received one per cent of the education budget in 2014-2015, and not all AES programmes are prioritised in funding and implementation: PEP accounted for 0.7 per cent of AES centres, 0.3 per cent of AES teachers, and less than one per cent of AES enrolment in 2013 (MoEST, 2014a). PEP services are not implemented in all states or counties, including those with large cattle-herding populations. In 2013, five PEP services were operating in Central Equatoria, two in Warrap, one each in Jonglei and Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and none in other states (MoEST, 2014a). In Tonj East, an education official reported that no programmes specifically for cattle-herding communities were funded although there were over 100 cattle camps in the county and chiefs from all camps were requesting education services for their communities: “Why is AES not operating here? The government doesn’t answer us... Why [do they] fail to extend this programme?” Some MoEST and donor representatives acknowledged gaps in policy and programme responses to aspects of identification and difference. However, their discussions generally justified the failure to address particular dimensions of inequality by referring to geographic distance or ‘risk’ and ‘danger’. As one donor representative explained,

*I don’t think there are enough actors addressing the really marginalised pastoral groups yet sufficiently... It’s so difficult, for a start, and it’s dangerous. In present circumstances, there’s a lot of issues around danger and risk.*

As discussed in Chapter 6, the policy focus on specific (individual) dimensions of inequality suggests an implicit (or explicit) acceptance of inequalities linked to more political and politicised aspects of identification, which governments and donors may be unwilling to explicitly address. Broad policy statements emphasise the importance of educational equality and respect for difference, but specific policies and programmes selectively respond to ‘neutral’ forms of inequality and identification and overlook (or
accept) more ‘political’ forms implicated in historical and contemporary violence. Discourses of ‘equality’ and ‘recognition’ are applied only to certain populations or dimensions of identification. This raises questions about “what… the liberal nation-state is recognizing and what is it misrecognizing when it acknowledges difference” and “why some forms of life and relatedness are more… eligible for recognition, thinkable, and livable than others” (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, pp. 76, 86).

This section illustrates the ways in which narratives of ‘culture change’ (contributing to ‘securitisation’, ‘civilisation’, and ‘modernisation’) are operationalised through government and donor decisions about education practice and content. Current curriculum priorities and content have limited relevance for diverse social, cultural, and economic systems, and work to suppress (or eliminate) certain aspects of ‘difference’. They define certain skills, knowledge, and livelihood systems as ‘productive’ and others as inferior, requiring transformation or ‘modernisation’. Education services thus perpetuate structural violence as well as entrenching dimensions of oppression and domination. This illustrates how inclusion or participation in education services can itself be a form or mechanism of oppression, domination, and violence, although this is not acknowledged in government and donor policy discourses.

**8.6 Chapter Summary and Implications**

In this chapter, I explore empirical findings concerning education sector engagement with identification and difference. I critically examine government policy statements on participation and representation in education and peacebuilding, focused on respect for diverse aspects of ‘identity’, relevance of education for different communities, responses to historical dynamics of oppression, and ‘national’ identity, and donor narratives focused on ‘barriers’ to education. Discussing the importance of responses to systems of inequality as underlying of conflict, some critical peacebuilding scholars refer to the recognition of different forms of (collective) identity and attention to political dimensions of identity, ‘plurality’, and boundaries of difference (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 106; Richmond, 2013, p. 282, 2016, pp. 5, 33). The findings in this chapter illustrate some limitations of formal policy statements and objectives, and critical peacebuilding discussions, associated with identification and difference, and the ways in which they are undermined through formal and informal policy discourses and practices. First, negative and essentialising narratives of ‘identity’, ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, and ‘livelihoods’ are used to depoliticise and justify or legitimise forms of inequality.
and violence. Second, ‘peacebuilding’ narratives ‘in practice’ are described in terms of ‘cultural’ and livelihood changes, reproducing colonial dynamics of violence. Third, discourses of ‘equality’ and ‘recognition’ are applied only to certain populations or dimensions of identification and difference in government and donor policies and programmes, reproducing patterns of ‘cultural’ violence.

Some critical peacebuilding scholars acknowledge the use of discourses of ‘culture’ and ‘otherness’ to justify and depoliticise injustices and interventions. For example, Richmond (2010b, p. 668) describes ‘liberal’ peacebuilding discourses as reflecting a “colonial intellectual move” in which “inequality can be effectively justified by non-liberal alterity”. Jabri (2010, pp. 47, 43) describes peacebuilding projects as “framed in a discourse of modernisation… that is institutionally implemented and discursively legitimised”, based on “a hierarchical conception of subjectivities premised on the primacy of the European liberal self as against others”. Similarly, Chandler (2010a, p. 369) explains that, “the discourse of culture is key to understanding the peacebuilding discourses of intervention and regulation”, as it explains and legitimises the persistence of social, political, and economic problems and divisions “while simultaneously offering potential policy programmes on the basis of… goals of social transformation”. This chapter illustrates specific ways in which these processes occur within a particular social/institutional context, through formal and informal discourses and practices. In general, the critical peacebuilding literature pays limited attention to ‘cultural’ aspects of inequality linked to identification and difference, and associated responses and implications (in relation to ‘social services’ or to peacebuilding processes more broadly). This chapter emphasises the importance of these issues and the ways in which ‘cultural’ inequalities intersect with socioeconomic dimensions of resource and service distribution and political dimensions of representation.

This chapter illustrates how ‘peacebuilding’ narratives in education contexts are described in terms of ‘cultural’ and livelihood changes, reproducing colonial and post-independence patterns of violence. This echoes critical peacebuilding discussions of externally-driven peacebuilding interventions as (neo)colonial, reproducing historical systems of power and domination over ‘non-Western’ populations (Duffield, 2001, pp. 31–2; Heathershaw, 2008, p. 620; Richmond, 2009a, pp. 565–8; Darby, 2010, pp. 701–5; Taylor, 2010, p. 156; Pugh, 2011, p. 314; Jabri, 2013, p. 8; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 176; Sabaratnam, 2017, pp. 136–41). Jabri (2010, p. 53), for example, describes (liberal) peacebuilding (in Foucauldian terms) as a form of colonisation.
“expressed in the form of… confinement of populations to spaces subject to surveillance, administration… and the ‘training’ of locals into societies amenable to self-discipline”. As central sites and mechanisms of colonisation, education systems are particularly relevant to critical discussions of neo-colonial dimensions of peacebuilding interventions, although this is neglected in the critical peacebuilding literature. Analysis of education systems provides insight into continuities in (historical) colonial processes, which may occur under the guise of ‘inclusion’ and ‘welfare’.

This chapter echoes the point made by some critical peacebuilding scholars that (‘liberal’) responses to inequality and exclusion aim to integrate populations into existing structures rather than working for structural transformation (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 566–8, 2010b, p. 667; Mac Ginty, 2012, pp. 170–1). Some acknowledge that ‘service provision’ interventions (responding to ‘welfare’ and ‘everyday’ needs) may illustrate external influence and control (Richmond, 2008b, p. 299; Lidén, 2009, pp. 620–2; Mitchell, 2011, p. 1624; Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 269), involving disciplinary, regulatory, and ‘normalising’ interventions (Duffield, 2007a, p. 6; Richmond, 2007b, p. 470; Jabri, 2010, p. 48). Jabri (2010, p. 53), for example, refers to “the government of populations through… pedagogical means” shaping their conduct. This is illustrated by the focus on education’s ‘enlightening’, ‘civilising’, and ‘modernising’ function for ‘peacebuilding’ purposes. Education is instrumentalised as disciplinary mechanisms or techniques to shape and ‘improve’ behaviours, actions, and moral attitudes – and to teach young people and their wider communities to ‘govern’ their own behaviours and practices. As Duffield (2007b, p. 239, 2007a, pp. 16–24, 217–8) explains, ‘uninsured’ (‘non-Western’) populations (described in terms of political, economic, and cultural ‘underdevelopment’) are presented as threats to security and stability. Security-oriented responses are framed as “supporting and promoting life through, for example, interventions in… education” (2007a, p. 189), intended “to change whole societies and the behaviour and attitudes of the people within them” (2001, p. 42).

In these ways, this chapter indicates that for some communities, inclusion or participation in education services can involve oppression, domination, and violence. It also illustrates specific narratives used by government and donor representatives to advance these aims. This illustrates the need to consider the specific aims and content of ‘social’ services (both formally and informally stated), including aspects of ‘relevance’, and raises questions about whether ‘culturally appropriate’ interventions “represent a more efficient instrument of neo-colonial governance” (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 270).
While some critical scholars explore the disciplinary and (neo)colonial dimensions of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding, their discussions of ‘social services’ do not explicitly acknowledge the ways in which ‘service provision’ can reproduce such dynamics. This chapter also expands critical discussions of control and influence through peacebuilding interventions, illustrating the extension ‘international’ influence as well as ‘national’ elite control over ‘local’ populations.

This chapter suggests that it is insufficient to consider ‘recognition’ only in terms of formal institutions and policies. Critical peacebuilding discussions of ‘social services’ generally concentrate on formal processes, with less attention to the significance of informal discourses. This chapter demonstrates that informal narratives reproduced and legitimated by individuals in positions of authority are critically important to understanding the peacebuilding role of ‘social service’ systems. Dismissive, negative representations of particular communities among government authorities, as well as education services irrelevant or antagonistic toward those same communities, undermine policy statements of ‘respect’ and ‘recognition and negatively affect relations between the government and populations and perceived responsiveness to ‘everyday’ needs and priorities of communities.

