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Thesis Submitted for the Fulfilment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations
University of Sussex
March, 2011
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be submitted in whole or in part to another University for award of any other degree.

Signature

..........................................................
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Even though I am alone responsible for the arguments put forward in this thesis, the thesis itself is not the product of an isolated intellectual expedition. I would have never written this thesis in the first place, had I not been brought up by two very particular parents, Alix and Samuel, who took part of history and struggled to make a difference in a specific geopolitical con-text. Their example continues to inspire every thought contained in these pages. My parents’ history would not have sufficed for me to embark in the project of writing a PhD though. The course Genocide in World Politics offered by Martin Shaw opened up the intellectual window for me to reflect on some of the events I witnessed as a young boy and well into my teens and which I had relegated to a remote corner in my memory. My debt to him, however, goes beyond intellectual inspiration: his guidance, support and generosity have gone beyond what any supervisee could expect. I have also benefited hugely from the supervision and support of Stefan Elbe, whose invaluable guidance helped me to shape a coherent argument and to present it in a clear and concise way.

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Falmer
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a critique of the idea that genocide is a domestic process and that only some groups are worthy of protection against genocide. By looking at the destruction of the Unión Patriótica in the context of a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, in which a polarised circulation of sympathy, antipathy, indifference and oblivion occurred, the thesis not only challenges the notion that genocides occur in locations detached from the international community, but also unveils how affect is mobilised through narratives which support and contest this fantasy. Thus, the thesis contends that geopolitical narratives can help solidify a genocidal conjuncture by allowing the amalgamation of various actors into a perpetrator bloc, but also disintegrate it by bringing about a fluid transnational network of resistance to genocide. In contrast to the two-dimensional geopolitical imagery that genocide takes place within the borders of the nation-state, it is argued, instead, that a fragmented geography, galvanised by a continuous victimisation-resistance spiral that links different actors, places, and dramas together, enables genocide to unfold. The thesis therefore proposes contextualisation as a new method to research genocide as a geopolitical phenomenon.
**ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCU</td>
<td>Campesino Self-Defence Forces of Córdoba and Urabá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>Middle Magdalena Valley Self-Defence Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCJ</td>
<td>Colombian Comission of Jurists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Campesino Self-Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINEP</td>
<td>Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNP</td>
<td>Colombian National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUT</td>
<td>National Trade Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS</td>
<td>Colombia’s Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTOs</td>
<td>Drug Trafficking Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPL</td>
<td>Popular Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDM</td>
<td>Fundación Dos Mundos</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>National Front Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRP</td>
<td>United States Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IACHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Commission of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAMR</td>
<td>Inter-American military regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGOs</td>
<td>Inter-Govermental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Intensity Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Death to Kidnappers Paramilitary Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRN</td>
<td>Death to North-eastern Revolutionaries Paramilitary Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-19</td>
<td>Nineteenth of April Movement Guerrilla Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Govermental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSD</td>
<td>National Security Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCCC</td>
<td>Communist Party Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Polo Demócratico Alternativo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEPES</td>
<td>People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMCs</td>
<td>Private Military Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REINICIAR</td>
<td>Corporación para la Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Socialist International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOA</td>
<td>School of the Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNCs</td>
<td>Transnational Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Unión Patriótica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPNB</td>
<td>Unión Patriótica National Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCHR</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Human Rights</td>
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INTRODUCTION

1 GEOPOLITICS AND GENOCIDE: SCRIPTS, NETWORKS AND AFFECTIVE-DISPOSITIONS

Between 1984 and 1985 Colombia saw the emergence of the Unión Patriótica (UP). The UP was a political front created as part of the peace agreement between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government. The UP was not a homogenous group; it was an organization within which different people’s needs and expectations met. Therefore, some guerrilla fighters demobilised and joined many others from different political backgrounds, including members of the Communist Party (PC) and the Democratic Front, trade union members, workers, youth organisations, and peasants. From 1985 to 2002, when the group formally ceased to exist in Colombian politics, more than 5000 of its members had been assassinated, hundreds of other members had been disappeared or forced to leave the country, some others had gone back to continue waging war against the state, and many others had abandoned their political identity in order to survive the violence. This, altogether, brought about the destruction of the UP.

Yet the destruction of the UP has been overlooked by genocide scholars and relegated to oblivion by transnational political networks. Indifference for the victims’ suffering has been linked to sympathy for Colombian elites and antipathy towards insurgents (first represented as the embodiment of communism and then criminalised as drug traffickers). Thus, massacres, systematic selective assassinations, forced displacement, disappearings, torture, illegal imprisonment, the targeting of buildings, households and entire towns associated with the socio-political power of the UP have been overshadowed by the long-lasting armed conflict between the Colombian state and narcoguerrillas. Today, World Bank narratives promoting the idea that armed conflicts are about greed rather than grievances (Collier 2000) are contributing to shape a dominant interpretative framework that focuses on understanding the multidimensional violence in Colombia through the lens of resource war theory often disregarding the connections between the armed conflict and other forms of collective
violence.¹ This, together with the lack of alternative approaches to study the complex dynamics involved in the intersubjective violent clash between perpetrator of genocidal violence and civilian social networks, has reinforced the passing attention paid to the destruction of the UP.

Eduardo Pizarro’s (1999) and Steven Dudley’s (2004) stance encapsulate the dominant macronarrative among Colombian scholars, according to which the destruction of the UP was the consequence of the political strategy developed by FARC and the PC during the 1980s; namely ‘the combination of all forms of struggle’.² Put simply, the claim is that FARC’s combination of arms and politics placed the UP in an awkward position which legitimised the violent targeting by paramilitary groups. This macronarrative relies on perpetrators’ accounts and scripts put forward by most Colombian administrations since 1984.³ Although, after the mid 1990s, victims’ organisations started challenging such interpretations by publishing accounts of what they argued was the genocide of the Unión Patriótica (Sobrevivientes del Comité Cívico por los Derechos Humanos del Meta 1997; ASFADDDES et al. 2000), victims’ micronarratives were disregarded because scholars’ macronarratives alleged that victims’ over-ideological narratives impeded an objective assessment of the violence. Thus, scholars almost exclusively referred to the political assassinations of UP members as part of the armed conflict, which demonstrated the political character of the violence (i.e., Ramírez and Restrepo 1988).

Even though, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, some studies looked at the connection between political assassinations and poor electoral results (Pinzón 1989; Vélez 1992), so by the mid 1990s scholars usually mentioned in passing the destruction of the UP. Not even in regional studies of Urabá, where the massacres against the UP proliferated during the 1990s, did scholars overcome ‘the combination of all forms of struggle’ micronarrative (Ramírez 1997). It was not until 2000 that Leah Carroll carried out a major scholarly account of the ‘political violence’ against

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¹ Rangel (2000) focuses on the criminalisation of the guerrilla groups to examine the insurgency economy of Colombia. In contrast, Sanchez and Formisano (2005) develop a more complex analysis linking armed conflict, violence and crime, which offers a contribution to the Collier-Hoefller model.
² Campbell argues that it is useful “to draw a distinction between the ‘micronarratives’ of the participant-interpreters (the political actors) and the ‘macronarratives’ of the observer-interpreters (the media and academics) and explore the relationship between them” (1998a: 43).
³ Ó Tuathail uses the term script “to describe a set of representations, a collection of descriptions, scenarios and attributes which are deemed relevant and appropriate to defining a place in foreign policy” (1992: 156).
the UP, establishing connections with the democratization process. Her PhD thesis did not trigger much interest amongst Colombian scholars. Today, however, Carroll’s (2011) just-released book comes timely to ignite the reassessment of the destruction of the UP.

Throughout the last ten years few scholars have researched the complex dynamics of the violence against the UP, despite the fact that a superficial narrative of the destruction of the UP continues to dominate. Mauricio Romero (2003: 193-222) dedicates a whole chapter to the targeting of UP leaders in Urabá in his study of the expansion of the Campesino Self-defence forces of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU). Andrés Fernando Suárez (2007) also focusing on Urabá, has produced the most recent account, which gets closer to studying the violence against the UP as part of a different form of collective violence. According to his analysis of the region from 1991 to 2001 a case of reciprocal extermination occurred between former members of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and UP members in the framework of the dispute for territorial control between FARC and the ACCU. Romero’s and Suárez’s discussions of ‘political identities’ and ‘reciprocal extermination’ contribute to better the understanding of the violence against the UP in a particular region. However neither of them puts this episode into the context of the targeting of the UP in different regions and different times. Furthermore, they analyse the targeting of the UP through the ‘logic of the armed conflict’, thereby limiting the understanding of the multiplicity of motives involved in it.

As the destruction of the UP was not only the political destruction of a group; as the perpetrators did not exclusively target UP members, but also the complex web of relationships that constituted the social power of the group; as the violence spread against children, elderly, and any sector of the population identified by the perpetrators as UP; and as it developed from individual attempts to destroy the political power of the group into a complex network of violent relations aimed at the social destruction of the UP, this thesis moves away from the above accounts and places the destruction of the UP at the centre of the analysis. It does so, through an interdisciplinary method which seeks to confront mainstream macronarratives that have made it inconceivable to consider the destruction of the UP as a case of genocide. In so doing, it engages with human rights grassroots organisations’
accounts of the UP genocide (REINICIAR 2006a, 2007, 2009), and a handful of books and articles written by academics, journalists, and lawyers which have hitherto been relegated to the fringe of Colombian scholarship (Dudley 2004; Rodríguez 2005; Cepeda 2006; Cepeda and Girón 2005; Ortiz 2006). Cepeda’s and Ortiz’s efforts are valuable for they contribute to the conceptual debates and gather empirical evidence about the systematic destruction of the UP. To the extent that these authors explore it as a state-led process restricted to Colombian politics (Cepeda 2006: 102), such an account fits what one may call the genocide script. By contrast, this thesis challenges this account by questioning the very idea that the UP genocide was exclusively state-orchestrated and contained within Colombian borders and continues the author’s attempts to unveil the complexities of the destruction of the UP and to draw from it lessons for genocide studies (Gomez-Suarez 2007, 2008, 2010).

This is not to suggest that it is futile to debate the destruction of the UP as a case of genocide. Instead, it is to argue that in order to fully understand the destruction of the UP one needs to go beyond the genocide script. The point is, then, not to argue for or against considering the destruction of the UP as a case of genocide but to deconstruct the genocide script; a script that informs such a debate and narrows our understanding of the genocidal conjuncture within which the destruction of the UP occurred. A glance into the historical process leading to such a conjuncture shows that the ‘Colombian crisis’ was far from domestic. First, it evolved from the liberal modern state building process carried out under the guidelines of modernization theory and the Alliance for Progress, which was resisted by different social groups that, influenced by the 1959 Cuban revolution, created guerrilla groups (cf. Bolívar 2003). Second, the criminalisation of social movements in Colombian politics (Archila 2005: 87-128) was entangled with the US National Security Doctrine which was exported to Latin America through the training of armed forces in the School of the Americas (SOA) during the cold war (Gill 2004). Third, counterinsurgency policies, “a major element of post-World War II [US] foreign policy toward […] the ‘third world’” (Doty 1996: 75), became the touchstone of Colombian elites leading to the creation and proliferation of paramilitary groups (Medina 1990; Romero 2003).

Other factors contributed to worsen the crisis. The increasing international demand for marihuana during the late 1970s brought about the creation of drug gangs, which
fostered the consolidation of self-defence groups (Palacios 2003: 276-9). The Reagan doctrine\(^4\) contributed to the decision made by Colombian elites to start opening up the political system in 1985, and at the same time reinforced the radicalisation of the armed forces in their fight against communism; these ambiguous policies resulted in the stigmatisation of political forces challenging the traditional political structures. With the end of the cold war, the global south was overflowing with arsenals of small arms and light weapons, no longer required for the superpowers’ confrontation, and Private Military Companies (PMCs) proliferated to carry out the traditional task of national armies (see Lilly et al. 2002). Such a privatisation and transnationalisation of violence had two consequences: first, it contributed to strengthen the coercive power of paramilitary groups in strategic geographical regions of Colombia, and second, it internationalised security thus weakening further the Colombian state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.

In this context, paramilitary groups (trained by international mercenaries), the Colombian army (of which officials were trained at SOA), PMCs (operating and transnationally funded), drug traffickers (operating globally), and Colombian elites (supported by US administrations) targeted the socio-political power of the UP. As the UP (unevenly) resisted the (violent) targeting, these actors escalated violence and gathered together in a *perpetrator bloc* consolidating a hard power against which the soft power of the UP had few chances of survival. The hard power of the perpetrators and the soft power of the UP were not only the product of the combination of long-term processes and contingent events but also the materialisation of their interactions within broader transnational networks. Due to the connections between military, political, and criminal actors across the Americas, the targeting of the UP was another case of political violence in Latin America which metamorphosed into a genocidal conjuncture within the geopolitics of the Western Hemisphere.

This short discussion of the geopolitics involved in the UP genocide relies on traditional understandings of international politics. But, it is insufficient to map the geopolitical con-text of the UP genocide,\(^5\) that is, the narratives displaying Colombia

\(^4\) The Reagan doctrine was a mix of promoting democracy and confronting communism in the Third World (Slater 2004: 110-2).

\(^5\) The practice of hyphenating is common in academic writing. Con-text seeks to emphasise the indistinguishable discursive dimension embedded in what it is usually portrayed as objective-
as a genocide-free locale in the evolving global space. More generally, such narratives are related to a particular “ensemble of technologies of power concerned with the governmental production and management of territorial space” (cf. Ó Tuathail 1996: 7; 12; 14). One can only understand the way Colombia is portrayed by US foreign policy makers if one sees it in the context of Latin America in the space of US foreign policy. For about a hundred and twenty years – from the Monroe Doctrine (1823) until World War II – ‘Latin America’ was the frontier upon which the space of US foreign policy materialised. Nevertheless, since at least the mid 1980s US foreign policy has become the space in which the institutionalisation of particular ways of seeing and displaying a given state or/and a ‘region’ within the global order take place. Latin America’s place in US foreign policy space has, since then, been unresolved and problematic and as such Latin American countries have been institutionalised as ‘faraway-so-close’ dramas. Within the context of such dramas, the hyperreal writing of Colombia in US foreign policy has permitted the display of fantasies which not only downplayed the destruction of the UP but were also integral part of what could be characterised as a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture.6

During the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture (1980-1986) government officials and common people supported the violence against the UP.7 Hegemonic cold war narratives legitimised the violence against the ‘communist enemy’; security forces were therefore a central actor in various regional coalitions for violence against the UP. It was not coincidence that the patterns of the onset of genocidal violence coincided with other cases of extreme political violence in Central America. Between 1987 and 1991, during the first genocidal cycle a sharp increase in massacres was related to a transformation in the perpetrator bloc, which placed drug traffickers and paramilitary groups at the core of the regional coalitions for violence. Although the cold war came to an end in 1989, anticommunism continued to inform the narratives of Colombia’s political, economic and military elites and broader social

6 Following Baudrillard, hyperreal is used throughout this thesis as an adjective that emphasises the character of actors and processes which are generated “by models of a real without origin or reality” (1983: 2).
7 According to Ivan Cepeda (2006) the genocide of the UP occurred in three periods: 1984-1991, 1992-2002, and 2002-2006. The thesis’ findings support such a periodisation. However, in this study each ‘genocidal cycle’ is broken into different periods, according to the transformations undergone by victims and perpetrators.
networks. This was so because in Colombia, contrary to the Central American experience, guerrilla groups gained military might despite the collapse of Soviet communism.

During the second genocidal cycle (1992-2002), human rights discourse and the consolidation of the democratization campaign shaped a so-called ‘liberal-democratic’ common sense in the urban areas. However, as the privatisation of violence had reinforced the power of multiple illegal armed groups in rural regions, genocidal massacres in Meta and Urabá were common practice between 1991 and 1997. Each regional dynamic evolved differently. Suffice for now to say that survivors from different regions usually resettled somewhere else, allowing new UP strongholds to flourish. Thus, they continued to challenge traditional political entrepreneurs and ad hoc authoritarian military governors who, in order to maintain the status quo, allied with outlaws. In these settings, the UP was trapped in the battle between paramilitary groups and FARC. Paramilitaries and PMCs continued targeting the UP because they did not distinguish between the UP and FARC.

Cepeda (2006) argues that from 2002 to 2006 the last phase of the genocide occurred. In this period, some survivors continued to be targeted. In fact, assassinations and persecution intensified during the ‘war on terrorism’ that President Alvaro Uribe, a key ally in the ‘global war on terror’, fought against FARC (FDM 2006). The survivors’ sense to date is that although the group no longer formally exists as a political entity, to have once been a member, to have had a relative who was a member of the UP, or to ask for reparation justice and truth is a stigma that allows the destruction to continue. From 2006 to 2010, then, a cycle of apparently post-genocidal violence followed.

The analysis of these genocidal cycles challenges the genocide script that reduces extremely complex geopolitical processes visible in the ‘third world’ to internal crises that must be halted by the international community. Hence, rather than resorting to mainstream macronarratives to argue that the destruction of the UP was genocide, this research finds that the destruction of the UP could help advance critical voices and research agendas in genocide studies. Along the lines of Martin Shaw (2007) one could then argue that the destruction of the UP was genocide because it was an (irregular) intersubjective clash, in which a perpetrator bloc crystallised turning
against the socio-political power of the civilian network surrounding the UP. As such clash occurred across geopolitical con-texts, it needs to be con-textualised. This thesis is a first attempt to con-textualise the UP genocide. The third section discusses the epistemological and ontological implications of such a method, suffice for now to say that con-textualism contributes to dealing with the neglect of the UP genocide in Colombian scholarship and complements the work of critical scholars who, across various disciplines, are challenging the genocide script by unveiling the complex relationship between geopolitical contexts, narratives, and the perpetrators and victims of genocidal violence.

**Deconstructing the genocide script**

This thesis does not propose a new definition of genocide as such, nor does it support a fixed concept of genocide to study the destruction of the UP. Instead, by looking at the UP genocide, it questions the United Nations Genocide Convention (UNGC) definition for essentialising victims and deconstextualising genocidal processes and attempts to overcome the proliferation of definitions and the excessive legalism surrounding the convention. As the UNGC has reified the scripting of genocide as one-sided domestic process by emphasising the passiveness of genocide-victims and the prosecution of the perpetrators, this section draws on critical accounts to deconstruct the genocide script. Shaw’s (2007) attempt to bring back the fundamentals of Raphael Lemkin’s definition into the understanding of genocide is an important step in this regard, for Lemkin argued that

> genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves … and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups (1944: 79).

The importance that Lemkin placed on broader processes supports the need to question the legal definition stated under article II of 1948 UNGC, which (re)defined genocide as
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Lemkin’s concern with the destruction of national groups meant that for him genocide occurred alongside transnational processes. However, the way in which the UNGC has been understood, genocide is assumed to be ‘produced’ in domestic contexts and ‘punished’ internationally. Thus, many accounts have fallen into the trap of what one may call the *domestic myth* and, as such, have contributed to reinforce it. Problematic assumptions lie at the core of the domestic myth: first, that cold war genocides are the product of leaders’ barbarism, their domestic interests and their abuse of state power (i.e., Kuperman 1996; Kissi 2003); second, that states are the perpetrators of genocide (i.e., Chalk 1994); and third that the international community is complicit, if at all, in the occurrence of genocide because of its inaction (i.e., Power 2003; Valentino 2003). Critical approaches that regard the Westphalian system of international states as a genocidal structure have also been trapped in the domestic myth. Kuper, for example, argues that

The sovereign territorial state claims, as an integral part of its sovereignty, the right to commit genocide … no state explicitly claims the right to commit genocide but the right is exercised under other more acceptable rubrics, notably the duty to maintain law and order, or the seemingly sacred mission to preserve the territorial integrity of the state (1981: 162).

The issue, however, is not that the idea of an international system based on the principle of sovereignty makes genocide more likely –examples of genocidal violence abound in the post-Westphalian international system (i.e, Rwanda, Bosnia, Darfur, to mention but few). Rather the point is that *genocide is as such a geopolitical phenomenon*.

Throughout history, a multiplicity of cross-border processes has brought together various violent collective actors (both legal and illegal), state agencies, and individuals in what this author calls perpetrator blocs (Gomez-Suarez 2007). Whereas in the pre-1980s, state institutions usually played a central part in the ‘order of genocide’ (due either to the state-builders’ search for concentrating coercion or to
maintain it); in the post-1980s, processes of privatisation of violence have increasingly decentralised the concentration of coercion bringing to the fore of the perpetrator blocs the multiplicity of public/private legal/illegal networks that have been usually involved in genocidal campaigns (cf. Kaldor 1999). As such, the role of ordinary people in perpetrator blocs has become more prominent. This is not to say that ordinary people did not collude with state institutions before. On the contrary, colonial settlers and paramilitaries supporting core constituencies have played important roles in modern genocides (see Moses and Stone 2006; Mann 2006). Yet, recently, violent collective actors have more actively and openly designed and coordinated extremely violent campaigns and colluded with state institutions. As perpetrator blocs resemble less hierarchical structures and more dynamic complex networks, state agencies need to be approached not as the headmasters of genocide but as important nodes amongst many. Hence the importance of understanding the transformations in the way the nodes communicate with one another and the circulation of sympathy/antipathy determining the position of state-nodes within the perpetrator blocs.

Not only perpetrator blocs mutate during genocide, but the target groups also undergo dramatic transformations. Therefore, the search for ‘the essential internal properties’ of the target groups, which has resulted, as the debate on political groups exemplifies, in stagnating debates about inevitable membership and voluntary

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8 Goldhagen’s (1996) book, for instance, unveils the role of ordinary people in the Nazi genocide in Poland.
9 An exponent of the hierarchical character of contemporary genocidists is Mark Levene. In his view, the Rwandan case offers a blueprint of the perpetrators of genocide: “at the top a small group of core planners and directors in control of the key apparatus of the state… below them… middle managers who ensure that the orders and directives from the top can be carried out and are acted upon finally at the bottom of the pyramid a mass of hands-on operatives” (Levene 2005: 99).
10 There is a growing literature on networks. This thesis relies on Jon Arquila and David Ronfeldt’s characterisation, according to which networks are divided into three classes: the Chain, the Hub and the All-channel. The chain and the hub are both hierarchical models of network. The All-channel model, in contrast, is not hierarchical and requires dense communications; “[d]ecision-making and operations are decentralized, allowing for local initiative and autonomy” (Arquila and Ronfeldt 2001: 9). In the last decades, perpetrators blocs have started to resemble hybrid networks: complex mixtures of hierarchical and non-hierarchical models.
11 Foucault’s (2002) discussion of 16th century cosmogony has inspired the reflection on sympathy/antipathy throughout this thesis.
12 Since 1946, when the UN resolution “declared genocide to be a crime under international law whether committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds,” the idea of including political groups as a category of groups to be protected has been largely contested (Kuper 1981: 24).
affiliation,\textsuperscript{13} is futile. As scholars have recently argued “genocide is carried out against a group that the perpetrator believes has essential properties … however fictive such a belief may be” (Straus cited in Levene 2005: 87). Indeed, Semelin argues that it is “in the imaginary representations of the executioner that the figure of the victim … is first constructed” (2007: 21). This suggests that the imaginary line the UNGC draws between the political and the protected groups is misleading.\textsuperscript{14} Genocide-victims need instead to be considered as complex social actors. Shaw’s (2007: 113-30) argument that genocidists target civilians because of the social power they represent must then be complemented with Powell’s suggestion of understanding victims as networks (2007: 542). This would allow genocide-victims to be understood as dynamic \textit{civilian social networks}, affected by transnational processes, by the portrayal of them by other networks, and by the violence inflicted by the perpetrator blocs.

The foregoing indicates that the irregular intersubjective violent processes between civilian social networks and perpetrator blocs are not one-sided.\textsuperscript{15} The violent actions of the perpetrator blocs produce reactions on the side of the civilian social networks, which attempt unevenly to resist the violence through political, social, and economic (and sometimes violent) strategies. Perpetrator blocs interpret these strategies as tactics aiming at eroding the various actors’ positions in particular social contexts. Thus, contrary to scholars’ understanding of genocide as a different form of violence (that should be studied separately from war),\textsuperscript{16} genocide’s overlap with warfare goes

\textsuperscript{13} See Bauer (1999) for arguments in favour of the inevitable membership of the target groups. Note however, that in his keynote speech on the First Graduate Conference of Genocide and Holocaust Studies at Clark University in April 2009, he seemed to have moved away from this position. For the irrelevance of the inevitable membership see Kuper (1981). Following Kuper, many scholars have opposed the 1948 UNGC exclusion of political groups (i.e., Fein 1993; Chalk 1994; Charny 1994; Shaw 2007).

\textsuperscript{14} In this regard Kuper’s words have not lost validity: “in the contemporary world, political differences are at the very least as significant a basis for massacre and annihilation as racial, national, ethnic or religious differences. [And t]hen too, the genocides against racial, national, ethnic or religious groups are generally a consequence of, or intimately related to, political conflict” (1981: 39).

\textsuperscript{15} The one-sidedness of genocide was first argued by Chalk and Jonassohn (1990). It gained wide support by many scholars during the 1990s. Fein, for instance, argued that genocide is “an asymmetrical slaughter of a disorganized group or collectivity by an organized force” (cited in Markusen 1996: 80).

\textsuperscript{16} For example, Horowitz argues that “it is operationally imperative to distinguish warfare from genocide… because domestic destruction and international warring are separate dimensions of struggle” (1987: 38). Similarly, Chalk and Jonassohn contend that “there is not anything to be gained analytically by comparing cases that have little in common except that they produce large numbers of casualties” (1990: 24).
Beyond the external link between war and genocide (Shaw 2003). To such an extent that Shaw (Forthcoming) nowadays argues that genocide is itself “a particular structure of conflict.” In fact, as he previously argued, genocide entails “a clash of social power and experience between [at least] two social forces” (Shaw 2003: 40).

Armed conflicts, as such, are not genocidal. Instead, they degenerate over time. Only eventually, the particular geopolitical con-texts in which armed conflicts unfold contribute to metamorphose them into genocidal conjunctures in which “hard power is used to destroy soft power” (Shaw 2007: 112). Advancing Shaw’s approach, one might contend that such conjunctures crystallise in part after armed conflicts have escalated into degenerate wars. For in degenerate wars various actors begin colluding to destroy the social power of civilian networks. Later, while killing, violence, and coercion of individuals thought to be members of the collective self escalate, the perpetrator bloc crystallises consolidating thus a hard power. This abstract description is more complex in reality because the hard power of the perpetrator bloc is a dynamic matrix that changes over time depending on the combination of political, social, economic, military, and affective power, in the same way that the soft power of civilian social networks depends on the fusion of social, political, economic, and affective power. The way in which both powers evolve is determined amongst other things by the asymmetrical intersubjective character of the clash between perpetrators and victims, which mainly relies on military power on the perpetrators’ side and on affective power for the victims.

Intent is certainly important in the (irregular) coordinated plans deployed by the perpetrator blocs against the civilian social networks. However, it is not central, as scholars following Lemkin and the UNGC contend (i.e., Fein 1994). Genocide is not about the intention to destroy a civilian social network. Genocide is about “relations of destruction” (Barta 1987: 238), albeit not in the strict economic sense Barta suggests, but rather in a geopolitical sense which includes economic amongst many other cross-border social relations. The need to move to geopolitical relations of

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17 Kuper (1981) is the first scholar to point out the overlap between war and genocide. Later, Markusen (1996) pinned down the link between total war and genocide.

18 Fein argues that genocide is characterized by “a pattern of purposeful action” leading to the destruction of a significant part of a targeted group and contends that the “critics who dwell on the difficulty of establishing such intent often do not understand the difference between intent and motive” (1994: 97).
destruction is not only confirmed by Michael Mann’s conclusion that “murderous cleansing is rarely the initial intent of perpetrators” (2006: 7) but also by Shaw’s contention that intention should be taken into account only as an indicator of deliberate policy-driven action, for “policy and its drives are [not] coherent and consistent over large range of actions and often long periods of time” (2007: 83). As the next section elaborates, genocidal geopolitical conjunctures cannot be preconceived by the perpetrator blocs. Instead, these crystallise alongside broader conflicts in which multiple perpetrators are involved. The constant circulation and reproduction of sympathy, antipathy, indifference and oblivion, complement such conjunctures by enabling certain actors to construct (hyper)real collective selves as target for destruction.

In sum, the deconstruction of the genocide script shows that dominant macronarratives reify the domestic myth and essentialise genocides as extremely rare events, product of perpetrators’ intent. In contrast, this thesis functions as a critical eye unravelling the genocide script by firstly con-textualising the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture in which transnational processes allowed the destruction of the UP and secondly by bringing to the attention of genocide scholars a case largely disregarded because it does not suit such a script.

**Theorising genocidal geopolitical conjunctures**

Although western responses to genocide have come under strong criticism in post cold war years (i.e., Cushman and Meštrović 1996; Barnett 2002), and even the role of the West in post World War II genocides has begun to be critically scrutinised (i.e., Jones 2004; Esparza, Huttenbach, and Feierstein 2010), the study of genocide continues to be trapped in the domestic myth. This has resulted in a hegemonic liberal discourse that claims that the West could have done (and should do) better in preventing genocide. Indeed, in some cases the lack of political will to act allowed the genocidal campaigns to continue. However, as the previous sections suggest, such campaigns are seldom the products of isolated indigenous forces. Instead, sometimes geopolitical con-texts crystallise into genocidal conjunctures.

Hence, genocidal geopolitical conjunctures could be described as ‘complex geometries of coexistent time-spaces’ in which goods, peoples, ideas and affect
circulate. These complex geometries are product of the convergence of long-term processes (i.e., state-building, globalisation, nationalism) and combinations of contingent events (i.e., economic crises, political reforms, social mobility). Upon these geometries some sectors of social, economic, political and military networks amalgamate into a perpetrator bloc to resolve already tense human interactions. In so doing, they further escalate violence against civilian social networks, which are interpreted as being the source of tensions—a threat. The intensification of violence occurs in tandem with the polarisation of sympathy/antipathy. This contributes to the radicalisation of the frames of interpretation that seek to accommodate various others within the idea of a collective self. In this context, those who cannot be accommodated are, to use Baumann’s words, “construed in the antigrammar of genocide: For us to survive as ourselves, the others must die” (2004: 46). However, as the reproduction of an antigrammar of genocide coexists with various grammars of identity/alterity, genocidal geopolitical conjunctures materialise upon the intersubjective relationship between genocidists and victims. Or, better put, in a dialectic process, in which classificatory structures that define identity/alterity are entangled with processes whereby perpetrators’ hard power solidifies and victims’ soft power evolves. This genocidal process of reordering sociomaterial relations takes place in a “folded and striated geography” thus entwining apparently distant subjects, objects, events and places together.21

19 By geopolitical is meant that transnational and international processes do not exist separately but rather intermingle in complex ways. This is not meant to reify an absolute conception of space based on Euclidian geometry. Processes are seldom contained within the borders of a nation state. Rather, a relative conception of space—which problematises the notion of distance and considers that spaces can only be understood as a fluid system of relations (Harvey 1969)—informs the notion of genocidal geopolitical conjunctures in the sense that they are inscribed with the imaginary of a world divided into nation states.

20 Baumann and Gingrich use the word grammar as “a simple shorthand for certain simple classificatory structures that… can be recognized in a vast variety of processes concerned with defining identity and alterity… [which] are intrinsically related to social conceptions which… are always shaped and influenced by their respective historical and sociological contexts” (Baumann and Gingrich 2004: ix). This anthropological definition rejects any essentialist connotations by embracing a ‘soft’ concept of identity, which relates identity/alterity to social contexts and processes.

21 See Murdoch’s (1998: 370) discussion of Actor Network Theory (ANT) and geography. In line with ANT, the term ‘sociomaterial relations’ is used here to point out the importance of the relationship between human beings and their environment.
International Relations (IR) scholars are, at least in theory, better placed to analyse the contexts in which genocides occur. However, the shadow of the domestic myth has also laid over IR (see, for instance, Harff and Gurr 1988; Wheeler 2000; Campbell 2001; Valentino 2003). Barnett’s (1997) account, in particular, is a powerful critique of the United Nations Security Council’s decision to abstain to directly intervene in Rwanda, and as such it portrays the genocide as a domestic event. The failure to observe the long term transnational processes that crystallised during the genocide allows for the reproduction of an idealist scenario that imagines the perpetrators of genocide as domestic forces acting thanks to the inaction of international actors. In decontextualising genocides from genocidal geopolitical conjunctures, scholars misconstrue genocidal processes and help to produce them as scripts. More importantly, they contribute to the rise of ontological orders of representation which transhistoricise present-situations through imbedding the topos with essentialist ahistorical actors and dramas (see Campbell 1998a: 80). As a result, the genocide script, whereby complex genocidal geopolitical conjunctures are reduced to two-dimensional domestic crises in which a state orchestrates the mass murder of passive fixed social groups, is used to create a blueprint for the deeds of the international community; a community represented as an enlightened collective self, detached from the very genocidal geopolitical conjunctures that aid its reproduction. Otherwise, how could it be explained that the genocide in Darfur and the destruction of the UP are either disregarded or normalised by writing them as domestic dramas topical of backward places in the evolving process of mastering the global space while the Holocaust is usually depicted as a global drama?

An idealist representation that eclipses the geopolitics of genocide is not only what is at stake here, but also the conflictive construction of western identity vis-à-vis its violent past (Barkawi and Laffey 2006). Given that IR and Holocaust and Genocide Studies lie at the core of this conflictive construction of identity, critical interdisciplinary approaches are needed to unveil how global grammars of

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22 Only recently genocide scholars started paying attention to geopolitical processes (Bloxham 2007, 2009). Traditionally, they had focused on analysing the failures of the ‘international community’ in its deed as preventer of genocide (i.e., Harff 1987; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990).
23 This imagery supports and is reinforced by scholars such as Rae (2002) who argues that today state-builders usually resort to genocide when they are not contained by the international system.
24 As Midlarsky, correctly argues “[w]hatever the virulence of the ideological underpinnings, the actual events occurring just prior to the genocide and the relevant geopolitical setting are crucial” (2005: 18).
identity/alterity are reproduced in genocidal geopolitical conjunctures and how these folded and striated geographies are the product of the provincialisation of what one may label as a paranoic western self, which “generously distribute the right to be different, while secretly and inexorably working to produce a pale and undifferentiated world” (Baudrillard 1996: 84).

Various scholars have already paid attention to the relationship between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ factors and the identity politics involved in the occurrence of genocide. Hence, this thesis builds upon the work of historians Mark Levene (2000, 2005) and Donald Bloxham (2007, 2009), IR scholars Martin Shaw (2007, 2009), David Campbell (1998a, 1998b)–and to less extent David MacDonald (2008)–and critical geopolitical Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1996). The issue is not about whether geopolitical contexts matter, as Levene, Bloxham and recently Shaw demonstrate, nor is it whether essentialist ahistorical representations allow for genocides to unfold, as Campbell and Ó Tuathail convincingly argue, nor whether a trivial representation of the Holocaust has come to form “a collective past, shared by many western nations, upon which leaders freely draw to make foreign policy and domestic policy distinctions” (MacDonald 2008: 2). Instead, the issue is to bring together these different contributions to account for the crystallisation, solidification and disintegration of genocidal geopolitical conjunctures.

This thesis aims to unveil how the connections between transnational economic, political, social and military networks (re)create spatial-temporal frames which aid the construction of civilian social networks as (trans)national threats; in this intersubjective production of reality, dominant narratives of (inter)national politics

25 Scholars taking into account structural process have considered international relations in their analysis of colonial and contemporary genocides. Starting from Sartre’s (1968) theory of genocide in colonization, which could be read as “a theory of genocide in the international relations of the great powers” (Kuper 1981: 46), scholars began to understand social structures as drivers of genocide (see Wallimann, Dobkowski, and Rubenstein 1987, 2000). This insight contributed to path-breaking works, which trace back the history of twentieth century genocides and show the connection between imperialism and genocide (Moses 2002, 2008).

26 Levene’s work is concerned with the occurrence of genocide within the development of the modern international system, Bloxham has worked extensively on the geopolitical contexts of the Armenian and Nazi genocides. Shaw has recently proposed a theoretical framework to study genocidal clusters. Campbell and Ó Tuathail share the same epistemological assumptions and both deal with genocidal violence in Bosnia; their findings prompt a focus on how interpretations of international politics allow for violence to unfold. MacDonald studies how the Holocaust has framed contemporary western identity politics by looking at how it has been used in Bosnia, Australia, New Zealand and America; this thesis disagrees, however, with the main assumption of his analysis: the uniqueness and unprecedentedness of the Holocaust.
polarise the grammars of identity seeking to secure a hyperreal collective self; as a result, sympathy/antipathy towards either the civilian networks or the hyperreal collective self are radicalised allowing not only for genocides to unfold but also for ending them. The thesis does this by con-textualising the destruction of the UP within the changing imageries of international politics, which are constitutive part of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Although recent research studies the regional patterns of genocide during the cold war in Latin America (Esparza, Huttenbach, and Feierstein 2010), the assumption remains amongst most of the contributors that the international system is a ‘material’ external-fixed-structure that stamps social patterns in isolated locales producing genocide. Since such an assumption is in itself problematic (Walker 1993), this thesis moves beyond the line of inquiry that seeks to uncover the relationship between genocide and the great powers’ struggle for mastering space. Instead, it unsettles the genocide script embedded in the reproduction of the imagery of geopolitics, which hides away the convolutions of genocide.

Thus, the analysis goes beyond the critique by scholars, human rights activists, and politicians who, thanks to the scripting of the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides through the lenses of what Duffield (2001) calls ‘new barbarism’, continue to rely on the domestic/international dichotomy to argue that post-cold war genocides mainly happened through the ‘inaction’ of the international community (i.e., Jackson 1990; Power 2003). Although, indeed, the lack of a military intervention allowed genocidal campaigns to unfold, the active flows of capital, goods, people, and narratives ignited political, economic, and military elites’ antipathy towards social

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27 Adam Jones’s (2004) edited book, which studies the involvement of Western powers in some genocides mistakenly considered as results of domestic processes, is another excellent attempt to unveil how genocidal processes have been linked with the developments of a western-led international system. Linda Melvern (2000) develops a similar critique further in regards with the Rwandan genocide. As such, these books epitomise a line of research that relies on the inside/outside dichotomy but at the same time challenges the ‘domestic’ character of genocide.

28 In an interconnected world it is a misrepresentation to suggest that domestic factors can be singled out as the drivers of genocide. Yet these misleading accounts are common ground in IR. Barkawi and Laffey (2006: 362) contend that IR’s Eurocentric nature explains why “when mass slaughter takes place in locales… removed from the West, as in Africa, it is … attributed to non-Western factors such as the absence of modern political, economic and social arrangements.” This has helped to consolidate scripts such as ‘murderous states’ and ‘failed states’ (Zartman 1995), which reify the fantasy of the domestic nature of genocide by imagining some geographies and subjectivities as more prone to experience genocide. IR’s Eurocentric narratives have to some extent been contested by genocide scholars (Kuper 1981; see Levene 2005).
groups. This escalated the armed conflicts and allowed the radicalisation of violence entrepreneurs, army officers and paramilitary leaders. Eventually, they amalgamated in perpetrator blocs and construed civilian networks as threats through an antigrammar of genocide. This was the case not only in the destruction of the UP, as discussed earlier, but also in the Bosnian genocide, in which complex flows (of resources and capital) allowed for the emergence of a war economy (Kaldor 1999: 64). Upon the unfolding of such an economy an ahistorical antipathy towards an essentialised other construed as a threat imbued tense social interactions. This facilitated the collusion of various actors, who circulated micronarratives, which relied on and reinforced macronarratives recreating the simulation that a “national community requires the nexus of demarcated territory and fixed identity” (Campbell 1998a: 13).

In both cases, the perpetrators’ alliances were not fixed and hierarchical, but fluid. Moreover, the hard power that materialised from their alliances was based on the grammars of identity/alterity which circulated the idea that they shared a solidarity-bond. Antipathy towards ‘threatening’ civilian networks was central in reinforcing sympathy not only amongst perpetrators, but also between them and broader sectors of social networks. The diffusion of sympathy/antipathy solidified the imaginary division between different collective selves. In this process, sympathy/antipathy were radicalised thus (re)producing the intersubjective clash between perpetrators and victims. Both the international community and the evolving civil society played a role in such radicalisation. Scripts transferred by popular media reinforced (and recreated) the antipathy of some sectors of the perpetrator blocs. Informal networks provided arms and narratives, which enabled them to construe civilian networks as cohesive groups made of essential immutable characteristics and to destroy them. Finally, political representations, embodied in the international community’s scripting of genocides as ‘domestic’ dramas, boosted murderous processes of state formation.29

29 Campbell (1998a) deconstructs the micronarratives of the international community and the macronarratives of media and scholars so as to problematise their role in the genocidal process of state formation in Bosnia. Ó Tuathail (1996) develops an excellent account of practical geopolitics in the breakup of Yugoslavia. Drawing on this theoretical framework I wrote an account of practical geopolitics in 1980s US-Colombian relations (Gomez-Suarez 2010). References to the media and informal networks indorse critical geopolitical writers who categorise geopolitics into popular, formal and practical geopolitics (for a concise discussion see Dodds 2007: 45).
This thesis focuses on the (re)production of antipathy towards the UP, but it does not seek to generalise the findings so as to suggest that there is a teleological linear process which is part of other genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. Although similar patterns can be found in different conjunctures, a large connection of unseen and unexpected events and narratives trigger unique dynamics of victimisation and resistance. Furthermore, the analysis shows that antipathy cannot be understood in isolation. Rather, it has to be approached as part of a dynamic nexus of affective-dispositions, in which sympathy, indifference, oblivion, and antipathy are indivisible. The thesis unveils the role that such nexus played in the crystallisation, solidification and disintegration of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within which the destruction of the UP happened. Consequently, it maps the circulations of ‘emotional (dis)connections’ in the grammars of identity/alterity that (re)produced a multiplicity of collective selves, amongst which one was eventually construed, through an antigrammar of genocide, as a multifaced threat that had to be destroyed. This is not to say that the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture was the product of the circulation of affective-dispositions. As political (socio-natural) devices that allow human interaction affective-dispositions do not produce genocide and war on themselves. However, as affective-dispositions are mechanisms through which power circulates, these are, to use Foucault’s words, “invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination” (1980: 99). In the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture here studied, sympathy, antipathy, indifference, and oblivion were invested with

30 This thesis differs from IR scholars who equate affect and emotions (Crawford 2000). Rather, it is closer to poststructural and constructivist theorists (Edkins 2003; Ross 2006).
31 Affective-dispositions and emotional (dis)connections are interrelated. However, recalling that affect and emotion follow different logics and pertain different orders –affect is not entirely containable in knowledge but is analyzable in effect and emotion is the subjective content inserted into narrativizable action-reaction circuits (Massumi 2002)– it could be argued that emotional (dis)connections capture the way how affective-dispositions shape the subjectivities of actors who become victims, perpetrators and spectators. In the same sense that affect is not used as a loose synonym for emotion, affect and affective-dispositions have different meanings. After a growing poststructural line of analysis that follows Spinoza and Deleuze, the thesis considers that affects “occur in an encounter between manifold beings, and the outcome of each encounter depends upon what forms of composition these beings are able to enter into” (Thrift 2004: 62). Insofar affect is relational, affective-dispositions are the concrete expressions of the different forms that affect takes once it emerges in the bodies. Thus affective-dispositions are at the same time both individual and collective, and become the target of different forms of power, which “work to organise affect to have certain effects upon motion and emotion” (Adey 2008: 440).
hyperreality, colonised by state institutions, and utilised by social groups during their continuous circulation. It was in this flux that affective-dispositions were instrumentalised by social groups to escalate violence and to resist violence, to take action and to stand aside, to remember and to forget. Although the con-textualisation of other genocides is needed, the research on the destruction of the UP suggests that the circulation and reproduction of sympathy, indifference, antipathy, and oblivion, or what one might call a political economy of affective-dispositions is a complex process that must be mapped for any genocidal geopolitical conjuncture.

To be sure, the idea of a political economy of affective-dispositions suggests, similarly with Ahmed’s ‘affective economy’, that affect does not ‘positively inhabit anybody or anything, meaning that ‘the subject’ is simply one nodal point in the economy, rather than its origin and destination’ (2004: 46). Yet it recognises that governing apparatuses play an important role in the circulation and reproduction of affective-dispositions, for as this study shows, state-nodes shape the ‘operative frameworks, within which,‖ to use Butler’s words, “certain lives are regarded as worthy of protection while others are not” (2009: 50). Thus, affective-dispositions

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32 This means that radicalised affective-dispositions (simulations of the real) become, to use Baudrillard’s words, “more real than the real itself” (quoted in Ó Tuathail 1992: 157).
33 State leaders do not only colonise affective-dispositions during genocide, rather this is central part of the scripting upon which geopolitics are constantly performed. As Ó Tuathail’s reflections on the invasion of Iraq show, state leaders use “affect-saturated memory and ‘gut feelings’” so as to deepen the disposition of broader social networks “to view certain regions, peoples, and faiths as hostile” (2003: 858). It is in particular conjunctures, such as the ‘war on terror’, that the polarisation of sympathy/antipathy inscribes with hyperreality the grammars of identity/alterity allowing the circulation of narratives, which could eventually crystallise into an antigramm of genocide.
34 Production is consciously excluded because in the ‘history’ of the reproduction of power the search for origins is futile, hence, instrumentalising Baudrillard’s thoughts, it could be argued that “production [has been always] dead, long live reproduction” (1983: 126).
35 Political economy, as first proposed by Antoine de Montchrétien in 1615, was about studying the conditions under which production or consumption was organised within nation-states. The division between production and consumption was criticised by Marx in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Marx argued that production, consumption, distribution, and exchange (circulation) were all links to a single whole: a distinct mode of production, which in bourgeois society was the capitalist mode of production and reproduction. Although I do not seek to explain why capitalism generates a particular production-circulation-reproduction of affective-dispositions, Marx’s critique is useful to explain what it is understood here by political economy: a political economy is the ever-changing set of links through which a given x circulates, is produced and reproduced –Ahmed, borrowing from Marx’s Capital, for example, relies on ‘the economic’ as a limited analogy to offer “a theory of passion not as the drive to accumulate, but as that which is accumulated over time” (2004: 45).
36 Ben Anderson’s recent work on the targeting of morale by the military on the war on terror is a good example of this line of inquiry, which maintains that “[w]ork on affect must take care not to presume either the manipulation of affect in a form of hierarchical domination from a central source, or the escape of affect over any and all forms of power… it is the aleatory, indeterminate, nature of affect that provides the ground and support for modalities of power” (2010: 431).
constantly circulate across the margins of various networks through the scripting of social processes which privilege some narratives over others.\textsuperscript{37}

Since scripts are part of geopolitics, which is understood here as “a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas” (Ó Tuathail 1996: 59), there are at least two reasons to study geopolitics critically.\textsuperscript{38} First, to “challenge the geographing of (global political) space as a system of pregiven containers for politics” (Dalby quoted in Ibid.: 62), within which genocides happen. Second, to trace the way in which politicians, socio-economic elites and military officers craft scripts that target affective-dispositions, aiming thus at producing particular collective emotional (dis)connections vis-à-vis sectors of the perpetrator blocs and the civilian social networks.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, critical geopolitics contributes to meet the twofold interest of this thesis: firstly, to analyse the combination of (geopolitical) processes and events that made a political economy of affective-dispositions the axis for (a) the radicalisation of large sectors of social networks against, (b) the disconnection of others from, and (c) the solidarity-connection of few with the UP; secondly, to discuss how transformations both in the political economy of affective-dispositions and in geopolitical con-texts, fractured the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture making possible for the UP to seek to bring the perpetrators to justice.

\textsuperscript{37}The term margin seeks to overcome the fixed idea of national borders, which Parker (2009) argues no longer hold for postinternational societies.

\textsuperscript{38}Following Gramsci’s notion of organic intellectuals Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992: 194) argue that “the notion ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ refers to a whole community of state bureaucrats, leaders, foreign-policy experts and advisors throughout the world who comment upon, influence and conduct the activities of statecraft.”

\textsuperscript{39}Mathew Sparke’s (2007) analysis on the geopolitical discourse of fear that legitimated the war on terror exemplifies how through discourse analysis it is possible to unveil how collective emotional responses are to a large extent influenced by scripts product of statesmen’s calculations. In recent years scholars have studied the connection between affect and thinking, through film (Connolly 2002), and affect and human and non-human interactions, through the geographies of spaces of practice (McCormack 2003). However, this thesis exclusively deals with the link between affect and the scripts circulating in micro- and macronarratives. Future research would indeed benefit from broadening the analysis to films, spaces of practices, and architecture.
**Con-textualisation**

Critical geopolitics, post-structuralist IR, and critical genocide studies[^40] are at the core of the interdisciplinary approach proposed by this thesis to overcome the genocide script and to understand how the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture studied here crystallised. The method has as its object of study the *fold at which the direct physical violence inflicted upon the bodies of civilian networks merges with shifting geopolitical con-texts*. Its aim is to con-textualise the geopolitics of genocide. Such method, here called *con-textualisation*, ontologically and epistemologically relies on Laclau and Mouffe’s assertion that “all objects are constituted as objects of discourse, and that there is not ontological difference between linguistic and behavioural aspects of social practice” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 107). Furthermore, by “analysing the way in which political forces and social actors construct meaning within incomplete and undecidable social structures” and by aiming to “describe, understand, interpret and evaluate carefully constructed objects of investigation… to account for incomplete or misleading understandings and to redescribe phenomena in new terms” this method fits within the broader realm of discourse theory (Howarth 2000: 129; 139).

Con-textualisation is closely related to Foucault’s strategy of problematisation. For it seeks to uncover how the international community’s scripting of genocide reinforces essentialist assumptions of both victims and perpetrators and relies on hyperreal imaginings of security and social order, which polarises a political economy of affective-dispositions thus contributing to the crystallisation of genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. However, both strategies differ in the sense that con-textualisation aims to map the amalgamation of geopolitical narratives and the topologies of genocidists and genocide-victims.[^41] In this regard, it borrows from critical geopolitics the tactic of deconstructing scripts so as to unveil (1) how scripts overshadow raw events and (2) how they are constructed in cross-border interactions,

[^40]: Scholars part of what Dirk Moses calls ‘critical genocide studies’ largely support ‘post-liberal’ theories of genocide. Contrary to liberals, who argue that “[g]enocide is established when an agent, in particular the modern state, can be determined to possess the requisite genocidal intention”, post-liberals see that genocides are “not merely the contingent outcome of aberrant settler violence, but inherent in the structure and logic of the colonial project” (2002: 19-26).

[^41]: Topology is understood here as critical mapping of networks.
which reinforce sympathy/antipathy towards a particular civilian network, or relegate it to indifference/oblivion.

Altogether, con-textualisation is a tactic to de-essentialise genocide and, as such, to tackle the following set of questions that emerge from looking into a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture:

1. How do geopolitical con-texts affect the civilian networks’ grammars of identity/alterity and the identity the perpetrators fashion about the social networks they target for destruction?
2. How do geopolitical con-texts shape the processes that bring together the perpetrators of genocide as networks integrating civilian sectors with various collective violent actors?
3. What are the scripts and representations exchanged in geopolitical con-texts that shape mindsets which put forward an antigrandmar of genocide that promotes the destruction of an apparently cohesive collective self?
4. Do genocidal geopolitical conjunctures finally crystallise when a rather small perpetrator bloc unleashes –unrestrained by large social networks– murderous campaigns against the social fabric (soft power) of an apparently coherent collective self, within which some sectors resist the violence but usually fail to influence sections of the very social networks –that stand indifferent– so as to timely halt the escalation of violence? How does this contribute to materialise a fictive self/other binary into the writing of a ‘material’ outside globe made up of multiple insides?

In dealing with these questions, con-textualisation maps a political economy of affective-dispositions. The circulation of such dispositions allows social groups to amalgamate and to structure grammars of identity/alterity. This results in an uneven flow of scripts and representations which bring closer or isolate some sectors of social networks in the onset of the escalation of violence. Hence, to con-textualise a political economy involves carrying out a genealogy of the institutionalised ways of seeing and displaying geopolitical conjunctures as ‘local dramas’ in the making of the global space.
In recent years, such institutionalisation has been both the product and the result of defining a place for such dramas—politically bounded by national borders—within the space of US foreign policy. This has been possible because of the reproduction of an assemblage of scripts that precede “actual events and appropriates those events as part of itself” and, as such, creates a convenient reality that relies on “the marginalization of alternative meanings and alternative scripts” (Ó Tuathail 1992: 157). Since the creation of reality through mere representations is part of what Ó Tuathail calls ‘the principle of hyperreality’ in foreign policy, whereby scripts structure ways of seeing reality admitting “only certain political possibilities as ways of responding to that ‘reality’,” the result is “a persuasive story designed to explain the messy complexity of events in a simple fashion” (Ibid.). The deconstruction of such stories is then central in dealing with the principle of hyperreality that institutionalises the representation of a country in US foreign policy. However, the issue that remains is who creates the scripts that underpin the writing of the global through US foreign policy.

Agnew’s and Ó Tuathail’s (1992) contribution sheds light on this regard by demystifying the idea that geopolitics is only a discursive practice created by the ‘wise men’ who consider themselves the inheritors of ‘scientific’ geopolitics. They also deem the description of a foreign policy as geopolitics, they contend that there are two different types of geopolitical reasoning … [1] Practical geopolitics refers to the spatializing practices of practitioners of state-craft such as statepersons, politicians, and military commanders … [2] Formal geopolitics refers to the spatializing practices of strategic thinkers and public intellectuals who set themselves up as authorities on the totality of the world political map (Ó Tuathail 1996: 60).

Notwithstanding that statepersons, politicians, military commanders, strategic thinkers and public intellectuals are at the core of the production of scripts, they are at the top end of social networks within which representations are exchanged. Consequently, a genealogy of scripts must look into the circulation of representations within and across military, political, social and economic networks.

This thesis is concerned with the practical geopolitics of the UP genocide, or the narratives put forward by political, economic, and social elites (and institutions) that
permeate different worldwide networks of spectators who have ended up ignoring or denying the destruction of UP. Such is the result of conveniently displaying Colombia both as closely linked but also detached from the overarching imagery of the global. As some social networks resist the imagining of this global geography, the thesis is also concerned with what Routledge (2003) calls anti-geopolitics, or the assemblage of discourses whereby some NGOs, social movements, trade unions, and political parties contribute to the (re)writing of the global. In the case studied here, such a re-writing occurs by making public the UP genocide. However, this thesis approaches the anti-geopolitics of the UP genocide as a discursive/material matrix, where flows of resources, goods, and people accompany the micro- and macronarratives of a fluid transnational civilian network which seeks to challenge the scripting of Colombia as a genocide-free locale in the writing of global politics. Global human rights Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have played a part in such a network. Recalling that global human rights NGOs sometimes reify power relations, by making visible some dramas and no others, the thesis assesses their role in the anti-geopolitics of the UP genocide. Nevertheless, as global human rights NGOs are only the top end of the struggle involved in the anti-geopolitics of the UP genocide, the analysis unveils how the struggle evolved from the UP leaders’ early attempts to break the indifference of broader sectors of social networks by igniting sympathy for their struggle and antipathy towards the perpetrators. In this way, con-textualisation traces the (irregular) relationship between the practical geopolitics and the anti-geopolitics of the UP genocide. As the final section of this introduction discusses, a multi-method approach is necessary not only to trace such a relationship, but also to study the mobilisation, circulation, and colonisation of affect. Suffice for now to say that similarly to Pain’s (2009) critical methodology to the study of emotional geopolitics, con-textualisation relies on semi-structured interviews, focus groups, archival research and discourse analysis. This enables to unearth the anti-geopolitics of genocide-victims, to unveil the practical geopolitics of various sectors of the perpetrator blocs, and to map the topologies of the genocidal geopolitical conjunctures in which perpetrator- and victim-networks intersubjectively clash.

Put simply, con-textualisation is a method of disrupting the fantasy that genocide takes place in isolation from geopolitical interactions; it does so by exploring the role
that the intersubjective exchange of ways of imagining such interactions plays in the occurrence of genocide. In following con-textualisation this thesis (1) deconstructs the hyperreal writing of Colombia in US foreign policy and (2) maps the political economy of affective-dispositions upon which the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture crystallised, solidified and disintegrated. In consequence, the thesis complements Bloxham’s (2007, 2009) and Levene’s (2005) geopolitical lines of inquiry, at the same time that it challenges their epistemological and ontological assumptions. The focus on scripts, networks, and affective-dispositions questions traditional understandings of ‘the international’ and therefore the idea that genocide occurs amidst a battle for power in an international system of states. The study suggests that it is more fruitful to question the very assumptions that ‘drive’ the actions of a multiplicity of actors in the ‘space of the international’, hence the focus on the political economy of affective-dispositions. Only then would researchers be better able to deal with the genocide script, which not only helps to create international boundaries but also, and mainly, allows for the reproduction of the very abstraction of a world divided into multiple Insides and one Outside. Furthermore, the findings of the study suggest that by following con-textualisation new genocide research could contribute to subvert dichotomies, such as inside/outside, self/other, private/public, and discursive/non-discursive. Overcoming them has been the main challenge of this thesis. The thesis should therefore be judged not only by the contribution it makes to Shaw’s (2009: 9) call for “a more structural emphasis on macro-historical contexts (regional as well as global) … [so as] to look at the dynamics involved in clusters of cases in particular periods and regions,” but also by placing a (post)structuralist emphasis on con-textualising genocide into the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture unfolding upon the polarisation of a political economy of affective-dispositions.

Con-textualising the political economy of affective-dispositions

The writing of the global constantly refers to local dramas. Therefore, intellectuals of statecraft’s representations of the processes part of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, within which the destruction of the UP occurred, served to reinforce the boundaries between sovereign national states in the Americas. Since the UP was not only singled out by a perpetrator bloc and allowed to perish ‘within’ the boundaries of
Colombia but was also portrayed as part of the wider communist threat to the hemisphere during the 1980s, military and political leaders in the region were able to advocate strengthening the borders of the states to contain the circulation of the threat. Thus, to paraphrase Campbell, “[t]he very domain of inside/outside, self/other, and domestic/foreign [we]re constituted through the writing of a threat” (1998b: x).

Although the threat of communism vanished at the turn of 1990s, violence against UP strongholds continued. From the mid 1990s until the early 2000s Colombia was depicted as a failed state, in which new non-state actors were challenging the sovereignty of the state within its own boundaries. In this context, a large number of actors in Capitol Hill, the Pentagon and the White House depicted it as impossible for the ‘weak’ Colombian state to protect the UP from the right wing paramilitary groups. Such groups continued legitimating the massacres by stressing the link UP-FARC.

