Social elites on the board and executive pay in developing countries: evidence from Africa

Hearn, Bruce, Strange, Roger and Piesse, Jenifer (2017) Social elites on the board and executive pay in developing countries: evidence from Africa. Journal of World Business, 52 (2). pp. 230-243. ISSN 1090-9516

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Abstract

This study applies a new multi-focal actor-centered institution-theoretic approach to examine the association between executive pay and the recruitment of social elites to the board of directors in developing countries. We use a sample of 119 initial public offerings (IPOs) from 17 African stock markets to model this relationship. The results suggest that a higher proportion of elites on the board is associated with lower executive pay. This is moderated by institutional quality; that is, lower institutional quality is associated with more directors drawn from social elites and with higher pay, while the opposite is true in higher-institutional-quality environments. Our findings confirm the importance of the social environment within which governance is embedded.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Business and Management
Depositing User: Joy Blake
Date Deposited: 05 Jan 2017 09:52
Last Modified: 18 Aug 2017 10:11
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/66034

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