The CPE framework informed these analyses and the identification of potential ‘causal’ factors underlying approaches to identification and difference in education contexts. Events, processes, and experiences identified in empirical data illustrate the influence of colonial logics underpinning persistent narratives about ‘cultural’ identification, difference or ‘otherness’, and ‘tradition’ versus ‘modernity’, and resulting explanations of education’s ‘civilising’ role. This is linked to underlying assumptions about the role of formal education as ordering and ‘disciplining’ populations by shaping ‘proper’ behaviour, attitudes, interactions, and knowledge. This also reflects liberal ideologies of individual ‘rights’ to and ‘inclusion’ in education (as provided by a ‘benevolent’ state), as well as a focus on ‘individualised’ forms of inequality and an ‘acceptance’ of collective dimensions of marginalisation. Education provision across geographic and livelihoods communities may also be shaped by mechanisms of regime maintenance and elite reproduction by the SPLM/A. The strategic provision or restriction of education (in terms of content, type, and distribution) represents a means of exerting control over populations, and serves to maintain existing structures of power and authority within and through educational institutions. At the same time, community members demonstrate agency in the ways
in which they navigate and negotiate these structures of power. In these ways, the theoretical framework informs my arguments about the political structures underlying educational narratives about ‘culture’, identification, and difference, explanations of education’s peacebuilding role, and the ways in which these shape both community perceptions and formal policy responses.
CHAPTER 9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

9.1 Reviewing the Empirical Findings

As Richmond (2016, p. 186) states, “the slow and painful piecing together of new services, institutions, and agreements on how to distribute resources or bridge identity difference… is a marked characteristic of every post-conflict society”. In this thesis, I attempt to understand the role of education, as a specific socio-political institution, in relation to peacebuilding in South Sudan. I examine the ways in which different forms of inequality are reproduced within and through the education system, and the resulting implications for violence and peacebuilding. I use these findings to expand critical peacebuilding discussions of responses to systems of violence and inequality underpinning conflict, ‘local’ engagement, and ‘everyday’ priorities and concerns. In this section, I summarise key empirical findings concerning the relationship between education and peacebuilding in South Sudan, focusing on key points from the three empirical chapters before addressing crosscutting themes.

My analysis of the ways in which educational resources and services are distributed in South Sudan indicates that existing distribution patterns reproduce, justify, and institutionalise inequalities and grievances. First, rather than serving as a means of ‘redistribution’, existing resource flows (at multiple scales) intersect with and reproduce geographic and intergroup inequalities in resources and services. For example, central budget shortages and allocation procedures mean that education financing responsibilities are shifted from central to subnational and household levels, further marginalising areas and communities with limited access to material resources. Geographic resource and service inequalities intersect with other dimensions of inequality, including socioeconomic class and ‘ethnic’ identity. Second, ‘transparent’ resource allocation criteria depoliticise, justify, and institutionalise these ‘distributional’ inequalities. For example, ‘conflict-sensitive’ donor criteria for allocating capitation grants or school construction projects reproduce inequalities associated with geographic access or material resource challenges. Third, the lack of redistributive donor and government policies and programmes illustrates the ‘acceptance’ of inequalities linked to geographic or community-level resource distribution and the prioritisation of more ‘individualised’, less ‘political’ inequalities.

My analysis of ‘local’ participation in education indicates that processes of ‘decentralised’ education governance reproduce patterns of political oppression and
exploitation. First, formal decentralisation processes entrench and legitimise rather than redistribute (centralised) authority and influence. For example, hierarchical management and communication ‘protocols’ restrict possibilities for influence and decision-making among county and payam officials and school managers, and donor and government authorities actions can undermine the existing positions and authority of these ‘local’ actors. This negatively affects relations and trust between subnational MoEST and school-level representatives and higher levels of government (and donors). Second, policy statements (and donors shaping them) abstract education from wider political dynamics and fail to address ‘informal’ aspects of governance that permeate and are reproduced through education systems. This includes the militarisation of government institutions and patronage systems reflected in education management. Third, the transfer of education financing responsibilities to communities and households, framed as ‘participation’, reproduces distributional inequalities in service delivery rather than contributing to ‘representational’ equality. The ways in which communities experience and perceive ‘participation’ (as ‘responsibility’ or burden) reflect wider debates about neoliberal influences on social service financing and provision. My empirical findings provide some insight into specific narratives used to encourage and legitimise this process, including framing financing responsibility as ‘care’ for children and their education. Together, these represent a failure to deliver anticipated ‘benefits’ of decentralisation and negatively affect relations and trust between communities and the government and between levels of government.

My analysis of questions of identification, difference, and ‘recognition’ within the education sector indicates that formal programmes and informal sector narratives reproduce (neo)colonial dimensions of oppression and violence. First, negative and essentialising ‘identity’-based, ‘cultural’ narratives are used to depoliticise and justify forms of inequality (in education access and resources) and the occurrence of violent conflict, explained as resulting from ‘tradition’ and ‘livelihoods’ rather than political marginalisation and exploitation. These narratives are advanced and legitimised through informal narratives among government and donor officials in positions of authority. Second, education’s ‘peacebuilding’ role is described in terms of ‘cultural’ and livelihood change, focusing on education’s ‘enlightening’, ‘civilising’, and ‘modernising’ function (through transformation of individual and community behaviours and attitudes) rather than respect or recognition. This reflects patterns of oppression ‘devaluing’ particular livelihoods and forms of knowledge and reproducing
colonial dynamics of violence. Third, as noted above, discourses of ‘equality’ and ‘recognition’ are applied only to certain populations or dimensions of identification and difference in government and donor policies and programmes, reproducing patterns of ‘cultural’ violence. Aspects of ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, or ‘livelihoods’ are omitted from formal policy responses, despite their significance in dynamics of violence and peace.

A number of crosscutting themes emerge from these empirical findings. First, inequalities and dynamics of violence are depoliticised and justified in multiple ways, including through ‘conflict-sensitive’ resource allocation criteria and ‘cultural’ explanations for inequality. For example, decision-making criteria for resource allocation used by government and donors can reproduce, justify, and depoliticise distributive inequalities in the name of ‘transparency’. Additionally, informal narratives reproduced by individuals in positions of authority normalise and depoliticise dynamics of inequality and conflict while masking the role of political elites and policies. Wider processes influencing these narratives ought to be considered. International and government institutions face pressures “to present simple messages” that simplify the complexity of experiences, in order to account to donors, raise funds, influence other agencies, and so on (Crewe and Harrison, 1999, p. 191). ‘Stabilised’ interpretations of events function to mobilise and maintain political support and justify and legitimise policy goals, resource allocation, and practice (Mosse, 2004, pp. 648–55).

Second, current education policy and programme responses selectively engage with aspects of inequality, addressing some while ‘accepting’ others. Government and donor policies have not explicitly addressed forms of inequality associated with, for example, geographic and intergroup disparities in resources and services or ‘recognition’ of identity (e.g. ‘ethnic’, livelihood) and difference. Formal policy responses prioritise ‘individualised’ aspects of inequality while failing to systematically address collective, ‘context-specific’ inequalities linked to historical and contemporary conflict. This reflects the influence of global education agendas, focused on ‘gender’ (girls’ education), disability, and primary education with limited attention to underlying, historical systems and structures of cultural, political, and economic violence and inequality (which entrench and influence gender- and disability-related inequalities). ‘Equality’ and ‘recognition’ are applied only to certain dimensions of identification and difference, while others (e.g. geographic location, ethnicity, livelihoods) are omitted from systematic policy responses. The distribution of educational resources across geographic regions, for example, is intensely political, due to the ways in which this
intersects with ‘local’ dynamics of political (and ethnic) representation and loyalty as well as histories of mobilisation and conflict. MoEST officials emphasised the importance of addressing these dynamics of inequality. However, as Sabaratnam (2017, p. 135) explains,

The absolute and relative lack of resources for the host state means that they feel pressure to accept resources from donors, even when accompanied by dubious arrangements, not wholly aligned with what they really want to do, or even obviously potentially damaging.

At the same time, government bodies and donors may be unwilling to explicitly address these highly political dynamics. Broad policy statements emphasise the importance of educational equality, but specific policies and programmes selectively respond to ‘neutral’ forms of inequality and overlook (or accept) more ‘political’ forms. It is difficult for government ministries and international organisations to address institutionalised systems of privilege and disadvantage that involve challenging the interests of those in power. As such, policy decisions reproduce, entrench, and institutionalise relations of subordination and inequality by neglecting historical, ‘cultural’, and political dimensions of identity and violence and disadvantaging particular ethnic, livelihood, and geographic communities (Duffield, 2001, pp. 205–20). These policy decisions and priorities illustrate “the relations of accommodation and complicity with violence” existing within education and peacebuilding processes (p. 202), through depoliticised, ahistorical resource distribution and policy development.

Third, ‘inclusion’ and ‘participation’ in education (for students in schools or for household or community ‘participants’ in resource mobilisation and management) can represent forms of oppression and violence. For example, for cattle-keeping communities ‘inclusion’ in formal education may be linked to efforts to change livelihood practices and separate children from family and community influences. For households with limited material resources, ‘participation’ in school management may be associated with unsustainable resource and labour contributions. Different narratives may be used to advance these processes, including framing ‘responsibility’ in moral terms, as ‘care’ for children or responding to ‘basic needs’. As such, “the very act of inclusion, of being drawn in as a participant, can symbolize an exercise of power and control”, which may be more difficult to challenge (Kothari, 2001, pp. 142–3).

