Cooperative or inoperative? Accountability and transparency at the World Bank’s inspection panel

Sovacool, Benjamin (2017) Cooperative or inoperative? Accountability and transparency at the World Bank’s inspection panel. Case Studies in the Environment. ISSN 2473-9510 (Accepted)

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Abstract

The World Bank remains the largest international financial institution in the world. This case study examines the effectiveness of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel. The Inspection Panel makes it possible for citizens and communities to challenge World Bank projects through an independently administered accountability process. Between 1994 and 2016, the World Bank Inspection Panel has received 112 requests for inspection across more than 50 countries. This case study analyzes the history, dynamics, benefits, and barriers to the Inspection Panel, including an assessment of World Bank projects spread across Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Chad, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Nepal, Nigeria, Romania, Tibet, Togo, and Uzbekistan. In doing so, the case study highlights how Inspection Panels like the one operating at the World Bank can improve and enhance governance outcomes and result in more equitable decision-making processes. Yet there are also limits to what such independent accountability mechanisms can accomplish.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > SPRU - Science Policy Research Unit
Depositing User: Nora Blascsok
Date Deposited: 25 Sep 2017 15:30
Last Modified: 25 Sep 2017 15:30
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/70342

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