Spirits of enterprise: the disappearing child in Thatcherism and theory

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Title

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Abstract

Thatcherism offered a promise of future prosperity based on unleashing the young male’s ambition; simultaneously, its ‘Victorian values’ sought to retrieve a moral past. Literary depictions of Thatcherism make the child central to a resulting contradiction between imagined moral past and materialistic future.

The disappearance of the child recurs in Peter Ackroyd’s *Hawksmoor* (1985), Ian McEwan’s *The Child in Time* (1987), and Alan Hollinghurst’s *The Line of Beauty* (2004). These novels satirise how Thatcherism managed the contradictions in its vision of the future by attempting to regulate the child’s ambitions. They even use the abducted, killed, or simply disappeared child to audaciously parody both the results of Thatcherite policy and contemporaneous practices of literary and psychoanalytic Theory, as each struggles to represent the child’s interests in the future. Here Thatcherite materialism leads, unintentionally and ironically, to unacceptable material ambitions in the child.

Keywords

Thatcherism in literature, child disappearance, Theory, queer studies, Ian McEwan, Alan Hollinghurst, Peter Ackroyd.
1. **Thatcher’s children**

Temporality is the problem [...] in any discussion of childhood.¹

Playful waste [...] allows for the possibility of historical change.²

‘The post-war era sentimentally ignored [...] that children are at heart selfish, and reasonably so.’³

Thatcherism offered a vision of the future, but one identified with the past – not the recent past, but an earlier reality imagined as both ‘Victorian’ and timeless - producing contradictions, as Subroto and Clarke claim in *Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution*:

While dreaming of creating a Britain for her father, Alderman Roberts, Mrs Thatcher has left us a Britain fit only for the likes of her son.⁴

As this oedipally resonant metaphor acknowledges, Thatcherism’s emphasis on setting entrepreneurial young men⁵ free from the post-war order (which stood accused of frustrating their ambitions) was frequently alleged to conflict with its own moralising rhetoric.⁶ The child, in whom Thatcher’s government had a pronounced interest, appears at this conflict’s centre.

Two very different pieces of legislation, passed only months apart, demonstrate Thatcherism’s interest in the child. The 1989 Children Act (after which Ian McEwan named a 2015 novel),⁷ prioritises the child’s interests in every situation where the
authorities are required to determine them. Another law, the Local Government Act 1988, by its Clause 28 prohibited ‘teaching of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship’, a clause initially motivated by children being given books depicting gay relationships. (Clause 28 was a significant political impetus for the development of academic queer studies, which dominates contemporary analysis of literary children, in Britain.) Both Acts were concerned with how the future would be affected by the child’s encounters with the adult world – encounters either educational or physical, the latter imagined at worst as the child’s abduction or abuse (according to Rose, ‘one of the traumas of the 1980s’). Both sought to recognise the child’s interests in the future. Nevertheless, Clause 28 explicitly mandates the non-recognition of the experiences of certain children, as though such withdrawal of recognition would change reality (indeed, some realities did change following Clause 28). By this, Thatcher intended to reverse the 1960s’ alleged introduction of ‘a radically new framework within which the younger generation would […] behave’ and replace this with another future where greed and good would be reconciled, and where the ambitious (particularly male) child would be rewarded, not punished, for his aspirations.

However, the persistence of the disappearing – abducted, exiled or killed - child in literary representations of Thatcherism queries whether Thatcher’s children have any future at all. Here, the future Thatcherism finds most difficult to manage turns out to be the one it ostensibly promotes, the one promised by the child’s ambitions for material
pleasures; Thatcherism’s willingness to withdraw recognition from these ambitions when they apparently become perverse manifests itself in fiction as these child disappearances. This withdrawal paradoxically creates a recognisable moral and ideological image of the child that replaces the interests of real children. These novels also suggest, though, that both Thatcherism, and the Theory through which we might critique its actions, unexpectedly share in the struggle to represent the child’s interests in the future.

In the novels, individuals of varying ages appear (and disappear) as children\(^\text{15}\) – Kate in *The Child in Time* is three; most of Dyer’s victims in *Hawksmoor* are entering puberty, whilst his killings of them stem from his own desires in infancy; but Charles in *The Child in Time* and Nick in *The Line of Beauty* are adult males whose own inner children become exposed. ‘Theory’ refers here primarily to practices of literary criticism informed by psychoanalytic and queer frameworks, often developed partly in response to 1980s politics, \(^\text{16}\) through which the latter novels have not only been interpreted, but with which their authors have degrees of explicit and implicit engagement. ‘Thatcherism’ refers to the programme combining free-market economics and social conservatism pursued by Margaret Thatcher from 1979 to 1990.

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Proclaiming a return to ‘Victorian Values’, Thatcher added, ‘they are also perennial values’.\textsuperscript{17} Freezing ‘history into essence’,\textsuperscript{18} Thatcherism abolished ‘uncertainty by suggesting that the future could be lived through the past’.\textsuperscript{19} This future was also to indulge material ambitions, those of entrepreneurial young men in particular, despite Thatcher’s avowed opposition to amoral consumerism.\textsuperscript{20} Not only opponents of Thatcherism, but sympathetic writers of its history like Baroness Thatcher’s authorised historian Charles Moore, agree that Thatcherism’s emphasis on materialistic opportunity – and the ambitious ‘new men’ to whom its appealed - was central to its political success,\textsuperscript{21} and yet that Thatcher’s struggle to align this with ‘Victorian’ morality was a genuine one (even if resolved more easily by her than some others).

