Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

Manzini, Paola, Mariotti, Marco and Unset (2001) Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration. Games and Economic Behavior, 37 (1). pp. 170-195. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator-who can only become active with the consent of both parties-in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic theory. Demography > HB0131 Methodology > HB0135 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods Including econometrics, input-output analysis, game theory
Depositing User: Paola Manzini
Date Deposited: 08 Nov 2017 16:09
Last Modified: 08 Nov 2017 16:09
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/71023
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