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On smiles, winks and handshakes as coordination devices
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 08:42 authored by Paola Manzini, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, Nicolaas J VriendIn an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognised and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium. Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial.
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
Economic JournalISSN
0013-0133Publisher
Wiley-BlackwellExternal DOI
Issue
537Volume
119Page range
826-854Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2017-11-13Usage metrics
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