As noted, Thatcher succeeded in squaring this circle partly by emphasising her programme’s contrast to another future emerging in the 1960s and 1970s, a ‘period of obsessive and naive interest in “youth”’ characterised by frivolous materialism:

A whole ‘youth culture’ [showed] vibrancy and talent, but this was also in large degree a world of make-believe. A perverse pride was taken in Britain about […] Carnaby Street in Soho, the Beatles, the mini-skirt […] They concealed the real economic weaknesses […]\textsuperscript{22}
Whether or not Thatcher’s prognosis was economically accurate, its own focus seems, as Christopher Hitchens remarked, ‘more aesthetic than economic’.23 (Thatcher also claimed that the Bloomsbury Group’s ‘rejection of the Victorian virtues in their own behaviour’ corrupted Keynesian economics).24 Thatcher’s (perhaps unexpected) ambivalence towards entrepreneurial ambitions here implies an association between youth (and ultimately, childhood, as ‘make believe’ hints) and political dissidence. ‘Make believe’ and ‘perverse pride’ echo the ‘pretended’ families targeted by Clause 28, similarly perceived as products of the 1960s.

Adam Phillips argues that ‘morality is the way […] we redescribe desiring so that it seems to work for us’,25 and the Thatcher government reconciled its leader’s ambivalence towards materialistic consumption through a combination of ‘social cohesion alongside the creation of wealth through private enterprise’ as ‘the two conditions of our future progress […] it worked for the Victorians’.26 ‘Make-believe’ disturbed Thatcher’s Methodist notion of future pleasures as a reward for the repetition of past virtue; these pleasures were instead offensively unproductive. The accusation of ‘perverse pride’ suggests a phobic displacement of the fascinations of images of excess - protesting too much, perhaps, because Thatcher’s own government was itself claimed to have unleashed materialistic frivolity amongst certain young people: ‘yuppies’ and City Boys.
Attempting to unite the unconscious drives of childhood greed and its afterlife in the aspirational young (particularly male) adult with the superego of Methodist morality, Thatcherism encouraged young men to gain more material goods in the belief that ‘more’ need not lead to the creation of social and historical change; yet ‘more’ and ‘different’ may not be so easily separable, according to the texts we’ll consider.

2. Images of Tomorrow

Literary representations of Thatcherism consistently depict recognition, or its denial, as fundamental to the political project, indicated inter alia through repeated associations between Thatcherism and visual fantasy, as in *The Line of Beauty* and Thatcher’s appearance in *The Assassination of Margaret Thatcher* (2014). On the night of the 1987 General Election, the TV satire *Spitting Image* parodied *Cabaret*’s (1972) scene where a beautiful Nazi youth sings ‘Tomorrow Belongs to Me’. Here, the boy – prepubescent, but dressed as a City Banker, the image of Thatcherism’s materialistic promise - fades disturbingly into the grotesque Puppet-Thatcher before a series of cuts to images of environmental degradation, economic chaos, and closing hospitals. Finally, Thatcher repeats, voice echoing, ‘tomorrow belongs to me’. This demand to recognise a vision of tomorrow, the sketch indicates, depends on not recognising the future actually emerging, replacing it with the vision of a fantasy-child as ‘tomorrow’. Here the Thatcherite future, supposed object of the child’s fascination, transforms him, embodiment of that future, into becoming himself the object of adult
fascinations (a hypocritical transference dramatised as the grotesque Thatcher/child juxtapositions). This circular fantasy ends, naturally, any possibility of disruption from the child’s own imagining of ‘tomorrow’.

This was both a literal child and a ‘child within’ the adult, as his City Banker dress suggested, a fantasy of an essential inner child whose ambitions Thatcher, as grotesque oedipal mother, uniquely offered to fulfil. This parodied Thatcher’s rhetorical alignments of the child with an imminent future where painful virtue would be rewarded with pleasurable prosperity, as when, in 1984, she affirmed the necessity of ‘young people’ learning ‘the spirit of enterprise’.31

This emphasis on learning a spirit that was supposedly essentially real anyway reflected with a belief that the child was at risk of being lured into the wrong future, evident in Thatcher’s concern that ‘children who need to be taught to respect traditional moral values are being taught that they have an inalienable right to be gay […] that our society offers them no future’.32 If Thatcherism depended on combining conservative morality with individual pleasures, the child imagined in this speech unsettles that unity, provoking Thatcher’s repudiation of a future where ‘homosexual activists’ sought ‘the legal right to exploit the sexual uncertainty of adolescents’.33

Collapsing the disappearance of the child’s innocence into his imagined actual abduction, Clause 28 targeted gays as responsible for ‘disappearing’ the child, but its
presentation also cast children themselves as potential participants in their own disappearance. Baroness Knight, who introduced Clause 28 in Parliament, suggested that queer images would incite the child’s pleasurable fascination: ‘brightly coloured pictures of little stick men [that] showed all about homosexuality and how it was done’. Here the child is inscribed, as Steven Bruhm says, ‘as both the thing we wish the child to be and the thing that actively resists [it,] both the quality of a child and that quality’s undoing’. The sense that the child might be drawn merely into playing gay, with unintended consequences, casts the scenario imagined by these proponents of Clause 28 in similar terms to how Thatcher characterised 1960s and 1970s fashions and music, both supposedly derived from childish fascinations that turned to perverse adult ambitions. In both cases, an economic aesthetic is used to associate this supposedly dangerous frivolity with a lack of productivity, with the warning of serious danger if such frivolity goes unchecked, if the ‘uncertainty’ allows itself to be ‘exploited’.

Clause 28 proposed to intervene in the child’s imagined reading, refusing recognition to queerness – dismissed as essentially a frivolous play - in order to control the future. Here precisely what Thatcherism elsewhere claimed to value in the child, his ambition and appetite for material pleasures, was recast as ‘a disgraceful waste of money’. This repudiated an uncertainty that could only be conceived as unproductive; hence Clause 28’s characterisation of children’s reading as indoctrination betrays the unspoken fear that it might not be such indoctrination, but rather something far more
indeterminate: the more the child reads, the less he can be read. Curiously, that which leads to condemnation of this act as wasteful also proves its real significance: this reading is imagined as pleasurable for the child. Here, the inconsistencies in Thatcherism’s materialism uncannily and unwillingly expose the possibility of that which they would rather not recognise: the material possibilities for pleasure without moral or economic predictability, and the risk of eliciting such possibilities when eliciting the child’s ambitions.

