Supervisory Cooperation in the Single Market for Financial Services: United in Diversity?

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ABSTRACT

The post-crisis financial services regulatory overhaul, and, particularly, the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) and the Banking Union mechanisms, has increased the complexity of the EU’s financial supervisory architecture. In this new system, financial supervision is carried out by a network of interconnected financial supervisors, with different mandates and subject to various accountability structures, operating at both the Member State and EU levels and bound by a regime of cooperation duties. An efficient cooperation among and within the various levels of this complex supervisory architecture is critical for the good functioning of the EU’s financial system. This paper identifies and analyses key supervisory cooperation challenges in the single market for financial services, and assesses whether the EU legal and regulatory frameworks effectively address them. The paper argues that, despite the advancement of EU financial services integration and supervisory convergence that the post-crisis regulatory overhaul has brought, there are important legal and regulatory obstacles to an efficient supervisory cooperation in the EU; these source, primarily, from the following: first, the lack of clarity and precision of the EU’s regime on supervisory cooperation duties; secondly, the limited applicability of the ESFS’s mediation mechanisms to supervisory cooperation disputes; and, thirdly, the tensions between transnational mandates of financial supervision and national accountability structures and mandates. The paper also examines the threats that Brexit and the EU’s political crisis pose to EU financial integration and supervisory cooperation.

Keywords: financial supervision, supervisory cooperation, European System of Financial Supervision, Banking Union, Brexit

I. INTRODUCTION

In the European Union (EU), supervisory responsibilities concerning financial markets, institutions and the financial system are fragmented among a number of competent supervisory authorities (CSAs) at both the Member State and EU levels.¹ Owing to the cross-border nature and implications of EU financial-sector activities,²

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² Despite the negative effects of the global financial crisis on international financial flows, intra-EU capital flows are of major importance to the EU economy; for example, in the year 2015, intra-EU
when CSAs perform supervisory functions they often need to cooperate with and assist each other; for example, the home CSA of a financial entity may need information about the latter that can only be obtained through cooperation of a host CSA in a member state where such entity is providing financial services.\(^3\)

An efficient financial supervisory cooperation framework is essential for the good functioning of the single market for financial services and, more generally, for fostering financial integration in the EU.\(^4\) Without adequate supervisory cooperation, CSAs may be unable to properly exercise their supervisory and enforcement responsibilities, and to guarantee core targets of financial supervision, such as the soundness of the financial markets, the stability of the financial system and consumer protection.\(^5\) Also, suboptimal levels of cooperation between CSAs increase the risk of an inconsistent application of EU law across the Member States,\(^6\) and supervisory arbitrage.\(^7\)

Before the global financial crisis, the rules and procedures on supervisory cooperation in the EU were, primarily, Member State-based, and their scope was very narrow, excluding, for instance, macro-prudential oversight.\(^8\) Financial supervisory responsibilities were distributed among Member State CSAs with different structures, targets, mandates, and powers.\(^9\) The role of EU in the organization and coordination of supervisory cooperation was very limited.\(^10\) Although EU financial sector laws acknowledged certain supervisory cooperation duties,\(^11\) cooperation was essentially

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\(^2\) For examples of procedures applicable to supervisory cooperation requests in the EU see e.g. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/980 of 7 June 2017 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to standard forms, templates and procedures for cooperation in supervisory activities, for on-site verifications, and investigations and exchange of information between competent authorities in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, O.J. 2017, L 148/3.


\(^7\) See e.g. Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Reformed Financial Sector for Europe (COM(2014) 279 final) 4.


\(^9\) For example, the Lamfalussy Committees –which are explained in section 4.2 below– played a role in the promotion of supervisory cooperation and convergence in the EU; however, they had limited powers and authority –see E. Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision’, in E. Wymeersch, K. Hopt, and G. Ferrarini (n 1) 118.

articulated on the basis of non-binding agreements, and CSAs from the Member States enjoyed ample margins of discretion in deciding whether or not to cooperate with each other in particular instances.\footnote{See e.g. F. Allen, T. Beck, E. Carletti, P.R. Lane, D. Schoenmaker and W. Wagner, \textit{Cross-Border Banking in Europe: Implications for Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policies} (Centre for Economic Policy Research 2011), 5; and, J. Zhou, ‘Institutional Setup for the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union’ in C. Enoch, L. Everaert, T. Tressel and J. Zhou (eds.), \textit{From Fragmentation to Financial Integration in Europe} (International Monetary Fund 2014), 46.} This resulted in inconsistent approaches to supervisory cooperation across the EU.\footnote{See e.g. H. Jones, ‘UK bank lobby urges better watchdog cooperation’ \textit{Reuters} 28 Sept. 2007.}

The crisis exposed the failures of such a national-based system of financial supervision and supervisory cooperation.\footnote{The Committee of Wise Men, \textit{Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets} (2001), 69, 75.} The financial services regulatory overhaul that followed, and, particularly, the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) and the Banking Union mechanisms did introduce major changes to the EU financial supervision architecture, including in matters pertaining to supervisory cooperation.\footnote{For an analysis of the use and implications of such direct supervisory powers see e.g. E. Howell, ‘The Evolution of ESMA and Direct Supervision: are there Implications for EU Supervisory Governance?’ (2017) 54 CML Rev 1027.} In this new architecture, there has been a transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the EU level; for instance, EU institutions –such as the European Central Bank (ECB)– and bodies –such as the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)– are entrusted with direct supervision of certain areas of the financial system,\footnote{See e.g. N. Moloney, ‘Supervision in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’ in E. Wymeersch, K. Hopt and G. Ferrarini (n 1) 101-102.} and they also play a key role in the development of rules on supervisory cooperation,\footnote{The ESAs play a key role in the promotion of supervisory convergence –for examples of actions in this area see e.g: ESMA, \textit{Supervisory Convergence Work Programme 2016} (ESMA/2016/203).} the creation of a common supervisory culture,\footnote{The ESAs’ mediation powers will be addressed in section 6 below.} and mediation between CSAs.\footnote{These will be explained in section 4 below.}

However, at the same time, the reforms of the EU financial supervisory system have significantly increased the complexity of the supervisory patchwork, which is composed of a network of interconnected CSAs with different mandates and subject to various accountability structures, operating at both the member state and EU levels and bound by a system of cooperation duties. This raises the question of the role and limitations of EU law in dealing with such complexity and guaranteeing an efficient supervisory cooperation framework where CSAs are willing and able to cooperate with each other. This paper analyses the supervisory cooperation challenges brought about by the complex and multilevel nature of the post-crisis EU financial supervision architecture, and assesses whether these challenges can be and are effectively addressed by the EU legal and regulatory frameworks. In order to do so, the remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.

Section 2 offers a concept and taxonomy of supervisory cooperation that takes stock of the EU’s multilevel and transnational supervisory relationships; this is followed by an examination of the determinants of the incentives and ability of CSAs to cooperate, respectively (Section 3). Section 4 charts and assesses the evolution of the supervisory cooperation regime in the EU, from the early days of the single market for financial services until the present; this section explains the transformation of supervisory cooperation relationships resulting from the creation of the ESFS and
the Banking Union. Section 5 examines the limits of and exceptions to supervisory cooperation duties embraced by the EU constitutional and legal frameworks and evaluates whether the process of EU financial integration and the increasing harmonization of financial rules have narrowed the discretion of CSAs from the Member States to withhold cooperation from other fellow CSAs. Section 6 studies the main mechanisms offered by the post-crisis EU financial supervision architecture to address cooperation disputes between CSAs, their scope, applicability and potential impact on the incentives of CSAs to cooperate. Section 7 considers the nature of the mandates of CSAs within the ESFS and the Banking Union and analyzes the potential tensions arising from the coexistence of transnational (EU-wide) and national (Member State) mandates of supervisory cooperation and of accountability relationships. Section 8 offers some insights as regards the threats to EU financial integration and supervisory cooperation posed by Brexit and the prospect of a multi-speed EU. Section 9 summarizes the main findings of this paper and concludes.

II. THE CONCEPT OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO EU FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: A WORKING DEFINITION AND TAXONOMY

Cooperation is a relationship in which one or more parties collaborate and/or assist each other in the performance of certain tasks. In the field of financial supervision, cooperation refers, primarily, to the assistance provided among CSAs of the same or different jurisdictions, with respect to supervisory matters, namely licensing and authorization of financial entities, supervision stricto sensu, sanctioning, and crisis management.

The existence of and need for supervisory cooperation stems from two main factors. First, supervisory responsibilities are fragmented among CSAs along inter alia functional, sectoral and jurisdictional dimensions. Second, the nature and implications of the activities of supervised financial entities often cut across one or more supervisory dimensions; as a result, those activities may be subject to oversight

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20 The Cambridge Dictionary defines cooperation as: “the act of working together with someone or doing what they ask you”.
21 R. Lastra, ‘Financial Institutions and Accountability Mechanisms’ in Iglesias-Rodríguez (ed.), Building Responsive and Responsible Financial Regulators in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Intersentia 2015) 34. CSAs perform both regulatory and supervisory roles and, although cooperation may refer to any of these functions, this paper focuses on the supervisory dimension of cooperation.
22 For instance, in jurisdictions that follow the twin-peaks model of financial supervision, also known as supervision by objectives, different CSAs are in charge of different objectives of financial supervision; this normally results in a CSA being responsible for prudential supervision and another CSA carrying out conduct of business supervision, of all sectors and entities in a given jurisdiction; on the twin-peaks model of financial supervision see: E. Wymeersch (n 9) 258; and, Group of Thirty, The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace (2008) 13-14.
23 In the three-pillar/institutional model, the supervision –both prudential and conduct of business– of banking, insurance and securities entities is carried out by different CSAs. In this model, which is, for example, used in Spain, it is the activity and legal status of an entity that determines the CSA that will supervise it; on the three-pillar model see: E. Wymeersch (n 9) 250-251; and, Group of Thirty (n 22) 24.
24 An example of a multilevel jurisdictional financial supervision architecture is the ESFS in the EU, where supervisory tasks are shared among EU bodies –e.g. the ESAs– and CSAs from the Member States; on the ESFS see, generally, E. Wymeersch, ‘The Institutional Reforms of the European Financial Supervisory System, an Interim Report’, Ghent University Financial Law Institute Working Paper No. 2010-01 (2010).
by various CSAs;\textsuperscript{25} it follows that, when CSAs carry out supervisory functions, they may often need to cooperate with each other. A supervisory cooperation procedure involves two key actors, namely a requesting CSA and a requested CSA.\textsuperscript{26} A requesting CSA will trigger a supervisory cooperation procedure when it needs cooperation by a requested CSA; this will normally relate to instances where, in order to exercise its supervisory functions, a requesting CSA must access information that can only be obtained through the intervention of a requested CSA.\textsuperscript{27} In this respect, a request may pursue, either the performance of actions by a requested CSA, aimed at acquiring and/or transmitting the relevant information, or the granting of an authorization to a requesting CSA to directly perform those actions on its own, or jointly with the requested CSA; for example, a requesting CSA may make a request targeted at either gaining access to the offices of a financial entity in the jurisdiction of the requested CSA, with the purpose of conducting a joint on-site inspection with the requested CSA, or, alternatively, it may request that a requested CSA carries out an inspection on its behalf.\textsuperscript{28} Whereas supervisory cooperation often involves an \textit{ex-ante} ad hoc request of assistance by a CSA, it may also be provided spontaneously by another CSA; supervisory cooperation agreements do, indeed, tend to embrace and encourage unsolicited assistance among CSAs.\textsuperscript{29}

National cooperation takes place between CSAs from the same jurisdiction; in the United Kingdom (UK), two CSAs, namely the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) –in charge of authorization and prudential supervision of financial firms– and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)–entrusted with conduct of business supervision of financial firms– have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that sets out mechanisms of cooperation, for example, through the exchange of information between both CSAs.\textsuperscript{30} Likewise, CSAs engage in forms of multijurisdictional cooperation at the international level. International cooperation is particularly relevant in relation to the supervision of entities operating on a cross-border basis –for example, incorporated in a Member State but with branches and/or

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{25} For example, ABN AMRO Bank N.V, a large Dutch banking institution, is supervised by two Dutch CSAs, i.e. the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank) –the prudential supervisor– and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële Markten) –the conduct of business supervisor–, as well as by one EU level CSA, namely the ECB, on the supervision of ABN AMRO see: ABN AMRO, Structure and regulators (2017) available at https://www.abnamro.com/en/about-abnamro/our-company/corporate-governance/structure-and-regulators/index.html.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} This is the terminology used by, \textit{inter alia}, the ESMA Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Arrangements and Exchange of Information (ESMA MMoU), and the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (IOSCO MMoU).
  \item \textsuperscript{27} For instance, a requested CSA may hold records of transactions executed in its jurisdiction by a financial entity that is being investigated by the requesting CSA.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} See e.g. Art. 6 ESMA MMoU.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} For example, Art. 13 of the IOSCO MMoU, stipulates that: “Each Authority will make all reasonable efforts to provide, without prior request, the other Authorities with any information that it considers is likely to be of assistance to those other Authorities in securing compliance with Laws and Regulations applicable in their jurisdiction”.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} For a critical analysis of the creation and rationale of the PRA and the FCA see E. Ferran, ‘The Break-up of the Financial Services Authority’ (2011) 31 OJLS 455.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} PRA and FCA, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) (2013).
\end{itemize}
subsidiaries in other Member States or outside the EU.\textsuperscript{32} In the EU, there is a coexistence of forms of national cooperation, i.e. between the CSAs of each Member State, or between EU level CSAs,\textsuperscript{33} and of supranational cooperation, i.e. between the EU CSAs and the Member State CSAs.

Without adequate cooperation arrangements and procedures in place, CSAs may be unable to properly monitor and discipline firms under their supervisory remit; this may, in turn, result in costs being borne by investors and consumers of financial services.\textsuperscript{34} As regards systemic considerations, the global financial crisis evidenced that lack of or insufficient cooperation in prevention as well as resolution stages may also hinder the stability of the financial system.\textsuperscript{35} An efficient supervisory cooperation framework is therefore essential for the accomplishment of key targets of financial supervision, such as the sound functioning of the financial markets, the protection of consumers of financial services and, ultimately, financial stability.\textsuperscript{36} In the EU, supervisory cooperation has been acknowledged as a condition of financial integration;\textsuperscript{37} consequently, as the process of construction of the EU single market for financial services advanced, policy makers have been devoting greater degrees of attention to how to enhance cooperation between CSAs within the EU.\textsuperscript{38}

Depending on the hierarchy of the CSAs involved in a given supervisory cooperation procedure, it is possible to define instances of horizontal or vertical cooperation. Horizontal cooperation refers to cooperation between CSAs from the same or different jurisdictions, operating at the same hierarchical level, or with different hierarchical standing, but with respect to matters in which they have equal authority or in relation to which supervisory authority is allocated symmetrically; an example of this type of cooperation would be that between a prudential CSA and a conduct of business CSA of the same jurisdiction in relation to the activities of a financial entity under the supervisory umbrella of both supervisors; in the Netherlands, the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) and De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) –respectively entrusted with conduct of business supervision and prudential supervision of both financial institutions and pension providers– articulate their cooperation through agreements that embrace, \textit{inter alia}, the exchange of information and supervisory dialogues between both CSAs.\textsuperscript{39} Vertical cooperation involves CSAs

\begin{itemize}
\item Efficient supervisory cooperation has, indeed, been identified as a critical factor for the smooth operation of the EU single passport for financial services; see e.g. Committee of European Securities Regulators, Protocol on the Supervision of Branches under MiFID (CESR/07-672b), p. 2.
\item Such as the ESAs.
\item An example was the insufficient cooperation between CSAs from Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands with respect to Fortis’ liquidity crisis in the year 2008; see e.g. D. Schoenmaker, \textit{Governance of International Banking: The Financial Trilemma} (OUP 2013).
\item In this respect see e.g. IOSCO, Principles Regarding Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation: Final Report (2010) 7-9.
\item See e.g. COM (2005) 177, (n 4) 10.
\item For example, the Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (the de Larosière Report), published in the year 2009 as a response to the global financial crisis, proposed several measures aimed at improving supervisory cooperation in the EU; the de Larosière Report will be further explained in section 4.3 below.
\item See e.g. AFM and DNB, Covenant between Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten and De Nederlandsche Bank N.V. (2007).
\end{itemize}
from the same or different jurisdictions, operating at different hierarchical levels or
with the same hierarchical standing but with respect to matters in which they have
uneven authority; an example of such a vertical cooperation relationship would be a
supranational CSA with exclusive competence on a given supervisory matter that
requests information to a national CSA –bound by cooperation duties towards the
supranational CSA– in relation to such matter; for instance, in the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) of the Banking Union, the ECB is entrusted with the direct
prudential supervision of significant credit institutions in the Member States that
participate in the SSM,40 and the CSAs from those Member States are bound by
cooperation duties vis-à-vis the ECB in relation to the latter’s exercise of such a direct
competence.41

Cooperation may be requested and provided on the basis of informal or formal
mechanisms. The former include forms of cooperation that do not abide by a
particular set of pre-determined rules; an example is an informal conversation
between the heads of two CSAs where they exchange views and/or information about
a given financial entity or supervisory process.42 Formal mechanisms comprise
instruments of cooperation that follow pre-determined ad hoc rules –binding or
otherwise– applicable to a supervisory cooperation relationship. Among the formal
mechanisms, there is a distinction between binding and non-binding mechanisms.
Whereas supervisory cooperation has traditionally been and still is articulated through
non-binding instruments, such as MoUs,43 financial regulatory frameworks tend to
acknowledge cooperation duties that require CSAs to assist each other.44 As will be
shown throughout this paper, in the EU, the post-crisis overhaul has strengthened the
binding dimension of supervisory cooperation through, among others, the expansion
of supervisory cooperation duties to which CSAs are subject.