During the first decade of the new millennium, hundreds of UP survivors were assassinated,\(^\text{42}\) structural violence, stigmatisation, and forced detention were some of the violent practices that accompanied selective assassinations. In the post-9/11 world, counterinsurgency and counter-drug efforts merged in a state (re)building plan, largely funded by the US.\(^\text{43}\) The demobilisation of paramilitary groups and the weakening of FARC have allowed influential think tanks in the realm of Washington’s foreign policy, such as the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, to disregard the involvement of security forces and other state institutions in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Colombia is thus portrayed as a successful story of state building that sheds light on how to proceed in Afghanistan and Pakistan (DeShazo, Meldenson Forman, and Phillip 2009).

In contrast to these shifting representations, the continuity of the inside/outside dichotomy has been the referent object of the grammars of identity/alterity for both victims and perpetrators during the last 30 years. This has allowed, ignited, and reproduced the multiple narratives that form the axis of the political economy of affective-dispositions upon which Colombian identity politics has unfolded since the

\(^{42}\) According to REINICIAR and the Colombian Commission of Jurists between 2002 and 2006, 136 former UP members had been murdered, 38 disappeared and 28 have been suffered assassination attempts, and hundreds of families have been forcibly displaced (REINICIAR 2006c: 75).

\(^{43}\) “The United States has provided more than $6.8 billion in assistance to Colombia since the approval of the emergency supplemental in support of Plan Colombia in July 2000” (DeShazo, Meldenson Forman, and Phillip 2009: x).
1980s. Such representations have been intertwined with three long-term processes. First, the development of mindsets that regard the destruction of certain social groups as the path to follow; the materialisation of such mindsets is what I elsewhere call genocidal mentalities (Gomez-Suarez 2007). Second, the spread of sovereign-subject power relations that seek to bring about a national identity able to reproduce hegemonic narratives, which materialise, paraphrasing Mann (2006), modernity’s legacy of creating a “we the people” like ‘us’. Third, the instrumentalisation of geography that in a discursive event allows for the bordering of social processes and the creation of policies of intervention or non-intervention. Geography, a power/knowledge that produces specific power relations and hence a central part of geopolitics, provides scope for human beings to detach from or attach to social processes that are represented as someone else’s business.

The convergence of these three processes suggests that genocidal mindsets, at the core of which there was an antigrammar of genocide that enabled various actors to regard the destruction of the UP as the path to follow, were entangled with the modern process of state formation and the unfolding of narratives representing geography as a natural given that needed to be mapped out in order to secure the survival of a fictive Colombian self. It was in this flux of social processes that sympathy/antipathy came to reinforce from within and without the idea of a nation-state and where from sprang the grammars of identity/alterity.

During the latter part of the twentieth century, the (re)production of a particular Colombian identity was to borrow Neumman’s (1993: 350) definition of identity politics a “struggle to form the social field in the image of one particular political project.” One of the multiple origins of the historic specificity of late 20th century Colombian identity can be traced back to the Frente Nacional (FN). From 1958 onwards capitalist-democratic values were, according to political elites, the cornerstone of national identity. This politico-moral figuration enabled, paraphrasing

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44 Mann (1993) argues that the modern state is a place and an actor at the same time. However, it can only be so thanks to discursive practices depicting it as a place with a given geography. This discourse is central part of state-subject power relations. The centrality of the state as a place was to dominate the late 19th century political imagination. This was so, in part, because as Mann correctly demonstrates the ‘science’ of geopolitics emerged as part of the expansion of the infrastructural power of the state.

45 “The texts of geopolitical discourse are not free-floating… but are rooted in what [Foucault] calls ‘power/knowledge’, serving the interests of particular groups in society and helping to sustain and legitimate certain perspectives and interpretations” (Hepple 1992: 139).
Campbell (1998b: 136), the image of “a ‘fictive self’… to perform the regulative ideal of domesticating contingency and enframing identity.” In token of such a fictive self, the FN solved the dispute between the Conservative and Liberal Parties, but excluded other political ideologies. Political elites thus attempted to carry on with a nation-building project based upon excluding people who did not support the bipartisan agreement. Since “Identity is inconceivable without difference” (Ibid.), otherness was needed to reinforce the similarities between the members of Colombia’s ‘imagined community’. The first writing of the ‘other’ in the early stages of the FN was the labelling of certain leftist social constituencies as safe havens for bandits (cf. Sánchez and Meertens 2001). This attempt at depoliticising the other was hampered by the emergence of communist guerrillas in the early 1960s. In this context, the other was installed within the battlefield of “the Schmittian friend-enemy politics; and became the absolute enemy challenging the sovereignty of a supposedly completed nation-state” (Orozco 2006: 34-64).

A central mechanism in the ‘apparatus of security’ of the FN was the explicit delegation of public order management to the military. This not only produced the simulation of Colombian territorial space as an organism under threat but also produced a particular idea of how to treat it. The military, usually represented as the guardian of national borders in modern societies, was to become after 1958 the nucleus of the officers of the law. The outcome of a radicalised military mindset was

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46 What defines a national identity is contested. However, according to Balivar (2002: 68), “there are two basic ideological themes: (a) fictive ethnicity: no nation rest historically on a ‘pure’ ethnic base, but every nation, through its institutions, constructs a fictive ethnicity which distinguishes it from others by perceptible (visible, audible, etc) marks … (b) patriotism -transhistorical mission- … having as its corollary the duty of each individual to ‘hand on’ from generation to generation a symbol which is the country’s ‘own’.” In the Colombian case, the traditional political parties played the transhistorical mission to hand on patriotic values to the next generation. This only started to change in the mid 1980s when following the UP example various political movements started opening up the political system.

47 The emergence of societies of security occurred at the turn of the 18th century. Foucault argues that in this time apparatus of security emerged which replaced discipline as a mechanism prescribing what needed to be done in order to complement reality. Instead of prescribing, security focused on regulation: allowing things to happen. It does not do away with a threat; it actually regulates it so as to cancel it out (Foucault 2007). In a recent work Giorgio Abamben (2009: 8, 20) argues that the term ‘apparatus’ is a central technical tool in Foucault’s thought. “The term certainly refers… to a set of practices and mechanisms (both linguistic and non-linguistic, juridical, technical and military) that aim to face an urgent need and to obtain an effect that is more or less immediate… Apparatus, is first of all a machine that produces subjectifications, and only as such it is also a machine of governance.”

48 The scripting of the army as an exclusive mechanism of foreign policy is highly problematic. As Foucault (1991: 168) argues, “[p]olitics as a technique of internal peace and order, sought to implement the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile, useful troop, of the regiment in camp and in the field, on manoeuvres and on exercises. In the great eighteenth-century states the army was a technique and a body of knowledge that would project their schema over the social body.”
the militarisation of the grammars of identity/alterity, in which communism embodied a dangerous other. The emergence of communist guerrillas allowed a discursive shift, whereby the other was written as an assemblage of local violent entrepreneurs cemented by a foreign ideology. In this context, the struggle against the Soviet Union’s ‘grand strategy’ was framed within the imaginary boundaries of Colombia, which resembled in the military’s gaze a legitimate and uncontested sovereign nation-state. Thus, McCarthyism became a central feature of the FN’s ‘law officers’. This resulted in the institutionalisation of the State of Siege as part of the apparatus of security that enabled the military to control public order and hence to crack down on communism. By 1978, when the Colombian military had adopted and adapted the National Security Doctrine (NSD), the representation of ‘that one that is not like us has to be domesticated or destroyed’ came to dominate not only the first line of command of the armed forces and most of its body of conscripts and lifers, but had also permeated the civil service.

Once the FN’s political project tolerated exceptional levels of violence against the non combatant-other, a murderous process of producing and reproducing differentiation based on sympathy/antipathy was set off. At first, traditional politicians’ sympathy for the other sought to offer opportunities of assimilation. In this context, the UP was launched. However, as the UP was influenced by ‘foreign ideologies’ the military not only thought of it as unwilling to integrate to Colombian politics but also saw with distrust the (re)integration of some of its members into society. The UP, then, was essentialised as a fixed ahistorical entity unable to change and hence disentitled to sympathy or assimilation. With the radicalisation of antipathy and the deepening of the crisis of legitimacy of the political system, the destruction of the UP by military means came to inform various social groups, which colluded with collective violent actors. In some regions, the military were implicitly given a carte blanche to deal with those who were not worthy of assimilation. This was possible because the geopolitics of the second cold war had succeeded in fixing representations in the Colombian and US civil societies’ mindsets. Such representations had reinforced antipathy towards the UP allowing a violent crackdown against it. During the 1990s, Bogotá exploited feelings of sympathy by playing up the price paid by ‘Colombian society’ in the war against the international
‘scourge’ of drug trafficking. US administrations’ sympathy for the Colombian tragedy downplayed the links between politicians, security forces, and paramilitaries in genocidal massacres against the UP. Antipathy was thus replaced by indifference. Throughout the Uribe administration the UP was portrayed as a past experience; during George W. Bush’s years, Washington overlooked the atrocious human rights record of the security forces. Sympathy for the government was the norm and indifference was supplanted by oblivion. Sympathy, antipathy, indifference, and oblivion are part of the complex set of mechanisms upon which geopolitical interactions are (re)produced. Consequently, in con-textualising the destruction of the UP within a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, each chapter of this thesis helps to unveil how amidst a political economy of affective-dispositions various (trans)national networks colluded to target a fluid civilian social network, which also utilised affective-dispositions to resist the destruction.

**Outline**

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first two chapters trace the topology of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within which the UP genocide unfolded. The chapters analyse various processes that led to the escalation of the armed conflict in Colombia; how, because of such an escalation, the conflict flowed into a genocidal process of sociomaterial reordering in which a perpetrator bloc materialised and waged war on a fictive self, projected on civilian social networks, and how genocidists and genocide-victims intersubjectively constructed and reconstructed themselves, otherness and third-parties (bystanders) by relying on different grammars of identity/alterity. Such grammars were based upon a political economy of affective-dispositions polarised by the state leaders’ constant affective preaching and thus coexisted with unfolding antigrammars of genocide present in the narratives and scripts circulating in the geopolitical con-text of the second cold war in the Western Hemisphere. Chapter 2 critically maps the complex dynamics within the UP. It follows a twofold strategy. First, it looks into the circulation of affective-disposition, scripts, and narratives between the UP and the Colombian administrations from 1985 to 2002. Second, it connects the transformations in the UP’s grammars of identity/alterity with the genocidal practices of which the group was target. Chapter 3
is a topology of the perpetrators. It traces the materialisation of various regional coalitions for violence, how they amalgamated in a perpetrator bloc, and the structural transformations of the perpetrator bloc from 1985 to 2006.

Whereas chapters 2 and 3 unveil the transformations taking place in processes of victimisation, resistance and identity formation thereby offering some insights into the changing dynamics of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, the next three chapters seek to con-textualise the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within the geopolitics of the Western Hemisphere. In so doing chapters 4-6 are a topology of the transnational circulation of narratives and resources between military, political and criminal networks. The analysis focuses on how narratives, which reproduced the imagery of a continent divided into segments needing to follow the blueprint model presented by the US, contributed to the crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture by encouraging the teaming up of legal and illegal actors in an attempt to control contingency in the hemisphere. Chapters 4 and 5 mainly concentrate on the circulation of scripts within and amongst military and political networks, while chapter 6 looks at the circulation of narratives and resources within transnational criminal networks. All three chapters roughly deal with the same time-span from the early 1980s to late 2000s. Chapter 4 analyses how the transnational circulation of scripts informed the participation of various sectors of the Colombian security forces into the perpetrator bloc; it connects some transformations within the perpetrators with the geopolitics of military networks in the Western Hemisphere. Chapter 5 engages with the transnational scripting of Colombia by political networks; it deconstructs the narratives that enabled the free circulation of the perpetrator bloc, its collusion with politicians, and informed some transformations within the bloc. Chapter 6 maps the transnational connections between legal and illegal actors and links them with the perpetrator bloc. Moreover, it explores how the scripting of transnational criminal networks as security threats contributed to solidify the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture.

After con-textualising the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture by mainly focusing on the dynamics of the perpetrator bloc, the next two chapters turn to con-textualise the transformations within the UP and to integrate such con-textualisation with the previous chapters. Chapter 7 is a topology of the transnational efforts of the UP to halt
the genocide and bring the perpetrators to justice; it looks at the role the UP played in bringing about a fluid transnational network of NGOs, political parties and social movements so as to resist the genocidists and challenge the narratives put forward by military, political, and criminal networks. Chapter 8 returns to the critique of the genocide script presented in chapter 1; it brings to the fore the transnational dimensions of the intersubjective violent clash between the perpetrator bloc and the UP thereby emphasising that genocide is a complex geopolitical process. It outlines the implications of the research methodology for future genocide research.

Methods

Methods and research design are a central part of this thesis for at least four reasons. First, the case study lacks external validity; no Anglo-American genocide scholar lists the destruction of the UP as a case of genocide. Second, there are few accounts of the UP genocide and victims have mainly produced them. Third, most genocidists deny their involvement in the destruction of the UP. These two reasons raise reliability issues. Fourth, one of the main contributions of the thesis is to propose a new method to study genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. These four particular reasons explain why methodology matters, but in a more general sense methods are important so as to critique macro- and micronarratives that hinder our understanding of how genocides unfold.

The primary research in this thesis comes from two visits to Colombia and archival research conducted in Washington. The thesis had three research stages. First, at the Library of Congress, Congress Hearings on Colombia (1978-2002), State Department Reports on Human Rights Practices (1984-1998), School of the Americas’ Magazine ‘Adelante’ (1987-1991), and the New York Times (1985-2008) were reviewed. Second, during the first fieldwork visit to Colombia, semi-structured interviews with UP survivors and perpetrators were conducted. Ten national leaders were selected and four demobilised paramilitaries were randomly chosen for semi-structured interviewing. Focus groups were also part of this stage; six sessions in total were carried out: three with second-generation survivors in Bogotá and three with women survivors in the Meta County. The final part of the fieldwork was dedicated to the newspaper review of El Espectador and El Tiempo (1984-2002) in the Luis Angel
Arango Library in Bogotá. Third, during the second visit to Colombia, semi-structured interviews with ten selected UP survivors (former regional leaders) and a focus group with UP leaders in the Nariño County were conducted. I also accessed the personal archive of Boris Cabrera. As part of this stage of the research, I visited Aida Avella in Geneva and carried out two sessions of informal interviewing and studied her personal archive.

Some of my interviewees requested not to be named; only public figures who consented to being named are directly quoted throughout the thesis. The aim of carrying out semi-structured interviews was to gather information on regional differences in terms of resistance strategies and experiences of genocidal violence. The reason for using this kind of interview was to access narratives by allowing a more natural interaction with the interviewees. Informal interviewing, on the other hand, was used to obtain the former UP president’s personal account; therefore it followed the natural flow of our conversations. Focus groups were used to explore how survivors interpret various social groups’ sympathy/indifference/oblivion vis-à-vis the UP genocide, what groups or institutions they identify as the perpetrators, and what reasons they believe motivated the perpetrators. The resort to focus groups sought to explore how group characteristics and dynamics were constitutive forces in the construction of meaning of the UP genocide and the practices stemming from it. Finally, because of the post-structural stance of the thesis, which focuses on the deconstruction of scripts through the analysis of primary sources (i.e., official documents, UP press releases and bulletins, military magazines), archival research was also part of the multimethod approach used not only to trace the genealogy of ideas, allowing hidden voices to emerge, but also to interpret the role of documents in shaping a dominant outlook in a given context.49

In order to deal with validity and reliability issues (i.e., the partiality of the archives, the noncomparability of interviewees’ responses, the credibility of the documents, and the small number of participants and the selection process which makes focus groups an insecure basis for generalisation), the three research methods were triangulated during the data collection process. To be sure, by resorting to

49 For semi-structured and informal interviews this section relies on the works of Britten (1995) and DeWalt and DeWalt (2002), for focus groups on Kamberelis and Kimtriadis (2005), and for archival research on Gidley (2004). In dealing with documents’ reliability and validity concerns the techniques proposed by Finnegan (1996) were considered.
In the thesis does not attempt to capture an objective reality; rather it aims to ensure an in-depth understanding of the complex social processes that converged in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture studied here. Focus groups were used to collect data on cultural mindsets, supporting the information that eventually emerged from the semi-structured interviews. The archival research data on governmental statements and its relationship with other perpetrators was validated against interviews with key informants. Finally the focus groups’ data was validated against data collection on the nationwide media accounts of the destruction of the UP. Furthermore, internal triangulation complemented external triangulation. However, triangulation was also used in different ways: first, as a technique to reinforce a sceptical stance towards the new data generated during the three stages of the research and as a multidimensional approach to study complex social phenomena. The aim was to account for continuities and discontinuities in social processes and to avoid falling into a ‘teleological trap’ by paying attention to multiple realities as socially constructed and historically embedded. Second, triangulation helped to unveil different ‘realities’ that converged during the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. The different data collected through these different methods enabled the mapping of the complexity of multiple social dynamics converging in episodes that were unique and at the same time part of structural dynamics. Despite the author’s efforts to enhance the quality of the research, the reader should be aware of various methodological caveats, thus most chapters introduce the data collection method and the analysis technique.

Genocide scholars have been mainly concerned with genocide prevention. This demonstrates the normative drive behind genocide scholarship. Thus, even though ethical concerns vary when carrying out historical, anthropological, sociological, and other kind of genocide research, the importance of ethics is, at least amongst genocide scholars, taken-for-granted. However, this link between research ethics and normative

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50 According to Flick (2002: 229), “The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, perspectives, and observers in a single study is... a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry.”

51 Triangulation is understood in different ways. Denzin (1970) prompted qualitative researchers to deploy different methods to validate findings. Later, Denzin (1978) developed four types of triangulation (diverse sources of data, multiples observers in the field, several hypotheses in mind, and different research methods). In Denzin’s post-modern turn triangulation is about using more than one interpretative practice in order to account for complex social realities (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 4; cf. Richardson 2005).
claims is problematic: genocide research can be ethical without making normative claims. Ethical concerns are at the core of this thesis, not only because of the ethnographic work conducted, in which victims sensibilities and collective memories were an important element for consideration and to which the thesis tries to be faithful, but also because the attempt has been made to understand how it was that outrageous levels of violence were (and are) carried out, observed and legitimated by human beings like us. This does not mean however that the thesis suggests how a genocide-free world should look like. Instead, the thesis proposes a method for scholars to approach the study of genocide. Understanding the geopolitical complex processes should inform the ethical decisions of human beings in concrete historical conjunctures in which civilian social networks are written as an ‘other’ who must be destroyed for us to survive. This would avoid large numbers of human beings siding and complying with/circulating dominant narratives that fuel hyperreal sympathy/antipathy enabling genocides to unfold.
2 A Topology of the Unión Patriótica: Civilian Social Networks and the Social Construction of Genocide-Victims

The genocide script, as chapter 1 argues, has reinforced the essentialisation of genocide-victims. Decontextualised (and apparently) innate characteristics, such as ethnicity and nationhood, underpin macronarratives that rely on the UNGC to examine genocide (i.e., Kiernan 2007). Even when scholars deal with targeting of political or other social groups, the result is that the identity of belonging to the group becomes essentialised (i.e., Harff and Gurr 1988; Jones 2006). This contributes to the misleading portrayal of social groups as passive victims rather than actors who resist the perpetrators and the genocidal policies/narratives. This chapter attempts to overcome such a shortcoming. Instead of focusing on demonstrating the political affiliation of the victims, the chapter looks at how the different interactions between various actors allowed for the emergence of a fluid idea of a collective self. This empowered civilian social networks to participate in politics in the context of the second cold war, when antipathy/sympathy were polarised. Consequently, ‘a communist-other’, who at the same time was the source of antipathy and its target, was construed. Against it, various actors built up alliances to wage a war through which they recreated their own collective self. The endurance of these alliances resulted in the solidification of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within which the destruction of the UP occurred.

As the sections below show, the UP was the materialisation of political representations through which various actors interacted creating a solidarity-bond. In Latin America, social networks’ concrete interactions were not restricted to politics. Yet they were scripted as radicalised political interactions, for, then, US foreign policy makers were creating the border between two hyperreal collective selves: capitalist-freedom-loving people/communist-non-freedom-loving people. These scripts aided neoconservative US elites to colonise narratives circulating in political networks, which polarised sympathy/antipathy forcing various groups to re-imagine their selves vis-à-vis the battle between capitalism and communism. The writing of countries in Western Hemisphere as battlefields thus polarised a political economy of
affective-dispositions upon which multiple social actors intersubjectively interacted (see chapter 5).

The foregoing calls for reassessing Cepeda’s (2006) claim that the membership to the UP was the defining feature of the genocide. This is not to say that the genocide was apolitical: all genocides are political. Nevertheless, as shown later, the social interactions between a broad network of leftist activist sympathisers, and their relatives, as well as acquaintances and allies allowed for the consolidation of a social power that gained political positions at the local, regional and national level. It was the fabric of such social power –based upon the historical presence of communist ideas and the leadership exercised by the PC and the FARC from 1984 to 1987– which was the first target of destruction. Security forces, who construed themselves as part of the ‘freedom-loving people’, framed UP politics within the geopolitical context of the second cold war. In so doing they scripted the UP as part of the ‘non-loving-freedom people’ opening up the path for genocide (see chapter 4).

Although the foregoing supports a sociological understanding of the UP as a civilian social network, it must be noted that the UP was a formal political party. But political parties can be understood as networks.¹ At first glance, political parties are defined by individuals’ membership to the collectivity. The decision to join a party is widely regarded as a consciously and rationally made. When a political party is created, regulations are established in order for the party to be legally recognised within a political system. The party’s members are those who are obliged by such regulations. In this formal sense, a political party can be seen as a hierarchical and closed network. However, the party’s proposals always transcend its members bringing together other sectors of social networks, who are labelled as supporters, sympathisers, or militants. This ‘informal’ diffusion of the political-bond brings about a complex, open network that encompasses individuals and social groups that identify with a particular political representation. Thus, in the case of the UP, belonging to the political platform was reinforced by a group-identity represented in an ‘imagined

¹ Although Knoke (1990) introduced a network theory analysis of politics, his discussion of political networks is based on an implicit distinction between political parties and political networks. However, the argument here is that one can better understand the ‘internal’ dynamics of political parties when approaching them as hierarchical dynamic networks in which the links between different sectors and the centrality and prestige of different positions induce transformations in the structure of the party itself.
community,’ which, paraphrasing Anderson (1983: 15-6), recreated a deep, horizontal comradeship in the minds of people who would never meet and “yet in the minds of each, live[d] the image of their community.”

However, the unfolding sense of community around the UP was not the product of exclusive intra-network relations. Rather, it was the result of a dynamic process of intersubjective interactions embedded in the geopolitical con-text of the second cold war, within which other collective selves were also targeted for destruction in the hemisphere (see Feierstein 2007). The mutual identity-building process that took place in this con-text was structured upon various grammars of identity/alterity. Although identity-building processes often take place through representing “the materiality of physical geographic objects and boundaries … [and] discursive borders between an idealized Self and a demonized Other” (Ó Tuathail 1996: 14-5), these seldom end in the annihilation of one of the social groups. However, when the relationship between self and other is not regulated by grammars of identity/alterity but by an antigrammar that construe the other for destruction, the identity building process becomes genocidal (Baumann 2004). This was the case in the destruction of the UP: grammars of identity/alterity unfolded alongside an antigrammar of genocide.

Since the reproduction of an antigrammar of genocide does not eliminate the grammars of identity/alterity, the (anti)grammars coexist, entwining apparently distant subjects, objects, and relations within a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture (see chapter 1). In the case of the UP, grammars of identity/alterity allowed for the creation of political alliances with other parties and establishing communication channels with opposite sectors of Colombian society. At the same time, nevertheless, the transnational military cadres’ circulation of an antigrammar, which represented the UP as a threat to the survival of an ideal Colombian collective self, was slowly permeating other social networks (see chapter 3). Such an antigrammar put violence at the centre of politics both in urban settings and in the countryside. Moreover, it hampered the consolidation of the grammars of identity/alterity put forward by the Betancur administration, which was seeking to accommodate the ‘other within’ by integrating it into politics.

The previous paragraphs show the importance of exploring “how the dynamics of mass violence are influenced by… the construction of identity” (Hinton 2002b: 16;
see also Hinton 2002a) and vice versa. This chapter aims to contribute to such an exploration. However, it moves away from research that exclusively studies how genocide-victims are constructed by the perpetrators (i.e., Dwyer and Santikarma 2003). Instead, the chapter shows that because UP leaders were actors; they mobilised affective-dispositions within increasingly polarised grammars of identity/alterity. Thus, they attempted to reinforce sympathy for the UP and antipathy for the perpetrators. UP leaders thereby challenged the (geopolitical) scripts legitimating violence against the group and put forward different narratives that (re)presented the UP as a collective self, contesting the Colombian administrations but able to accept difference within. This brought about structural transformations on the political platform throughout the eighteen years it was formally recognised in Colombian politics. Moreover, as chapter 7 shows, such transformations shaped the transnational dimension of the grammars of identity/alterity that informed the development of an informal transnational network of resistance to genocide.

This chapter sets the basis to con-textualise the UP’s complex dynamics into the geopolitics of the second cold war and the ‘new world order’ in the Western Hemisphere. Since the analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with former UP leaders and an extensive newspaper review from 1984 to 2002, revealing complex dynamics within the core of the political platform through the production of different narratives, the chapter may be judged as one of the first attempts at writing a topology of the UP. Although both official and UP political statements cannot be taken at face value, it is through them that narratives circulate aiming at influencing particular audiences. The chapter is divided into five parts. First, the emergence of the UP and the exchange of narratives within the UP, and between the UP National Board (UPNB) and Colombian administrations, are discussed. Second, the chapter looks into the narratives circulating during the process leading to the first democratic election of mayors. Third, it explores how new narratives circulating in the grammars of identity/alterity started to create a division within the UPNB in the late 1980s. The fourth part analyses 1990 as a year of internal turmoil within the UP. Finally the chapter discusses the reconfiguration of the UP’s grammars of identity during the 1990s.

Stephen Dudley (2004) completed the first ethnography of the UP.

In twentieth century Colombian politics the affiliation to a political party was highly influenced by family tradition. Liberals ‘were born’ Liberals and Conservatives ‘were born’ Conservatives. In the same vein, the Communist Party based its survival on the peasants’ land struggle, which developed a sense of collectivity that could be passed on to next generations (Viera's interview on Harnecker 1988: 10). Such a focus enabled the PC to create communist strongholds in scattered rural areas across the country. In regions, such as Urabá, second and third generations inherited the communist ideology because of peasant colonization led by the PC in the 1960s (see García 1996: 50-2). Nevertheless in regions, such as Tolima, the strong link between the PC and peasant’s self-defence movements resulted in the constitution of the Marxist-Leninist FARC. In these regions there was a horizontal and vertical spread of communist ideology. The former occurred alongside FARC’s growing territorial power, whilst the latter took place within the FARC. In order to create a support social network, family ties served as communication channels between peasant communities. This is not to say that people within this communist-led political network were actual members of the PC, rather their sense of belonging and identity was strongly influenced by communist beliefs.

In 1985, when FARC launched the UP, the political network expanded from communist-led nodes to a more inclusive and broader network in which different political and social sectors could interact. The Uribe Agreements between the Betancur administration (1982-1986) and the FARC served as the cornerstone for the FARC to propose the creation of a political front. Such agreements accomplished a bilateral ceasefire and established “a year period for the FARC to organise itself politically, economically and socially” (Arenas 1985: 65-8). The openness of the political party was stated by FARC’s commander Manuel Marulanda: “it is not clear whether the PC would have a central role in the new political movement” (El Espectador 1984a: 15A). A few months later, FARC publicly made official the intention of becoming a “national pluralist political movement” and said it was

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3 This can still be seen today in socio-political victims’ movements, which recreate the previous political struggle in order to demand justice, truth, and reparation (Personal interviews with Colombian victims, August 2008)

4 Agreement signed on 28 March 1984.
seeking to form “alliances with other parties and democratic leftist movements,”
will to support the democratic election of mayors and governors, an agrarian
reform and a campaign against the proliferation of paramilitary groups (El Espectador
1984b: 10A). The broader scope of the UP was confirmed when FARC called
“liberals, conservatives, communists, socialists” to join the UPNB (El Espectador
1985c: 9A).

The UP was officially launched on 31 March. Although FARC’s move was
welcomed by a wide sector of Colombian population, the Betancur administration
coined the term ‘armed proselytism,’ adding a dose of mistrust to the peace process.
Armed proselytism became a common script amongst government officials, military
officers, political entrepreneurs, and cattle ranchers. They used it to differentiate
themselves from the UP and highlight a threat to Colombia’s stability. This early
accusation of combining arms with votes became the script circulating during the
1986 electoral campaigns; such a script also shaped the grammars of identity/alterity
upon which the UP was construing its own image. The UP thus crafted a counter-
script based on what Otto Morales called the ‘enemies of peace’. The UP linked such
enemies to militarism, capitalism and oligarchy (see Herrera 1985). The broader
countercharacter which FARC attempted to give to the UP was constrained by this binary
script-counterscript. This was unsurprising because the narratives of Colombian
participant-interpreters were trapped in geopolitics of the second cold war infused
with a polarised grammar construing ‘others’ as enemies.

Since FARC could not organise a political party without disarming and
demobilising most of its fighters, the PC called a national leftist convention and
offered to work with demobilised FARC soldiers in the creation of UP grassroots
political committees, Juntas Patrióticas. The political campaigning of demobilised
FARC leaders gave great hopes to the Betancur administration of the group’s
complete reintegration to society. This miscalculation quickly led to disillusionment.
President Belisario Betancur gradually shifted towards a realist approach, equating
peace with demobilisation, disregarding political reforms (Ramírez and Restrepo
1988). In this context, the UP remained in political turmoil, not only represented as
combining arms and votes but also as being a façade of the PC (Ibid.: 193). A FARC
delegate in the UPNB, Braulio Herrera, contributed to reinforcement of the FARC-UP
script when stating that “the UP did not mean the burial of the FARC but its projection as a political movement” (El Espectador 1985e: 11A).

Up until March 1986, the UP carried out a successful campaign. Discursive practices played a central role in reaching a broader audience (cf. Giraldo 2001: 28). For instance, UP narratives favouring multi-party alliances won support from intellectuals. Nevertheless, in an increasingly polarised con-text, in which sectors of society construed an ‘us’ without-guns-and-for-democracy and an ‘other’ with-guns-and-for-communism, UP leaders started to be a target of violence. Colombian and US administrations actively participated in the creation of this climate; Decree 1560 of 1985, for instance, authorised mayors to close down political headquarters in which it was thought terrorist training was taking place; whilst, the ‘narcoguerrillas script’, put forward by US Ambassador to Colombia Lewis Tambs, contributed to solidifying radicalised ‘us’ and ‘them’ representations upon which violence against the UP escalated (see chapters 4 and 5).

Ironically, the Ricardo Franco guerrilla, a dissident group from FARC, carried out the first assassination attempts against UP national leaders (El Espectador 1985b: 1A, 13A). The Colombian government’s lack of will in pursuing this group allowed the proliferation of violent actions against the UP. The break-up within the FARC was exploited discursively in several ways. On the one hand, the UP argued that the dissident group was product of a military infiltration aided by reactionary political sectors (El Espectador 1985d: 15A). On the other hand, some military officers hastily stated that the real threat to the peace process was coming from the same guerrilla groups. Thus, both the evilness of communism, recreated by the military, and the antipathy between the FARC and the military, circulated by the PC, added to the polarisation of the grammars of identity/alterity regulating the interactions between the UP and traditional sectors of Colombian society.

When FARC’s commander Jacobo Arenas was publicly designated as the UP presidential candidate FARC asked for an extension of the truce agreement. The beginning of the presidential campaign was marked by allegations of an intimidation campaign carried out by the UP in Huila County. Such claims were made by traditional politicians (i.e., Senator Héctor Polanía) and supported by members of the clergy (i.e., Bishop of Garzón Ramón Mantilla). The claims opened the path for
Bishop of Manizales Monsignor José Jesús Pimiento to state that the UP was a threat to Colombian democracy (El Espectador 1985a: 7A). As a result, alliances between the UP and other political parties were questioned. At the same time, FARC divulged a persecution campaign against the UP. FARC delegate in the UPNB Iván Márquez contended that the campaign was part of a strategy to impede the approval of the democratic election of mayors due to the UP’s high levels of popularity; he also denounced the army’s harassment of UP sympathisers in Arauca, Guaviare, Casanare, and Meta.

In this climate of mistrust, assassination attempts and murders against UP members marginally escalated. As a consequence, a sector within the UP saw the need to emphasise the distinction between the UP and FARC: “the UP is not FARC’s political party” (Behar 1985: 386). This distinction allowed the UP to launch its political campaign regardless of the government’s decision to extend the truce. Despite the efforts made to highlight UP’s civilian character, violence continued. El Espectador reported the assassination of four UP members in Huila.

A few days after Betancur indefinitely extended the truce with FARC, the army killed 23 FARC soldiers, and the PC headquarters in Bogotá suffered a terrorist attack. These incidents, together with the take-over of the Palace of Justice by the M-19 and the army, affected FARC’s decision to withdraw Arenas from presidential candidacy. The take-over became central in UP and anti-UP narratives. While UP leaders focused on underscoring the army’s disproportionate reaction to the Palace takeover, the Betancur administration emphasised the M-19’s actions: if a diminished guerrilla group, had been capable of carrying out such an action in the middle of Bogotá, what would a strong guerrilla group be capable of if allowed to act freely in politics?

Such narratives radicalised actors moving amongst military, economic, political and social networks. By contenting that militarism was at the core of the Colombian establishment, the UP stepped up circulation of antipathy towards the military, and by putting the responsibility of the bloodshed on the M-19, the Betancur administration not only propagated demonisation of the guerrillas put forward by the military but also adopted and reinforced US narratives, whereby guerrilla groups were portrayed
as the drug traffickers’ mercenaries (see chapter 5). Thus, mistrust towards the M-19 spread onto FARC and the already weakened peace process.

Despite the distrustful relation between FARC and Betancur, in February 1986 the UP presented ex-magistrate Jaime Pardo Leal as its presidential candidate and announced alliances with liberal sectors in various counties. To reinforce FARC’s commitment to a peaceful electoral debate, Arenas indicated that after “20 years of armed confrontation the FARC were seeking to conquer public opinion” by supporting UP candidates (El Espectador 1986e: 12A). But the violence against the UP continued. Yet, Arenas claimed that albeit more than “200 deaths occurred since the Uribe Agreement”, FARC was “determined to defend the space gained in Colombian politics” (El Espectador 1986d: 11A). Thus, when Betancur formally ratified the ceasefire, it was ruled that

the government will give the UP and its leaders the guarantees and security measures needed for them to carry out political activities in equal conditions with other political groups. The government will use its authority to prosecute citizens or authorities denying this right. It will also give guarantees and freedom to FARC members to reintegrate themselves to the legal political activity (El Espectador 1986g: 12A).

1986 parliamentary elections saw the UP become the third political force in the country with 14 MPs and 21 County Representatives, and the first political force in peripheral counties such as Arauca, Guaviare and Caquetá, where 38 UP councilmen were elected. The presidential campaign solidified the UP as a national political force. Pardo’s role in reinforcing the civilian character of the group and his constant denouncements of the security forces’ harassment and paramilitary violence gained the UP four percent of votes. This, however, contrasted with uncertainty of FARC’s move once elections were over and FARC’s demobilisation seemed further than ever from realisation.

The Fourth National Plenum assessed UP performance in both elections, stating that “FARC’s honesty and clarity regarding the peace process brought together different sectors” (UP 1986: 7). Moreover, it reinforced the UP’s antipathy towards the military by circulating a narrative of the country as “invaded and occupied by its own army and other forces” (Ibid.: 16). This melodramatic representation of Colombian reality aimed at exposing the central role of the army in the regional
coalitions for violence responsible for assassination of 184 UP members, dozens of disappearings and hundreds of tortures. Relying on these figures, the report reinforced sympathy for FARC’s decision to remain armed: “the government asks a schedule for FARC’s demobilisation but there is not a schedule for the disintegration of paramilitary groups and deactivation of military plans” (Ibid.: 20). However, in order to consolidate the UP’s political power, civilian character and seek unity with traditional parties’ democratic sectors and leftist groups, the report called for the creation of more Juntas Patrióticas. By resorting to an encompassing grammar that enabled bringing others within the self, the UP sought to neutralise the geopolitical scripts reinforcing the hard notion of self that construed the other for destruction in the military mindset (see chapter 4). Yet the UP’s affective power did not break the military power, which was subtly consolidating the hard power of the perpetrator bloc bringing together security forces, outlaws, and paramilitary and self-defence groups (see chapter 3).

Soon after the plenum the UP headquarters in Bucaramanga were targeted. In Rojas Puyo’s view “these terrorist actions were not targeting guerrilla groups but the pluralist political process consolidated in the last elections” (El Espectador 1986b: 5A). Thus, after the 1986 elections, UP members started to disassociate the violence from a degenerate war against the FARC. In this con-text, the UPNB saw Pope John Paul II’s visit to Colombia as an opportunity to expose leaders/sympathisers’ victimisation. This early step to internationalise their struggle came in tandem with Amnesty International’s (AI) report on the Colombian ‘dirty war’. Yet the violence against the UP escalated. Systematic attempts aimed at killing the UP members elected for public offices started in earnest with the assassinations of UP MPs Leonardo Posada and Pedro Nel Jiménez on 30 August and 1 September 1986 respectively, and ended up with Pardo’s murder in October 1987.

As a reaction to the first MPs assassinations, UP leaders started meeting members of the incoming Barco administration (1986-1990). In a meeting with Minister of Government Fernando Cepeda, they denounced the assassination of 14 members in less than two months and accused Middle Magdalena Valley paramilitary groups as the perpetrators of such assassinations, which they argued were part of the broader ‘Plan Cóndor’ (El Espectador 1986j: 13A). Following Senator Jiménez’s murder, UP
MP Braulio Herrera claimed that Gen. (r) Fernando Landazábal was leading the extermination campaign, named by the perpetrators as ‘Plan Baile Rojo’. Although these denouncements weakened the already debilitated peace process, FARC leaders asked all 27 fronts to honour the truce agreements. Arenas said FARC “were to take preventive measures to defend the lives of those participating in UP politics”, yet he emphasised the need for mass mobilisation in order to halt the assassinations (El Espectador 1986i: 10A). It was common practice, thereafter, for UP members to call for regional or even national strikes (see REINICIAR 2006a: 73-80).

UP national leaders identified the MAS (Death to Kidnappers) paramilitary group as part of the perpetrators. The UP claimed the institutionalisation of paramilitary groups was the army’s counterinsurgency strategy. Since the UP had been stigmatised as the political party with an armed force, counterinsurgency included incitement to kill its members. Hence, inside the UP, the FARC started to marginalise itself: in public statements FARC sought to show its influence within the UP reduced to solidarity between them (El Espectador 1986a: 11A). Outside the UP, FARC’s gradual marginalisation was interpreted as confirmation of the continuation of the armed struggle. As his peace policy was overshadowed by a national security policy, which mainly relied on the constant use of the State of Siege, wider political sectors began to talk about the likeliness of the breakdown of the truce agreement.

In November 1986, after the attempted assassination of the President of Meta County Assembly, Eusebio Prada, and discovery of plans to kill Pardo and Herrera UP MPs indefinitely left Congress. Thus, they sought to press for the protection and, for the first time, warned that the upsurge of terrorist attacks and the proliferation of paramilitary groups were jeopardising the truce agreement (Murcia 1986: 14A). Still, the assassinations continued. By mid December, 350 members had been killed. Therefore, the UP resorted to a new narrative calling for the organisation of a ‘broad self-defence unity’ to stop the political and physical annihilation of the group (El Espectador 1986c: 11A). Notwithstanding Pardo’s clarity that it was a call for civilian resistance, the message was used by rightwing sectors to reinforce the circulation of the armed proselytism script.
In early 1987 the distance between FARC and some sectors within the UP increased. When FARC took over Mutatá (in Northeastern Antioquia), the UP mayor denounced that the guerrilla sought to clash with the police (Herrera 1987: 10A). Rojas Puyo used this episode later to show that the UP and FARC were two different entities: “the UP works within Colombian law; UP mayors cannot be seen as allowing a mini-state within the state” (Silva 1987: 10A). On 22 February the UPNB released a public statement formally reiterating its independence from FARC. It restated the UP’s right to remain an institutional force in Colombian politics regardless of developments in the peace process. Yet Liberal sectors reassessed their alliances with the UP: a wider range of politicians became reluctant to continue working together.

This attitude exemplifies, first, the widespread consensus amongst Colombian civil society that the UP’s separation from FARC was only part of the PC’s long-lasting political strategy: ‘the combination of all forms of struggle’ and, second, the failure of the UP to influence the grammars of identity/alterity so as to be recognised as the other that could be accommodated within the Colombian self.

The latter point is of foremost importance because the violence against the UP shaped a grammar of identity that excluded FARC as a legitimate actor. Therefore, the FARC slowly moved to the margins of the UP. The ambiguous narratives put forward by Colombian and US administrations (supported and reinforced by military networks) contributed to the circulation of scripts that were used by rightwing elites, military officers and paramilitary groups to legitimate armed actions against UP leaders. Over time, as part of its efforts to circulate counter-scripts, UP’s civilian resistance incorporated national strikes, advocacy with AI and international leaders, and public denouncements of paramilitary leaders and their alliances with military officers. In this context, the violence against the UP escalated. As a result, some fronts of FARC started carrying out isolated military actions, thereby weakening the solidarity-bond bringing together different sectors into the UP. Thus, the UPNB declared independence from FARC.

The UP as the Offspring of the Peace Process (1987 – 1989)

After the UP-FARC break-up, the Barco administration demanded the UP make a public pronouncement condemning FARC’s armed struggle. The UP’s reaction to
government’s pressure, however, did not match Barco’s expectations: UP publicly stated that the armed struggle “was legitimate in a restrictive democracy” (El Espectador 1987e: 10A), wherein, “the ‘Operación Exterminio’\(^5\), carried out since mid 1986 has sought to wipe out UP public officers” (El Espectador 1987f: 10A). Therefore, in contrast to Barco’s wishful thinking, the UP demanded the creation of a National Tribunal of Guarantees and contacted Colombian ex-Presidents to circulate a declaration of its independence from FARC (El Espectador 1987c: 10A). In this context, Barco described the UP to the British magazine *South* as “the guerrillas’ party” (El Espectador 1987a: 9A). The UP rejected Barco’s statements: “claiming that the UP is the guerrilla’s party implicitly justifies military actions and assassinations against our leaders” (Murcia 1987: 10A). Indeed, the assassinations intensified; by late April, 20 more UP leaders had been killed.

In early May, in another attempt to halt the ‘Plan Baile Rojo’, the UPNB released a list of army officers responsible for attacks and UP assassinations. It also exposed drug trafficker Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha as an active sponsor of paramilitary groups. Even though Minister of Defence Gen. Rafael Samudio refused the accusations, Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos designated a civilian Armed Forces Attorney in order to guarantee impartiality in the investigations. Hoyos’s decision –informed by the UP’s advocacy (Gómez 1987: 3)– showed that the UP grammars of identity/alterity had managed to create sympathy amongst some sectors of the judicial system. Thereafter the UP continued circulating antipathy towards the perpetrators. Pardo extended his denunciations of the army’s complicity in UP assassinations in eight more counties.

On 22 June 1987, Barco publicly declared the truce broken after a FARC attack killed 26 soldiers in Caquetá. This toughened up Barco’s peace policy. The new context left the UP in an awkward situation. Barco’s decision meant escalation of military operations in UP strongholds. Since FARC members were previously working within the UP in some regions, UP sympathizers were easily linked with FARC supporters, even more so after Gen. (r) Landazábal’s assertion: “in Colombia the guerrillas are legalized because the Betancur and Barco administrations recognised the FARC as the PC-UP’s armed branch” (El Espectador 1987d: 3).

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\(^5\) Operación Exterminio and Plan Baile Rojo were used interchangeably by UP members.
Minister of Government César Gaviria sought to clarify the government’s position by pronouncing that the Barco administration recognised the UP and FARC as different entities and by announcing undergoing investigations into crimes against the UP.

A new political battle between the UP and the Barco administration began after Minister of Defence Gen. Samudio publicly supported paramilitary groups. In a strong public statement the UPNB asked for his dismissal. UP leaders insisted that self-defence groups were outlaws hampering the party’s political activities. During the political dispute Attorney General Hoyos took sides with the UP claiming that self-defence groups were illegal. UP leaders started then to denounce publicly politicians’ sponsorship of self-defence groups. Yet, since mid August the assassinations escalated to one UP public official being killed every day. When human right defenders started to being assassinated as well, Pardo argued that the “dirty war had broadened to leaders and intellectuals beyond the UP” (El Espectador 1987j: 10). These narratives seeking to bring different leftist sectors together under the UP grammars of identity/alterity were complemented by the UP’s call for a national strike.

On 11 October a paramilitary group assassinated UP President Pardo, by then, according to UP estimates, more than 470 UP members had been assassinated. During the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, UP public officers had mainly been the target of violence; nevertheless, new and broader genocidal campaigns were about to set off.

Senator Bernardo Jaramillo was elected as UP President amidst this climate of violence. As PC member Jaramillo had played a central role in consolidating Urabá as UP stronghold. In his inaugural speech Jaramillo stated that violent actions “had not weakened UP political power.” Unfortunately, he said, Colombia is close to a civil war “much more bloody and longer than in El Salvador” (Prada 1987: 7A), and he reiterated that despite UP’s independence from the FARC, it respected the armed struggle carried out by the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolivar (CGSB).6

Pardo’s assassination and Jaramillo’s designation gave rise to two dynamics within the UP. Firstly, many political leaders, such as Diego Montaña Cuellar, joined the UP as a demonstration of solidarity with the political project (Vanegas 1991). Secondly,

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6 This platform was an attempt to bring ELN, FARC, M-19 and EPL together.
the UPNB hardened its position against the armed forces by asking the government for the designation of a civilian Minister of Defence and demanding the proscription of the principle of National Security and the ‘contra-guerrilla manuals’, based on America’s doctrine of ‘low-intensity warfare’ (El Espectador 1987b: 5A). By publicly linking a degenerate counterinsurgency strategy with US military institutions, the UP reproduced allegations made by human rights NGOs and other sectors of civil society in Central America, namely that in order to halt the spread of communism, US interventionism had aided the establishment of military cadres, which were responsible for gross human rights violations. In fact, as chapter 4 demonstrates, the counterinsurgency warfare delegated to private actors in Colombia was part of a larger trend characterising the 1980s western hemispheric military network.

Even though Barco’s security strategy did not change, the legitimacy of the UP was restated. Barco claimed to have assumed responsibility for protecting UP leaders and for carrying out judicial investigations to bring perpetrators to justice. A few days later, Minister of Justice Enrique Low Murtra pointed to Gacha as the ‘intellectual author’ of Pardo’s assassination. Murtra’s intervention marked a turning point in the Barco administration’s narratives; for, as María Jimena Duzán pointed out, it let the administration argue that

a great number of the UP members assassinated are the result of a battle between leftist groups and drug traffickers in search for control of territories in the Meta and Guaviare Counties (1987: 2A).

This shift in the administration’s narratives –supported by US pressure to step up counternarcotics operations– shows that the UPNB’s attempts to bring an end to the assassinations were interpreted as a zero-sum political battle, in which to recognise the armed forces violence against the UP meant deepening the ongoing ‘crisis of legitimacy’. Thus, thereafter, the polarisation of the grammars of identity/alterity enabled political networks to create another ‘other’ who could be blamed for the violence, overlooking the actions of military and rightwing political networks.

The government inaction against the perpetrators contributed to the escalation of violence against the UP that followed. On 24 November 1987, in Medellín the first of many massacres took place, killing five JUCO youths (and injuring three more); the perpetrators entered and left the heavily guarded JUCO headquarters without being
noticed. As a consequence, JUCO representative in the UP José Antequera sued the Colombian state. When the second assassination attempt on Vice-President of Antioquia County Assembly Gabriel Santamaría took place, the UPNB demanded a serious investigation into the Intelligence Service Agency of the Army Brigade in Medellín. Alongside the first perpetration of massacres, the UP adopted a new tactic in its resistance strategy by announcing, for the first time in December 1987, that it was contacting the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to denounce “the complicity of the Colombian government in the extermination campaign of the UP” (El Espectador 1987k: 13). This, as chapter 7 shows, was part of an evolving and fluid transnational network of resistance to genocide, which materialised as a result of the anti-geopolitics of the UP and followed the example set by Argentinean human rights organisations in the late 1970s.

For the first popular election of mayors (due March 1988), the UP focused on consolidating the 1986 political success, which had resulted in what Patricia Pinzón labelled as the ‘leftist regionalisation’ (1988: 3B). The UP political campaign continued to be centred on reform of the National Constitution through a Constitutional Assembly including all political parties and social organisations. This was an attempt to create consensus with other sectors. Furthermore, the UP criticised Barco for issuing the Statute of Defence of Democracy (or Decree 180), which created ‘terrorism’ as a new crime. Thus, during the 1988 elections, the UP grammars of identity/alterity were constantly traversed by narratives seeking to balance the antipathy towards militaristic sectors and the need to build up sympathy with other political parties. The latter sought to halt the violence against the group.

In February 1988, after UP Spokesman to Latin-America Carlos Gómina was assassinated, the UP withdrew from the Tribunal of Electoral Guarantees. The UP’s withdrawal coincided with the second massacre in the extermination campaign. In the La Negra-Honduras Massacre, more than 30 banana workers were killed; while the killings were taking place, the perpetrators kept shouting ‘viva la paz abajo la Unión Patriótica y el Frente Popular’, hence the UP claimed that the massacre sought to prevent peasants from voting in the forthcoming elections (Atehortúa 1988: 1A, 3B). After the massacre the UP Regional Board in Urabá demanded the replacement of Brigadier General Manuel Sanmiguel Buenaventura (Calle 1988: 3). Instead of
bringing the perpetrators of this massacre to justice, the Barco administration blamed the violence on the guerrillas’ influence in the region, neglecting that a paramilitary group had claimed responsibility for the massacre.

By the time the first popular election of mayors took place, 14 UP candidates had been killed. “The physical annihilation of UP”, as Restrepo (1988: 8A) contends, “limited the political reforms aiming at opening up the political system”. This was demonstrated in the results of the polls in which the UP suffered a setback: of 23 mayoralties given by Barco, it only got 15 by direct election. The UP’s defeat in the polls was very much affected by ten percent of its candidates having been assassinated in the last two months.

The more than 500 assassinations of UP members and Barco’s decision to militarise Urabá, prompted UP President Jaramillo to argue that “the number of massacres were to increase if the government was to decide to militarise regions in which massacres were carried out by extreme right groups.” Jaramillo’s statements were pronounced after the Seventh UP National Plenum in which general consensus was that due to the fact that the military forces could not protect citizens’ lives, “no Colombian can decline its right to face the aggressors, denounce the violence and demand protection, or even acquire a gun for their personal protection” (El Espectador 1988f: 7A). By resorting to a narrative that argued for self-defence against militarisation, UP members implicitly continued reproducing antipathy towards the army and sympathy for the armed struggle against the terror inflicted by some state institutions.

The UPNB thought that the militarisation of Urabá would lead to the spread of violence to other regions. Indeed, in May UP Mayor of Remedios was assassinated by the Muerte a Revolucionarios del Nordeste (MRN) paramilitary group, which days later painted various graffiti walls in Segovia and Remedios (Northeastern Antioquia), announcing the execution of UP mayors elected on March 1988. Violence also escalated in Meta, where the President of Meta County Assembly Carlos Kovacs was assassinated the same month. Although the foregoing demonstrates that the UP was correct in fearing the militarisation of its regional strongholds, the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) ruled in favour of military rule in some regions. The SCJ’s decision epitomises the limited effect of the UP’s attempts to mobilise affective-dispositions
amongst different state institutions, as sympathy for the UP was eclipsed by national security matters which political and military elites had long before successfully equated to public order (see chapter 4).

The UP’s political pressure against militarisation was met by the Barco administration with a harder discourse against armed proselytism. Peace Advisor Rafael Pardo made this clear:

Disarticulating the combination of all forms of struggle is a responsibility of peasant, popular movements, and political parties... It is responsibility of the Frente Popular, as a political organisation, to state whether it has links with EPL and if it publicly supports the armed struggle. The same goes for the UP in relation with FARC... The government considers guerrilla groups as different from political organisations. However, it is the duty of these political organisations to unleash themselves from guerrilla groups with concrete statements against the armed struggle (El Espectador 1988b: 11A).

Thus, the Barco administration’s narratives continuously passed some of the responsibility of the violence to the UP and to other political movements. The narratives legitimated the extermination campaign. It allowed for arguing that tolerance with FARC and its political project had created a vicious circle in which the Barco administration was not to blame for the violence inherited from Betancur, who had legitimated the combination of politics and arms.

Such narratives allowed the massacres to continue. On 4 July 1988 the First Caño Sibao Massacre in the Meta County took place. The perpetrators killed 17 people, among them seven women and four children. The massacre was reported as a mistaken attempt to kill the UP Mayor of El Castillo. Following the massacre, the UPNB asked Barco to participate in what they called the Democratic Coexistence Commission. UP members were well aware that their survival depended on the revival of the peace process with the CGSB. Paradoxically, FARC commander Arenas began criticising the UP. This quickened the process of the UP separating from the FARC; the UPNB thus decided in late August 1988 to apply to become member of Socialist International (SI).

Despite positive developments in Barco’s peace plan with CGSB, a FARC attack on the army on 4 October finally put an end to the Uribe Agreements. Shortly after, Minister of Government Gaviria delivered a speech asking Colombian people to isolate all guerrilla groups. In this context and despite discrepancies within the UPNB,
Jaramillo’s commemoration speech of the first anniversary of Pardo’s assassination showed that the UP was not ready yet to condemn “the heroic struggle for freedom of Colombian guerrilla fighters” (El Espectador 1988d: 1A). The Barco administration’s narratives sought to convince Colombian public that continuation of the armed conflict depended on the existence of guerrilla groups and the political groups that did not criticise armed struggle. Meanwhile UP narratives aimed at legitimating an uncompromised position vis-à-vis FARC by presenting themselves as experiencing a ‘different’ form of violence, as the target of genocidal massacres.

The UP’s national and regional responses to Barco’s pressure and to the extermination campaign differ at this moment in time. At the national level the UPNB called for Parliamentary debates. Whereas in Urabá, for example, UP members opposed the implementation of ID cards –central policy of the military administration. The challenge posed by UP members was in most of the cases interpreted by army officers as a demonstration of FARC’s military strength; hence it was almost certain to expect the escalation of violence. The Segovia Massacre on 11 November 1988 demonstrates that the UP challenge was to be wiped out in North-Eastern Antioquia, where the MRN paramilitary group killed 43 people while the Bomboná Battalion standing-by did nothing to halt the slaughter. This time, as part of the (trans)national efforts to halt the massacres, the UPNB did not only “demand the dismissal of Minister of Defence but also the intervention of the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations” (El Espectador 1988g: 9A). Nevertheless, on 5 December, the MRN carried out the Puerto Valdivia Massacre, which, according to survivors’ accounts, followed the same patterns of the Segovia Massacre and was aimed at “killing those civilians who voted for the UP” (Correa 1988: 16A).

Although the PC had worked within the UP and at times seemed both as one political force, the changes in the international system brought about by Gorbachev’s Perestroika together with Barco’s isolationist discourse against the guerrillas started to create divisions within the PC and the UP. The internal debate took place during the PC’s XV Congress in December 1988. The orthodox view of supporting the combination of all forms of struggle won over the reformist view of condemning armed struggle. Such a decision disappointed the Barco administration and leftist sectors of the public, according to Duzán (1988: 2A) for instance, after the Congress
“what remains to be seen is the role the UP will play in the combination of all forms of struggle now that the armed struggle has been prioritised.” The perpetrators interpreted the PC’s decision as legitimating the need to carry on with the extermination campaign.

In early 1989 the UPNB saw, in the Barco–M-19 peace talks, a new opportunity to push forward its political agenda of peace and reconciliation. However, after a paramilitary group carried out the Rochela Massacre, the UP released a public statement and sent a letter to the Armed Forces Attorney denouncing that paramilitary groups had set up training schools in the Middle Magdalena Valley and that “witnesses of massacres are assassinated after travelling to Bogotá to give their statements” (El Espectador 1989j: 14A). Notwithstanding attempts to show unity against the perpetrators, the internal division in the UP was about to transcend its members.

In sum, the narratives circulating during the process leading to the first democratic election of mayors contributed to the polarisation of sympathy and antipathy. This, which aided the escalation of rightwing violence against the UP and other sectors of el pueblo, maintained UP narratives that legitimated FARC’s armed struggle and called for popular resistance against the militarisation supported by the US administration. Such narratives reinforced the military’s interpretation of the UP posing a threat to the fictive Colombian self and conflated regional political, economic, and social networks with violence entrepreneurs. As a result, ten percent of UP candidates were killed during the 1988 electoral campaign, opening the path for massacres to mushroom. In this context the UP stepped up its transnational resistance strategy. However, the bloodshed and the reformist ideas reinforced by the Perestroika affected the grammars of identity/alterity within the UP, thus a slow process of differentiation started between those for and against the armed struggle. As both sides were concerned with halting the extermination campaign, which was draining the socio-political power of the platform, they managed to accommodate themselves within the UP collective self. However, as the next section shows the UP grammars of identity/alterity were to be centred upon the idea of two others staying together.

7 The massacre did not target UP members, but 13 judicial officers investigating assassinations perpetrated by paramilitary groups.
The UP Revolt against the PC (1989 – 1990)

Although the reformist view emerged in February 1989, the process that brought it about started around April 1988 when Alvaro Salazar, Bernardo Jaramillo and other UP members visited Europe. Jaramillo’s tour focused on meeting parties affiliated to the SI in Western Europe but he also visited the Soviet Union and most Eastern European countries, where he realised the importance of the Perestroika. Back in Colombia he decided to affiliate the UP to the SI and to moderate the UP political discourse by getting closer to a socio-democratic one (Vanegas 1991: 108-9). Even though there was some support for Jaramillo’s reformist views in the UPNB, especially among the independent sectors that had joined the UP after Pardo’s assassination, traditional communists felt uneasy with such a proposal.

