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PATRONS, BROTHERS AND LANDLORDS:
COMPETING FOR THE VOTE IN RURAL PAKISTAN

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May 2011
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature
How do citizens vote in rural Pakistan, and how much agency do they have in relation to local landlords, patrons and kinship networks in making electoral decisions? I explore this question in this dissertation through an empirical investigation of the voting behaviour of Pakistan’s rural majority in its most populous and politically important province, Punjab, using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods and original data on the voting behaviour of about 2300 households in 38 villages.

The results of this dissertation counter the notions that rural Punjabi voters are dependent and that national elections can be won on the basis of extended kinship networks. My data reveals that the dependence of rural voters that so captivates popular discourse about Pakistani politics describes only about 7 percent of voters, and that kinship networks function more as forums for local collective action than as extended political organisations. I found that a vast majority of rural Punjabi citizens vote as members of village-level vote blocs that are organised by the landed village elite. Nevertheless, most rural Punjabi voters do not participate in vote blocs because of socio-economic dependence. Instead, I found that they are benefit-seeking political actors who organise within their kinship networks to strengthen their bargaining position and then give their collective votes to vote bloc leaders who act as broker-patrons and provide access to state officials and services. I also found that voting behaviour varies significantly across villages and across households within the same village. Most of the variation between villages is explained by differences in social structure and varying levels of historical and current land inequality, while the fact that households that lie within the same village behave differently from one another is explained mainly by their wealth and caste status.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The deadline for the submission of this dissertation was April 27th, the day in 1994 when all South Africans were allowed for the first time to cast a vote as equals. That day re-affirmed to the whole world what a vote can mean to a citizen. Yet, there are people in many parts of the world who are still unable to vote freely as equals for all sorts of reasons, even though in many cases they may cast a vote on election day. My effort to understand what restricts a poor, rural Pakistani from being an equal and truly free citizen became a work of passion that would not have been possible without some people.

For the fact that this dissertation happened at all two people deserve all my gratitude. First and foremost amongst them is my supervisor Mick Moore, who contributed so much to this dissertation with his constant encouragement, by getting me excited about my own work, and through his extremely incisive comments that he regularly prefaced with “here be brutality — but you will thank me for the bruises eventually”. He was absolutely right. I thank him now for everything, above all for teaching me how much better it is to say things simply, and for giving me the confidence to do so. He also went beyond the call of duty to become my pillar of strength through periods of personal hardship, for which I will never be able to thank him enough.

This dissertation also owes everything to my research partner Ali Cheema. From that day in 2003 when we first sat down to talk about possibly conducting some research on how political reforms affect the lives of people in the villages of Pakistan, to building one of the largest and most detailed original databases on the political economy of rural Punjab, Ali has been a constant source of inspiration and support. From him I learnt about research strategy, quantitative methods and asking the right questions. While Mick insisted I think about the bigger story and what all this ultimately means, Ali taught me to be concerned about every last detail. I can only hope that I have managed to find a way to combine these two invaluable lessons about research that they both taught me.

I am in debt to so many others as well. To Peter Houtzager for keeping my eye on the implications of my findings for democracy and national politics and for increasing my interest in connecting micro-processes to their macro impacts. To Mark Robinson for insisting I start my PhD at exactly the right time. To Farooq Naseer at LUMS for his patience in introducing me to data management, and to Angela Dowman at IDS for making the whole process so smooth from beginning to end. And of course then there is the wonderful research team with whom I worked. I use the word “I” in the dissertation, but I was almost never alone in the field. Researchers and students from the Lahore University of Management Sciences provided constant support. The most important amongst these were Ali Asjad Naqvi, Hassan Javed, Hasnain Haider, Asadullah Tahir, Salma Khalid, Faraz Hameed and Michael Sequeira, who made Sargodha their second home through their time at LUMS.

This dissertation draws from research that was funded by the DRC for the Future State at IDS and was hosted by the Lahore University of Management Sciences. To both these institutions I will be forever grateful for providing a supportive
institutional framework and for making this research possible. I would also like to thank the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission for a 4-year grant that afforded me the luxury of concentrating on this dissertation in a single-minded fashion.

None of this would of course have been possible without my editor, my most ardent supporter, most engaged discussant, and undemanding husband, Miguel, who read, cleaned and cooked his way through the last few months so that I could write at a stretch, all the while trying to write his own dissertation. It was because of his love and support that this whole process never became too difficult.

My brother taught me how to dream, while my mother showed me what strength, perseverance, and success mean. From Ami I learnt how to never give up, no matter how hard the circumstances. I learnt to believe in my abilities by simply watching her live her life. The fact that I am here today is because of the strongest woman I know.

And last but not the least, I am thankful to the residents of Sargodha who welcomed us to their villages and their homes with such graciousness, who answered our incessant questions with such patience, and who gave us so much of their time whenever we needed it. I hope that I will be able to contribute to their lives in some way through this research.

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of

My father

Who would have been happy to see me get here.

And

It is written in memory of

Hamza Alavi and Saghir Ahmad

Who I hope would have been happy with its subject, And without whom scholarship on Pakistan is a lesser place.
GLOSSARY OF URDU AND PUNJABI TERMS USED

Aarthi: A middleman in the trade of agricultural produce, largely based in small urban towns in agricultural areas.

Abadkar: Initial settler.

Akath: A meeting of the village called by the maalik or lambardar, in order to discuss and decide on important matters, including the collective voting decision of the village, or the vote bloc.

Bedakhali: Agricultural tenant eviction

Begaar: Corvée

Biraderi: Lineage group

Bhaichara: A tenure system whereby parts of land are owned separately and taxed individually, as opposed to collectively as a single unit.

Chak: A Crown village, settled during the second phase of village and land settlements in colonial Punjab.

Charpai: A string bed

Chaudhry: A large landowner whose family was given land at the time of the original settlement of the village.

Daara: A public meeting space maintained by large landlords around which the social and political activity of the village revolves.

Dera: A compound maintained by farmers (owners or tenants) on their lands where they keep their animals, machines and implements, and where they may also sometimes sleep at night to keep an eye on things. Many small independent landowners may also build their homes on these deras, in many cases to break their homestead-based dependence on large landlords who in many cases still own the residential land of the main village settlement.

Haveli: Mansion

Jagir: An estate granted, as opposed to sold, by the British Colonial Administration.

Kammi: The traditional artisan castes in the rural quom hierarchy, ranking below zamindars but above musallis.

Kardar: A bailiff of a landlord.

Kumbah: Extended family.

Lambardar: The person appointed by the colonial state as responsible for revenue collection, regulation of village affairs and to act as the main intermediary between the state and the village. Very often this was the largest landowner in a village. Most villages the position has become hereditary. In Crown villages lambardars generally act in consultation with other chaudhries, and do not necessarily represent a level of authority or power greater than that of the other chaudhries.

Maalik: Literally owner, but with strong connotations of lordship over the entire estate.

Malikan-deh: Village Proprietary Body.

Maulvi: Caretaker of a mosque, who gives the call for prayers, the azaan, and also leads the prayer.

Misl haqiyat: Colonial era record of rights within a village.
Musalli: Musallis are the lowest ranked group in the quom hierarchy. They are now called muslim sheikhs.

Munshi: A manager of a landlord’s agricultural estate.

Muzair/Muzarein: Tenants-at will

Panchayat: Village council, often set up informally to resolve disputes in the village.

Patti: Share.

Pattidari: A tenure system whereby land from a single Estate, after being divided amongst different owners, is still taxed collectively as a single unit.

Patwari: The lowest level government revenue officer in Pakistan.

Pir: A living saint, usually a descendant of an important Sufi saint. Most cities and regions of Pakistan have a patron saint, whose descendants still occupy a spiritually exalted position, have thousands of spiritual follows, and can, therefore, be powerful political players. The current Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Reza Gilani, is from a family of pirs.

Pukka: When used for a house it means a brick structure, but when used for a road it means that the road has been paved.

Purdah: Literally curtain, it refers to the restricted mobility of women and to their use of various types of veils, or burqahs, while in a public space.

Quom: Hierarchically arranged, endogamous status groups that involve a notion of occupational castes. The three main quoms are zamindar, kammi, and musalli (in order of rank). Within each quom, there are sub-quoms or biraderis that are also, often, ranked hierarchically. Gough calls them “castelike status groups” (Gough 1977: 9).

Reiaya: Literally, subject. The residents of an Estate, living under a maalik.

Sakin-deh: Village residents

Seip: An informal contract in which kammis would provide services to zamindars in exchange for in-kind payments.

Shart wajib-ul-arz: Colonial village administration paper.

Shajra-i-nasb: Colonial government document that recorded genealogies.

Tehsil: An administrative division of a district. It is the second tier of the three-tiered local government system that comprises the district, tehsil and union. For example, in Chapter 4, Sahiwal is a village in the Bakhar Bal union of Shahpur tehsil in Sargodha district.

Thanedar: Local police officer

Vangaar: Labour on somebody else’s land, usually at times of harvest and sowing, done in return for a meal. It can either indicate social support the villagers may extend to one another, or can be demanded by the landlord.

Zaildar: Zaildars assisted the colonial administration with revenue collection and administration within a set of villages.

Zamindar: The landowning caste in the quom hierarchy.
1

ONE

VOTING IN RURAL PUNJAB — AN INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

1.1.1. Pakistani Politics in a Comparative Context

It is March 30th 2011 and the Indian sub-continent is gearing up for the biggest sports event of the last few decades. India and Pakistan are to meet in the semi-final of the 2011 ICC Cricket World Cup in Mohali in Indian Punjab, not far from the India-Pakistan border. Many tense and frenzied hours later India defeats its neighbour, and then three days later goes on to defeat its other neighbour, Sri Lanka, in the final to lift the Cup. Almost immediately Indian cricket’s governing body announces a monetary award of ₹10 million¹ for each player on the winning team. Various Indian state governments top up these cash awards. Three days earlier on March 30th, with Pakistan facing a tough semi-final against India in which it was not the favourite, the Chief Minister of Pakistan’s largest province, the Punjab, had also announced a reward for the national team if they were to win. The reward would not take the form of cash, but of 25 acres of agricultural land for each player. That choice reflects the greater symbolic value of land in Pakistan. From the Pakistani perspective, this might appear to be a simple continuation of colonial traditions. British colonial rulers often gave grants of land in return for service. But ‘tradition’ is not a satisfactory explanation: the British ruled the territories that are now Pakistan and India in a very similar way. There is something distinctive about landowner status in Pakistan compared to India. Sketching out how this difference evolved is a way of summarising some major differences in political evolution in the two countries since 1947.

Moore (1966) argues that there was a special relationship between the colonial state and the landed elite of British India’s countryside, which had led the state to strengthen the landed class through state patronage, at the cost of developing an

¹ About £143,000.
urban, dynamic bourgeoisie. Indeed, the two main political parties — the Congress in India and the Muslim League in Pakistan — emerged from colonial rule with a high dependence on “locally dominant rural elites” (Harriss 1989: 71; Alavi 2002). While Moore correctly identified a symbiotic relationship between the colonial state and the rural landed elite of India, a relationship I explore in detail in Chapter 2, he seems to have understated the role of other classes, above all industrial capitalists. Even under colonial rule India had begun to develop an urban, industrial capitalist class that became quite powerful by the time of independence in 1947 (Alavi 1989: 16). This class became an important part of the Congress party, within which it funded politics and the nationalist movement that the party led for Indian independence (Alavi 1989: 17). However, in the Muslim-majority areas that came to constitute East and West Pakistan at partition, the urban industrial class was comparatively weak and was unable to fund either the Muslim League or the movement for Pakistan that it led.

The Muslim League, instead, came to be centred on the urban “salariat”, 2 which would later dominate the civil bureaucracy in the new states, and “big landowners, especially of the Punjab” (Alavi 1989: 18). Though the rural landed elite was also a part of the Congress, they were essentially “junior partners” (Alavi 1989: 18). The difference in the importance of landed groups within the two parties meant that while India instituted land reforms soon after independence, these were avoided in Pakistan. India’s land reforms reduced the landed elite’s centrality in post-independence politics and opened up the space for the emergence of new political groups and leaders (Banerjee and Iyer 2004). In Pakistan, on the other hand, the landed class’s centrality within the Muslim League had helped them transition into becoming an important component of the governing class of the new state, and so land reforms were obviously not on the agenda.

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2 A term Alavi uses for the salaried class of Muslim government servants, especially those in the Hindu-majority parts of northern India that came to form the core of the Pakistan movement. Alavi argues that having seen a diminution in its share of jobs in pre-partition India, the Muslim salariat saw that it stood to gain most from the creation of a new state.
Pakistan’s initial years were difficult and unstable. The Muslim League did not have a large support base in the provinces that now constituted Pakistan, and the need to “enforce central authority over provinces where the Muslim League’s organizational machinery was virtually non-existent” had the party turn to the bureaucracy for support (Jalal 1994: 250). This was similar to the Congress’s reliance on the administrative wing of the state in the years after independence. However, the “broad-based nature of Congress’s organizational machinery” — built during a mass nationalist movement (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 14) — allowed it to strike a balance with both the bureaucracy and the military in which it retained the upper hand (Jalal 1994: 250). Without such broad-based support the Muslim League quickly lost out to the bureaucracy in terms of authority and dominance within the state structure. This was facilitated by the power struggle between West Pakistan, which dominated the army and bureaucracy, and East Pakistan, which had a demographic majority. “In any representative political system, the Bengalis [of East Pakistan] would dominate power at the centre” (Jalal 1994: 251). Civil and military officers decided, therefore, to avoid elections altogether and the bureaucracy-assisted military coup of 1958 decidedly shifted the balance of power in favour of what has since been known as the “military-bureaucratic oligarchy” in Pakistan (Alavi 1989: 18; Sayeed 1980; Gardezi 1983).

Within this oligarchy the rural landed elite played an important role. Military dictatorships in Pakistan have repeatedly had to turn to politicians to provide parliamentary fronts for authoritarian rule. In looking for suitable politicians these regimes have concentrated on landed groups for an obvious reason — their ability to pull in votes even without the support of a strong party structure. Therefore, while the military kept Pakistan’s political system focused on priorities emanating from the logic of the Cold War and from strategic security concerns vis-à-vis its neighbours, and in the process undermined the development of representative political institutions, politically influential landed groups have provided support and

3 The Muslim League’s main support through the Pakistan movement had come from the Muslim populations of Hindu-majority states. Its support from Muslim majority states had come close to partition in 1947 and was based not on ideology but on strategic alliances with locally powerful groups, such as the landlords of Punjab.
legitimacy for this system (Ali 1970; Alavi 1972b; Jalal 1995; Diamond 2000; Haqqani 2005; Bhave & Kingston 2010).

The spaces created in India by the waning influence of landed groups were gradually filled by political actors led by the logic of electoral majorities, which in India’s case were made up of lower caste groups. New political parties emerged that mobilised the previously marginalised lowest caste groups as their main support base (Beteille 1971; Kaviraj 2000b; Kohli 2001). Though Gough argues that much of this mobilisation has been class-based, pointing out that “radical political parties have organised first middle peasants and then landless laborers and other propertyless workers against the landlords, the rich peasants, and the bigger merchants and other owners of property” (1977: 12), Hassan (2000) and Kaviraj (2000b) have attributed this to caste-based mobilisation. In fact, Kaviraj points out electoral politics made caste more salient as an identity. “Instead of dying obediently with the introduction of elective mechanisms, caste groups simply adapted to new demands, turning caste itself into the basis of a search for majorities” (2000a: 156).

A sustained space for such electoral logic never opened up in Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan’s political parties have had little room for manoeuvre under the “military-bureaucratic oligarchy”. While the Muslim League lost out to this alliance early on, later parties were undermined and manipulated — their activities were restricted, their leaders repeatedly jailed or exiled, and new loyal-to-the-king parties continually created and disbanded. For a brief period in the 1970s it had seemed that the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was in the process of building a broad support base around both the urban and rural poor that was not very different from the class and ideology-based political identification that Kaviraj (2000a) claims existed in India under Nehru. However, this lasted only until the next military regime came

Furthermore, while India’s Second Five Year Plan led to the development of a modern industrial sector with a diversified base, the industrial sector lagged in its development in Pakistan, which remained import dependent. Its “indigenous bourgeoisie” thus remained weak even after partition so that while the landed classes ruled the countryside, urban areas were dominated not by the industrial class but by an unusually large “salariat” that drew its power from the state and that, therefore, sought to remain in control of it (Alavi 1989: 19).

Since every party created by a military leader has used this name in some form — mainly for its resonance with the population as the party of Jinnah — it is confusing to trace the history of the original party. By most accounts the original party ceased to exist during Ayub Khan’s regime in the 1960s.
along in 1977, and since then political parties in Pakistan have been unable, through extended periods of manipulations and restrictions, to build broad constituencies or develop broad programmatic connections with voters. Instead they have relied on a combination of three types of linkages to bring in votes during elections: (a) the landed power of candidates and local leaders, (b) extended links of kinship, and (c) clientelistic networks.

In summary, the political developments of the last six decades have led the two neighbours along extremely divergent paths. India has a vibrant and stable democracy where economic inequality may still be high but its poor citizens are organised by various political parties that have been able to represent their particular interests within national and regional politics. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been through repeated cycles of democratisation and de-democratisation over the last six decades (Tilly 2003). Its third military regime recently came to an end in 2008 and the PPP came back to power for its fourth term since the 1970 election. However, every month for the last year electronic news channels and newspapers have announced the imminent fall of the government. The fact that it has survived so far has surprised people more than if it were to fall without completing its 5-year term. The balance of power still rests with non-elected institutions of the state in Pakistan, its political parties are still weak with limited support bases, and the old rural landed elite still fills their ranks.

Through all its cycles of military and civilian rule Pakistan has had elections, many of which have been genuinely contested and open, even when the state was backing one side. Pakistan’s elections are not showcase events and have played an important role in its history. Pakistan was born as a result of the election of 1946, and a quarter of a century later, it was the result of another election in 1970 that split it into two separate countries — Pakistan and Bangladesh (Wilder 1999). Its first military coup was caused by the threat of an election in 1958, and to this day, elections have played many roles through all types of regimes. They have validated military rule (1985, 2002), led to its demise (1970, 1988, 2008), and created support bases for political parties under civilian rule (1970, 1990, 1993 and 1997). Therefore, despite Pakistan’s reputation as a political system characterised by military dictatorships, its voters have actively been involved in defining its political
history. Yet, we know very little about these voters. In some sense it seems that they support the system and its inherent politics, turning up in sizable numbers to vote during elections, and often voting for the ‘loyal-to-the-king’ party. However, a lack of scholarship on the subject has meant that we have little idea why or how they do this. In a system where elections have become essential under any type of regime, and where even a military dictator now requires an electoral mandate, it is strange that its voters have not been the subject of greater scholarly curiosity.

1.1.2. Exploring Voting Behaviour in Pakistan

While it has not been studied in any great depth, and certainly not empirically, various explanations for voting behaviour can be found in the literature on Pakistani politics that are often bandied about by the media and in popular discourse. The most oft repeated of these is the explanation that the voting behaviour of Pakistan’s rural majority is controlled by “feudals”\(^6\). Given the nature of Pakistani politics this is not a surprising conjecture. The relationship between a concentration of power in the hands of the landed elite and a host of political issues is well-documented, both within Pakistan and in more general theoretical literature, which tells us that it can lead to a lack of political modernity (Moore 1966), an oligarchic political order (Scott 1972), lack of democratisation (Rueschemeyer 1992), ineffective political institutions (Kurtz 2006) and the perpetuation of poverty (World Bank 2002, ADB 2002). Pakistan has certainly exhibited all of these political symptoms. Yet some scholars argue that the “feudal” control of the popular vote is exaggerated, and that the voting behaviour of Pakistani citizens is determined to a much greater extent by political relationships that are formed around identities of kinship, or biraderis. This, they argue, is the most important institution in Pakistan’s social structure and also its main form of political organisation (Alavi 1971; Ahmad 1977; Talbot 1998; Wilder 1999). Yet others believe that the voting behaviour of Pakistani citizens is a response to material inducements and clientelistic linkages with political patrons (Wilder 1999; Keefer \textit{et al.} 2003). Kitschelt describes it in the following way:

“\(\text{In a global comparison, Pakistani parties rely quite heavily upon clientelistic inducements while offering few programmatic inducements to voters...[and] average}\)

\(^6\) A term used in public rhetoric in Pakistan to signify a multifaceted relationship of extreme social, political and economic inequality between landlords and other rural classes (Herring 1979).
voters respond more readily to targeted material inducements than to programmatic policy appeals (2009: 22-23).”

Pakistani voters are, therefore, described as dependent and coerced, as over-socialised members of kin groups and as vote-selling clients of political patrons all at the same time. In this dissertation I argue that these ideas, deployed in a generalised manner at a macro level of analysis, are unable to tell us very much about why Pakistani citizens vote as they do, or what separates the choices and decisions of one type of voter from another. They also tell us little about how encompassing these ideas are, in that all voters led by considerations of feudalism, kinship and clientelism, or are some voters able to build more programmatic, ideological ties with political parties and candidates? If it is the former, which of these often competing linkages is the most important to them? Basically, we do not know much about how rural citizens vote, and how much agency — given the arguments on feudalism, biraderi-ism and clientelism — they have vis-à-vis their landlords, kin brothers and patrons in making electoral decisions.

I explore these questions in this dissertation through an empirical investigation of the voting behaviour of Pakistan’s rural majority (69 percent)\(^7\) in its most populous and politically important province, Punjab. In this investigation I use a unique mix of multiple methods and an original dataset that contains detailed survey data on 1600 households, limited census survey data on another 9000 households, and about 70 interviews in 35 villages in one district of central Punjab, Sargodha. This dataset is supplemented with detailed qualitative work in 6 case villages and with archival research. I analyse voting behaviour at three levels, using a different methodology for each level of this nested analysis. I conducted an extensive literature review to analyse national-level politics in Part I of this dissertation, qualitative case studies and limited pair-wise comparisons to analyse village-level politics in Part II, and quantitative survey-based regression analysis to analyse household-level behaviour in Part III.

\(^7\) 1998 Population Census, which is the latest available census.
In carrying out this multi-level analysis, I look at voting behaviour rather differently from the way it is dealt with in most of the literature. Lipset & Rokkan (1967) and most studies that take off from their framework look at voting behaviour as it is expressed in the act of voting for a particular candidate or political party. In this dissertation I explore voting behaviour at a lower level, as it is expressed not in the vote but in a voter’s membership of village-level political institutions that I call vote blocs. Instead of asking why a rural citizen voted for one political party over another, I ask instead why they chose one vote bloc over another. Though their membership in a vote bloc does end up, or at least is expected to end up, in the act of voting, I argue that the logic of this vote is entirely altered by the fact that an intervening institution and actor — a vote bloc and its leader — exists between the voter and the political party. Furthermore, the fact that the relationship between the intervening actors and voters is based on, (a) everyday contact, and (b) relations outside the political arena, makes this a very different type of voting behaviour from that more commonly studied between voters, cleavages and the formation of party support. In this dissertation I posit that in any political system in which such intervening actors and institutions exist the study of voting behaviour has very different requirements and needs to focus not on formal political institutions but rather on these informal institutions that organise, influence and shape the vote.

In my investigation I find that a majority of rural Punjabi citizens vote as members of these vote blocs that are organised by local power holders with whom they have everyday contact. These vote bloc leaders are generally part of the old landed elite of the village. Yet, I found that a majority of rural Punjabi voters do not participate in vote blocs because of socio-economic dependence. Instead, their membership is the result either of clientelistic negotiations aimed at access to public services and other material benefits, or it is a form of collective action. I found that vote blocs are thus either vertical networks of patrons and clients, or horizontal networks of social solidarity. They are very rarely expressions of dependence or of political party support. I also found that voting behaviour varies significantly across villages that lie close together and across households within the same village. Most of the variation between villages is explained by differences in social structure and varying levels of historical and current land inequality, while the fact that households that lie within the same village and thus face the same structural
constraints behave differently from one another is explained mainly by their wealth and caste status. My data reveals that the dependence of rural voters that so captivates popular discourse about Pakistani politics describes only about 7 percent of the poorest rural groups now while most rural Punjabi citizens use their vote to either improve their material condition or to strengthen their ties of social solidarity. These findings about voting behaviour are consistent with two other facts about the Pakistani political system — the delivery of more targeted than universal services, especially in rural areas, and the weakness of its political parties as forums for organisation. I argue that vote blocs are rural Punjab’s way of dealing with these two facts. Until political parties build more direct linkages with their rural voters and unless services are delivered in a more universal manner, vote blocs and their leaders will remain central to the political life of rural citizens as landlords, kin brothers and patrons.

**Contribution:**
The main aim of this dissertation is to provide an empirical and nuanced understanding of how rural citizens in Punjab vote, a subject that is central to understanding politics in Pakistan and yet severely understudied, and to help dismiss the image of rural voters as dependent, ignorant and disempowered citizens. A secondary aim is to use the findings to highlight political changes that are required in order to empower rural voters and allow them to participate more directly and in a less mediated manner in the political system.

This dissertation makes a number of contributions. First, it makes a direct contribution to the study and understanding of Pakistani politics. Second, it makes a methodological contribution by providing an example of how to combine multiple research methodologies to explore and unravel complex questions. Third, it contributes a new instrument, the Index of Bargaining Power, through which to conceptualise and measure voting behaviour. Finally, it makes a contribution to the comparative study of democratisation by analysing the processes of political change in Punjabi villages and the socio-economic conditions that lead to these. Furthermore, it suggests a more nuanced way in which to conceptualise and analyse the variation in the linkages that exist between voters and leader-brokers in clientelistic systems. It does this by developing a typology of voters and by focusing
on vote blocs, making the argument that this method is essential for the study of voting behaviour in any system in which most voters either have no contact, or heavily mediated contact, with political parties through intervening actors and institutions that regulate political behaviour through everyday contact across multiple arenas.

1.2. Two Villages, Different Worlds

How and where does one start a complex piece of research? In my case the answer was provided by two studies by Ahmad (1977) and Rouse (1988) of the same village in Sargodha district of rural Punjab. Their studies provided a detailed historical analysis of various types of relationships between the village elite and its other residents. It seemed like a good place to start, and so I set out for my first look at rural Punjabi politics.

A few days after I arrived in village Sahiwal with a small team of research assistants from the Lahore University of Management Sciences, we were told that the landlord had called a village meeting to which we were invited. It was a hot summer evening and as I walked out of the landlord’s comfortable living room in his large bungalow I noticed that the crowds had begun to gather early in his large, beautiful garden. They walked up in groups and seated themselves on what appeared to be pre-designated string beds laid out neatly in a square formation. As I looked down the four sides of the square, I realised that not only was everyone present over 60 years of age, but that the village residents had sorted themselves into quoms\(^8\) and biraderis.\(^9\) The zamindar quom, or landowning caste, and its various biraderis were all seated down one side, the kammis, or artisanal castes were seated together down another side and some kammi biraderis and very few muslim sheikhs, the lowest caste, filled the third side. The fourth side, at the head of the garden, was still empty, obviously to be filled in shortly by the landlord, his cousins and nephews, his estate managers, or munshis, and his special guests — the male members of my research team from Lahore. People walked around and

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\(^8\) Roughly, caste. See glossary for a full explanation.

\(^9\) Kinship groups within each quom.
warmly greeted one another but most stuck to their own side of the square in general.

Once everyone had settled down, one of the managers walked into the living room to inform the landlord that it was now time for him to make his entrance. The group of men inside emerged together with great ceremony and walked towards the gathering of village residents, all of whom stood up to greet them. While the landlord’s family and managers walked straight to their assigned charpais at the head of the square, the landlord walked around greeting each person as he went. With the zamindars he exchanged the customary hug, followed by a quick handshake. As he moved into the kammi groups, the greeting changed to a quick handshake followed by the villager bending to touch the landlord’s knees in a marked gesture of respect and subordination. By the time he reached the few representatives of the muslim sheikh caste, the greeting had reduced to a smiling nod by the landlord and a touching of his knees by the villager. The landlord then walked back to his place at the head of the gathering, and declared the meeting open.

I was in the process of witnessing, from behind a door in the courtyard, my first ever akhat, an integral part of how politics function in rural central Punjab. This particular akhat, however, had little overt connection with politics. The landlord was a resident of Lahore and was visiting the village after a long time. Such an akhat marked most of his visits, and in his words, kept him from having to meet all the village elders individually each time. Today’s main agenda was to allow the village to congratulate the landlord’s family on his nephew’s recent victory at the polls for the seat of the tehsil naib-nazim. However, it was identical in form to the akhat that is called before each election, in which the landlord informs the elders of all the biraderis who the village will be voting for this time. The message is then carried out of the akhat to the various households, and on voting day, the decision of the akhat is implemented. It is also at the akhat that the village puts across its demands for public services, immediately after the name and party of the

10 A village meeting. Literally, it means ‘to come together’.
11 Deputy mayor of the tehsil, the second tier of local government that lies between the district and the union.
candidate have been announced, in the vague hope that the demands will make it back to the candidate through the landlord.

What I saw at this akhat seemed to support everything I had read about ‘feudal’ politics in rural Punjab, under which citizens vote not as they want to but rather as they are told to by landlords who have managed to merge together their socio-economic dominance with political influence. I knew from Ahmad and Rouse’s studies though that Sahiwal had been steadily changing over the decades. But for now I had another question on my mind: did Sahiwal’s politics resemble rural political organisation in the other villages of the district too? I already knew, for example, that Sargodha had different types of villages across which land inequality and social structure varied. These variations were based on the history of how land was settled in different parts of the district under colonial rule, and divided the villages into two main types — Proprietary and Crown (see Chapter 2 for details). Sahiwal was a Proprietary village. Would a Crown village behave in a similar way?

My research team and I headed off to a Crown village to investigate. The image of rural politics that I carried from Sahiwal lasted only until we arrived in Chak 1. Here I learnt that the akhat was a much less grand affair, with the village’s two main factions meeting separately in small gatherings. All the landlords of the village — of which there were many because of the manner in which Crown villages had been settled a century ago — were part of one faction. The other faction was organised around “colony politics” — the politics of the spatially segregated neighbourhood of the village’s poorest kammi and muslim sheikh households — and was led by a small landholder from a family of sharecroppers, and a muslim sheikh councillor whose recent electoral success had made him the voice of the poor. Here was a story of class politics, independence of the poorer groups and a daily challenge to the power of the landed (see Chapter 5 for a detailed analysis).

Sahiwal and Chak 1 were politically two different worlds. While the landlord of Sahiwal was confident of the support of his entire village, the landlords of Chak 1 complained constantly about the damage that had been inflicted on their reputation
by the declared independence of the village poor. That both villages lay within the same district and adjacent constituencies told me that I had stumbled across an interesting variation in rural political behaviour that needed to be studied, unpacked and analysed. While the literature on Pakistani politics generalised across the whole country, here were two villages that refused to let me generalise across one district.

1.3. The Logic of Voting in Rural Punjab

1.3.1. Preliminary Observations

Besides the fact that I could expect variation across short distances, my initial study of Sahiwal and Chak 1 also made a number of other things evident about voting behaviour in rural Punjab.

1. *Elections matter to the rural poor*: Despite its history of intermittent military rule, politics is alive and well in Pakistani villages, political competition is central to village life, and elections are extremely important events. In fact, elections and universal franchise are of great importance to the rural poor because they have given them something that the politically active elite of their village values greatly — a vote. The fact that they possess this means that their landlord or patron may be willing to negotiate and bargain with them in ways they could not have imagined in an election-less environment.

2. *Voting is a collective activity*: For most rural citizens voting is a collective and not an individual activity. Whether it is the voters of Sahiwal who come together as one under their landlord, or the class-conscious voters of Chak 1 who have sought to challenge the political leadership of the landed, most voters in these villages are part of vote blocs, within which they take collective electoral decisions. This is not very different from the village factions that Powell (1970) described in Italy and Venezuela, or even those that Gaventa (1982) documented in southern USA. Gaventa described a situation similar to rural Punjab when he argued that political party alignments rarely feature in politics at the local level. Instead, “long-standing factions, primarily headed by competing elites... appear to be the basis of
cleavages” and that people speak of politics in terms of the “bunch” that they are aligned with (1982: 142).

3. *Vote blocs change the way we think about political competition:* In rural Punjab the number of vote blocs in a village are a better and more effective measure of competition than the number of candidates running for a constituency seat. Consider scenario A — multiple political party candidates are running for a particular national assembly seat but all the voters of a particular village within that constituency are organised under one vote bloc and leader. In this case, despite the choice available to voters in terms of candidates the extent of choice that an individual voter in the village can exercise is severely limited. In order to vote for a candidate other than the one that the vote bloc has decided to align with, the voter will have to sever all political and non-political ties with the vote bloc leader, usually a heavy and long-term price to pay for one election. Now consider scenario B — there is only one electoral candidate for an uncontested constituency, but the votes of the village are organised across multiple vote blocs. In this case, as far as the individual voter is concerned competition exists and s/he can negotiate greater benefits in exchange for her vote with different vote bloc leaders.

4. *The link between vote bloc leaders and members is multifaceted:* Local leaders and vote blocs do not simply insert another link in the chain that connects electoral candidates to voters but rather, changes the logic of the exchange itself. For one, vote bloc leaders may filter the information that flows between candidates and voters, so that neither have complete information about the other. Leaders may sort through voter demands and preferences, many of which may never reach the candidate, and responses too in turn may be filtered before they reach the voters. Another reason is that while the link between candidates and voters is usually election-specific and purely political, that between vote bloc leaders and voters is year-round and multifaceted. Their proximity implies multiple types of linkages, both political and non-political. Besides organising the vote, a vote bloc leader may also be the voter’s employer, a clan member, a patron through whom state services and jobs may be accessed, a neighbour, a religious leader, and so on. This is, therefore, a more complicated relationship but it is the one that holds the answer to
how rural citizens vote and how they prioritise certain relationships over others in making electoral decisions.

5. *Some members may be able to bargain more than others:* It seems that the extent to which rural citizens are able to negotiate with vote bloc leaders through their vote varies based on the relationship that exists between them. While some voters may only be able to hold on to their jobs as agricultural labourers in exchange for their vote, others may be able to negotiate more public service delivery to their neighbourhood. This depends entirely on the extent of dependence that a voter has on the vote bloc leader, which dictates how much agency a voter will have within the relationship. Whether a relationship is vertical or horizontal too seems to vary greatly, not just between villages, but also between different households in each village. It seems that not only is it difficult to generalise across villages but also across different households within the same village.

6. *Vote blocs blur the significance of electoral statistics:* In a paper on local government elections in Pakistan, Akramov *et al.* find “that voter turnout is strongly associated with the personal and social gratifications people derive from voting” and that “people who live in rural areas, and farmers are far more likely to vote” (2008: 2 & 21). This is an interesting result, but if we know that people in rural areas do not take individual, independent decisions but rather collective ones within vote blocs, can a statistic like voter turnout still effectively tell us very much about voter preferences? One could argue that in any political system in which vote blocs exist, voter turnout is affected by a completely different logic than in a system in which a voter’s political decision is individually taken. This logic is defined by the relationship between voters and leaders within the vote bloc, in which the voter may have minimal decision-making power. In this case, to understand voter preferences we would have to look at not why they turn out to vote, but rather at why they chose to be a member of a particular vote bloc. It is, therefore, difficult in such a system to make effective use of most easily available electoral statistics (such as voter turnout) to ascertain the political relationship between political parties and voters since it is heavily mediated by intervening actors and institutions. Corbridge *et al.* (2005) explain a similar situation in India where they say there is a “relative scarcity of the state” in rural areas, and where sightings of the state by rural citizens are
“sectional”, framed and coloured by ethnicity, clan, kinship, caste and tribe, and mediated by those with power at the local level. Similarly, it seems that in rural Pakistan the political preferences of rural voters are shaped by local vote blocs and their leaders.

1.3.2. The Variously Described Voting Behaviour of Rural Punjab

My time in Sahiwal and Chak 1 made it obvious to me that an empirical study of voting behaviour in rural Punjab was greatly required because there is a wide gap between the complex behaviour of voters in villages and the generalised ideas we have of this behaviour. There are various confusing, and sometimes contradictory, popular perceptions about how voters in the rural parts of Punjab vote. For example, rural voters are perceived simultaneously as passive victims of either landlords or biraderi, and as voters who need to be bought off through patronage. Most explanations for rural voting behaviour can be grouped into four broad categories that I outline here, and provide details for later in Chapters 2 and 3.

1. The ‘feudalism’ explanation: According to this explanation rural Punjab is ruled by large landlords, on whom voters are socio-economically dependent. These landlords may be electoral candidates themselves, or they may be local power holders who are able to use their control over land and people’s livelihoods to tell them who to vote for. According to this explanation, citizens in rural Punjab vote not as they would like to, but rather, as they are told to (Sayeed 1980; Gardezi 1983; Alavi 1983 & 1990; Waseem 1994).

2. The ‘class’ explanation: This explanation refers to a particular period in Punjab’s history when its countryside was swept by a class-based political ideology. The two elections of 1970 and 1977 pitted sharecroppers and labourers against their landlords. According to this view, citizens in rural Punjab voted in these elections according to their occupational and class interests and connected directly to workers of a political party that provided them with external support with which to counter their landlords. This type of voting behaviour did not last past the 1970s and, as explanations, class and party identification are now used only within an urban context. For rural Punjab, this explanation marks more of a historical watershed.
rather than providing an explanation of voting behaviour. While it lasted, this view posited that rural citizens in Punjab had voted not as they were told to but as they had wanted to, to further the collective interests of their class (Ahmad 1972; Alavi 1973; Jones 2003).

3. The ‘biraderi’ explanation: This explanation views rural Punjabi voters as over-socialised members of kinship groups, or biraderis. According to this view, biraderis function as corporate groups that determine the behaviour of group members. Individuals are expected to be a part of, and lend their support to, their particular biraderi to strengthen it politically vis-à-vis other biraderis in order to gain access to limited state resources. The leaders of the group, or the group as a whole, may decide who to vote for and the members are expected to behave in accordance with the decision. This explanation argues that biraderi groups will mostly support members of their kin as electoral candidates without taking into account other considerations about the candidate or political party. Therefore, according to this view, citizens in rural Punjab vote not as they would like to but as they are told to by the collective decision of their kin group (Alavi 1972a & 2001; Talbot 1998, Wilder 1999).

4. The ‘clientelism’ explanation: This view argues that rural Punjabi voters exchange their vote for goods and services. According to this view voters are not tied to either landlords or kinship groups, and are instead, able to offer their electoral support to whichever candidate promises to deliver the most. Voters evaluate a candidate’s delivery record at each election and then vote accordingly. Due to this most candidates spend their time in office providing targeted goods to supporters. This view argues that rural Punjabi citizens vote not as they are told to but as they would like to in order to maximise their access to limited state resources (Wilder 1999; Keefer et al. 2003).

Yet another view holds that rural Punjabi voters are swing voters with an anti-incumbency bias. So who really are rural Punjabi voters — victims of economic circumstance, over-socialised members of kin networks, class-conscious party activists, benefit-seeking vote sellers or unpredictable swing voters? The paucity of empirical research on this subject means that we have no real way of answering this
question without the use of these generalised labels. But my account of Sahiwal and Chak 1 has already shown that the differences between villages and households are too significant to justify such generalisation. The challenge then is to study the voting behaviour of rural Punjabi voters in an empirical, systematic and comparative manner.

1.3.3. What Questions to Ask and of Whom?

In setting up this research I knew that I did not want to ask vote bloc leaders, who are very often landlords, about the source of their political power, nor why people vote as part of their vote blocs. Niemi & Weisberg (1993) point out correctly that there is much that lies in the questions one chooses to ask, and who one chooses to ask them of. The answer to why landlords or other vote bloc leaders are powerful may be more accurate if received from those over whom they exercise that power. Therefore, why landlords are able to dominate village politics is best understood by studying the households that fall within the general domain of that dominance. So, I flipped the question about voting on its head and decided to find out where and how the power of local leaders is incomplete. In other words, my interest is in the various pressures that can work on rural voters and affect the way they vote. To that end, I ask rural households what shapes their voting decision.

This is not an easy task either. Literature on voting behaviour indicates that people, whether as economic, social or political actors, have differing motives for the same set of actions. People’s actions can be determined by a range of pressures; by command (being told how to do things), by custom (believing this is how things are always done), and by rational choice (doing it like this ensures maximum utility) (Piore 1975 in Granovetter 1985: 485). Each voter can occupy multiple ‘identity spaces’, and each identity space comes with its own pressures, in that “the alignments suggested by his role in one sub-structure may conflict with those suggested by his role in another sub-structure” (Alavi 1971: 112). Differentiating between these pressures to determine which of them is most responsible for the way in which a rural household casts its vote is an almost impossible task. Therefore, I ask no straightforward questions about voting. Rather, this dissertation is a study of voting behaviour as it is expressed by rural
voters’ membership of village-level vote blocs that are organised not by political parties and electoral candidates, but by local power holders with whom voters have everyday contact. In it I do not look at who rural citizens actually vote for, or even how many of them turn out to do so. Instead, I am concerned with how and why they become members of vote blocs, and how much agency they exercise within these.

But in investigating vote blocs, which questions should I ask? Is it enough to know whether people are or are not members of vote blocs? Would that allow me to say something substantial about their level of dependence? As I expanded my research after Sahiwal and Chak 1 to four other case study villages, I began to understand certain aspects of voter behaviour better. I realised that for most rural voters, especially the poor, both voting and their extent of independence from landlords, patrons or kin brothers mattered not because they were particularly concerned about political participation, freedom and expression, but because these determined their access to basic public services such as electricity, schools, street paving and sanitation. The Pakistani state’s record of public service provision, especially in rural areas, is poor and it delivers more targeted than universal services (Easterly 2001, Keefer et al. 2003, Cheema et al. 2007). In the villages I found that such targeted delivery usually heads to groups of supporters and influential local power holders, rather than individual party supporters. A rural resident thus stands a higher chance of accessing basic services if s/he can negotiate a share of this targeted delivery, for which offering his/her vote to a vote bloc leader and being part of a group is a prerequisite. In fact, it makes sense for voters to strengthen the vote bloc through numbers so that its leader can negotiate more services — more electricity connections, more teachers, a street paving scheme — with candidates and parties. Given this logic, I realised that simply looking at whether a voter is a part of a vote bloc or not tells us little about how free or dependent s/he is. It could also mean that s/he is planning strategically to access a public or private good, or it could even indicate that s/he is participating in collective action.

I realised through my work in the six case study villages that the question about membership needed to be supplemented with one that would allow us to determine
whether or not a voter participating in a vote bloc could negotiate with a leader. The extent to which a voter can access targeted services through vote bloc membership depends on whether or not s/he can talk to the leader about his/her needs and requirements. Not all vote bloc members are able to negotiate equally with the leader. Alavi argues that the membership of a voter who is economically dependent is “pre-determined by his economic situation” and s/he cannot negotiate anything more than his/her continued livelihood (1971: 126). On the other hand a fellow landlord that chooses to align with a particular vote bloc is able to talk to its leader as an equal and negotiate the price of his/her support. Therefore, the extent of negotiation depends on whether leaders and members have an equal or unequal relationship. Those with unequal relationships link up to the leader vertically and those with equal relations link to him/her horizontally.

Alavi (1971 & 1973) argues though that there are different types of vertical and horizontal linkages. Both economic dependents and clients link up to vote bloc leaders vertically, while many different types of voters can have horizontal linkages — members of a leaders family or clan, people in his neighbourhood, people with whom he shares an occupation or a class identity, or even those who share his identification with a political party. However, not all within a particular type of linkage will have the same level of bargaining power. In a vertical linkage a leader need not respond to an economically dependent voter and still be able to maintain his/her support but s/he will certainly need to deliver something to maintain the support of a client who is a member simply because s/he expects to gain materially from this relationship. Similarly, in a horizontal linkage, a leader may be assured of the unconditional support of family and clan members for a long time but with other members s/he may need to make more concessions and be more responsive. A leader, therefore, needs to respond to certain voters more than others, and this determines the bargaining power of a voter. This dimension of voting behaviour is not captured by any of our enquiries above and requires a third analytical question.

My qualitative work in the six case study villages gave me three questions to ask in my investigation of vote blocs, the relations that are manifest within these, and what they tell us about the original question — how do rural citizens vote and how much
agency do they have vis-à-vis their landlords, kin brothers and patrons in making electoral decisions? These are:

1. Do rural citizens vote as members of vote blocs?
2. If yes, do they have a vertical or horizontal linkage with the leader?
3. Within either of these, how much bargaining power do they have vis-à-vis the leader?

1.4. Investigating Voting Behaviour

1.4.1. Why Sargodha?

If one’s interest is in using limited resources and time to study variation in voting behaviour at the most micro-level in order to gain some slightly generalisable understanding of political organisation and institutions in rural Pakistan, it makes most sense to do so in the districts of central Punjab. As Syed points out, “a political party, or a coalition, in Pakistan can form a stable government at the center only if it commands substantial electoral support in the Punjab where more than 60% of the country's population lives” (1991: 581). In fact, of Pakistan’s 272 parliamentary constituencies 148 are in Punjab,12 Wilder zooms in closer to point out that “the key to electoral success is in central Punjab, which has half of the Punjab’s and a quarter of the entire country’s National Assembly seats. It is the most densely populated, urbanized, and industrialized of the Punjab’s four regions, and hence politically the most volatile”. He also points out that since 69 percent of this region’s population is rural, “elections have reinforced the political dominance of rural Punjab” in Pakistani politics (1999: 215-6).

Sargodha, the district where this study is based, is in central Punjab, and has two other important attributes as well. First, despite its political volatility and the fact that it lies in the most agriculturally prosperous and progressive part of rural Pakistan, it is home to some of the largest, historically landed families that have dominated Punjab politics since before Partition in 1947. There is a good chance here of running into the type of large “feudal” lord that exploits the dependence of

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12 Compared to 61 in Sindh, 35 in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa, 14 in Baluchistan, 12 in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and 2 in the federal capital.
landless villagers for political gain that the media and popular discourse on Pakistani politics refer to regularly. Therefore, Sargodha presents an interesting case of the coexistence of historical landed power with the exponential rise of the capitalist large and middle farmer, and a dramatic decline in tenancy. Second, Sargodha has an interesting mix of five different types of villages that lie in close proximity to one another within the same district and very often the same constituency. The differences between these village types, outlined in Chapter 2, are based on colonial land settlement patterns that have resulted in varying levels of land inequality and different social structures. Therefore, not only does Sargodha lie in a region that is central to Pakistani politics, it also provides a natural laboratory in which I can hold many things constant — such as local administration, post-independence political history and culture, economic development and levels of urbanisation — while testing the impact of other factors, such as land inequality and social structure.

1.4.2. Setting up the Research, Sampling Villages and Designing Survey Instruments

The way in which I define voting behaviour — as a political activity that is determined by relationships, both within and outside the political arena, between leaders and members — requires an understanding of village structure, society and the everyday contacts that occur within it. Such understanding can rarely be achieved through large amounts of survey data collected across a number of villages. It requires, instead, conversations with various groups of villagers — from the largest landlord to the poorest labourer — and an observation of their interactions with one another over a period of time. It also requires that they come to trust you enough to point out to you the gaps they left in their accounts when they spoke to you for the first time. This requires that a researcher spend a lot of time getting to know a village and its residents. At the same time, I am also interested in being able to say something about voting behaviour that I know to be true of more than one village. Moreover, I want to be able to compare villages to see how and why voting behaviour might vary across them. A purely qualitative or

13 Sargodha district has five National Assembly constituencies.
quantitative survey methodology would, therefore, not have worked for the questions I ask.

To figure out the best way to deal with this research, I took a step-by-step iterative approach over a period of 18 months between 2007 and 2008. I started in Sahiwal, a village that had been extensively studied in the past and where I could, therefore, conduct a longitudinal analysis of political change over Pakistan’s sixty years of existence. I was aware, however, of the fact that Sahiwal was a particular type of village — a “Proprietary” estate with high historical land inequality. What it told me about rural politics were necessary details but they were not sufficient. So from here I moved on to a completely different type of village, Chak 1 — a Crown village where land had historically been less concentrated in the hands of a single family. I found that its voting behaviour was very different. Sahiwal was also a village very close to an urban town. I was curious to know if a village’s voting behaviour would be significantly different if it shared all of Sahiwal’s characteristics, including the way in which it was originally settled, but was far from urban areas. So I went next to Tiwanabad, and so on and so forth until I had sampled villages on all of the three main variables along which I expected voting behaviour to vary; (a) social structure as shaped by the pattern of colonial land settlement, (b) historical land inequality, and (c) distance from a town.

In each of the six case study villages, I (along with a team of research assistants and students from the Lahore University of Management Sciences) conducted an intensive village study to get a detailed understanding of the networks of association that get built around certain powerful influentials within the boundaries of a village. To ensure that we spoke with a representative cross-section of the village, we stratified the village population according to the household characteristic that we thought would most affect behaviour — caste. We then randomly selected a sample of households from this stratified population. We used various types of surveys to study these villages, all of which together I shall refer to through the rest of this dissertation as ‘survey set A’. These included:

1. Qualitative field notes based on ethnographic participant observations.

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14 Through this dissertation I use the pronoun “I” when I refer to my analysis but the word “we” when I refer to field research to acknowledge the assistance and contribution of this incredible group of people.
2. Open-ended interviews with 15-20 key respondents per village.

3. Surveys with about 35-45 percent of randomly selected households per village using questionnaires that probed networks and relations within the village.

4. Census surveys of the full village population to get data on land inequality, literacy rates, poverty and demographic composition in terms of caste and kinship groups.