III. THE DETERMINANTS OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION: THE INCENTIVES
AND ABILITY OF CSAS TO COOPERATE

Despite the key instrumental role of supervisory cooperation for the good functioning
of financial markets and in advancing financial integration, CSAs in the EU have
often failed to efficiently cooperate with each other. In the opinion of the High-Level
Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, the pre-global financial crisis supervisory

40 Art. 4.1 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions,
O.J. 2013, L 287/63 (SSM Regulation).
41 Art. 6.2 SSM Regulation. On the issue of competence sharing between the ECB and CSAs in the
SSM see, C. Gortsos, ‘Competence Sharing Between the ECB and the National Competent Supervisory
Authorities Within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)’ (2015) 16 European Business
42 Informal mechanisms of supervisory cooperation, such as exchanges of letters between CSAs,
played an important role in the early stages of development of the EU single market for financial
services; for an example of this see S. Bergsträsser, ‘Cooperation between Supervisors’ in G. Ferrarini
(ed.), European Securities Markets: The Investment Services Directive and Beyond (Kluwer Law
43 MoUs are written, non-binding, bilateral or multilateral agreements that set rules regarding exchange
of information and cooperation between CSAs of the same or different jurisdictions.
44 See, for example, Art. 2.3 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities
and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision
setting was characterized by a “Lack of frankness and cooperation between supervisors”\textsuperscript{45} that had detrimental effects on the quality and promptness of the responses to the financial meltdown: “As the crisis developed, in too many instances supervisors in Member States were not prepared to discuss with appropriate frankness and at an early stage the vulnerabilities of financial institutions which they supervised. Information flow among supervisors was far from being optimal, especially in the build-up phase of the crisis. This has led to an erosion of mutual confidence among supervisors.”\textsuperscript{46}

Suboptimal supervisory cooperation may adopt three main forms. The first is lack of cooperation; this may happen, for instance, when a CSA plainly rejects a request of cooperation. The second form of suboptimal cooperation consists of incomplete cooperation, an example being the provision of partial or insufficient information to a fellow CSA. Thirdly, there are instances of delayed cooperation.\textsuperscript{47}

Understanding the reasons why CSAs may engage in forms of suboptimal cooperation is essential to assess whether and how EU law adequately addresses this problem. Suboptimal levels of supervisory cooperation can be traced to two core general causes, namely lack of willingness and lack of ability of CSAs to cooperate.

On the one side, a CSA – e.g. a requested CSA from a Member State – may lack willingness to cooperate, notably when the perceived costs of cooperating with another CSA – e.g. a requesting CSA from another Member State – are higher than the benefits. The provision of supervisory cooperation may, in the first place, result in costs for supervised entities, financial markets and the financial system in the jurisdiction of the CSA providing cooperation; for example, the delivery of information about a supervised entity by a requested CSA – e.g. a host supervisor – may lead to sanctions being imposed on such entity by the requesting CSA – e.g. the home supervisor. In a supervisory cooperation relationship the incentives of CSAs may be misaligned, notably, when the economic and systemic relevance of a supervised entity is different in the jurisdictions of the requested CSA and of the requesting CSA, and, consequently, the actions resulting from the provision of cooperation, such as the imposition of sanctions to the supervised entity, have an asymmetrical impact in those jurisdictions; for instance, in the early stages of the global financial crisis, CSAs from various Member States adopted protectionist supervisory approaches characterized by lack of cooperation in crisis management, as well as ring-fencing practices aimed at prioritizing the interests of their own financial institutions.\textsuperscript{48} Henceforth, the significance of a supervised entity in relation to which supervisory cooperation is sought, as well as the potential impact of the provision of such cooperation in the financial system under the supervisory remit of a requested

\textsuperscript{45} De Larosiére Report (n 38) 41.
\textsuperscript{46} De Larosiére Report (n 38) 41.
\textsuperscript{47} With regard to supervision of banking institutions, K. D’Hulster – ‘Cross Border Banking Supervision Incentive Conflicts in Supervisory Information Sharing between Home and Host Supervisors’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5871 (2011) 12 – notes that: “At an institutional level, the home supervisor may not report, or may misreport or delay reporting supervisory information to the host supervisor, resulting in issues with regard to timeliness and relevance of information shared in a college.”
CSA, are key factors that will determine the latter’s incentives to cooperate.\textsuperscript{49} In addition, supervisory cooperation is an intrinsically costly activity that requires the mobilization of time and other resources, whose cost will also be considered by a CSA when assessing the value of cooperation in a particular supervisory context.\textsuperscript{50} However, lack of cooperation may also have negative effects for a CSA withholding it. Notably, it may hinder supervisory relationships with the CSA requesting or expecting cooperation. This may, in turn, result in future costs for an uncooperative CSA – for example if a CSA that has been denied cooperation behaves reciprocally and refuses to provide cooperation in the future. Likewise, a non-cooperative CSA may be subject to various forms of accountability when, by not cooperating, it is deemed as having acted against its duties and mandates.\textsuperscript{51}

On the other side, a CSA may face scenarios where it may be willing to cooperate but is not able to do so. There may be two primary reasons for this. The first is the presence of resource constrains that hinder the ability of a CSA to meaningfully cooperate, if at all.\textsuperscript{52} The second relates to legal and regulatory constrains that may preclude a CSA from offering cooperation. Legal and regulatory constraints may fall within three main categories. First, rules regarding supervisory cooperation may be absent or incomplete; this would include cases in which the rules concerning the procedure for supervisory cooperation are too vague and do not offer a precise answer on how cooperation is to be organized in a particular supervisory setting. Second, the legal framework in which a CSA operates may embrace exceptions to the duty to cooperate that allow and/or require a CSA to withhold cooperation in certain instances.\textsuperscript{53} Third, there may be cases in which there is a conflict between the mandate of a CSA and compliance of the latter with a given request of cooperation.\textsuperscript{54}

The EU regime of supervisory cooperation in the financial field has experienced major transformations throughout the various stages of development of the EU single market for financial services. The successive reforms of such a regime have aimed at, \textit{inter alia}, fostering the incentives and ability of CSAs to cooperate as well as financial integration. The next section examines the evolution of the EU regime on supervisory cooperation from the early days to the present; it also addresses the reforms encompassed by the European System of Financial Supervision and the Banking Union, which have radically transformed the supervisory cooperation architecture in the EU.

\textbf{IV. EU FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY COOPERATION IN PERSPECTIVE: FROM THE EARLY BEGINNINGS TO THE POST-GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS REGULATORY OVERHAUL}

The evolution of the system of financial supervisory cooperation in the EU is linked to developments in EU financial regulation as well as in the institutional architecture

\textsuperscript{49} K. D’Hulster (n 47), offers a detailed account of the impact of the economic and systemic significance of supervised banking entities on the incentives of home and host supervisors to cooperate.


\textsuperscript{51} D’Hulster (n 47) 6, however notes that the accountability of CSAs for lack of cooperation with foreign counterparts is very limited.

\textsuperscript{52} See e.g. R.J. Herring (n. 50) 212.

\textsuperscript{53} This will be addressed in section 5 below.

\textsuperscript{54} These potential conflicts will be examined in section 7 below.
of EU financial services supervision. This section distinguishes three main periods of development of the EU regime of financial supervisory cooperation, and analyses the nature and instruments of supervisory cooperation in each of them. It also assesses whether and the extent to which different forms of cooperation address the challenges relating to the ability and willingness of CSAs from different Member States to assist each other.

A. EU financial supervisory cooperation in the early days

In the initial stages of construction of the EU single market for financial services, which can be traced to the Treaty of Rome and which received additional momentum in the year 1986 with the adoption of the Single European Act, cooperation was primarily horizontal. This was, to a great extent, due to the decentralized nature of the EU financial regulatory and supervisory architecture, which was largely built through directives and based on the principles of minimum harmonization and mutual recognition as well as a combination of home country control and host country supervision. In such framework, there was an exclusive delegation of regulatory and supervisory functions in the financial services field to CSAs of the Member States, with no EU level independent authorities performing or even coordinating those functions.

Second, cooperation was essentially two-sided and based on separate bilateral agreements subscribed between CSAs of the different Member States. This system somehow filled the lack of EU level ad hoc formal instruments embracing and providing a common multilateral framework for assistance among CSAs. As a consequence, the system of cooperation was fragmented and asymmetrical, largely dependent on the specific –non-harmonized– content of bilateral agreements.

Third, cooperation was rather informal. This does not mean that it was voluntary. On the contrary, EU laws in the financial realm have, long since, recognized the binding character of cooperation among CSAs. However, those very same laws...
provided neither an institutional framework nor precise substantive and procedural rules on whose basis a system of mutual assistance among CSAs could be built. EU Member States opted for implementing a system of cooperation based on instruments that gave them substantial flexibility and discretion; two of such instruments were particularly salient: informal exchanges and memoranda of understanding (MoUs).

Informal exchanges of information constitute the most basic and earliest form of cooperation among CSAs, and their use preceded the first directives in the field of financial services.\(^{60}\) In addition, this mechanism was pre-eminent and, to a large degree, exclusive, before cooperation was institutionalized at the EU level through ad hoc formal instruments. In practice, informal exchanges take place through meetings and conversations among heads or senior staff of CSAs. They may also adopt the form of goodwill sharing of documents. Informal exchanges are not bound by given procedural rules specifying whether and how information is to be disclosed and exchanged.\(^{61}\)

Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) are formal but non-binding agreements aimed at providing a general framework for cooperation between the signatory CSAs. MoUs address aspects such as the scope of assistance and the procedures applicable to a request of cooperation, as well as the modes in which such cooperation is to be provided by the requested CSA or the uses that the requesting CSA can make of the information received. MoUs were the first instruments to set up common substantive and procedural norms of supervisory cooperation. In the early stages of the EU internal market for financial services MoUs were bilateral.

In this period, financial firms and actors tended to operate, primarily, on a national basis and their cross-border activities were rather limited. This was, in part, due to the presence of barriers for cross-border financial activities and capital flows.\(^{62}\) Whereas the Single European Act and the resulting legislative measures in the financial sector, such as the Capital Liberalization Directive,\(^{63}\) the Second Banking Directive\(^{64}\) or the Investment Services Directive,\(^{65}\) all helped to remove some of the obstacles to cross-border financial activities –notably, the introduction of a system of single passports enabled financial market actors to move across jurisdictions more easily–, several barriers to cross-border capital flows persisted in the EU.\(^{66}\) These did contribute to

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Member States shall cooperate with each other whenever necessary for the purpose of carrying out their duties...”

\(^{60}\) References to this early form of cooperation are provided by J.P. Lépine, ‘A Response to Fedders “Waiver by Conduct”’ (1984) 6 Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 319.

\(^{61}\) They are, however, subject to compliance with the legal and regulatory frameworks in the jurisdictions of the CSAs involved.


\(^{66}\) The single passport essentially meant that a financial entity authorized to operate in a Member State was allowed to offer its services in other Member States without being subject to additional authorization requirements in the latter. On the “Single Passport” see, Bank of England, “The EC single market in financial services” (1993) 3 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 92.

\(^{67}\) In this respect see E. Grossman and P. Leblond, ‘Financial Regulation in Europe: From the Battle of the Systems to a Jacobinist EU’ in J. Richardson (ed.), Constructing a Policy-Making State?: Policy Dynamics in the EU (OUP 2012) 197.
creating neither cooperation incentives – due to the low interdependence between financial systems – nor a strong cooperation culture among CSAs. In addition, the very nature of the main instruments of cooperation also posed some barriers to effective cooperation; in this respect, both MoUs and informal exchanges of information were not binding and, hence, they did not impose formal obligations on CSAs. In addition, as will be explained in section 5, relevant EU legislation and MoUs executed between CSAs, incorporated a series of waivers from the duty to cooperate that enabled CSAs to withhold cooperation under certain conditions. Lastly, the lack of common substantive and procedural EU rules addressing cooperation arrangements led to a very fragmented system with high degrees of uncertainty as regards the rights and duties of CSAs in cooperation relationships.

B. The Lamfalussy architecture: towards the Europeanization of financial supervisory cooperation

In the late 1990s CSAs of the Member States adopted various institutional initiatives that led to a strengthening of the framework for supervisory cooperation in the EU. A major development in this respect was the creation, in the year 1997, of the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) by securities supervisors of the Member States, Norway and Iceland. Unlike insurance and banking supervisors, which had, long since, had their own EU supervisory cooperation fora, namely, the Conference of Supervisory Authorities of the Member States of the European Union and the Groupe de Contact, respectively, this was not the case in the securities field. FESCO filled this important gap by offering a space of debate and exchange of ideas among CSAs in charge of securities supervision. Another critical development was the creation and adoption of the first formal – albeit non binding – multilateral instruments of supervisory cooperation within the EU. Notably, in the year 1997, the Conference of Supervisory Authorities published the “Siena Protocol” and, two years later, FESCO adopted the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Information and Surveillance of Securities Activities (FESCO MoU). These instruments provided, for the first time, common rules applicable to supervisory

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70 The Conference of Insurance Supervisors was originally set up in the year 1958; it was composed of insurance CSAs from 15 EU Member States and three European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The Groupe de Contact was established in the year 1972 by banking CSAs from EEA countries – see K. Lanoo, ‘Supervising the European Financial System’ CEPS Policy Brief No. 21 (2002) 17, 19.