In view that the PC had become the core of UP, Jaramillo’s room for manoeuvre was rather limited to the politics within the PC. Therefore he decided to open up the debate by publicly criticising the guerrillas and then taking it to a PC Plenum in which he won the support of few members. Next, the UPNB condemned terrorism, kidnapping, and extortion as forms of political struggle and asked the guerrillas to reflect on their tactics. The foregoing sought to reinforce the UP’s independent and democratic character. Jaramillo’s strategy was effective because some sectors of the public interpreted the shift in UP narratives as demonstrating that two different positions were at the core of the Colombian left: “the orthodox view that prioritises the armed struggle… [and] the UPNB’s view that prioritises the political struggle” (Duzán 1989b: 2A).

The UP President’s moderated narratives did not, however, manage to halt the extermination campaign. Within 10 days, UP national leaders Eduardo Yaya, Teófilo Forero, and José Antequera were assassinated. The UP reaction was again to demand real guarantees from the government while the PC called for international public opinion to send repudiation letters to the Barco administration and the UNCHR. However, after Antequera’s assassination the UPNB withdrew from the Barco-M-19 peace talks. These assassinations brought together the PC Central Committee (PCCC) and the UPNB to design a new strategy for political action. By then, the number of UP members assassinated was uncertain; according to El Espectador, the death toll was well over seven hundred people (see El Espectador 1989d: 11A). In this context,
PC members sought to reinforce the idea that there were some differences between the PC and the UP but that overall both entities were part of the same political project. PC member Carlos Lozano’s letter to María Jimena Duzán stated that

the UP has received all the support from communists and, among other things, it is the product of communists’ work... A different matter is that the PC, as an autonomous organisation, goes further in some arguments because the UP and the PC have different structures (see Duzán 1989a: 2A).

A month after Antequera’s assassination the Barco administration started to reassess its policy against paramilitary groups. Barco set up a meeting between the UPNB and the Commander of the Armed Forces, from which emerged a joint statement condemning violence. Next he made public various measures to tackle the rise of rightwing terrorist groups. In May 1989 the PC gave the Minister of Government a secret document describing the networks, activities, key actors, places, vehicles and people involved in criminal organisations led by drug traffickers Gacha and Carranza. The document demonstrated military complicity. The secrecy of the document was part of the cooperative effort with the Barco administration, which was only to continue if prompt actions were carried out to dismantle the paramilitary groups.

In light of these developments (though the assassination of UP members continued), the UPNB decided to publicly ask the ELN to end terrorist attacks on the oil pipeline. It argued that such actions affected the national economy and the environment (El Espectador 1989b: 13A). The UP move was welcome by Barco, so much so that on the day commemorating its fifth anniversary, he greeted the UP.

The process of opening up democracy in Colombia has been interpreted by some minorities as a threat. Parallel to the consolidation of the UP, violence against its leaders escalated to a level never seen before in our history. This demanded from the government a new security strategy. Through the violence of which it has been victim, the UP continues working on democratic politics (El Espectador 1989f: 10A).

Although Jaramillo had left Colombia few days before Antequera’s assassination due to threats on his life, he returned as recognition of Barco’s efforts to crack down on paramilitary groups. Despite this, violence against the UP resumed shortly. Terrorist attacks against PC headquarters were to follow as well as assassinations in
Bogotá and Meta. As a response, the UPNB occupied the Ministry of Government, demanding the administration set up a commission to report on dismantling paramilitary groups and to explain why “the perpetrators of the dirty war against the UP had not been captured yet; since they were well known people who were even interviewed by the media at their homes” (El Espectador 1989e: 13A). The fluidity of UP narratives was closely linked to the fact that Barco narratives were not accompanied by policies able to bring to an end the extermination campaign. Therefore, Barco narratives only managed to calm down UP animosity against the armed forces and traditional elites for a short while.

Although the UPNB soon resorted to previous strategies, its narratives oscillated between acknowledging Barco’s efforts to dismantle paramilitary groups and denouncing his lack of action on the matter. This was seen by the UPNB as the only strategy left. Doing otherwise would have allowed undecided sectors of the army and traditional elites to ally with the perpetrators. In fact, such alliances were proliferating in regions such as the Middle Magdalena Valley, in which, according to UP Vice-president Montaña,

army air strikes and MAS violent actions had forcibly displaced some 2000 peasants allegedly linked with guerrilla groups; in addition to the targeting of UP members by drug traffickers led by Gacha (Luna 1989: 13A).

In August 1989, when Liberal Senator Luis Carlos Galán was assassinated, Barco stepped up measures against drug traffickers by issuing among others the Extradition Decree. The UP saw Galán’s assassination as the consolidation of a broader dirty war, therefore it firmly criticised Barco’s actions;

It is not time to announce new measures. It is time to act. It is not time to issue decrees. The country is overloaded with them. It is time to apply the decrees issued before. It is time to apprehend the warlords and get to their strongholds: Pacho, Puerto Triunfo, and Puerto Boyacá (El Espectador 1989a: 5A).

The UPNB resolution not to yield to the intimidation of drug traffickers meant that the UP was to become a direct target for destruction again. When Jaramillo was elected as presidential candidate, the UP decided to support Barco’s crusade against drug trafficking. The following months, drug traffickers’ terrorist attacks increased. One
such action targeted the DAS headquarters, attempting to force the Barco administration to derogate the Extradition Decree. Barco’s disregard of the alliance between some army officers and drug traffickers made it a flawed campaign because, according to the UP, a special emphasis was needed on disarticulating drug traffickers’ military groups, instead of resorting to extradition and the State of Siege. In representing itself as challenging militarism and US interventionism, the UP showed its mistrust in some members of the Barco administration as much as in President George H. W. Bush’s ‘counternarcotics strategy’. In fact, as chapter 5 demonstrates, such strategy was not only contributing to hide away the involvement of state institutions in genocidal violence under the script of narcoterrorism, but also providing the materiel and economic resources for the military’s counterinsurgency campaign, which, in tune with the Central American experience, targeted the alleged social networks supporting the guerrillas. Because of the antipathy for US and Colombian administrations and the crisis of the communist bloc, the UP and the PC increasingly asked for sympathy from international organisations – in December 1989 for instance, they called for United Nations (UN) verification in the forthcoming presidential election. Although differences between some members were extant and stronger than ever, members clung to a solidarity-bond by prioritising Jaramillo’s presidential campaign (El Espectador 1989c: 5A).

In January 1990, after the UP had supported the social movement calling for a Constitutional Assembly, the FARC said it would create a new political group if the plebiscite were to take place. Minister of Government Carlos Lemos was among the members of the administration who opposed such an idea. His opposition was strongly criticised by Jaramillo who claimed that FARC’s aspiration was legitimate. FARC’s decision allowed the UP to finally demonstrate to its critics that if FARC was to have a political party, it was not the UP. Therefore, Jaramillo asked for electoral guarantees in various regions.

However the violence against the UP continued. In early February, Fidel Castaño’s paramilitary group kidnapped more than 50 UP members, nine of the bodies were found days later. Later in the month two UP councilmen (in Norte de Santander and Cauca) and UP Mayor of Apartadó Dana Cardona were assassinated. Although facing a climate of fear in these regions, UP members in Meta accepted the guarantees
offered by military officers and handed in a list of gunmen operating in the county. But, the violence in Urabá escalated further. On 1 March 1990, the Unguía Massacre took place. In despair, because of the impossibility of halting the assassination of UP members and as a reaction to Barco’s claim that the assassination of UP leaders was a tactic of the party itself, Jaramillo gave an interview to the Spanish newspaper *La Vanguardia* in which he stated that Colombia had the most imperfect democracy of the Americas and that President Barco had been compliant with the extermination campaign against the UP: “either Barco is an imbecile, and he does not really know what is going on in Colombia, or he is accomplice to what has happened in the last four years” (Escorcia 1990: 6A).

The regional extermination campaigns against the UP were mirrored in the elections of March 1990 in which the UP lost six seats in Parliament. Nevertheless, Jaramillo’s renovation discourse identified internal problems as another cause of the UP’s defeat. According to him, the poor results in Bogotá, Huila and Valle were the result of the political and organisational limitations of the party, whereas in Meta, Córdoba and Santander the results were the product of the dirty war. As a consequence of the poor results and Jaramillo’s critique, members of the UPNB started challenging further the PC’s orthodoxy which still maintained a ‘revolutionary myth’. Rojas Puyo therefore argued that the time had come to “start a process of integration with all the leftist groups in a new party propelling a democratic and humanist socialism” (Murcia 1990b: 5A).

While the UP and the PC were clashing internally, and National Board members were defending the new democratic project legitimated few months before by Barco, Minister Lemos reinstated the FARC-UP script.

I think there is a link between FARC and UP. This link has always been there. See Braulio Herrera, a FARC member elected as UP MP that goes back to FARC … how strong or weak is this link? It is for the UP to answer … [by] condemning FARC’s actions… as long as such a declaration is not made, I will recur to the evidence (El Espectador 1990f: 11A).

Although Jaramillo’s interviews underscored the fact that UP assassinations were legitimated by the recreation of the link UP-FARC, sectors of the government and Colombian society had continued circulating the UP-FARC script. That the
extermination campaigns against the UP went beyond its actual link with FARC was corroborated on 22 March when Jaramillo was assassinated, just after giving an interview in which he stated:

People still link us with FARC. We have agreements on different issues, about democracy and peace, but disagreements when they attack civilians. It is one thing to have agreements on some issues and another is to be at their service (El Espectador 1990i: 8A).

Jaramillo’s assassination was, according to a heading of El Espectador (1990e: 12A), “the 1385th UP member to have been killed in four years of extermination”. The mass killings were central in the material expression of the radicalised antipathy towards the UP. The reaction from the National Trade Union (CUT) and other social movements and public institutions was to call for a 48-hour national strike, while the UPNB demanded Minister Lemos be discharged. Jaramillo’s murder deepened the political turmoil within the UP. PC orthodox members saw Jaramillo’s assassination as demonstration of the need to continue supporting the armed struggle, whereas the UPNB reformist members –labelled as ‘Jaramillists’– saw it as showing the need to reinforce condemnation of any use of violence. Although the dispute to control the UPNB ended in April 1990 when most Jaramillists had withdrawn from the UP and PC members had taken the presidency, what was at stake in such a dispute was not only a political line but the very survival of the people associated with the UP. Indeed many people left the UP to avoid assassination, yet it would be remiss to disregard the role that political differences played among some national, regional and local leaders who decided to withdraw from the party –as the cases of Montaña, Garzón, and others exemplify8– carrying on their resistance by joining forces with the M-19 in the newly created leftist coalition AD-M19 (Archila 2005: 296).

Throughout 1989, the PC and the UP showed themselves as different others but part of the same collective self. This was closely related to the crisis of communism, which brought a bitter debate between reformist and orthodox communists around the world. While the UP’s new leadership followed the reformist trend and decided to step up criticism of the guerrillas and to support some official narratives, the PC

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8 In personal interviews with this author (June, 2009) UP members in Pasto said they left the party because of the disagreements with PC politics at the national level.
constantly recriminated the lack of willingness of the establishment to halt the violence. The UP’s move influenced Barco narratives for a short while: recognising the stigmatisation and violence suffered by the UP. As violence increased, the UP resorted to PC narratives circulating antipathy towards the military and some sectors of the Barco administration. Since, after the broadening of the dirty war, Barco conveniently submitted to US pressure by portraying drug traffickers as the source of Colombia’s tragedy, the UP distanced further from the administration and focused on circulating proofs of army-drug traffickers alliances. This resulted in a further escalation of violence. This time, however, due to the polarised relationship between the administration and the UP, Barco blamed the violence on the UP and the UP blamed him for the extermination campaign. Although the UP had resorted to the PC narratives, it was not willing to uncritically support the armed struggle; the cost of this was further internal debate. Seeking to benefit from it, the Barco administration recycled the armed proselytism script and this, instead of immediately deepening the division, furthered violence. In this context various leaders left the party, demonstrating that the grammars of identity/alterity within the UP were not decided by the undergoing transformation in the geopolitics of communism but mainly by the genocidal violence. However, as the next section shows, the grammars of identity/alterity continued to be a space of contestation for at least another year.

*Post-traumatic months: in re-search of a self (1990 – 1991)*

The bulk of the members that remained in the UP were peasants in peripheral regions of Colombia and PC leaders in urban areas. Although violence had already targeted UP’s strongholds in Meta, Urabá and Arauca, UP activists stayed in the party because, contrary to the turmoil taking place in the UPNB, UP membership was almost the only possible expression of social mobilisation. Furthermore, as the UPNB between April 1990 and November 1991 was mainly constituted of PC members and affirmed to be defending “the political ideals of Pardo and Jaramillo” (El Espectador 1990g: 11A), people in peripheries carried on their activism within the UP.

Despite the UP’s withdrawal from the presidential contest, violence against the remaining UP members did not stop. UP President Oscar Dueñas announced in June 1990 that he had survived 3 assassination attempts since April (El Espectador 1990h:
12A). Furthermore, in regions such as Urabá, where FARC were still a powerful military actor, assassination campaigns against the UP continued; such campaigns had a complex connection with the armed conflict and the consolidation of a ‘peace mentality’ that had resulted in ‘regional dialogues’ between guerrilla groups and local governments –regional dialogues had been taking place since 1988, when massacres and assassinations against UP members skyrocketed.⁹

The results of the 1990 presidential polls gave some hopes of renovation in Colombian politics. In this context, and because President César Gaviria (1990-1994) did not completely close the door for peace talks with the larger guerrilla groups, UP members in FARC strongholds continued campaigning for peace and in some cases publicly legitimating the armed struggle.¹⁰ Paradoxically, in November 1990, Gaviria and the UPNB met to clarify a disclosed security forces report which attested that the UP had received orders by the FARC to infiltrate militants into official positions (Murcia 1990a: 5A). As a result, the UP received authorisation to visit FARC headquarters. The army’s surprising military engagement against FARC Secretariat, at the time of the meeting reinforced the UP’s distrust of Gaviria’s policy regarding peace talks with the Coordinadora National Guerrillera (CNG).¹¹ In fact, its ambiguity lasted almost until 1994; as such, the army’s attack on Casa Verde in December 1990 was only the beginning of the ‘integral war’ that took away the belligerent character of FARC (Orozco 2006). Gaviria’s integral war did not weaken the FARC, but contributed to continue targeting of the UP, which the perpetrators still scripted as FARC –not only because of its geographical closeness to FARC strongholds and their campaigning for human rights and peace talks, but also because of the PC’s opposition to openly criticizing the combination of all forms of struggle. What made

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⁹ For an analysis of the evolution of the movement for peace in Colombia see Garcia-Duran (2006).
¹⁰ The complexity of the relationship between peasants and armed groups, in which the former support the latter but are not actually soldiers, has been recently studied for the Salvadorian case under what Elizabeth Wood (2003) suggestively calls ‘insurgent campesinos’. Similarly, in the case studied here UP members and sympathizers, who were not FARC members, recognised the validity of the armed struggle. This should be analysed as part of a broader trend; for instance, according to a former human rights activist (working as a consultant for an international agency) interviewed by Tate “The leaders of the local committees quickly learned about denuncia… In the foros, they gave really fiery speeches. There was nothing propositivo, nothing. Some would go so far as to give speeches in favour of the armed actors” (2007: 95).
¹¹ CNG was an umbrella organization created between the FARC and ELN in the early 1990s to carry out negotiations with the Gaviria administration. There were two rounds of negotiations in Caracas and Tlaxcala, but the peace process broke down and the CNG disintegrated (see García-Durán 1992).
the integral war more dangerous for the UP was that it was connected with a ‘new’ counterinsurgency strategy supported by the CIA and the Pentagon (see chapter 5).

Although many communist parties were revisiting the maxims of cold war communism, the PC continued for quite some time avoiding the reassessment of Soviet communist dogmas. This, however, did not impede the PC building electoral alliances with democratic sectors within the UP platform. The UP’s close relationship with human rights organisations brought respected human rights defender Alfredo Vázquez Carrisoza into the political formula for the elections of the National Constitution Assembly that was to draft the 1991 Constitution. However, a diminished UP only succeeded in getting two members elected. During the sessions of the Assembly, UP members asked the plenum to create a commission to investigate political crimes in Colombia, which according to their statistics had, during the first two months of 1991, reached 50 UP assassinations. Entire families continued to be targets of violence, exemplified by the massacre of Rosalba Camacho’s family –UP councilwoman for Prado (Tolima) whom together with her husband and 5 children were killed by a paramilitary group (El Espectador 1990a: 10A). The appeal to the Assembly was a last resort after publicly stating:

our denouncements and demands of guarantees have never been met. The investigations hardly started. And they never concluded. We live in the kingdom of impunity. The mechanisms to protect our lives are everyday more precarious… In this context, the government shows the incapacity or its lack of interest in protecting the UP leaders’ lives. This has meant the reactivation of the dirty war… We demand to be allowed to live and demand to tell the country the truth about the extermination of the UP (El Espectador 1990d: 5A).

The Assembly did not take on board the UP’s request, albeit some UP leaders agreed the New Constitution offered a renewed political system. Not everyone agreed with such a reading of history; this together with the poor results in the constitutional polls brought back the old debate between ‘democratic pluralism’ (Jaramillists) and ‘dogmatic communism’. Thus, a new confrontation developed within the framework of the XVI Congress of the PC in August 1991; as a result UP President Carlos Romero was excluded from the PCCC. Such a confrontation had internal effects, which recreated the division in the UPNB, resulting in the UP and PC running separately for the first time in the parliamentary elections of November 1991. It also
had external consequences because Minister of Government Humberto de la Calle reissued the UP-FARC script. This had negative consequences for the UP, not only because it contributed to re-ignition of massacres against the UP (El Espectador 1991a: 12A; 1991c: 12A); but also because the internal dispute was to be resolved in the parliamentary polls in favour of the PC, whose candidate was elected as MP, enabling the PC to claim victory over Jaramillists. Hence, by December 1991, when the Third National Congress of the UP met, the PCCC had expelled dissenters from the UPNB. Thereafter, the PC was to control the UPNB and, as such, play a dominant role in the grammars of identity/alterity informing self-identification of the UP. Therefore, in the years to follow, participant-interpreters and observer-interpreters alike saw genocidal campaigns against the UP as the product of close contact between PC and FARC. Moreover, as the early days of the post-cold war geopolitics informed Gaviria’s modernisation reforms, which were seeking to consolidate Colombia as a free-market democracy, official narratives interpreted the PC’s decision to stick to the communist orthodoxy as a demonstration that the UP could only push for outdated policies. Such narratives aided not only the criminalisation of UP politics but also the circulation of sympathy for the perpetrators, antipathy towards the UP and indifference for the genocidal targeting of UP strongholds.

_from the Communist Party’s dominance to the shadow UP National Board (1992 – 2002)_

By the time the UP elected a new national board with Aida Avella as president, there had been for quite some time narratives circulating that put most of the blame of the recent genocidal campaign against the UP on FARC. As the PC-FARC script had been reissued, the fantasy circulating was that the UP was targeting the UP. There might have been cases in which FARC’s military actions affected UP sympathizers but, certainly, they were isolated cases and not a policy of the Secretariat, as some micro- and macronarratives suggested. Another narrative linked the UP directly with urban cells of FARC; just as Mayor of Medellín Omar Flórez did (see El Espectador 1991b: 5A). Both macro- and micronarratives contributed to maintaining the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, and were used by US policy makers to define Colombia in foreign policy space (see chapter 5).
In June 1992 the second and third Caño Sibao massacres unleashed the last outbursts of violence which completed the diminishing of the UP in Meta. In this context, the Constitutional Court ordered People’s Ombudsman Jaime Córdoba Triviño to enquire “the actual development of the investigations regarding the disappearing, killing, and other crimes against UP members.” Córdoba committed himself to identify the “perpetrators of the genocide of the Unión Patriótica”, which had since its creation “experienced the annihilation of its most important leaders” by not “only one, but many perpetrators” (El Espectador 1992b: 5A). His report was released in October and not only became, as chapter 7 demonstrates, a central event in the transnational efforts carried out by UP President Avella, but also showed that the 1991 Constitution had created new mechanisms within the Colombian political system that could be used by UP members to seek the protection of the UP. Notwithstanding the fourth Caño Sibao Massacre and the assassination of UP President for Meta José Rodrigo García sealed the cleansing of UP political power in Meta, except for the UP Mayor of El Castillo, who left the town in January 1995 after various assassination attempts.

Throughout 1993, UP leaders’ assassinations continued. In November, Miller Chacón, who was documenting army officers’ involvement in violence against the UP, was killed. By then, according to UP figures, more than 2000 UP members had been murdered (El Espectador 1992a: 5A). However, the UP went on to participate in the 1994 electoral contests. Although the political campaigns were marked by similar levels of violence against UP candidates as in previous elections, the UP obtained a MP and various mayoralties in Urabá. Senator Manuel Cepeda was murdered on 10 August, a few days after President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) had come into office. Cepeda’s assassination consolidated the genocidal campaign aimed at wiping out the remnant UP national leaders. In 2009, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) condemned the Colombian government for complicity of army officers in his murder. Many UP national leaders were murdered the following years as part of the ‘Plan Golpe de Gracia’. UP Councilman Josué Giraldo was one of the many assassinated in 1996. By the late 1990s, few UP members, such as Hernán Motta and Aida Avella, had managed to escape death by going into exile.
The Plan Golpe de Gracia unfolded alongside another genocidal campaign in Urabá: Plan Retorno. This campaign was carried out between 1994 and 1996, taking the lives of more than 350 UP members—the bloodiest campaign to be carried out in an UP stronghold in the 1990s (REINICIAR 2006a). Puzzlingly, UP members thought Samper (because of his historic militancy on the left of the Liberal Party and amicable connection with leftist sectors) was to guarantee a safer environment for the UP than other administrations. However, as chapter 5 argues, the Clinton administration’s scripting of Colombia as a narcodemocracy during Samper’s presidency contributed to shape an inconsistent internal policy regarding the armed conflict, which resulted in the re-legalization of paramilitary groups, re-branded this time under the name of ‘Convivir’. Convivir units were part of the coalition for violence that carried out the Plan Retorno (see chapter 3).

Yet the Samper administration not only contributed to consolidation of sectors of the perpetrator bloc but its narratives also allowed for the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture to continue. In the climate of tension between US and Colombian administrations, Samper saw the indictment for the UP genocide before the IACHR as further weakening its position in US foreign policy space, therefore his administration argued that it had taken “measures to protect UP members’ lives” and as such it was “confident that the IACHR would not admit case No. 11227” (Cardona 1995). Indifference against the UP circulated upon this narrative. Thus political entrepreneurs, such as Governor of Antioquia Alvaro Uribe, prioritised the creation of Convivir in Urabá, aiding the consolidation of a regional coalition for violence that had as its target the UP, which in their view was not only challenging the traditional regional political structure but was also the socio-political network of FARC (see chapter 6).

During the Samper administration’s final months massacres against the UP in Urabá were complemented by various types of harassment, in particular by set-ups, such as judicial processes supported by faceless witnesses. Thus, public officers in Urabá were imprisoned because of apparently participating in massacres against Esperanza Paz y Libertad members (they were released years later because investigations proved they had not participated in such actions). In this context, PC members on behalf of the UP distributed a press release arguing that there were no
guarantees for ‘the Left’ to take part in the political contest because they were “equated to the guerrillas and drug trafficking” (El Espectador 1997a: 5A). This press release showed a shift in UP narratives. After the UP President Avella left the country, PC members started referring to UP-PC as separate entities again, to the extent that they talked of the genocide of UP and PC members. In this con-text, a broad Left collective self became the object of self-reference integrating both parts.

The Plan Golpe de Gracia continued targeting communist leaders throughout 1998. The United Self-defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) was at the core of the perpetrator bloc in this conjuncture. According to the PCCC, one of its commands was in Bogotá ready to kill PC General Secretary Jaime Caycedo and other PC leaders because paramilitary leaders saw the guerrillas “as the armed arm of the PC and the national secretary as the coordination board” (El Espectador 1998a: 7A). During the consolidation of the AUC in the early months of 1998, PC leaders stepped up their criticism of state policies vis-à-vis paramilitary groups and strongly opposed peace talks with paramilitary groups. While paramilitary narratives circulated antipathy towards the UP by describing them as civilian insurgents (see chapter 6), the UP narratives sought to depict paramilitary groups as the exclusive product of state policies, thus circulating antipathy towards the AUC (El Espectador 1998b: 7A).

UP narratives were to match incoming President Andrés Pastrana’s narratives (1998-2002). Pastrana, elected on the basis of his promise to bring to an end the armed conflict with the guerrillas, again illegalised Convivir and constantly presented his administration as fighting the AUC. Although Pastrana recurrently resorted to narratives that recognised the wrongdoings of previous administrations so as to maintain the peace talks with FARC, in practice army officers’ distrust for the peace process sided them with AUC blocs, which proliferated during Pastrana’s presidency (see chapter 4). History repeated itself: both Betancur and Pastrana administrations intended negotiated solutions but covert coalitions for violence, made up of the same security forces that they were meant to direct, carried out the assassination of civilians who were regarded as the socio-political network of the guerrilla groups. In both conjunctures the unwillingness of American administrations to support the peace processes –during the Clinton years, in particular, after the killing of three American indigenists by FARC– contributed to reinforcement of radicalised antipathy towards
civilian networks framing a constant battle against criminal communist insurgencies (see chapter 4).

This time, however, the target was not necessarily labelled as ‘UP’ but ‘the Left’. In fact, there were few people identifying themselves as UP by then. The extent of the genocide against the UP-PC, evident in the XVII Congress of the PC held in October 1998, meant that apart from Jaime Caycedo and two letters sent from exile by Avella and Motta no more than 70 people attended the first national communist congress in 6 years. But assassinations continued, as in the case of 72 year old Julio Poveda in February 1999. Parallel to this process, though, former UP members who had withdrawn from politics were carrying out their resistance struggle through human rights grassroots NGOs, working in former UP strongholds (see chapter 7).

The beginning of the Pastrana-FARC peace talks produced ambiguous interpretations by UP members and the media. During 1999, for example, some public statements of UP leaders seemed to suggest that the future of the UP was linked to developments of the peace process. *El Espectador* interpreted such statements as a demonstration that the UP was to become the political arm of FARC. In December, after FARC announced the creation of the Movimiento Bolivariano (MB), the UP called the Fourth National Congress, the first in 8 years, to which more than 400 people attended. The main topic for discussion during the event was what role the UP was to play in this new context. PC members argued that it should become again the political platform joining different leftist groups, such as the Frente Social y Político that was about to be launched by the CUT. However, at the time, the UP did not have the political structure to bring together other political actors. The narrative that supported such an idea was more the product of the PC’s imageries, which aimed at circulating sympathy among different leftist sectors so as for them to gather around an old political project.

In 2000, when FARC officially launched the MB, UP leader Jahel Quiroga and PC Secretary General Jaime Caycedo quickly moved to point out the difference between the UP and the MB. According to Quiroga,

The FARC has got the political and ideological control of the MB, this is the great difference with the UP, whose political platform was built in tandem with other social movements; another difference is that the UP continues to legally work for changes in the Colombian political system (Castrillón 2000).
Caycedo considered the MB an interesting experiment, joining most leftist forces under Bolivar’s heritage, and acknowledged that the MB’s political platform coincided with the UP’s and the PC’s ideals. He underscored, however, as Quiroga did, that the methods of doing politics were different, especially if it were taken into account that the FARC decided the MB was to be a secret political movement so as to avoid extermination. These efforts did not manage to stop the killings; in 2002 a few months before the Uribe administration (2002-2010) formally withdrew the legal recognition of the UP, UP Councilman for Arauca Octavio Sarmiento was assassinated.

The coming to power of Alvaro Uribe was traumatic for the UP. Not only was its legal recognition withdrawn, forcing the few UP members left to create a shadow UPNB, but violent patterns also intensified against the survivors during the first years of his administration. The geopolitical narratives of the war on terror, as chapter 5 shows, have fuelled antipathy towards civilian networks allegedly close to the hyperreal security threat posed by ‘narcoterrorist guerrillas’. This contrasts with Pastrana’s attitude; it has only been during the Pastrana administration that an amicable solution between the victims of the genocide of the UP and the Colombian government has been on the table. Chapter 7 discusses in detail the developments since 2002, suffice to say for now that the grammars of identity/alterity that circulated around the idea of the UP since its creation in 1985 have not disappeared. They have been transferred to the next generation, daughters and sons of the socio-political network once (self-)identified as UP.

Conclusion

The periodisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture presented above demonstrates that the grammars of identity/alterity upon which the idea of the UP was performed were not only determined by the official narratives put forward by the various administrations, but also by the genocidal campaigns. However, such campaigns and grammars were both influenced by geopolitical narratives, which shaped not only the perpetrators (and the involvement of important sectors of state-institutions) but also a fluid identity of genocide-victims (and their resistance
strategies). The junctures discussed here therefore mark important moments in the dynamic convergence of affective-dispositions and narratives. Because chapters 4 to 7 will con-textualise the destruction of the UP into the geopolitics of the second cold war and the post-cold war, this chapter laid the basis for mapping the links between the changing character of the UP and geopolitical narratives. By resorting to a soft concept of identity the chapter de-essentialised the UP and moved beyond the genocide script thereby exposing the complexity surrounding the UP grammars of identity. Accordingly, it identified five moments in the destruction of the UP.

From 1985 to early 1987, sympathy/antipathy circulated within the UP around the idea of demolishing FARC. During this first moment FARC and the PC, at the core of the political platform, sought to bring other sectors of Colombian society closer. Alliance building was part of the strategy to create sympathy between the UP and traditional parties’ democratic-progressives sectors. The relation with the other was structured in what Baumann (2004: 25) calls ‘an encompassing grammar’ through which the UP was displayed as a broad space for all Colombian people to participate. However, the narcoguerrillas script pushed by the Reagan administration and the violence it fuelled against disarmed FARC members and other sectors of the UP contributed to marginalising FARC from the UPNB. Thus, a collective self, bringing together different sectors started to be less cohesive.

In the second moment (1987-1989) UP narratives turned to highlight the distinction between the political platform and the guerrilla group. The UPNB continued nevertheless supporting the armed struggle. Assassinations and massacres reinforced the UP narratives that continued reproducing sympathy for FARC and incriminating high ranking officers as the headmasters of the extermination campaign. The aim was to break the indifference of broader sectors of Colombian society by reproducing antipathy towards the perpetrators. The lack of solidarity from Colombian social, political, and economic networks, informed by Barco’s blaming the guerrillas for the climate of violence in Colombia and drug traffickers for the violence against the UP, facilitated a gradual shift in the genocidal campaigns, which no longer targeted UP members but anyone identified as UP. The military rule in various regions of the country, which constantly resorted to the armed proselytism script circulated by political networks, solidified the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture;
thus massacres targeting the UP proliferated weakening the UP’s transnational efforts to halt the slaughter. In this context, an internal division—informing by the transformations in the communist bloc and concrete violent campaigns—brought about a grammar of ‘reverse mirror-imaging’ for structuring relations between different sectors within the UP. Thus, the reproduction of the collective self was based on a relative sympathy/antipathy tension between orthodoxs and revisionists.

During 1989 and 1990 the UPNB directly criticised the guerrillas’ armed struggle. In response, Barco’s narratives circulated sympathy for the UP. Although this brought both collective selves together for a short while, the continuation of violence in urban and rural settings reignited the UP recrimination of the administration. This together with UP narratives circulating antipathy towards drug traffickers and paramilitary groups made the UP the target of further violence. Barco’s myopic imaginary of paramilitary groups as unrelated to the armed forces and his submission to Bush senior’s counternarcotic policies fuelled some UP leaders’ incendiary rhetoric. Some members of both administrations met this by returning to the UP-FARC script. The UP’s ‘internal identity struggle’ was put aside until the second UP president was assassinated. This event not only deepened the internal division but also confirmed in the minds of many citizens that cutting the links with the UP was the only way for survival.

The UP’s internal turmoil, experienced from 1990 to 1992, was a fourth moment in which various sectors close to the PC attempted to continue Jaramillo’s idea of bringing non-communist sectors into the UP. This earned the UP a place in the drafting of the new constitution. However, poor results in the polls and the consolidation of narratives portraying a post-communist world of triumphant free-market capitalism re-ignited bitter divisions. The segmentary grammar of structuring the relationship between both parts resulted in the expulsion of most dissenters to the PC political line. This had a rather limited effect regionally because many people’s affiliation to the UP passed through the Communist Party. Moreover, regional coalitions for violence were a more dangerous ‘other’, because they were carrying out genocide. As the UP time-space inevitably intersected with FARC’s, the time-space framework of rural settings greatly differed from urban settings where UP

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12 This term refers to Baumann’s orientalizing grammar of identity (2004: 20).
13 See Baumann (2004: 21).
leaders could decide on a different basis whether to support the armed struggle or not. Gaviria’s ambiguous narratives enabled public circulation of regional dwellers’ sympathy for the armed struggle, because although a US-financed integral war against drug trafficking and guerrillas was waged, Gaviria did not close the door for peace talks with FARC.

For ten years (1992-2002), the PC dominated the UPNB. As alterity had been solved within, the UP grammar of identity/alterity turned in the next years exclusively against the alliance between the army and paramilitary groups, which were the core of the perpetrator bloc carrying out a twofold genocidal campaign. Colombian administrations, on the other hand, enabled the legal proliferation of paramilitary groups and produced narratives circulating indifference against the UP; such narratives were later recycled by the covert (para)military alliance to circulate antipathy towards what they saw as the socio-political networks supporting FARC. The re-issuing of the UP–FARC and the narcoguerrillas scripts reignited genocidal campaigns. As a result the UP’s regional power faded away. In this context, its legal recognition was withdrawn and Uribe narratives slowly started to obliviate the UP genocide. Against this, new generations have brought the history of the UP back into the contested grammars of identity/alterity upon which the Colombian fictive collective self is recreated.

Understanding these five moments during which the UP resisted and re-imagined itself vis-à-vis official narratives offers a glimpse into the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. However, to fully grasp its complexity there is a need to complement the analysis by studying the perpetrators’ interpretation of the UP, how such interpretation framed an antigrandammar of genocide which shaped the narratives of different actors and how such narratives were translated into genocidal campaigns against the UP. The next chapter turns to do so.
3 A TOPOLOGY OF A PERPETRATOR BLOC: A CRITICAL MAPPING OF GENOCIDISTS

The genocide script has not only essentialised victims, which, as chapter 2 demonstrates, are constituted through complex processes of social interaction, but also simplifies, as chapter 1 argues, the dynamics that materialise genocidists. Such a simplification is due to the dominant discourse of what Moses (2008) calls ‘the liberal theory of genocide’, which until recently focused on the kind of regimes that were more prone to commit genocide and hence highly relied on a hierarchical understanding of the perpetrators (see Harff and Gurr 1988; Harff 2003). This chapter challenges the traditional representation of the perpetrators in the genocide script, namely that non-democratic states are the perpetrators of genocide. By studying the perpetrators of the UP genocide, it problematises three common assumptions: (1) the centrality of the state as the perpetrator, (2) the portrayal of perpetrators as hierarchical actors/structures, and (3) the static character usually ascribed to the perpetrators. The chapter thus sets up the scene to con-textualise the complex dynamics bringing together various collective (non)violent actors into the post-détent geopolitics in the Western Hemisphere; in this con-text, such actors interpreted the emergence and consolidation of the UP through scripts that eventually structured an antigrand of genocide, which translated radicalised antipathy into genocidal practices. More generally, the chapter contributes to remedy some of the shortcomings of the study of the perpetrators of genocide, which, albeit less so, still suffers of the unwillingness of scholars to embark on an ethnographic or other form of field study of the genocidists. This is not meant to deny, however, that in recent years new research, in particular into the Rwandan genocide (Straus 2006) and currently into the Bosnian Genocide (Clark 2009), has started to address the issue; and that also Browning’s Ordinary Men triggered a whole new line of investigation, which has sought to understand the role of ordinary people in the perpetration of the Holocaust and other genocides (Szejnmann 2008). Nevertheless, as Clark contends, notwithstanding the existence of valuable perpetrator-focused research… overall the marginalization or neglect of perpetrators –specifically perpetrators of war crimes and genocide– is a broad phenomenon (2009: 422).
This chapter differs from Clark (and most of the recent perpetrator-literature) substantially in one point, that is, the central role that scholars ascribe to the state in the organisation of genocidists. Insofar as what one may call the ‘hierarchical syndrome’ is kept intact in genocide studies, the understanding of the variation over time of the significance and forms of vertical/horizontal organisation of genocidists is to remain obscure. To be sure, the claim is not that state agencies do not play a definitive role in genocide. In cases such as the Nazi genocide, for instance, a strong bureaucratic apparatus did so. However, as recent research shows, what brought different actors together was not so much the strong bureaucracy but the networks that linked multiple actors (with multiple interest) to a political project from which all benefited, either socially, economically, or politically (Feldman and Seibel 2005). Thus, quoting Christian Gerlach (2005: 17), “some dimensions of the problem of mass involvement in the Holocaust can hardly be understood if one does not take these beneficial effects into consideration.”

Yet to take the focus away from the state and pay attention to the networks and the polarisation of sympathy/antipathy upon which various actors converge, eventually consolidating a hard power that regulates the way they interact with ‘others’, calls for a radical reinterpretation of the typologies of genocidists. This poses important questions: if the state is not the cohesive force bringing a mass of perpetrators together, what then enables their alliances? Are economic, political, and social benefits sufficient to bridge group differences? Is national (ethnic) identity—the referent object that different groups seek to protect from ‘others’—what brings different groups with different interests together? But then, how do these groups deal with different ideas of the ‘same’ identity? And finally, how is their identity constructed (and reconstructed) during the perpetration of genocide?

Few genocide scholars have considered issues related to such questions; Gerlach summarises the reasons for this:

...genocide studies tend to focus on ethnic or racial issues instead of multi-causality, on the state instead of society, on long-term ‘intent,’ planning and centralization instead of a process and autonomous groups, on one victim group instead of many. Structural mechanisms of the genocide model work toward simplification and against contextualization (2006: 466).

The lack of contextualisation informs indeed the approach of genocide scholars who following (and reinforcing) the genocide script disregard questions associated with the multiplex identity of the perpetrators. Either because, along the line of Goldhagen’s (1996)
simplification of Nazi perpetrators as anti-Semitic Germans, they take for granted the identity of the perpetrators or because, in line with Browning’s (1998) psycho-sociological approach, they are more interested in answering why ordinary people commit genocide. Amongst the latter, debates usually spring from siding with personality or circumstances as the defining triggers for participating in genocide; what is at stake in these debates is the structure/agency dichotomy, which recently is resolved by arguing that is not one or the other but both (see Clark 2009: 430-438). However, Bloxham is categorical in stating that

The very evidence of mass participation in most genocides shows that the context is generally more important than the disposition and beliefs of the individual perpetrator, since in the ‘right’ situation so many people of demonstrably different characters and values participate (2008: 187).

Bloxham’s call for a focus on contexts opposes psychological approaches that seek to unveil the innate (individual) affects informing the perpetrators of genocide. However, the post-structuralist approach followed here aims to map the circulation of affective-dispositions informing the participation and collaboration of multiple actors in genocidal campaigns. In exploring the context-affect nexus this chapter shows that alongside the crystallisation of a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, different perpetrators come together in alliances forming a bloc that deploys hard power against the social fabric of a civilian network they construe as a threat. Hence, in order to understand how a perpetrator bloc materialised, the chapter contextualises, that is, traces the fluid system of relations connecting actors not only within the perpetrator bloc but also sectors of the perpetrator bloc with broader transnational networks. As such a system comes into being through the circulation of narratives (and affective-dispositions), the argument underlying the chapter is that in the geopolitical con-text of the second cold war, a genocidal conjuncture crystallised enabling multiple actors to gather in a perpetrator bloc against the UP.

The focus on con-text suggests the need to understand the links between the various perpetrators of genocide. Moreover, by proposing a flexible understanding of the relationship between different geopolitical con-texts and the many ways in which various perpetrators come together, the term ‘perpetrator bloc’ challenges the state-centrism prevailing in the genocide script. To be sure, state agencies are always cliques within the perpetrator blocs; however, the intensity, directedness and connectedness with other cliques and clusters always vary. More importantly, the links between various cliques and clusters are not contained
within the artificial boundaries of nation states. Rather they cut across different polities. This chapter thus shows that the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide surpassed Colombia’s domestic politics and international borders.

The perpetrator bloc conceptually shares many similarities with Gerlach’s (2006) ‘coalitions for violence.’ First, both see perpetrators as dynamic actors and recognise alterity within the very institutions that are part of the alliances. Second, both recognise that a multiplicity of motives bring different social forces with diverse interest for violence together. Third, both expose the connections between hands-on perpetrators and broader social, political, and military networks. The main difference is that, perpetrator blocs are understood here as the genocidal materialisation of ‘transnational hegemonic blocs’ that in an attempt to deal with contingency allow the free flowing of antigrammars of genocide.¹ The emphasis that Gerlach places on individual’s decision to join the coalitions, enables one to argue that a perpetrator bloc encompasses various coalitions for violence which materialise clusters and cliques of the perpetrator bloc regionally.

This chapter maps the relations between collective violent actors, government officials, state enforcement agencies, political entrepreneurs, big land owners, and other sectors of society. No doubt various state-institutions and bureaucrats played important roles throughout the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Yet the chapter shows that in processes of privatisation of violence, paramilitary groups and other collective violent actors consolidate enough coercive power enabling them to autonomously commit genocidal acts against civilians. The chapter is divided into five parts. First, it shows how during the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture the army played a leading role in the constitution of the perpetrator bloc. Second, it analyses the processes through which violence entrepreneurs took an important role in solidifying the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Third, it argues that because of the tension between the UP’s sympathy networks and anti-UP networks within the state apparatus new dynamics emerged within the perpetrator bloc; this deepened contradictions between the different actors thus bringing about transformations in the bloc’s structure. The last two parts look into the different shapes of the perpetrator bloc since 1990; despite vertical-hierarchical structures were part of most sectors of the perpetrator bloc, these sections show that horizontal relations constituted the top-end interactions between multiple leaders who were part of an ever-changing acephalus network of genocidal violence.

¹ Robinson and Harries (2000) use the concept of transnational hegemonic bloc to link discursive and nondiscursive practices allowing for the production of a global ruling class.
In contrast to the extensive literature on the Colombian armed conflict, this chapter unveils the links of various actors in the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide. Therefore, two caveats related to the ongoing narrative-clash for and against referring to the destruction of the UP as genocide should be noted. Firstly, perpetrators assert that the violence did not target the UP; they claim that the murders aimed at FARC. Secondly, military officers have been acquitted of the crimes charged. Although the prosecution of paramilitary leaders in public hearings has advanced the understanding of the genocidists, future ethnographies could contribute to map the micro-processes of genocidal practices in peripheral regions and the convergence of various coalitions for violence into the perpetrator bloc. For now, the chapter’s contribution is to analyse critically the data collected through semi-structured interviews, a newspaper review of national media and secondary sources.

The armed forces’ targeting of communists: the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture (1980 – 1987)

The unintended constitution of the perpetrator bloc was the product of the intended targeting of communists, which had started before the creation of the UP. From the late 1970s to 1987, a military gaze dominated by a strong anticommunism meant that the army not only directly targeted communists but also contributed to polarise broader legal and illegal networks, which slowly gathered together eventually singling out the UP for destruction. The army had intensified harassment against communism during the Turbay Administration (1978-1982), when the NSD was implemented in earnest. By 1983, some army generals’ and Minister of Defence’s anti-communist public statements demonstrated that the NSD was informing the military gaze, which opposed President Belisario Betancur’s (1982-1986) peace policy. The NSD had also helped to amalgamate different sectors of Colombian society in order to fight (international) communism. The alliance between drug traffickers and some army officers was exposed by Attorney General Carlos Jiménez Gomez in February 1983, when he named 59 army officers who were part of Death to Kidnappers (MAS), the largest illegal private army at the time (see Ramírez and Restrepo 1988). Although drug traffickers had created the MAS, its tactics matched the NSD. This was linked with the production of secret contra-guerrilla manuals. According to UP member Manuel Cepeda, Army Document 1689 of 1981 allowed for the organisation of ‘Self-defence groups’ (1986: v-vi). The success of the NSD meant that the early stages in the continuum of violence against PC and UP members took
place in the midst of the militarisation of Colombian national elites. Twenty-odd years of armed conflict allowed the military organisation and its values to influence Colombia’s social structure; because paraphrasing Shaw “in… periods of intense war-preparation… the logic of war… become[s] the driving force of social change” (1991: 20).

Traditionally the armed forces and the civilian government were considered as two different spheres in Colombia’s political system. This division had been promoted in the late 1950s by President Alberto Lleras Carmargo (1958-1962) and became a civil doctrine on military affairs thereafter (see chapter 4). As a result of the ‘civilian government-armed forces separation’, army members had, by the 1980s, embraced an esprit de corps, which prevented high rank officers to recognise the gravity of some members’ excesses and misconducts within the framework of the armed conflict (Cubides 2005: 92). The polarisation of sympathy amongst army officers reinforced antipathy towards communism, which was construed as a dangerous ‘other’ –resembling the dominant narratives of the cold war. This circulation of affective-dispositions, which shaped the frames to interpret reality, not only explains why the Military Penal Justice System acquitted the aforementioned 59 army officers, but also the lack of flexibility within the armed forces to revaluate the traditional framing of the armed conflict once the peace process with the guerrillas started. The military gaze was to prevail over the Betancur administration’s peace policy.

At first glance, the Colombian experience seems to entail a triple paradox for the process of militarisation materialised during (1) the peace process between Betancur and various guerrilla groups, at a time when (2) European militarism was being dismantled, and (3) while the demilitarisation in the Southern Cone was taking place. Chapter 4 deals with the latter by discussing the role of the liberal western hemispheric military network in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within which the destruction of the UP unfolded. Suffice to say for now that UP members saw a close link between militarism and US foreign policy; hence, the process of militarisation in Colombia was seen as the continuation of the war against Soviet imperialism started in the Southern Cone (see Cepeda 1986). This representation, part of the UP anti-geopolitics, was backed up by other narratives circulating in broader sectors of Colombia’s political networks, as Liberal Senator Iván Marulanda’s (1987) statements demonstrate:

The Armed Forces... are an active body in the anti-communist enterprise… This is so, to great extent, due to the influence of international propaganda and their training by international anti-
communist institutions. And because the Armed Forces have found support in the structure of the country’s economic power, which share the anticommunist enterprise and see in it a way to defend its properties and economic and social position.

Throughout the 1980s, a considerable number of Colombian army officers were trained at the SOA, a US military institution spreading counterinsurgency as part of the geopolitical struggle against communism (Gill 2004). High-ranking officers trained at SOA went back to Colombia to fight communism and because of their radicalised antipathy also disseminated the anticommunist hatred among socio-economic elites. The military’s privileged position in influencing traditional Colombian social-political networks enabled them to circulate narratives that copied the anticommunist script learnt in US training schools thus mobilising antipathy towards the civilian social networks challenging the traditional political system. The interaction between military and socio-political networks shows that military tactics sought to halt the expansion of “Soviet imperialism”, which according to Gen. Fernando Landazábal “was a new form of colonialism administered by Cuba in the Western Hemisphere” (1980: 138); but such interaction also aimed to ‘appease’ Colombian society by adopting the tactics of the Argentinean Military Junta.² Marulanda’s words are again telling in this regard:

in Medellin, for some years now, army officers organize meetings with Antioquia’s businessmen and socio-economic elites, so as to show propaganda in which they seek to demonstrate that the country is on the brink of a revolution and the takeover of power by the Communist Party… Civilians wearing military uniforms also participate in these meetings… large companies’ directors wearing military uniforms stand up and give a military salute to the army officers who organize and lead the meeting. This is a campaign… to create a particular psychological state of mind: an anti-communist paranoia and a fanatism of socio-economic elites that allows for the use of violence against whom they consider to be part of the communist threat.

The paradoxical relationship between the weak peace process and the rapid militarisation of national elites –both reinforced by the geopolitical narratives circulated as part of US military and political networks’ anticommunism (see chapters 4 and 5)– was one the contexts which converged to crystallise the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. In fact, the precarious peace process allowed for two ambiguous reactions. On the one hand, some social groups supported it; they saw it as a momentum for change in Colombian politics. On the other hand, other groups opposed it; they saw it as the breakdown of Colombian institutions.

² Attorney General Jiménez Gómez deemed necessary to prosecute military officers in order to avoid the ‘Argentinization’ of the country (El Espectador 1986f: 1A).
Amongst the latter, military sectors feared Colombia was to become the next Nicaragua; national socio-economic elites and rightwing political entrepreneurs, who advocated for the militarisation of politics, shared their fear. In a battle against Soviet imperialism in the midst of social unrest, ‘FARC’s political platform’ became the enemy embodying politicians and military’s fears. They amalgamated in a rather small ‘coalition for violence’ against those pushing for social change. The target of PC and UP members under, what Cepeda (1986) named, the ‘Plan Cóndor’ was the central part of the unveiling ‘dirty war’.

According to Cepeda’s account, the Plan Cóndor started shortly after the UP was launched in May 1985 and went on until late 1986. It was carried out in three phases. First, it started with the selective assassinations of trade unions’ communist leaders and the terrorist targeting of UP-PC headquarters. Then, violence spread to peasant regions, in particular targeting UP strongholds for the forthcoming elections. Finally, once UP members took public offices on 20 July 1986 they became the main target. By December 1986, three UP MPs were amongst the 300 UP-PC members murdered in the unfolding of a plan that sought to weaken the structure of the UPNB (Cepeda 1986: vi-xii). The first two stages of Plan Cóndor were, according to UP Senator Braulio Herrera, aimed at FARC and UP leaders; this sought to “prevent the extension of the truce agreement with the government” (El Espectador 1986h: 3). The last stage developed into the ‘Plan Baile Rojo’, which attempted to assassinate and kidnap UP leaders elected to public offices (Cepeda 2006).

The Plan Baile Rojo evolved beyond a military plan of the Colombian army. Rather, it was shaped by a complex process of paramilitarisation unfolding in various regions where the army was weaker due to the poor military build-up to face the growing challenge posed by the guerrillas. Regional elites’ previous pacts with guerrilla groups were dismantled by incorporating them into the counterinsurgency warfare (see Medina 1990). Such enterprise was the cornerstone of the NSD: regional elites were needed to fight against the ‘internal enemy’ –a script borrowed from the geopolitics of the second cold war which blurred the distinction between social movements, leftist political parties, guerrilla groups, and communism. Such a script brought together regional elites and shifted the military’s target from guerrilla groups to civilians.

To counterbalance the spread of the communist ideology in the Middle Magdalena Valley Generals Daniel García Echeverri and Faruk Yanine Diaz focused the military strategy on ‘winning the hearts and minds of the population’ (Ibid.: 162-3). The success of the strategy
was to be measured by two interdependent variables: (1) the supply of information regarding guerrillas’ tactics and organisational structures and (2) the creation of ‘self-defence’ groups ready to ‘protect’ Colombia’s traditional institutions. The latter was a central part of contra-guerrilla manuals which induced regional elites to collaborate with paramilitary groups. In this context, those sectors of the population identified as ‘allies’ of the guerrillas, namely communists, were trapped in the midst of the flowing of information for military intelligence and an unfolding process of privatisation of violence.

The proliferation of paramilitary groups and the implementation of the NSD played a central role in the cleansing of communists in the Middle Magdalena Valley. In this region the selective assassination of political leaders and the cleansing of guerrilla-controlled areas were carried out by an alliance of military officers and so-called ‘self-defence’ groups. At this stage, economic elites (cattle ranchers and big landowners), such as Henry Perez, had taken on board the army’s doctrine of self-defence, leading the arming of peasants in order to fight the FARC. The same process was replicated in other regions; hence paramilitary groups mushroomed in nearby counties. The foregoing reinforced the decision made by some farmers to organise self-defence groups to face the increasing practice of kidnapping for ransom (see Rubio 2008). In this context, some traditional political entrepreneurs also decided to promote the constitution of self-defence groups as a response to the challenge posed by the democratization process started by Betancur which had allowed the UP to get hold of various mayoralties across the country (Carroll 2000).

The process of (para)militarisation reinforced rightwing regional and national elites’ power; thus they managed to protect their interests. The military, which had a weak coercive power in some regions, played different cards at regional and national levels with the same goal in mind: defeating communism. Therefore, Minister of Defence Gen. Rafael Samudio publicly supported the unfolding process of privatisation of violence and in some cases legitimated violence against the UP. Although the military and rightwing political and socio-economic elites were the driving forces behind the violence against the UP in the early and mid 1980s, the alliance of some of them with drug traffickers was to be central in the assassinations of UP members under the Plan Baile Rojo. The alliances spread throughout various regions because of the unwillingness of the Military Penal Justice System to prosecute the officials involved. It was feared that otherwise the ‘enemy within’ would have been strengthened and the unity within the military institution weakened.
In 1981, drug traffickers, enriched by the access to the US cocaine market and advised by US officials (see chapter 6), created the MAS. Its aim was to kill guerrilla members, or capture them and hand them over to enforcement agencies, in order to force the return of their kidnapped relatives and to protect their social network from kidnapping. The MAS cleansed the Antioquia County of some guerrilla groups, prompting other drug traffickers to create their own gangs in other regions (López 2007a: 418). This episode converged into the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture for it circulated an antigrand of genocide that framed a new way to deal with the guerrillas. Furthermore, it enabled drug traffickers to build up violent groups which became part of coalitions for violence of the perpetrator bloc. Such was the case of Fidel Castaño who consolidated between 1982 and 1987 a standing army in Northern Antioquia and Córdoba known as Death to North-eastern Revolutionaries (MRN). The proliferation of these private armies was facilitated by Colombian elites’ and the Betancur administration’s complacency with drug traffickers’ socio-economic expansion. However, after Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla’s assassination in 1984, Betancur decided to crack down on drug trafficking. The extradition of nationals to the US thus became a central policy of Betancur’s war on drugs. This helped to solidify the drug traffickers’ militarisation because fighting the state meant better training and equipment in order to succeed.

Yet the conflictive relation between the Betancur administration and drug traffickers was resolved at the regional level, where drug traffickers’ private armies created alliances with the army and self-defence and paramilitary groups in order to secure economic and military gains. Drug traffickers’ economic investment in the Middle Magdalena Valley gave them social legitimacy amongst landowners and army officers. This reinforced the armed solution adopted by socio-economic elites to oppose FARC and the contra-guerrillas tactics implemented by the army (Rementería 2007: 350). Thus, drug traffickers’ militarisation proved to be more fatal for the UP than to the establishment: drug traffickers had found in the army and economic elites new allies to win the dispute for land control with FARC. In late 1987, when the FARC-Barco peace talks broke down, this coalition for violence committed the assassination of the first UP President and new violent practices emerged against the UP. Although the UP had named army officers and policemen involved in more than 400 assassinations no perpetrator had been brought to justice (El Espectador 1987g: 12A). The impunity surrounding UP murders; the shoulder-shrugging indifference of broader social
networks which, as chapter 5 shows, was reinforced by the circulation of scripts amongst US and Colombian political networks; and the consolidation of transnational criminal networks that was under way, opened up the path for the massacres that were to follow.

The genocidal geopolitical conjuncture crystallised during the transition from Plan Cóndor to Plan Baile Rojo, but it solidified through the proliferation of massacres. This signalled a metamorphosis of the perpetrator bloc: narco-paramilitary groups consolidated a powerful position in leading the genocidal campaign. The proliferation of massacres also meant a new phase in the destruction of the UP for remaining regional socio-economic networks supporting the UP became the target of destruction. The shifting point between the crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal conjuncture was connected with geopolitical narratives: the anticommunism of the second cold war materialised in the plans that aimed at the internal enemy. SOA graduates recreated the ‘internal enemy’ script circulated in their military training, therefore military cadres ended up seeing drug traffickers as partners to protect a fictive Colombian self from Soviet imperialism. Thus, a hyperreal sympathy started to bring together legal/illegal private/official security forces. The rightwing interpretation that Betancur had nourished the communist threat by holding peace talks with FARC had put in place regional coalitions for violence that circulated a radicalised antipathy towards the unfolding socio-political power of the UP.


By the mid 1980s, some paramilitary and self-defence groups had teamed up with the drug traffickers’ private armies in the Middle Magdalena Valley. A financial crisis within the political structure of the self-defence groups and the increasing wealth of drug traffickers, such as Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and Pablo Escobar, contributed to merge a mutually convenient alliance. The leading role of drug traffickers meant the modernisation of weaponry and the transnationalisation of the private armies training methods (Gutiérrez and Barón 2007: 290). Thus, from 1987 to 1989, the coalitions for violence of drug traffickers and violence entrepreneurs materialised in powerful paramilitary groups cutting across various regions. The intensity, directedness and connectedness of the relationship between paramilitary groups and the security forces (in particular the army and the police) increased due to a polarised political economy of affective-dispositions, based on the circulation of a
hyperreal sympathy amongst the perpetrators and a radicalised antipathy towards the UP. A perpetrator bloc, empowered by the monies of drug traffickers, thus shaped the geography of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture: only in those regions where paramilitary groups did not take root, the violent campaign of the army did not escalate into genocidal violence. However, by 1988, the increasing power of drug traffickers brought about disagreements that started weakening the connectedness between security forces and paramilitary groups, thereby transforming the geography of the genocide and the structure of the perpetrator bloc.

Private armies’ violent practices against the UP changed along with the transformations in the perpetrator bloc. Fidel Castaño’s MRN paramilitary group exemplifies it so clearly. While the group was emerging scattered violent actions selectively targeted trade unionists, by late 1986 however the group intensified and systematised the killing of trade unionists involved in labour negotiations within the Banana Industry in Urabá. The important role the UP played in such negotiations allowed for the MRN to represent all of Sintrabananano union members as UP-FARC (El Espectador 1987i: 14). Thus, paramilitaries and army officers equated the assassinations of trade union members to UP-FARC’s assassinations. This would explain why, according government statistics, 51 out of 55 political murders were UP members (Bejarano 1988). Nevertheless, MRN’s violence against UP members was not restricted to Urabá. In 1987, the group had already committed more than 50 assassinations in Remedios and Segovia (El Espectador 1987h: 16A). Since Remedios and Segovia were UP strongholds, the violence was directly linked with the UP’s political success (López 2007b: 136).

