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TEACHER MOTIVATION AND INCENTIVES IN RWANDA:
ANALYSIS OF STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHANGES
IN TEACHERS’ MOTIVATION DURING 2008-13

BY

Emmanuel MUVUNYI

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX
FOR THE FULLFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

JULY 2016
Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and it has not been, and will not be submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signed…………………………...
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Professor Kwame Akyeampong (1st supervisor)

Signed…………………………...
Professor Gillian Hampden-Thompson (2nd supervisor)
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May God bless you all.
Dedication

To my father, John Buteteri and mother, Edith Buteteri, for all their sacrifices and the pride they took in investing in my education right from my childhood.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDPREs</td>
<td>Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSP</td>
<td>Education Sector Strategic Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBP</td>
<td>Great Britain Pound (Exchange rate used in this study: 1,000RwF = 1GBP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMR</td>
<td>Global Monitoring Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoR</td>
<td>Government of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEE</td>
<td>International Educational Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSET</td>
<td>In-service Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPPIS</td>
<td>Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIE</td>
<td>Kigali Institute of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIFOTRA</td>
<td>“Ministre de la Fonction Publique et du Travail” (Ministry of Public Service and Labour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINECOFIN</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEDUC</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBR</td>
<td>National Bank of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPSPR</td>
<td>Rwanda Public Sector Pay and Retention (Policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REB</td>
<td>Rwanda Education Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ</td>
<td>Research Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RwF</td>
<td>Rwanda Francs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNEP</td>
<td>“Syndicat National des Enseignants du Primaire” the National Union of Primary School Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for the Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDM</td>
<td>Teacher Development and Management (Policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEMP</td>
<td>Teacher Education, Management and Professionalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMIS</td>
<td>Teacher Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children Educational Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACCO</td>
<td>Umwalimu [Teacher] Savings and Credit Cooperative Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar (Exchange rate used: 740RwF = 1USD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSO</td>
<td>Voluntary Service Overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVOB</td>
<td>“Flemish Association for Development Cooperation and Technical Assistance”.</td>
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Abstract

This thesis explored the impact of the teacher incentive policies which were designed and implemented in Rwanda between 2008 and 2013, with the aim to understand their impact on teacher motivation.

Research evidence shows that, competence and commitment of teachers are among the main determinants of student learning outcomes (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). As such, governments have the responsibility to ensure that teachers are appropriately trained and motivated to teach. Yet, motivational and incentives issues among teachers have been inadequately researched in the African context to understand how teacher motivational issues might be addressed by governments and international donors to improve educational quality. Rather, as reported by the Voluntary Services Oversees (VSO) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), educational policies have focused much more on teacher supply and demand issues in response to increased access to education (VSO, 2002; UNESCO, 2005). In countries where teacher motivation issues have been on the education agenda, these have been piecemeal interventions lacking long-term sustainability. As such, UNESCO’s 2013/14 Education For All-Global Monitoring Report (EFA-GMR) recommends the need for policy-makers to identify ways how teachers’ motivation can be improved so as to enable teachers to work in the service of improving learning for all (UNESCO, 2014).

This study employed a mixed methods sequential explanatory research design, where quantitative data (from 276 teachers from 46 schools located in 10 districts) was collected first, followed by qualitative data (obtained from interviews with eighteen participants, selected from institutions involved in teacher incentives’ policy making,
implementation, facilitation and the beneficiary level). This data was then integrated at the intermediate and final stages of the study and presented concurrently in this thesis. The study was framed around the content (or basic needs) theory of motivation (see Chapter 3).

Findings indicate that, individual teacher characteristics are key in understanding how the incentives impact on teachers’ levels of motivation. As such, the Government of Rwanda (GoR), should take into consideration these characteristics, when designing the teacher incentive policies for the teaching profession. The study confirms earlier findings that, teachers’ pay is very low, both in absolute terms and in comparison to other professions, which is a major motivational challenge. The study further shows that, while most teacher incentives may achieve the purpose for which they are meant, others are likely to result into unintended implications, which should be factored and monitored while designing and implementing the teacher incentives (see Chapter 6, section 6.2.2). Furthermore, the study shows the “8-step monthly protocol on processing the teachers’ salaries”, as an example of incentives that are cost-effective and are likely to create an immediate positive motivation impact, and which can be ideal for resource-constrained contexts, such as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, including Rwanda. The study notes the key potential role of parental contributions to teachers’ pay (top-up), and that governments need to harmonise and regulate it, so as to eliminate the imbalance it causes, between primary and secondary teachers; and rural and urban schools. Most teachers responded that teacher training and professional development was the main intrinsic motivational factor. The study noted that, while the teacher’s union was viewed as potentially key in enhancing teachers’ status, solidarity and power, the teachers’ union was very weak and influenced by government, which is characteristic of most unions in the SSA. This is coupled with limited teachers’ participation in decision-making on issues that concern them (see DeJaeghere et al, 2006), which is likely to lead to their de-motivation.

This study, therefore, has attempted to make a contribution to the development of the theoretical and substantive knowledge in terms of policy changes designed to improve teacher motivation in Rwanda (and possibly in the SSA region). It also contributes to a clarification of the methodology, which can be employed for future research on teacher motivation.
CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Motivation is fundamental to both individual and organisational performance, and even a very capable and well-trained member of staff will not perform effectively without being motivated to do so (Addison and Brundrett, 2008). Earlier research shows that, teachers’ competence and commitment are among the key determinants of student learning outcomes (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). As such governments, including Rwanda, have the responsibility to ensure that effective, high-calibre teachers are not only attracted into the teaching profession, but are also appropriately trained and motivated to meet the ambitious global education goal of quality education for all. Despite this fact, research into the motivation of teachers is limited, more specifically, in relation to the low-income developing countries (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

This thesis reports on a study on teacher motivation in Rwanda. The study aimed to explore the impact of the teacher incentive policies which were designed and implemented by the government of Rwanda between 2008 and 2013 to improve teacher motivation in Rwanda. The study employed a mixed methods sequential explanatory research design (MMSE), where quantitative data was collected first, followed by qualitative data. The two sets of data were analysed concurrently (Archibald et al, 2015).

Initially, the study was designed as a follow-up of an earlier one by Bennell and Ntagaramba which explored the status of teacher motivation in Rwanda in 2008 by surveying 550 teachers (Bennell and Ntagaramba 2008). As a follow up study, I had intended to survey the same teachers to understand any individual level changes in their motivation to teach five years later. However, I soon realised that because Bennell and Ntagaramba’s data were completely anonymised, it could not precisely be linked to individual respondents’ data so that changes in motivation levels could
be measured, as such the idea of conducting a follow-up study was dropped. Nevertheless, I still considered Bennell and Ntagaramba’s study design an appropriate and relevant study to provide the starting point for my study, and not as a baseline to measure changes in teacher motivation over time.

Based on recommendations from the Bennell and Ntagaramba’s (2008) study, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) implemented a variety of financial and non-financial incentives between 2008 and 2013 to improve teachers’ motivation. The measures included: (i) increasing and harmonising teachers’ salaries; (ii) reviewing teachers’ working and living conditions; (iii) promoting public recognition of teachers; (iv) improving school and classroom facilities; and (v) professionalising teacher management (recruitment, deployment and transfer).

However, since 2008 no study had been conducted by GoR to investigate the impact these had made in terms of improving teacher motivation. Hence, this study attempts to provide a contribution to the development of the theoretical and substantive base on teacher motivation in Rwanda and elsewhere, by analysing what worked and what did not to motivate teachers in Rwanda during 2008-13. This study also contributes to a clarification of the literature and methodology, which can be useful for future studies on teacher motivation. This study, therefore, aims to form a foundation for the construction of a knowledge base in terms of policy changes designed to improve teacher motivation in Rwanda (and possibly in the SSA region).

1.2 Rationale for the study

My interest in the topic of ‘teacher motivation’ has been driven by a combination of my personal and professional work over twenty-five years. I started my professional practice as a secondary school teacher. I later pursued a Master’s degree in Business Administration (MBA) in the United Kingdom. I then taught Bachelors of Business administration (BBA) courses at undergraduate level in Rwanda. The most recent part of my professional career since 2003 has been at senior level within the education
sector in Rwanda. I headed the Student Financing Agency for Rwanda (SFAR)\(^1\) between 2003 and 2010, then the Teacher Service Commission (TSC)\(^2\) from 2010 to 2011; and at the time of the study, I was head of National Examinations for Primary and Secondary Education. At these levels, I participated in policy level discussions, including those concerning teachers. From my interaction with fellow teachers, the questions around: ‘What really motivates teachers?’ arose from my own observations, from teachers’ grievances, media and literature – all of which mostly remained unanswered.

On the one hand, I witnessed GoR’s commitment to the improvement of teacher motivation, and on the other, through engaging with teachers, I saw only too well that they still remained unmotivated. This inevitably raised the question as to why such a state of affairs should remain. Accordingly, as a doctoral research student at the University of Sussex, who was also a practising education professional in Rwanda, I was presented with both an opportunity to engage in more thinking and inquiry on these issues around which I had first-hand experience. Specifically, I was concerned with whether the teacher incentives introduced during the period 2008 to 2013 (and previously) had made the expected impact, and if not, what teachers felt were the limitations inherent in the new incentives.

1.3 Background and problem statement

Previous research has shown that, next to school infrastructure and resources, teachers represent the largest, most extensive, and most critical factor in improving quality in any education system (Jessop and Penny, 1998; Afe, 2001; Ololube, 2007). Few would disagree with the view that:

The teacher is the ultimate key to educational change and school improvement. The restructuring of schools, the composition of national and provincial curricula, the development of benchmark assessment - all

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1 SFAR, established in 2006 was mandated to manage a student loan scheme for higher education.
2 TSC was established in 2006 as a Teacher Regulatory Agency in Rwanda.
these things are of little value if they do not take the teacher into account (Jessop and Penny, 1998:393).

Both the scale and speed of education system expansion in SSA over the last three decades have meant that there is a considerable shortage of qualified teachers to meet the increased demand (World Bank, 2011; Olantunji, 2011). Consequently, a high proportion of teachers have left the teaching profession. Some have left for jobs that provide better pay and working conditions, while others remain in the profession but demonstrate a lack of interest in the job, which can ultimately have adverse effects on pupil performance (VSO, 2002; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). In the case of Rwanda, various reports from the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) and the Voluntary Services oversees (VSO) indicate that with the laudable expansion of access to 12 years of basic education, acceptable learning outcomes can only be attained if teachers are adequately motivated (VSO, 2003; MINEDUC, 2007; MINEDUC, 2010b). In such contexts, where a shortage of qualified teachers is invariably a serious problem, the motivation and satisfaction of the teaching force, and their commitment to teaching as a lifelong career are vital if any meaningful success with regard to children’s learning outcomes is to be achieved (Michaelowa, 2002; Hyde et al, 2005; UNESCO, 2005).

Moreover, teachers - particularly in basic education - are required to play several roles during the course of the school day, including those that parents have traditionally been expected to undertake such as the moral education of children (Hakanen et al, 2006; Keshwar and Devi, 2013; Wolf et al, 2015), while to others, teaching seems as an endless battle (Ariffin, 1998). These ever-rising academic expectations and constantly changing societal requirements put tremendous pressure on teachers. Teachers are said to be often first in the firing line of politicians, media, parents, pupils and schools to deliver high quality basic education to all children (Mulkeen et al, 2007; Moon, 2008; Moon and O’Malley, 2008; Olantunji, 2011). As a result, teachers are not only exposed to stress, but are at risk of burnout, which may lead to a decrease in their motivation and commitment to teaching (Hakanen et al,
Liu and Onwuegbuzie, (2012) point out that teaching in today’s schools can be filled with stress, frustration and little time to take care of oneself. Consequently, the issue of teacher motivation has received significant attention in the education literature over the last few decades (Guarino et al, 2006; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Hettiarachchi, 2010; Liu and Onwuegbuzie, 2014).

Recent studies have explored different aspects of teacher motivation, including determining factors, impact on teaching and the relationship between teacher motivation, pupil motivation and learning outcome (Hettiarachchi, 2010). Although numerous studies on teacher motivation have been conducted in developed countries, there is little evidence of much research on the same subject in developing countries.

In Rwanda, several pronouncements have been made by the government to improve teachers’ motivation (see MINEDUC, 2007, 2010b, 2012); however with the exception of the study carried out in 2008 (Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008), there has not been further systematic research which seeks to understand the views of teachers on the changes that have taken place since 2008.

1.4 Significance of the study

Teachers in Rwanda argue that their existing living and working conditions are poor, and that this has contributed to the low and declining social status of the teaching profession compared to other professions (Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008; World Bank, 2011). The GoR and other key education stakeholders recognise the critical importance of improving teachers’ social status, pay, and living and working conditions to achieve the desired improvements in education. However, attempts to address the issue have invariably been limited to piecemeal interventions, such as increasing teachers’ salaries and issuing teachers with loans to engage in income generating activities.

The likely reasons for this are several: First, very little research has been undertaken in Rwanda that directly focuses on teacher motivation and incentives (for exceptions,
see Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008). In the absence of such evidence base, any government policy on teacher incentives risks being unsuccessful, at the same time, with reliable evidence, GoR would have no excuse for not being able to act. Availability of research evidence would, therefore likely act as a trigger for GoR to respond to teachers’ needs. Second, limited attention has been paid to the low levels of motivation among teachers in Rwanda, in spite of the fact that it is universally recognised that most interventions aimed at improving access and quality of schooling will not succeed unless teachers are well motivated (VSO 2002; Shaari et al, 2002; Seniwoliba, 2013; Igbe et al, 2015). Third, as reported by VSO (2002), is the international donor community’s influence on policies on teachers in developing countries, who in some cases recommend ceilings for teachers’ salaries.

1.5 Research questions

To explore the impact of teacher incentives implemented in Rwanda between 2008 and 2013, the study formulated the following research questions (RQs):

RQ1: What are the key individual characteristics of the surveyed teachers, and the school settings in which the surveyed teachers are employed?

RQ2: (a) What teacher incentives were introduced between 2008 and 2013?

(b) How, in the views of policy makers, implementers and facilitators did these incentives meet the aim of motivating teachers?

(c) In the view of teachers (the final beneficiaries of the incentives), to what extent did the incentives improve or, conversely, constrain their motivation to teach?

(d) Which of the incentives did they find particularly motivating and why? And which did they find inadequate and why?

RQ2 is constructed to cover the bottom-up and top-down approaches to understanding the initiatives to improve teachers’ motivation. The top-down approach requires effective, centre-sector bureaucratic infrastructure to be in place
so that the beneficiaries of policy change - in this case, teachers (and ultimately pupils) - can be reached. The intention of the bottom-up approach was to question teachers as to whether they perceive the changes in their motivation to be a result of the incentives.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter One presents the background, rationale and significance of the study; the research questions and structure of the thesis.

Chapter Two presents a contextual background of the study. It starts with an overview of the geographical, administrative and social context of Rwanda. It further presents an overview of the education system in Rwanda, considering its structure and administration, and the implication of expansion of the education system (learners and teachers) to teacher motivation. It also describes the place and importance given to teachers and teaching in national plans and strategies. The chapter then discusses the teacher incentive policies introduced during 2008-13 to motivate teachers. Two of the key policies and institutions put in place by GoR, to address the issues of low teacher pay, are discussed.

Chapter Three comprises a review of relevant and selected literature on teacher motivation with a focus on countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The chapter starts with the researcher’s account of the scarcity of literature on teacher motivation in the SSA context. A historical perspective on the status of teachers in Africa is presented. The chapter then presents definitions and distinctions of the key terms used in the study and theories of motivation, focusing on ‘content theories’. Research evidence on extrinsic and intrinsic factors, which determine teacher motivation in SSA are also presented. The chapter ends with a discussion of the conceptual framework on which this study is framed.
Chapter Four discusses the methodology and methods adopted in the study. It starts with a discussion of the meaning of mixed methods research design. It presents the approach, design, methods and instruments used. At the end, the chapter presents the techniques used in the data analysis, and ends with a discussion of the ethical considerations of the study.

Chapter Five presents the characteristics of the surveyed teachers and a description of the interview stakeholder participants.

Chapter Six presents the analysis of the findings from the study. It discusses the views and perceptions of the participants on changes in teachers’ motivation as a result of the incentives introduced during 2008-13.

Finally, Chapter Seven discusses the key theoretical and empirical contributions of the study to the topic of teacher motivation. It reflects on the research journey and process, drawing attention to the limitations of the study and finally outlines areas for further research in the area of teacher motivation in Rwanda.
CHAPTER TWO

2. CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK OF TEACHER INCENTIVE POLICY IN RWANDA

2.1. Introduction

The concept of teacher motivation cannot be examined in isolation from the wider context of the country in which teachers live and work. This is because of the wide and complex nature of this construct and its linkage to many social, economic and political aspects of the country. Accordingly, this chapter describes the Rwandan context, with a focus on the teacher incentive policy and practice.

2.2. Rwanda’s geographical, administrative and social context

Rwanda is a relatively small, landlocked country with a total area of 26,338 square kilometres. It is located in eastern Central Africa. In 1994, in the space of approximately 100 days, spanning April, May and June, Rwanda was plunged into one of the worst genocides the world has experienced in recent times. The genocide had a devastating impact on education, both in terms of the suffering and psychological impact on pupils, teachers, and communities, and in the degradation of the education system and its infrastructure (Obura, 2003).

Large numbers of teachers were either killed or fled the country. Teachers had traditionally been considered among Rwanda’s educated class and highly regarded in the Rwandan society. Nevertheless, they became a part of the target of massacres. Teachers were also perpetrators of the genocide and indeed participated in the killing of close family members, fellow teachers, neighbours and pupils (Obura, 2003). When the genocide was over, it took a long time for teaching to be seen as an attractive profession, especially by those who had lived through the holocaust (ibid).

Providing education in the emergency situation during and after the 1994 genocide was a huge challenge for the Government of Rwanda. For example, post-war Rwanda concentrated, in the initial period following the genocide, on equity of provision and
access. This was done to reverse the “past errors” involving the systematic use of ethnic and regional quotas rather than performance, as selection criteria for entry into education at every level (see Obura, 2003). In 2000, the Government of Rwanda introduced a decentralised system of governance with six tiers: national, regional, district, sector, cell and village level (MINALOC, 2000). Similar to other public social services, the provision of education was moved from the central to decentralised levels. District and sector levels are the most prominent in the local administration of education, including recruiting, deploying, and remuneration of teachers for primary and secondary schools.

2.3. Rwanda’s education system: Structure and administration

The structure of education in Rwanda has been subject to many reforms in the past, but the original conception of the system has not changed (MINEDUC, 2013, 2014). Rwanda’s education system has a 6-3-3-4 structure, meaning six years of primary, three years of lower secondary, and three years of upper secondary schooling, together with an average of four years of higher education.

In the context of a decentralised governance system, the responsibility for education policy design and national planning remains with central government (Ministry of Education), while that for policy execution and planning, and general administration of schools has been devolved to the provinces, districts and schools (MINEDUC, 2003; World Bank, 2011). The district is now the main administrative unit in terms of the implementation of government programmes, including education. At the same time, the education sector has undergone a process of de-concentration, whereby other functions remain at the central level but others have been contracted out from the Ministry of Education to autonomous educational agencies (see Appendix 1).

2.4. Decentralising teacher management in Rwanda: Implications for teachers’ motivation

It is argued that the comprehensive decentralisation of school management results in significant improvement in teacher recruitment and deployment, as well as higher
levels of motivation and overall performance (Bennell, 2004; UNESCO, 2014; Wolf et al, 2015). This is because school managers and teachers are more accountable to parents and other local stakeholders, and schools and/or communities have much greater direct control over teacher recruitment and deployment.

In this perspective, the teacher management function in Rwanda has evolved through several stages. Prior to 2000, teacher management was initially a responsibility of the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC), then the Ministry of Public Service and Labour (MIFOTRA)\(^3\). Following the decentralisation of governance in 2000, the management of teachers was transferred to the districts. However, the decentralisation policy brought changes in the administrative boundaries of districts. For example, in 2008, there were 12 regions (prefectures) and 106 districts. These later merged into 5 regions (provinces) and 30 districts. As a consequence, schools and teachers were moved across districts each time new demarcations were made.

However, while schools and teachers were successfully re-located at the various stages of the decentralisations, teachers’ employment files were not duly transferred through this process, that is from: MINEDUC, to MIFOTRA, to the initial 106 districts and finally to the current 30 districts. According to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), some files were either misplaced or lost completely along this process (MINECOFIN, 2011). Accordingly, teachers’ salaries and benefits were not duly paid, as the files were needed as a basis to support the payment, hence the accumulation of salary arrears (ibid). Acronym

An audit, carried out by MINECOFIN in 2011 established the amount of arrears owed to teachers, by category (see Figure 2.1). The largest category of arrears was due to the ‘unpaid salary increases’ amounting to 78.8% of the total claims. The other categories are: un-paid salaries (15.3%); underpaid salaries (2.8%); terminal benefits (1.2%); death allowances (1.6%); and for acting allowances (0.3%). Such

\(^3\) MIFOTRA is an abbreviation for ‘Ministre de la Fonction Publique et du Travail’, a French name for the Ministry of Public Service and labour.
accumulation of teachers’ payment arrears were in part due to the displacement and in some cases, complete loss of teachers’ employment files.

**Figure 2.1: Categories of teachers’ pay arrears**

![Bar chart showing categories of teachers' pay arrears]

- Unpaid salary increases: 78.8%
- Unpaid monthly salaries: 15.3%
- Underpayment of salaries: 2.8%
- Unpaid terminal benefits: 1.2%
- Unpaid death allowances: 1.6%
- Unpaid acting allowances: 0.3%

Source: MINECOFIN (2011:8).

**2.5. Teachers and the teaching profession: A national priority**

Various reports reviewed in this study indicate that the Government of Rwanda affirms the importance of teachers, acknowledges that teachers play an important role in the national development process, and that teaching is a valued profession (see Figure 2.2). For example, the Rwanda Vision 2020 (Republic of Rwanda, 2003b) provides the overall vision of Rwanda’s development in all sectors, including education. The Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) II (Republic of Rwanda, 2013) defines specific mid-term targets in respect of sector plans, including education. The education sector policy, (MINEDUC, 2003) highlights the importance of teacher development and, in particular, the various teacher incentives. The current five-year Education Sector Strategic Plan (2013/4-2017/8) addresses the issue of teacher motivation, specifically articulating that the teacher is the main instrument for bringing about the desired improvements in learning, and that
adequate teacher management structures, policies and strategies are key factors that determine teacher performance (MINEDUC, 2010b).

**Figure 2.2: A framework for planning and implementation of teacher incentives**

![Diagram showing the framework for planning and implementation of teacher incentives]

Source: The Author

The Teacher Development and Management (TDM) policy (MINEDUC, 2007) was drawn from the Education Sector Policy (ESP) and the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP). This policy specifically addresses issues in the teaching profession and teacher motivation in particular. It provides for substantial reform in teacher education and management and stresses the need to recognise teaching as a distinct and respected profession within the public service, governed by its own code of professional ethics, and having clear pathways for professional and personal development.

The TDM policy articulates the need to “develop and install a framework for motivation that will enhance the socio-economic and professional status of teachers” (MINEDUC, 2007:14). It specifically mentions the introduction of financial and non-financial teacher incentives. To implement these (and other) aspects of the TDM policy, a summit for the reform of teacher education, management and professionalisation (TEMP) was held in Kigali, Rwanda on 8-9 March, 2010. This
summit came up with specific commitments for GoR to implement teacher incentives and address teacher motivation issues (see MINEDUC, 2010a).

2.6. Rapid expansion of the education system and its implications for teacher motivation: The Nine and Twelve Years Basic Education programmes

The post-1994 period in Rwanda was characterised by education sector policies that comply with major international education goals, consistent with the UN 2000 Millennium Declaration and the Milleneum Development Goals (MDGs), particularly those that highlight the importance of universal primary education (UPE). Specifically, with respect to the goal of ensuring access to basic education, in 2009 GoR implemented the Nine Years Basic Education (9YBE) programme (extending basic education from six years of primary to nine years up to lower secondary). The 9YBE was extended to Twelve Years Basic Education (12YBE) in 2012, further expanding basic education to include three years of upper secondary. The 9YBE and 12YBE were intended to ensure that all children who completed six years of primary education had the opportunity to proceed to lower and then to upper secondary (MINEDUC, 2012b). As a result of the 9 and 12 YBE programmes, class sizes surged, and the demand on the teachers to teach a large number of children increased.

2.7. Teacher supply and demand in Rwanda: Implications for teacher motivation

Following the end of the genocide in 1994, it became apparent that there was a shortage of teachers due to neglect in teacher education by the previous governments (MINEDUC, 2007), and due to the war genocide. According to MINEDUC, prior to this:

> There were no teacher training colleges, no focus on teacher training, and teachers...generally obtained...diverse qualifications from sundry sources. (MINEDUC, 2007:6)

The few teachers who had qualified started looking for work in other sectors, owing to a lack of adequate financial incentives and accommodation provision, poor salary schemes and an ambiguous status compared with other civil servants (MINEDUC,
2007). Prior to 1998, primary teacher education had been a separate course offered at some 20 upper secondary schools (World Bank, 2011). Teacher Training Colleges (TTC’s) were then established as specialised and professional training institutions for primary (A2) teachers. Similarly, there had not been institutions dedicated to the training of secondary school teachers. In 1999, the Kigali Institute of Education (KIE) - now the University of Rwanda-College of Education (UR-CoE)⁴ - was founded to train both lower and upper secondary school teachers. In 2008, Kavumu and Rukara Colleges of Education (CoE) were established to train lower secondary (A0) teachers, hence reducing the pressure on KIE, and allowing it to concentrate on producing upper secondary (A1) teachers.

