Supply and demand for discrimination: strategic revelation of own characteristics in a trust game

Heyes, Anthony and List, John A (2016) Supply and demand for discrimination: strategic revelation of own characteristics in a trust game. American Economic Review, 106 (5). pp. 319-323. ISSN 0002-8282

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Abstract

In strategic settings a player may be able to influence the behavior of an opponent by revealing information about their own characteristics. They may for example aim to exploit stereotypes held by others. We provide an experimental test of this. A substantial fraction of players in a trust game exhibit a positive willingness to pay to reveal a photograph of themselves to their randomly-assigned partner. This suggests that they perceive that they can use their own characteristics to influence the behavior of others. The demand for such self-revelation depends negatively on price.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of Business, Management and Economics > Economics
Depositing User: Stacey Goldup
Date Deposited: 08 Nov 2016 16:50
Last Modified: 08 Nov 2016 16:50
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/65376
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