Subjective externalism

Sawyer, Sarah (2017) Subjective externalism. Theoria. ISSN 1755-2567

[img] PDF - Published Version
Restricted to SRO admin only

Download (150kB)
[img] PDF - Accepted Version
Restricted to SRO admin only until 16 November 2019.

Download (311kB)

Abstract

In this article I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective externalism’. The view combines an internal, subjective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins internalist theories of thought, and an external, objective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins externalist theories of thought. While internalism and externalism are mutually inconsistent, the constraints to which each theory is committed are not. It is this realization that opens up the conceptual space for subjective externalism, according to which the correct attribution of thought content to an individual is essentially constrained by her nonrepresentational relations to objective manifest properties in her wider reality.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: Externalism; internalism; perceptual discriminarory capacities; mind.
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Depositing User: Sarah Sawyer
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2017 15:01
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2017 15:12
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/71315

View download statistics for this item

📧 Request an update