5. Archival data on village history and historical land inequality using colonial Village Inspection Reports from the archives of the District Revenue Office.

Based on the detailed understanding that we got of politics and voting behaviour in the six case study villages, we expanded the research to 35 other villages within the same district. The case study findings allowed me to make some predictions about how people in certain types of villages behave, and also gave me an idea of the dimensions along which household-level voting behaviour may vary. I now wanted to test this across a larger number of villages. We drew a random sample of 35 villages along the same three axes of variation along which I had sampled the case studies, and within these drew a random sample of households stratified by caste.

We also went back to the drawing board and designed new questionnaires based on our now deeper understanding of village political and social life. These surveys still sought to capture information on the relationship between leaders and voters but also included questions on household behaviour in the areas of demand articulation, public service delivery, dispute resolution and economic relations. These detailed surveys were designed to compensate for the fact that we would now be spending only 2-3 days in each of the 35 villages and would not have time for the detailed observations we had undertaken earlier over a few months of fieldwork in the case of Sahiwal, and several weeks each in the case of the five other case study villages.

We then headed to these villages with a set of instruments that together I shall call ‘survey set B’. These included:

1. Structured interviews with 2-3 key respondents per village.

2. Surveys with 45 randomly selected households per village, which gave me a dataset of almost 1600 households in total.
3. Census surveys of the full village population to get data on land inequality, literacy rates, poverty and demographic composition in terms of caste and kinship groups. This rendered a dataset of over 9000 households.

4. Archival data on village history and historical land inequality using colonial Village Inspection Reports from the archives of the District Revenue Office.

The qualitative analysis in Part I of this dissertation is based on survey set A while the quantitative analysis in Part II is based on survey set B. This combination of qualitative and quantitative methodology allows me to take advantage of the clarity of large-n analysis and the detailing benefits of a small-n thick analysis. My methodology in this dissertation is in line with recent calls for the use of more mixed methods to study political concepts (Coppedge 1999, Lieberman 2005).

1.5. Inequality, Social Structure and Status

Through most of this dissertation my concern is to understand how rural citizens vote, a subject that is understudied in Pakistan and widely misunderstood. People have general ideas about how they think people are voting in rural areas. The lack of an empirical study to either confirm or refute these ideas has led to rural voters being typecast as ignorant, coerced and dependent. In this dissertation I deal mainly with providing empirical data with which to not only unravel how rural citizens vote, but also to analyse how this varies across villages and across households. Through this I do not deal with any puzzle in particular, but my investigation and the answers I provide throw up a puzzle at the end, which I outline here along with my main argument and then deal with in my last chapter.

The questions I asked to investigate rural voting are not very different from those that Alavi asked in 1971 article; “how does the leader of a village faction recruit support, and what instruments does he use? Do the rural poor, who constitute the potential members of a faction, have a choice?” (1971: 111). He went on to argue that the extent of choice that a voter has depends on the extent to which s/he is dependent on the faction leader, which in turn is based on the “sub-structures” of a village that are “inherent sources of political authority, power and influence, and
(given a parliamentary constitution) the ability to mobilise voters”. He identified these sub-structures as the “traditional social institutions” of caste and kinship ties, the relations of production within the economic structure, and the “structure of government and administration, especially the police and magistracy…which is a potential sources of considerable power for those who can establish effective links with it” (1971: 112).

In this dissertation I mainly advance Alavi’s work in this and a number of other articles he published in the 1970s on village politics and draw extensively on these. Alavi’s work was detailed and ethnographic, but not comparative. I not only update his work to see how much has changed since he and Ahmad (1977) wrote about village politics in the 1970s (in Chapter 4) but I also compare village politics across a number of villages (Chapter 5), and then carry out an empirical, quantitative analysis using comparative data across a sample of 35 villages (in Chapters 6 and 7). Here I simply outline what I found through my empirical research and statistical analysis.

1.5.1. Findings

First and foremost, I found that every village in my sample has a vote bloc, which range in number from one to four per village, and that 80 percent of our respondents were members of these vote blocs. I found that there is no one way to describe a vote bloc and that it means different things to different voters. For some it is the manifestation of a landlord’s power in which they have to do as they are told. For others, they represent an opportunity for collective action, and a political response with which to correct their lack of access to public services. I also found that of the leaders of the 71 vote blocs in my sample villages, 70 are landed, though their landholdings can range from just two acres to 450 acres. 65 of these are from families and biraderis of the village elite, those to whom land was originally granted under colonial rule. This means that the power of vote bloc leaders is hereditary, and is based on both social and economic influence, but while these seem to be necessary pre-requisites for leadership, they are not sufficient.
I found that a majority of our respondents do not participate in vote blocs or link up to these leaders because of socio-economic dependence. The data revealed that only 7 percent of our respondents are in relations of dependence with vote bloc leaders. Another 6 percent participate based on shared class or party identification. The rest participate in vote blocs based on one of two reasons — ties of family, kinship and caste (51 percent) or ties of broker clientelism (35 percent). A majority of voters, therefore, are members of vote bloc because of either a negotiated relationship that enables them to access public services and other material benefits, or as a form of collective action in which they can act together with other members of their family or kin group to improve their material circumstances. Any given vote bloc can, therefore, be both a vertical network of patrons and clients, or a horizontal network of social solidarity and collective action. They are very rarely expressions of dependence or of political party support.

To empirically test if certain village and household characteristics predict voting behaviour, I devised six different measures of voting behaviour as my dependent variables — three each for village and household-level behaviour. Five of these are based on survey questions and are fairly straightforward, but the final measure — which measures variation in the bargaining power of voters vis-à-vis leaders across different villages — is fairly complex. Based on eight dimensions along which vote blocs may vary — an insight provided by my extended period of fieldwork in the case study villages — this Index of Bargaining Power provides a unique composite measure of the extent of bargaining power that voters have within vote blocs in different villages.

The village tests, for which I used multivariate linear regression models, showed that the list of independent variables I used — the social structure of a village, its level of land inequality, its distance from a town, its level of poverty and its extent of plurality in terms of the number of social groups that live in it — are highly significant predictors of voting behaviour and bargaining power and are together able to explain about 70 percent of the variance in my sample. The statistical analysis shows that if a village has a vertical social structure and was historically unequal, more of its voters will be members of vote blocs, within which they will have more vertical linkages with the leader, and lesser bargaining power. At the
other extreme, if a village has a horizontal social structure and was historically more equal, more of its residents will vote outside of vote blocs. Those that are members of vote blocs in these villages will have horizontal ties with the leader and greater bargaining power. Voters in remote villages are more likely to be members of a vote bloc, but within these they have more horizontal relationships, mostly of social affinity, and more bargaining power vis-à-vis the leader. Those in more plural villages will tend to be in vote blocs and will have vertical linkages with the leaders, but these are clientelistic linkages within which they have higher bargaining power. Voters in wealthier villages are no more likely to be in vote blocs than those in poorer villages, but they do tend to have more horizontal linkages with leaders when they are members, but with lower bargaining power, which indicates that they may participate for reasons of family or kinship-based affinity.

For household tests I used multivariate logistic regressions and found that only two variables can significantly predict whether or not a head of a household is a member of a vote bloc — age and elite social status. Members are older and of higher social status than non-members. However, when it comes to the nature of linkages and bargaining power, the results are much stronger. The social status and wealth of a household make all the difference — higher caste groups and the wealthy have horizontal linkages and greater bargaining power, while the poor and lower caste groups have vertical linkages and less bargaining power within vote blocs vis-à-vis their leaders. Interestingly though, it is not landed wealth that matters most. It is wealth expressed as the structure of the house, which means that a family may be landless but if it is able to accumulate wealth through non-farm employment, it can make its linkages more horizontal and increase its bargaining power.

Using the data of my quantitative analysis I counter two notions about voting behaviour in Punjab — that rural voters are dependent and that national elections can be won on the basis of biraderi networks. My results show that voters are generally benefit-seeking political actors who organise within their kinship networks to strengthen their bargaining position and then give their votes to broker-patrons that are able to promise access to state resources and other private goods. However, these results lead me in the end to a puzzle. I found that voters in rural Punjab are not dependent. Rather, they strategise ties of kinship and clientelism to negotiate
their way to better service delivery. But I also found that vote bloc leaders are still all landed and part of the old village elite. So the questions that arise are, if voters are generally independent of these leaders, why then is leadership still dominated by a closed group of the landed elite? Why do these landed leaders still organise vote blocs and determine voter preferences through them? If voters have agency why have they not used this to organise on their own, away from the old landed elite? It is true that there is a handful of what we might call emerging political entrepreneurs — the six leaders in my sample who are not part of the old colonial elite, or the 25 who have land below the subsistence level of 12.5 acres. I document these emerging leaders at various points in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. However, it is also true that while an average of 70 percent of the population in our sample villages is landless, only 1.4 percent of our vote bloc leaders fall within this group. Vote bloc leadership is, therefore, still an exclusive club. In the final chapter of this dissertation I take up this puzzle and explain how vote bloc leaders have managed to remain relevant and central to rural politics, and created an oligarchy of sorts. In this, I argue, they have been helped by two factors external to local politics — targeted, instead of universal, service delivery by the state, and the continued weakness of political parties.

1.6. The Plan

This dissertation is organised in three parts. Each part deals with a particular level of analysis and uses a different methodology. Together they provide a nested analysis of voting behaviour in rural Punjab, with each level of analysis confirming the finding that voting behaviour in rural Punjab is not explained by the ‘feudal’ control of dependent voters but rather by ties of social solidarity and the need to access more public services.

In Part I, which comprises Chapters 2 and 3, I look at national politics in Pakistan through a review of the available literature. In Chapter 2 I analyse the impact of colonial rule and the process through which land was settled in colonial Punjab to argue that this period created the social structure of villages and the extreme land inequality that I later use as explanatory variables in my statistical analysis. In Chapter 3 I analyse Pakistan’s post-colonial political history to discover that most of the literature about this period gives us only a very vague and abstract idea about
voting behaviour in rural Punjab. I, thus, call attention to a need for the more rigorous and systematic analysis of the subject that this dissertation provides in its later chapters.

In Part II, made up of Chapters 4 and 5, I step down from the national arena into the world of village politics. Using qualitative case study methods I conduct first an intensive longitudinal analysis and then an in-depth cross-sectional analysis of political organisation in six villages. The longitudinal analysis in Chapter 4 is aimed at exploring how the village and its various residents have responded to political changes at the national level, and at analysing the ability of its landed elite to adapt to changing circumstances in order to remain relevant and central to village politics. The cross-sectional analysis in Chapter 5 shows that political organisation varies greatly across villages. A pair-wise comparison of the case villages in this chapter reveals certain associations between structural variables and voting behaviour that require more rigorous and systematic analysis.

In Part III, comprising Chapters 6 and 7, I carry out this systematic, quantitative analysis by exploring variation between individual households within the same village. Using findings from the case studies about the dimensions along which voter agency can vary, I develop measures for voting behaviour and bargaining power in Chapter 6, and then test these against a list of independent variables at both the village and household level in Chapter 7 to arrive at the findings outlined in the previous section. Part III, therefore, uses quantitative data to test the relationships between leaders and voters that were explored in the qualitative case studies of Part II. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 8 by exploring a puzzle and looking at the need for two specific political reforms suggested by this research.
PART I

National Politics
TWO

COLONIAL CONSTRUCTS AND POST-COLONIAL POLITICS

Introduction

A good place to start a story is at the beginning. In the case of land inequality and the power of landed groups in the politics of rural Punjab, this beginning is the annexation of Punjab by the British colonial state in 1849\(^{15}\), which, according to Gazdar, “can be seen as the point of departure for any historical analysis of land” (2009: 6). The institutional and administrative reforms that followed this annexation took Punjab from being “a land of small peasant proprietors” to a province where by the end of colonial rule in 1947, “less than four per cent of the agricultural population owned more than 50 per cent of the land while poor peasants, landless sharecroppers and agricultural labourers accounted for 80 per cent of the population” (Hamid 1982: 52). In this chapter I argue that in meeting the main goals of Empire in Punjab — the maintenance of law and order, and the creation and expansion of a revenue base — the colonial state changed the nature of Punjabi villages and created economic and social hierarchies that still determine the pattern of politics in these villages. The colonial reforms I describe in this chapter are of particular importance to the analysis in this dissertation because three of the four independent variables along which I sampled villages and households and ran statistical tests — social structure, historical land inequality and caste — were shaped by the events of this period.

Landed power continued largely unabated post-independence. The first real challenge it faced was during the 1970s regime of Zulfiqar Bhutto. In the second half of this chapter I analyse the changes that were instituted during this period. I argue that this decade represents a historical watershed in Punjabi politics for two reasons. First, it introduced the phenomenon of uncontrolled elections for the national and provincial Assemblies, which would become a regular feature of the political landscape from here on after. Second, it challenged and weakened the

\(^{15}\) Annex 1.1 provides a chronology of political events in Pakistan’s history.
power of local landed elites over the general rural citizenry. Though landed groups would recover some of their lands and much of their influence under General Zia in the 1980s, landed power never regained its complete control over its former subjects again.

2.1. The State and the Village Under Colonial Rule — 1849-1947

Soon after its annexation of Punjab in 1849 the British colonial state set about a set of reforms. The basic aim of these was not different from what Young described as the objective of colonialism in Africa — to construct “institutions of domination with improvised resources…[and] simultaneously to create agencies of rule and to invent extractive devices imposing on the subordinated societies the cost of the unsolicited governance proposed for them” (Young 1994: 78). In Punjab the colonial state had three main aims: (a) establish a revenue base and extract resources to fund the administrative apparatus of the state, including the army; (b) maintain local law and order and create “agencies of rule”; and (c) expand the revenue base over time. In this section I look at how the British colonial state went about these three tasks in Sargodha district, or Shahpur as it was then called.

2.1.1. Revenue Base and Extraction

The most immediate task was that of establishing a revenue base. In a rural setting like Sargodha’s there were only two sources of revenue — land and labour. But at the time of annexation 89 percent of the district was “in a state of nature” and it was inhabited by semi-nomadic pastoralists (Ousley and Davies 1866). Settled agricultural communities existed only in close proximity to the bank of the river Jhelum, but even in these villages there was indefinite and varied tenure, fluid communal institutions and ambiguous rights of ownership (Imperial Gazetteer of India 1908, Vol.1; Banerjee and Iyer 2004). It was almost impossible to impose a tax on such communities. This meant that both land and labour had to be settled before they could be taxed. The British colonial state had two tasks before it — to define private property rights in established villages and to settle the nomadic population in new villages. As Young put it, “sedentary cultivating populations
were far easier to bring within the net of domination than were pastoral and nomadic communities” (1994: 100).

Private property rights were the lynchpin of establishing a revenue base. Metcalf notes that “in collecting the land revenue, the Government had of necessity to settle responsibility for its payment on some person, and in so doing to define the rights in land of the various classes of society” (1962: 295). The first phase of land settlement in Sargodha, therefore, simply conferred rights of private property on existing villages. This was also because in the early days of the annexation the colonial state, backed by the British Parliament, was championing the cause of small peasant proprietorships and joint ownership by village communities all over India (Metcalf 1962). The revenue and rights settlements during the first phase — the bhaichara settlements — defined the village community in terms of lineages of cultivators that held proprietary rights in land based on a hereditary claim that their ancestors had founded the village or established possession over the village land (Nelson 2002). In bhaichara villages the entire “body of the village” was the joint holder of the village, regardless of whether or not they claimed common ancestry, and “almost all cultivators were 'proprietors', paid the same revenue rates, and [usually] belonged to the single farmer caste of Jat” (Stokes 1975: 521).

Eight years after annexation the Indian Mutiny, or the War of Independence, of 1857 erupted. The rebellion was led by the same middle peasantry that the colonial state had been supporting while large landowning tribes came out to fight on the side of the British. This turned the tables of colonial land policy. Metcalf explains,

“For the first time in fifty years the landlord classes found widespread sympathy among the British officials in India, and the previously accepted ideas of peasant proprietorship were vigorously challenged. Even in such a stronghold of peasant settlement as the Punjab most officials, from the Lieutenant-Governor on down, had by 1864 become converted to a policy of landlordism and revision of settlement” (1962: 307).

The motto of this new policy, associated with the colonial bureaucrat Henry Lawrence, was to govern with the assistance of rural intermediaries and “natural leaders”, especially those large landlords that had rendered loyal services to the colonial government during the 1857 Rebellion (Talbot 2002: 69). In fact, this new bent was even couched in terms of being the custom of the land. The Settlement Commissioner during the 1860s, Edward Prinsep, explained, “a superior class
'exercising an absolute right of property’ had always existed in the Punjab, and that this class, once secure in its traditional rights, was the source of the future prosperity of the province” (Metcalf 1962).

The post-1857 phase of land settlement, therefore, concentrated on securing this ‘absolute’ and ‘traditional’ right of landlords in various parts of India. In Sargodha, some zamindari grants of crown wasteland were endowed on local chiefs who had loyally assisted the British in military combat during the Second Sikh War (1848-49) and during the 1857 rebellion (Conran and Craik 1993: Talbot 2002). Under zamindari grants landownership rights were conferred on one person or family — the zamindar — who was responsible for the payment of land revenue. The landlord collected this revenue by leasing land out to tenant cultivators — largely without occupancy rights — and was free to determine the level of rent paid by these tenants. The land revenue obligation of the landlord was based on the size of the landholding, rather than on produce, so that any surplus from tenant rents and sharecropping arrangements belonged to the landlord (Douie 1931; Gazetteer of the Shahpur District 1897, 1917). Some villages were also settled as pattidari tenures, under which land was held in severalty by different proprietors according to ancestral or other customary share, who were separately responsible for revenue payments (Douie 1931). These represented separate portions that were not fractions of an original whole (Imperial Gazetteer of India 1908: 110). Stokes (1975) argues that pattidari tenures were similar to bhaichara tenures except that in the latter most owners were cultivators while in the former there was more tenancy.

Together these three types of villages — zamindari, pattidari, and bhaichara — were referred to as “Proprietary villages” by the colonial administrators (Village Inspection Reports 1911), a terminology I maintain through this dissertation. The colonial state served two objectives by settling villages in this manner. First, they brought wasteland under cultivation through new settlements. Special land revenue concessions were given to abadkars to encourage them to settle and cultivate the

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16 Tenants-at-will cultivated land under a contractual arrangement with the landlord and had no security of tenure, as opposed to occupancy tenants who had rights of ownership (Rouse 1983: 744).

17 Initial settlers.
village as quickly as possible. Second, it created a class of loyal intermediaries that not only collected revenue for the state but also maintained local law and order.

2.1.2. ‘Agencies of Rule’ and Intermediaries

The colonial state did not confer rights of ownership on all residents of a village. A differentiated population with a hierarchical structure had advantages to offer. First, it would ensure the loyalty and support of those who were given special privileges. Second, it ensured that these local intermediaries could maintain control over the rest of the subject population, thus decreasing the pressure on the state’s own security apparatus. Therefore, in each type of village authority was settled on specific families or lineages that were called the *malikan-deh*\textsuperscript{18}, or the ‘Village Proprietary Body’ (I use the acronym VPB for these through the rest of the dissertation). The VPB’s special status received formal legal recognition in the revenue records\textsuperscript{19}, which went into great detail in defining their relationship with, (a) government, (b) each other, (c) the non-proprietary *sakin-deh*\textsuperscript{20} of the village, which was made up of tenants (*muzair*) and artisans (*kammi*), and (d) the potential entrants and other outsiders to the village (Chakravarty-Kaul 1996: 198). Regardless of the type of village, the VPB had ‘proprietary’ rights over the rest of the village population, thus the common label as a “Proprietary village”. They were to serve as intermediaries — with “unofficial agency” — between the state and the village, and were expected to act on “behalf of the landowners, tenants, and other [village] residents in their relations with the State” (Douie 1931: 137). Douie describes how the official administrative machinery of the state was supplemented by “representatives of landowners in the shape of village headmen, *inamdars*, and *zaildars*” (1931: 137).

The colonial state went a step further and gave the VPB’s special status the force of custom, in keeping with what Prinsep had claimed above. Based on a desire to “uphold Native institutions and practices, as far as they are consistent with the

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\textsuperscript{18} Malik means owner, and *deh* means village, so that the term literally means owners of the village, which was a hereditary claim to the village land.

\textsuperscript{19} Made up of the record of land rights, the *wajib-ul-arz* (village administration paper), and the *shajra-i-nash* (the genealogical record).

\textsuperscript{20} Residents
distribution of justice to all classes, the colonial state settled the rights of different classes of villagers by recording village custom, or as much of it as was visible to colonial officers, in the shart-wajib-ul-arz (the village administration paper). By then incorporating the wajib-al-arz into the Punjab Land Revenue Act of 1871 the state ensured that customary law was now part of the formal legal system of the province (Chakravarty-Kaul 1996: 187). In this document was enshrined the social and economic dominance of the VPB, to the effect that “village governance was no longer to be based upon the consensual will of the village community” (Chakravarty-Kaul 1996: 198). Mamdani (2001) records a similar process of the formalisation of customary laws in Africa, and argues that much of the colonial legacy of social inequality flows from the fact that the colonial state chose not to enforce civil law between natives in its colonies. He points out:

“While civil law spoke the language of rights, customary law spoke the language of tradition, of authenticity. These were different languages with different effects, even opposite effects. The language of rights bounded law. It claimed to set limits to power. For civic power was to be exercised within the rule of law, and had to observe the sanctity of the domain of rights. The language of custom, in contrast, did not circumscribe power, for custom was enforced. The language of custom enabled power instead of checking it by drawing boundaries around it” (2001: 654).

One aspect of the state’s new concern with customary practice was that many tenants who had been given rights of occupancy in the initial settlements soon after annexation had these revoked and became, instead, tenants-at-will. Prinsep considered this to have been traditional practice under Sikh rule, when “the landowner had the right to evict any tenant and could do so at any time”. The result was that by 1866 out of 60,000 tenants recorded as hereditary cultivators in Amritsar [district] all but 15,000 had been reduced to tenants at will” (Metcalf 1962: 305).

Soon after customary law was institutionalised in 1871, another law was passed to protect the landownership of this special group of intermediaries that were now

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22 For a detailed discussion on the need for codification of customary law in colonial Punjab, see Prenter (1924), who writes; “...just as the vague Customary Law was in a way codified in Bengal and the United Provinces by the Brahmens, so there is no racial reason why Customary Law in the Punjab should not be codified in an appropriate way. The reason why it has not become codified long ago is not because codification is repugnant to the people, but because hitherto no power has attempted the task” (Prenter 1924: 232)
23 Young (1994) explains that both civil and criminal law existed but it applied only to the colonisers, and to issues that arose between colonisers and natives.
24 Prinsep to Financial Commissioner, Punjab, 28 April 1863, quoted in Metcalf (1962: 305).
central to colonial administration. This was the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900, which divided the population of rural Punjab between agricultural, or zamindar, and non-agricultural “tribes”. Under this law only agricultural castes could own land, and land could not even be sold to a member of a non-zamindar caste. Through this Act the colonial state linked economic endowment to a primordial, social identity, and then it froze this in time and restricted both economic and social mobility. For instance, a person from a non-agricultural caste who may have been on the brink of saving enough to buy some land would now not have been able to do so until after independence, when the law, though yet to be repealed, stop being enforced. Furthermore, someone from a non-agricultural caste would not have been selected to join the military or the civil service, and would even have had to apply for special permission to upgrade his/her house from a mud hut to a brick building. Later when limited elections were introduced in 1920, the Candidate Qualification Rules of 1919 would stop them from running for elections or even voting (Yadav 1987).

Smith (2000) and Gilmartin (1994a) both argue that it was this process of recording the details of village life in India in law and government records that led to the now prevalent practise of classifying Indian rural society as one determined primarily by caste. They point out that caste went from being simply a principle of social organisation — and in that an essentially dynamic and fluid concept — to being the basis of static government rules, regulations and administration, so that “customs, rights, and duties came increasingly to be defined, instead of each village negotiating the way it was to run its affairs” (Smith 1996: 172). This classification, done largely to enable the state to integrate each village and its social structure into a standardised mould of administrative control and regulation (Gilmartin 1994a; 1127), was “instrumental in creating a new kind of caste consciousness” (Smith 2000: 2). Berry (1992) and Dirks (2001) both argue that in the process of encoding

25 The word “tribe” was used to refer to what were essentially caste groups, or quoms.

26 Gilmartin (1994a) claims that it was repealed. However, an interview with a senior officer of the Punjab Board of Revenue revealed that the Land Alienation Act of 1900 was never formally repealed, but that after 1956 it became Constitutionally illegal. Various court cases led the state to add an amendment to the Act that declared all citizens were “agricultural tribes”. In India, however, it was formally repealed soon after independence.

27 The right to run for election was restricted to revenue paying members of the VPB. Other zamindar castes could vote, but non-proprieters were permitted to do so only if they had completed their primary education.
custom the colonial government instead constructed its own version of customary
law with an increased emphasis on caste as the main social demarcator (Dirks
2001). Dirk points out that “the power of colonial discourse was not that it created
whole new fields of meaning instantaneously but that it shifted old meanings
slowly, sometimes imperceptibly, through the colonial control of a range of new
institutions, including those for which the study of caste was judged necessary”
(Dirks 1992; 75).

2.1.3. Expansion

Another task before the colonial state was to expand its revenue base over time.
Punjab’s vast tracts of wasteland and its low population density — 156 people per
square mile compared to 311 in Bengal and 420 in the North Western Provinces—
presented few opportunities for this, given that the state had already settled the
villages that lay in its agricultural zones (Chakravarty-Kaul 1996). The rest of the
province was dry and uncultivable. This, however, did not deter the colonial state.
At the turn of the century it set about creating the world’s largest network of
perennial irrigation canals that transformed Punjab from a dry wasteland to the
‘bread basket’ of India and Pakistan that it is today.

To do so the state designated all uncultivated land as “Crown lands” and declared
these uninhabited, despite the existence of the semi-nomadic pastoralists that
roamed it. Canals were then dug in to carry water from Punjab’s rivers across the
length and width of the province. Along these canals villages were built from 1902
onwards that were numbered rather than named, and that were laid out in fixed
square plans as perfect grids in which compound walls were perfectly aligned to
ensure regular, straight streets (Gilmartin 2004: 7). Then the state started to move in
*abadkars* from the more populated eastern parts of the province to inhabit these
canal colonies and cultivate the newly irrigated land, also laid out in perfect squares.
Land was conferred on this new population in small packages under occupancy
tenancy contracts. As before, land rights were given exclusively to members of the
agricultural castes, so that once again, land settlement determined not only the

28 Now Uttar Pradesh.
structure of landholdings but also the structure of authorities and rights of different groups within the village (Ali 1988, Gilmartin 2004).

The canal colonies of Sargodha district were settled slightly differently from the rest of Punjab during this phase. In the 1890s the Horse and Mule-breeding Commission was created to investigate the possibility of the British Indian army gaining self-sufficiency in breeding cavalry horses and reducing its dependence on the import of horses from other countries (Ali 1988: 24-25). In 1901 as the Lower Jhelum Colony was being settled — which covered the canal colony villages that fell within Sargodha district — the Commission recommended that this self-sufficiency may be possible if the new grants were tied to a tenant’s ability “to maintain mares for breeding horses and mules for the army” (Ali 1988: 24). Therefore, in what came to be known as ghoripal (horse-breeding) grants, “the breeding obligation….became the basis on which [tenants] took up the land” (1988: 25). The size of each grant was determined by the number of mares that each settler brought along. A mare was worth 2 squares of land (55 acres), and a family that was able to contribute more than one could secure rights over a sizeably large land grant. Within these horse-breeding tenancies there were also the yeoman (sufedposh) grants, under which a tenant was given only one-and-a-half squares per mare but was allowed to maintain between five and fifteen mares, with an upper limit of about 650 acres of land in total (Ali 1988). Therefore, whereas landholdings in canal colony villages were in general smaller than those in Proprietary villages, some horse-breeding grantees did manage to amass quite large landholdings. I follow the Village Inspection Reports (1911) in using the term “Crown villages” for all these types of villages settled during this phase. These villages are also called chaks, and are listed in government records as such, followed by a number and an acronym that signifies their position along various branches of the canals.\(^\text{29}\)

Crown villages were different from Proprietary villages in many ways. First, land inequality was lower since land grants were given to many landowners in each village. Levels of tenancy were also lower since most proprietors were expected to, and often did, farm their own land. In this Crown villages were actually not very

\(^{29}\) Such as, a village may be called Chak 37 N.B., which means Crown village No.37 along the northern branch canal.
different from *bhaichara* villages, though with the important difference that all landowners did not belong to the same lineage group, in which aspect they more closely resembled *pattidari* villages. Second, settlers in Crown villages were tenants of the state and did not have full proprietary rights. Due to this, unlike Proprietary villages, Crown villages were directly administered by the district office through “colony law” and the tenancy contracts drawn between the state and its tenants, and not by customary law. This was to allow the state to better regulate these villagers as suppliers to the military. To this end a tenant’s continued possession of land was dependent on his/her fulfilment of the obligation to breed healthy horses and mules. In 1941 when these horse-breeding conditions were abrogated, the settlers in Crown villages received proprietary rights, at which point they became the VPB.

Regulation by the state meant that the village headman, or *lambardar*, was appointed by the Deputy Commissioner of a district, and it was he\(^{30}\) who was responsible for the collection of taxes and not the *malikan-deh*, which in the case of Crown villages were called *chaudhris*. In return for collecting the village revenue and playing a role in policing and dispute resolution, the *lambardar* received 5 per cent of the revenue he collected (Imperial Gazetteer of India 1908: 113). The state remained uninvolved in Proprietary villages, where it delegated all rights of regulation and administration to the VPB.

Third, relations between the proprietary caste and other village residents were less hierarchical. Since the *zamindar biraderis* of these villages were themselves tenants of the state, they had no proprietary rights over the rest of the village population. Also, the residential land on which the village’s other caste groups lived was not owned by the *zamindars*, unlike in Proprietary villages where the VPB owned all homestead land and, through it, exercised great control over the lives of non-VPBs. In Crown villages the state granted homestead land to village artisans and to the private tenants of the state lessees, making them considerably more independent of the *zamindar* caste. Furthermore, since the elite status of the grantees in these villages was not underwritten by customary law, and since they acquired proprietary rights much later than the VPBs of Proprietary villages, they were less cohesive as a group and their power of other village residents was considerably limited.

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\(^{30}\) Invariably ‘he’.
2.1.4. The Impact of Partition

The creation of a colonial state administration and its relationship with villages was thus influenced by variation in the Punjabi environment. In Sargodha villages were variously settled — old, natural communities along the river banks were settled together as lineage bhaichara settlements, vast tracts were given to abadkars to cultivate through tenants as zamindari or pattidari tenures, and new Crown villages were created and settled through state tenants. This process of land settlement in Sargodha marks the most significant difference between villages in the district. No post-independence change has come close to approximating the impact that the events of the colonial period had on village structure and on the relations between different groups of villagers.

One more type of village was, however, created by the partition of India and Pakistan at independence in 1947 — the migrant village. When Sargodha district became part of the newly created Pakistan its Sikh and Hindu population abandoned its lands and villages — both Proprietary and Crown — to move to India. This population was replaced by Muslim migrants from parts of East Punjab that were now in India. In some cases entire villages were abandoned and then resettled in this way and ownership rights of the land were given to the new settlers. Property was allotted, however, only in compensation for that which the migrants had left behind in India, so that only those that would have been landowners back home would have received land after migration. The replacement of populations eroded the old social and authority structures of these villages. In many cases families and biraderis attempted to move and settle together, and so these ‘migrant’ villages came to resemble the old bhaichara villages of lineage-based communities.

In picking variables along which to hypothesise why voters in rural Punjab may behave differently from one another today, the historical events of the colonial period provide me with the three most important ones that I use in statistical tests later in this dissertation. Given what we now know of colonial rule in Sargodha and the subsequent partition of India, I can expect differences to exist between; (a) Proprietary and Crown villages, and even between the different types of Proprietary
villages; (b) equal and unequal villages, since the extent of land inequality varied within each village type; and (c) zamindar and non-zamindar households, or VPB and non-VPB households within the same village.


2.2.1. Colonial Politics and the Partition of 1947

When elections to the Provincial Legislative Councils and Assemblies were introduced in India in the last three decades of colonial rule, the large landlords of Punjab — Muslim, Hindu and Sikh — came together to form a political party that would dominate the province until independence. The Unionist Party — many of whose founding leaders were from Sargodha district — was secular, rural, had a strong Punjabi identity, and was extremely closely aligned to the British colonial state, given the special relationship that existed between the province’s landed groups and the state, as discussed in the previous section. This close relationship put the party in direct opposition to the Congress and the Muslim League, one of which was leading the movement for independence while the other was leading the Pakistan movement. The political power and influence of these landlords in Punjab kept both the Congress and the Muslim League from gaining any substantial support. In the 1937 election for the Provincial Legislative Assemblies the Unionist Party secured 95 out of the 175 seats in Punjab, while the Congress won 18 and the Muslim League managed to get only 1 urban seat (Oren 1974). Of the Unionist’s 95 seats 84 were rural constituencies, and of these, interestingly, 76 percent were the large landlords of Proprietary villages (Yadav 1987).

However, things had changed dramatically by the 1946 election when the Muslim League swept the Muslim seats of the province, both urban and rural. Though some part of this was attributed to rising support for the Pakistan movement, the main reason for this was the fact that many of the muslim members of the Unionist Party had by 1945 joined the Muslim League, and had brought with them their rural

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31 The remaining seats were not necessarily held by non-VPBs or the landed groups of Crown villages. I was simply unable to identify and match the remaining names from the lists provided by Yadav (1987).
constituencies and votes. This shift was compelled by two things that had become clear to these members. First, that British colonial rule was coming to a definite end in India. Second, that its obvious successor, the Congress party, was committed to instituting land reforms soon after taking over. Jinnah and his Muslim League, on the other hand, were ambiguous on this issue (Talbot 1980). Pakistan, therefore, looked like a much better prospect for these landlords in the event of being abandoned by their old colonial patron, and so the country came into being on 14th August 1947 led by a political party that was dominated in the Punjab by conservative landlords. The ex-Unionists’ conviction that they had chosen wisely was expressed by one of the original leaders of the party, Sir Feroz Khan Noon — a prominent landlord of Sargodha and one of those who shifted to the Muslim League in 1945 — to Hamza Alavi over a casual lunch in Dhaka in 1951, when he remarked, “Jawaharlal [Nehru] comes from a good family. But he has surrounded himself by communists. They are out to destroy the great landed families of India. Thank God they cannot touch us here [in Pakistan]” (Alavi 2002).

2.2.2. Continuation of Landed Power — 1947-1970

Noon was later the Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1957-58, the last of a series of Prime Ministers who attempted to rule through the first 11 years after partition. The Muslim League had its hands full at the time with establishing the basic framework of the new state. A constitution had to be written that would define the nature and functions of parliament, the bureaucracy and the army, and relations between these. It had little time to think of its own organisation and about building a support base within the provinces that now constituted West Pakistan, where they had had almost no support just two years prior to partition. Until it could do so, the landlords — who had joined it just in time for the 1946 elections that had sealed the deal on the creation of Pakistan — were useful and played much the same role that they had under colonial rule, that of maintaining control of the countryside and ensuring revenue and produce. The question of land reforms was clearly off the table. That is, until General Ayub Khan took over the country in a military coup in 1958. This delay, both in instituting land reforms and in circumscribing the political power of landed groups, had a number of political impacts. First, it meant that by the time land reforms came around, the rural elite had become firmly ensconced in the
national politics of the new state. They would remain so for the rest of Pakistan’s history. Second, the rural population remained dependent for access to land and employment on a few powerful landowners, who over time were able to convert this economic dependence into political support in subsequent elections. Third, the power and influence of landed groups in both national politics and rural society meant that when political parties were eventually created, they were built around these groups, who were able to herd together large instant vote banks in a country whose voters are primarily rural (Herring 1979; Sayeed 1980; Gardezi 1983; Alavi 1983 & 1990; Waseem 1994).

General Ayub Khan instituted Pakistan’s first set of land reforms in 1959, a year after his coup. These reforms were an attempt to broaden the constituency of the regime by redistributing assets from the landed gentry to the middle farmers who provided the bulk of his support. They were not aimed at empowering small peasants and the landless from non-agricultural castes. Many of the beneficiaries of these reforms were former military and civil officers to whom resumed land was given at extremely low prices (Jalal 1994: 160). In fact, Ali (1970: 95) suggests that Ayub’s land reforms were an attempt not at equality amongst peasants but equality amongst landlords. He argues that these reforms quelled a growing unrest in the countryside that could have led to a peasant uprising, and as such, managed to entrench the landlords even further. Under these reforms, uncultivated land that needed to be put under cultivation was given not to the landless but to existing landowners and bureaucrats. About 100,000 acres, that had been developed by tenants under the promise of eventual ownership, were auctioned off to landowners, an action that dislodged 200,000 tenants (Ali 1970: 119). It was also during Ayub’s military regime that the army became entrenched as a major landholder itself. In the same year as the land reforms, Ayub introduced the Basic Democracies system of local government elections, the aim of which was to introduce a limited semi-democratic system that was based on the “politics of exclusion”, differentiated economic patronage and the doctrine of “functional inequality” (Jalal 1994: 159). Elections held under this system in 1959 and 1964 created a restricted franchise that put political power entirely in the hands of the landed classes.\(^{32}\)

\(^{32}\) Details of this are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
2.2.3. Class Divisions and the Rise of the Pakistan People’s Party

Something was, however, changing in the countryside. Analyses of rural Punjabi society post-independence usually stratified it by caste and lineage, or *quoms* and *biraderis*, which had been the social logic of colonial village settlement patterns (Inayatullah 1963). Scholars writing in the 1970s, however, started to discuss rural Punjab in terms of class, not caste, and argued that “social stratification is a matter of economic class more than of caste or kinship groups” and that “political behavior is largely motivated by economic considerations” (Ahmad 1972: 73). Others that made similar points were Alavi, who insisted that class conflict was replacing factional [kinship-based] conflict in the villages of Punjab (1973: 47) and Gough (1977). Ahmad (1972) even went so far as to posit the two lowest rural classes — the “poor peasants” and the “peasant proletariat” — as forces for revolutionary change, given the unequal land-based relations of dependence that had existed to date. This hope coincided with the rise of a new political party — Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).

Ayub’s “politics of exclusion”, pursued by the regime through the 1960s, resulted in rising unrest and opposition. In 1968 discontent erupted into a movement that was led by “labour militancy and student radicalism” and which demanded universal adult franchise and parliamentary democracy (Jalal 1994: 160). The movement not only brought down the military regime and eventually led to elections in 1970 and Pakistan’s first elected parliament, but also created conditions that led to the victory on the western side of the country of a party whose politics were radical and inclusive.

The newly created PPP swept to power in the 1970 elections on a platform of *masawat* (literally, equality). It won the election by “cobbling together a loose coalition of divergent social and economic interests” that included among others, “the Punjabi rural underprivileged – small landlords cum tenant farmers, landless field labourers, and menials” (Jalal 1994: 162). The election “threw up elements

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33 For the analyses of this period this referred to the conflict in rural areas between those that owned land and those that did not (tenants, artisans and labour).
from the lower and middle social strata who, having been radicalised by the politics of exclusion and the economics of functional inequality [under Ayub Khan], now wanted to capture the PPP, and by extension, the political arms of the state” (Jalal 1994: 163). Rouse supports the same view, in that “for the first time in Pakistani history, the producing classes saw state power as central in affecting change in their status” (Rouse 1983: 780).

Jones’s (2003) study of the 1970 elections casts rural Pakistani voters as citizens who prioritised a class identity over all other social groupings and voted along ideological lines in support of a political party and its manifesto. He points out that in this election Zulfiqar Bhutto:

“…led his Pakistan People’s Party to victory…by galvanising the common man behind his programme of Islamic Socialism and promise of *roti, kapra, makan* (‘bread, clothing, housing’). Never before had the rural peasant or urban worker so broken with his customary leadership, the rural landlord and the urban union godfather, to assert his independent political rights as he did in 1970” (2003:2).

Baxter points out that the PPP came out of nowhere in the 1970 election to beat all “feudals”, and that “no member of the rural elite can find much pleasure in the results of the 1970 elections…[because] as a group the rural elite was badly beaten and this by a group largely comprising unknowns” (1974: 28).

Wilder (1999) and Jones (2003) both point out that the main division along which voters in the 1970 election were split was defined by land — those that had it voted against the PPP and those that did not have it voted for it, earning the PPP the label ‘party of the poor’. Through the initial years of the PPP regime, “small peasant proprietors, tenants, and field labourers believed that Bhutto had released them from the grasp of oppressive landlords who, while managing to evade the PPP’s land reforms, had nevertheless been forced to ‘part with some of their feudal perks’ and ‘overlords mentality’, which was ‘by no means a small achievement’ (Viewpoint (28 Aug. 1977): 16, in Jalal 1994: 171). Though Bhutto vacillated often in his public speeches on the extent of socialism or revolution that he supported, his election campaign statements such as “[the] present movement would not be successful until the worker owns his factory and the tenant the land he cultivates” earned him a large constituency within urban labour and the rural peasantry (Jones

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2003: 239). As one respondent, an agricultural labourer, put it to me during a field interview in 2007, “Pakistan was liberated in 1947 by Jinnah. We [the poor] were liberated in 1970 by Bhutto”.

Much of this support was a result of the successful rural campaign of the ‘Punjab Left’ within the party, a faction led by Sheikh Rashid whose workers campaigned in villages directly with tenants and agricultural labourers, and whose most vehement stance was the exclusion of all “undesirable” landed elements from the PPP. Though the Punjab Left was not entirely successful in keeping the PPP free of landed groups — especially given that Bhutto himself was a large landlord, and many large landholders from his native Sindh had joined the PPP early on — it did manage to keep them out in Punjab to the extent that by the time of the election, almost half of the party leaders were political newcomers. Based to a large extent on the work of the Punjab Left, the PPP rode to an almost 60 percent victory at the national level in the 1970 election in West Pakistan and a 76 percent landslide victory in Punjab based on the crucial “mass support by the powerless, non-privileged, non-landholding classes in the countryside” (Jones 2003: 399).

The fact that those that had until now been described as an unsophisticated, uneducated rural electorate to whose “genius” democracy was not suited, had responded with such speed to the populist appeal of a brand new party that had appealed directly to them and not to their landed lords, made many analysts of the time hopeful that “one might conclude that the day of the rural elite control of government in the Punjab has ended” (Baxter 1974: 28). Baxter took this as an indication of the fact that “the rural elite, obviously, does better in limited or controlled elections, as in those prior to independence or those during the Ayub period”, but he also warned that the consolidation of such a huge change in voting behaviour needed more time and that “only another election held on the terms of those in 1970 can determine the future of the landed aristocracy — and whether the PPP has redeemed its pledge to end “feudal” power in politics” (1974: 28).

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35 A phrase originally used by President Iskander Mirza in 1958 as an immediate precursor to Ayub Khan’s Martial Law regime. He used Pakistan’s low literacy rate to explain why the 1956 Constitution was creating problems by asking for elections and democracy. The same sentiment was later also attributed to General Ayub Khan, who used it as a justification for his model of controlled democracy.
However, the next election was not held on the same terms or with the same populist fervour. By the time the 1977 election rolled around, Bhutto had changed his bias from small landholders, peasants and labour to larger landlords and moderate middle-roaders in both urban and rural areas. He gave a large proportion of party tickets to, “members of influential landed families, many of whom had been defeated by the PPP’s relatively unknown candidates in the 1970 elections” (Jalal 1994: 169). Despite this, there appears to be a consensus in the literature that this period represented the greatest challenge in Pakistan’s history to the political and social power of rural landlords. According to Sayeed “Bhutto’s great contribution was that he had aroused both a new hope and political consciousness among these classes [poor peasants, tenants, artisans and farm labour] that, given certain decisive policies on the part of the government, their lot could improve” (1980: 93). The processes that allowed this to happen had started to consolidate in the protests and demonstrations that brought down Ayub Khan’s military regime, but it was under the PPP government that this social uprising had translated into political power for groups that had previously been kept out of power.

2.2.4. Agrarian Reforms During the Bhutto Years — 1970-1977

It was not just through politics that Bhutto’s regime attacked the landed. Soon after coming to power in 1971 Bhutto instituted Pakistan’s second set of land reforms that had a more radical aim than the first. His party’s manifesto made this clear by stating:

“West Pakistani owners of large estates, the feudal lords, constitute a formidable obstacle to progress. Not only by virtue of their wealth, but on account of their hold over their tenants and the neighbouring peasantry, they yield considerable power and are, even at present, a major political force…The breaking-up of the large estates to destroy the power of the feudal land owners is a national necessity that will have to be carried out through practical measures” (PPP Manifesto 1970, in Shafqat 1997: 146).

Bhutto, like Ayub, imposed ceilings on landholdings but reduced these from 500 acres of irrigated land and 1,000 acres of non-irrigated land in Ayub’s reforms, to 100 acres and 200 acres respectively by the time of the final round of reforms in 1977. More importantly, “land was to be resumed without compensation and it was also to be distributed to tenants free of cost” (Sayeed 1975; 55). Also, public officials (excluding members of the armed forces) could keep no more than 100 acres of the land that they had received from the Ayub government. The reforms
also extended to revenue payments, in that landowners with land below 12 acres of irrigated land or 25 acres of non-irrigated land were exempted from the payment of land revenue and other land-based revenue assessments. This reform in itself benefited more than 5 million farmers in Punjab (Sayeed 1980: 92).

Land reforms were accompanied by tenancy reforms that sought to protect tenancy rights and livelihood, and included a law against *bedakhali*, or the eviction of tenants. Other measures such as the reiteration of the abolishment of *begaar*,\(^\text{36}\) which Ayub had implemented, and the seizure by state of illegally occupied land were also instituted (Shafqat 1997). These reforms were strengthened by a change in attitude of various state departments. For example, when “soon after the 1970s elections, rural lords reacted to the PPP’s promise to give land to the tillers by allying with local state functionaries to carry out a series of tenant evictions” landlords found that the judiciary had become very receptive to litigations by tenants concerning evictions and coercion (Jalal 1994: 162), and that out of the cases of evictions registered in Punjab, 70 per cent of the judgements ordered the restoration of tenants (Herring 1983: 117). Herring also claims that evictions themselves may have been constrained to some limited extent by increased tenant militancy that in itself was a result of the “development of political and social consciousness among tenants in rural Pakistan” during this period (Herring 1983: 116).

In 1976 a National Charter for Peasants was added to the list of reforms under which all cultivable land owned by the state was to be distributed to peasants living below subsistence levels (Shafqat 1997: 152). However, as far as peasants and labourers are concerned, the most dramatic reform with the greatest impact turned out to be the homestead reforms introduced at about the same time, under which state land within the village settlements was turned into residential schemes with 5-marla\(^\text{37}\) plots. These plots were allotted to about 600,000 applicants in Punjab that included artisans, farm labourers and tenants (Sayeed 1975). Besides this, in Proprietary villages where most of the residential land was owned by members of

\(^{36}\) Corvée, or a day’s unpaid labour performed by a subject on the demand of a landlord.

\(^{37}\) 5 marlas equal 126.5 square meters. A marla is a traditional unit of land measurement in South Asia. 20 marlas = 1 kanal, and 8 kanals = 1 acre. Under British rule the marla was standardized to the equivalent of 25.3 square meters.
landowning families, homestead land was confiscated by the state and handed over to those that were resident on it through the issuance of formal certificates that clearly stated the new ownership and right of residence of these tenants and labourers. This represented a dramatic change because prior to this these landless groups lived under a constant threat of eviction and were, therefore, in a position of complete dependence. They were expected to offer begaar in return for their occupation of this land and were also expected to demonstrate total subordination to any other demands made by landlords. With the threat of eviction removed, a considerable degree of personal freedom and empowerment was allowed to these groups.38

Despite all this, the impact of Bhutto’s reforms was limited by various loopholes in the land reform laws that were exploited by landlords to hold on to their assets. Since the ceiling was on individuals rather than on families, landlords transferred land to direct family members, so that in the end only about 2 per cent of the total arable land was distributed, which affected 2,298 landlords and 88,582 tenants and small peasants (Syed 1992: 130). They also carried out large-scale evictions, many of which were contested in court to their disadvantage, but enduring linkages with state officials were exploited so that land was restored to tenants in very few cases. Landlords also handed over bad quality, unproductive land so that there was little change in rural poverty statistics by most measures, though some literature does insist that the various reforms of this time combined to double the cultivators’ income in Sindh (Sayeed 1980: 93).

The debate around the impact of Bhutto’s reforms remains contentious (Herring 1983; Rouse 1988; Shafqat 1997). The PPP under Bhutto had sought to end “feudalism” in Pakistan by setting land ceiling and instituting related agrarian reforms. However, both Shafqat (1997) and Herring (1983) point out that the causal link between setting land ceilings and the break-up of feudalism is weak, given that feudalism is also based on the social and political control of the landless by the landed. Therefore, most analyses of these reforms believe they had little impact in terms of reducing ties of dependence between landlords and other rural classes.

38 Various other governments in the 1980s and 1990s later continued this policy of issuing homestead ownership certificates to village residents.
(Hussain 1979; Alavi 1983; Shafqat 1997). What little had changed suffered a reversal after General Zia came into power in 1977. This is discussed in the next chapter.