3. Theory and Frivolity

How might we, against Thatcher’s wishes, further theorise the paradox of a political project that promises to indulge the child’s ambitions, yet also fears them?

Adam Phillips argues that for the child, ambition is inextricable from pleasure. In play, the child encounters and remakes images of how she might be otherwise than adults believe her to be. However, the ambitions thus provoked are unpredictable; they expose an ‘idiosyncratic privacy of transformation’ in the child,37 who is disturbingly easily satisfied by play: ‘There is no purpose to the child’s life other than the pleasure of living it. It is not the child […] who believes in something called development.’38

For Phillips, the child’s fantasies may be a ‘fiction’, but ‘a fiction of prolific consequences’,39 though these consequences are neither recognisable nor predictable for the adult. In terms that recall both Clause 28 and Thatcher’s phobia towards the
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1960s and 70s, Phillips notes that these fantasies, and the play from which they arise, can only be understood by adults as frivolous, yet intimidating.

Thomas Docherty has similarly argued in more directly political terms that ‘playful waste’ – wasteful because it refuses demands for predictably productive use of time – is essential to the formation of a meaningfully different future and therefore meets hostility from the authorities. Similarly, for Phillips, the child’s frivolities affect the adult world, but in persistently unpredictable ways, this unpredictability rooted in the privacy of the child’s experiences.

Lee Edelman’s influential *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (2004) describes how the child’s image underpins a conservative politics (particularly the American conservative turn from the 1980s onwards that paralleled British Thatcherism), demanding prioritisation of a future that never comes and yet cannot be contested. Edelman pointedly notes that this refuses the futures of particular real children, those who grow up queer; we shall later find this scenario played out in some literary representations of Thatcherism. Edelman argues that the association of the queer with death should be embraced, as the negation of the image of the child, a negation he calls queerness.

Edelman’s arguments politically complement Serge Leclaire’s more domestically-situated revision of the oedipal scenario in *A Child is Being Killed*.
(which, despite Leclaire’s contrasting Lacanian framework, is also suggestively compatible with Phillips). Here conflict enters the child’s life primarily as the image of the child himself imposed by the parents, which interrupt his free play and produce a persistent wish to destroy that image and regain his pleasurable, creative and private freedom. The child’s fascination with images – one of the ways in which he makes private play and re-makes the world presented to him – can be transformed into adult scrutiny of the child as image, within which his ambitions can be adapted for adult wishes.

Unlike Leclaire, Edelman seems somewhat uninterested in the relationship between children themselves and their image as used in the dominant socially conservative order, whilst in identifying a position of absolute negation, Edelman ignores the conservatism inherent in prioritising the act of identification itself. He claims that queer theory ‘suggests a refusal […] of every substantialization of identity’, yet nevertheless in practice - including his own reading practice in the case studies of *No Future* - the queer comes to be a rather substantial figure itself, one demanding recognition.

As Lesnik-Oberstein has pointed out, Edelman’s assumptions constitute an example of how ‘the child has a tendency to recur as a foundational or essential real, even in some queer […] theoretical writings which express an explicit commitment to questioning essentialist notions of identity’. As she says, Edelman’s drawing of an
opposition between image and real child both fails to acknowledge the mutual contamination between the image and the real (and thus counters one essentialism with another), and having repudiated the image, fails to engage the conditions of the real child, rather tacitly presuming that correct recognition is a sufficient aim for analysis.

In both the conservatism Edelman attacks and the criticism he advocates, a recognisable image or figure becomes, in practice, a condition for interest in the child. This avoids a more genuinely radical potential in the child’s reading, as Clause 28 tacitly acknowledged in its concern with an uncertainty or frivolousness that, whilst certainly associated with queerness, also goes beyond it.

Such reading here is both a material act – it can be physically prevented - and yet a private one too, its implications neither recognisable nor predictable. Following Phillips and my own reading of Thatcherite anxieties, we can observe that reading for the sake of pleasure alone (playful and wasteful reading) frustrates any recognition of some essential quality as the justification for permitting its own material conditions. (If this risks ‘pleasure’ coming to sound as substantial and recognisable as queerness is for Edelman, Phillips’ emphasis on its intimidating privacy for the adult observer warns against this.) Thatcherite materialism’s own emphasis on pleasure ironically and uncannily leads to this frustration of recognition in the texts discussed here.
The children we find in these texts do not suggest that Thatcherism fails to fulfil their ambitions because of some essential characteristic in the child that denies all fulfilment. Rather, Thatcherism’s failures are precisely because, as Phillips points out, in unpredictable but significant fashions, the child can sometimes fulfil his ambitions in ways that fall outside the existing adult social order, ways that frustrate predictable recognition. These successes will inevitably be received as simultaneously frivolous and profoundly dangerous. Thatcherism’s hostility to the times and spaces of pleasurable reading and its fascinations, and the new and adapted ways of living these can produce, is a hostility towards history itself as the potential for change; as Docherty says, ‘playful waste […] allows for the possibility of historical change’.46

Leclaire defines the ‘work of psychoanalysis’ as ‘a way to locate unconscious representatives without claiming that any translation […] can be absolutely faithful’.47 Curiously, this demand makes most sense when transferred to politics and criticism, and applied to children, if taken literally: where will the child’s play be located – where, in what conditions, will it be allowed to happen? This is the same question demanded by Clause 28, with its hostility to the idea of representing aspects of the child’s experience that we know to exist but which we nevertheless cannot perfectly recognise, and whose consequences are truly ‘entrepreneurial’ precisely in that they cannot be predicted; they begin with mere pleasure. Whereas Thatcherism figures pleasure as the potential end of a process, a reward for virtuous adaptation to an
ultimately satisfying social order, here the child’s pleasure can surely only ever appear as a disruptive, uncertain beginning. Hence, Thatcherism disappears the child, by the peculiar method (correctly described in other contexts by both Edelman and Leclaire) of creating an image of the child that demands recognition.