While these initiatives led to a significant increase in the enrolment of teacher trainees between 2008 and 2012 (Figure 2.3), the increase was not sufficient to offset the rapid expansion in enrolment of learners in basic education, hence a teacher shortage resulted (see Figure 2.4). This eventually led to challenges in terms of large class sizes and increased teaching hours which, in turn, conspired to adversely affect teacher motivation (Lewin and Akyeampong, 2005; MINEDUC, 2008b).

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⁴ UR-CoE is one of the six colleges of the University of Rwanda, created after the merger of all public higher learning institutions in Rwanda in 2013, including the former KIE.
Enrolment in teacher training institutions was rising steadily over the period between 2008 and 2012. The number of teachers trainees enrolled in the three teacher training levels increased from 9,112 (2008) to 19,608 (2012), an increase of over 115%. The largest increase was among the Diploma teacher trainees enrolled in Colleges of Education (CoEs), with an increase of approximately 461% (from 286 trainees in 2008 to 1,606 in 2012). This huge increase was largely as a result of the newly established CoEs, which were initiated to train teachers for lower secondary. The Government of Rwanda established Rukara and Kavumu CoEs as a response to the expanding enrolment in primary and lower secondary and to meet Education For All (EFA) goals. Previously, teachers for both lower and upper secondary had been trained at KIE.
Figure 2.4: Trend of primary & secondary students & teachers in Rwanda (2008–12)

Source: MINEDUC (2011).

2.8. Teacher incentive policies introduced during 2008-13

As discussed earlier, several teacher incentive policies were implemented during 2008-13, with the aim to motivate teachers. In 2012, a policy paper on teacher incentives (MINEDUC, 2012) was developed from the 8th National Leadership Retreat and the recommendations from the Bennell and Ntagaramba (2008) study. A draft paper was submitted to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) for onward Cabinet’s approval. This policy covers the following key incentives:

a) Payment of higher education tuition fees for at least three teachers’ immediate biological or legally adopted children.

b) Establishment of the Education Graduate Incentive Scheme (EGIS) targeting degree education graduates who were seeking employment elsewhere.

c) Construction of 416 eight-room housing blocks, one in each sector for the accommodation of the newly qualified and deployed single teachers.

d) President’s Teacher Award Scheme (PTAS) targeting the best performing teachers, conducted on the International Teachers’ Day.
The focus of this study is to explore how these incentives were implemented to motivate teachers, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.

2.9. Teachers’ Pay Guidelines and Rwanda Public Sector Pay and Retention policy

In 1995, immediately following the genocide in Rwanda, GoR initiated several public sector employment and pay reforms (MIFOTRA, 2012). One of these was the teachers’ pay guidelines which was put in place in 2004 and later reviewed in 2006 (MIFOTRA, 2004). Until, 2012, implementation of these guidelines was not successful - largely due to fiscal constraints - leaving many pay and retention issues, including those relating to teachers’ salaries, yet to be addressed. To address this gap, in 2012, the GoR developed the Rwanda Public Sector Pay and Retention (RPSPR) policy. The aim of this policy was to:

Put in place a framework for compensating, rewarding, retaining and motivating public servants that is equitable, competitive and recognises their competencies and contributions to the performance of the public sector and achievement of government’s objectives (MIFOTRA, 2012:4).

The expectation was that this policy would enhance the capacity of the public sector to attract, retain and adequately motivate personnel with the requisite skills and experience to improve service delivery, quality and accessibility in an equitable and sustainable manner at the national and local level. The RPSPR policy stipulates that: teachers’ salaries will be increased annually; a bonus, based on the ‘performance contract system’ and the points awarded to each teacher in the annual performance evaluations will be paid to teachers annually and teachers will be graded at various levels according to their qualifications and experience (MIFOTRA, 2012).

While, as explained, failure to implement the public sector pay reforms is attributed to lack of sufficient resources, persistent failure to do so would raise doubts about the quality of the planning process in general, leading to the incentive policies. Again one would wonder, even within the context of resource constraints, whether in a period of
over two decades, would not offer flexibility to mobilise resources to implement most of the pay reforms.

The RPSPR policy acknowledges that, whereas teachers comprise the largest proportion of public sector employees, they are comparatively low paid. The policy also recognises the incongruity between the teacher wage bill share (20%) and employment share (62%) during the financial year 2011-12 (MIFOTRA, 2012). Due to this situation, the RPSPR policy proposed a pay rise for teachers to be progressively achieved during the period from 2011-12- 2017-18, which would lead to a significant increase in the monthly net teacher pay from 23% to 106%.

Furthermore, the policy indicates a challenge in that teachers already represent a significant proportion of public sector employees (for example, 69% in 2003, 57.5% in 2009, and 62% in 2011/2012 (see Figure 2.5), yet the projection indicates a need for increased numbers and quality of teachers to meet the national (Vision 2020, EDPRS and ESSP) and international (EFA and MDGs) educational goals and targets. This poses a challenge in such a way that, a slight upward adjustments in teachers’ pay could potentially have a significant impact on the overall wage bill of the public sector. The medium and long-term implications of a persistently low wage bill share of teachers’ reflects their relatively low pay as well as academic qualifications “as there is a strong correlation in the Rwandan public sector between academic qualifications and pay” (MIFOTRA, 2012:19).

Nevertheless, only teachers, among civil servants received the 10% pay increase in 2010. The question here was how this percentage increase was determined. This is an example of the public service pay reforms (see MIFOTRA, 2012), whose implementation was done on a piecemeal basis, and likely not involving teachers. However, even with this pay rise, the net basic salary for a degree-qualified teacher was only approximately 65,000 Rwanda Francs (RwF) equivalent to 65 Great Britain Ponds, less than that enjoyed by a university graduate employed in an administrative or technical role elsewhere in the civil service (World Bank, 2011).
As a result, large numbers of degree-holding teachers resigned to seek better paying positions in other public sector departments, district and sector offices in particular (World Bank, 2011). Turnover rates had reached such a crisis point by 2006/07 that the GoR was obliged to increase the degree-level teacher salary from approximately RwF 50,000 to RwF 113,000, thereby opening up a very sizeable income difference with primary school teachers, further exacerbating the demotivation of the latter.

**Figure 2.5: Relative public sector employment and wage bill shares of teachers, 2003, 2009, 2011/12**

![Relative public sector employment and wage bill shares of teachers, 2003, 2009, 2011/12](image)


First, the decline in teachers’ public sector employment share between 2003 and 2009 is a reflection that, engagement in the rest of the public sector grew much faster and, as discussed above, the number of qualified teachers dropped markedly. However, from 2009\(^5\), the number of qualified teachers rose (see Figure 2.3), further increasing teachers’ employment and wage bill share in 2011/12. Even with this increase in the wage bill, it still remains low compared with other SSA countries (see Figure 2.6).

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\(^5\) The GoR established the Colleges of Education (CoE) as a response to the demand for teachers as a result of a rapid increase in enrolment in schools.
A comparative analysis of the teachers’ employment and wage bill share across four SSA countries (Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zambia), shows that, Rwanda’s gap is bigger (see Figure 2.6).

**Figure 2.6: Comparative data on teachers’ share of public sector employment and wage bill by selected SSA countries, 2009**

![Chart showing comparative data on teachers' share of public sector employment and wage bill by selected SSA countries, 2009](chart)


The data show that teachers’ share of public sector employment in the four countries is about 50%, which accords with those countries in the east and south of the continent, in which teachers’ share generally represents about 54% of total public sector employment (MIFOTRA, 2012). However, teachers’ share of the public sector wage bill in Rwanda is quite low (21.7%) compared to other countries. In the case of the three comparison countries, the figure is generally typical of the region, with a ratio of 1:1 (between teachers’ public sector wage bill and employment share). For example, for Tanzania, the ratio is 0.993:1; Kenya, 1.06:1; Zambia, 1.05:1, whereas in the case of Rwanda the ratio is 0.38:1 (2009), having dropped from 0.52:1 in 2003 (MIFOTRA, 2012).

The data above demonstrates that, while the share of employment has been growing over time, relative to other professions in the public sector, the teachers’ wage bill
share has not increased at the same rate. This implies that, generally teachers in Rwanda have been facing a consistently low pay and long standing motivational issues.

However, as shown in Figure 2.7, the RPSPR policy predicts that the teachers’ salary and wage bill share will improve over a five-year period (2011/12–2016/17) to surpass that of other public sector professions (military, health and central administration). Thus, while the teachers’ wage bill share was 23.2% with an employment share of 62%, in financial year (FY) 2011/12, by FY 2016/17, the wage bill share is projected to be 37.1% compared to 34.8% (central administration), 20.1% (military) and 8% (health).

**Figure 2.7: Projected teachers’ wage bill share compared to other sectors, 2011/12 -2016/17**


Second, the RPSPR policy provides for both an annual bonus increase and the grading of teachers in levels, based on years of professional experience. The former is
calculated according to performance and evaluation indicators. This projected teachers’ salary and total wage share increase is promising, and if implemented it is likely to improve teachers’ motivation. However, given past experience, where the previous reforms were not appropriately implemented, the government needs to put in place strategies to ensure that the suggested reforms are realised.

2.10. Teachers’ Savings and Credit Cooperative Organisation (USACCO)

The Government of Rwanda realised that teachers’ existing salary was not sufficient to meet their socio-economic needs or motivate them professionally, and that given the scarcity of budgetary resources, the teachers’ wage bill cannot be stretched to cater for a reasonable increase in the teachers’ salaries. For this reason, in 2006, the GoR established a teachers’ savings and cooperative organisation (USACCO). The aim of the USACCO is to manage a teachers’ loan scheme (MINEDUC, 2007; USACCO, 2009). The members of USACCO (teachers) are required to contribute 5% of their monthly salaries as mandatory savings. They may also contribute additional voluntary savings. These savings accumulate to form the fund from which the loans are issued to the teachers. From 2008 until 2012, the organisation charged 14% as interest on the loans. Figure 2.8 shows the evolution of membership and savings in USACCO during 2008-13.

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6 The annual bonus awarded to teachers is calculated as follows: Below 60% (no bonus); between 70-80% (a 3% bonus × the basic salary), and above 80% (a 5% bonus × basic salary).

7 ‘Umwalimu’ in the Rwandan language means teacher. The Teachers’ Savings and Credit Organisation is commonly referred to in Rwanda as the ‘Umwalimu Sacco’.
Figure 2.8: USACCO: Evolution of membership and savings, 2008-13

Source: USACCO (2013)

In March 2013, the organisation had 79,236 members as compared to 42,017 in 2009, an increase of nearly 87% in 5 years. In 2013, 60,000 savings accounts belonged to individual teachers while 19,236 were for teachers’ cooperatives and schools (USACCO, 2013). At this time, the total savings had accumulated to over 9 Billion RwF, which is approximately 9 million Great Britain Pounds (GBP), comprising 6 Billion RwF (approximately 6 million GBP) of mandatory savings and over 3 Billion RwF (approximately 3 Million GBP) of voluntary savings. These savings were coming from only 40,606 teachers whose salary was paid by the government. Since 2008, teachers were accessing loans for different income generating activities such as retail trade and transport business, as well as mortgage (housing) loans for purchasing new or renovated houses. The surge in membership is an indication that teachers view the benefits from the cooperative as useful, and as such enrol in it. The question on
the perception of teachers on how they benefit from the cooperative is discussed in chapter six.

In 2012, the Government of Rwanda reviewed the loan financing scheme. With the new scheme, the government committed to disburse 30 Billion RwF to USACCO in a period of 10 years (see Appendix 3). The aim was to increase its capacity to finance more teachers, to increase the loan repayable period to 15 years. Upon consideration that teachers were charged a high interest (14%) on the issued loans - in some cases nearly comparable to other financial institutions, as such likely not motivating teachers to take out loans - the GoR further reduced the interest loan to 11%. Such terms and conditions are not obtainable in any other financial institutions and so this provides an incentive to teachers.

2.11. Summary and conclusion

This chapter presented key contextual background of Rwanda focusing on the aspects related to the education in general, and the teaching profession and incentives policies and practice, in particular. Despite the impact of the war and genocide against the Tutsis in 1994, GoR put in place initiatives to improve the socio-economic welfare of teachers with the aim to improve their motivation to do their job. The chapter shows that, these incentives met with challenges, and have not attained the desired intention. Again, there have not been studies (exception of Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008), to provide an evidence base on what has worked and what has not, and as such to inform policy and practice. This chapter sets the scene for the current study, which intends to contribute to this evidence.
CHAPTER THREE

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF TEACHER MOTIVATION

3.1. Introduction

This chapter serves the purpose of reviewing literature related to the construct of motivation in general and teacher motivation in particular. After giving an account of the scope and sources of the literature used and a historical perspective of the status of teachers in Africa, I review the key concepts and theories of motivation employed in the study. Literature on the key themes of this thesis, the extrinsic and intrinsic factors that determine teacher motivation, with a focus on the sub-Saharan African (SSA) region, are elaborated. Finally, a conceptual framework on which this study is framed, is discussed.

3.2. Scope and sources of the literature on teacher motivation

As I started thinking about researching teacher motivation in Rwanda, at first, I was apprehensive about the sources of literature for the theoretical framework. This concern arose from the evidence that literature on teacher motivation in the developing world, including Rwanda, is scarce (VSO, 2002; Haq and Islam, 2005; Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008; Seniwoliba, 2013; Wolf et al, 2015). Indeed, most of the available literature on teacher motivation is limited to the western context (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). The recent comprehensive studies conducted in the SSA setting included those undertaken in Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia (Musikanga, 2005; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Adelabu, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Urwick et al, 2005; Harding and Mansary, 2006; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). While I regarded the situations in respect of teachers in these contexts not to be directly comparable to that in Rwanda, the literature from these contexts still proved useful in the Rwandan context.

Online studies, reports and documentation on Rwanda’s education policy and implementation of teacher incentives formed the bulk of my literature sources. Hence,
although I started with uncertainty about the possible sources of literature, the literature I obtained was sufficient to cover the research topic.

3.3. The status of teachers in Africa: A historical reflection

The current situation with regard to teacher motivation in Africa needs to be put into a historical perspective. The current conditions of teacher motivational issues in most of SSA shows that teachers are poorly motivated and dissatisfied with their living and working conditions. However, this has not always been the case, as noted by Adelabu:

Prior to independence, teaching was considered by almost all sections of society as a highly respected profession. Teachers played key leadership roles in local communities and acted as role models. However, after independence, when the demand for educated labour grew rapidly, many teachers left the profession to take up jobs elsewhere in the public and private sector (2005:3).

To a large extent, the status of teachers in African is a reflection of the origin of teacher education in the African continent. For example, Olantunji notes that:

The first phase of teacher education in Africa was the period often referred to as that of teacher evangelist. During this period, pupils were trained specifically for religious propagation and the training programme concentrated on reading, writing and the mastery of the Holy Books. This was applicable both to the Koranic schools established by Moslem Missionaries and the Mission schools established by Christian Missionaries (2011:1)

Clearly, during this period teaching was a valued profession, but although there was much emphasis on literacy and numeracy skills, focus was put on inculcating moral values and religious teaching. Such a combination seems to have led to the high status of teachers, who were seen as elites and custodians of knowledge, especially at a time when not many citizens were educated.

At that time, teachers worked untiringly and expressed their belief in an ‘eternal reward from God’ for services rendered, an attitude that has continued to influence the
perception of most Africans about teaching and teachers (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005).

In colonial times and during the first wave of independence on the African continent, teachers were the most highly educated individuals, and this further heightened their singular status (VSO, 2002; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005). Hence, the first ‘crop’ of post-independence home-produced teachers were highly respected by all (Olantunji, 2011). However, the respect that was accorded them was not because of what they possessed materially but for who they were seen as: custodians of knowledge and the non-commercial values that characterized their occupation (Olantunji, 2011). They worked passionately; they were satisfied not only with their remuneration but also with the job itself (ibid).

Things changed in the post-colonial era as a result of the rapid and extensive development in education (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005). The emergence of specialists in diverse fields put an end to the age-long social and professional monopoly enjoyed by ordinary teachers; and this has not only adversely affected their status, sending it into decline, but has also kept it suppressed ever since, a situation brought about by increasing competition from other, emergent professions that have proceeded to grow rapidly (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Olantunji, 2011). Teachers, previously benefiting from considerable public respect and reasonable financial reward, feel that their status is in decline (VSO, 2002).

It is now widely acknowledged that the social status of teachers in SSA in particular has declined appreciably during recent decades (Michaelowa, 2002; VSO, 2002, 2003; Bennell, 2004; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Urwick et al, 2005; Adelabu, 2005; Ololube, 2006, 2007; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008; Pole de Dakar, 2009; Tanaka, 2010; World Bank, 2011; Seniwoliba, 2013). As the report from a study on Zambia, Papua New Guinea and Malawi indicates:
As a result [of the declining teacher status], the teaching profession in developing countries is characterized by high attrition rates, constant turnover, lack of confidence and varying levels of professional commitment. Teachers very often feel powerless either to create positive learning experiences and outcomes for their pupils or to improve their own situations (VSO, 2002:1).

Due to such a low social standing in the region, teaching, at the primary and secondary levels in particular, is no longer considered to be a desirable job, and those who do join the profession tend not to stay in it for long (Inman and Marlow, 2004; Hanushek et al, 2004). The teaching profession is not perceived to have good long-term career prospects (Akyeampong and Furlong, 2000; Hedges, 2002; VSO, 2002; Bennell, 2004). In most SSA countries, teaching is perceived as a path to further education or an exit strategy (Olantunji, 2011). As, one Tanzanian student put it:

It [teaching] is the only profession which will allow me to advance to higher levels of education (Towse et al, 2002).

Another student said that:

I just want to get a profession and thereafter proceed with my own activities, particularly business, but if I will get no employment I will teach (Towse et al, 2002).

As such, to some, teaching is considered a useful springboard to further study or an alternative career. Some teacher trainees seem resigned to teaching simply as a means of earning a living, and many suggested that they would leave teaching if the national economy improved. Responding to the question: “Do you intend to become a school teacher on completing your training?” a male Diploma student in Tanzania said that:

In order to fulfil my needs, as long as there is no other employment in Tanzania (Towse et al, 2002).

Others join teaching having failed to pursue their first choice of career, most facing the need for an alternative. The study (Towse et al, 2002) noted that, some Diploma and Certificate students had accepted their academic or financial limitations and opted
for teaching as the only feasible alternative. Responding to the question: “Why did you want to become a teacher?” a female Diploma student said:

In fact, I don’t want to be a teacher. I am here because I missed other chances. Because of the national economy, I prefer to join the teacher training college rather than become jobless or with no other qualifications.

To others, teaching is regarded as a mere stepping stone to a career that they feel commands more respect and is more highly paid (Hedges, 2002; Osei, 2006; Olantunji, 2011). According to the EFA-GMR, 2013/14, teaching does not always draw the best candidates to the profession. As such, in some countries, especially in TDM, “teaching is seen as a second-class job for those who do not do well enough academically to enter more prestigious careers, such as medicine, or engineering” (UNESCO 2013/14: 25).

### 3.4. Definition of concepts

This study makes extensive use of the concepts of motivation, extrinsic motivation, intrinsic motivation and teacher motivation. The following sections present definitions and relationships of these constructs.

#### 3.4.1 Definition of motivation

According to Elliot et al (2001), motivation is defined as one's direction to behaviour, or what causes a person to want to repeat a behaviour and vice versa. Peretomode (1991) defines motivation as the process of influencing or stimulating a person to take action that will accomplish desired goals. According to Ryan and Deci (2000a), motivation is that which prompts the person to act in a certain way, or at least develop an inclination for specific behaviour. Their definition of motivation emphasises the process oriented perspective of the concept of motivation. They note that:

To be motivated means to be moved to do something. A person who feels no impetus or inspiration to act is thus characterized as unmotivated, whereas someone who is energized or activated toward an end is considered motivated (2000a:54).
According to Ryan and Deci (2000), motivation can be conceived of as a cycle in which thoughts influence behaviours, behaviours drive performance, performance impacts thoughts and the cycle begins again. Accordingly, each stage of the cycle is composed of many dimensions including attitudes, beliefs, intentions, effort and withdrawal, which can all affect the motivation that an individual experiences. This notion is further supported by Dessler (2001) who defines motivation in terms of complex forces, drives, needs, tensions, states and other mechanisms that initiate and maintain voluntary activity that is directed towards the achievement of personal goals.

Ololube (2006) argues that when an individual has a need, deficiency, desire or expectation, he or she seeks to mitigate it. In so doing, a tension results within the individual and this eventually pushes him or her to adopt a goal-directed behaviourism which will provide feedback on the needs met (Mullins, 2005). It therefore, follows that, the behaviour is initiated from within the individual. Seniwoliba (2013) notes that there is an ‘internal state’ or condition (sometimes described as a need, desire, or want) that serves to activate or energise behaviour (individual or organisational) and give it direction.

From the above definitions, three questions arise regarding the motivational process, as to: (1) What initiates and energizes human behaviour, behavioural pattern, or a change in behaviour? This aspect of motivation deals with the question of what is it that motivates people and attempts to explain the amount of effort or energy an individual puts into a task? (2) How are such forces directed and sustained? In other words, what is it that determines which behaviours an individual chooses among the alternative actions, behaviours or problem solutions? This aspect of motivation deals with the question of choice and conflict among competing behavioural alternatives. It deals directly with the direction of one’s effort. (3) What outcomes (performances) do they bring about? That is, what determines an individual’s level of persistence with respect to behavioural patterns and what leads some individuals to keep working at something long after others have quit? This aspect of motivation deals with how
behaviour is sustained and stopped. It deals with the persistence and consistency of behaviour.

While many theories have been developed and applied to the study of human motivation, this study is based on ‘need theories’ which assume that an unsatisfied need is a source of individual motivation and that individuals are likely to take actions that they believe will help them satisfy these unsatisfied needs (Maslow, 1947). With respect to the three stages of the motivation process (energizing, directing, and sustaining), the need theories are most applicable as they attempt to explain what motivates individual behaviour without particular attention to the process of deciding among behavioural alternatives. Examples of these theories are Maslow (1947) and Herzberg (1966), which are explained in detail in chapter 3, section 3.7.

3.4.2 Definition of teacher motivation

Two definitions of teacher motivation have been suggested in this study, which emphasise the satisfaction of various teachers’ needs, as a way to motivate them to teach. For example, Ofojebe and Ezugoh define teacher motivation as:

A way of empowering teachers in the occupation and involves the perceptions, variables, methods, strategies and activities used by the management for the purpose of providing a climate that is conducive to the satisfaction of the various needs of the employees [teachers], so that they may become satisfied, dedicated and effective in performing their task (2010:401).

In her quantitative analysis in six francophone countries, Michaelowa defines teacher motivation as: “The willingness, drive or desire to engage in good teaching” (2002:5).

The above definitions suggest that there is need to motivate teachers in order to enhance their commitment in performing their duty, which will enhance the attainment of educational objectives. The definitions above further suggest teacher motivation as constituting a situation where the existing conditions lead to teachers’ commitment to teaching, which in turn is demonstrated by evidence of high morale and the facilitation of positive learning outcomes. I describe teachers as being well motivated if they are
seen to strive to meet personal goals that correspond closely to the official aims of the school and ideals of the teaching profession in general.

3.4.3 Distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation

As argued by Thomas (1984), a proper approach to the understanding of the construct of ‘work motivation’ lies in a careful distinction between the two broad categories of factors of motivation: extrinsic and intrinsic. For example, Herzberg's (1964) 'two-factor theory' (see section 3.6) distinguishes between extrinsic rewards surrounding a job (such as salaries, fringe benefits, and job security) and intrinsic rewards of the job itself (such as self-respect, sense of accomplishment, and personal growth). Fraze et al (1992) identified two sets of factors that affect teachers’ ability to perform effectively: work context factors (the teaching environment), and work content factors (teaching). The work context factors relate to extrinsic factors, while work content factors relate to intrinsic factors (see chapter 4, section 4.7).

While extrinsic motivation results from the attainment of externally administered rewards, including pay, material possessions, prestige and positive evaluations, intrinsic motivation comes from within a person or from the activity itself, and it positively affects behaviour, performance and wellbeing (Ryan and Deci, 2000b). Tasks are intrinsically motivating when they are characterised by key motivators such as responsibility, challenge, achievement, variety and advancement opportunity (Herzberg, 1966). For example, teachers are primarily motivated by intrinsic rewards such as self-respect, responsibility, and a sense of accomplishment (Ryan and Deci, 2000b).

As such, intrinsic motivation is viewed to have a more sustainable impact on teacher motivation and student learning. For example, Fraze et al (1992) argue that teachers enter teaching to help young people learn, that their most gratifying reward is accomplishing this goal and that the work-related [or intrinsic] factors most important to teachers are those that allow them to practise their craft successfully. However, studies from developing countries seem to point to the fact that extrinsic factors such
as salary are crucial in determining teacher motivation. This is because teachers in such contexts are in poor living conditions. For example, Bennell (2004) suggests that pecuniary motives are likely to be dominant among teachers in low-income developing countries, which is not surprising in nations where poverty is still prevalent. Hedges (2000) used the findings of Apt and Grieco (1994) to support Maslow's theory: "poor pay and working conditions leave many teachers trapped on the first step of Maslow's ladder" (p12).

Furthermore, research has explored whether or not intrinsic motivators in respect of the teaching profession are more effective than extrinsic motivators; and if they are, whether teacher incentive schemes should reflect this principle (Scott et al. 1999). While evidence from the West indicates that teachers are primarily motivated by intrinsic rewards such as self-respect, responsibility, and a sense of accomplishment (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007), evidence from developing countries points to the notion that extrinsic motivators such as salary are more important in determining job satisfaction and teacher motivation (Shaari et al, 2002; Bennell, 2004; Musikanga, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Adelabu, 2005; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008; ; Seniwoliba, 2013; Igbafe et al, 2015).