The viciousness of Castaño’s actions was to be demonstrated in the massacres that followed after November 1987. These massacres also evidenced the deployment of sophisticated methods of military planning which were related to Castaño’s and some of his subordinates’ participation in transnational training courses run by international mercenaries, such as Yair Klein. The JUCO massacre was the first of many massacres carried out by the Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Nacional Socialista –a command of the MRN (El Espectador 1988e: 1A). The lack of response of the Colombian government, the passiveness, and in most cases complicity, of police and military officers allowed Castaño’s to replicate similar massacres throughout 1988.4

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3 Trade unions signed a framework agreement with the government, which was to a great extent the result of the UP’s and the Frente Popular’s joint efforts (see REINICIAR 2006a).
4 Bejarano (1988) shows that businessmen supported by drug traffickers and military and civilian authorities (the Voltígeros Battalion in particular) aimed at those seen as linking guerrilla groups and trade unions. The
Fidel Castaño’s anticommunism stemmed from his father’s assassination by the FARC. Castaño’s antipathy informed the process of building up his private army. He circulated a radicalised grammar of identity/alterity that represented the UP as dangerous other (undistinguishable from FARC). This enabled Castaño to cultivate a solidarity-bond with Middle Magdalena Valley anticommunist leader and deputy Pablo Guarín and drug traffickers. In Córdoba, for example, he teamed up with drug trafficker César Cure so as to ‘clean up’ the region from communists. As a result, more than 50 UP militants were murdered in the first four months of 1988 –most of the bodies were dumped into the Sinú River. However, Castaño’s anticommunist actions in Córdoba were not an isolated private campaign against communism; the assassination of UP councilman Alfonso Cujavante and the Mejor Esquina Massacre coincided with the creation of the XI Brigade of the Army (see Romero 2003: 142). Indeed, according to the 1988 AI report, the systematic extermination of UP members, local leaders and human rights defenders seemed to show that death squads were operating under the authority of high rank army officers (El Espectador 1988a: 1A).

By 1989 it was clear that Castaño’s grudge with the UP had no limits. Pablo Escobar had made it clear in an interview with UP member Alvaro Salazar (Dudley 2004: 144). It was such the scale of UP assassinations ordered by Castaño that “one of the nicknames Escobar gave Fidel was ‘2000’, for the number of UP members he’d allegedly killed” (Ibid.: 149-50). Albeit the unreliability of Escobar’s statements (because of the conflictive relationship between kingpins); the massacres, assassinations and displacement in Castaño’s controlled regions account for a very large number of UP victims during the crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture.

A similar process was developing in the Meta County where the Revolutionary Peasant Front (FRC) paramilitary group was carrying out assassinations of UP leaders. A flier distributed by the group in May 1987 in Villavicencio, after the assassination of three UP leaders, shows the circulation of antipathy that informed the systematic targeting of UP members in the region:

The FRC openly recognises that it will continue with the military campaign to wipe out the UP… As true contra-revolutionaries and as an independent self-defence organisation, we are forced to save our country of those unpatriotic people that only seek to destroy our already weakened democracy (El Espectador 1987i: 14).

massacres committed in early 1988 sought to destroy this link and to generate terror in the wider population (see chapter 2).
Such a narrative exemplifies how different cliques of the perpetrator bloc inscribed with hyperreality the grammars of identity/alterity in the region. Thus, they turned to an antigrammatical of destroying the UP in order to protect the fictive collective self that brought the perpetrators together: ‘a Colombian democracy-driven national identity’. Upon this imagery, outlaws, such as Gacha and Víctor Carranza (an emerald dealer and cattle rancher), legitimated the alliance that allowed them to control most death squads in Meta and to secure economic benefits. The consolidation of this paramilitary alliance and the narratives it (re)produced also reinforced the decision made by military officers and rightwing political elites to exterminate the UP. UP leader Josué Giraldo’s testimony is revealing in this regard:

In San Martín, in the Hacienda Maputa… Senator (L) Hernando Durán Dussán, Meta’s political entrepreneurs (L) Jorge Ariel Infante Leal and (C) Leovigildo Gutierrez, and other traditional politicians met, in late 1986, with the Commanders of the IV Division and the VII Brigade of the Army to decide the social and political extermination of the UP (Giraldo 1997: 255).

By 1987, the UP had been wiped out from San Martín, but the ‘clean up’ of Vista Hermosa followed. Between 1987 and 1988 more than 300 murders were perpetrated in Vista Hermosa and El Castillo; according to Giraldo, the extent of the slaughter was such that UP members were forced to create a self-defence group and to request protection from the FARC (Ibid.: 256). This developed into a war of positions between the UP-FARC’s allies and a regional coalition for violence of the perpetrator bloc in which UP members were the target. What is worth noting is that the targeting of UP members was part of the ‘Plan Esmeralda’, which aimed at wiping out the UP-PC’s influence in Caquetá and Meta, two of the counties in which the UP superseded the Liberal and Conservative parties in the 1988 municipal elections (Cepeda 2006). This in fact developed into a genocidal campaign characterised by a series of massacres and the establishment of death camps associated with Carranza’s paramilitary training schools.

The proliferation of paramilitary groups in Meta reached its peak in early 1989 when there were, according to DAS estimates, at least 12 paramilitary groups operating. DAS estimates contradicted the 1988 Human Rights Presidential Council Report, which contended that there was only one paramilitary group with various branches, one central command unit and many cells set up by army battalions. Yet, the fact is that the Carranza-Gacha alliance had spread the army officers’ and political entrepreneurs’ anticommunist campaign throughout the
county. In some cases the relationship was so close that, according to former paramilitary Camilo Zamora Guzmán’s declaration, VII and X Brigade army officers and policemen were at the same time paramilitary soldiers (ASFADDES et al. 2000: 200). Gacha and Carranza financed the constitution of a network of death squads in various municipalities, such as San Martín, Vista Hermosa, and Mesetas. Carranza also built up a powerful standing private army headquartered in Puerto Lopez; his soldiers were trained in a paramilitary-training site known as the ‘60’ school. Set up in the premises of Carranza’s Hacienda San Juan, the school was one of the spaces in which geopolitical scripts circulated amongst il(legal) and trans(national) actors legitimising the radicalisation of antipathy towards the UP (see chapter 6). The school was also a detention and torture centre that eventually developed into a death camp. El Espectador’s coverage of DAS Democracy Plan is significant in unveiling the genocidal practices:

between 80 and 100 people, most of them UP sympathisers would be buried in the Hacienda San Pablo. The school had been functioning for three years and since then not only hundreds of individuals had been trained there… but many victims had been buried in mass graves… The victims were kidnapped in different zones in the Meta County and then taken to the Hacienda… then they went through monstrous experiments, such as acid-burning and chopping-off fingers, arms, and legs before being shot death and their bodies threw into mass graves (El Espectador 1989i: 1A, 10A).

Mayor of Puerto López Ricardo Bravo Contreras’ attitude demonstrated the lack of ‘political will’ amongst regional elites to halt the slaughter, and their complicity, in many cases, with the genocidists. Because perpetrators widely publicised the persecution of UP members, it would have been almost impossible for the civil service not to notice the activities carried out in the hacienda. Even more so when Carranza had financed Bravo’s political campaign (ASFADDES et al. 2000: 200).

Although the consolidation of private armies in Meta, Córdoba and Urabá, Gacha’s financial contribution to the Middle Magdalena Valley Self-Defence Groups (AMMs) made it by far the most powerful army. The ‘profesionalisation’ of private armies demanded sophisticated training centres. Gacha’s hacienda ‘Las Galaxias’ became the Middle Magdalena Valley’s paramilitary training school. By 1988, the alliance between paramilitary
leader Henry Pérez and Gacha had materialised in a strong network of death squads,\(^5\) which became a regional private army capable of protecting the drug industry and fighting communism. In fact, between 1985 and 1987 former FARC member and paramilitary commander Alonso de Jesus Vaquero carried out the assassinations of hundreds of UP leaders in the Middle Magdalena Valley. Dudley’s account is telling about the most vicious practices of the genocidal campaign:

> The men gathered their prey, brought them to designated areas, and massacred them. They then frequently dismembered their victims… and removed the intestines in a process they called a *picalesco* or ‘glutting’. In this way, the corpses would sink to the bottom of the rivers, where no one would find them (2004: 66).

AMMs effectiveness in cleansing the region from communists prompted political entrepreneurs in other regions to hire their services. I have discussed elsewhere how, for instance, when Cesar Pérez saw threatened his political power by the UP in Segovia, he turned to the MRN and AMMs for help (Gomez-Suarez 2007: 641-2). However, Gacha’s alliance with political leaders was not free of conflict. This is demonstrated by his decision to order Guarín’s assassination in order to accommodate the AMMs to his interests. Such actions also confirmed that political elites and the military were no longer able to exercise the same influence over paramilitary activities.\(^6\) Therefore, after 1987, Gacha’s increasing power resulted in a rather instable alliance because self-defence leaders, such as Ramón Isaza,\(^7\) felt that their original interests were not been met (Gutiérrez and Barón 2007: 291).

In this context, the DAS started to chase Gacha’s AMMs. The first blow to the organisation occurred in April 1988 when DAS officers raided the headquarters of the Campesino Self-defence Force (CSF) paramilitary group. According to *El Espectador*, the documents confiscated demonstrated that Gacha was financing the CSF in order to protect his personal interests under a so-called war against communism. What is noteworthy to mention is that the CSF statutes claimed that (1) communism was to be annihilated, (2) that in the

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\(^5\) In the early 1980s, Henry Pérez established a contra-guerrilla group which also opposed drug trafficking, however, by 1985, a convenient alliance between Pérez and the Medellín DTOs started to grow (*El Espectador* 1989g: 10A).

\(^6\) The autonomy AMMs gained from the military did not bring about the army’s effort to pursue paramilitaries. On the contrary, according to a 1989 Attorney General report, the Army Brigade V and Division II overlooked AMMs’ activities in the region. Furthermore, according to dwellers’ accounts, the Del’huyer Battalion protected paramilitaries responsible for one of the largest mass graves in the region (*El Espectador* 1989h: 1A, 13A).

\(^7\) Isaza formed a self-defence group in 1979. He gathered landowners and farmers and requested help from the Battalion to start killing ‘the supporters of guerrilla groups’ in the Middle Magdalena Valley (*Duncan* 2006: 246-7).
controlled regions, country dwellers had to join the group, and (3) that the organisation had to be kept secret (El Espectador 1988c: 13A). Thereafter the DAS campaign against Gacha intensified. By late 1988, the Democracy Plan had been drawn and had started to be deployed against his paramilitary group. Moreover, a secret report had been issued uncovering the relationship between military officers and the AMMs (see chapter 2). However, the apogee of the DAS campaign occurred from January to December 1989. This matched up with the drug traffickers’ unfolding war on the Colombian establishment, which can arguably be seen as evolving from mid January (when the Rochela Massacre happened) and reaching its climax from August (when Galán was assassinated) to November (when DAS headquarters were bombed). Indeed, as a reaction to the Barco administration’s decision to resume extraditing drug traffickers to the US, some members of Medellín drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) publicly declared a war on the Colombian government. This deepened the division within the perpetrator bloc. As a result, some groups, such as Castaño’s, slowly started to set up an ambiguous alliance with Cali DTOs to distance themselves from Escobar, at the same time that some demobilised paramilitaries started to cooperate with enforcement agencies to hunt down Gacha and Escobar. The circulation of antipathy within some sectors of the perpetrator bloc brought about new dynamics in the regional coalitions for violence; such dynamics were also related to the transition from Reagan’s geopolitics of the second cold war to Bush’s geopolitics of a new world order, in which transnational narcoterrorism started being used as the script embodying the threat previously posed by Soviet imperialism (see chapter 5). Gacha was finally gunned down in December 1989 after a genocidal campaign against the UP which had not only taken the lives of hundreds of its members, but had also targeted the social network associated with it.

Gacha had at least three reasons to wipe out the UP: (1) (and shared with other members within the perpetrator bloc) the UP had made public denouncements of the drug traffickers - paramilitary groups alliance which forced the Barco administration to take some action against drug traffickers; (2) Gacha was fighting FARC for land control in coca-growing regions, and as the UP was represented as FARC’s political party he turned against the easiest target: unarmed civilians; (3) (and borrowed from other members within the perpetrator bloc)

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8 For the Rochela Massacre see chapter 2.
9 Barco issued various Decrees after Galán’s assassination, which sought to the crackdown of drug traffickers overwhelming power and to ban paramilitary groups (see Medina 1990).
10 Dudley contends that Gacha was responsible for roughly 25% of the UP assassinations carried out between 1985 and 1989 (2004: 142).
the destruction of the UP meant to win the anticommunist campaign which had motivated other groups to ally with drug traffickers. The affective-dispositions behind these reasons show the complex polarisation of the political economy of sympathy/antipathy. By reproducing an anticommunist narrative Gacha was able to recreate a hyperreal sympathy with actors that in principle should have been chasing him. This allowed him to reinforce the circulation of a real antipathy towards FARC and to forge alliances to win the territorial dispute against it. His involvement in massacres against the UP was not the product of anticomunism; instead, it resulted from the reproduction of the FARC-UP script, which informed his decision to transfer the frontline of his battle against FARC to unarmed civilians. This matched Gacha’s antipathy towards UP national leaders whose public statements had become a hindrance for him to smoothly run his illegal business.

Notwithstanding the focus on these three regional cases similar patterns occurred in regions where the UP had some socio-political power; such was the case in the Magdalena County (see Zúñiga 2007: 236-8). Nariño, however, followed a different dynamic. Although enforcement agencies saw with disregard UP members and sometimes illegally imprisoned some of them, assassinations, torture and displacement rarely occurred during the 1980s. This was so because (1) drug traffickers and paramilitaries were latecomers, only after 1990 they started entering the region; (2) the relationship between some regional elites and UP members was based on political collaboration rather than political competition, the system of alliances designed by the regional board succeeded in gaining municipal, departmental and national public seats, which armoured UP members against an elite-driven violence; furthermore, (3) FARC presence in the region was rather weak and within the peace process the commander of FARC’s 8th Front –operating in Cauca and northern Nariño– was seen as a legitimate actor whom many traditional politicians visited. After 1987, when the peace process broke down, FARC’s military strategy in the region focused on controlling southern Nariño. This brought about the creation of the 29th Front in 1990. The stepping up of FARC presence coincided with the incursion of paramilitary groups as well as with the rise of violence against the UP. Unlike in the case of Nariño, in southern counties such as Putumayo, the UP was the target of socio-political destruction. More research is needed in Putumayo, albeit the cases discussed here demonstrate that genocidal practices against the UP took place in regions in which (1) a multiplicity of interests was at stake and (2) the UP had been

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11 Interviews carried out in 2008 with former UP members in Nariño support this part of the analysis.
represented as a serious contender to the various actors’ intention to gain and/or protect economic, social and/or political interests. Thus, in regions such as Nariño, where the narratives stemming from the armed conflict did not radicalise the grammars of identity/alterity, the circulation of sympathy for UP members succeeded in halting the mobilisation of antipathy. This avoided the establishment of a coalition for violence that could have polarised narratives seeking to secure the survival of a fictive collective self by resorting to an antigrammar of genocide. Put simply, although the army was central in circulating a radicalised antipathy towards the UP, it was only when coalitions for violence materialised that genocidal traps solidified and were integrated into the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture by the perpetrator bloc.

Although drug traffickers played a central role in the solidification of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, the materialisation of regional genocidal traps cannot be understood in isolation from the circulation of the geopolitical scripts which contributed to forge regional coalitions for violence. Since the internal enemy was the script allowing actors with different interest to target the civilian social networks, they interpreted it as posing a threat to their interests. The multiplicity of interests and the changing geopolitical narratives, which chapters 4 to 7 explore in detail, made these coalitions instable but deadly. Although security forces put an end to some of these coalitions, new coalitions emerged, amongst which some sectors took advantage of the new geopolitical scripts in order to continue fighting the old hyperreal threat of (inter)national communism.

1989 – 1991: The turmoil years within the perpetrator bloc

After Gacha’s killing Barco put forward the narrative that the violence against the UP was over. Such a simulacrum denied that regional coalitions for violence were still in place and that the UP was represented as a threat by different sectors of the perpetrator bloc. The war against the UP continued because sectors of the perpetrator bloc identified sectors associated with the UP as powerful actors, which were a hindrance to materialise their interest, would they be land appropriation, political power, or ideological homogeneity, in the context of an armed struggle.

In the Middle Magdalena Valley, Gacha’s death was the expression of conflicts between drug traffickers and paramilitary leaders. Yet, it helped to consolidate an ‘anti-Medellín Cartel alliance’ between Cali DTOs and some paramilitaries, which speeded up paramilitary
leaders’ search for autonomy from Medellín DTOs (Gutiérrez and Barón 2007: 292-3). This regional coalition for violence continued targeting UP leaders as part of their contra-guerrilla campaign. Although Gacha’s death prompted the demobilisation of some paramilitary groups in Cundinamarca (El Espectador 1990c: 12A), the regional coalition for violence continued because of

a range of intersections, product of alliances and ruptures between violent agents, political elites and inhabitants, which… end[ed] up generating an explosive mix of private and collective interests (Garzón quoted in Duncan 2006: 249).

Nevertheless, an important part of the Middle Magdalena Valley coalition for violence was finally dismantled in January 1992, when paramilitary leader Ariel Otero was gunned down.\textsuperscript{12} By then most of the 1980s paramilitary commanders had been killed by emerging paramilitary leaders or incarcerated and a new process of reorganization amongst new violence entrepreneurs started (Gutiérrez and Barón 2007: 294).

In Meta, Victor Carranza remained at the top of paramilitary groups. The Macetos, in the Ariari region, and the Carranceros, in eastern Meta expanded their control from Puerto López and Puerto Gaitán to El Dorado and San Martín, former Gacha’s strongholds. The consolidation of Carranza’s network of death squads was so successful that it gave rise in the late 1990s to the Campesino Self-defence Force of Meta and Vichada. By the turn of the 1990s, however, the Macetos were not only operating in Meta but were also expanding to Casanare with the financial support of big landowners. This gave rise to the Campesino Self-Defence Force of Casanare, which carried on with wiping out the UP (González 2007: 318).

In Córdoba, Fidel Castaño continued the cleansing of the UP. As a result, by early 1990, the UP participated in the polls as a rather small force within a broader coalition; this contrasted with the growing political power the UP had shown in the 1988 elections (Romero 2003: 145). In March 1990, the second UP President was assassinated by a \textit{suizo} trained by Fidel’s brother: Carlos Castaño. \textit{Suizos}, as Dudley explains, “were mostly trouble teenagers who were lured into the Mafia by a short pep talk and the prospect of earning some fast money” (2004: 154). They were trained to carry out assassinations without knowing that they were most probably to be killed during the execution of the plan. Jaramillo was assassinated in Bogotá airport and, as it occurred with previous assassinations, Barco immediately blamed

\textsuperscript{12} Ariel Otero had replaced Henry Pérez in the leadership of the AMMs. Pérez had been gunned down in mid 1991.
the Medellín Cartel. Blaming Escobar allowed Barco (1) to continue to wage a war against the Medellín DTOs, (2) to protect Fidel Castaño who was joining forces with the government and the Cali DTOs to dismantle Escobar’s drug empire, and (3) to protect DAS officers who had been involved in Jaramillo’s assassination and many other plots against UP national leaders.\footnote{http://www.elespectador.com/node/187096/print (retrieved 31 May 2010)} The circulation of antipathy towards drug traffickers and sympathy for security agencies fuelled the indifference of broader sectors of social networks vis-à-vis the suffering of the UP because what was at stake was the very survival of Colombian institutions. However, at the regional level sympathy amongst the perpetrator bloc and antipathy towards the UP continued to maintain an antigrandma of genocide that enabled to secure multiple benefits to various legal/illegal, private/public, armed/unarmed actors.

Shortly after Jaramillo’s assassination, some warlords announced their intention of dismantling their armies. By November 1990, Fidel Castaño announced that he had disintegrated his private army operating in Córdoba and Antioquia and that had distributed land among peasant communities (El Espectador 1990b: 13A). His rather surprising decision had been informed by two events at the regional level. On the one hand, during 1990, the EPL discussed with Castaño the possibility of an eventual demobilisation (Romero 2003: 146). On the other hand, as the UP’s political power in Córdoba and Antioquia had been broken down, traditional political entrepreneurs recovered control of public offices making unlikely the prosecution of actors involved in the regional coalition for violence. Fidel Castaño’s short-term decision allowed his younger brother Carlos to slowly start taking over the paramilitary project. This, together with a CIA-Pentagon advisory commission formed by the US government to develop a set of national security recommendations for Colombia’s Ministry of Defence (see chapter 4), meant yet another metamorphosis of the perpetrator bloc. By the mid 1990s, ACCU had started concentrating coercion (Romero 2007a: 417).

Late 1990 and 1991 was then a turning point in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Firstly, the UP’s political power had been almost extinguished (see chapter 2). Secondly, the perpetrator bloc had started to transit from an acephalous to a more hierarchical network, in which there was still chance for decentralized decision-making. The transformation unfolded because the weakening of Middle Magdalena Valley paramilitary groups and Carlos Castaño’s takeover of the paramilitary project in Cordoba and Urabá converged. This reinforced Castaño’s ambition to expand the paramilitary project to Meta and to build up a
national paramilitary network. During this transition Cali DTOs played an important role within the perpetrator bloc which enabled the creation, in 1992, of ‘Los Pepes’ (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar), an experience that, as Duncan (2006: 276) recalls, would strengthen Castaño’s self-defence project.

More important, regarding the genocidal campaign against the UP in Urabá throughout the 1990s, was the consolidation of the Gaviria-EPL peace talks. As a result of poor disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) policies, a dissident EPL faction created the Comandos Populares (hereafter Comandos). This militia group sought apparently to protect former EPL soldiers from the FARC; the anti-FARC discourse and the UP-FARC script allowed them to ally later on with Carlos Castaño’s paramilitary groups. They were the core structure of the regional coalition for violence which annihilated the last UP stronghold.

Before turning to this issue, it needs to be emphasised that during the consolidation of George H. W. Bush’s new world order geopolitics and the disintegration of the communist bloc some guerrilla groups demobilised; this created a con-text for some ‘anticommunist drug traffickers’ to disarm their private armies and to attempt to legalise their socio-economic power by siding with the international efforts to dismantle the Medellín Cartel. Such temporal alliance based on hyperreal sympathy enabled a two-front war: against subversives who had not demobilised and drug traffickers unwilling to submit to Colombian traditional elites.

The reconstitution of paramilitary groups: toward a more hierarchical perpetrator bloc (1992 – 1997)

Although Fidel Castaño disarmed large part of his paramilitary structure in Córdoba, death squads continued sporadically operating in the region under his orders during 1991. Furthermore, between 1992 and 1993, Fidel and Carlos Castaño participated in Gaviria’s campaign to hunt down Pablo Escobar. This put them in contact with other rich drug traffickers, high ranking army officers, national political and social elites, and big land owners who agreed that after Escobar, FARC was the largest national security threat. The Castaños’ twofold campaign: against ‘FARC supporters’ in Córdoba and against Escobar in the cities matched with Gaviria’s ‘integral war’, which was publicly declared in 1992 but had as precedent the attack to FARC’s headquarters in December 1990 (see chapter 5). Gaviria’s war on two fronts, against drug trafficking (exclusively, the Medellín Cartel) and insurgency (mainly, FARC), allowed a multiplicity of legal-illegal alliances that brought together
different political, economic and social cliques and clusters under one solidarity-bond once Escobar was gone: an anti-FARC mentality. In this polarised context, and because of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, FARC turned to drug trafficking to increase its finances and to strengthen its military might. In 1994, partially because of FARC’s unprecedented military build up, but also thanks to their participation in the alliance against Escobar, Fidel and Carlos Castaño decided to (re)build a cohesive hierarchical counterinsurgency to bring down the FARC (cf. Romero 1999). The ACCU theatre of operations was Urabá.

In 1994, Urabá was the last UP stronghold (see Suárez 2007: 140). Although the UP had been the target of vicious violent campaigns between 1992 and 1993, its socio-political network still survived. The constitution of the ACCU, however, brought about a transformation both in the genocidal campaign and the perpetrator bloc. By 1997, the ACCU-led coalition for violence had destroyed the UP’s political power and its social fabric. As the UP and FARC were represented as part of the same collective self, the UP genocide and FARC’s retreat to other regions was represented as a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Nevertheless, what in fact occurred was that a socio-political order had been reconstituted benefiting transnational companies, traditional socio-political elites, drug traffickers, and emergent socio-economic elites. Therefore, between 1995 and 1996, the genocidal campaign against the UP was not only a side effect of the ACCU’s war on FARC, as most scholars and the national media interpret it. Instead, it was mainly a campaign that targeted a civilian social network because multiple actors saw its socio-political power as an obstacle to achieve (or maintain) economic, political and social benefits (cf. Romero 2003: 205-11). The campaign was scripted by sectors of the perpetrator bloc as counterinsurgency; therefore victims were represented as FARC supporters. However, to reduce the UP genocide to the anticommmunist ideology (re-branded as anti-FARC) shared by army officers and paramilitary leaders alike is to simplify the complex motives that brought other groups into the perpetrator bloc.

The massacres, assassinations, and other violent actions carried out by the Comandos between 1992 and 1994 did not follow an anticommmunist logic. Rather, these assaults were related to the demobilisation of a large sector of the EPL and the creation of the political movement Esperanza, Paz y Libertad (hereafter Esperanza), in March 1991. As the Gaviria administration (1990-1994) portrayed the political reintegration of EPL members as a
solution to the conflictive tensions in Urabá and reinforced the simulacrum that Fidel Castaño had completely disarmed his paramilitary structure, the decision was made to dismantle the military rule, which had been in place since 1988 (see chapter 2). Gaviria also offered public posts to Esperanza members and the possibility to join security agencies to ex-EPL fighters. However, as the demobilisation of the EPL had not exclusively been the product of insurgency-government talks, but Fidel Castaño played an important role in it, FARC and UP-PC members observed the process with distrust; such distrust was reinforced by the resettlement of a considerable number of EPL social networks in Castaño’s illegally appropriated territories. Moreover, UP leaders interpreted the administration’s backing of Esperanza as a way of weakening the UP’s political power. Although FARC did not publicly target Esperanza members (hereafter Esperanzados), most scholars contend that FARC’s Milicias Bolivarianas and the 5th Front started harassing Esperanzados soon after they disarmed (i.e., Romero 2003; Ortíz 2007; Suárez 2007). However, in early 1992 violence escalated when Francisco Caraballo’s EPL dissident front started carrying out assassinations and kidnappings of Esperanzados together with FARC (Ramírez 1997: 99-101). Such actions were legitimated through a narrative that portrayed Esperanzados as betrayers because of their relationship with the police, the army, and the DAS. In fact, Esperanzados’ statements in reintegration workshops show that security agencies sought to integrate them into intelligence operations so as to strengthen the counterinsurgency campaign against FARC (López de la Roche 1999: 170).

The success of the UP in the 1992 elections contrasted with a rather poor performance of Esperanza. This political failure, together with the lack of coherent DDR policies (Ibid.: 171), placed (many) Esperanzados in an awkward situation, thereby having to choose between marginalising themselves from society so as to show that they were not betraying the revolutionary ideal or collaborating with state agencies so as to show their willingness to be part of Colombian society. Having decided to reintegrate into society, Esperanzados sided for cooperation with security agencies. However, such a decision was not free of ambiguity for some Esperanzados decided to rearm and join the Milicias Obreras de San José. This gave rise the Comandos Populares –a mix of urban militia and paramilitary group that teamed up with DAS and regional elites until 1994 and targeted UP-PC regional leaders who were

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14 The EPL dissidence and FARC sealed a pact during the CGSB-Gaviria peace talks. Once the peace process broke down, all guerrilla groups (FARC, ELN and EPL) escalated violence against the establishment. As Esperanzados were linked with security agencies, they became military targets in the eyes of the guerrillas. Gaviria’s ambiguous peace policy contributed to the radicalisation of guerrilla groups (see Medina 2009: 81-6).
represented as the FARC’s socio-political network (Ramírez 1997: 120). The suspension of the Gaviria-CGSB peace talks in March 1992 contributed to FARC’s escalation of violence against the Comandos and its ‘civilian support network’ (namely Esperanza), at the same time that the security forces’ incapacity to protect Esperanzados from violent actions contributed to their radicalisation. The rearming of some Esperanzados and the violent campaign against the UP fuelled with callousness FARC’s grammars of identity/alterity; this produced a violent campaign against the ‘EPL’ which reached its peak in January 1994, when FARC committed the Chinita Massacre. This massacre became a central episode in the circulation of antipathy towards the UP, by both the Comandos and state institutions. The Comandos’ response was to further escalate violence against the UP, whereas biased judicial investigations were carried out against UP regional leaders while being victims of illegal imprisonment – about hundred UP leaders in the region were victims of illegal imprisonment between 1994 and 1997 (REINICIAR 2006a: 122).

Although the Comandos justified their existence as the last resort to avoid and neutralize the violence carried out by the dissident EPL group against Esperanza, it made clear, since April 1993, that two UP-PC members would be killed for each Esperanza’s member assassinated.¹⁵ The political enmity between Esperanza and the UP produced thus a genocidal reaction of the Comandos, which was legitimated by the FARC-UP script that circulated through the narrative that “UP public statements were not critical enough of FARC’s actions” (Suárez 2007: 145). This was exploited further by security agencies in their campaign to clamp down on the links between FARC and civilian networks. UP public officers denounced the vicious levels of violence, yet the slow pace of the judicial investigations contributed to the proliferation of death squads such as ‘Urabá’s Pacifying Army’ which were too keen on targeting the UP.¹⁶ In December 1993, when the Comandos committed the Cativos and Ceja massacres, it was clear that any person associated with the UP was a target. In this context, the Chinita Massacre in an Esperanza-influenced neighbourhood reinforced the political enmity between UP-PC and Esperanza, which allowed observer-interpreters to continue representing the violence in Urabá as an ongoing degenerate war between EPL and FARC.

¹⁶ Only up until August 2006, the Public Prosecutor’s Office started investigating into Los Cativos Massacre (http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/pag/divulga/noticias2006/DH/DhPatrioticaAgo31.htm retrieved 18 April 2010).
every time a group of workers is killed, Mario Agudelo, on behalf of the Esperanza, or Luis Antonio Tapias, on behalf of the PC-UP, claim that they are sympathizers of their organizations… this demonstrates that there is a dispute between the political groups and the guerrillas for the control of the region… therefore, [businessmen] call for the re-militarisation of Urabá and to cancel the 1994 polls.¹⁷

Notwithstanding both the UP and Esperanza argued for carrying out the political contest as a demonstration of resistance against the perpetrators, the national and regional media presented Esperanza as the victim of a strong UP-FARC alliance. This circulation of antipathy towards the UP weakened the political manoeuvre of the group and legitimated the violence against it. Moreover, judicial investigations weakened further the capacity of the UP to design political strategies to halt the violence. Although the UP and Esperanza (and other political groups) reached a political agreement to elect the Mayor of Apartadó, the violence against the group did not stop. In 1994, the Castaños’ death squads started entering the region and sided with the Comandos in their war against FARC. Though paramilitary leaders’ statements are far from reliable, it is telling that Hébert Veloza (alias H.H.) declared in a public audience in July 2008 that the reason why so many people were killed in Urabá when they were entering the region was that

we used former EPL members as informants and teamed up with the Comandos Populares. We based our actions in black lists they gave us and without verifying whether they were guerrilla fighters or not we ordered their assassinations. Then we found they were innocent.¹⁸

Such a narrative shows the anti-FARC mentality that legitimated the violence against civilians, but hides away the use of terror as a mechanism of controlling the population and imposing new norms of behaviour and forcing new solidarity-bonds. H.H. however recognised later in the same interview that the asymmetrical military might between the ACCU (at the time under formation) and the FARC was such that the ACCU resorted to terrorising the population so as to force them to stop supporting FARC.

The return of Castaño’s death squads to the region can be traced back to April 1994, when 100 paramilitaries killed and burned down the houses of ‘FARC supporters’ in Turbo. Next they gathered the survivors and threatened those they considered as FARC’s civilian networks. This became a widespread practice in traditional communist strongholds because

of the circulation of the PC-FARC script. However, in early 1994, different groups, such as the ‘Profesionales’ and ‘Hijos del Pueblo’, were also targeting the UP. After September 1994 Carlos Castaño had partially set the ground for establishing a hierarchical structure to control the various death squads operating in the region and to integrate them into one line of command. Thus, Castaño’s Tangueros became the structure around which different death squads amalgamated. By late 1995, the Comandos had also been subsumed under the ACCU. The Comandos’ political enmity and the paramilitaries’ anti-FARC discourse created a script that became the signifier of their antigrand of destruction: ‘civilian guerrillas’. Hence, military power was not used to directly attack FARC; instead, it was used against the UP, as the Aracatazo,19 Los Kunas and Bajo del Oso massacres demonstrate (see Suárez 2008: 60).

The consolidation of the ACCU in 1995 was not exclusively related to the centralisation of coercion and finance within the network of death squads operating in the region. Instead, it was linked with the counterinsurgency strategy of Army Brigade XVII (Romero 2003), which under the command of Gen. Rito Alejo del Río stepped up its operations against FARC. The tough stand against the guerrillas was shared by the military cadre in the region and forcefully supported by Governor of Antioquia Alvaro Uribe who invested Gen. del Río with the control of public order. This together with President Samper’s constant concessions to the military due to the scripting of Colombia as a narcodemocracy in US foreign policy (see chapter 5), allowed the consolidation of the perpetrator bloc that finished off the social fabric of the UP in Urabá. The perpetrator bloc operated in a genocidal conjuncture which lasted roughly from 1995 until 1997. The army played an important role in the materialisation of such a conjuncture not only because of the counterinsurgency campaign against FARC but also because Gen. del Río decided to protect Esperanza’s settlements leaving the UP-PC without protection (Romero 2003: 180). After all, in Gen. del Río’s and military cadres’ view the UP and FARC were the same. Commander of Armed Forces Gen. Harold Bedoya, for example, circulated the UP-FARC script in public statements by arguing that “those who are against zones under military rule cooperate with guerrilla groups” (Yarce 1996: 8A). The UP was thus an easy target for the military campaign of the ACCU (Suárez 2007: 165). Army officers’ circulation of sympathy for Esperanza and antipathy towards the UP reinforced the structuring of the antigrand of genocide that produced in 1996 the largest number of


From 1994 to 1997, the core of the regional coalition for violence was the ACCU. It carried out the first massacres against the UP in Turbo and then moved slowly towards Apartadó, Chigorodó and San José de Apartadó (Eje Bananero). Once the ACCU accomplished the destruction of the UP in the Eje Bananero and defeated the three remaining EPL dissident blocs, many former guerrilla fighters joined the paramilitary group (see Aranguren 2002: 229-32). Then, the ACCU and Army Brigade XVII continued the targeting in the Uraba-Chocoano. The alliance between the ACCU and the army was evident in the Operación Génesis, in which 12 paramilitaries guided the air strike carried out by the Army Brigades IV and XVII against FARC 57th Front and its ‘social strongholds’.\(^{20}\) According to Carlos Miguel Ortiz (2007: 160), the reason for the genocidal campaigns in the Urabá-Chocoano was that the FARC had lost the war in Apartadó and had to retreat to Riosucio. If this is one of the motives, it does not suffice to understand the cruelty of the campaign, which produced the largest cleansing in the region with more than 10,000 people expelled. The political dimension has to be taken into account, if only because the Mayor of Bojayá was part of a political coalition of which the UP was a central actor. Even though families resettled in Paravandó so as to survive the violence; they did not escape paramilitary attacks, as Operación Cacaria continued until March 1997.\(^{21}\) The convergence of paramilitary-military operations sealed the expelling of the UP-PC from the Urabá-Chocoano—in August 1997 the few survivors left Bojayá (REINICIAR 2006a: 173).

By mid 1997, the ACCU had won the dispute for territorial control in Urabá. The ACCU directly targeted what was represented as the socio-political network of FARC, thereby all those broadly labelled as ‘UP’ were the target of violence. The extent of the genocidal campaign that included diverse plans, such as Plan Retorno, Plan Golpe de Gracia, and Plan Nudo Negro, overlapped spatially and temporally with the aforementioned army operations and paramilitary campaigns. The perpetrator bloc was then a network of multiple groups in which the ACCU had established a powerful position. The targeting of the UP was to


continue, but with the political cleansing of Urabá the new task was to build a new socio-political network so as to legitimise the economic benefits they had achieved by the destruction of the social fabric of the civilian social network that had challenged traditional social structures in the region.

Although dislocated communities attempted to isolate themselves from politics, they continued to be targets of violence. In order to avoid the annihilation, the few communities remaining in Urabá resigned to their political identity and sought to rebuild a social fabric around the idea of establishing ‘peace communities’ highlighting their unarmed character and neutrality vis-à-vis the illegal and legal armed actors of the conflict. The decision made by the fragmented civilian social network was followed by the decision made by the UP regional board to withdraw from the political contest in July 1997. This finally broke the regional social fabric that the PC had built since the late 1960s and that had flourished during the 1980s and early 1990s. Contrary to Suárez’s (2007: 177) claim that the UP’s decision aimed to avoid ‘total politicide’, one may argue that such a decision was the very expression of the ongoing genocide, whereby the perpetrator bloc (1) had succeeded in destroying the social power of the UP and (2) was putting into place the grammars of identity/alterity needed for the construction of a new social fabric of the regional body politic. The ACCU’s genocidal campaign had set the foundations for a new social fabric, which was to be shaped by the paramilitarisation of economic, political, and social networks led by the newly founded AUC. In this context, those remnants who did not want to comply with the new body politic and had been once associated with the UP continued to be the target of destruction. Not only through assassinations and massacres against the peace community of San José de Apartadó the UP genocide continued. It also continued by the targeting of less organised peasant communities throughout the country which were stigmatised as guerrillas because of their previous sympathy for the UP. To analyse the coalitions for violence of such episodes turns the last part of this chapter. Before doing so, it is worth noting that, geopolitical narratives were aiding the continuation of the genocide in a conjuncture in which, paradoxically, the first Clinton administration was institutionalising the human rights discourse at the centre of US geopolitics. Because sectors of the administration sought to counterbalance what they depicted as a narco-state, they circulated sympathy for the very military cadres that were teaming up with the ACCU. Washington and Urabá were thus linked together by a foreign
policy that helped the free circulation of il(legal) sectors of the perpetrator bloc (see chapters 4 and 5).

The rise and fall of a narcoparamilitary-led perpetrator bloc (1998 – 2006)

The ACCU’s consolidation in Urabá encouraged Carlos Castaño to propose to various paramilitary groups operating in different regions of the country, such as the Self-defence forces of the Eastern Plains, the Self-defence forces of Casanare, and the Self-defence forces of the Middle Magdalena, to form a national umbrella organization. In April 1997, the AUC were created. Although the paramilitary structures maintained a large degree of autonomy, the attempt was twofold: first, to coordinate the violent campaigns against FARC and its network of supporters at the national level and second, to consolidate a dominant position within the international drug trafficking industry so as to finance the war against FARC and benefit from immense economic revenues (see Aranguren 2002: 199-203; chapter 6 discusses this in more detail). This is not to say, however, that there was not competition between the different paramilitary structures; the uneven concentration of coercion and capital made the AUC a rather instable alliance. Hence, violent disputes between paramilitary groups regularly emerged. On 6 June 2001, Carlos Castaño left the military leadership of the organization and became with Ernesto Baez the ‘political’ leader of the AUC. This demonstrated internal disputes which escalated the following years and ended in Castaño’s disappearance in mid 2004 (Romero 2007a).

Nevertheless, between 1997 and 2001, the coordination between paramilitary groups and the army in ‘counterinsurgency operations’ was widespread –paramilitary leaders’ statements in public audiences in the framework of the Justice and Peace Law have largely documented this. One of the many joint counterinsurgency operations carried out across the country shows that the target continued to be the social fabric of a civilian network closely associated with FARC –the UP. In July 1997, the ACCU with help from the army carried out the Mapiripan Massacre in Meta. The massacre in which more than 60 people perished occurred because peasants were portrayed as guerrillas for they had been UP sympathizers.22 Although the UP had been wiped out from Meta in the mid 1990s, the antipathy towards civilians continued

circulating among the military because of FARC’s military build-up in the region. Thus, they portrayed the social fabric of civilian social networks as a threat that had to be dealt with and saw the ACCU as an ally in securing a particular collective self.\(^{23}\)

The collusion between state institutions and narcoparamilitary groups was not restricted to the army, the police, and the security agencies. New intelligence units were created thanks to the processes of re-legalisation of self-defence groups that started in 1994 (see chapter 5). This contravened the legislation that Barco put into place to outlaw paramilitary groups (see chapter 2). However, it matched with the recommendations issued by the 1991 CIA-Pentagon advisory commission to the Ministry of Defence. The creation of ‘Convivir’ was supported by US security agencies and intellectuals of statecraft. A 2001 Rand report for example argued that

\textit{Convivir}… based on the neighborhood watch concept, was deliberately set up to avoid the appearance of the outlawed paramilitary groups. \textit{Convivir} was a way of involving people in the struggle against the subversive organizations without organizing them as militias. These groups performed intelligence functions for the security forces and became the targets of guerrilla attack… the \textit{Convivir} groups were not allowed to carry rifles or heavier weapons needed to defend themselves effectively against guerrilla attacks. They could carry only side arms… The \textit{Convivir} groups were declared illegal, allegedly on the grounds that some of them had begun to arm themselves unlawfully and had morphed into “illegal” self-defense groups (Rabasa and Chalk 2001: 54).

However, the genocidal campaign against the UP in Urabá shows that the 13 Convivir, created in April 1997, became part of the perpetrator bloc even before ‘allegedly arming themselves’. If only because Convivir allowed the circulation of ‘counterinsurgency’ information that aided the reproduction of the idea that all the multiple legal/illegal actors belonged to the same hyperreal collective self who was at war against an ‘other’ whose power was represented in the social fabric of civilian social networks which enabled the FARC’s military build-up. The extent to which Convivir contributed to organise the finances of the AUC while were still legal was first made public when former paramilitary commander H.H. stated that “convivir were a legal figure used by the AUC to collect protection rackets.”\(^{24}\) Thus, the AUC laundered the contributions of various economic groups, including transnational companies. Raúl Hasbún, a businessman in the banana industry and paramilitary commander ‘Pedro Ponte’ in 1997, confirmed H.H.’s statements. According to

Semana’s transcription of Hasbún’s confession, Government Secretary of Antioquia Pedro Juan Moreno told him to create twelve Convivir. When these units started operating they consisted of 150 people each, 800 radios, cars, and weapons. Moreover, in order to finance them,

Carlos Castaño had many meetings with companies working in the banana industry, and he was able to reach an agreement where the companies would pay CONVIVIR three percent of every box of bananas exported... These payments continued until 2003 in cases such as that of Chiquita Brands.  

Castaño’s interest in financing Convivir was not only related to gathering intelligence information on FARC for the army and the police, but mainly to support the ACCU’s war on ‘FARC’.

Without sacrificing the image of a respectable businessman, Hasbún became the head of a bloody and ambitious paramilitary group that worked under the guide of Vicente Castaño. Hasbún used information that he gathered from CONVIVIR units for the purposes of the paramilitary group. He said that the twelve CONVIVIR groups in Urabá worked as a network. The information that they gathered was sent directly to him, as a paramilitary head, at the same time that it was sent to the military and police.  

These very same units, which had been made illegal in December 1997, collected the intelligence information that informed Hasbún’s decision to commit the San José de Apartadó Massacre of 1998. Convivir units armed themselves and then carried out the destruction of the peace community of San José de Apartadó as part of the UP genocide (cf. Suárez 2007: 247). Even though the Samper administration created a special military unit to pursue them, the unit’s poorly structured operations enabled these illegal self-defence groups to remain armed (Leal 2002: 139).

Suárez (2007: 175) argues that the establishment of Convivir just before the ending of the war of reciprocal-extermination was central in securing the victory of paramilitary groups: Convivir became the apparatuses that allowed the gathering of information giving them an advantage against FARC. Although one may partially agree with Suárez: Convivir contributed to the expulsion of FARC from Urabá, one might argue that to see the violence

26 Ibid.
27 Hasbún “ordered the massacre because the town was so secluded... that it wasn’t worth it to make an incursion just to kill one or two people;” therefore, “they killed the largest amount of people that could possibly be associated with the FARC” (Ibid.).
against the UP as part of a degenerate war between FARC and an EPL-Paramilitary alliance gives some hints of the viciousness of the ongoing armed conflict in Colombia, but it does not actually allow to understand the different logics behind the violence.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, Convivir were part of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture in which the UP genocide occurred; they articulated different subjects, objects, spaces, and times in multiplex violent campaigns aimed at the destruction of the social power of a civilian network scripted as ‘FARC-supporters’.\textsuperscript{29} This explains why the UP genocide continued through the targeting of communities, regardless if they attempted to create mechanisms of resistance or not so as to give meaning to their political identity. In the case of the peace community of San José de Apartadó, four massacres were carried out; altogether, more than 100 members were assassinated between March 1997 and December 2001 (Ibid.: 184). The mass killings did not reach larger numbers if only because international humanitarian agencies provided shelter for the community (see chapter 7).

If, by 1997, the genocidal campaign in Urabá had enabled the return of traditional parties to public offices, after 2002, when the peace community had been diminished, the AUC started to exercise a direct socio-political control in the region by creating strong alliances with emergent political forces (López 2007b). The consolidation of the rising power of the AUC since the mid 1990s –when the ACCU expelled FARC from el Eje Bananero– had, by the late 1990s, transformed Urabá from a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture into a ‘peaceful space’ in which a new body politic could emerge upon a paramilitary-politician alliance – which indeed elected senators up until 2006 (Ibid.: 163-181). The ‘Urabá territory of peace’ script circulated among political, economic, and social actors nationwide thus contributing to spread the project from Antioquia to other regions of the country. In this con-text, the AUC-Uribe negotiations not only aimed to disarm the paramilitary groups but to finish institutionalising the new body politic. Romero’s (2007b) edited volume is an excellent attempt to unveil the processes of forming the ‘body (para)politics’ during Pastrana and the first Uribe administrations (1998-2006), which cannot be discussed in detail here. Suffice it to say that the institutionalisation of the body politic and the Uribe-AUC negotiations (which

\textsuperscript{28} This line of argumentation reproduces the narratives of the perpetrators. Thus, Suárez argues that “there is no need for the victims to be combatants and the availability of reliable information supporting such a claim, but what is needed is for the perpetrator to represent his victim as a combatant” (2008: 65). This neglects the importance of the social power that victims have, product of their position in social networks.

\textsuperscript{29} One needs, therefore, to be sceptical of Steele’s (2009: 423) suggestion of using the idea of ‘collective’ targeting in order to explain the violence against the peace community.
led to the demobilisation of 30000 paramilitary fighters in 2006) converged with the formal withdrawal of legal recognition of the UP as a political party. Although assassinations of survivors rose during the first Uribe administration, the violence was to be represented by the government as episodic and the perpetrators as criminals acting purely for circumstantial reasons.

It is not surprising that the violence against the survivors of the UP genocide escalated during the early days of the Uribe administration; Uribe continuously circulated the UP-FARC script and laid it over former UP members. As his administration matched with George W. Bush’s geopolitics of the war on terror, the narcoterrorist guerrillas script became the empty signifier through which sympathy for the security forces, antipathy towards former UP leaders, indifference for the survivors, and the oblivion of the UP genocide circulated. What seems surprising, however, is that as this section shows, during the second Clinton administration and Pastrana’s presidency the destruction of the remnants of the UP took place silently despite both administrations represented themselves as protecting both human and victim rights. This was possible because sectors of transnational military, criminal, economic and political networks imagined themselves as part of a collective self able to deal with alterity amongst them but continued construing former UP members as a threat to their interest which needed to be destroyed. Thus, the different coalitions for violence that integrated the perpetrator bloc from 1986 to 2006 interlinked various locales in a complex system of temporal relations that materialised a genocidal conjuncture.

Conclusion

The perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide was a complex structure in which a multiplicity of motives allowed various social groups to ally and wage a war against a fictive collective self they all construed as enemy. The armed conflict was a central factor that facilitated this. A hyperreal interpretation of the conflict let the military, some governmental officials and political entrepreneurs to opt for radical solutions and ally with outlaws. It was because of this instable alliance, and the continuous political pressure from UP members, that sectors of the Barco administration acted against factions of the perpetrator bloc, bringing to an end some of the genocidal practices. Nevertheless, US foreign policy representations and the

30 Because of the massacre that followed Uribe’s accusation against San José de Apartadó members of being FARC supporters, PDA MP Iván Cepeda is pressing charges against Uribe before the International Criminal Court (see [http://elespectador.com/node/219594/print](http://elespectador.com/node/219594/print) retrieved 29 August 2010).
involvement of sectors of the army into the perpetrator bloc kept in place the antigrand of genocide that solidified the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Thus, as foreign and domestic representations prompted legal and illegal actors to project the image of the UP as the internal enemy, which had to be destroyed, new alliances emerged which carried out the UP genocide throughout the 1990s.

The perpetrator bloc went through various transformations, in which state institutions and enforcement agencies played contradictory roles. Such discrepancies were the product of domestic processes and geopolitical narratives circulating amongst military and political networks. Hence, while the UP genocide was unfolding, the cores of the regional coalitions for violence were SOA-trained army officers, policemen, and some rightwing politicians reproducing US neoconservatism. Later, when drug traffickers succeeded in building strong private armies, the core coalitions, in most regions, included army officers, political entrepreneurs and drug traffickers. The latter had, by then, resorted to the scripts fuelling antipathy towards the UP as a means of maximising their benefits, thus consolidating their role in the coalition. Towards the late 1980s, when drug traffickers’ military power challenged the survival of the Colombian establishment and the US stepped up the war on the Medellín Cartel, enforcement agencies tried to break down drug baron’s private armies but in doing so allied with other sectors of the illegal drug industry. Some of these drug traffickers became the core of the perpetrator bloc in the 1990s.

The changing dynamics within the perpetrator bloc also affected the different patterns that the genocidal practices followed. Up until 1987, the systematic assassinations of UP members were mainly carried out by gunmen and low rank army officers under the orders of high rank officers. Between late 1987 and 1989, paramilitary groups started carrying out massacres against UP strongholds in which the target was the UP’s social network. Furthermore, private armies training camps, financed by drug traffickers, political entrepreneurs and economic elites, became death camps in which hundreds of UP members were tortured and their bodies thrown into mass graves. From late 1989 to 1991, the combination of massacres and selective assassinations brought about the extermination of the ‘national’ socio-political power of the UP, few strongholds remained which became targets of destruction throughout the 1990s.

Regional variations in the genocidal practices and the loose line of command of the perpetrator bloc allowed most of the crimes to go unpunished. The US administrations’ lack of pressure to seek the prosecution of perpetrators (and their excessive pressure on fighting
narcoguerrillas) contributed to the proliferation of the spread of violence throughout the national geography. As both Betancur and Barco did not enforce adequate measures to tackle the anti-UP campaign, ingrained in some army brigades and other enforcement agencies, most state institutions overlooked the genocidal practices against the UP. The Attorney General Office was one of the few institutions demanding investigation into the charges against the armed forces. As a result, the DAS conducted a tough campaign to break the links between drug traffickers and army officers. Paradoxically, some DAS officers teamed up with paramilitaries in urban plots against UP leaders. DAS stepped up its campaign against paramilitary groups, meanwhile ‘other’ paramilitary groups finished off cleansing entire regions of UP members. This was a mortal blow to the UP because many members resigned their identity or flew the country to survive the genocidal campaign by a more hierarchical perpetrator bloc.

The constitution of a more hierarchical perpetrator bloc took some time however. Between 1991 and 1994, various death squads and urban militias backed up by security agencies and the narratives put forward by the CIA-Pentagon’s new security strategy carried out massacres, torture, disappearings, and cleansing of UP members. Political enmity and anticommunism were important motives in the violence against the UP. The radicalisation of political enmity was central in Urabá, where a genocidal antipathy towards the UP was put in place by directly linking the lives of UP sympathizers to the security of other political contenders. In this context, former guerrilla groups teamed up with paramilitary groups and the army in a joint counterinsurgency campaign against FARC. The UP was thus also target because of the FARC-UP script. By 1997, the ACCU had become a semi-hierarchical structure that centralised finance and was the core cluster in planning actions against ‘FARC’. They called for the constitution of the AUC paramilitary national umbrella organisation, which, together with the army formed the core of the perpetrator bloc thereafter. Geopolitical narratives were central for this to happen because since 1995 the narcodemocracy script had sided the first Clinton administration with the army and the police, thus allowing the free circulation of outlaws within the perpetrator bloc.

Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, the Pastrana-FARC peace talks and Clinton’s narratives demanding better human rights records forced the army to continue a counterinsurgency campaign through covert coalitions for violence. Thus, at the turn of the century narcoparamilitary groups had assembled the military-political power needed to solidify
radicalised grammars of identity/alterity that construed FARC as the other in different regions. In this context, all those who had been UP, in FARC strongholds, became the target of destruction. Former UP sympathizers were thus easy targets, regardless of being active in politics or not. The social power of their positions within civilian social networks allowed various actors to radicalise narratives that interpreted its social fabric as the base for FARC military might. The anti-FARC discourse enabled the cooperation between narcoparamilitary groups and security forces, evident in the co-option of the Convivir units created by the state to deal with security threats. This increased the perpetrator bloc’s effectiveness in the multiple violent actions against the UP, which were products of the multiplicity of interest bringing together different actors. By the early 2000s, Uribe’s presidency allowed for the dismantling of an important sector of the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide. However, under Uribe the legal recognition of the UP was also withdrawn. This converged with a radicalised grammar of identity/alterity that until today reproduces antipathy towards ‘FARC supporters’; thus the targeting of the civilian social networks pushing for social change continued. Amongst them, UP survivors were until then target of violence, however, the Uribe administration portrayed the perpetrators as a loose structure.

In sum, by mapping the topology of the perpetrator bloc this chapter has shown how some actors interpreted the UP, how other actors borrowed such interpretations and how this translated into genocide. The predominance of scripts which simplified the complexity of the UP, which chapter 2 discussed, resulted in the immobility of broader social networks. This is not to say, however, that the perpetrator bloc was restricted to the interaction of Colombian army officers, drug traffickers, and politicians. On the contrary, as the next chapter analyses in detail, the connectedness of Colombian military cadres with military clusters in the liberal hemispheric military network shows that the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide was the materialisation of broader transnational interactions.
4 MAPPING GENOCIDE-PERPETRATORS TRANSNATIONALLY: A TOPOLOGY OF THE MINDSET INFORMING THE PARTICIPATION OF COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES IN THE PERPETRATOR BLOC

Genocidists are constantly transforming. Such transformations, however, are not only the product of the intersubjective asymmetric clash between perpetrators and victims; but also the consequence of other processes in which perpetrators are immersed, such as the accumulation of capital or the military build up for national security reasons (see Chapter 3). Thus, in order to understand the transformations experienced by the perpetrators, and, in turn, the dynamics of genocidal geopolitical conjunctures more broadly, what is needed is to unveil the connections between the broader processes in which the various perpetrators are immersed and their participation in genocidal violence. This means to move away from the genocide script which reinforces the idea that genocide can be grasped exclusively by untangling the concrete social interactions in which it occurs (see chapter 1); by decontextualising, disconnecting, and isolating genocidal traps from the sociomaterial networks within which they take place, scholars end up representing perpetrators’ mindsets as the product of innate evilness or, at best, as the result of the circulation of ideas circumscribed to fixed geographical locations. Goldhagen (1996), for example, considers the circulation of somehow unchanging anti-Semitic narratives in Europe, but in particular in Germany, as the main reason for the targeting of European Jewry. However, this kind of interpretation misses the point that perpetrators’ mindsets are not fixed and are constantly (re)constructed in intersubjective interactions, which overpass the concreteness of the genocidal conjunctures they contribute to crystallise and solidify. In a world imagined as divided into nation states, perpetrators’ mindsets materialise due to the geopolitical circulation of narratives amongst actors who regard themselves as sharing a particular role in (trans)national networks. Military networks are at the centre of the reproduction of national boundaries. Thus when studying the participation of the military in genocidal geopolitical conjunctures, it is not enough to explore their role within perpetrator blocs. What is also needed is to understand the connections with the broader military networks that shape the mindsets that inform the targeting of the social fabric of civilian networks.

This chapter traces the connections between the circulations of narratives amongst various military clusters integrated into a military network that saw as its mission the protection of
the (liberal) Western Hemisphere and the mindset informing the military’s participation in the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide. The tracing of these connections shows that in the UP genocide objects, events, and places deemed distant were actually close together. Following this relative conception of space, it can be seen that the intensity of Colombian and US militaries’ interactions not only linked military-perpetrators, genocidal episodes, and US military training institutions, but also that the circulation of narratives amongst them produced the imagining of a flat geography in which Bogotá and Washington were brought closer together, whereas regional genocidal traps were distanced apart. This contributed to put Colombia in different places within US foreign policy space (see chapter 5).

The aim of the chapter is twofold. On the one hand, to con-textualise the Colombian military sector of the perpetrator bloc within the liberal western hemispheric military networks and to describe how the military’s narratives intermingled, bringing into play scripts that allowed the UP genocide. It does so by deconstructing the scripts that supported the hyperreal writing of Colombia by security cadres; such scripts were constitutive part of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. As chapters 2 and 3 discuss in detail the various roles of the military in the perpetrator bloc and the exchange of narratives between military generals and UP leaders, this chapter focuses on the transnational interactions of military clusters in the last 60 years. The reader is referred to the previous two chapters for a more comprehensive picture of the connections between genocidal episodes and the narratives circulating within the liberal western hemispheric military networks.

Although this chapter shares the thesis underlying most of the contributions contained in the edited volume *State violence and genocide in Latin America*, according to which, “[t]he initiation of the US National Security Doctrine radicalized preexisting local, long-standing internal conflicts while providing the ideological pretext to eliminate political opposition” (Esparza 2010: 5), it differs from the idea of understanding states as units and thus as the perpetrators of genocide. As modern state apparatuses are complex assemblages of networks that seek to govern populations and their milieu (Mann 1993); it is more insightful to look at particular actors, their interactions in clusters, the links between clusters, and the networks that materialise of such complex web of relations. Thus, contrary to the valuable accounts contained in the first scholarly book dealing with genocide in Latin America, this chapter contends that military networks were an important sector of the hegemonic bloc, but only one sector. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the uneven and fluid connections within political and
criminal networks so as to show how the materialisation of the perpetrator bloc in Colombia was the concrete genocidal expression of a transnational historic hegemonic bloc in the hemisphere. Thus the imagining that genocides were carried out by states in a hemisphere divided into nation states is supplanted by a multiplex topology of sociomaterial networks that materialised victims and perpetrators in different geopolitical con-texts.