**Conclusion**

The rural landed elite of Punjab was the special constituency of the British colonial state, which created and protected both their landed power and their social dominance. In the post-colonial political environment of Pakistan — first unstable, then authoritarian — these elites were able to transform their economic and social power into political influence, and became central figures within national politics. Bhutto, himself part of this elite, challenged and circumscribed this power of the landed in the 1970s by appealing to rural discontent, a strategy that allowed the fledgling PPP to sweep a national election and be brought into power by an electorate that had never before, and has not since, voted so obviously and overwhelmingly along class lines.

The tipping of the scales against the rich, landed class during Bhutto’s regime proved, however, to be but a short-lived interlude in Pakistan’s political history. The next section explains how Zia’s subsequent regime reversed all hope of the end of the landed elite’s control over politics, and of voting behaviour organised along horizontal, class identity. However, this interlude was not without impact. Jalal (1994) notes that the landed classes’ politics had undergone a change through the 1970s, in that there was greater realisation that political alignments that ignored the rural middle and lower classes were no longer feasible. Jones summarises the impact of PPP’s 1970s campaign by pointing out that, “…the political map of Punjab had altered and that the countryside was no longer a place where vast bodies of politically inert folk would passively support their traditional leaders” (2003: 243). Wilder argues that landlords now appear to understand that “while parties [still] need strong candidates in rural constituencies, strong candidates increasingly need strong parties to win” (Wilder 1999: 218).

The 1970 election allows us to modify the analysis of Pakistani politics in two very important ways. First, it is now possible to think of the “feudals” or rural elite as a
beatable force in rural politics, given that there has now been a historical instance when their political and economic influence was heavily circumscribed by an external political force. Second, it enables us to move beyond the debate on the need for structural changes such as land reforms as a prerequisite for political change and the empowerment of the rural poor. The 1970 election took place before the second round of land reforms in 1972, so that this sea change occurred while landholdings were still fairly large. The literature makes it obvious that in this case the poor had been empowered not by structural reforms aimed at greater equality, but simply as a result of a reconfiguration of political forces through a new political party that had chosen to bypass local landlords to campaign directly with rural voters, and to appeal to them on a class basis. When given an opportunity, the class interests of rural voters had trumped all other ties of feudalism, biraderi-ism and clientelism with little else having changed.

The 1970s marked a historical watershed in the study of Punjabi politics. Literature on political behaviour before and after this period has all posited that rural citizens build ties around economic dependence, kinship or patronage. This was not the argument of the 1970s, when for a brief period voting behaviour in rural Pakistan came to be organised, and thus defined, along class lines. The significance of this period for our purpose also lies in the fact that the 1970 election campaign marked the point of transition from “the passing age of elite politics” to a “new age of mass politics” in Pakistan (Jones 2003: 7). In the next chapter I analyse this era of mass politics.
THREE

LANDLORDS, BROTHERS AND PATRONS IN NATIONAL POLITICS — 1977-2008

Introduction

After Bhutto’s regime was deposed in 1977, Pakistan went through two periods of authoritarian military rule under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), and an 11-year period between these during which the civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif played ‘musical chairs’ in parliament. Four elections were held in these intermediate 11 years, bringing into power first Bhutto (1988), then Sharif (1990), then Bhutto (1993) and then Sharif again (1997) until General Musharraf’s coup ended the game in 1999. The Bhutto years had changed the Pakistani electorate in a significant way. Unlike Ayub, Zia and Musharraf could no longer rule without electoral politics and parliaments, and so they too held multiple elections during their regimes. The period from 1977 to 2008 was, therefore, marked by seven intermittent elections to the national and provincial Assemblies and four local government elections. Through periods of both democratisation and de-democratisation, Pakistani citizens were now busy voting.

Despite all this electoral activity though, the voting behaviour of Pakistani citizens has remained understudied. Few scholarly works have attempted to develop a conceptual or empirical understanding of how citizens vote, especially in rural areas. However, if the various ways in which voting behaviour has been described in the literature were to be conceptually organised, they would give us three generalised explanations for what determines the vote of rural citizens. These are, (a) feudalism, (b) biraderi-ism and (c) clientelism. In this chapter I review the literature on each of these in turn and explain how certain historical political developments in Pakistan gave rise to these labels. However, I argue that as concepts deployed at a macro-level of analysis to explain national politics these terms are woolly and unwieldy, and leave us with an unclear picture of voting behaviour that conceals more than it reveals. I point out that the main problem
with these concepts is that they refer to relationships that exist at a micro level — between groups of voters and the landlords, kin brothers and patrons that play an important role in how they vote — but use these to explain macro phenomenon, such as political change at the national level. I argue that it is when they are used at a micro level, such as within a village, to unravel political relationships that they become useful and can help us sort through the various pressures that work on voters and determine how they vote on election day. I, therefore, call attention in this chapter to the need for the more rigorous and micro analysis of these concepts and relationships that I undertake later in the dissertation.

3.1. ‘Feudalism’

Through the process of establishing and expanding its revenue and administration structure in rural Punjab, the colonial state created socio-economic inequality that was premised on landownership, and then encouraged this to be stitched together with political dominance by patronising the Unionist Party. This fusion of economic, social and political power at the point of production was labelled “feudalism” by scholars such as Alavi (1983) and Herring, who argued that,

“...in the submontane Punjab and the canal colonies, the contemporary agrarian configuration can hardly be said to have constituted feudalism, but the social, political, and economic relations between landlords and the peasantry were often of a feudal type: the power of the landlord locally was indeed frequently de facto paramount, his system of authority both arbitrary and pervasive, his exactions diffuse and acontractual, his demands for loyalty personalistic and absolute...The fusion of polity and economy, state and society, is real at the local level, the law is quite secondary” (1979: 524).

For this reason literature on politics in Punjab focuses a great deal of attention on the political dominance of the landed rural elite (Sayeed 1980; Gardezi 1983; Alavi 1990; Waseem 1994, Keefer et al 2003). However, in Chapter 2 I argued that this dominance suffered a setback in the 1970s when the landed elite lost control over large parts of their rural constituencies, the voters of which broke out of their social and economic dependence to the extent of prioritising class and party identification as the basis of their vote in the 1970 and 1977 elections. The fact that by the end of Bhutto’s regime the landed elite of Punjab was filling the PPP’s ranks in droves is also testimony to the fact that the political party had replaced the landed power of the rural elite as the primary force in rural politics. Nevertheless, “feudalism”
continues to serve as the favourite “whipping boy of Pakistan’s intelligentsia” (Ahmad 1998). The media too continues to advance the idea that voting behaviour in rural Pakistan is shaped by it. Take, for example, the media’s coverage of the February 2008 election through headlines such as the BBC’s “Feudal shadow over Pakistan elections” (Hasan 2008), Dawn’s “Pakistan’s Feudal Demon” (Salahuddin 2008), or Daily Times’ “Feudal Politics” (Ali 2008).

There are two main reasons for why the multidimensional power of the rural landed elite has remained centre-stage in discussions of politics and voting behaviour. First, many of the limitations that the Bhutto years had placed on landed power disappeared when General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Bhutto in a military coup soon after the 1977 election, using as an excuse the anti-government urban riots that had broken out over election rigging allegations. The need for support and a constituency made Zia reach out to the “bigger fish” in rural areas, and thus he pledged to protect their property and to stop the last round of land reforms that had gone into the pipeline at the end of Bhutto’s regime (Jalal 1999: 322). Under his rule the land reform agenda was dropped and landowners were able to keep large holdings without fear of redistribution, to add to their existing holdings, and even to recover some of the land lost under Bhutto. State departments, especially the judiciary that had been sympathetic to the claims and issues of tenants and labour under Bhutto, reverted to siding with the landed elite and many tenancy claims based on the tenancy reforms of the 1970s were now thrown out of the courts. Successive governments after Zia either completely ignored the issue of land reforms and redistribution, as the governments of both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif did in the 1990s, or actively sought to reverse the reforms, as General Musharraf’s recent military government did when he allowed the ownership of large farms in order to provide incentives for the corporatisation of agriculture in the 2001-2002 budget (Khan 2004: 6).

Such reversals and the general ineffectiveness of the various rounds of land reforms have meant that land inequality is still high in Pakistan. Its gini coefficient for land is 0.83, compared to 0.62 for India and 0.49 for China (World Bank 2002, Bardhan

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39 Gini coefficient measures inequality on a scale from 0 to 1, on which 0 is perfect equality and 1 is perfect inequality.
In 2003 Gazdar calculated that in Pakistan “nearly half of all rural households do not own any agricultural land while just 2.5 per cent of the householders account for over two-fifth of the total owned area” (Gazdar 2003: 1). Tables 3.1 and 3.2 makes this obvious in the high land ginis for both Pakistan as a whole and Punjab in particular, the high levels of rural landlessness and the skewed distribution of landholdings. Most political analysis that takes off from such statistics argues that land inequality translates into the economic dependence of rural voters, and therefore, dependent voting — or as they call it, “feudal politics”.

Table 3.1. Land inequality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land inequality</th>
<th>Land owned</th>
<th></th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>0.83*</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>513*</td>
<td>3.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Punjab</strong></td>
<td>0.83**</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>221**</td>
<td>2.4**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Agricultural Census of Pakistan 2000; World Bank 2002; Gazdar 2003
* Average across all provinces (World Bank 2002).
**Average across north, central and south Punjab (World Bank 2002).

Table 3.2. Land ownership distribution in Pakistan and Punjab (in acres)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>&lt;2.5 acres</th>
<th>2.5 to 12.5 acres</th>
<th>&gt;12.5 - &lt;100 acres</th>
<th>100 &amp; above acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Owners</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total farm area</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Punjab</strong></td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Agricultural Census of Pakistan 2000; World Bank 2002; Gazdar 2003

Second, this explanation continues to grab people’s imagination because the rural landed elite is actually to be found in key positions in all of Pakistan’s political parties, including the PPP. The president, prime minister and most of the cabinet of the current PPP government are some of the largest landlords of Pakistan. Gazdar argues that the landed have a “monopolistic control on electoral politics” (2003: 3). Zaidi corroborates this by finding in a study that most elected representatives are extremely asset-rich (2004: 4935). The story, therefore, goes that continuing land inequality has meant that the rural elite can use its landed power to control and manipulate the vote in rural Pakistan to have itself elected to seats in parliament.

However, other studies point out various reasons for why this explanation is incomplete. Keefer et al (2003) argue that,

“Landlords are not a monolithic class and compete vigorously among themselves for political office. Many landlords, including the most feudal, lost their parliamentary seats in the 1990s. Second, anthropological evidence shows that rural inhabitants were
less reliant on landowners in the 1990s than earlier, reducing the leverage of landowners over the voters in their areas” (2003: 15).

The “feudalism” explanation is also strongly countered by literature that points to basic facts about agriculture in Pakistan to argue that the “feudal” label fails to describe it accurately. Despite the general ineffectiveness of the land reforms, Table 3.3 shows that farms of larger than 12.5 acres have reduced significantly in number while those under 2.5 acres have increased dramatically between 1972 and 2000. This could be because of sales and distribution brought on by a fear of land reforms, or through land fragmentation because of shariah based laws of inheritance. Also, Table 3.4 shows that rates of tenancy have also reduced significantly so that almost 80 percent of farms are now owner-operated. Zaidi uses these facts to argue that “while feudal practices may have been extensive at the time of independence, and, in fact, may have been dominant, capitalist agriculture has been the leading trend and it is not possible to label Pakistan or Pakistani agriculture today as ‘feudal’” (Zaidi 1999: 18-19). By extension, scholars like Zaidi argue that if the mode of agricultural production cannot be called feudal, neither can the political relationships that exist between the different classes of the agricultural sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>&lt;2.5</th>
<th>2.5 to 12.5</th>
<th>&gt;12.5 - &lt;50</th>
<th>50 &amp; above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Agricultural Census of Pakistan 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All farms</th>
<th>Owner operated</th>
<th>Owner-cum-tenant operated</th>
<th>Tenant operated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Agricultural Census of Pakistan 2000

In summary, this section reveals that land distribution in both Punjab and Pakistan is very unequal and that the rural landed elite is disproportionately represented in political parties. This has led some scholars to characterise rural politics as “feudal”. Others insist that agricultural modes of production have changed to the extent that this label is entirely inaccurate. Neither argument, however, helps to clarify whether

\[Shariah\] laws of inheritance stipulate equal division of assets across all sons, and a comparatively smaller fraction divided across all daughters.
or not there remain voters in rural Punjab that may still be in relations of
dependence with landlords. To understand that we need a much more nuanced
analysis that focuses on how the particular relationship that this term refers to works
out in Punjabi villages. Based on what we know from the discussion here, though, I
expect to find that few rural citizens would actually still be in relations of complete
economic dependence with their local landlords. That remains to be seen in Part III
of this dissertation.

3.2. Biraderi-ism

3.2.1. Defining Biraderi — The Traditional Social System of Pakistan

Much of the attention focused on biraderi-ism has to do with its centrality in
defining the social structure of rural Pakistan, especially Punjab. The village society
in Punjab is a complex phenomenon that is organised primarily in terms of families
that come together within patrilineal kinship groups, or biraderis, which in turn
collectively form quoms, which are hierarchically arranged, endogamous, status
groups that involve a notion of occupational castes. Scholars insist that quoms and
biraderis in Muslim groups are different from the jatis and gotras of the Hindu
caste system41 (Alavi 1971; Ahmad 1977; Jalal 1994). They point out that the rules
of endogamy are different and that the Hindu caste system involves notions of ritual
pollution that are missing in the social stratification found in Muslim groups. The
differences, however, are minimal. Both the Muslim quom and the Hindu jati are
strictly endogamous. However, while the Muslim biraderis are also endogamous,
the Hindu gotra is strictly exogamous (Alavi 1971; Beteille 1991; Bougle 1991).
And while there may be no strong sense of ritual pollution associated with the
lowest groups or a religious basis for the stratification, quoms are, nevertheless,
hierarchically arranged and social association between different quoms — including
ritual exchange and attendance at marriages — is limited. Functionally, quoms are
jatis, and biraderis are gotras, in that they are all ascriptive, primordial identities
that are associated with occupation.

41 Quoms are internally divided into biraderis, just like jatis are internally divided into various gotras
As discussed in Chapter 2, colonial rule and discourse led to hierarchically ordered *quoms* and *biraderis* becoming the “pivotal institution in the ‘traditional’ social structure” of Punjab (Alavi 1971: 114). In its rural areas these social institutions have a corporate structure that converts individual behaviour and choices into collective ones, and has political and economic functions. *Biraderis* are a strong unit of identity in a village, and usually the primary unit of organisation, social support and collective action. *Biraderi* leaders are not always clan elders, but rather “mature, middle-aged men who have the time and energy to run about attending to lineage business. Their effectiveness and power vary, so that some lineages are more tightly controlled than others” (Alavi 1971: 117). *Biraderis* collectively regulate marriage decisions of individual members, and use ostracism as the most effective sanction in the case of disobedience or other transgressions deemed harmful by the collective group, such as breaking ranks during important events (Lefebvre 1999: 46-48; Wakil 1970: 704). With the advent of elections in Pakistan, voting was included in the list of activities monitored and organised by *biraderis* in rural Punjab, which took on an increasingly important role in political mobilisation.

The social structure of most Punjabi villages is stratified into three *quoms* (Ahmad 1977, Rouse 1988, Alavi 2001). At the very top of the hierarchy is the *zamindar quom* of landowners and tenant cultivators. Within these there is a further distinction between those lineage groups, or *biraderis*, that were recognised under colonial rule as the VPB (as explained in Section 2.1), and the *biraderis* of non-proprietary tenants.42 The *kammi quom* of artisans are placed below the *zamindar quom* while the *muslim sheikhs*,43 or landless labourers, lie right at the bottom of the social order. Typically, they are the poorest and most exploited group in the village social structure. *Quoms* and *biraderis* in rural Punjab are relatively more fluid and mobile than *jatis* and *gotras* in India, in that a change in wealth and employment often leads people to change the name of the *biraderi* with which they refer to themselves. Ahmad presents a popular and amusing Punjabi proverb that says:

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42 This is not defined by a specific type of *biraderi*, in that members of a *biraderi* might be village proprietors in one village and tenants in another.

43 Muslim Sheikhs are also sometimes referred to as *mussalis*, a term which was more commonly used a few decades ago but which is now considered a pejorative term. I use the old term when referring to studies that use it, or to villages where the term is still common.
“Last year I was a Jullaha [weaver], this year I am a Sheikh [disciple of the Prophet Mohammad], and next year, if the prices rise, I will be a Syed [descendent of the Prophet Mohammad]” (Ahmad, 1973: 207).

Each village in Punjab usually has multiple biraderis that fall within the three main quom groups. Alavi (2001) explains that biraderi organisation varies by quom. It is weakest among the kammis and muslim sheikhs simply because they are often dependent on higher groups for access to land, services and patronage. Their avenues for collective action or solidarity are, thus, often undermined or rendered irrelevant by their need for linkages with more influential quoms and landed groups. The biraderis of VPB zamindars on the other hand — usually the larger landowners in the village — have extremely flexible biraderi linkages in that they can use their resources and power to extend their ties of kinship beyond the village and form larger alliances and coalitions, especially through marriages, with large landowners in other villages. The pursuit of such alliances can result in the formation of biraderi-based political blocs, with considerable access to resources and power. It is small landowners, the middle zamindar biraderis, that Alavi identifies with biraderi solidarity. Governed by panchayats, small landowners tend to have higher levels of solidarity because they are more independent of the stronger, large landowners than are kammis or muslim sheikhs. Ahmad (1977) concurs that attempts by landlords to suppress collective action is almost always directed against the rural poor, and not against small, independent zamindars.

3.2.2. Biraderi-ism and Politics in Pakistan

Alavi (1971, 1972a & 2001), Ahmad (1977) and Inayatullah (1963) represent the few attempts made at studying the impact of biraderi-ism on village-level political organisation and activity, all of which have been qualitative accounts of political life in a village. Other than these, much of the attention that the concept has received as a political determinant has been at the macro-level — as a determinant of how constituencies are demarcated, how parties allot election tickets to candidates, and how candidates form alliances. A number of works are particularly instructive in this regard, such as Talbot (1998), Wilder (1999) and Jones (2003). Talbot (1998) argues that biraderi-ism was an integral part of politics in the Punjab

44 In my sample villages the number of biraderis in a single village range from 9 to 55.
45 Village council, often set up informally to resolve disputes in the village.
even before the creation of Pakistan, and that the parties that contested the elections of 1937 and 1946 organised themselves around biraderi networks. In fact, he alleges that the reason why Jinnah’s Muslim League managed to win only one seat in the 1937 election was because it was unable to “garner votes through the traditional channels of political mobilisation in the countryside, the biraderi networks, the patron-client ties between landlords and tenants and the network of disciples of the leading pirs” (1998: 63). By the next election, however, Jinnah appears to have learnt the trick, and his party fought the 1946 election by organising around biraderis and the influence of landed groups (Talbot 1998: 73). The party won a resounding victory that sealed the deal on Pakistan’s birth.

This norm continued past independence to the first set of local government elections held under the Basic Democracies system in 1959-60 during Ayub’s military regime. Wilder quotes Inayatullah (1963) to show that biraderi-ism was the major principle of political organisation in villages during these elections, in which “the candidates did not directly contact the individual voters. First it was biraderi as a whole that was contacted and when it was realised that there were some families who were loosely integrated to the larger units then pressure was shifted to the family” (Wilder 1999: 180). In the 1970 elections that brought Bhutto to power, the PPP’s class-based vote did not just render feudal control of rural voters ineffective but “also claimed to have finally ‘shattered’ the biraderi system, at least insofar as its customary political functions are concerned” (Jones 2003: 331). The military regime of Yahya Khan, under whom the 1970 election was held, had expected that “biraderi, century-old rural relations, traditions, the hold of certain establishment families and not mere crowds at public meetings will be the deciding factor at the polls” (Morning News (Dhaka) article in Jones 2003: 257). But the crowds at the PPP’s public meetings did indeed convert their support into votes on election day and all other traditional forms of political organisation and alignment, including biraderi, were defeated.

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46 Descendents of saints
47 After Ayub Khan had to step down during the movement of 1968, he handed power to another general, Yahya Khan, who announced and oversaw the 1970 election and the subsequent civil war in East Pakistan, before handing power to Bhutto in Dec 1971.
Political configurations that were defeated in the 1970s were, however, brought back by the personalisation of politics in the 1980s under Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime. Soon after coming to power in 1977 Zia banned political parties, repressed all party-based political activities, and started a campaign to depoliticise the rural and urban poor. Compared to Bhutto’s slogans that centred on the political empowerment of marginalised groups, the new regime’s mantra was Islamisation, and in this it built its main constituency around the urban middle and lower-middle classes of traders, merchants and aarthis\textsuperscript{48} (Jalal 1994: 173). Like Ayub before him, Zia held local government elections in 1979\textsuperscript{49} on a non-party basis. In the absence of political parties candidates in these elections turned once again to the only available forms of political organisation and mobilisation — biraderi based networks and the local influence of the landed elite.

When Zia finally announced provincial and national assembly elections in 1985, eight years after coming to power, these too were held on a non-party basis. The absence of political parties transplanted the logic of local forms of political organisation around influential landed elites and biraderi networks to the higher tiers, and in so doing, strengthened the personalisation of politics (Cheema and Mohmand 2003). This is discussed further in the next section. Gilmartin argues that the “importance of biradari [sic] grew hand in hand with the increasingly heavy hand of state control under Zia” (1994b: 36). All that had changed in the 1970 election was undone by the 1985 election, the result of which was “a parliament dominated by landed interests” (Jalal, 1994: 180), and in which “ties to clan, tribe, or biradari [sic] and feudal social bases…largely determined the outcome” (Rais 1985 in Wilder 1999: 183). Even in the 1993 elections that Waseem (1994) and Wilder (1999) studied — in which Bhutto’s daughter Benazir won her second term in office\textsuperscript{50} — most of the candidates of the two main parties, the PPP and PML-N, represented the dominant biraderis of their constituencies. Waseem (2006) claims that even in the election of 2002 held during Musharraf’s regime, rural Punjabi citizens voted predominantly on the basis of caste and biraderi. According to these

\textsuperscript{48} A middleman in the trade of agricultural produce.

\textsuperscript{49} For an explanation for why only military dictators in Pakistan have held local government elections, see Cheema and Mohmand 2003.

\textsuperscript{50} The first had been in 1988, right after Zia’s regime ended with his death in the mid-air explosion of a plane carrying him and the top-brass of his army.
scholars, candidates, especially those in central Punjabi districts like Sargodha, use these primordial identities to garner the support of vote bloc leaders in their constituencies that are from the same or related biraderis.

There are a number of problems, though, with this biraderi-based explanation of voting. Wilder admits that while biraderis play an important role in political campaigns, their role in determining patterns of voting on election day itself is unclear and that “popular perception of the importance of biradari [sic] in determining voter behaviour is exaggerated” (1999: 185). A major problem with this view is that it does not sit well with the demographics of the typical Punjabi village, each of which are fragmented, heterogeneous communities with multiple biraderis that are organised politically at the level of the village and rarely across village boundaries. This fact in itself makes it hard to imagine that candidates can win elections based entirely on the primacy of lineage solidarity. Also, if biraderi alone could allow candidates to win elections, then no electoral candidate in Punjab would need a political party ticket, for running as an independent would be enough. Yet political party tickets are important even in rural areas (Wilder 1999: 186). Another problem with the biraderi based view of voting behaviour is that it projects a static view of politics in Pakistan. As one politician explained, “Where I have won I had Rajput biraderi support. Where Mr. Akram Ansari has won, he had Ansari biraderi support. The Ansari biraderi is in the majority so he has won” (Wilder 1999: pg.184). If this were true, Pakistani politics would be unchanging and candidates of the same biraderi would always win, given that biraderi residence patterns are fairly fixed, at least in the short-term. However, Pakistani politics is not a static phenomenon, especially in central Punjab where Wilder and my analysis is based, where marginal seats exist and are actively fought over, and where voters appear to have an anti-incumbency bias (Wilder 1999: 209; Cheema and Naseer 2008).

Given all these problems with the biraderi-based explanation, why have the notions of kinship and caste been so central to the analysis of voting behaviour in Pakistan? I argue that the problems listed above are based not on the woolliness of the concept

51 Political organisation in villages is discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
itself but rather on the level of analysis at which it is usually operationalised in the literature. While as a determinant of national politics biraderi-ism’s role is ambiguous and its importance exaggerated, it is an important source of political identity and a central forum for the organisation of collective political action in Punjabi villages. It is, therefore, as a micro-level measurement of the relationship between voters and their kin brothers — a relationship that I expect to find is extremely relevant to rural voting behaviour — that biraderi-ism becomes a useful analytical concept.

3.3. Clientelism

3.3.1 Two Types of Clientelism

There are numerous definitions of clientelism that differ on the particular role that a patron plays, the types of exchanges that take place between patrons and clients, and the level at which such contact occurs. For the purpose of my analysis I need to reconcile the difference between clientelism that occurs at two different and distinct levels — that which links patrons and clients through face-to-face contact within villages, and that which links voters and politicians through political clientelism in which such direct contact is neither necessary nor usual. The reason for this is that while my research — presented through the rest of this dissertation — revealed that most rural voters in Punjab are linked to local patrons through direct links of clientelism, the literature that deals with clientelism in Pakistani politics has concentrated instead on the targeted exchanges that occur between electoral candidates and voters.

The first of these — clientelistic links that exist between patrons and clients in Punjabi villages — is described well by Powell’s work on clientelism in peasant societies, in which he defines the system as one:

“involving an interchange of non-comparable goods and services between actors of unequal socio-economic ranks”, with three essential features: “first, the patron-client tie develops between two parties unequal in status, wealth and influence…Second, the formation and maintenance of the relationship depends on reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services…Third, the development and maintenance of a patron-client relationship rests heavily on face-to-face contact between the two parties” (1970: 412).
From this definition of clientelism Powell excludes “relationships based on coercion, authority, manipulation” and those based on economic dependence since in what he defines as a clientelistic relationship, both the patron and the client must have agency. Similarly, Powell also clearly separates between relations based on kinship, and those based on clientelism by positing them as mutually exclusive substitutes, in that the latter develop in societies where kinship ties are not able to link people of unequal status (Powell 1970: 412-414). Many other definitions of clientelism, advanced by a host of scholars, do not separate so neatly between these ideas. Both Weber (1978) and Fatton (1990) acknowledge the existence of structures of coercion in patron-client relationships. Lukes (1974), Gaventa (1982) and Moe (2005) argue that in such relationships patrons often wield their disproportionately greater power to reduce the reciprocity inherent in clientelistic ties by manipulating benefits to flow only in their own direction. Bodemann (1988) believes that in agrarian societies a discussion of patron-client relations cannot be had without including class and the structures of inequality that emanate from relations of production. Similarly, other scholar insist that clientelism in South Asia cannot be adequately discussed without a consideration of caste and kinship-based social structures, in that these ties serve to strengthen clientelism by allowing local patrons another instrument through which to consolidate their power and influence over extensive client networks (Alavi 1972a, Jeffrey 2002).

Clientelism, economic dependence, class and kinship are all closely connected concepts in the literature on clientelism. Nevertheless, it is important for the purpose of this dissertation and the typology of relationships between local leaders and rural voters that I develop in Chapter 6 that clientelism be defined separately from these other relational concepts. In the context of a Punjabi village I define clientelism as an instrumental, short-term,\textsuperscript{52} political relationship in which clients are in face-to-face contact with a local patron of higher status, and with whom they strategically exchange their vote for access to certain benefits, which are usually private or club goods and services. Archer (1990) calls this “broker clientelism” and separates it from “traditional clientelism” in which the client is bound through non-political ties to a patron whose influence emanates from economic power.

\textsuperscript{52} These relationships may last over a long time but they need to be continually renewed.
However, the sense in which the literature on Pakistani politics talk of clientelism, discussed below, is closer to Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s (2007) definition in which it is “a particular mode of ‘exchange’ between electoral constituencies as principals and politicians as agents in democratic systems” (2007: 7), and which in the context of national institutions is a more symmetrical, intermittent relationship based on broker-mediated, rather than face-to-face, contact (2007: 4). The last point about brokers helps reconcile the two definitions, as does Powell’s emphasis on the role of the patron as the “gatekeeper” in local societies through whom voters in villages are connected to politicians and other state officials. These gatekeeper-patrons, Powell argues, are valued not so much for their wealth but, rather, for their connections with the state, so that a letter of recommendation handed to a client before a meeting with a state official is of more instrumental value in maintaining the relationship than the patron’s economic power. In fact, Powell points out that as villages become more integrated into the national system, the role of these “gatekeepers” becomes more, not less, important (1970: 414). Patrons develop relationships with bureaucrats and national-level politicians through which they help their clients negotiate a larger, more unfamiliar terrain. As change happens, clientelism meets Weber’s patrimonialism and the power of the patron remains stable. Political support during elections flows upwards from voters through patrons — with whom they have regular face-to-face contact — to politicians, and targeted benefits flow downwards from state actors through local patrons to voters.

3.3.2 Clientelism in Pakistani Politics

Various scholars have argued that the Pakistani political system is defined by weak political parties, personalistic politics and clientelism, and that these trends were particularly strengthened by the politics of the 1980s and 1990s. As mentioned earlier, Zia brought back local government elections in 1979 on a non-party basis, and after considerable measures had been taken to repress political party activity within districts. This meant that local candidates had only local networks based on biraderi-ism and clientelism to rely on in order to win their seats for the District Councils. Furthermore, since Zia had only this tier of electoral politics on which to rely for legitimacy he gave District Councils considerable power to raise and spend
money, turning them quickly into an attractive source of political patronage. The two rounds of local government elections held within such a framework in 1979-80 and 1983 introduced an era of fierce local electoral competition between individual local power holders within a decentralised structure of political clientelism in which political parties were missing (Cheema and Mohmand 2003). Politics, thus, came to revolve around personalities and not parties. A few years later when Zia decided to hold National and Provincial Assembly elections on a similar non-party basis, this local system of personality-based, clientelistic politics was transplanted to the national stage.

In the 1985 National and Provincial Assembly elections Zia not only banned political parties but also excluded many of their members from the electoral race. The absence of many politicians that had risen through the 1970s meant that the assemblies were captured by local government politicians from the District Councils, so that nearly half of all elected to the Punjab Assembly were sitting local councillors. This “helped transplant the culture of local body politics to the provincial and national levels” (Cheema and Mohmand 2003) and the 1985 assemblies emerged as politically fragmented patronage structures. In the words of one minister during the 1985 National Assembly’s first budget session, “We don’t have one party, or ten parties (…) we have two hundred parties. Each member of the assembly considers himself responsible only to himself” (Cheema and Mohmand 2003: 10). Consistent measures to weaken political parties through the Zia era meant that the tendency towards the localisation and personalisation of politics carried on even after the revival of party-based national elections in 1988.

After Zia’s regime ended with his death in 1988, Pakistan went through an 11-year period during which four national elections were held. Benazir Bhutto’s PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N came to power twice each, one after another, and ruled over short-lived, unstable governments. Despite the return to civilian rule this

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53 Most Muslim League factions withered away through the Zia years. After the 1985 election, however, a new configuration of the party came into being, headed by Zia’s protégé, Nawaz Sharif, who had risen to prominence as first the nominated Finance Minister of Punjab, and then after the 1985 election as the Chief Minister, of Punjab. When party-based elections were restored in 1988 after the death of Zia, Sharif’s party provided the main opposition to the PPP.

54 PPP won the 1988 and 1993 elections, while PML won the 1990 and 1997 elections. Each government was dismissed before it could complete its term by different Presidents on corruption charges, until in
period did little to strengthen the internal organisational structure of political parties. Jalal argues that Zia had encouraged the personalisation of politics, weakening of party organisations and the fluidity and mobility of local vote blocs to keep his rural landed allies happy, who wanted access to political power without the imposed discipline of an external party structure (1999: 322). After Zia this over-reliance of political parties on the individual power and networks of local influentials continued (Cheema et al 2006).

Many of these local influentials in the Punjab were, of course, the old rural landed elite that had been the target of Bhutto’s early years but who had joined the ranks of the PPP by the time of the 1977 election. These groups had stayed away from the PPP in the 1970 election, based largely on the fact that they had not expected their cultivated ties of dependence and kinship to be defeated so readily by a new political force in its first ever election. In fact, it seems that even Bhutto himself had not expected that his party would get more than 35-40 of the total 138 West Pakistan seats in the National Assembly (Jones 2003: 258). What he got instead were 81 seats, or almost 60 percent of the mandate in West Pakistan, and over 75 percent in Punjab. This victory led droves of the landed to the PPP, especially in Punjab, in what Jones terms the “if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em” culture of Punjabi politics (2003: 454).

However, Wilder points out that local power brokers were no longer able to rely on their economic wealth to get votes since their landholdings had been reduced by land reforms, sales and land fragmentation. Instead, they had to start catering to demands for private and club goods and services from their clients, who through elections had discovered that they possessed something of value to local influentials — their vote — and which could, thus, be exchanged for material benefits. Jones notes that:

“Though their traditional authority had been challenged, often successfully, in the 1970 elections, the notable and gentry groups soon proved their residual authority to be remarkably resilient. They still had the best access to the district and provincial bureaucracies, often through personal connections with relatives and school chums in the upper bureaucracy, and could play the game of ‘brokerage’ far more effectively…than PPP officeholders who had no social access to elite circles. They used these contacts to rebuild their influence, getting local petitioners jobs, transfers,
promotions, more canal water, agricultural loads, fertilizer, tubewell connections, etc.” (2003: 454).

Wilder’s research shows that the tendency to vote in response to targeted material inducements — popularly known as “thana katcheri kee siyasat” (literally, politics of access to the police and courts) — became stronger with each successive election through the 1990s. It was evident even in the run up to the 2008 election when a BBC article on feudalism quoted a local journalist as follows:

"What has changed now is that people tend to wait till the end to see who is most likely to win. Then they vote for that guy in droves... so that it ensures that they will have some access to the 'station and katchery (courts)’...What is seen as a basic right — access to justice — is used as a crude but very effective electioneering tool”.

Wilder, in fact, argues that factionalism in Punjab — often referred to as its most potent form of local political activity — is now trumped by a record of delivery. He quotes a politician to explain this; “All dharas [factions] disappear if I have given them the delivery of electricity or roads. All the dharas are there for local feuds but if I’ve done a lot of development everyone will vote for me” (1999: 197).

Interestingly, such clientelism revived political parties in Punjab and re-politicised voters. This, Wilder (1999) claims, was also true of rural areas where politics came to be focused more and more around political parties, rather than simply around powerful local personalities. The reason for this was simple — patrons could only provide services, such as electricity, roads or schools, and benefits, such as public jobs, if they made it into government. Therefore, patrons had to belong to or be linked with parties because “politicians only have access to patronage if they win an election, and in particular, if they end up in the winning party” (Wilder 1999: 193). This played out particularly strongly during the four elections of the 1990s when the fluidity of vote bases became evident. Based on the perception that each government was not dismissed simply to be brought back into power by the “establishment”, voters swung in large numbers between the PPP and the PML-N looking for services, in what came to be seen as an anti-incumbency bias especially in the Punjab.

56 In Pakistani popular perception, it is the “establishment” that really runs politics, a word that is used to refer largely to the army and the intelligence agencies, backed by the US.
This political clientelism, while it heralds the breaking down of old ties of dependence and kinship and the re-emergence of political parties, also means that the politics of ideology or policy has little relevance in rural politics. Voters evaluate each political party at an election by how much its individual candidates were able to deliver in their particular area, rather than on the policies that the party was able to formulate, pass and implement while in power. Therefore, a government’s foreign policy, such as its relations with India or the US, or the extent of a government’s bent towards religion, and other such national issues count for little if it is able to deliver targeted services. The one exception to this may be a policy that is able to lower the prices of basic goods. Other than that, elections are now mainly won through a record of local, targeted delivery. Wilder observes that the fact that even the Chief Minister of Punjab’s office functions as a personal darbar (royal court), in which his Political Secretary personally listens to individual requests and hands out the all-important “chit” (recommendation) or makes calls to various government departments on behalf of supplicants, shows a recognition even on the part of the highest office in the province that its legitimacy is based on how much it can deliver to each voter and not on the quality of its policy-making (1999: 199). However, he also quotes another politician to indicate that the explanatory value of clientelism as a determinant of voting behaviour may be exaggerated.

“Every MNA [Member of the National Assembly] has a constituency of approximately half a million [voters]. There is a limit to the number of jobs an MNA can create, how many postings and transfers he can arrange, how many villages he can electrify and develop, etc.” (1999: 209).

This analysis of national-level political clientelism is instructive but it leaves an important question unanswered — have individual rural Punjabi voters really broken out of their ties of dependence and kinship to the extent that they can strategically evaluate candidates and their delivery record and negotiate benefits before they cast their vote? How does their contact with a patron of higher status with whom they have regular face-to-face interaction affect their ability to carry out such strategic evaluations? For answers to that we will have to move this analysis to the level of a village, return to Powell’s definition of clientelism and see to what extent the particularistic linkage between patrons and clients at the micro level affect how rural citizens vote.
3.4. Politics Today — A Mixed Bag

What emerged in Punjab through the 1990s was essentially a two-party system in which all electoral competition was centred around the PPP and the PML-N, with various smaller parties aligned to one or the other (Table 3.5). When General Pervez Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif in a dramatic coup in October 1999 to take over as Pakistan’s third military ruler, he created another party out of a splinter group of the PML-N, called the Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid (PML-Q).

The 2002 election was fought mainly between these three parties in Punjab, and though the PPP won the election, PML-Q formed the government. This was accomplished through various political manipulations, but mainly by convincing a group of PPP parliamentarians to break away and join the PML-Q, post election, in order to reduce the PPP’s majority in the National Assembly. The most dramatic defection within this group was that of a PPP politician who had run on an anti-army platform in Okara, a largely rural constituency that was witnessing tenants’ uprisings against landlessness and forced evictions from army-owned agricultural land. After winning the election on a PPP ticket and a promise to help the tenants fight for their rights of occupancy and ownership, the politician not only split from the PPP to join Musharraf’s military regime, but also went on to become the new Defence Minister in his cabinet.

Table 3.5. Number of seats won by the main political parties (1970-2002)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPP and PPP-led alliances</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML and PML-led alliances</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>PML-Q</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>118</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>All others combined</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td></td>
<td>140</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>342</td>
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*Source: Election Commission of Pakistan*

The weakness of political parties was obvious and apparent through Musharraf’s regime. PML-Q used its term to provide Musharraf with legitimacy by providing a

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57 Musharraf deposed Prime Minister Sharif while still on a flight back home from Sri Lanka, even as Sharif attempted to fire Musharraf (from his post as the chief of the army) before his flight could touchdown at Karachi airport. Musharraf won the day and landed at the airport, with the last of the fuel remaining in the plane’s tank, as the new ruler of the country.
parliamentary cover to his military rule. Like Zia, Musharraf attempted to neutralise political opposition by considerably weakening the PPP and the PML-N, both of whose leaders — Bhutto and Sharif — spent the entire Musharraf era in exile outside Pakistan. And like Zia, Musharraf introduced local government elections, which were, yet again, held on a non-party basis in 2001 and 2005. These elections again strengthened the old local power blocks and networks. Keefer et al (2003: 14) estimate that up to 70 percent of seats at the local level were won by the “rural gentry”. Bari and Khan (2001) point out that a majority of elected nazims (district mayors) owned land in access of 25 acres and that there was a positive correlation between the size of land ownership and the probability of success in elections for the district nazim (2001: 59). While government reports of the time claimed that the elections had managed to clean out Pakistani politics by removing old politicians and replacing them with “young blood”, Manning et al found that, “30 percent of district nazims in Punjab were former MNAs or MPAs, and approximately 90 percent belonged to established political families” (2003: 27).

Through Musharraf’s time state patronage flowed down to constituencies either through the PML-Q or through the elected tier of local governments that were associated with the Presidency itself. Musharraf strengthened this association by coming in strongly on the side of local government officials in conflicts between the various tiers of government. Supported by a strong military dictator, the PML-Q was the first party since the PPP in the 1970s to finish a full term. However, the fact that the new party had no identifiable ideology or manifesto, that it did not campaign on any specific policy issues and that its members had for years built their constituencies through clientelistic ties, its tenure was marked only by a strengthening of political clientelism and not the party itself. After Musharraf’s power started to wane in the wake of a popular movement against him in 2007, the PML-Q could not hold its own in the 2008 election. In fact, the adage that had been used for the PPP in the 1970s — that even a lamp-post would have won had it had a PPP ticket — was used again to describe how any candidate associated with the PML-Q and Musharraf would have lost the 2008 election.

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58 This included various measures, such as the selective disqualification of politicians based on new educational criteria, the registration of new corruption cases, arrests and incarcerations on various charges, and offering PML-Q membership as a way to avoid any of the above.
Pakistan’s two main parties, the PPP and the PML-N, made a comeback in this election, sharing the vote largely between them. The 2008 election brought the PPP back to power at the centre — 6 weeks after the assassination of its leader, Benazir Bhutto — and the PML-N in Punjab. An exit poll revealed that the PPP has retained its vote bank amongst lower income and very poor groups, and that it also got a majority of rural, illiterate and female votes. The PML-N, on the other hand, appears to have established a fairly stable urban, educated, middle and upper class, male constituency (Gallup Pakistan 2008). Though the labels of feudalism, biraderi-ism and clientelism were all thrown about by the media in its coverage of the election, the fact that the two main parties overcame extensive political manipulations to contest the elections under a sitting military President — General Musharraf, who was not only opposed to both of the parties, but more importantly, whose loyal cadre of local government officials were organising the polls in each district — brought to the fore analysis about a resurgence of party-based identity and voting. The 2008 election is believed to have been won by a mix of an anti-Musharraf vote, party identification and a strong belief that because of Bhutto’s recent assassination PPP was the winning horse, thus driving droves of votes in its direction. Gilani’s (2008) analysis of elections in Pakistan has led him to conclude that various factors now matter in determining which party will win, and that, especially in Punjab, the difference is often based on a very small swing vote.

**Conclusion**

The literature on politics in Pakistan, therefore, leaves us with confusing conclusions. The media insists there was a “feudal shadow” hanging over the 2008 election. Waseem (2006) argues that rural voters were predominantly voting along caste and biraderi lines in the 2002 (and possibly by extension the 2008) elections. Many scholars believe that Pakistan’s politics have mainly been clientelistic since the 1990s, while analyses of exit polls such as Gilani’s (2008) suggest that party identification may be on the rise again as a determinant of voting behaviour. In this chapter I looked at each of these in turn and realised that the reason these varying explanations are unable to give us a clear understanding of why rural citizens vote as they do is because they use micro concepts that define relationships between individual actors to explain macro political phenomena.
I argue that feudalism, biraderi-ism and clientelism are far more useful as analytical tools when used at a more micro level, where the relationships inherent in each concept can be more easily and clearly observed — between landlords and their dependents, between networks of kin, and between local patrons and their clients with whom they have face-to-face contact. Furthermore, how each of these relationships affect politics is also more easily understood at this more micro-level of analysis. No study of Pakistani politics to date has attempted to observe and analyse in a systematic manner whether the pressures that work on individual voters live up to the generalised ideas about landed power, kinship, party support and clientelism in the literature. Wilder (1999) signalled a need for a more micro-level examination by admitting that the aggregated polling station level data that he used may well have blurred the real picture. As Bodemann also pointed out, the study of clientelism has concerned itself with “the superstructural emanations of clientage” and that “the time has come to start from the microlevel – at the bottom” (1988: 204). This microlevel — the village — is where I head to next in Part II.

In the next part of this dissertation — Chapters 4 and 5 — I take a step down from analysing national politics to look at political organisation within villages to see how relations of dependence, kinship, clientelism or some other fourth configuration affect and influence people’s votes. Running through the analysis of this chapter was a thread that focused on the ability of landed groups to adapt to changing circumstances and how, despite the interlude of the 1970s when the principles of political organisation were redefined, the rural, landed elite were able to remain central to national and local politics. In the next chapter I examine this adaptive ability of a family of landlords in one village to see exactly how they were able to manipulate their economic and social wealth to remain politically relevant despite the various changes that were occurring at the national level.

In the final part of this dissertation — Chapters 6 and 7 — I recast the three concepts that I explored in this chapter as measures of household level behaviour, and propose a typology of rural Punjabi voters that is based on these. In doing this I draw hypotheses from the analysis of the current chapter. Given what we now know from the analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3, I hypothesise that few voters in rural Punjab are now in relations of complete economic dependence with their local
landlords, and that both kinship and clientelism are more important determinants of the voting behaviour of rural Punjabi voters. I also hypothesise that despite the recent optimism that party-based identification and voting may be returning to Pakistani electoral politics, the chances that I will actually find this in rural Punjab are slim.
PART II
The Village
FOUR

FROM DOMINATION TO INTERMEDIATION: THE LANDED ELITE OF SAHIWAL

Introduction

The analysis in Chapter 3 allows us to understand the evolution of national politics in Pakistan. However, at the end of the chapter I pointed out that such a macro level of analysis does not allow us to understand the relationship that exists between voters and those that are able to influence voting decisions — landlords, clan leaders, political patrons — within villages in Punjab. Essentially, we have little understanding of how these macro-level determinants — “feudalism”, biraderi-ism, clientelism — convert into micro-level pressures on individual voters. In this chapter I narrow my prism considerably to look at what was happening in one village in central Punjab while all the changes discussed in the previous chapters were playing out on the national stage. This chapter is, therefore, the tale of the transition of a village, Sahiwal, from “feudalism” to a socio-economic and political structure defined by class, and eventually to clientelism with a biraderi-based social structure. By focusing on this one village and its journey from colonial times to 2008 we are able to witness the transforming relationship between voters and village-level leaders as a consequence of national-level political and economic changes.

The village of Sahiwal lies in Sargodha District, about 6 kilometres from the market town of Shahpur Saddar, which is also the tehsil headquarter. Sahiwal was given by the colonial government in 1860 as a zamindari grant of 4572 acres to Sarfaraz Khan, who was from an ethnically Pukhtoon chiefly family of another district, for services rendered to the British colonial government against the Sikhs (Rouse

59 This chapter is dedicated to the memory of SKN — the ‘Naib’ of this story — whose interest in and commitment to scholarship meant that even after two extensive previous studies, and sometimes severe accounts of him in those, he welcomed us to his beloved Sahiwal with warmth and graciousness, and with an acceptance of the fact that we scholars were never really there to say good things about landlords. He had little concern for what we had to say about him and his role in the village, and a much greater concern that his village be studied and analysed, and that Sahiwal be used to inform and update scholarship on Pakistan.
1988), or in suppressing the rebellion of 1857 (Ahmad 1974). The family eventually paid a nominal price for the grant and received full ownership rights vested in one man, and through him, in his family and descendents. Sarfaraz Khan was considered an *abadkar*, and as such was allowed revenue concessions in order to encourage him to settle and cultivate the land as quickly as possible. He did this by attracting tenants from agricultural castes from the surrounding areas. Each tenant moved to the village with their own *seip-kammis*, or artisans, who specialised in various services, such as blacksmiths, barbers, carpenters and water carriers. Each tenant was given the freedom to occupy as much land as they could clear, prepare and till with their oxen and tools. By 1867 the work was complete and Sahiwal “began as an acknowledged village with a full set of functionaries and a contractual relationship established between the landlord, farmers and artisans” (Ahmad 1974: 138). Sahiwal was managed by the family as one unit until 1920, when a feud between two grandsons of the original grantee allegedly led one to instigate the murder of the other. Since the son of the deceased was not yet old enough to inherit and manage the land, part of the estate passed to the state under the Court of Wards system until 1933, when it was returned to the son of the murdered heir. This split the village into two separate *pattis*<sup>60</sup>, and converted the *zamindari* tenure to a *pattidari*<sup>61</sup> tenure.<sup>62</sup> Since then the village has been divided into two, with each *patti* headed by a single *zamindar maalik* who plays an important role in the economic, social and political life of the village. Each of these *maaliks* also plays a central role in the tale of Sahiwal’s transformation presented in this chapter.

Together with my research team I chose Sahiwal as a case study for one simple reason — the fact that it had been studied in detail by Saghir Ahmad in 1964-65 as the case study for his doctoral dissertation (Ahmad 1977), and then again in 1978-80 by Shahnaz Rouse for the same purpose (Rouse 1988). Sahiwal, a pseudonym originally coined by Ahmad and then used by Rouse, therefore presented the perfect

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<sup>60</sup> Shares.

<sup>61</sup> Ahmad argues that this was a *bhaichara* tenure, which is similar to *pattidari* except for the fact that in *pattidari*, the size of the *patti* determines the revenue payable, while in the *bhaichara* system, the, “revenue payable regulates the share” (1977: 43). He, however, points out that most villagers did not recognise this technicality. Indeed, in our fieldwork the largest landlord — the owner of one of the *pattis* — identified it as a *pattidari* village.

<sup>62</sup> This *pattidari* tenure is different from the lineage-*pattidari* category I use in Chapter 7 to classify villages. In Sahiwal the term refers to the separate control of land by two branches of the same family. In my later classification, village land is split between entirely different kinship groups, or *biraderis*. 
case study for precisely the sort of longitudinal analysis I undertake in this chapter. Ahmad and Rouse had used almost identical methods to study Sahiwal. Both had employed a mix of qualitative, anthropological work, archival research, a village census and structured household surveys\textsuperscript{63} that collected data on relations of production, social structure and political behaviour. Rouse also used the village and farm accounts maintained by one landlord. Returning to the village in 2007, we too used a mix of many methods, combining qualitative methods — such as limited ethnographic participant observations and key respondent interviews — with extensive quantitative data collection through a full village census, a household survey of almost 35 percent of the village (201 households), with social network analysis methodologies aimed at uncovering village-level alignments. Together, these three studies are able to present a unique, longitudinal, micro-level view of the impact of structural changes — such as land reforms and agrarian modernisation — and national political changes — represented by alternating periods of authoritarianism and democratisation — on the residents of a village, and on their political and socio-economic relationships with one another captured at three points in time over more than four decades.