71 Lanoo (n 70) 9.


73 The FESCO MoU was adopted on 26 January 1999 and its aim was: “to establish a general framework for cooperation and consultation between the Authorities referred to hereinafter, in order to facilitate the fulfilling of their supervisory responsibilities” – Art. 1 FESCO MoU.
exchanges in the EU; in doing so, they contributed, substantially, to the process of convergence in areas pertaining to supervisory cooperation.\textsuperscript{74}

The Member State-nature of the first EU-wide supervisory cooperation arrangements was, to a great extent, the result of the reluctance of the Commission to develop EU level supervisory structures and mechanisms. For instance, in its Communication: \textit{Financial Services: Building a framework for action}, while highlighting the importance of encouraging a closer coordination between CSAs,\textsuperscript{75} the Commission argued that: “structured co-operation between national supervisory bodies –rather than the creation of new EU level arrangements– can be sufficient to ensure financial stability”.\textsuperscript{76} Whereas the Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), published in the year 1999,\textsuperscript{77} acknowledged the feasibility of future proposals for an EU single securities supervisor,\textsuperscript{78} it nevertheless advocated for the development of supervisory arrangements based on the existing multilateral Member State-driven structures,\textsuperscript{79} rather than the creation of EU level ones. The idea of institutionalizing supervisory cooperation arrangements within \textit{ad hoc} EU level structures was first proposed by the Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (the Lamfalussy Report), published in the year 2001.\textsuperscript{80} In this respect, the Lamfalussy Report proposed the creation of an EU Securities Regulators Committee (ESRC), which would take over of the functions of FESCO but with an official EU status –as an advisory body to the Commission– and a broader mandate.\textsuperscript{81} This recommendation materialized in the creation of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) by the Commission in the year 2001.\textsuperscript{82} This was followed by the establishment of its counterparts in the banking and insurance fields, namely the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), respectively, in the year 2003.\textsuperscript{83} The mandate of the Lamfalussy Committees was twofold. First, they were entrusted with the promotion of regulatory and supervisory consistency and convergence in the field of financial services in the EU;\textsuperscript{84} their tasks in this area included advising the Commission on policy issues as well as implementing measures, issuing non-binding guidelines, standards and recommendations targeted at furthering the uniform implementation and consistent application of EU financial laws by the Member States, and developing mechanisms

\textsuperscript{74} E. Ferran (n 56) 47.
\textsuperscript{76} Commission (n 75) 2.
\textsuperscript{77} Commission (n 68).
\textsuperscript{78} FSAP, 14.
\textsuperscript{79} Such as the Groupe de Contact, the Conference of Insurance Supervisors and FESCO -FSAP, 14.
\textsuperscript{81} Lamfalussy Report, 33-38.
\textsuperscript{84} See, for example, Art. 4 of the Charter of the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR/06-289c, 2006) and Art. 2 of Commission Decision 2004/5/EC.
aimed at fostering a consistent supervision and enforcement across the EU.\textsuperscript{85} Another core function of the Lamfalussy Committees was to enhance supervisory cooperation among CSAs;\textsuperscript{86} their work in this field was extensive and included the development of guidelines on supervisory cooperation\textsuperscript{87} the creation of multilateral instruments of cooperation, such as MoUs,\textsuperscript{88} as well as the operation of mechanisms of mediation between CSAs;\textsuperscript{89} the latter gave the Lamfalussy Committees an important –albeit non-binding–\textsuperscript{90} mediation role in the solution of supervisory cooperation disputes between CSAs. The Lamfalussy Committees also took a close interest in and encouraged the work of colleges of supervisors\textsuperscript{91} –which CSAs had been establishing since the early 2000s–,\textsuperscript{92} for example by developing common principles applicable to supervision within supervisory colleges, including in matters pertaining to supervisory cooperation.\textsuperscript{93}

Whereas the supervisory architecture embraced by the Lamfalussy Committees did not entail a transfer of powers from the member state level to the EU level,\textsuperscript{94} it did however result in a greater centralization of (quasi) supervisory functions in the latter. Particularly, the Commission’s recast of the decisions setting the CESR, the CEBS and the CEIOPS in the year 2009, broadened their remit so as to “strengthen their contributions to supervisory cooperation and convergence”.\textsuperscript{95} Cooperation largely remained, nonetheless, a Member State matter, but with the EU taking a much more active and formal role in the coordination of assistance among CSAs.

The FSAP proposed a series of legislative measures that –jointly with the introduction of the Euro– boosted the process of financial integration and cross-border

\textsuperscript{86} See, for example, Art. 2 of: Commission Decision 2004/5/EC, and Commission Decision 2004/6/EC; and Art. 4.4 of: Charter of the CESR, and Charter of the CEBS.
\textsuperscript{87} See, for example: CEBS, Guidelines for Co-operation between Consolidating Supervisors and Host Supervisors (2006).
\textsuperscript{88} See, for example: CESR, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Information and Surveillance of Securities Activities (CESR/05-335) (CESR MoU).
\textsuperscript{89} See, for example: CEIOPS, Protocol on Mediation Mechanism between Insurance and Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS-DOC-14/07).
\textsuperscript{90} See, for example, Art. 5.3 Protocol of the CEBS Mediation Mechanism: “Mediation outcomes shall not have any legal effect, be legally binding or be enforceable.”
\textsuperscript{91} These are collegiate structures carrying out supervision of specific market actors –such as banks– that operate on a cross-border basis; supervisory colleges are made of CSAs from the jurisdictions responsible for and participating in the supervision of those cross-border entities –see, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for effective supervisory colleges (Bank for International Settlements 2014) 1.
\textsuperscript{92} See, for example, the Memorandum of Understanding on the Coordination, Supervision and Oversight of the Euronext Group, signed in March 2001 by the Authority for the Financial Markets (the Netherlands), the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (France), the Banking Finance and Insurance Commission (Belgium), and the Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (Portugal).
\textsuperscript{93} See, for example: CEBS and CEIOPS, Colleges of Supervisors – 10 Common Principles (CEIOPS-SEC-54/08 CEBS 2008 124 IWCFC 08 32).
flows in the EU, creating deeper interconnectedness between the financial systems of the Member States and increasing the need for supervisory cooperation among CSAs. Despite this, such cooperation faced important barriers. The financial supervisory patchwork in the EU was highly fragmented among CSAs with very different mandates, objectives and powers. In addition, as referred above, the EU level supervisory arrangements encompassed by the Lamfalussy architecture were limited in scope and non-binding.

C. The global financial crisis of 2008 and the transformation of the EU financial supervisory cooperation architecture

The global financial crisis exposed important flaws of the pre-crisis financial architecture in the EU, and the limitations of a nationally-based supervisory system; these were acknowledged by the Commission in its Communication on Financial Supervision published in the early stages of the financial crisis: “Current supervisory arrangements proved incapable of preventing, managing and resolving the crisis. Nationally based supervisory models have lagged behind the integrated and interconnected reality of today's European financial markets, in which many financial firms operate across borders. The crisis exposed serious failings in the cooperation, coordination, consistency and trust between national supervisors.” The roots of the reform leading to the post-crisis EU financial supervision architecture can be traced to the Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (the de Larosiére Report), published in the year 2009. The High-Level Group was set up in the year 2008 by the Commission, which entrusted it with the formulation of recommendations about supervisory arrangements aimed at increasing the efficiency, integration and sustainability of financial supervision in the EU. According to the de Larosiére Report, the weaknesses of the EU pre-crisis system of financial supervision sourced from, inter alia, the lack of an EU macro-prudential supervisor, the flaws and inefficiencies of the cooperation arrangements between CSAs at the Member State level, as well as the limited resources and powers of the Lamfalussy Committees. The de Larosiére High-Level Group made proposals for the creation of a decentralized, but integrated and coordinated structure of financial supervision that would comprise new EU level macro and micro-prudential financial supervisors as well as the CSAs of the Member States. These proposals were supported by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council and resulted in the

102 De Larosiére Report, notably 38-58.
104 De Larosiére Report, 40-41.
105 De Larosiére Report, 41-42.
creation of a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) in the year 2010.\textsuperscript{107} The ESFS is a network made of three pillars, each with its own institutional structures of financial regulation and supervision that operate in a coordinated manner, in charge of supervising of the EU’s financial system.\textsuperscript{108} 

The first pillar relates to EU-wide systemic risk supervision.\textsuperscript{109} This is carried out by a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),\textsuperscript{110} which performs macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system, with the primary aim of preventing and mitigating systemic risk,\textsuperscript{111} issuing, where necessary, warnings and recommendations addressed to the EU, its Member States, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), or CSAs.\textsuperscript{112} 

The second pillar concerns micro-prudential regulation and supervision at the EU level.\textsuperscript{113} This task is performed by three EU agencies, namely the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs).\textsuperscript{114} The ESAs are organized along sectoral lines and comprise the European Banking Authority (EBA),\textsuperscript{115} the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA),\textsuperscript{116} and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).\textsuperscript{117} The ESAs carry out important quasi-regulatory and supervisory functions.\textsuperscript{118} On the rulemaking front, the ESAs develop guidelines and recommendations addressed to CSAs or financial market participants and targeted at, \textit{inter alia}, promoting regulatory and supervisory convergence within the ESFS;\textsuperscript{119} they also contribute to building a single rulebook for the EU financial markets through the creation of draft regulatory and implementing standards\textsuperscript{120} that develop technical aspects of EU financial sector laws.\textsuperscript{121} On the supervisory side, the ESAs monitor and assess market developments as well as their potential impact on financial

\textsuperscript{108} See, for instance, recital 14 and Art. 1.2 ESRB Regulation.  
\textsuperscript{110} The ESRB was instituted by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, O.J. 2010, L 331/1 (ESRB Regulation).  
\textsuperscript{111} Art. 3.1 ESRB Regulation.  
\textsuperscript{112} Art. 16.2 ESRB Regulation.  
\textsuperscript{113} Commission, COM(2009) 252 final, 3.  
\textsuperscript{114} On the ESAs see Iglesias-Rodríguez (n 1) 193-196.  
\textsuperscript{118} E. Wymeersch, ‘The European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs’ in E. Wymeersch, K. Hopt, and G. Ferrarini (eds.) (n 1).  
\textsuperscript{119} Art. 16.1 ESAs Regulations.  
\textsuperscript{120} Whereas the ESAs are entrusted with the drafting of technical standards, these are submitted to the Commission for consideration and approval through Regulations or Decisions –Arts. 10.1, 10.4, 15.1 and 15.4 ESAs Regulations. The power of the Commission to adopt delegated acts and implementing acts is based on Art. 290 and 291 of the TFEU.  
\textsuperscript{121} See, for example, recitals 5 and 22 of ESMA Regulation, and of EBA Regulation.
market participants, providing, where necessary, recommendations aimed at preventing or remediating risks and vulnerabilities. They are also entrusted with the development of a common supervisory culture in the EU through actions that range from participating in the creation of uniform supervisory standards to promoting cooperation between CSAs. An important difference between the Lamfalussy Committees and the ESAs is that, unlike the former, the latter do have binding supervisory and enforcement powers. For example, in cases of disagreements between CSAs, the ESAs may settle the dispute through a binding decision requiring the CSAs concerned to adopt or refrain from certain actions. Moreover, the ESAs may adopt temporary bans or restrictions on certain financial products or activities which pose a threat to the “…orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union…”. In addition, the ESAs have been given direct supervisory powers with respect to certain areas of the financial system; this is the case of credit rating agencies and trade repositories, which are directly supervised by ESMA, and, in relation to which, the latter may impose fines or withdraw registration.

The second pillar incorporates a forum of cooperation between the three ESAs, the Joint Committee, whose purpose is to ensure cross-sectoral consistency in regulation and supervision.

The third pillar regards the day-to-day macro-prudential and micro-prudential regulation, supervision and enforcement activities relating to markets and institutions at the Member State level. This is assigned to the CSAs from each jurisdiction.

The ESFS attributes a central role to cooperation among its various levels. As will be further explained below, this is reflected in, among others, the configuration of a detailed regime of cooperation duties among the constituents of the ESFS.

The economic downturn that followed the financial crisis evidenced the close connections between banking crises and sovereign debt risk, as well as the dangers of spill over effects resulting from the latter within the euro area. The Commission

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122 Art. 32 ESAs Regulations.
123 Art. 29 ESAs Regulations.
124 Art. 19 ESAs Regulations.
125 Art. 9.5 ESAs Regulations. For instance, Arts. 40 and 41 of the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) (Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, O.J. 2014, L 173/84), respectively enable the ESMA and the EBA to adopt such prohibitions or restrictions.
128 With respect to trade repositories, see recital 74 and Art. 73 EMIR.
129 Arts. 2.2(e) and 54 ESAs Regulations.
130 See, for example, recital 9 ESMA Regulation, and Art. 2.2(f) ESAs Regulations.
responded by proposing a Banking Union that would provide a system of common supervision, deposit protection, crisis management and resolution of banks in the EU. This eventually materialized in the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the year 2013 of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in the year 2014 as well as in the formulation of proposals for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) in the year 2015. In the Banking Union, supervision is assigned to the SSM, which is a supervisory system made of the ECB and relevant CSAs of the Member States. The SSM gives the ECB a pre-eminent role in the post-crisis EU financial architecture by entrusting it with the direct prudential supervision of significant credit institutions in the Eurozone and in other Member States that decide to join the SSM. CSAs remain responsible for the conduct of business supervision as well as the direct prudential supervision of less significant banks.

Both the ESFS and the Banking Union represent a shift from a system of fully decentralized supervision, primarily conducted at the Member State level–and organized through cooperation agreements between CSAs– towards a system of greater centralization of supervisory functions at the EU level, while remaining, nonetheless, a decentralized system with multiple supervisory actors. Such centralization has two main dimensions. First, in the new framework, there has been a transfer of direct supervisory responsibilities from the Member State to the EU level. For example, as indicated above, in the ESFS, the ESMA has direct supervision powers with respect to credit rating agencies and trade repositories. In the SSM, the ECB exercises direct prudential supervision of credit institutions throughout the EU. Second, in the post-crisis EU financial services architecture, EU entities, such as the ESAs, have assumed important responsibilities in the coordination of financial supervision EU-wide; an example are emergency situations in which there are developments that “may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of


137 Art. 2 SSM Regulation.

138 Whether a credit institution is significant or not depends on a set of criteria related to: “(i) size; (ii) importance for the economy of the Union or any participating Member State; and (iii) significance of cross-border activities”–Art. 6.4 SSM Regulation.

139 This includes the authorisation and withdrawal of authorisation of credit institutions –Art. 4 SSM Regulation.

140 Centre for European Policy Studies, ECB Banking Supervision and Beyond (CEPS, 2014) 59.

141 Recital 15 SSM Regulation.
financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union”; in those cases, the ESAs are entrusted with the facilitation and, even the coordination, of actions by CSAs of the Member States.\(^\text{142}\) In addition, the ESFS confers on the ESAs the task of “…promoting and monitoring the efficient, effective and consistent functioning of the colleges of supervisors…”\(^\text{143}\)

The creation of the ESFS and the Banking Union, and the distribution of supervisory responsibilities within them to various actors along sectoral and functional lines have resulted in a multiplication of supervisory cooperation relationships. In the new setting, the performance of supervisory tasks by an authority operating in a given supervisory level –e.g. EU or Member State– may require the cooperation of other authorities in the same or other levels. Moreover, certain supervisory actions are entrusted to various authorities. The post-crisis supervisory patchwork embraces three types of cooperation relationships. In the first place, supervisory cooperation applies to the relationship between the various pillars within both the ESFS and the Banking Union; for example, the initiation and coordination of stress tests to assess the resilience of financial market participants is jointly performed by and requires cooperation between the ESAs and the ESRB.\(^\text{144}\) Likewise, in the SSM, the performance of tasks relating to consumer protection and anti-money laundering require cooperation between the ECB and Member State CSAs.\(^\text{145}\) Second, there is a need for cooperation within each of the pillars of the ESFS and of the Banking Union; for example, the ESFS envisages cooperation between the ESAs in relation to, \textit{inter alia}, financial conglomerates and cross-sectoral matters.\(^\text{146}\) Third, supervisory cooperation also takes place between the ESFS and the Banking Union bodies, notably, with respect to matters of joint interest, and institutions operating across sectors.\(^\text{147}\)

The change in the nature of supervisory relationships has led to a redefinition of the EU regime of supervisory cooperation duties. The latter includes forms of both horizontal and vertical cooperation.

On the one side, the general cooperation duties within the ESFS and the SSM encompass a notion of horizontal cooperation between their various constituent levels. With regard to the ESFS, the ESAs Regulations stipulate that: “In accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the parties to the ESFS shall cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular in ensuring the flow of appropriate and reliable information between them.”\(^\text{148}\) The SSM Regulation also implements a model of horizontal cooperation, between the ECB and the Member State CSAs: “Both the ECB and national competent authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith, and an obligation to exchange information.”\(^\text{149}\)

In specific supervisory contexts, the relationship between different authorities is hierarchical and asymmetrical, giving rise to forms of vertical cooperation that embrace ascendancy of some supervisors over others. This is particularly the case in certain relationships between the EU supervisory authorities and the Member State

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\(^\text{142}\) Art. 18.1 ESAs Regulations.

\(^\text{143}\) Recital 35 EIOPA Regulation and recital 36 ESMA and EBA Regulations.

\(^\text{144}\) Art. 32 ESAs Regulations.

\(^\text{145}\) Recital 29 SSM Regulation.

\(^\text{146}\) Art. 54.2 ESAs Regulations.

\(^\text{147}\) See, for example, recital 31 SSM Regulation.

\(^\text{148}\) Art. 2.4 ESAs Regulations.

\(^\text{149}\) Art. 6.2 SSM Regulation.
CSAs. For example, the general duties pertaining to exchange of information in the ESFS require that the CSAs of the Member States provide the ESAs information relevant to their supervisory functions, without establishing a corresponding duty for the ESAs: “At the request of the Authority [an ESA], the competent authorities of the Member States shall provide the Authority with all the necessary information to carry out the duties assigned to it... Upon a duly justified request from a competent authority of a Member State, the Authority may provide any information that is necessary to enable the competent authority to carry out its duties...”

The asymmetrical position of financial supervisors at the EU and Member State levels, respectively, is patent in areas where the former have direct supervisory powers; for example, in the SSM, the ECB may, in the exercise of its direct supervisory powers, issue instructions addressed to CSAs.

