Take what you can: property rights, contestability and conflict

Fetzer, Thiemo and Marden, Samuel (2016) Take what you can: property rights, contestability and conflict. Economic Journal. ISSN 0013-0133 (Accepted)

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Abstract

Weak property rights are strongly associated with underdevelopment, low state capacity and civil conflict. In economic models of conflict, outbreaks of violence require a prize that is both valuable and contestable. This paper exploits spatial and temporal variation in the availability of land with title that is contestable by private actors, to explore the relationship between (in)secure property rights and civil conflict in the Brazilian Amazon. The results suggest that resolving this contestability of title at the local level could eliminate substantively all local land-related violence but might increase conflict in areas where title remained contestable.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Depositing User: Stacey Goldup
Date Deposited: 14 Nov 2016 16:28
Last Modified: 08 Mar 2017 06:48
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/65456

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