4.1. Sahiwal in the 1960s: Domination\textsuperscript{64}

Saghir Ahmad came to Sahiwal in 1964 to study the impact of two specific events that had occurred under Ayub Khan’s military regime about five years ago. One of these was the land reform law passed in 1959 that had imposed ceilings on the holdings of large landlords, and had distributed the land resumed from landlords to landless tenants. The other was the introduction of the Basic Democracy system in the same year, under which local government elections were held for the first time in Pakistan. Each village, if between 700-1000 residents over the age of 21, chose a Basic Democrat to be part of a Union Council.\textsuperscript{65} Together, these reforms had promised to redistribute both power and resources across a greater number of people, and to empower poorer groups and include them in the governance of the

\textsuperscript{63} Rouse surveyed a random stratified sample of 280 households.
\textsuperscript{64} This section is based entirely on Ahmad (1974) and Ahmad (1977).
\textsuperscript{65} The heads of the Union Council were represented on the Tehsil Council, the heads of which sat on the District Council. Together, the 80,000 Basic Democrats composed the electoral college for the Presidential elections. This was Ayub’s pattern of “controlled democracy”.
country. Many analyses of the 1959-60 elections suggested that “power had reached the masses” (Ahmad 1977: 92). Ahmad chose Sahiwal to evaluate, at the most micro level of analysis, the diffusion of power and wealth that had come about because of these two reforms.

4.1.1. Physical Layout and Structure

Ahmad described Sahiwal in 1964 as a village of 1590 residents divided across 274 households, 90 percent of which were descendants of the original tenants and artisans that moved here a century ago with Sarfaraz Khan. Its only link with the external world was provided by a *tanga* 

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ride across fields or a dirt road to the nearby town of Shahpur. The village, he says, was:

> “divided into two unequal halves by a main unpaved street. The eastern half contains most of the houses, while the western half consists of a compound containing a few houses...Inside this compound are the landlords’ warehouses for storing wheat and cotton, stables for their horses, residential quarters for one of the two landlords, and a two-storey building which serves as a meeting place for villagers and as a guest house for visitors” (1974: 136).

In the rest of the village, all the houses were made of mud. Only three others were *pukka*, or brick, houses, which belonged to a family of goldsmiths. The village had two mosques — one for each faction — “a primary school, and a number of small general shops kept in the shopkeepers’ residences” (1974: 137). Most artisans used their residences as their area of work, while tenant farmers lived in the village but also built mud huts on their lands, called *deras*, where they kept their animals, their implements and where they sometimes also slept at night to keep an eye on things.

When Ahmad arrived in Sahiwal it was owned and headed in its entirety, some 4572 acres in all, by two of Sarfaraz Khan’s descendants, Haji sahib and Khan sahib, 

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both of whom were absentee landlords who controlled their village and their lands through *munshis*, or managers, and who cultivated their lands through sharecropping arrangements with resident tenant farmers. For strategic reasons, these managers were not from Sahiwal itself, and were brought in, instead, from

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66 Horse-drawn carriage.

67 Khan sahib was the grandson of Sarfaraz Khan, and Haji sahib was his great-grandson, and the son of the murdered heir. Khan sahib’s brother was the one who allegedly instigated the murder of Haji sahib’s father. Both of these — Haji sahib and Khan sahib — are pseudonyms coined by Ahmad and used by Rouse.
Sarfaraz Khan’s ancestral village in Mianwali district. Both Haji sahib and Khan sahib were also the village lambardars, and were, thus, responsible for revenue collection from the village on behalf of the state, a remnant of colonial administrative practice. However, in Sahiwal these two were the only landowners (along with a few other members of their families whose shares they controlled) and, therefore, the only ones responsible for paying revenue. Much of this revenue was financed from tenancy proceeds.

4.1.2. Economic Structure and Relations

The entire village, its land and its people were divided into two equal halves. Each of the two landlords controlled 2100 acres, despite the land reforms of 1959. The entire village economy was based on land, in that 95 percent of the village residents made their living off it. The continuing animosity between the two landlords — based in large measure on the murder of Haji sahib’s father at the behest of Khan sahib’s brother — and their complete control over the main economic resource of the village meant that all tenants, artisans and village servants worked for, and were aligned with, one or the other landlord, and not both.

Within the typical social structure of a Punjabi village, zamindar quoms tend to dominate the social hierarchy because of their control over land. In Sahiwal, this dominance lay with the Pukhtoon landlords, who were not part of the traditional Punjabi biraderi system. The rest of the village was made up of three quoms. At the top of the hierarchy were the agricultural castes, or the zamindars, all of whom were involved in agriculture, mostly as tenants. After them came the kamnis, who were the village artisans and supported the farmers in their work by making their implements (the lohar), repairing their ploughs (the tirkhan), winnowing the wheat (the mehnti musalli), and making their shoes (the mochi). At the bottom of the hierarchy were the musallis, who were the village sweepers and domestic and

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68 Since there were two separate pattis, there were two separate lambardars.

69 These are names of biraderis, but quite literally indicate the profession of the group. This was much truer in Ahmad’s time than it is now, when the sons and grandsons of these artisans have diversified into other professions. Lohar literally means blacksmith, tirkhan means carpenter, mehnti musalli means hardworking servant, and mochi means cobbler. Many other such kamni biraderis existed in the village that would render particular services to either the whole village or to specific households.
farm labourers. The tenants were all non-occupancy sharecroppers, and divided the produce 50-50 with the landlords. According to the law “occupancy tenants become owners of the tenanted land if they occupy it for twelve or more years, while non-occupancy tenants never acquire such a right. A non-occupancy tenant cultivates a piece of land at his landlord’s pleasure” (Ahmad 1977: 58). The artisans and musallis worked for seip, which meant that they received a portion of the harvest in kind for services that they had rendered to the landlord and the zamindars through the year. Their transactions with one another were also settled through an exchange of services, so that the mochi made shoes for the nai and his family, in exchange for getting haircuts for himself and his family.

When Ahmad arrived this economic structure was entirely unaffected by modernisation, or the mechanisation of agriculture. Ploughing and threshing was done by oxen, and harvesting and winnowing by hand-labour, while all fertilizer was animal manure. The main crops were “wheat, cotton, sugarcane and fodder, with minor cultivation of vegetables, pulses and tobacco” (Ahmad 1974: 143). The only changes that had affected Sahiwal’s traditional pattern of agriculture were that more cash crops were being grown on the insistence of landlords, which also meant that landlords were now making more decisions, and that agriculture was getting more commercialised, in that produce, especially that of cotton and sugarcane, was no longer distributed according to traditional divisions within the village but was being sold, instead, to new mills in the area through agents that visited the village. Interestingly, Ahmad found that it was landlords that were selling to mills, while tenants, despite the option of getting a good price, were still exchanging cotton and sugarcane with shopkeepers and kammis, in the first case to establish credit to procure other items of need, and in the second case, to support the traditional sources of livelihood for these groups (1974: 149-50). Ahmad also noted that both landlords had just recently established their own farms on a small portion of their lands — 200 acres in the case of Haji sahib, and 75 acres in the case of Khan sahib (1977: 57).
4.1.3. Sources of Dependence

Access to land, therefore, defined all relations of production, and all livelihoods within the village. The fact that all of this vital resource was owned and controlled by two men placed an incredible amount of power and authority in their hands. This authority was conceptualised in terms of the landlords’ ownership not only of the land, but also of the village, and with it, of its people. Ahmad was told by residents that the landlords “are the maliks [owners/lords] and we are reiaya (subject) or ghulam (slave)” (1977: 116).

Dependence also flowed from two other sources. The initial land grant had included not just agricultural land but also the land on which the village was eventually built. This meant that all tenants, artisans and servants had built their houses on land owned by the landlords, which in turn meant that if they were to be evicted from the house, it would also effectively translate into expulsion from the village and its community. This was an extremely serious threat, and according to Ahmad’s account, apparently always hung over people’s heads. Through the ownership of village land the landlords were able to control the lives of not just those who worked directly for them, but even those who worked outside the village, because “the final authority as to who should live and who should not live in the village rests with the landlords” (Ahmad 1974: 141). People from kammi and musalli quoms in particular had to offer free labour, or begaar, to the landlord for the right to live on his land, long after it was officially abolished under Ayub Khan in 1952. Besides this, when Sarfaraz Khan had first started to settle the land of Sahiwal, he had built a private canal that brought irrigation water into the village. It was not until 1956 that the state opened an all-season canal managed by the Irrigation department. Prior to this date, all tenants had been dependent on the landlords’ jointly owned private canal for their irrigation needs, and on rains and wells. Tenants were expected to pay a fee for its use, and all villagers were expected to contribute free labour to maintain it. Anyone who displeased the landlords might quickly lose access to irrigation water.

To a much lesser extent dependence also flowed from the village residents’ need for an influential mediator in their dealings with the state. Villagers did not often have
to approach state officials, but when they did, it helped to have a “powerful and benevolent landlord, functioning as lambardar and having influence in high places” to secure benefits for his village. Ahmad termed this relationship “client dependency”, indicating that while the landlord provided some patron-like services to his clients, in this case an “approach”\(^{70}\) to the state, the relationship was built primarily around dependence (1974: 142).

4.1.4. Pattern of Politics

Ahmad, thus, walked into a village where the control of landlords was fairly complete. He commented that “by controlling the land on which the people live and from which they draw their subsistence, the landlords have some control over every villager. They set the tempo of village life and standards of right and wrong” (1972: 67). This was reflected in the electoral politics of Sahiwal. Every household in the village, whether zamindar, kammi or musalli, counted itself as part of the electoral faction of one or the other landlord, based largely on whose land they tilled, or from whom they drew their seip. Factionalism ran so strong that “many members of a lineage group working for one landlord may not even speak to members of their same lineage group working for the other landlord, much less participate with them in social events” (Ahmad 1974: 153). Ahmad recalls being told that this even included brothers, cousins, or uncles if these belonged to the opposing patti (1977: 103). In fact, the members of each faction even prayed apart in two separate mosques, in which the maulvis\(^{71}\) “broadcast propaganda for their respective masters every friday before prayer time” (Rouse 1988: 837). This played out particularly strongly during the local government elections held under the Basic Democracies system of Ayub Khan in 1959-60 and then again in 1964.

Ahmad points out that Sahiwal had many “‘good, wise, and concerned persons’ who could have qualified well as basic democrats”, especially given that these local government elections were for too low a tier of government for the landlords to have been interested in contesting them (1974: 165). However, instead of allowing

\(^{70}\) Ahmad points out that, amusingly enough, this word has passed into the local Panjabi dialect. More than four decades later, during my own fieldwork in rural Sargodha it was still the most common word used in villages to indicate having a good relationship with an important contact in the state.

\(^{71}\) Caretaker of a mosque.
and supporting one of these residents, the landlords put up their managers as candidates. Neither of these managers were from Sahiwal, and their main role in the village was to protect the interests of the landlords and to maintain control over it in their absence. They had never been accepted as part of the village community by the other residents. Nevertheless, no one opposed their candidacy, and everyone came out to vote for them because it was obvious to all that votes were being cast not for the candidates but for each landlord. Ahmad found that Khan sahib’s candidate was reputed to be “‘religious’, ‘simple’ and ‘honest’; [and Haji sahib’s candidate] ‘a drinker of wine, a womanizer, corrupt’ but ‘helpful’” (1977: 99). The latter won. Though Sahiwal now had a representative on the Union Council, the intense factionalism that existed within it meant that the winning candidate was able to represent only half the village, and worked strictly for Haji sahib’s faction through his entire tenure.

The elections were contested in exactly the same way in 1964, and Haji sahib’s manager and candidate won again. However, this time Khan sahib had used his influence to have a seat added to Sahiwal, so that two basic democrats were now to be elected. This worked as he had hoped, and of the two “minor employees” put up by both sides from a neighbouring hamlet, Khan sahib’s candidate won. Ahmad was curious about the fact that Haji sahib’s manager had won both times, given that the village was split extremely equally between the two factions. He found that about 350 of the 823 votes were not tied to either faction, in that they “belonged to the kammis who served either the whole village or an equal proportion of tenants on both sides, and the “independents” — including shopkeepers, goldsmiths, and other outside employees” (1977: 100). While all of these claimed to have split their votes between the two factions equally, Ahmad found that much of the decision-making had been based on pressures, sanctions and promises (mostly of jobs and extra land) from both sides. Further investigation led him to find that what had finally led to a victory for Haji sahib’s faction were votes cast by two families of the kammi quom of barbers, who were “educated and upwardly mobile”, and who had based their vote entirely on the reputation and prestige of Haji sahib, as opposed to that of his candidate. Where prestige was involved, Khan sahib lost repeatedly, despite the fact that he had a little more “land and more men under his control” (Ahmad 1977: 101).
4.1.5. Power and Monopolistic Control in Sahiwal

Based on such instances, Ahmad noted that the villagers were not entirely powerless. As long as they were able to break ties of land-based dependence, people like the barbers and the goldsmiths could make independent decisions. In fact, even those that were still dependent used factionalism to their advantage to gain some measure of power. Ahmad pointed out that they constantly attempted to:

“Create competition, or to keep old factionalism alive between their lords, for the peasants benefit from such rivalry and disputes. I was amazed and amused at the villagers' constant attempts to create dissension between the landlords, between the landlords and managers, and between managers” (1972: 67).

Nevertheless, he noted that in the final analysis:

“The outcome of the election was primarily the result of existing economic alliances with the landlords, secondarily due to promises and hopes of benefits in the future, and thirdly due to the prestige of the candidates’ sponsors. These factors were strong enough…to override the ties of friendship, kinship and caste” (1977: 102).

Ahmad showed that the landlords of Sahiwal had high levels of authority and power in the 1960s. He quoted the example of a member of the goldsmith family — one of the richer, politically more independent households in the village — who had the son of one of Khan sahib’s tenants prosecuted in the courts for a robbery. Although the courts had sentenced the young man and his accomplices, the goldsmiths withdrew the case and settled for an out-of-court compromise when Khan sahib asked them to. The goldsmith explained that he settled the case in this manner only because “we cannot afford to refuse Khan sahib. If we do, we know we will lose our house, our shop, and the business. We cannot do that, so we have to go along with his suggestion”. Ahmad described this not as “voluntary obedience” but as the “fear of ‘negative sanction’” (Ahmad 1977: 104-5). It was this fear of sanction that trumped all other ties of kinship, class, friendship and reciprocal clientelism in Sahiwal in the 1960s. Commenting on this period, Rouse noted that, “extra-economic means of coercion abounded during this period. The system of social and production relations that existed in Sahiwal during this time closely resembled that of feudal relations” (1988: 834).

Within such a structure, when Ayub’s land reforms were implemented in 1959, the landlords simply by-passed them by using their contacts in the state and their power to apply sanctions within the village. They redistributed land to various relatives and descendants, and converted some land from tenant farms to farming of cash
crops with wage labour, thus impoverishing sections of the tenants and artisans. About 600 acres were indeed redistributed,\(^2\) though in much smaller packets than the stipulated 12.5 acres. Those peasants that made a bid to acquire more as per the law, soon found that they had lost all rights to cultivate land that they had previously farmed over generations, that they had difficulty accessing irrigation water, and that they were continually threatened with evictions from their homes. In answer to his original questions, therefore, Ahmad found that the power of the landlords and their contacts with the state had effectively translated into their immunity against any attempts at the diffusion of power. Neither the land reforms, nor the local government elections had had a significant impact. Therefore, despite threats to their complete domination of Sahiwal, Ahmad found that at the close of his study the two *maaliks* were still firmly in control of the entire village, all of its land and each one of its dependent residents, barring a handful.

### 4.2. Sahiwal in the 1980s: Transformation\(^3\)

By the time Shahnaz Rouse arrived in Sahiwal to start her study in 1979, the Green Revolution had transformed agriculture in rural Punjab, the 1970 election had introduced a completely new dynamic, the 1972 land reforms had been instituted, Bhutto’s regime had served its full term and Pakistan had returned to military rule under General Zia-ul-Haq. Pakistan, and with it Sahiwal, had undergone extensive changes, and it was the transformation brought about by these changes, especially in village relations, that Rouse wanted to analyse through the study of one village, Sahiwal. In doing this, she concentrated in particular on one landlord, Haji sahib, and his progressive and liberal eldest son, Naib,\(^4\) to see “what liberal politics and rhetoric combined with conservative and punitive measures translate into in terms of rural political action” (1988:41).

\(^{72}\) Figure is based on my interview with Haji sahib’s son in 2007.

\(^{73}\) This section is based entirely on Rouse (1983) and Rouse (1988).

\(^{74}\) A pseudonym coined by Rouse.
4.2.1. Changes in Physical Layout and Structure

In the 15 years between Ahmad and Rouse’s study, Sahiwal had almost doubled its population and was now a village of 439 households. Its connectivity with Shahpur town had improved because of a paved road and people had stopped referring to it as *pardes* (a foreign land). They now travelled to town easily and regularly, to buy goods at its small bazaar, to access the hospital, or to work in its factories. The village and its layout had not changed much but it now had two new residential colonies that were set slightly apart from the rest of the village. The first of these, known as *Lokari*, was created close to the village on a piece of Haji sahib’s agricultural property, on which he settled landless labourers. The other, that Rouse reports only in passing, was created during Bhutto’s regime as a colony of small house plots near the school, and therefore called School Colony, in which ownership rights were given to poor households within the village. Besides this, “some non-owners, poor peasants, *kammis* and landless labourers received titles to their homes” during the Bhutto government, but this did not apply to those already resident in *Lokari* “because their settlement was claimed as landlord’s private agricultural land and not as village common-land” (Rouse 1983: 323). Rouse notes that only in these two colonies was residence *quom* specific — since land in both *Lokari* and School Colony was distributed only among *kammi* and *musalli* groups — while the rest of the village had a mixed residential pattern. Sahiwal’s two mosques had now multiplied into five. One was built in each of the two new colonies, and the increasingly influential Shia *syed biraderi* of the village had built one of their own. Except for this last one that was used exclusively by Shias, Rouse notes that the use of the mosques was no longer faction specific, but were, rather, used by whoever lived closest to them. Sahiwal now also had a middle school for boys and a primary school for girls.

Haji sahib’s landholdings had reduced as a result of the land reforms of 1972 and the sale of outlying lands to “support his feudal style of life, characterised by a love of pomp and a show of generosity” (1983: 313). Rouse recorded his total landholdings to be 1077 acres (compared to the 2100 he owned in 1964), of which 800 were under mechanised self-cultivation now and only 277 acres were leased out to 31 tenants. Khan sahib now owned about 825 acres himself and had passed on
about 550 acres to his three sons. Of the total, 1117 were under mechanised self-cultivation, and 258 were leased out to tenants. While Khan sahib remained in Shahpur town, Haji sahib was no longer an absentee landlord. He had moved to the village with Naib and both now personally oversaw their large farm. This also meant that the discretionary power of their managers had now been reduced, though the manager remained an important intermediary between the village and its *maaliks*. Like other landlord families in the province, Haji sahib had responded to his reduced holdings by insisting his sons diversify away from the life of a landlord. While Naib had full responsibility for the family’s lands, the second son was sent to the army while the youngest joined the private sector, and was a banker outside Pakistan by the time we started our study in 2007.

Some of the land sales had been made to tenants from *zamindar biraderis* in the village, who had managed to accumulate enough money through other sources of income to have purchased land. A family of goldsmiths, who were of the *kammi quom* but had accumulated much wealth through their traditional occupation, now controlled about 160 acres between four households, all of which was let out to tenants. Three other ex-tenant households now owned 50, 13 and 6 acres each. However, these landholdings were insufficient to meet the subsistence needs of these families, and so they remained involved in their non-agricultural occupations.

### 4.2.2. Changes in Agrarian Relations of Production

Ahmad studied Sahiwal at the beginning of an agrarian transformation based on the land reforms of 1959 and the commercialisation of agriculture. Right after the completion of his study, the Green Revolution took off in Punjab. He heard of it at a distance as it was beginning, and commented,

> “In Sahiwal, at the time of this study (1965), not many ex-tenants belonged to this class [the peasant proletariat]. Instead, this class was dominated by the artisans. It was recently reported to me, however, that more land had been put into so-called "self-cultivating farms", which could have been achieved only by evicting the tenants or decreasing their holdings, hence forcing them to work at least partly as laborers (1972: 69).”

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75 Ahmad passed away in a tragic accident in 1971. All of his work quoted here was published posthumously.
By the time Rouse arrived in Sahiwal, “mechanisation, or what the census refers to as ‘self-cultivation’, [was] the basis of the system of agricultural production in Sahiwal” (1983: 318-9). Ayub Khan’s push for growth in the 1960s had led to the modernization of agriculture and to a dramatic increase in production during the Green Revolution. The increased productivity convinced both the maalik families in Sahiwal not only to rationalise agricultural practices but actually to bring large tracts of land together under mechanised self-cultivation. Many argued that this period marked “a break from ‘feudal’ to ‘capitalist’ relations of production” (Rouse 1988: 38). The two years that Rouse spent studying these changes in Sahiwal led her to conclude that the transformation had led to greater inequality and the impoverishment of tenants, artisans and landless labour.

What happened in Sahiwal was not unusual. Migdal explained the processes of agricultural change in the 1960s and their particular impact on small farmers and tenants by pointing out that as mechanisation became the norm, large landowners sought to consolidate their holdings by either evicting tenants, or by raising rents so that tenants, already “hovering near subsistence” were pushed out of the tenancy market (1974: 161). This, Migdal points out, meant that the most mechanised villages were also often the most unequal because market and technology were both pushing towards a concentration of land in fewer hands (1974: 158). Smaller farmers that were less able to adopt or compete with innovative techniques during the period of the Green Revolution were displaced in large numbers, to the extent that in Pakistan “those with less than 10 acres and those with 10 to 25 acres lost 12.2 percent and 6.9 percent of their land respectively from 1959 to 1969, while the holders with 50 to 100 acres gained 19.2 percent” (Migdal 1974: 164).

Rouse saw exactly these changes play out in Sahiwal. Mechanisation had led Naib to move to the village from Lahore and to convert almost all his land into a capitalist farm. This, in turn, had led to a transformation in “traditional forms of production relations” and had necessitated the eviction of tenants from plots of land that they had cultivated over generations. Given the figures in the previous section for self-cultivation, tenants now farmed only about 700 acres in all, compared to the more than 4000 acres they had cultivated 15 years earlier. Many of the tenants were forcibly evicted, starting in 1966. The first eviction “was also the first instance of an
armed confrontation over land, a confrontation in which police forces and all the armed power at the landlord’s disposal were brought into play” (Rouse 1983: 315). Encouraged by the state’s support, the landlords continued evicting tenants over the next four years.

The loss of a livelihood was not limited to tenants. Mechanisation meant a lower demand for farm labour, as well as a reduced need for many of the agricultural implements made or maintained by village artisans. The well diggers were no longer required after the introduction of tubewells, which also resulted in a reduced demand for the pots that the potter biraderi used to make for the Persian wheels. Fewer farmers meant less work for the blacksmiths and the carpenters. At the same time, easier access to the growing market town of Shahpur meant that the residents of Sahiwal had access to more varieties of cloth and shoes than what the weaver and cobbler biraderis could offer them in the village. All in all, Rouse’s time in Sahiwal was a period of a loss of traditional livelihoods for a large part of the population, and a period of flux during which people looked for alternative means of income. Artisans and ex-tenants alike were forced to enter the market as wage labourers, working on land whenever the opportunity to sell their labour presented itself, or then migrating to urban centres to look for employment. She notes that this was a time when Sahiwal provided an increasing number of recruits to the army, and that migration and “entry into marginal positions in the service sector and petty commerce is on the rise” (1988: 904-5). Rouse claims that the greater number of wageworkers erased the occupation-based demarcations between the various artisan biraderis, who now fell within the same class group. This led to greater class consciousness that played out in the elections of 1970.

Until 1970 the eviction of tenants had gone largely unchallenged. However, Bhutto’s regime, recognising the rural producers as a large and effective constituency, brought the law on to the side of the tenants. It worked to protect their interests so that not only were evictions far fewer and less rapid than under Ayub or later under Zia, but many of the tenancy-related litigations in Shahpur tehsil were also decided in favour of the tenants rather than the landlords. Naib realised which way the wind was blowing and joined the PPP after the 1970 elections. Rouse observed that:
“In order to realise his political ambitions he had to pay allegiance to the PPP political platform, and this meant implementing Bhutto’s land reforms to the letter. And this he did. No more evictions took place in his patti as long as Bhutto remained in power. The division of inputs provided in the law was strictly and honestly adhered to. Naib went further than most; he even called a meeting of the tenants to inform them of their newly acquired legal rights” (1983: 317).

It was also at this time that begaar “became less acceptable among artisans in Sahiwal. Among the tenants, on the other hand, the practice still continues, although superficially it is now undertaken voluntarily” (Rouse 1988: 801). She points out that begaar, a practice that includes a notion of force, started being called vangaar, which is used for the practice of tenants helping each other during harvest and sowing seasons, and which is voluntary and reciprocal in nature. When tenants offered such assistance on the landlords’ lands, “quite clearly, such reciprocity is absent” (1988: 577). What was present, still, was the threat of eviction in the case of a refusal.

Rouse points out that “it should be noted that with all his liberal leanings, [Naib] followed the letter of the law only. The law contained many loopholes and in the long run was open to subversion; a fact of which full advantage was taken” (1983: 317). In fact, as soon as Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup by Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, Naib’s attitude changed too. Between 1979 and 1980, Rouse recorded 16 evictions and observed that the threat of an eviction, along with a recognition of the repressive stance of the new military leader that was aimed against Bhutto’s constituency, was enough to acquire the quiescence of the remaining tenants. She pointed out that “whenever disputes arise over evictions or implementation of other land regulations and general law and order, the revenue and police authorities favour the property-owners…I did not find a single case where a decision was made in the favour of tenants when they were involved in disputes with the landlords” (1983: 321).

4.2.3. Transformation of Dependence and Power

All of these changes had affected the relationship between maalik and reiaya in both positive and negative ways. Rouse notes that “with large landlords currently organising production along the lines of the firm, the ties that bound the rural producer to the landlord have been broken” (1988: 906). A few other changes also
reduced the dependence of Sahiwal’s residents on the *maaliks*. The setting up of the colony of small house plots and the granting of homestead rights to those that had homes on the *maaliks*’ land in the main village reduced dependence dramatically and eliminated one of the most significant private sanctions and sources of coercion available to the landlord. Another form of control that was removed at this time was the *maaliks*’ control over water. Over the years they had come to control access to irrigation water because the state-owned canal now ran through their self-cultivated farms, and because they owned the only tubewells in the village. However, during Bhutto’s regime public taps were dug on the outskirts of the village that allowed open access to water and later, in 1982, public tubewells were also put in. “Also, there now existed in Sahiwal other categories of landowners — rich, middle and small peasants. The petty bourgeois sector of Sahiwal’s population had also increased” (Rouse 1988: 842). This, together with increased education and easier access to urban towns, reduced the extra-economic control that *maaliks* exercised over their *reiaya*.

However, ironically, the shift to wage labour did not free them from dependence on the *maaliks* because, in the absence of an investment in education or the acquisition of alternative skills, labour on land still provided the only means through which a relatively stable source of income could be acquired. Rouse observed that even now “85% of the villagers in Sahiwal make a living from the land” (1983: 319).

However, the supply of labour outweighed the demand, and weakened the position of the village populace vis-à-vis the landlords. Rouse pointed out that:

“The *kammi* no longer receive their traditional dues from the new crops of rice and sugarcane. Wages are low in Sahiwal and casual labour is mostly restricted to harvest time, or when sugarcane and rice are planted (both wheat and cotton are planted mechanically). People in the village say that they can now expect nothing from the landlords and will get only that which they strive and fight for. They also express a sense of betrayal by the state. They deeply lament Bhutto’s death” (1983: 318).

The *maaliks* also retained control over those that resided in *Lokari* colony since they had not received ownership rights, and their compliance, in the form of tied labour, was required in return for the right of residence (Rouse 1983: 317). In fact, even in the rest of the village Rouse noted that despite their possession of official ownership certificates of homestead, villagers still believed that they lived on the landlords’ land and that their occupation of it was tenuous and based on the benevolence of the

Those that remained as tenants were given land at the furthest edges of the landholding, and their work was now closely regulated by Naib and his managers, who now maintained detailed worksheets and “any tenant who failed to do as instructed was fined, and those whose work was not satisfactory were warned by threats of eviction” (Rouse 1983: 316). Also, in bringing land under self-cultivation, the maaliks had chosen the best irrigated lands around the government canals. Their private tubewells were also installed on these lands close to the canals. This meant that the lands they gave out to tenants further afield had poor access to water, and until public tubewells were installed in 1982, tenants remained dependent on the landlords for access to irrigation water. Records of the “orderly system of assigned turns” for the public canal were maintained by the managers of the landlords, and were often manipulated. In fact, withholding water was considered the easiest way to get rid of a tenant. Tenants claimed they were powerless in the face of such manipulations because “they have no access to records, cannot read or write, and for them to approach government officials is difficult” (1983: 321). Tenants had earlier lost much of their decision-making power on what to cultivate as agriculture came to be standardised around four crops — wheat, cotton, rice and sugarcane, of which “only wheat was a subsistence crop”76 (Rouse 1983: 316). Furthermore, as animals lost their importance and centrality for the landlords’ mechanised farms, the maaliks insisted that tenants produce less fodder, thus affecting the latter’s ability to rear cattle and greatly reducing their asset base.

The transformation of agriculture, therefore, meant that not only did tenants have less access to land, but they also lost their other assets and their ability to grow subsistence crops. The power of Sahiwal’s producing classes vis-à-vis the landlords was greatly reduced as the wealth of the latter increased while the poverty of the former was exacerbated. Yet another source of dependence was the close relationship between the state and the landed class. Rouse points out that the three

76 Ironically, this had happened because the 1972 reforms had put the burden of taxes and the provision of seeds and half of all other inputs on the landlord, who insisted, therefore, on making more decisions (1983: 317).
main state officials that maintain direct contact with the village – the patwari (lowest level revenue officer), the thanedar (local police officer) and the tehsil magistrate – maintained a close collaboration with the landed class and lent official weight to the influence of the landlord (1988: 784). She pointed out that “access to the state permits certain forms of control” (1988: 43) and allowed the landed to decide who could access the state and for what purpose. While the maaliks lost this power briefly under Bhutto, it was restored to them soon after by Zia.

4.2.4. Politics: From Factionalism to Class

The changing relations of production outlined above completely transformed politics in Sahiwal in the 1970s. The two maalik families reacted to their loosening control over the village by putting aside their antagonism and bringing both the pattis together in one political faction. They had imagined that this would allow them to increase their control over the villagers, “who [would] no longer use the antagonism between the two households to their advantage” (1988: 857). However, they could not have expected what happened instead in the 1970 elections. Rouse summarises it as follows:

“The PPP found a receptive audience among Sahiwal’s working population. Party chapters were organised in Shahpur and Sahiwal. The local chapter was headed by a man from an artisan quom. When elections were held in 1970, the PPP set up its own candidate for the local seat. The large landlords, for the first time in Sahiwal’s history, set up a joint candidate in opposition to the PPP’s candidate. Both landlords used all their capacity to convince villagers to vote for their candidate. The PPP candidate won. For the first time, villagers voted along class and not factional lines. Some households voted with the landlords, but these came primarily from the petty bourgeois households in the village or those retainers closely connected with the landlords. The landless voted overwhelmingly for the PPP candidate, as did the majority of the sharecroppers and small holders” (1988: 875).

The PPP regime meant many things to the residents of Sahiwal. For the first time they had direct access to national-level state power through their PPP representatives, “the overall environment was in their favour”, as was an external institution — the party — to which they now looked as an alternate source of support and power with which to counter the power of the maaliks. As one of my respondents in the village put it, “Bhutto’s regime changed everything because for the first time people with just 2-4 acres could get into top political seats in the area.” It was a realisation of the extent of the change that had occurred that made Naib
join the PPP, “expecting to regain lost control over the political process” (1988: 876).

Rouse does not mention specifically what happened during the 1977 elections, possibly because they were similar to the 1970 elections. After Bhutto’s regime was toppled by Zia, the new military regime announced elections. For these, Naib was rewarded with a PPP ticket for his continued allegiance to the party, and he was to run as a candidate for the national assembly. However, these elections were eventually cancelled, the PPP was banned and only local government elections were held in 1980 on a non-party basis. However, in the run-up to these elections it became evident again that the producing classes of Sahiwal were organising around their class interests (Rouse 1988: 898). Naib’s candidature was opposed by the PPP party cadre within Sahiwal, which wanted seats to be allocated on the basis of elections within the party. However, the PPP itself had come to be dominated by landed groups in the later part of the regime, and these felt that their power would be better preserved by the allocation of seats through nominations, and so it was Naib who received a ticket. This brought forth severe criticism within the village of the PPP and its diminishing support of peasant groups. In fact, most surprisingly, given the later pattern of Pakistani politics, the party cadre in Sahiwal explicitly told Rouse that:

“...Should the party not present a coherent program delineating what it proposed to do for the rural poor, the organizers were willing to abandon the party and join another that did have such a program... For the local party leaders, the program was as important, if not more so, than past achievement [of the party]. And the process through which the party was organised also carried considerable weight in retaining the continued support of the rural producers” (1988: 879).

After the national elections were cancelled and non-party based local government elections were announced in their place, Naib was no longer interested in running as a candidate. Instead, Khan sahib nominated a candidate to whom Haji sahib’s family gave their full support. This ended Naib’s affiliation with the PPP. Rouse observed that “as soon as it was announced that political party based elections were not in the cards, his commitment to liberal causes ended” (1988: 880). The small and poor peasants, artisans and labourers, however, still rallied around the issues that had brought them together in the 1970s, and put up their own kammi candidate who was a tenant of Khan sahib’s. He won, despite vigorous campaigning by Naib himself for Khan sahib’s candidate. Rouse notes that this victory was of “enormous
importance because this time the rural producers had no national political organization behind them” (1988: 881). They were, however, supported by an ex-tenant who had recently acquired 50 acres and had started building a political base in the village against the landlords. He had come to be viewed as a representative of the interests of artisans and labour, and a “champion of their rights” (1988: 84).

In substantive terms, however, the victory meant little for the producing classes given the Zia government’s lack of commitment to them. The winning candidate was evicted from his lands, and no one in the village was able to contest this legally in a judicial climate that explicitly favoured the powerful, despite the fact that the victim was an elected official of the local government. Negotiations, however, went on within the village. Interestingly, during the period of his eviction the ex-tenant landlord gave the candidate some of his own land to cultivate. Eventually, Khan sahib granted him his tenancy back but “the acreage allotted was appreciably smaller than before, in a remote area and of very poor quality land” (1988: 882).

4.2.5. Inequality, Class and Power in Sahiwal

In conclusion, Rouse points out that:

“The general picture one observes in the village, therefore, is one that shows a concentration and centralization of production in the hands of the large landlords, at one end, combined with increasing proletarianization and sub-peasantization among the bulk of the village population on the other end” (1988: 895).

While people were now more independent of the maaliks, growing inequality, landlessness and unemployment limited their social and economic mobility. Rouse noted that despite all the changes, the basis of social organisation in the village was still determined by the relations of property, and that “forms of control, at different historical times, have corresponded closely to the nature and type of production” (1988: 845). She pointed out that:

“Changes in the system have relaxed the traditional structure, so that kammis may be found as rich peasants, or Jats77 as wage labourers. By and large, however, for most classes the movement is downwards, with increasing segments of each (excluding the large farmers and the rich peasants) being forced to join the ranks of the rural or urban proletariat” (1983: 322).

In the immediate aftermath of Bhutto’s rule Rouse stated confidently that the ideology of quom had become fluid, and that, instead, class consciousness was

77 The highest ranked of the agricultural zamindar quoms.
increasing, as more people became part of the same rural proletariat. However, she also cautioned that despite the evident class consciousness of Sahiwal’s producers:

“Forces preventing the sustained organization of the rural producers along class lines have not completely dissipated… Thus, the ‘caste’ ideology that historically served to maintain the status quo, continues to play a role. This ideology of status ascription has long been used by the landed elites to sustain their privileged position” (1988: 907).

Rouse concluded that “today’s Sahiwal is in a transitional period, in which both economic and extra-economic methods of control co-exist” (1988: 856). This was to change further in the following decades, and we arrived in 2007 to see on which side the die had settled.

4.3. Sahiwal in the 2000s: Intermediation

Unlike Ahmad and Rouse I did not go to Sahiwal to study a major economic event. Instead, it was the continual exposure of rural citizens to electoral politics that brought me here in 2007 with a team of researchers. When Ahmad studied Sahiwal its citizens had no experience of national politics. They had only voted in two rounds of local government elections. By the time Rouse came around the residents of Sahiwal had voted in Pakistan’s first two national elections in 1970 and 1977, and in the local government elections of 1979-80. They had finally been exposed to political parties but the experience was recent. However, by the time we arrived the residents of Sahiwal had become intimately acquainted both with national elections and with Pakistan’s political parties. Between Rouse’s study and ours they had participated in 6 national and provincial elections, and 4 local government elections — 10 elections in just over 25 years. Our main interest, therefore, lay in studying the changes in village-level politics that may have been brought on by this repeated engagement with elections at different levels.

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This section is based on my fieldwork, parts of which were presented earlier in Cheema et al. (2007).

The team was led by Dr. Ali Cheema of the Lahore University of Management Sciences, and I, and included various students of the university. Many thanks are due in particular to Syed Ali Asjad Naqvi and Hassan Javed for their meticulous note-taking in their conversations with many of the male respondents with whom I could not work directly.
4.3.1. Changes in Physical Layout and Structure

While Sahiwal had doubled its population between Ahmad and Rouse’s study, its population had increased by only 132 households in the 25 years between Rouse and our study. The total population is now 571 households. The main reason for this slow growth is migration away from the village to Shahpur town, Sargodha city, Lahore, or even further afield to other parts of the country. Sahiwal’s layout has changed little since Ahmad’s description of it, complete with the walled-off compound of the landlord’s houses and their granaries. However, now instead of just three *pukka* houses, 88 percent of its residents live in brick structures with high boundary walls. Some of these, such as the homes of the *jaura biraderi* of goldsmiths, are large multi-storied *havelis* decorated with coloured tiles. In sharp contrast to these are the remaining mud houses that belong almost exclusively to the *musalli biraderi*, now called *muslim sheikhs*, and which have no, or very low, boundary walls. Both the schools have been upgraded, so that the village now has a high school for boys and a middle school for girls.

Both the colonies still exist. *Lokari* has been named after Naib, and is now a part of the main village, though it still lies on its western border. Many of the poorer groups in the village still live here. School colony is still set apart from the village and is almost exclusively home to *muslim sheikhs* and low-ranked *kammi biraderis*. Our mapping of the village also revealed some other *biraderi*-based residential concentrations in various parts of the main settlement, such as the *Kasai colony*, where all of the households of the *kasai biraderi* of butchers live. Most of the *zamindar biraderis* live in clusters in the middle of the main settlement, while many of the *syeds*, who are still the only Shias in the village, live together in a relatively isolated cluster at the rear of the main village settlement. The goldsmith *jauras* live in another cluster along the main road that runs through the village, which has come to be known as ‘goldsmith street’. Interestingly, higher ranked *kammi biraderis*, such as the potter *kumhars*, do not live in clusters and are, instead, spread throughout the village.

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80 “Sunharian di galli”.

There are now a total of six mosques in the village. The most recent one, the Jamia mosque, is now considered the main mosque and was constructed recently by the Social Welfare Organisation of the village to provide a common place of worship. The land for it was granted by Naib, and every household in the village contributed money for its construction, though the main financial contribution came from the jaura biraderi. It is interesting that a sixth mosque was built for this purpose, given that two of the older mosques have the capacity to fit most of the village’s population. However, sponsoring a mosque often underpins a family’s rising wealth and influence in both rural and urban Pakistan, so that the most plausible reason for the building of this recent mosque appears to be the fact that the influential jauras were not until now associated with any of the other mosques.

By the time we arrived in Sahiwal both Haji sahib and Khan sahib had passed away, and their sons now headed the two families. Haji sahib’s son, Naib, had moved to Lahore with his family and visited Sahiwal on a fortnightly basis, while Khan sahib’s eldest son, Sardar, still lived in Shahpur and visited the village every day. Due to this Sardar was now more involved in village activity than was Naib. Nevertheless, Naib retained more prestige and influence. This was plainly visible in each of his visits to the village, one of which is recounted on the first page of this dissertation. While people bent to touch Naib’s knees in greeting and deference when he entered the akhat, no one did this for Sardar. From what we saw, Naib was still very much the maalik of the village. Much of this had to do with Naib’s own personality — his education, urbanisation and sophistication — and the fact that, like his father, he had a love of pomp and ceremony. All of these combined to set him apart from the rest of the village, a fact that was both resented and respected. On the other hand, Sardar was much closer in his ways to the lifestyle of the villagers, to the extent that one of his nephews, Nazim, had even married a woman from the village and was now a full-time resident. No member of the maalik family had married someone from Sahiwal before this, and had looked, instead, to their ancestral village for suitable spouses. What had particularly shocked the family, and earned Naib’s displeasure, was that Nazim’s bride was the daughter of his ex-

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81 All the new names introduced in this section have been coined by me.
manager. While people related more to Sardar for all these reasons, the relationship included much less deference than that which they showed to Naib.

Both Naib and Sardar’s landholdings have decreased dramatically over the past years. Land sales have continued but a much more important reason has been the fragmentation of land within the family. Soon after the 1972 land reforms Haji sahib had divided his land amongst his children in order to avoid further reforms. What had been held in the name of one man came to be officially owned by 12 people.\(^8^2\) This did not affect anything while Haji sahib was alive, since Naib managed the entire landholding as one unit. However, after Haji sahib passed away Naib’s siblings, especially their spouses and adult offspring, started to show an interest in managing their own lands. Naib now owns only 140 acres, but many of his siblings continue to defer most decision-making to him for the rest of the estate as well. Similar fragmentation has occurred on Sardar’s side of the family, and he now personally owns only 250 acres.

4.3.2. Changes in Agrarian Relations of Production

At a time when Sahiwal had only 274 households and all of the land was cultivated through tenants, Ahmad had observed that the pressure on available agricultural land had increased manifold because of demographic growth and expansion. It is, therefore, not surprising that with 571 households now and most of the agricultural land being self-cultivated by the *maaliks*, two drastic changes in agricultural patterns and relations of production have occurred. First, people have moved away from agriculture as their main occupation, and some have even moved out of the village in search of work. Only 17 percent of the population identifies itself now as cultivators, 13 percent of the village is now employed in the state sector, including the army, while 20 percent of current residents are employed in the non-farm sector within the village (Table 4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultivators</th>
<th>Daily wage labour</th>
<th>Non-farm</th>
<th>Govt service/Army</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Unemployed/other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^8^2\) This includes Haji sahib, his wife, his 7 daughters and his 3 sons.
Second, in a village society in which status is still marked by landownership, much of this new non-farm income has come to be invested back in land. As the maaliks continued to sell small pieces of their land, various ex-tenants and artisans of the village bought these to mark their upward mobility, to the effect that 22 percent of the village, or 127 households, now own agricultural land. Most of the increase has been in the zamindar biraderis, in which 79 households now have landholdings that range in size from 1 to 50 acres. While no member of the muslim sheikh quom owns any land even now, 39 kammi households have managed to acquire land, though only one of these is above the subsistence level of 12 acres (Table 4.2). Tenancy has virtually disappeared as a practice. All landholdings are either farmed by the family or by hiring agricultural labour on a daily wage basis. Only 24 percent of land, less than 400 acres, is now tenanted by 25 households, or 4 percent of the population.

As far as agrarian relations of production are concerned, Sahiwal is now neatly polarised between those who own land and cultivate it themselves, and those who are landless and work as agricultural labour. In the middle lies a strata that is no longer connected to land.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2. Landownership by quom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maalik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landowning households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent landowning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent landless</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the dramatic shift to non-farm sources of income, Rouse’s thesis of the proletarianisation of the village is fully evident in the fact that 40 percent of the village makes its income through daily wage labour. Most of these work as agricultural labour on the lands of various owners, ranging from the maaliks to the kammis. Others work outside the village on construction sites or in the market in Shahpur. The number of agricultural labourers remains high because despite Rouse’s concern that “…if, and when, harvesters are added to the farm machinery still more labourers will lose their jobs in the village” (1983: 325), the maaliks decided against mechanising the harvest. This was primarily because canals cut through fields in Sahiwal in a way that makes them too small for the effective use of large combine harvesters. However, Naib explained to me that another reason they stuck to a manual harvest, as well as the manual planting of sugarcane, was
because “we had a sufficient dependent workforce that we had control over. Smaller landlords in other villages, especially those in chaks, have had no choice but to mechanise because they had no control over the population of their village, but that is not the case here in Sahiwal”. Almost half of the village, therefore, remains tied to the maaliks through relations of production.

4.3.3. Circumscribed Independence

A few of Sahiwal’s zamindar biraderis not only increased their landholdings but complemented this with livestock rearing, an increased investment in education, and jobs in the state and other urban sectors. In doing so they have built linkages with nodes of power outside the village and have become autonomous vis-à-vis both the maaliks and the village economy. Many of these connections are with members of their own biraderis in other villages and towns. For example, Sahiwal’s mekans, who were tenants of the maaliks during Ahmad’s study but who had soon after purchased land, have since acquired education, forayed into the urban job market and built into the politically influential network of the larger mekan biraderi that is well represented in the local government politics of both Shahpur tehsil and Sargodha district. The mekans have found an alternate basis for social and political organisation, one that is independent of the maaliks, and in doing so they have also provided the residents of Sahiwal with an alternate channel for state access. These new channels, centred around biraderi networks, have reduced the village’s unidirectional dependence on the maaliks for state access.

Similarly, the jaura biraderi of goldsmiths, already independent during Rouse’s time, have continued to consolidate their economic position within the village and are now considered second to only the maaliks in their wealth. Not only has their traditional occupation continued to turn high profits but they also have exclusive control over Sahiwal’s credit market. Interestingly, this has happened because of a realisation by Sahiwal’s residents that the maalik families’ control of other aspects of their lives could easily put them into debt bondage if loans were to be introduced into the relationship. So, instead, they have turned to the jauras who have an
available cash flow but do not exercise any other control over them. The *jauras* present an extremely interesting case of upward mobility, given that Ahmad had noted that this group was assigned a low rank among *kammi biraderis* in the village. Nevertheless, even during Ahmad’s fieldwork this group had started to mark their upward mobility by enforcing “strict purdah for their women, a rather uncommon practice among lower social groups” and “when asked for self-placement on a five point hierarchical social scale, they placed themselves at the top” (1972: 67).

My interview with the *jaura* women revealed an interesting aspect of the repercussions of such upward mobility within the strictly endogamous *biraderis* of rural Punjab. As one of them explained, “if there are no *jaura* boys in Sahiwal to whom we can marry our daughters they will remain unmarried because we cannot trust *jauras* from other villages”. Since I had not heard this sentiment echoed by any other *biraderi* in the village — who often looked to the extended *biraderi* outside the village for suitable matches — I probed further and found that it was based on an unwillingness to marry their girls into other *jaura* families who may not have experienced similar upward mobility. Unable to marry boys from other *biraderis* and unwilling to marry members of their own *biraderi* who may still be ranked among *kammi* groups in other villages, *jaura* girls faced the prospect of either remaining unmarried or marrying any available *jaura* boy from Sahiwal, regardless of age or previous marital status.

Upward mobility is not, however, restricted to just the *jauras* or the *zamindar* groups. Some *kammi biraderis* too have experienced such mobility, based to a large extent on the acquisition of education. This is evidenced by the fact that *kammis* have a higher literacy rate than *zamindar biraderis*, and that more of them live in brick houses (Table 4.3). In fact, the schoolteachers in the village are almost all from the *kammi* quoms. There are two major reasons for this. First, since they had not been connected to land in their traditional occupations — as owners, tenants or labour — *kammis* had started investing in education earlier than other groups. Second, as village artisans many *kammi* groups were far more skilled in terms of the urban economy and had an easier time integrating into it than the agrarian *zamindars*. The mobility of *muslim sheikhs*, on the other hand, has been fairly
limited. 72 percent of them are employed as daily wage labour, and they continue to constitute the most deprived social group in every way.

Table 4.3. Socio-economic indicators by _quom_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maalik</th>
<th>Zamindar</th>
<th>Kammi</th>
<th>Muslim sheikh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Literacy</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Brick houses</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upward mobility is often accompanied by entire families changing their _biraderi_ names. We recorded various instances of families who were referred to as either _kammis_ or _muslim sheikhs_ by the rest of the village, but who introduced themselves to us with names of _zamindar biraderis_. Previously _pauvli_ (weaver) families are now _gondals_, including Naib’s current manager, _mochis_ (cobblers) are now _bhattis_, and many _muslim sheikhs_ are now _qureshis_. As one member of the latter group told me, “we changed our name when our son started working in Sargodha. It works outside the village where we can use any name we want. But in the village it makes no difference. Everyone knows who we are”. Yet, over time, the new names do appear to stick. Naib’s powerful manager was never introduced as a _pauvli_, and even Naib referred to his name change only once while explaining how unusual it was for someone from a _kammi_ group to have risen to this position.