4. **Children lost outside, found within.**

Ian McEwan’s 1987 novel *The Child in Time* uses child disappearance as the central metaphor in its ‘dystopian, ecofeminist critique of Thatcherism. Stephen, a children’s author, finds that his three-year-old daughter Kate has disappeared in a supermarket (Thatcher’s ‘supermarket’ as moral threat). Despite frantic searching, Kate remains forever missing. The novel narrates the failed search alongside Stephen’s psychological retrieval of his own childhood, his co-option on the ‘Prime Minister’s Official Commission on Child Care’, and the peculiar case of his associate Charles Darke. Throughout, the figure of the child attracts paranoia and aggression; Stephen himself is occasionally suspected of child abuse.

Quotations from an ‘Authorised Childcare Handbook’ begin each chapter, aligning the child’s nature with an essentialist, atemporal economic system demanding an educational counter-reformation: ‘The post-war era sentimentally ignored […] that children are at heart selfish, and reasonably so.’ This cancellation of post-war progress, indeed of *any* meaningful social change, makes it impossible, McEwan hints,
to imagine the future at all: The child in time – dynamic, curious, ambitious - must accordingly be disappeared. Yet not only Thatcherism disappears children: Multiple competing agendas ensure the child is ‘extensively theorised [and] dissolved in an empty succession of meanings’,\(^5\) as when the Commission’s sterile arguments seek to determine appropriate children’s reading material and methods (echoing the real contemporaneous Clause 28 debates). A variety of educational and psychoanalytic theories are satirised in these discussions, in which the child’s reading attracts particular hostility, as a private and unproductive act with unpredictable consequences (the disappeared Kate, notably, liked to read).

Official paranoia towards actual children is matched by the indulgence offered to the child imagined within the adult; as Darke, originally Stephen’s entrepreneurial publisher, later politician, says: ‘This book is not for children, it’s for a child, and that child is you [Stephen]’.\(^5\) The Prime Minister - an unnamed Thatcher in playfully thin disguise, Darke’s patron and ‘the nation’s parent [in] collective fantasy’,\(^5\) with special interests in children’s policy - releases previously repressed materialistic ambitions in the young male. His greed can be infinitely indulged, but on condition that this greed (which the handbook identifies with the child) is recognisable and predictable, trapped in oedipal debt to the mother who has eliminated frustrating post-war paternalism and recovered the supposed reality of the essential child - both within the adult, driving his
continued ambitions, and outside him as real children, being taught Victorian values and
the spirit of enterprise in order to permanently guarantee the Thatcherite future.

However, Darke’s story spirals into ironic parody of both Kate’s disappearance
and Thatcherite rhetoric on the child. Darke becomes a government minister, the Prime
Minister’s favourite; then his career falls apart when he suffers a total regression to a
private ‘childish’ narcissism, spending his days climbing trees and playing. Darke
comes to embody ‘childish’ and ‘private’ ambitions for pleasure that nevertheless
become politically disruptive; ironically, this is because he becomes too recognisably
the child, mocking Thatcherism’s oedipal logic by following it too closely.

Darke also mocks Thatcherism’s ‘privatisation’: With his enforced
disappearance, the private as what is known to exist but nevertheless cannot be
recognised also disappears from representation (literally, in Darke’s exile from political
life). McEwan thus links the child with private life as a necessary condition for a
humane political order, which is reinforced when Stephen eventually finds peace by
imaginatively recovering his own internal traces of childhood, countering the
essentialist link between an inner child and adult economics advocated by the
Handbook’s philosophy.

Casting the post-war period of Stephen’s own upbringing as both politically
progressive but also a more natural order than that offered by Thatcherism, McEwan
finds for his protagonist a pastoral place in which the child might be educated, and in which the adult might recover his own natural inner child against an inhuman political economy. Stephen eventually theorises reading as itself such access to nature, in response to a fellow committee member’s suggestion that reading is an unwarranted disruption to the natural course of time in the child’s play, and thus counters the idea that the child’s reading might refuse any predictable future.

Stephen expresses desire for a ‘natural’, harmonious relationship between past and future, when having sex with his wife for the first time since their daughter disappeared:

[…] Biology, existence, matter itself had dreamed this up for its own pleasure and perpetuity, and this was exactly what you were meant to do, it wanted you to like it.⁵⁵

Yet shortly later ‘the lost child was between them again’,⁵⁶ the harmony disrupted. Stephen makes over-theorising responsible for the child’s disappearance: only return to ‘biology, existence, matter itself’, and the painful disruptions of politics and theory, which damage the child’s natural progression, will fall away. McEwan also locates Stephen’s recovery of his own childhood (and Darke’s descent into his) spatially, in the countryside. This Wordsworthian identification between the pastoral and autobiographical interiority suggests a wishful disengagement with materiality in
favour of a naturalised image of childhood with which to counter Thatcherism’s own essentialisms.

Yet the uncanny role of Thatcherite materialism in unintentionally exposing the incompleteness, the temporal disruptiveness, in the child’s ambitions is not quite eradicated. Whereas Kate is perfectly disappeared and almost perfectly replaced by the child Stephen retrieves within himself, Darke’s disappearance remains altogether messier. Perhaps Darke’s very regression betrays McEwan’s attempt to manage the anxiety his character provokes: isn’t the adult, who loses his worldly ambitions in order to become the child again, less troubling than the child always (but unevenly) growing up, unpredictably ambitious, remaining disruptive however far he is indulged? By making the ‘child within’ awkwardly visible, Darke betrays the fear haunting the consolation Stephen finds in his own inner child and resulting symbolic resolution of his daughter’s loss: the fear that the persistence of powerful ambitions for pleasure in the adult only confirms, rather than resolves, the disruptive potential presented by the child. Darke’s frivolous play both conceals and codes this potential.