Finally, perceived inequalities emerge as critically important for grievances and violence. In addition to ‘actual’ inequalities in resources and services, participation opportunities, and recognition and relevance, my empirical findings emphasise the
significance of people’s perceptions and interpretations of these processes, and to elements of experience and emotion. These undermine education’s peacebuilding possibilities and contribute to intergroup grievances when tied to perceptions of deliberate marginalisation or exclusion (by political and international actors) and framed in ‘us and them’ terms. Aspects of perception and interpretation are particularly significant in relation to historical experiences and contexts, linked to decades of violence, marginalisation, and inequality experienced by different communities. They draw attention to the importance of experience and emotion in political peacebuilding processes, and can be understood as expressions of agency or ‘resistance’.

9.2 Limitations and Generalisability

Before exploring the implications of these findings for the critical peacebuilding literature and for policy and practice, I address the limitations of this research as well as questions of generalisability. One limitation concerns the focus on inequality as the primary ‘lens’ of analysis. While this provides a useful and important entry point for exploring relationships between education and peacebuilding, I acknowledge that there are other dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding that this thesis does not explicitly address. A second limitation concerns the sites and sources of data. When identifying research sites in South Sudan, I aimed to represent diverse geographic, demographic, and conflict contexts. Due to security restrictions, I was unable to visit opposition-held areas, where education service provision and governance, educational inequalities, and implications for violence and peacebuilding are different from other parts of the country. However, interviews with representatives of NGOs working in opposition-held areas provided some insight into these issues. Additionally, the diversity of experiences and perspectives across and within communities in South Sudan shapes responses provided by research participants. Perceptions, experiences, and expectations of education services may differ widely between ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographic, or livelihoods communities, between people who have returned from East Africa, Sudan, North America, or Europe, and those who remained in South Sudan prior to and after the CPA and independence. This contributes to the richness of the data, but also limits to some degree the generalisability of the findings within the country.

This thesis represents a “contextualised analysis of concrete peacemaking practices” (Selby, 2013, p. 59), focusing on education, dynamics of inequality and violence, and peacebuilding in South Sudan. Numerous contextual factors influence the
implementation and social and political outcomes of peacebuilding interventions (Tschirgi, 2010, p. 1; Hameiri, 2011, p. 192; Sending, 2011, p. 62; Sabaratnam, 2013, pp. 270–4; Paffenholz, 2015, pp. 864–5; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 174). Similarly, education systems are located within complex international, national, and ‘local’ contexts (Dupuy, 2008a, p. 25; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008, p. 481), and the nature and duration of conflict, social and economic environments, and political settlements affect education’s peacebuilding role (Smith and Vaux, 2003, p. 19; Ishiyama and Breuning, 2012, pp. 65–6; Zembylas and Bekerman, 2013, p. 203). When considering the implications of inequalities in relation to education and peacebuilding processes, numerous factors must be considered: political conditions (e.g. state structures and institutions, political accommodations and opportunities, agendas of conflict actors), economic conditions (e.g. resource availability), and demographic factors (e.g. location and size of group populations, significance of intergroup ‘differences’) (Cramer, 1997, pp. 8–9; Regan and Norton, 2005, p. 333; Stewart, 2008, pp. 19–22; Stewart, Brown and Langer, 2008, pp. 288–96; Brown and Langer, 2010, pp. 31–2; Østby, 2013, pp. 216–7; Anderson and Rolandsen, 2014, pp. 547–51).

While not arguing against all forms of generalisation, Mohanty (2003, pp. 501–2) emphasises the importance of “grounded, particularised analyses” recognising “the specificity of difference”. In this thesis, I consider emerging meanings and explanations as connected to a particular sociocultural and historical context (Mohanty, 1991, pp. 55, 69). Numerous contextual and historical factors shape the specific relationships between education, inequality, and peacebuilding in South Sudan and affect the generalisability of the findings. First, the context of the peace process and settlements influences the ways in which ‘post-conflict’ interventions, including education development and resource allocation, have unfolded since 2005. The CPA and 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict, and associated interventions, focus on ‘power sharing’ and issues relevant to the two negotiating parties (SPLM/A and GoS in 2005, SPLM/A and SPLM-IO in 2015), neglecting ‘internal’ dynamics of conflict and their structural dimensions as well as education and other social institutions. As described in Chapter 2, South Sudan’s geopolitical context affected support to the SPLM/A by international actors such as the UK and US, which shaped subsequent bilateral arrangements, including aid to education.

Second, the nature of the South Sudanese state, as a new state created from a period of continuous civil war since independence, affects national and subnational
resource management and governance dynamics. SPLM-led governance reflects its origins as a military movement, and civilian political and administrative structures remain highly militarised (Blunt, 2003, pp. 133–4; Rolandsen, 2005, pp. 64, 155–6; Knopf, 2013, p. 23; de Waal, 2014, p. 348; Hutton, 2014, p. 16). This has specific influences on relations between central and subnational governments and ministries, management systems and ‘cultures’ across government institutions and sectors, opportunities for (re)distribution of political authority, and budget allocation decisions.

Third, South Sudan’s specific economic context affects education management and associated inequalities. South Sudan’s economy is dependent on oil revenues and as a rentier state is heavily affected by fluctuations in production (including due to ongoing conflict) and global prices. This affects resources available to the education sector, further constrained due to limited economic diversification, budget overspending, and theft of public funds (Young, 2012, p. 325; World Bank, 2013b, pp. 3–7; Mamdani, 2014, pp. 39–40; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). The prioritisation of security and military sectors in government budgets (and neglect of ‘social’ sectors) is linked to the militarised character of the government and responses to ongoing civil war, and education sector allocations are lower than in neighbouring countries (World Bank, 2013b, p. 10; MoEST and UNESCO-IIEP, 2016). This presents particular challenges to addressing inequalities and contributing to peacebuilding through education.

Fourth, South Sudan’s geographic size affects education ‘development’. Geographic distance influences disparities in education resource and service distribution and opportunities for accessing forms of education, as well as communication processes and opportunities for influencing decision-making on the part of school managers and ‘local’ government officials. These geographic aspects of distribution and participation are affected by historical disparities in ‘development’ and representation during colonial and post-independence periods. Geographic disparities reflect intergroup (ethnic, socioeconomic) inequalities, mirroring historical inequalities and reflecting their particular significance (and implications for conflict) in South Sudan.

Finally, the history of South Sudan’s education system has had lasting influences on dynamics of inequality, conflict, and peace. These include the use of education investment (including deliberate ‘underdevelopment’), policies, and content (including language and curriculum) by colonial and northern Sudanese authorities as a means of exerting control over southern populations, and education as a site of resistance in SPLM/A-controlled territories. The development of South Sudan’s
education system was also influenced by reliance on ‘international’ actors for education provision in the south, including Christian missionaries during the colonial period and UN-led OLS services in the 1990s. These factors contributed to existing inequalities in education distribution, as well as shaping relations between the current government and international partners. They also shape popular perceptions and expectations concerning the distribution and nature of education.

These contextual factors mean that certain findings are accentuated in South Sudan: the neglect of the education sector in government budget allocations, hierarchical and militarised education sector management (affecting opportunities for political participation), geographic challenges to education ‘development’ (and links to intergroup and historical disparities), and the highly politicised nature of education as a site and mechanism of both control and resistance. My findings do, however, point to some issues and implications for wider peacebuilding contexts and debates. Case studies are “studies both of something particular and of something more general” (Gerring, 2007, p. 76), revealing both ‘unique’ and ‘universal’ insights (Simons, 2009, pp. 164–7). Analyses of specific cases can be used to make broader generalisations or (theoretical) propositions (Collier, 1999, p. 4; Yin, 2003, pp. 31–3), with certain insights and implications transferable to other contexts (Simons, 2009, pp. 164–7).

First, the ways in which South Sudan’s education policies address questions of inequality, and resulting implications for violence and peacebuilding, reflect in some ways the intensification of (hegemonic) influences of global education agendas on national policy decisions. This includes the ways in which education policies address forms of inequality, focusing largely on girls’ education and disability (reflecting MDG/SDG and EFA goals) rather than context-specific, conflict-related dimensions of inequality. This also includes the promotion of policy reforms such as decentralisation and privatisation as part of a wider neoliberal project, the transfer of financing responsibility to households and communities, and resulting distributional and representational inequalities and implications for state-society relations. This illustrates the applicability of my findings to other conflict-affected contexts, given the scale of policy commonalities between countries through processes of policy ‘borrowing’, harmonisation or standardisation, or imposition associated with donor conditions and power relations (Ball, 1998, pp. 125–7; Mundy, 1998, p. 449, 2007, pp. 346–7, Dale, 1999, pp. 2–6, 2000, p. 428, 2005, pp. 130–2; Phillips and Ochs, 2003, pp. 451–7;
Second, findings concerning colonial legacies reproduced through education systems (in terms of the form and content of education, and the use of education as a mechanism of control over ‘cultural’ or livelihood communities) are transferable to other ‘post-colonial’ contexts. International education interventions and policy agendas are widely described as reproducing colonial legacies through definitions of education as ‘schooling’ (linked to Eurocentric ideas of ‘modernity’ and ‘civilisation’), ‘Western’ domination over curriculum policies (including through ‘Western’ donors and ‘Western’-dominated organisations), and devalorisation of local knowledge, histories, and learning (Mundy, 1998, pp. 449, 471, 2007, p. 350; Brock-Utne, 2000, p. xxiii–xxx, 276-82; Shizha, 2005, pp. 66–72).

Finally, findings related to the marginalisation or exclusion of education from peacebuilding processes can be extended to other conflict-affected contexts. Formal peace processes and agreements, and wider international peacebuilding interventions, pay little attention to education’s role in peacebuilding (Degu, 2005, p. 130; Novelli and Smith, 2011, p. 33). Reviews of peace agreements signed since 1989 report that only 40 to 60 per cent of agreements include (very general) provisions for education (UNDP and Christian Michelsen Institute, 2006; Dupuy, 2008b). This affects the political prioritisation of, commitment to, and financing of education development in different ‘peacebuilding’ contexts.

