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Supply and demand for discrimination: strategic revelation of own characteristics in a trust game

journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 03:58 authored by Anthony Heyes, John A List
In strategic settings a player may be able to influence the behavior of an opponent by revealing information about their own characteristics. They may for example aim to exploit stereotypes held by others. We provide an experimental test of this. A substantial fraction of players in a trust game exhibit a positive willingness to pay to reveal a photograph of themselves to their randomly-assigned partner. This suggests that they perceive that they can use their own characteristics to influence the behavior of others. The demand for such self-revelation depends negatively on price.

History

Publication status

  • Published

Journal

American Economic Review

ISSN

0002-8282

Publisher

American Economic Association

Issue

5

Volume

106

Page range

319-323

Department affiliated with

  • Economics Publications

Full text available

  • No

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2016-11-08

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