McEwan finds ironic parallels between Thatcherism and Theory in their treatment of the child, but his own theorisation of childhood, like Thatcherism’s, presents itself as natural - as only recognising what is essentially there. For McEwan, the disappearance of the child indicates the removal of the child who should be visible;
yet Darke betrays an underlying anxiety about the very possibility of her recognition – and not only under Thatcherism.

5. **Ambitious reading**

_The Line of Beauty_ (2004) dramatises in Thatcherite history the scenario Edelman identified theoretically: the forced disappearance of the real child who grows up queer, in order to establish a political order based upon the image of the child, deployed to avoid exactly the different future the real child portends. Although Nick is not a child (but rather in his twenties) during the novel’s timeframe, his downfall emerges directly from both ambitions located in his own childhood reading and the fascinations it provokes, and from Thatcherism’s essentialist image of the child.

Nick Guest uses his own childhood ambitions and appetite for pleasure to gain entry to times and spaces to which he would not otherwise have access, principally the Feddens’ home, where Nick lodges from shortly after graduation, in 1983, until 1987. Invited there by his university friend Toby Fedden, he joins the household of Gerald Fedden, a Conservative MP. There, Nick accesses a world of pleasures contrasting with his own provincial childhood, but playing out fascinations with art, books and architecture persisting from that childhood. Nick is simultaneously entering adulthood through sexual exploration, eventually with the son of a Lebanese businessman, Wani.
The public exposure of this relationship (and of Wani’s AIDS) leads to Nick being thrown out of the Feddens’ home.

No other writer on Thatcherism probes its ironic contradictions towards pleasure so far as Hollinghurst (who, unlike McEwan and Ackroyd, wrote with hindsight, after Clause 28’s repeal). His title might refer to lines of cocaine or poetry, but also suggests containing beauty: Here, pleasure (beautiful bodies, houses, art) can be infinitely enjoyed provided it remains without effect, whilst sources of potential disruption - HIV/AIDs, racism, mental illness - are managed through non-recognition. Conversely, repeated recognisable images create ‘lines’ that both secure and contain pleasure - particularly the pervasive image of Thatcher herself: ‘The wives, you see, all look like…her – they’ve all got the blue bows’.

Matching Thatcher’s image – literally or symbolically - becomes a condition for fulfilment of ambition (Gerald even repaints his front door blue for her visit), hinting audaciously at parallels between the ‘heterosexual queenery’ of Thatcher-adoration and 1980s gay society.

The power of images is closely associated with the child’s fascinations and ambitions, as suggested when Nick returns to his hometown in a car gifted to him by Wani:

Some lads, or ‘louts’, roamed about under […] the market hall [which] had been the pride of Nick’s childhood […] ranked with the Taj Mahal and the
Parliament Building in Ottawa in his private architectural heaven. The moment of accepting it was not by Wren had been as bleak and exciting as puberty. Now he revved round it, the lads looked up [...] the achievements of sex and equities and titles and drugs blew out in a long scarf behind him [...] pleasures and privileges these boys couldn’t imagine and thus beyond their envy [...] Gerald sprang out [...] torn between his sporty show-off self and a hint of compromised dignity [...] in being seen in such a car with a young gay man.  

Situated originally in his early reading and now returning from the ‘real’ world of politics and money, the child’s ambitions cause a *disturbance*, literalised in the disturbance caused by Nick’s car, drawing the lads’ own fascinated gaze. Nick mentally contains the potential disturbance, in turn, from the lads’ jealousy by assuming their economic and aesthetic ignorance. Gerald’s comical anxiety to avoid recognising the affinity between his own exhibitionism and Nick’s queerness ironically reflects Nick’s own internalised equivalent imperative to not recognise affinity with the lads. This refusal of recognition is, again, paradoxically a means of *recognising* the other: the lads are defined, for Nick, by their (economically poor, presumed heterosexual) inability to imagine the pleasures he enjoys. This assumption draws simultaneously on Nick’s alignments with (and between) Thatcherite society, with gay culture, and with academic
knowledge; also upon his own reading of himself as child, in order to avoid recognising any similarity between the child he once was and the youths who watch him in Barwick.

Curiously, in both Line and Hawksmoor, architecture embodies the child’s movement from imaginative reading to physical creativity (the movement Clause 28 feared). Images (in this case architectural) provoke fantasies of ‘prolific consequence’ (as per Phillips) in the child. Nevertheless, images also apparently serve as tools of control: Nick’s cocaine use, his pornography-dominated life with Wani, and the images of Thatcher, all stimulate and immediately control fantasies of excess – frozen, framed, and endlessly repeated in an apparent guarantee of predictability, conjuring Thatcherism as an atemporal gilded age. The very use of these images ironically acknowledges the power of the image to disrupt; like Clause 28, they show that the extension of recognition to the child’s desires and its withdrawal can be one and the same thing, or as Nick puts it, they have a ‘style that hides and reveals things at the same time’. In Lacanian terms, we might say they attempt to reconcile the disruptive pleasure of the self’s fascination with the image of the Other with a totalising symbolic order, secured through endless repetition.

Yet even repetition is not, ultimately, a function of control here, but rather of an excess, an ambition, that finally refuses any frame attempting to provide its satisfaction – much as the young Nick found the architecture of Barwick both infinitely exciting and yet ultimately unsatisfying. Here the materialistic desire for wanting more access to
pleasure ultimately sits all too closely alongside the unwanted creation of social
difference, as the ambivalent relationships here between Thatcherite materialism, gay
culture, and institutions of aesthetic and literary interpretation, suggest.