9.3 Implications for the Critical Peacebuilding Literature

My empirical findings illustrate the ways in which aspects of resource and service distribution, decision-making arrangements, and engagement with identification and difference in South Sudan’s education system intersect with and reproduce political, economic, and cultural inequalities. These findings provide insight into key issues raised in the critical peacebuilding literature, and provide effective entry points for contributions to more just, sustainable peacebuilding. In this section, I summarise key implications of my empirical findings for these critical discussions, focusing on the three key themes identified as central to ‘just’, ‘sustainable’ peacebuilding, building on key critiques of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding: the transformation of systems of violence and inequality, ‘local’ participation and influence, and engagement with and responses to ‘everyday’ priorities and concerns. For each of these areas, I explore the implications of
my findings for critical analytical dimensions, and normative political (empirical or ‘real world’) dimensions (Peterson, 2016, p. 513). These discussions illustrate a broader argument that education should be brought into peacebuilding analyses and debates.

The small body of critical peacebuilding literature that considers social institutions and services presents three broad explanations of their peacebuilding role, focusing on ‘service delivery’ as a form of socioeconomic (re)distribution, response to ‘everyday’ needs and priorities, and contributor to state-society relations. These narratives generally frame education as a ‘good’ or ‘service’ to be delivered rather than a social or political system or institution, with limited attention to the links between education and wider political and economic systems (including how it is used as part of wider political agendas). They also largely reflect an (implicit) assumption that education (or ‘social service’) provision is necessarily ‘good’, beneficial, or neutral. A growing body of education literature provides a more nuanced understanding of education’s complex role in both violence and peace, arguing that education systems can contribute to peacebuilding processes but also play a role in fuelling or exacerbating conflict (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2005; L. Davies, 2010; Smith, 2010; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith, 2015). Education systems reflect and reproduce dynamics of violence, inequality, and power, which are neglected in depoliticised narratives of ‘service delivery/provision’. Such narratives also pay limited attention to education’s role in ‘operationalising’, legitimising, and reproducing broader political projects and agendas, including neoliberalisation, pacification, and (neo)colonial violence.

The first broad direction for more transformative, just, and sustainable peacebuilding discussed in the critical peacebuilding literature concerns responses to, and transformation of, systems of violence and inequality underpinning conflict (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002; Richmond, 2006a, 2006b, 2009a, 2014, 2016, Newman, 2010, 2013; Sabaratnam, 2013; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). Some suggest that ‘service provision’ represents a form of socioeconomic distribution, contributing to peacebuilding by addressing social and economic rights and exclusion (Lidén, 2009, p. 621; Newman, 2011, p. 1750). My findings challenge the implied assumption that ‘service provision’ addresses exclusion and inequality, illustrating the ways in which social institutions such as education reproduce, legitimise, and depoliticise political, economic, and cultural inequalities.
When discussing the importance of responses to systems of inequality, critical peacebuilding scholars focus primarily on the (re)distribution of economic or material resources and benefits and of political power and representation (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 106; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008a, pp. 391–6; Richmond, 2008b, p. 290, 2010a, p. 30, 2013, pp. 279–82, 2014, pp. 458–63, 2016, pp. 5, 180; Mac Ginty, 2013, pp. 4–5; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, p. 315). Few refer to dimensions of identity, ‘plurality’, and boundaries of difference (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002, p. 106; Richmond, 2013, p. 282, 2016, pp. 5, 33). The critical peacebuilding literature generally pays limited attention to ‘cultural’ dimensions of inequality linked to identification and difference, or associated responses and peacebuilding implications (in relation to ‘social services’ or peacebuilding processes more broadly). My findings illustrate the importance of these issues and the ways in which ‘cultural’ inequalities intersect with socioeconomic aspects of resource and service distribution and political aspects of representation.

My empirical findings illustrate the need to consider not only formal service ‘provision’ or ‘delivery’, and ‘real’ distributional inequalities, but also how communities perceive these processes. Some critical peacebuilding scholars acknowledge that the state’s failure to respond to populations’ service expectations can affect perceived state legitimacy, state-society relations, and wider peacebuilding contributions (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 561–7, 2014, p. 457; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016, pp. 319–20; Sabaratnam, 2017, p. 132). However, aspects of perception and experience are largely neglected in this literature. My findings illustrate the need for analysis of perceptions, in terms of implications for grievances and conflict as well as peacebuilding. This involves locating perceptions in relation to historical contexts and experiences, which is not explicitly addressed in critical peacebuilding discussions. Efforts to support transformative, ‘just’ peacebuilding should therefore address perceptions of inequality through clear, direct communication with ‘local’ authorities and communities concerning resource distribution decisions within specific social institutions. It also requires critical analysis of ‘conflict sensitive’ allocation criteria that legitimise inequalities and shape perceptions of deliberate exclusion.

These findings have implications for broader critical discussions of the role of inequalities in peacebuilding. They illustrate the need for analysis of specific ways in which political, economic, and cultural aspects of inequality are reproduced within and through education systems (through resource distribution, political representation, and recognition of difference) and other social institutions, and links to wider political,
economic, and cultural systems. They also illustrate the importance of analysing specific forms and dimensions of ‘inequality’ privileged in social policies, those that are obscured or ‘accepted’, and how this intersects with dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding. Efforts to promote transformative, ‘just’ peacebuilding therefore ought to explicitly address the redistribution of education resources (material, human, etc.) and services and opportunities for participation in policy decision-making, in response to historical patterns of marginalisation and inequality as well as contemporary differences in priorities and preferences across regions and communities.

My findings confirm critical arguments that (‘liberal’) responses to inequality and exclusion largely aim to integrate populations into existing structures rather than working for structural transformation (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 566–8, 2010b, p. 667; Mac Ginty, 2012, pp. 170–1). While some scholars acknowledge that ‘service provision’ may illustrate external influence and control (Richmond, 2008b, p. 299; Lidén, 2009, pp. 620–2; Mitchell, 2011, p. 1624; Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 269), they do not always explicitly consider the ways in which ‘service provision/delivery’ might facilitate these processes. My findings illustrate the importance of analysing how education and other social institutions reproduce and legitimise existing structures and simultaneously (attempt to) integrate populations into these structures. My findings build on critical peacebuilding discussions concerning ‘governmentality’ and ‘discipline’ in peacebuilding interventions. Education provides a specific, and effective, means of shaping the conduct, behaviours, and attitudes of (and thus administering, disciplining, and governing) populations that present ‘threats’ to stability (Duffield, 2007b, p. 239, 2007a, pp. 16–24, 217–8, 2001, p. 42; Jabri, 2010, p. 53), through encounters with systems used to meet basic needs (Mitchell, 2011, pp. 1630–1). This occurs through a focus on ‘self-reliance’ (Duffield, 2007a, pp. 68–9), illustrated by the transfer of financing responsibilities to communities and households, and through policies and programmes focused on education’s ‘civilising’ and ‘modernising’ function.

The second broad direction for transformative, just, and sustainable peacebuilding discussed in the critical peacebuilding literature concerns the promotion of ‘local’ engagement, participation, representation, and ownership as part of peacebuilding processes. The literature frames ‘participation’ in terms of opportunities, at all levels of peacebuilding projects, for ‘local’ actors to define peacebuilding needs, strategies, and objectives (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 149, 2011b, pp. 47–67, 2015, p. 840; Lidén, 2009, p. 628; Autesserre, 2010, pp. 248–70; Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2012, p. 6;

My empirical findings illustrate how ‘participation’ processes play out in a specific social institution at multiple ‘local’ scales (e.g. subnational governments, schools, households), including who participates and how. This has implications for critical peacebuilding analysis, extending the focus beyond ‘service delivery/provision’ to decision-making and governance arrangements informing policy processes, resource distribution, and management priorities and directions. My findings illustrate the importance of considering ‘local’ actors at the ‘border’ between state and community, including subnational education officials, school managers, teachers, and school management committees. This involves attention to dual roles as community representatives and mediators between government and populations, as well as multiple loyalties and forms of accountability affecting ‘local’ roles and representation. Critical peacebuilding analyses should also examine relations and dynamics of power between different ‘local’ actors, as illustrated by findings concerning interactions between subnational ministry levels, subnational officials and schools, and so on.

My findings confirm and advance critical peacebuilding discussions by illustrating specific means and practices through which patterns of authority are reinforced within a social institution that effectively extends authority and influence from global to central (national) to ‘local’ levels. Some critical scholars explain that the advancement of a hegemonic (neoliberal) projects require a ‘politics of support’ and a ‘politics of power’, preventing resistance or discussion of alternatives (Pugh, 2005, p. 31; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008b, pp. 2–3; Taylor, 2010, pp. 159–67). My findings illustrate the means through which this is managed within a particular social institution, including specific narratives used to encourage and legitimise neoliberal education projects. They also illustrate the need to locate social institutions (or ‘services’) within wider political systems and ‘cultures’. These represent entry points for understanding how power and influence might be (re)distributed in ‘local’ contexts. Education governance arrangements have wider political implications, reflecting and reproducing broader political structures and presenting entry points for transformation across multiple sectors (Shizha, 2005, p. 75; Dupuy, 2008b, p. 150; Smith, 2010, p. 23; Boak,
Efforts to support transformative, ‘just’ peacebuilding should engage with and aim to strengthen the decision-making opportunities and influence of the ‘local’ actors identified above, operating between the state and communities. This should also involve attention to the ‘cultures’ of power within these ‘micro’ contexts (within school management contexts, subnational ministry contexts, and so on).