Research in developing countries goes further to say that it is only when intrinsic needs are satisfied that extrinsic motivators such as salary and working conditions become significant (Michaelowa, 2002). Earlier research by Lortie (1975) suggests that teachers seek to realise their personal and professional aspirations rather than pursuing purely monetary reward; and teachers sometimes reject reward schemes that provide high salaries if the overall package neglects other motivators.

Moreover, evidence shows that, while motivation has been broadly categorised into extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, there still remains a paradox of whether these two factors are independent or overlapping. Evidence also shows that intrinsic motivation is far stronger a motivator than extrinsic motivation, yet extrinsic motivation can easily
act to displace intrinsic motivation, where an individual attributes his or her behaviour more to a visible extrinsic motivator than to inherent intrinsic reasons. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic types of motivation has been useful in shedding important light on both developmental and educational practices. Intrinsic motivation remains an important construct, reflecting the natural human propensity to learn and assimilate. However, extrinsic motivation is argued to vary considerably in its relative autonomy and thus can either reflect external control or true self-regulation. Evidence on these categories of factors of motivation is discussed in section 3.7.

The discussions above suggest that none of the categories of motivators alone is sufficient to motivate teachers. As such, a careful selection of incentives is important when considering which to provide to teachers. The section below elucidates the literature on specific incentives and how they impact on teacher motivation, focusing on SSA counties.

3.5. Theories of motivation

Scholl (2002) defines theories of motivation as “psychological ways of understanding what drives individuals to work towards a goal or outcome, or what is it that inspires human beings to extend their abilities and perform according to expectations. It is argued that most motivational theories available in the general literature offer the same conceptual explanation, although using a slightly different approach or terminology (Scholl, 2002). In particular, for this study, in selecting the motivational theories, I paid deliberate attention to the three categories in which the motivation theories are often placed (ibid). Firstly, 'content' or 'needs' theories, that explain the relative amount of effort that energizes behaviour. Secondly, 'process' theories that explain the 'direct' aspect of the effort that directs behaviour. Thirdly 'behavioural' theories that explain the continuation of a behavioural pattern that sustains behaviour.

I made a decision to focus on 'content' or 'needs' theories because these are 'not competing explanations of the same construct' in that each type of theory explains a part of the entire motivation process (Scholl, 2002). This choice of this model was
also prompted by its articulation of the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic factors, which have an impact on an individual’s motivation. This comparison is important as intrinsic factors cannot be addressed before extrinsic factors are satisfactorily met, and because intrinsic factors are more difficult to tackle as they depend to some extent on the individual. A discussion on how these theories are used in the study is explained in the conceptual framework (see section 3.9).

3.6. Content theories of motivation

Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs and Herzberg’s (1966) two-factor theory - perhaps the best known variations on the content theory - were identified for this study. These are explained in the following sections.

3.6.1 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory

Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs theory is the most widely recognised conceptualisation of motivation of the content theories (Barrs, 2005; Ololube, 2006). It postulates that humans have specific needs that must be met. These needs are naturally ranked hierarchically, an arrangement which corresponds to the changing sense of urgency in terms of the individual’s perceived needs as he or she progresses through life. Thus, moving up the pyramid, needs cease to be regarded in terms of ‘deficits’ of nature and become ‘being’ needs (Maslow, 1943).

The theory assumes five categories of needs (see Figure 3.1). These are: physiological, safety, belonging, esteem and self-actualisation needs. Individuals must satisfy each need in turn, starting with the most fundamental conditions upon which survival itself depends; that is, those which may be regarded as deficit needs. It is only when such lower order needs of physical and emotional well-being are satisfied that attention can be turned to the higher order needs of influence and personal development. Once a need is satisfied, it is necessarily no longer a need, it ceases to inform the individual’s behaviour, and his or her attention turns to the next most pressing need at the following level of the hierarchy.
Figure 3.1: Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs theory

Source: Adapted from Maslow (1943).

3.6.2 Herzberg’s two-factor theory

Herzberg (1966) adopted Maslow’s ideas to make them more applicable to the work environment and employee motivation, suggesting that not all needs are motivators, as Maslow assumes (Barrs, 2005; Ololube, 2007). Conversely, Herzberg’s theory of motivation makes a clear distinction between the factors that determine job satisfaction and those that influence motivation (see Figure 3.2). Accordingly, the theory holds that job satisfaction and dissatisfaction nearly always arise separately from different factors, rather than simply opposing reactions to the same factors, as had always previously been believed (Herzberg, 1966).

According to Herzberg (1966), the factors that lead to job satisfaction when present are not the same as those that lead to such a characteristic when absent. Thus, Herzberg regards job satisfaction and dissatisfaction as independent of each other, referring to those environmental aspects of the workplace that cause the dissatisfaction of employees and which are largely extrinsic in nature as ‘hygiene factors’ (also referred to as ‘maintenance factors’, ‘non-satisfiers’, and ‘events’).
Such factors, which are associated with job context, include: company policy and administration; technical supervision; salary; interpersonal relationships with supervisors, peers and subordinates; and working conditions. Accordingly, the presence of these factors alone does not result in job satisfaction, as they are held to be necessary to but insufficient in themselves to bring about the fulfilment of employees (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

Figure 3.2: Herzberg’s (1966) two-factor theory of motivation

Herzberg (1966) also identifies ‘motivating factors’ (also referred to as ‘motivators’ or ‘satisfiers’) as those aspects that make employees work harder, positing that such factors are associated with job description or what people actually do in the workplace, and listing them as achievement, recognition, the job itself, responsibility and advancement. They are also referred to as intrinsic motivation factors (Peretomode, 1991).

Source: Adapted from Herzberg’s (1966) and Ololube (2007).
Herzberg (1966) also suggests that both motivation and hygiene factors should be accorded equal attention to achieve worker satisfaction. In this regard, motivators are associated with a long-term, positive impact on job performance, while hygiene factors only tend to produce short-term changes in work attitude and motivation, which quickly drop back to their previous levels (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

Having adopted the content theories for the present study, I acknowledge that my research on, and understanding of, motivation theory may have not been exhaustive enough to cover most of the relevant theories on motivation. I also considered the fact that a large number of recent motivational theories have been developed as modifications of the earlier theories. Also, I believe that the motivational theories finally selected for this study appear to be particularly relevant to the teaching context in low income developing countries (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007) and in particular to the teaching profession. Besides, time would not permit to study of more theories, given the great number of major theories of motivation, such as: Vroom's (1964), Porter's and Lawler's (1968) expectancy theory of motivation and McClelland's (1961) motivational needs theory. However, owing to the scope and limitations of this study, I am confident that the major theories have been presented. Future research on this topic will give particular attention to this aspect.

However, having also conceded that the scope of the study itself was necessarily restricted, I am confident that the conceptualisations I selected as being relevant to it were useful in providing a basis for an understanding of the substantive issues addressed. Nevertheless, future research on this topic should give particular attention to further exploring other theories in such a context.

3.7. Extrinsic factors of motivation

3.7.1 Low and irregular teachers’ salaries and rigid teacher pay structure

3.7.1.1 Low and declining teachers’ salaries

While teachers’ salaries are considered key among motivational factors for teachers, especially in low-income countries, they remain too low to cover basic teachers’
living costs (UNESCO, 2014). For example, in his analysis of primary teachers’ salary across three decades (1970 to 2000) for seven African countries - Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, Senegal, Cameroon and Madagascar - Lambert (2004) concluded that teachers’ salaries were declining significantly, and this was sometimes accompanied by a decline in the status of the teaching profession relative to others, hence leading to low teachers’ motivation.

In Rwanda, a World Bank report (2011) showed that the monthly income of 70 United States Dollars (USD) of primary school teachers in 2008 was among the lowest in SSA. This was only 14 USD higher than Sierra Leone, but lower than the nine other selected SSA countries (see Figure 3.3).

**Figure 3.3: Average monthly income of qualified primary teachers in selected African countries, 2004-2006 (US$ per month)**

![Average monthly income of qualified primary teachers in selected African countries, 2004-2006 (US$ per month)](image)


Studies have shown that the cost of maintaining, ideally well-qualified and high-calibre, teachers in the context of seeking to meet EFA targets, makes it difficult for many African governments to remunerate its large numbers of teachers on the same level as doctors and other professionals (Lambert, 2004; Olantunji, 2011; World Bank, 2011). Hence, governments are faced with the dilemma of whether or not to find a
way of raising salaries as a means of attracting more and better qualified teachers (Mulkeen et al, 2007).

On the one hand, governments need to pay competitive salaries to attract the best teachers; on the other, many face a dilemma: higher salaries would raise the public budget unless teachers’ numbers fell, which would increase class size (UNESCO, 2014). Some ministries of education declare that their country’s economic conditions cannot support teachers’ demand for rises in pay and benefits, or improvement in working conditions (Ololube, 2006). Specifically, they argue that teachers’ demands are beyond the capacity of the government to meet, and any pay rise inevitably leads to an increased demand on the national budget. Some of them go as far as accusing teachers of negligence, laziness and lack of enthusiasm and dedication to work, contending that such shortcomings in efficiency and effectiveness do not warrant the constant demands for pay rises, incentives, and better working conditions (Ololube, 2006).

For their part, teachers remain unsatisfied and complain that their governments ignore their plight and are not treated in a similar way as other public servants. As stated by Ololube:

> Teachers themselves tend to claim that their existing salary structure, benefits and working conditions do not meet their basic needs in as much as other sectors of the economy command a more generous salary and enhanced working conditions, thus leading to higher levels of motivation (2006:2).

Such perpetually opposed points of view and counter accusations, far from helping to resolve the teacher motivation issue, merely lead to a spiral of demotivation.

In their study, Bennell and Akyeampong found an overwhelming consensus amongst stakeholder and teacher interviews in all but two (India and Nepal) of the 12 case study countries that: “teachers are seriously underpaid and that this, more than anything else, is the key factor undermining teacher morale and motivation” (2007:32). In most developing countries, low salaries are supplemented by the parents and communities
around the school. This is a common burden to some parents, who may not always afford these costs, especially in rural areas where poverty is high. This has contributed to wide inequality in teachers’ income between urban and rural areas, adding to the difficulty of attracting teachers to rural areas (UNESCO, 2014). The consequences of persistently low teachers’ salaries are numerous. First, is the widespread phenomenon of teachers seeking additional income (VSO, 2002; Wolf et al, 2015). This tends to lead to a situation where time, attention and loyalty are divided between teaching and at least a second job, which impacts negatively on the quality of schooling (UNESCO, 2014). For example, in Zambia, Bennell and Musikanga found that:

The majority of teachers in Zambia have developed an attitude of ‘work as you earn’, which many believe greatly affected their professional attitudes and overall commitment to achieving quality of education for all (2005:36).

Many teachers have resorted to coaching which may adversely affect teacher commitment to timetabled classes (Harding and Mansaray, 2006).

The issue of low teachers’ salaries in SSA is compounded by the challenge of irregular salary payment and lengthy teacher remuneration procedures (Hedges, 2000; VSO, 2002; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; UNESCO, 2005). Evidence shows that such delays in processing teachers’ salaries may be partly attributed to public fiscal crisis and/or underdeveloped banking system (Kadzamira, 2006; Mulkeen et al, 2007; Bennel and Ntagaramba, 2008; World Bank, 2011).

The negative implications of irregular salary payments on teacher motivation, particularly in rural areas, are enormous (Mulkeen et al, 2007; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; UNESCO, 2014). For example, (Ayeni 2005) found that school head teachers in Nigeria often complained about teachers not willing to work because of delays in payment of their salaries. In Malawi, where teachers’ pay is low and payment often unpredictable, one-in-ten teachers stated that they were often absent from school in connection with financial concerns, such as travelling to follow up and collect their salaries or securing credit and making loan payments (UNESCO, 2014).
In a study in Tanzania, Mulkeen et al, (2007) reported that 53% of teachers in publicly funded schools claimed that their salaries were never paid on time. Additionally, according to Mulkeen et al (2007), teachers who have not been remunerated promptly typically fail to arrive for work on time and are distracted by hunger when they do make an appearance. Mulkeen et al, state that:

Rectifying problems with payments and allowances may involve more teacher absence while they take long and frustrating visits to district offices, further reducing motivation (2007:22).

Research shows that ensuring timely salary payment can dramatically increase teacher motivation and morale (VSO and CfBT, 2008). For example, Ubom (2002) found that in Nigeria, prompt payment of salaries induced greater commitment to teaching. Adelabu (2005) found that teachers and other school workers in Nigeria remained contented and reasonably motivated as long as their salaries were paid on time.

3.7.1.2 Rigid teacher pay structure and salary discrepancies across the public sector

Numerous research studies have shown that the overall structure of teachers’ remuneration shares most of the negative characteristics of public sector payment systems in low-income developing countries. In such contexts, the pay scales of both primary and secondary school teachers are often very flat, with very small salary increments awarded on the basis of seniority and experience, and with little or no link with actual job performance (Michaelowa, 2002; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Adelabu, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Urwick et al, 2005; Musikanga, 2005; Kadzamira, 2006; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Mulkeen et al, 2007; Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008; World Bank, 2011; MIFOTRA, 2012). For example, in Malawi, a qualified primary teacher in the lowest category, with two to four years of secondary education and a teaching Diploma, receives less than a third of the salary of a teacher in the highest category, predominantly head teachers (Steiner-Khamsi and Kunje, 2011). In Rwanda, a World Bank report indicates that the pay structure in publicly funded schools is characterised by limited progression within the advanced Certificate (A2),
Diploma (A1) and Degree (A0) qualification groups (World Bank, 2011). The same report notes that the teachers’ pay structure in Rwanda is further characterised by: (i) limited pay progression within the three main qualification groups: the only way A2 or A1 holders can increase their pay significantly is to upgrade their qualifications to A1 or A0 levels, respectively; (ii) salary deficit between education and non-education graduates: the former earn over 50% more, which is likely to result in lower retention rates among the latter group; and (iii) there is a failure to implement a higher pay scale for head teachers compared to classroom teachers.

Another feature of the salary structure of the public sector across SSA is the discrepancies in salary levels, which causes dissatisfaction among teachers. For example, in Rwanda, the net income of a Bachelor degree (A0) teacher is little more than a third that of other similarly qualified civil servants (MINEDUC, 2010b; World Bank, 2011; MIFOTRA, 2012); while A1 and A2 teachers earn comparatively even lower salaries, at 1.6 and 1.8 times less, respectively (MIFOTRA, 2012). Sizeable discrepancies in salaries also exist between qualified and unqualified or underqualified teachers in government schools. For example, in Malawi, at both primary and secondary levels, unqualified teachers receive considerably lower salaries even though their workloads are usually the same as, if not heavier than, fully qualified colleagues (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Kadzamira, 2006).

3.7.2 High cost of living

Evidence indicates that teachers’ pay in most low-income SSA countries is not commensurate with the costs they are expected to meet (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Olantunji, 2011); and as well to provide a reasonable standard of living (UNESCO, 2014). The UNESCO EFA-GMR reports that:

In Zimbabwe, teacher pay dropped drastically, as a result of dire economic conditions and hyperinflation, from around US$500 per month in the 1990s to US$2 per month in early 2009. Although an allowance of US$150 per month was awarded in 2009, teachers were still paid well below the country’s poverty line of around US$500 that year (UNESCO, 2014).
The EFA-GMR further quotes a Rwandan teacher:

My salary is not enough to cover housing, transport, food and the payments on my student loan. It makes me feel unappreciated, and though my students reassure me every day that I have chosen the right profession, it would be wonderful to receive the same reassurance from administrators (UNESCO, 2014:247).

This teacher shows the extent to which teachers’ salaries in publicly funded schools in Rwanda are too low to meet teachers’ basic needs. The EFA-GMR further notes that, while it is assumed that a primary school teacher needs at least 10US$ to live per day\(^8\), primary school teachers in some SSA countries earn less than that (see Table 3.1). This is less than the amount needed to keep teachers’ families above the poverty line (UNESCO, 2014). This shortfall negatively impacts on teachers’ performance, particularly in the case of urban schools whose teachers are invariably subject to high cost of living expenses, such as those for accommodation and transport, compared to their counterparts in rural postings.

**Table 3.1: Primary teacher gross income per day in selected African countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less than 10US$ per day</th>
<th>Between 10 and 15US$ per day</th>
<th>Between 15 and 20 US$ per day</th>
<th>Above 20US$ per day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Benin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Sao</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Tome/Principe</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Ivory coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Primary teachers in South Africa were reported to earn US$127 per day, which is far higher than most SSA.

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\(^8\) This assumption is basing on the Pole de Dakar database and OECD Education at a Glance (2013).
3.7.3 Poor work and living conditions

Considerable research evidence indicates that the quality of the environment in which teachers live and work strongly influences overall levels of teacher motivation (Santiago, 2002; Adelabu, 2005; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Mulkeen et al, 2007; World Bank, 2011; Bhatti et al, 2012; UNESCO, 2014). The EFA-GMR notes that a good working environment that values teachers’ contribution can enhance job satisfaction and reduce teacher absenteeism (UNESCO, 2014). Santiago (2002) cites the following as some of the critical features of a teacher’s workplace: class size, number of classes taught, teaching load, ability to take temporary leave, composition of the teaching staff, safety, quality of school facilities and equipment, quality of instructional materials, opportunities for collaboration and opportunity for participating in decision making. Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) add to this list poor teacher housing, high cost of living, collegial and management support and school location.

However, voluminous evidence from across SSA indicates that the state of teachers’ work and living conditions in SSA are generally ‘very poor’ (Adelabu, 2005; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Mulkeen et al, 2007; World Bank, 2011; Bhatti et al, 2012) and this tends to lower teachers’ self-esteem and motivation. For example, in a study in Nigeria, Adelabu found that:

Public schools in Nigeria are a collection of dilapidated buildings, many without toilets and other basic facilities. The schools are staffed by tired and frustrated teachers and attended by poorly fed, disenchanted pupils. This environment does not engender high job morale (Adelabu, 2005).

Such conditions are responsible for low teacher morale and the difficulty in attracting and retaining quality personnel into the teaching profession. As such, strategies to address teacher motivation should emphasise improving teachers’ work and living environment.
3.7.4 Heavy teachers’ workload

Heavy teachers’ workload is one of the key demotivating factors (UNESCO, 2014). In some contexts, this results from assigning teachers more subjects to teach, a situation that is frequently exacerbated by overcrowding, large classes and constant changes to curriculums, which all lead to severe demotivation (Adelabu, 2005; Mulkeen et al, 2007). For example, in Rwanda teachers’ workloads and contact hours have increased as a result of the high demand for schooling brought about by the expansion in access to education (MINEDUC, 2013, 2014). Heavier workloads tend to be due in part to shortages of teaching staff and partly owing to a lack of financial resources to recruit additional teachers to meet the increasing demand (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005).

Moreover, workloads vary considerably by school size, type and location, as well as subject area (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Adelabu, 2005; Kadzamira, 2006; Mulkeen et al, 2007; World Bank, 2011). For example, specialised teachers in small schools tend to have lighter workloads than general teachers in large schools working in overcrowded classrooms (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005, Hyde et al, 2005).

However, since there is no difference in the amount teachers are paid according to how many classes or pupils are taught, unpaid and, in many cases, unrecognised heavy workloads can induce demotivation (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005). It has also been suggested that wide variations in the number of periods taught in the same school can generate a strong sense of unfairness, which is further compounded by the lack of a performance-based promotion system (ibid).

In Rwanda, most primary school teachers are assigned 6.5 hours of contact time per day, with 1.5 hours for lunch. As shown in Table 3.2, nearly 20% of them have contact hours in excess of 35 per week, the average being 32 (World Bank, 2011). One reason for this high workload is that many of them work under the ‘double-shift’ system whereby they are obliged to teach two separate classes a day, which is particularly demanding (ibid).
Table 3.2: Distribution of teachers by workload and school level in 2009 (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hours/week</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Lower Secondary</th>
<th>Upper Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥40</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank (2011)

High teacher workloads, especially in SSA have resulted from education reforms, especially those that have led to rapid student enrolment without corresponding increase in supply of teachers. This has prompted teachers being assigned to teach many hours, a situation that has contributed to teacher burnout and demotivation (Wolf et al, 2015).

3.7.5 Large class sizes

Another critical factor that negatively affects basic education teachers’ motivation in many SSA countries is the large size of classes (UNESCO, 2014). In SSA, this has occurred in countries which endeavour to attain the EFA and MDG targets (Michaelowa, 2002; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Adelabu, 2005; UNESCO, 2005, 2009; World Bank, 2011). Such expansion puts an immense financial strain on already constrained economies, inevitably leading (amongst other things) to reductions in teachers’ pay, which is demotivating.

3.7.6 Poor teacher housing and high transport costs

In most countries in SSA (and Asia), housing has been identified as one of the most critical issues affecting teacher morale and motivation. For example, in a survey with primary school teachers in Zimbabwe, Chireshe and Shumba (2011) concluded that poor teacher accommodation was ranked the fourth among the key challenges faced by Zimbabwean teachers, next to poor salaries, lack of resources, and poor working
conditions. In the contexts of the 12 countries\(^9\) covered in their study, Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) concluded that housing was a major issue affecting the morale and motivation for nearly all teachers. In another study in Tanzania, Bennell and Mukyanuzi (2005), found that rural primary teachers lived in dilapidated, poorly-maintained school or government accommodation on or near the school compound. It further noted that scarcity of decent accommodation was a constant catchphrase of nearly all reports, both official and by independent researchers. In Kenya, Hyde et al, (2005) found that availability and quality of teacher housing came second on the list after distance travelled to school among the key motivational factors for primary school teachers. In Rwanda, teachers’ accommodation, especially for primary school teachers, has been reported to be generally poor (Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008; World Bank, 2011; MINEDUC, 2012). Because of this, newly qualified teachers were discouraged from being posted to schools because they could not find accommodation near the schools or, if it was available, the rent was mostly unaffordable. Although several governments in SSA have promised to improve teacher’s accommodation, over the last 30 years very little progress has been made in terms of actual provision (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Chireshe and Shumba, 2011), and without acceptable housing, teachers’ motivation levels are expected to be low.

The lack of housing for teachers is compounded by the high transport costs. Whereas finding decent accommodation is a challenge for most teachers in rural areas, simply getting to work tends to be a much bigger problem for those in urban areas (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Mulkeen et al, 2007). In such locations, the high cost of public transport inevitably leads to high expenses, teacher lateness or absenteeism, consequently reducing teacher morale.

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\(^9\) This study was done in twelve countries: eight African countries, namely: Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia); and four Asian countries, namely: Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan.
3.7.7 Student behaviour

Research evidence indicates that student behaviour in developing countries, especially in SSA, does not appear to be such a burning issue, as the case is in developed countries, particularly in Europe and North America where pupil misbehaviour is a major de-motivator for teachers (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). For example in Tanzania, Bennell and Mukyanuzi (2005), noted that the behaviour of pupils is not a problem for teachers. A World Bank report on education in Rwanda notes that pupils at rural primary schools are generally well behaved, with the exception of a few cases in urban areas where teachers have some trouble controlling the movements of pupils in and out of the school, especially where schools do not have adequate security fences (World Bank, 2011).

However, with the abolition of primary school fees and associated increase in pupil enrolment, teachers are having to address new pupil dynamics, with the inevitable impact on their motivation. For example, there is the exacerbated phenomenon of over-age pupils with mixed abilities in the same class, all of which contributes to the difficult and complex problem of pupil behaviour (Hyde et al, 2005). A significant proportion of increased enrolments can be attributed to families who are unfamiliar with formal education and the conventional modes of behaviour associated with it, making it more difficult and challenging for teachers to manage pupils from such backgrounds (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). Teachers have reacted differently to the regulations on disciplining pupils. In Kenya, for example, teachers do not like the new official policy that forbids the use of corporal punishment; most feel that they are being deprived of an important part of their disciplinary arsenal (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

3.7.8 School leadership and teacher management systems

Evidence shows that the quality of school management systems and the competence of individual managers at all levels (school, district, region, and ministry headquarters) are critically important in ensuring that teachers are adequately motivated (Bennell
and Mukyanuzi, 2005). This is echoed in the World Bank status report on the education of Rwanda, which states that:

Teachers must be well managed if they are to be properly motivated and utilized (World Bank, 2011:132).

The recent EFA-GMR 2013/2014, affirms the need for strong school leadership to ensure that teachers show up on time, work a full week and provide equal support to all (UNESCO, 2014).

However, research indicates that many teachers, and in some countries the majority of teachers, do not feel that they are well managed (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Tanaka, 2012). In some case, this is due to a lack of basic management skills by the employing authorities. For example, Bennell and Akyeampong (2007) note that teachers at many of the schools in Sierra Leone complained about unfair recruitment and transfer practices by school authorities, who are mostly churches.

In Ghana, the weakness of management systems and practice is fairly typical:

The management of primary schools is very weak. Head teachers are not appointed because of their competence as managers but because of the number of years they have spent teaching. Most of them have not been given any management training since assuming office. The disciplinary authority granted to them is ineffective. Consequently, vices such as lateness, absenteeism, drunkenness etc. abound. Circuit supervisors do relatively little - just check staff numbers and enrolments rather than offer professional advice and support to teachers (Akyeampong and Asante, 2005:40).

Herzberg’s (1966) theory (see section 3.6.2) notes that if teachers are well regarded and treated fairly by school leaders, and if the staff management system is transparent, it is more likely that teachers will be well motivated. However, some countries in SSA do not have effectively functional education sectors or infrastructure for the management and support of basic school teachers, and in such contexts teachers are likely to lose their sense of professional responsibility and commitment (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). A study by Adelabu (2005) examining this issue in the Nigerian
context, found that a lack of clear overall accountability for the management of grassroots education had seriously undermined teacher morale over the years. The attitude of inspectors to the supervision of school operations is another vital motivational factor. In this regard, Adelabu (2005) confirmed Bamisaye’s (1998) findings that unfair administrative and supervisory practices tended to undermine teacher morale, in some cases inspectors being regarded as ‘police officers’. Inspections are infrequent and weak, especially in more remote schools and where head teachers lack ‘de facto’ administrative control over teachers.

