On smiles, winks and handshakes as coordination devices

Manzini, Paola, Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, Vriend, Nicolaas J and Unset (2009) On smiles, winks and handshakes as coordination devices. Economic Journal, 119 (537). pp. 826-854. ISSN 0013-0133

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Abstract

In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognised and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium. Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic theory. Demography > HB0131 Methodology > HB0135 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods Including econometrics, input-output analysis, game theory
Depositing User: Paola Manzini
Date Deposited: 13 Nov 2017 09:35
Last Modified: 13 Nov 2017 09:35
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/71006
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