When discussing questions of state-society relations and ‘local’ participation, the peacebuilding literature tends to focus on international- or national-level governance or the ‘grassroots’ level, with less attention to processes and institutions linking the two. My findings illustrate the significance of education as a key site of contact between communities, state authority, and international and global influences. For example, ‘global’ neoliberal projects advanced by international donors are operationalised through national ‘decentralisation’ policies, which directly engage communities and households through school-based management and financing. This illustrates the importance, in critical peacebuilding analyses, of tracing the linkages between scales of action and the roles of specific social institutions in ‘operationalising’ particular political and economic projects at ‘local’ levels.

political elites. In these ways, education systems reflect and reproduce not only ‘global’ (e.g. neoliberal) influences, but also national and ‘local’ relations of power.

Some critical peacebuilding scholars suggest that responses to ‘everyday’ or ‘welfare’ needs, including service delivery, can serve as mechanisms of external (rather than ‘local’) control and influence, advancing hegemonic political and economic projects (Taylor, 2007, pp. 556–8, 2010, pp. 154–62; Richmond, 2008b, p. 299; Lidén, 2009, pp. 620–2; Mac Ginty, 2011b, p. 84; Mitchell, 2011, pp. 1624–40; Roberts, 2011b, p. 416; Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 269). My findings illustrate specific mechanisms of influence within the education sector, including ‘global’ influences on national education policies and the advancement of political and economic agendas of decentralisation, privatisation, and so on. My findings also illustrate the ways in which education advances ‘national’ (not only ‘external’) elite-driven priorities and interests. Linked to the notion of ‘local’ engagement, the participation of ‘local’ authorities, school managers, and households in education management maintains rather than challenges existing structures and relations of power and influence. The framing of educational inequalities and education’s peacebuilding contributions in ‘cultural’ terms also depoliticises these processes and masks elite dynamics of violence.

As noted above, the critical peacebuilding literature generally pays limited attention to ‘cultural’ dimensions of inequality. Similarly, it pays limited attention to aspects of ‘cultural’ identification and difference associated with ‘everyday’ dimensions of peacebuilding. Some critical scholars (Chandler, 2010a, p. 369; Jabri, 2010, pp. 43–7; Richmond, 2010b, p. 668) acknowledge the ways in which discourses of ‘culture’ and ‘otherness’ are used to justify and depoliticise inequalities and violence as well as ‘peacebuilding’ interventions. This is linked to broader critiques of externally-driven peacebuilding interventions as (neo)colonial, reproducing historical systems of power and domination over ‘non-Western’ populations (Duffield, 2001, pp. 31–2; Heathershaw, 2008, p. 620; Richmond, 2009a, pp. 565–8; Darby, 2010, pp. 701–5; Jabri, 2010, p. 53, 2013, p. 8; Taylor, 2010, p. 156; Pugh, 2011, p. 314; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 176; Sabaratnam, 2017, pp. 136–41). However, critical peacebuilding discussions of the role of ‘social services’ do not explicitly acknowledge the ways in which ‘service provision’ can reproduce such dynamics.

My empirical findings illustrate specific ways in which these processes occur within a specific social/institutional context, through both formal and informal discourses and practices. They also suggest that critical analyses ought to explicitly
consider the ‘cultural’ dimensions of violence associated with ‘everyday’ engagement. This includes attention to specific ways in which social institutions engage with questions of identification and difference and reproduce (or challenge) (neo)colonial forms of violence, such as the framing of education’s peacebuilding role in terms of ‘civilisation’, ‘modernisation’, and pacification. Given their role as central sites and mechanisms of colonisation (and other forms of international intervention), education systems are particularly relevant to critical analyses of the (neo)colonial dimensions of peacebuilding interventions. This includes attention to continuities in colonial processes under the guise of ‘inclusion’ and ‘wellbeing’ of communities. Efforts to promote transformative, just peacebuilding might therefore explicitly challenge such framings of the potential contributions of social institutions and services, and consider mechanisms for ‘recognising’ identity and difference in policy and practice (including forms and content of education).

My empirical findings illustrate the significance of perceptions of inequalities, marginalisation, and exclusion. Critical peacebuilding analysis of engagement with ‘everyday’ priorities and processes, efforts to strengthen ‘local’ participation, and responses to systems of inequality should involve a focus on perceptions and interpretations in addition to ‘actual’ inequalities in resources and services and formal systems of distribution, representation, and recognition. Similarly, critical peacebuilding discussions of ‘social services’ generally concentrate on formal policy responses. My empirical findings illustrate the need to consider informal discourses as part of critical peacebuilding analysis, including as part of broader analysis of engagement with ‘everyday’ priorities, ‘local’ participation, and responses to systems of inequality, and more specific analysis of the roles of social institutions such as education.

Finally, my empirical findings advance critical peacebuilding discussions by exploring some relations between systems of inequality and aspects of the ‘local’ and ‘everyday’. They illustrate some ways in which efforts to support one dimension of justice might undermine another (Fraser, 2008a, pp. 33–5). Some critical peacebuilding scholars acknowledge, for example, the ways in which neoliberal interventions focusing on ‘productive’ self-reliance can reproduce and widen ‘distributional’ inequalities (Duffield, 2001, p. 51, 2010b, pp. 65–6, Richmond, 2008b, p. 295, 2009a, pp. 562–6, 2012, pp. 359–68, 2014, pp. 450–64, Pugh, 2010, pp. 263–8, 2011, pp. 312–3; Cooper, Turner and Pugh, 2011, p. 2006; Newman, 2011, pp. 1743–4; Howarth, 2014, pp. 261, 295). Detailed analysis of social institutions such as education provides insight into
specific processes and sites through which this occurs. For example, ‘decentralisation’ efforts intended to support ‘local’ participation can entrench distributional (geographic) inequalities in resources and services when education financing responsibilities are transferred to subnational governments, communities, and households. Responses to ‘everyday’ (‘welfare’) needs through inclusion in formal education might reproduce cultural forms of violence against certain communities. This illustrates the complexity of education’s potential peacebuilding roles, and the need to consider interactions between multiple (political, economic, cultural) forms of inequality and injustice.

My empirical findings provide insight into the implications of education for critical peacebuilding debates concerning responses to systems of inequality and engagement with the ‘local’ and ‘everyday’, and for peacebuilding processes and outcomes more broadly, as part of wider critiques of ‘liberal’ peacebuilding approaches. My findings also draw attention to the need to consider the ways in which these issues are reflected in and (re)produced through other ‘social’ institutions and ‘basic’ services, such as health systems, housing support, and so on. This requires attention to aspects of resource and service distribution, decision-making and management, and engagement with identification and difference across a range of social institutions and systems, and their implications for both violence and peacebuilding.

9.4 Implications for Policy and Practice

My empirical findings provide insight into possible entry points (in multiple areas and at multiple scales) for political, economic, and ‘cultural’ transformation and contributions to more just, sustainable peacebuilding. In this section, I identify implications for policy and practice, of potential relevance to UN agencies, donor agencies and development organisations, and government institutions in both peacebuilding and education sectors. As noted in Chapter 1, education alone cannot address peacebuilding challenges. However, engagement with education can play a much greater role in supporting peacebuilding processes in South Sudan and other conflict-affected contexts. The implications outlined below reflect the assumption that, in peacebuilding efforts, inequalities should be “acknowledged as a starting point rather than as merely an inconvenient fact at local, state and global levels” (Richmond, 2016, p. 56). While inequalities alone do not drive conflict, they do have significant implications for reproducing and maintaining dynamics of violence underpinning conflict. Responses to inequalities are thus critically important to peacebuilding.
Persistent inequalities and structural injustices represent forms of violence that reproduce conflict dynamics in ‘post-conflict’ contexts and threaten peacebuilding goals (Cramer, 2006, p. 245; Roberts, 2011a, p. 2540; Keen, 2012, p. 771; Newman, 2013, p. 318; Richmond, 2014, pp. 449–50). Sustainable, ‘positive’ peacebuilding thus involves addressing underlying causes of conflict, including structural inequality and injustice (Galtung, 1969, p. 183). This requires the promotion of social justice, transforming ‘institutionalised obstacles’ preventing people’s full participation in social life and interaction through the distribution of material resources, representation in political processes and decision-making, and ‘cultural’ respect and valorisation (Fraser, 2008a, p. 17, 2013, pp. 164–7, 193). As indicated by my empirical findings, this requires attention to relationships between communities and governments and between groups or geographic communities: “Where group differences exist such that some groups as privileged while others are oppressed, achieving economic and social justice requires explicitly attending to these relationships” (Hill Collins, 1998, p. xiv).

The policy and practice implications of my empirical findings focus on aspects of education resource and service (re)distribution, forms of representation and participation in decision-making and management, and engagement with identification and difference. In relation to the distribution of education resources and services, policy and practice implications include:

- Considering the revision of resource allocation policies, such as subnational budget transfers, to promote equitable allocation (through redistribution) in response to existing disparities across geographic communities, rather than ‘equal’ allocation based on existing resources (e.g. schools, personnel).
- Considering not only the total amount or budget allocated to the education sector, but also how funds are allocated within the sector. This includes a careful examination of activities and forms of education that are privileged and marginalised (e.g. alternative education), and associated implications for inequalities and conflict.
- Exploring and adopting a more critical concept of ‘conflict sensitivity’ in relation to resource allocation criteria or guidelines. This includes considering and responding to inequalities reproduced and entrenched through the implementation of ‘conflict-sensitive’ or ‘transparent’ criteria across geographic regions and communities.
• Considering and acknowledging continuities/challenges in previous statements and (perceived) commitments concerning education (by political authorities such as the SPLM/A, for example), moving away from an ahistorical view of education and associated expectations.

