File(s) not publicly available
Supply and demand for discrimination: strategic revelation of own characteristics in a trust game
journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 03:58 authored by Anthony Heyes, John A ListIn strategic settings a player may be able to influence the behavior of an opponent by revealing information about their own characteristics. They may for example aim to exploit stereotypes held by others. We provide an experimental test of this. A substantial fraction of players in a trust game exhibit a positive willingness to pay to reveal a photograph of themselves to their randomly-assigned partner. This suggests that they perceive that they can use their own characteristics to influence the behavior of others. The demand for such self-revelation depends negatively on price.
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
American Economic ReviewISSN
0002-8282Publisher
American Economic AssociationExternal DOI
Issue
5Volume
106Page range
319-323Department affiliated with
- Economics Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2016-11-08Usage metrics
Categories
No categories selectedKeywords
Licence
Exports
RefWorks
BibTeX
Ref. manager
Endnote
DataCite
NLM
DC