Is there a deductive argument for semantic externalism? Reply to Yli-Vakkuri

Sawyer, Sarah (2017) Is there a deductive argument for semantic externalism? Reply to Yli-Vakkuri. Analysis. ISSN 0003-2638 (Accepted)

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Abstract

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2017) has recently argued that the Twin Earth thought experiments offered in favour of semantic externalism can be replaced by a straightforward deductive argument from premises widely accepted by both internalists and externalists alike. The deductive argument Yli-Vakkuri offers, however, depends on premises which are such that, on standard formulations of internalism, they cannot be satisfied by a single belief simultaneously; it does not therefore, constitute a proof of externalism. The aim of this paper is to explain why.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Externalism; internalism; mind; mental representation; mental content.
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User: Sarah Sawyer
Date Deposited: 11 Dec 2017 11:24
Last Modified: 11 Dec 2017 11:24
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/71952

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