This situation is not different in most of SSA, where for most administration regarding teacher management, there is lack of clear rules which, in turn, tends to generate conflict, a power vacuum, overlap and duplication of effort (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). In such situations, teachers have little sense of self-determination, which seriously undermines their motivation. The high turnover of head teachers reported in many countries (ibid) is particularly detrimental for teacher motivation. Where they exist, teacher management systems have largely been found to be based on rigid hierarchical structure, which results in limited participation, delegation, and communication in terms of major school management decisions (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

3.7.9 Teachers’ participation in decision-making

Another factor that influences teacher motivation is the degree to which teachers are consulted about policy and procedures in school. For example, DeJaeghere et al, 2006 suggest that traditionally the education system of many countries in SSA has tended to operate as a ‘steep hierarchy’, with decision-making power heavily concentrated with leaders at the top, and those at the bottom (teachers, in this case) being involved in no more than the implementation of policies passed down to them.

3.7.10 School location, facilities and characteristics

The unattractiveness of teaching locations in rural schools can be a strong cause for low teacher motivation. The size of the rural-urban differences in some countries
creates strong disincentives to being posted to a rural school (Mukyanuzi, 2005). The location of schools, school facilities and environment are considered to have great impact on the levels of teacher motivation. Evidence further suggests that there is a varied level of teacher preference for deployment in urban areas as compared to rural areas (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Adelabu, 2005; Kadzamira, 2006; Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008). This is especially so for female and newly qualified teachers.

It is usually much harder to deploy female teachers to rural locations. In part, this is due to social and cultural factors that impinge far more on the personal and professional lives of female teachers, especially those who are single. Because of this factor, most countries in SSA allow married female teachers to live with their spouses (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). By doing this, more female teachers are deployed to work in urban areas. As a result, women teachers tend to be heavily concentrated in urban schools, as found in India and Zambia (ibid). In Bangladesh, safe housing is particularly important in encouraging women to teach in rural areas (UNESCO, 2014).

Teachers, mostly males, prefer employment in urban schools so as to access quality education for their own children, employment opportunities for spouses, opportunities for further study and secondary income, better working and living conditions and to maintain close family and friendship networks (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

In many African countries, newly appointed primary school teachers expect to upgrade their qualifications within three-four years so that they can become secondary school teachers or have a second chance of getting a place at university (Adelabu, 2005). As such, being posted to a rural primary school can severely reduce the possibility to undertake further studies, and demotivate teachers who intend to upgrade their qualifications.
3.8. Intrinsic factors of motivation

3.8.1 Individual characteristics

Individual teacher characteristics such as qualifications, age, and gender are all key criteria in explaining the disparity in teacher motivation in SSA (Bennell, 2004; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Barrett, 2005). For example, in Tanzania, older teachers, who are generally less well educated and trained, and largely in rural schools, are regarded as being more highly motivated than younger, better-qualified teachers, who are quite heavily concentrated in urban schools (Mukyanuzi, 2005). This may be partly because the older generation feel ‘privileged’ to be teachers. This is confirmed by Barrett (2005) who notes that younger, better educated teachers find a rural-school posting more difficult than older counterparts who, though generally less well educated and trained, tend to be more highly motivated. She argues that in rural schools, the teachers’ work is more challenging, but not all communities are capable of morally supporting teachers or holding them accountable. Hence, young men posted to rural schools are often the most demoralised and feel most estranged from the wider education system (Barrett, 2005).

Surprisingly, even though younger teachers are usually much better paid and more easily find a job with a school in a preferred location, motivation levels do not appear to be higher among this age group (VSO, 2002; Mulkeen et al, 2007; World Bank, 2011). This is probably linked to their choice of the teaching profession, and the possibility that they have not yet settled on a career in teaching (Tayyab and Farid, 2011), and may be considering a job in another field and are merely using teaching as a “stepping stone” to that end (Hedges, 2002; Olantunji, 2011; Tayyab and Farid, 2011).

In most SSA countries, female teachers at government-funded schools prefer employment in schools that are easily accessible and near major towns because they do not want to be separated from their spouses, and there are pervasive cultural concerns about posting single female teachers away from their family homes (Bennell, 2004; Adelabu, 2005). A gender-balanced teaching force is critically important in
order to eliminate educational attainment disparities between girls and boys (Mukyanuzi, 2005). The question of how individual teacher characteristics impact on their levels of motivation is outside the scope of this study and would benefit future studies.

3.8.2 Teacher competence

Research shows that there are two inter-related features of occupational motivation: ‘will-do’ and ‘can-do’ (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). Accordingly, while will-do motivation refers to the level to which a worker has embraced the organisation’s goals and objectives, can-do motivation focuses on factors that influence the capacity of individuals to realise organisational goals. As such, a teacher may be greatly dedicated to the achievement of the school’s learning goals, but he or she may lack the desirable competencies to teach effectively, which ultimately becomes demotivating. The actual and perceived competence of teachers is therefore a key issue, and these can be attained through the teacher education and training programmes.

Substantial research evidence indicates increasing recognition of teacher education and training, leading to teacher competence, as a major source of motivation (Michaelowa, 2002; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Musikanga, 2005; Urwick et al, 2005; Kadzamira, 2006; Osei, 2006; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Olantunji, 2011). For example, Urwick et al (2005) found that, although extrinsic incentives tend to attract the most attention of teachers in Lesotho, in-service training opportunities were rated high in rural areas in terms of motivating teachers. Michaelowa (2002) noted that knowledge of the job and teaching competence are relevant for teacher job satisfaction. In Malawi, a study found that, the long time it took for unqualified teachers to be considered for training, and as such access the necessary professional qualifications, these teachers became de-motivated (Kadzimira, 2006). Osei (2006), noted that teachers are motivated to attain a higher qualification as a way of increasing their earnings. Bennell and Akyeampong (2007)
conclude that teacher competence is one of the eight key determinants of teacher motivation in developing countries (ibid).

Even though qualified teachers generally feel that they have acquired the necessary competencies from ITE, the extent to which they can upgrade their qualifications through continuous professional development (CPD) programmes is a major motivational factor (Michaelowa, 2002; Urwick et al, 2005; Mulkeen et al, 2007; Olantunji, 2011; World Bank, 2011). Upgrading teacher qualifications is considered crucial as it is possibly the only leeway to improve one’s pay grade and gain job mobility and security (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). However, such reasoning assumes that there is an efficient salary structure whereby pay rises are commensurate with qualifications - this also still remains an issue, especially in SSA (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Urwick et al, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Kadzamira, 2006; World Bank, 2011).

Teachers are motivated to improve their competences through further training to an extent that they are ready to fund their costs. For example, in Rwanda and Kenya, teachers are so motivated to upgrade their qualifications that they are prepared to use their own resources to fund their studies (Hyde et al, 2005; World Bank, 2011).

If not well monitored and supported, opportunities for further studies may lead to teachers leaving the profession. For example, in Ghana many of the teachers that went for further studies and still remained on the payroll did not return to teaching (Olantunji, 2011). As such, the scheme was unintentionally promoting a steady flow of teachers out of the profession, and may be used merely as an exit strategy by individuals who are likely not to be motivated and wish to leave the profession.

3.8.3 The teacher career structure

The availability of teaching career advancement opportunities that can lead to a higher salary over time is a crucial motivational factor (Bennell, 2004; Mukyanuzi, 2005; Urwick et al, 2005, Kadzamira, 2006; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). However,
this remains limited in most SSA countries. In Rwanda, primary school teachers who graduate with an advanced Certificate (A2) do not have the possibility to advance in their teaching career at all. This is because currently in Rwanda there is no teaching profession career pathway. Consequently, both good and poor teachers are promoted indiscriminately, which many of their colleagues find very demoralizing (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

In many developing countries, teachers’ career structures are not sufficiently linked to prospects of promotion that recognise and reward teacher effectiveness. In Rwanda, while the Teacher Development and Management policy (MINEDUC, 2007) stresses the need to establish clear pathways for the teaching profession, at the time of filed data collection and writing this report, it was noted that the draft policy establishing teaching profession career pathway was still pending validation and approval by relevant authorities, nearly seven years after the TDM policy was approved.

While career structures are important for motivating teachers, especially primary school teachers, evidence shows that these are still limited in most of SSA. These need to be introduced and reviewed over time so as to attract and retain good teachers.

3.8.4 Teacher conduct

While professional misconduct is as old as professions themselves (Anangisye and Barrett, 2005), unprofessional behaviour on the part of teachers in SSA has been found to be on the high side. This has contributed much in large part to lowering the motivation and status of teachers in the region (Betweli, 2013).

Rampant forms of unprofessional teachers’ behaviours in most SSA include: extorting money from pupils for compulsory extra tuition, absenteeism, drunkenness, gender-based violence, examination fraud, abusive language, drug abuse, unethical dressing, appearing on the payroll but not in reality working at the school, ‘ghost teachers’ (Leach et al, 2000; Olantunji, 2011; Betweli, 2013) and ‘remote teaching’, the practice of leaving instructions to pupils on the board or engaging a class prefect to read a textbook to the class, while the teacher is elsewhere (VSO, 2002). For example, pupil
extortion in general and favouritism in assigning or selling grades have also been reported, particularly in respect of Guinea and Madagascar (Chumi, 2001; Mwero, 2004; Telli et al, 2004).

3.8.5 Occupational solidarity and power

Presence of occupational solidarity among teachers can provide a substantial impetus to the status and vocational commitment and motivation of teachers (Michaelowa, 2002). However, evidence shows that this remains weak among teachers (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005). A key reason for this is that in most SSA countries, teachers’ unions do not exist, or where they do, their powers are restricted. Olantunji (2011) noted that the most serious weakness of teaching as an occupation, from which other weaknesses such as that of diminishing status derive, is the absence of a professional governing body with the authority to articulate and exercise professional standards. Yet, governments are expected to work more closely with teacher unions to formulate policies (UNESCO, 2014).

In Tanzania, for example, Bennell and Mukyanuzi reported that:

Until very recently, there has been no collective bargaining over pay and other conditions of service and strikes have been illegal. (2005:16).

Evidence indicates that relationships between teachers and governments have become increasingly strained in many African countries, and this adversely affects teacher motivation (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). The common way by which the teachers’ unions express their grievances has been to stage sit-down strikes. During the period of study, I accessed 56 articles published in Uganda (The Monitor and New vision), Kenya (The Daily Nation) and Rwanda (The New Times), all of them reporting on teachers’ sit-down strikes.

The Daily Nation of Kenya, dated September 22, 2015 reported that:

Both the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT) and the Kenya Union of Post Primary Education Teachers (KUPPET) separately
directed their members [teachers] to keep off [not to supervise] the national examinations, one week before the scheduled exams begin. Teachers in public schools had been on a sit-down strike, demanding the implementation of the 50-60% salary increase awarded to them by the Court of Appeal the previous month.

As a result of teachers’ sit-down strikes, the same paper dated Thursday, September 24, 2015 reported that:

School children in Isiolo county were working in a quarry to supplement their parents’ meagre income, others were watching in video and pool dens, near markets in Mbeere south sub-county, while hundreds of school children in Mombasa studied in groups as others thronged the library for individual studies.as teachers were on a sit-down strike.

In Uganda, the Saturday Monitor, dated September 21, 2013 reported that the teachers’ union leaders advised teachers who were on strike to vote for political leaders on the basis of how they solve teachers’ issues.

Please my fellow teachers, in 2016, elect leaders who will fight for your rights and freedoms. I believe you have learnt a lot since we started this struggle….so be careful and look out for leaders who will appreciate the problems you are going through as you teach children of this nation.
Photo 3.1: Teachers in Uganda on a peaceful demonstration

![Image](image1.png)

Source: The New vision of Uganda, dated April 26, 2013

Teachers in Uganda were on a strike claiming that the government had failed to honour the promise of a salary increase of 30%.

Photo 3.2: The impact of teachers’ strikes on children learning

![Image](image2.png)

Pupils return home after being told there will be no studies due to the absence of teachers

Pupils idle in class during a teachers’ strike in Uganda
Teachers, especially in SSA, have not been able to exert considerable social influence as an organised group, and this has gone a long way to diminish their status. This is because, unlike other professions such as law, medicine and engineering that are well established in the region for many years, teaching at a formal level has been an emerging profession. The result of absence of a professional governing body for teachers is that many of the vital functions of such a body are divided between a government department and government-appointed agencies.

3.9. Conceptual framework

The conceptual framework of this study (illustrated in Figure 3.4) is based on the theoretical models of: Maslow (1947), Herzberg (1966) and Frase et al's (1992). The definitions and categorisations of the factors of motivations under the three models, converge in two main categories: intrinsic and extrinsic, and are all relevant to the teaching profession.

Frase et al (1992) refer to the “work or job context factors” as those that meet baseline needs. These factors to include: teachers’ work and living conditions, such as class size, student discipline, availability of teaching materials; the quality of the principal’s supervision, basic physiological needs such as money, status and security and housing.

These factors are consistent with Maslow’s “deficit needs” and Herzberg’s “hygiene factors” of motivation (see section 3.6). On the other hand, Frase et al’s “work or job content factors” are intrinsic to the work itself. They include opportunities for professional development, occupational status and recognition; and vocational commitment, challenging and varied work, increased responsibility, achievement, empowerment, and authority. These factors are consistent with both Maslow’s “being needs” and Herzberg’s “motivators”.
In respect of the first level (physiological needs), Maslow’s theory is particularly relevant to the teachers in the context of the present study, in which the vast majority work to satisfy life’s basic needs alone (Ololube, 2007). Adequate teacher remuneration is necessary to help meet such physiological needs. Accordingly, teachers who are tired, hungry and/or principally preoccupied with meeting household livelihood needs are unlikely to be strongly motivated to engage in professional development activities (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

The second level of Maslow’s needs addresses the safety of the individual, which includes protection from danger, accident, threat, deprivation, physical and
psychological harm and economic disaster. In the context of the present study, these factors could be realized in the form of teacher retirement or pension schemes, health and/or other insurance, medical service provision, job security and clean and healthy working conditions.

The third level of needs comprises social needs such as those for affection, love, friendship, interaction and acceptance in relationships with other people, all of which have a bearing on teacher job satisfaction. For example, the question arises as to whether primary and secondary teachers are satisfied with interpersonal relationships with principals, colleagues, pupils, parents and school inspectors. In this regard, it has been found that people who exhibit a need for affiliation tend to choose a career that carries a lot of interpersonal contact such as teaching (see Tanaka, 2010).

The fourth level addresses the needs of the ego. This category includes the need to attain goals, competency, self-respect, prestige, independence, freedom, approval, reputation, social status and recognition. This aspect of the theory guided the study as I investigated the extent to which teachers were satisfied with the kind of recognition they received for efforts made, the extent of autonomy in the classroom and the level of professional status accorded to them.

A particular relevance of Herzberg’s (1966) theory to the teaching profession is in terms of the complexity with which financial elements (salary, earnings, and benefits) are considered to be motivators. Herzberg (1966) contends that money is not itself a motivator in the same way as other primary motivators such as achievement and recognition. However, considering the interrelation between remuneration and other factors such as the pay scale and salary administration, the former becomes a type of motivator in the sense that it is a factor that contributes to the employee’s sense of achievement at work.

Although influenced by Maslow (1943), Herzberg’s (1966) motivation-hygiene theory goes further to posit that factors intrinsic to work, such as achievement and responsibility, have more potential for a positive effect on motivation, while extrinsic
factors, such as pay, managerial policy and working conditions have more potential to cause a negative effect if they fall below expectations. This makes the theory appear more applicable to education systems in which resources and expertise are abundant than to those in which they tend to be scarce. In the latter situation, improvement in pay or managerial policy can be important positive motivators; nevertheless, teachers in developing countries - indeed, in developed countries as well – are likely to be motivated by a mixture of intrinsic and extrinsic factors (Jacobson, 1995).

In terms of its practical application to education systems, the first step in enhancing teacher motivation is to eliminate dissatisfaction; therefore, administrators should ensure that remuneration, working conditions, policy, administration and so forth are appropriate and reasonable. When these targets have been met, motivation itself can be addressed, but it should be borne in mind that a pay rise and improvement in working conditions alone rarely lead to a higher level of motivation; rather, administrators should seek to provide teachers with the opportunity for growth, achievement and greater responsibility (Ololube, 2007).

Overall, Maslow (1943) and Herzberg’s (1966) theories were relevant for the purposes of answering the two RQs of this study, given that both conceptualisations are concerned with identifying the variables that influence behaviour and seek to elucidate the specific factors that motivate workers in an organisation (Barrs, 2005). They also address extrinsic and intrinsic factors of motivation, making them even more relevant to the present study. The application of these theories in this study could be understood that, if teachers’ “needs are satisfied”, they can be motivated to do their job better (Seniwoliba, 2013), and the reverse is possible.

3.10. **Summary and conclusion**

This chapter presented the theoretical and empirical evidence base on the topic of teacher motivation from the SSA perspective. The discussions in this chapter show that research on teacher motivation within the context of low-income countries has been limited, most of the studies having been done in the western world. A historical
reflection of the status of the teaching profession in Africa shows that, during colonial times the teaching profession was highly valued, but this respect diminished over time. Today teachers are increasingly demotivated, which may partially explain deteriorating teaching performance and student learning outcomes, particularly in the low-income countries (Moon, 2007; Bennell and Akyeampong 2007). Owing to their relevance to explaining the human behaviour in the context in SSA, two examples of need theories, ‘Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory’ and ‘Herzberg’s two-factor theory’, were used to explain this behaviour. These theories, which form the theoretical framework of this study, clearly categorise motivators into intrinsic and extrinsic motivators, literature on examples of the key intrinsic and extrinsic motivators, and how they influence teacher motivation in the SSA context were also discussed.

The review of literature on teacher motivation clearly demonstrates the need for a careful distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivators. Such a division may help to inform governments, managers and supervisors of teachers of what actually motivates teachers to carry out their duties effectively, especially in a resource-constrained environment. However, even if this distinction is adopted, it is important to note that for teachers to be motivated, a combination of the factors of motivation is necessary, as no single factor alone can serve to effect permanent and absolute motivation; rather, there must be a combination of factors which, when manifested together, are able to achieve the overall objective of increasing or at least sustaining the motivational levels of employees (see Herzberg, 1966; Michaelowa, 2002). Overall, this chapter has therefore provided a basis for understanding the findings from this study on teacher motivation in Rwanda, presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
CHAPTER FOUR

4. METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

4.1. Introduction

Understanding the complexity of a national system in which decisions about improvements in the teaching profession are made and whether teachers are motivated, or not, requires a carefully planned research. Hence, this chapter presents the methodology and methods I used for this study. This chapter covers a discussion of the research approach and design; sampling and data sources, the design of research instruments, a description of the research journey and finally a reflection on the limitations of the study.

4.2. Use of the mixed methods approach

4.2.1 Meaning of mixed methods research

Many authors define mixed methods (MM) research as a procedure for collecting, analysing and “mixing” or integrating both qualitative and qualitative data at some stage of the research process within a single study for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the research problem (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003; Ivankova et al, 2006; Mertens, 2007; Morgan, 2007; Bryman, 2007; Johnson et al, 2007; Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007; Creswell and Tashakkori, 2008; Bergman, 2011; Guest, 2012; Greenwood and Terry, 2012; Creswell, 2012; Caruth, 2013).

Johnson and Onwuegbuzie define MM research as:

The class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study (2004:17).

Johnson and Onwuegbuzie further note that MM research, compared to monomethod, is an extensive, creative, comprehensive and diverse form of research. As such, it provides to researchers leeway to take a wide-ranging approach to method selection and the thinking about and conduct of research.
Moreover, many researchers now view qualitative and quantitative methods as complementary, offering a more enhanced insight into the research problem(s) and question(s), and resulting in more questions of interest for future studies (Greene et al., 1989; Huberman, 1994; Creswell, 1994, 2003, 2010, 2012, 2015; Miles and Salome, 2003; Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006; Burke and Onwuegbuzie, 2007; Morgan, 2007; Guest, 2012; Frels and Onwuegbuzie, 2013).

For example, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie noted that:

Today's research world is becoming increasingly inter-disciplinary, complex and dynamic; therefore, many researchers need to complement one method with another, and all researchers need a solid understanding of multiple methods used by other scholars to facilitate communication, to promote collaboration and to provide superior research (2004:15).

Research further shows that MM research does not aim to substitute either of the traditional approaches (qualitative and quantitative), but rather to draw from the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of both in single research studies and across studies (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Additionally, it provides the epistemological and methodological diversity needed in educational research, ultimately enabling them to conduct more effective research (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Mertens and Hesse-Biber, 2012; Wilson, 2014).

4.2.2 Explanatory sequential research approach

Five approaches of MM research (see Figure 4.1) are commonly used in educational research (Ivankova et al, 2006; Caruth, 2013; Creswell, 2012; Zheng, 2015; Creswell, 2015). They are:

(i) simultaneously collecting, merging, and using both quantitative and qualitative data, called *convergent parallel approach*;

(ii) first gathering quantitative data and following up with the qualitative data so as to enhance the quantitative findings, called *explanatory sequential approach*;
(iii) first collecting qualitative data and following up with quantitative data to explain the qualitative findings, called *exploratory sequential approach*;

(iv) using either the convergent, explanatory, exploratory or embedded design types while including the design types within an evolving context, called *transformative approach*; or

(v) examining a subject or issue through a number of studies, called *multi-phase approach*.

The choice of the particular approach will depend on which one will enable the attainment of the aim of the study.

**Figure 4.1: Approaches to mixed methods designs**

![Diagram showing approaches to mixed methods designs](source: Adapted from Caruth (2013) and Ivankova et al. (2006))

This study employed the explanatory sequential approach to MM research, where quantitative data was collected first, followed by qualitative data. The two sets of data were then integrated (or “mixed”) in the intermediate and final stage of the study. The aim of collecting data separately and analysing it concurrently was threefold: first, to have the interview responses (qualitative data) to complement the survey responses (quantitative data). Secondly, to inform the analysis of the interview responses (Greene et al. 1989; Dixon-Woods et al, 2001; Small, 2011). Thirdly, to compensate
for the weaknesses in the survey data (Brewer and Hunter, 2006; Small, 2011). As such, this design helped to triangulate responses and to seek their consistency through the top-down and bottom-up approaches (Ivankova et al, 2006; Small, 2011).

As such, while the quantitative data and its preliminary analysis provided a general understanding of the research problem in form of statistical analysis, the subsequent qualitative data and their preliminary analysis refined and explained the statistical results (Creswell, 2003; Ivankova et al, 2006).

### 4.2.3 Ontological and epistemological stance: the pragmatic paradigm

As a MM research, this study employed a combination of two traditional research paradigms namely: (i) the positivist (and post-positivist) paradigm; and (ii) the interpretivist/constructivist paradigm (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006; Migiro and Magangi, 2011). Mertens (2012b) describes paradigms as assumptions related to ethics, reality (ontology) and epistemology that lead to different assumptions about the nature of systematic inquiry.

While the positivist (and post-positivist) paradigm tends to predominantly use quantitative approaches to data collection and analysis, though not necessarily exclusively, the interpretivist/constructivist paradigm tends to rely upon the "participants' views of the situation being studied" (Creswell, 2003:8), and uses qualitative methods (Mertens, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Migiro and Magangi, 2011; Mertens and Hesse-Biber, 2012).

The pragmatic paradigm has been put forth as a philosophical framework that supports the use of both the above paradigms, based on the assumption that there is not one set of methods that is appropriate; rather, using the criteria of what fits with the research question in this study (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Mertens, 2012b).
Mertens notes that the pragmatic paradigm:

Allows the researcher to adhere to the beliefs of the post-positivist paradigm in conducting quantitative-oriented data collection and the constructivist in qualitative-oriented data collection and then to put the two in conversation with each other throughout the study to allow for deeper understandings based on the convergence and dissonance found in the approaches (2012b:256).

RQ2 aimed at investigating the teachers' current and previous experiences in the teaching profession, in particular with respect to how motivated they have been. It also sought to understand whether the changes in teachers’ motivations are linked to incentive policy changes introduced during 2008-13.

The challenge addressed by the study was therefore to identify and gain knowledge of these incentives and processes. It is for this reason that the researcher took a positivist dimension to gain knowledge about these incentives and the processes (Bassey, 1995). Positivist ontology assumes reality to be objective (not subjective), and single (not multiple). Positivist epistemology advocates for the detachment or dualism of the knower (in this case being the teachers) and the things to be studied (in this case being the incentives and processes). With this ontological and epistemological dimension, I employed a questionnaire survey (quantitative) approach.

The qualitative interpretivist approach acted as an empowering process in this study where the participants were free to express their views, rather than being objects of the study (see Tuli, 2010). Through this approach, the study allowed the participants to make meanings of their own realities and came to appreciate their own construction of knowledge. The findings from the interviews are presented descriptively, using words (see Tuli, 2010).