...And continuity

However, while the _maaliks_ may have lost their absolute dominance of the village, they have not yet lost their authority. There are multiple reasons for this. First, despite the fragmentation of landholdings, as a family the _maaliks_ still own most of the land in the village. This means that agricultural labour is still dependent on them for its livelihood, as are all those who need fodder for their livestock. Second, most major disputes and crimes, including inter-_biraderi_ issues, are resolved by the _maalik_ family, especially by Sardar and Nazim. When Ahmad studied village-based dispute resolution and the role of “influentials” in it, he found that the landlords and their managers were not involved and it was a few members of the large _zamindar biraderis_ that resolved disputes. Ahmad concluded that this could indicate that “landlords are seen as outside the village, only occasionally concerning themselves with village affairs; …they are probably viewed as being above these petty offices
and activities” (1977: 116). Now, however, dispute resolution is a central aspect of the maalik family’s involvement in village activities. Our team was witness to two separate panchayats, one led by Sardar and the other by Naib’s manager, in which a theft and a disagreement over the regulation of visitors to the local shrine were resolved. In the former case, the thief (also our first guide) was punished by being dismissed from the service of the maaliks, fined Rs.10,000 in addition to the original cost of the sack of vegetables he had stolen, and banned from entering Naib’s daara. The defendant, who was training to be a kardar, was reduced to daily wage labour as a result of these tough sanctions. The fact that the maaliks could impose and implement such harsh punishments without any formal legal authority is a testament to their continuing dominance.

Third, despite the emergence of biraderi-based networks, our interviews revealed that the most effective state access is still provided by the maaliks who have maintained close linkages with politicians and the district and provincial bureaucracies. The recent election of Nazim as the deputy mayor of both the union and Shahpur tehsil has served to strengthen the role of the maaliks as the main intermediaries for the delivery of state services. Our surveys revealed that almost all demands for public services are first articulated within biraderis and then brought to Nazim through biraderi leaders. The maaliks are also used as the main contact with the police and the courts. In cases when dispute resolution leaves the purview of the village panchayat, the maaliks can affect the manner in which the police chooses to deal with complaints. Service delivery is seen by village residents to be dependent on the will and proactivity of the maalik, and that the cost of such delivery is usually deference and obedience.

Finally, the influence of the maaliks is reinforced through myths, symbols and a language of patronage that describes a relationship that is still that of a benevolent father who maintains a distance but loves his children dearly. During the akhat we

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83 In Sahiwal, this is now called the Islahi Committee, roughly translated as the Corrections Committee.
84 About £75.
85 A public meeting space maintained by large landlords around which the social and political activity of the village revolves.
86 A bailiff of a landlord.
witnessed most speakers eulogised the *maaliks* and their “*mohabbat*” for the people of Sahiwal that was evident in all the things that they, especially Naib, did for the village. When Naib addressed the gathering he described the spirit of Sahiwal as being that of one big, caring family. He went on to credit the village for the recent remission of the cancer with which he had been struggling for many years. He told everyone present that leading researchers in the US had told him during his treatment that there was a special ingredient in his body that had helped him recover faster, one that they could not figure out, but which he knew was the love and prayers of the people of Sahiwal. Furthermore, I was told by various respondents that for decades most people in the village had believed that anyone who spoke against Naib would lose their eyesight.

4.3.4. Politics, Factions and Intermediation

As the economic and social power of the *maaliks* of Sahiwal weakened, they increased their involvement and investment in politics. Initially they turned their attention to national and provincial politics, but eventually, as they lost other sources of authority, they got involved in local government as well, a level that until now they had shunned. Haji sahib had been a close friend of President Ayub Khan but the family did not get directly involved in politics until the second national election under Bhutto in 1977 when both Haji sahib and Naib’s wife, Malika, contested and won seats on PPP tickets in the Provincial Assembly of Punjab. However, since the government fell almost immediately afterwards because of Zia’s military coup, they were in power for less than three months. As recounted in the previous section, soon after Naib was given a PPP ticket for the National Assembly elections that Zia had promised. However, when these were replaced by non-party based local government elections, Naib passed the candidature to one of Khan sahib’s nominees.

Under Zia the PPP was banned, its political activity severely constrained and its leaders jailed or exiled. At the same time a new configuration of the PML was created during the mid 1980s, with Nawaz Sharif at its helm, to which the *maalik*

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87 A deep love.
family shifted its allegiance. Malika made it back to the Punjab Provincial Assembly in the non-party based elections that Zia held in 1985. Through the multiple elections that followed in the next two decades, the family has maintained its support for the PML-N. Malika is the vice-President of its Punjab women’s wing and is credited with having had significant public grants released for Sahiwal for street paving, sanitation and the upgrading of the two schools. Another testament to the power of the maaliks is the fact that despite Rouse’s observation that through her stay in Sahiwal she noted a desire of the people to see a return to PPP rule (1988: 877), the village has never again voted for a PPP candidate. Instead, it has consistently supported Naib and Malika’s PML-N.

The maaliks’ forays into local government have been limited to Sardar’s side of the family. It started with Sardar’s election to Sargodha’s District Council under Zia in 1987. According to our interviews the village received almost nothing during Sardar’s tenure, which is another reason for the higher support and respect shown to Naib by Sahiwal’s residents. More recently, Nazim ran for and won the seat of the nai-b-nazim, or deputy mayor, of the union and tehsil councils in the local government elections of 2005. The fact that tehsil councils have access to significant funds for local projects meant that during our fieldwork in the village Nazim was the most actively sought after member of the maalik family.

Our surveys show that internally Sahiwal is divided across many small factions that are largely biraderi-based. The Shia syeds consider themselves a faction, while the kumhars are organised under a kumhar schoolteacher as a separate faction. A significant number of the middle strata of traders are organised by the sons of the ex-tenant whose rise against the maaliks was recorded by Rouse. However, when it comes to elections they seem to all align with the maaliks. The main reason for this is the fact that while they have made useful contacts with influential members of their larger extended biraderi networks in the district, their connections cannot compete with those of the maaliks, especially Naib’s family, who have regularly sat down to dinner with presidents and prime ministers since the 1950s. What these factions do ensure, however, is that maaliks have to negotiate their support before each election. At the akhat we witnessed soon after Nazim’s victory, a member of the Syed biraderi told him in a rather straight-forward manner that the election had
been won and he now needed to get on immediately with the business of bringing development schemes to the village.

While on the surface the two maalik families are still politically united, the campaign for the 2002 election in the village provided some indications that the old fissures between them had reappeared. The campaign also provides an insight into the control that the maaliks still have over the political process and how people vote. Since Naib was unwell at the time, Sardar called an akhat, though at Naib’s daara, in which the family’s support for a PML-Q candidate was announced. Representatives from all the village biraderis were present. Sardar presented the maaliks’ choice of candidate, along with the merits of voting for him, after which everyone was given a chance to voice an opinion. Most people chose, instead, to make demands for particular public services, presenting them as the cost of their vote, and hoped that these would be forwarded to the candidate they were about to support. Sardar assured them that he would do that, and the voting decision appeared to have been finalised. However, the night before polling began a rumour spread through the village that Naib was supporting the PML-N candidate and that he did not agree with Sardar’s support for the PML-Q. The next morning the village came out in droves to vote for the PML-N. The constituency, however, was won by the PML-Q candidate, supported both by Musharraf’s military government and his loyal local government cadres. Through the PML-Q’s tenure that followed, Sahiwal received nothing from the national government.

Just before the 2008 election, Naib finally lost his long struggle with cancer and passed away. Many had expected that political power within the village would now shift to Sardar and Nazim. However, PML-Q’s waning prospects, Bhutto and Sharif’s recent return to Pakistan, and the expectation that their parties would make a comeback in these elections retained the support of the residents of Sahiwal for the PML-N, and with it for Malika, who took on her husband’s mantle as the head of the village. PML-N won in both Sahiwal and in the Punjab in 2008. Support for Malika has since been underscored both by her appointment as an advisor to the Chief Minister of Punjab, and the fact that the provincial and national governments have both withdrawn their support from the local government system introduced by
Musharraf. This has significantly weakened Nazim’s newfound influence within the village.

4.3.5. Intermediation and Political Control in Sahiwal

Both Ahmad and Rouse emphasised the fact that the basis of social organisation in the village had been the relations of agricultural production. While this is still true in that it is primarily the ownership of land that allows a family to break its ties of dependence on the maaliks, it is also true that we found groups in Sahiwal to now be organised primarily around their own biraderis. Most of these are headed by biraderi leaders who organise the various families, arrange for support during hardships, aggregate their votes at election time, and resolve most family or group-based issues. Within the zamindar quom this organisation is underscored by inter-marriages between its various biraderis, leading to increased cohesion. Whereas the producers of Sahiwal had aligned on the basis of class three decades ago, the disappearance of external support for this form of social organisation made them turn instead to horizontal alignments on the basis of kinship. The residential clustering of biraderis in the village and their kinship-based linkages with the external world point to the importance of biraderi as a form of social organisation now.

During our fieldwork it seemed that the maaliks of Sahiwal retained great dominance over the village. However, as we deepened our investigation we realised that their authority was now very different from that which Ahmad had observed here four decades ago. This authority is centred now not on economic production but on the maaliks’ investment in the state, both in terms of bureaucratic contacts and representative politics. Their continuing authority is, in fact, a testament to their ability to adapt to changing conditions. When their power was first challenged in the 1970s the two maalik families reacted to their loosening control over the village by putting aside their antagonism and coming together in one political faction to counter the mounting opposition of the sharecroppers and labourers. When the class-based organisation of the village producers that had necessitated this union disappeared, they began to drift apart again. When Sahiwal’s producers found support in the PPP’s manifesto, the maaliks joined the party and won the right to
represent them. When Zia banned it, they shifted their allegiance to the party supported by the new regime. When their economic power was reduced by market forces, the *maaliks* became involved in activities they had earlier considered too far below them, such as contesting local government elections and resolving village disputes. The power of the *maaliks* has transformed dramatically from extra-economic dominance, to economic control, to political representation and intermediation, but through it all, their authority has remained.

**Conclusion**

In the early twentieth century, only members of the agricultural tribes, as defined by the Land Alienation Act (1900), were allowed to stand as candidates and some form of property restrictions remained in place until independence (Talbot 2002). This shifted both political power and representation towards the rural landed elite. Over time such regulations were removed, political parties were organised and local bases of organisation diversified away from the landed elite. At the same time, landholdings became smaller and agrarian relations of production were altered. Yet, the history of Sahiwal shows us that despite all these changes, politics in the village is still organised by its *maaliks*. Sarfaraz Khan was given complete ownership of Sahiwal in 1860, and 150 years later, it is still his great great granddaughter-in-law, Malika, who decides how the village will cast its vote.

However, the nature of the *maalik*’s authority has changed. Ahmad defined it as almost complete power, and told a story of dependence that was defined by the *maaliks* ownership of three things — land, homesteads and water. The control over land was eventually reduced by land reforms and land sales. The control over homesteads was liberalised in the 1970s and 1980s, and control over water vanished too with the opening of public canals, tubewells and taps. Yet, Rouse found that the power remained because of the *maaliks*’ continuing economic control over land and employment. As this was reduced further by sales and fragmentation, the *maaliks* increased their investment in the state and became the main conduit for state-based
political clientelism. Absolute feudal power transformed into political authority, and the residents were once again denied Migdal’s “free state” condition.\textsuperscript{88}

The interaction between the residents of Sahiwal and its \textit{maaliks} has altered in interesting ways. As the economic power of the \textit{maaliks} was reduced they involved themselves more vigorously and directly in regulating village affairs and providing access to the state, and so, maintained their centrality, authority and relevance. As village residents lost their ties of dependence and were “freed” of their membership in one or the other of the landlords’ factions, they first organised around a class-based identity and eventually around horizontal ties of kinship. Now they are connected to their \textit{maaliks} mainly through ties of clientelism. This transformation within the village was affected primarily by changes in the external environment, which shows not just how susceptible the village is to changes in national policy and political actors, but also how quickly it responds. The residents of Sahiwal are acutely aware of the fact that their lot depends on the nature of the state and on national level politics. Yet their access to both is severely circumscribed by their intermediating \textit{maaliks}.

In its journey from pure feudalism to class-based social and political organisation, and from there to the rise of \textit{biraderi}-based social organisation and political clientelism, Sahiwal throws up many answers to the question of how rural citizens vote. However, Sahiwal is unique in that it was a very large \textit{zamindari} grant with an unusual amount of power concentrated in the hands of one family by the colonial state. What we do not know is whether people in villages that were settled differently under colonial rule behave in a similar way. Are the residents of \textit{bhaichara} villages or Crown villages similarly constrained by their landed elite?

This chapter has allowed us to analyse change within a case, but it has told us nothing about variation across cases. To this variation I turn my attention in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{88} A condition that Migdal defines as one in which “only [the peasants] values and beliefs would determine whether they would be attracted to new patterns and processes” (1974: 14).
Introduction

This chapter speaks mainly to people who dislike or mistrust complex statistical analysis, and prefer explanations of political behaviour to be presented in prose and to deal with identifiable local contexts and identifiable local actors. Without replicating the detail with which I told the story of Sahiwal in the previous chapter, I provide similar summaries of how politics has evolved over time in the other five case study villages of Tiwanabad, Badhor, Chak 1, Chak 2 and Chak Migrant. In telling these brief stories, I focus especially on vote blocs. Chapter 4 explained how vote blocs can change over time. This chapter now shows how they can differ across villages.

However, I go beyond telling a set of stories. I also do four paired comparisons between sets of villages to see if I can identify the main variables that affect the voting behaviour and bargaining power of voters in rural Punjabi villages. These comparisons are exploratory. It is only in Part III that I set up hypotheses and then test these in a statistically rigorous fashion. But I hope that the more ‘artisanal’ tests presented in this chapter will add to the credibility of the results of the more rigorous testing.

The six case studies, including Sahiwal in Chapter 4, provide evidence that vote blocs are both fluid, in that they respond quickly to changing circumstances, and can vary widely across villages that lie close together. In this chapter I explore the variation in voting behaviour and vote bloc organisation. In the next chapter I deal with the challenge of defining vote blocs, their leaders and their members in ways that make it possible to devise measures for voting behaviour. Once we have these measures we will be able to not only capture the variation in vote blocs across villages in a more systematic manner but we will also be able to explore the possible sources of this variation.
5.1. Sampling Case Villages

I explained in Chapter 1 that the research for this dissertation was conducted as an iterative process in which we first studied six case villages in detail, using survey set A, and then expanded the research to quantitatively analyse voting behaviour in 35 other villages using survey set B.\(^{89}\) In the first stage, we added case villages to our sample based on three village-level axes of variation along which I expected voting behaviour to vary; (a) village type, that is Proprietary or Crown, (b) historical land inequality, and (c) distance from a town. This gave us the matrix in Table 5.1.

To fill the cells of the matrix we decided to select three Proprietary and three Crown villages. Within each type we needed to pick both equal and unequal villages, and remote and more urban villages. The aim also was to select natural pairs of villages to the extent possible. To do so we first identified a list of union councils\(^{90}\) (UC) that had a mix of historically equal and unequal villages. Out of this list we randomly picked one UC in the Proprietary belt of Sargodha district, and one in the Crown villages belt. Within each UC we then randomly selected one equal and one unequal village.\(^{91}\) This gave us Tiwanabad (unequal) and Badhor (equal) in the Proprietary belt, and Chak 1 (unequal) and Chak Migrant (equal) in the Crown belt.

Both these UCs turned out to be remote in terms of distance from the tehsil town. To add an urban Proprietary village we did not have to look far. We had already started work in Sahiwal, which had been selected to take advantage of the earlier studies by Ahmad (1977) and Rouse (1988). It was a village like Tiwanabad in every way other than the fact that it was very close to Shahpur town. It, therefore, fit our criteria perfectly and we added it to our sample purposively. To add a Crown village that was unequal and close to a town we drew a list of all such villages and then randomly picked Chak 2.

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89 See Annex 1.2 for a reminder of the instruments used in each set of surveys.
90 A union council is the lowest tier in the three-tiered local government system, which comprises the district, tehsil and unions.
91 A union council usually has between 5 and 15 villages.
We used a number of government records to create the master list from which we chose each village. We started with the 1998 Population Census’ listing of revenue villages. Within these we separated Proprietary from Crown villages by using a simple naming convention since Crown villages are called *chaks* and are listed in government records as such. Therefore, it is possible to differentiate between village types just by looking at their names. Nevertheless, we further verified this classification through a database that we created from the Revenue Office’s colonial archives. These included the Village Inspection Reports, which were created between 1911 and 1922 as a record of village and tenure type, division of land and mode of agriculture. We also used these Inspection Reports to differentiate between historically equal and unequal villages on our list. The specific indicator we used for this purpose was the extent of landless tenancy in each village. If this was more than 60 percent we classified it as an unequal village. To calculate the distance of each village from the *tehsil* town,

This provided a total sample of 690 households.

In these six villages we collected both qualitative and quantitative data using survey set A. Qualitative tools combined ethnographic methods with over 90 key respondent interviews while quantitative data was collected by first running a complete census of each village, and then using surveys to collect information on a random sample of about 40 percent of households in each village that were stratified by caste and *biradert*. This provided a total sample of 690 households. The household surveys collected information on the attributes of individual households and mapped the association and relation of each sample household with key individuals with regard to electoral politics. In the next section I present this

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92 Each district in Pakistan is sub-divided into *tehsils*. Rural *tehsils* usually have one main town, which is also the administrative headquarter.
93 A range of 34 to 47 percent, depending on the size of the village.
94 I explain household sampling in greater detail in Chapter 7.
data as short stories about politics and vote blocs in each of the five case villages we visited after Sahiwal.

5.2. Five Contexts

5.2.1. Tiwanabad

Like Sahiwal, Tiwanabad is also a Proprietary village, of about 318 households, which was settled as a zamindari grant that the Inspection Report recorded as 2281 acres owned by only one landholder in 1917. This landholder was from the Tiwana tribe of central Punjab that had initially consolidated its power in the region by developing strong and fierce cavalries that gave it control over the local population. They later drew strength from first Sikh and then British military and economic patronage to emerge as the largest landholding tribe in all of West Punjab (Talbot 2002). Separate branches of the tribe received various estates in Sargodha in return for services rendered to the British colonial state during the Sikh Wars. Tiwanabad was one of these estates. When I studied the village in 2007 it was still owned by only one person but land fragmentation, land reforms and land sales had reduced the holding to only about 300 acres. Nevertheless, this was still large enough to have maintained Tiwana as the malik of the village.

Compared to Sahiwal the power and authority of the malik appeared to be more oppressive and obvious in Tiwanabad. Tiwana himself is an absentee landlord who lives in Lahore but controls the village through four managers. Some of this control is based on continuing economic dependence, some on severe inequality, while some is based on a constant reiteration of the family’s historical social authority over all the residents of the village through various means. For example, all homestead in the village used to be owned by the Tiwana family, and they used this liberally as a sanction against recalcitrant villagers, to the extent of not even allowing such villagers to clear out their belongings before being locked out of the house, or altogether thrown out of the village. The logic behind this, as explained by the current Tiwana’s father to his villagers, was that anything a villager amassed over the years was either as a result of the malik’s benevolence or of villagers stealing from him, and thus it all belonged to him. Homestead rights were granted to
occupants in the 1970s and 80s, but even during my fieldwork in the village, most villagers still considered the village to be Tiwana’s personal property, because that is what they were told. As one respondent put it, “so what if I have a paper from the government saying this piece of land on which my house stands is mine. The village and all its land is still Tiwana’s”. This power is underwritten by political office and connections. The current landlord was part of the National and Provincial Assemblies under both Generals Ayub and Zia. One of his daughters is married to an ex-President’s son, while another is married to a senior PML-N politician.

Like Sahiwal, Tiwana’s power suffered a blow in the 1970s when small landholders began to emerge in the village. To avoid Bhutto’s two rounds of land reforms, Tiwana sold off a significant amount of land during the late 1960s and 1970s. Some of this was bought by zamindar tenants and even some kammi families, who managed to break loose of the Tiwana’s control. As in Sahiwal, during the 1970s tenancy decreased in Tiwanabad, self-cultivation increased, and with it so did the number of families involved in agricultural and day labour. In fact, agricultural labour on daily wages was the occupation of more than 30 percent of the village in 2007. Bhutto’s reforms ended beegar and relations between the various caste groups were monetised. This ended the traditional seipi relationships that tied all village classes economically, and through this socially, to the malik. Until the 1970s Tiwanabad’s tenants were constantly rotated between parcels of land to maintain them as ‘tenants at will’ and so to reduce their claim for occupancy tenancy. Bhutto’s reforms attempted to extend the right of occupancy tenancy to all tenants. When the maliks resisted the tenants’ demands for their contracts to be converted, tenants rose in militant protest against the absentee maliks for the first time in the history of the region and turned his manager out of the village. Though much of the ground conceded by the maliks was reclaimed soon after this incident under the Zia regime, this revolt transformed the relationship between the malik family and the rest of the village. As Tiwana himself explained to me, “Bhutto gave azadi (independence) to all these people [referring to the village population]. Until Bhutto came along I could control them. But after him things were different and they broke rules”.
The greatest challenge to Tiwana’s power, however, came as late as the 2005 local government election, when the son of one of the small peasant proprietors stood for the *nazim* post in the local government elections in opposition to his candidate, and won. The local government elections had always been considered too low a level for the Tiwana family to contest personally, but they had taken a keen interest in them since the 1980s by nominating candidates for the entire union council, who would be elected unopposed. This was commonly known as Tiwana’s “panel” and his ability to pick the panel served to underscore his political and social power. In the 2001 union council elections Tiwana nominated Ishaq — a young enterprising son of a small landowning *zamindar* family who ran two private schools in the village — as a councillor to this panel. The fact that Ishaq polled more votes than Tiwana’s trusted managers — the result of a door-to-door campaign by Ishaq’s family — warned Tiwana against Ishaq and he was dropped from the panel for the 2005 election. Instead of backing off Ishaq decided to contest the seat of the head of the union council, the *nazim*, against Tiwana’s nominated candidate, and he won. He attributed this to a number of factors, not least of which was the fact that people, especially younger voters, had simply been waiting for someone to oppose Tiwana so that they could vote for him. Ishaq noted that many households were split between parents and older siblings voting for Tiwana’s candidates and younger members voting for him. Another contributing factor was the poor performance record of Tiwana’s candidate during his first term in 2001.

My study of the 2005 local government election in Tiwanabad provided an interesting insight into the process of casting what should be a secret ballot but usually is not. Ishaq explained that candidates could use various measures to ensure that people voted exactly as they had promised to. The most common way was to have a potential supporter seal the deal by taking an oath on the Quran. Other ways included not allowing agents of opposing political parties into the polling station, and placing their own agents inside polling stations to ‘remind’ everyone of the promise. If a vote is bought, the payment is withheld until the election results are in. Since results are announced by polling station, it is easy to connect a failed candidate to a lack of votes from within the village. In Tiwanabad, it is also a

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95 Made up of 10 villages.
tradition for all polling agents to be fed with food that comes from Tiwana’s house on election day, as well as the rather extreme measure of ensuring that the booths are set up next to open windows in the polling station so that voters can hold up their stamped ballot paper to show agents stationed just outside that they had indeed placed their stamp on the correct candidate’s name. A voter who failed to hold up the ballot paper was assumed to have voted against Tiwana’s choice. Ishaq attributed his victory also to his family’s presence in the polling stations on election day as his agents. This was the first time in Tiwanabad’s history that opposition polling agents had been present in a polling station in the village. The fact that they were able to ensure a secret ballot allowed many groups, especially the poor, to vote as they wanted to and not as they had been told to.

Though Tiwana’s power has been shaken, it has not disappeared. Ishaq won the union nazim election through a majority vote in many of the other villages of the union that do not fall under Tiwana’s direct economic and social control. In Tiwanabad itself Tiwana’s nominee won by a margin of 120 votes. Also, the challenge to the maalik’s political dominance is restricted to local government elections. As far as National and Provincial Assembly elections are concerned, Tiwana’s power is secure and largely uncontested. This is because at those levels there is no opposing vote bloc leader in the area that can compete with Tiwana’s political influence and connections. Therefore, for national elections there is one large vote bloc in the village in which about 88 percent of the village votes according to the dictates of the maalik. There is a small group of independent landowners, about 10 percent of the population which includes Ishaq’s family, who do not live in the main settlement and do not vote as part of Tiwana’s vote bloc. They vote individually, though there is some indication that they may discuss this decision informally with one another.

Tiwana, by his own admission, has no special political alignments with any political party. Instead, his support for a candidate is based on the choice of his pir,96 Sialvi of Sial Sharif. The pir decides whom to support — usually a candidate of either of the Muslim Leagues — then passes the decision to Tiwana (and his other

96 A living saint (see glossary).
followers), who in turn passes the decision on to his managers in the village. The managers announce the decision to the village on the loudspeakers of the main mosque and then monitor the voters on election day to ensure that the votes are cast accordingly.

Though Sahiwal and Tiwanabad are similar villages, the fact that respondents expressed incidents of greater oppression and control in the latter could be attributed to their lack of access to proximate alternative sources of employment and services. Tiwanabad is 25 kilometres from Shahpur, the tehsil headquarter — as compared to Sahiwal’s 6 kilometres — with few regular means of public transport. While Sahiwal has upwardly mobile families from zamindar biraderis that have invested remittance income in agricultural land, middle-tier landowners do not exist in Tiwanabad. This could be the result of the fact that while Sahiwal is close to a growing market town that has allowed its residents access to alternate, non-agricultural sources of income, and therefore an ability to accumulate land, Tiwanabad’s remoteness has kept its people away from urbanisation and market integration, thereby limiting their ability to purchase land.

An interesting contrast between the two villages — both of which had a recently elected naim or deputy naim — is the extent to which this new political sphere of influence could be separated from the maalik’s traditional spheres of authority. In Sahiwal the deputy naim of the union and tehsil was from the maalik family and so the source of the continuing concentration of all authority in the maalik was harder to distinguish than in Tiwanabad, where the new naim, Ishaq, was from a zamindar family of small landowners. Interestingly, even in a village with such extreme vertical control Ishaq’s formal position as a state official quickly made him an alternative channel of access to state resources. His powers were conferred on him in 2005 and by 2007 most people were naming him as their primary intermediary for demands related to school management, street paving and sanitation works. However, when it comes to access to the police and courts and village-based dispute resolution, the social power of the maalik counts for more than the formal authority bestowed on the naim. This is also true for the basis of participation of people in the one large vote bloc in the village for national elections. Many of my respondents pointed out that most people are part of this vote bloc because they still think of
themselves as the reiaya of the maalik, whom they continue to refer to as their “maee baap”.97

5.2.2. Badhor

Badhor is a small village of only 110 households in the same union council as Tiwanabad but which was not part of the original estate. It is a Proprietary village that is also remote but unlike Tiwanabad, it was not a zamindari grant. In fact, it was hard to decide whether it was a bhaichara or a lineage pattidari grant. Like bhaichara villages it is dominated by one large biraderi, the Badhor, which constitutes 40 percent of the population and much of its land. However, like pattidari villages, it was originally settled in two separate pattis of the majority Badhor biraderi and minority Basra biraderi, which only accounts for 7 percent of the village population. Also like pattidari villages, each patti has a separate lambardar, a position that in Badhor is hereditary. While the Badhor are the demographic majority and have more landholdings, the Basra have invested in education and urban employment, and have used this remittance income to become the wealthiest group within the village with the four largest individual landholdings.

Badhor has no large landlord and was settled as a village of small peasant proprietors. The colonial Inspection Report lists it as a village of 457 acres that were owned by 49 different landowners. All of this land, however, is owned by members of either the Badhor or Basra biraderis, while the remaining 53 percent of the population — a mix of about 14 other biraderis — is landless and dependent on these two main biraderis for agricultural labour, or for access to land in the case of ten tenant households. Agricultural output in the village, however, has suffered because of the poor quality of land and a shortage of irrigation water, since the village is at the tail end of the canal. A large proportion of the village has opted to join the army because of this — 20 percent of the households were either in, or retired from, the army at the time of our census — while the more influential families of the two main biraderis have recently used barren land and remittance income to start fish farms on which they employ village residents.

97 Literally, ‘mother and father’. Used to refer to a father figure.
Though the main lambardari is now with the Badhor, it is the minority Basra that are politically dominant. There is only one vote bloc in the village that is led by the largest landowner of the Basra biraderi, Mian, who owns 75 acres. Mian is a senior officer in the state highways department and lives in Sargodha city. The vote bloc encompasses almost all groups within the village, many of who claimed to be actively involved in the decision-making process within the vote bloc. Together the various biraderis have chosen to support the PML-N in the last few elections. Voters identified three main reasons for being in the vote bloc. Half the village — the Badhors and Basras — identified kinship as their reason for participation. The other half was split between two types — those that were dependent on the leading Badhor and Basra families for employment on their lands and fish farms, and those that said that these families provided their only access to state officials because of Mian’s job within the bureaucracy.

The head of the Basra biraderi ran as part of Tiwana’s panel and became the deputy nazim in the 2001 local government election. Even during Ishaq’s election in 2005 Badhor as a village voted for Tiwana’s candidate, even though their own head was no longer a candidate. This was based largely on the access to senior offices within the state, especially in the provincial capital Lahore, that Tiwana is able to provide to the heads of Badhor’s main biraderis. A comparison between Tiwanabad and Badhor makes the impact of historical inequality amply obvious. Both villages are Proprietary and have restricted access to urban employment and services, but the difference in the size and form of their original land settlements has meant that whereas Tiwanabad is a vertical village still dominated to a large extent by one man who has used his landed wealth to gain political influence, Badhor is more horizontal, and its elite have little political influence even within the union and have increasingly moved into non-agricultural professions.

5.2.3. Chak 1

Chak 1 is a Crown village that lies 18 kilometres from the tehsil town Sillanwali, and it is the most unequal of my sample of three Crown case villages. It was leased as a sufedposh, or yeomen, grant in 1902 to three families of agricultural castes from three different villages. Two of these families brought five mares each while
the third brought seven mares and was granted about 390 acres, and was also
nominated to the office of the lambardar by the colonial state. A number of other
families came with one mare each. Like other Crown villages, Chak 1 became home
to a number of unrelated landowners, or chaudhries, from different biraderis.

The largest landowner and lambardar was made responsible by the colonial state
for functions such as revenue collection, management of the common land and fund
of the village, informal dispute resolution and an overall representation of the
community in negotiations with the colonial district administration on issues such as
land and revenue assessments. While the maaliks of Sahiwal and Tiwanabad were
the main intermediaries between the state and village residents because of their
social authority, the lambardars of Crown villages had this authority vested in them
formally by the state. However, given the almost equal distribution of land between
different families in Chak 1, the authority of the lambardar was constrained and had
to be exercised in consensus with the larger group of chaudhries. Therefore, the
village was more horizontal in its authority structure.

Nevertheless, the chaudhries were able to amass economic, social and political
authority based on a number of elements of control. They controlled almost the
entire land of the village collectively. Thus, they were able to use economic
sanctions to regulate rights of tenancy and agricultural employment, as well as the
share of tenants and seips. This ownership and control has remained largely
unchanged for two reasons. First, like Tiwanabad, the remoteness of Chak 1 means
that there has been little upward mobility or accumulation of wealth amongst small
landowners and other quoms. Second, the size of landownings was below the
ceilings set by both the 1959 and the 1972 land reforms so that the only change in
landholdings has come from land fragmentation within families. However, a much
greater element of control came from their ownership of homestead land. Like all
Crown villages, Chak 1 was a planned settlement that divided the village into four
large residential blocks within a perfect square intersected by two perpendicular
streets. Three of these blocks were each assigned to the three large landowning
family, while the fourth was divided between the smaller landowners. Since each
family had been expected to bring their own kammis and musallis (artisans and
servants) at the time of settlement, these were settled on the periphery of the
residential block of their “owner”. Kammis were even given two acres of agricultural land per family while musallis received nothing. This pattern of residential settlement meant that both kammi and musalli castes were dependent on the person whose land they lived on. The threat of evictions was always high, and as one kammi respondent put it, “our lives were governed by the phrase, ‘collect your things and leave immediately’”. Given the level of collusion between the chaudhries, the evictee could not settle in any other block and an eviction meant that they would have to leave the village.

The chaudhries used their economic power to maintain social and political control of the village. All disputes were resolved by them and they made all political decisions amongst themselves and then announced these at an akhat to their kammis and musallis. The fact that their kammis and musallis could choose differently was inconceivable. Despite the apparent cohesion between them vis-à-vis other castes, the network of chaudhries was essentially unstable and deeply factional. Decades of fighting over various economic arrangements — mainly irrigation water — had led to the current lambardar describing the other main landowning family to us as their “traditional enemy”. The chaudhries, therefore, did not have the singular authority of the maaliks of Sahiwal and Tiwanabad, and this was reflected in village politics. The village has two main vote blocs. The first, with about 56 percent of the votes, is led by the lambardar and includes all the zamindar biraderis along with their dependent kammis and musallis. The second, with about 37 percent of the votes, is an extremely unusual vote bloc in that it is made up almost entirely of the kammi and musalli population that lives in the ‘colony’.

As mentioned earlier, in the 1970s the Bhutto government turned state land in villages into residential schemes of small plots that were distributed amongst kammi and musalli groups in order to reduce their homestead-based dependence on maaliks and chaudhries. In Chak 1 this 5-marla scheme came to be called the ‘colony’, and with its establishment “colony politics” came to Chak 1. Kammi and musalli families that moved to the colony, unlike those that remained in the main village settlement, were no longer dependent on the chaudhries for residence. At the same time, the development of a stone-crushing industry near the village gave the poor of Chak 1 an alternative source of daily wage employment away from the chaudhries’
lands. With these two sources of dependence reduced, colony residents no longer saw a reason to align under the chaudhries, under whom they had merely cast votes and received nothing in return. Instead, under the leadership of a landless member of a zamindar biraderi, Nawaz, and a musalli, Ali, colony residents organised their own faction and created their own links with the same political candidate that the chaudhry vote bloc was aligned with. In this they were supported, but not led, by the “traditional enemy” of the lambardar, a major landowner of over 100 acres. In both the 2001 and 2005 elections Ali was elected as a councillor to the union council. As one chaudhry put it to me, “we never thought we would have to see the day a musalli would rise to this position in the village. People in other villages are talking about this and it reflects very badly on the influence of us chaudhries. People are wondering how we could have let this happen”. Ali’s nomination and consequent election by colony residents is seen by both sides as a mark of “rebellion” against the chaudhries, who are perceived to have blocked all service delivery to the colony in the past. A particularly bad blow, the lambardar said, was when he found out that even his own manager had voted for Ali, and as part of Nawaz’s vote bloc during the national elections. “The colony has a ‘Bangladesh mentality’”, he said. “They are now in open rebellion against us and want to do everything themselves”. Not surprisingly, when a recent extension to the colony was approved by the state, its implementation was blocked by the chaudhries.

Chak 1 has a greater quom-based social polarisation than any of the other case study villages. This has resulted in the development of a class consciousness on the part of the lower quoms, who see few ties between themselves and the chaudhries and describe village life in terms of “us” versus “them”. As another councillor candidate from the colony explained, while discussing a kammi who is in the chaudhries’ faction, “we may be totally opposed to one another when it comes to politics, but as far as the poor versus the zamindars are concerned, we are complete allies in terms of our efforts to protect the interests of the colony”. In complete contrast to Sahiwal and Tiwanabad, where class identity is far less developed in the quest to build

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98 This candidate is extremely strong and influential in Sargodha politics, with a good record for service delivery, and is one of only a handful of national politicians that has never lost an election since the 1980s.

99 Bangladesh, previously East Pakistan, separated from West Pakistan in 1971 after a civil war and a protracted movement for independence.
vertical links with the *maalik*, or in Badhor, where the lack of historical socio-economic power has allowed consensual politics to develop, life in Chak 1 is defined by class-based polarisation and confrontation.

5.2.4. Chak 2

Chak 2 is a Crown village that lies about 10 kilometres from Sargodha city, and is a *ghoripal* settlement in which land was granted to ten families of different *biraderis* who came here with one mare each when the land was originally settled. Land was, therefore, equally divided between these ten *chaudhry* families but the rest of the village population was landless. Eight of these original ten families were from the same village in Khushab district, close to the ancestral village of the Tiwana tribe. The great grandfather of the current *lambardar* was related to Malik Khuda Baksh Tiwana, one of the first Tiwanas to get a large estate grant in Sargodha district. Through Malik Tiwana’s intervention the ancestor asked the colonial state for a *lambardari* of a new Crown village in return for bringing mare-owning families from his village to settle and cultivate it. He was given Chak 2 and its *lambardari*, even though he brought with him only one mare like everyone else. This position was considered hereditary\(^{100}\) and the great grandson, Rabba, is still the *lambardar*. His current functions include collecting the *abiana* (irrigation tax) and *malia* (agricultural produce tax) according to a list maintained and provided by the *patwari*, for which he receives 3 percent of the total amount collected as a commission.

Chak 2 is a village made up of about 50 different *biraderis*, of which the largest are the *muslim sheikhs* (24 percent) and two *zamindar biraderis*, the Awans (15 percent) and Khokhars (10 percent). The *lambardar* is from the Khokhar *biraderi*. The village encompasses about 80 squares\(^{101}\) of land in total. Of these 20 squares are the original *ghoripal* grants,\(^{102}\) 40 squares are either barren or occupied by the village settlement, the roads and pathways, and the remaining 20 squares is owned

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\(^{100}\) A *lambardari* was not by law hereditary but has functioned in this way in most villages.

\(^{101}\) About 2000 acres. Each square equals 24 acres in this area.

\(^{102}\) As explained earlier, each *ghori* (mare) was worth 2 squares (48 acres), and this village was a '10-ghori chak'.
by the Sargodha Municipal Corporation that is rented out to various families on short-term leases.\textsuperscript{103} Descendants of all ten original grantees still live in the village, and no one landowner owns more than 55 acres now. The lambardar’s family has been able to increase its landholdings from the original 2 squares to 5.5 squares (130 acres) through purchases, but this is divided between three siblings. After the original grants the colonial government cancelled some ghoris, which means that the lease of land to a grantee family was revoked because the mares they maintained were found by regular inspections to be in poor health. The lambardar intervened on their behalf with the colonial state and eventually had these leases restored to the families.

One of these was the Syed family of local pirs, who now organise one of the village’s two vote blocs. The other is organised and led by the Khokhar lambardar. These two vote blocs divide the village almost equally between them and are bitterly opposed to one another, even though they usually connect up to the same electoral candidate. For the local government elections of 2005 both vote blocs put up a candidate for the union nazim’s office — the lambardar’s younger brother in the case of the Khokhar vote bloc, and the pir himself in the case of the Syed vote bloc. The pir won.

As far as national elections are concerned, the lambardar explained, “I am a PPP supporter at heart but the PPP candidate here is very weak and so I see no point in wasting my vote on him. I won’t get anything from him. We play the political game for survival, and to get what we can for our people, and not for ideology. If we don’t try and grab what we can like this, it’s not as though the state will deliver on its own.” Therefore, both factions chose to support the same PML-Q candidate in 2002.\textsuperscript{104} However, when the candidate visited the village close to the election, he ignored Rabba and went only to visit the pir. To hurt him Rabba had his faction poll all their votes for the MMA\textsuperscript{105} candidate. The PML-Q candidate was sure to call on

\textsuperscript{103} The law stipulates that any state land within 10 miles of the city cannot be leased out for more than 5 years at a time.
\textsuperscript{104} The same one that was supported by the two factions of Chak 1, who is highly regarded for his strong record of public service delivery.
\textsuperscript{105} A coalition of various religious parties that managed in 2002 to form a government in the Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa province.
him the next time round and so Rabba announced that in the 2008 election he would have his vote bloc support him. In return, he asked for the road to Sargodha city to be repaired, a veterinary hospital to be built, and electricity and gas provided to the village. Rabba explained, “he has promised to deliver all of this so we’ll vote for him. Besides, there are a few land issues stuck in the courts which he can help us resolve if we support him”.

Rabba’s hold over his vote bloc, however, is weak. The proximity to Sargodha city and the landlords’ own limited landholdings means that most people are not economically dependent on Rabba or the pir. Both leaders said that a large portion of the village’s voters swing between the two vote blocs, which are extremely unstable. Rabba’s vote bloc claimed 400 votes in the 1997 national elections and 700 in the 2002 elections, while the pir’s side said it had 800 votes in the 1997 election and only 400 in 2002. The fact that about 300-400 voters changed their membership from one election to the next shows the lack of power and authority of the chaudhries, even though it is a Proprietary village that was historically unequal. Rabba was able to identify some biraderis that he knew were “undependable swing voters. They proclaim publicly to be with us but we are never sure which side they are really voting on”. However, he suspected that many others were also moving between vote blocs from one election to the next and that both sides had become increasingly unsure of voters’ alignments over the past few years. Other respondents in the village hinted that villagers take advantage of the animosity between the two vote bloc leaders and actively play them against one another to gain greater leverage for themselves.

Our household interviews revealed that Rabba and the pir had an accurate count of their support, and that indeed about 63 percent of the village had voted as part of Rabba’s vote bloc in the 2002 election and the rest had aligned with the pir. From the point of view of the voters, they aligned with either of the two leaders for one main reason — the expectation of service delivery and access to the state, especially the police. However, their link with the leaders is not individual or direct. Instead, they first come together either as biraderis or as a neighbourhood — which is this

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106 In fact, he asked if our surveys could possibly help figure out people’s political alignments. Needless to say, no information was shared with him.
village is considered a class-based collectivity since the three main classes, upper, middle and lower, live in different parts of the village — and then decide collectively which of the two leaders to align with. That depends on how much each can promise them, which in turn depends on how much each leader has been able to negotiate with the electoral candidate. This means that any bargain that the leader is able to strike with the candidate has to be made public in order to gain support. Interestingly only 2.5 percent of the village supported the pir based on his spiritual standing.

People were equally ambivalent about the leaders’ social power, especially when it came to dispute resolution within the village. Some people claimed that since the pir and Rabba would never sit on the panchayat together, the members of each one’s faction go to them to resolve problems. If the dispute is between members of the two different factions, they go to the police. While we were in the village one of Rabba’s kardars was caught stealing on the pir’s side of the village. Both sides refused to talk to one another about this and insisted on resolving it only through formal channels. Others, however, claimed that since Rabba was the hereditary lambardar, whose responsibility it was to resolve disputes, all village issues, including those of the pir’s faction members, go to him for resolution.

While Chak 1 is completely fractionalised in its politics on the basis of a class division, Chak 2, like the other urban, unequal village Sahiwal, is separated between two equal landowners whose internal rivalry has split the village in half. However, the social authority of the maaliks of Sahiwal, a Proprietary village, is largely unquestioned and pervasive. This is not the case in Chak 2 where any authority that the chaudhries have been able to retain is based on their ability to cultivate connections with electoral candidates and state officials, and to negotiate with them on behalf of their village voters.
5.2.5. Chak Migrant

Chak Migrant is a Crown village of about 280 households that lies close to Chak 1, and is also over 18 kilometres from the tehsil town Sillanwali. It was originally a village of Sikh infantry grantees who had come here from various districts of East Punjab, including Ambala. According to the colonial Inspection Report, the land grants in this village were small and varied between one and two squares. The village was abandoned in 1947 when the entire population migrated to East Punjab, and a new set of Muslim migrant settlers, incidentally once again from Ambala district, came to claim it in compensation for the land that they left behind. The complete replacement of its population by migrants meant that Chak Migrant was significantly different in its social and authority structures from the adjacent Chak 1, which had always been a Muslim village and so saw no change of population in 1947.

About 60 percent of the population of Chak Migrant came from the same village — Raiwali in Narainger tehsil of District Ambala in East Punjab. They are all from the Rajput biraderi and claim to be the 11th generation of a single forefather, Rai Maigh Singh. They are divided across four main kumbahs (extended families) in the village. In 1947 the elders of these kumbahs were given a choice of places to settle and they chose the relatively prosperous, completely abandoned, agricultural village of Chak Migrant, which had fertile land and an abundant supply of water at the time. Land was allotted on the basis of the amount of land each household had owned in Raiwali. As it turned out, the four kumbahs had owned more land there than was available in Chak Migrant and its adjacent villages. Therefore, these families were also allotted land in Districts Jhang, Narowal and Sheikhpura. Although their landholdings were spread out across Punjab, the families decided to reside together in Chak Migrant. Population pressure over time, however, has forced some families to relocate to their other landholdings. Much after the initial flow of migrants in 1947, a small group of unrelated migrant Rajputs from Chak Jhansa in District Karnal of East Punjab came to the village, and though they were given residential land in the village, they were allotted landholdings in the adjacent Chak 38. Other groups in Chak Migrant include a large minority of Gujjars — migrants from Chak Cheemay in Sanam tehsil of District Patiala in East Punjab — who are
also all from the same lineage group. Other than the Gujjars, there is a small population of kammis who came to this village as the artisans of the Rajput kumbahs in 1947.

As a result of this settlement pattern groups in Chak Migrant identify themselves first in terms of lineage and then in terms of kumbahs. The social structure of Chak Migrant is relatively horizontal, and looks like an inverted pyramid. At the top are the demographically dominant Rajputs, almost all of whom are small landowners. They are also the economically and socially dominant group within the village. Below them is a small middle tier made up of the zamindar Gujjar, Arain and Jat biraderis, all of whom together constitute about 23 percent of the population. The remaining 17 percent of the village population is made up of the various kammi biraderis who make up the lowest tier, but who own more land here than the members of the same biraderis do in any of the other five case study villages. This social structure, together with the relatively more equal distribution of land amongst the population, has led to the lack of concentration of both land and authority in the hands of a powerful individual, family or group. This authority is, instead, vested in and exercised by a panchayat that is comprised of the various kumbahs of the Rajputs and the other lineage groups. Authority within the panchayat is equally shared and no one individual or family is able to dominate it. All economic arrangements, dispute resolution and sanctions are determined by this fairly horizontal social organisation. This panchayat is also where the village’s voting decisions are discussed until a consensus is reached and a decision is announced to the village.

The panchayat has, however, often been factionalised by contentious issues, and is dominated by the four Rajput kumbahs. Rana, the wealthiest and most educated member of the Rajput families, dominates both this forum, as well as the village’s political life. Vote bloc organisation in the village, however, is fluid and unstable. For the 2001 local government elections there were two vote blocs in the village that divided the village in half during a period of active electoral competition. In the 2005 local government elections, however, the whole village came together to vote for the same candidates. In the 2002 national elections the village also split in half, though both vote blocs ended up supporting the same PML-Q candidate. One vote
bloc was made up largely of the Rajput *kumbahs*, while the other vote bloc brought together a mix of all the other *biraderis*, including the *kammis*, without an identifiable leader to organise them. 31 percent of the village chose to not align themselves with either side and voted independently for various candidates.

This competition and sporadic factionalism is based almost entirely on different people’s political preferences for different politicians, rather than on class or *quom* polarisation. Various village residents have established independent linkages with local and national level politicians, and it is the strength of this relationship that determines how many vote blocs will form within the village for a given election. Either way, the decision is taken at the *panchayat*, which, despite an inherent hierarchy based on the dominance of the Rajput *biraderi*, is a functional institution that provides the main forum for public governance in the village. The lack of land inequality and historical social authority, coupled with the homogeneity of the village, has meant that no group has effective socio-economic control over any other group, and that the power of the main political organiser, Rana, is based instead on his acquired wealth, education and his political dynamism, especially in terms of his ability to develop and maintain close contacts with various electoral candidates and public officials.

5.3. Varying Politics

I do not attempt a systematic and detailed pair-wise comparison in this section. However, the previous section highlights certain features of political organisation in the five case villages that allow for some simple comparisons to be made between certain pairs. In selecting comparable pairs I do not include Proprietary and Crown villages within the same pair simply because they are so different from one another. Comparisons are far more interesting when conducted between pairs that are similar in all respects save one. For this reason I construct and compare pairs using a simple logic — that each pair should differ from one another on only one of the three variables along which we sampled. Tiwanabad and Badhor provide a natural pair along the inequality axis. They are both Proprietary villages that lie close to one another within the same UC and are over 25 kilometres from the *tehsil* town Shahpur. Sahiwal, which is only 6 kilometres from Shahpur, forms a good pair with
Tiwanabad along the distance axis. Similarly, Chak 1 and Chak Migrant form a natural pair lying close to one another about 18 kilometres from the tehsil town Sillanwali and within the same UC, while Chak 1 and Chak 2 are comparable as two unequal Crown villages. Table 5.2 presents these pairs.

Table 5.2. Pair-wise comparisons of six villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pair</th>
<th>Village 1</th>
<th>Village 2</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Similarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sahiwal</td>
<td>Tiwanabad</td>
<td>Both Proprietary (zamindari)</td>
<td>Both unequal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tiwanabad</td>
<td>Badhor</td>
<td>Both Proprietary (zamindari)</td>
<td>Both remote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chak 1</td>
<td>Chak Migrant</td>
<td>Both Crown</td>
<td>Both remote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chak 1</td>
<td>Chak 2</td>
<td>Both Crown</td>
<td>Both unequal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pair 1: Sahiwal and Tiwanabad are both villages that came into being as Proprietary, zamindari, unequal colonial estate grants. To this day they are led by descendants of the original grantees whose authority has been challenged at various points but who have managed to retain socio-economic influence over the village and still lead large, singular vote blocs. However, Sahiwal’s proximity to Shahpur town has meant that its middle tier residents have managed to access jobs outside the village and have become more independent of the maalik through the accumulation of wealth and land. This middle tier is missing in remote Tiwanabad, where the power of the maalik is visibly more oppressive. In terms of politics this has meant that while more voters now align with the maalik of Sahiwal because of patronage, voters in Tiwanabad still consider themselves the reiaya (subjects) of the maalik.