Both the ESFS and the Banking Union largely internalize the process of regulatory coordination on matters pertaining to supervisory cooperation through the creation of institutional mechanisms of joint decision-making led by CSAs from the Member States. For instance, the ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors, whose voting members are the heads of the Member State CSAs, are the main decision-making bodies of the ESAs and their powers include the adoption of draft technical standards, guidelines and recommendations. Likewise, in the SSM, the formulation of rulemaking and supervisory decisions is entrusted to a Supervisory Board where most decision-making power rests in representatives of the Member State CSAs. This Member State-based governance structure facilitates the debate and exchange of ideas among national authorities on matters pertaining to financial regulation and supervision, as well as to supervisory cooperation rules and processes, and, consequently, may contribute to foster the legitimacy of the latter. On the one side, from an input-legitimacy viewpoint, the joint decision-making process enables the engagement of all the CSAs affected by and subject to EU-wide supervisory cooperation rules and policies, in their creation; moreover, the adoption of decisions regarding supervisory cooperation rules and processes often requires qualified majority within the ESAs and the ECB, and, hence, greater degrees of consensus among the Member State CSAs.

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150 See, for example, Art. 35 ESMA and EIOPA Regulations.
151 Art. 6.3 SSM Regulation.
152 Art. 40.1(b) ESAs Regulations.
153 Arts. 43.1–2 ESAs Regulations.
154 Art. 26.1 SSM Regulation.
155 The Supervisory Board is composed of a Chair, a Vice-Chair, four representatives of the ECB and representatives of the CSAs in each participating Member State – Art. 26.1 SSM Regulation.
156 The ESAs have been delegated powers for the development of norms applicable to supervisory cooperation in different areas of the financial system. For instance, under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) (Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, O.J. 2014, L 173/349), the ESMA has been delegated the adoption of draft implementing technical standards on “Standard forms, templates and procedures for competent authorities to cooperate in supervisory activities, on-site verifications, and investigations and for the exchange of information” – see Art. 80.4 MiFID II and ESMA, Final Report Draft implementing technical standards under MiFID II (ESMA/2015/1858), pp. 29-30; likewise, ESMA’s Draft Implementing Technical Standards on forms and procedures for cooperation between competent authorities under Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 on market abuse (ESMA70-145-100), develop a comprehensive framework of supervisory cooperation among the various CSAs and levels of the ESFS in the field of market abuse.
157 For instance, the adoption of draft technical standards, guidelines and recommendations by the ESAs requires a qualified majority of the voting members of their Boards of Supervisors – see EBA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Banking Authority Board of Supervisors.
On the other side, as regards output legitimacy, the meetings of the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs and of the Supervisory Board of the ECB operate as fora of transnational dialogue where CSAs can devise, together, supervisory cooperation policies tailored to their needs and expectations; this, in turn, may promote the acceptance of those policies among the CSAs concerned and further the effective functioning of financial sector supervisory cooperation in the EU.

The post-crisis EU financial services supervision architecture examined in this section represents a shift towards a model of greater centralization and coordination of financial supervision, with potential benefits for the convergence, consistency and legitimacy of supervisory cooperation rules and procedures. However, contemporarily, the model of centralized decentralization embraced by the ESFS and the Banking Union has substantially increased the complexity of the EU financial supervisory patchwork, which is now composed of a number of CSAs operating at various functional and jurisdictional levels and bound by an heterogeneous system of supervisory cooperation duties. This raises the question of whether and how EU law is able to deal with such complexity and guarantee the effective functioning of supervisory cooperation. In order to answer this question the next sections of this paper examine and assess key legal, regulatory and institutional aspects of the post-crisis EU financial supervisory cooperation architecture, their impact on the ability and incentives of CSAs to cooperate with each other as well as their contribution to the process of development of a single market for financial services.

V. SUPERVISORY COOPERATION DUTIES AND THEIR LIMITS: THE ROLE OF MEMBER STATES’ DISCRETION

Cooperation duties are not unconditional. From the outset, EU instruments have embraced limitations to the duty to cooperate which give CSAs certain degrees of discretion as regards the decision whether or not to cooperate in specific scenarios. The regime concerning waivers from supervisory cooperation has been particularly developed in the securities field, notably by the ESMA’s Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Arrangements and Exchange of Information (ESMA MMoU), which contains detailed rules and procedures regarding cooperation among CSAs and between CSAs and the ESMA. According to the ESMA MMoU, there are three reasons that may justify a refusal to cooperate by a requested CSA.

\[(\text {EBA/DC/2011/001 (Rev 4), Art. 3.5; EIOPA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority Board of Supervisors (EIOPA-BoS-11/002-Rev3), Art. 4.2; and ESMA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Securities and Markets Authority Board of Supervisors (ESMA/2012/BS/88 rev3), Art. 4.4. Also, in the SSM, the Supervisory Board takes decisions on draft regulations, which are used to develop important aspects of supervisory cooperation within the SSM –e.g. the Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism–, by qualified majority of its members –see ECB, Rules of Procedure of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank (2014), Art. 6.5 and Art. 26.7 SSM Regulation.}\]

\[(\text {158 Indeed, stakeholders seem to acknowledge that the creation of the ESAs has generally improved cooperation between CSAs – see European Parliament, Review of the New European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). Part 1: The Work of the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA And ESMA) –The ESFS’s Micro-Prudential Pillar (IP/A/ECON/ST/2012-23) 143.}\]

\[(\text {159 ESMA/2014/608.}\]

\[(\text {160 Art. 3.4 ESMA MMoU.}\]
The first is that the request of cooperation falls outside the scope of the ESMA MMoU.\textsuperscript{161} This would, however, be a highly unlikely scenario, first and foremost because the ESMA MMoU offers a rather comprehensive list of potential areas and modes of cooperation.\textsuperscript{162} In addition, the wording of the ESMA MMoU leaves an open door to the inclusion of areas and forms of cooperation not expressly addressed by it; for instance, when referring to the subject-matter of cooperation, the ESMA MMoU stipulates that: “assistance includes but is not limited to matters relating to…”\textsuperscript{163} Likewise, with respect to the forms of cooperation, the ESMA MMoU establishes that: “The scope of assistance available from the Requested Authority shall include, \textit{inter alia}…”\textsuperscript{164} In any event, a refusal to cooperate based on the above-mentioned justification, would only apply to requests of cooperation grounded on the ESMA MMoU. Therefore, a requested CSA may be entitled to withhold cooperation under the ESMA MMoU and, yet, be required to provide cooperation, if it is compelled to do so by EU or national laws.

The second reason that may warrant the withholding of cooperation by a requested CSA, according to the ESMA MMoU, is that the law of a Member State allows such a refusal to cooperate.\textsuperscript{165} This is, however, restricted to requests that are not grounded on EU law –i.e. when the requesting authority is not invoking a cooperation duty set in an EU Directive and/or Regulation. The progressive process of harmonization of EU securities laws has broadened the catalogue of areas of financial regulation subject to EU law and, consequently, to EU law-based cooperation duties, reducing, in turn, the scope of Member State law-based waivers from cooperation.

Third, a refusal to cooperate may be founded upon an exception to the duty to cooperate acknowledged by EU law.\textsuperscript{166} The EU legislator has not adopted a uniform approach to the treatment of these exceptions; as a result, the regime regarding the waivers from cooperation is a fragmented one and the scope of the CSAs’ cooperation duties varies according to the specific EU law or instrument under which a request of cooperation is issued.

As will be shown in this section, EU law waivers from supervisory cooperation pursue the protection of legitimate rights and interests that might be threatened by the actual provision of cooperation in particular cases. However, at the same time, those very same waivers give CSAs discretion as regards the interpretation of when and the extent to which such threats exist. Consequently, there is the potential risk of CSAs biasedly interpreting and invoking exceptions to the duty to cooperate in order to withhold cooperation in an opportunistic manner. This section carries out a twofold analysis. First, it identifies the various exceptions to the duty to cooperate embraced by EU instruments and assesses the scope for their potential misuse. Second, it examines the evolution of the legal treatment of those exceptions in order to answer an important question: has the process of integration of EU financial supervision led to a narrowing of the scope of the exceptions to the duty to cooperate and, consequently, to more limited degrees of discretion of the Member State CSAs in supervisory cooperation decisions?

\textsuperscript{161} Art. 3.4(a) ESMA MMoU.
\textsuperscript{162} See, for example, Arts. 3.2 and 3.3 ESMA MMoU.
\textsuperscript{163} Art. 3.2 ESMA MMoU.
\textsuperscript{164} Art. 3.3. ESMA MMoU.
\textsuperscript{165} Art. 3.4(c) ESMA MMoU.
\textsuperscript{166} Art. 3.4(b) ESMA MMoU.
A. Waivers from supervisory cooperation grounded on the interest of a Member State

A first category of waivers from the duty to cooperate refers to instances in which the provision of cooperation would have a negative effect on the protection of the interest—this concept broadly understood—of the Member State of the requested CSA. For example, some FSAP Directives—such as the Directive 2003/6/EC—Market Abuse Directive (MAD)—167 and the Directive 2004/39/EC—Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)—168 allowed CSAs to withhold cooperation when the latter “might adversely affect the sovereignty, security or public policy of the State addressed”.169 The IOSCO MMoU also contemplates the possibility of a requested CSA denying cooperation “on grounds of public interest or essential national interest”.170 These public interest-related exceptions gave CSAs substantial freedom in the interpretation of their duty to cooperate and, ultimately, in the decision of whether or not to cooperate in a specific case, opening the door to potentially protectionist behaviors; for instance, a requested CSA could use public interest-related exceptions opportunistically, withholding the exchange of information about firms operating in critical sectors—e.g. energy, military—or with major relevance for the economy, even in cases in which cooperation would pose no actual threat to the sovereignty, security or public policy in the Member State of the requested CSA. EU laws have progressively limited the scope of waivers related to the protection of the interest of a Member State and, thus, the ability of CSAs to refuse cooperation on such grounds; for example, the Regulation No 596/2014—Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)—171 which repeals the MAD, removed the references to threats to the “sovereignty” and “public policy”, and focused, instead, on cases in which the provision of cooperation “…could adversely affect the security of the Member State addressed, in particular the fight against terrorism and other serious crimes”.172 MiFID II, which partially recasts the MiFID, plainly eliminates any reference to waivers linked to the protection of the interest of a Member State.173 Nonetheless, CSAs would still be entitled to deny cooperation in instances of threats to national security, as the latter is a Treaty-based exclusive competence of the EU Member States.174

B. Waivers from supervisory cooperation grounded on the principle of Ne Bis In Idem

A second category of waivers relates to instances of res sub judice and res judicata, and provides protection against double jeopardy through the principle of ne bis in idem. These anti-double jeopardy exceptions, which are common in EU laws and

169 Art. 16.4 MAD and Art. 59 MiFID.
170 Art. 6(e)(iv) IOSCO MMoU.
172 Art. 25.2(a) MAR.
173 Art. 83 MiFID II.
174 Art. 4.2 Treaty on European Union (TEU).
MoUs in the financial field, allow CSAs to withhold cooperation in two scenarios. First, when judicial proceedings have already been initiated with regard to the same actions and the same persons before the authorities of the Member State of the requested CSA. Secondly, when final judgment has already been delivered in the Member State of the requested CSA with regard to the same persons and the same actions. These waivers do, however, pose certain problems of interpretation that will be examined in the next paragraphs. As will be shown, the evolution of the legal treatment of the anti-double jeopardy exceptions—from their initial wording in the FESCO and CESR MoUs to their current form—evidences that, overall, their scope has been progressively broadened, and, consequently, the ability of CSAs to refuse cooperation, increased.

The first question relates to the subject-matter jurisdictions covered by the anti-double jeopardy waivers. Whereas the FESCO and the CESR MoUs explicitly limited the *lis pendens* waivers to “…judicial proceedings for the imposition of criminal penalties…”, the reference to “criminal penalties” is absent in most post-FSAP and post-crisis EU financial laws, which merely make reference to “judicial proceedings,” without specifying any particular subject-matter. This raises the question of whether a refusal to cooperate might be grounded on the existence of judicial proceedings pertaining to matters beyond the criminal realm. Whereas the application of the principle of *ne bis in idem* has traditionally been limited to (national) criminal justice, over the years, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has construed it as a (transnational) general principle of EU law, not necessarily limited to the criminal jurisdiction but, instead, extendable to other types of judicial processes with a punitive nature. The omission of the reference to “criminal penalties” may suggest that anti-double jeopardy waivers embrace such EU law trend and extend to non-criminal jurisdictions—e.g. civil jurisdiction cases. The practical effect of this approach is that the ability of CSAs to withhold cooperation would be broadened.

A second issue regards to whether anti-double jeopardy waivers only apply to judicial proceedings/decisions or also include administrative actions—for example, when a requested CSA has already imposed a fine to a firm in relation to which the requesting CSA solicits information. According to both the FESCO MoU and the CESR MoU, administrative decisions were included in the anti-double jeopardy waivers. In this respect, the former read: “…where a non-appealable judicial or administrative sanction has already been imposed…”, and the latter referred to instances “…where final judgement has already been passed or administrative sanctions have already been applied…”. In contrast, in force MoUs and EU laws in the financial field seem to only explicitly include judicial decisions. Traditionally, EU law has adopted an ambiguous approach to the treatment of administrative sanctions in the context of *ne bis in idem*, often excluding administrative punitive decisions from a strict application of such principle, with the result that the same facts

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175 See e.g. Art. 83(a) MiFID II and Art. 25.2(c) MAD.
176 See e.g. Art. 83(b) MiFID II and 25.2(d) MAR.
177 See e.g. Art. 3.3 of the FESCO MoU and of the CESR MoU.
180 Art. 3.3 FESCO MoU.
181 Art. 3.3 CESR MoU.
182 See, for example, Art. 25.2(d) MAR.
could result in sanctions at various jurisdictional levels.\textsuperscript{183} Whereas some recent decisions of the CJEU encompass the notion that administrative punitive decisions would bar double prosecution,\textsuperscript{184} certain post-crisis EU legislative developments seem to take a very different view. For instance, the MAR acknowledges the possibility of the same offence being subject to both criminal and administrative sanctions.\textsuperscript{185} Recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has taken a much clearer stand, arguing that administrative enforcement and criminal prosecution for the same actions are incompatible. Of particular relevance for financial market practice, is the decision of the ECHR in\textit{ Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy}. Grande Stevens and other defendants who committed market manipulation were, first, fined administratively by the Italian securities supervisor –the \textit{Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa} (Consob)--\textsuperscript{186} and, subsequently, subject to criminal proceedings for the same facts. The ECHR argued that this constitutes a breach of the principle of \textit{ne bis in idem} embraced by article 4 of Protocol 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights –regarding the right not to be tried or punished twice. In the framework of cooperation between CSAs, it remains unclear what the scope of anti-double jeopardy waivers would be, in this respect. Even a full encompassment, by EU law and case law, of the applicability of the \textit{ne bis in idem} principle to administrative sanctions, would not necessarily extend to cooperation duties of CSAs –but, rather, to their enforcement procedures. The silence of in force anti-double jeopardy waivers on this matter, jointly with their emphasis on “judicial” decisions, would indicate that the intention of the EU legislator was to exclude administrative sanctions from the scope of such waivers. This would, in turn, limit the ability of CSAs to decline cooperation. For instance, the fact that the requested authority had already imposed a fine with regard to the same persons and actions would not, \textit{per se}, enable it to withhold cooperation.

A third important question refers to the extent to which anti-double jeopardy waivers also embrace instances in which the request of assistance is not aimed at bringing judicial proceedings or punitive administrative enforcement against a person involved in the actions to which the request of cooperation refers, for those very same actions –and/or may not result in those proceedings being brought in the jurisdiction of the requesting CSA. This would, for example, be the case of a request for cooperation about facts relating to and/or persons involved in a given securities laws violation, when such a request is merely instrumental to another supervisory or enforcement procedure relating to different actions and/or persons. The FESCO MoU offered a rather straightforward answer to this question by limiting the applicability of the anti-double jeopardy waivers to instances in which “…the provision of assistance might result in a judicial or administrative sanction being imposed in the jurisdiction of the Requested Authority, in respect of the same actions and against the same persons”.\textsuperscript{187} A similar approach is found in the IOSCO MMoU, which permits

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item J.A.E. Vervaele (n 178) 107.
\item See e.g. the Bonda case –Case C-489/10, Bonda [2012] ECR I-0000. An analysis of this question is provided by J. Lelieur –“‘Transnationalising’ Ne Bis In Idem: How the Rule of Ne Bis In Idem Reveals the Principle of Personal Legal Certainty” (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 198, 207.
\item Recital 72 MAR.
\item Art. 3.3 FESCO MoU.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the requested CSA to refuse cooperation “…unless the Requesting Authority can demonstrate that the relief or sanctions sought in any proceedings initiated by the Requesting Authority would not be of the same nature or duplicative of any relief or sanctions obtained in the jurisdiction of the Requested Authority”. This is, however, an aspect in relation to which contemporary EU MoUs and legislation are silent, hence opening the door to rigid interpretations that could back the withholding of cooperation, just because a given request refers to the same actions and persons.