The chapter is divided into six parts. First, it discusses the circulation of anticommunist narratives and the transfer of military materiel between US and Colombian militaries from the early 1950s to the late 1960s. Then, it looks into the 1970s and the adaptation of the National Security Doctrine by the Colombian military. The chapter next analyses the 1980s; it shows how the low-intensity conflict syntax (re)produced a narrative based on the UP-FARC script, which enabled the embodiment of the ‘internal enemy’ in the UP and thus to target it for destruction. This analysis is complemented by assessing the influence of the School of the Americas in the fifth section. Finally, the chapter outlines the geopolitical narratives circulating since the 1990s; these have ingrained in the military mindset the idea that FARC and its ‘network of collaborators’ are the largest threat to a fictive collective self written as ‘we the Colombian people’.

The making of an anticommunist military mindset (1950 – 1970)

Interaction between Colombia’s military and other countries’ has taken place since the early days of the republic (Brown 2004; Leal 1989). Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, however, there was no formal set of procedures to coordinate military actions in a long-term perspective. In fact, the first formal set of agreements was signed between Colombia and the US in 1952. Thereafter, and beyond the Korean War (1951-4), a regular contact was established between military institutions in Colombia and the US (Coleman 2006).

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1 Paraphrasing Robert Cox (1993: 56-7, 62-3), ideas and material conditions are always bound together building a transnational historic bloc. Hegemony plays a central role in such a bloc. Following Cox it could be argued then that a transnational historic bloc usually allows not only for co-opting counter-hegemonic ideas, in the manner of transformismo, but also reducing the chances of resorting to extreme levels of coercion (genocide) to maintain dominant classes’ benefits. However, when such a bloc is imbued with instability due to the scripts circulating in the dominant classes’ grammars of identity/alterity various actors ally and resort to the destruction of those others who have been construed as unassimilable and menacing in an antigrammatical of genocide. Thus perpetrator blocs could be seen as the materialisation of an instable transnational historic bloc.

2 In the early 20th century, countries such as Chile, Germany and Switzerland sent military missions (see Leal 1989: 196).

3 “[B]etween 1953 and 1957, to help the Colombian military government, the United States’ relaxed oversight of military aid, provided arms, engineering equipment, and other materiel to the Colombian military; helped train specialized Colombian counterinsurgency units; participated in revising the Colombian recruit training
contact allowed a first exchange of doctrines, which had at its core the anticommunism inherited from the Korean War. The close bond between both military institutions meant that Colombia was one of the first recipients of military aid in South America.  

In fact, Colombian military carried out the first counterinsurgency operation in the continent in the early 1960s under what was known as Plan Lazo. This civilian-military operation was aimed at dismantling peasant movements in the Tolima County and put into motion President Kennedy’s approach to Latin America (Muller 2006). Plan Lazo also demonstrated how US military narratives had permeated the Colombian military, in the sense that communist strongholds were represented as reluctant to comply with the requirements posed by the ‘natural’ development of a western society. The military, then, portrayed Colombia as a western nation threatened by insurgents allied with the ‘Soviet Empire’. The representation of Colombia as belonging to the ‘West’ neglected the cultural diversity at the core of the unfinished processes of nation and state building, but came to reinforce the FN political elites’ narratives that regarded as central the implementation of exceptional measures in order to strengthen Colombia’s liberal democratic project. Although Plan Lazo was presented by Colombian militaries as a successful operation which demonstrated the consolidation of the state’s sovereignty over its internal frontier, an organised guerrilla movement emerged from the survivors of the campesino self-defence group. The FARC was to epitomise the threat posed by communism to western values.

During the 1960s, with the FARC in the background and the anticommunist struggle at the forefront, a particular military mindset that regarded military institutions as the ‘true’

program; and contributed technical and materiel assistance to assorted Colombian military state-building projects” (Coleman 2006: 376). It is also important to note that in 1951 the General Command of the Armed Forces was created, this unified the command of the Police and the Army under the direction of the Ministry of War (Leal 1989: 214). As a result a joint campaign against liberal and communist insurgencies was well underway when the US-Colombian military relations began.

According to Leal (2002: 23) only Brazil and Chile received larger military assistance during the 1950s and 1960s.

“In 1962, A U.S. assessment team concluded that lack of planning, coordination, poor utilization of resources, lack of equipment, reliance on static outposts, sporadic collection and untimely dissemination of intelligence, patchy civic and psychological action programs, and poor Army-Police coordination, combined with the country’s systemic problems of underdevelopment, put the Colombian military on the defensive. The U.S. response included a $1.5 million security package, including vehicles, communications, and helicopters; Military Training Teams to instruct Colombians on counter-insurgency; training soldiers and police at the School of the Americas in Panama; a revamping of both the military and police intelligence structure; and the creation of special operations units” (Porch & Muller quoted in Muller 2006: 28-9). These reforms culminated in Plan Lazo.

The combination of development (Alliance for Progress) and counterinsurgency (Military Assistance Programs) was seen as the most effective approach to fight international communism.

Gen. Alberto Ruiz Novoa was the first high ranking officer who operationalised the new role of the military during the cold war and merged ‘internal’ and ‘external’ politics (Leal 1989).
guardians of Colombian society reinforced a certain degree of autonomy that the military had gained as part of FN agreements.\textsuperscript{8} Such autonomy was evidenced by (1) giving away the command of defence and public order to the military; (2) the lack of control mechanisms to look over the military cast; (3) the absence of dialogue between political elites and military commanders; and (4) the development overtime of a self-referential military outlook based on the principles of the NSD and thereby in constant clash with democratic ideals (Pizarro 1995: 163-4). The military’s autonomy allowed them to merge public order and counterinsurgency operations to fight communism. Such autonomy contributed to secure the FN political system; FN dissenters were not only portrayed as disruptors of the public order but also as communists (Leal 1989: 268). To deal with public order, a constant state of siege was put into place in the 1950s, allowing the military to repress political opposition and to disband rural and urban social movements (Pearce 1990).

Unlike the rest of South America where the US doctrine of the National Security State merged into the NSD and prompted a process of militarisation which ended up in the dictatorships of the 1970s, in Colombia, militarisation was not a linear process and was at times contested by some political elites. As the FN secured itself by giving carte blanche to the military in matters of public order, the overall result was a further militarisation of ‘internal’ security. Yet military-civil relations between 1958 and 1994 varied in five different moments: 1958-65 when the military were implicitly subordinated to political elites but were developing certain autonomy, 1965-77 when they were explicitly subordinated but gained autonomy to repress social movements, 1977-82 when the military experienced a minimum subordination to political elites and therefore consolidated their autonomy, 1982-89 when the government enforced subordination upon the military but they retained a clandestine autonomy; and 1989-94 when there was an objective subordination of the military to political elites but they retained their autonomy in specialised military areas (Dávila quoted in Leal 2002: 40). Throughout the first two moments, the training of high-ranking military commanders under the US International Military Education and Training program produced a military cast imbued with a strong anticommunist ideology. Gen. Ayerbe Chaux, a graduate

\textsuperscript{8} President Alberto Lleras Camargo’s speech on 1958 is usually interpreted as the turning point for an increased military autonomy within the FN system. However, scholars’ opinion is divided between those who see military’s autonomy as a contractual outcome at the core of the FN and the ones that regard it as one of its unexpected development (see Pizarro 1995). In my view, although military’s autonomy unexpectedly allowed for a concentration of political power in terms of dealing with public order, this would not have been possible without tacit consent from political elites. In a word, is not one or the other but both.
of the US-run USARCARIB military training school in Panama, wrote in 1966: “today we can affirm, without doubt, that communism is the principal source of the subversion in Colombia and Latin America” (Leal 1989: 253).

The struggle for autonomy came to reinforce the military mindset under formation which not only overemphasised traditional values such as patriotism, honour, discipline and order, but also generated feelings of superiority, disdain and above all distrust towards civilians (Ibid.: 258). The gradual embeddedness of the military in this mindset resulted in representations amongst military cadres that regarded the army as the institution called to save ‘Colombian society’ from political and non-political threats alike.9 These narratives allowed the military to put themselves beyond politics, at the very moment when they were actually taking over a central role in politics by having the right to name some political contenders as absolute enemies. Because the Colombian military mindset was evolving within a constant exchange of ideas produced by the US military doctrine, which had for long time been influenced by Clausewitz’s theorisation of war, the principle that ‘pure enmity leads to absolute violence’ silently informed the notion that there was only one way of dealing with absolute enemies: through military means.10 Thus, political contenders became military targets. By putting into motion a radicalised antipathy towards populations regarded as the FN’s enemies, military cadres were colonising affective-dispositions and polarising the grammars of identity/alterity of broader social networks. Thereafter, conservative members of society and various social networks were to portray social movements and PC members as the ‘other within’; against the threat they represented, these sectors of society advocated for the military’s autonomy to protect the ‘social body’. Thus, radicalised antipathy towards the PC was accompanied by the circulation of sympathy for the military.

As a result of the constant negotiation of an open-ended autonomy in dealing with public order, the military did not regard a military coup as a viable option for engineering Colombian society. However, it was precisely this settlement, which enabled the Colombian military to be part of the Inter-American military regime (IAMR). The IAMR saw as its principal function not the protection of the national borders against so-called ‘external

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9 This was symptomatic of “new continental doctrine [which resulted in the fact that] large sectors of the armed forces across Latin America began to view themselves as holy warriors in an apocalyptic East-West conflict” (McSherry 2005: 32).

10 The influence of Clausewitz in the US military is ongoing today. Colonel Darley (2006: 75) argues that Clausewitz’s theorisation is being used to politicise the plain kinetic approach that some militaries propose to win the war on terror. This, in his view, will avoid falling into a war that seeks the “total destruction of the adversary and his civilisation.”
aggressor’s, but the protection of a body politic from its ‘internal aggressors’; this reinforced the bond bringing various military clusters together: their commitment “by vocation to fight against their societies’ underdevelopment, illiteracy, poverty, and national fragmentation” (Roniger 2010: 26). As a result, the security agenda in the Americas was to militarise police cross-borderly: the alliance between the militaries in the region made unlikely a war between the armies of ‘liberal nations’. In a geopolitical discursive turn, the exterior – that is the idea of a Western Hemisphere– was depicted as the realm of order and peace, while the interior – that is the idea of a territory controlled by a nation state– was portrayed as an anarchic space in need of order and discipline.

These hyperreal narratives solidified the polarisation of sympathy/antipathy which had been underway since at least the mid 1950s across the Western Hemisphere. This resulted in the militarisation of public order in Colombia, which aided to concretise a military mindset that construed political enemies as military targets. Thus, the scene was set for the consolidation of the NSD in Colombia.

The national security doctrine: Southern Cone dictatorships and Colombia in the 1970s

Colombian elites allowed increased military autonomy in order to (1) secure their own autonomy in running Colombia’s economy and (2) consolidate their exclusive use of public offices. As narratives depicted military and political affairs as two distinct realms, the military was presented as an apolitical actor. Yet since the military implicitly supported the two traditional parties; the simulacrum of an apolitical military cadre naturalised the social order imposed by the exclusivist FN system. Under the state of siege, military control over political activities was legitimised by the need to save the nation from chaos. Chaos was perceived by the military as the disruption of the politico-economic project of the FN. This explains why the consolidation of the NSD in the Southern Cone ended up in dictatorships and occurred at the turn of the 1970s, while in Colombia the NSD shaped the apparatus of security that maintained the FN. The climax of the NSD at the turn of the 1980s in Colombia thus took place under a civilian government that overlooked the military’s atrocities.

By the mid 1970s, the NSD had enabled the establishment of various regimes of terror throughout Latin America. For example, cross-border counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Southern Cone dictatorships (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay),
approved at least by one US secretary of state (Henry Kissinger) and with logistical support from US intelligence agencies, became a coordinated activity widely known as Operation Condor (McSherry 2005). This operation was set up in 1975 in Santiago, Chile, in the midst of the first Inter American Working Meeting of Intelligence. By then, the military in democratic and non-democratic regimes alike –Colombia to a lesser extent– had “dismantled democratic and populist structures and expanded organisations for surveillance, intelligence, and repression” (Ibid.: 34). Thereafter, according to McSherry, the organised destruction carried out by ‘the transnational Condor system’ was genocidal:

Condor was an organized, coordinated system focused on the elimination of key individuals and groups that had escaped the dictatorships of their own countries… Condor operations, and the larger campaigns of state terrorism, reflected intent to destroy. The violence was not isolated, random, or sporadic. It was planned, coordinated, and executed with military discipline, and guided by ideological categorizations of large groups of people (2010: 119).

Although there is no evidence showing Colombian military’s participation in Condor, by the late 1970s Colombian military leaders began to quash democratic pressures from below. This was in tune with “the continental counterinsurgency regime” of which Condor was “a crucial component” (Ibid.: 107). The turning point for the consolidation of the NSD in Colombia was the Presidency of Julio César Turbay (1978-1982). The minimum subordination of the military to political elites during this period materialised into a counterinsurgency based on the principles of the NSD in the Southern Cone and the US National Security State. The Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Battalion (Binci) became a central institution within military agencies, which sought to colonise affective-dispositions by circulating narratives that described the PC as the ‘internal enemy’ and the source of guerrilla movements, disorder and crime (see Leal 2002: 25).

The Security Statute (Decree 1923 of 1978) was at the centre of other legal mechanisms of the apparatus of security developing under the consolidation of the NSD. Because it “established media censorship, criminalized social protest, and allowed civilians to be tried in military tribunals” (Blair quoted in Dugas 2005: 233), the Statute came to complement previous measures put in place in the 1960s11 –the Military Penal Justice system, the right to arm and train civilians as paramilitary forces, and the militarisation of police. It also reinforced Decree 1573 of 1974, which was the first norm to specifically mention the concept

11 Decree 3398 of 1965 and Decree 893 of 1966 institutionalised such changes (see Leal 2002: 47-8).
of ‘national security’ and to bring with it various NSD principles that advocated for “a nation in arms to defend itself” (Leal 2002: 54). The consolidation of the NSD occurred at the same time that a new generation of military officers were taking hold of the leadership of the armed forces. The new approach introduced to deal with public order was evident in Gen. Luis Carlos Camacho’s efforts to repress social movements as means of securing law and order. It was the repression of communism, however, that was at the centre of Gen. Camacho’s security strategy – then Commander of the Armed Forces.

Low Intensity Warfare: a post-Vietnam counterinsurgency in the making

Even though, by the late 1970s, the NSD had galvanised rightwing political regimes throughout Latin America, two events weakened the institutionalisation of the IAMR. First, the Revolution in Military Affairs pushed aside the strong reliance of US military cadres on Latin American security forces when it came to ensuring the protection of its sphere of influence (Ibid.: 11). Second, in part as a consequence of US failure in Vietnam, the Carter administration’s (1977-1981) focus on human rights had diminished the power that US military could exercise in counterinsurgency operations throughout the hemisphere (Metz 1995). The administration’s neglect of the IAMR did not mean that US military interaction with Latin American militaries was to stop; it rather meant a covert interaction in most South American countries and a direct military intervention in Central America. This shift engendered yet another turn in geopolitical narratives.

Soon after 1979, when the Sandinista revolution broke out,12 two scripts emerged. On the one hand, Central America was depicted as a quagmire in need of direct external intervention by US security forces; this part of the hemisphere needed to be pacified. On the other hand, South America was portrayed as a realm of consolidated nation-states; sovereignty, then, had to be respected and direct intervention was deemed impossible. The latter script came to reinforce the US military’s sympathy for South American security forces; after all, South American military cadres were playing an important role in the ‘natural’ historic process of

12 The interaction between US and Nicaraguan military institutions between 1929 and 1979 demonstrates the fabric of the Inter-American Military Regime (see Grossman 2005). The IAMR did not seek US direct intervention in Latin America; its objective was to create a cross-border military network of intelligence, surveillance and counterinsurgency able to operate throughout the hemisphere.
state building.\textsuperscript{13} In this context, it was considered a matter of internal evolution for these societies to transit from dictatorship to democracy, as in the case of Southern Cone societies, or to deal with subversion and the emerging drug kingpins, as in the case of Andean societies. South American security forces thus continued to be trained at the SOA and other military training schools in the US. Furthermore, some Latin American military officers were the instructors of the new form of warfare that was to replace counterinsurgency operations: Low Intensity Warfare.

The idea of a Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) started to circulate in US military academies in the early 1980s. LIC was coined as part of the geopolitical narratives that emerged to deal with the Central American ‘quagmire’ (Sandinista Nicaragua, the FMLN in El Salvador, and the communist uprising in Guatemala, in particular). As a result of the emergence of LIC as a military concept, the subject of counterinsurgency, which had been suppressed from the US army after Vietnam, was reintroduced. And military training institutions, such as the Army’s Special Warfare Center, the SOA, and the Air Force’s Special Operations School expanded their offerings on counterinsurgency attempting to integrate lessons from Vietnam. The emergence of post-Vietnam counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine, which was to dominate military thinking in Central America, Colombia and Peru throughout the 1980s, was thus the result of

\textit{... the explosion of thinking and debate about low-intensity conflict... [As a] number of serving and former government officials, retired officers, and analysts at government-related think-tanks began to write on low-intensity conflict[,]... [a]rticles on counterinsurgency returned in force to military publications such as Military Review, Parameters, and Marine Corps Gazette after a decade-long hiatus (Metz 1995: 11).}

The post-Vietnam counterinsurgency doctrine, which was implemented in earnest in El Salvador, was based in two principles: (1) the US must not assume control of the conflict and (2) military activities should be subordinate to economic, political, and psychological activities designed to augment the legitimacy of the government (Ibid.: 15). The emphasis put on counterinsurgency as a ‘domestic’ enterprise and US support for the UK in the Falklands War (1982) demonstrated that the IAMR had been superseded by the consolidation of a North Atlantic Military Regime. From the first Reagan administration (1981-1984) onwards,

\textsuperscript{13} This contradicted the Carter administration’s relationship with Pinochet and Videla, which sought to exercise some pressure on Chile’s dictator and Argentina’s junta due to the international campaigns of denunciation of human rights violations, but softened the path for Reagan’s quiet diplomacy toward Chile (Roniger 2010: 34-6).
military relations in Latin America were to be carried out through bilateral agreements, depending on the needs of each country. The US military’s shift weakened military rule in the Southern Cone dictatorships, contributing to processes of demilitarisation and democratisation. The opposite, though, was the case in countries in which the military had taken on board the idea of a LIC. In Colombia, for example, the process of militarisation started in the mid 1960s was only partially dismantled in 1991, when a new Constitution was signed.

Importing Salvadorian counterinsurgency warfare into 1980s Colombia

Throughout the 1980s, Colombian military institutions with the support and advice of US military, and thanks to learning about the Central American experience at the SOA, carried out low-intensity warfare that resembled Salvadorian counterinsurgency operations. During the 1970s, Salvadorian military forces integrated a large right-wing paramilitary and vigilante branch (Organización Democrática Nacionalista) to the sophisticated state-security agencies (Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia) created in the 1960s; this displacement of the state’s repressive functions to intermediaries was the distinctive element of the low-intensity warfare and the cornerstone for the proliferation of death squads in 1980s (Lauria-Santiago 2005: 97-9). The emergence of privately controlled death squads did not mean however “that the violence came from fringe elements on the left and right” as the Reagan administration contended (Ibid.: 100); it rather demonstrated that, similar to the Colombian case, various collective violent actors were amalgamating into a perpetrator bloc of terror-sponsored violence to crumble opposition movements. Massacres in the countryside were not only autonomously carried out by death squads, but were also part of the counterinsurgency practices of the army; counterinsurgency instructed by the US military and the CIA focused on identifying and eliminating rebel leaders and sympathizers.14 The Salvadorian experience allowed for the emergence of ‘a counterinsurgency war delegated to private actors’ (Guerrero 1999: 245), which was to be followed in the US fight against Sandinista Nicaragua and would have “an organic nexus with the proliferation of paramilitary groups that took place throughout the 1980s in Colombia” (Gomez-Suarez 2010: 158).

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14 According to Lauria-Santiago, the counterinsurgency program in El Salvador was based on the Vietnam-era Phoenix Program; as a consequence, the ones that suffered violence were the “Peasants who had not left a rebel-controlled zone during the early years of the war [and hence] were perceived by the military to be actual or potential FMLN supporters” (2005: 101).
Between 1982 and 1993, the Colombian military sometimes openly, but most of the times covertly, contravened presidential plans that attempted to bring to an end the armed conflict with different guerrilla groups. In the case of President Betancur, the army openly disagreed with the peace talks between the government and FARC. The military maintained that the only possible way of securing public order was to do away with communism. This is evident in the writings of Gen. Fernando Landazábal (1980), who was to become Commander of the Armed Forces during the first part of the Betancur administration. Furthermore, as the quote below shows, Gen. Landazábal’s view demonstrates that contrary to Betancur’s attempts to see leftist guerrilla groups as relative enemies, the NSD continued to inform the military perception of subversion as an absolute enemy and, even more dangerous, the PC as the mastermind behind the guerrilla uprising.

Guerrilla groups have only been pawns… [of] the Colombian Communist Party [which] has been the instrument that sustains, feeds and encourages pawns’ moves… and Cuba, sometimes as the intermediary but always the champion of Russian doctrine and strategy in Latin America… ensures the Soviet Union’s success (Landazábal 1985: 194).

Gen. Landazábal opposition to Betancur’s peace policy forced his retirement in 1984. Before he stepped down, however, the military had decided to carry out an undercover battle against communism. Following the example of El Salvador in the 1970s, and thanks to Colombian legislation (Decree 893 of 1965 was still in place), the army started to arm peasants to support its counterinsurgency operations with a right wing paramilitary structure (see Reyes 2007: 356). The military formed death squads, as part of the first operations carried out against opposition movements, which were seen as enemies not only for being sympathizers of the guerrillas but also because they were ‘communist’. During these operations, some Colombian SOA graduates managed regional intelligence networks, which had at its core right wing paramilitary groups but had also allied with privately controlled death squads (Gill 2004: xv-xvi). In 1985, when the UP was launched, a military mindset deeply influenced by the NSD, immediately regarded the group as the ‘internal enemy’ embodying an existential threat to the nation:

The recent launching of the [UP] party obeys, amongst other things, to the need to make come true FARC’s last decision of becoming the People’s Army… the whole party, in a given moment will take arms… and an important and definitive step would have occurred towards the takeover of power (Landazábal 1985: 233).
Put simply, the last two sections show that the military mindset played a central role in polarising the grammars of identity/alterity informing the idea of a Colombian collective self. Since the mid 1970s, military institutions construed the PC as the internal enemy. This, together with the circulation of narratives portraying it as the mastermind behind the guerrilla uprising, had by the mid 1980s set up the basis to interpret social unrest as a battle between ‘us’ without-guns-and-for-democracy and an ‘other’ with-guns-and-for-communism. By framing the emergence of the UP in this con-text, the long-lasting antipathy of military sectors towards the PC was automatically transferred to the UP.

The School of the Americas: the exchange and production of scripts amongst hemispheric security forces (1980 – 2000)

Scholars working on state-sponsored violence in Latin America and human rights NGOs have demonstrated the central role the SOA played in the training of hundreds of military officers who during the 1980s went back to countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador and Colombia to carry out a counterinsurgency warfare that disregarded human rights (i.e., Menjívar and Rodríguez 2005; Esparza, Huttenbach, and Feierstein 2010; Nelson-Pallmeyer 1997; Gill 2004). This is not to blame the US military alone; human rights violations in Latin America can only be understood as the product of an intersubjective interaction between various clusters of military officers. Therefore, perhaps, Human Rights Watch (HRW) Deputy Director Anne Mannuel stated that the school played an important role not because it was simply training officers to become murderers and dictators, but because “it gives them more prestige and gives them more power when they go home” (quoted in Schmhmitt 1995: A8). However, her statement misses the important point that the US military anticommunist ideology allowed for a further radicalisation of Latin American militaries. This explains the similarities between Gen. Landazábal’s statements and those of Lt. Col. Donald M. MacCay’s –commander of the US Army Jungle Operations Training Center at Fort Sherman in Panamá:

why should we let what America considers its greatest opponent –communism– get a foothold in

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15 It is worth noting that the school did not represent itself as an altruistic institution. As Col. Michael Sierra, the school commander during the 1980s, bluntly put it “the school is an extension of our foreign policy […] And our foreign policy tries to influence people in a manner beneficial to the United States” (The Chicago Tribune 1984: A24).
the region, when we can rip it in the bud when it’s still at the early stages of guerrilla warfare? (The Christian Science Monitor 1984: 1).

Such similarity shows that the narratives shaping the Colombian military mindset were to a great extent shaped by the interaction with US militaries in training courses at the SOA (and other military schools) and also by direct military collaboration. Notwithstanding the importance of US military academies, the American Military Summits were another important source of NSD conceptions for the Colombian military. This was evident in a Summit held in Argentina, as late as 1987, in which it was argued that the army still had “an important role [to play] in ‘internal defence’ and therefore the fight against international communism could involve the armed forces in ‘an intervention in all areas of power’” (The Wall Street Journal 1989: A10).

Public criticism against the SOA first surfaced in 1990. The involvement of Salvadoran SOA graduates in the assassination of six Jesuit priests ignited a series of demonstrations at Fort Benning, Georgia, demanding that the school stop training Latin American militaries (Gill 2004: 200). In the years to follow evidence of former SOA students involvement in human right abuses was to pile up. In 1996, Rev. Roy Bourgeois, Head of SOA-Watch, in a letter to The New York Times, argued that 73 percent of the soldiers cited for atrocities by the Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador were trained at SOA (Bourgeois 1996: A18). Soon after, a huge controversy started because of the training manuals being used at the SOA; the excerpt that follows, from an article that appeared in The New York Times, gives an account of the magnitude of the issues raised by the disclosure of the manuals.

Training manuals... recommended bribery, blackmail, threats and torture against insurgents... The manuals –written in Spanish and carrying titles like ‘interrogation’ and ‘revolutionary war and communist ideology’– advocated tactics that the Pentagon said violated American policy and principles... The tactics included ‘motivation by fear, payments of bounties for enemy dead, false imprisonment, executions and the use of truth serum’. Army intelligence officials compiled the manuals in 1987 from lesson plans that had been in use since 1982. The Pentagon said ‘as many as a thousand copies’ of the manuals had been used at the School or distributed by the US Southern Command's training units in Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru. ... the Pentagon and the US Southern Command... defended the School’s as ‘an important strategic asset’. The Pentagon said the mistake was based on the use of ‘old fashioned’ reflecting policies of the 1960s. The US Southern Command notified governments in Latin America that the ‘manuals contained passages that did not represented US Government policy’ (Myers 1996: 13).

What seems important to note in regards to these manuals is that, as chapter 2 discussed, from
the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, the UP campaigned against the contra-guerrilla manuals used by the Colombian army. In the political struggle to press the government to force the army to get rid of these manuals, the UP argued that the manuals were an adaptation of US counterinsurgency manuals; this was an important narrative in the anti-geopolitics of the UP (see chapter 7). For the time being, suffice to say that the extract above shows that UP members were quite right in their claims.

Throughout the 1990s, as a reaction to the strong criticism against the SOA, Pentagon officials and the US military saw the need to defend the school. Pentagon officials argued that the school was important because it forged “closer ties between American military personnel and their Latin American counterparts, and helps Washington’s goal of instilling the concept of civilian control in emerging democracies” (Schmmitt 1995: A8), while the School’s commander, Col Roy R. Trumble, showed how it had adapted to ‘transformations in the international system’ by stating that “clearly, there is more attention paid to human rights than there was 5 years ago” (Ibid.). In order to defend the school, militaries, such as Maj. Jaime F. Lilinet, went as far as arguing

Maybe we don’t have to send American forces to Latin America because of the students who came here… If we close the school, maybe we’re going to have to go back to the interventionist policies of Teddy Roosevelt, because when there is a security threat in Latin America, you know we’re going to be there (The New York Times 1999b: A18).

Nevertheless, the strong opposition to the SOA forced the military to change its name in 2000; it was renamed as the Western Hemispheric Institute of Security Cooperation.16

The narratives that Pentagon and military officials used were part of a new geopolitical discursive ensemble, which articulated human rights and democracy as the axes of the US and Latin American militaries’ interaction in the hemisphere. In the Colombian case, in particular, counter-narcotics training was represented as the path to follow to secure democracy. Although Colombian militaries accounted for half of the trainees during the 1990s, their human rights records improved slowly.17 What makes even more difficult to assess the effectiveness of the courses is that while the security forces’ human rights record improved,

16 “The House voted this year effectively to shut the school by eliminating the money for students’ scholarships, but the financing narrowly survived in September [1999] when the Senate sided with the Army… The Army would still provide combat training, especially for commanders of small units, which… are critical to dealing with countries’ security threats, specially from drug traffickers” (The New York Times 1999a: A22).
17 “More than 150 Colombian SOA graduates have been linked to human rights abuses and paramilitary death squads during the1980s and 1990s” (Leech quoted in Dugas 2005: 240).
human rights abuses by rightwing paramilitary groups skyrocketed. It has been reported that in order to improve their human rights records various units and brigades of the Colombian army and national police overlooked paramilitary activities.18

Because of the UP-FARC script the UP was trapped in the ‘dirty war’ carried out by the military sector of the perpetrator bloc, within which it was singled out as the ‘internal enemy’ to be destroyed. Although during the 1980s there were nationwide genocidal campaigns against the UP, throughout the 1990s regional genocidal campaigns were carried out to wipe out the few UP strongholds that remained. In both periods the military mindset –shaped by NSD principles and their legacy– saw the UP and FARC as indistinguishable (see chapter 2). What explains the different scope of the campaigns is that during the 1980s the US military anticommmunist ideology allowed Colombian militaries to carry out counterinsurgency operations –based on SOA’s training manuals– against ‘communist subversives’ without restraints on the use of violence; this enabled various military units to be central to regional coalitions for violence. As a result, by 1991 the UP’s national socio-political power had faded away. Thereafter, military involvement in the genocidal campaigns against the UP was less visible; the consolidation of the human rights discourse and the strong disapproval of SOA’s counterinsurgency training propelled Colombian security forces to improve human rights records, which slowly started to do so. However, as Dugas points out,

strong ties continue[d] to exist between the armed forces and the paramilitaries... By 2000, Human Rights Watch had documented abundant and compelling evidence linking at least half of Colombia’s brigade-level army units (excluding military schools) to paramilitary activity (2005: 237).

Between 1995 and 1997, the ACCU-led coalition for violence not only carried out the last genocidal campaign against the UP in Urabá without any attempt from the security forces to bring it to a halt, but it also teamed up with some militaries to bring about the destruction of the group. In other regions, the military, in fact, deployed narco-paramilitary units, which wiped out former UP strongholds represented as FARC strongholds.

The military mindset had, and it still has, at its core an anticommmunist ideology that feeds militaries’ antipathy towards social movements and leftist political leaders associated with

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18 In September 2009, the Historical Memory Committee part of the National Reconciliation and Reconstruction Commission released a report on the Salado Massacre demonstrating the passivity of the security forces in the assassination of 61 persons by a paramilitary group in Northern Colombia in February 2000. See http://elespectador.com/impreso/articuloimpreso161054-esa-guerra-no-era-nuestra (retrieved on 6 October 2009).
the FARC; therefore, the war on drugs –increasingly militarised during the 1990s– was in the mind of Colombian militaries a continuation of the war against Marxist-narcoguerrillas. Thus, instead of helping to combat drug trafficking, the training of Colombian cadres at SOA and US military funding strengthened both the hyperreal sympathy between military clusters in the liberal western hemispheric military network and the fabric of an alliance between paramilitary death squads, drug traffickers’ private armies, regional political entrepreneurs, and security agencies, which in fighting the FARC circulated a radicalised antipathy towards the UP. As in the military mindset the UP was (and still is) equated with FARC, the UP genocide was disguised as being the outcome of a clash between right wing paramilitary groups, FARC, and security forces. Disguising the UP genocide under the complex intertwinement of multiple violent collective actors, the Colombian and US militaries aided the transnational reproduction of indifference against the UP, which came to inform the US Congressmen’s scripting of the ‘Colombian tragedy’.

_Narcoguerrillas and narcoterrorism: scripting existential threats to Colombia’s survival (1984 – 2010)_

Chapter 3 explains in detail how various units of the security forces colluded with various violent actors throughout the 1980s and 1990s so as to bring down the socio-political power of the UP. So far, this chapter has discussed how the military mindset, which contributed to the formation and consolidation of the perpetrator bloc, was intertwined with the Inter-American military cooperation since the 1950s. This assemblage of interactions came about in a specific historical (discursively produced) moment: the outset, unfolding and end of the cold war (Campbell 1998b). In this con-text, the anticommunist struggle, produced, reproduced and reinforced by political leaders –advocates of _realpolitiks_– was the middle ground between military institutions. In the late 1980s, however, with the collapse of communism the US military mindset started to move towards global police-related operations. The first move was the militarisation of the ‘war on drugs’. This move was quite straightforward in Andean states because since the early 1980s a link between insurgency and drug trafficking had developed. Colombia was at the centre of the merger between counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics operations.

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19 The militaries disregarded the complex processes taking place within the UP, thus they played a central role in creating a script that allowed for simplistic representations of reality, which resulted in the stigmatization of the UP across socio-economic and political networks. Chapter 2 discusses the complexities of the UP.
1984 was an important year for new representations that started to circulate amongst US drug enforcement officials and militaries. Two important events prompted the consolidation of these new narratives. First, on 10 March the Tranquilandia cocaine-lab owned by Gacha was discovered in Caquetá and a FARC camp was found just about half mile away from it. The raid of the lab was the result of a joint effort between the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and Colombian National Police (CNP). The importance of this event is that the proximity of FARC camp to the lab demonstrated, in view of US and Colombian enforcement agencies, that Colombia was in fact fighting narcoguerrillas (see US House of Representatives 1984: 16). This concept had been an implicit signifier defining US foreign policy towards Colombia since the early days of the Reagan administration; however, it became the central script defining US-Colombian political and military relations thereafter. US military thus emphasised their distrust for the Betancur-FARC peace talks not only by arguing that it was part of FARC’s strategy of power takeover, but also by stressing its organic link with the consolidation of narcotics cartels. The script allowed the US embassy in Bogotá to legitimate violent practices against the UP and social movements by stating that these actions were taking “place in rural areas where armed forces were fighting guerrilla groups. In such cases persons wounded or killed may have been engaged in guerrilla or criminal activity” (US Department of State 1986: 465). Second, on 30 April, thugs apparently hired by drug traffickers assassinated Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. According to media reports and police investigations, the assassination was Gacha’s revenge for the close cooperation between Lara and the DEA. The significance of this event is that, after Lara’s assassination, US military and enforcement agencies started to see drug trafficking as the main source of criminal and political violence in Colombia. Thus, Colombia was actually threatened not only by narcoguerrillas, but also by narcoterrorists. This was to become an important script throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, the assassination of UP leaders, such as Jaime Pardo Leal and Bernardo Jaramillo, were, according to the accounts of the Military Group of the US embassy, carried out by the drug traffickers’ attempts to destabilise the country (see US Department of State 1988, 1991).

Nonetheless, narcoterrorists and narcoguerrillas were dynamic scripts that at times blurred together, such as during and in the immediate aftermath of the Palace of Justice takeover by the M-19 in November 1985, when Colombian military restated that an implicit alliance between guerrilla groups and drug kingpins threatened the survival of ‘Colombian
democratic society’. These scripts, initially dominating the military mindset, permeated other social networks in Colombia and across the Atlantic; hence US media statements, such as

the United States has trained 13500 Colombian officers and non-commissioned officers since 1950. But the Colombian army… is disintegrating in the face of terrorist insurgents and cocaine traffickers (The New York Times 1988: 17).

became a common account of the violence in 1980s Colombia, allowing US military to assert that Colombia’s stability depended on the continuation of US military training. Other times, one of the two main scripts would be emphasised, positioning it as the largest threat to Colombian society. This was the case after Galán’s assassination in August 1989. Then, narcoterrorists declared ‘war’ on the establishment, becoming regarded by the military-politico-socio-economic Colombian ruling class as the enemies of Colombian society.

During the 1990s, US military cooperation with Colombia’s security forces was based on narcoterrorists script, and the US military could continue to train Colombian armed forces. However, some political leaders in the US Congress questioned the cooperation because of the appalling human rights record of the CNP and the army. Only in 1998, when the Pastrana-FARC peace talks were on the horizon, both Colombian and US security agencies started shifting emphasis towards the narcoguerrillas script again. In less than three years Colombia went from being depicted as a narcodemocracy to be portrayed as a quasi-failed state (see chapter 5). The US military reloaded the narcoguerrillas script based on the rapid military build up of the FARC and created the failed state one because of Colombian political elites’ unwillingness to increase military expenditure to reform the army. This put some pressure on President Pastrana, who commissioned Minister of Defence Rodrigo Lloreda with designing a modernisation program for the armed forces. This became a central part of Plan Colombia, a priority of the second Clinton administration’s foreign policy in the hemisphere. By 2002, when the peace talks broke off, the narcoguerrillas and narcoterrorists scripts merged into what the military regarded as narcoterrorist guerrillas. The script was taken on board and became central part of the geopolitics of the war on terror supported by the Uribe administration since 9/11.

Throughout the last 25 years, these scripts played different roles in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture that saw the unfolding of the destruction of the UP. During the mid 1980s the hyperreal threat of the narcoguerrillas helped to generate antipathy towards the UP. The military portrayed the UP both as part of the FARC’s political strategy and as a
mechanism that allowed the FARC’s involvement on drug trafficking in peripheral regions. The generalised impression of the UP as untrustworthy spread by the military was to prevail amongst wider sectors of urban populations. From the late 1980s until 2002 the hyperreal narcoterrorist threat helped to unify some sectors of urban populations under the fear of the collapse of the state. As the UP had continued challenging the Colombian Establishment, the military portrayed the UP as unpatriotic group and a threat to the survival of the Colombian state; this created widespread indifference to the hardship suffered by UP members. Broader sectors of Colombian society relied on military accounts of the genocidal massacres against UP members in Urabá, which were presented as the product of a war declared by the ACCU against the enduring UP-FARC alliance. Since 2002, the hyperreal narcoterrorist guerrilla threat has been instrumentalised by the military so as to impose a state of exception. In this context, the past and present genocidal practices against the UP have been relegated to official oblivion. Up until 2010, the hyperreal global war against terrorism allowed not only the rewriting of history but also the neglect of events such as assassinations, disappearances, tortures and forced displacement of UP survivors.

Conclusion

The intense interaction between the Colombian and US militaries between the early 1950s and the late 1960s not only allowed the circulation and reproduction of an anticommunist ideology, but also enabled the Colombian military to inscribe its autonomy regarding public order with antipathy towards anyone challenging the ‘traditional’ social order. This antipathy informed the polarisation of the encompassing grammar of identity/alterity through which the relationship with the PC and other leftist political groups was to be structured. By the late 1970s, the Colombian military had escalated the targeting of PC and other leftist political groups. The genocidal character of the transnational Condor system had by then started to shape the tactics of the Colombian military. This converged with the generation and circulation of the LIC syntax in US military academies. By rebranding counterinsurgency as a military-led domestic enterprise indirectly supported by the US, militaries across the continent were allowed to step up the campaigns against communist subversion. This solidified the links between military clusters in Central America, the Andean Region, and the Southern Cone, as demonstrated in “the mission of [Argentinean] military advisors training counterinsurgency forces in El Salvador and Central America between 1978 and 1982”
(Sheinin quoted in Roniger 2010: 36) and the importing of the Salvadorian counterinsurgency model by the Colombian military at the turn of the 1980s.

The covert counterinsurgency campaigns carried out by the Colombian military from 1982 to 1986 targeted dissidents and subversives alike, however once the UP was publicly launched, the military’s antipathy towards dissidents (PC) and subversives (FARC) allowed for the specific targeting UP leaders. Military leaders recreated and circulated the idea that the UP was part of FARC’s conscription strategy, surreptitiously directed by the PC. The imaginary that Colombia was to turn into another Nicaragua, resulted in the proliferation of paramilitary groups and deaths squads. Through military trainings at SOA and other US military institutions and American Military Summits, military networks continued circulating the narratives of the NSD and imagining the nation as a self, whose identity was under threat. By the mid 1980s, the antigrand of destroying the ‘internal enemy’ had been instilled in the Colombian military mindset, and the segmentary grammar of identity/alterity came to structure the military relations with outlaws. This created a rather loose perpetrator bloc which contributed to the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Thus military and drug traffickers’ death squads entered into conflict and/or cooperated according to context. As the military’s counterinsurgency strategy was the engine of the dirty war during these years, and this was supported by the liberal western hemispheric military network, the participation of the army in death squads and the orchestration of military plans aimed at the UP was quite open. During the 1990s, the military covertly supported paramilitary groups to carry out the genocidal campaign against the UP, this was so because (1) the Salvadorian counterinsurgency tactics were still informing CIA, Pentagon and Colombian military interactions and (2) the liberal western hemispheric military network had come under strong criticism because of the human rights violations uncovered in the mid 1990s.

Since the early 1980s the three scripts (re)produced by US and Colombian militaries, namely narcoguerrillas, narcoterrorist, and narcoterrorist guerrillas, have circulated and shaped a fluid military mindset that knitted together (with more or less intensity) communism, drug trafficking, and terrorism according to the geopolitical con-text. The criminalisation of ideological struggles not only permitted the participation of the Colombian military in the emergence of the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide but also aided to maintain the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. The US military’s sympathy for the
Colombian military’s struggle against the existential threats to the nation has been since then an important source of indifference for the suffering of broader social sectors associated with terrorist insurgencies, such as the UP. Moreover, radicalized antipathy of the Colombian military towards the UP has to some extent continued because of the solidarity between US and Colombian militaries. In this vein, today’s denial of the genocide needs to be understood as an expression of the close tie bringing together a US-Colombian military alliance at the core of a partially reinvigorated liberal western hemispheric military network, which aims to secure a fictive collective self from the threat posed by a conglomerate of rogue states, terrorist organisations, and criminals.

To conclude, anticommunist narratives circulating in the liberal western hemispheric military network aided to shape a Colombian military mindset that construed political contestants as military targets. Contrary to the ‘domestic-perpetrator’ fantasy supported by the genocide script, this chapter thus demonstrates that the central role Colombian military cadres played in the crystallisation of the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide was to a large extent the materialisation of the western military clusters’ (re)production of hyperreal geopolitical threats. However, as the next chapter discusses, this was only possible because such threats had been written in tandem with dominant political networks.
5 The Hyperreal Writing of Colombia: Contextualising the UP Genocide in US Foreign Policy Space

Genocidal geopolitical conjunctures are space-time convergences that crystallise when narratives are (re)created within transnational military, political, social and economic networks enabling the production of genocidal violence in locales connected with other sites in which the reproduction of the social relations of such networks takes place. Military networks, as chapter 4 shows, circulate narratives that shape mindsets that allow the targeting of civilian social networks depicted as geopolitical threats to a fictive collective self. By representing themselves as the guardians of social orders, different military clusters manage to deal with contingency, thus shaping the space of politics. In totalitarian regimes and dictatorships politics are openly intermixed with military affairs; hence, when genocides unfold the perpetrator is commonly abstracted as the state and the genocidal sites as contained within the territories it controls which are represented as disconnected from the realm of western liberal democracies. This is how, as chapter 1 discusses, the genocide script aids to write off genocide from the milieu in which liberal social relations are reproduced. This chapter challenges the genocide script by contextualising the UP genocide within US foreign policy space.

The chapter shows that despite Colombia and the US being liberal democracies in which politicians presented themselves as the defenders of life, individualism and freedom, genocide unfolded amidst narratives that created others who were located outside the realm of liberalism. The threat the other posed to liberalism allowed for its violent destruction. However, as liberalism is a biopolitical governmentality that lies on the idea of letting live (Foucault 2007), political networks legitimated the violence within the encompassing grammar of identity/alterity. This is not to say that the antigrammar of genocide was exclusively circulating amongst military networks; Congress hearings show otherwise: US political elites constantly detached themselves from the suffering of those trapped in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture by simplifying reality and portraying themselves as the saviours of Colombian democracy. In so doing they advocated for the destruction of hyperreal threats, which were discursively connected with civilian social networks.
In regulating relations with the other, however, some politicians were more flexible than transnational military cadres and traditional US-Colombian political networks construing other collective selves as fixed entities unable to change. Encompassment allowed dialogues between some politicians and groups labelled as others, yet the ambiguity at the core of political networks’ narratives backfired, for the military based their interpretation of reality on some of the scripts persistently pushed by the ‘transnational political network’ to explain reality. This allowed the military to play an important role in the perpetrator bloc, which was paradoxically targeting the UP, which was brought into the political process by previous Colombian administrations. Thus the genocidal violence by the military was legitimated by narratives circulating in the grammars of identity/alterity of political networks, which advocated for exceptional measures to protect the space of a liberal social order.

US foreign policy was the space in which Colombia was written as the oldest democracy in the Western Hemisphere. As such, Colombia was slowly brought closer from the periphery to the core of US foreign policy. Paradoxically, the closer Colombia moved to the core, the larger the number of human rights violations carried out by the alliances between state agencies and outlaws. Politicians’ narratives accommodated the unfolding genocidal conjuncture within the space of liberalism by resorting to the reproduction and circulation of hyperreal threats that polarised affective-dispositions. Thus, such narratives (1) made invisible to larger sectors of social networks (bystanders) the suffering of those who had being regarded as others with who it was possible to coexist, (2) fuelled the radicalisation of violence entrepreneurs’ antipathy towards the ‘enemy within’, (3) instrumentalised sympathy amongst polarised sectors of the hegemonic bloc as a tool to overlook the genocidal practices in which various clusters of political and military networks were involved, and (4) recently enabled political networks to write a history in which there was not space for the UP genocide.

To con-textualise the UP genocide within the space of US foreign policy entails then to carry out a genealogy of the institutionalised ways of seeing and displaying Colombia as a particular locale in the Western Hemisphere. Because statespersons, politicians, military commanders, strategic thinkers and public intellectuals are at the centre of the production of scripts in the space of US foreign policy, the chapter looks
into their cross-border ‘dialogues’ between the late 1970s and 2008. The analysis is based on US Congress reports and hearings, which show that, Capitol Hill has been one of the concrete sites where from the liberal global space has been written about in the last twenty-five years. The overall aim here is to unveil the scripts that have produced the hyperreal writing of Colombia and the US as interrelated segments of the global space and which allowed for the UP genocide to happen.

The chapter is divided into four parts. First it discusses the late 1970s; it shows how the emergence of neoconservative public figures in the US was interpreted by some Colombian political elites as legitimating a tough stance against social movements. The second section analyses how through the Reagan years narcoguerrillas were depicted as the largest threat to Colombia; this hyperreal imagery weakened the Betancur-FARC peace talks and hid away the slow amalgamation of various actors into a loose perpetrator bloc. Third, it looks into how during the Bush senior administration the narcoterrorists threat enabled to blame the ‘Colombian drama’ on outlaws who were responsible for weakening the state. Finally, the chapter briefly considers the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush years so as to illustrate how the hyperreal writing of Colombia allowed for indifference vis-à-vis the UP during the 1990s and oblivion at the turn of the millennium.

*From Carter to Reagan: US neo-conservatism and the consolidation of the national security doctrine in Colombia*

The close relationship between Colombian and US political elites, which started with President Marco Fidel Suárez (1918-1921), was an important source of stability for the Colombian political system throughout the 20th century. It was not until the late 1970s that some disagreements between Bogotá and Washington emerged. Although US-Colombian relations went through ups-and-downs between 1978 and 1986, the relations between both countries had never before nor have ever since been as strained as they were between 1994 and 1998, as it would be clear later. What it seems important to note however is that throughout these years the UP genocide was disregarded. This is unsurprising, for as Ó Tuathail argues “US foreign policy is typically a mix of both ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, with strategic [and idealist] simulations and fantasies... existing side by side” (1992: 165). In the case of
Colombia, the strategic simulations revolved around the perils posed by insurgency and drug trafficking for the Western Hemisphere, whilst the idealist fantasies centred on seeing Colombia as the oldest democracy in the continent. Both simulations contributed to simplify Colombia’s reality and to put Colombia in different places in US foreign policy space.

The scripting of Colombia as the oldest democracy in the Americas in need of dealing with drug traffickers can be traced back to 1977, when President Jimmy Carter asked Congress to send a political mission to South America. The mission reported that

[1] The Colombian military has been and will continue to be very supportive of the democratic system. [2] The nation is no longer threatened by a serious insurgency problem as it was ten years ago… [3] President Lopez is establishing a highly trained, well-paid, elite organization to combat the drug traffickers (US Congress 1978: 3-4).

Despite the Carter administration’s early attempts to strengthen US-South American relations, Colombia occupied a marginal place in US foreign policy until the mid 1980s. Colombia’s peripheral role in Carter’s foreign policy had to do with his focus on human rights, which were part of the administration’s attempt to position the US above the ideological dispute in a post-cold war scenario.

By placing the US as the guardian of humanity, Carter carried on the confrontation with the Soviet Union without escalating animosity. By 1979, however, a sector of neoconservative thinkers and politicians had managed to ascend to powerful positions in the US government. This, together with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian Revolution, and the establishment of Sandinista Nicaragua enabled to recreate in the mind of the American public opinion the neoconservative representations used to produce and secure a particular US identity. Such representations were masterly condensed by Georgetown University Professor Jeane Kirkpatrick, who was to become US ambassador to the UN during the Reagan administration. In her attack on Carter, she put forward four realist simulations: first, she represented the world as a space in need of counterinsurgency rather than democracy. The US was thus called to be an interventionist force instead of being “the world’s midwife to democracy when the birth [was] scheduled to take place under conditions of guerrilla war” (Kirkpatrick 1979: 38). Second, President Carter
was portrayed as an ally of Communism: “Carter is, par excellence, the kind of liberal most likely to confound revolution with idealism” (Ibid.: 41-2). Third, rightwing dictatorships were represented as defenders of human rights:

there is a damning contrast between the number of refugees created by Marxist regimes and those created by other autocracies: more than a million Cubans have left their homeland since Castro’s rise… as compared to about 35000 each from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (Ibid.: 44).

Finally, Kirkpatrick described those opposing US policies not only as false democrats but also as real enemies:

If… revolutionary leaders describe the United States as the scourge of the 20th century, the enemy of freedom-loving people, the perpetrator of imperialism, racism, colonialism, genocide, war, then they are not authentic democrats or, to put it mildly, friends. Groups which define themselves as enemies should be treated as enemies (Ibid.: 45).

This neoconservative shift matched with President Turbay’s realist stand in Colombian politics. While Carter took some distance from militarised regimes, softly pushing for democratisation in Argentina and Brazil, Turbay recognised in 1978 that there were critical situations in which the military were called to govern in order to assure the survival of a given society (Leal 1989). Turbay’s statements, which allowed the military to exercise an open repression against communism, coincided with US ambassador to Colombia Diego Asencio’s acquiescent approach to extreme anticommunist tactics. This is evident in a 1978 cable to the Secretary of State, in which he reported that

a disturbing development of recent date is the delineation of a plan… approved in late November 1978 by gen. Jorege [sic] Robledo Pulido, commander of the army… to create the impression that the American Anti-communist Alliance (AAA) has establish itself in Colombia and is preparing to take violent actions against Colombian communists. However, the activities thus far carried out in pursuit of this plan, e.g. The bombing of the Colombian Communist Party’s headquarters on December 12 with no casualties might be more appropriately characterized as dirty tricks than as violations of human rights… I feel that the GOC record is still relatively clean, if not as pristine as it was last year… in the mean time, I urge the department to exercise extreme caution in reacting publicly to any but confirmed reports it may receive concerning alleged human
Asencio was a hardline anticommunist who, after being hostage for 61 days in the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogotá in 1980, was appointed as Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs during the early days of the Reagan administration. Before going to support Washington’s anticommunist crusade in the US capital, he helped pave the way for the Colombian military to envisage the possibility of importing Central American counterinsurgency doctrines to complement (the already adapted) Southern Cone NSD (see chapter 4). Moreover, he also reinforced Colombian rightwing politicians’ fantasy that Colombia was complying with human rights standards.

The increasing repression against communists was eclipsed by the Carter administration’s concern with drug trafficking. The discursive event that was to ignite the scripting of Colombia as the battleground to fight the war on drugs was the 1978 Peter Bourne’s memo charging that three prominent Colombian politicians had dirtied their hands in the drug trade, including Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, who was then the front-running Liberal candidate for president (Chepesiuk 2003: 60).

This, allowed Washington to put pressure on Turbay to “use chemicals for eradicating marijuana crops”, and his preference for trying “a frontal military offensive against drug traffickers,” resulted in an experimental fumigation (Tokatlíán 2003: 8-9).

Whilst the Carter administration was busy imposing chemical fumigation, Turbay’s hard-line approach to social unrest and crime was bringing about the consolidation of a rightwing mindset amongst traditional politicians who saw in the further militarisation of public order a means to continue securing their exclusive access to state institutions. This matched with the military mindset, which was merging public order with counterinsurgency (see chapter 4). Thus, the neoconservative scripting of reality had contributed to consolidate a hegemonic imagery upon which the military eventually became the axis of a covert apparatus of security integrating rightwing political, economic, and social networks’ antipathy.

1 The cable was unclassified in 2007. A PDF copy of the document can be found at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB223/index.htm (retrieved 2 November 2009; capital letters in original, italics added).
towards communism. By 1981, when Ronald Reagan came into power, the time was ripe for politicians, both in Colombia and the US, to slowly begin merging the war against communism with the war on drugs.

The Reagan doctrine and the Colombian dilemma: ‘peace is war’

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Colombia was depicted by both Carter and Reagan as one of the few democracies in the Western Hemisphere. Fighting the war on drugs was rewarded “with $16 million in additional anti-drug assistance” (Shifter and Stillerman 2004: 335). Nevertheless, by 1982, when Betancur assumed power, drug traffickers had thoroughly permeated social, economic and political circles in Colombia. Furthermore, dangerous alliances between drug traffickers, governmental officials and the army were proliferating in different regions of the country to fight guerrilla groups. When Vice President George H. W. Bush and President Reagan visited Colombia in August and December 1982, respectively, they scripted Colombia as a free society, which according to Reagan had a “profound tradition of law and liberty,”2 endangered by insurgents. In Bush’s view it was necessary that “the United States build a military base in Colombia to monitor the country’s insurgents” (Shifter and Stillerman 2004: 336).

Paradoxically, Betancur had since the outset of his administration distanced from Reagan and developed a more independent foreign policy. He called Colombia to join the Non-Aligned Movement and created alongside Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama the Contadora Group as a counterbalance to “the Reagan administration’s hardline policies in Central America” (Bagley and Tokatlián 1985: 41). Betancur’s shift in foreign policy reflected the changes he was to implement in domestic politics to “confront the regime’s deepening legitimacy crisis and the problem of continuing political violence” (Ibid.: 35). Once in office, he opened negotiations with various rebel groups and proposed a package of political reforms. Betancur’s alternative approach to Reagan’s tough anticommunist strategies made it possible for the FARC to regard the creation of the UP as a means to access the political system (see chapter 2).

Notwithstanding the Betancur-FARC peace talks, Colombia continued to fall steadily into a deep socio-political and humanitarian crisis. This was because of (1) the strengthening of DTOs, which developed a twofold strategy of regional power consolidation: politisation and militarisation; (2) a weak and inefficient judicial system, which allowed extremely high levels of impunity; and (3) the unfolding of a ‘dirty war’ that enabled various social groups to collude with collective violent actors in waging a counterinsurgency war delegated to private actors. The strengthening of drug kingpins, the weakening of the judicial system and the ultraconservative anticommunism triggering violence against the UP were not new; rather these developments had been evolving since Turbay’s opposition to Carter’s detente policy.

Betancur’s independent foreign policy came to an end in November 1985, when the M-19 takeover of the Palace of Justice was represented by US officials as an event that should “solidify perhaps more than ever the government’s resolve to crack down on narcotics-trafficking organizations” (US Congress 1986a: 51), thereby disregarding the political nature of the M-19 military action. Since then, the Reagan administration –unsupportive of the peace talks– began to pressure Betancur by pointing out the links between FARC and DTOs. According to Department of State official Jon Thomas, there were indications that the FARC was “directly involved in some of its 28 fronts, with providing protection to narcotics trafficking and processing organizations” (Ibid.: 51). Yet, as the principle of sovereignty was to guide US relations with a regime in which the army was committed to fighting communism and the government engaged with the US war on drugs, US officials were constantly recurring to the inside/outside dichotomy. Thus Thomas argued:

I wouldn’t say that we support or don’t support them in their truce with the FARC. That is an internal decision of the Colombian Government. We certainly support them in their antinarcotics operations and because of the truce or any type of peace negotiations, I have not seen any slackening off on the part of the Colombian Government against narcotics traffickers (Ibid.: 58).

Yet in the remaining months of his administration Betancur completely submitted to US politico-military pressure, which demanded a hard-line approach to deal with the crisis of legitimacy in Colombia.
These developments were linked to the hyperreality dominating Reagan’s foreign policy, which in an attempt to tackle the hyperreal threat of communism had, by 1985, encouraged alliances between the CIA, the contras in Nicaragua, Noriega in Panama, and the Medellín DTOs in Colombia.\(^3\) Such alliances were to be made public years later when the investigation into the Iran-contra scandal was carried out. From 1985 to 1989, the scripting of Colombia as a *democratic nation jeopardised by vicious outlaws* followed the traditional realist/idealist simulation pattern at the core of US foreign policy. Such scripting was part of the geopolitical imaginary that allowed Reagan to carry out a covert operation against ‘communism’ in Nicaragua and to overlook Andean nations’ murderous anticommunist tactics, which were fed by the monies destined for the ‘war on drugs’. This was possible because US Congress reports showed that

> the increased cooperation and collaboration between narcotics traffickers and terrorist groups constitute[d] a serious threat to US national security interests and to the political stability of numerous other countries (US Congress 1986b: 11).

The findings were supported by DEA intelligence operations, which were reported to Congress in November 1985. According DEA Assistant Administrator for Operations David Westrate, although there was “no information on any significant relationship between drug traffickers and terrorists in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay or Venezuela,” there was “limited intelligence on Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia” which demonstrated that “FARC groups ha[d] considered international trafficking in cocaine, in exchange for weapons” (US Congress 1986a: 57-8)

DEA’s reporting was in tune with Reagan’s anticommunism; countries within which leftist insurgencies were operating were thus scripted as spaces where terrorists and drug traffickers were allied against the state. In the case of Colombia, this was complemented by US complacent attitude towards the early violence against the UP. This to a large extent had to do with the fact that the US embassy in Bogotá continually transferred to Washington uncritical accounts of Colombian politics based on rightwing political representations. As early as 1986, the embassy was reporting that the “participation of the Patriotic Union, or FARC-UP, in the 1986 elections

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\(^3\) The complex relationship between drug traffickers and the contras is discussed in the Kerry Report (1989a: 36-61).
ha[d] generated a heated controversy over the possibility of ‘armed proselytizing’ by the FARC-UP in rural areas” (US Department of State 1986: 470).