Pair 2: Tiwanabad and Badhor lie close to one another within the same union council and are both remote, Proprietary villages. However, the similarity between them ends there. The fact that one was a zamindari estate while the other was a small bhaichara or pattidari village means that the two are completely different in their internal power dynamic and social structure. Compared to Tiwanabad’s vertical social structure and its maalik’s oppressive social control, Badhor has a horizontal social structure in which one patti has demographic majority while the other is economically dominant. Therefore, politics in Badhor is characterised by
consensus and cooperation, while in Tiwanabad it is still based on coercion and the fear of sanctions.

Pair 3: Chak 1 and Chak Migrant lie close to one another and are both remote, Crown villages. However, while Chak 1 was settled as a sufedposh village in which three families received a lease to most of the village land, and in which 1947’s partition between India and Pakistan caused no upheaval, Chak Migrant went through a complete re-settlement process post-1947 in which over 60 percent of the village population received access to land. This has resulted in a horizontal social structure in Chak Migrant led by a consensual panchayat. On the other hand, the marginalisation of the village population by the landed chaudhries in Chak 1 has resulted in a class-based political confrontation that has completely polarised the village.

Pair 4: Chak 1 and Chak 2 are both historically unequal Crown villages in which land was given to a few families that owned and bred mares for the British cavalry. Both villages are divided between two factions that are bitterly opposed to one another. However, the nature of the divide is completely different in both villages. The remoteness of Chak 1 has meant that the village population was dependent on the landowners until recently when stone-crushing jobs became available nearby. This intensified both their interaction and their subsequent political conflict, which arose out of extreme deprivation and marginalisation. On the other hand, Chak 2’s proximity to Sargodha city meant that dependence on landowners was always low, and leaders in the village have had to negotiate voter support through service delivery and personal favours.

These comparisons reveal that when villages differ from one another along any of the three axes of variation — village type, historical land inequality and distance — their politics and the voting behaviour of their populations end up varying along significant dimensions. For example, both the villages close to a town — Sahiwal and Chak 2 — differ from the others in that they have vote blocs that are primarily formed around clientelistic ties between leaders and voters, while both the villages that were historically equal — Badhor and Chak Migrant — are different from all others because they have vote blocs that are organised around horizontal ties of
kinship, with clientelism as a close but secondary basis. Table 5.3 provides additional information on variation and comparisons along some key dimensions of political organisation in each of the case study villages. In order to make sense of this variation and to be able to ascertain whether the three variables along which these villages differ from one another are indeed significant predictors of the nature of politics and voting behaviour, I need to devise measurements for voting behaviour and then test these rigorously against the three variable. I do this next in Chapter 6, based on the dimensions listed below in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3. Dimensions of political organisation in six villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Proprietary</th>
<th>Crown</th>
<th>Chak 1</th>
<th>Chak 2</th>
<th>Chak Migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Number of vote blocs in each village</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Number of votes controlled by each vote bloc*</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>VB 1**: 52%</td>
<td>VB 2: 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Vote bloc stability between two elections of the same level</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Basis of formation of vote bloc</td>
<td>Socio-economic authority &amp; clientelism</td>
<td>Socio-economic authority</td>
<td>Kinship and clientelism</td>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Clientelism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Participation of lowest caste group in landlords’ vote blocs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Process of electoral decision-making at the time of each election</td>
<td>Announced by maalik</td>
<td>Announced by maalik</td>
<td>Deliberated decision</td>
<td>VB1: non-deliberative</td>
<td>VB2: deliberated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Population proportion of the caste to which the vote bloc leader belongs</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>VB1: 10%</td>
<td>VB2: 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Extent of overlap between vote bloc leaders and largest landlords</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>VB1: Full</td>
<td>VB2: None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The remaining in each village are non-bloc voters.
** VB1 is Vote Bloc 1. VB2 is Vote Bloc 2.

Before I move on to quantitatively test the associations between structural variables and village politics that this chapter highlighted, there are two other observations about vote bloc organisation that should be mentioned. The first has to do with variation in the number of people that vote as part of a vote bloc. Table 5.4 shows the percentage of people who are members of vote blocs in the six villages, and also shows the variation across levels of elections. It reveals four basic findings. First, as already mentioned, a majority of people in each village vote as part of a vote bloc. Second, this number varies across villages. The highest and the lowest number of non-bloc voters are all in Crown villages — Chak Migrant has the highest number of people that are not part of a vote bloc, while the deeply factionalised and
clientelistic Chak 2 has the lowest. Third, the number of non-bloc voters also varies across different levels of elections, with more votes being organised through vote blocs for parliamentary elections, and more people voting outside vote blocs in local government elections for union councillors. I will look at the profiles of non-bloc voters in more detail in Chapter 7 to see if there may be some correlation between the attributes of a household and its ability to make electoral decisions independently of a vote bloc.

Table 5.4. Percentage people voting as part of a vote bloc

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sahiwal</th>
<th>Tiwanabad</th>
<th>Badhor</th>
<th>Chak 1</th>
<th>Chak 2</th>
<th>Chak Migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNA elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2002)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union nazim elections (2005)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union councilor elections (2005)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second observation has to do with service delivery. Though I do not look at service delivery as a variable that may be affected by the pattern of political organisation in this dissertation, some basic observations based on the case study villages can be made. The villages with the highest service delivery — in terms of functioning schools, paved streets and lanes, and sanitation drains — are Sahiwal, Badhor and Chak Migrant. Sahiwal’s service delivery is usually explained as the result of the *maalik* Naib’s enlightenment and the political networking and dynamism of its independent, active and vocal middle tier of small landowners. Badhor and Chak Migrant have a common reason — high social cohesion within a horizontal social structure with a consensus on the need for service delivery. Supported by their networks both the leaders — Mian and Rana — have cultivated links within the bureaucracy and with politicians, and have prioritised service delivery in their negotiations with the latter. Chak 2 comes next in terms of public provision. The village is well provided but the factionalism in the village has resulted in both street paving and sanitation being targeted to certain neighbourhoods only.

Tiwanabad and Chak 1 occupy the lowest tier. Before Ishaq’s election in 2005 Tiwanabad did not have a single paved street nor any sanitation drains. The main road into the village led straight to Tiwana’s front gate, at the outer edge of the
village, and stopped there. The rest of the village had only unpaved streets. After his election work started on both street paving and a sanitation system and was underway when we visited in 2007. However, the construction work stopped conspicuously at the entrance to the muslim sheikh neighbourhood. Chak 1, on the other hand, has remained completely under-provided. The village does not have a single drain or paved street, and has low-quality schools with an extreme shortage of teachers. This was the result of social polarisation. The chaudhries said they had requested their political candidate but received nothing, possibly because he was aware they no longer had any control over a large portion of the village vote. The poor in the colony, on the other hand, claimed that the political candidate himself had confirmed to them that the chaudhries blocked every scheme that he approved for the village, possibly to punish them for their rebellion. The class-based politics of the village had delivered few benefits to the village. The cases of these two villages seem to suggest that both extremely vertical relations of dependence and voluntary horizontal networks based on a class identity are detrimental for service provision in rural Punjab. This, however, is the subject of a separate investigation.

**Conclusion**

The longitudinal analysis presented in Chapter 4 and the cross-sectional one presented in this chapter start to clarify and nuance the generalised ideas about voting behaviour that I discussed in Part I. We now know that political organisation can vary significantly across villages that lie close to one another within the same district. We also know that there seems to be some association between this variation and the three structural variables — village type, inequality and distance — along which we had sampled case villages. Each time I held two of these constant and changed one, I found that politics varied. Tiwanabad is an unequal, remote, Proprietary village that has the most vertically organised politics with high levels of coercion and sanctions still in use. At the other end, Chak 64 is an equal, migrant Crown village where politics is consensual and many voters are not part of vote blocs at all. Voting behaviour in the three other villages vary in different ways between these two polar cases. Villages that are unequal are organised in ways that resemble one another and are different from villages that are equal. Similarly,
remote villages share certain dimensions of political organisation but behave differently from villages that are close to towns.

However, the association between these structural variables and the way vote blocs are organised needs to be tested in a much more rigorous and systematic manner to see whether they are indeed significant predictors of the nature of politics and voting behaviour. Equipped now with a clearer idea of how villages are organised politically, and along which dimensions vote blocs and relationships between leaders and members may vary, I now move on in Part III to construct measures for voting behaviour so that I may systematically test its correlation with the three structural variables, as well as with other possible explanatory factors. I devise the measures in Chapter 6 and run the statistical tests in Chapter 7.
PART III

The Household and its Village Context
BARGAINING WITH LANDLORDS: 
CONCEPTUALISING VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN RURAL PUNJAB

Introduction

In Part I I looked at the various ways in which the voting behaviour of rural Punjabi voters has been described in the literature and argued that these are unable to give us a clear understanding because they use micro concepts that define relationships between individual actors to explain macro political phenomena. I highlighted the need to recast these ideas at the micro level as relationships that exist between vote bloc leaders and their members in order to better understand the voting behaviour of rural citizens. In this chapter I deal with the need highlighted in Part I by looking in turn at what my data reveals about the nature of vote blocs, the profiles of their leaders and members, and their linkages with one another in 35 villages.

Based on the analysis in Part I I had hypothesised the types of linkages I expected to see between local leaders and voters — that I would find few voters that are in relations of complete economic dependence with their local landlords, and that both kinship and clientelism would be more important determinants of voting behaviour. I had also hypothesised that despite the recent optimism that party-based identification and voting may be returning to Pakistani electoral politics, I expected to find very few such linkages in rural Punjab. To see whether these hypotheses are valid, I devise detailed measures in this chapter to capture variation in the nature of vote blocs and in the linkages between leaders and members in a systematic and consistent manner. Using these measures I find that these hypotheses are valid and that most voters, 86 percent, participate in vote blocs because of ties of kinship and “broker” clientelism.

The measurements of leadership, membership and linkage are straightforward and are based on survey questions. Vote blocs, however, are difficult to measure. Even more difficult to measure is the extent of bargaining power that voters have as members of these vote blocs. A major contribution of this chapter is a composite
measure that I devise — an Index of Bargaining Power — on which I measure the extent to which voters are able to bargain with leaders in order to access public and private goods and services.

6.1. Defining Vote Blocs

The village stories in Part II have already introduced vote blocs in considerable detail. The fact that people in rural Punjab vote as members of vote blocs is now fairly obvious. However, it is important that I define these village-level political institutions more precisely so that we are able to separate them from other micro institutions and see precisely how they function. I do that in this section. In the next chapter I provide the details of the sampling strategy for the quantitative stage of this research. For the data presented in this chapter suffice it to say that it was collected using survey set B and that a total of 1572 households and about 70 key respondents were interviewed across 35 villages.

Vote blocs are territorially-bounded, informal institutions\textsuperscript{107} that are organised and led by local political brokers or intermediaries. Through these institutions the vote bloc leaders organise political action at the level of a village and recruit voters on different bases to make collective electoral decisions. Vote bloc members and leaders may identify with political parties but they are not organised by them. In all of these ways vote blocs are exactly the same as factions. However, I use the term ‘vote bloc’ and not ‘faction’ in this dissertation because of one important definitional requirement of the latter. Nicholas (1968) points out that factions are conflict groups, and as such, there must always be two or more competing factions within any given electoral contest or arena. However, as we observed in Sahiwal in 2007, it is possible for villages in rural Punjab to have just one large vote bloc that encompasses the whole village. In such cases, factional political conflict may not exist, but the vote bloc continues to organise political action nevertheless. Therefore, the term ‘vote bloc’ better.

\textsuperscript{107} In that they are not formally recognised as a political institution, but they are defined by norms and rules.
Other than this difference, vote blocs resemble Nicholas’ factions\textsuperscript{108} in every other way. According to him, these are groups that organise political relations and have little function outside politics\textsuperscript{109} (Nicholas 1968: 23). He also argues that a faction leader’s power is multi-faceted, and draws on different types of power — social (family and history), economic (dependence) and political (office plus connections) — and that leaders are central to understanding factions. There is a notion of “membership” in and “recruitment” to these groups in the broadest sense of the terms, and these can be based on a multitude of relations. He quotes Firth (1957) in making the point that factions can “rest upon kin ties, patron-client relations, religious or politico-economic ties or any combination of these” (Nicholas 1968: 29). He further clarifies that factions are not corporate groups, and that they lack permanence. However, they can persist over a long period of time, and variation in their stability and persistence can indicate the strength and dominance of their leaders.

Alavi (1973) argues that factions are the most pervasive form of political organisation in peasant societies, and since they cut across both class and caste, political and social cleavages in such societies do not always coincide. As such, factions, more than any other type of organisation, are central to an analysis of rural politics, and the process through which they are organised sheds a lot of light on power and social relations in rural areas. Alavi’s work is particularly useful in understanding faction membership. He uses Bailey’s (1969) concept of “core” and “follower”, who he quotes as saying, “the core are those who are tied to the leader through multiplex relationships: the bond with a follower is transactional and single interest” (1973: 45). Alavi differentiates between these as “an inner circle of retainers” and “an outer circle of followers”, and points out that “only if he [the leader] recruits followers on every possible basis, it is argued, can the leader mobilise adequate support” (1971: 112).

\textsuperscript{108} I use the term “faction” while I refer to literature that deals with this term specifically. Once I am done with the discussion of the literature, I will use the term vote bloc only.

\textsuperscript{109} Though he recognises that Lewis (1958) insists they have “important social functions outside politics” (Nicholas 1968: 23).
On election day most rural Punjabi voters arrive at the polling station having taken not individual decisions on who to vote for but collective decisions within vote blocs. Their vote, in most cases, reflects not how they identify with the candidate or the political party for which they cast the vote, but rather, their relationship with the leaders of the vote blocs of which they are members. Of the 1572 households I interviewed, 1243, or about 80 percent, openly identified themselves as members of a vote bloc, or *dhara* as they are locally called, in the 2002 election. The number was quite similar in the previous election in 1997 (Table 6.1). There was nothing immediately obvious that set apart the 21 percent that were not members of vote blocs — they did not live in a separate part of the village, did not belong to certain identifiable groups and were not part of a publicly known village conflict. However, I analyse this more rigorously in Chapter 7 to see if there may be certain factors that set apart this group of voters.

My data revealed that the most common number of vote blocs in a village for the 2002 election is two. Eight out of the 35 villages have only one vote bloc, 16 have two, 10 villages have three vote blocs each, and only one village has four. While those that have two or three vote blocs have no distinguishing characteristics, villages that have just one bloc share certain features in common. All except one were historically unequal in terms of land distribution, and five of them were *zamindari* villages very similar to Sahiwal and Tiwanabad in their authority and social structure. These five also had just one bloc in the 1997 election, so that this appears to be a general pattern of political organisation in these villages. The three other villages that also had a single vote bloc but were not *zamindari* villages had two blocs in the 1997 election that merged before the 2002 election for various reasons. The outlier village with four vote blocs was a unique and unusual consequence of a natural disaster, a flood that destroyed the main settlement of the village some decades ago and turned it into seven different small hamlets, each of which organised its own votes and then aligned with one or two of the other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloc voters</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-bloc voters</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
settlements. Since such a dispersed settlement pattern is extremely unusual in Sargodha the incidence of this high number of vote blocs does not form a major part of my analysis.

Vote blocs aggregate village votes and then connect upwards to a political party or electoral candidate. My data reveals that the trend is for each vote bloc to connect to a different candidate and political party. In only five out of the 27 villages with multiple vote blocs did more than one vote bloc connect to the same electoral candidate. Interestingly, the organisation of vote blocs often closely reflects changes in national-level politics. The fact that the 1997 election was essentially a two-party electoral contest between the PPP and the PML-N that became a three-way contest in 2002 with the emergence of the PML-Q under the Musharraf regime had an interesting impact on village politics. In nine out of the 35 villages an additional vote bloc appeared between the 1997 and the 2002 elections, and in all of these there was now at least one vote bloc associated with the new party. In my sample if a village has three vote blocs it almost invariably means that they are each aligned to one of the three main political parties, the PPP, the PML-N and the PML-Q. This finding seems to contradict Nelson’s (2002) argument that factions in rural Punjab are a reflection of local animosity and conflict, for it seems that there is evidence to suggest that vote blocs may be a reflection of national-level political divisions, and a possible strategy for risk reduction in gaining access to limited state resources. The greater the number of parties that a single village can connect to through vote blocs, the higher are the chances of being associated with the winning candidate, and therefore, the higher the probability of bringing some services to the village. This argument may not hold in the case of private good or targeted services that can be restricted in their use to the members of a particular vote bloc, such as the paving of streets in a particular neighbourhood only. However, if the service sought is a public good — such as a high school for girls or a road to the village — then it seems plausible to argue that multiple vote blocs connecting to different political parties may represent not local conflicts but the best strategy for ensuring delivery.

110 It was not necessarily always the new vote bloc that linked up to the new political party. In some cases an older vote bloc changed its affiliation to the new party, and the new vote bloc then linked up to the party that had been abandoned by the older vote bloc.
6.2. Profiling Vote Bloc Leaders

We know from the case studies in Part II that there is a substantial bit of variation in the nature of leadership. The vote bloc leaders of Sahiwal and Tiwanabad are large landlords who in the past controlled more than just the political decisions of the members of their vote blocs. Over time their control has been reduced due to various factors but their influence, both socio-economic and political, is still pervasive. On the other hand the leader of Badhor’s single vote bloc draws his influence largely from a network based on kinship ties, within which his own singular authority is circumscribed by horizontal social relationships. The leaders of Chak 1’s two vote blocs represent different class groups and draw their influence from class-based solidarity, while the influence of the two leaders in Chak 2 comes from their ability to negotiate public service delivery on behalf of their members. In Chak Migrant the influence of its one identifiable leader is underwritten by a village panchayat which makes political decisions through consensus. In six villages that lie close to one another within the same district the source of the political influence of vote bloc leaders varies from landlordism to class-based factionalism, and from clientelism to horizontal kinship networks.

In this section I aggregate a few facts about the profile of vote bloc leaders across the 35-village sample to gain a wider understanding of who these leaders are and what their political influence is usually based on. The 35 villages had 73 vote blocs between them, each with one leader. We were able to interview and collect information on 71 of these.\footnote{One refused to be interviewed, while another, who lives in Lahore, could not be contacted. Others who lived outside the village, mainly in Sargodha city or Lahore, were located and interviewed.} I found that despite the variation discussed above, these leaders had certain things in common. First, they were all male.\footnote{I, therefore, refer to them in the masculine through the rest of this dissertation.} Second, they were all landowners. 70 out of the sample of 71 leaders were landed. Within these, however, the size of the landholdings varied immensely from just two acres to 450 acres. 35 percent of them owned landholdings below the stipulated subsistence level of 12.5\footnote{Stipulated as subsistence level by the state and used in both the land reforms. The logic comes from a holding size that can be cultivated by a family with one pair of oxen.} acres while 27 percent owned in access of 50 acres. Despite the extent of this range it is still an important finding that in villages where the gini-
coefficient for land inequality is extremely high — 0.87 for the sample as a whole — all leaders save one fall within the 30 percent minority that owns land.\footnote{See Table A in Annex 1.3 for the distribution of land across the population of the 35 sample villages. Overall about 70 percent of the population is landless and 95 percent owns less than the subsistence level.}

65 of these 71 vote bloc leaders were also from VPB families and \textit{biraderis},\footnote{In Chapter 2 I had explained that these were the families and \textit{biraderis} to whom the colonial state had originally given land rights.} and all except one — the single landless vote bloc leader — were from \textit{zamindar biraderis}. This means that most leaders are part of the village elite and that their political influence has a historical, social basis. When we asked respondents why a particular person was the head of their vote bloc, 46 percent said it was because he was the \textit{maalik} or the \textit{chaudhry} of the village — both terms used for members of the VPB (Table 6.2). 24 percent said it was because he was the largest landlord in the village, while another 12 percent said it was because he was the \textit{lambardar}. All three terms very often refer to the same person — it is common for the largest landlord to be considered the head of the village and to have inherited the position of the \textit{lambardar} from his forefathers, on whom its was bestowed by the colonial state. Together these three categories account for 82 percent of responses. The fact that people refer to these leaders using these different terms provides a valuable insight into what voters think is the basis of a leader’s political influence. Most importantly, only 24 of the total 82 percent think land is the predominant basis of vote bloc leadership. The rest believe that leadership is based on influence and authority that is accumulated over generations. Interestingly, only 3 percent think their leader derives his power from being the head of a particular \textit{biraderi}.

Table 6.2. Basis of leadership of vote bloc leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis of leadership</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maalik-Chaudhry (Head of village)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest landlord</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambardar</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government officer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biraderi</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically active and dynamic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician-candidate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall about 70 percent of the population is landless and 95 percent owns less than the subsistence level.
Competing nodes of authority and political leadership are emerging in some villages. Six of our vote bloc leaders were not from VPB *biraderis*, which implies that they came to prominence within the village later. Even though they were not originally granted any land we know from above that they acquired it at some point. One of them received land during Bhutto’s 1972 land reforms. A common reason for their rise to political prominence is their participation in local government elections in the 1980s or the 2000s, like Ishaq in Tiwanabad, or because they became politically active at some point to represent previously marginalised groups, such as Nawaz and Ali of Chak 1. The case of our only landless, non-*zamindar* leader is interesting. Anwar, who is from the *kammi* weaver *biraderi*, formed a third faction of 50 members of his extended family and *biraderi* just before the 2002 election and linked it to the new party, the PML-Q. The village had until then been dominated by two factions led by landowners from the same dominant *biraderi* that split the village in half and were aligned with the PPP and PML-N. In his household survey Anwar claimed to be led in his political alignment only by party identification, though he was possibly able to negotiate some gains for his vote bloc members that they may not have been to access through their membership in the two older blocs.

Such negotiated links, however, are not limited to new emerging leaders. 60 percent of respondents said the alignment between their vote bloc leader and the electoral candidate was a strategic election-time alliance that they forged through negotiations (Table 6.3). The way in which this usually happens is that either an electoral candidate will call on the vote bloc leader to offer to help the village with various issues — road construction, street paving, the upgrading of a school, cases stuck with the police or courts — in return for electoral support, or the vote bloc leader will get in touch with a candidate that he considers useful and offer him the votes he holds within his vote bloc. Either way, things are offered by both sides and a deal is struck without the candidate coming into contact with those that will eventually be voting for him or her on election day. The second most common alignment between leaders and candidates appears to be based on social links of friendship and having gone to the same schools in Sargodha city or Lahore. Only 7 percent of the respondents thought that their leader was aligned with the candidate because he identified with that particular party. Other alignments are based on links
of “traditional clientelism” between candidate-patrons and leader-clients, and only a total of 6 percent said that the alignment was based on familial, biraderi or religious links, or because they shared a common profession.

Table 6.3. Basis of alignment between vote bloc leader and candidate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis of alignment</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election-time strategic alliance</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends/classmates</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional clientelism</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same family</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote bloc leader is the candidate himself</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Peeri-mureedi</em> (Saint and disciple)</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same occupational group</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same <em>biraderi</em></td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We know now that vote bloc leaders are almost all landed, are from the zamindar caste, and that within this, almost always belong to VPB *biraderis*. Their political influence appears to be based on their ownership of land and the historical social dominance of their kin group. This conclusion may well provide evidence for the view that citizens in Punjabi villages vote as the dependents of the landed, and that they vote as they are told to rather than as they would like to. Indeed, if I had simply interviewed vote bloc leaders this is the impression that we would be left with. However, the focus of my investigation was not on vote bloc leaders but on voters. And voters have a very different idea about how and why they participate in vote blocs. The data I present in the next section reveals that the landed and social power of leaders may be an almost necessary but certainly not sufficient condition for leadership.

### 6.3. Unravelling Vote Bloc Membership

Alavi argues that in studying village politics, perspective matters. He points out:

“We find that the question [of member recruitment] appears very different…if we shift the perspective from that of the faction leader, for whom it may matter very little on what basis he recruits his followers, to that of the follower, who may be faced with a multiplicity of ties linking him with rival faction leaders, and who therefore has to make a choice” (1971: 112).

It is this choice identified by Alavi that a vote bloc member must make between leaders that I unravel and analyse in this section. I want to know which tie or
identity voters prioritise when choosing between vote blocs. I also want to know whether voters are actually free to choose between vote blocs and leaders. The answers to these questions require that we differentiate between types of members.

6.3.1. Four Ideal Types of Relationships

Alavi (1971 & 1973) distinguishes between members by looking at the linkages that they draw with vote bloc leaders, which he says are of two types — vertical and horizontal. Two types of members have vertical linkages: (a) those who are tied to the leader through ties of economic dependence, and (b) those who are tied to the leader through ties of patronage and protection. According to Alavi, these two types of members form the “core” of the faction, and they exercise little or no choice in deciding between different and possibly competing bases for membership. Their decision is made for them by their need for the particular vote bloc leader, either as an employer or a patron. Two other types of members have horizontal linkages: (a) those with primordial ties of lineage, tribe, religion, kinship or caste with the leader, and (b) those with more acquired ties of class solidarity, shared professions, or a common neighbourhood. These two types of members are the “followers” in a faction, who have more contractual, transactional relations with the leader, and therefore, have a higher degree of choice in deciding between different factions and leaders.

I take a slightly different approach to voter choice than does Alavi, for whom “core” members with vertical linkages have no choice while “follower” members with horizontal linkages have choice. I argue that within each type of linkages — vertical and horizontal — members have varying degrees of autonomy, which may affect their ability to choose between different and competing vote blocs and leaders, if these are available. My argument is based on the fact that voters have two types of relationships with vote bloc leaders: (a) socio-economic relationships whose logic is shaped in non-political spheres and structures, and (b) political relationships whose logic emanates purely from within the political sphere. I argue that voters with political relationships have more autonomy than those with socio-economic relationships with leaders outside the political arena. This approach allows us to separate between Alavi’s four types of actors above on the basis of autonomy.
Therefore, within the group of “core” members those that are economically dependent on the leader are less autonomous than those that are his clients. Similarly, within the group of “follower” members that are aligned with their own caste or kin group are less autonomous than those that forge alternate, voluntary ties with other members of their class, neighbourhood or profession.

I use this argument to construct the matrix in Table 6.4. The columns of the matrix distinguish voters with vertical linkages from those with horizontal linkages, as defined by Alavi. Vertical linkages exist between actors of unequal status while horizontal linkages exist between equals. The rows of the matrix set apart voters with political relationships, and thus more autonomy, from those with extra-political relationships, and thus less autonomy, as per my argument above. The interaction of type of linkage with autonomy gives us four ideal types of relationships between vote bloc leaders and members — socio-economic dependence, broker clientelism,ascriptive affinity and voluntary affinity. In practice voters’ reasons for participating in a particular vote bloc are rarely so easy to categorise, and may be based on any combination of these polar motivations described above. However, a stylised categorisation of a voter’s primary basis for participation in a vote bloc, captured through a set of survey questions, is tremendously useful in unravelling the complexity of voting behaviour in rural areas where voters have multifaceted relationships with local leaders and power holders. I explain each of the four ideal relationships below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.4. Four types of relationships between vote bloc leaders and voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vertical Linkage</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(unequal status)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Less Autonomy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. ASSCRIPTIVE AFFINITY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to this matrix, if a voter connects to a vote bloc leader vertically and the logic of their relationship is based on ties outside the political sphere, the voter will have little autonomy within the political sphere and the relationship between them is one of socio-economic dependence. In a rural context the most common example of this would be agricultural labourers employed by a large landlord who owns most of
the land around a village, thereby controlling most employment opportunities. Tenants, sharecroppers and even herders dependent on landlords for fodder may fall within this category of members. Furthermore, such a tie can also be based on dependence on the village elite for performing certain social functions, such as dispute resolution between kin or caste groups. This relationship includes the possibility of sanctions and punishment in the case of a member choosing to opt out of the vote bloc or join another one, and so the voter uses both membership and his/her vote to avoid sanctions. There is no notion of negotiation between member and leader, and the relationship is long-term and stable.

If, however, members connect vertically to the vote bloc leader but the relationship is primarily a political one, the voter will have greater autonomy and the relationship is one of broker clientelism. The most common example of this is a voter whose main aim is to gain access to a particular public good or service, such as an electricity connection. Such members use their votes and membership in a vote bloc to press the leader for the delivery of such services through their state connections. In this case members will choose the leader that they think is most capable or most willing to provide the good or service in question, and will then strengthen the leader’s political position by voting as part of his vote bloc, since a more powerful patron may mean greater access to state resources. This is a transactional relationship between two actors of unequal status (Powell 1970), based on negotiation and bargaining, and can be short-term and unstable (Archer 1990).

If vote bloc members connect horizontally to vote bloc leaders as equals and the logic of their relationship is based on ties outside the political sphere, the voter will have little autonomy and the relationship between them is one of ascriptive affinity, based on ties of family, kinship, caste or religion. Such voters align with a vote bloc leader out of a sense of social obligation. A typical example of this would include people who join a vote bloc either because it is led by a member of their own caste or kin group, or because it includes all other members of this group. This does not mean that the group has no practical use. For many voters such groups function as forums for collective action in which the leader builds links with state actors and institutions to represent the interests of the primordial group. However, a member’s autonomy is limited within such vote blocs by the fact that the ascriptive group,
usually *biraderi*-based, can enforce sanctions like social ostracism as the cost of defection or going against the collective will (Lefebvre 1999; Wakil 1970). This is a long-term and stable relationship that involves little negotiation.

If, however, vote bloc members connect horizontally to vote bloc leaders as equals but the relationship is primarily a political one, the voter will have greater autonomy and the relationship is one of *voluntary affinity*, based on class solidarity, shared occupations, common neighbourhoods\(^{116}\), or political party support. An example of such a tie would include all sharecroppers coming together under the leadership of another sharecropper who is willing to formulate and put forward a demand for changes in the tenancy arrangements in the village. It could also include all members of a certain profession, such as farmers or potters, coming together in a vote bloc to promote certain collective demands. This is basically a horizontal group without a corporate structure, and is a short-term, unstable relationship based on negotiation.

These four ideal types of relationships help us move considerably forward in our understanding of voting behaviour in rural Punjab by allowing us to separate between different types of voters within the same village, and indeed, the same vote bloc. Note that three of these four ideal types of relationships quite closely resemble the macro concepts of “feudalism”, *biraderi*-ism and clientelism used to discuss voting behaviour in Chapter 3, except that here they have been recast as micro, direct relationships between voters and leaders that lead to a more nuanced understanding of why voting behaviour may vary across households that live under the same structural constraints. The matrix shows that the same vote bloc can mean different things to different voters. While for some it is a manifestation of their economic dependence on a landlord, for others it is a forum for collective action. The simple fact of vote bloc membership tells us very little on its own about the level of dependence or freedom of a voter. I argue here that voting behaviour is determined to a large extent by the particular relationship that voters have with vote

\(^{116}\)There are two main types of residential patterns in Punjabi villages — mixed residence and segregated. Both types fit into quadrant D. In the first case neighbourhoods are so mixed that the only reason someone would identify it as a basis for vote bloc participation is if they had forged a voluntary residence-based political tie with their neighbours. In the second case, where residential segregation exists it is based on class rather than caste, especially in the form of the schemes of small homestead plots (the *5-marla* colonies) initiated by various governments to give homestead rights to the poor.
bloc leaders and the degree of agency they are able to exercise within this relationship, which is determined by the extent to which they are able to move out of relations of socio-economic dependence and ascriptive affinity.

6.3.2. Empirical Evidence

I had hypothesised at the end of Chapter 3 that I expected to find that few voters in rural Punjab would now be in relationships of socio-economic dependence with their local landlords (quadrant A in the matrix above), that both kinship and clientelism would be more important determinants of voting behaviour (quadrants C and B above) and that few voters would have built ties of voluntary affinity with fellow village residents (quadrant D above). I can now turn to my data to see what it tells me about these hypotheses. One of my household survey questions asked the 1572 respondents about the basis on which they participated in a vote bloc. The respondents were not prompted about primary or secondary bases, and interestingly, they invariably gave one answer to why they were members of a vote bloc. Table 6.5 tabulates the responses. According to these 35 percent of the respondents identified broker clientelism as the reason for their participation in a vote bloc (quadrant B). 51 percent identified reasons that fall within the category of ascriptive affinity — biraderi, biraderi-based alliances, family and religion (quadrant C). These two categories together account for 86 percent of our respondents. Only 7 percent said they were in a vote bloc because they feared sanctions from the village head if they opted out or because they were economically dependent on the landlord (quadrant A), and only another 6 percent said they participated because of voluntary affinity, such as party identification, same occupational group or same neighbourhood (quadrant D).
Table 6.5. Basis of participation of a household head in a vote bloc

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis of participation</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patron-client (service delivery)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biraderi alliance</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended family</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biraderi</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (including peeri-mureedi)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence on landlord</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of violence sanctions from village head</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational group</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to this, there are two main types of bloc voters in rural Punjab — those that become members because of an expectation of a tangible benefit, and those that identify socially, usually on the basis of kinship, with a horizontal network. Though the findings above could lead us to conclude that rural Punjabi voters are primarily led by primordial considerations of kinship, rather than clientelism, in their voting decisions, we need to be slightly cautious in accepting this result. If we take another look at the figures in Table 6.5 we would notice that 33 percent of those listed as kinship-based voters actually identified a biraderi-based alliance, rather than biraderi itself, as their basis of participation. The difference lies in the fact that while in the latter case the vote bloc would be composed of members of the biraderi, in the former case voters first organise on the basis of kinship within their own biraderis, and then the kin group provides the collective vote to the highest bidder, as it were, after a negotiation. Such voters organise as kin, but they participate in a vote bloc as clients. Looked at from above from the perspective of the leader, this is clientelism. Look at from below, from the perspective of the voter, it is ascriptive affinity. Perspective and the point at which data is collected, therefore, make all the difference in unravelling behaviour. Overall then this gives us about 68 percent of vote bloc members who are engaged in clientelistic behaviour. This fact also clarifies that biraderi-ism and broker clientelism can co-exist because while the first is usually a form of horizontal social organisation and collective action, the second is a strategy for accessing the state and public services.

In summary, we now have a much clearer and nuanced insight into voting behaviour in rural Punjab. Landed village elites with old social power organise vote blocs and about 80 percent of village residents participate in these. However, despite the
landed and social power of the leaders, most voters participate not because of socio-economic dependence but because they need access to a distant and unresponsive state and the leader is able to provide, or at least promise to provide, access to limited state resources. It seems in rural Punjab voters are striking bargains with landlords.

6.4. Operationalising Voting Behaviour and Bargaining Power

Voting behaviour is a complex subject, made even more so by multifaceted relationships between vote bloc leaders and members. Some members may have single-stranded ties with leaders based on employment. Others may have more multi-stranded ties, in which voters may need the leader to access state services, and at the same time, may also be from the leader’s kin group, possibly share his class status, and live in his neighbourhood. In choosing between vote blocs and leaders, I find from the discussion in the previous section that two main sets of logic appear to shape the voting behaviour of rural Punjabi voters. The first of these is the logic of rationality, which tells us that most voters, even those who do not exercise autonomous choice, are making rational decisions, as defined by Downs (1957). This, to a large extent, is the neglected factor in debates and research on these issues in Pakistan. In a context where most individuals are identified by others as belonging to one or more 'groups' (village, caste, clan, vote bloc), and elections are understood by electoral candidates dominantly to involve seeking the support of groups en bloc through their group leaders, 'rational' voters take their own ascriptive or potential group identities into account when making electoral decisions. If everyone expects them to support the vote bloc lead by their local landlord, is it not rational actually to support that landlord, independently of any considerations of dependency, because this will increase the landlord’s power and the chances that he will be able to use it to bring resources to the locality? Similarly, even if there is no local 'dominant', members of an egalitarian village may still support the collective choice of a group in which they participate, so as to (a) increase the electoral power of the group and, thus, attract more resources to the locality, and (b) ensure the future support and solidarity of the group if the individual suffers misfortune. Therefore, the fact that someone votes as part of a vote bloc tells us nothing on its
own about his/her level of dependence, because to be part of a vote bloc may simply be the rational choice.

The second logic that shapes voting behaviour is that of agency, which tells us that the ability of voters to make electoral choices are shaped by relationships within other, non-political spheres and structures. These extra-political relationships determine whether a voter and leader are of equal or unequal status — and will thus have vertical or horizontal linkages — and how much autonomy a voter has vis-à-vis the leader. Together these two dimensions tell us how much bargaining power a voter will have within a vote bloc in relation to the leader. This second logic allows a much clearer understanding of voter dependence, or its lack thereof.

The voting behaviour of rural Punjabi voters is defined by these two sets of logic and is, therefore, made up of three specific and nested aspects: (a) whether a voter is part of a vote bloc or not, (b) whether the linkage between the voter and the leader is vertical or horizontal, and (c) the extent of bargaining power that a voter has in relation to the leader. To explore variation in voting behaviour I, therefore, need to answer three questions:

1. Why are some voters more likely than others to join vote blocs? And why do more households join vote blocs in some villages than in others?
2. Of those that do join vote blocs, in what circumstances are their linkages to vote bloc leaders more likely to be vertical or horizontal? Again, why do some villages have more households with vertical relationships than others?
3. In what circumstances do voters generally have more bargaining power in relation to vote bloc leaders? And, why do households in some villages have more bargaining power than in other villages?

Each of these questions requires one household-level measure of voting behaviour and one village-level measure. I develop these six measures of voting behaviour as follows.

**Vote Bloc Membership**

I measure vote bloc membership using responses to a question from my household surveys that asked respondents if they voted as part of a vote bloc in the 2002 election. I have already presented the results of this question in Table 6.1 in the
previous section, which showed that almost 80 percent of all households in my sample identified themselves as members of a vote bloc. This simple measure allows me to sort between households that are members of a vote bloc and those that are not, and I label this measure *vb2002*. The variable assigns a value 0 to a household whose head is not part of a vote bloc, and a value 1 if s/he is part of one. This variable is my household-level measure of voting behaviour for question 1 above. To get a village-level variable I use the same survey question and calculate the proportion of voters in a village that are members of a vote bloc. I call this village-level measure *vb2002_prop*.

_Veritical vs. Horizontal Linkages_

A second question in my household surveys asked voters why they participate in a vote bloc. I presented the results of this in Table 6.5. I use the responses to this question here to distinguish voters with vertical linkages with leaders from those with horizontal linkages. The variable, which I label *vb_basis*, assigns a value 0 to a household that has a vertical linkage — which includes socio-economic dependence and broker clientelism — and a value 1 if it has a horizontal linkage based on ascriptive or voluntary affinity. This variable is my household-level measure for question 2 above. I convert this into a village-level measure by using the same survey question to calculate the proportion of bloc voters in a village that have horizontal linkages with vote bloc leaders. I call this village-level variable *vb_basis_phor*.

_Bargaining Power_

What does voter bargaining power mean in a context of social, economic and political inequality? In the relationship between members and leaders in a vote bloc, bargaining power would not be unlike Dahl’s (1971: 2) three fundamental opportunities that citizens in a democracy must have: (a) members’ ability to formulate preferences, (b) members’ ability to express these preferences to the leader, and (c) members’ ability to have these preferences be considered and weighed equally by the leader.

At the household level bargaining power may be measured as an interaction between two relational factors. First, are the voter and leader of equal or unequal
status, and second, does the household have other, non-political relationships with the leader that may compromise his/her autonomy vis-à-vis the leader. In other words, household-level bargaining power may be measured across the quadrants of the matrix in Table 6.4. I argue that the bargaining power of a voter increases incrementally through quadrants A to D. To develop this measure I use the same survey question about the basis of participation, and rank the responses as follows: socio-economic dependence (1), broker clientelism (2), ascriptive affinity (3) and voluntary affinity (4), where 1 represents minimal bargaining power and 4 represents the maximum. I assign a higher value for bargaining power to the kinship-based members of quadrant C because they are in a relationship with an equal, and because their membership often represents an effort at collective action. Bargaining power can, therefore, vary widely across households within the same vote bloc. I label this household-level measure \( vb_{bp} \).

There is, however, no straightforward way to measure bargaining power of voters within a village as a whole. There are too many variables that matter at that level to allow for a measure to be constructed from a single survey question. I, therefore, construct a composite measure of bargaining power using a list of dimensions along which the nature of vote blocs, and with them the bargaining power of their members, can empirically vary across villages. This composite measure is based on the eight dimensions listed in Table 5.3 (in Chapter 5). Table 6.6 arranges these according to the three aspects of bargaining power discussed above. In the next section I explain each of these measures in detail and score the variation that we can expect to see along them. By doing this I develop the composite village-level measure that I call the Index of Bargaining Power, and label \( hpindex \) in my quantitative analysis in Chapter 7.
Table 6.6. Measures of bargaining power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Do members have a choice between vote blocs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Can members switch between vote blocs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Can members form their own vote blocs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Can members participate in the decisions of a vote bloc?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>On what basis are members recruited into vote blocs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>How many votes do vote bloc leaders control?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Do leaders belong to the majority social group?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Is the leader’s influence based on extra-political factors?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.5. Constructing the Index of Bargaining Power

6.5.1. Measuring Variation in Bargaining Power

In this section I take on three specific tasks. First, I elaborate on each of the dimensions and proxy measures listed in Table 6.6 and explain the type of variation that exists empirically along these. Second, I assign the variation within each dimension an ascending order of scores. The higher the score, the higher is the bargaining power of vote bloc members. By adding together these scores at the end I construct the Index of Bargaining Power. Third, in explaining the variation that exists within each measure, I provide insight into the nature and organisation of vote blocs in rural Punjab.

Measure 1: Number of vote blocs in each village

The number of vote blocs in a village is a measure of the extent of choice that is available to voters. If there is only one vote bloc in a village the only choice voters have is to either become members of that vote bloc or then stay outside it and attempt to form independent links with candidates. Since most middle strata and poor households in villages find it impossible to communicate their needs and preferences...

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117 I present here only the conceptualisation of each measure. Details on how the measures were coded and scored from the dataset are presented separately in Annex 2.2.
118 I developed this by using information from a variety of sources — key respondent surveys, household and census surveys, archival data and qualitative field notes. See Annex 2.3 for the individual village scores for each dimension of the index.
preferences directly to candidates — who rarely campaign directly or maintain party offices below the district level — the existence of only one vote bloc can severely restrict their choice. However, if there are two or more vote blocs in a village voters not only have more choice in terms of which vote bloc to join, but may actually be able to make leaders compete with one another for their vote. This can significantly increase their bargaining power.

I assume further that voter bargaining power is affected positively if each vote bloc leader connects to a different electoral candidate. This is simply because electoral candidates will value both vote bloc leaders and members more highly if they are directly competing for the vote of a village against another electoral candidate. If one candidate is assured the full vote of a village, albeit divided across different vote blocs, s/he will value the individual votes of the village far less. Also, vote bloc leaders will be under greater pressure from candidates to maintain the vote of each member in a village that has fierce competition between vote blocs, candidates and parties. Either way, a greater number of candidates and vote blocs mean a higher chance to express preferences, more effective participation and higher bargaining power of the individual voter.

The number of vote blocs varies across villages. As mentioned earlier, in my case villages the range was between 1 to 4 vote blocs per village. I assign scores to each village according to the criterion in Table 6.7 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of vote blocs in village</td>
<td>1 vote bloc</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 or more – connecting to same candidate or party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 or more – connecting to different candidates or parties</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measure 2: Vote bloc stability between two elections of the same level

A vote bloc’s stability between two elections in terms of the number of members measures a voter’s ability to switch between leaders. A member’s inability to switch from one vote bloc to another, and from one leader to another, indicates a tie of either economic dependence or of ascriptive, social obligation. On the other hand, if members can switch between blocs and leaders it indicates a fluid relationship in which ties and relationships are evaluated afresh at each election,
and disappointed members can punish an unresponsive leader by shifting to another vote bloc. Vote bloc instability between two elections can, therefore, indicate greater bargaining power of members. An added dimension here is the change in the number of vote blocs itself. If vote blocs decrease in number, choice decreases, and if they increase, voter choice increases. It may also indicate that a new emerging leader is able to find support within the village. In my data I found that the creation of a new political party between the 1997 and 2002 election led an increase in vote blocs in a number of villages. These variations are categorised and scored in Table 6.8 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote bloc stability between two elections of the same level</td>
<td>High stability – No change in number of blocs, and no or minimal change in number of votes controlled between two elections</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low stability – No change in number of blocs but significant change in number of votes controlled, with votes being transferred from winner to loser (significant loss of votes for previous winner). Or, decrease in number of factions.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase in number of factions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Measure 3: Participation of lowest caste group in landlords’ vote blocs**

An important measure of voter bargaining power in rural Punjab would be their ability to organise around an identity of their own choosing and away from the influence of local dominants. This would mean that a particular group in the village opts out of all existing vote blocs to form an alternate one around a horizontal grouping, such as kinship, class, neighbourhood or some other shared interest or ideology. Ideally, the easiest way to capture this would be to ask people directly if they feel they have the freedom and agency to do this. However, perception questions lack credibility and it is best to capture information about configurations that already exist. This is even harder to do in a village setting where most voters may share more than one type of linkage with a vote bloc leader. They may share his caste or kin group, his occupation or class, or at the very least, his extended neighbourhood. Therefore, in asking voters if they can form a vote bloc of their own, the word “their” may be hard to define, and may include the current vote bloc leader in one way or another.
There is, however, one way to demarcate with some degree of clarity between vote bloc leaders and voters as two distinct groups. This is the case of the vote bloc leader being a landlord and the voters being from the lowest caste group in the village, who usually work as domestic and agricultural labour. In this case the leader and voters share almost no social linkages. Their most usual relationship with landlords is one of economic dependence or political clientelism. Therefore, to measure their ability to organise politically on their own away from the influence of the landlord serves two purposes. First, it allows us to demarcate a group that cannot be in a vote bloc led by a landlord for any social reason, and second, it allows us to measure agency at the extreme, where it may matter most — for if the lowest caste group is free enough of economic and clientelistic ties to form a vote bloc of its own, then other groups in the village will obviously be able to do so as well. As one respondent explained, “the lowest castes in the village try to form their own vote bloc but the people with asr rasookh (influence) split them up. They cannot tolerate them being in their own vote bloc, and negotiating with candidates on their own against other factions. Including the lowest castes in their own faction keeps them dependent because then all their links to candidates go through the landlords”. Alavi (1973) argued similarly that less powerful biraderis get co-opted into different vertical cleavages to prevent them from forming horizontal linkages of their own that could lead to class-based, ideological conflict.

In not a single of my sample villages had the lowest class group organised on its own and in only one were some of them included in a vote bloc that was not led by a landlord. I categorise these variations in Table 6.9 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation of lowest caste group in landlords' vote blocs</td>
<td>All included in 1 vote bloc led by landlord</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All included but split across 2 or more vote blocs led by landlords</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some included but others in separate vote bloc led by non-landed leader</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not included – have formed separate vote bloc</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measure 4: Process of electoral decision-making at the time of each election
This is a straightforward measure of the extent to which members can participate in making decisions within vote blocs. The specific decision we are concerned
with here is the one regarding electoral candidates. To what extent are members able to influence the decisions about who the vote bloc will give its collective vote to? This can vary across a full spectrum. At one end members are able to discuss electoral choices with leaders and can participate fully in arriving at a consensus decision within the bloc. At the other end, an absentee landlord-leader takes a decision on his own in his city home and then communicates this decision to his managers or agents in the village, who then announce it to the village usually through the loudspeakers of the village mosque, or at the Friday prayers, or through word of mouth. Between these extremes lie other scenarios. The vote bloc leader may call a large meeting of the vote bloc in which a decision may be announced without any deliberation but members may get a chance to voice their opinions. Or, the vote bloc leader may go from house to house to tell his members whom they will be voting for and why. The fact that he needs to do this rather than be able to announce the decision at a meeting means that there may be a need to convince some members and spend some face-to-face time to ensure compliance. This may indicate greater bargaining power on the part of members. These variations are categorised and scored below in Table 6.10. In 22 of my 35-village sample non-deliberated decisions were announced by leaders, while in the rest some degree of deliberation and discussion existed.

Table 6.10. Dimension 4 – Can members participate in the decisions of a vote bloc?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process of electoral decision-making at the time of each election</td>
<td>Non-deliberated decision announced by landlord or vote bloc leader to village or vote bloc</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-deliberated decision announced in village council (some element of public forum and discussion)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-deliberated decision announced by leaders or agents door-to-door (elements of campaigning for candidate)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decisions taken after deliberations between leaders and members</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Measure 5: Basis of formation of a vote bloc

This measure categorises the basis on which voters are recruited into vote blocs by leaders. I divide these into two types — extra-political bases and political bases. Extra-political bases for the formation of a vote bloc point to sources of power and authority outside the realm of politics that leaders can use to recruit members. These include economic dependence on a landlord-leader, historical ties of loyalty to a landlord-leader, and social obligation to, or primordial identification with, a group. Voter bargaining power is limited across both landlord-dependent relations and kinship ties.