C. Waivers from supervisory cooperation grounded on the interest of a competent supervisory authority

There is a third category of cooperation waivers aimed at protecting administrative investigation and enforcement activities in the jurisdiction of the requested CSA. Such type of waiver was introduced in the year 2014 by the MAR, which allows a requested CSA to deny cooperation when: “complying with the request is likely adversely to affect its own investigation, enforcement activities or, where applicable, a criminal investigation”. Although the reference to “its own investigation and enforcement activities” can be interpreted as referring to supervision regarding the same actions and persons to which the request of cooperation refers, the subsequent allusion to “a criminal investigation” seems to have a broader scope; for example, it may be interpreted as including criminal investigations by the requested CSA, relating to different persons and/or actions –or even, more generally, to criminal investigations conducted in the jurisdiction of the requested CSA by bodies different from the latter. To a certain extent, the MAR expands the cooperation waivers from the judicial to the, primarily administrative, non-judicial stage of an investigation and/or enforcement action, but with a more restricted character, i.e. only when the provision of cooperation has a likely negative effect on investigation and/or enforcement activities in the requested jurisdiction. From the point of view of the rights of the CSAs of different Member States involved in a given investigation, this waiver from cooperation poses some problems, because it implicitly attributes greater weight and primacy to an investigation and/or enforcement activity in the jurisdiction of the requested CSA –which is entitled to decline cooperation– than to an investigation and/or enforcement action in the jurisdiction of the requesting CSA, which may equally suffer negative effects if the requested CSA withholds cooperation on the grounds of the interest of its own investigations.

The analysis of the evolution of the content of the exceptions to the duty to cooperate from their early configuration in the FESCO and CESR MoUS to their current form –for example, in force EU Directives and Regulations– shows that, whereas the scope of some waivers has been narrowed, in certain instances it has been expanded and, consequently, the ability of CSAs to withhold cooperation increased. Indeed, despite the greater degrees of supervisory integration and centralization brought by the post-de Larosière framework, the regime concerning supervisory cooperation exceptions still grants considerable discretion to the Member State CSAs. One of the risks of such regime lies in its lack of clarity and definition, opening the door to dissimilar interpretations across the Member States. More importantly, it may result in potential opportunistic behaviors by CSAs, which may justify the withholding of cooperation on the basis of biased readings of the exceptions to the

188 Art. 6(e)(ii) IOSCO MMoU.
189 Art. 25.2(b) MAR.
duty to cooperate. Ultimately, disagreeing interpretations of the scope of the duties – and exceptions– to cooperate brings about the risk of increased supervisory dissent across the EU.

The next section examines and assesses post-crisis regulatory developments that have instituted mechanisms of solution of disagreements among CSAs, including instances of supervisory cooperation disputes.

VI. THE ESFS, THE EMERGENCE OF THE ESAS AS SETTLERS OF SUPERVISION COOPERATION DISPUTES, AND THE INCENTIVES OF CSAS TO COOPERATE

An important development brought about by the ESFS consisted of the institutionalization of a rather formal dispute settlement framework in which the ESAs are given extensive powers to resolve disagreements between CSAs. These powers are instrumental to the attainment of one of the key tasks of the ESAs, namely enhancing the consistent application of legally binding Union acts. Such consistency may be hindered when, for example, CSAs have different views about whether and how they are expected to cooperate with each other or with the ESAs – as required by EU law.

The ESAs have been vested with various mechanisms, some general and others ad hoc, that can be used to address instances of lack of compliance with cooperation duties by CSAs. In contrast with the Lamfalussy Committees, some of these mechanisms embrace the use of binding powers by the ESAs. The allocation of dispute settlement powers to the ESAs raises various questions that are relevant to understand and assess the post-crisis transformation of supervisory cooperation in the EU. A first question relates to the nature, scope and limitations of the ESAs’ instruments of dispute settlement. The answer to this question is useful to respond to a second question, namely, whether and why these new mechanisms of dispute settlement may have an actual impact on the incentives of CSAs to cooperate. Thirdly, by performing a quasi-judicial role in relation to CSAs, the ESAs are potentially subject to conflicts of interest that may affect their ability to solve disputes in an unbiased manner; it is, hence, important to understand the sources of such conflicts as well as the extent to which these are properly tackled by the EU regulatory and institutional frameworks.

The next sections explore these issues through an analysis of the nature, scope and potential effects of the ESAs’ dispute settlement mechanisms, in respect of both the ESFS and the Banking Union.

A. The mediation mechanism of article 19 of the ESAs Regulations: scope and limitations

The core mechanism of dispute settlement between CSAs is provided by article 19 of the ESAs Regulations, whereby the ESAs may mediate between CSAs in cases “…where a competent authority disagrees about the procedure or content of an action or inaction of a competent authority…in cases specified in [legally binding Union acts]…” Art. 19.1 ESAs Regulations. This provision embraces, inter alia, instances of cooperation disputes

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190 Art. 8.1(b) ESAs Regulations.
191 Art. 19.1 ESAs Regulations.
between CSAs, such as those arising when a requested CSA refuses to provide information to a requesting CSA. The reference to both ‘content’ and ‘procedure’ amplifies the reach of the ESAs’ mediation powers to, not only cases in which a request of cooperation is rejected, but also instances in which a requesting CSA is not satisfied with the quality of the cooperation provided – e.g. if the requesting CSA deems the information provided by the requested CSA to be incomplete or inadequate.

The mediation mechanism of article 19 consists of a one-to-three step process, where progression to each consecutive step depends on whether a solution is reached or not in the previous.

In step one (conciliation), an ESA mediates between the CSAs in disagreement, assisting them in the reaching of a solution. The conciliation step may be initiated at the request of CSA(s) or on an ESA’s own initiative – in the latter case, whenever the disagreement can be determined on the basis of objective criteria. The role of an ESA at this stage is that of a mere facilitator of cooperation between the CSAs in dispute. If the CSAs do not reach a solution within a time limit specified by the relevant ESA, then the latter may decide to proceed to step 2.

In step two (binding mediation), an ESA adopts a binding decision addressed to the CSAs in dispute that settles the disagreement, by requiring them to take specific action or refrain from it. An example would be a decision whereby a requested CSA must provide certain information to a requesting CSA. Step two-decisions are binding and, therefore, CSAs are expected to comply with them. However, if they do not do so, then an ESA may proceed to step three.

In step three (direct binding decision), an ESA adopts an individual decision addressed to a financial market participant, requiring it to take specific action or refrain from it. This mechanism is aimed at guaranteeing that, when a CSA does not comply with a binding mediation decision, the market participants concerned follow courses of action that, somehow, overcome the failure of a CSA to observe an ESA’s settlement.

The mediation process is led by Mediation Panels within each ESA. These panels are appointed by the respective Boards of Supervisors and composed of the Chair of an ESA plus two members – six in the EBA – of its Board of Supervisors who neither represent the CSAs in disagreement nor have direct links with the latter or any interest in the dispute. The decisions of a Mediation Panel with a proposed binding settlement are forwarded to the relevant Board of Supervisors for final adoption, which generally requires simple majority of its members.

The powers of the ESAs under article 19 are much more extensive than those held by the Lamfalussy Committees. In the first place, the powers of the Lamfalussy Committees were not binding, unlike those of the ESAs, which may settle a disagreement between CSAs through a binding decision. Second, the ESAs can, at

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192 Art. 19.1 ESAs Regulations.
193 A similar mechanism of non-binding mediation between CSAs is also envisaged by Art. 31 of the ESAs Regulations.
194 Art. 19.2 ESAs Regulations.
195 Art. 19.3 ESAs Regulations.
196 Art. 19.4 ESAs Regulations.
197 Art. 41.2 ESAs Regulations.
198 Art. 41.2 ESAs Regulations.
199 Art. 41.3 ESAs Regulations.
200 Art. 44.1 ESAs Regulations.
201 See e.g. Art. 5 CESR mediation protocol (CESR/06-287b).
their own discretion –where disagreements are objectively determinable–, step into a dispute and initiate a mediation process, whereas the Lamfalussy Committees were able to play a mediation role, only after a request from a CSA.\footnote{202}

Despite the width of the powers granted to the ESAs under article 19, there are some important limitations and interpretative problems regarding their application to instances of supervisory dissent.

First, the mechanism of article 19 can only be applied when an EU legally binding act explicitly backs such use –and only for the purposes specified in it.\footnote{203} EU financial sector Directives and Regulations take different stances in this respect, some being more restrictive than others. For example, article 82 of MiFID II embraces a far-reaching application of article 19, enabling its use to address disagreements between CSAs “where a request relating to one of the following has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time: (a) to carry out a supervisory activity, an on-the-spot verification, or an investigation, as provided for in Article 80; or (b) to exchange information as provided for in Article 81.” In contrast, article 23.4 of the Regulation No 236/2012 (Short Selling Regulation),\footnote{204} provides for a more narrow application of article 19, limiting its use to instances where “a competent authority disagrees with the action taken by another competent authority on a financial instrument traded on different venues regulated by different competent authorities…”

Second, step two and step three of the mediation mechanism require the existence of a breach of EU law, which the mediation process aims to put to an end to. For example, as indicated above, when a requested CSA withholds information that a requesting authority has the right to access and which the requested CSA ought to provide –according to the general duty of cooperation between CSAs and/or concrete cooperation duties set in EU financial laws–, there would be a breach of EU law and the ESA concerned would, hence, be entitled to use a step two-binding decision to settle the disagreement –if the conciliatory phase failed. However, cooperation disputes founded on breaches of domestic laws establishing specific cooperation duties would be excluded from this mediation mechanism, as long as they do not imply a breach of EU law. Likewise, discretionary actions by Member State CSAs, based on explicit or implicit EU legislative delegations, are shielded from and cannot be superseded by ESA’s binding mediation decisions, as long as the exercise of such discretion is in compliance with EU law.\footnote{205}

In addition, the general applicability of step three-decisions to supervisory cooperation disputes is questionable. In this respect, section 3 of article 19 of the ESAs Regulations stipulates that: “…where a competent authority does not comply with the decision of the Authority, and thereby fails to ensure that a financial market participant complies with requirements directly applicable to it by virtue of the acts referred to in Article 1(2), the Authority may adopt an individual decision addressed to a financial market participant requiring the necessary action to comply with its obligations under Union law…”. Therefore, article 19.3 seems to limit the applicability of direct binding decisions to instances in which lack of compliance of a CSA with an ESA’s binding mediation decision also results in and/or implies lack of

\footnote{202}{See e.g. Art. 3 CESR mediation protocol.}
\footnote{203}{Art. 19.1 ESAs Regulations. See also E. Wymeersch (n 118) 266.}
\footnote{204}{Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, O.J. 2012, L 86/1.}
\footnote{205}{See e.g. recital 32 EBA Regulation.}
compliance of a market participant with EU law. This is, however, not necessarily the case in cooperation disputes. For instance, when a CSA does not abide by a binding decision of an ESA, it may be breaching EU law—for example, general cooperation duties—without this necessarily resulting in a consequential breach of EU law by a market participant. These limitations to the powers of the ESAs in the use of step two and step three-decisions are, indeed, consistent with the Meroni doctrine, according to which EU institutions cannot delegate discretionary powers that involve wide margins of discretion.

Third, the safeguard clause of article 38 of the ESAs Regulations, whereby step two-mediation decisions must not impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of the Member States, might also pose some limitations to the use of binding mediation by an ESA, notably in the context of resolution disputes. If a Member State considers that there is such an impingement, it may trigger a procedure that involves the binding decision of the ESA being suspended, reconsidered by the latter, and whenever maintained, subject to scrutiny by the Council, which decides whether to uphold it or not. Nevertheless, owing to the creation of the Single Resolution Mechanism and the transfer of resolution authority to the Single Resolution Board, the room for decisions of an ESA regarding resolution disputes with an impact on the fiscal responsibilities of the member states is more reduced and so is the scope for invoking a breach of article 38.

In addition to the procedure for the challenge of decisions of article 38 of the ESAs Regulations, which is restricted to instances when an ESA’s binding decision invades the fiscal responsibilities of a member state, CSAs are entitled to challenge mediation decisions adopted by the ESAs before the ESAs’ Board of Appeal, and, eventually, before the Court of Justice of the EU; this remedy could for instance be used when a CSA deems an ESA’s decision arbitrary or adopted without following applicable statutory procedural requirements.

A potential additional restriction of the mediation mechanism of article 19 relates to the nature of the organs in charge of adopting binding decisions. The voting power within both the Mediation Panels and the Boards of Supervisors—which are in charge of proposing and adopting binding decisions, respectively—is primarily concentrated in representatives of CSAs; it is unclear the extent to which these may be able to vote impartially, merely on the facts of the dispute at stake in a given case. The political economy of voting in binding mediation processes may be influenced by

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206 Wymeersch highlights the limited applicability of direct binding decisions, to only directly applicable regulations—E. Wymeersch (n 118) 270.
209 Art. 38.2 ESAs Regulations.
210 Art. 60.1 ESAs Regulations. This is a joint body of the ESAs composed of six members and six alternates with high repute and proven experience in financial services and who are not employed by national or Union institutions involved in the activities of the ESAs—Art. 58.2 ESAs Regulations.
211 Art. 61.1 ESAs Regulations.
212 In the Mediation Panels, the voting members are the Chairpersons and the representatives from CSAs—Art. 41.2 ESAs Regulations—and, in the Boards of Supervisors, the voting members are the representatives of CSAs—Art. 44.1 ESAs Regulations.
factors such as the relationships and mutual interests between the voting members of a Board of Supervisors and the CSAs in dispute; this may in turn create distortions, especially when voting procedures are not secret.\textsuperscript{213} For example, a member of a Board of Supervisors may be reluctant to cast a vote against the interest of a certain CSA in a particular cooperation dispute for fear of negative repercussions in the cooperation relationships with that CSA in the future.

1. Does the mediation mechanism of article 19 of the ESAs Regulations have an impact on the incentives of CSAs to cooperate?

In order to assess whether and how the mediation procedure of article 19 may impact supervisory cooperation between CSAs, it is first important to understand the costs resulting from its application –especially when it escalates to step two– on both the requesting and requested CSAs.

On the one side, a binding mediation of an ESA overturning a non-cooperation decision of a requested CSA may result in certain costs for the latter.

In the first place, the binding decision will have the immediate result of compelling the CSA concerned to perform an action –e.g the forwarding of information to the requesting CSA– that it likely deems prejudicial to its own interests and/or the interests of actors that it is bound to protect, such as investors or consumers of financial services in its jurisdiction.

Second, a binding mediation may limit the discretion of a CSA in deciding whether to cooperate or not in the future, because its decisions in that regard will be largely bound by what an ESA has ruled in prior binding mediation procedures. In this respect, the binding mediation constitutes a quasi-regulatory tool through which the ESAs can shape the behavior of CSAs, by signaling the preferences of the former about the extent and scope of cooperation that the latter are expected to provide in similar instances as those being subject to a mediation process. It follows that a CSA whose decision not to cooperate in a particular case has been overturned by an ESA, may, in the future, adjust its supervisory behavior to the expectations of such ESA –even when those supervisory courses of action are contrary to the policy views and preferences of the CSA concerned–, in order to avoid the threat of binding mediation processes being initiated.

Third, owing to the fact that binding mediation decisions must be approved by the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs,\textsuperscript{214} and that, consequently, the nature and scope of the disagreements are made known to fellow CSAs within an ESA,\textsuperscript{215} the reputation of the CSAs whose non-cooperative actions are upturned, vis-à-vis other CSAs, may

\textsuperscript{213} The standard voting procedure in the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs seems to be the hands-off vote, but the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Supervisors also acknowledge the possibility of secret voting for certain matters –see, for example, Art. 7.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Banking Authority Board of Supervisors (EBA/DC/2011/001 (Rev 4), 2014)–, and/or upon request of some of its members –see, for example, Art. 4.7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Board of Supervisors of EIOPA (EIOPA-BoS-11/002-Rev2, 2015).