It was only after 1989, when the Kerry Report brought to light how during Reagan’s war against communism that the drug cartels posed “a continuing threat to national security at home and abroad” (1989a: iv), that the struggle against communism was relegated to a second place in US foreign policy. Nevertheless, the report carried on using the common scripts in describing Colombia as “the oldest democracy in Latin America” threatened by the alliance between drug traffickers and guerrillas (see, Ibid.: 25, 28).

What these representations of Colombia did not tell is that AI visited Colombia in 1988 and found that since the election of President Barco, an increasing number of assassinations of political activists were taking place along with the ‘systematic extermination’ of the UP. According to AI, paramilitary groups were not the only perpetrators, alongside them high rank army and police officers and drug traffickers had orchestrated violent actions and many government officials had colluded with them. After AI published the report Minister of Defence Gen. Rafael Samudio responded that the armed forces only acted in defence of Colombia’s democratic institutions. Most Ministers of the Barco administration followed suit and supported Samudio’s claims (Ramírez 1988).

The disregard for the genocidal violence against the UP did not mean, however, that Washington was unaware of the situation. On the contrary, the Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices (HRP) partially recognised that “1987 witnessed an increase in the number of assassinations apparently motivated by politics” and that the “Communist-supported UP party continued to be a principal target of such violence.” Yet in an attempt to downplay military and politicians involvement in the actions, the report added that

Motives for the killings are difficult to establish, but probably include personal, narcotics related, and other criminal reasons in addition to political motives... various guerrilla groups, drug traffickers, organised bands of hired killers, paramilitary ‘death squads’ and independent elements of the police and military acting outside the scope of their official duties escalated the already high level of violence, directly challenging the Government’s ability to maintain order and preserve democratic institutions (1988: 426-7, italics added).
US political networks scripted an incomplete reality as the overarching feature of the Colombian tragedy, in which Colombian elites and military commanders were represented as the helpless defenders of democracy. Uncommitted adverbs, such as ‘apparently’, were part of the rhetoric that allowed US statesmen to portray themselves as objective observers and to subtly offer support to the Barco administration while shedding some doubt on the actual involvement of some of its members on the violent actions. However, US politicians’ scripting of Colombia often relied on hasty representations put forward by administration officials, as it was the case in UP President Pardo’s assassination, when drug trafficker Gacha was blamed for the action (Ibid.: 429). The scripting of Colombia in US foreign policy had, at least since the late 1970s, been created by the cross-border interaction of politicians, militaries and intellectuals. In the reproduction of this interplay of representations, the hyperreal oldest democracy threatened by hyperreal narcoterrorists overshadowed the dirty war and the unfolding of the UP genocide. This implicitly supported the grammars of identity/alterity that reproduced the idea of a fictive liberal collective self, which encompassed both Colombian and US national identities.

By the time Reagan left office, the interaction between official US and Colombian political networks had firmly established the script that Colombia was the main battlefield in which the war on drugs was to be fought. Whilst the exchange of various representations through diplomatic channels allowed such scripting, the onset of massacres against peasant sectors of the UP had given way to a quick escalation of violence against the group (see chapter 2). The genocidal practices taking place on Colombian soil had been eclipsed by the realist fantasy of waging war against a social practice (drug addiction), which, because of its illegal character, had allowed immense profits to be made by rather marginal actors in Colombia. This is not to say

4 The influence of public intellectuals became increasingly important after 1988. The proliferation of reports on Colombia forced political elites in the US to open up the space for inviting academics and journalist to discuss the drug issue. In 1989, for example, Professor Bruce Bagley was invited to a seminar in which he stated “Though institution building has had a bad name from the Alliance for Progress era in Latin America, viable states are essential to the implementation of US policy” (US Congress 1989b: 19). The same year, Colombian journalist Fabio Castillo was invited to a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, his statement reinforced the scripting of Colombia: the Medellín Cartel’s “only weapon is violence and their only aspiration is to undermine the oldest democracy in Latin America” (US Congress 1989c: 64).

5 Christian Allen’s analysis touches the core of the drug issue: “drug prohibition is the mechanism that transforms coca from cheap commodity to immensely valuable consumer product. Drug enforcement can be modeled as a tax that raises the supply curve and leads to higher equilibrium prices and greater
that the Colombian drug kingpins were not real people resorting to violence in order to defend their private interest. Instead, it is to say that the war on drugs had created the opportunity for drug lords to gather together and set up various collective violent actors, which regularly colluded with other social actors in violent campaigns aimed at the UP. Conveniently, these events had been hidden by a schematic narrative that was to allow the US to start playing a ‘police-role’ in the changing international order.

George H. W. Bush’s New World Order: the hyperreal writing of the Colombian drug cartels threat

The International Narcotics Act of 1986 enabled US policymakers to envision a ‘new role’ for the US vis-à-vis Latin America in the 1990s. This meant a slow reaccommodation of the whole region in the space of US foreign policy. A hyperreal threat coming from Colombia was a central part of redefining the setting of US-Latin American relations. In 1987, cross-border policing began to operate. This, according to US enforcement agencies, was a response to the alignment of Colombian DTOs with Mexican traffickers who attempted to take advantage of the Mexican’s heroin and marijuana smuggling and distribution networks already in place in the US (see US Congress 1987). Over time, policing activities were complemented by bringing the military into the counter-drug strategy; two developments in Colombia during 1988 and 1989 enabled to this to happen.

First, the assassination of Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos in January 1988 stepped up US Congress pressure to give the army a more prominent role in the war on drugs. US Congressman Christopher Smith (R-NJ), for instance, argued that in “Colombia the traffickers, the guerrillas… the NARC FARC and… all the little buzz words we use are winning… And we are losing… And where is the Army?” (US Congress 1988b: 38). Alongside Smith’s call for the army to step in, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Robert Gelbard stated

Colombia faces an extraordinary challenge to the survival of its long-lasting democratic system. The Medellín narcotics criminals have made a conscious decision to do whatever is necessary to save their lives and their lifestyles even if the result is the destruction of spending on drugs… corruption functions as an informal ‘tax’ on smuggling and traffickers viewed it as a necessary business expense” (2005: 30-2).
the judicial foundation of that system (Ibid.: 57).

This scripting of Colombia explicitly dismissed the unfolding genocidal campaigns against the UP and disregarded the fact that various government officials and military leaders had built up alliances with Medellín DTOs (and other illegal organisations) in an effort to destroy the judicial system and do away with ‘undesirable people’ doing ‘armed proselytising’ (see chapter 6). The conclusion reached by US officials that more military assistance was needed was then unsurprising. However, as congressional hearings show, the time was not ripe to fully militarise the war on drugs, despite the fact that some members in Congress were advocating for doing so. Congressman Smith, for example, disagreed with the division of labour to fight guerrillas and drug trafficking, in his view “the military could be used on fighting both fronts” (US Congress 1988b).

The second event was Galán’s assassination in August 1989. This was the turning point in bringing about a police-military strategy so as to fight the war on drugs. Barco’s reaction to Galán’s assassination was to cooperate thoroughly with the Bush senior administration. The most important action taken in relation to US-Colombian relations was to reinitiate the extradition of Colombian nationals to the US. Drug traffickers’ reaction was made public by a communiqué stating:

we declare total and absolute war on the government, on the industrial political oligarchy, on... all those who persecuted and attacked us. We will not respect the families of those who have not respected our families (Brooke quoted in Hinojosa 2007: 17).

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6 In a following hearing Gelbard restated the importance of the militarisation of the war on drugs: “particularly in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia we need significantly greater infusions of military assistance and economic assistance in order to complement the ongoing anti-narcotics programs. Because of the close links intertwining of terrorist guerrilla movements and the drug traffickers, there is a clear necessity for the armed forces of those countries, particularly Colombia and Peru, to have significantly greater military resources to combat the insurgent movements” (US Congress 1988a: 45). Gelbard mentioned the murder of Liberal journalist Guillermo Cano to demonstrate those who opposed drug traffickers were target of Medellín Cartel’s violence; despite UP President Jaime Pardo being one of the toughest critics of drug trafficking Gelbard disregarded his assassination.

7 Although the militarisation of the war on drugs started in earnest in 1989, US enforcement agencies had already shown that the counterdrug strategy was going in this direction. In 1985, for example, a Miami based FBI-DEA Joint Drug Intelligence Group was put into place (US Congress 1989c). This process was however contested, as the following extract shows “US role has expanded dramatically in the last 4 years... DEA is being thrust into essentially a paramilitary role for which it is ill-equipped” (US Congress 1989d: 1).

8 The US had been pressing for this measure to be reinstated from 1987 when the Supreme Court of Justice had declared it unlawful.
The scripting of Colombia in US foreign policy, which had, for at least 5 years, been anticipating reality; had finally created reality. Drug traffickers decided to spread fear in Colombia’s main cities so as to press a settlement with the Barco administration. Narcoterrorism, as it had already been labelled, had to be fought by military means. Thus, within days of the communiqué “President Bush ordered $65 million in emergency aid to Colombia and sent military trainers to the country.” Although some Colombian political elites and the UP contested the issue of military aid, by December “the US announced plans to use its navy to provide surveillance for all flights and ships leaving Colombia” and Bush “signed legislation authorizing $240 million in aid for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru” (Hinojosa 2007: 18).

The fight against narcoterrorism made invisible the UP genocide during the Bush senior administration. Notwithstanding the fact that the administration was aware of allegations about human rights violations, the representations transferred to Washington by the embassy in Bogotá continued relying on biased rightwing fantasies and reinforced antipathy towards the UP. The 1988 HRP, which by then had gained importance as an instrument for assigning a place for a country in US foreign policy space, described the situation as follows:

Colombia has recently been fighting threats from both political extremes as well as from enormously wealthy narcotics traffickers… The extreme right is made up of disparate groups, mostly civilians but at times including members of the security forces... less well organized than the left, these groups also practice assassinations, kidnapping, vigilante justice, extortion, and robbery, and have also engaged in narcotics trafficking … rightwing activists have resorted to intimidation and assassinations of leftwing politicians (some of whom are aligned in various degrees with the insurgents) and the civilian support networks of the guerrillas... The UP was formed by the largest guerrilla... and some of its leadership retain active ties with the guerrillas. Since its inception, the UP has suffered from a very high level of assassinations and intimidation there is little doubt that narcotics traffickers and individual members of the military and police have been involved… AI released a special report [warning of a] government campaign, run by the military high command to wipe out political opposition… it seems to rely heavily on CPHR and UP... However, great uncertainty exists about the extent to which the security forces are involved in aiding and abetting political killings by private vigilante groups (US Department of State 1989: 498-501, italics added).

The importance of this excerpt does not exclusively lie in the reproduction of the UP-

9 Liberal presidential candidate Ernesto Samper and former Conservative Presidents Misaël Pastrana and Belisario Betancur made public interventions (see Hinojosa 2007: 18).
FARC script. Three other representations contributing to place Colombia in the space of US foreign policy throughout the 1990s are also found in the report. First representation: the incapacity of the Colombian government to deal with threats gave rise to privatization of violence. This portrayal of a weakened nation-state assumed that an uncontested nation-state had existed in the first place and disregarded the strategic military thinking behind the counterinsurgency warfare delegated to private actors. Second representation: drug traffickers and guerrilla groups had mapped Colombian territory into cooperation zones and battlefields. This fiction ignored the battle for space between guerrilla groups and drug traffickers; and the alliances between drug traffickers and security forces at the centre of which genocidal campaigns against the UP were unfolding. Third representation: Colombian security forces’ involvement in aiding political killings and vigilante groups was contentious. This fantasy helped to dismiss AI reports showing alliances between security forces and vigilante groups against communities.

By the time President Barco left office in 1990, these representations underpinning the scripts of a hyperreal stable democracy weakened by real narcoterrorists and hyperreal narcoguerrillas had made genocidal episodes invisible. As a consequence, although the HRP mentioned the Segovia Massacre against the UP, it downplayed the collusion between the army, the police and paramilitary groups and disregarded the political nature of the action by dismissing the victims’ affiliation to the UP and previous death threats made by the perpetrators (see Ibid.). As a result, US officials’

10 Another report carried out at the time shows even more balanced representations, which nonetheless aimed to reinforce the hyperreal threat of narcoguerrillas to the already weaken oldest democracy: “The linkages between traffickers and insurgents are neither clear nor consistent... in some cases, traffickers and insurgents cooperate with each other, in others, they are engaged in pitched battles. In still others, some members of the Colombian military may temporarily form alliances with traffickers to attack guerrillas, while in others the military directly attack both groups.” (US Congress 1989d: 24).

11 The conflictive relation between FARC and drug traffickers was presented to members of Congress by Diego Viafara, a former M-19 member infiltrated in the Campesino Self-Defences of the Middle Magdalena Valley (AMM): “The rivalry between drug traffickers and the leftists of Colombia is evident from 1983... Their objective is to eradicate subversion in Colombia if possible... The war against the left in Colombia has been waged against the political arm of the FARC... The FARC could well become the next major Colombian Cartel” (US Congress 1989c: 80).

12 The same report that showed a sophisticated analysis of Colombia’s situation contained sections in which simplistic representations reinforced the narcoguerrillas script: “the growing strength and numbers of the largest insurgent group are attributable to their growing involvement in narcotics trade... The clearest evidence of involvement in narcotics exists regarding the FARC... the FARC could well become the next major Colombian Cartel” (US Congress 1989d: 22-3).

13 Chapters 2 and 7 discuss the Segovia Massacre; see also Gomez-Suarez (2008).
indifference grew. The mix of indifference towards civilian social networks and fear fuelled by real/hyperreal foes gives some hints to understand why it was unproblematic for the US Department of State to issue from 1989 until 1993 “thirty-nine licenses to U.S. firms to export small arms to Colombia, for a total value of $643,785.” However, even though arms transfers were legitimated through the need to protect an old democracy, the transfers themselves were also part of the US security strategy for the Western Hemisphere. This was so because

[d]uring the Cold War, U.S. arms transfers were... both an instrument of influence and an indicator of US political support... The United States thus exported arms to friendly and often regionally dominant governments –democracies and non-democracies alike– that voiced opposition to communism... Therefore, during the Cold War years, human rights and democracy were likely overshadowed by traditional security concerns (Blanton 2005: 648-9).

With the cold war finally ‘over,’ the conditions were ripe to eventually replace the communist threat with the drug threat (see chapter 6). Thus arms transfers were bound together with Bush’s “Andean Initiative, a five-year, $2.2 billion plan designed to heighten the United States’ war on drugs” (Shifter and Stillerman 2004: 338). The Andean Initiative did not exclusively aim at the US carrying out subtler interventions in the hemisphere; it was also designed to solve the ‘external threat’ that drugs posed to US society.

It is in this context that the rise on arms transfers since 1989 has to be understood; yet it would be remiss to neglect that it was closely related with the end of the FARC-Barco peace talks. This had reinforced the central government’s counterinsurgency narratives, opening the space for a new intelligence strategy to fight the insurgency. In 1990, within the framework of the Andean Initiative, the US government formed an advisory commission of CIA and Pentagon officials to develop a set of national security recommendations for Colombia’s Ministry of Defence. As a result, the

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14 Think tank Global Advisory Services director Lee Rensselaer’s statement before the Committee on Foreign Affairs demonstrates that US officials’ simplification of Colombian reality was not the product of ignorance: “[i]n Colombia, cocaine dealers have formed informal ententes with established groups such as rural landlords, right-wing politicians, businessmen, some military commanders to combat guerrillas and guerrillas’ sympathizers. The alliances have succeeded in sanitizing vast regions of Colombia... Paramilitary death squads financed by such traffickers as Escobar and Gacha have become instruments of counterinsurgency warfare. They are on the cutting edge of Colombia’s dirty war against the revolutionary left” (US Congress 1989b: 19).

Colombian government issued Order 200-05/91, which was a plan to better combat “escalating terrorism by armed subversion.” HRW demonstrates how, through Order 200-05/91, paramilitary groups were incorporated into the armed forces’ intelligence apparatus in order to carry out surveillance of opposition political leaders and attacks on dangerous individuals selected by the army’s high command. The consolidation of this military intelligence network resulted in the proliferation of massacres against the UP in different regions of Colombia (see chapter 3).

The Andean Initiative and CIA-Pentagon security recommendations to Colombia were the product of the militarisation of the war on drugs which by then had managed to bring Latin American and US military forces into counter-drug operations. This had been possible because in both military and political networks a particular narrative had allowed them to portray drugs “as a threat to the US coming from outside its borders” (Youngers and Rosin 2005: 4). In a discursive shift, US political networks no longer fearing communism eventually created new transnational security threats upon which US foreign policy towards Latin America was to be structured during the 1990s (cf. Ó Tuathail 1998: 18-9).

One of these new security threats that could, in the future, also be moulded to match human security concerns was based upon the powerful transnational narcoterrorism script, which reinforced traditional understandings of security, uncritically appropriated by the Bush senior administration. Cross-border criminal activities of the ‘Medellin Cartel’ were used to simplify the social and economic processes at the core of the illegal drug trade. At the same time, the links between DTOs and enforcement agencies, both in the US and in the Andes, were downplayed. Nevertheless, there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that without such a strategic alliance there would have been few chances for narcoterrorism to emerge.

The foregoing discursive shift determined Washington’s realist approach toward Colombia which continued to be reinforced by the realist/idealist simulations and fantasies transferred by the US embassy in Bogotá. Until 1993, when Bush left office, the dirty war in Colombia was seen through a very particular set of lenses, whereby it was possible to contend that drug traffickers were the principal source of violence. According to the 1990 HRP, “narcotraffickers... often propagated disinformation

regarding official human rights abuses, hoping to undermine both domestic and international support for the government” and rightwing paramilitary groups often engaged “in political violence at the direction of drug traffickers and power rural political elites” (US Department of State 1991: 548). By centering the source of political violence on DTOs, US Embassy officials in Bogotá not only showed support for Colombian political elites but also underpinned a common simulation that blamed the assassination of UP members exclusively on criminal actors. Thus, they reported that before

the March elections there was an organised wave of assassinations of the leftist Patriotic Union... Both narcotraffickers and rightwing paramilitary groups were responsible for these killings (Ibid.: 550).

Although the report acknowledged that “[t]he UP charged that security forces were also involved in some of these assassinations and that the government was not providing it with adequate protection,” the report reinforced the view that the violence against the UP was carried out by “narcotraffickers intent on destabilizing the country” (Ibid.).

HRPs did not continue exclusively relying on Reagan’s hyperreal realist simulations; the reports slowly started to acknowledge that excessive “responses by government security forces had resulted in scores of non combatant deaths” (Ibid.). However, these abuses were depicted as a minor part of the problem, for the weakening of the legitimate monopoly of the use of violence was what was at stake in countries like Colombia. Early attempts to carry out US state-building support operations relied on this imagery. However, a cross-border militarisation of the war on drugs was seen with distrust by some political and military sectors; the partial collapse of communism made the military unwilling to start taking over new tasks, which instead of focusing their attention on “real enemies” were to force them to act as “law-enforcement or police officers” (US Congress 1990: 9). This in part explains the unwillingness of Colombian military to stop fighting communism. To which it should be added that in fighting communism the military saw drug traffickers as allies who, after all, were financing some of the paramilitary groups that were bringing
down the communist insurgents.\textsuperscript{18} In contrast, President Gaviria’s unwillingness to fight drug trafficking aimed to move his administration away from Barco’s military strategy against narcoterrorism, which had demonstrated that the socio-economic cost of fighting the war on drugs was too high for Colombia.

In this context, Gaviria spun a narrative that distinguished between narco-trafficking and narco-terrorism. The former was described as “an international phenomenon that would only be solved through multilateral efforts and international cooperation,” whereas the latter was depicted as “an urgent domestic crisis” and hence a \textit{sui generis} Colombian solution was needed (Hinojosa 2007: 20). The discursive deployment of the outside/inside dichotomy allowed Gaviria to convince the Bush administration of the adequacy of carrying out a plea bargain with Medellín drug traffickers around the issue of extradition.\textsuperscript{19} This eased, at least for a short while, US pressure to militarise the war on drugs in Colombia; for doing otherwise would have meant for the US to recognise the failure of the war on drugs (cf. Matthiesen 2000: 34). The 1991 HRP showed the Bush administration’s complaisance with the Colombian administration by stating “narcoterrorism continued to decline during 1991 due in part to the surrender provisions of the Gaviria Administration’s decrees providing immunity from extradition” (US Department of State 1992: 535). However, sections reporting on political violence were filled with ambiguity and inaccuracy. For example, even though narcoterrorism had been ‘weakened’, paramilitary groups were presented as responsible for the “sharp increase in the number of murders of members of the small left-wing Patriotic Union” (Ibid.: 536). Furthermore, acts of violence that were part of genocidal campaigns against the UP were reported as unconnected events. This was complemented with a new narrative, which was transferred from everyday-life simulations circulating in various sectors of Colombian society, namely that “[l]eftist guerrillas were responsible for numerous extrajudicial

\textsuperscript{18} Mississippi State University Professor Donald Mabry’s words show that there was still a large degree of confusion on what the US was fighting in the war on drugs: “[i]f we want to fight a war against leftist guerrillas in Colombia or Peru, we should say so from the outset… if we got involved in such a war, the narco-traffickers who hate leftist and kill them with great regularity, would be our natural allies” (US Congress 1990: 14).

\textsuperscript{19} In 1991, when Gaviria visited Washington he was warmly greeted by Bush. “Despite Gaviria’s already-public offer to negotiate the surrender of cartel leaders in return for promises of non-extradition and lenient sentences, Bush did not criticize the Colombian leader. On the contrary, he praised him as ‘a man of courage’ who is ‘devoted to law and to liberty’ and for that you have our admiration and respect” (Hinojosa 2007: 21).
killings… including some UP leaders, whom they declared guilty of ‘crimes against the people’” (Ibid.: 537). This recreated indifference towards the civilian social networks at the very moment in which they were being target of genocide. As such, the micronarratives of the Colombian tragedy in HRPs were part of the genocidal geopolitical con-text.

From 1991 to 1993 HRPs continued scripting Colombia in the same simple fashion. Yet Escobar’s escape in July 1992 triggered an array of criticism over Gaviria’s strategy, paving the way for a further militarisation of the drug war.20 This enabled the FN’s legacy of delegating public order matters to the military to subtly continue, despite the fact that Gaviria had sought to reverse it in the early days of his administration. In 1993 militarised counterdrug operations took place alongside the escalation of guerrilla violence.21 In this context, Gaviria declared an ‘integral war’ on both drug trafficking and guerrillas. Certainly by then “the militarisation of politics and the criminalisation of war” were well underway (Sánchez quoted in Leal 2002: 92).22 When Bush left office, mixed representations attempted to make sense of Colombia’s reality: on the one hand, Escobar still incarnated the narcoterrorist threat, and on the other hand, paramilitaries were being described as the new ‘evil-doers’, the exclusive source of non-insurgent violence in Colombia. Although the HRPs were paying more attention to the links between military and paramilitary groups, the reports usually portrayed the alliances as the result of individual commanders and in the worst-case scenario as the result of peripheral army units (see US Department of State 1994: 392-402; 1993: 359-66).

While paramilitary groups were consolidating military and economic power in regions such as Córdoba and Antioquia, and this could be seen as the criminalisation of the armed conflict, the government attempt to criminalise guerrilla warfare was part of a differentiated long-term effort to delegitimise the political character guerrilla groups regarded for themselves (see Orozco 2006). This had started in 1988 with Decree 180 (also known as ‘Antiterrorist Statute’). In November 1993, the Gaviria

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20 The Bloque de Búsqueda Special Joint Task Force was created to hunt down Escobar. It was a unit made of 600 militaries and policemen, most of them trained at US military schools, and supported by US security agencies (see Leal 2002: 91).
21 FARC armed attacks proliferated after the army’s attack on Casa Verde in 9 December 1990.
22 See Iván Orozco (2006) for an account of the politico-juridical processes through which guerrilla groups were, by the mid 1990s, no longer considered political offenders in Colombian jurisprudence.
administration released a new National Strategy against violence under the name *Security for the People*, in this document the government argued that the borders between drug trafficking, guerrillas, and common crime had blurred. Gaviria thus unified a punitive-police approach against all forms of violence. This scripting of reality had damaging consequences for rural dwellers in FARC-controlled areas, who were criminalised because according to ‘intelligence’ accounts they were part of FARC’s ‘support network’. Those who suffered the most were the remnants of the UP. As the few strongholds that remained were in FARC-controlled zones criminal activities were associated with UP members. Because the UP’s national socio-political power had faded since the early 1990s, it was easier for government leaders to argue that some of the assassinations were part of local disagreements, and therefore part of the high levels of criminality in the countryside, to which the guerrillas and drug traffickers were contributing. This was instrumental in making invisible the genocidal practices against the UP to Colombian public opinion throughout the 1990s. In this way, the invisibility of the victims in US politics was complemented by the invisibility of the genocide in the very place where it was taking place.

What seems paradoxical on the side of the Gaviria administration is that even though it regarded the FARC’s armed uprising illegal, before leaving office, in early 1994, Gaviria issued Decree 356 making possible the re-legalization of self-defence groups. This Decree allowed the formation of Security Cooperatives later known as Convivir, which linked with Carlos Castaño’s paramilitary group were to carry out the extermination of the UP in Urabá, the last remaining UP stronghold (see chapter 3).

The last two sections show that US foreign policy’s scripting of Colombia from 1981 to 1993 recreated the image of an old democracy under attack. Whereas Reagan circulated the idea that Colombia faced a narcoguerrilla threat, Bush turned to the idea of a narcoterrorist threat. In both cases the writing of Colombia had reproduced antipathy towards the UP, sympathy for Colombian political and military elites, and indifference for the suffering of civilian social networks. As Colombian administrations were complicit in the radicalisation of affective-dispositions, a political economy of sympathy amongst members of a fictive liberal collective self,

23 Leal argues that “as US withdrew from the anticommunist struggle, Colombian military openly criminalised guerrilla groups” (2002: 101).
and antipathy towards civilian social networks represented at its margins, informed the coexistence of transnational grammars of identity/alterity with an antigrm of genocide. This led to the solidification and free circulation of the perpetrator bloc. Bill Clinton’s foreign policy was about to portray Colombia as a narco-democracy, the perpetrator bloc was to continue operating. This was so because the Clinton administration decided to side with the security forces.

*Clinton’s multilateralism, Bush’s war on terror and the neglect of the UP genocide*

President Clinton finally placed human rights as one of the central tools in defining the place of a country in US foreign policy. This enabled the US government to decide whether or not to intervene in a domestic drama in the name of humanitarianism. In the case of Colombia, the decision was made that the genocidal practices against the UP and other atrocities were less urgent than cracking down on drug trafficking. The complacent attitude towards the UP genocide was the result of the simulation that regarded drug trafficking as the source of violence. This enabled to essentialise the perpetrators and decontextualise the genocide, thereby producing a shallow script that obfuscated the complexity of such a conjuncture. Thus, the alleged links between President Samper and drug traffickers allowed for scripting Colombia as a *narco-democracy* in US foreign policy space, and “Colombia went from being an ally of the US to be a victim of ‘coercive diplomacy’” (Leal 2002: 101). US military officers described Colombian security forces as the true defenders of democracy at the very moment when they were involved in genocidal campaigns against the UP. This weakened Samper’s capacity to govern. According to Department of State Assistant Secretary Robert Gelbard,

> Clinton denied certification to Colombia… because the efforts of Colombia’s police, military, prosecutors, and other honest government officials were being undermined by corruption at the highest levels of the Colombian Government and Congress… We have proposed not only to continue, but to augment the US assistance to the Colombian police, military, and justice sector which are confronting the drug threat and the corruption it has engendered… The traffickers intend to make Colombia a drug-safe haven, and they have demonstrated their power to do so by successfully corrupting a President (US Congress 1996: 4).
Together with the narcdemocracy script, Colombian military generals started to circulate the narcoguerrillas script again. US Congress invited the Colombian military to hearings in which the military represented the FARC as the ‘the third cartel.’ In this con-text, human rights concerns were rapidly overlooked by liberal fantasies, which imagined the establishment of the office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights in Bogotá as bringing to an end the military’s involvement in such violations (Ibid: 16). Put differently, the UN office was established in order to validate the Colombian military, at a time of sharply rising paramilitary abuses that were portrayed by US policymakers as fully autonomous actors, while even those instances of military’s direct involvement in abuses was rendered invisible.

Although the destruction of the UP had almost been accomplished by the time Clinton came into power, the last genocidal episodes were still to come. The genocidal campaign, known as Plan Retorno, which took place between 1994 and 1997, was completely disregarded by the 1994 HRP. The only reference found in regards of the UP was the assassination of the last UP Congressman Manuel Cepeda (US Department of State 1995: 352). Although the 1995 and 1996 HRP more explicitly referred to the more than “2000 assassinations of UP members over the last ten years,” the reports portrayed the violence against the group as a domestic experience and principally highlighted “UP’s complaint… before the IACHR that charges the Government with ‘action or omission’ in what the UP terms ‘political genocide’ against the UP and PC” (US Department of State 1996: 364; 1997: 393). While UP leaders welcomed the report, they called on the US to specify the responsibility of US agencies in providing intelligence strategies and training to the Colombian security forces (El Espectador 1997b: 5A).

Instead of addressing human rights violations, stepping up diplomatic pressure and investigating the multiple transnational connections of various sectors of the perpetrator bloc (see chapter 6), the Clinton administration carried on focusing on representing drug trafficking as a serious threat coming from Latin America. As Congressman Benjamin Gilman’s (R-NY) words exemplify, the epicentre of such a threat was Colombia: “Today, drugs and the narco guerrillas threaten to turn Colombia, South America’s oldest democracy, into a full-blown narco state that could become a major regional threat” (US Congress 1998b: 1). The othering of the Samper
administration gave rise to narratives that reinforced a distinction between the Colombian government and the Colombian people who, according to Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtienen (R-FL), were “fighting with their daily lives against these narco traffickers” (Ibid: 5). These narratives imagined a country split into evil politicians and good cops. Such a simulation enabled the further militarisation of the war on drugs in Colombia and in the whole region. This was demonstrated by Clinton’s decision to make “a quiet shift in 1999” by transferring the Pentagon’s office for Inter-American Affairs from the Bureau for International Security Affairs into the Bureau for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; under the reorganization, Latin America was at the time “the only geographic area assigned to an office that deal[t] with issues like terrorism, drug enforcement, and other activities of Special Forces” (Isacson 2001: 1).

Ironically, this occurred at the same time that Clinton was supporting Pastrana’s peace policy. In matter of months, US narratives had gone from bitter criticism of Colombian politicians to unconditional support for the Pastrana administration. Scholars’ macronarratives, such as Mark Chernick’s, helped to path the way for this shift in US foreign policy. In his address to Congress Chernick emphasised that

> With the election of President-elect Pastrana… the acrimonious and tense nature of the relationship between the two governments has already been left behind, and there’s an opportunity to rebuild the traditionally strong relationship between the two countries. President-elect Pastrana… has made clear… that the very essence of his administration will be to address the issue of peace in Colombia, and in attacking illicit narcotic crops (US Congress 1998a: 2).

In order to legitimate Pastrana’s approach, Chernick argued against labelling the FARC as the third cartel. Instead, he represented the FARC as insurgent group exercising “authority in parts of rural Colombia, particularly in these coca grown zones.” As such, he said to be

> convinced that if the FARC ordered the eradication of coca production tomorrow, and if they and the state could provide alternatives to the populations that live and depend on coca production, perhaps as much as 90 percent of coca cultivation would be eliminated tomorrow (Ibid.: 3).
That what was at stake in Colombia was US antinarcotics policy was evident by his final remarks:

my advice to US policy, is that the US should support the peace process in Colombia. The major interest of the US and Colombia… are anti-narcotics. From what I can see, the most enlightening and effective US would be to support the peace process because the peace process is in fact, the most direct, effective, and efficient way for the US to be able to deal with the problems of illicit narcotics in Colombia (Ibid.: 5).

Despite the fact that Amnesty International-USA’s Advocacy Director for Latin America and the Caribbean Carlos Salinas pointed out the role of security forces in human rights violations: “[t]he links between the paramilitary and regular security forces cannot be stressed enough, and have been amply documented” (Ibid.: 11), US politicians continued stressing the narcoguerrilla script as the main concern for the US when deciding the extent of the support for the Pastrana administration. According to Congressman Gilman “The money that these narco-terrorists [FARC and ELN] collect on a monthly basis… exceeds the entire annual budget of the UN Drug Control Program” (Ibid.: 14). By then the narcoguerrillas script had been institutionalised in US foreign policy by designating the ELN and the FARC as foreign terrorist organizations by Secretary of State Madeline Albright in 2001.

By doing so the Clinton administration was able to continue supporting the military’s ‘counternarcotics operations’. Nevertheless, in order to conform with AI’s concerns about the appalling human rights record of the Colombian military, which were related to the destruction of the UP (the civilian social network portrayed as supporting FARC), human rights training was provided to the Colombian security forces in the SOA (US Congress 1998a). Between 1999 and 2002 Colombia led the world’s number of trainees by US military institutions with over 15,000 militaries and police officers (Vaicius and Isacson 2003: 3). The lack of US support for the peace process, the proliferation of paramilitary groups and FARC’s ambiguous attitudes resulted in an utter failure. By 2001 the conflict had escalated, FARC had increased its military might, the army had been reformed and built up with Plan Colombia’s monies, and paramilitary groups had aided to establish a vicious politico-military social order in most regions of the country. Despite the complicity of political elites both in the US and Colombia in bringing about such turmoil, US politicians continued
representing themselves as not only the champions of the “second oldest democracy in the hemisphere” but a progressive South America. Senator Joseph Biden’s (D-DE) words are telling in this regard

when they ask me why I am so hung up on helping Colombia, I ask them to look at a map of South America and ask them how they can envisage a South America that is progressive, open, democratic in the next 20 to 30 years with Colombia not a democracy any longer, Colombia a narco-state (US Congress 2001: 2).

These narratives allowed ruling elites to show themselves as objective and transparent actors and the drug trade as a dark force that had “led to an assault on Colombia’s very democracy, not only by drug traffickers but also by left-wing guerrillas and by right-wing paramilitaries” (Ibid.: 3). Such narratives had paved the way for the simplification of reality that was put forward after 9/11. In this con-text, the Colombian peace process initiated between Pastrana and the FARC broke off, and the path was clear for the new apotheosis of the principle of hyperreality pushed by the Bush-Uribe alliance in the Western Hemisphere: the regional variant of the global war on terror.

Although the modernisation of the Colombian army entailed the merging of counterdrug operations with counterinsurgency during the second Clinton administration, when Plan Colombia was designed, it was not until 2001 when the Bush junior administration merged both operations under the term counterterrorism. As a result, “with the stroke of a pen, billions of dollars of drug-war aid suddenly became ‘counter-terror’ aid” (Vaicius and Isacson 2003: 13). This is nicely summarised in Congressman Cass Ballenger’s (R-NC) words:

Up until now, Congress has been reluctant to even address the… conflict in Colombia directly… The $1.3 billion aid package to Colombia, approved by Congress in the year 2000, limited US assets to counternarcotics operations only… The recent failure of the peace talks with the FARC, coupled with sharp increases in terrorist attacks in Colombia, is leading us to seek alternative solutions; and it only makes sense to apply the policies which now guide our worldwide war on terror to the scourge of terrorism in Colombia (US Congress 2002: 1)

The war on terror fused terrorism with criminality. National security was no longer dominated by the realist paradigm but by the liberal one that did not see in other states as threats to the survival of society. Instead, criminal actors were seen as attempting
to disrupt the protection of life. Even conservative politicians, who had supported Reagan’s anticommunism, were rebranding the cold war struggle as a fight between the axis of evil and the axis of good. Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) argued: “We should not be blinded by false ideological labels. There is no Left and no Right in Colombia, only competing bands of narcoterrorist criminals” (Ibid.: 5). Amidst the war on terror, UP social networks continued to be targets of destruction, exemplifying that in “the context of Colombia… and the Andean border zone, counterterrorism seems to be little different from old-school, Cold War-style counterinsurgency” (Isacson 2005: 50). Since 2001, terrorism became a catch-all term used to describe internal opposition,24 resembling the cold war years when for some political elites social movements were allies of communism. Until 2010, President Uribe frequently referred to NGOs and other political opponents as allies of terrorism. As early as 2003, he criminalised civilian social networks by stating that some of his critics were “human rights traffickers, who should take off their masks and show their political ideas.” 25 Such statements allowed the systematic persecution of human right defenders and the violent practices against UP survivors to continue (see REINICIAR 2006b; Cinep and Cceeu 2004).

What US aid has done throughout the 2000s is to support the Colombian security forces. Plan Colombia, Plan Patriota, and Plan Consolidación have had at their core the build-up of army brigades involved in counterinsurgency operations so as to deal with what some members in Congress identified, in the mid 2000s, as a potential Andean quagmire (Isacson 2005: 51). Although these plans have been described as having a social component, the fact is that the military build-up has been unmatched by an “increased aid to strengthen rural development, and other civilian governance needs” (Ibid.: 53). What the plans have successfully done is to relegate to oblivion the UP genocide and the survivors’ struggle to find the truth.

24 According to Rojas, “the US has played a central role in the changing dynamics of the Colombian armed conflict by confusing a counternarcotics war with a counterinsurgency war in one single strategy, today identified as the war on terrorism” (2007: 41).
Conclusion

The hyperreal writing of Colombia in US foreign policy allowed the crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture until 2010. In the late 1970s, the neoconservative turn amongst US political networks enabled the consolidation of a similar rightwing mentality amongst Colombian traditional political elites. The imagining that human rights violations against communist leaders was a legitimate tactic of weakening political contestants helped to create an alliance between ruling elites and a military cadre eager to define itself in terms of counterinsurgency. Upon this imagery, neoconservatives circulated the script that Colombia was a long-standing and stable democracy. Such a scripting framed the micronarratives enabling the materialisation of the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide and the macronarratives aiming at explaining the complexity of the Colombian drama.

During the 1980s two scripts complemented the narratives mapping Colombia in the Western Hemisphere: narcoguerrillas and narcoterrorists. These scripts, circulated by US-Colombian political networks in an attempt to deal with contingency (discipline space) and to explain (simplify) reality, weakened Betancur’s peace policy, which aimed to circulate sympathy for communism. Narcoguerrillas and Narcoterrorists soon became central to the micronarratives informing everyday-life representations and the flows of arms and resources. The merging of drug trafficking and communism in the geopolitics of the second cold war further radicalised anticomunism; thus, the narcoguerrillas script succeeded in fixing representations in Colombian and US civil societies’ mindsets, which reinforced antipathy towards the UP allowing a violent crackdown against it. In the late 1980s, US and Colombian administrations started blaming narcoterrorists (drug traffickers) for the violence against the UP. Colombia was thus positioned as the battlefield to wage the war on drugs.

Throughout the early 1990s, Congress was a forum in which the Colombian drama was discussed in a constant dialogue held between military, political and intellectual networks. Yet, US foreign policy officials carried on (re)producing scripts that simplified complex conjunctures. This allowed for US agencies to issue intelligence recommendations that advised the continuation of a counterinsurgency campaign
delegated to private actors. Such a campaign prolonged the targeting of hyperreal narco guerrillas and concrete civilian social networks considered to be the FARC’s socio-political network of supporters. By then fighting narco guerrillas and narcoterrorists had become a transnational affair. The US administration’s sympathy for the Colombian tragedy downplayed the links between political entrepreneurs and security forces in genocidal campaigns against the UP. Sympathy coexisted with indifference. The indifference of US officials contributed to make invisible the UP genocide amongst Colombian public opinion. As such, the genocidal campaigns continued mostly unnoticed or at least disregarded by the broader social networks who were spectators and protagonists of the concrete battlefield in which the war on drugs was being fought: the unseen genocidal geopolitical conjuncture.

In the mid 1990s the narco democracy script weakened Samper’s capacity to govern. This put the administration at the mercy of the military so as to sustain itself in power. The Colombian military’s anticommunism drove them to tighten up their cooperation with narcoparamilitary groups. The creation of Convivir by the administration sealed this alliance and showed the narrow scope of action that the civilians had in security matters. Although the involvement of high ranking military officers in the violence against the UP was widely known, the US army continued training Colombian security forces in courses that allegedly sought to improve their human rights records. The Clinton administration further weakened the civilian administration in Colombia by portraying security forces, the CNP in particular, as the true defenders of Colombian democracy. Despite Pastrana’s presidency brought along a new peace process with FARC, diplomatic relations between US and Colombian administrations improved. Yet because of the FARC’s firepower, conservative political networks increasingly represented Colombia as a quasi-failed state. The Colombian drama was no longer about drug trafficking but the very survival of the state. During these years Pastrana recognised the previous involvement of military officers in human rights violations and, as chapter 7 discusses, started a process of seeking a political solution with the UP. However, the violence against the

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26 In 1999 Gen. Rosso Jose Serrano, Chief of National Police, was considered by some US politicians and various high ranking police officers around the world as the best policeman of the world. However, as July 2009, paramilitary leader Mancuso accused him of supporting the AUC (http://www.semana.com/noticias-justicia/mancuso-senala-rocco-jose-operar-paras/125758.aspx retrieved 30 August 2010).
UP was at the time interpreted as the product of the violent clash between paramilitary groups and FARC which, in Clinton’s eyes, a weak (corrupt) Colombian state could not halt.

At the turn of the millennium, FARC’s military build up (materialised into a war of positions) and 9/11 facilitated the reemergence of the narcoterrorist guerrillas script which contributed to a sharp increase of violence against UP survivors. During the later years of the Uribe administration the UP was mainly portrayed as a past experience. This, together with the fact that George W. Bush overlooked the atrocious human rights record of Colombian security forces, allowed the consolidation of sympathy for the Colombian government, indifference for survivors’ drama, and oblivion for the UP genocide. During the 2000s, scripts such as narcoterrorist guerrillas and resilient state have brought Colombia to the core in US foreign policy space; as such the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture has been ‘surreptitiously’ connected with Congress.

Although the last two chapters demonstrate the centrality of transnational military and political networks in the crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture in which the destruction of the UP occurred, it would be remiss to disregard the contribution of outlaws who colluded with security forces and politicians into the perpetrator bloc. The interactions between transnational criminal networks and the liberal western hemispheric military network are complex, entailing cooperation and conflict, as do the interactions between US and Colombian administrations and drug traffickers. To analyse the role of transnational criminal networks in the crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal conjuncture turns the next chapter.
6 DRUG TRAFFICKERS, PARAMILITARIES AND TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES: MAPPING ILLEGAL MATERIAL/DISCURSIVE FLOWS IN THE UNFOLDING OF THE UP GENOCIDE

If the military mindset that allowed the participation of Colombian security forces in the perpetrator bloc was the product of it being part of a transnational network, which saw itself as the guardian of the (liberal) Western Hemisphere (see chapter 4), and the very idea of a Western Hemisphere threatened by hyperreal threats was reproduced in transnational political interactions, allowing the military to freely team up with outlaws in their attempts to control contingency by carrying out genocidal violence (see chapter 5), what remains to be explored are the transnational connections of various outlaws and how such connections enabled the consolidation of the perpetrator bloc in the concrete genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. This chapter offers a topology of the transnational criminal network colluding into the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide.

Since the late 1980s, and especially since 9/11, transnational crime has been associated with new international security threats. Narratives put forward by intellectuals of statecraft promote the idea that poorly governed spaces provide fertile home bases for transnational crime, which in turn “contributes to the ability of ‘terrorists’ to increase their involvement in crime” (Giraldo and Trinkunas 2010: 429, 436). This narrative contributes to representations of outlaws as unconnected with institutions that exercise strong law enforcement, as in the case of the US. This misrepresentation not only allows for a simplistic interpretation of reality in general, but also reifies, in particular for our case study, the simulation put forward by political networks that depraved outlaws were the perpetrators of violence against the UP. This chapter con-textualises the transnational connections of the criminal sector of the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide and the discursive production of transnational crime as a security threat. In doing so, it challenges the genocide script whereby the liberal international community is presented as disconnected from the perpetrators of genocide.
Genocide studies lacks a serious study of the outlaws’ role in the perpetration of genocide, and as a result of the genocide script, scholars have focused mainly upon the state, and therefore paramilitary groups, when taken into account, are at best seen as subsidiaries of the state (i.e., Erickson 2006). This chapter aims at complementing chapter 3 by showing that as transnational criminal networks’ alliance with state agencies and private companies enable them to materialise in the first place, they become ideal partners in the targeting for destruction of civilian groups seen as a threat to a complex assemblage of political, military and economic networks. It focuses on unveiling the transnational connections of drug traffickers, paramilitary groups and transnational companies. First, it con-textualises the emergence of DTOs and the convenient alliance that eased tensions between competing racketeers during the most part of the 1980s. Then, it shows how, by teaming up with the military and paramilitary groups, some drug traffickers were able to access the legal arms trade. This militarisation sided them with anticomunist regional coalitions for violence, placing DTOs in a unique position to take a leading role in some genocidal campaigns against the UP in the late 1980s. The third section looks into the ambiguous relationship between state agencies and drug traffickers in the early 1990s and how this was related to transformations in the structure of the perpetrator bloc. The fourth part turns to analyse the scripts created in the space of US foreign policy which concealed the complex relations between drug traffickers, state agencies and private legal enterprises aiding to blur the distinction between drug-trafficking and insurgency, and thereby eclipsing the genocidal episodes taking place in mid-1990s Colombia. Finally, the chapter unveils the transnational connections between the newly empowered narco-paramilitary groups and legal actors, which enabled them to concentrate capital and coercion and surpass their own expectations of success at the turn of the new millennium.

The rise of drug-trafficking organizations (1976 – 1984)

The growth of DTOs in the early 1980s set the grounds for the militarisation of some racketeers who, in the mid-1980s, decided to team up with the army in counterinsurgency campaigns which had started to target the UP. DTOs’ growth, however, was not a spontaneous process. Colombian historians have usually studied
the rise of Colombian DTOs as a domestic development (i.e., Palacios 2003). However, DTOs were the product of local processes evolving because of the need of politico-economic elites to insert the country into the international political economy; thus, as Allen (2005: 16) points out, the rise of DTOs has to be studied “amidst Colombia’s own economic liberalisation efforts, which encouraged cross-border flows of trade and investment.” Colombian administrations carried out these efforts in a historical context in which inter-state relations were regulating markets, reconstructing borders, and developing and enforcing prohibition regimes, all of which contributed in defining the ‘illicit spaces’ of economies (Ibid.). For this reason political elites had to adhere to US pressure to illegalise dynamic sectors of the country’s economy, such as the cultivation of marijuana. The illegalisation of these sectors increased the profits that could be made by adventuring in the illicit drug trade. In a developing country, in which 54 percent of the peasants were in poverty (Palacios 2003: 296), many turned to drug-trafficking in search of fortune.

Although a marijuana boom occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, it was nothing more that another case of a short-term agrarian economy. This was the case because, as Camacho (2006: 391-2) explains,

the irrationality of the actors, the technical difficulties of the hustle and bustle, the frequent imprisonment, and, particularly, the internal cultivation of marijuana in the US… which ensures larger productivity and quality, converged to bring about the decline of the Colombian smugglers’ share in the marijuana business.

Contrary to the experience of Colombian marijuana smugglers, the cocaine traffickers were soon to become a driving force of Colombian economy. By the mid-1970s they had managed to monopolise the cocaine trade from Peru and Bolivia to the US. Narcotics traffickers’ cunning and risk-taking mentality were not the only keys to success. Colombian administrations had, at least since the early 1970s, contributed to it too. Thus, by the 1980s, thanks to the ‘Left-Handed Window’, which had been created during President Alfonso López Michelsen’s term (1974-1978), and allowed US dollars illegally earned to enter the economic system and be converted into pesos, “the drug trade was booming and cocaine… was starting to eclipse marijuana as the Colombian smuggler’s drug choice” (Chepesiuk 2003: 60). Once narcotraffickers achieved a privileged economic status, they developed a twofold strategy of regional
power consolidation: politicisation and militarisation. This substantially affected almost every single social network existing under the evolving Colombian state building process.¹

During the second half of the late 1970s, however, the largest impact of drug-trafficking was that it

allowed upward social mobility. Colombian society, in which social mobility had been quite blocked... suddenly offered a whole new set of prizes to individuals who had the skills and the resources to get involved in illegal activities (Gutiérrez 2009: 31).

Although this came to shake the static traditional social structure reinforced by the FN agreements, upward social mobility –made possible thanks to immense fortunes amassed by the control over drug-trafficking transnational routes– enabled individual actors to permeate political and economic elites. This process was not free of conflict,² and disputes between drug barons over trafficking routes, which ended in bloody vendettas, were common during the 1970s.³ However, a particular event which brought together the most powerful drug traffickers dispersed throughout Colombia eased tensions for about a decade. In 1981, drug trafficker Fabio Ochoa convoked a summit with Pablo Escobar, Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, Carlos Ledher and another 222 drug traffickers to join efforts in a campaign to seek the release of his daughter Martha Nieves Ochoa who had been kidnapped by the M-19. This event not only led to the creation of the drug traffickers’ private military force MAS, but it had ramifications which were to shape DTOs throughout the 1980s. Thereafter, drug

¹ Following Charles Tilly and Norbert Elias, González, Bolívar, and Vázquez (2004) argue that the Colombian conflict has to be studied as part of an ongoing state building process rather than as a process producing a failed state.
² This is not to say, to paraphrase Reuters (2009: 275-6), that “illegality itself is sufficient to generate high levels of violence in a market,” although “the drug-related wars in Colombia and Mexico have been prominently reported in the US press and have helped reinforce the view that drugs cause violence.” The foregoing should not, however, downplay the fact that “criminal organizations are hindered in their internal as well as external transactions by the lack of accesses to civil courts… thus a dispute about responsibilities of a subordinate can quickly escalate to a violent conflict.” See also Naylor (2009: 241), who develops a compelling analysis demonstrating that “[t]here is little or nothing in the inherent logic of illegal markets to lead to the expectation of violence in their conduct. To the extent violence does occur, the best place to look for its explanation is in the societal and political context. Violent societies produce violent criminals and violent police and military forces.”
³ What was known as the ‘1978 War’, for example, allowed drug traffickers to consolidate control over distribution networks in Miami and New York (see Castillo 1987: 79-87). ‘Cocaine Wars’, this time between Medellín drug traffickers and Cuban-American distributors, took place between 1979 and 1981; through these wars the Medellín DTOs managed to control the distribution network in Florida (Bagley 1988-1989: 75).
traffickers began to consolidate alliances which resembled mafia-type organisations based on “ritual kinship” (Paoli 2002). While “there was no formal, hierarchical form of leadership that synchronized activities, prominent leaders did emerge in coordinating roles” (Lee quoted in Allen 2005: 59).

By the late 1980s, the ‘Medellín Cartel’ was amongst the most feared organisations. Its consolidation, according to some scholars, was the result of the fact that during the Reagan administration “the struggle against communist expansion ha[d] always been given diplomatic priority over the war against drugs” (Bagley 1988: 169). This was demonstrated by the 1989 Kerry Report, which pointed out precisely that the strengthening of the Medellín Cartel between 1984 and 1986 was related with the fact that

the supply network of the Contras was used by drug-trafficking organisations, and elements of the contras themselves knowing received financial and material assistance from drug traffickers. In each case, one or another agency of the US government had information regarding the involvement (US Congress 1989a: 36).

Nevertheless, the Reagan administration disguised US security agencies’ alliance with drug traffickers by creating the Commission of Organized Crime in 1983, which listed the Colombian cartels as some of the most powerful organised crime entities (Paoli 2002: 56). This shaped the imagination of some conservative intellectuals of statecraft who, ten years later, were contending that

Transnational criminal organizations, particularly drug-trafficking organizations, operate unrestricted across international borders. They are a very similar in kind to legitimate transnational corporations in structure, strength, size, geographical range, and scope of their operations” (Williams and Florez quoted in Ibid.: 57).

The foregoing, as Paoli rightly points out, allowed not only the representation of transnational organized crime as “the great threat,” but also drug-trafficking as the single most important menace to world order “that, after the sudden disintegration of the USSR, sectors of American federal institutions, the public, and some scholars desperately seemed to need” (Ibid.). The scripting of Colombian DTOs by US administrations since the early 1980s as organised and powerful cartels does not withstand close examination. Paoli’s comments on this regard are again telling, in her view the so-called Colombian cartels
were loose combinations of relatively small family-based cocaine manufacturing firms that merely joined forces in the early 1980s to transport and smuggle cocaine to the United States. Although the system appears to be well-organized, many of these partnerships do not last long and frequently change their composition; manufacturers who participate in one shipment do not have to participate in others... as the quick disintegration of the Medellín coalition after the death of its charismatic leader Pablo Escobar shows, the institutional organization of the cocaine industry is rather precarious. A similar process of disintegration has also affected the Cali ‘cartel’ (2002: 68-9).

The events behind the scripting of ‘Colombian cocaine cartels’ would be best described as the consolidation of two somehow powerful economic alliances, which managed, to some degree, to monopolise the bulk of the illegal cocaine trade in the hemisphere and control the main distribution networks in the US. Between 1978 and 1981, these consortiums had started to revolve around the entrepreneurship of two families: the Rodriguez Orejuela based in Cali and the Ochoa Vasquez in Medellín. New York and Miami respectively became their ‘spheres of influence’ in the US (Castillo 1987: 41-66). Although the relationship between drug traffickers working within the two consortiums was amicable, the strategies to insert themselves in their respective regional societies were quite different. Whereas the Rodriguez Orejuela-led consortium decided to quietly penetrate the economic and financial sector of the Valle del Cauca County, some members within the Ochoa Vasquez-Escobar alliance opted for direct public intervention in politics (cf. Palacios 2003: 277). This difference explains the Medellín Cartel’s direct involvement in the armed conflict throughout the 1980s and contributed not only to the war that emerged between the Cali and Medellín DTOs after 1987, but also in sealing a convenient alliance between some

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4 Fidel Castaño’s statements show the difficulty in finding an explanation of the war between the Cali ‘Cartel’ and Escobar. In 1991, Fidel Castaño told scholar Alejandro Reyes “I have never understood why the war between the Medellín and Cali cartels started. The fact is that there are many actors intervening in the conflict, the DEA, the DAS, the Police, the Government, industrialists, and politicians. One does not know where the bullets come from” (Reyes 2009: 91). However, Riley’s account gets closer to explaining the origin of the war: “By 1987 and 1988 almost any semblance of cooperation between Cali and Medellín had evaporated as the cocaine industry erupted into open conflict. The rancour developed over a number of issues, including Gacha’s attempts to acquire a share of the lucrative New York City cocaine market controlled by Cali, and Jorge Ochoa’s arrest at a roadblock outside Cali in 1986. Ochoa’s arrest, suspicious because it occurred at the hands of a municipal police officer while Ochoa was under heavy guard, place him in some jeopardy... Medellín’s grab sparked a violent conflict in both the United States and Colombia, which pitted the two organizations against each other... A bomb exploded outside one of Escobar’s apartment buildings... Escobar... blamed Cali for the detonation. Medellín, in response, initiated a campaign of bombing the chain of pharmacies owned by the... Orejuela family. The government’s intense efforts in 1988 to...
Medellín drug traffickers and army battalions. Such an alliance was to prevail thanks to the polarisation of sympathy/antipathy, which enabled outlaws and security forces to negotiate informal grammars of identity/alterity so as to resolve their differences and to forge an antigrand of genocide which resulted in genocidal campaigns against the UP in regions such as the Middle Magdalena Valley in the mid-1980s (see chapter 3).


Although US foreign policy makers and intellectuals of statecraft represented the Medellín Cartel as a transnational criminal network colluding with communism and thus posing a serious security threat to the liberal Western Hemisphere, evidence shows that the connections with US security agencies helped its consolidation. The Medellín DTOs’ consolidation at the core of transnational criminal networks reinforced some DTOs’ militarisation and positioned them at ‘the centre’ of the perpetrator bloc targeting the UP. However, in US narratives this was incorporated and twisted, and as a result, the criminal character of the violence against the UP was overemphasised, and the political drive informing the connection between security agencies, politicians, and drug traffickers was downplayed. To expose the simplification of complex events which aided in solidifying the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, the first question that needs answering is: why did the Medellín drug traffickers’ politicisation strategy end up reinforcing the militaristic option propelled by the Ochoa’s clan?

At the beginning Escobar and Carlos Ledher invested large amounts of money in populist programmes and advertising campaigns for their ‘noble cause’. This gained them some support amongst poor beneficiaries in cities such as Medellín and Armenia.\(^5\) Populist projects, such as ‘Medellín without slums’, allowed Escobar to

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\(^5\) “In a survey carried out in schools in the Comuna Nororiental [a poor neighbourhood in Medellín] 21 per cent of the students considered Pablo Escobar the most important national figure… 56 per cent of the survey participants expressed a positive opinion of Escobar” (Salazar and Jaramillo quoted in Rubio 1999: 88).
obtain sufficient votes in his 1982 campaign for Congress. Once he became a member of the House of Representatives for the Liberal Party, some traditional politicians and few members of the Betancur administration started a strong campaign to root out drug traffickers from public institutions. Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla is perhaps for Colombia’s hegemonic collective imaginary the person who embodied this fight. Lara realised that “while Colombian judges were afraid of drug traffickers, drug traffickers only feared US judges” (Castillo 1987: 184), and his weapon was therefore to submit to US pressure to make effective the extradition treaty. In this context, Ledher’s private advertising campaign shifted from calling for the creation of a widespread movement of ‘Los Secuestrables’ against the guerrillas, to supporting and spreading communiqués of ‘Los Extraditables’. Los Extraditables’ motto “we prefer a tomb in Colombia than a jail in the US” demonstrated that Lara was correct in his judgement. Although Lara did not manage to isolate drug-trafficking from politics, his assassination in April 1984 forced political-hungry drug traffickers to retreat into clandestinity. Medellín DTOs’ last attempt at politicising their criminal activities came a few weeks later. In a secret meeting in Panama with former Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, they handed in a ‘unilateral memorandum’ in which they

[1] condemned Lara’s assassination, [2] reiterated their political convictions in favour of the political system, [3] denied any links with the FARC-EP… [4] underscored that their only ambition was to ensure the abolishment of the extradition treaty, and [5] pledged themselves to withdraw from the illegal enterprise, repatriate their capitals, dismantle all cocaine labs and sell, with prior government authorization, their aircrafts and chemical precursors (Palacios 2003: 278-9).