The disruptive possibilities of time – of ‘growing up’, but also of meaningful
politics – depend, as Leclaire argued, on the traumatic yet pleasurable position of both
being someone’s child and always becoming other than that child - the source of the
‘creative spirit’. When Nick feels the gap between his parents’ investment in him,
their intelligent only child, and his present life, which has realised his ambitions but not
as they anticipated, he ‘felt for both parties, as though […] witnessing an argument with
himself’. Nick as dangerously ambitious child re-emerges after his affair with Wani is
publically exposed. Gerald now imagines Nick as a changeling, taken in by the
Feddens only to destroy them, driven by resentment over his own homosexual inability
to produce children. Two children are in play here: the recalcitrant real child (like Nick,
always in fact growing up), and the fantasy child in whom moral authority is invested.
Nick isn’t the only one undermined by a fantasy child he cannot match: Toby Fedden’s
semi-arranged relationship disintegrates; Catherine Fedden remains mentally ill but
perceptive about matters her family refuse to recognise; Wani is dying of AIDS after
long staging a heterosexual engagement. Nick is scapegoated for the failures of all the
novel’s children, the queer phobically treated as embodying ‘no future’ when he exposes the future actually emerging.

Nick thus ironically proves that when, as in this society, the child is identified as a key figure for a version of reality based on securing material pleasures (as, for example, Wani’s personal materialism reflects his role in securing the position first gained by his immigrant entrepreneur father), this child will never sit easily within the lines created for him. One scene captures this perfectly: Wani’s little brother plays noisily with a toy Ferrari, echoing the actual cars bought by Wani and reflecting the materialism at the centre of the family’s – and Thatcherite – values. Yet the toy car ultimately proves an irritating disturbance, and is angrily stopped by the furious father’s foot.

Nick himself is finally thrown out when Gerald figures him as having taken revenge for his own childhood by destroying the children of others: ‘you must have been very envious I think of everything we have […] from your background too’. Gerald’s suddenly paranoid reading, his a macabre character study, ironically echoes the novel’s constant references to practices of literary interpretation. Nick’s access to pleasures is consistently gained through his own abilities to ‘read’ (he helps Wani with study at Oxford, bonds with Lord Kestler over art, and is inaccurately introduced to Mrs Thatcher as a ‘don’).
Hollinghurst mischievously gives Nick the quasi-academic a parallel in his antiques-dealer father (whose name, Don, puns on this ironic juxtaposition), who gains access to aristocratic homes and beautiful things to give them a monetary value, whilst Nick gives them an intellectual value. In making the novel’s events an ironic substitution for Nick’s doctoral research on Henry James, Hollinghurst parodies a political system that controls access to pleasure through its own theories of reading and strategic interpretations; conversely, the parody extends to institutionalised practices of critical reading, too.

Published in the same year as No Future, Line’s parody plays out Edelman’s thesis only to subtly refute it: To recognise the child growing up queer is not to solve the problems of that child’s pleasures and his ambitions here, any more than Nick’s awareness of his own sexuality means that he is correct to dismiss the fascinations of the lads watching him from the building that once stimulated his own (highly consequential) fantasies. The hard lines around beauty, around pleasure – simultaneously conceptual and material – divide what is permissible to recognise from what is not; and the real child, on the latter side, is persistently disappeared.

6. Thatcherism and Theory

Peter Ackroyd’s novel Hawksmoor (1985) is structured upon a series of child disappearances. These disappearances ironically reveal the persistence of realities to
which Thatcherism refuses recognition, and which provoke the child’s fascination and private ambitions.

Ackroyd’s first novel, *The Great Fire of London* (1982), parodied both Thatcher’s ‘Victorian values’ and the leftist accusation of ‘Dickensian’ poverty in 1980s London. Ackroyd, however, was more obviously influenced by developments in literary theory (and, increasingly, his mystical sense of history) than by contemporary politics. Lacan, Derrida, and Saussure are well-recognised early influences upon him; Derrida is even discussed by characters in *Great Fire*, before which Ackroyd had authored a radical New Critical monograph, *Notes for a New Culture*. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, *Hawksmoor* situates child disappearance as a consequence of both Thatcherism and Theory, the latter more explicitly than by McEwan or Hollinghurst, but like them Ackroyd is ultimately interested in the simultaneously political and theoretical difficulties of reading the child’s ambitions. Finally, however, *Hawksmoor* shows Ackroyd himself similarly unable to escape these difficulties.

*Hawksmoor* parodies specifically Thatcher-era obsessions with child abduction and gays. Ackroyd’s antiheroic protagonist Nicholas Dyer haunts the Thatcherite 1980s, disappearing its children to revenge its refusal (which the novel traces to Enlightenment rationalism) to admit the existence of any forces in the world that frustrate recognition and nonetheless affect the future. Yet here the child’s
disappearance also equally embodies the interpretative violence enabled by Dyer’s claims to recognition of the world’s true nature, and of the child.

*Hawksmoor* is structured as two parallel texts that unify at the ending: one is narrated by Dyer, a macabre Doppelgänger of the architect Nicholas Hawksmoor (c.1661-1736), who recounts his life as it has led to his 1711 commission to build seven London churches. The other text is a third-person narrative in the mid-1980s, where a detective called Hawksmoor investigates a series of murders – almost all of children - perpetrated around Dyer’s now-derelict churches. These churches are in fact coded embodiments of the gnostic religion into which Dyer was abducted in infancy, after abandonment following his parents’ deaths in the plague. Taken from the streets by a mysterious man, Mirabilis, Dyer was brought into a Manichean faith recognising evil and darkness as necessary elements of an unchanging universe, elements suppressed by the Enlightenment thought promoted by Dyer’s rival and former mentor, Christopher Wren.