\textsuperscript{214} Arts. 19.3 and 44.1 ESAs Regulations.

\textsuperscript{215} The proposal for a binding mediation decision that a Mediation Panel submits to a Board of Supervisors for approval in the binding mediation stage must include, among others: the identity of the CSAs involved in the dispute; the opinion of the Mediation Panel on how to settle the disagreement, as well as the reasons on which it is based; and, if appropriate, the deadline by which the CSAs addressed by the decision should take action or refrain from it. The proposed decision must also be accompanied by materials indicating the views of the CSAs concerned about the proposed settlement –see, for example, Arts. 7.6-7 of: ESMA, Decision of the Board of Supervisors. Rules of procedure of the Mediation Panel (ESMA/2012/BS/86).
be hindered—especially whenever an ESA justifies its binding decision on an alleged lack of consistency and/or reasonableness of the requested CSA’s behavior.

Because binding mediation may bring about important costs for a requested CSA, the latter will tailor its behavior to the assessment of the likeliness of an ESA’s mediation process being initiated, either at the demand of the requesting CSA or on an ESA’s own initiative. Likewise, the threat of binding mediation may contribute to deter a requested CSA from arbitrary or inconsistent non-cooperation decisions that could potentially trigger the mediation process—or, if the latter is initiated, to revise its decision in the conciliatory phase.

On the other side, a decision adopted by an ESA in the context of a binding mediation may also create costs for the requesting CSA. By submitting a dispute to an ESA for mediation, the requesting authority is, in fact, shifting decisional power away from the requested CSA to the relevant ESA. Hence, the mere request of an ESA’s intervention through mediation may harm the trust of the requested authority in the requesting authority, impairing the relationships between them. This may, in turn, affect the quality of future cooperation; for instance, a requested CSA may be more reluctant to voluntarily disclose unsolicited information that could, nonetheless, be useful for the requesting CSA.

A requesting CSA will apply for an ESA’s mediation if the potential costs resulting from such a request are lower than the potential benefits of the provision of cooperation stemming from an ESA’s mediation. This will, most likely, be limited to very relevant supervisory procedures—e.g. with a major impact on the markets and actors in the jurisdiction of the requesting CSA—and where the probability of an ESA’s decision upholding the requesting CSA’s demands vis-à-vis the requested CSA are high—e.g. if and when the grounds for lack of cooperation by the requested CSA are weak.

The data regarding the use of mediation by the ESAs would support the hypothesis of article 19’s deterrent effect. For instance, since the ESAs became operative, only the EBA applied the mediation process of article 19; this happened in two occasions, both in the year 2014, and, in both cases, the disagreement was settled in step one of the process, that is, in the conciliation phase. In its Annual Report of the year 2015, the EBA did, indeed, highlight its pre-eminently informal role in the settlement of disagreements between CSAs: “Although there have been several cases of disagreements between CAs, during 2015 the EBA has not been approached with a request to provide its assistance in one of these formal procedures on mediation. Nonetheless, the EBA played an important role in providing its assistance to settle disagreements between CAs in an informal way”. The Commission’s review of the ESFS acknowledged the potentially dissuasive effect of the binding mediation mechanism, recognizing, at the same time, the “lack of clarity” of the ESAs

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Regulations with respect to the scope of binding mediation, suggesting that this may be addressed in future reforms of the ESAs Regulations.219

2. The Single Supervisory Mechanism, The Single Resolution Mechanism and the role of the EBA as a mediator between the Banking Union EU level supervisory structures and Member State CSAs

The creation of the SSM and the SRM and the allocation of direct supervisory responsibilities within these structures to the ECB and the SRB, respectively, have led to a reconfiguration of the supervisory relationships within the EU financial supervision architecture. Under the SSM and the SRM, both the ECB and the SRB are bound by cooperation duties vis-à-vis CSAs and the EBA as well as between each other. Supervisory cooperation is given a central role within the SSM: “It is essential for the smooth functioning of the SSM that there is full cooperation between the ECB and NCAs and that they exchange all the information that may have an impact on their respective tasks…”220 Likewise, the SRM Regulation embraces close supervisory cooperation of the SRB with the EBA—and, where appropriate, also with the ESRB, the ESMA, the EIOPA and other supervisory authorities in the ESFS—, the ECB and other supervisory authorities within the SSM, as well as with resolution authorities.221

Under the EBA Regulation, both the ECB and the SRB are deemed CSAs and, hence, subject to the EBA’s supervisory remit.222 The regulatory framework acknowledges the applicability of the EBA’s mediation mechanism to supervisory cooperation disputes involving the ECB and the SRB. As regards the ECB, the EBA’s Rules of Procedure for the Settlement of Disagreements between Competent Authorities, stipulate that: “In view of the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the EBA should be able to carry out its tasks also in relation to the ECB in the same manner as in relation to the other competent authorities.”223 Also, the SRM Regulation recognizes that, for the purposes of the Directive 2014/59/EU—Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)—, the SRB is bound by the EBA’s mediation decisions.224

The scope of applicability of the mediation mechanism is more limited in respect of the SRB than the ECB. This is because, according to the EBA Regulation, the SRB will be considered a CSA—and, hence, subject to the EBA’s mediation processes and decisions—only when and if it is not exercising discretionary powers or making policy choices.225 Owing to the fact that supervision and resolution tasks generally embrace

221 Recital 89 SRM Regulation.
222 Art. 4.2(i), (iv), EBA Regulation.
223 Recital 4 Decision of the European Banking Authority adopting the Rules of Procedure for the settlement of disagreements between competent authorities (EBA/DC/2014/091 (Rev 1)).
224 Art. 5.2 SRM Regulation.
225 Art. 4.2(iv) EBA Regulation.
the exercise of margins of discretion, the potential role of the EBA as a settler of disagreements involving the SRB will be very narrow.\textsuperscript{226}

The efficient functioning of the principal-agent institutional design, on which both the SSM and the SRM are based,\textsuperscript{227} requires a smooth interaction between EU level CSAs –namely, the ECB and the SRB– on the one side, and the Member State CSAs on the other. For instance, in the SSM, the ECB largely relies on CSAs for the enforcement of prudential regulation\textsuperscript{228} and, in the SRM, the SRB delegates the execution of resolution schemes to national resolution authorities.\textsuperscript{229} In addition, the SSM and the SRM are mutually dependent and require a close cooperation between the ECB and the SRB in tasks such as the development of recovery and resolution plans.\textsuperscript{230} For reasons similar to those explained above with regard to the ESFS, the activation of the mediation mechanism could lead to costs for both requesting and requested CSAs within the SSM and the SRM. Therefore, it would most likely be relied upon only as a last resort mechanism in exceptional circumstances.

B. Disagreements between the ESAs and CSAs: the ESAs as interested parties and judges

As has been explained in the preceding subsections, the ESFS encompasses a series of supervisory cooperation duties between the ESAs and CSAs, raising the possibility of disagreements about the rationale, grounds, extent and scope of those duties in concrete supervisory scenarios.

Although the ESAs Regulations do not offer ad hoc mechanisms of settlement of cooperation disputes between the ESAs and CSAs, they, nevertheless, embrace instruments that can be used for such purpose. An example is article 17 of the ESAs Regulations, which institutes a three-level procedure to address breaches of EU law by CSAs. In the first stage, an ESA is empowered to investigate alleged breaches of EU law by a CSA and to issue recommendations directed to the latter with indications on the steps to take so as to remedy such breaches.\textsuperscript{231} If the CSA concerned fails to comply with the recommendation, then there is a second stage where the Commission may issue a formal opinion, requiring the CSA to take action to comply with EU law.\textsuperscript{232} Lastly, if the CSA fails to observe the Commission’s opinion, then the process may move to a third stage where an ESA is vested with the power to issue an individual binding decision directly addressed to a financial institution, in order to remedy the lack of compliance with EU law.\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{226} On the limitations to the EBA’s binding mediation powers resulting from the ‘discretionary powers’ exception see N. Moloney, ‘European Banking Union: assessing its risks and resilience’ (2014) 51 CML Rev 1609, 1669.


\textsuperscript{231} Arts. 17.1-3 ESAs Regulations.

\textsuperscript{232} Art. 17.4 ESAs Regulations.

\textsuperscript{233} Art. 17.6 ESAs Regulations.
Whereas the mechanism envisaged by article 17 of the ESAs Regulations is primarily aimed at tackling instances in which a CSA fails to ensure that supervised entities comply with EU financial sector laws, its scope of applicability is broad, as it may be used by an ESA “Where a competent authority has not applied the acts referred to in Article 1(2), or has applied them in a way which appears to be a breach of Union law…” On the one side, this would include cases where a CSA fails to comply with cooperation duties vis-à-vis other CSAs but where there is no apparent express disagreement between the CSAs concerned and the mechanism of article 19 is not deployed. On the other side, it could also comprise instances in which a CSA breaches cooperation duties set in EU acts vis-à-vis the ESAs. As regards the latter, the cooperation mandates instituted by EU financial sector laws are rather all-encompassing; for example, according to the Short Selling Regulation: “The competent authorities shall cooperate with ESMA for the purposes of this Regulation…The competent authorities shall provide, without delay, ESMA with all the information necessary to carry out its duties”. As a result, the ESAs may enjoy substantial discretion in the actual determination of the extent and scope of the supervisory cooperation duties of CSAs towards them.

The application of article 17 of the ESAs Regulations to supervisory cooperation disputes between an ESA and a CSA would raise the question of the ability of the former to exercise independent judgment because, in those instances, an ESA would be acting, both as one of the parties to the dispute and as a judge. This would pose some legitimacy concerns, especially in light of the extensive powers conferred on the ESAs throughout the various stages of the procedure of article 17. In this respect, an ESA has full control of the first stage of the procedure, as it has the power to initiate an investigation on its own initiative and also to issue a recommendation. In addition, in the second stage, the Commission’s opinion “Shall take into account the Authority’s recommendation”. Furthermore, in the third stage, an ESA is vested with binding powers to put an end to a breach of EU law through an individual decision.

Despite the *prima facie* extensive reach of the powers of the ESAs under article 17, these are also subject to important limitations. In the first place, the scope of an ESA’s direct binding decision for breaches of EU law is restricted to instances in which lack of compliance of a CSA with the Commission’s formal opinion also results in and/or implies lack of compliance of a market participant with EU law—which, as has been explained in relation to the mediation procedure in section 6.1, may not always be the case in instances of supervisory dissent. Additionally, the power of an ESA to issue a direct binding decision under article 17 is subject to strict conditionality—e.g. actual or potential distortion to competition or the functioning or integrity of the financial system, and direct applicability of the relevant EU law to the financial

234 Art. 17.1 ESAs Regulations.
235 Art. 17.1 ESAs Regulations.
236 The Chairperson of an ESA may determine, on a case by case basis, that mediation is more suitable for dealing with an alleged breach of EU law—see, for example, Annex 2 of: EBA, Decision of the European Banking Authority adopting Rules of Procedure for Investigation of Breach of Union Law (EBA/DC/2014/100).
237 Art. 36 Short Selling Regulation.
238 Arts. 17.2-3 ESAs Regulations.
239 Art. 17.4 ESAs Regulations.
240 Art. 17.6 ESAs Regulations.
241 Art. 17.6 ESAs Regulations.
institution to which the binding decision is addressed. These conditions largely restrict the use of article 17 to supervisory cooperation disputes between an ESA and a CSA. Furthermore, a decision of an ESA based on article 17 may be challenged by a CSA before the Board of Appeal of the ESAs and, ultimately, before CJEU; consequently, this reduces the potential of an ESA’s prejudiced use of article 17.

VII. THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE DUTY TO COOPERATE AND THE ABILITY TO COOPERATE: MULTI-LEVEL SUPERVISORY POWERS, LEGAL MANDATES AND ACCOUNTABILITY

As has been explained throughout the previous sections, the constitutional, legal and regulatory frameworks at both the EU and Member State levels institute, in different degrees, cooperation duties between CSAs. Compliance with those cooperation duties requires an adequate empowerment of the supervisory authorities, which, for instance, enables them to fulfill a given request of cooperation from a counterpart. When and if a CSA does not have adequate powers to cooperate, the effective provision of cooperation may be hindered. The fragmented nature of the European supervisory framework, where supervisory powers are widespread among several CSAs operating at different levels, propitiates some tensions between cooperation duties, on the one side, and the ability of CSAs to provide cooperation, on the other. Such tensions owe to two primary reasons.

In the first place, CSAs across the EU diverge substantially in their structure and powers. Over the years, each Member State has developed its own financial supervision architecture according to local preferences, experiences and needs. This has resulted in a somehow byzantine scheme that combines, not only various financial supervisory models –such as the three-pillar, the single supervisor or the twin-peaks–, but also distinctive and, often, dissimilar domestic approaches to the CSAs’ supervisory powers. Moreover, Member States frequently shift from one model to another, notably as a result of crises or scandals in the financial realm and to consequential concerns about the effectiveness of the institutional frameworks of financial supervision in place; this has resulted in a complex and heterogeneous supervisory picture. Although the global financial crisis has brought about certain degrees of institutional convergence –e.g. towards the twin peaks model– there still are major divergences in the structure and powers of CSAs of the various Member States.

Secondly, financial supervision involves the carrying out of actions subject to substantive and procedural requirements of various areas of the law –such as general

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242 Art. 17.6 ESAs Regulations.
243 Art. 60 ESAs Regulations.
244 Art. 61 ESAs Regulations.
245 See, for example, ECB, Recent Developments in Supervisory Structures in the EU Member States (2007-10) (2010).
246 In this model, also known as the integrated approach, a single CSA is entrusted with both the prudential and conduct of business supervision of all financial sectors and entities in a given jurisdiction –Group of Thirty (n 22) 13-14.
249 See ECB (n 245).
administrative law and data protection rules—whose content also varies significantly across the Member States.

The diversity of supervisory architectures and powers, as well as the differences in the general legal frameworks relevant to the provision of supervisory cooperation may create some practical problems; notably, when a CSA from a Member State requests the performance of a supervisory action to a CSA from another Member State, the latter may not be able to perform it owing to lack of powers, or because such provision of cooperation would result in a breach of its domestic laws.

The Lamfalussy reports acknowledged the diversity of supervisory competencies of CSAs across the EU and the potential negative impact that such unevenness might have on supervisory cooperation, highlighting the need for convergence of supervisory powers available to CSAs. These calls for greater convergence were indeed reflected in various FSAP directives, such as the MiFID and the MAD, which introduced regimes concerning the minimum supervisory powers of CSAs. For example, article 12 of the MAD and article 50.2 of the MiFID developed a rather comprehensive *ad minimis* catalogue of powers that CSAs must have at their disposal for the exercise of supervisory functions; these included, among others, accessing any document and data, requiring or demanding information from any person, and carrying out on-site inspections. The specific scope of those minimum supervisory powers was, nonetheless, conditional to the content of national laws. If and when domestic laws did not empower a CSA to directly exercise a given supervisory competence included within the catalogue of minimum supervisory powers set by the relevant EU financial laws, the latter embraced the possibility of and required either the co-exercise of such powers with other authorities, their delegation to other authorities or entities, or their exercise by application to judicial authorities. In other words, according to the regulatory model encompassed by EU financial law, for each supervisory power listed among the minimum powers there ought to be an authority able to either exercise or co-exercise it in every Member State. Whereas this system brought about increasing consistency to the EU supervisory system, it also had some flaws, notably, because rather than a convergence of CSAs’ supervisory powers, it encouraged a minimum harmonization of powers available at the Member State level for supervisory tasks. Under this system, tasks instrumental for the exercise of supervision may be decentralized among various authorities, not necessarily limited to CSAs. These chains of authorities in supervision pose the risk of an increasing complexity of the supervisory architecture and, also, of supervisory cooperation

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251 Lamfalussy Report, 38.
252 Art. 12.2(a) MAD and Art. 50.2(a) MiFID.
253 Art. 12.2(b) MAD and Art. 50.2(b) MiFID.
254 Art. 12.2(c) MAD and Art. 50.2(c) MiFID.
255 See, for example, Art. 12.2 MAD: “…the powers referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with national law and shall include at least the right to…”
256 This could, for instance, be the case in which a CSA of a given Member State is not empowered to intervene telephone conversations or enter the premises of a firm directly, but only after receiving judicial authorization; on the differences in the powers of CSAs of the Member States in relation to market abuse supervision see CESR, Review Panel report MAD Options and Discretions 2009 (CESR/09-1120, 2010) 88-93.
257 See, for example, Art. 12.1 MAD and Art. 50.1 MiFID.
because, under them, the accomplishment of a single supervisory action –such as the gathering of information from a market participant– may require coordinated action by or authorizations from different authorities and/or entities in one Member State. The risks of an inefficient supervisory cooperation may be exacerbated when authorities –such as the judiciary– in charge of some tasks within a supervisory chain lack independence or efficiency.