Betancur refused to negotiate. Whether or not the US pressured Betancur into making this decision as Palacios suggests, the fact stands that after this point some drug traffickers within the Medellín consortium escalated violence against some state institutions.

6 The Kidnapable Ones was the name chosen by drug traffickers after the 1981 summit. The name was widely publicised by Ledher through the dissemination of leaflets in football stadiums in the autumn of 1981 calling for “a paramilitary counter-kidnapping task force” that “the Secuestrables were willing to finance” (in Salazar, quoted in Rubio 2005: 38). Once the Betancur administration started to persecute them, they changed their name to Extraditable Ones.
The creation of the MAS, which, according to the Kerry Report, was advised by a US government official to the members of the Medellín Cartel (Guerrero 1999: 237-8), spurred the emergence of violence entrepreneurs, who had been at the core of the slow but steady process of militarisation of some DTOs. Once the possibility of accessing the legal social sphere was closed, drug traffickers such as Gacha and Escobar, turned to building up violence entrepreneurs’ military capabilities so as to set up their own private military forces. They also allied with paramilitary and self-defence groups operating in the Middle Magdalena Valley. The anti-guerrilla discourse and the immense flows of money put into the bribing of state officials forged a convenient alliance between military officers fighting ‘the internal enemy’ and drug traffickers as the ‘private financiers’ of the dirty war that provided paramilitary groups with a larger budget, better arms, and more mercenaries. The military’s distrust of, and Escobar’s hatred for, ‘Colombian oligarchy’, had brought them together.7

The involvement of the Medellín DTOs in the conflict moulded the way in which they were to connect with illegal and legal actors cross-borderly. Thanks to links with the Colombian army, Medellín DTOs established contact first with the CIA and then with Israeli and British mercenaries who supplied them with weapons.8 Medellín DTOs’ use of the supply network of the Contras in exchange for financial and material support allowed not only the Ochoa family to consolidate a hegemonic position in the southern US cocaine market but also opened the path for Gacha and Escobar to access the international arms markets, “such as those in Central America that were flooded with surplus weapons in the 1980s” (García-Peña 1999: 83).9

7 For the military’s distrust of Colombian oligarchy see chapter 4. As for Escobar’s hatred, Fidel Castaño’s statements are quite telling: “none else hates oligarchs as much as Pablo” (see Reyes 2009: 91). Escobar’s own words reveal that it was a common discursive practice for him to legitimate his war on the Establishment based on a verbal attack of the oligarchy in favour of the popular classes (see Rubio 1999: 87-8). His hatred stemmed from some traditional elites’ refusal to accept Escobar’s upward mobility as part of the process of constituting a new emerging elite.

8 The alliance also allowed internal arms transfers; this explains why, as Garcia-Peña (1999: 90) contends, “many weapons registered and legalized by the army for wealthy Colombians are later used to arm paramilitary groups.”

9 During the 1980s the arms trading system was undergoing an important transformation. Laurence, for instance, saw a tendency towards “returning to its former merchants-of-death character, where the lack of governmental control resulted in private traders having a significant impact on conflicts and foreign policy.” This had reinforced “the appearance of illegal arms exports in the 1980s,” which had to be understood in the context of “a surge in U.S. arms production capabilities (spurred by increased defense spending), some problems with controlling commercial exports, and a decline in the international demand for legitimately traded arms.” In such a context, the collusion between state
Whilst both Gacha and Escobar saw in the procurement of weapons a means to protect the first stages of the chain of illicit activities associated with the production and domestic transportation of cocaine, each of them assumed different roles in terms of the military build up. Gacha, responsible for the domestic transportation, was to become deeply involved with the military-paramilitary counterinsurgency campaign against the FARC, whereas Escobar, godfather of a significant number of US cocaine distribution networks since the late 1970s, was to arm and command urban gangs so as to do away with competitors and state agents who did not submit to his bribes.10

According to the US Department of Justice, the first significant export control case involving light weapons destined for the Medellín Cartel dates back to 1988 (Klare and Andersen 1996: 71-2). However, export control statistics are not a reliable source in discovering the extent of arms acquired by DTOs in the legal markets during the 1980s, for as Greene (2000: 176) points out

> [m]any of the weapons came from the USA, where sophisticated firearms could be bought relatively easily due to its liberal gun laws. They could then be shipped to Latin American countries, often taking advantage of opportunities to divert legal exports of civilian firearms to unauthorised destinations.

Moreover, even though it is difficult to attain accurate information regarding arms black markets, evidence seems to suggest that Medellin DTOs’ kingpins had accessed the illegal arms trade long before 1988. Only this would explain the sophisticated arms transfer strategy whereby Gacha alone purchased 100 Mini Uzis (9 mm), 200 Galils (5.56 mm), and 200 Galils (7.62 mm) in 1989 from the Israeli Military Industries (IMI).11 Various cases of illicit arms transfers demonstrate not only that drug traffickers had accessed the arms black market but also that the illicit drug trade

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10 It is difficult to establish with accuracy the extent to which the Gacha and Escobar military campaigns overlapped. However imprecise Escobar’s words may be, it is worthy quoting them because these are somehow significant in highlighting the division of military tasks with Gacha: “I have never belonged to the Right because it disgusts me. I have not had, I have not got, and I will not have paramilitary groups; for I have never defended oligarchs’ and landowners’ interests” (see Rubio 1999: 87).

11 Israeli mercenary Yair Klein played a central role in Gacha’s procurement of weapons. The largest part of the transaction took place within the legal arms market, however “the weapons were clandestinely diverted to Rodriguez Gacha and the Medellin cartel” (for a complete account of the transfer see Klare and Andersen 1996: 62-5).
and the black-market arms trafficking had become heavily linked; therefore “[g]un smugglers and drug traffickers often combine[d] operations and use[d] the same routes and transportation systems for both arms and drugs” (Klare and Andersen 1996: 61). This is not to say, as US intellectuals of statecraft pretend to show, that so as “to move arms or munitions in Latin America [at the time], the established networks [were] owned by the cartels” (Gorman quoted in US Congress 1989a: 11); rather the fact is that Medellín DTOs accessed the arms black market thanks to “the idea [supported by US policy makers] that drug money was perfect solution to the Contra’s funding problems” (Ibid.: 41).

However, in arms transfers, small arms were not the only ‘things’ being transferred. Scripts exchanged between suppliers and DTOs shaped their perception of the war and thereby the techniques used in dealing with their enemies. In so doing, such scripts influenced the narratives circulating in the grammars of identity, allowing the accommodation of alterity within the perpetrator bloc and reinforcing a hyperreal construction of the UP as an ‘other’ who could only be subjected to the antigrand real of genocide. The drug traffickers’ multiplicity of enemies forced them to recreate hyperreal sympathy for the army; they were thus able to join Latin American military forces in their fight against communism as a way to secure their business. Put simply, a ‘convenient ideologisation’ informed the antipathy some of them (re)circulated towards the internal enemy. In this context, to associate ‘local’ violent practices with ‘foreign’ successful methods of crushing the other, whoever it was, was the logical step to follow. The know-how of the Israeli and British mercenaries was to become part of the tactics of a sector of the perpetrator bloc in dealing with enemies within Colombian borders. In other words, transnational cooperation shaped genocidal practices. Inhuman acts carried out by Israeli and British mercenaries’ trainees complemented the already terrorising techniques implemented by drug traffickers and paramilitary groups in the Middle Magdalena Valley, Meta and Urabá (see chapter 3).

All in all, the analysis of the 1980s shows that the hyperreal writing of the threat posed by the Medellín Cartel to international security eclipsed the structures and policies which were fuelling transnational criminal networks in the first place. After the mid-1980s, the narcoterrorists script –used until then to describe the Colombian drama– was given a transnational dimension, which allowed the Reagan
administration to allocate a place to Latin America in the space of US foreign policy. Although the US State Department was already issuing yearly Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, there was, as yet, no place for hemispheric human rights tragedies in the space of US foreign policy. Thus, the writing of the global was to privilege particular representations, which were then scripted and brought about particular realities. By 1988, the Medellín Cartel script used to domesticate contingency transnationally had come to complement the narcoterrorists script, which was also eclipsing Colombian officials involvement in the dirty war in general, and in the UP genocide in particular. In this con-text, it became a common practice, both at the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ level, to blame the killings of UP members on paramilitary groups financed by the Medellín Cartel. Indeed, Gacha had financed paramilitary groups and ordered the killing of many UP members. Nonetheless, he had also colluded with high-ranking military officers, statesmen, farmers and ranchers in genocidal campaigns against the UP. That said, it needs to be emphasised that drug traffickers were not alone involved in genocidal massacres, threatening people to do as they wished or challenging the state to get away with their crimes; some politicians, military officers, and statesmen were co-opting drug traffickers so as to secure particular interests and bring about the destruction of the UP. 12 This pattern of interaction, which seems particular to the Colombian locale, was however possible thanks to the


The substitution of the Medellín conglomerate by other DTOs as the core of a transnational criminal network did not mean the dismantling of genocidal campaigns against the UP. Rather, the largest events in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture were still to come. These were the products of Carlos Castaño’s siding with the

12 ‘Clean’ militaries, statesmen and politicians are for the purpose of this chapter those who were not involved in drug-trafficking. Corrupted officials in my view are part of the structure of DTOs.
security forces in the war against Escobar, transferring his urban anti-communist crusade to the peripheries. This brought Castaño within the imagery of a collective self that, by resorting to the extreme use of violence, saw itself as protecting the body politics of ‘the Colombian nation’. At the same time, however, his closer associates were consolidating key positions in the transnational networks dominating the illegal drug trade.

By 1989 Gacha and Escobar had achieved an economic-military build up, which they were using against the Colombian establishment. Small arms transfers and mercenary training had transformed the paramilitary groups into war machines able to cleanse entire regions of communists. After Galan’s assassination, however, the Barco administration, with US financial support (see chapter 5), stepped up its campaign against Medellín DTOs and their paramilitary groups. Gacha was gunned down in December 1989. Because of the Barco administration’s campaign against the Medellín Cartel, Fidel Castaño decided to dismantle the MRN paramilitary group in Córdoba and Urabá and the Self-Defence Forces of the AMM were severely weakened, bringing about another transformation in the perpetrator bloc (see chapter 3).

In this context, Escobar bargained with the Gaviria administration to surrender. The end of terrorist attacks was exchanged for the abolition of the extradition treaty. In 1991, after a new Constitution was signed, declaring unconstitutional the extradition of Colombian nationals, Escobar gave himself up. ‘La Catedral’, a ‘high-security’ prison, was built to lock Escobar in. While Escobar was detained the Cali syndicate and other smaller DTOs saw the opportunity to take over Escobar’s routes. This intensified the ongoing war between Cali and Escobar, in which some of his collaborators turned against him (Camacho 2006: 397). As Escobar stepped up his war against competing DTOs, various drug traffickers allied against him. In 1992, Gaviria had decided to transfer Escobar from La Catedral because of the widely known irregularities taking place. He escaped before the order was carried out. His enemies, however, were determined to hunt him down. It is not clear whether or not Fidel and Carlos Castaño started an anti-Escobar alliance,¹³ the fact is, however, that

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¹³ In his first public interview in 1994 with weekly magazine Semana, Fidel Castaño explained the origin of his war against Escobar as follows: “about fifteen months before Escobar imprisonment, Pablo had brought into the country a large armament destined to the ELN, this annoy me quite a lot.”
the Gaviria administration created the Bloque de Búsqueda, which together with the Castaños’ paramilitary force shot Escobar down in December 1993. The weakening of the Medellín syndicate hence occurred alongside the strengthening of some drug traffickers that were later to form the ACCU. This was not fortuitous; Fidel and Carlos Castaño and Diego Fernando Murillo’s alliance with the Cali syndicate, publicly known as Los Pepes,\(^{14}\) opened up the path for a new period in which paramilitary groups started to rearm and fortify their military build up. According to Carlos Castaño, drug traffickers’ money enabled him to substantially increase the procurement of small arms in the early 1990s: from 100 or 200 muskets bought in the arms black market to 4500 arms entering the country from Central America (Aranguren 2002: 205). This new period of paramilitarisation occurred in the context of state-sponsored protection rackets,\(^{15}\) for the Gaviria administration used Los Pepes in its campaign to hunt Escobar down.\(^{16}\)

Los Pepes’s attacks on Escobar occurred alongside Carlos Castaño’s crusade against what he, and a powerful group of “patriots”, identified as “active guerrilla fighters within leftist organisations” (Ibid.: 121), most of which were UP members. By that time, various national leaders had decided to withdraw from the party. While the UP remained in politics until 2002, the perception was that the PC had taken over it. However, the fact is, that the majority of leaders who left the UP were PC members

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\(^{14}\) In the same interview with *Semana*, Fidel Castaño denied his links with the Cali Cartel and abstained from giving the names of his collaborators. He insistently stated that he was the founder of the Pepes and that his brothers did not have anything to do with the violent actions aimed at hunting down Escobar (Ibid.).

\(^{15}\) According to Snyder and Duran-Martinez (2009: 254-55), state-sponsored protection rackets are “informal institutions through which public officials refrain from enforcing the law or, alternatively, enforce it selectively against the rivals of a criminal organizations, in exchange for a share of the profits generated by the organization… [the provision of] information about rivals and [the] compliance with certain behavioural expectations.”

\(^{16}\) New evidence demonstrates that during 1992 and 1993, the Colombian police joined forces with criminal actors in the battle against Escobar. According to one of the members of the Army Task Force: “we decided to hold an interview with Fidel Castaño… In that meeting, apart from securing the support of Castaño’s subordinates, we realised the need of talking to kingpins of the Cali Cartel… After the meeting in Cali, the Army Task Force received a message from the Middle Magdalena Valley, from Puerto Boyacá to be precise. Ariel Otero, commander of the AMM, decided to join the crusade against Escobar… Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano… together with Carlos Castaño decided to create a Paramilitary Task Force to target Escobar’s contacts” (http://www.elespectador.com/node/37967/print, retrieved 23 November 2009).
too, so they also stepped down as PC members. What had been the backbone of the UP, the PC, was then the only structure left to defend the ideals of the party (see chapter 2). Because of the historic relationship between the FARC and the PC, Castaño used the division within the UP to argue that the leaders who remained in the UP were active guerrilla fighters. After a few years of an urban counterinsurgency warfare, which systematically eliminated regional and national UP leaders, Carlos Castaño moved its operations to the countryside. The ACCU were to carry on with a rural counterinsurgency campaign aimed at cleansing Urabá and Meta of ‘FARC-UP subversives’ (see chapter 3). Carlos Castaño had learnt many of the irregular tactics applied in urban and rural counterinsurgency operations in a one-year course in Israel, where he realised that the key to win the war was “to defend, invade and win territory” (Ibid.: 107-11). Castaño’s contact with foreign violence entrepreneurs did not only give him the military training to knock down social movements and carry out some of the systematic assassinations of UP members, but it also helped to shape the very same representations that regarded particular sectors of the population as depraved allies of the guerrillas who should be exterminated. This, altogether, enabled Castaño to instrumentalise the antipathy towards FARC (recreated by a constant reference to the assassination of his father) and circulate an antigrammar of genocide that sought to do away with the UP, a central part of the civilian social networks that was seen as an obstacle to securing the immense economic benefits to be obtained by building up a strong private counterinsurgency apparatus able to exercise control over the production end of the drug-trafficking industry in peripheral regions.


From 1994 to 1998, the scripting of Colombia’s drama in US foreign policy contributed to the weakening of the already fragile political system and the rising of powerful paramilitary groups, which, thanks to consolidating a privileged position in the transnational drug trade, gained the means to carry out the genocidal campaign in Urabá. The dismantling of Cali DTOs played an important role not only in US narratives, but also in the concentration of coercion and capital by an emerging smaller model of DTOs.
In 1994, when President Samper stepped into the Nariño House, Cali DTOs were responsible for 70 percent of the cocaine circulating in the US market. The Orejuela-led cocaine syndicate had taken over Medellín’s routes without any attempt by the Gaviria administration at stopping them. Cali DTOs’ non-confrontational strategy had made it easier for the Barco and Gaviria administrations to overlook their illicit activities. Although serious allegations about drug traffickers’ subtle involvement in politics, the two leading contestants in the 1994 presidential race completely disregarded the issue and excluded it from the debate (Tokatlián 1999: 244).

In this context, President Clinton delegated to Barry McCaffrey the direction of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. This appointment stepped up the Clinton administration’s pressure on Samper, demanding the dismantling of the Cali Cartel and the capture of its leaders. Even though Bogota quickly succeeded in fulfilling US demands—in part because one sector of the CNP turned against the Cali kingpins (Camacho 2006: 399)—US coercive diplomacy based on the circulation of the powerful narcodemocracy script (see chapter 5) and the corruption scandal over the financing of Samper’s presidential campaign by Cali drug traffickers, rapidly eroded the rather limited legitimacy that the Colombian political system had gained in 1991 after drafting a new Constitution. Around the same time, FARC and ELN’s warfare went from the guerrilla stage to mobile warfare. As Samper saw in the traditional political structures the last resort for clinging to power, it accepted a ‘tough line’ approach to deal with insurgency. Carrying on with the previous administration’s measures attempted to defend Colombia’s democracy, Ministry of Defence Fernando Botero put into practice Decree 356 of 1994 by allowing the creation of the first Convivir. The legalisation of paramilitary groups did away with five years of ambiguous efforts by the Barco and Gaviria administrations to dismantle self-defence groups.

The perverse effect for Colombian society, and the UP in particular, was that it came to reinforce the rearmament of drug traffickers’ paramilitary groups, including

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17 *Time* magazine, for example, was stating by 1991 that Cali drug-trafficking organizations were “the new kings of cocaine, patriarchs of a criminal consortium more disciplined and protected from prosecution than the Sicilian Mafia and now bigger than the Medellín cartel. The Cali combine produces 70% of the coke reaching the U.S. today, according to the DEA, and 90% of the drug sold in Europe” (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,973285,00.html retrieved 30 November 2009).
the ACCU. This enabled them to strengthen their role in the transnational illegal drug trade. Yet only until 1995, when the Cali syndicate was dismantled, “more decentralized flexible networks incorporating greater members of smaller and more specialised DTOs” started to take over the cocaine trade. Paraphrasing Allen, this occurred because “by emphasizing local flexibility and international complexity, the criminal economy adapt[ed] itself to the desperate control attempts by rigid, nationally bound state institutions” – a “manifestation of ‘after-fordism’” (2005: 26, 61). The only organisation left which seemed somehow to resemble the mafia-type cocaine consortiums was, until recently, the Norte del Valle consortium (NVC),¹⁸ which in the mid-1990s allied with the ACCU, and from 1997 to 2005 sided with the AUC in its fight against the ‘guerrillas’.

The ACCU consolidated after Fidel Castaño was shot dead in 1994. Carlos Castaño took over his senior brother’s paramilitary group. In Carlos Castaño’s enterprise there was space for former guerrilla fighters to join in. This allowed demobilised EPL fighters to join the ACCU. In the context of a war between FARC and EPL, the ACCU saw an opportunity to establish a dominant position in Córdoba and Urabá. The EPL demobilised soldiers organised themselves under the Comandos Populares; this group together with the ACCU then targeted what they identified as FARC: UP members in Urabá. Contrary to the rest of the regions in which the UP had formerly exercised political power before assassinations, cleansing, threats had diminished its power, in Urabá the UP was a rising power (see chapter 2). This allowed the UP to carry on challenging capitalist structures of social reproduction. In retaliation to the diminishing of a social network of leftist activists, FARC targeted EPL strongholds. Within this context a war of mutual extermination started between the FARC and the EPL. The last genocidal episode against the UP occurred amidst the context of a dirty war between an ACCU-EPL-Army alliance and the FARC (see chapter 3). Most victims of a series of vicious massacres were UP members (Suárez 2008: 64). The perpetrator bloc did not only reproduce the antipathy of broader sectors of the population towards the FARC, and take advantage of their indifference to the luck of the UP, but also drug traffickers within the perpetrator bloc became key

¹⁸ According to Camacho (2006: 400), the NVC was a third party in the relations between Medellín and Cali. By 1995, it had gained control over various routes, which gave it the autonomy through which it could survive the dismantling of the larger cocaine syndicates.
actors in spreading an antigrm of genocide against those civilian social networks that fell under the FARC-UP script. Thus, the grammars of identity/alterity bringing together the various clusters and cliques within the perpetrator bloc existed side by side with an antigrm of genocide that reproduced a fantasy in which, to use Orozco’s words,

the perpetrators saw themselves as victims-perpetrators-innocent while represented UP members as perpetrators-victims-culprit; these representations fed by mainstream discourses allowed the perpetrators to transfer the guilt to the victims (quoted in Ibid. : 70).

The AUC: the second narcotisation of paramilitary groups and protection rackets (1997 – 2006)

The emergence of the AUC in 1997 converged with a larger transformation in the structure of transnational drug-trafficking networks. On the one hand, whereas the Medellín and Cali syndicates sought to control drug-trafficking from production to distribution, post-1995 Colombian DTOs decided to drop distribution in the US. This had two effects. First, it allowed other drug traffickers –mainly Mexicans– to substantially increase their share of the profit. Mexican DTOs had been involved since the Escobar years; however, most DTOs collaborated with Colombian organisations so they were part of a broader network, and hence violence erupted when disagreements over whether or not to cooperate with ‘the foreigners’ emerged. Since the emergence of smaller Colombian organisations, the Mexican DTOs have gained autonomy. This, together with the democratisation and anti-corruption reforms in Mexico, has created conflict; “[v]iolence thus supplanted state-sponsored protection as the main survival strategy of [Mexican] drug traffickers” (Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009: 267). Second, it dismantled the ‘control’ over the flow of arms that Colombian DTOs may have had due to their presence at both ends of the drug trade. In this sense, Colombian drug traffickers became dependant on other actors offering security, which would explain their cooperation with both guerrillas and paramilitaries. So, in contrast to Mexico, violence has been perpetuated because a sui generis mix of state and non-state sponsored protection is the survival strategy of Colombian drug traffickers.

On the other hand, arms-traffickers became common intermediaries between the
production end and the distribution networks (Camacho 2006: 406). This, instead of weakening drug traffickers’ position in the complex web of relations in the Colombian armed conflict, allowed them to take over a role as arms-brokers. Drug traffickers were in a position to offer arms to both guerrilla and paramilitary groups in exchange for protection in rural regions, at the same time that they could arm their own death squads to offer ‘security’ services in urban areas. The case of drug-trafficker Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano alias ‘Don Berna’ – who owned the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) paramilitary group operating in Antioquia and had “a vast criminal organization in Medellín known as ‘La Oficina’ which employed hired killers to work on commission for whoever wanted to pay” (Oude and Rozema 2009: 419) – demonstrates how Colombian drug traffickers took advantage of transformations in the drug trade at the local level. At the transnational level though, they also benefitted economically: as arms brokers assumed marketing roles in the drug trade, a reduction in the insurance paid by drug traffickers took place. Ensuring the supply in foreign markets became someone else’s responsibility. The reduction in profits was then compensated by (1) cutting insurance costs and (2) developing profitable illegal enterprises related with socio-economic local processes. In the context of the Pastrana-FARC peace talks, ‘private counterinsurgency operations’ carried out by regional coalitions for violence and bringing together the army and the AUC, were aided by conservative sectors of society that saw in the peace process a threat to Colombia’s liberal socio-economic structure. Thus, “various members of the City Council and industrialist played a leading role in the paramilitary death squads,” which targeted people “suspected of left-wing views, but they were often innocent civilians” (Ibid.: 413, 406).

Though there is some agreement amongst scholars in terms of the transformation in drug-trafficking networks, US politicians started to refer to FARC as the new cocaine Cartel in 1998. The narcoguerrillas script, discussed in chapters 4 and 5, was widely used during the 1980s, and because of the military-economic power demonstrated by the Medellín syndicate at the turn of the 1990s, the Bush senior administration focused on ‘narcoterrorism’. It designed the Andean Initiative and saw counterinsurgency as a matter that could be delegated to the Ministry of Defence, which issued order 200-05/91 to create a counterinsurgency network upon which few
paramilitary units could continue to operate freely (see chapter 5). The first Clinton administration’s efforts to dismantle the Cali syndicate were somewhat related to domestic politics—heavily affected by the Lewinsky scandal. By 1998, however, when President Pastrana proposed to bring to an end the conflict through a political settlement with FARC, politicians both in the US and Colombia dusted off the narcoguerrillas script. The hyperreal FARC Cartel was fed by media reports on the use FARC was giving to the demilitarized zone—‘the size of Switzerland’!—in the Eastern Plains. By 2002, even the commander of the AUC, Carlos Castaño, was using such a script so as to justify the involvement of drug traffickers in the national paramilitary umbrella organization; and to paraphrase him, “it took narcoparamilitaries to fight narcoguerrillas” (Aranguren 2002: 206).

Although there is no denying the fact that FARC’s involvement in drug trafficking-related activities had sharply increased since 1990—when the Colombian army attacked FARC’s headquarters—, calling it a ‘cartel’ simplified the complex dynamics within Colombian insurgents (see Gutiérrez 2004). Furthermore, it contributed to eclipsing the fact that the AUC had managed to bring together various drug traffickers under a counterinsurgency campaign aimed at wiping out ‘the guerrillas’. This not only helped drug traffickers to hide illicit activities and to establish better contacts with state agents (Gutiérrez and Barón 2008: 119), but it also allowed feelings of sympathy between outlaws and government officials to go unquestioned.

Nevertheless, not even the AUC, closely linked with the NVC and bringing together other smaller DTOs, could be called a cartel in a strict sense; much less FARC, despite The Economist suggesting so by estimating in 2001 that the “total annual drug related earnings for Colombia’s guerrillas range[d] from 250-500 million”. Even if these estimates are correct, Allen’s words seem to be worthy of consideration:

estimates of the total annual value-added of the Colombian cocaine industry range from 2 bn to 10 bn. Leftist guerrillas account for at most one-quarter, and perhaps as little as 2-3% of Colombia’s cocaine profits. The remainder is controlled by ‘traditional’ DTOs and their associated paramilitaries (2005: 66).

Ramírez (2004: 256) shows how while the Pastrana-FARC peace talks were taking place, Washington started denouncing links between FARC and the Tijuana Cartel. By the time the peace process reached a deadlock, the Colombia’s Prosecutor General Office was pressing charges against FARC for drug-trafficking.
Through overemphasising the drug trafficking component of FARC, the Colombian government managed to bring together the governments of the Organisation of American States (OAS) to sign the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and their Component Parts in 1997. Although the agreement came into force in 1998, succeeding in circulating antipathy towards FARC, paramilitary groups continued obtaining arms in the black market. In 2000, for example, “3000 AK-47… were delivered to the AUC” (Bromley 2009: 4). Paradoxically, this did not only occur amidst the Pastrana-FARC peace talks, a time when the Pastrana administration had publicly committed to dismantling paramilitary groups, but also in the context of Plan Colombia. As the modernisation of the army did not bring to an end the consolidation of narcoparamilitary groups, scholars rightly started questioning whether Plan Colombia sought to modernise the army so as to enhance US national oil security or to help solve the root causes of the armed conflict and its relationship with the global illicit cocaine trade (Allen 2005: 65). Looking back, it could be argued today that US involvement in Colombia was paving the way for the circulation of antipathy towards some terrorists. This has backed up the global war on terror that militarised counter-terrorism by recreating hyperreal sympathy between a non-terrorist fictive collective self and radicalised antipathy towards terrorists who cannot be accommodated within the frames of a global fictive collective self.

The foregoing explains why the US counter-drug component of Plans Colombia, Patriota and Consolidación did not weaken DTOs’ activities. What brought the NVC down in 2008, for instance, was not the US assistance programs taking place since 2000, but the dispute for international markets and domestic transportation networks between some of its affiliates. Similarly, what dismantled the cocaine empire of some warlords amalgamated in the AUC was not a US-backed counter-terrorist plan, but the bargaining agreement signed between the Uribe administration and some warlords. This time, impunity was exchanged for weaponry. The hyperreal demobilisation of narcoparamilitary groups has overshadowed the political agreements that brought their power into being in the first place. The extradition of some paramilitary leaders and drug traffickers has contributed to recreating the
fantasy that criminals cannot escape justice. Nonetheless, what has also taken place behind the scenes is that, just as what happened in 2008 when NVC drug trafficker Diego Montoya was extradited to the US, a large number of crimes against humanity and genocidal massacres – in which government officials, traditional politicians, ranchers, farmers, militaries, and policemen participated – are left untold, keeping in the dark the secret alliances and plans behind not only the genocide of the UP but also crimes against a whole social fabric of inconformity-led social movements. This is how oblivion has started to replace indifference for the tragedy of UP survivors. And even worse, it has been institutionalised by what some scholars today call ‘power crime’, because of “the presence of immunity which undermines effective strategies for detecting, prosecuting, and punishing those engaged in... an array of human rights abuses” (Ruggiero and Welsh 2009: 297).

In the Colombian case, ‘power crime’ takes on a different dimension when some of those engaged in human rights violations are TNCs. In recent years, a scandal came to the fore when Chiquita International recognised that it had paid more than $1.7 million to the AUC for protection between 1997 and 2004. The payments made to the narcoparamilitary group took place at the very moment of consolidation of the AUC, just after the largest genocidal campaign against the UP in Urabá was carried out. Chiquita’s farms are located in this region so it claims that the payments were made to protect the company’s employees. The fact, however, is that in 1997 a large number of UP survivors had to leave the region after, what Suárez (2007: 244) called, ‘political cleansing’. Although few survivors stayed aiming at ensuring their survival by downplaying their political identity and establishing links with international NGOs, (para)military violence against them did not stop (see chapters 2 and 7). Throughout these years Chiquita carried on making payments to the AUC. As states can to some extent counter corporate ‘power crime’, it would have been reasonable to

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20 By the late 1980s, Diego Montoya Sánchez controlled Trujillo, and together with the Urdinola brothers and Cali Cartel’s drug trafficker Hélder Pacho Herrera, extended his sinister power throughout the region. However, at the same time, the ELN guerrilla group also wanted to create a front in Trujillo. This ignited a bloody war between both sides which quickly spread to civilians. According to the IACH, in two years 107 civilians were viciously assassinated and many of their bodies were thrown into the Cauca River. Don Diego’s involvement, together with army officers and policemen, has been documented. At the outset of the Uribe-AUC ‘peace talks’ Don Diego attempted to bargain with the Uribe administration, but the US had already warned the Colombian government, so his name was not included as part of the AUC. The FBI calculated that 70 percent of the drug entering the US and EU markets had the same remittent: Don Diego (see, http://elespectador.com/node/98226/print retrieved 2 December 2009).
expect Colombian and US administrations to collaborate with each other in curbing the power of big businesses to commit power crimes and to bring those who colluded with the perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice. However, as Holmes rightly points out,

the fact remains that states, like corporations, frequently place their own vested interests ahead of those of either the collective or their own publics. This will sometimes result in collusion with miscreant big business in various forms of power crime. Neo-liberalism, with its emphasis on markets’ unfettered freedom, deregulation, and the blurring of the boundaries between the state and the market, greatly increases the likelihood of such collusive power crime (2009: 396).

The foregoing explains at least in part why for more than a decade Chiquita was able to bribe politicians and pay for illegal protection even though the company’s financing of the AUC in the region was publicly known, and why today none of its employees have been prosecuted in Colombia or in the US. Chiquita however paid a $25 million criminal fine, making it the first major US Corporation ever convicted of financial dealings with terrorists. The full explanation for state-corporate crime has to do, however, with the fact that the AUC was becoming by the late 1990s a (private) security force to which many economic and political networks not only in Urabá, but in most regions of the country, were turning for protection. This occurred due to a particular political economy of affective-dispositions, in which polarised sympathy/indifference, inserted in the grammars of identity/alterity, circulated amongst social, political, and economic networks, and hyperreal antipathy/oblivion were recreated in an antigrammers of genocide circulating mainly amongst military and criminal networks but also permeating various cliques and clusters of the complex assemblage of networks reproducing the idea of being part of a larger collective self. Hence, to bring all those who colluded with the hands-on perpetrators of the UP genocide to justice would provoke a political turmoil, if only because ex-President Alvaro Uribe was Antioquia County’s governor between 1995 and 1997.

**Conclusion**

Drug-trafficking organisations became powerful outlaws that were able to create private armies and death squads because of the Reagan administration’s geopolitical
narratives, which encouraged alliances with drug traffickers so as to support its campaign against communism in the Western Hemisphere. Anticommunism sealed a convenient alliance between outlaws and liberal Western Hemispheric military networks which consolidated the crystallisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Political networks hid away such alliances by resorting to the narcoterrorists and narcoguerrillas scripts during the 1980s and 1990s and to the narcoterrorist guerrillas in the 2000s. By blotting out the collusion of state agencies with outlaws, the criminal sector of the perpetrator bloc was allowed to freely access arms markets and in return carry out (private) counterinsurgency operations, which had as its target the civilian social networks represented as supporting FARC.

The competition for dominating illegal markets created fierce battles between drug traffickers during the 1970s. This dispute was resolved in the early 1980s when the creation of MAS paramilitary group allowed them to downplay their differences by circulating a hyperreal solidarity-bond based on the idea that collaboration would secure the fortunes to be made from their participation in the illegal drug industry. Alterity was thus accommodated in the drug traffickers’ grammars of identity. However, differentiated processes of integrating themselves into regional societies broke such grammars and escalated violence between drug traffickers. By the late 1980s Medellín DTOs had gradually become involved in the armed conflict, putting some drug lords at the forefront of some genocidal campaigns against the UP.

The militarisation of some Medellín DTOs was also the result of drug traffickers’ convenient alliance with the army, which saw in DTOs’ private armies a perfect complement for its anticommunist crusade. This opened the path for drug traffickers to access the transnational arms market and to establish connections with arms brokers and mercenaries. As a result of the interaction with transnational violence entrepreneurs, Colombian drug traffickers were dragged into a circulation of narratives that shaped their representations of the other and informed the terrorising techniques used to do away with it. This reinforced an antigrandmar of genocide. In this context, drug traffickers instrumentalised affective-dispositions so as to expand their alliances from the military to broader legal actors seeking to maintain economic, political and social benefits.
Yet the late 1980s and early 1990s saw the radicalisation of some Medellín DTOs against the Establishment, which brought about a division within the perpetrator bloc. By 1993, a network of drug traffickers working around Carlos Castaño had started to take over regional genocidal campaigns, previously carried out by some sectors of the Medellín conglomerate. His campaign against the UP was informed by the FARC-UP script which allowed him to reproduce and circulate antipathy against the civilian social networks he identified as the hidden social structure that allowed FARC’s build up. In the mid-1990s, once the Medellín and Cali conglomerates were dismantled and Colombia’s complex reality was scripted as a narcdemocracy, Castaño managed to rearm a strong paramilitary group siding with small drug traffickers who had accessed the transnational trade. This enabled him to toughen up his participation in the genocidal campaign against the UP. By reproducing an antigraam of genocide that relied on the representation of victims as culprits, Castaño in particular, and other sectors of the perpetrator bloc in general, were able to rebrand the old antipathy towards communism as an antipathy towards narcoguerrillas.

By the late 1990s, the scripting of FARC as the new ‘drug cartel’ hid away the complicit relationship between legal and illegal actors in the drug trade. Furthermore, international agreements aided in circulating the FARC cartel script but did not manage to halt the acquisition of arms by the narcoparamilitary sector of the perpetrator bloc. The script did not only consolidate the criminalisation of insurgency but was also appropriated by narcoparamilitary leaders to publicly legitimize their involvement in drug-trafficking. Their finances, however, also depended on transnational capital as TNCs contributed to fill the AUC’s pockets. Thanks to a large budget the AUC acquired the military means to join the army in the ‘pacification of Urabá’. This script supported by traditional politicians, such as Alvaro Uribe, legitimised the illegal tactics used by the army and the siding of the ‘civil society’ with a rightwing narcoparamilitary project. Thus, Uribe’s coming into the presidential office institutionalised ‘power crime’, enabling the maintenance of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Today, an antigram of genocide seems to have moved to construct sectors of the Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) as the other within, which cannot be accommodated in the imagery of Colombian identity. This is not to say that there is a teleological continuum of victimisation (PC-UP-PDA), but rather
that in an unresolved process of state formation, civilian social networks unwilling to submit to the dominant project of some economic, social, political and military networks are represented as dangerous others, against whom any means can be used. Thus, drug traffickers continue playing a central role in the perpetrator bloc, and the money coming from their participation in the transnational drug trade are welcomed to secure the survival and (re)production of a fictive collective self, by inscribing with hyperreality the sympathy/antipathy/indifference/oblivion nexus of affective-dispositions.

By showing how the participation of powerful Colombian outlaws in an evolving fluid transnational criminal network enabled them to collude with security forces thus aiding the crystallisation of the perpetrator bloc, this chapter complements chapter 4, and, by unveiling the cooperation between various administrations and outlaws, it supplements chapter 5. The three chapters altogether contribute to a better understanding of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture by advancing what could be called a ‘geopolitical topology’ of the perpetrator bloc. In so doing, they contextualise the ever-changing character of the perpetrators presented in chapter 3. What remains to be done then, is to map the transnational dimension of the UP’s resistance struggle displayed in chapter 2. The next chapter does so.
7 **Anti-geopolitics: the UP as Part of a Transnational Network of Resistance to Genocide**

The perpetrator bloc, circulating freely in the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture thanks to the transnational links of legal and illegal actors and the scripts (re)produced by political and military networks, successfully crushed the socio-political power of the UP. However, the UP did not stand still vis-à-vis the perpetrators, rather, as chapter 2 discusses, it resisted violence in everyday grammars of identity/alterity by circulating narratives that reproduced antipathy against the perpetrators. Although such narratives were interpreted differently by the various perpetrators, the overall result was the escalation of violence. This brought perpetrators together in different regional coalitions for violence, which crystallised into a perpetrator bloc that targeted the socio-political power of the UP for destruction. However, insofar as the perpetrator bloc was the materialisation of the transnational connections of legal and illegal networks in the geopolitical con-text of the cold war in the Western Hemisphere, the UP’s resistance also spread cross-borderly, attracting the attention of international organisations, other political parties and social movements. This chapter is a topology of the informal and relatively fluctuating transnational network of resistance to the UP genocide.

Although resistance is generally associated with the “legitimate recourse to armed force for a just cause” (Semelin 1993: 23), it cannot be reduced to a military tactic to oppose domination. For as Foucault (1980: 142) rightly points out, “there are not relations of power without resistances”: resistance needs to be understood as a continuum of armed and unarmed tactics that enable the reproduction of social relations. As genocide destroys the reproduction of social relations of civilian social networks, resistance has had a marginal place in scholars’ attempts to understand why and how genocides unfold. This in fact reinforces the genocide script, which recreates the fantasy that genocide is the product of the intent of the perpetrators whilst downplaying the intersubjective processes that produce the multiplex interpretations that shape an antigrand of genocide. Notwithstanding when genocidal geopolitical conjunctures crystallise the possibilities of armed resistance decrease, therefore genocide-victims increasingly resort to limited forms of civilian resistance which seek
to maintain the integrity of the group, its cohesion, the defence of basic freedoms for it to act, the respect for individual rights and for social and political attainments (cf. Semelin 1993: 30). Against such actions the perpetrators toughen up their violent campaigns. The impossibility of armed resistance and the escalation of violence mean that victims resort to building up cross-border links by circulating sympathy for their struggle amongst broader economic, political and social networks and antipathy towards the perpetrators to halt the destruction. This chapter, then, goes beyond Semelin’s effort of understanding resistance against Nazi domination by placing resistance at the core of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture in which the UP genocide occurred. Thus, it advances Shaw’s (2007) call for a focus on the clash between perpetrators and victims.

Even though a detailed investigation into the connections between armed and unarmed forms of resistance to the perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide would better the understanding of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, such an enterprise goes beyond the scope of this chapter in particular, and the research in general. The challenge for future research into the UP genocide is then to overcome the narratives reinforced by observer- and participant-interpreters, which have forced scholars to leave unexplored the forms of armed resistance so as to avoid reinforcing the ‘armed proselytism’ script. Thus, two unavoidable questions guiding new research are:

1. What were the connections between the armed struggle of the FARC and the UP civilian resistance to the violence of different sectors of the perpetrator bloc?
2. How did such connections affect the developments of the armed conflict?

For now, this chapter focuses on the unarmed (civilian) resistance unfolding since the early violent actions targeting individuals of the political platform. It complements chapter 2 by looking into the transnational efforts led by the UPNB in order to first bring to a halt the genocidal campaigns and then the perpetrators to justice. Despite the fact that these efforts did not succeed in bringing the genocide to a halt—the transnational connections of the perpetrator bloc ensured the continuation of genocidal campaigns—the transnational connections of the UP have ensured the re-
writing of history, a struggle for memory that seeks to challenge some of the simulations underpinning the reproduction of a fictive Colombian collective self. Thus, the UP’s resistance can be seen as epitomising what Routledge calls anti-geopolitics, that is, “an ethical, political, and cultural force within civil society that challenges the notion that the interests of the state’s political class are identical to the community’s interests” (2003: 236).

The chapter argues that the anti-geopolitics of the UP solidified a transnational network of resistance to genocide, which connected leftwing political parties, state agencies, trade unions, human rights NGOs, and social movements. This shaped the various resistance practices that have emerged not only from different sectors within the UP, but also from victims’ organisations in the last 25 years. At the same time, international organisations, such as the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR), became central actors in the denunciations of military-paramilitary alliances or in researching the connections between regional coalitions for violence and US foreign policies, as in the case of Amnesty International. Although this informal network has gone through various transformations, from being a quite centralised network in the mid 1980s to be rather decentralised in the mid-2000s, the chapter shows that in essence it has been an acephalous network producing multiple forms of resistance, from awareness campaigns, political debates, and national strikes to scholarship efforts. The analysis is based on three different sources. The first part, from 1985 to 1989, mainly relies on a discourse analysis of various issues of the International Bulletin of the Unión Patriótica. The other parts, from 1989 until today, rely on a multiplicity of sources, mainly interviews with various participants-interpreters, legal documents, NGOs reports, fieldwork notes, and secondary sources. Despite the insight offered by previously unresearched documents, the resort to triangulation so as to validate the findings, and the strive to maintain a high level of critical reflection, the reader should be wary that the chapter mainly relies on victim sources, and as such tries to be faithful to their accounts.

The chapter is divided into five parts. The first part looks into the early days of the UP transnational strategy. It explores how many UP members internalised various elements of counter-hegemonic narratives, which brought the UP together with other political parties in Latin America. Second, it discusses how the writing of anti-
geopolitics brought it closer together with International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and NGOs. The third part focuses on the unfolding of anti-geopolitics as a more coherent strategy to expose the state’s collusion with outlaws in genocidal practices. Next, it outlines how during 1990 and 1991 the transnational strategy was sidetracked. The final part focuses on the post 1992 years. During this period, some UP survivors remained in the political struggle and others created grassroots NGOs as new form of resistance. This solidified a multiplicity of cross-border alliances through which UP survivors are still struggling for truth, reparation and justice.


In 1985 when the UP was created as a movement for the FARC to make a transition from war to peace, it was decided to create the figure of an International Affairs Officer within the UPNB. The director was to design the contact not only with other communist parties in the communist world but to create interaction with NGOs (Federación Sindical Mundial [FSM]), IGOs, such as the UN, and other parties particularly in Western Europe. Strong links with leftist trade unions in Latin America also allowed UP members to escape violence for a while before going back to Colombia to continue the political struggle. This strategy, however, was not very effective in halting the assassinations. By 1987, a considerable number of activists and sympathizers had been assassinated. Another strategy designed by the UP was to rely on the PC’s extensive work on human rights solidarity movements. The PC had played an important role in the development of human rights activism since 1974 and over time had come to dominate the Permanent Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, created in 1979, the year in which AI visited Colombia for the first time (see Tate 2007: 80-4). Thus, during the first years the UPNB’s efforts focused on sending information to AI and calling for another country visit.

Because of the sharp increase in assassinations after August 1986, the UPNB designed in early 1987 a new transnational effort to stop the assassinations, disappearances, tortures, illegal detentions, stigmatization, and the political cleansing that was taking place in some UP strongholds (see chapter 2). The UP’s strategy was
to issue international bulletins.¹ The first bulletin called for the international community to take action to halt the ‘dirty war’ in Colombia.² The publication was written both in Spanish and English. It mentioned the Plan Cóndor and listed 20 UP public officials and 265 UP activists who had been killed between 9 March 1986 and 11 March 1987; all public officials had been killed by paramilitary groups, whereas 38.5 percent of activists by paramilitaries and 29 percent by the army. The bulletin described the violence against the group as orchestrated from within the state apparatus, as the statement below demonstrates:

Democratic peace and social rights desired by colombian people are impossible [sic] if the government would not depurate Colombian army of the members that conduct, adhere and/or support paramilitary groups that acts [sic] according to the ‘National Security Doctrine’, designed in Washington, where all terroristic [sic] methods are accepted in the action against the ‘internal enemy’.

After this first call for international solidarity, a formal first issue was officially released later in 1987. Guadalupe Nieves figured as editor, under the supervision of Alvaro Salazar,³ the UP International Affairs Officer at the time. The aim of the bulletin was to reach “solidarity committees abroad, NGOs, democratic political parties and movements, diplomats and other world actors”. It came out only in Spanish and gave an overview of the UP and its ‘foreign policy’. As the UP was seeking to present itself as the unique popular alternative in Colombia, the bulletin highlighted how a variety of actors, such as the FARC, PC, ELN, trade unions, theatre companies and social movements were gathering in the UP. This enabled the UP to begin gaining political recognition amongst leftist groups in Western Europe (cf. Vanegas 1991). To consolidate sympathy amongst socialist parties in Europe, a particular emphasis was placed in portraying the FARC as honouring the peace talks and the government as breaking them. According to the bulletin, the unfolding dirty war showed that the Barco administration was unwilling to honour the Uribe Agreements; however, “the FARC-EP… two ELN detachments and the ADO

¹ The policy of issuing international bulletins is related with the decision made by some UP members at the regional level to set up human rights committees. In 1987, for example, Jahel Quiroga, UP Councilwoman in the Middle Magdalena Valley, founded CREDHOS, which could report human rights violations to the UPNB. This information was then used in international bulletins to create consciousness-raising.
² Bulletin without publication date; it was probably released in May 1987.
³ Former FARC member Salazar had demobilised to work in the UP.
continue honouring the truce and striving for bringing to completion the agreements” (UP 1987a: 2).

The UP also showed itself as an example of radical democracy, for various guerrilla groups and the PC were in constant contact with communal assemblies, grassroots organisations and independent activists. The distinction between the guerrilla groups and both political parties (the UP and the PC) was an important one, however, because as the bulletin restated, the guerrilla groups had not disarmed and had not lost their character of rebel groups. Thus, the UP’s democratic experiment was radical in two ways. First, as a bottom up democratic exercise in which Juntas Patrióticas –the small cells around which peasants, students, women amongst others were to participate directly in the building of the party– played a central role. Second, as a movement in close contact (and supported by) leftist rebel organisations, which had not resigned to the armed struggle to bring about a structural transformation in Colombia. The bulletin therefore portrayed the UP as the driving force behind different resistance actions, such as “strikes, popular demonstrations, land invasions, student discussions, indigenous’ demonstrations, human rights struggles, [and] anti-militarism campaigns” (Ibid.: 3), at the same time that the dirty war was described as the largest obstacle to consolidate a truly democratic exercise.

The UP’s foreign policy also underwent an important transformation at the time. It sought to link the domestic struggle for radical democracy with emancipatory struggles taking place in Central America and other regions of the globe (e.g., Namibia, South Africa, Palestine, Nicaragua and El Salvador), at the same time that it supported particular regimes. By stating that

social movements should be at the forefront of the struggle for the defence of the principles that are part of progressive states’ International Law and of international relations that do away with war, injustice and misery (Ibid.: 4),

the UP portrayed itself as an actor which recognised that radical transformations had to comply with the international legal framework. Sovereignty –still the ‘organising principle’ of international relations at the time– was to be respected, and thus the UP managed to bridge the contradiction between emancipation and compliance with the status quo by favouring the principles of pacific coexistence and non-intervention. The foregoing allowed the UP to present its foreign policy as based on pluralist
ideology rather than dogmatic communism and so to structure it around the struggle for human rights, territorial integrity, equal sovereignty, non-alignment policy and proletarian internationalism. Hereafter, the UP strongly criticised US intervention in Nicaragua, not only because the Pentagon was carrying out a campaign to destabilise Nicaragua, setting the ground to defeat the Salvadorean movement, but mainly because “the gathering of Central American peoples around democratic and nationalist alternatives to achieve peace in the region were being hampered by US interventionism” (Ibid.: 10). As a demonstration of resistance to coercive regimes, the bulletin highlighted the importance of social mobilisation against Pinochet’s dictatorship. The UP’s anti-Americanism was complemented by calling for a New International Economic Order. The UP—in tune with the dependency school theory in vogue—saw this as the only way for Third World countries to overcome poverty, at the same time that demanded the Colombian government to stop paying the external debt.

Together with such an internationalist approach, the UP sought to bring closer Colombian diasporas in Europe and the Americas. In so doing, the bulletin stated that UP Congressmen were working to push forward an Emigration Bill in Congress. The attempt was to enhance bilateral cooperation agreements between the Colombian government and other countries so as to set up aid programs for Colombian diasporas (Ibid.: 6). Although the bilateral agreements proposed did not oppose directly the extradition treaty between the US and Colombia, the UP stated that the extradition treaty weakened the Colombian judicial system and therefore the sovereignty principle. Even though many drug traffickers were involved in the assassination campaigns against the UP—as clearly demonstrated in the assassinations of UP MPs Pedro Nel Jimenez and Leonardo Posada— and the extradition of some of them was presented by the Barco administration as a way to halt the slaughter, the UP advocated against the extradition treaty. Perhaps, one could argue, the UP was too aware that extraditing drug traffickers to the US was an opportunity for the administration to use drug traffickers as scapegoats and conceal the participation of army officers, security forces, policemen, politicians, and government officials in the unfolding perpetrator bloc.
Short after the Barco-FARC peace talks had broken down a third issue of the bulletin was released. Thereafter articles were to be published in both Spanish and English. Contrary to the previous issues, it focused on informing what the bulletin called the international public opinion of the charges presented by UP President Jaime Pardo against “a general, three colonels (one of them in retirements) [sic], one captain and two majors” because of their involvement in paramilitary activities (UP 1987b: 3). In order to consolidate its pluralistic ideological stand, the bulletin did not portray the army as responsible for the killings of UP members, rather it stated that

the fratidical [sic] action of some of its members who desire to transform the military institution into an aggressing [sic] group without respecting the Law, and following [sic] instructions of some obscure plans against the popular mouvement [sic] were responsible for the violence (Ibid.: 4).

Although the UPNB knew that there were sectors within the army that were not colluding with paramilitaries, the distrust with the Military Penal Justice System was such that the UP formally asked Barco for a civilian investigation into the army and other security forces. Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos granted that a civilian ombudsman should carry out the investigation. The bulletin described Hoyos’s decision as a victory of the UP. By demonstrating to international audiences that the UP was in tune with democratic sectors of Colombian society supporting political change, the UPNB sought to align itself with the wave of narratives supporting democratisation processes in the hemisphere. As democracy and human rights were starting to play an important role in the grammars of identity/alterity structuring cross-border relations, the UP was able to circulate sympathy for its struggle. The UP international campaign to end the dirty war did not stop there; in the next section the bulletin listed some of the perpetrators and their actions (see Ibid.: 7-15).

The fourth issue focused on explaining FARC’s decision of attacking a military convoy on 16 June 1987, which brought to an end the truce between the Barco administration and the rebel group in Caquetá. The bulletin however started with a forceful criticism of Barco’s neoliberal policies; which was followed by a direct

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4 Although Issue 3 is without date, because of the events discussed it is probable that it was released in July. Issue 1 and 2 may have, then, been released between May and June, and Issue 4 in August.
opposition to TNCs, most of which were involved in the oil industry. In this context the UP resorted to Bolivar’s Pan-Americanism,

the UP proposes to continue with the tradition of unity and alliance between the two countries [Venezuela and Colombia] and with the rest of Latin America as was shown by Bolivar, Girardot, Ricaurte, Sucre, Rondón, Córdoba and Melo and ratified by Uribe Uribe (UP 1987c: 4).

The foregoing did not only attempt to appease the conflict between ‘Colombian and Venezuelan oligarchies’, but also to highlight the transnational class consciousness existing between trade unions in both countries which, had in turn, resulted in solidarity actions with the UP in the Arauca region, because of the assassinations of various UP leaders. The strong criticism of the Barco administration helped to set the ground for the UP to explain to its international audience the difficult conjuncture in which the FARC was starting to move away from politics. The bulletin reprinted two letters\(^5\) by the FARC’s Central Command in which it “explained that the 14\(^{th}\) and 15\(^{th}\) fronts were forced to act as they did because of the permanent offensive against them by the army’s specialised units of contraguerrilla” (Ibid.: 25-7).

The UPNB referred to the Barco administration’s description of FARC’s attack and the political statements that followed as a smokescreen aimed at downsizing the violence that UP members and part of its social network of political supporters had been victims of. The bulletin stated that the action was being used to silence the UP President’s denunciations of military officers. Furthermore, as an attempt to gain the support of international actors for the peace process, the bulletin stated that Barco’s announcement that “the truce and cease-fire will come to an end wherever the FARC clashes with the army” was troublesome; for it meant that the civilian government had left in the hands of the military the direction of the peace process –this was already having an impact on the UP; since July violence against UP members had intensified. As the quote below demonstrates, this period marked a shift in UP narratives.

1… the president in a very dangerous act for the Colombian future took the decision of giving the military the faculty to decide where and when the cease-fire is broken without considering the crimes and abuses that some of its members commit.

\(^{5}\) The letters were addressed to President Barco and Peace Advisor Carlos Ossa Escobar.
2. The Patriotic Union has as its principal ideal the defence of peace and the dialogue as the only way to achieve it and to overcome the crisis the country is suffering.
3. The UP whether or not the truce continues, since we are neither the government nor the FARC will continue with its goal of organizing and orienting the Colombian people in order to attain its wishes for a change and its social emancipation (Ibid.: 28-9).

The letter was signed by Jaime Pardo Leal, Ovidio Salinas, Carlos Efren Agudelo, Plinio Bernal, Iván Marquez, Israel Beltrán, and Jaime Caycedo, as members of the UPNB. Thereafter, the UPNB was to carry the flag of peace in its international efforts to bring FARC and Colombian administrations to the table. This came to reinforce a slow process of moving away from FARC, which was started by the UPNB’s request for the UP to be accepted as a member of the Latin American Permanent Conference of Political Parties (COPPPAL). Joining COPPPAL was part of the attempt to build strong regional alliances with alternative political parties which shared the same resistance ideals, such as support to Contadora, demanding American Congress to stop helping the Contras, and campaigning for negotiated settlement with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. The foregoing could be seen as a means to institutionalise sympathy cross-borderly.

Writing anti-geopolitics

By December 1988, most FARC members had returned to wage war against the state. Few members decided to give up the membership of FARC so as to remain in the legal political struggle carried by the UP. At the time, Alvaro Salazar, one of the few who decided to stay in the UP, was not only the UP Director of International Relations but had also assumed as editor of the International Bulletin of the UP. The UPNB had completely changed since October 1987. After Pardo’s assassination a new UP leadership had contributed to shape a more active UP foreign policy. The first of many actions took place in February 1988, when Pardo’s widow Ms Gloria Florez de Pardo was invited to give her testimony in front of the UNCHR in Geneva. Her statement sought to bring to the Commission’s knowledge the outrageous levels of human rights violations in Colombia and to request the study of Colombia’s reality as

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6 At the domestic level, UP members had organised demonstrations in defence of life and for peace until 1985, by 1987 other sectors of Colombian society had started joining UP demonstrations; not only because of the high levels of violence against the group, but also because broader sectors were being affected by violence. This is related to the second period in the development of the movement for peace in Colombia (cf. García-Durán 2006: 189).
part of its future activities (see Motta 1995: 35-6). The invitation had been arranged thanks to the lobby carried out by UP members exiled in Europe and it succeeded in its call for international solidarity. During 1988 various NGOs carried out country visits to Colombia. In this context, the UP sought to consolidate close links with European NGOs, such as Pax Christi and Justice and Peace, by documenting the violent campaigns suffered by UP members and its networks of sympathizers. The UP also sought advocacy by IGOs’ missions invited to the country by the Barco administration, such as the UN Working Group on Forced Displacement’s visit to Colombia in November 1988 (UP 1988: 4).

As assassinations sharply increased and massacres started to proliferate in various regions of the country after the Barco-FARC peace talks deteriorated in mid 1987 (see chapter 2), the UPNB created the Human Rights Office. Throughout 1988, this office did not only centralise the documentation of human rights violations against UP members and sympathizers, but also carried out visits to international organizations. For example, UP Human Rights Officer Erika Paez visited the OAS Human Rights Office. She travelled as a representative of the Colombian Office on Human Rights, a human rights platform bringing together aborigines, peasants, local NGOs, alternative political movements (such as A Luchar and Frente Popular), and relatives of disappeared people. The platform aimed at halting the violence that was spreading to various sectors of Colombian social networks, many of which were not formally part of the UP but were informally building links and supporting new political alternatives. Paez’s visit disseminated amongst a broader international audience the genocidal political violence carried out against the UP. This helped to consolidate a counter-hegemonic struggle based on the production of sympathy for the UP, which sought to neutralise the antipathy resulting from the scripting of reality by US and Colombian elites (see chapter 5). Thanks to the visit, Paez stated,

it was possible to show to some members of the Parliament and before the American public opinion that this ‘dirty war’ is not only a conflict between two organizations of drug-traffickers, but a systematic attack by paramilitary groups (protected by these drug-traffickers and members of the military forces, of which activities the Government is well informed) against the civilians and, especially, against the popular and political sectors of the left-wing. As a result, the OAS will follow closely the situation in order to present a formal denunciation against the Colombian State. The non-governmental organizations [sic], on the other hand, proposed a visit to Colombia and the American media agreed to publish information about the Colombian situation (UP 1988: 5).
The UP also participated in the Fifth Congress of North American Colombian Committees, held between 7 and 10 October 1988. UP International Affairs Officer Álvaro Salazar went as a representative of the ‘Left-Wing Unity’, as it was called the political agreement signed between the UP, A Luchar and the Frente Popular. The aim of the visit was to plan

solidarity and denunciations about the situation of Human Rights in Colombia in order to make it known [sic] by the United Nations, the OAS, as well as by governments, parliaments, political parties, unions and non-governmental organizations of both the US and Canada (Ibid.).