Political bases for the formation of a vote bloc point allow voters greater bargaining power. These include ties of broker clientelism — in which members align with leaders based on an expectation of material benefits — and ties of ideological or programmatic support — in which members align with leaders based on a set of shared beliefs. These differences in the bargaining power of members are captured by the scores in Table 6.11 below. Since a leader can aggregate voters into a vote bloc across any or all of these bases, I got multiple responses for the basis of formation of each vote bloc. I therefore scored each basis independently and then assigned an average score to the vote bloc. Judging by average scores it seems the most common bases of formation are broker clientelism and social obligation to an ascriptive group.

Table 6.11. Dimension 5 – On what basis are members recruited into vote blocs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extra-political basis: Economic dependence, loyalty to landlord family</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-political basis: Social obligation to, or primordial identification with, a group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political basis: Expectation of benefits as a group</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political basis: Support for ideological or policy-based reasons, or social solidarity based on an acquired identity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measure 6: Number of votes controlled by each vote bloc

The number of votes controlled by each vote bloc leader, or in other words, the size of a vote bloc, is a measure of competition. It measures bargaining power of a voter by considering the monopoly power of the leader. If there is only one vote bloc in a

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119 This is different from the ‘basis of participation’ measure I use in constructing the household-level measures. While that measure is household specific, this one is vote bloc specific.
village that controls a majority of votes the leader may have little incentive to bargain with voters over expressed preferences. On the other hand, if there are many vote blocs that divide the limited vote bank equally between them, each leader would have to compete vigorously against the others for members. In such a situation not only do leaders need to keep their members happy but they may also attempt to attract members of the other blocs through promises of delivery and responsiveness. Either way, the bargaining power of a voter is increased. There were a few patterns that became visible in my data — if there was only one vote bloc in the village it generally controlled 90-100 percent of the village vote; if there were two vote blocs they split the vote quite evenly between them, though in some villages a 2:1 ratio was found; and if there were three vote blocs the trend was for two of these to be large and equal, with the third bloc controlling a small proportion of the total vote. The variation in vote bloc size is categorised in Table 6.12 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of votes controlled by each vote bloc</td>
<td>1 large vote bloc (covering over 3/4th of village)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of votes controlled by each vote bloc</td>
<td>2 medium vote blocs (whole village divided between 2)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of votes controlled by each vote bloc</td>
<td>&gt;2 small vote blocs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measure 7: Population proportion of the caste to which the vote bloc leader belongs

This dimension measures bargaining power by looking at the social basis of leadership as a proxy. It measures whether the leader is a member of a majority or a minority caste group in the village. The logic employed here is simple — if a person from a minority social group manages to lead a vote bloc that pulls in members from diverse backgrounds, it indicates power and influence across economic and political domains. It also indicates a more vertical social structure within the village. On the other hand, a leader who is from the majority social group may be able to construct a quite large vote bloc simply on the basis of social identification, without having to employ influence across other domains. This indicates a more horizontal social and power structure within the village, and therefore, more bargaining power for voters. A leader who shares social ties with voters may enable more open lines of bilateral communication. Voters who think of leaders as one of them, see them regularly at social occasions and have the opportunity to sit down with them for casual conversations are more likely to express their preferences and have these be
considered by the leader, as compared to voters to whom the leader is available only through formal appointments and large vote bloc meetings.

In rural Punjab the main social divisions are defined by caste and kinship, with lowest castes usually being the largest numerical social group. In my sample the population proportion of a leader’s caste varied widely, from 0.2 percent in a zamindari village to 62 percent in a lineage bhaichara village. The variation and scores are presented in Table 6.13 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population proportion of the caste to which the vote bloc leader belongs</td>
<td>Vote bloc leader member of a minority caste in the village</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote bloc leader member of a majority caste in the village, but less than lowest caste groups</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote bloc leader member of the largest caste in the village</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Measure 8: Extent of overlap between vote bloc leaders and landlords*

As discussed earlier, a leader’s ability to recruit members across multiple types of linkages assures him the largest number of votes. Of these, those that are economically dependent on him constitute the most stable core of the vote bloc. To these members a leader need not be responsive at all for they have few choices but to keep voting as part of his vote bloc to maintain their livelihood. The extent of a leader’s economic dominance, therefore, is a good measure of voter bargaining power in relation to him, and the easiest way to capture this information is by looking at the amount of land that each vote bloc leader owns.

If there is a complete overlap between the largest landlords and the leaders of each vote bloc this would indicate a high degree of economic power, many dependent members, and little bargaining power. Furthermore, a leader’s dominance is magnified if he also enjoys historical social and political dominance of the sort that can only come from having been part of the elite over generations. In Punjab, this can be easily measured by whether or not a vote bloc leader is a descendent of the original VPB families or biraderis. This is because being part of the original VPB enabled families to accumulate both social power and political contacts with the state over generations, which they used to heighten the dependence of the village
population on them for various functions, such as dispute resolution and access to state departments, especially the police and judiciary.

At the other extreme, if vote blocs are led by leaders who have no or little access to economic resources, little historical social power and have only recently emerged as political leaders, we would expect to find members to have joined the vote bloc because of reasons other than dependency, and therefore, to have greater bargaining power. These variations are reflected in the categories and scores in Table 6.14 below.\footnote{120} I have already mentioned that in my sample 70 out of 71 leaders are landed, 27 of them own in access of 50 acres and 65 of them are from VPB families and \textit{biraderis}.

Table 6.14. Dimension 8 – Is the leader’s influence based on extra-political factors?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent of overlap between vote bloc leaders and landlords</td>
<td>Overlap, with vote bloc leader being (a) member of original VPB, and (b) landowner of more than 12.5 acres (medium and large)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overlap, with vote bloc leader being (a) member of original VPB, but (b) landowner of less than 12.5 acres (small)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No overlap, with vote bloc leader who is an emerging intermediary: (a) not a member of the original VPB, (b) small or no landholdings (&lt;12.5 acres).</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.5.2. The Index of Bargaining Power

All that now remains to be done to construct a composite measure of bargaining power is to combine the scores across the eight dimensions. These combined scores will give us the range along which the bargaining power of voters can vary across villages. I call this the Index of Bargaining Power score of a village. Like the Polity project’s index of democracy and autocracy (Jaggers & Gurr 1995: 472-479), my index too is constructed as an additive scale derived from the individual scoring of each dimension of bargaining power above. I construct this as follows:

\footnote{120} The eight dimensions are presented together in Annex 2.1.
1. Number of vote blocs in each village — Range: 0-2
2. Vote bloc stability between two elections of the same level — Range: 0-2
3. Participation of lowest caste group in landlords’ vote blocs — Range: 0-3
4. Process of electoral decision-making at the time of each election — Range: 0-3
5. Basis of formation of a vote bloc — Range: 0-3
6. Number of votes controlled by each vote bloc — Range: 0-2
7. Population proportion of the caste to which the vote bloc leader belongs — Range: 0-2
8. Extent of overlap between vote bloc leaders and landlords — Range: 0-2

Each of these scores is a simple ordinal measure, where 0 indicates no or minimal bargaining power, and each successive number indicates increasingly more of it. Adding them together gives me a single continuum on which bargaining power ranges from 0 to 19, where 0 measures the complete absence of bargaining power, and 19 measures the maximum. This is my Index of Bargaining Power (IBP) that I can now use as a village-level variable to measure why voters in some villages have more bargaining power than those in other villages.

I found that across my sample villages IBP scores range from 0.7 to 12.03. This means that; (a) in no village do voters have maximum bargaining power, since the highest score of 12.03 is well below the possible 19; and (b) that there is considerable variation in bargaining across villages that lie within the same district and very often within the same constituency. What causes this variation? I answer that question in Chapter 7.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I looked at vote blocs, their leaders and members in detail and found that all villages have vote blocs, and almost all of these have leaders that are landed and are part of the historic village elite. Their power is hereditary, and is based on both social and economic influence. However, their landed and social power appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for leadership. It does not guarantee political support. Instead, a majority of voters participate in vote blocs
because of either a negotiated relationship that enables them to access public services and other material benefits, or as a form of collective action in which they can act together with other members of their family or kin group to improve their material circumstances. Any given vote bloc can, therefore, be both a vertical network of patrons and clients, or a horizontal network of social solidarity and collective action. They are very rarely expressions of dependence or of political party support. These findings support the hypotheses I derived from Part I.

With this chapter I make a contribution to the field of comparative politics by suggesting a way to measure and study voting behaviour in systems where most voters either have no contact, or heavily mediated contact, with political parties through intervening actors and institutions that regulate political behaviour through everyday contact across multiple arenas. I constructed three household-level and three village-level measures of voting behaviour in this chapter. These are, (i) vb2002, which tells us whether a household is a member of a vote bloc or not, (ii) vb_basis, which tells us whether the linkage between members and leaders is vertical or horizontal, and (iii) vb_bp, which tells us how much bargaining power a voter has in relation to the leader. The village-level variables are, (iv) vb2002_prop, which is the percentage of bloc voters in each village, (v) vb_basis_phor, which is the percentage of bloc voters with horizontal linkages to the leader, and (vi) bpindex, which is the IBP score of each village.

Together, these six measures capture information on the general voting behaviour of a village and the particular behaviour of individual households within them. They complement one another to deepen our understanding of voting behaviour in Punjabi villages. For example, if the IBP score tells us that voters in a village have a medium amount of agency with a score of about 8, I can further break this finding down with the household-level variables to find that despite the average agency of voters, there is still a sizeable minority of dependent voters in the village that exercise almost no bargaining power in their relationship with their landlord-leaders, as well as some that vote on the basis of party identification and ideology and must, therefore, have high bargaining power.
Table 6.15 presents the descriptive statistics of my six measures of voting behaviour. In the next chapter I use these as dependent variables and conduct a quantitative analysis to see which variables are most able to explain why voting behaviour varies across villages and households.

### Table 6.15. Descriptive statistics – dependent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household variables</th>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i vb2002</td>
<td>Binary</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii vb basis</td>
<td>Binary</td>
<td>1210</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii vb_bp</td>
<td>Ordinal</td>
<td>1210</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village variables</th>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iv vb2002-prop</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>79.07</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>97.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v vb basis-phor</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>58.79</td>
<td>19.37</td>
<td>10.26</td>
<td>85.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi bpindex</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>7.66</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>12.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SEVEN

INEQUALITY, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND STATUS:
THE UNEVEN POLITICAL ARENA OF RURAL PUNJAB

Introduction

In Part II of this dissertation I identified certain variables that affect the voting behaviour and bargaining power of voters in rural Punjabi villages. For example, I pointed out that both the villages close to a town — Sahiwal and Chak 2 — differed from the others in that they had vote blocs that were primarily formed around ties of broker clientelism between leaders and voters. Similarly, both the villages that were historically equal — Badhor and Chak Migrant — were different from the others in that their vote blocs were organised around horizontal ties of kinship. Proximity to a town and levels of historical land inequality appear to be correlated with voting behaviour.

In this chapter I deal with the hypotheses generated by the empirical associations between certain structural variables and voting behaviour that became evident in Part II, and test these associations with a list of explanatory variables. We know already that there may be no one way to classify rural Punjabi voters because their voting behaviour varies across villages, across time, and even across households within the same village. However, there is also evidence to suggest that there may be ‘method to this madness’, in that certain variables may be able to explain why much of this variation occurs. My task in this chapter is to identify those explanatory variables.

The quantitative analysis I carry out in this chapter reveals that more than 60 percent of the variation across villages in my sample is explained by three structural variables — the social structure of the village, its level of historic land inequality and its distance from a town. The fact that households that lie within the same village and thus face the same structural constraints behave differently from one another, and engage the leader of their vote bloc in varying ways, is explained mainly by differences in their wealth and caste status.
7.1. Sampling Villages and Households

As explained earlier, in the second quantitative stage of this study we expanded our research from the six case villages to include 35 other villages, using a new set of survey instruments. These villages were sampled along two village-level axes of variation — village type and historical land inequality. We picked a random sample of 23 Proprietary villages and 12 Crown villages, which roughly represents the distribution of these village types in the district\textsuperscript{121} (Table 7.1. below). Within this random sample we ensured a mix of historically equal and unequal villages, again roughly in proportion to the number of such villages in the district, where in about two-thirds of all villages land was historically unequally distributed (23 in my sample). Table 7.2 presents the 35-village sample distributed according to the three axes of variation.

| Table 7.1. Proportion distribution of village types in Sargodha and in sample |
|-----------------------------------|-----|----|-----|-----|
| Village Type                      | Proprietary villages | Crown villages |
| Total in district                 | 513 | 62% | 317 | 38% |
| Study sample                      | 23  | 68% | 12  | 34% |

| Table 7.2. Distribution of 35-village sample by village type and inequality |
|-----------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|
| Village Type                      | Proprietary villages | Crown villages | Total |
| Unequal                           | 16  | 7   | 23   |
| Equal                             | 7   | 5   | 12   |
| Total                             | 23  | 12  | 35   |

In each of these 35 villages data was collected in three rounds using survey set B. In the first round we conducted a full census of each village, in which we collected information on each household’s:

- Caste;
- Primary sources of income;
- Literacy and age of the household head;
- Land ownership; and
- Type of housing structure.

\textsuperscript{121} In this random sampling three of our case villages (Tiwanabad, Chak 1 and Chak 2) were selected again. Instead of replacing them we decided to retain them in the sample and re-survey them from scratch with the new survey instruments. This would allow us to verify that the data collected through the new, quicker surveys was able to provide the same information as if we had spent more time studying each village in detail as a case village.
This census allowed us to stratify the population of each village by caste. We used the three main caste, or *quom*, categories: (a) *zamindars*, which included all agricultural castes of the village; (b) *kammis*, which are the village artisanal castes; and (c) Historically Poor *Quom* (HPQ), which we defined separately for each village as *biraderis* that had historically been involved in menial, domestic and agricultural labour and that still constituted the lowest caste group in each village. This group included the *Muslim sheikhs* in each village but in some cases also included some *kammi biraderis*.

The *zamindar* category was further divided to separate out *biraderis* of the village elite — the historical VPBs — from other *zamindar biraderis*. This was based on information contained in the colonial Inspection Reports and the Sargodha Gazetteers. To be considered part of a village’s colonial proprietary body, a *biraderi* needed to have historically met two conditions: (a) it had to have been granted property rights to land, a land grant, or land lease in the village by the colonial state; and (b) it had to be from the *zamindar quom*, since the 1900 Land Alienation Act stipulated that a land grant or lease could only be given to someone from the designated ‘agricultural castes’. The colonial Village Inspection Reports listed all the *biraderis* that had received land grants during the time of the colonial village settlements.

The information on VPBs and HPQs was corroborated in the second round in which interviews were conducted with 2-3 key respondents in each village on:

- Social stratification;
- Economic relations;
- Village history; and
- Political organisation.

These were generally with those considered the best informed about village affairs, such as *munshis*, school teachers, politically active figures or caste leaders. In the third round we conducted household surveys. During this round 28 households in each village were randomly picked from within the caste-stratified village population. This sample represented the proportion of the caste categories in each village. In addition, households of prominent political and social influentials were purposively added to the sample in each village. These
households were identified on the basis of the key respondent surveys conducted earlier. In total, 44-45 households were interviewed in each of the 35 villages. The household surveys collected information on:

- Basic household profile and composition;
- Economic background and relations;
- Politics and voting patterns; and
- Dispute resolution.

The total number of households surveyed in the 35 villages using survey set B is 1572, while the census instrument provided limited additional data for about 9,000 households.

*Questions on voting behaviour:*

We asked a number of questions on the voting behaviour of individual households. Respondents were asked to identify whether or not they voted as part of a vote bloc, their basis of participation in the vote bloc, the name of the leader of the vote bloc, his attributes and affiliations, and the nature of their relationship with him. This information was preceded by, and so later corroborated through, the key respondent surveys in which we collected information on the process of vote bloc formation, the nature of leadership and electoral decision-making in each village. Each of the household and key respondent questions were asked for two consecutive elections at two different levels — the National Assembly elections of 1997 and 2002, and local government elections of 2001 and 2005. In this dissertation I use the responses for the 2002 national election,\(^\text{122}\) the most recent national election at the time of my fieldwork in 2007, for the main analysis, and use data for the 1997 election to check for changes in behaviour and patterns. I do not analyse the local government elections separately since I found the voting behaviour of respondents to be generally similar in both levels of elections.

\(^\text{122}\) Even though state interference was alleged in this election, which was held under a military regime that strongly favoured the PML-Q, the popular vote and the election was won by the PPP despite the fact that its leader, Benazir Bhutto, was in exile at the time of the election. However, it was prevented from forming the government through post-election manipulations and floor-crossing (see Chapter 3).
7.2. Defining Independent Variables

In Chapter 2 I explained how villages in Punjab were settled in different ways during British colonial rule. At the end of the discussion I argued that I expected these different settlement patterns to have affected the structure of each village to the extent that one may be able to predict differences in village politics simply by looking at a village’s settlement history. In other words, I hypothesised the impact of three historical variables on village and household voting behaviour today: (a) the social structure of a village, which I argue was determined by the pattern of land settlement under colonial rule, (b) the extent of land inequality that existed in each village at the beginning of the 20th century, and (c) the caste and VPB status of a household.

In the last chapter I explained that to explore the sources of variation in voting behaviour between villages and households, I would have to answer three related and nested questions at both the village and household levels. These are:

Village
1. Why do more households join vote blocs in some villages than in others?
2. Why do some villages have more households with vertical relationships with the leader than others?
3. Why do households in some villages have more bargaining power in relation to leaders than in other villages?

Household
1. Why are some voters more likely than others to join vote blocs?
2. Of those that do join vote blocs, in what circumstances are their linkages to vote bloc leaders more likely to be vertical or horizontal?
3. In what circumstances do voters generally have more bargaining power in relation to vote bloc leaders?

To what extent are the answers to these questions contained in the hypotheses and variables I laid out above? In this chapter I further develop the independent variables I derived from Chapter 2 in order to be able to empirically test if they provide answers to the questions above. I also add a list of other explanatory
variables that I think may also be able to predict voting behaviour in Punjabi villages.

7.2.1. Village-level Independent Variables

I develop five independent variables to explain the voting behaviour of a village as a whole.

1. Social Structure:

I expect a village’s original land settlement pattern to have immense explanatory value for voting behaviour. This is because the way in which authority and land were distributed under colonial rule came to determine the social structure of each village. I differentiate social structures along just one dimension — how vertical or horizontal a village is in terms of the dispersion of authority. In a vertical social structure a few people exercise authority over a large village population, while in a horizontal social structure hierarchy may still exist but a larger part of the population at the top exercises authority over a smaller population at the bottom. Vertical social structures are “unicentric” in that authority and power is centralised at the top, while horizontal social structures are “multicentric” in that authority is distributed across more people (Barkun 1968). All villages in Punjab are hierarchical in that each one has three main *quom* groups — *zamindars* at the top of the hierarchy, *kammis* in the middle and *muslim sheikhs* at the bottom of the hierarchy. Yet there are differences between them in terms of how dispersed authority is at the top amongst the *zamindar quoms*. A good measure of this is the number and population proportion of VPB *biraderis* — the group in which authority is usually vested — in both the village and within the *zamindar quoms* (Table 7.3). Here I describe the social structure of five types of villages in rural Punjab.
Table 7.3. Demographics of Village Proprietary Body (VPB)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village Type</th>
<th>VPB Birchêris (%)</th>
<th>Average No. of VPB Birchêris per Village**</th>
<th>Average Population Size (%) of Each VPB Birchêris per Village***</th>
<th>VPB Birchêris as a proportion of zamindar quoms (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zamindari</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineage Pattidari</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>11.33</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaichara</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crown</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: household surveys by author
**Source: colonial Inspection Reports
***Source: village census by author

Zamindari villages are completely vertical in their social structure, with the top of the pyramid occupied by one maalik family to whose ancestors land was granted by the colonial state. The main feature that distinguishes this group of villages from others is that even today the village elite — descendants of the original VPB — is a very small proportion of the village population. Table 7.3 shows that across the six zamindari villages in our sample only 10 percent of their combined population is from VPB biraderis, that there is only one such biraderi in each village, and that these biraderis make up only 20 percent of the zamindar quoms. Almost all authority in each of these villages rests with this one VPB biraderi that accounts for only 1.65 percent of the population on average in each of these villages. Sahiwal and Tiwanabad are typical examples of zamindari villages and their social structure.

In pattidari villages authority and the right to landownership was split and shared between various small and medium zamindar biraderis. According to the colonial Inspection Reports landownership rights were given to more than 150 families in the same village in some cases. This means that today a large part of the population in these villages is from VPB biraderis. Table 7.3 shows that 43 percent of the combined population of the six pattidari villages in our sample are from VPB biraderis, of which there are on average three such biraderis per village, any of which accounts for about 11 percent of the population on average. They constitute about 71 percent of the total population of zamindar quoms in these villages. In Hafizabad, a typical pattidari village in our sample, land was originally granted to all the families of five different biraderis and a separate lambardar was appointed to separately manage the affairs of each biraderi. This situation still exists and the five families form five different nodes of authority.
In *bhaichara* villages authority and land was settled on one large VPB *biraderi* that made up the majority group in the village. In village Gorna, for example, all of the village land — some 4349 acres — were granted to just one *biraderi* that makes up 58 percent of the village. Table 7.3 shows that like *pattidari* villages 45 percent of the combined population of this category of villages are from VPB *biraderis*, but unlike *pattidari* villages, there is usually only one such *biraderi* per village which, on average, makes up about 28 percent of the population of each village, and in some cases can be more than 60 percent of the population. They account for about 77 percent of the population of *zamindar quoms*. There is an obvious node of authority in such villages but this nose represents the village majority.

In Crown villages 29 percent of the combined population is from VPB *biraderis* and Table 7.3 shows that Crown villages have the highest number of such *biraderis*, almost 7, per village. Each of these *biraderis*, though, is extremely small in size. This social structure is reflective of the fact that the colonial state settled these villages with a mixed population of multiple castes, *biraderis* and families from all over Punjab. VPB *biraderis* make up only 49 percent of the *zamindar quom* population of Crown villages but this does not mean that their social structure is more vertical than that of *pattidari* and *bhaichara* villages. The authority of VPB groups in Crown villages still reflects the fact that they were not private owners but rather tenants of the colonial state, which directly regulated these villages until 1941. The elite of Crown villages thus did not develop the type of authority that the elites of Proprietary villages had over the rest of the village population, a fact that is evident in the relationship between the *chaudhries* and colony residents of my case village, Chak 1.

In migrant villages — entirely resettled with a new population in 1947 — the original colonial Inspection Reports were obviously unable to tell me which *biraderis* were VPBs. In these I assigned VPB status based on the fact that property compensation in post-1947 settlements were only given to those that were part of the VPB in their original village. These villages are very horizontal and quite similar to Chak Migrant in my case villages. Table 7.3 shows that in the three migrant villages we found in our sample — one Proprietary and two Crown — land rights were given to over 53 percent of the combined population, that there are two
such *biraderis* in each village, and that they constitute about 20 percent of each village population on average and up to 78 percent of the total *zamindar quom* population.

Figure 7.1 approximates the differences in social structure across these five types of villages in a highly stylised manner. Based on the comparative data in Table 7.3 I argue that the social structure of villages is more horizontal, and the authority of the VPB less pervasive, as we move from left to right in the figure below. Yet, in constructing an independent variable for social structure I do not rank these five types of villages. Instead, I use a categorical variable that I label *village_type.*[^1] I hypothesise that villages with a more vertical social structure will have: (a) more households in vote blocs, (b) more households with vertical linkages, and (c) less bargaining power, or a lower score on the IBP.

![Figure 7.1. Village types and social structures](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant caste</th>
<th>Lineage Pattidari</th>
<th>Bhaichara</th>
<th>Crown</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle caste</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower caste</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Historical Land Inequality:

The second village-level independent variable I use is land inequality to capture the variation in the distribution of land within each type of village, which as Table 7.4 shows can vary considerably across some types. Both Rouquie (1978: 27) and Rouse (1988: 845) argued that the pattern of ownership and control of the economic means of production is a determining factor of intra-village relations, so I therefore expect it to impact political relationships and voting behaviour. I constructed two separate measures for historical and current land inequality. This was important because a historical measure would allow me to capture more entrenched inequalities that may have developed over generations between leaders and members than a measure of current inequality would allow. However, I discovered

[^1]: See Annex 3.1 for details of each variable.
that these two variables — the historical one, constructed from the colonial Inspection Reports as explained in Chapter 5, and the current one, constructed from my census surveys as a gini coefficient of each village — were both highly correlated (at 0.70), which means that if a village was unequal in the 1910s it is unequal even now, relative to other villages in the sample. In my quantitative analysis I use only the historical variable, labelled hist_ten, with the caveat that wherever historical inequality is used in my regression models, the findings, the direction of its correlation and its significance applies for current inequality too. This variable measures the extent of landless tenancy in a village between 1911 and 1922 and I found that it could vary from just 23 percent tenancy in one pattidari village to a 100 percent in almost all zamindari villages. I hypothesise that villages that were more unequal will have: (a) more households in vote blocs, (b) more households with vertical linkages, and (c) less bargaining power, or a lower score on the IBP.

Table 7.4. Current land inequality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village Type</th>
<th>Total number of villages in sample</th>
<th>Average Gini</th>
<th>Gini range across village type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zamindari</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.91 – 0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineage Pattidari</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.66 – 0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaichara</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.70 – 0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crown</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.73 – 0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.81 – 0.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Distance from tehsil town:

Both the independent variables discussed so far record historical events. As explained earlier, Punjab has been through many changes since independence in 1947. I pointed to some of these in the discussion of Sahiwal in Chapter 4, a village that was close to the tehsil town, Shahpur. Over time, its residents started to use schools and hospitals in the town, and even commuted on a daily basis to its factories and markets for jobs. As Shahpur expanded and the transportation links became better, and as the residents of Sahiwal gained access to jobs, commodity markets and public services in town, the monopolistic hold of its maaliks on their socio-economic lives was reduced. I expect that the impact of such changes is greater in villages close to urban centres, like Sahiwal, then in those that are at a distance, like Tiwanabad. There is a lot of variation in terms of distance in my
sample — the closest village is just 3 kilometres from a *tehsil* town while the farthest is 45 kilometres away. Therefore, the distance of a village from a town is a good way to capture differences in the impact of post-independence modernisation on a village and its political relationships. I label this variable *distance*. Based on Rouquie’s (1978: 28) assertion that the authority of local power holders in greater in more remote localities, I hypothesise that villages that are more remote will have: (a) more households in vote blocs, (b) more households with vertical linkages, and (c) less bargaining power, or a lower score on the IBP.

4. Poverty:

Another village-level characteristic that I believe may impact voting behaviour is the poverty level of the village. Again, based on Rouquie’s (1978: 27) point that “scarcity of the necessities of life and vulnerability of economic status are the two mainsprings of insecurity consolidating vertical solidarities”, I expect the power of a leader to be more pervasive in poorer villages. I measure poverty through a proxy variable, labelled *house_type*, that records the proportion of brick houses in a village. The fewer the percentage of brick houses, the poorer is the village.\(^{124}\) This can vary from just 17 percent in the poorest village to about 60 percent in the richest village in my sample. I hypothesise that villages that are poorer will have: (a) more households in vote blocs, (b) more households with vertical linkages, and (c) less bargaining power, or a lower score on the IBP.

5. Plurality:

My last independent variable is the heterogeneity of a village. This is based loosely on Huntington’s (1968: 9) argument that “in a society in which all belong to the same social force, conflicts are limited and are resolved through the structure of the social force”. I, therefore, expect that the more homogenous a village is the greater is the cohesion of collectivities such as vote blocs but that relationships will be mostly horizontal. I measure heterogeneity as the number of *biraderi* groups in a village, labelled *plurality*, which can vary in my sample from 9 to up to 55 *biraderis*

\(^{124}\) This is based on the fact that I was repeated told during interviews that converting a mud house into a brick structure is one of the primary investments that a family will make if and when it has extra income.
within the same village. I hypothesise that villages that are more homogenous will have: (a) more households in vote blocs, (b) more households with horizontal linkages, and (c) more bargaining power, or a higher score on the IBP.\textsuperscript{125}

The five independent variables and the hypotheses related to these are summarised in Table 7.5.

Table 7.5. Village-level independent variables and hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vertical social structure</th>
<th>Higher historical land inequality</th>
<th>More remote</th>
<th>Higher poverty</th>
<th>More homogenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More households in a vote bloc</td>
<td>More households in a vote bloc</td>
<td>More households in a vote bloc</td>
<td>More households in a vote bloc</td>
<td>More households in a vote bloc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower IBP score</td>
<td>Lower IBP score</td>
<td>Lower IBP score</td>
<td>Lower IBP score</td>
<td>Higher IBP score</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.2. Household-level Independent Variables

The hypotheses discussed above are all concerned with the impact of structural variables on the voting behaviour of a village as a whole. However, not all households that exist within the same structural constraints will behave in similar ways. In fact, different groups living within the same village will have different reasons for joining a vote bloc and within it will have different types of linkages and varying levels of bargaining power. What determines these differences? I develop eight independent variables to predict differences in the voting behaviour of households within the same village. I divide these into three main categories.

1. Social Status:

I use two household-level independent variables with which to measure differences in the social status of a household — caste and VPB status. Alavi (1973) provides a useful explanation of how households from different caste groups can vary in terms of their voting behaviour and their relationship with vote bloc leaders, which I discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2). Using his logic, I can expect that members of the zamindar quoms, including the VPB biraderis, may be more likely to not join a

\textsuperscript{125} I also constructed a variable for the size of the village in terms of the number of households but do not use it because it is highly correlated, at 0.76, with plurality. Larger villages, it seems, have more biraderis.
vote bloc, but when they do, they are more likely to maintain more horizontal links with vote bloc leaders and have more bargaining power, while members of kammi and muslim sheikh quoms can be expected to get co-opted into vertical relationships within which they will have lesser bargaining power. In fact, Alavi has also suggested that these other quoms are actively prevented from forming kin-based, horizontal linkages of their own in order to undermine class-based organisation. I measure a household’s caste status as an ordinal variable, labelled caste, that tells us whether a household belongs to a lower, middle or upper caste group, and its VPB status as a binary variable, labelled vpb, that assigns a value 1 to a household if it is a member of the original VPB biraderis. In my sample 35 percent of the households are from VPB biraderis, 23 percent are from other zamindari biraderis, 18 percent are from kammi biraderis and 24 percent are muslim sheikhs.

2. Economic Status:

Wealth and class-based explanations of voting behaviour have abounded since Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Rouquie (1978) explains above how poverty can impact the political behaviour of voters within unequal contexts. Based on this I hypothesise that wealthier groups are more likely to be able to remain independent of vote blocs if they so choose, and that within vote blocs they will have more horizontal linkages and greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the leaders. I use three different measures of wealth: landsize, which is a continuous variable that records the number of acres that each household owns; ownhome, which is a dichotomous variable that assigns a value 1 to a household if it owns the house it lives in, and is a proxy for dependence; and house_struc, which is an ordinal variable that records whether the house is a mud or brick structure, and is a proxy for poverty. I found that almost 70 percent of the population that we interviewed through the census surveys was landless and 25 percent owned less than the subsistence level of 12.5 acres, leaving only 5 percent with landholdings above subsistence level (Table A. Annex 1.3). 74 percent of the total census sample owned the house they lived in and 23 percent lived in mud houses.

3. General Characteristics:

\[\text{See Annex 3.2 for details of each variable.}\]
I use three other independent variables to measure differences in three other characteristics of rural households that I believe may impact their voting behaviour. Lipset (1981) listed both age and occupation as important determinants of voting behaviour, while Hershey (2007) argued that education might make voters more informed and conscientious voters. I use these three variables in the following way. I hypothesise that older voters are more likely to be conservative and traditional and, therefore, more likely to participate in vote blocs but within these it is not age but other factors that will determine the nature of their linkage and bargaining power. Higher education and higher occupation (those that provide profits and salaries rather than wages) will allow voters to opt out of vote bloc membership if they want to, and will allow them to have more horizontal linkages with greater bargaining power if they choose to become members. I measure each of these using the following variables: age, which is a continuous variable that records the age in years of the household head; education, which is a continuous variable that records the education in years of the household head; occupation, which records the occupation of the household head in ordinal categories. In my sample the average age of a household head was about 49 years, and the literacy rate was about 56 percent though the average years of education was only five. The two main occupations in which they were involved were agriculture as an owner or tenant (37 percent) and daily or agricultural labour (28 percent). Another 10 percent were involved in trade (see Table B. In Annex 1.3).

7.2.3. Empirical Strategy

Using these independent variables and the six dependent variables from the previous chapter, I now develop regression models to predict voting behaviour.

*Village-level models:*

I use three different models to estimate the effect of village characteristics on voting behaviour — one for each of the three village-level dependent variables vb2002_prop, vb_basis_phor and hpindex. Each of these is a multivariate linear regression model that tests the impact of my village-level independent variables on
these three dependent variables. Table 7.6 below gives the descriptive statistics of each independent variable used in these models.

Table 7.6. Descriptive statistics of village-level independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Correlation with: vb2002_prop</th>
<th>vb_basis_phor</th>
<th>bpindex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>village_type</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hist_ten</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>68.25</td>
<td>20.66</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distance</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>19.78</td>
<td>9.61</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>house_type</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>31.93</td>
<td>10.96</td>
<td>17.36</td>
<td>59.89</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plurality</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>31.63</td>
<td>10.94</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I estimate the effects of these different independent variables on voting behaviour using the following multivariate linear regression model:

\[ vb_{dv_v} = \alpha + \beta_1 C_v + \beta_2 X_v + \epsilon_v (1) \]

In this model, \( vb_{dv} \) is the dependent variable of interest in village \( v \) — \( vb2002\_prop \), \( vb\_basis\_phor \), and \( bpindex \) — \( C \) is a vector for the colonial-era variables — social structure and historical land inequality — and \( X \) is a vector for the other independent variables listed above. The results of these tests are presented in Section 7.3.

Household-level models:

I set up four different models to estimate the effect of various household characteristics on the voting behaviour and leadership potential of individual households. Three of these are multivariate logistic regression models that tests whether a list of household-level independent variables are able to predict, (a) the probability that the head of a household is a member of a vote bloc — for which I use the dependent variable \( vb2002\); and (b) the probability that the member has a horizontal linkage with the vote bloc leader — for which I use the dependent variable \( vb\_basis\); and (c) the probability that it is the household of a vote bloc leader — for which I use the dependent variable \( vbleader \) which assigns a value 1 to the households of vote bloc leaders. I also set up a multivariate regression model to estimate the impact of the independent variables on the bargaining power of each
household, using the dependent variable \( vb_{bp} \). Table 7.7 below gives the descriptive statistics of each independent variable used in these models.

Table 7.7. Descriptive statistics of household-level independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Correlation with:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>caste</td>
<td>Ordinal</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>( vb_{2002} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vpb</td>
<td>Binary</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>( vb_{basis} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landsize</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>24.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>( vb_{leader} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ownhome</td>
<td>Binary</td>
<td>1565</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>house_struc</td>
<td>Ordinal</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>48.59</td>
<td>14.70</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupation</td>
<td>Ordinal</td>
<td>1549</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None of these household-level independent variables are highly correlated with one another so I use them together to set up three multivariate logistic regression models, and one multivariate regression model, which I specify as follows:

\[
Pr(vb_{hv} = 1) = \alpha + \beta_1 SS_{hv} + \beta_2 ES_{hv} + \beta_3 X_{hv} + \varepsilon_v (2)
\]

\[
vb_{bp_{hv}} = \alpha + \beta_1 SS_{hv} + \beta_2 ES_{hv} + \beta_3 X_{hv} + \varepsilon_v (3)
\]

In Equation (2) \( vb_{hv} \) is the relevant dependent variable of interest — \( vb_{2002}, vb_{basis} \) or \( vb_{leader} \). Household \( h \) in village \( v \) has a value of 1 if the head is a member of a vote bloc \( (vb_{2002_{hv}} = 1) \), or if the member has a horizontal linkage with the vote bloc leader \( (vb_{basis_{hv}} = 1) \), or if it is the household of a vote bloc leader \( (vb_{leader_{hv}} = 1) \). If the household \( h \) is not a member of a vote bloc, if it has a vertical linkage with the leader, or if it is not the household of a vote bloc leader, the household is assigned a value of 0. \( SS \) is a vector for the social status of household \( h \) in village \( v \) — using the variable \( caste \) and \( vpb \). \( ES \) is a vector for the economic status of household \( h \) in village \( v \), using the variables \( landsize, ownhome \) and \( house\_struc \). \( X \) is a vector for the three other characteristics of household \( h \) in village \( v \) — \( age, educ \) and \( occupation \). Equation (3) uses the same independent variables to estimate the bargaining power, \( vb_{bp} \), of each household. The results of these specifications are presented in Section 7.3.
7.3. Explaining Voting Behaviour through Village Characteristics

Table 7.8 below provides the results of the village-level models I constructed in the previous section.

Table 7.8. Estimated impact of village-level variables on voting behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) vb2002_prop</th>
<th>(2) vb_basis_phor</th>
<th>(3) bpindex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>zamindari</td>
<td>5.854***</td>
<td>-32.27***</td>
<td>-6.776***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.959)</td>
<td>(1.642)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pattidari</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bhaichara</td>
<td>-3.076***</td>
<td>-2.518**</td>
<td>-0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.725)</td>
<td>(0.871)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crown</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
<td>-1.689</td>
<td>-0.472**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.865)</td>
<td>(1.251)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>migrant</td>
<td>-1.770</td>
<td>1.514</td>
<td>-0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.244)</td>
<td>(1.496)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hist_ten</td>
<td>0.0479**</td>
<td>-0.133***</td>
<td>-0.0331***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0150)</td>
<td>(0.0215)</td>
<td>(0.00323)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distance</td>
<td>0.209***</td>
<td>0.110**</td>
<td>0.0508***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0244)</td>
<td>(0.0355)</td>
<td>(0.00611)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>house_type</td>
<td>-0.000602</td>
<td>0.354***</td>
<td>-0.0108*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0230)</td>
<td>(0.0256)</td>
<td>(0.00529)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plurality</td>
<td>0.122***</td>
<td>-0.307***</td>
<td>0.0508***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0287)</td>
<td>(0.0315)</td>
<td>(0.00480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>67.95***</td>
<td>70.63***</td>
<td>8.982***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.993)</td>
<td>(2.494)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>1,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>0.736</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

The most important part of these results is that the models explain a large proportion of the variance in my sample. The $R^2$ for differences in the types of linkages between leaders and members in vote blocs, vb_basis_phor, is 69 percent, while that for the IBP score of the village is 74 percent. This means that about 70 percent of the linkage and bargaining power differences between villages are explained by the independent variables included in this model. The results are not very strong for the variance in vote bloc membership, vb2002_prop, where the $R^2$ is only 20 percent. This could indicate that the reason for why people participate in vote blocs may be better predicted by the individual characteristics of a household rather than the generalised characteristics of a village as a whole. In other words, the
household-level variables I use in the next section may work better in explaining vote bloc membership.

7.3.1. Results for Vote Bloc Membership

I found that vote bloc membership can vary across villages. The lowest number of bloc voters is in the *bhaichara* village Jada, where only 59 percent of our respondents claimed membership in its two vote blocs, while the highest number is in the *zamindari* village Noorpur Noon where 98 percent of our respondents were part of its single vote bloc, led by a landlord that has the largest landholding out of our census sample of 9000 households. What explains this variation? The results in Column (1) above point out a few variables that appear to be significant, despite the low $R^2$.

They show that vote bloc membership is positively predicted by historical land inequality, remoteness, and plurality. Of these, inequality is significant at the 0.1% level while the other two are highly significant at the 0.01% level. This means that we can expect there to be a higher percentage of vote bloc membership in villages that were historically unequal, that are more remote, and that have more *biraderis*. Holding other variables constant, a one percent increase in historical inequality increases the vote bloc membership in a village by almost 0.05 percent, a one kilometre increase in distance increases the membership by almost 0.20 percent, and a one *biraderi* increase in the population of a village increases membership by 0.12 percent. The poverty level of a village is insignificant. As for social structure, it seems that *pattidari*, Crown and migrant villages are quite similar in the proportion of vote bloc membership while *zamindari* and *bhaichara* villages behave significantly differently. Compared to these three types of villages, it seems that voters in *zamindari* villages are 6 percentage points more likely to be members of a vote bloc, as compared to voters in *pattidari* villages, while those in *bhaichara* villages are 3 percentage points less likely.

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127 I run the social structures test with five dummy variables for each village type. This is one way to use categorical independent variables in a multivariate regression model. The other way is to use the categorical variable as a fixed effect. I ran a check on each model using this method as well and the results reported here for social structures stand according to both methods.
The beta coefficients for this test reveal that the variable with the highest impact on membership is residence in a zamindari village (0.23), followed by distance (0.21). However, given the limits of this model, we will return to examining membership in a vote bloc with household level variables in the next section.

7.3.2. Results for Types of Linkages between Members and Leaders

In Chapter 6 (Table 6.5) I found that 42 percent of all bloc voters in our sample had vertical ties with leaders, while 56 percent had horizontal linkages. Differentiated by village, this variable reveals an extremely high level of variation across villages. 89 percent of the voters of the zamindari village, Mir Ahmad Sher Garh, are members of a vote bloc. Of these only 10 percent have horizontal linkages with their vote bloc leader. At the other extreme, in the migrant village Kot Fateh Khan, 85 percent of those that are in vote blocs connect with the leader horizontally. Can such a significant variation be predicted by our village-level variables?

The results in Table 7.8 show that 70 percent of this variance is explained by my model in Column (2). Historical inequality, poverty and plurality are all highly significant at the 0.01% level, while distance is significant at the 0.1% level. Of these a horizontal linkage is positively predicted by distance and wealth, and negatively predicted by inequality and plurality. This means that richer villages, more equal villages and less plural villages have bloc voters with more horizontal linkages. Holding all else constant, for every percentage point increase in landless tenancy in a village between 1911 and 1922, we can expect horizontal linkages between members and leaders to decrease by 0.13 percent, for every unit increase in the percentage of brick houses horizontal linkages increase by 0.35 percent, and for every extra biraderi in a village, horizontal linkages decrease by 0.31 percent. The distance finding is counter-intuitive and shows that for every extra kilometre the proportion of horizontal linkages increases by 11 percent, so that bloc members in more remote villages will have more horizontal linkages.

The results in terms of social structure are similar to those of the last model. Pattidari, Crown and migrant villages have no significant differences between them while zamindari and bhaichara villages behave significantly differently. This
difference is significant at the 0.01% level for zamindari villages and 0.1% for bhaichara villages. The difference between bhaichara and the other villages is minimal, but voters in zamindari villages are 32 percentage points less likely to have horizontal linkages, ceteris paribus. The beta coefficients for this model show that residence in a zamindari village has by far the highest explanatory value relative to other variables (-0.62), followed by the wealth of a village (0.20).

7.3.3. Results for Bargaining Power of Members vis-à-vis Leaders

In the previous chapter I developed a village-level variable — the Index of Bargaining Power — that allows me to approximate the bargaining power of members vis-à-vis their vote bloc leaders as it varies across villages. This Index gives a score to each village, and I found that it ranges from 0.7 in three zamindari villages — Noonpur Noon, Tiwanabad and Mir Ahmed Sher Garh — to 12.03 in a lineage pattidari village Chak Sheikha. This indicates a correlation between village type and the Index scores. Does this correlation stand up to regression analysis? Are there other variables that could also predict a village’s score on the IBP?

Table 7.8 shows that the model that uses the Index, bpindex, as a dependent variable is a strong one with an $R^2$ of 74 percent, the results of which are in Column (3). Index scores are positively predicted by distance and plurality, both of which are highly significant at the 0.01% level. This means that villages that are more remote and that have more biraderi living in them have voters with more bargaining power. All else constant, for every increase by one biraderi group in a village, the IBP score of the village can be expected to increase by 0.05, and for every extra kilometre the IBP score will also increase by 0.05. On the other hand, IBP scores are negatively predicted by inequality and wealth. While inequality is highly significant at the 0.01% level, wealth is significant only at the 0.5% level. Their negative correlation means that the more unequal the village was in terms of land distribution, the lower will be its Index score. For every unit increase in the percentage of landless tenancy, the VBI score is expected to decrease by 0.03 units. As for wealth, it seems that the more brick houses there are in a village the lower will be the bargaining power of bloc members vis-à-vis their leaders. This result makes little intuitive sense and needs to be revisited in the household-level tests.
As for social structures, this time it seems that pattidari, bhaichara and migrant villages have similar IBP scores while the scores of zamindari and Crown villages are significantly different, at the 0.01% and 0.1% levels respectively. All village types have lower scores than pattidari villages, but the scores are significantly different for these two types of villages, and will tend to be considerably lower in zamindari villages. The beta coefficients of this model show that once again residence in a zamindari village is by far the strongest predictor of a low score on the IBP (-0.78), followed by historical inequality (-0.21).

7.3.4. Conclusion

With these results I can start building a predictive model of differences in voting behaviour across villages. For example, if a village was settled as a zamindari tenure and was historically unequal, more of its voters will be members of vote blocs, within which they will have more vertical linkages with the leader, and little bargaining power. At the other extreme, if a village was resettled in 1947 and land was distributed in an equitable manner, more of its residents will vote outside of vote blocs. Those that are members of vote blocs in these villages will have horizontal ties with the leader and greater bargaining power. Voters in remote villages are more likely to be members of a vote bloc, but within these they will have more horizontal relationships and more bargaining power vis-à-vis the leader. Those in more plural villages will tend to be in vote blocs and will have vertical linkages with the leaders, but these are clientelistic linkages within which they have higher bargaining power. Voters in wealthier villages are no more likely to be in vote blocs than those in poorer villages, but they do tend to have more horizontal linkages with leaders when they are members, but with lower bargaining power, which indicates that they may participate for reasons of family or biraderi-based affinity.
7.4. Explaining Voting Behaviour through Household Characteristics

In this section I look for independent variables that may be able to explain why households that lie within the same village and, therefore, the same structural constraints, behave in different ways. Table 7.9 below provides the results of the household-level models I constructed in Section 7.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) vb2002</th>
<th>(2) vb basis</th>
<th>(3) vb bp</th>
<th>(4) vbleader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>caste</td>
<td>0.332***</td>
<td>0.108***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.0317)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vpb</td>
<td>0.625***</td>
<td>0.998***</td>
<td>0.184***</td>
<td>1.931***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td>(0.0494)</td>
<td>(0.452)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landsize</td>
<td>0.0145*</td>
<td>0.00181*</td>
<td>0.0230***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00623)</td>
<td>(0.000853)</td>
<td>(0.00500)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ownhome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.465*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.744)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>house_struc</td>
<td>0.768***</td>
<td>0.180***</td>
<td>1.515*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
<td>(0.0348)</td>
<td>(0.592)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>0.0123**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0344***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00457)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.114***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupation</td>
<td>-0.0929*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0378)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.255***</td>
<td>-2.331***</td>
<td>1.883***</td>
<td>-12.81***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.0929)</td>
<td>(1.982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>1,188</td>
<td>1,188</td>
<td>1,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard errors in parentheses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

The results above show that different household characteristics matter for the three different aspects of voting behaviour. I will look at each of these in turn. I also added a test for predicting if a certain household is that of the vote bloc leader, which I will discuss briefly in the end. Each model above has been run with village fixed effects to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias. It also means that I am able to control for village-level differences and the results presented here analyse the variation that exists between households within the same village.
7.4.1. Results for Vote Bloc Membership

I discussed earlier that 80 percent of my respondents identified themselves as members of a vote bloc. This means that in each village there are some voters who are not members of a vote bloc. By village this ranges from no non-bloc voters in some villages to as many as 43 percent opting to stay out of vote blocs in village Jada. What causes households to behave so differently? Table 7.8 in the previous section showed that village-level explanations for this are weak. Column (1) in Table 7.9 shows that even at the household-level few variables really matter for distinguishing non-bloc from bloc voters. Being a VPB is highly and positively correlated at the 0.01% level, while age is positively and significantly correlated at the 0.1% level. This means that, ceteris paribus, older residents and members of the VPB biraderi are more likely than younger and non-VPB residents to participate in vote blocs. For every 10-year increase in age, a household head’s probability of being in a vote bloc increases by about 1-2 percent, and the likelihood of VPB biraderi members being in vote blocs is about 10 percent more than that of non-VPB households. Occupation is negatively and less significantly correlated at the 0.5% level, which means that labourers, artisans and the unemployed are more likely to be members of vote blocs. No other household level variable is significantly correlated, which means that vote bloc membership cannot be predicted by caste, wealth or education. The predictive capacity of this model is about 79 percent.

7.4.2. Results for Types of Linkages and Bargaining Power between Members and Leaders

Types of linkages between leaders and members within vote blocs can vary households within the same village. There are extreme cases, such as that of the zamindari village in which 89 percent of all vote bloc members have vertical linkages, or the migrant village in which only 14 percent have vertical linkages. In most other villages there is usually a fairly even distribution of members with vertical and horizontal linkages, as is evident from the mean, 0.58, for the dependent variable vb_basis. What determines this even split between households in my sample? Column (2) in Table 7.9 shows that the difference is entirely predicted
by socio-economic status. Caste, VPB status and house structure are all positively and significantly correlated at the 0.01% level, which means that members of higher caste groups, those that are from VPB *biraderi* and those that live in brick houses are more likely to have horizontal linkages with the leader of their vote bloc. The amount of land they own is important but much less so at only the 0.5% significance level. The predictive capacity of this model is about 75 percent.