4.3. Study design: A five-phase Mixed Methods Model

This section presents a description of the study design. A study design explains the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and ultimately to its conclusions (Yin, 1989).
Figure 4.2: Visual model for the Explanatory Sequential MM design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Sample description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>QUANTITATIVE Data Collection</td>
<td>• Paper-based survey (276 participants) • 50% response rate</td>
<td>Numeric data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Preliminary Quantitative Data Analysis</td>
<td>• Data screening (Univariate, multivariate) • Cross tabulation • Frequencies • SPSS(^{10}) Software V.20 • Further development of interview questions</td>
<td>165 analysis tables generated using SPSS • Descriptive statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>QUALITATIVE Data Collection (Phased by stakeholder category)</td>
<td>• Purposefully identifying interview participants (18 participants): • Conducting individual interviews • Documents and reports • Observation</td>
<td>Text data (Interview transcripts and notes) • Audio interview data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4</td>
<td>Preliminary Analysis and summary of Qualitative Data</td>
<td>• Cross-thematic analysis • Coding and thematic analysis</td>
<td>Text data (transcripts, documents, descriptions, photographs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 5</td>
<td>Integration and Concurrent Analysis of Quantitative and Qualitative Data</td>
<td>Interpretation and explanation of Quantitative and Qualitative results</td>
<td>• Thesis report • Discussion of findings • Contribution to theory on teacher motivation • Future research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

\(^{10}\) SPSS is an acronym for Statistical Package for the Social Sciences.
The design used in this study is illustrated using a visual model (see Figure 4.2), which is based on Ivankova et al’s. (2006)11 “Visual Model for MM Sequential Explanatory Design Procedures” (2006:15). The model illustrates the phases, procedures and products involved in this study. An additional column (adopted from Crump and Logan, 2008)12, is included to indicate the sample description. The model illustrates the quantitative data collection (phase 1) and the preliminary quantitative data analysis (phase 2); followed by the qualitative data collection (phase 3) and preliminary qualitative data analysis (phase 4). The integration and analysis of both strands of data then follows in phase 5 (Archibald et al, 2015).

The quantitative phase involved surveying teachers (see section 4.4) to understand whether there were changes in their motivation during 2008-13, and whether the changes were due to the incentives introduced during this period. A questionnaire was employed, which included the two broad types of motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic) that determine teacher motivation. These factors were identified through the analysis of the related literature and the theoretical models of motivation forming the conceptual framework of this study (see chapter 3).

In the qualitative phase, I used largely individual interviews to gather information. Eighteen participants were interviewed. They were selected from institutions with a role in the design and implementation of teacher incentives in Rwanda (see Table 4.2). The individual participants were selected on the basis of having the potential to help me answer the research questions, given their current positions and perceived levels of judgement (Creswell, 2012). The participants are categorized into five stakeholder groups, namely: (i) policy makers (4); (ii) policy implementers (4); (iii) policy facilitators (5); (iv) teachers’ union (1); and (v) policy beneficiaries13 (4). The

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11 The study by Ivankova et al, (2006) adopted a mixed methods sequential explanatory design to understand doctoral students’ persistence in a Distance Learning Doctoral Programme in Educational Leadership in Higher Education (ELHE), in the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
12 In their evaluation of the Smart Newton Project, using a Mixed-Methods Sequential Explanatory Design (Crump and Logan, 2008).
13 These are teachers who had left the teaching profession during 2008-13.
quantitative data from the survey and the qualitative data from the interviews formed the main data sets for analysis.

4.4. Sampling and data sources

4.4.1 Survey respondents

276 teachers from 46 schools located in 10 districts were surveyed. Figure 4.3 shows the geographical dispersion of the schools, districts and provinces from where the sample was obtained. As mentioned earlier, survey respondents were purposively selected from the 550 teachers who participated in the Bennell and Ntagaramba (2008) study. 550 questionnaires were sent out to the 46 schools where these teachers are employed, out of which 313 (nearly 57%) were filled and returned to the researcher. 37 of these were discarded from the analysis because they were either filled out incorrectly or were grossly incomplete. For example, the total number of female and male respondents did not correspond to the total number of respondents. This was due to un-entered data on "sex" for some respondents. Such errors in data entry could seriously impact on the analysis and results.
Figure 4.3: Map of Rwanda showing the location of the survey sample

Source: The Author

Note: Sampled districts shown by light-blue colour. Black dots represent the 46 schools located in 10 districts (2 per each province).

Table 4.1: Survey questionnaires: Distributed, returned and analysed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sampled</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Survey Questionnaires</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Distributed</td>
<td>Returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Province</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Burera</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Musanze</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gasabo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kicukiro</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Province</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gasagara</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kayonza</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rwanagana</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rusizi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Karongi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author
4.4.2 Interview participants

Eighteen interviewees, categorized under: (1) policy makers, (2) policy implementers, (3) policy facilitators, (4) teachers’ union, and (5) policy beneficiaries, were selected for the study (see Table 4.2). Policy makers (PM) were selected from government institutions, which are responsible for the design of teacher incentive policies, which are: Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), MINEDUC, MIFOTRA, and MINECOFIN. One participant was selected from each of the three ministries.

Policy implementers (PI) were selected from agencies which have a stake in the implementation of teacher incentive policies. These are: Rwanda Education Board (REB) - mandated with coordinating the implementation of the teacher incentive policies; USACCO, which operates a teachers’ loan scheme; districts - which are responsible for the management of teachers, including their recruitment, transfer, inspection and remuneration; and schools - the lowest level, closer to the teacher – where the teacher incentives are implemented.

Policy facilitators (PF) were selected from non-government education stakeholder institutions. Most of these provide teacher intrinsic incentives in the form of teacher professional development. They include: the Flemish Association for Development Cooperation and Technical Assistance (VVOB), Wellspring Foundation, VSO, UNICEF and the International Educational Exchange (IEE).
Table 4.2: Interview frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder group</th>
<th>Institution where the participant was selected</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Participant’s position (coded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy makers (PM)</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PM1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MINEDUC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PM2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MINECOFIN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PM3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MIFOTRA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PM4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy implementers (PI)</td>
<td>REB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PI1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USACCO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PI2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Musanze district</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PI3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kagugu Secondary school</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PI4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy facilitators (PF)</td>
<td>VVOB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PF1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Well Spring Foundation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PF2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VSO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PF3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PF4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IEE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PF5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ union (TU)</td>
<td>SNEP(^{14}) (National Teachers’ Union)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TU1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy beneficiaries (PB)</td>
<td>Teachers who left the teaching profession during 2008-13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PB(_{1-4})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

Finally, four teachers (Policy Beneficiaries) were selected randomly from those who had left the teaching profession or transferred to other schools during 2008-13. I obtained the names and telephone contacts of thirty teachers from their former head teachers. From these, I selected a sub-sample of four, considering the different school settings (rural, semi-urban and urban), gender, age and level of qualification.

\(^{14}\) SNEP is a French acronym for “Syndicat National des Enseignants du Primaire”, the National Union of Primary School Teachers in Rwanda.
4.5. Research instruments

The following instruments were used in this study.

4.5.1 Survey questionnaire

A questionnaire was designed to collect quantitative data from teachers (see Appendix 4). It contained five sections, A to E. Section A extracted demographic data about the teachers. Section B asked about their teaching employment. Sections C, D and E asked teachers whether their motivation changed or not due to the extrinsic and intrinsic incentives introduced during 2008-13.

Question items were of various types. Some were dichotomous with two response options such as: ‘male’ and ‘female’, ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Other items involved nominal and ordinal variables, with responses given on a 2 to 5-point Likert scales (Ololube and Kpolovie, 2012). A few items were either open-ended or required limited responses (continuous variables) such as name, age and amount of expenditure.

In designing the questionnaire, I ensured that the questions were relevant to the research questions, consistent, usable, clear, measurable and understandable (Ololube and Kpolovie, 2012). I piloted the questionnaire to assure it met these criteria (see section 4.6.2). Rwanda introduced English as a medium of instruction in schools in 2009. As such I expected that the English proficiency levels of some of the teachers in the survey, especially rural primary teachers, was low. Hence, I ensured that the language in the questionnaire was simple and the questions short. This was aimed at ensuring that there were no difficulties in filling in the questionnaire.

4.5.2 Interview guides

According to Kvale, “an interview guide indicates the topics and their sequence in the interview” (1996:129). A separate interview guide was developed for each stakeholder category (see Appendices 5 to 9). These contained a set of prepared questions which were asked during the interviews, exactly as worded. The guides were constructed in a way that one RQ was explored through several interview guides,
hence obtaining rich and varied information by approaching a topic from several fronts (Kvale, 1996). Interview guides were designed in a way to allow the interviewees a great deal of leeway in how to reply (Agee, 2009).

4.5.3 Interview protocol

An interview protocol was used to indicate the instructions to be followed during the interview process to ensure consistency between interviews and thus increase the reliability of the findings. It included: what to say to interviewees when setting up the interview and when starting the interview (such issues as informed consent and confidentiality); what to do during the interview (for example, whether to take notes or audiotape or both); and what to do following the interview (such as filling in the gaps in the notes, checking the audiotape for clarity and summarizing the key responses from each interviewee).

4.5.4 Voice recorder

Although I was taking some notes during the interview sessions, I could not write fast enough to capture everything the respondents said. I therefore audio taped the interviews. I was mindful that the presence of recording equipment during the interviews can lead to the respondents being cautious of what he or she says (Vulliamy et al, 1990; Crossley and Vulliamy, 1996; Crossley and Broadfoot, 1992).

Prior to the interviews, I explained to the participants the purpose for using the recorder and assured them that it was for the good of the research and not any other purpose. I, however, did not insist on using it with one of the interviewees, PB2 (from the policy beneficiaries’ category), who insisted not to be recorded. In this case the interview session took a little longer, since I was writing each and every response. The audio recordings from the interviews were saved on a personal computer and deleted from the voice recorder to avoid the possibility of being accessed by other persons.
4.5.5 Field notes

Field notes were used throughout the duration of field data collection. During the interviews, the notes were used to complement recorded interviews, where I noted some of the aspects that could not be recorded such as body languages or where the responses were not clear enough and/or made references to reports and other literature. During the transcribing of the interview responses, recorded interviews and descriptive notes were consulted concurrently to make meaning of the responses.

4.6. Research journey

The research journey involved ten steps, summarised in Figure 4.4

4.6.1 Planning the study

The research journey started with planning the study. This involved gaining a deeper understanding of the concepts of ‘motivation’, ‘teacher motivation’ and ‘teacher incentives’, in the context of low-income developing countries, including Rwanda. This informed my thinking of the appropriate research paradigm, design, methodology and questions suiting the investigation, and led to the choice of type of data, methods and instruments of data collection to be used in the study.

I then started searching for, and reviewing relevant literature which formed the theoretical framework of the study. At this stage, I also sought and obtained research approvals from the University of Sussex and MINEDUC to undertake the study. The University of Sussex’s guide on ethical principles requires a researcher to submit a summary of the proposed research to the University Research Ethics Committee (UREC) prior to conducting the actual study. The Research Committee at MINEDUC also requires all research activities to be approved, which I did and was granted (see Appendices 11 and 12). All these checks ensured that the participants were free from any form of risk either physical, psychological, social, legal, or economic, arising out of the study (Sieber, 1998, cited in Creswell and Garret, 2008).
4.6.2 Preliminary field activities

Preliminary field activities largely involved identifying the survey and interview participants. For the survey, I contacted Dr. Paul Bennell and Mr. Johnson Ntagaramba, who are the principal researchers in the earlier study (Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008) to seek on my behalf consent from teachers (who had participated in their study in 2008) to participate in the current study. These teachers had preferred to have their identity anonymised during the Bennell and Ntagaramba (2008) study. Johnson, who lived in Rwanda, had knowledge of the local study context - the districts, schools and the teachers - while Bennell, who was living out of Rwanda, had the data base of the surveyed teachers. Both consented to my request: Johnson contacted the teachers through the head teachers of the 46 schools, and Paul provided the anonymised data.

With the consent of the teachers to participate in the study, I then proceeded to contact them directly through their telephone numbers - some of them physically - to arrange for the survey. At this stage, I also contacted the DEOs of the ten sampled districts to request for their support in distributing the questionnaires.

My first physical contact with the teachers was when I was conducting the pilot of the survey. This involved 5 randomly selected teachers from Kicukiro district, one of the sample districts. I chose this district on the basis of proximity to my residence and workplace. The aim of the pilot was to determine: (i) how respondents understood the questions (Fink, 1995); and (ii) the quality, suitability, validity and clarity of the questionnaire items. The feedback from pilot respondents helped to enrich the final questionnaires (Oloolue, 2007). The advantages derived from the pilot were several: (i) new insights into the issues covered in the questionnaire were obtained, (ii) the errors pointed out were corrected and (iii) the extent to which the respondents understood the questions was measured.

I then proceeded to making the first contact with the interview participants, first to present my study and second to request their permission to be interviewed. I
specifically explained the following key aspects of the interviews: (i) the purpose of the interview; (ii) why and how the participant was chosen; (iii) the expected duration of the interview; (iv) why and how their responses would be kept confidential; and (v) my plans to use a voice recorder during the interviews.

The key outcomes of these initial meetings were the dates and venue for the interviews. Owing to the busy schedules of the participants, interviews were set at different dates over a period of 4 weeks. Some of the participants preferred to have the interview guides in advance of the interviews – so that they may be better prepared – which I consented to.

4.6.3 Administering survey questionnaires

As I was preparing for the field to administer the survey, I anticipated that some of the 550 teachers who participated in the Bennel and Ntagaramba (2008) study, could have left the teaching profession or transferred to other schools during 2008-13. For this reason, initially I considered producing fewer copies of questionnaires as this would save on costs. However, I foresaw the challenge where I could not precisely predict how many of them had left and hence those I would access for the survey.

I decided to make 550 paper copies of questionnaires. I packed these questionnaires in 46 separate clearly labeled envelopes, destined for the schools where the sampled teachers are employed. I then sorted the school-bound envelopes according to the districts in which they are located. These were then placed into larger envelopes destined to each of the 10 districts, clearly labeled with the district name, and addressed to the District Education Officer (DEO).

The next step was to dispatch the envelopes, which I did using a registered mail service. This was done to ensure that they were safely delivered to the respective destinations. I informed the respective DEOs of the incoming couriers and reminded them of my earlier request to distribute the questionnaires to respective heads of schools within their districts. I kept on monitoring the process of delivering the
questionnaires to the teachers by speaking on the telephone to the DEOs and respective head teachers.

I continually made telephone calls to the head teachers to provide details and answer questions about the questionnaires. Some of the questions asked by head teachers are: “Can any teacher fill this form?” “Who fills the consent form?”, “How shall we return the filled in questionnaires?” Although I had previously explained some of these questions, it was now clear that the head teachers needed to have more explanation when they had the documents with them.

Although Rwanda is not geographically large in size, I nevertheless met a challenge delivering the questionnaires to the teachers at the respective schools, and having them returned to me after they were filled. This was particularly so in the most distant and rural districts, such as Gisagara and Rusizi.

There was flexibility in the way of returning filled in questionnaires to me. This largely depended on what was convenient for the respective head teachers and DEOs. Some of the head teachers who had official reasons to come to REB brought them directly to me. Others sent them through their respective DEOs (at the district headquarters) who, in turn, either brought them to me or sent them through the mail service. In general, it took a maximum of 6 weeks and approximately 50 GBP to have the filled questionnaires returned to me. Without the support from the DEOs and head teachers in this process, it could have taken longer and cost more.
Figure 4.4: A visual presentation of the research journey

Step 1: Conceptualisation of the study
Determine the broad notion of the research:
Problem, Paradigm, Design and Methodology

Formulate Research Aim & RQs

Step 2: Conduct Literature Review

Step 3: Determine data types, collection methods/instruments

Step 4: Obtain Ethics Approval

Step 5: Identify Survey and Interview participants

Mixed Methods Sequential Explanatory Design
Survey, Interviews, Secondary sources, Observation
Review of interview questions

Step 6: Pilot and Review Survey Questionnaire

Step 7: Survey field data Collection

Step 8: Quantitative data entry, cleaning and preliminary Data Analysis

Step 9: Conduct interviews, Data transcription Data coding

Step 10: Concurrent QUANTITATIVE & QUALITATIVE Data analysis and Report writing

Source: The Author
Note: The main steps are indicated by boxes – joined by continuous lines – running from top to bottom of the figure. The hexagonal shapes connected by dotted lines are extensions to the main steps and provide additional explanations on the particular steps.

The survey data was then entered into a computer-based statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS). Owing to the volume of this data, I used professional data entry clerks to do this task, which took one week, and cost me 100 GBP. By doing
this, I saved time and gained efficiency in the data entry, than if I had personally done it. Besides, I found the cost affordable.

4.6.4 Conducting interviews and summarising responses

By this time, I had set the appointments for the interviews. With the exception of a few participants in the policy makers (PM) and policy implementers (PI) stakeholder categories who postponed the interviews due to heavy schedules in their work, the rest of the appointments for the interviews went as scheduled. At first, I had intended to transcribe all the interview responses. Transcribing interviews from an oral to a written mode involves transforming the interview conversations in a form amenable for closer analysis – and in fact is itself the beginning of analysis (Kvale, 1996). When I started doing this, I realized that a 45-minute interview took approximately 5 hours to transcribe. Since this proved time consuming and unsustainable, transcription was hence dropped. I decided to use the audio recordings and my research notes to analyse the data and summarise the key responses, highlighting the patterns or themes from the responses from the various categories of participants.

4.6.5 Data coding

I coded the key information (names, positions or any other identifications) of the survey and interview participants which would otherwise lead to identifying the specific responses with the participants. As such, their identities are not disclosed in the data analysis and final report.

Coding was done using three digits. Districts, schools and teachers were given numbers. For example, a survey respondent with code (1-1-1) stands for a teacher in a school (with code 1), in a district (with code 1).

For the interviews, a combination of letters and a number were used to denote the individual respondents and the stakeholder category in which they belong. For example, the code for an interview participant in the policy maker (PM) stakeholder category was coded as PM1, while one in the policy implementing (PI) stakeholder category was coded as PI1.
I kept the hardcopies of the survey questionnaires in a safe place to ensure no unauthorised access to it. Electronic data – including audio and transcribed interviews - were kept on my computer and protected with a password to prevent access by other persons other than by myself.

4.6.6 **Concurrent data analysis and report writing**

The last step of the research journey involved a concurrent analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data, and writing the report. Analysis was done in two steps: first covering the characteristics of the survey and interview participants; and second, analysing the participants’ perceptions on the changes in teachers’ motivations during 2008-13. The discussions of findings are presented separately, in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, consecutively.

I proceeded to clean the data before undertaking the preliminary data analysis. This step brought the number of well completed questionnaires to a sub-sample of 276 teachers, employed in 35 schools located in 10 districts, which constituted a response rate of over 50.2 per cent (see Table 4.1).

While analyzing the interview responses, I approached the data qualitatively, using narratives and quotations. I approached the survey data quantitatively with the use of univariate, bivariate and cross tabulations, calculating averages and simple frequency statistics. Crossover analysis approaches - referred to as “quantitizing” qualitative data, or “qualitizing” quantitative data (Onwuegbuzie et al, 2007; Small, 2011) - were also used to integrate qualitative and quantitative data.

Some of the interview responses were presented in quotations, as said by the participants. This is because they presented an important story about the study. In other cases, the themes coming out of the responses were grouped by category of participants (PM, PI, PF, and PB) whose responses indicated that they perceived things differently from each other. As such, the study used a combination of a few key verbatim quotations and also presented general themes.
Data analysis pulled together the issues arising across the individuals in the five stakeholder groups, and formed common themes, shared responses and patterns of responses, agreement and disagreement (Cohen et al, 2010). This approach led to two main benefits: (i) patterns of responses could be seen easily at a glance, and (ii) it reduced the challenge of data overload (see Cohen et al., 2010). Figure 4.5 illustrates the three approach used to organise and present interview data in the study.

**Figure 4.5: Five ways of organising and presenting qualitative data analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation and presentation of data analysis by</th>
<th>Organisation and presentation of data analysis by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Groups of respondents</strong></td>
<td><strong>Individual respondents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation and presentation of data analysis by</td>
<td>Organisation and presentation of data analysis by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Particular issue</strong></td>
<td><strong>Research question</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation and presentation of data analysis by</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research instrument</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Cohen et al, (2010:467).

**4.7. Ethical considerations**

Research involves collecting data from people and about people (Punch, 2005). As such, while designing this study I anticipated ethical issues to arise, prior to and during the study. Foremost, I found that many participants (most of whom are employed by the government) preferred their identity to remain confidential. This was understandable given the sensitivity of the research topic and questions which call for investigating teachers' perceptions about their levels of motivation, and their opinions about GoR policies. I was aware that teachers may need to protect their jobs by not appearing to show to the public that they are not satisfied with their pay and teaching and living conditions.
I supposed that the participants could have thought that the research may eventually lead to decisions affecting them in some way. Several things that immediately came into my mind in this regard are: teachers responding that they are not motivated to do their job, that the work and living conditions are poor, and that their current teaching hours are high and class sizes are large. Such issues may have implications for their job security once the employer happens to know about them. Due to this level of sensitivity of the information, safeguards were put in place to protect the participants. Participants were assured of the confidentiality of their identities. This was done through coding the responses so that no person other than myself would be able to link the responses with the individual participants; and to avoid the possibility of these falling into the hands of other researchers who might misappropriate them (Creswell and Clark, 2007). Use of the interview protocol helped to emphasize key ethical considerations to the participants, so as to avoid possible bias before and during the interviews. For example, the need to uphold informed consent from the participant, ensuring confidentiality of the responses, and use of an audiotape to record the interviews.

Given that these teachers preferred to keep their identity anonymous during the 2008 study, I had to go through the principal researchers, Bennell and Ntagaramba, to seek consent from the same teachers - so as to maintain the confidentiality of the participants. For ethical considerations, I could not have accessed them for the current study without going through this process.

Finally, the power of influence between myself and the participants was considered a potential ethical issue and could lead to some form of bias. Most of the head teachers, and some of the teachers surveyed, knew me in my current capacity as head of the Examinations and Accreditation Department (EAD) at REB and in my previous roles in MINEDUC. As such, I considered this as a potentially compromising situation in which, on the one hand, I considered myself as a detached outsider who was trying to conduct an unbiased investigation, and on the other hand, acknowledged my position as an insider, involved in a way with the participants. Thus, although I had not been
working directly with teachers, I cannot claim to be completely an outsider because I have a part to play in the dynamics of the teaching profession at the policy making level in Rwanda. Conscious of this challenge, I became more sensitive and more careful about the impact it may cause. To address this in the interviews, I maintained a collaborative approach with the participants, which allowed reciprocity. There was a possibility of distancing myself from the research, but again this would create a danger of losing the opportunity of expressing myself, yet I cannot completely claim to be an outsider. In the survey, it was possible for me to keep a distance from the respondents (teachers), and this could have helped to dampen the bias.

4.8. Summary and conclusion

This chapter discussed the methodology employed in this study. First, it explained the mixed methods sequential explanatory design, and how it emerged from the traditional qualitative and quantitative approaches. It then presented the sampling techniques, data collection instruments and the research process. Finally the chapter reflected on the ethical considerations of the study.

The choice of mixed methods provided a relevant design to study the topic of teacher motivation in Rwanda. On the one hand, collecting the views of 276 teachers’ on their perceptions of the changes in their motivation during 2008-13, was benefitted through a qualitative approach; on the other, understanding the insights on the perceptions of stakeholders involved in the design and implementation of the teacher incentives called for interviews. The sequencing of these methods enabled triangulation of the responses, and as such a coherent understanding of the issues concerning teacher motivation in Rwanda. The mixed methods design required use of varied tools and techniques in collecting and analyzing the data. As such, I found the study to be complex and challenging to understand and employ. Nonetheless, owing to the complex nature of the concept of teacher motivation, and considering the RQs, the design was appropriate for this study.
CHAPTER FIVE

5. FINDINGS I: INDIVIDUAL TEACHER CHARACTERISTICS AND SCHOOL SETTINGS THAT IMPACT ON TEACHERS’ MOTIVATION

5.1. Introduction

Substantial research evidence indicates that individual teacher characteristics can adversely impact on teacher motivation levels (Coultas and Lewin, 2002; Akyeampong and Stephens, 2002; Bennell, 2004; Urwick et al, 2005; Barrett, 2005; Ololube, 2006, 2007; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Salifu and Agbenyega, 2013). It is against this background that this chapter is focused on key characteristics and background information of the surveyed teachers, including: age, gender, teaching qualification, civil status, spouse separation and employment, level of household dependence, deployment, transfer and absenteeism. The location of the surveyed schools in relation to the characteristics of the surveyed teachers is also presented. Implications of teacher characteristics, and school settings is discussed in chapter seven (section 7.2.1).

5.2. Surveyed teachers’ characteristics

Data from the demographic part of the questionnaire yielded information about surveyed teachers’ age, gender, teaching qualification, civil status, spouse separation and employment, teacher transfers and absenteeism; and school location. Table 5.1 presents a summary of the key statistics in this data. A detailed analysis is presented in sections 5.2 and 5.3, while a general discussion is presented in chapter seven (section 7.2.1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveyed teachers’ background information</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34 years</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44 years</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 years and above</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest teaching qualification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors (A0)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma (A1)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced certificate (A2)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary certificate (D5)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-teaching qualification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spouse separation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live with spouse</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not live with spouse</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spouse employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-employed</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed (as teacher)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed (as other)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependence level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (under 5 dependents)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (5 to 9 dependents)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (10 to 14 dependents)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high (15 and above dependents)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transfers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching at the same school during 2008-13</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred from/to other school</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Absenteeism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent from teaching for more than 6 months during 2008-13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not absent</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School setting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural-urban</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distance travelled between residence to school</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2kms</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 2 to 3.9kms</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 4 to 5.9kms</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 6kms</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport costs incurred between residence and school</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incur transport costs to school</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not incur transport costs</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author
* This category includes teachers who are divorced (12), widowed (10) and separated (1).
5.2.1 Age

The minimum and maximum ages of the surveyed teachers was 22 and 69 years respectively. The mean age was 38.18 years and standard deviation was 8.825 (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: Age distribution of the surveyed teachers

Source: The Author

In this study, teachers’ ages were grouped into four categories, namely: lower age group (under 25 years), lower middle age-group (25 to 34), upper middle age-group (35 to 44 years) and upper age-group (45 years and above). The results presented in Table 5.2 indicate that the majority of the teachers (76%) were equally distributed
between the two middle age groups: 25 and 34 years; and 35 and 44 years. Nearly 23% were 45 years and above and 3% were under 25 years.