The de Larosière Report voiced concerns about the persistence of important differences in the powers of CSAs and recommended the adoption of measures aimed at enhancing the consistency of CSAs’ supervisory remits across the EU. In its Communication on *Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector,* the Commission acknowledged that the differences among legal systems of the Member States was one of the reasons behind the divergences in the sanctioning powers of CSAs and undertook to make proposals aimed at furthering greater convergence in this field. Post-crisis EU legislation has attempted to foster convergence, primarily through a broadening and/or redefinition of the catalogue of powers of CSAs. For example, as regards supervision concerning market abuse, the MAR has added the power “to enter the premises of natural and legal persons in order to seize documents and data…” to the list of minimum powers of CSAs –this being an area where some CSAs lacked competences.

Despite these improvements in the consistency of the substantive scope of the CSAs’ supervisory powers, the post-crisis EU financial laws are largely inspired by the regime of minimum harmonization of supervisory powers subject to national implementation, as developed by the FSAP directives and, consequently, they reflect one of the weaknesses of the pre-crisis regime, namely, the risk of supervisory powers being exercised through chains of actors; this may increase the complexity and hinder the efficiency of supervisory cooperation.

An aspect relating to the CSAs’ ability to cooperate to which the post-de Larosière overhaul has given particular attention is their mandates. The creation of the ESFS and the Banking Union and the allocation of important tasks to CSAs within them have, indeed, led to the configuration of transnational mandates that bind CSAs to the accomplishment of targets beyond their own jurisdictions. For instance, in their role as members of the governing bodies of the ESAs, the SSM and the SRM, representatives of CSAs must act in the interest of the Union as a whole. Some post-crisis EU laws also embrace general transnational mandates that CSAs must abide with in their day-to-day supervision at the national level. For example, article 7 of the Directive 2013/36/EU –Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV)– stipulates that: “The competent authorities in each Member State shall, in the exercise

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259 De Larosière Report, 23, 41.
260 Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector (COM(2010) 716 final).
262 Art. 23.2(e) MAR.
264 See, for example, Art. 23.2 MAR: “In order to fulfil their duties under this Regulation, competent authorities shall have, in accordance with national law, at least the following supervisory and investigatory powers”. See, also, Art. 72.1 MiFID II, Art. 23.1 MAR, and Art. 64.2 CRD IV.
265 See, for instance, Arts. 42 and 46 ESAs Regulations, and Art. 47 SRM Regulation.
of their general duties, duly consider the potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial system in the other Member States concerned and, in particular, in emergency situations, based on the information available at the relevant time.”

Despite the post-crisis broadening of the Member State CSAs’ mandates, the latter remain, to a primary extent, national and relate to the accomplishment of objectives pertaining to financial systems, markets, institutions and firms in the CSAs’ own jurisdictions. The laws instituting national CSAs often acknowledge, in an explicit manner, the national character of the CSAs’ mandates. For example, as regards the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) defines the FCA’s integrity objective as: “protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system”.266

There is some tension between the national character of the Member State CSAs’ core mandates and the latter’s position within EU structures – such as the ESFS and the SSM – aimed at the pursuing of goals with a cross-border dimension.267 When it comes to the specific area of cooperation, a potential problem is that a CSA from a Member State may be faced with a request of cooperation whose compliance with would contribute to EU-wide objectives and/or mandates of financial supervision but might, at the same time, hinder the accomplishment of national supervisory mandates. Whereas the principle of supremacy of EU law would determine that a national mandate conflicting with a duty of cooperation set by EU law ought to be set aside,268 in those instances, a CSA may nonetheless be subject to incentives to refuse cooperation or provide an incomplete cooperation, so as to maximize its compliance with the mandates established by domestic laws.

The accountability relationships within which CSAs operate are critical to understand the way in which they may balance the mandates, duties and interests at stake in particular cooperation contexts. Although the post-crisis EU overhaul incorporates some forms of multi-level transnational accountability – e.g. an ESA may hold a CSA to account through the binding mediation mechanism of article 19 of the ESAs Regulation – the account principals with the power to call and/or hold CSAs to account are, to a great extent, domestic actors. For example, the appointment and dismissal of heads of CSAs is carried out by national governments and/or parliaments in each Member State. Likewise, the creation and abolition of CSAs and the budgets at their disposal depend on decisions adopted by political institutions in the jurisdictions of the CSAs concerned. In addition, the accountability of CSAs at the national level is essentially determined by the extent to which they accomplish their mandates,269 which, as referred above, tend to have a marked national character. Owing to the pre-eminently domestic nature of both the mandates and accountability of the Member State CSAs, when the latter are faced with cooperation requests in which national interests are at stake, they may have an incentive to give priority to the maximization of such interests, rather than broader targets embraced by EU law

266 Section 1D(1), Part 1A FSMA 2000.
cooperation duties and/or mandates. This may be particularly the case in instances where CSAs are not properly insulated from undue political and stakeholder interferences in their own Member States.

VIII. THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CRISIS, BREXIT AND THE FUTURE OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION IN THE EU

From the outset, the EU single market for financial services has developed through a process of incremental integration. The Single European Act, the FSAP, the Lamfalussy and de Larosiére architectures, the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union represent steps of such a process, which has led to increasing degrees of regulatory and supervisory convergence as well as greater centralization of decision-making tasks at the EU level. The various crises that the EU has been facing since the year 2008 do, nevertheless, raise some concerns about the future, scope and pace of the process of EU financial services integration.

On the one side, the financial, euro and sovereign debt crises, and their effects on the EU economy, have hindered the trust of citizens in the EU and led to a decline of support of the process of EU integration. Likewise, disagreements between Member States on how to deal with these crises – e.g. proponents of austerity and structural reforms, such as Germany, vs. opponents to them, such as Greece – led to greater polarization and tensions within the EU. In addition, the post-crisis trend of centralization of financial regulatory, supervisory, and, more generally, executive powers at the EU level has not been equally welcomed by all the Member States.

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269 The Capital Markets Union is a plan adopted by the Commission in September 2015, whose main target is to create a single EU capital market by the year 2019. The focus of the Capital Markets Union Plan is on, inter alia, the promotion of mechanisms of direct finance and cross-border capital flows – see Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: action plan on building a capital markets union (COM/2015/0468 final).

270 In the early stages of the global financial crisis there were instances of CSAs’ actions driven by the protection of national interests but with distortive effects on international capital flows. An example was asset ring-fence in the UK and Germany in response to the Icelandic Banks’ crisis and Lehman’s default, respectively – S. Claessens, “The Financial Crisis and Financial Nationalism” in S.J. Evenett, B.M. Hoekman and O. Cattaneo (eds.), Effective Crisis Response and Openness: Implications for the Trading System (The International Bank for Reconstructions and Development/The World Bank 2009) 269-270.


272 For example, the UK, has long since been a strong opponent to the shift of decision-making power from national to EU level bodies, as embraced by the ESFS – see e.g. L. Quaglia, ‘The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Politics of Financial Services Regulation in the European Union’ (2012) 17 New Political Economy
On the other side, the EU’s legitimacy and political crises have been magnified by the diverging approaches of the Member States in core areas of EU policy, such as migration and security, which have accentuated internal frictions within the EU.\(^\text{278}\)

One of the manifestations of the EU’s various crises has consisted of a rise of popularity of political parties that oppose EU integration – notably in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany –\(^\text{279}\) and, more dramatically, the decision of the UK to leave the EU;\(^\text{280}\) in addition, at the EU level, the Commission and the Council have been mulling over a multi-speed EU with different degrees and/or speeds of integration.\(^\text{281}\)

### A. The EU-UK supervisory relationship after Brexit

Brexit raises important questions as regards the future of financial integration and supervisory cooperation in Europe. The UK is one of the main international financial centres and it hosts some of the largest financial entities from the EU internal market.\(^\text{282}\) The PRA and the FCA – as well as their predecessors – have played a central role in the shaping of EU financial regulation and supervision.\(^\text{283}\) Brexit will result in a transformation of the nature of the relationships between the CSAs from the EU and those of the UK. The position of the UK in this new framework will largely depend on whether the negotiations between the EU and the UK result in a soft or a hard Brexit.

In a soft Brexit scenario, the UK would keep its membership in the European Economic Association (EEA)\(^\text{284}\) and, consequently, companies established in the UK would be able to maintain access to the single market for financial services through the Single Passport.\(^\text{285}\) Under this framework, the UK would be subject to EU

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\(^{515, 525;}\) see also, Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2014] ECR 1-0 – where the UK challenged, unsuccessfully, the constitutionality of the powers of ESMA in respect of short-selling bans – as well as Case T-496/11, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Central Bank (ECB) [2015] – in which the CJEU upheld the UK’s view that the ECB lacked the power to impose requirements regarding the location of CCPs. Likewise, the German Federal Financial Supervision Authority (BaFin) also voiced concerns against the centralization of supervisory powers in the SSM – see D. Lombardi and M. Moschella, ‘Domestic preferences and European banking supervision: Germany, Italy and the Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (2016) 39 West European Politics 462, 473.

\(^{278}\) See e.g. G. Baczynska, ‘No compromise in sight, EU ministers at odds over immigration’, Reuters, 18 Nov. 2016; and F. Murphy and I. Binnie, ‘Austria says to control migrants on Italy border, Rome protests’, Reuters, 4 July 2017.


\(^{280}\) The majority of the votes in the EU referendum of 23 June 2016 supported Brexit – an analysis of the results of the EU referendum is provided by: E. Uberoi, ‘European Union Referendum 2016’, House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP 7639 (2016).

\(^{281}\) This will be further explained in section 8.2 below.


\(^{283}\) See e.g. City of London Corporation, Shaping legislation: UK engagement in EU financial services policy-making (2016).


\(^{285}\) Under the Single Passport rights, financial entities authorized in an EEA Member State have the right to provide services in other EEA Member States without the need of additional authorizations – see M. Szczepański, ‘Understanding equivalence and the single passport in financial services: Third-country access to the single market’, European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing, Feb. 2017, 3.
financial markets legislation and, therefore, to the corresponding cooperation duties vis-à-vis other CSAs and the ESAs. As regards the position of the UK within the ESFS, the representatives of the PRA and the FCA would become non-voting members of the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs. When it comes to supervisory cooperation disputes, the UK CSAs would be subject to the mediation mechanism of article 19 of the ESAs Regulations; however, the adoption of a binding mediation decision addressed to them would correspond to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority, not to the ESAs. The likelihood of membership of the UK in the EEA post-Brexit is, in principle, low because it would imply a series of commitments, such as acceptance of the EU four freedoms and indirect judicial oversight by the CJEU, which clash with the UK Conservative Party’s manifesto.

As regards the possibility of UK financial entities relocating to the EU in order to maintain access to the single market, an Opinion issued by ESMA in May 2017 suggests that authorizations to relocating entities will be subject to strict conditionality and CSAs of the Member States will be expected to monitor the real reasons for moving to the EU and to “…reject any relocation request creating letter-box entities where, for instance, extensive use of outsourcing and delegation is foreseen with the intention of benefitting from an EU passport, while essentially performing all substantial activities or functions outside the EU.”

286 The EEA Agreement extends the Single Market freedoms to EEA-EFTA countries – currently, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway –, which are, as a result, subject to the EU internal market laws – see European Parliament, ‘Overview of EU rules applicable to EEA/EFTA countries in financial services, competition and taxation’, Briefing Note (IP/A/ECON/NT/2008-24) (2008) 2.

287 The ESAs Regulations were incorporated into the EEA Agreement by: Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 199/2016 of 30 September 2016 amending Annex IX (Financial services) to the EEA Agreement [2017/276] – with regard to the EBA Regulation; Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 200/2016 of 30 September 2016 amending Annex IX (Financial services) to the EEA Agreement [2017/277] – with regard to the EIOPA Regulation; and, Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 201/2016 of 30 September 2016 amending Annex IX (Financial services) to the EEA Agreement [2017/278] – with regard to the ESMA Regulation. The heads of the relevant CSAs of EEA-EFTA Member States are non-voting members of the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs – see e.g. Art. 40.1 (b) EEA Consolidated Version of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC.


289 There are some discussions about the effects of Brexit on the UK’s membership in the EEA – i.e. whether, after leaving the EU, the UK would retain its membership in the EEA, or if, on the contrary, it would cease being an EEA contracting party – on this issue see e.g. Allen and Overy, Implications of EEA membership outside the EU – different name, same game? (2016) 7.

290 Arts. 6 and 7 EEA Agreement; see also, Hogan Lovells, The UK and the EEA after Brexit (2017).

291 The Conservative Party, Forward, Together: Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and a Prosperous Future. The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2017 (2017) 35-36. At the time of writing this paper, the Conservatives were the UK’s ruling party. See also J. Edwards, ‘Theresa May’s silent decision to leave the EEA is setting up Britain for the worst of all possible Brexit deals’, Business Insider, 26 Jan. 2017.


293 In areas relating to, among others, the governance, operations, and outsourcing and delegation agreements of the relocating financial entities –ESMA Opinion, 3-6.

294 ESMA Opinion, 5.
In a hard Brexit scenario,295 namely one in which the UK does not maintain membership in the EEA and there is no alternative agreement giving it similar rights as those sourcing from EEA membership,296 the UK would become a third country for regulatory and supervisory purposes.297 In such a scenario, the UK’s access to the single market for financial services would depend on the adoption of equivalence decisions298 whereby the Commission might decide that the UK’s financial regulatory and supervisory regime is equivalent to the EU regime.299 The access rights encompassed by the equivalence framework are, however, much more restricted than those sourcing from the single passport;300 for instance, equivalence can only be requested by third countries and granted by the Commission when an EU financial law embraces such possibility, and only for the specific purposes stipulated in such law; moreover, a decision on equivalence can be unilaterally withdrawn by the Commission.301 As regards financial supervision, the UK’s CSAs would not anymore be subject to supervisory cooperation duties set in EU law; nor would they form part of the ESFS and its supervisory cooperation instruments. More generally, Brexit – particularly, in its hard version – will bring greater legal divergence between the EU and the UK,302 and this may have a potential impact on the ability of CSAs from both sides of the channel to cooperate with each other.

In areas of systemic importance for the financial system, Brexit may require a redefinition of supervisory relationships between the EU and the UK, to address potential threats to the stability of the EU financial system. One of such areas is post-trading.303 In June 2017, the Commission proposed a new regulatory framework concerning third country Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (CCPs),304 which is

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296 E. Ferran (n 284) 41.

297 E. Ferran (n 284) 42.


299 On the concept of equivalence in financial services see M. Szczepański (n 285) 2; and, Commission, Commission Staff Working Document. EU equivalence decisions in financial services policy: an assessment (SWD(2017) 102 final).