• Considering *perceptions* of resource allocation decisions, explicitly addressing resource provision expectations when conducting assessments or evaluations involving schools and ‘local’ authorities, and ensuring that decisions (e.g. why programmes and resources are provided in some schools, *payams*, or counties and not in others) are clearly communicated to ‘local’ officials, school managers, teachers, and students. This can contribute to managing perceptions of (deliberate) exclusion from resource allocation, and associated grievances.

• Addressing more ‘political’ dimensions of inequality in policy and practice, moving beyond ‘individualised’ aspects to address geographic, socioeconomic, and collective (e.g. ethnic, livelihoods) inequalities linked to conflict dynamics. Targeted, systematic, redistributive policy and programme responses to these inequalities can contribute to addressing other dimensions of inequality (such as the education of girls and students with disabilities).

In relation to forms of *participation* in decision-making and management, policy and practice implications include:

• Facilitating the participation of county and *payam* officials and school managers in policy and curriculum development and revision processes. Although this would require more time and resources, it would facilitate opportunities for influence over decision-making as well as recognition and representation of the significant diversity within states (ethnic, geographic, livelihood, etc.).

• Explicitly and formally recognising the central role of communities, through PTAs and other school management committees, as crucial ‘local’ actors in both peacebuilding and ‘development’ processes. Financial and labour contributions to service provision and management ought to be linked to expanded opportunities for influence over policy decisions as well as consistent communication of policy decisions from central and subnational levels.

• Considering relations and perceptions of trust and legitimacy between MoEST/government levels, rather than focusing only on ‘state-society’ relations. This includes relations between national and subnational levels and between
different subnational levels (e.g. state, county, payam). This involves attention to the ways in which central and state officials engage with county and payam officials and school managers, in administration and communication.

- Considering and avoiding government and international partner (donor, INGO) actions that contradict or undermine existing positions and authority of subnational government officials (for example, by bypassing county and payam offices when approaching schools).

- Considering horizontal dimensions of participation and influence, in addition to vertical relations between communities and government or between levels of government. This might involve sharing information, knowledge, experiences, struggles, and strategies between school managers, county or payam officials, and others.

- Considering the education system as an entry point for transformative approaches to governance across different government institutions and sectors. This is of significance for governance and peacebuilding actors, given the role of the education system (and education sector actors) as a mediator between the state and populations.

In relation to engagement with identification and difference within and through the education sector, policy and practice implications include:

- Involving members of diverse geographic, ‘cultural’, and livelihood communities (including cattle-keeping and rural communities) in the development of education policies and curricula. This can support the development of policies and curricula that recognise the cultural and economic systems, knowledge, and priorities of diverse communities, based on communities’ decisions about the ways in which they are represented, as well as providing opportunities for representation in decision-making.

- Considering questions of ‘relevance’ in education forms and curricula, responding to different ‘identities’, histories, and ‘cultural’ and livelihood systems of communities (e.g. cattle-keeping or rural communities). However, the concept of ‘relevance’ should be critically interrogated, to avoid reifying dimensions of identification and difference.

- Critically considering and challenging explanations of education’s peacebuilding contributions based on ‘cultural’ or livelihood change in both formal policies
and informal discourses. This could contribute to aims of recognition, respect, and valorisation of diverse communities and their livelihoods. This is important not only for education sector actors, but for security and peacebuilding actors engaging with different ‘cultural’ and livelihood communities.

- Engaging in open discussion of tensions between recognition of difference and national ‘unity’ within/through education institutions and content. This might include explicit attention to commonalities and differences in historical experiences, practices, and expectations, in policy discussions and curriculum content. However, the potential for ‘shared’ histories and identities to entrench systems of cultural and political marginalisation must also be considered.

- Incorporating historical analysis into education and peacebuilding policy planning and conflict analysis, involving attention to legacies of and continuities in colonial and post-independence violence in policies and programmes. This challenges ahistorical and apolitical perspectives focusing on interpersonal aspects of violence rather than structural or systemic dimensions.

- Taking seriously the implications of ‘informal’ narratives advanced by education-sector authorities. This involves attending to the ways in which education and peacebuilding actors, including ministry, donor, and NGO/CSO representatives speak about and engage with different communities, and the ways in which this reproduces historical (colonial) dynamics of violence.

My empirical findings suggest that education policy and programme responses in South Sudan, as in many other conflict-contexts, are shaped by global, international, and national interests and priorities and, in many ways, represent mechanisms of social order and control. However, as one of the most widespread public institutions, the education system also represents a mechanism through which to address ‘local’ and ‘everyday’ dimensions of inequality and injustice as part of peacebuilding analysis and intervention. Strengthening education’s peacebuilding contributions involves changes to organisational or institutional perspectives, assumptions, and practices among donors, UN education and security actors, national and international NGOs, and national government actors and institutions. As Butler (2004, p. 204) explains, social transformation requires “interventions at social and political levels that involve actions, sustained labor, and institutionalized practice”. Active engagement with education as a contributor to peacebuilding ought to occur both during and after situations of violent conflict. Waiting until conflict has ‘ended’ (following a ‘security first’ approach) to
consider education’s peacebuilding role leads to the reproduction and exacerbation of inequality and violence and misses crucial opportunities for transformative action for a more just and sustainable peace.

As one South Sudanese peacebuilding representative explained, “Education may not necessarily be a guarantee to peace”. However, education does provide numerous entry points for contributing to peacebuilding. The findings outlined in this thesis illustrate the complexity and tensions of education’s peacebuilding role: it is one of the key socio-political institutions through which political, economic, and cultural forms of violence are reproduced and legitimised, while also one of the most (potentially) transformative. This presents valuable insights for the critical peacebuilding literature, and for peacebuilding debates and processes more broadly.
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### Decentralised Roles and Responsibilities in the Education Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central MoEST</th>
<th>State MoEST</th>
<th>County education department (CED)</th>
<th>Payam education office</th>
<th>School governing bodies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Develop policies, standards, strategies, and curricula</td>
<td>- Disseminate education policies and guidelines</td>
<td>- Deliver primary and alternative education (with <em>payam</em> offices)</td>
<td>- Participate in county planning and budgeting</td>
<td>- Formulate school development plan and budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Determine education staff distribution across states</td>
<td>- Develop plans and budgets based on national policies and strategies</td>
<td>- Manage County Education Centres, <em>payam</em> education offices</td>
<td>- Deliver primary and alternative education (with CEDs)</td>
<td>- Manage school funds, including capitation grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Set qualifications and responsibilities of teachers and education managers</td>
<td>- Allocate state and county transfers</td>
<td>- Manage budget transfers for CEDs, <em>payam</em> offices, schools</td>
<td>- Manage day-to-day contact with schools</td>
<td>- Purchase materials with school funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Develop sector budgets, allocate resources to states</td>
<td>- Monitor primary and alternative education delivery</td>
<td>- Manage teacher transfers and supervision</td>
<td>- Conduct school inspections</td>
<td>- Day-to-day supervision of head teachers and teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Manage secondary exams and national assessments</td>
<td>- Deliver secondary education and TVET</td>
<td>- Supervise education infrastructure</td>
<td>- Support PTAs and SMCs (with CEDs)</td>
<td>- Monitor student and teacher attendance and achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Manage EMIS</td>
<td>- Recruit, deploy, and manage teachers</td>
<td>- Compile inspection reports and send to state ministry</td>
<td>- Monitor use of capitation grants</td>
<td>- Provide EMIS data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Monitor state-level service delivery</td>
<td>- Coordinate in-service teacher training</td>
<td>- Manage county EMIS data</td>
<td>- Collect EMIS data</td>
<td>- Collaborate with school inspectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Manage TTls and national secondary schools</td>
<td>- Manage state inspection system</td>
<td>- Monitor PTAs and SMCs (with <em>payam</em> offices)</td>
<td>- Report on budget performance to state ministry</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2. Interview and Discussion Guides and Transcript Excerpts

Interview guide for key stakeholders (MoEST, donors, organisations)

Thank you so much for agreeing to help me with this research. These questions are only a guide, so we might not cover all of them, and we might talk about other issues as well. I may have some follow-up questions depending on your answers. As explained in the Information Sheet and Consent Form, you can refuse to answer any of these questions and you can decide to end this interview at any time.

1. Could you tell me a little about your role in relation to education in South Sudan?
   Peacebuilding organisations: Could you tell me a little about your role in relation to peacebuilding in South Sudan?

2. What are some of the main challenges facing the education system?
   School managers: What are some of the main challenges facing your school?

3. How do you think the education system is related to the on-going tensions and conflict in the country? In your state or county?

4. In what way do you think educational governance systems and practices (for example, management or policy reform) are addressing or contributing to tensions and conflict?

5. Which areas of the country or state do you think require most educational attention and effort?
   Is there sufficient attention to these areas? If not, why do you think that is?

6. Which sectors of the education system do you think require the most attention to address inequalities?
   Is there sufficient attention to these inequalities? If not, why do you think that is?

7. What role have international actors played in contributing to addressing educational inequalities? In contributing to addressing peacebuilding?

8. Education and peacebuilding actors: How do you collaborate with international organisations in education development? In peacebuilding
   International organisations: How do you collaborate with the Ministry of Education in education development?
   Subnational ministries: How do you hear about policies and decisions that are made in Juba?

9. How do you think education can contribute to peacebuilding in South Sudan?

10. What policies and strategies do you think should be adopted in order to better address educational inequalities? To better contribute to peacebuilding?

11. Is there anything else that you wish to share or that you think is important to discuss?
Focus group discussion guide (teachers and students)

Thank you so much for agreeing to help me with this research. These questions are only a guide, so we might not cover all of them, and we might talk about other issues as well. I may have some follow-up questions depending on your answers. As explained in the Information Sheet and Consent Form, you can refuse to answer any of these questions and you can decide to leave this discussion at any time.