Table 5.2: Surveyed teachers' age group (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveyed teachers’ age group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34 years</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44 years</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 years and above</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

5.2.2 Gender

Table 5.3 reveals that the survey sample was dominated by male teachers, (60.5%) compared to female, (39.5%). The gender distribution of this sample nearly aligns with the sample in Bennell and Ntagaramba (2008) study, which was 60% male and 40% female teachers. The distribution also reflects the gender distribution of the national teaching workforce where 54.5% are males and 45.5% are females (MIFOTRA, 2014). A further analysis indicates that male teachers dominated their female counterparts in nearly all age groups, with the exception of the teachers who are 25 years and below.

Table 5.3: Distribution of surveyed teachers by gender and age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Surveyed teachers’ age group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Under 25 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total count</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

5.2.3 Professional qualification

Another key teacher characteristic is their level of qualification. This study considered five levels of qualification, namely: Masters, Bachelors (A0), Diploma (A1), Advanced Certificate (A2) and Ordinary Certificate (A5). The survey found that 42%
of the surveyed teachers possessed a teaching qualification. More than one-half (58%) of the surveyed teachers did not have a teaching qualification. Interviews with PM1, PI3 and PI4 and various reports (MINEDUC, 2007; MINEDUC, 2010a; World Bank, 2011) indicated that, at the national level, many teachers, especially at primary level, did not have a teaching qualification. Most of these were recruited from high school graduates to fill the large gap in the teaching workforce resulting from the rapid expansion in education (see Chapter 2, section 2.6). Bachelor’s degree (A0) and Diploma (A1) levels dominated in the category of teachers possessing a teaching qualification, with 33.6%, followed by Advanced Certificate (A2) holders (24.1%), Masters (4.3%), and Ordinary Certificate (A5) holders (4.3).

Table 5.4: Distribution of surveyed teachers by levels of qualifications (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of teaching profession qualification</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master’s degree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree (A0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma (A1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Certificate (A2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Certificate (D5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

5.2.4 Civil status

The survey indicated that the majority (nearly 69%) of the teachers were married. Nearly 23% were single, about 8% were divorced, widowed or separated (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5: Distribution of surveyed teachers’ civil status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of teachers’ civil status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author
Notes: *Others include divorced (12), widowed (10) and separated (1).

A further comparison of the civil status and age of the surveyed teachers, shows that the majority (91) of the married teachers were between 35 and 44 years, and some (45)
married teachers were 45 years and above. One married teacher was under 25 years. Most (50) single teachers were aged between 25 and 34 years (see Table 5.6).

**Table 5.6: Distribution of surveyed teachers by age and civil status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveyed teachers’ age group</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34 years</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44 years</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 years and above</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total count</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Notes: *Others include divorced (12), widowed (10) and separated (1).

The incidence of single teachers varied significantly across the 10 survey districts (see Figure 5.2). Karongi, Burera and Kayonza, all categorised as rural districts, had the highest number of single teachers.

**Figure 5.2: Distribution of surveyed teachers by marital status across the survey districts (Percent)**

Source: The Author

Notes: *Others include divorced, widowed and separated.
5.2.5 Spouse separation

95% (181) of the married teachers were living with their spouses, while only 5% (9), were living separately from their spouses. (Table 5.8). Spouse separation mostly occurs as a result of deployment of teachers away from their family home.

Table 5.7: Distribution of surveyed teachers by gender and spouse separation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers’ gender</th>
<th>Live with spouse</th>
<th>Do not live with spouse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

While, more male teachers (60%), than their female counterparts (35%) ‘were living with their spouses’ (see Table 5.7), less male teachers (2%), compared to 3% ‘were not living with their spouses’. The survey findings (see Figure 5.3) further indicate that cases of teachers’ spouse separation were common in the rural districts, namely: Musanze, Rusizi, Kayonza, Burera and Gisagara.

Figure 5.3: Incidence of spouse separation across the sample districts

Source: The Author
5.2.6 Spouse employment

The survey data in Table 5.8, shows that over 65% of the married teachers had their spouses employed, while nearly 35% (66) of them reported that their spouses were unemployed. 53.2% (66) of the employed spouses were teachers, working either at the same or nearby schools as their spouses. 46.8% (58) were employed in occupations other than teaching. Male teachers dominated all categories of employment statuses.

Table 5.8: Employment status of teachers’ spouses (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Employed as teachers</th>
<th>Employed in other occupations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married teachers</td>
<td>(66)</td>
<td>(124)</td>
<td>(66)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34.7%)</td>
<td>(65.3%)</td>
<td>(53.2%)</td>
<td>(46.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

5.2.7 Households’ dependence

The study employed the “number of biological and adopted children” as a proxy of the measure of the level of dependence on teachers’ incomes. These children either lived with the surveyed teachers, on their own or with other families; and the teachers supported them by providing some of their needs, mostly food, clothing, medical and educational.

Dependence was categorised into four groups, depending on the number of dependants (see Table 5.9). The survey results, indicate that all the surveyed teachers had dependants in their households. The majority (54%) of the teachers’ households reported ‘moderate level of dependence’ and the least number (1%) fell under the category with ‘very high dependence’ levels. However, in general over 96% of the surveyed teachers agreed that the level of dependence was “low” or “moderate”.
Table 5.9: Teachers’ responses on levels of household dependence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of teachers’ household dependence</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low dependence</td>
<td>0 – 4 dependents</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate dependence</td>
<td>5 – 9 dependents</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High dependence</td>
<td>10 – 14 dependents</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high dependence</td>
<td>15 and above</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

The levels of teachers’ dependence burden were analysed across teachers’ gender (see Table 5.10). Male teachers reported the highest number of dependents (60.5%) as compared to their female counterparts (39.5%).

Table 5.10: Distribution of level of teachers’ household dependence by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveyed teachers’ gender</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Very high</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Teachers’ household dependence was further done across the teachers’ civil statuses (see Table 5.11). Results revealed that the majority of the teachers with dependents were married (nearly 69%), followed by single teachers (nearly 23%) and the least were the divorced, widowed and separated teachers, who account for 8.3% (23).

Table 5.11: Distribution of level of teachers’ household dependence by civil status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveyed teachers’ civil status</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Very high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others**</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Note: The figures include both categories of dependents. ** Include: Divorced, widowed and separated teachers.

Further Analysis (see Table 5.12) indicated that the mean of biological dependents was higher (3.06) than that of the adopted dependents (2.03). This implies that there
were more biological dependents living in the same teachers’ household than adopted dependents. The nearly equal standard deviation values for biological (1.944) and adopted (1.536) dependents suggests that the distribution of biological and adopted dependents among the surveyed teachers is nearly the same.

Table 5.12: Distribution of dependents among surveyed teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependents</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biological dependents</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>1.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopted dependents</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>1.536</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

5.2.8 Deployment and transfer

Surveyed teachers were asked whether they had transferred from other schools during 2008-13. As shown in 5.13, responses indicate that nearly 79% (217) did not transfer during 2008-13. Over 21% (59) had transferred to their current school during the same period. The survey found that transfers were voluntarily initiated by teachers themselves for personal reasons (see Table 5.14).

Table 5.13: Responses on teacher transfers during 2008-13’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveyed teachers’ responses on whether they transferred during 2008-13?</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transferred to current school</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not transfer to current school</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

As indicated in Table 5.14, 7.6% of the teachers who transferred from other schools cited ‘seeking for a school near their home area’ as the reason for transfer. Others cited ‘seeking for a higher income’ (4.3%); ‘seeking opportunities for professional development’ (4%); ‘looking for a school with accommodation facilities’ (3.6%); ‘seeking a school located in an area with a low cost of living’ (1%) and ‘seeking for a school with a conducive administration’ (nearly 1%).
Table 5.14: Reasons for teacher transfers during 2008-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers’ responses on why they transferred during 2008-13</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seek for a school near my home area</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek for a higher income</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek for opportunities for professional development</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek for school with accommodation facilities</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek for location with lower cost of living</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek for a school with a conducive administration</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
<td><strong>21.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Interviews with the teachers who left teaching during 2008-13 confirmed the above reasons. Interviews with policy implementers (presented in Chapter 6) revealed that a teacher management policy is being developed in part to manage key teacher management functions, such as transfers. Teachers wishing to transfer within or across districts will seek approval to do so. Once approval is granted, it will be easy to effect the transfer with minimum delay and impact on the salary processing (MINEDUC, 2007).

5.2.9 Absenteeism

While over 91% of the surveyed teachers reported that they were not absent from teaching, nearly 9% (24) admitted that they had temporarily abandoned teaching, for more than 6 months during 2008-13. Table 5.15 summarises the reasons given by the teachers for abandoning teaching for at least 6 months during 2008-13. Searching for other sources of incomes” and “attending professional training” had the same weight, each accounting for over 29% (7). 25% (6) were attending short-term in-service teacher training courses”; health reasons (nearly 17%). None of the surveyed teachers were absent from teaching due to suspension from duty.
Table 5.15: Reasons for absence from teaching for over 6 months during 2008-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for absence from teaching for more than 6 months</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Looking for alternative sources of income</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending professional training</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending short-term in-service teacher training courses</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and family sickness</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

5.3. School setting

5.3.1 School location

As indicated in Table 5.16, over 50% (139) of the surveyed teachers were employed in schools categorised as rural, nearly 33% (90) as urban and 17% (47) as rural-urban.

Table 5.16: Distribution of surveyed teachers by school location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-urban</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Figure 5.4 shows the relationship between teachers’ age and school location. The rural-urban and urban locations have a similar age-pattern distribution, where teachers aged below 25 years were fewer, followed by those aged above 45 years and then those between 25 and 34 years. Teachers aged between 35 and 44 years formed the majority. The pattern is different for the rural schools. The teachers aged between 25 and 34 years dominated followed by those aged 35 to 44 years, then those aged over 45 years and finally those below 25 years.
Male teachers (60.5%) dominated their female counterparts (39.5%) across the three settings (rural, rural-urban and urban). While in ‘rural’ and ‘rural-urban’ locations, the proportion of male teachers nearly doubled that of their female counterparts, in urban settings the proportion of male and female teachers was nearly the same.

### Table 5.17: Distribution of surveyed teachers by age, gender and school location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveyed teachers’ by gender</th>
<th>School location</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Rural-Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (109)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (percent)</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (167)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (percent)</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

5.3.2 Distance travelled by teachers

Majority of teachers (40.6%) travelled a distance ranging between 2 and 3.9kms, one-way from their residence to their school each day. Nearly 18% (49) travelled less than 2kms.
Table 5.18: Distance between teachers’ residences and their schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance travelled by teachers</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2kms</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 2 to 3.9kms</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 4 to 5.9kms</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 6kms</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Furthermore, the study found that the average distance travelled by teachers from their residences to school was 2.8kms, and from residence to the nearest trading centre or town it was 4.85kms. The maximum distances reported were 15kms and 50kms, respectively.

Table 5.19: Distances travelled by surveyed teachers (in Kilometers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers’ responses on the distance</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance between teachers’ residence and school</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>2.7746</td>
<td>2.59294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance between school and nearest trading centre/town/city</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>49.90</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>4.8525</td>
<td>7.13130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Data on distances travelled by teachers from their residences to schools disaggregated by school location (rural, rural-urban and urban) (see Table 5.20). 2.5% of the surveyed teachers in urban; 1.4% in rural-urban; and 3.6% in rural locations, travelled over 6kms between their residences and schools.

Table 5.20: Distance between teachers’ residence and school (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance between school and teachers’ residence</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Rural-urban</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 kms</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 3.9 Kms</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 5.9 Kms</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Kms and above</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author
In most urban locations, teachers are able to travel such distances and still get to work on time, due to availability of reliable public transport means as compared to the rural locations. This, however, comes at a cost, which may be another teacher de-motivator. Travelling long distances in rural locations is likely to be problematic owing to the limited means of transport; and where these exist they are likely to be costly.

5.3.3 Costs of transport incurred by teachers

Over 41% of the surveyed teachers said they incurred transport costs to travel between their residences and schools. The available means of transport reportedly used included: public commuter taxis, motorcycles and bicycles (see Table 6.21). The average transport cost per day between residence and school was reported as nearly 1 GBP (1,000RwF). The minimum and maximum daily transport cost was one-fifth of a GBP (200RwF) and nearly 6 GBP (6,000RwF). The majority (54%) of the teachers who incurred transport costs between residence and school responded that these had increased during 2008-13.

Teachers who did not incur transports costs between their residences and schools said they either walked to school (12%), presumably for those living a short distance from school, or rode their personal bicycles or motorcycles (nearly 47%). Some teachers did not incur direct transport costs: 12% did not require any transport means as they lived near the school or within the school premises.

Table 5.21: Teachers’ responses on expenditure on transport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers’ responses on the cost met on their transport</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do not incur transport costs to school</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I incur transport costs to school</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author
5.4. **Summary and conclusion**

This chapter describes the characteristics and background information on the surveyed teachers, as these adversely impact on the teachers’ motivation levels. The characteristics presented include: age, gender, qualifications, civil status, spouse separation and employment. Data also shows the level of dependence on surveyed teachers’ households’ incomes. It further presents a description of the settings (rural, rural-urban or urban) where the schools in which the surveyed teachers work are located; the locations of the schools in relation to the surveyed teachers’ residences; and the means used and cost of transport incurred in moving between residence and school. As discussed earlier, such teachers’ characteristics adversely impact on the teacher motivation levels. As such, this chapter provides a context for understanding this. Teachers’ perceptions on how the incentives impacted on their motivation during 2008-13, are presented in chapter six.
CHAPTER SIX

6. FINDINGS II: PARTICIPANTS’ PERCEPTIONS ON THE CHANGES IN TEACHER MOTIVATION

6.1. Introduction

This chapter presents responses from the survey and interviews. It covers the participants’ perceptions on how the incentives introduced by Government of Rwanda impacted on the teachers’ motivation during 2008-13. It is framed in three parts: the first covers the impact of extrinsic incentives; the second presents the impact of intrinsic incentives; and the last explores the perceptions of the participants on how the teachers were consulted in the design and implementation of the incentives, and whether this was a factor determining how the incentives changed, or not, the teachers’ motivations during 2008-13.

6.2. Impact of extrinsic incentives on teachers’ motivation during 2008-13

This section presents responses from the participants on the extrinsic incentives introduced during 2008-13. The incentives covered in this study include: teachers’ salary and other incomes, teachers’ households’ expenditures and cost of living and work and living conditions.

6.2.1 Low teachers’ income

As indicated in the theoretical and empirical evidence (in chapter three), teachers’ salary is considered one of the key incentives impacting on teachers’ motivation. Table 6.1 presents statistics of survey data on the teachers’ perceptions on various aspects of their income, such as: sources of income; extent, sources and periodicity of increase in income; timeliness of payment of teachers’ salaries and the various allowances and benefits teachers receive in addition to their normal pay. These are variables that influence the level to which teachers’ income is likely to determine their motivation. Analysis of this data is presented in the rest of section 6.2.
Table 6.1: Frequency table for the responses regarding teachers’ income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surveyed teachers’ responses regarding their income</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources of teachers’ salary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers receive supplementary income from the teaching job</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers receive supplementary income from non-teaching activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of change of teachers’ income during 2008-13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10%</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-35%</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-60%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-58%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86-100%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 100%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for pay rise during 2008-13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government policy</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to higher qualification</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory salary increase</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodicity of teacher’s salary increase</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within the last 6 months</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within the last 1 year</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within the last 2 years</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years ago</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers received monthly salary on time during the past 6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowances given to the surveyed teachers are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Note: * Others, possibly private employers

A review of the Rwandan public service salary structure (MIFOTRA, 2012) indicated that teachers’ salary in the public sector was composed of the teachers’ basic salary and allowances, such as medical insurance, housing, transport, and social security. Interview responses showed a consensus among all interview participants that the teachers’ salary in Rwanda was still very low, both in absolute terms and relative to other civil servants with the same levels of qualifications. For instance, policy maker participant (PM2) stated that:

Most people agree that the take home pay for the teachers in Rwanda is still very low compared to the average salary of other civil servants.
Much as most PM and PI participants perceive the teachers’ salary to be low, it was apparent that the government had introduced the teachers’ loan to supplement the low salaries. As such, the low salary is not considered a de-motivator, if teachers can access the loans. For example, PM4 said that:

However low, teachers’ salary is nevertheless regarded as the main teacher motivator. This is because, with the low salary, a teacher can access a loan from the teachers’ cooperative [USACCO]

With the loan, a teacher can run a small business that can generate income to supplement the low salary. This is confirmed by policy implementer (PI2) who echoed the position that teachers’ salary, however low, still remains a primary source of teacher motivation. PM2 said that:

Meriting such a loan does not depend on the amount of teachers’ pay, so being a teacher is the only requirement to become a member of the cooperative.

The opinion of the PMs and PIs is that the negative implications of the low pay to teachers’ motivation can be dampened by providing them loans to help them earn supplementary incomes. What seems to be more important here is whether teachers are actually able to access the loans. In other words, whether or not the salary is too low to improve motivation, what is key is the loan which teachers see as providing opportunity to top up their income through business ventures. So in effect the policy on loans is an indirect means for teachers to ‘earn’ more and stay motivated.

### 6.2.2 Challenges associated with the teachers’ loans

Interview responses revealed several challenges with the teachers’ loans. For example, policy beneficiaries (PB) revealed the complications involved in accessing the loan, which contradicts the initial intention of the loan scheme. PB3 said that:

Initially, when the USACCO had just been established, accessing a loan was less of a challenge, but today, it is a hassle. May be the cause is the large membership of the USACCO, and the large number of demands for loans, and the limited funds. At the beginning, the USACCO was still
looking for members, at that time it was easy to get the loan, but now as the membership has expanded, it has become more difficult.

Another challenge is associated with the relevance and potential impact of the loans to teachers' commitment to their teaching job. For example, PF$_3$ (policy facilitator), viewed the loans positively - as a potential source of teachers' social and economic welfare, such as a means of obtaining a house for the family, as quoted below:

The loan can be useful around [may be] building a house for the teacher, that gives them somewhere to stay, that is probably near to the school…that would be [I think] useful, because they will not have to pay rent anymore and will not walk long distances to the school.

In this case, the teachers' loan was seen as a way for teachers to obtain accommodation and reduce the distance travelled to school, both which can be motivating. On the other hand, interviews revealed that teachers may use the loans to enter into businesses, which results in taking time away from their primary teaching job, thus rendering the incentive of teachers' loan counterproductive. As policy facilitator (PF$_3$) said:

Regarding the idea of obtain money to start business, you find sometimes that the teachers are spending all their time running business and not teaching. Or [I am] ... if they are having to employ someone to run their business, in which case they risk not making the profit.

This argument was supported by PI$_4$ (head teacher). He said that:

Teachers may take the loans from the USACCO, because they can easily access them at a reasonable interest, and one can pay it back after a long period of time. But as much as I know, when a teacher starts a business idea, it takes most of his time, because he would want to make profit and also be able to pay back the loan. You find that sometime he misses his classes because he is attending to the business.

This response demonstrates how, from the perspective of the head teacher, the loan is likely to impact negatively on the teachers' commitment and performance at his school, and has the potential to drive teachers away from their primary job, which is teaching.
Interviews with PI2 (policy implementer) and a review of reports from USACCO show that this concern is known by the government. They argue that when teachers obtain the loan to run a small business, it does not have to be the teachers themselves to run the business but their spouses and relatives; so there would not be reason for the teacher not to attend to the teaching job. This argument is questionable, since from the interview with PI4 it is clear that the need to earn a profit and the implication of failing to re-pay the loan can be a key impetus for a teacher who has obtained a loan to personally manage the business activities, as such possibly compromising the teaching job.

Interview responses from the policy beneficiary (PB4) noted that,

It all depends on the nature of the business activity, and whether it requires fulltime supervision, or not. For example, a piped water sale project, which involves selling water to the public using several water outlets. Each outlet has a counter, so that in the morning a teacher can take the meter readings, and at the end of the day, using the new readings, you are able to calculate the volume of water sold and amount of proceeds from the water sold per day. This is simple and straight forward, and it is easy to manage even when one is away. This can be different from a retail grocery shop where the attendant may sell some commodities and replace them with new ones, in which case you may not know that the sale was done.

The above discussions indicate that the nature of the business activity for which the loan is sought, the process involved in accessing the loan from the USACCO and how the business is managed as to achieving the intended objective, are some of the issues that may determine how the loans will impact on teacher motivation.

6.2.3 Alternative sources of income for the teachers

The study explored the various alternative sources of teachers’ income and how the availability of these is likely to impact on the teachers’ motivation to teach. Results show that over 77% of the surveyed teachers received a monthly salary from the government, while nearly 23% (23) received their pay from employers other than government (see Table 6.2).
The survey did not investigate deeper into who the other employers were, as this was beyond the scope of this study. However, the study established that some of the surveyed schools are privately owned and as such, it is assumed that teachers employed therein are paid by the school proprietors.

**Table 6.2: Surveyed teachers’ employer**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

*Note:* *Other sources are assumed to be private-for-profit school proprietors, Non-Governmental Organisations and Faith-Based Organisations.

In addition to the monthly salary, 46% of the teachers indicated that they had received some top-up (referred to in Rwanda as “primes”) from their respective schools (see Table 6.3), while 54% reported not to have received these top-ups from their schools.

Interviews with participants in the PM, PI, PF, TU, and PB stakeholder groups, confirmed that teachers, especially at publicly funded secondary schools, receive top-ups from their respective schools ranging from 15,000 to 30,000RwF (approximately between 15 to 30 GBP per month).

**Table 6.3: Distribution of teachers according to sources of their income (percent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of teachers’ incomes</th>
<th>Teachers receive a top-up from their respective schools</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary paid by Government</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary paid by other</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Over 33% indicated that they received additional income to that earned from their normal teaching job, whereas nearly 67% said that they did not (see Table 6.4).
Table 6.4: Distribution of teachers by alternative sources of incomes (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of teachers’ salary</th>
<th>Teachers receive supplementary income from activities outside the normal teaching job</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary by Government</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary paid by other</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Establishing how much of the surveyed teachers’ income comes from activities outside the normal teaching job was an issue beyond the scope of this study. However, interviews with PI3, PI4 and all PB established that most teachers, especially in urban schools, earn a secondary income from private tutoring or coaching students in the evenings, weekends and during the holidays; and marking district and national examinations. For example, PB4 (policy beneficiary) said that:

Coaching in the evenings and on weekends and during the holidays is an important source of supplementary income for teachers, especially in Kigali and other urban areas. Teachers don’t mind working extra hours, because they know what they will be earning. You have to have a formal job at a particular school, but teach children from the same school or other schools in extra time. Sometimes teachers perform well in their formal school, and use this to build relationships and confidence with parents, who then privately bring their children for coaching.

Teachers do coaching although it is not permitted by MINEDUC. As such, they do not openly do it, as was indicated by PB4:

Because it is forbidden to coach students, teachers have labelled coaching as: “gucana itoroshi” which can be translated as “moonlighting” and mostly done from the teachers’ homes, or other places where not many people can find them.

Earning secondary income is central to the means of survival adopted by teachers to meet the basic living needs. It amounts to a ‘shadow’ education system in many countries with very large proportions of pupils involved (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).
6.2.4 Teacher income differentials

Interviews with most stakeholder groups and reports from the Ministry of Public Service and Labour reveal a long-time unresolved issue of income differentials across the three teacher qualification levels (A0, A1 and A2) and across the various professions in the public sector.

As shown in Figure 6.1, the Prime Minister’s order establishing salaries and fringe benefits for public servants of the central government (see PRIMATURE, 2013), indicates that in 2013, the gross salary of secondary school teachers with a university degree (A0) was nearly four times more than the Advanced Certificate level (A2) primary school teacher. This is a large income differential both in absolute terms, and in comparison to other professions within and outside Rwanda.

![Figure 6.1: Gross monthly salary for A0, A1 and A2 teacher qualifications (2013)](chart)

Source: PRIMATURE (2013)

Note: The gross salary is for a beginning teacher.

The Prime Minister’s order (PRIMATURE, 2013) showed further variation between the teaching profession and other professions. For example, while the gross salary for an Advanced Certificate (A2) teacher is 59,125RwF (approximately 59 GBP), that of a Nurse, Social Worker or Medical Technician with the same level qualification,
employed at a government hospital/health centre is 166,315RwF (approximately 166 GBP), a difference of 107 GBP.

As presented in Table 6.5, while an education degree holder (A0) was paid a gross salary of 212,504RwF (approximately 212 GBP), a Medical Doctor employed by the Ministry of Health was paid 465,341RwF (approximately 465 GBP), a difference of over 190 GBP. Again, such difference is considered significant in the context of civil servants holding the same level of qualification and employed by the same government.

Table 6.5: Monthly gross salary breakdown for public civil servants for selected professions, 2013 (RwF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Degree (A0)</th>
<th>Diploma (A1)</th>
<th>Advanced Certificate (A2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>212,504</td>
<td>159,900</td>
<td>59,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse/Social Worker/Technician (Ministry of Health)</td>
<td>404,515</td>
<td>280,763</td>
<td>166,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Doctor (General Practitioner)*</td>
<td>465,341</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse (University teaching hospital of Kigali)</td>
<td>566,221</td>
<td>393,526</td>
<td>252,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Hospital/Health centre staff</td>
<td>337,308</td>
<td>280,736</td>
<td>166,315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRIMATURE (2013)

Note: These figures are gross salaries (excluding supplementary/top-up paid by the schools). *The minimum qualification for a medical Doctor is a degree.