In the 1980s, whilst detective Hawksmoor investigates the serial murders around Dyer’s churches, he faces pressures to use new algorithm-driven technologies, successors to Wren’s earlier science of recognition and predictability, promising to predict crime and literally secure the future. For Ackroyd as for Hollinghurst, this desire for the recognisable, the material and the predictable is at odds with the materiality to which it lays claim, and with the individual ambitions it offers to fulfil. The
monumentally material spaces in the novel, the churches, are ironically not only the products of childhood ambition, but also manifestations of aspects of reality that refuse recognition (whilst Enlightenment rationalism, equated with Thatcherism, descends into fantasy, ignorance, and openness to manipulation through its insistence on empirical recognition).

When Wren first encounters the young Dyer, Wren questions his claim to have read a particular architectural book, since it is not in English:

No, I answer’d a little abashed, but I have looked upon the Pictures.75

The novel’s repeated movement, from the opening, between (two-dimensional) drawings and the physical (three-dimensional) churches emphasises the child’s creative ambition, derived from the fascination with ‘the Pictures’ as a form of reading: the churches embody both Dyer’s childhood creativity, maintained as his secret adult resistance to the dominant ideological order, and his own secret rival order, his peculiar theory. Dyer thus ironically creates a direct, if perverted, parallel to his Enlightenment and Thatcherite opponents; he, like them, seeks to master time through collapsing past and future into a single present, which he achieves when the novel’s final encounter takes place in the fictional Church of Little St Hugh, named for the medieval child-martyr (contrasting with the novel’s other churches, all real products of the historical Hawksmoor). Thus the three-dimensional products of the child’s desires, the churches,
finally reduce back into the two-dimensional, textual image; now reading is no longer transformative, but freezes time, just as in killing boys on the verge of youth, Dyer halts their entry into sexuality and language, a parodically psychoanalytic act analysed by Link, Hock-soon, and Taube.

As Hawksmoor gradually comes to suspect the ghostly truth of Dyer’s responsibility for the 1980s child disappearances, he becomes himself increasingly closer to Dyer, for whose ‘true’ name his substitutes, until at the novel’s close they dissolve into a single voice and announce: ‘And I am a child again, begging on the threshold of eternity’. A new textual child – produced, again, by the real child’s disappearance.

Dyer’s reading of the world, a theory posed against both the Enlightenment’s faith in predictability and the common people’s complacency, becomes the most precious thing he can pass on to the child (as Mirabilis once passed it to him). This reflects not only Dyer’s repetition and restitution of an original loss from his own infancy (the Lacanian situation Link identifies underpinning the novel), but the threat to his creative desires from the social order. Dyer’s theory, in fact, persistently parodies Lacanian thought:

Why do we not believe the very Infants to be the Heirs of Hell […] I declare that I build my Churches firmly on this Dunghil Earth and with a full
Conception of Degenerated Nature. I have only room to add: there is a mad-drunk Catch, Hey ho! The Devil is dead! If that be true, I have been in the wrong Suit all my Life.  

The alienation of the child, the abject (‘Dunghil’; ‘Degenerated’), language (the ‘Catch’), lack and the phallus (the building of the churches), all evoke a Lacanian psychic landscape, as Link argues. Ackroyd had explored Lacan in Notes; Ackroyd had explored Lacan in Notes; Hawksmoor translates theory into parody. Prefiguring Borch-Jacobsen’s critique of Lacan, and despite Lacan considering his work a ‘Copernican’ undermining of human mastery, Ackroyd mischievously equates Lacanian thought with Dyer’s quest for mastery of time, implying that desire for such mastery lies behind strategies of both political control and authoritative interpretation – Thatcherism, and Theory.

There are hints, however, that the child’s creativity is not necessarily reducible to the Lacanian scenario of loss from which it supposedly first sprung. Thus, although Dyer remarks of the plague pit that ‘I cou’d not weep then but I can Build now’, seeming to make the churches the mere inversion of the loss represented by the pit, his irony and self-awareness undermine such pathos, suggesting that ‘looking upon the pictures’ (images entirely outside the family relationship) may be as much responsible for his motivations as the loss of his parents, after which he feels a ‘Chearfulness of Spirits’. Ambition is pleasurable, even frivolous; and it is perhaps the fear of losing this pleasure, as much as of losing his parents, that drives Dyer’s authoritarian turn. His
quest for mastery of time aims to manage the future through disappearing children in the service of preserving the material expressions of his own pleasurable childhood creativity – the churches – as permanent.

The final line, ‘I am a child again, begging on the threshold of eternity’, suggests that, as Dyer’s, Hawksmoor’s, and Ackroyd’s voices collapse into each other, the quest for mastery is replaced by a surrender to history. It is through encountering (in both places and texts, which become, at Hawksmoor’s end, the same thing) hidden and uncanny history, Ackroyd suggests, that one achieves release from both the philistine rationalism of Thatcherism and the intellectual authoritarianism of contemporary Theory, and so finds the proper object for the child’s ambitions:

I cannot change that Thing call’d Time, but I can alter its Posture and, as Boys do [...] so I will dazzle you all.

This also forms the basis for a mode of reading: Ackroyd’s own idiosyncratic historicism and belief in genius loci. Yet Ackroyd’s position is not so separable from what he parodies and this – despite Hawksmoor’s ironic, self-aware sensibility – ultimately, ironically, proves the difficulty of the child’s materiality. His mystical historicism avoids any link between reading and the possibility for disruption in the material world, instead emphasising textual pleasures; this has diminishing returns on the fascination and creativity (‘dazzle’) from which it first sprang. Ackroyd’s 1990s and
2000s work consistently repeats the same thesis of uncanny historical continuity, losing the disruptive possibility that gives it significance in *Hawksmoor*. Although neither would likely accept the comparison, Ackroyd’s version of uncanny mystical history has something in common with Edelman’s queerness (and both emerge from theoretical engagements in which Lacan features significantly). Seeking to negate one essentialist account of reality as applicable to the child, both place a premium on recognition of another essential reality, which then becomes a condition for the child’s value to be read much as Thatcherism made its non-recognition a condition for the child’s access to read.

