Motivating knowledge agents: can incentive pay overcome social distance?

Berg, Erlend, Ghatak, Maitreesh, Manjula, Ramachandra, Rajasekhar, D and Roy, Sanchari (2013) Motivating knowledge agents: can incentive pay overcome social distance? Working Paper. Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis in Development.

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Abstract

This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a public health insurance programme. In the absence of incentive pay, social distance impedes the flow of information. Incentive pay increases overall agent effort and appears to cancel out the negative effects of social distance.

Item Type: Reports and working papers (Working Paper)
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Depositing User: Sanchari Roy
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2016 10:06
Last Modified: 19 Dec 2016 10:06
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/65930

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