Figure 7.2 plots the probability functions of these variables — the Y axis depicts the probability of members having horizontal linkages with leaders and the X axis represents additional increments along the values of the independent variables, caste (1-3), VPB (0-1) and house structure (1-3). It shows that, all else constant, the probability of a household having horizontal linkages goes up by 12 percent if it is a member of a VPB *biraderi*, that it differs by 9 percent between households of lower and upper caste groups, and that the probability of people living in a mud house having horizontal linkages is only 17 percent compared to 49 percent for those who live in brick houses.

The results for bargaining power in Column (3) of Table 7.9 are exactly the same as those for the type of linkage. This is not surprising given that both measures are based on the same survey question, and the variable, *vb_hp*, simply differentiates between types of vertical and horizontal linkages in terms of bargaining power. Since within vertical linkages only 16 percent of respondents are dependent voters while the rest of the 84 percent have links of broker clientelism with the leader, and within horizontal linkages only 11 percent vote on the basis of voluntary affinity while the rest of the 89 percent have ascriptive ties with the leader, this variable essentially estimates the impact of broker clientelism (a vertical link) vis-à-vis that
of social, ascriptive affinity (a horizontal link). Therefore, once again higher bargaining power is predicted by higher caste, VPB status and greater wealth in terms of house structure, with landownership significantly correlated at only the 0.5% level. The beta coefficients for this model show that VPB status and wealth (house structure) have the highest explanatory value compared to the other independent variables in the model, at 0.18 and 0.16 respectively. The overall model explains 23 percent of the variance in my sample.

Since I ran both the models in Columns (2) and (3) with village fixed effects I was able to see if the differences between types of households are more significant in some villages as compared to others. Only five villages stand out in terms of the extent of differences between different types of households, and interestingly, all of these are zamindari villages. It seems that in these caste, VPB status and wealth stand for more than in other villages, where household-level variables may hold lesser significance and explanatory values.

7.4.3. Results for Vote Bloc Leader

I also ran an additional logistic regression to see if the probability of being a vote bloc leader is positively predicted by certain household characteristics. We already know from Chapter 6 that vote bloc leaders are almost all landed and that they very often belong to VPB biraderis. The strength of these two results in Column (4) of Table 7.9 is uninteresting. However, the results also reveal that vote bloc leaders tend to be older than other village residents and more highly educated. Both these variables are highly significant at the 0.01% level. It is interesting that the education variable that does not seem to have any impact on voting behaviour in the other models is so strongly correlated with leadership. To a much lesser degree of significance, at only the 0.5% level, the wealth of a leader in terms of his ownership and structure of the house also matters. The predictive capacity of this model is about 96 percent.
7.4.4. Conclusion

These results make a few aspects of voting behaviour evident. First, only two variables significantly predict whether or not a head of a household is a member of a vote bloc — age and VPB status. Members are older and of higher social status than non-members. Second, the results for the nature of linkages and bargaining power are much stronger. The socio-economic status of a household makes all the difference in this case. Higher caste groups and the wealthy have horizontal linkages and greater bargaining power, while the poor and lower caste groups have vertical linkages and less bargaining power within vote blocs vis-à-vis their leaders. Third, education seems to make no difference, and voting behaviour appears to have little to do with it, and much more to do with socio-economic relationships. Finally, the results make it evident that it is not landed wealth that matters most. It is wealth expressed as the structure of the house, which means that a family may be landless but if it is able to accumulate wealth through non-farm employment, it can make its linkages more horizontal and increase its bargaining power within a vote bloc. This also means that while education may have no impact on its own, it can affect voting behaviour if it helps raise the income of village residents.

7.5. Making Sense of Voting Behaviour

In this section I synthesise the results of the last two sections. Earlier in this chapter I had predicted certain behavioural differences between villages and households given a list of independent variables. Table 7.10 below lists these independent variables in terms of the findings of the last two sections and allows for a quick comparison between the findings and my original hypotheses in Column $H_0$. A cross in this column indicates that the result I got contradicts my hypothesis while a tick mark indicates that voting behaviour is exactly as I had predicted.
There were three specific questions that I sought to answer through the quantitative analysis of this chapter:

1. Why are some voters more likely than others to join vote blocs? And why do more households join vote blocs in some villages than in others?
2. Of those that do join vote blocs, in what circumstances are their linkages to vote bloc leaders more likely to be vertical or horizontal? Again, why do some villages have more households with vertical relationships than others?
3. In what circumstances do voters generally have more bargaining power in relation to vote bloc leaders? And, why do households in some villages have more bargaining power than in other villages?

I answer each of these in turn below.

1. Vote bloc membership:

Voters that are older and those that are members of the village elite are more likely to be members of vote blocs, and villages that are unequal, zamindari, remote and plural are likely to have more households in vote blocs than outside them. Having said that, the results for vote bloc membership were the weakest in the village-level analysis, and had the fewest significant variables in the household-level analysis. What this means is that there really is no significant difference between those who become members and those who opt out of vote blocs, and in fact, for most it seems simply to be a matter of personal choice, because 97 percent of our respondents who were not members of vote blocs said they opted out because they did not agree with
this process of political organisation and preferred to make their own decisions about who to support in an election.

There is also no connection between vote bloc membership and dependence. In fact, members of VPB *biraderis* are more likely than the other residents of a village to join a vote bloc, a result that I had not anticipated. However, this makes sense given my earlier argument that vote blocs mean very different things to different voters. For some voters they are the political manifestation of their economic dependence on a landlord, while for others they are their best shot at accessing limited state resources. For yet others they provide a forum for collective interest and demand articulation. It, therefore, follows that we should not be able to strongly predict membership using the socio-economic characteristics of a household and village.

2. Nature of linkages:
Members who are part of the village elite and are rich are most likely to have horizontal linkages with the leaders of their vote blocs while all others have more vertical linkages. This makes perfect sense given that leaders are also almost invariably rich and from the village elite. Ties of family, kinship and class are, therefore, likely to abound between them and support Alavi’s (1973) argument that higher caste groups and agriculturalists have stronger links of social solidarity and are better organised politically. Villages that have a more horizontal social structure, that are more equal and more homogenous and that are richer have more households with horizontal linkages. These are intuitive findings. However, the fact that members in remote villages also have more horizontal rather than vertical linkages is not an expected result but two different models in Columns (2) and (3) in Table 7.8 confirm that the further a village is from the *tehsil* town the more horizontal are its voters’ linkages and the higher is its score on the IBP. This finding may be counter intuitive and it contradicts Rouquie’s (1978) argument on which I had based my hypothesis, but it is in line with our findings from the case studies in Chapter 5 in which I found that in both the villages that were close to urban centres vote blocs were formed primarily on the basis of broker clientelism, a vertical linkage, while the two villages that had a preponderance of horizontal linkages — Badhor and Chak Migrant — were remote villages.
3. Bargaining Power:
Members who are part of the village elite and are rich are likely to have greater bargaining power in relation to leaders than poorer, non-elite members of a vote bloc. Again, as above, this makes sense given the profile of most vote bloc leaders. As for the second part of the question about bargaining power, it is obvious from Table 7.10 that almost all of my hypotheses were wrong, except the one about land inequality. The villages with the higher IBP scores are certainly more equal, and bargaining power co-varies quite closely and inversely with land inequality. Table 7.11 shows that IBP scores are low when the gini coefficient for that group of villages is high, and they increase steadily as the gini decreases.

Table 7.11. Correlation between IBP score, village type and land gini

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village Type</th>
<th>Average Gini*</th>
<th>Average IBP score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zamindari</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>7.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crown</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>8.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaichara</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattidari</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: village census by author

As far as the other hypotheses are concerned, it seems that the villages with the higher IBP scores are not close to urban centres, homogenous, rich or the most horizontal in terms of their social structure. Instead, it seems that it is remote villages, those with a larger number of biraderis, those that are poorer and pattidari villages that score higher on the IBP scores. For example, the highest scoring village, with 12.03 on the IBP, is a remote pattidari village called Chak Sheikha. It is a plural village with 32 different biraderis but it is relatively poor in that only 27 percent of its houses are made of brick. It was originally settled quite equally in that 153 landowners from seven different biraderis were given ownership rights to small packets of land by the colonial state. Even today authority does not rest in any single individual, family or biraderi, and landed power plays little role in the formation of its three vote blocs, the leaders of which own only between 12 and 14 acres each. Though about 10 percent of respondents in the village identified ties of economic dependence with these landowning leaders, 51 percent of the others said

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128 This is true even though none of the eight dimensions I used to construct the IBP included a measure of land.

129 The average from my census is about 32 percent, with a maximum of 60 percent.
they came together on the basis of kinship and then decided collectively which of the three vote blocs to align with. Another 31 percent said they had direct clientelistic ties with the three vote bloc leaders.

Overall, it seems most villages score well on the IBP. Table 7.12 shows the sample of 35 villages distributed according to their IBP scores across the five village types.\textsuperscript{130} Interestingly, despite the popularly held belief about the dependence of Punjabi voters, only five villages score less than 4 on the IBP. All of these are \textit{zamindari} villages. Nine villages score between 4 and 8 and there is at least one village from each of the five social structural types in this band, though the majority of these are Crown villages. The rest of the 21 villages, from all social structural types except \textit{zamindari}, score over 8 on the Index, which shows that a majority of my sample villages have voters with relatively high bargaining power vis-à-vis their vote bloc leaders.

Table 7.12. Distribution of 35 villages by IBP score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IBP Score 0 – 4</th>
<th>IBP Score 4 – &lt;8</th>
<th>IBP Score &gt;8</th>
<th>No. of villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Zamindari}</td>
<td>Tiwanabad, Kot Hakim Khan, Noon Pur Noon, Muzaffarabad, Ahmed Sher Garh</td>
<td>Bharath</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Pattidari}</td>
<td>Noon Kalu</td>
<td>Badin Hafizabad Jara Chak Sheikha Ahmed-E-Wala</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Bhaichara}</td>
<td>Marray Thatta Mohd Panah</td>
<td>Bharath Sharif Awan Kot Ghazi Khurd Jada Loranwali Nabi Shah Khurd Dhal Gurna</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Crown}</td>
<td>Chak 1 Chak 10 Chak 62 Chak 124</td>
<td>Chak 2 Chak 6 Chak 7 Chak 65 Chak 115 Chak 120</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Migrant}</td>
<td>Kot Fateh Khan</td>
<td>Chak 3 Chak 13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of villages</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{130} I divide the score into three roughly equal bands (given the sample’s score range of 0.7 to 12.03 on the IBP) and list villages within these according to their score.
Why does bargaining power matter? We know from Section 6.3 that most respondents (51 percent) participate in vote blocs based on ascriptive affinity. However, 65 percent of these (33 percent of total sample) organise on the basis of kinship but then collectively give their vote to the highest bidder, so that they are essentially clientelistic participants in vote blocs. Another 35 percent of voters identified broker clientelism as their primary basis of participation. This means that a clear majority of rural Punjabi voters — 68 percent of bloc voters, or 54 percent of our total sample — are clientelistic voters, which supports the argument that the politics of rural Punjab is “thana katcheri kee siyasat” (literally, politics of access to the police and courts). Within this pattern of politics vote bloc leaders have authority and influence not because they own land or because they have economic control over the livelihoods of voters, but rather because they serve as the main intermediary between the state and its rural citizens. When we asked voters if they approach the police and courts directly when required, only 300 said they did. 81 percent of our respondents said they go through someone, and when named, these intermediaries were invariably the leaders of vote blocs in each village. We got similar responses for questions regarding public services.

Clientelistic voting behaviour by definition involves negotiating over service delivery and other material benefits. This is why the bargaining power of a voter matters. Those who have less of it will be able to negotiate few benefits, while those that have more of it — richer, elite groups — will be able to negotiate greater benefits. While poorer groups may continue to connect to leaders as clients in the hope of eventual access to public services — especially since, as Alavi (1973) argued, their ability to organise horizontally and independently is limited — they may get very little out of the relationship in terms of material benefits. This explains the visible under-provision of public services in poorer parts of most villages. However, the extent to which this is true and is correlated with the pattern of village-level politics is the subject of a separate, and future, research project.
Conclusion

This chapter provided the results and findings of my quantitative analysis to reveal some interesting conclusions about voting behaviour in rural Punjab. The rural elite is still landed, the distribution of land in rural areas is still very unequal, and this landed elite continues to influence rural politics by organising voters into vote blocs. However, the landed power of the rural elite appears to not be the reason why voters participate in these vote blocs. Instead, voters connect to them because of their role as intermediaries through whom they are able to access targeted public service provision. This is not different from Hagopian’s explanation for the persistence of the traditional elite in Brazil, where she argues that “traditional elites shifted their power base from land into the state, transforming themselves into a political class whose political dominance rested on their manipulation of state resources” (1986: 4). This finding counters the popular perception that the votes of rural Punjabi citizens are influenced by their relations of socio-economic dependence on local landlords.

It is certainly still true that one would be able to find many voters in zamindari villages, where the multifaceted power of the landlord is still pervasive and evident, that have relations of dependence and mostly vertical linkages with minimal bargaining power. However, such villages are few, not just in Sargodha but across Punjab. The majority of villages in Sargodha are either bhaichara or Crown grants, and in these voting behaviour is organised around horizontal kinship networks within which voters have considerably more bargaining power. While this means that biraderi is the most common basis for the participation of rural voters in vote blocs, I found that it is not the basis on which leaders connect to candidates. In fact, as pointed out earlier, only 0.35 percent of respondents said their leader was connected to a candidate on the basis of biraderi. This finding strongly counters the literature that claims that biraderi-based networks influence and determine national-level politics in Pakistan, and that many politicians gather their votes on the basis of biraderi.

The results of my quantitative analysis, therefore, counter both the notions that rural Punjabi voters are dependent and that national elections can be won on the basis of
*biraderi* networks. My results show that voters are generally benefit-seeking political actors who organise within their kinship networks to strengthen their bargaining position and then give their votes to broker-patrons that are able to provide access to state resources and other private goods. What does this pattern of broker-clientelism tell us about national politics in Pakistan? To this I turn briefly in the next and final chapter.
8.1. Summary of the Argument

The main aim of this dissertation was to provide an empirical and nuanced understanding of how rural citizens in Punjab vote, a subject that is central to understanding politics in Pakistan and yet understudied. People have general ideas about how they think rural citizens vote. The lack of an empirical study to either confirm or refute these ideas has led to rural voters being typecast as ignorant, coerced and dependent. In this dissertation I provided empirical data with which to unravel how rural citizens vote, as well as to analyse how this varies across villages and across households.

Through a nested analysis that divided my dissertation into three parts, I analysed the voting behaviour of rural citizens at progressively more micro levels of analyses. I started in Part I with a national-level analysis of the political history of Pakistan, in particular Punjab, using secondary sources. In Part II I conducted a longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis of six case villages in Sargodha district of Punjab using original qualitative data and two previous studies of a case village, and finally in Part III I analysed household-level voting behaviour using quantitative regression analysis in a sample of 35 villages. With each level of analysis I confirmed my finding that the voting behaviour of rural Punjabi citizens is not explained by the ‘feudal’ control of dependent voters but rather by ties of social solidarity and the need to access more public services.

I developed the following argument through the three parts of this dissertation. Starting with the annexation of Punjab by the British colonial state in 1849, the rural landed elite of Punjab became the special constituency of the colonial state, which created and protected both their landed power and their social dominance. In the post-colonial political environment of Pakistan — by turns unstable and authoritarian — these elites were able to transform their economic and social power into political influence, and became central figures within national politics. Bhutto
challenged and circumscribed this power of the landed in the 1970s by appealing to rural discontent, as a result of which the fledgling PPP was brought into power by an electorate that had never before, and has not since, voted overwhelmingly along class lines. The 1970s marked a historical watershed in the study of Punjabi politics, and marked its transition to a political system that remained unstable and authoritarian, but in which elections were now common fare. The literature on post-Bhutto politics in Pakistan advances varied and often contradictory perceptions of voting behaviour in Punjab. While the media and popular perception insists that a “feudal shadow” hangs over Punjabi politics, others argue that rural citizens are over-socialised voters who prioritise their ties of kinship over all other political identifications. Yet others believe that Punjabi voters are mostly clientelistic and are looking to gain access to limited state resources through their vote.

Realising that the main reason the literature leaves us with such confusing notions about rural Punjabi voters is that it uses micro concepts that define relationships between individual actors to explain macro political phenomena, I examined politics within a set of six villages in Sargodha to see if a more micro and nuanced level of analysis would help clarify these generalised concepts. I found that village politics were organised around vote blocs in which the relationships between landlords and their dependents, between networks of kin, and between local patrons and their clients were all evident. Moreover, these relationships could all co-exist within the same vote bloc. I also found that the nature of village politics and vote blocs varied greatly across these six villages. Were there certain household-level characteristics that determined why different households would have such divergent relationships with the same leader within the same vote bloc? Were there certain characteristics of villages that determined how households within a village would behave politically?

To answer these questions I collected data across a larger number of villages and conducted a quantitative analysis to find that while nothing in particular determines whether or not a household will become a member of a vote bloc, the socio-economic status of a household significantly impacts what kind of a relationship it will have with the leader once it has decided to join the bloc. Richer households and those that are a part of the old village elite join mostly for reasons of social affinity,
both of an ascriptive and voluntary nature, while poorer non-elite households join vote blocs either because of their socio-economic dependence on a landlord who is also the vote bloc leader, or because a relationship of broker clientelism with the leader is their most effective way to access state officials, such as the police, and services, such as electricity and paved streets. Of these relationships I found that the most common by far were those of ascriptive affinity and broker clientelism, and that both socio-economic dependence and voluntary class- or party-based affinity accounted for only a combined 13 percent of the sample. As for village characteristics, I found that there were indeed some that were highly correlated with the particular voting behaviour of a village. The strongest predictor of behaviour is village type — if a village was settled under colonial rule as a zamindari tenure, even today its voters have more vertical relationships and less bargaining power in relation to their vote bloc leaders than in any other type of village. While voters in other village types behave more similarly to one another, those in villages where authority was distributed across separate groups of landowners by the colonial state, the pattidari villages, tend to have more horizontal relationships with the most bargaining power in relation to leaders. It is interesting that structures and hierarchies created during colonial rule to satisfy the imperatives of colonial governance still impact how people vote today.

The results of my quantitative analysis counter both the notions that rural Punjabi voters are dependent and that national elections can be won on the basis of biraderi networks. I conclude instead that rural Punjabi voters are generally benefit-seeking political actors who organise within their kinship networks to strengthen their bargaining position and then give their votes to broker-patrons that are able to provide access to state officials, resources and other private goods. These leaders, in turn, forge strategic election-specific alliances with politicians, and members of their class within the village create different vote blocs to connect to as many of the main political parties as possible, so as to reduce the risk of backing a losing candidate and ensure maximum service delivery. Everyone, it seems, is bargaining with each other in rural Punjabi politics.
8.2. Vote Blocs and the Oligarchy of the Landed Elite

The results of my analysis lead me to a puzzle. As explained, I found that voters in rural Punjab are not dependent. Rather, they strategise ties of kinship and clientelism to negotiate their way to better service delivery. But I also found that vote bloc leaders are still all landed and almost all of them are part of the old village elite. So the questions that arise are, if voters are generally independent enough of these leaders to be able to bargain with them over benefits or to organise within their own kin groups, why then is leadership still dominated by a closed group of the landed elite? Why do these landed leaders still organise vote blocs and determine voter preferences through them? If voters have agency why have they not used this to organise on their own, away from the old landed elite? It is true that there is a handful of what we might call emerging political entrepreneurs — the six leaders in my sample who are not part of the old colonial elite, or the 25 who have land below the subsistence level of 12.5 acres. However, it is also true that while an average of 70 percent of the population in our sample villages is landless, only 1.4 percent of our vote bloc leaders fall within this group. Why have the landless not taken advantage of their sheer numbers to organise politically within a vote bloc of their own in other villages like they have done in Chak 1? Why have new leaders not emerged to organise voters around class? Why have they not built more links directly with political parties? There are four parts to the answer.

1. Oligarchies of the landed

The first part of the answer has to do with the fact that the elite of rural Punjab have demonstrated a remarkable ability to constantly adapt to changing circumstances and to reinvent themselves so as to remain central and relevant to the lives of the rural population. By doing so they have ensured that the realm of leadership remains closed to new entrants. Chapter 4 provided the details of such a transformation by the maaliks of Sahiwal. When their power was first challenged in the 1970s the two maalik families reacted to their loosening control over the village by putting aside their antagonism and coming together in one political faction to counter the mounting opposition of the sharecroppers and labourers. When this proved to not be enough one of them joined the PPP and came on to the side of the landless classes.
When Zia banned the party, the *maaliks* shifted their allegiance to the party supported by the new regime and so avoided being marginalised from access to state power. When their economic power was reduced by market forces, the *maaliks* became involved in activities they had earlier considered too far below them — contesting local government elections and resolving village disputes — and intensified their own investment in the state in order to become the main channel through which the village could access state officials and services. Elite vote bloc leaders have, therefore, managed to ensure their continuing relevance in a context defined by change.

Moreover, the rural elite has also ensured that while their individual landed power may have reduced, their power as a group — as an oligarchy of the rural landed — has been maintained. Alavi (2001) explained that the *biraderis* of VPB *zamindars* use their resources and power to extend their ties of kinship beyond the village and form larger alliances and coalitions, especially through marriages, with large landowners in other villages. The pursuit of such alliances can result in formidable *quom*-based political blocs formed by vote bloc leaders that can strengthen their position vis-à-vis electoral candidates and political parties, as well as against other non-elite contenders. These leaders will usually also have attended the same schools in the district or provincial capitals and are often part of the same extended social circles. Bodemann (1988) argues that whereas such leaders may compete against one another to expand their own vote blocs, the same people when considered part of a class will reinforce each other’s dominance and play politics in ways that maintain the power of the entire group. He argues that such leaders, therefore, need to be seen as members of a class that has special relations with the state and that jealously guards the collective power of its members, rather than as separate individuals.

2. Fragmentary vote blocs and *biraderis*

The second part of the answer is provided by the fact that Punjabi villages are highly fragmented. This is because their two main forms of organisation — linkages of broker clientelism that bring residents together in vote blocs, and ties of ascriptive affinity that bring them together in *biraderi*-based networks — divide the
village into many small, disunited groups. Scott argues that societies that are organised under the logic of clientelism have a “disaggregated peasantry attached vertically by bonds of loyalty to agrarian elites who form the active participants in an oligarchic political order” (1972: 5). Fatton explains that the impact of such a top-down pattern of organization is that it “disorganizes and individualizes the resistance and struggles of the clientele against its bonds of coercive dependence,” while at the same time, “unify[ing] the dominant classes by linking them to a framework of cooperation closely associated with the state” (1990: 460-1). Valenzuela (1977) points out that in rural Chile too voters are organised by political brokers in complex brokerage networks that cut across classes and work against class organisation.

Rural Punjabi voters do organise in horizontal networks as well but these do not work any better in uniting the poorer groups of the village. These networks are based on primordial identities that serve to separate all groups within the village, rich and poor, into separate lineages or biraderis. Therefore, a village with 30 lineages will have 30 small social groups. Such segmental organisation also works against class-based organisation and ensures that ideological conflict does not arise. Even when certain groups build alliances beyond the village they do so with members of their own biraderis in other villages and towns, so that the alliances do not amount to the building of “supra-local solidarities among the deprived and the dispossessed” (Jalal 1989: 11). The nature of social and political organisation in Punjabi villages help prevent ideological, class or party-based opposition to the power of the landed oligarchs and so maintain them in their positions of leadership.

For the poor to organise on their own away from the influence of the landed they would have to become less fragmented and unite across biraderi lines to articulate collective demands based on the common interest of their class rather than the narrow interest of their particular lineage group. However, would it make any sense for them to do so if the delivery of services remains largely targeted and political parties are unable to offer any external means of support? These two aspects of Pakistan’s political system provide the next two parts of the answer.
3. The logic of clientelism and targeted service delivery

The third part of the answer lies in the way essential services are delivered to the rural population. The Pakistani state rarely delivers universal, non-discretionary, rule-based services to villages (Keefer et al. 2003). Other than the rule-based provision of a primary school in each village and a health centre in each union, all other services are targeted, awaiting demands from citizens and the intervention of influential actors. This provides the ideal space within which local landlords can step in and build their reputations as “deliverers” of essential public services. They deliver services, and people deliver votes. Clientelism, and with them vote blocs, thrive on this targeted pattern of service delivery since the relationship would lose its very logic if the leader were no longer required as a broker to access public services. In a system that is based on fragmented bloc-based politics it is in the interest of all — politicians, vote bloc leaders and even voters themselves — for public service delivery to be targeted to specific groups. And if service delivery is targeted then it makes sense for voters to support leaders with the most effective links to line departments, law enforcement agencies and politicians. Such leaders are rarely from within poorer groups.

Such a system of broker clientelism and targeted service delivery works against programmatic party politics at all levels. Let us look at the incentives of each actor in turn. My analysis showed that 54 percent of my respondents participate in vote blocs to gain access to public services. If voters are certain that services will not be delivered universally it makes little sense to remain outside the vote bloc of the strongest leader with the most state-based connections. It also makes little sense to support a vote bloc for ideological or party-based reasons since these would gain the voter little by way of material benefits. From the point of view of the voter, ideological, class or party-based identification is trumped by the need to access essential goods and services that are not universally delivered. The same logic applies to the relationship between vote bloc leaders and political candidates. In such a system it is not in the interest of the leader to build party-based linkages with candidates because it would bring in few benefits to pass on to his supporters. The candidate would simply thank him for his ideological or programmatic support and then take what he can deliver to the next village where the leader has no such
identification and requires material benefits in return for providing electoral support. It, therefore, makes much more sense for vote bloc leaders to simply build election-specific strategic alliances. As Rabba of Chak 2 put it, “I am a PPP supporter at heart but the PPP candidate here is very weak and I need a road”.

As for politicians, “because Pakistan's rural constituencies are particularly poor, particularly spread out and thoroughly organized into voting blocs, the relative political benefits of providing narrowly targeted rather than broadly available public goods, are high” (World Bank 2002: 74). Most politicians understand the fact that their success “depends on their personal reputation for providing goods, jobs and government access to individuals with whom they have had contact… Such legislators have little interest, as a consequence, in providing public goods that benefit a broad range of the public” (Keefer et al. 2003: 17). I found in an earlier paper that politicians are, “more prone to provide services that can be targeted to specific groups, that are tangible and visible, and that are directly attributable to them. This allows them to reward their own factions and to appear to prioritise them over all others in order to retain their support. This is not possible in the case of universal services, improvements in which are not only less visible and obvious, but they cannot be easily targeted to specific groups either” (Mohmand and Cheema 2007: 56).

This means that universal services, like girls’ schools for which we found immense demand, stand little chance of being delivered in a political system that is factionalised and clientelistic. It also means that it is particularly difficult for leaders from poorer groups to compete with local power holders with contacts that have been established over generations. In fact, such a system perpetuates the poverty of the poor and the power of the elite (Stokes 2007: 618-9).

4. Political parties as conglomerations of clientelistic networks

The final part of the answer lies in the nature of political party organisation in Pakistan. The personalisation of politics in Pakistan post-1970s and the constant manipulation of political parties by military regimes have left them as little more than large conglomerations of multiple clientelistic networks that are based on the personal power of individual members. Political parties in Pakistan today do not appeal directly to voters, like the PPP did in the 1970 election, and do not campaign on the basis of broad national policies aimed at better service delivery, such as the
PPP’s “roti, kapra, makan” slogan\textsuperscript{131} in the 1970 election. Political parties in Pakistan certainly do not function to represent “the interests of different classes” and they are not “a democratic translation of the class struggle” (Lipset 1981: 230). Instead, they look to the local landlord to organise and deliver the local vote, who organises this through ties of kinship and clientelism, both of which are non-ideological forms of identification and are not conducive bases for building either party or programmatic support. In such systems elections serve the purpose not of strengthening democracy but of simply providing an opportunity and rationale for the landed to bring into use all their economic and social power to periodically revive vote blocs and to strengthen the linkages that they embody (Rouquie 1978).

Authoritarian regimes and clientelistic politics based on traditional rural power holders have a particularly synergistic relationship. Archer (1990) argues that clientelism helps maintain regime stability by reducing ideological organisation and conflict. Hagopian explains the synergy by saying, “as virtually the only group that could operate state clientelism on a grand scale in Brazil and secure the electoral victories needed to legitimize military rule, the traditional political elite was the military’s best option to prevent the radicalization of the polity and the development of class- and interest-based politics” (1994: 56). Jalal points out that such a political system sits well with the landed in Pakistan for whom political power has become a central facet of their local influence but who do not want the imposed discipline of an external party structure (1999: 322). In the absence of strong party platforms they can use personal power and social status to create factions and to win elections. Authoritarian regimes are rarely interested in new entrepreneurial leaders from within the landless population of a village that require external support to organise the poor in opposition to the landlord that has the “advantage of already established networks” (Hagopian 1994: 56).

\textit{Conclusion}

The answer to why the landless have not organised on their own and the political power of the old landed elite has remained intact despite the ability of most rural

\textsuperscript{131} Literally, “food, clothing and shelter”.

citizens to be politically strategic in their voting behaviour is, therefore, the following:

1. Politics in rural Punjab is dominated by oligarchies of the landed that close off the leadership space to new entrants.
2. *Biraderi* and vote bloc-based politics fragments voters and discourages class or party-based identification.
3. Clientelism and vote-bloc based politics both support targeted rather than universal service delivery, so that vote blocs are most likely to be organised by those that have the most state-based connections, usually built over generations.
4. Political parties in Pakistan do not provide external support to poorer voters and do not represent specific class interests. Instead, they simply aggregate existing clientelistic networks of the locally powerful.

### 8.3. Paths of Change

Rural voters in Punjab are not dependent on local landlords. They have strategic, clientelistic ties with their vote bloc leaders and are able to organise in horizontal networks in which they have a fair degree of bargaining power. Yet, as the discussion in the previous section has shown, this does not mean that Pakistan’s political system is now more democratic or that its parties are moving towards more programmatic, policy-oriented politics. The establishment of “deliberative democracy” will require the “establishment of a political context which secures the rights of less advantaged or less ‘resource-full’ people, often against local power-holders” (Harriss 2001: 11).

Figure 8.1 below shows where the Pakistani political system is right now and along which paths it would have to move to reach a more substantive form of democracy in which voters align with political parties that represent special class interests, especially of the poor. It shows that in the 1970s Bhutto’s “roti, kapra, makan” campaign moved voters away from links of dependence straight to a more class-based identification that was linked to a political party. However, since then through the 1980s and 1990s the political system has moved simultaneously along two different paths. The autonomy of voters increased but it did so within vertical
relationships with local landed patrons that moved the political system towards clientelism. Many voters also started to organise more horizontally, but they did so not on the basis of voluntary affinity but rather on the basis of ascriptive kinship-based affinity towards a political system defined by *biraderi*-ism.

The challenge now is to move the system back towards class and party-based organisation along either path ‘A’ or ‘B’. Each requires a different type of change. Path ‘A’ requires that services be delivered more universally so that landed patrons will have little power left and broker-clientelism will lose its *raison d’être*. In fact, the only way in which local leaders will be able to maintain their political influence in this case would be by becoming members of political parties, like Naib of Sahiwal had to do during Bhutto’s regime. Path ‘B’ requires that political parties build more direct linkages with rural citizens and provide external support so that they are able to organise in larger, less fragmentary networks based on class identification, on the basis of which they will be able to build supra-local solidarities. Political parties also need to support Path ‘A’ by appealing directly to voters on the basis of campaigns and manifestos that are aimed at the universal delivery of public services.

These two types of changes are important because as Keefer and Vlaicu point out, “in low-credibility states, political appeals to patron-client networks may be welfare enhancing, but in the long run, they delay political development by discouraging direct appeals to voters that are essential for credible mass-based political parties” (2008: 371). Empowering the rural poor requires these political changes in the way
the state operates far more than it requires structural changes such as land reforms now.

8.4. Future Research

My analysis of voting behaviour in rural Punjab and its impact on national politics leaves some questions unanswered. First and most importantly, while we know that part of the logic of vote bloc organisation and membership revolves around the targeted delivery of services, we actually know nothing about the extent to which such political organisation actually impacts service delivery. Are villages better provided if they have large vote blocs headed by strong leaders? Do villages with higher IBP scores get more services, or do households with greater bargaining power receive more material benefits from leaders? We do not know what the variations in voting behaviour that I unravelled and analysed in this dissertation mean in terms of the delivery of public services and other material inducements. The cases of Tiwanabad and Chak 1, our most under-provided case villages, seem to suggest that both extremely vertical relations of dependence and voluntary horizontal networks based on a class identity (in the absence of external political party support) are detrimental for service provision in rural Punjab. The extent to which this is true requires further investigation.

The discussion of the previous chapters has explained why universal services are not delivered. However, in a system where competition between electoral candidates is high, seats are often marginally won, and voters have the ability to bargain with their landlord leaders, why do politicians not deliver more targeted services and why do the majority of rural Punjabi voters still have poor access to basic essential services? The analysis presented in this dissertation will, hopefully, prove to be the basis on which the answers to these questions will be built through further research.
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CHRONOLOGY OF POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN

1849
Annexation of Punjab by the British colonial government.

1871
The Punjab Land Revenue Act is passed which incorporates customary law of the Punjab tribes as part of the formal legal system.

1900
The Land Alienation Act of 1900 is passed that divides rural Punjab into agricultural and non-agricultural tribes, and limits landownership to agricultural tribes only.

1906
Muslim League formed as a political party to represent the Muslims of India.

1920
Jinnah quits the Congress Party and joins the Muslim League.

1937
First elections to Provincial Legislative Assemblies are held. The Muslim League suffers defeat in all provinces.

1946
Second elections to Provincial Legislative Assemblies are held. The Muslim League re-aligns itself with various regional groups, including the Unionist Party in Punjab, and wins the election in NWFP, Punjab, Sindh, and East Bengal. The party’s main demand is a separate country for India’s Muslims, called Pakistan.

1947
Independence from colonial rule, and the partition of India and the newly created Pakistan. Pakistan is divided into West and East Pakistan, between which lies 1609 km of Indian territory.

1947-1958
Quick succession of various heads of a Constituent Assembly, while a constitution is written.

1948
Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder and first Governor General, dies after a protracted illness.

1948
Pakistan’s first war with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir.

1951-1954
Elections to the Provincial Legislative Assemblies are held in Punjab (1951), NWFP (1951), Sindh (1953) and East Pakistan (1954). All of these are later described as “a farce, a mockery and fraud upon the electorate” by the Election Commission itself (Kamran 2009).

1956
The first Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is promulgated, calling for the country’s first election.

1958
Pakistan’s first military coup, led by General Ayub Khan.

1958-1969
Pakistan’s first Martial Law regime under General Ayub Khan.

1959
Pakistan’s first set of land reforms.

1959-1960
Pakistan’s first local government elections are conducted under the ‘Basic Democracy system’ to create an electoral college to endorse Ayub Khan as Pakistan’s first President.

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132 This has been built from various printed sources, all of which are included in the bibliography. More recent events have been put together from news sources. Many events have also been put together from my own recollections, and of course, from history lessons.
1962 A second Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan is promulgated.

1964 (Sept-Oct) Local government elections are held again under the Basic Democracy system.

1965 (Jan) Presidential election in which Ayub Khan, at the head of the Convention Muslim League (CVML), ran against Jinnah’s sister, Fatima, who was the candidate of the Combined Opposition Parties (COP). Only basic democrats elected 3 months earlier were allowed to vote.

Pakistan’s second war with India over Kashmir.

1968 Anti-Ayub social movement led by students and labour that eventually brought down Pakistan’s first military regime.

1969 General Ayub Khan steps down and hands power to General Yahya, who announces Pakistan’s first general election.

Dec 1970 (Dec) Pakistan’s first general election takes place, in which Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s newly created Pakistan People’s Party sweeps the election in West Pakistan while Mujib-ur-Rehman’s Awami League sweeps East Pakistan. In the opposition are the various Muslim Leagues - Convention Muslim League (CVML), Council Muslim League (CML) and Qayyum Muslim League (QML).

1971 (Mar) Civil war breaks out in East Pakistan as it attempts to secede to become Bangladesh, after years of struggling to make Bengali a national language and to get equal status with the less populous but dominant West Pakistan. It continues through the year.

(Dec) Third war with India breaks out when it steps in to support East Pakistan in the civil war. West Pakistan is defeated only days later and Bangladesh comes into existence. In what is left of Pakistan, Yahya Khan resigns and hands power to Bhutto.

1971-1977 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto becomes Pakistan’s first elected President.

1972 Pakistan’s second set of land reforms.

1973 The third, and still in effect, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is promulgated. Under this, Bhutto goes from being President to becoming Pakistan’s first elected Prime Minister.

1975 Reform of land tenure laws.

1976-77 National Charter for Peasants instituted and land ceilings reduced further.

1977 (Mar) Pakistan’s second elections held. PPP wins again, but riots break-out over rigging allegations.

(July) Soon after, Bhutto is overthrown in a military coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq.


1979 Bhutto sentenced to death and executed.
1979-80  Zia holds party-less local government elections for District Councils under the Local Government Ordinance of 1979.

1983  Another round of party-less local government elections held.

1985  Zia holds party-less elections that he had promised in 1979. Mohammad Khan Junejo becomes the Prime Minister and confirms Zia as the President. After various religious laws and amendments are added to the 1973 Constitution, including one that places all powers in the office of the President (Article 58-2(B)), Martial Law is lifted and the Constitution is revived.

1986  Rise of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir, returns to Pakistan from exile to lead movement.

1987  Further local government elections are held.

1988  Zia dismisses the government using Article 58-2 (B), and institutes shariah law through the Shariat Ordinance in June. In August, Zia is killed in a mid-air plane explosion, along with the entire top brass of his army. Ghulam Ishaq Khan takes over as President and announces an election.

1988  Pakistan’s third, party-based national election brings the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) back to power with Benazir Bhutto as the new Prime Minister. However, the government is dismissed in less than two years (20 months) by the President, who dissolves the National Assembly on charges of corruption using powers provided to the President by Article 58-2 (B).

1990  Pakistan’s fourth national election brings the opposition Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI — a coalition of the various Muslim Leagues and other regional and religious parties) to power with Nawaz Sharif, a Zia protégé, as the Prime Minister. Again the government is dismissed in 32 months on corruption charges by the same President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, using Article 58-2 (B). The government is restored by the Supreme Court, but the President and Prime Minister both resign a month later in July 1993 under military pressure.

1993  Pakistan’s fifth national election brings Benazir Bhutto and the PPP back to power, again for about 37 months, and again dismissed on corruption charges by a different President, Farooq Khan Leghari, using Article 58-2 (B) in November 1996.

1997  Pakistan’s sixth national election brings Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League (PML) back into power for 32 months before he is overthrown in a military coup by General Pervez Musharraf on 12th Oct 1999, only a few hours after he tries to dismiss the military leader.

1999-2008  Pakistan’s third military regime under General Pervez Musharraf. Nawaz Sharif is exiled to Saudi Arabia and Benazir Bhutto is in self-exile in Dubai.
2001 Pakistan has party-less local government elections after Musharraf introduces new decentralisation reforms in 2000.

2002 Pakistan’s seventh party-based, national elections bring to power a new political party engineered by Musharraf, the Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid (PML-Q), which is made up largely of a break-away faction of Nawaz Sharif’s PML (now called the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N)), and a few members of the PPP (now called the Pakistan People’s Party Patriots (PPPP)).

2005 Pakistan’s second local government elections under Musharraf, again party-less, are held.

2007 Musharraf has a Presidential election to lengthen his rule, but fears over the Supreme Court ruling unfavourably on his eligibility as a candidate leads him to dismiss the Chief Justice for the second time that year. A lawyers movement to restore the Chief Justice, started after the first dismissal in March, gains momentum. In November Musharraf declares Emergency Rule, during which time he alters the Constitution. Emergency is lifted six weeks later on December 15th, and elections are announced. Bhutto and Sharif both return to Pakistan from exile, in October and November, respectively, to prepare for the election.

Benazir Bhutto is assassinated on Dec 27th in Rawalpindi.

2008 Pakistan’s eighth national election is held on Feb 18th that ousts Musharraf’s PML-Q and brings back into power the PPP with Yusuf Raza Gilani as the Prime Minister and Benazir Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, as the President.

2010 The Constitution is returned to its 1973 state through a repeal of all Zia and Musharraf-era amendments, and Article 58-2 (B) is finally removed, leading to a return of all powers to the Prime Minister and Parliament.
ANNEX 1.2.
METHODS AND RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

Survey Set A

Qualitative Case Study Analysis

1. Qualitative field notes based on ethnographic participant observations.
2. Open-ended interviews with 15-20 key respondents per village.
3. Surveys with about 35-45 percent of randomly selected households per village using questionnaires that probed networks and relations within the village.
4. Census surveys of the full village population to get data on land inequality, literacy rates, poverty and demographic composition in terms of caste and kinship groups.
5. Archival data on village history and historical land inequality using colonial village Inspection Reports from the archives of the District Revenue Office.

Survey Set B

Quantitative Regression Analysis

1. Structured interviews with 2-3 key respondents per village.
2. Surveys with 45 randomly selected households per village, which gave me a dataset of almost 1600 households in total.
3. Census surveys of the full village population to get data on land inequality, literacy rates, poverty and demographic composition in terms of caste and kinship groups. This rendered a dataset of over 9000 households.
4. Archival data on village history and historical land inequality using colonial village Inspection Reports from the archives of the District Revenue Office.
## ANNEX 1.3.
### ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER 6

Table A. Land distribution across census sample in 35 villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cum. %</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cum. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Landless</td>
<td>6290</td>
<td>68.80</td>
<td>68.80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – &lt;5 acres</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>1,404</td>
<td>15.36</td>
<td>84.16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – &lt;12.5 acres</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>10.81</td>
<td>94.97</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28.16</td>
<td>35.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.5 – &lt;25 acres</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>97.66</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19.73</td>
<td>54.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – &lt;50 acres</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>99.17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18.31</td>
<td>73.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 – 150 acres</td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>99.89</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21.13</td>
<td>94.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;150 acres</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,142</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B. Occupation of sample population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (owner/tenant)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour (day/agricultural)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/trade</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly/contractual labour</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 2.1.
INDEX OF BARGAINING POWER: 8 DIMENSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of vote blocs in village</td>
<td>1 VB</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 or more – connecting to same candidate or party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 or more – connecting to different candidates or parties</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote bloc stability between two elections of the same level</td>
<td>High stability – No change in number of blocs, and no or minimal change in number of votes controlled between two elections</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low stability – No change in number of blocs but significant change in number of votes controlled, with votes being transferred from winner to loser (significant loss of votes for previous winner). Or, decrease in number of factions.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase in number of factions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of lowest caste group in landlords’ vote blocs</td>
<td>All included in 1 vote bloc led by landlord</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All included but split across 2 or more vote blocs led by landlords</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some included but others in separate vote bloc led by non-landed leader</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not included – have formed separate vote bloc</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process of electoral decision-making at the time of each election</td>
<td>Non-deliberated decision announced by landlord or vote bloc leader to village or vote bloc</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-deliberated decision announced in village council (some element of public forum and discussion)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-deliberated decision announced by leaders or agents doorto-door (elements of campaigning for candidate)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decisions taken after deliberations between leaders and members</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of formation of vote bloc</td>
<td>Extra-political reasons: Economic dependence, loyalty to landlord family</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extra-political reasons: Social obligation to, or primordial identification with, a group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political reasons: Expectation of benefits as a group</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political reasons: Support for ideological or policy-based reasons, or social solidarity based on an acquired identity</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of votes controlled by each vote bloc</td>
<td>1 large vote bloc (covering over 3/4th of village)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 medium vote blocs (whole village divided between 2)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;2 small vote blocs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population proportion of the caste to which the vote bloc leader belongs</td>
<td>Vote bloc leader member of a minority caste in the village</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote bloc leader member of a majority caste in the village, but less than lowest caste groups</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote bloc leader member of the largest caste in the village</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of overlap between vote bloc leaders and landlords</td>
<td>Overlap, with vote bloc leader being (a) member of original VPB, and (b) landowner of more than 12.5 acres (medium and large)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overlap, with vote bloc leader being (a) member of original VPB, but (b) landowner of less than 12.5 acres (small)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No overlap, with vote bloc leader who is an emerging intermediary: (a) not a member of the original VPB, (b) small or no landholdings (&lt;12.5 acres).</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 2.2.
PROCESS OF CODING THE 8 DIMENSIONS OF BARGAINING POWER

A. Instruments used
- Village surveys (2-3 key respondents per village)
- Household surveys (44-45 households per village)
- Census surveys (full village population)
- Archival data (colonial village Inspection Reports from the archives of the Revenue Office)
- Qualitative field notes.

B. Coding process
Dimension 1: Do members have a choice between vote blocs?
Measure: Number of vote blocs in a village.
- Used village surveys, Section G.4 and household surveys.
- Recorded number of vote blocs identified by key respondents.
- Then checked for the leader of each vote bloc and looked at which party or candidate they were connected to.
- Double-checked, when in doubt, with household survey responses for that village.

Dimension 2: Can members switch between vote blocs?
Measure: Vote bloc stability between two elections of the same level
- Used village surveys, Section G.61
- Compared number of vote blocs in each village, and the number of votes controlled by each vote bloc, in the 2002 National Assembly election with those in the 1997 National Assembly elections.
- 1st step: If number of vote blocs has changed, code 1 for decrease and 2 for increase.
- 2nd step: If the number of vote blocs has remained the same, check proportion of votes controlled. Coded 0 for no or minimal change, or 1 for change.
- For this, turned all votes into a proportion of total votes. Then compared across 2 elections.
- Also, checked name of vote bloc leader to see if winners may have lost and losers may have gained.

Dimension 3: Can members form their own vote blocs?
Measure: Participation of lowest caste group in landlord’s vote bloc
- Used village surveys, Sections E, G.7 and G.8, household surveys and census surveys.
- Checked for the lowest caste in each village.
- Checked to see if lowest caste had a vote bloc of its own.
- Checked to see which vote blocs they were in and who the leader of the bloc was. Verified this names with the leaders identified in the household surveys, Section 12.
- Checked landownership profile of the vote bloc leader in the village surveys section on social structures, Section E. For those on whom information was not clear in this file, I verified their landholding status in the census data for each village.
Dimension 4: Can members participate in the decisions of a vote bloc?
Measure: Process of electoral decision-making at the time of each election
• Used village surveys, Section G.10a and 10b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Survey question options</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Akhat (village council) held at landlord/village head’s daara</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Announcement by vote bloc leader or his agent</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Announcement by village head/maalik/chaudhry</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Direct house-to-house announcement by candidate/landlord/agent/</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Discussions held between vote bloc leaders and members</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dimension 5: On what basis are members recruited into vote blocs?
Measure: Basis of formation of vote bloc
• Used village surveys, Section G.6.
• Scored each vote bloc separately.
• There were multiple reasons for the formation of each vote bloc. I scored each reason separately, and then used the average to assign each vote bloc a score.
• I then averaged out the score of each vote bloc to assign a score to the village.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Survey question options</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Quom</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mohalla</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Political party affiliation / candidate affiliation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Extended family – khandaan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Patron client (landlord dependent)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Patron client (violence/sanctions)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Patron client (protection/service delivery)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Peeri-muridi</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Quom alliance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dimension 6: How many votes do vote bloc leaders control?
Measure: Number of votes controlled by each vote bloc
• Used village surveys, Section G.1. and G.6, household surveys and qualitative field notes.
• Got number of total registered voters in each village from Section G.1. These included all those that were members of vote blocs, those that voted without being a member of a vote bloc, and those that did not vote.
• Verified this with household surveys. Checked household survey data for numbers of these three categories of voters in each village. Converted these to percentages, and then verified percentages against those derived from Sections G.1 and G.6. The match was quite good in almost all cases.
• In the two villages where the gap was large, resolved issue through qualitative field notes.

Dimension 7: Do leaders belong to the majority social group?
Measure: Population proportion of the caste to which the vote bloc leader belongs
• Used village surveys, Section G.6, and census surveys.
• Listed each vote bloc leader and his/her caste group.
• Used census surveys to get proportions of all caste groups in each village.
• Matched caste of vote bloc leader to this list in each village.
• Scored each vote bloc in each village separately, and then averaged out the individual vote bloc scores to get a score for the village.

**Dimension 8:** Is the leader’s influence based on extra-political factors?
**Measure:** Extent of overlap between vote bloc leaders and landlords.
• Used village surveys, Section E and G.6, census surveys and archival data.
• Created list of families in each village that are descendents of the original village proprietary body (VPB). For this used census surveys and archival data from colonial Inspection Reports.
• Matched vote bloc leaders to this list of VPB families.
• Used census surveys and village surveys, Section E, to get size of landholding of each vote bloc leader.
• Scored each vote bloc in each village separately, and then averaged out the individual vote bloc scores to get a score for the village.
ANNEX 3.1.
DESCRIPTION OF VILLAGE-LEVEL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Table C. Description of village-level independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Type of village (social structural classification)</td>
<td>village_type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Historical inequality</td>
<td>hist_ten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Distance from nearest town</td>
<td>distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>house_type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>plurality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX 3.2.
DESCRIPTION OF HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Table D. Description of household-level independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Caste of household</td>
<td>caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Member of original village proprietary body</td>
<td>vpb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Land ownership</td>
<td>landsize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Home ownership</td>
<td>ownhome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Type of house</td>
<td>house_struc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Age of household head</td>
<td>age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Education of household head</td>
<td>education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Occupation of household head</td>
<td>occupation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>