1. What are some of the main challenges facing the education system? Your school?

2. How do you think the education system is related to the on-going tensions and conflict in the country? In your state or county?

3. Which areas of the education system do you think require the most attention to address inequalities?

4. Is there sufficient attention to these inequalities? If not, why do you think that is?

5. Teachers: How do you collaborate with international organisations? With the Ministry of Education?

6. Teachers: How do you hear about policies and decisions that are made by the Ministry of Education?

7. How do you think education can contribute to peacebuilding in South Sudan? In your community?

8. What strategies do you think can help to better address educational inequalities? To better contribute to peacebuilding?

9. Is there anything else that you wish to share or that you think is important to discuss?
Interview 1

So first, could you tell me a little bit about your role in the education system?

Yeah, thank you. My role in the education system is that I, I oversee actually all activities of the ministry. And in the ministry, there are several directorates and there are directors and deputy directors, inspectors, etcetera in every directorate. For instance, we have the directorate of secondary schools, primary schools, early childhood development, private schools, vocational training schools, alternative education system, even we have administration, and yeah, administration and others. So all these fall under me, and I supervise their work. I have to see that they that [inaudible] of their plans of work, and they execute the plans and if, at all if there is somebody who has not executed his plan, so I need, I need to know why. And then I have to know, to collect information about the functionality of the directorates. What are the programmes, the difficulties so that, especially at this moment, when the national government does not have money to run most of the educational activities, so I have to know their annual work plans, so that when, when I have partners coming to ask, then it’s better for me to share with the partners where we have the gaps, where the particular partner can give [inaudible], then I have to liaise the partner with the particular directorate. Yeah, and then I have to account also to give my reports to the minister, all the activities taking place in the ministry on a daily basis, monthly, quarterly, and annual, basis. Also, subsequently, forwarding the reports to the national government so that the national government can see how far we have gone with the educational activities in the state, yeah. And also to coordinate any requisitions from the national government, any issues emerging they write to me then I have to, to disseminate to various communities. And also, not only the directorates here, we have counties, we have 10 counties and about 51 payams. So we, at the county level we have county commission directors, and then at payam level we have payam education supervisors, and then we have headmasters in secondary schools, head teachers in secondary schools and primary schools. So all those network of education supervisors.

That sounds like a lot of coordination, a huge network.

Yeah, yeah.

Okay. And so you mentioned some of the divisions of responsibilities, the collection of information from, for example, the county level or directorates, and the transmission of information to the minister and to the national level. What are, what are some of the specific responsibilities that are, that have been devolved to the state level? What are some the specific responsibilities of the state ministry?

Yeah, yeah, of course, as far as the budget, budgeting is concerned, I’m the signatory to the accounting, the procedures of the ministry, and then the, the accounting activities are coordinated or carried out by the administration unit, whereby this accounting section, etcetera, the payments, etcetera. So they prepare, then they will bring to me, I have to go through to approve so that the payment is done. And any requisition which is brought to administration is also [inaudible] to me, so I am the final person to approve any use, any financial use in the ministry. And even when there, in the salaries for example, come from Juba, so the account department prepare the [inaudible], I have to sign them, write the requisition, I have to sign all of those requisitions, so that the monies are transferred. So for accountability purposes, yeah.

Okay. And is, and that’s money transferred to the county level, or-

Yeah.
Okay. And so when you’re talking about the, the salaries that are sent from Juba for example, those are the state transfers?

[Nod]

Okay. And are the, how are decisions about the amount and the use of state transfer funds, how are those made? Are those decisions made at the level of the state?

No. Actually at the moment, the transfers are just what we call Chapter 1, which is salary transfer. And then another transfer is the operating transfer, which goes right to the counties, which we have been allocated from the headquarters. Then they come just through the account of the ministry and we make the transfer to the counties. Then for salaries, also the same. They come, we transfer. The only thing we can decide upon is the operation costs, which is a limited amount that we use for running fuel, vehicles, everything, other services that we decide upon. And for that one we, when it comes we sit as a, a group, a committee, then we raise, we receive requests for services. Then we have to prioritise, and because the money’s not enough, so that’s why we have to prioritise, so that we can at least solve issues which are for high priority, and we have issues that are not prioritised, we can [inaudible] them for many other months. Yeah.

Okay. What are some examples of issues that are prioritised?

Actually here in the ministry, there are vehicles, of course, running, we need fuel, we need fuel for electricity, and then we need services, if there is any, any visit around the [inaudible]. So we give priority to that. And the operation of the directorates. So when there is anything, when there is communication or [inaudible], we have to communicate with the payam, with the counties, etcetera. So we have to prioritise fuel, we have to prioritise car, vehicle maintenance, we have to prioritise Internet use, for example, we have to prioritise airtime allocation for every directorate, so that if anybody is sent on a mission anywhere, because he is able to communicate back. Any time we are able to call from here to the counties and get information, yeah, for communication and so on. So those are the things that we prioritise, and also if there is a planned visit to a school or schools, etcetera, we also prioritise that, for fuel and maybe something for survival, DSA, etcetera. We have to prioritise what activity is for the benefit of education. So those are what we actually prioritise. Yeah.

Interview 2

First, could you tell me a little bit about your role in the Ministry of Education?

Yes, yeah, my position?

Yes. What is your role and responsibilities?

Me, I’m here in the ministry, I’m acting director for general education, basic and secondary. And of course, my role, I’m the first man in the ministry here, after the Minister and Director General and Director for Quality Promotion. My work here is to, to monitor, to monitor how the director of basic education or primary education is monitoring or is implementing the policy and is implementing the, the ministry plan to run the primary schools, yeah, even secondary schools, yeah. So the director of primary schools and secondary schools are under me, and we are always sharing all the information and we are implementing the policy of the government together, yeah. I don’t interfere in the, in their work unless if there is something very difficult, but they are free to, they are free to implement their work, then me, it’s I’m just like I’m just monitoring, and if there is any obstacle then I will, I can be a mediator between the director, Directorate of General Education and the director for general and the minister. This is my role in the ministry.
Okay, all right. And when you talk about the ministry plans for schools, are those the plans that are developed at the central ministry in Juba?

Yes, for sure, all the, the government or the national ministry in Juba is always the one who plan. After they plan, they plan for the, actually they plan, they give us the final, the plan and the information required from us, yeah, at the level of the state. There is a plan at the national level and also there’s a plan for the, at the state level to be implemented. And from there we came down, used to go down from [the] level of the ministry to the county, payam, up to the schools.

Okay, okay. And when the, the plans and the policies are developed in Juba, does the state ministry participate in some of that decision-making, have the chance to offer suggestions?

Yes, yeah. Yeah, sometimes they call us. If it is necessary, they call us to go to Juba, all the states, all the 10 states. We go there and they share information with us. We used to make a workshop together and, and give ideas to, and share them, to share them with the other states, together, then this thing will be a government, the national ministry used to adopt these ideas and it became disseminated, yeah. But not always. Sometimes they just send us any, they can decide and we have to implement. But sometimes they ask us to share with them.

Okay. Do you think that the state ministries are sufficiently involved in the planning and the decision-making, so that you can help inform, make sure that policies and plans are relevant for all the different states?

Yeah, yeah, the state ministries are involved to make decisions, yeah.

Interview 3

I want to come back to one of the questions I had asked, I had asked earlier about rural areas or rural families, isolation. You talked about those being some of the, the major inequalities or disparities in the education sector. Are donors or different partners, are there any programmes or policies to address some of those inequalities?

Yeah.

So what are some examples of what people are doing to address these disparities?

Okay, now on the side of the government there is, there is gender issue which is addressing the issue of specific to the women, both in the rural areas and outside. And then there are policies, some [inaudible] supported by partners, and the government policy of the [family?].

Okay. What’s the name of the policy? Which directorate or ministry is supporting that?

Uh, the, the ministry supporting it is uh, Gender and Social Welfare, yeah.

Okay, I see. Okay. But in terms of specifically education in isolated areas or education in rural areas, are there any programmes, even donor programmes that are addressing those issues?

I think the other things fit under this broader issue, yeah. When the donors come they, they support activities like this, yeah.

Okay, okay. So the donors might support some of those gender-

Yeah, and girls’ education problems, girls’ education movement, and then AIDS, and then also now girls’ education movement started with GESS, Girls’ Education South Sudan. So now, if
you can see, the capitation grants is the major one that is going to all different communities because it is targeting where these schools are, and so it will support uh, going to these communities, yeah. And then also WFP, they give uh, something called girls’ incentive, if the girl comes to school within 22 days, then they are given some, some incentive for use for the food, to girls, to the parents, so that the parents allow them, so they get to come to school, yeah.

All right. Okay. So we’re talking about equality, questions of equality, questions of equity. What, for you, what does equality mean, in terms of education?

Okay, in terms of education, equity is, to me it means even this disadvantaged group, like women or disabilities, disability people, people with special needs, and then equality, in myself, it means giving it to everybody, regardless of, of what status they are. Yeah, yeah.

Okay. So to address different inequalities, disparities in education, you’ve mentioned some of the things that the government and the donors are already doing. What else do you think needs to be done? What types of policies, what programmes do you think need to be developed in order to respond to the main inequalities in education?

