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On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 08:57 authored by Dritan Osmani, Richard TolRichard Tol
We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements. The analysis of Chwe is extended by investigating the question how to find farsightedly stable coalitions. The myopic stability concept of d'Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszeweiz, and Weymark and the farsighted stability concept of Chwe are compared. Farsighted stability, direct and indirect domination are discussed. Considering of the direct domination, we check for the single-step stability by comparing the profits of every coalition member after one-step deviation has occurred, while considering the indirect domination (farsightedness) we check for the multistep stability by comparing the profits of every coalition member after a series of deviations have come to an end. On the contrary, myopic stability assumes that players look only one step ahead. The improvement of farsightedly and myopically stable coalitions to the environment quality and welfare are compared. Only the farsightedly stable coalition math formula improves the welfare and abatement by 20% and 79% in comparison to all three myopically stable coalitions together. Algorithms are developed, which can find all farsightedly stable coalitions structures.

History

Publication status

  • Published

Journal

Natural Resource Modelling

ISSN

0890-8575

Publisher

Wiley

Issue

2

Volume

31

Page range

1-27

Article number

e12141

Department affiliated with

  • Economics Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2017-11-22

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