305 One of the main functions performed by CCPs is novation. Novation refers to the substitution of a contract between a buyer and a seller of securities for two new contracts, one between the buyer and the CCP and, another between the seller and the CCP; by interposing itself between the buyer and the seller and guaranteeing the performance of the obligations of the parties in case of default by any of them, the CCP mitigates counterparty risks. On the role of CCPs in risk-mitigation see e.g. D.D.
aimed at strengthening their supervision with a view to mitigating systemic risks in the EU.\textsuperscript{306} Owing to the central role that CCPs play in the functioning of financial systems, their failure may have a systemic impact.\textsuperscript{305} Recognized third country CCPs provide clearing of a significant amount of financial instruments denominated in Euro and other currencies of the Member States;\textsuperscript{308} as a result, disruptions affecting recognized third country CCPs may have a major effect in the stability of the EU financial system.\textsuperscript{309} In the view of the Commission, the supervisory cooperation arrangements embraced by the equivalence regime did not properly guarantee a robust supervision of recognized non-EU CCPs: “…after a third-country CCP has been recognised, ESMA has encountered difficulties in accessing information from the CCP, in conducting on-site inspections of the CCP and in sharing information with the relevant EU regulators, supervisors and central banks. As a result, there is a risk that third country CCP practices and/or adjustments to risk management models go undetected and/or unaddressed, which may have important financial-stability implications for the EU entities.”\textsuperscript{310}

The Commission’s Proposal specifically acknowledged the risks posed by Brexit; the UK hosts some of the main CCPs clearing euro-denominated transactions, such as London Clearing House Limited (LCH),\textsuperscript{311} consequently, after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, there would be a major increase in the volume of such transactions being cleared in third countries, and subject to lesser degrees of EU oversight.\textsuperscript{312}

Under the proposed reform, ESMA is tasked with carrying out assessments about the systemic importance of third country CCPs for the financial stability of the EU.\textsuperscript{313} Those assessments may determine, either that a CCP is, or is likely to become, systemically important (Tier 2 CCPs),\textsuperscript{314} or that a CCP is neither systemically important nor likely to become so (Tier-1 CCPs).\textsuperscript{315} Tier-1 CCPs are subject to the general equivalence and recognition regime.\textsuperscript{316} Tier-2 CCPs can be divided in two categories, which receive different regulatory treatment. On the one side, ESMA may consider that a Tier-2 CCP is systemically important; this category of CCPs is under a special regime whereby, in addition to compliance with the general equivalence conditions, they must fulfill additional requirements, such as the EMIR’s prudential rules applicable to CCPs in the EU.\textsuperscript{317} On the other side, ESMA may conclude that a

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\textsuperscript{306} See e.g. Commission, Commission proposes more robust supervision of central counterparties (CCPs), Press Release, 13 June 2017.


\textsuperscript{308} Commission’s Proposal, 5.

\textsuperscript{309} Commission’s Proposal, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{310} Commission’s Proposal, 5.


\textsuperscript{312} Commission’s Proposal, 6.

\textsuperscript{313} Commission’s Proposal, 24 and recital 29.

\textsuperscript{314} Commission’s Proposal, 24 and proposed Art. 25.2a of EMIR.

\textsuperscript{315} Commission’s Proposal, 24 and proposed Art. 25.2(e) of EMIR.

\textsuperscript{316} Commission’s Proposal, 24.

\textsuperscript{317} Commission’s Proposal, 24-25 and proposed Art. 25.2(b) of EMIR.
CCP is of substantial systemic importance; this would apply to CCPs that, because of their particular features—e.g. their concentration of clearing operations—pose major risks to the stability of the EU or to one or more Member States; the Commission’s Proposal considers that the regulatory and supervisory arrangements embraced by the third-country equivalence-recognition regime are not suitable for this type of CCPs and that, therefore, they should not have access to it; ESMA may propose to the Commission that a CCP deemed as being of substantial systemic importance is not recognized; if the Commission adopts an implementing act to that effect, then the recognition regime would be dis-applied, with the result that the third-country Tier 2 CCP concerned could only provide services within the EU single market by relocating to the EU. The criteria that ESMA will use to determine the systemic entity of CCPs include their size, the value in each EU currency of the transactions cleared by them, as well as the impact that their failure would have on the EU financial system. Consequently, the proposed regime might result in some UK-based CCPs that play a central role in the clearing of Euro-denominated transactions, such as LCH, being required to move their clearing business to the EU or, otherwise, losing their access to the EU single market.

Overall, the proposed reform would result in greater centralization of supervisory functions pertaining to third-country CCPs at the EU level. Notably, ESMA would be entrusted with the supervision of both Tier 1 and Tier 2 CCPs, particularly with respect to ongoing compliance with the conditions for recognition. In addition, some of the EMIR’s proposed amendments are aimed at fostering supervisory cooperation, for example, by requiring that: “the cooperation arrangements between ESMA and the relevant competent authorities of equivalent CCP third-country regimes must be effective in practice.” The Commission’s Proposal also stipulates that equivalence and recognition will be conditional on the effective cooperation by CSAs from third countries; if the latter fail to cooperate in good faith with ESMA and/or other EU supervisors, the Commission may decide to revoke an equivalence decision. The Commission’s Proposal has been complemented by the ECB’s Governing Council Recommendation of 22 June 2017 to amend article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. Under the proposed reform, CCPs would be put under the ECB’s regulatory and supervisory remit. The ECB’s proposal largely builds on the CJEU’s decision in Case T-496/11, relating to the UK’s challenge of the power of the ECB to regulate CCPs—and, notably, of its competence to impose location requirements—under the Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework; the CJEU upheld the UK’s views, but

318 Commission’s Proposal, 25 and proposed Art. 25.2c of EMIR.
320 Commission’s Proposal, 25-26 and proposed Art. 25.2c of EMIR.
321 Commission’s Proposal, 26 and proposed Art. 25.2c of EMIR.
322 Commission’s Proposal, 24 and proposed Art. 25.2a of EMIR.
323 See e.g. Jones, ‘LCH urges EU to avoid forced relocation of euro clearing’, Reuters, 7 June 2017.
324 Commission’s Proposal, 26 and proposed Art. 25.b of EMIR.
325 Commission’s Proposal, 26 and proposed Art. 25.7 of EMIR.
328 The amended version of Art. 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) would read as follows: “The ECB and national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems, and clearing systems for financial instruments, within the Union and with other countries.” –see Art. 1 ECB/2017/18.
acknowledged, at the same time, that the ECB could request the EU legislator to be granted the power to regulate CCPs – if the ECB deemed such power necessary for the proper performance of its tasks. 329 The proposed amendment of article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks would result in additional centralization of CCP clearing regulation and supervision at the EU level, with the ECB playing a central role in the oversight, not only of EU CCPs, but also of third-country CCPs that clear euro-denominated transactions. 330 The ECB has indicated that it will favor a strict approach with regard to the recognition of third-country CCPs, in order to preserve financial stability in the EU. 331 Consequently, the formulation of this proposal in the midst of the Brexit talks has raised concerns among UK policy makers and financial industry actors, which foresee a potential threat to a key sector of the UK’s financial industry. 332

In the post-Brexit scenario, the incentives of CSAs from the EU and the UK to cooperate with each other will largely be determined by the degrees of financial interdependence between the EU and the UK. A first potential scenario is one where the UK would lose relevance as a financial center in Europe; this may happen, for instance, if there is an increase in financial outflows from the UK to the EU, in combination with a decrease in financial inflows from the EU to the UK; 333 in such a case, the scope of cooperation between the EU and the UK would be more limited. A second potential scenario is one where the UK would retain its relevance as a financial center in Europe, and in which the high degrees of financial interdependence between the EU and the UK are maintained; 334 in such a second scenario, CSAs would have incentives to develop arrangements that guarantee an efficient supervisory cooperation, even in absence of a strong framework of binding cooperation duties.

B. The prospects of a multi-speed EU and its impact on supervisory cooperation

The EU political crisis, which was, to a certain degree, exacerbated by the Brexit vote, 335 received mixed policy reactions. Whereas some proposals point in the direction of greater integration and centralization of financial supervision at the EU level, others might lead to the coexistence of mixed degrees of integration within the single market for financial services.

On the one side, the EU economic and political crises have increased awareness within the EU-27 about the need to advance the process of capital markets integration

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329 Case T-496/11, para. 109.
330 See e.g. recital 7 ECB/2017/18.
331 See e.g. B. Coeuré, ‘European CCPs after Brexit’, Speech at the Global Financial Markets Association, Frankfurt am Main, 20 June 2017.
333 Post-referendum data suggests that Brexit may have a negative impact on UK-based stock market funds — see S. Bowers, ‘UK investment funds suffered £5.7bn outflows after Brexit vote’, The Guardian, 23 Aug. 2016.
334 Some commentators argue that, owing to the high interdependencies between the EU and UK financial systems, a Brexit deal that hinders the position of the City of London, would be negative for the EU as well; see D. Boffey, ‘EU will lose out from bad Brexit deal on City, says leaked report’, The Guardian, 1 Feb. 2017.
in order to support the EU economy. The Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan, published by the Commission on 8 June 2017, acknowledges the instrumental role that supervision plays in the good functioning of capital markets and suggests the need to move towards greater integration of the EU financial supervisory framework. The reforms put forward by the Mid-Term Review document include a future revision of the powers of the ESAs, and particularly, ESMA, with a view to fostering their role in EU financial supervision, as well as broadening the areas of the financial system within their direct supervisory remit. These reforms, which would lead to more centralization of financial supervision in the EU, build on the plan for a Financial Union proposed by the Five President’s Report, published in June 2015. The pillars of the Financial Union project are the Banking Union as well as the Capital Markets Union – as regards the latter, the Five President’s Report envisaged the future creation of a Single European Capital Markets Supervisor.

On the other side, the idea of a multi-speed Europe, which has been gaining force since the Rome Summit of March 2017, raises some questions as regards the future of financial integration and supervisory cooperation in the EU. In the White Paper on the Future of Europe, published on 1 March 2017, the Commission presented five potential scenarios regarding the EU’s future; these scenarios, which ranged from “less EU” to “more EU”, reflected different political views about the process of EU integration. One of the pathways suggested by the Commission was one where “The European Union allows willing Member States to do more together in specific areas,” this idea, which received mixed degrees of support among the Member States, was embraced by the leaders of the EU-27, the Council, the Parliament and the Commission in the Rome declaration of 25 March 2017. There is some

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337 Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan, 8.
338 Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan, 8, 10-11.
340 Commission, Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (2015) (Five President’s Report).
341 Five President’s Report, 11-12.
342 Five President’s Report, 12.
345 The proposed scenarios were the following: “Carrying on”; “Nothing but the single market”; “Those who want more do more”; “Doing less more efficiently”; and, “Doing much more together” – for an overview of the policies embraced by each of these scenarios see White Paper on the Future of Europe, 29.
347 Whereas France, Germany, Italy, and Spain supported the idea of a multi-speed Europe – see e.g. A. Robert, ‘Big four’ call for new European dynamic, multi-speed EU’, Euractiv, 7 March 2017 –, the Visegrad Group – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – opposed it, arguing that it could lead to a disintegration of the Single Market, the Schengen area and the EU – see e.g. Polish Presidency of the Visegrad Group, Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries “Strong Europe – Union of Action and Trust”: Input to Rome Declaration 2017, 2 March 2017.
348 In this respect, the signatories of the Rome declaration agreed on the following text: “We will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later. Our Union is undivided and indivisible” – see European Council, Declaration of the leaders of 27
uncertainty as regards whether and the extent to which the single market for financial services would be included within the scope of a multi-speed Union; the White Paper on the Future of Europe does not refer to the financial sector among the areas that would operate under multi-tier arrangements.\footnote{In addition, after the Rome Summit, EU policy makers have taken a series of decisions – such as the above-referred proposals to strengthen ESMA’s powers in the field of post-trading – that encompass an underlying notion of single-speed EU and of advancing \textit{en bloc} in the process of integration of the financial supervisory framework.} There are policy arguments that justify a same-speed approach to financial regulation and supervision. Notably, the creation of different speeds and/or tiers of financial integration in the EU could hinder the process of development and consolidation of the single market for financial services. As regards financial supervision, the coexistence of various levels of supervisory integration – e.g. with asymmetries in the extent and scope of cooperation duties depending on the Member States concerned – could result in distortions in the quality and consistency of the EU’s financial supervision. Indeed, a multi-speed internal market for financial services would be contrary to the objective of “ensuring common implementation of the rules for the financial sector and more centralised supervisory enforcement”\footnote{Commission, Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (COM(2017) 291).} and, more generally, to the process of construction of a Financial Union.

\section*{IX. Conclusions}

The post-financial crisis regulatory overhaul has transformed supervisory relationships in the EU dramatically. The new system is based on a greater centralization of powers at the EU level, with EU bodies and institutions, such as the ESAs and the ECB, playing a key role in both the exercise and coordination of financial supervision. The EU financial supervision architecture remains, nonetheless, largely decentralized and the CSAs of the Member States – each with their own, and often dissimilar, structures, mandates and powers – carry out important day-to-day supervision of their own financial markets, actors and institutions. One of the challenges brought about by this new complex multilevel architecture is how to articulate an efficient coordination, interaction and cooperation between the actors entrusted with supervisory responsibilities in its various levels. The response of EU law has been threefold.

In the first place, there has been a process of increasing harmonization of the rules on supervisory cooperation. EU directives and regulations in the financial field have developed a rather comprehensive catalogue of cooperation duties, reducing the discretion of Member States in the interpretation of the nature and scope of supervisory cooperation obligations.

Secondly, the mechanisms for solving supervisory cooperation disputes among CSAs have been improved and strengthened. Notably, the allocation of binding mediation powers to the ESAs vis-à-vis CSAs, albeit subject to important limitations, constitutes an important change of paradigm compared to the soft-law nature of the

\footnotesize{member states and of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, 25 March 2017.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{349} White Paper on the Future of Europe, 20-21.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{350} Commission, Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (COM(2017) 291).}
Lamfalussy Committees’ mediation decisions. The threat of deployment of those powers may create incentives for CSAs to comply with their cooperation duties, so as to avoid the potential costs of an ESA’s binding intervention in a supervisory cooperation dispute.

Thirdly, post-crisis EU laws have broadened the catalogue of minimum supervisory powers at the disposal of CSAs of the Member States, hence increasing their ability to fulfill requests of cooperation from fellow CSAs. Likewise, the ESFS and the Banking Union have embraced a transnationalization of supervisory mandates whereby Member State CSAs are bound to the accomplishment, not only of national objectives, but also of EU-wide supervisory targets.

Despite the advancement of EU financial services integration and supervisory convergence that the post-crisis regulatory overhaul, the ESFS and the Banking Union have brought, this paper has identified and analyzed important obstacles for an efficient supervisory cooperation in the EU.

First, EU financial laws still encompass exceptions to the duty to cooperate that may be subject to biased interpretations and opportunistic uses by CSAs, in order to refuse cooperation in particular instances. More generally, the analysis has shown that the content and scope of supervisory cooperation duties—as defined by EU laws—often lack clarity and precision; this carries the risk of diverging interpretations by CSAs across the EU and, consequently, of supervisory dissent.

Secondly, within the ESFS, the use of instruments for the settlement of disagreements between CSAs is subject to strict conditions that limit, considerably, their applicability in cases of supervisory cooperation disputes. Moreover, the activation of the ESAs’ mediation mechanism may create tensions and hinder trust between CSAs and, consequently, affect their future cooperation. As regards disputes between an ESA and a CSA, the ESFS implicitly vests resolution power in the ESAs, hence giving rise to potential conflicts of interest.

Thirdly, notwithstanding the increasing degrees of harmonization of supervisory powers across the EU, there still are important differences in the competences of CSAs in various Member States; this may, in turn, affect their ability to fulfill cooperation requests. Likewise, whereas the ESFS and the Banking Union have instituted transnational supervisory mandates, CSAs from the Member States operate under accountability structures that are, primarily, domestic; this may incentivize CSAs to pursue the prioritization of national interests in detriment of the accomplishment of EU-wide targets.

Fourthly, the EU political crisis, Brexit—which may result in the UK becoming a third country for supervisory purposes—, and the prospects of a multi-speed EU with various degrees of integration, raise some concerns about the future of the process of EU financial integration and of supervisory cooperation within the single market for financial services.

In spite of these various crisis fronts, and of the limitations of the current EU legal and regulatory frameworks in dealing with the complexity of the financial supervision architecture, capital markets is, nonetheless, an area where the process of integration has been advancing steadily. Brexit has, indeed, reinforced the determination of EU policy-makers to furthering such process; as put by Commissioner Dombrovskis: “As we face the departure of the largest EU financial centre, we are committed to stepping up our efforts to further strengthen and integrate the EU capital markets.”

Moreover, the EU institutions consider the enhancement of supervisory cooperation and convergence within the EU as a key priority in the process of future financial reforms. For example, one of the main elements of the Commission’s public consultation on the operations of the ESAs, related to the effectiveness of their tools and powers in fostering supervisory convergence and cooperation across borders.\textsuperscript{352} Also, the Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan has highlighted the need to strengthen the powers of ESMA to guarantee the consistency of financial supervision across the EU.\textsuperscript{353} Overall, these reforms may contribute to enhance the quality and efficiency of supervisory cooperation in the EU; on the one side, by removing legal and regulatory barriers to cooperation, they may increase the ability of CSAs to cooperate with each other; on the other side, by supporting greater financial integration, these reforms may help to align the interests of CSAs and, consequently, their incentives to provide meaningful cooperation.

\textsuperscript{352} Commission, Public consultation on the operations of the European Supervisory Authorities (2017) 7-8.
\textsuperscript{353} Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan, 8.