One is the decentralisation. That is good decentralisation, not the type of decentralisation that you can see and you call someone in your family and say this is decentralised and then [inaudible]. So you can involve the community in their own [inaudible] everything. And then what the community plus those in that grassroots feel that government should do, then the, then this is what the government will do and what donors have to go in to support, yeah. The other thing also is to address all these, we have to separate the difference between, because now we are using both quality and quantity, because last time there was no education in the whole South Sudan, so we need, we are focusing now on access, and to have access, there must be quality. So there, we need, as on my point, education has to be prioritised in the [inaudible]. Not just saying it is priority one when the funding is not there. If you see donors, donors they think that priority should be for other areas, not for education, and they say ‘Education, no, this is a long-term programme’. So it has to, donors, both donors and the government has to see the issue of education.

Interview 4

Before we end, is there anything that you think that is, if we’re talking about education and conflict and peacebuilding, do you think there’s anything that anything particularly important that you feel I should know or that we might have missed in our conversation?

Yeah, it’s also, to, to have this peace among the people, the community should be also aware, the community. There are people, you call the community and the community is not aware, there should be workshops, awareness for the communities to, to be aware about the peace and all these things. And it’s the life, life skills, yeah, to start in the community to know, and then they will also participate in providing peace in the, among themselves in the community.

And what might be some, some ways to engage the community in that type of learning?

So you do workshops, yeah, move the communities through the- In the schools we have what is called parent-teacher associations, PTA. Through these PTAs we can build the communities and then, then they’re aware, aware about what is going on and all these things, yeah. And then something must happen, happening, what can they do when conflict happens, all these things.

And parent-teacher associations, are they active in many schools now, or has that been a challenge?
Yeah, in many schools they are active, in many schools they are active. Because they are the one to monitor also the work of the school, and if there is any problem in the school also, they solve the problems, and also if there is need, like we want to have a teacher’s house or something like that. So we have to, also to contribute, to construct a house for teacher. If they want their children to be, to be taught or to learn, they have to also construct house for the teacher, yeah. And also from the school, if we are constructing these temporary learning spaces, so they have to also participate in this. Because if you leave them, also you will see that the organisation like UNICEF comes, constructs learning spaces and the community is not participating. They will say, ‘Ah, this school belong to UNICEF, not belong to the community, this school belong to UNICEF or belong to the government there’. This is what the community will say now, but if they are participating in constructing, ‘This is our school, this is ours’. Yes, yeah.
Appendix 3. Letter of Approval for Research in South Sudan

The Republic of South Sudan
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
Office of The Undersecretary

RSS/MOEST/OU/17.A.1

Date: 10th March, 2015

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This letter serves to certify that Gabrielle Daoost, a doctoral student from the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom is doing academic research on “How approaches to inclusion and Equality in Education Policies contribute to processes of Peacebuilding in South Sudan” as part of the fulfillment for the PhD programme.

The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology has given Gabrielle Daoost an approval to conduct her research on this particular area of research and be attached to University of Juba.

The office of the Undersecretary would be grateful in advance for any necessary assistance accorded to the Researcher for the success of academic venture. In case of any inquiry, please contact office of the Undersecretary on this Cellphone +211 955208000 or E-mail: michalopuke@ganil.com

With regards

Michael Lopuke Lotyam
Undersecretary
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
Republic of South Sudan
Juba

CC: Hon. Minister – Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
    Hon. Deputy Minister – Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
    File

Ministerial Complex, P.O Box 567, Juba South Sudan
Appendix 4. Information Sheet and Consent Form

Information sheet

Study title: Education, Inequality, and Peacebuilding in South Sudan

Invitation: You are being invited to take part in a research study on education, inequality, and peacebuilding. Before you decide to participate in this study, it is important for you to understand why this study is being done and what it will involve. Please read the following information carefully. You can discuss it with others if you wish, and you should feel free to ask the researcher if you have any questions about the study.

What is the purpose of this study? The purpose of this study is to understand how education can affect peacebuilding after conflict. This includes studying what different people think about education, inequality, and peace, as well as the different roles of government, international organisations, and schools. Participants will include government representatives from central, state, and county levels; representatives of international and non-government organisations; school managers; teachers; and students. This part of the study will last for around 10 months and will be completed in August 2015.

Why have I been invited to participate? You are being invited to participate in this study because of your role in the education system or education development in South Sudan, and the ideas that you can share about education and inequality, including policies and programmes, in the country / state / county / payam / school / community.

Do I have to take part? Participation in this study is completely voluntary. It is up to you to decide if you wish to take part in the study or not. You are free to refuse to participate. Even if you decide to participate now, you can refuse to answer certain questions or you can choose to withdraw from the study at any time, and there will be no negative consequences. If you wish to withdraw from the study, you can simply tell the researcher that you no longer wish to participate. You do not have to give a reason, and you can ask that the information you provided be destroyed.

What will happen if I take part? If you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to take part in a one-on-one interview / focus group discussion. The researcher will ask you to share your ideas about how education can affect peacebuilding, and about education policies and programmes. This discussion will last around 1 to 1.5 hours, and you can choose where the interview will take place. The researcher will take notes, and you will be asked if the discussion can be audio-recorded so that it can later be transcribed. The researcher may contact you after the interview if there are any additional questions.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? Participating in this study will take around 1 to 1.5 hours of your time. The discussion will take place at a location that you choose, to make it as convenient as possible for you. The discussion might cause some feelings of stress, if difficult experiences such as conflict, violence, or being excluded are discussed. The researcher will not ask any questions about your personal experiences in these areas. These experiences will only be discussed if you introduce them and the discussion will continue only as long as you decide. If you feel upset at any time you can decide to refuse to answer any questions, end the interview, or end your participation in the study.
What are the possible benefits of taking part? Participation in this project will provide an opportunity to share your thoughts about education, inequality, and peacebuilding in South Sudan. It is important to study these issues in order to have a better understanding of how different people are included in education and the possible role of education in building peace. The study findings will be shared with representatives from the government and international organisations who are involved in the education system. Your ideas will be valuable for government ministries and organisations that wish to understand how to address inequalities in education and the role that education can play in peacebuilding.

Will my information in this study be kept confidential? Personal information will only be collected with your consent. The information that you share will only be identified by a code on documents and in the research reports. In reports or presentations, your name, position title, and county / payam / school name will never be identified. All of your personal information will be kept confidential by the researcher and will not be shared with anyone, except if required by law. For focus group discussions: Other group members will hear the responses you share, and confidentiality will be requested but cannot be guaranteed for the group discussion.

You can ask the researcher to remove and destroy your information even after the interview. You can do this at any time until the written report has been prepared, then the information cannot be removed from the report. You can ask the researcher for a copy of the transcript of the interview to review and provide comments before it is included in the research report. All of the research documents and recordings will be stored and saved in a locked cabinet or on a password-protected computer that only the researcher can access. The information that you share will only be used for the purposes of the study described in this document. Only the researcher and the research supervisors will have access to this information.

What should I do if I want to take part? If you have not already scheduled an interview, the researcher will call you two days after you have received this information sheet, to ask you if you wish to participate in an interview. If yes, you will then decide on a date, time, and location for the interview. If you choose to participate, you will also be asked to sign a consent form.

What will happen to the results of the research study? The results of this study will be used for the researcher’s PhD thesis project. The results of the study will also be shared during presentations with government ministries and international organisations and during academic conferences. All of the information that you share will be kept anonymous and confidential in the reports and presentations.

Who is organising and funding the research? The researcher is a PhD student at the School of Global Studies at the University of Sussex, United Kingdom. This research is supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Doctoral Fellowship.

Who has approved this study? This study has been approved by the School of the Global Studies’ ethical review process and by the Social Sciences Cluster Research Ethics Committee (C-REC) at the University of Sussex. The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of South Sudan has given permission for this study to take place.

Contact for further information: If you have any questions or would like more information about the study, or if you have any concerns about the way that the study was conducted, you can contact the researcher or the research supervisors at the University of Sussex.
Researcher: Gabrielle Daoust  
Telephone (South Sudan): 0926064932  
E-mail: G.Daoust@sussex.ac.uk  

Research supervisors (University of Sussex, UK):  
Prof. Jan Selby  
Department of International Relations  
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E-mail: J.Selby@sussex.ac.uk  

Prof. Mario Novelli  
Department of Education  
Telephone: +44 12 73 67 86 39  
E-mail: M.Novelli@sussex.ac.uk  

Thank you very much for taking the time to read this information sheet. Please feel free to ask the researcher if you have any questions about the information that is provided, or if you have any other questions about the study.
Interview consent form

Project title: Education, Inequality, and Peacebuilding in South Sudan
Project approval reference: ER/GD209/1

You should feel free to ask the researcher if you have any questions about this consent form or if you have other questions about the study. Please take the time to read this form carefully before signing. You can ask for new information at any time during the study. You will be given a copy of the signed form to keep.

I agree to take part in this study. The study has been explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I may keep for records. I have had the opportunity to ask questions which have been answered by the researcher.

I understand that agreeing to participate in this study means that I am willing to:

- Participate in a one-on-one interview / group discussion with the researcher
- Be available if the researcher has other questions after the interview
- Allow the interview to be audio recorded

I understand that any information I share is anonymous and private and that my name and personal identifying information will be not included in the report.

I understand that the research will keep my information confidential, except if required by law. Focus group discussions: I understand that confidentiality cannot be guaranteed for information that I share during the group discussion.

I understand that the information I share will only be used for the purposes of the study described in the Information Sheet, and that the data will be stored and saved in a secure location.

I understand that I can ask for a copy of the interview transcript to review before it is included in the report, and that I can review and approve the study findings before the final report is prepared.

I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in the study, that I can choose not to answer certain questions, and that I can withdraw from the study at any time without any negative consequences and without giving a reason.

I agree to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I understand that this information will be kept strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.

Participant name: ______________________  Researcher name: ______________________
Signature: ____________________________  Signature: ____________________________
Date: _______________________________  Date: _______________________________