Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment

Manzini, Paola and Unset (1997) Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment. Economics Letters, 54. pp. 15-22. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We build a simple allernating-offers bargaining model in which one of the players call commit to damage the "pie" that they are bargaining over. In the unique equilibrium partition his share does not vary monotonically with the discount factor.

Item Type: Article
Keywords: bargaining; commitment
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic theory. Demography > HB0131 Methodology > HB0135 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods Including econometrics, input-output analysis, game theory
Depositing User: Paola Manzini
Date Deposited: 08 Nov 2017 15:59
Last Modified: 08 Nov 2017 15:59
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/71029
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