Surprisingly, even the occupations considered of lower status, such as drivers, secretaries, security guards, in some government institutions earn a higher salary than the Advanced Certificate (A2) teachers (see Table 6.6). This can be demoralising and demotivating to these teachers.
Table 6.6: Comparison of A2 teacher gross salary, with “low status occupations” in the public civil service (Rwf)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>127,607</td>
<td>467,893</td>
<td>247,085</td>
<td>120,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>216,081</td>
<td>360,136</td>
<td>288,108</td>
<td>72,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store keeper</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>216,081</td>
<td>360,136</td>
<td>288,108</td>
<td>101,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td>163,763</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced certificate (A2) Teacher</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59,125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRIMATURE (2013)

Interviews with policy makers (PMs) indicates that this issue is well known by the government, which has made several interventions to harmonise the salary structures across the entire public service sector. PM4, noted that:

The public sector pay and retention policy brought in civil service pay reforms aimed at increasing and harmonising the salaries across the various professions. The reforms were not intended for teachers only, but all civil servants such as accountants, those in the academia, health, agriculture, etc.

However, from the PM4’s response, it is evident that the RPSPR policy (MIFOTRA, 2012), aimed at putting in place a framework for harmonising the civil servants pay structure, as such addressing the gaps that were not addressed by the 2004 and 2006 public service reforms. However, as PM4 further revealed, due to “fiscal constraints”, the proposed civil service pay reforms were not fully implemented. As such, this still remains a problem. As a temporary measure, in 2010 government increased teachers’ salaries by 10%.

Interviews with PM1, PM2, PM3 and PM4 revealed that, in a bid to redress the issue of imbalance in teachers’ pay, school funding in respect of the capitation grant (CG) - which was calculated at 12,500Rwf, approximately 12.5 GBP per teacher - was reverted and paid directly to individual teachers as part of their monthly salary package. Prior to this, it was paid to the school as part of the larger funding for the operation of the school, and paid to the teacher through the district. At this time, it
was never regular and was rarely paid in full, due to budget constraints and possible administrative bureaucracies. This measure increased the teachers’ monthly income, particularly primary teachers. As such, it reduced the income differential between primary and secondary teachers (World Bank, 2011).

6.2.5 Timeliness in processing teachers’ salaries

Over 79% of the teachers in the survey confirmed having received their salaries on time, while nearly 21% (57) said that their salaries were paid late.

Table 6.7: Teachers’ responses on the timeliness of payment of monthly salaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers’ responses on the timeliness of payment of salaries during 2008-13</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers received their salary on time</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers did not receive their salary on time</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

From the interviews, it was noted that until 2010 there was persistent late payment of teachers’ salaries in Rwanda, sometimes nearly by one month. The decentralisation of teacher management functions (see chapter 2, section 2.2), had partly caused this. As such, teacher salary processing had been made lengthy and bureaucratic.

Processing of teachers’ salaries involved the following key stages (see Figure 6.2): (i) preparation of the payroll by the respective districts; (ii) verification and approval of the payroll by MIFOTRA; (iii) verification of the payroll against the district’s budget by MINECOFIN; (iv) making payment transfers by the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR) to the respective banks in which teachers had opened personal accounts; and (v) respective banks crediting the individual teachers’ accounts with the salary. To resolve the problem of delays in paying teachers, the government introduced two strategies discussed in 6.2.4.1 and 6.2.4.2 below.

6.2.5.1 Eight-step monthly protocol on processing teachers’ salaries

Interviews with PM2 and PM4 revealed that in March 2010 the institutions involved in the payment of teachers’ salaries (Districts, MIFOTRA, MINECOFIN, NBR and
respective financial institutions\textsuperscript{15}) discussed the issue of delay in payment of teachers’ salaries. They reviewed their specific roles in the process and how they could cut down unnecessary delays. The outcome was an “8-step monthly protocol on processing the teachers’ salaries” (MINEDUC, 2010c), signed by all stakeholders on 2\textsuperscript{nd} June 2010. It specified the dates on which the various institutions have to perform their respective roles (see Figure 6.2). Specifically, the protocol committed that salaries would be credited to the individual teachers’ accounts by the 28\textsuperscript{th} of the month in respect of which the salary was being paid. Indeed, the study noted that this protocol was honoured with effect from June 2010. Despite receiving a low salary, teachers perceive that receiving it on time contributes to their motivation.

Figure 6.2: Eight-step monthly protocol on processing of teachers’ salary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1: District initiates the preparation of teachers’ payroll, commits the payment and seeks approval from MIFOTRA. By10th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 2, 3 and 4: MINECOFIN receives and completes verification of the 30 payrolls, issues payment order to National Bank of Rwanda. From 12th to 21st.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5, 6 and 7: NBR transfers salaries to respective financial institutions (from headquarters to branches and sub-branches) where teachers have opened bank accounts. From 23\textsuperscript{rd} to 25th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 8: Financial institutions credit the individual teachers’ accounts with their salaries. By 28th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The preceding discussions on teachers’ salaries indicate a general consensus among the participants that the surveyed teachers earn a low salary, particularly those working in rural primary schools, which is demotivating. Some teachers earn supplementary

\textsuperscript{15} These are commercial, banks and micro-finance institutions through which teachers’ salaries are paid, they were represented by the \textit{Banque Populaire du Rwanda} (BPR).
income through investing in business activities using the loans obtained from the teachers’ cooperative; however, the success of this is not straightforward, and is dependent on several factors. Some teachers receive monthly top-ups from their schools, which is an initiative by parents; however, this is largely in urban, public-funded secondary schools, than for teachers in rural primary schools whose salary remains low. Many teachers working in urban secondary schools, resort to coaching, which is prohibited. The long-term issue of income differential among teachers and between teachers and other professions in the civil service is particularly demotivating to teachers, especially primary teachers. Payment of teacher salaries on time is identified as a cost-effective way of improving teacher motivation.

6.2.5.2 Teacher management information system (TMIS)

Interviews with PM4 revealed that during 2008-13, the GoR introduced new human resources management software, aimed at improving the management of civil servants, including teachers. Specifically, the system would manage the recruitment, transfers, remuneration and other human resources functions. PM4, said that:

Initially we were using a software called ‘staff manager’, but this has now been transformed into a new one called IPPIS [Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System]. This software has two components. One is for human resource management, which keeps civil servants’ records from the time of recruitment to the time of retirement, including their bio data, academic and professional records, finger prints, and others. This is what makes up the civil servants’ management component. The software also expedites the processing of salary payment between MINECOFIN and the respective civil servant banks accounts. It avoids duplicate salary payment and provides archives of salary payment transactions, which can easily be traced in case of any issues on the civil servants’ salary.
In support of this, PI\textsubscript{1} indicated that Rwanda Education Board (REB) had at the same time initiated a project to design a set of teacher management policies\textsuperscript{16}, with the aim to improve teacher management at the national level, and consequently increase teacher motivation. One of the components of this policy is the teacher management information system (TMIS). PI\textsubscript{1} said that:

One other thing that we think will bring motivation to Rwandan teachers is this... in the past we have managed teachers' [employment] files manually. But increasingly as the world gets electronic, we are trying to make sure that, in order to speed up every process, we computerise everything to do with our teachers. It is to that extent that we [at REB] have a UNICEF funding on a project that is aimed at designing a TMIS so that the teachers' files, right from the day of recruitment up to retirement and all the process in between, are electronically managed and this is going to be done countrywide and [thank God] increasingly our country is installing the broadband connectivity and again we have the advantage of literally every corner of the country being accessible.

The co-existence of the two teacher management systems was not explored in this study and could be a question for future studies. But both PM\textsubscript{4} and PI\textsubscript{1} noted that there is need to harmonise the two components, the IPPIS and TMIS, and further link them to the MINECOFIN financial system.

Interview with the PB (teachers) indicated that they perceive the management information system, if well utilised, as a potential tool to expedite payment of their salary, and as such likely to be a source of motivation. PB\textsubscript{2} said that:

When I compare the past years, where payment of teachers' salaries was delayed, and sometimes leading to accumulation of arrears, and presently when we get paid the salary on time, just as other civil servants, I think the teachers' electronic management has been helpful. It would be better if the software is improved in a way that, even other services meant for teachers, such as transfers, medical insurance and promotions are also improved.

\textsuperscript{16} These teacher management policies, including the TMIS, were being developed by REB as part of the recommendations of the TEMP (see Chapter 2, section 2.5 and MINEDUC, 2010b) with support from UNICEF and UNESCO.
The response from PB2 clearly shows that teachers perceive management information systems as desirable and motivating, if only they will lead to timely processing of their salaries, another teacher management aspect.

The survey results presented in Table 6.8, show that teachers view ‘receiving the monthly salary on time’ as important for motivation. In the survey, teachers were asked if they perceived being paid their monthly salary on time as motivating. Nearly 52% (of those who had earlier said that they had received their salary on time), admitted that it was motivating.

Table 6.8: Teachers’ responses on impact of receiving monthly pay on time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers’ responses on the perceived implication of receiving salary on time to their motivation</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Not motivated</th>
<th>Motivated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers receive their monthly salary on time</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers did not receive their monthly pay on time</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>276</td>
<td><strong>40.6%</strong></td>
<td><strong>59.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

The survey results show that a significant proportion of teachers (27.5%) said that ‘receiving salary on time did not motivate them’. This is clearly surprising since research evidence in most of SSA argues that late salary payment can be demotivating (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). As such, a follow-up with the policy beneficiary (PB) stakeholder group found that, while it was appreciated when teachers’ salaries were paid on time, this did not have a long-term impact on their views on the low salary. PB4 said that:

It is true that at one time in the past, our salaries delayed, and at some point, they were paid on time, which we appreciated. However, given that our salary continues to be low compared to other equally qualified professionals in the public service, I think that the real problem has not been addressed. For example, an accountant with an Advanced Certificate [A2] earns over 150,000RwF per month while a teacher with a similar qualification earns about 40,000RwF per month. Such a comparatively low salary, however timely it is paid, still remains a challenge to us.
From the preceding discussions, it is clear that paying teachers’ salaries on time can create immediate positive impact on teachers motivation, but where the salary still remains the same, the impact will not be felt for a long time. As such, an increase in salary is necessary if the teacher motivation is to be sustained.

### 6.2.6 Teachers’ pay rise

The survey showed that nearly 86% accepted that their salaries had increased during 2008-13 (see Table 6.9). This is corroborated by the responses from the interviews with all policy making level participants, namely that teachers’ salaries had increased twice in 2012.

#### Table 6.9: Teachers’ responses on changes in their salary during 2008-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers’ responses on changes in salary</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary increased</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>85.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary remained the same</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary reduced</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

The first increase was in 2012, when the capitation grant was integrated into the salary package of Advanced Certificate (A2) primary teachers (see section 2.6.3). Next was the 10% salary increase for A1 and A0 teachers in July 2012. This increase was calculated on the basis of the new salary for the A2 teacher (after integrating the capitation grant in the salary package).
Table 6.10: Teachers’ responses on changes in their salary during 2008-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent of rise in teacher’s salaries</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% and below</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – 35%</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 – 60%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 – 85%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86 – 100%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 100%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>237</strong></td>
<td><strong>85.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Nonetheless, even with the salary increases teachers’ income is likely to have remained too low to be considered sufficient to offset difficulties faced by teachers with fewer opportunities for accessing additional sources of income, a case similar to Cambodia (see UNESCO, 2014), where the teachers’ pay rise incentives had limited impact on their motivation.

Further probing of teachers regarding their perceptions on the salary increase provided by GoR indicated that, although many of them (nearly 74%) agreed that there were salary increases during 2008-13, about a third of them felt that the increase was not significant enough to impact greatly on their motivation (see Table 6.10).

Interviews with PB stakeholder groups showed that teachers were concerned that there was no clear policy on salary increases; even the existing policy of ‘horizontal’ promotion - where teachers’ salaries are increased based on the annual performance evaluations - has never been implemented. Again, it is likely that this incentive, one of those introduced during 2008-13, was not implemented due to fiscal reasons.

6.2.7 Teachers’ household expenditures and cost of living

6.2.7.1 By survey districts

The survey results indicated that the levels of teachers’ household expenditure and cost of living varied across the survey districts. As shown in Figure 6.3, the median monthly expenditure was reported lower in rural districts (such as Karongi and
Gisagara) and relatively higher in urban and semi-urban districts (such as Musanze, Kicukiro, Kayonza and Gasabo).

**Figure 6.3: Median monthly teacher household expenditure by district (000’ RwF)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey districts</th>
<th>Median monthly expenditure (000’ RwF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burera</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasabo</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayonza</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kicukiro</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gisagara</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musanze</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanagana</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusizi</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karungi</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Overall, the majority (nearly 74%) of the surveyed teachers said that the level of teachers’ expenditure and cost of living was demotivating.

**6.2.7.2 Teachers’ expenditure by ‘expenditure category’**

This study grouped household expenses into the following expenditure categories: (i) health, (ii) transport, (iii) housing, (iv) food and (v) education. In order not to limit responses, the study also included a sixth category of (vi) other expenditures, to cater for others that do not necessarily fall within those mentioned above. Table 6.11 summarises the key statistics of the main expense categories.
Table 6.11: Summary statistics of monthly expenditures of key expenditure categories by the surveyed teachers’ households (RwF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers’ responses on their monthly expenditure</th>
<th>N*</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on housing</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>23,482.26</td>
<td>15,147.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on food</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>23,964.57</td>
<td>14,781.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on transport</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>12,573.19</td>
<td>8,730.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on health</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>9,229.81</td>
<td>5,884.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on education</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>479,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>47,475.97</td>
<td>66,534.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on others</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>14,736.80</td>
<td>13,191.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author
Note: *The number of teachers who agreed to be incurring expenses varies with the expenditure categories.

Table 6.11 compares statistics on surveyed teachers’ expenses on the various expenditure categories. It shows that expenditure on education was the highest, followed by food, then housing and then transport. Expenditure on health is among the least. A discussion on each of the expense categories follows.

6.2.7.1 Expenditure on housing

Interviews confirmed that teachers face high accommodation costs. 99% of the surveyed teachers live in either rented or accommodation provided by the school. The median monthly spending on housing by surveyed teachers is 20,000RwF and the mean monthly spending is 23,482 RwF. Less than 1% (11) of the surveyed teachers stated that they do not spend anything on accommodation, which is an indication that they live in self-owned houses. Interviews with the PM and reports from the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC, 2012) revealed this issue was well known and that the Ministry had initiated actions to provide teacher accommodation.

The survey revealed that nearly 17% (46) of the surveyed teachers’ accommodation was provided by their schools and over 28% stated that they own their houses. Both categories therefore did not spend on accommodation. While close to 7% reported that they live in school-rented accommodation, 48% said that they rented them.
Table 6.12: Nature of ownership of teachers' houses during 2008-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owned by the school</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned by teachers</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented by the school</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented by teachers</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Interviews revealed that historically in Rwanda there was no clear policy on teachers’ accommodation. The GoR did not provide housing for teachers. This has been one of the dis-incentives for teachers in the past.

The interviews with PM and PI indicate that in addition to the loans accessible by individual teachers for the construction of houses, in 2012 the government initiated a teachers’ housing programme to construct at least one teachers’ accommodation block per sector, with a capacity to accommodate eight single teachers, both females and males. The aim was to provide accommodation for the newly recruited teachers to facilitate their transition during the initial years of their teaching profession, enhance their punctuality at work and increase their motivation and performance. Photo 6.1 was taken in Nyarugunga sector, Kicukiro district in Kigali city. It shows two of the teachers’ houses constructed by government in each of the 416 sectors.

52% of the surveyed teachers rated their accommodation as demotivating. However, the extent to which teachers’ accommodation will impact on teacher motivation is determined by the nature of ownership, cost, and condition of the teachers’ accommodation.
Photo 6.1: Front view of two teachers’ house

Source: The Author

Note: In Photo 6.1, inhabitants of Nyarugungu sector are levelling a road leading to two teachers’ houses

6.2.7.2 Expenditure on transport

Over 53% of teachers used self-owned bicycles as means of transport. Close to 47% of the surveyed teachers who spend on transport, said that they use hired bicycles, motorcycles, or public transport buses.

Table 6.13: Surveyed teachers’ transport expenses between residence, school and nearest trading centre

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported daily expenditure on transport</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 1,000RwF</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 – 2,000RwF</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 2,000RwF</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ride self-owned bicycles</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Most of them spend less than 1,000RwF (1 GBP) per day (see Table 6.13), which is a significant cost particularly to primary teachers who already earn a low salary.
6.2.7.3 Expenditure on health

Expenditure on health is among the lowest expenditures (see Table 6.13). This is not surprising given that teachers in publicly funded schools are required by law to enrol in the government medical insurance scheme which is managed by the Rwanda Social Security Board (RSSB). Under this scheme, the employee and employer each contribute 7.5% of their gross monthly salary to the employee’s insurance premium. In return, RSSB covers 85% of the medical costs for the teachers and dependants, while the teacher pays the remaining 15% of the cost.17

Interviews with most policy implementer (PI) participants indicated that this scheme was a highly crucial incentive to motivate teachers. For example, participant PI1 said that:

As much as teachers have many challenges, at least we are sure that teachers’ families have full access to medical facilities through their medical insurance, and I think that is very important.

The positive views expressed by PI1 regarding the benefit teachers gain from the medical insurance scheme are shared by the teachers themselves. From the survey, 56.5% of the teachers responded that they ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ to the statement that “teachers were healthier during 2008-13”, (see Appendix 14), which could be linked to the health insurance scheme. More than one-half (54%) of the surveyed teachers responded that their improved health conditions were a motivation to do their job (see Appendix 15).

However, as indicated in the interviews with SNEP, sometimes the health insurance scheme did not provide efficient medical services to teachers as a result of inefficiencies in remittance of teachers’ medical contributions. However, it is possible that, if everything is in place, the medical insurance can be a key motivator.

6.2.7.4 Expenditure on education

The highest expenditure reported by the surveyed teachers was on education (Table 6.13). The mean expenditure on education (for teachers’ education and children’s education) was 47,476RwF (approximately 470 GBP), nearly doubling the expenditure on housing.

Some of the surveyed teachers reported that they were pursuing further studies and this could explain why expenditure on education was high among most surveyed teachers. This was confirmed by PI3, PI4 and PB, who reported that some teachers pursue evening and weekend degree programmes, either in education or other fields so as to raise their qualifications.

6.2.7.5 Expenditure of food and others

Teachers’ expenditure on food varied significantly between the surveyed teachers, with a standard deviation of 14,781RwF. Even with this, interviews did not highlight that expenditure on food was a key concern for the teachers. The scope of this study did not permit a detailed probe into “other” teachers’ expenditures. This could be explored in future studies. Varying levels of expenditure on food are likely to be due to a mix of factors: on the one hand, teachers who work in rural locations near their homes where they depend on food grown on their land; and on the other hand teachers who work in r-urban areas, and have to buy nearly all their food.

6.2.8 Teachers’ work conditions

Survey responses from teachers on ‘what the most critical work conditions are’, were ranked beginning with the most critical ones (see Table 6.14). Most teachers (over 36%) expressed concern for “teaching double shifts”. This was followed by “poorly performing students” (19%); then “lack of quality teaching materials” (nearly 18%); followed by “teaching large class sizes” (nearly 13%); then “teaching many hours” (8%), and lastly “lack of participation in decision-making at their school” (6.5%).
Table 6.14: Work conditions, by importance in determining teachers’ motivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teaching double shifts</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorly performing students</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of quality teaching materials</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large class sizes</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High teaching load</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher participation in decision-making</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Interviews raised the “existence and quality of school infrastructure” as another key work environment factor. They reported that the majority of the classrooms were constructed between 2009 and 2013 with the involvement of the community as part of the 9 and 12 years’ basic education programme.

However, interviews with PF stakeholder groups, especially, PF3, PF4 and PF5 noted that there was lack of sufficient science laboratories at schools, and this still posed a challenge, especially in secondary schools, as the cost of these materials is particularly high for a resource-constrained country like Rwanda. As clearly shown by evidence, the quality of the physical environment in which teachers live and work, determines the degree to which they are motivated and fulfil their work (Ololube, 2006).

The study noted that a Presidential Order No: 48/01 dated 10/08/2009, establishing quality standards in education for nursery, primary and secondary schools (MINEDUC, 2009), stipulates the expected behaviour expected of students while at school. School head teachers are expected to ensure that these norms are upheld within their respective schools. MINEDUC frequently provides instructions to schools on some specific aspects of discipline. Even with these initiatives, some students are still involved in cases of indiscipline.
The ‘norms and standards’ also mention the common forms of student indiscipline that are not allowed in schools, including: genocide ideology and other divisive tendencies; petty stealing; drinking of alcohol; drug use; absenteeism; use of mobile telephones in class; disrespect to fellow students, teachers and school administrators, especially in the final years of secondary school. In this study, the common forms of student indiscipline were framed into six categories: (i) bullying and fighting fellow students, (ii) use of indecent language, (iii) destroying school equipment, (iv) fighting teachers, (v) drug use and (vi) discriminative and genocide ideology.

Across the six behaviour categories, 67% (186) of the surveyed teachers responded that students had not depicted undesirable behaviours, which partly reinforces earlier research (Hyde et al, 2005; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007) that student behaviours were not a major cause of teacher demotivation in Rwanda (and other developing countries).

Thirty-three percent of the surveyed teachers said that they had witnessed some indiscipline among students. Figure 6.4, shows, shows the representative proportions (percent) of the teacher responses on the categories and extent of student indiscipline which were a concern to them according to the six categories.
Figure 6.4: Current situation of student indiscipline

The majority (29%) of the teachers were concerned with students’ use of “[abusive] and indecent and language”. This was followed by 24% (22) who said that “destroying school equipment” was an issue; then 22% (20) who said that “bullying and fighting fellow students” was an issue; then 17% (15) who said that they were concerned with students who were using drugs; then 6% (5) who were concerned with students who “fought their [fellow students and] teachers”; and finally, 2% (2) who said that students had “discriminative and genocide ideology” among the various groups of pupils and teachers on the basis of the assumed ethnic groups of “hutu” and “tutsi”. Evidence confirms these finds as noted by Bennell and Akyeampong (2007), that, unlike in most developed countries, student behaviour is not a major contributory factor with respect to teacher motivation in SSA countries.

6.3. Impact of intrinsic incentives on teachers’ motivation during 2008-13

This section presents participants’ responses on the intrinsic incentives introduced during 2008-13. In developed countries, extrinsic incentives, such as pay, have been found to be generally ineffective in increasing teacher motivation, in the same way as intrinsic factors. The same is true in developing countries, particularly in SSA, where
intrinsic incentives are perceived to have a more sustainable implication on teacher motivation as compared to extrinsic factors (Ololube, 2006; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

6.3.1 Teacher training, and professional development

This section presents interview and survey responses on the impact of intrinsic incentives introduced during 2008-13. Over 95% of the surveyed teachers agreed that they were motivated by the training they received during 2008-13 (see Table 6.15). A further analysis of the teachers who pursued further education during 2008-13 showed that more than one half sought opportunities for further studies on their own, while others had been offered the opportunity by their employers. These findings support the view that teachers perceive further education and training as a source of motivation, and that they are willing to initiate seeking admission, going to the extent of funding their studies.

Table 6.15: Impact of teacher education and training on teacher motivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses on impact of teacher education and training</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teacher education and training was a source of motivation</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher education and training was not a source of motivation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>276</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Table 6.16 shows that an equal number of respondents (33.6%) had undertaken A0 and A1 courses, and Master’s and A5 (4.3%), while 38% had undertaken A2 courses. More teachers had attended short term In-service Education and Training (INSET) compared to those teachers who undertook long training programmes leading to higher qualifications. 71% of the teachers confirmed they had attended short-term in-service teacher training programmes during 2008-13.
Table 6.16: Levels of education attained by teachers during 2008-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of qualification attained by surveyed teachers</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master’s degree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree (A0)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma (A1)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Certificate (A2)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Certificate (D5)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>116</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

The survey and interviews further revealed that the in-service courses which most teachers attended during 2008-13 were the English language mentoring training and the training in the teaching of mathematics and sciences in secondary schools. While 46% of the surveyed teachers (likely to be among the unqualified teachers) said they were motivated to attend pre-service training to obtain a higher qualification and the relevant skills needed to teach better, fewer than 30% said that they had attended pre-service training with the aim to qualify for a pay rise and promotion at the work place.

These findings concern the absence of a career and teacher promotion structure in Rwanda, especially for primary teachers, where pursuing a higher qualification is viewed by teachers as the only way to raise in their salary.

Participants in the PF category, confirmed that teachers were getting more motivated than before by the professional training they received. As participant PF1 pointed out:

"For the few times I have been working at school level, in the area of building the [professional] capacity of teachers, what I have seen is that the teachers are getting more confident and motivated to do their work as a result of the pedagogical training they are receiving. I have seen teachers who have moved from being a little timid in actual classroom instruction to being vibrant and are very open to saying, come and see how I am teaching."

Interviews with PF participants, citing the example of the introduction of English as a medium of instruction in 2009, where at first, there was very low teachers’ interest in the training, indicated that with the introduction of the school-based mentors (SBM),
the attitude towards teaching has changed. They noted that, with the use of SBMs, teachers are motivated to do better.

Regarding the training in pedagogy, PF5 said that:

When many of our teachers begin to learn learner-centred pedagogy, what they have said to us is..."Our teaching is now easier"; "It is not as hard work". One of our teachers in Gasyata said: "I used to be exhausted all the time. I was so tired", and he said: "Now I could teach 10 lessons a day... 20 lessons a day because the methodology allows me more freedom. It's not as labour intensive. It's not as tiring and children help each other". Therefore, we have also found that actual training in pedagogy has actually motivated the teachers.