Ultimately the dangerously ambitious child proves too difficult for someone as invested in interpretative authority as Ackroyd - a fact that Dyer ironically acknowledges. Whilst Dyer’s architecture codes the material power of the child’s ambitions, situated in his early fascinated reading, Ackroyd is unable to accept the indeterminacy and temporality implicit in this power, and so reduces it to an exercise of textual interpretation. In this exercise, which becomes Ackroyd’s subsequent literary project through his career, the material becomes secondary to the significance of essential realities Ackroyd attempts to reveal in increasingly doctrinaire fashion. In proclaiming the uncanny and the esoteric as legible objects, Ackroyd ultimately makes them so recognisable that they lose the qualities that distinguished them from rationalist and conservative complacencies in the first place; he is unable to accept the
unrecognisable element in material times and spaces, and thus ultimately de-materialises them, making them perfect objects for interpretation as the practice of recognition.

This de-materialising tendency emerges, as we’ve seen throughout, as an atemporal collapse of past and future, one that appears to provide a substantial site or figure for an essential, permanent reality. However, this figure is actually so substantial – so recognisable – that it cannot coincide with the material reality of the child who is in time, and whose own very material ambitions constitute a rupture between past and future; and thus it can finally only be represented as a violence to that real child.

7. **The child, in time**

The notion that ambition is merely for pleasure offends our moral sensibilities; that pleasure might become ambition disturbs our desire for predictability: as Thatcher feared – and as Thatcherism’s materialism ironically exposed - frivolous play in private might unexpectedly lead to social and historical change. The child who demonstrates this is disappeared for it.

Queer modes of reading foreground the potential of politically unrecognisable pleasures for temporal disruption. Yet, as I’ve suggested, could the continuation of literary criticism as the practice of identification or recognition – even through such queer frameworks - evade a more radical demand? A demand involving not opposing
the child’s embodiment of the future, but one based on realising that this embodiment is in fact a threat even to the political culture that claims to celebrate it?

In playing upon awkward parallels and complicities between Thatcherism and Theory – as manifested in institutionalised literary reading – these novels dramatise the prioritisation of recognition as the condition for the child’s access to times, spaces, books and images for pleasure. Clause 28 could correctly be read, via Edelman, as a sacrifice of the queer for the conservative futurism encoded in the child’s image. However, it also sought to withdraw access to books, and to times and spaces for the child, in the belief that they wastefully provided for nothing other than pleasure, with dangerously unpredictable consequences. As Docherty has argued, despite a rhetorical emphasis on entrepreneurship and material advancement maintained from Thatcher’s Britain to today’s, our political culture is marked by hostility towards the extension of material and aesthetic pleasures without predictable outcomes. Critical reading as practising identification or recognition – even of that which is refused by the dominant political order – similarly risks evading this demand for the child’s material access to the unpredictable pleasures of ambition without conditions of moral productivity.

Reflecting this demand might involve turning to the child marginalised by Thatcherism and its opponents alike: The lad, bored but watchful on the market square, deprived of material pleasures but with unknown (maybe not absent) ambitions. He is the spirit of enterprise, to use the phrase in a ghostlier sense than originally intended: the
child’s interests are known to exist, and demand representation, but, never wholly recognisable, promise a future irreconcilable to identification with the past. Thatcherite materialism and its promise to indulge ambition unintentionally exposes this most difficult characteristic of the child, his tendency to create frivolous fictions, to dream grand designs, to greedily fantasise – with potentially ‘prolific consequences’.

Ironically, it shows that to be materialistic in both senses – to attend to the materiality of spaces and times and to desire the pleasures to be gained therein – requires, despite Thatcherism’s best efforts, acknowledgement of a reality that repudiates clear recognition: the reality of the child’s frivolously pleasurable, strangely unrecognisable ambitions, in reading and in play.
Notes

5 The child benefitting from Thatcherism is typically imagined as male; when girls appear here, it is usually to disruptive effect.
6 This was perhaps most paradigmatically captured by Martin Amis in *Money: A Suicide Note*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1984.
12 Rose, Jacqueline. *The Case of Peter Pan, or The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction*. P. XI.
15 I occasionally refer to ‘real’ children in contrast to political images or figures of children. ‘Real children’ generally indicates those who would conventionally be deemed children in law and policy from the 1980s to today, i.e. those of 18 and below. However, I also follow Edelman in observing that the ‘real’ child is by definition in time, ‘growing up’ and therefore always reaching beyond the temporal definition of childhood, and simultaneously making the adult reach back towards it.
16 See Sinfield, especially his introduction.
18 Ibid, p.301.
26 Sinfield, p.296.


33 Thatcher, *The Path to Power*, p.57.

34 Qted. in Section 28 [LGBT History Month Publication]: <<http://lgbthistorymonth.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/1384014531528Background.pdf>> [Accessed 14/08/16]


39 Ibid, p.5.

40 Docherty, *For the University*, p.65.


46 Docherty, p.165.

47 Leclaire, p.38.


51 Ibid, p.155.

52 Morgado, p.247.


54 Ibid, p.88.


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58 Ibid, p.382.
61 Ibid, p.54.
64 Leclaire, A Child is Being Killed, p.3.
67 Ibid, p.211.
68 Ibid, p. 481.
69 Ibid, p. 331.
72 Great Fire, 91.
74 Ackroyd, Peter. Hawksmoor, p.41 and p.110.
75 Ibid, p.53.
79 Ackroyd, Hawksmoor, p.217.
81 Link, p. 523.
82 Ackroyd, Notes, p.111.
85 Ackroyd, Hawksmoor, p.16.
88 Ibid, p.11.

90 See *For The University*, especially 'The Student Experience', pp.36-67.