NGO mission design

Heyes, Anthony and Martin, Steve (2015) NGO mission design. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 119. pp. 197-210. ISSN 0167-2681

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Abstract

NGOs compete in mission statements. Opportunities for impact vary across issues—NGOs with broader missions expect to execute higher-impact projects but provide less precision to donors as to the sorts of projects that will be funded. This matters if donors have preferences amongst issues. The mission-design problem faced by an impact-motivated NGO is analyzed. Interestingly, expected donations are non-monotonic in mission-width. A monopoly NGO engages in “donor-stretching,” choosing a mission statement that includes issues not preferred by any of its donors, but still narrower than socially desirable. Under free entry, issue-widths are strategic complements amongst NGOs. In equilibrium there are too many NGOs, each with too narrow a mission. The issue-space is exactly donor-covered (all donors will have an NGO they wish to give to) but issue over-covered (mission statements overlap). Expected NGO impact is higher for issues at the periphery of any particular NGO's issue-domain, which is socially inefficient.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Depositing User: Stacey Goldup
Date Deposited: 08 Nov 2016 16:50
Last Modified: 08 Nov 2016 16:50
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/65377
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