The UP’s lobby was complemented by further steps taken by the UPNB to align the party with socialist parties in Western Europe. By the time the eighth issue was released the UP had been accepted as member of the COPPPAL and UP President Bernardo Jaramillo and Álvaro Salazar have decided to formally ask for membership to the Socialist International (SI). The formal request sent on 25 July 1988, and reprinted in the bulletin, was the result of internal discussions, which started soon after Jaramillo’s short visit to Western Europe. This visit had convinced wider sectors within the UPNB that Pardo’s call for international solidarity was not enough to halt the slaughter. Distancing from communist orthodoxy some leaders saw the intensification of political relations with Western European political parties as a way of balancing the subjection to US National Security policies, which in their view had produced a ‘dirty war’, despite the US’s preference of labelling it as a ‘low intensity conflict’. This took place in a context in which the Perestroika was bringing about a fundamental debate amongst Marxist-Leninist communist parties around the world.

The foregoing made it easier for Salazar’s article to internationally present the UP as an organization building bridges between communism and socialism.

The Patriotic Union is not a Marxist Leninist organization. Nevertheless, some of the movements within the Patriotic Union are so defined, but at the same time the Union

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7 A Luchar and El Frente Popular were not political parties, as such, were rather political movements created by unarmed sympathizers of ELN and EPL guerrilla groups. On 28 September 1988, A Luchar, Frente Popular and the UP signed an agreement—in which a joint presidency of the three movements was set up, consisting of the presidents of the three organizations and an Organization Committee—seeking to promote the conformation of a political movement known as the ‘Frente Político de Covergencia’. This alliance disbanded in 1989 (Archila 2005).
contains liberal, conservative, socialist and catholic sectors, as well as people belonging
to other leftist tendencies and even independents [sic]. Consequently, the Patriotic
Union does not form part of the International Communist movement, as suggested by
some people who try to discredit it using anticommunist arguments and forgetting that
the Perestroika is establishing the bases for the unification of the two main socialist
tendencies of our time… In the conditions of the modern world, a party which aspires to
direct the destiny of its country cannot stand aside from the political and social
tendencies who [sic] are at work on the international scene. It has to consider the
economic, technological and military interrelations which now influence any country in
the world” (Ibid.: 27).

In late 1988, this political party and its broad network of sympathizers was the
military target of various regional coalitions for violence. Liberal, Communist, and
Conservative party members, peasants, women, children, teachers, elderly, human
right defenders, and trade union members to name some of the victims had being
killed, massacred, cleansed, tortured, illegally detained, stigmatised, and had been
target of assassination attempts or had received life threats (see chapter 2). The eighth
issue of the international bulletin of the UP tried to make visible the worst of these
actions. Therefore, although not even a month had passed since the Segovia Massacre,
the bulletin informed its international audience of the responsibility of the Bomboná
Battalion in the massacre. It also sought to spotlight the memory of those leaders, who
even though not being registered UP members, had been killed as part of the ‘dirty
war’. Such was the case of Hector Abad Gómez who although member of the leftist-
wing of the Liberal Party dedicated his life to the defence of human rights. The
perpetrators targeted him as member of a social network of resistance, closely
working in a democratic project with the UP. By counting the assassination of
political leaders close to the UP project as part of the mass killing of the group, the
UP reinforced the narratives circulating in the grammars of identity that presented it
as an encompassing self able to accommodate alterity within and against whom
(para)military violence had been directed. In this genocidal con-text, UP narratives
implicitly sought the support of transnational democratic networks so as to halt the
unfolding of an antigrammar of genocide. The UP’s aim was that the intense work of
what Sikkink (1993: 412) calls the ‘international human rights network’ would
translate into an experience similar to that of the Argentinean case, where by the early
1980s after a decade of transnational campaigning, human rights practices had substantially improved.⁸

The unfolding of anti-geopolitics

The pluralist approach of the eighth issue brought about a transformation in the bulletin itself. Hitherto, the bulletin had been issued sporadically. Since mid 1987 until December 1988 only 9 bulletins had been released. However, the eight issue argued that the bulletin had been so well received that the UP was seeking to make it monthly magazine with a broader news coverage but specially focused on the activities and political views of the UP (UP 1988: 19).⁹

In April 1989, a couple of months before the Second National Congress of the UP in which the party was to define its political strategy for the forthcoming presidential elections as well as the survival and safety strategy of UP members, the tenth issue of the international bulletin was released. This bulletin shows new developments in the UP’s efforts of building transnational alliances. First, its youth organisation, Unión de Jóvenes Patriotas (UJP),¹⁰ was establishing links with socialist countries and for that reason was seeking to participate in the XIII Youth World Festival held in Piong-Yang, North Korea in June 1989. Committees had been constituted in Medellín, Cali, Bucaramanga and Meta, “breaking all the obstacles of the dirty war” (UP 1989: 9).

Second, to carry out a consistent and organised advocacy work abroad, the UP was creating a European Directive Commission, which was headed by UP President Jaramillo: Jaime Corena, UP Deputy Jesus Aníbal Suárez, and UP Councilman for Tunja Oscar Dueñas were the other members of the commission. This was an important move for political exiles belonging to the UPNB because they could continue with their political activities in Europe while the threats against their lives

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⁸ Sikkink’s analysis of Argentinean victims’ interaction with the international human rights network shares many similarities with the UP’s experience. In both cases UNCHR, IACHR, AI, and AW played central roles in resistance efforts.

⁹ It seems that this was never the case. The last issue found in Boris Cabrera’s private archive dates from April 1989. Agudelo (1994) had also access to the bulletin, but he only referenced issues from 1987 to 1989.

¹⁰ Because of the important role that children played in Eastern European Countries and other communist regimes, such as Cuba, the UP had carried on with the PC’s ideas of organizing youth organizations. Thus in 1987 the UJP was created, it sought to bring together various student organizations, such as JUCO, with youth organizations in different cities of Colombia. The participation of UJP in the festival shows that the PC played a central role in the organisation of the UPJ through the JUCO.
faded away. The aim of the commission was to “coordinate all political actions of solidarity with the Patriotic Union and orientate the task of the UP representatives in the different European countries [sic]” (Ibid.). By spring 1989, various members of the commission had carried out contacts with the Socialist Swedish Party, Austrian Socialist Party and the Spanish Socialist Party so as to speed up the UP entrance to the SI. Furthermore, Jaramillo was scheduled to meet the European Parliament and the International Committee of the Red Cross to explain “the dramatic human rights situation and political violence in Colombia” (Ibid.).

The UP continued lobbying the UNCHR throughout 1988. As a result a new intervention by a Colombian delegation was scheduled to take place during the 45th Session of the Commission held in Geneva between 30 January and 10 March 1989. The delegation was to participate on items related with forced disappearances and arbitrary and extrajudicial executions. Although it was composed of mainly UP members, some of them participated in the delegation representing trade unions, grassroots organizations, and political parties (in the case of those members who were in the UP representing other political tendencies).¹¹ As with the previous intervention in 1988, all the testimonies gave details of the dirty war and asked for the intervention of UNCHR in order to put an end to the “systematic violations of the Human Rights [sic]” (Ibid.: 15). However, the most important testimony was UP Mayor of Segovia Rita Tobón’s. Segments of her statement are reproduced below, not only because of its historical relevance, but because it demonstrates how UP survivors described the genocidal practices so as to awake sympathy amongst international audiences.

In 1988, a new modality of violence emerged in Colombia. Selective assassinations of political leadership was no longer enough. For some it appeared necessary to massacre masses of people in the regions where the political opposition movements were in the majority. During 1988 there were 60 cases of such massacres. The most deplorable incident was without any doubt the… [Segovia] massacre… In the days preceding the massacre, pamphlets issued by a paramilitary group, were found in Segovia in which they expressed the wish to clean the town of UP members in the name of God. The subsequent judicial investigation revealed that these pamphlets had been produced at the military base. Moreover, surviving witnesses have calimed [sic] to have identified some members of the army and the police based in Segovia as having been part of the group

¹¹ The delegation was composed of Gloria Mancilla de Díaz and Gloria Gómez (from Asfaddes); Aída Avella and Héctor José López (CUT); Jaime Caicedo (PC leader); Nubia Serrano (Asonal Judicial, Judicial Trade Union); Rita Ivonne Tobón (UP Mayor of Segovia); Eusebio Prada (UP Deputy in Meta County); Ramon Argumedo (Sintagro, Banana Workers Trade Union); and Aqueminofel (representative of the Colombian Indians) (UP 1989: 15).
of killers… In one of Segovia’s streets the massacre was not indiscriminate but based on a known list of names. Here the houses’ doors were thrown… the victims found and murdered cold-blooded in front of their families and friends. 12 Liberal Party members who sympathised with the UP were killed… The official version of the Colombian government tends to minimize this bloodbath with the argument that these people were caught in the cross-fire between left and right extremists which are impossible to control… The government of Colombia has undertaken a massive diplomatic offensive to claim that they cannot stop this violent events which attempt to diminish their responsibility in these violations of human rights. But it has says nothing about the manner it has been protecting the responsible of these violent events… Since 1986, 3600 prosecutions against army officers for violent acts against the people have been recorded. The government systematically refuses to remove them from the armed forces or police and turn them over to the civilian courts (Ibid.: 17-8).

While these actions were taking place in Western Europe, the UPNB in Colombia was meeting Colombian Foreign Secretary Julio Londoño Paredes. UP president in charge Diego Montaña and Álvaro Salazar showed support to the amicable solution of an international dispute between Colombia and Venezuela. The UP took the opportunity to call for the participation of social movements in both countries and offered to cooperate with the Venezuelan left-wing political parties and movements towards the solution of the controversy. In order to speed up the process of affiliation to the SI, Montaña and Salazar also met the Spanish Secretary of State for International Cooperation, Luis Yañez. According to the tenth issue of the bulletin, after the meeting Mr. Yañez manifested that his government will intercede before the Socialist International in order to find a international forum where the UP could make known the extermination campaign which since its fundation in 1985 has claimed the lives of at least one thousand of its members and forced to exile many others (Ibid.: 10).

The UP’s and local human rights organizations’ international work had managed to catch the attention of global NGOs and IGOs. Between 1987 and 1989 at least 6 international missions had visited the country. The last two of such missions had been conducted by Pax Christi International and the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in October and November 1988 respectively. Both missions’ findings confirmed previous reports, which expressed their concern with the high levels of political violence. The report of the UN Working Group, for instance,

12 America’s Watch, OAS, Juridical Mission headed by Nobel Prize winner Pérez Esquivel, AI, ILO, UN Working Group on Forced Disappearances.
noted that paramilitary groups’, self-defence groups’ and death squads’ ‘private justice’ had caused “numberless victims specially in the political left”; in most of the cases, “all kinds of evidences tend to demonstrate the participation of Armed Forces units or Security Services” (quoted in Ibid. : 19-20). By affirming that Colombia had “the highest ratio in the world of killings for a country not officially at war,” Pax Christi also sought to contribute to breaking the silence around Colombia, which the US had been scripting at the time as the oldest democracy in the continent (see chapter 5). The mission reported that it “was perplexed about the total impunity that is the response to the immense amount of crimes in Colombia” (quoted in UP 1989: 16).

Although Pax Christi had been invited by the UP and catholic NGOs and trade unions, the close connection with the UP can be seen in the fact that it organized a conference with participants from the UP delegation to the UNCHR so as to launch the report on Colombia. The UPNB’s efforts to place UP members as political actors in Colombian politics failed because intellectuals of statecraft continued their campaign of portraying UP members as undercover guerrilla fighters. Antonio Panesso Robledo, for instance, wrote a newspaper article describing those present at the conference as extremists, terrorists, religious fanatics, and followers of Pol Pot and designated Pax Christi as a façade organisation, which was flying terrorist from Bogotá over to Geneva.

By 1990, the circulation of sympathy amongst the different cliques and clusters of the transnational network of resistance to the UP genocide had not managed to influence rightwing intellectuals of statecraft and other public voices. As this section suggests, social, political, and economic networks spread the distrust for the UP to the very NGOs and other human rights activists instead. Thus, the UP remained in awkward position in the imagery of a fictive Colombian self. The UP and its ‘accomplices’ were usually referred to as terrorist, in so doing observer-interpreters’ macronarratives aided in the reproduction of an antigrand of genocide.


Public opinion narratives, the anticommunist discourse of the army, the transnational economic power and access to weapons of Medellín DTOs linked to paramilitary groups, and the alignment between US and Colombian administrations were all more
powerful than the UPNB’s transnational efforts to halt the slaughter and to bring radical democratic change to Colombian society. In March 1990 the UP’s national political power was finally mortally wounded. Jaramillo’s assassination not only resulted in the explosion of the internal division between orthodox sectors of the PC and sectors supporting a more pluralist approach to politics. It also brought fear and a sense of disillusionment amongst broader sectors of urban populations who either decided to resign to their political identity so as to survive the violence or join other political projects in order to advance their personal legacy of resistance.

The profound crisis brought about by assassinations of UP national leaders was closely related to the turmoil within the UPNB, which allowed the PC to play a more dominant role in the UP, and constrained the transnational work developed by the previous national board. While most Eastern European countries had started a process of democratization, the PC continued for quite some time avoiding the reassessment of Soviet communist dogmas. This, however, did not impede the PC from continuing to build electoral alliances with democratic sectors within the platform of the UP. As a result, newly elected UP President (and PC Central Committee member) Carlos Romero over time started taking distance from the communist orthodoxy. In May 1991, for instance, Romero met US State Department Officer for the Andean Region Barbara Euser so as to question US military aid to Colombia; albeit army harassment against the UP did not stop. Raids on UP offices in Arauca were carried out by the army few days later. According to the data collected for this research, Romero’s was one effort, if not the only one, carried out during 1991 to bring international attention to the ongoing genocidal violence against the UP. The transnational strategy that had dominated the late-1980s had been relegated to resistance within Colombian politics (see chapter 2).

The consolidation of anti-geopolitics and the hope of bringing the perpetrators to justice (1992 – 2010)

The Third National Congress of the UP elected Aida Avella as president. Avella’s presidency was to bring back the transnational dimension of the UP as a network of resistance. This time, however, the struggle was to develop rather differently. In 1992 the recently created Constitutional Court requested People’s Ombudsman Jaime
Cordoba Triviño to carry out an investigation into the assassinations of UP and Esperanza Paz y Libertad members (see, Sentence T-439 of 1992). The investigation showed that some 700 UP members had been assassinated and that 95% of the cases were in impunity. Cordoba invoked the use of the term ‘genocide’ for the assassination campaign. This event ignited a radical transformation in the UP’s transnational strategy. In 1993 the UPNB decided to ask for UP members protection by the Inter-American Judicial System.

Since the early days of her presidency Avella had started to recompile the human rights archives:

thousands of letters had been sent to the UP human rights office since 1985; survivors had typed or handwritten personal statements to leave a record of the army’s involvement in the violence against them.13

By the time the People’s Ombudsman Report was released Avella had already come to the conclusion that the violence against the group was of a different scale and nature than what Hylton (2006: 67) calls “the dirty war against the broad Left”. Generalised impunity and the large scale of the ongoing killing convinced her that the only space left for trying the perpetrators of the ‘genocide of the UP’ was the Inter-American system. With the end of the cold war, leftist activists had slowly started moving from portraying the OAS as a symbol of imperialism to seeing it as a space in which the battle for resistance was to take place. Thus, Avella directed the UPNB’s efforts to document the UP case against the Colombian state. She contacted many NGOs part of the broad network of human rights organizations,14 but all of them declined to help because “according to the UN Genocide Convention political groups could not be protected from genocide.”15 It was only until UPNB member Jahel Quiroga returned from exile that Avella found an ally to sue the Colombian state, before the IACHR, for the genocide of the UP political party.

The case was accepted for preliminary investigation by the IACHR, which demanded an infrastructure capacity that neither the UP nor Corporation for the Defence and Promotion of Human Rights (REINICIAR) –the NGO backing up the

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13 Personal interview with Aida Avella, Geneva, 17 and 18 December 2009
14 For an insightful account of human rights activism in Colombia since the 1970s see Tate (2007).
15 Personal interview with Aida Avella
demand– had. In this context the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ)\(^\text{16}\) agreed to join forces with them. The CCJ was the most experienced Colombian NGO in terms of dealing with the IACHR, and the founding provided by the Ford Foundation had allowed it to closely work with HRW. Therefore the partnership with the CCJ enabled the UP to establish close contact with HRW and re-establish its connections with AI. In this context, the two local NGOs started to work together in order to document the case. On the one hand the CCJ provided the legal expertise to put together the case, and on the other hand Reiniciar gathered together the survivors of the UP genocide to document their stories. They documented 1163 assassinations, 123 disappearances, 43 assassination attempts, and 225 death threats so as to demonstrate the systematic destruction of the UP (REINICIAR 2006b: 7). In 1997, although the IACHR (1997: art. 25) disregarded the case as genocide because of the 1948 UNGC, it admitted the case as the mass murder of a political group. Genocidal campaigns against the UP had however continued during the time Reiniciar was documenting the case. Between 1993 and 1997, the political cleansing of Urabá was carried out by the one of the regional coalitions for violence of the perpetrator bloc (see chapter 3).

Against this particular genocidal campaign, new forms of resistance emerged. Thus, even though the few members who survived violence and decided to stay in the region resigned from their identity, they formed grassroots NGOs or peace communities to keep a neutral role in the armed conflict. In so doing they sought support in international NGOs, such as Peace Brigades International. The decision of UP leaders/sympathisers to ‘resign’ to their political identity/sympathy and form for example the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó can be interpreted as radically different from most genocide survivors’ experiences: genocide usually reinforces a grammar of identity that essentialises sameness and downplays alterity. However, although UP survivors relinquished to their political identity, they continued reproducing parts of it by resorting to various narratives through which they constructed the axis of the solidarity-bond of their social fabric of the community. Neutrality became the signifier that enabled to present the community as an apolitical collective self that demanded respect for its social fabric. The neutrality-

\(^{16}\) From its early days, the CCJ’s difference with other human rights NGOs had been the internationalist focus; it tried “to exploit the potential of international mechanisms in relation to Colombia. [It was] the first [ngo] to focus on international organizations so they would work on Colombia, like the Inter-American Commission and Court and the UN” (Tate 2007: 115).
signifier did not do away with political resistance; rather, it informed the community’s grammar of identity so as to create a space out of the perpetrator bloc’s reach. The construction of this ‘apolitical space’ that resisted being co-opted by the dominant order being imposed by the perpetrator bloc and sectors associated with it can be seen as part of the reproduction a fluid collective self forming the transnational resistance network to the UP genocide. Yet the violence continued (see Carroll 2009).

In order to understand how this apolitical space is integrated within broader sociomaterial networks one needs to turn to the processes involved in the crystallisation of such a space. Following Alther (2006: 287), it could be argued that this occurred in five phases. (1) The creation of the UP and the narratives circulated by its leaders raised peasants’ “awareness of their marginalisation within the larger socio-political context”, thus they joined or sympathized with the UP from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s. (2) The perpetrator bloc’s genocidal campaign against the ‘UP’ between 1995-1996 in Urabá was, however, “a defining violent… experience that act[ed] as a catalyst for community cohesion”; as a result, peasant leaders ‘resigned’ to their political militancy/sympathy (seen as a means to better the position of their communities within the broader socio-political context) and turned to strengthen the social fabric of their communities by attempting to create an apolitical space that disrupted the sociopolitical con-text imposed by the perpetrator bloc. (3) Peasant leaders turned subsequently to human rights networks so as to look for “external support” for a neutral initiative of ‘apolitical resistance’. (4) The targeting of the community’s social fabric further consolidated the leaders’ drive for resistance. (5) A transnational network materialises when international NGOs institutionalise their support for the community; thus the community’s space of resistance becomes part of a folded geography aimed at distancing it from the genocidal practices of the perpetrators.

What is clear from the processes involved in the materialisation of the peace community is that they were all but apolitical. The very resistance vis-à-vis the dominant project imposed by the perpetrators was the continuation of the circulation of imageries that portrayed the community as part of a broader collective self that did not submit to relations of domination. This overlapped with Reiniciar efforts to circulate sympathy for the UP survivors amongst human rights activists, development
agencies, political actors, governmental agencies, international organisations, NGOs, and diplomatic missions. The strengthening of this social fabric as means of resistance was what the military cliques within the perpetrator bloc interpreted as a threat to the reproduction of the body politics they were meant to protect and resulted in genocidal campaigns, such as the Plan Golpe de Gracia, which took the lives of many activists and drove some survivors into exile, where they nevertheless carried on with the resistance struggle (see chapter 2).

Quiroga, however, continued leading Reiniciar. In 2000, the transnational efforts carried out by UP survivors seemed to finally be bringing to a halt the violence against the UP. This was so because during the Pastrana administration—and as part of the amicably settlement of the dispute proposed by the IACHR—a Working Group was put into place in order to (1) clarify the violent practices against the UP, (2) acknowledge the need for a comprehensive reparation, and (3) seek effective protection of UP members and survivors. Furthermore, various human rights NGOs had succeeded in campaigning for the inclusion of political groups in the definition of the crime of genocide under Colombian law. Although the military strongly opposed the inclusion of political groups in the definition of the crime of genocide by arguing that “the definition would impede the anti-subversive activities carried on by the military forces”, thereby restraining them from fulfilling “their constitutional duties, the Colombian Congress passed a definition of the crime covering political groups provided they develop legitimate activities” (Benavides-Vanegas 2002-2003: 604).

The military’s opposition to the inclusion of political groups shows the ambiguous con-text in which these developments were happening. Since the Pastrana-FARC peace talks were taking place, it seems contradictory that the military used anti-subversive activities as the main reason to oppose the bill. However, the peace talks had produced new geographies: Colombia had thus been split into a ‘space of peace’ and multiple battlefields. In the army’s theatres of operations, counterinsurgency operations had continued with the 1980s Salvadorian doctrine that did not only target guerrillas but what they saw as its socio-political network of supporters. In the case of Urabá in particular, army officers carried on harassing former UP members; by

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17 Members of the Working Group are: REINICIAR Director, CCJ Director, UP President, PC General Secretary, Colombia Vice-President, Chancellor, Attorney General, Ombudsman General, People's Ombudsman, Robert Goldman (Ex- ICHR President) and Erick Sottas (World Organisation Against Torture- OMCT President).
killings, tortures, disappearances they targeted the social fabric of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó. Thus, even though Pastrana advanced more than any previous administration in the amicable solution with Reiniciar, the UP continued to be the target of destruction by some army brigades that often directly carried out assassinations but usually allowed the AUC to freely act throughout the different battlefields.

Although the definition of genocide in Colombian criminal law was an important triumph for Colombian NGOs, no perpetrator has ever been prosecuted for genocide. The lack of prosecution of perpetrators surely contributed to the decision made by many army officers to continue targeting the UP. This, together with the coming to power of Alvaro Uribe, started to tear the hopes of reparation and justice apart. In May 2006, the National Board of Victims and Relatives of the Genocide of the UP and 14 Regional Boards decided to walk away from the settlement. The Uribe administration had not only dishonoured the amicable settlement agreement but under its rule violent practices against the UP had also re-emerged: 136 assassinations, 38 disappearances, and 28 assassinations had taken place (REINICIAR 2006c: 13). Furthermore, from the victims’ point of view, Uribe had shifted his approach from Pastrana’s: instead of prosecuting the perpetrators, President Uribe seemed to justify the destruction of the UP at the same time that he denied state responsibility in the violence against the group. In this climate of distrust, violent attacks on UP survivors continued, assassinations were carried out as late as August 2008, and life threats against Reiniciar’s staff have continued to this day. In this context, the Uribe administration’s narratives have contributed to the polarisation of the political economy of affective-dispositions by constantly circulating the hyperreal narcoterrorist guerrilla threat and linking it with the hyperreal ‘human rights traffickers’ script, of which UP grassroots NGOs are part. This has convinced Reiniciar of the need to consolidate its position within transnational human rights networks so as to assure justice, truth and reparation.

Accordingly, UP survivors continue their resistance struggle. Reiniciar’s close cooperation with the Swedish Embassy, the Swedish International Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the European Union has resulted in the publication of various survivor’s regional accounts of the UP genocide (i.e., REINICIAR 2006a, 2007,
Furthermore, as 2007, Reiniciar’s work with new generations of survivors helped to constitute a youth organisation called ‘Hijos e Hijas Contra la Impunidad y por la Memoria’. Drawing on previous transnational actions, Hijos e Hijas has carried on building links with youth social movements across Latin America, as in the case of Hijos e Hijas Argentina. Today, some UP survivors are moving from human rights activism back into politics. Iván Cepeda, for example, won a place in the House of Representatives in March 2010 legislative elections. He has led not only UP victims’ organizations but national organizations of victims. The role played by UP survivors in the constitution of the national movement of victims (MOVICE) has been central. This has also empowered victims’ organizations, which today have direct contact with European and American cooperation agencies. UP diasporas have helped to coordinate resistance actions in Europe. Aida Avella, exiled in Switzerland since 1997, for example, has informally continued lobbying the UN and the FSM. She has somehow joined forces with former UP-PC members. Together, they have formed the core of the PDA political party in Switzerland. Furthermore, Avella and Quiroga meet twice a year as members of the shadow UPNB. Both meet with CCJ Director Gustavo Gallón in Geneva once a year before the annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Council takes place. Avella’s networking in Europe has been central to bringing together UP refugees scattered throughout the continent, some of whom have been called to give their statements to the IACHR in the judicial procedure against the Colombian state.

**Conclusion**

This chapter shows that UP started to develop a transnational strategy to resist the violence unfolding against its members since the early days of its constitution. The first international bulletins sought to create awareness amongst the international public opinion of the alliance between the army and drug traffickers in assassination campaigns against the UP. This was aimed at circulating antipathy towards the perpetrators. However, as the violence continued the UP turned to international

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18 Cepeda run for the PDA. However, within the PDA he represents Hijos e Hijas and the MOVICE more broadly, within which UP survivors organizations have an important place.

19 Personal interview with Aida Avella
organisations, such as UNCHR and AI. Although the interventions in the Commission helped to draw global NGOs’ attention to Colombia, the interventions did not manage to stop the violence.

By 1990, when the UP’s national political power had been diminished, the UPNB turned back to a domestic strategy so as to ensure the survival of the platform. The main concern was how to stop the migration of supporters to the new political parties. It was only in December 1991 that a new transnational strategy came into place. This strategy resulted in pressing charges for genocide against the Colombian state. The IACHR’s provision of considering the UP genocide as a case of mass murder of a political group ignited new dynamics not only within the UPNB, but also amongst genocide-survivors. Despite the international attention to the case and the IACHR’s mandate to tighten up the protection of UP leaders, the perpetrator bloc continued the genocidal campaigns against the UP.

Paradoxically, the circulation of sympathy at the international level isolated the UP from political circles in Colombia throughout most of the 1990s. This only changed during the Pastrana administration, when an amicable solution between the Colombian government and the survivors of the UP genocide was on the table. In this context, Pastrana sought to accommodate the memory of the UP within the grammars of identity/alterity informing the Colombian collective self. However, during Uribe’s two terms in office the grammars of identity/alterity were polarised. The UP was portrayed as a sneaky and twisted ‘other’ who could not be trusted and this was transferred to the survivors and to victim’s organisations. Furthermore, the Uribe administration has linked many of the NGOs part of the transnational resistance network to the UP genocide with the guerrillas. By the labelling human rights defenders as ‘traffickers’, antipathy has been circulated. Yet the victims’ struggle has prevailed thanks to the consolidation of fluid geographies of transnational resistance networks. Today victims’ organisations have moved from moral-led to political-led resistance seeking to ensure the materialisation of reparation, justice and truth by securing a space in the Colombian Parliament. This resistance is connected with global NGOs and some European Governments’ agencies, which reinforces victims’ NGOs place in broader transnational networks.
The transnational dimension of the UP survivors’ resistance did not mean however that all former UP leaders were to abandon their political struggle. Even though the formal recognition was withdrawn in 2002, still today a shadow national board of the UP meets within and without Colombia. This epitomises the anti-(geo)political struggle of the UP. Moreover, some PC members who were part of the UP continue the political struggle within the PDA. Although the UP’s presence in the PDA is symbolic and marginal, the connection with victim’s organisations and the reconstitution of some political networks of the PC has recently brought back the memory of the UP. Today new generations attend international conferences, such as the 2009 Latin American Studies Association Conference, to offer testimonies of the processes undergone by victim’s organisations. In this way the transnational resistance network to the UP genocide fights the oblivion promoted by political networks.

To sum up, the UP was not a passive genocide-victim. It resisted the perpetrator bloc not only at the concrete level of the genocidal conjuncture, as chapter 2 discussed, but also, as this chapter demonstrates, at the (imaginary) level of the geopolitics informing the spatial-temporal relations of transnational networks. Since resistance and victimisation are indissociable dimensions of genocide, which bring about a striated geography in which multiplex actors, spaces and times converge, this chapter completes the main aim of this thesis: mapping the political economy of affective-dispositions that allowed for the crystallisation and solidification of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. In this context, the UP’s transnational efforts were interpreted by the perpetrators as a call to step up the violence against the group and get rid of the threats it represented. By challenging the genocide script, circulating among some networks of the global civil society and the international community, that portrays genocide-victims as passive actors trapped in domestic settings, this chapter suggests that scholars would benefit from studying genocide as a process that dissipates across the institutionalised Euclidian conceptions of space and time, in other words, from looking beyond the genocidal setting. To condense the findings of the study and discuss the challenges posed by the research methodology turns the next and final chapter.
CONCLUSION

8 GENOCIDAL GEOPOLITICAL CONJUNCTURES AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFFECTIVE-DISPOSITIONS: A CRITIQUE OF THE GENOCIDE SCRIPT

This thesis is a journey into the muddy waters of affect, into the terrifying processes associated with the escalation of violence, and into the unfolding of resistance to dominant interpretations of tense human interactions. The argument of the thesis is that contrary to the genocide script that simplifies genocide as a state-led domestic crime against passive victims, genocide is instead the product of an assemblage of complex geopolitical processes. Such processes crystallise into a violent intersubjective asymmetric clash between a hard power (product of the interaction of various actors into a perpetrator bloc) and a soft power (resulting from the consolidation of social networks). Genocide is therefore not the product of ‘the intent to destroy a group’; rather, its occurrence is closely linked with the polarisation of a political economy of affective-dispositions.

The research on the destruction of the UP shows that a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture crystallised, bringing apparently distant objects, subjects, and places together. Alongside the expansion of such a fluid system of relations, a gradual polarisation of sympathy/antipathy occurred. This radicalised the grammars of identity/alterity ordering social relations. In this con-text, an antigrmammar of genocide emerged, which shaped a mindset that regarded the destruction of the UP as the path to follow. Upon the coexistence of various grammars of identity/alterity and antigrammars of genocide, spaces of victimisation and resistance materialised. Such spaces linked various sectors of transnational military, political, economic and criminal networks together into a perpetrator bloc, and social movements, political parties, IGOs, and NGOs into a transnational network of resistance to genocide. The transnational connections of genocidists and genocide-victims reveal the material dimension of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture within which the destruction of
the UP occurred. Yet the circulation of narratives reinforcing the idea that Colombia is the oldest democracy in the Western Hemisphere reveals the discursive dimension of such a conjuncture.

Thus, the research suggests that instead of reinforcing the genocide script by focusing on the exceptionality of ‘domestic processes’, future genocide research should strive to con-textualise genocide. To follow con-textualisation as a method to research genocide is to go beyond the traditional historical analysis of international factors. Hence, the focus is not on the role that other states play in the occurrence of genocide in a given state. Instead, it is on deconstructing national borders and understanding complex social processes that surpass them.

The tactic of con-textualisation

The con-textualisation of genocide follows various steps. First, it moves away from a state-based understanding of the international system to focus on the narratives that reproduce the simulation of states as containers for domestic processes. The aim is to map out the cross-border circulation of narratives amongst various networks. This enables one to write the topologies of perpetrators and victims, without restricting the analysis to the borders of a particular state. Moreover, this first step helps understanding how distant actors and clusters are brought together and the differential intensity and connectedness between such clusters and multiple networks.

Second, it deconstructs the scripts at the core of the reproduction of perpetrators’ and victims’ narratives. This contributes to unveiling how various actors instrumentalise simplifications of reality in order to victimise or resist victimisation. Consequently, this second step advances tracing of the connections between the macronarratives of observer-intrepreters and the micronarratives of participant-interpreters. As such, this move contributes to display the role that apparently impartial actors play in the (de)construction of (a genocidal) social reality.

At this point, a third step follows: to enquire how perpetrators’ and victims’ scripts target affect; a targeting that seeks to produce the distancing or siding of broader audiences with the unfolding processes of victimisation and resistance. Put
differently, it is time to ask how it is that the polarisation of affective-dispositions helps to amalgamate various perpetrators into a bloc that solidifies a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, against which victims constantly resist by also resorting to affective-dispositions in order to bring about a fluid transnational network of resistance to genocide.

Finally, as a tactic for de-essentialising genocidists and genocide-victims, contextualisation demands a further effort: exposing how scripts circulate through different means (i.e., radio, TV, press, and films), depending on the specificity of the historical context. For this reason, there is a need to compare the scripts circulating in each form of media. Triangulation can help to deal with some of the limits of the method, namely the contradictory narratives that often hide the ‘true’ feelings of the actors. However, it cannot solve a larger limitation of con-textualisation, that is, that in order to present a viable research project, one might be forced to focus on one form of media. This thesis, for instance, relies on the analysis of texts, although contextualisation is not restricted to documents. Being aware of this limitation does not make up for it, but recognising it opens up avenues for new research agendas that contest the essentialisation of knowledge.

Findings and lessons for future research

The UP and the perpetrator bloc were complex networks, which changed over time during the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. As chapters 3 to 6 demonstrate transnational processes informed the crystallisation and the metamorphosis of the perpetrator bloc; whereas, as chapters 2 and 7 show, the UP was a changing civilian social network that eventually became part of an informal and fluid transnational network of resistance to genocide. Hence, the UP was not a passive actor. Although the core of the social network (the political platform) underwent various transformations, the moral and political resistance of different sectors within the social network consolidated its socio-political power. This enabled the UP National Board to contest dominant narratives legitimising violence and the UP regional clusters to denounce the military’s central role in early coalitions for violence. Against
such a resistance the military escalated violence in the mid 1980s. Such violence eventually became genocidal. Notwithstanding the military’s radicalisation was connected to UP politics, the training of high-ranking military officers in US academies and the long-lasting armed conflict had already shaped a military mindset that regarded the use of exceptional violent methods as a means to deal with ‘subversive’ political contenders.

But the military alone did not target the UP. Besides the security forces, drug and gemstone traffickers, political and violence entrepreneurs, big land owners and cattle ranchers, local and foreign mercenaries, paramilitary groups and private military companies colluded at different moments and spaces of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. A grammar accommodating difference within a collective self, according to context, enabled opposing actors to amalgamate into an acephalous perpetrator bloc. By 1987, some actors shared an antigrammar of genocide that construed the UP as a ‘threatening other’ which had to be destroyed; for the UP was a hindrance to the fulfilment of their political, economic, ideological, and military goals. Such scripting of the UP was not entirely the product of narratives circulating within the perpetrator bloc. Instead, it was the result of a multiplicity of scripts transnationally circulated by political, economic, social and military elites. Such elites sought to secure a fictive liberal collective self through the writing of communism as a geopolitical threat.

During the second cold war in the Western Hemisphere, the hyperreal writing of reality enabled rightwing politicians to polarise a political economy of affective-dispositions. Such dispositions became the core of the (anti)grammars (de)structuring social relations. The escalation of the armed conflict in Colombia therefore occurred alongside the unfolding of the UP genocide. Hyperreal sympathy sided indecisive sectors of the fictive liberal Western Hemispheric collective self with the perpetrator bloc; whereas radicalised antipathy distanced such sectors from the suffering of the UP. The fantasy that the UP was a threatening other radicalised antipathy. As a response, moderate-UP sectors recreated sympathy for FARC’s armed struggle; while a reinvigorated antipathy distanced such sectors from political, military and economic elites. The portrayal of a genocidal bourgeoisie reinvigorated antipathy.
The targeting of the UP continued through the post-cold war years because the grammars informing the writing of a liberal global identity continued relying on a polarised political economy of affective-dispositions. This allowed (para)military and other clusters within the perpetrator bloc to associate the UP with the international security threats posed by narcoterrorist-guerrillas. Moreover, the indifference of large sectors of the global civil society and the oblivion promoted by transnational political networks contributed to solidify the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. The civilian social network associated with the UP underwent various transformations during these years; wherever its social power was interpreted as a threat, violence against it prevailed.

This account suggests that the challenge for future genocide research is threefold. First, to overcome the ‘hierarchical syndrome’ surrounding the study of genocide-perpetrators; second, to de-essentialise the static identity ascribed to genocide-victims; and finally, to understand the transformations experienced by perpetrators and victims vis-à-vis the intersubjective violent clash that takes place amidst a polarised political economy of affective-dispositions. Furthermore, the research indicates the need to follow the tactics of deconstructive thought. This would help to show that the decisions (and explanations) made by military-perpetrators are usually connected to the exchange of micronarratives with other military clusters. Therefore, scholars might gain a better understanding of the topologies of genocide-perpetrators if the role of military networks is con-textualised within genocidal geopolitical conjunctures.

1. The importance of deconstructing geopolitical narratives

The research shows that the discursive production of the cold war, post-cold war, and post-9/11 geopolitical con-texts was central in the escalation of the armed conflict and the consolidation of its genocidal dimension against the UP. Had the Colombian army not been trained in American military institutions, which circulated radical anticommunism and shared tactics for crashing political opposition with other military clusters in Latin America; nor had it been facing an insurgency in constant expansion and borrowed political networks’ narratives thereby interpreting such expansion as
part of a simplistic reality which enabled them to team up with outlaws; the UP genocide may have not happened. The transnational political networks’ simplification of particular social dramas as isolated local processes was then an integral part of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Such simplification produced scripts, which circulated through diplomatic channels and the informal interaction of politician, intellectuals, military officers and other actors involved in issues of statecraft.

The scripts circulated by conservative US diplomats in Colombia allowed human rights violations to go unpunished; moreover, the concealment of unlawful military tactics against communists also contributed to the escalation of sporadic human rights violations into genocidal violence. Dominant liberal geopolitical narratives reinforced such scripts and thus the radicalisation of antipathy against the PC, which was later transferred to the UP. The rationale behind was the need to protect a ‘liberal’ regime. Such rationale infused the grammars of identity/alterity allowing US politicians to create close links with Colombian traditional political networks and to support the fantasies circulated by rightwing elites. All of them denied recognising the involvement of the security forces in genocidal campaigns against the UP. Yet the alliance between political elites is not the only reason for the unfolding of genocidal violence. During the mid 1990s, the relative antipathy between US and Colombian administrations reinforced radical counterinsurgency tactics amongst military sectors; hence, the targeting of the UP continued.

The (mis)representation of the UP by foreign political elites helped to consolidate an antigrandram that shaped the mindsets of various actors. Since they regarded the destruction of its social power as the path to follow; such representation aided to solidify the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture. Political networks contributed to the polarisation of antipathy/sympathy by linking the misrepresentation of the UP to the cross-border discursive construction of the hyperreal narcoguerrillas threat. Bystanders’ indifference vis-à-vis the suffering of the UP was therefore informed by the political elites’ circulation of a radicalised antipathy against FARC. Today, in the context of the war on narcoterrorist guerrillas, a re-writing of history has been accompanied by a transformation in the political economy of affective-dispositions.
Thus, oblivion for the UP genocide has been instrumentalised by rightwing politicians so as to create a new beginning of collective sympathy.

The analysis of geopolitical con-texts suggests that a poststructural shift could contribute to future genocide research in two ways. First, it could help to unveil how cross-border connections radicalise various political networks. This is important because such networks put forward scripts that aid the consolidation of perpetrator blocs and allow them to freely circulate during genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. Second, it could assist the deconstruction of the scripts that recreate genocidal geopolitical conjunctures as local dramas disconnected from the international community. Resorting to critical geopolitics, as a tactic for problematising the narratives that display the world as a globe naturally divided into nation states, might be a good starting point for future scholars not only to grapple with the domestic myth that maintains the genocide script alive but also to dig for the polarisation of a political economy of affective-dispositions.

2. The need of mapping perpetrator blocs

Although state institutions played an important role in the UP genocide, the research shows that outlaws were also key players. Outlaws’ transnational connections were as important as their alliance with military sectors in regional coalitions for violence. DTOs used sympathy for the fictive Colombian collective self as a means to avoid persecution, hence, some of them benefited from targeting the UP. Moreover, as DTOs could secure economic gains by cleansing the UP in some regions, their private armies were deployed against it. DTOs’ connections with military officers had helped their private security forces to become powerful regional war machines. The build up of such war machines and the training offered by foreign mercenaries informed paramilitary leaders’ narratives. This experience degenerated further the already terrorising techniques used against the UP. The connection between narco-paramilitary groups and legal actors went beyond political and military networks; TNCs saw in financing them a means to protect their economic interests. Thus, the genocidal political conjuncture was integrated into the global political economy. The
case of Chiquita International shows that the price that sectors of the transnational capitalist class paid for colluding with illegal sectors of the perpetrator bloc is marginal if compared with the profits to be made when TNCs manage to reduce production costs and secure their operations in regions torn by armed conflict. However, this complex assemblage of legal/illegal private/public actors is not only connected with the expansion of free market capitalism but also with identity politics; since local and global actors chipped in with the reproduction of a fictive liberal global collective self. Such a simulation is part of an imagined international community that reserves only for particular dramas the genocide script. This allowed the free circulation of narratives infusing an antigrand of genocide, which constructed the UP as a (para)military target because it could not be accommodated within the grammars professing the idea of a (capitalist) global community.

The analysis of transnational criminal networks shows that paramilitary groups are the product of complex geopolitical processes. Therefore, it is necessary to trace the cross-border connections allowing violence entrepreneurs to build up strong armies during genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. This is not to advocate for approaching genocide-perpetrators as racketeers; it is a fallacy to regard criminals as unconnected from legal actors. On the contrary, criminal sectors of the perpetrator bloc became powerful actors because of convenient alliances with legal institutions: the CIA and the Department of the State in regards with the US and the DAS and the Ministry of Defence in terms of Colombia. Various state agencies both in the US and Colombia saw outlaws as partners to secure ideological goals. Thus, the construction of transnational criminal networks as hyperreal threats was closely linked with the discursive production of the second cold war and the post cold war geopolitical contexts in the Western Hemisphere. Such a construct also sought to hide away the complex processes bringing transnational criminals into being and enabling them to grow. Nevertheless, the transnational criminal networks taking part into perpetrator bloc of the UP genocide were not only subjected to manipulation by political and military networks. Instead, as complex social actors, outlaws’ decision to participate in genocidal campaigns was informed in many cases by the cross-border circulation of
materials and narratives, which went beyond covert alliances with state agencies. The interactions with foreign violence entrepreneurs polarised the outlaws’ grammars of identity/alterity and the denunciations against them pressed by the UP engrained an antigrandm of genocide amongst sectors of the criminal networks.

The foregoing shows that genocide research has long delayed the analysis of the complex alliances between various perpetrators. Hence, future studies need to engage with the changing alliances between outlaws and legal actors and with the intersubjective clash between outlaws and genocide-victims. As a starting point this research proposes to understand perpetrators as forming dynamic networks or what here is constantly referred as perpetrator blocs. By paying attention to the circulation of narratives within criminal networks, new research could offer an insight in the way in which criminal and genocidal mindsets intertwine. This would better the understanding of the role that criminal sectors play in the reproduction of scripts within the perpetrator bloc. Furthermore, the term perpetrator bloc allows for thinking of a genealogy of the perpetrators of modern genocide that challenges the genocide script. A different focus on the various links (affecting directedness, intensity, and connectedness) between (il)legal cliques and clusters that materialise different geographies of genocide could shed light in cases as diverse as the genocide of Native American Indians in the 19th century, the Armenian and the Nazi genocide in the early 20th century, and postcolonial genocides, such as in 1965 Indonesia. Similarly, it could contribute to the study of post cold war genocides, such as Rwanda and Sudan, and genocidal violence in countries like Kenya (2005) and Congo (ongoing today). Thus, a genealogy of the perpetrator blocs of modern genocides could unveil the complex topologies of the networks of perpetration that surpass the domestic/international dichotomy that underpins the genocide script and obscure the understanding of genocidal geopolitical conjunctures. Lastly, bringing in a poststructuralist approach in critical security studies would benefit scholars seeking to unveil the ambivalent relationship between legal and criminal actors. Such a

179 I am grateful to Benjamin Madley for pointing out similarities between the Colombian case and the perpetrator’s structure in colonial genocides and to Martin Shaw for highlighting continuities and discontinuities between perpetrator blocs in colonial and post-colonial genocides.
relationship is usually hidden under the writing of international security threats. But more importantly, it is written off history by relegating to oblivion the genocidal geopolitical conjunctures and putting in place instead the fantasy that outlaws are to be prosecuted by inter(national) tribunals for ‘transnational crimes’ (but conceal the participation of many legal political, military, economic networks in genocide).

3. The significance of unwrapping genocide-victims

The research shows that to fully account for the different cycles of violence during the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, the complex dynamics of the perpetrator bloc have to be connected with the UP’s resistance; such a resistance was not contained within artificial political borders. The UP circulated scripts that reinforced sympathy amongst a fluid transnational resistance network. This fortified a grammar of identity, which was able to accommodate a multiplicity of selves, and thus the UP managed to protect (for a short while and in different moments in time) an emerging socio-political power. When the UP’s socio-political power was diminished, resistance strategies challenged the antigrandmar supporting the crystallisation of regional genocidal traps. Paradoxically, the more visibility the UP gained, the further violence escalated. This developed into a resistance-victimisation spiral. UP members conducted the first attempts at unarmed resistance. Then survivors and relatives, who structured grammars of identity based upon the political experience of their relatives, also supported the struggle. Against them violence spread. To counterbalance the diffusion of violence, the UP stepped up a cross-border resistance strategy thus connecting with broader sectors of an unfolding global civil society.

This is not unique to the UP case. The advocacy of genocide-victim diasporas demonstrates that the resort to international organisations is part of a social process of resistance to genocide, which seeks to transform the political economy of affective-dispositions. The research indicates that in the case of the UP, the first objective of such a strategy was to halt the slaughter and then to bring the perpetrators to justice. The UP eventually saw IGOs as an arena to fight state-genocidists; whereas global NGOs were regarded as actors capable of increasing pressure on state agencies. UP-
victims’ organisations, IGOs, and NGOs were connected through the human rights discourse. This solidified a platform which, in few occasions, forced state agencies to withdraw from the perpetrator bloc and to pursue some of the sectors that remained. However, genocidists often interpret resistance as a direct call for violence. Hence, perpetrators escalated the genocidal campaigns seeking to silence the UP and other sectors of the fluid transnational resistance network to the UP genocide. As a reaction, and as part of anti-geopolitics, the UP resorted to hegemonic liberal narratives to incriminate state-perpetrators. Yet the UP not only instrumentalised such narratives; it also designed strategies to use some mechanisms of the liberal governance apparatus to resist the simulation of Colombia as the oldest democracy in the Western Hemisphere.

The rewriting of history is also central in the anti-geopolitical struggle, which challenges the narratives of the transnational hegemonic bloc. Thus, the UP has resorted to various strategies to put across the history of the victims. This has not only been a symbolic struggle. Instead, it has been one of the few options left after the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture that brought about the social-political destruction of the UP. UP-victims’ organisations have received the support of few European state agencies. Thus, Reiniciar has published various testimonies. These resistance strategies have been hampered by new assassination campaigns. Moreover, political elites confront such resistance by putting forward narratives that relegate to oblivion past and present genocidal practices. Due to the lack of victims’ visibility, some leaders have moved from moral resistance to political resistance. The return to politics is in its early stages. However, recent developments show that victims’ movements are starting to contest the ‘transitional justice’ system put through by the Uribe administration; therefore victims’ decision to directly participate in the decision-making process. This complements the process of bringing to light their own history. The rapid transformation occurring in soft law mechanisms in the international legal order is the background upon which the UP’s contestation materialises in Colombia.

The active character of genocide-victims suggests that future genocide research on genocide-victims should engage with three broad problematics. First, to connect
armed and unarmed forms of resistance and to map resistance transnationally; thus future research could trace the relationship between the crystallisation of perpetrator blocs and resistance actions by exploring how genocidists re-interpret resistance(s) as a threat to their survival. Second, to understand the links between the different cliques and clusters of the fluid transnational resistance networks to genocide; this could offer some insights on the transformations of victims’ narratives in the intersubjective asymmetric clash with the perpetrators and enable scholars to contrast such narratives with the ones aimed at halting the free circulation of the perpetrator bloc in a geopolitical con-text. Finally, to explore (1) how the circulation of sympathy/antipathy aids the consolidation of the transnational resistance networks to genocide; (2) how this reinforces the circulation of narratives that spreads antipathy from the victims to the whole transnational resistance network thus contributing to solidify the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture; and lastly, (3) how this is interpreted by sectors of the perpetrator bloc, which reignites genocidal campaigns against different clusters, thereby expanding the genocidal campaign to any sector associated with the social power of civilian social networks.

4. Critical genocide studies’ challenge to liberal identity politics

Some of the research’s findings seriously challenge the nature of genocide studies. This research did not start as a critique of the genocide script. Rather, its concern was whether the destruction of the UP matched the genocide script. Soon it became clear that it did not. The literature review of genocide studies, poststructuralist IR and political geography revealed that critical accounts had been challenging for sometime the dominant fantasy informing the global identity politics of the liberal west. This is, that some social groups are worthy of being protected from genocide while others are not. The con-textualisation of the destruction of the UP not only suggests that genocides are connected with a multiplicity of processes evolving in particular historical conjunctures, but also, and more importantly, with the scripts produced to simplify a complex reality so as to secure ‘collective fictive selves like us’.
The genocidal geopolitical con-text unfolding since the second cold war epitomises this. During the early days of the Reagan administration, US hegemony produced by coercion and consent two scripts. These became dominant within political, economic, military and even criminal networks in the Western Hemisphere. First, the US liberal democracy is the ideal of freedom and happiness to be achieved by the fictive Western Hemisphere collective self. Second, the Cuban and Sandinista Revolutions— the epitomes of the dark forces of communism— are part of the rhizome-threat spreading throughout the self’s body politics. Such scripts imbued with hyperreality the circulation of affective-dispositions. Thus, antipathy against anyone seen as sympathising with communism informed the military networks’ battle against the ‘internal enemy’. Likewise, sympathy between diverse ruling elites enabled them to supersede the distaste for each other by closing ranks in protecting the body of the collective self. Put bluntly, antipathy informed the antigrand of destroying the ‘internal enemy’ and sympathy the segmentary grammar of regulating relations with ‘others like us’.

The US script is still in place today. However, the convergence of the collapse of communism, developments in new technologies, and the continuation of multiple violent and non-violent forms of resistance to established social orders have induced the production of new scripts amongst ruling elites in the last 20 years. Such scripts have produced the closeness or distancing of places in US foreign policy space. Thus, the reproduction of a fictive collective self, centred upon US imageries, has produced a changing geography of ‘us’ against ‘them’, connecting ‘ungovernable spaces’ within the self with ‘badly governed spaces’ of others. In this con-text, the circulation of antipathy towards a slippery ‘existential threat’—an amorphous ever-changing internal enemy— occurs together with a subtle reproduction of indifference for the victimisation of those who have resisted assimilation within the hegemonic project and the upfront oblivion of tragedies instigated by the scripting of a collective self constantly facing hyperreal threats.

180 Today, this is evident in the case of Colombia, where FARC strongholds are linked to the consolidation of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela’s soil.
In this geopolitical context, the rationale behind the destruction of the UP, which occurred in a genocidal conjuncture that began to unfold from the late 1970s, crystallised in the early 1980s, and solidified after 1987, continues to frame the war against the ‘narcoterrorist FARC guerrilla group’. Thus, an antigrammar of destroying FARC has enabled the targeting not only of socio-political networks seen as opposing the government, but also extrajudicial killings of individuals apparently less cohesively integrated into these networks. In this sense, the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture seems to have become a ‘social practice’, whereby the other, any given other, who cannot be any longer accommodated into the alterity of the fictive Colombian self, is violently and silently exterminated.

Revisiting Colombian scholarship: policy implications

Notwithstanding the lessons of the importance of bringing an international dimension to genocide research and of bringing genocide into the attention of IR scholars, the con-textualisation of the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture offers new elements to interpret the ongoing Colombian crisis. This has important implications for policymaking. Not only if according to the incoming Santos administration (2010-2014) the commitment is to end the armed conflict in Colombia and avoid the continuation (and escalation) of the destruction of the socio-political power of civilian social networks, but also because the juncture in Colombia seems to be ripe for a new cycle of genocidal violence. Romero and Arías (2009) discuss (and the mainstream media and some IGOs increasingly recognise) that paramilitary groups are

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181 The DAS has been at the centre of an apparatus of security that seeks to dismantle the social fabric of an ‘other’ that does not comply with the reproduction of the collective self institutionalised by the Uribe administration. However, only until April 2010 the Obama administration decided to withdraw the technical support to the DAS (see, http://www.semana.com/noticias-justicia/chuzadas-das-pierde-ayuda-tecnica-estados-unidos/137547.aspx, retrieved 13 May 2010).

182 Many army units were involved in the ‘body counting’ practice, which resulted in more than 700 extrajudicial killings during 2008. See, http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/dossier-secreto-falsos-positivos/120025.aspx (retrieved 13 May 2010).

183 In this regard it seems useful to revise whether Feierstein’s (2007) proposal of understanding genocide as a social practice for the Argentinean case, can help to account for the genocidal geopolitical conjuncture in Colombia.
rarming. As these so-called BACRIM (criminal gangs) have started targeting sectors of society that not long ago could well have been labelled as UP and civilian networks are not passive actors, various actors are developing strategies to halt the violence and bring the perpetrators to justice. This is demonstrated in PDA MP Iván Cepeda’s recent statements. However, the foregoing is taking place in the con-text of an increasingly polarised political economy of affective-dispositions, which is informing the grammars of identity/alterity upon which the current fictive Colombian self is being construed. One might argue that if the narratives of the incoming administration continue the line of its predecessor, it is all too likely to expect the crystallisation of a genocidal geopolitical conjuncture, in which various legal/illegal collective violent actors would step up their alliances in order to escalate violence and, alongside this, to radicalise antipathy towards civilian social networks. Although civilian social networks have managed to institutionalise linkages with human rights networks thus armouring themselves against violence, when perpetrator blocs crystallise they count not only with concrete military power and economic resources but also with transnational narratives, which then reproduce and help to make invisible the very genocidal practices they carry out.

The study of the armed conflict in Colombia was traditionally trapped in a realist framework that saw the conflict as a zero-sum game between the guerrillas and the Colombian administrations. This has been recently replaced by economic analyses that see the ongoing conflict as the product of a war economy that perpetuates all the actors involved. Although sophisticated analyses have resulted, that do not completely follow the ‘greed versus grievance’ resource war model, there is in general a lack of interest in understanding emotions and narratives. Bolívar (2006) is perhaps the exception that demonstrates the rule. Therefore, there is a need to reassess the past; to write a genealogy of resistance in Colombia, one that takes into account the voice of

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\(^{185}\) The recent communiqué of the Águilas Negras paramilitary group against WOLA demonstrates that the violence that once targeted the UP is constantly spreading to cliques and clusters of human rights defenders (see [http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/nueva-amenaza-aguilas-negras-prestigiosa-ong-estados-unidos/140342.aspx](http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/nueva-amenaza-aguilas-negras-prestigiosa-ong-estados-unidos/140342.aspx) retrieved 21 June 2010).
the victims, one that takes into account their emotions and the way in which affect is targeted. The con-textualisation of such a political economy of affective-dispositions would perhaps reveal the need of new macronarratives that avoid repeating the same history and thus contribute to the unending repetition of the very victimisation-resistance spiral that it neglects. To do so would confirm the ethics of this project and the main challenge of con-textualisation: not to present a future without perpetrators and victims but to offer tools to critically assess genocidal geopolitical con-texts in which affect drives actors (like us) in various ways thanks to its (unnoticed) colonisation by other actors who reproduce dominant mechanisms of power.

Afterthought: affective implications

Genocide studies have for a long time contested victors’ histories that depict nation-states as legitimately constituted sovereign powers. This endeavour, albeit valuable, has contributed to reify a domestic myth upon which the international community of states is imagined as the defender of ‘humanity’. Such a simulation is contested by realist IR scholars, but strongly supported by liberals, however scholars at both ends share the idea of a world naturally divided into nation-states. The poststructuralist shift in IR challenges this very idea. In the same vein, critical geopolitics has in the last twenty years deconstructed the writing of the global, a writing that advocates the intervention of powerful governing apparatuses into peripheral dramas, thus proposing the redrawing of boundaries. By developing the method of con-textualisation, this thesis calls for a change of direction in genocide research, which would in turn contribute to a re-think of the geographies, dramas, and actors of global politics. First, as complex social phenomenon, genocide must be researched from an interdisciplinary standpoint. New topologies, cartographies, categories, and macronarratives are required to account for new waves of genocidal violence and to re-assess the history of modern genocide. Second, there is a need to move away from positivist ontology, because no matter how ‘real’ the genocidal practices are, human beings resist and standby when they construct an idea of what is real. In this sense, a post-positivist approach that looks at how narratives construct ‘perpetrators’ and
‘victims’ could also shed light on how ‘bystanders’ interpret them, thus helping the reproduction of dynamics of victimisation and resistance. Finally, as human beings’ interpretations of reality also have psychological dimensions, new research must critically engage with affect. As such, the search for the psychological patterns of perpetrators should be replaced by an analysis of how collective emotions are (re)produced and mobilised. This focus on a political economy of affective-dispositions could help to deconstruct the male-rational-western simulation of an international system, in which weak states are condemned to genocide, while resilient states claim to be the guardians of humanity. By problematising such a simulation through the study of genocidal geopolitical conjunctures, in which multiple networks intersubjectively clash, con-textualisation exposes the importance of reimagining the cartography of the world we live in. It is for the reader of this thesis to judge whether this first attempt of con-textualisation has succeeded in doing so.
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