The relative importance of the skills gained from training is enormous and this is the intrinsic element that needs to be emphasised among the teachers. PF5 said that:

They [teachers] used to look for training that involving some form of financial gains, and absconded from training that did not..... But now they ask for training, irrespective of the financial benefit, this is as a result of the changed attitudes and increased realisation of the benefits from the training. There is a shift from looking at motivation as money to training and other intrinsic motivations.

6.3.2 Teacher management and professional support

Another intrinsically motivating factor for teachers is how they are managed and professionally supported to do their job. 68% of the surveyed teachers responded that the quality of school leadership was an important work environment motivating factor. Interviews with the PI stakeholder group and the review of documents, indicated that currently there is no teacher management system in Rwanda. The Teacher Development and Management policy (MINEDUC, 2007) mentions the establishment of a system for managing teachers. A report of the TEMP summit (MINEDUC, 2010a) outlines five key components of the proposed teacher management system in Rwanda (see Appendix 2). At the time of the field work and writing this thesis, the policy documents were still in draft, pending validation and approval by relevant Rwandan
authorities. Without a system of teacher management, and within a context of decentralisation, this is likely to lead to demotivation of teachers.

In the absence of a national teacher management system, head teachers were trying to improve the management of teachers at the school level. The survey disclosed that close to 90% of the surveyed teachers ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that their school administrators had shown commitment and competence to lead them, and promoted good relationship between the various categories of teachers.

Table 6.17: Teachers’ perceptions on their schools’ management and support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers’ responses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I consider how teachers at my school are managed and supported to be a source of their motivation to teach</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>80.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t consider how teachers at my school are managed and supported to be a source of their motivation to teach</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Interviews with the policy beneficiary (PB) stakeholder group indicated that a major reason for leaving was ‘poor school management’. This supports the evidence that effective management programmes for head teachers are crucial in bringing about improvements in teacher motivation and performance (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). A MINEDUC report indicated that a school management and leadership training programme was jointly implemented by the Ministry of Education and the Flemish Association for Development Cooperation and Technical Assistance (MINEDUC, 2008a). The aim was to improve the effectiveness of school management, including good working relations among teachers and between teachers and parents. Training was given to the head teacher, deputies in charge of studies and discipline, those in charge of finance, and the school secretary. The training covered school leadership skills such as: pedagogical management, financial management and planning.
As indicated in the responses, effective management of teachers, particularly at the school level, is likely to lead to their motivation. As such, governments should aim at establishing functional teacher management systems and structures if teachers are expected to maintain their sense of professional responsibility and commitment (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

6.3.3 Teacher inspections, promotions and transfers

Table 6.18, shows that 87% of the teachers ‘agreed or strongly agreed’ that school inspectors visited their school at least once per term (see MINEDUC, 2009:71). 54% responded that promotions of teachers were well managed and done fairly; and 50% agreed that teacher transfers were well managed and done fairly. Teacher inspection is done by officials from the sectors, districts, Rwanda Education Board and the Ministry of Education. 62% agreed that the ways in which teacher inspections, promotions and transfers were done at their school were sources of teachers’ motivation to teach. Interviews with stakeholder groups confirmed that inspection of schools had improved recently with the recruitment of sector education officials (SEOs).

Table 6.18: Agreement rates about teacher inspections, promotions and transfers (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School inspectors regularly visited my school</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotions of teachers were well managed and done fairly</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher transfers were well managed and done fairly</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher inspections, promotions and transfers were done in a way that motivates me to teach</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Interviews noted that teacher transfers were mainly voluntarily initiated by teachers themselves, as was said by PI3:
The very first function of the district in relation to a teacher is recruiting him [or her] to fill a vacant post identified in a particular school within the district. Once this is done, a teacher is expected to remain at this school. Most of the cases of transfers from the schools are requested for by the teachers for their own reasons, such as re-uniting with their family. In my district, in the past, we used to have many requests for transfer, but these have now reduced, perhaps, this is because teachers are recruited at the district level which was not the case before.

The response further shows that prior to decentralisation of teacher management functions, teachers were allocated to the schools by the ministry of education and ministry of public service and labour. This was likely to result in many cases of requests for transfers from the teachers. With the decentralisation (see section 2.4), teachers tend to be deployed to schools of their choice. As such, the incidence of voluntary transfers, particularly between districts, is reported to have fallen dramatically following the decentralisation of teacher management, when districts became the employer of teachers.

6.3.4 Teachers’ status and vocational commitment

The survey depicted varying results regarding the status of teachers. 62% ‘agreed’ that teaching had increasingly become a respectable profession during 2008-13; 74% agreed that teachers at their schools were respected by parents and community around the school; 63% agreed that teachers at their schools participated in teacher incentive policy decisions; and 76% agreed that parents and the community around their school got involved and provided support to the school (see Table 6.19).
Table 6.19: Statements on teacher status and vocational commitment (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements on teacher status and vocational commitment</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teaching has increasingly become a respectable profession</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers in our school are respected by the parents and community around the school</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers at my school participated in teacher incentive policy decision</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents and community around my school are involved and provided support to my school</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author

Nearly 69% of the surveyed teachers agreed with the statement ‘they had a strong personal desire for the teaching profession, regard teaching as a calling’ (see Table 6.20). It is clear, however, that around one-quarter of the teacher respondents opted to teach as a ‘last resort’ because they did not do well enough in their secondary school leaving examinations to be able to study their first choice subject, either at upper secondary school and/or at university or another higher education institution.

Table 6.20: Responses to why teachers remained in the teaching profession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for remaining in the teaching profession during 2008-13</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I have a personal strong desire for the teaching profession, I regard teaching as a calling</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I want to use the teaching profession as a means to proceed to the profession of my choice</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I failed to secure alternative employment opportunities</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was receiving a sufficient pay with my teaching profession</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because I work few hours as a teacher, compared to other professions</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I benefited from the long school vacation while students are on holidays</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author
As discussed earlier, a long-term commitment to teaching is a key indicator of vocational commitment (Michaelowa, 2002). In this regard, the study found that around 71% of the teachers responded affirmatively to the question “Do you intend to continue teaching in the next five years?” and 52% to the question: ‘Are you willing to choose teaching if there was an opportunity to start over a new career?’ Interviews noted that the “Best teachers’ award”, normally held alongside the celebration of the International Teachers’ Day (ITD), was considered as a key incentive for teachers. The ITD has become more significant in Rwanda since 1994, and as stated by PI,

There is much more of the desire to use the International Teachers Day as an opportunity to celebrate and recognise teachers. I know it has really been beneficial and on such a day we are saying, "Actually, you [teachers] are important and we value you.

Interviews revealed that the award event has a strong impact on sending the message to teachers that they are recognised by the society.

The best teachers, selected from all over the country, are recognised and given prizes. For example, PI said that:

In a crowd, when someone calls out your name, you feel good. So ...., within the means available, we always want to identify the best teachers in the 30 districts and it varies from one to so many teachers, say best one, best three teachers in a district. But the whole idea is, first of all, to encourage them to work hard and to appreciate those teachers who have been chosen as the best. The competition is such that it is on district basis, so every district wins even if the best in district X may have been the tenth in district Y. What is important is to distribute equally that recognition. So the best teachers are usually awarded computers worth more than a teacher’s two or three months’ salary and that’s quite motivating for a teacher.

This response shows that not only are teachers recognised, the respective districts where the best teachers are employed are also recognised. This implies that the role of districts in the management and motivation of teachers is recognised. The award scheme does not only recognise best teachers each year, but also those who have made improvements, the same to districts. Recognition of both teachers and districts
has made the teacher award scheme appreciated by many as a motivating strategy. Photo 6.2 shows some of the 30 best teachers, selected from the districts after receiving awards (laptop computers) from Rwanda Education Board.

**Photo 6.2: Best teachers awards 2015**

Source: The Author

For many years, the teaching profession has been treated as part of the general civil service workforce. As seen earlier, normally in some countries teachers are given a special statute which governs the teaching profession. An interview with the PI1 indicated that a special statute for teachers was being drafted. It is this statute which can define teachers’ recruitment, training, promotion, salary structure, career structures and retirement benefits. Thus, by treating teaching as a special profession, this structure would enhance teacher’s motivation.

6.3.5 **Teacher occupational solidarity and power**

While teachers in Rwanda share most of the grievances with teachers in other countries, there have been no such actions as strikes, by individual teachers or groups of teachers. The researcher did not ask the reasons for this; however, from the interviews with various participants, the likely reasons could be several. The first is related to the sensitivity of taking the approach of a strike in the context of Rwanda
which not so long ago emerged from genocide and insecurity, and which has embarked
on a programme for resolving conflicts and reconciling people. In such a context,
many would assume that, addressing teachers’ grievances, they could also learn from
this process, rather than ‘going on the streets’. Secondly, is the capacity of the TU
which clearly lacks the ability to sustain their bargaining to all levels. Finally, there
was the low commitment of teachers to participate in the TU’s activities in which they
did not seem to have the confidence to take industrial action against government. The
study found that teachers were aware of the existence of the primary teachers’ union;
however, some of the surveyed teachers, especially secondary teachers were not
members.

Table 6.21: Frequency table for membership in SNEP and USACCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teachers’ responses on perception on SNEP and USACCO</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership in the SNEP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on whether SNEP contributes positively to teachers’ motivation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>93.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in USACCO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>81.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on whether teachers benefited from the USACCO during 2008-13 (a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response to whether teachers considered USACCO loans as a boost to their welfare and motivation during 2008-13 (b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Author
Note: (a) 50 surveyed teachers responded that they were not members of the USACCO. As such, they did not respond to the question on “whether they benefitted from the services of the USACCO”. (b) 72 surveyed teachers did not respond to the question on “whether teachers considered USACCO loans as a boost to their welfare and motivation during 2008-13”.

The results in Table 6.21 show that while most (93.6%) teachers indicated that membership in the teachers’ union is a desirable thing, likely to contribute positively to their motivation, not as many (60%) teachers agreed that they were registered members of this union. The likely factor here is the limited scope of membership. As
in the interview with TU1, the union was initially meant for primary teachers, although from interviews it was established that the union’s statute was under review to extend to secondary teachers. This was indicated in an interview with TU1, who said that:

The teachers’ union was established in 1996, representing only primary teachers, as the name suggests [national union of primary school teachers]. In 2012, during the third annual general meeting of union members, we drafted a new statute, which is now in the Ministry of Public Service and Labour, and will be further forwarded to the Ministry of Justice for approval. It is expected that this process will result in a new teachers’ union statute which will cover primary and secondary teachers.

Extending the membership of the teachers’ union to include primary and secondary teachers will likely contribute to enhancing its capacity and power to fulfil its mandate.

The other likely reason for low membership is the capacity of the teachers’ union and the extent to which it can exert pressure, which motivates teachers to register as members. As indicated by TU1, the teachers’ union has full legal rights of existence and operation given by the constitution of Rwanda. He said that:

Article 38 and 39 of the National constitution gives any group of professionals the right to form a trade union and for any workers to join the union, exercise the rights and permits them to strike within limits provided by the law (see, Republic of Rwanda, 2003a:35-36).

TU1 further said that:

The only issue is that the Rwandan teachers’ union has is that it is still limited in terms of its capacity, of its staff and other areas as compared to other teachers’ unions in the region. One way we are building capacity is expanding the membership from only primary schools teachers to all teachers (including secondary teachers). We are targeting expanding membership to higher education lecturers similar to Tanzania teachers’ union.

However, it was evident from the responses from the various stakeholder groups interviewed that the SNEP did not have the capacity to do their mandate effectively. According to PM2:
SNEP did not exert any pressure on the government. It is not clear whether they are simply lacking capacity and don’t know what to do or there are no issues to raise. In such a general context of post conflict society like Rwanda, the last thing you would expect from a group of professions is to consider resolving their grievances and doing their advocacy role through strikes.

TU1 confirmed this, saying that:

To be honest, wherever we go to public offices [to demand teachers rights] we are welcome and we are listened to and given attention. We cannot think about doing strikes as the immediate solution to teachers’ grievances.

In effect, teachers seem to see that being a member of a union was a desirable thing, but the political context in Rwanda seems to make membership problematic. While teachers would want to express their dissatisfaction and demand for their rights, they do not do so through industrial action and strikes. This was confirmed in the interviews with the teachers who left their teaching employment during 2008-13. For example, PB4 said that:

I don’t know much about the teachers’ union. I used to attend meetings organized by the union, aimed at sensitising teachers about the benefits of becoming a member of the SNEP. At one time, we also signed up for the annual membership subscriptions, I did not follow to know what happened later. They used to emphasise that SNEP can speak for the members, and also can enlighten them of their rights, such as the right for salary increases and holidays. My impression from what they [union leaders] say, is that the SNEP can be useful for the teachers, but I cannot say, in which way this can happen, because it [the union] has been silent, it is too weak and to organise its members to influence government in any way to claim for their rights.

This clearly shows that teachers rate their union as politically weak and ineffective. This is characteristic of most unions in SSA (Bannell and Akyeampong, 2007). Exceptions, for example in Kenya, are where national teacher unions have been quite successful in negotiating improved conditions of service (Hyde et al, 2005).
However, through the decentralised governance system it is possible that most of the teachers’ grievances are solved at the levels closest to the teacher, reducing the role of SNEP in addressing teachers’ grievances. PM\textsubscript{2} said that:

The need for teachers to come together with a national complaint may not arise. So the combination of the historical context of Rwanda and its vision and decentralised governance is very important in determining the role of the teachers’ union in resolving the teacher issues.

From the interviews with TU, SNEP resolves most teachers’ issues through discussions with the concerned institutions. This finding supports the survey responses where surveyed teachers concurred with the statement that “teachers at my school think that their union was doing a good job”. TU\textsubscript{1} said that:

There has never been need to go to court to resolve such [teachers’] issues. For example, the teachers’ union [SNEP] had a meeting with the Rwanda Social Security Board (RSSB), USACCO and 30 teachers’ payroll officers from Districts to resolve the issue of teachers’ medical insurance. Teachers were not being given appropriate health services under the medical insurance scheme. Health centres and hospitals claimed that RSSB did not pay for the health services offered to teachers. The respective districts were not regularly remitting teachers’ monthly contributions to the RSSB, yet these were duly deducted from their salaries.

At the time of data collection, nearly 82% (226) of the surveyed teachers were members of the USACCO. Over 60% (166) concurred with the question of “whether they had benefitted from the loans during 2008-13”. When the surveyed teachers (276) were asked “whether they perceived the teachers’ loans were a potential boost to their welfare and motivation, of the 74% (204) who responded to this question, over 55% (152) confirmed that they did.
6.4. Teachers’ participation in the design and implementation of teacher incentives

Interview responses from policy makers (PMs), policy implementers (PIs) and policy facilitators (PFs) stakeholder groups indicate mixed perceptions of whether the teachers (who are the final beneficiaries of the incentives), are consulted on the design and implementation of teacher incentives. While PMs perceive that this happens, PIs indicate that it does not. PF$_4$ notes that there was no consultation of teachers yet they are a core part of the implementation of teacher incentives at grassroots level. PFs further indicate that while some discussions on the teacher incentives were taking place, the contexts predominantly in which those discussions were happening was, "how can we raise the quality of education"; they were not necessarily, "how does this improve teacher motivation". As mentioned by PF$_4$:

> So I feel that perhaps - our focus on quality - which has been right, has been great and very crucial, perhaps we haven't opened up the discussion enough to teacher motivation.

This concern is confirmed in a report on a study of three developing countries (Zambia, Papua New Guinea and Malawi) by VSO:

> Academic and policy debates focus on teachers’ deficiencies and seldom take into account the difficulties under which they live and work (VSO, 2002:1).

This provides some evidence that there was more focus and prioritisation on the need to improve the quality of education and less focus on teacher motivation as a means of achieving the desired quality education. An example is the discussions on the school based mentoring (SBM) programme, where the PFs were consulted as a way to help improve teachers’ English proficiency skills and hence the quality of teaching and learning. There had been challenges associated with the SBM, where teachers and head teachers, the majority of whom did not speak English, had initially been demotivated by the introduction of English as a medium of instruction. This situation was not seen as a unique opportunity to help support teacher motivation by giving the
professional skills, but was seen as a process to bring about improved teaching and learning.

PM participants stressed that teachers, similar to other professionals, are indeed consulted on the design and implementation of teacher incentives. However, their views come as part of the general community who participate in the various consultative forums at the local and national levels. For example, teachers participate as members of the local administrative councils, as citizens or parents at district, sector, cell or village levels or in the National Dialogue Council (NDC). Below is a quote from policy level participant (PM2):

In a typical village administrative council in Rwanda, you will find a civil servant such as teacher, nurse, agricultural officer, etc. and this is aimed at their role in development, so again it fits within the setup of the decentralisation. The consultative processes that take place at such levels do not include or exclude teachers by virtue of being teachers primarily as a starting point.

PM participants seemed to concur on the view that teachers’ ideas cannot fail to have a framework through which to channel them because it is these teachers, wherever they are, who are the citizens and leaders within their local communities.

The responses above clearly indicate that there is no systematic process of consulting teachers in Rwanda. Yet, as beneficiaries, teachers should play a vital role in deciding on incentives that benefit them. If genuinely done, consulting teachers, particularly on issues concerning teacher incentives, is likely to have a huge impact on their motivation since they are more likely to feel valued than if they were not consulted. In some countries where teachers have been consulted on an issue to satisfy their immediate conditions and, in some cases, to end the strike, actual decisions made have not reflected teachers’ views. However, the point about being consulted in itself may be what can motivate teachers that is demonstrating that their views and opinions matter.
6.4.1 Teacher consultations on socio-economic incentives: A case of USACCO

Interviews with PM and PI stakeholders indicated that there was a mechanism in place to consult teachers on the design and implementation through the teachers cooperative. However, an interview with the PB indicates that the consultations were not done. PM3 said that:

According to the nature of the teachers’ cooperative, teachers participate in the design and implementation of the socio-economic incentives provided through USACCO. The process usually starts with teachers consulting among themselves, which contributes to the understanding of what it is that can be useful to them. A proposal is then drawn, which then goes through the USACCO’s general assembly. It is here that an endorsement of what they think suits the teachers best is made. Once this is done, the three relevant government ministries (MINEDUC, MIFOTRA and MINECOFIN) consult in a joint meeting to see whether the incentive scheme is financially viable and affordable; can attain the intended objectives [motivation of teachers]; and will not cause undesirable motivational implications to other civil servants.

In concurrence with PM3, PI2 said that:

What is more important is that teachers themselves are involved in making all the decisions regarding the USACCO, including the teacher incentives. They [teachers] are invited to a general assembly, which is constituted by only teachers. There is also a board of directors, which is composed of five members; and a supervisory committee composed of 3 members, all of whom are teachers. This year [2013] we reviewed the structure of USACCO, and carried out elections to fill the new positions of members of the general assembly. Previously the general assembly was composed of 300 teachers, 10 from each of the 30 districts. This has been reviewed, we now have one representative from the [416] sectors, [2,148] cells and school levels. The executive management at the headquarters is responsible for bringing together the ideas from teachers at the decentralised structures and to draft proposals which are presented to the board of directors for review before forwarding them to the general assembly for final decision.

Clearly, both PM3 and PI2 indicate that the issue of participation in decision-making in USACCO is considered important by the government through the structures of the
teachers’ cooperative. However, this perception was not shared by the policy beneficiaries interviewed in this study. PB4 said that:

Yes, we elect our fellow teachers to represent us in the cooperative. But I do not see how they come back to us for our opinions regarding the decisions to be taken. I just hear that a decision was taken. There is a problem here.

Evidently, the USACCO is one way that allows teachers to give their views regarding teacher incentives and this may be considered by teachers as motivating. However, as discussed above, if any proposals of a financial nature coming from the cooperatives’ general assembly are again subject to the consultative process involving the line ministries (MINEDUC, MIFOTRA and MINECOFIN), the possibility that the teachers’ views will take precedence will be diminished, hence, questioning the value of the consultation process at the USACCO level.

6.4.2 When it may not be productive to consult teachers: A case of financial incentives

PM level participants argued that in the case of incentives of a financial nature, such as teachers’ salary and other monetary incentives, it might not be productive to consult teachers regarding the design of such incentives. In such cases, the incentive is discussed at the macro level (involving the relevant ministries) and there is very limited involvement and consultation with teachers. PM3 indicated that the reason for this is that there is no need to fix an incentive which has financial implications, which the government may not afford to meet.

While, as discussed earlier, teachers in other SSA countries have a say on salary issues through their unions, this study shows that it is not the case in Rwanda. As seen in section 6.3.5, the teachers’ union in Rwanda cannot aggressively engage in industrial action, such as strikes, to demand teachers’ rights, as is the case in other countries in the region.
The incentive design process - normally in the form of setting or increasing the teachers' salary - originates from MINEDUC, which is responsible for teachers, and it goes through a consultative process as described in the interview with PM3:

We [MINECOFIN] do work with the Ministry of Public Service and Labour [MIFOTRA]. We [MINECOFIN] have a very critical role in setting the remuneration and incentive policy of public service and..... while MIFOTRA is the custodian of the policy, it [MIFOTRA] basically proposes the remuneration packages, the incentive packages and all that, we [MINECOFIN] then asks, whether these packages affordable, or not? ..and this is not only viewed only in the current year, but also in the medium term, for reasons of sustainability. And so our role as MINECOFIN is very critical to ensure that the incentive that are proposed are not only one-off incentives but incentives that are sustainable to keep the civil servants motivated. You know it would not make sense to motivate someone for one year and then in the next year the system is not working. So largely, we [MINECOFIN] basically look at the salary, that is the monetary incentives, but also at some other benefits and costs of those other benefits. Some of these benefits might be non-monetary but we try to attach the monetary value to that and look at the cost involved in total.

MINECOFIN’s role concerns incentives of a monetary nature, such as salary and other benefits. For example, according to PM3,

In the previous years, when government was considering increasing teachers’ salaries, there was a concern that a slight increase per teacher would lead to a large increase in the teachers’ wage bill and this would not be feasible in terms of the national budget. This is where the idea to channel the funds through the teachers’ loans, which is viewed to have long lasting motivational impacts, came up. If teachers had been consulted on this, they would have probably preferred to increase their salaries than invest in the USACCO.

But even in such contexts, it would have been ideal to allow teachers’ views to be heard, and this consultation is what they see as a motivating factor, as ‘consulting teachers does necessarily mean whatever teachers want is what they get. The reasons for not going for high salary increases could be explained to teachers and other alternatives (such as loans) presented to them, so consultation is still important and necessary. PM2 supported this argument in the following words:
With the increase in numbers of teachers in Rwanda to meet the 9YBE and 12YBE, it would be almost impossible to raise a sufficient budget to meet their incremental wage bill.

Therefore, while there are some teacher incentive policy decisions that may be supply driven as opposed to being demand driven (initiated by teachers), there are other frameworks such as USSACO general assembly where teachers are consulted.

However, teachers, on their part view it differently, PB₄, said that:

If I was consulted on whether to increase teachers’ salary or provide loans to teachers, my opinion would have been to have the teachers’ salary increased. Teachers’ salaries should be increased to the level of other professions in Rwanda, in this case, teachers can be able to access loans through banks like any other professionals and citizens.

The responses here clearly show that it is deliberate that teachers are not consulted concerning financial incentives, yet, as discussed earlier, pay and financial incentives are critical motivating factors. While teachers are likely to demand higher pay and financial benefits, by only listening to their demands, even if their opinion may not be approved, is likely to motivate them. The government should use this opportunity to explain to teachers why some of the options are not feasible and what the government intends to do to address their concerns.

6.5. Summary and conclusion

This chapter presented survey and interview responses on participants’ perceptions of how the incentives introduced by government during 2008-13, changed teachers’ motivation to teach. The findings were presented under two main themes: impact of extrinsic incentives, and impact of intrinsic incentives. The chapter also pointed out issues arising from the study, which are likely to hamper achievement of the intentions of the incentives.

The chapter leads to a couple of conclusions. Foremost, in regard to extrinsic incentives, the teachers’ loan scheme (aimed to address teachers’ low pay and income differentials), on the one hand achieved its objective, at the same time was contentious
as to the likely impact on teacher commitment and classroom performance, as such potentially compromising the initial intention of the incentive. Although viewed as a short-term relief to teachers, timely payment of teachers’ salaries can be a good model for a cost-effective incentive which can create an immediate impact on teacher motivation. In such cases, salary increases are still necessary. Monthly salary top-ups from schools and coaching (although forbidden) are supplementary sources of teachers’ income, especially in urban secondary schools. Teacher households’ expenditures were surprisingly high, especially due to high dependence levels. The war and genocide in Rwanda left many without means to obtain basic needs, especially orphans. As a result, many Rwandans, teachers alike, have adopted dependents in their households, and for teachers with low incomes, this is a critical demotivator. The study highlights a serious deterioration of teachers’ work and living conditions, particularly as a result of the rapid enrolment of students in schools, without a corresponding increase in the supply of teachers (see DeJaeghere et al, 2006). As discussed earlier in regard to the SSA context, student indiscipline is not a motivational issue among teachers in Rwanda. Concerning intrinsic incentives, the findings show that teacher education and professional development is ranked among the highest motivators. While the status and vocational commitment of the teaching profession was reported better during 2008-13, teachers’ occupational solidarity and power was viewed as lacking in many aspects, which is likely to impact on teachers’ motivation. For example, the findings show that the teachers’ union was weak, with limited capacity to pursue teachers’ rights, including through industrial action such as strikes. Finally, the study shows that the participation of teachers in the design and implementation of incentives, especially those of a financial nature, is limited. Most of the decisions are unilaterally made by government. Disregard of teachers’ voices raises the issues of relevance, effectiveness and acceptability of the incentives from the teachers’ perspective.
CHAPTER SEVEN

7. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Introduction

Through an understanding of the process of teacher incentive policy change (top-down approach) and the gathering of empirical data on the perceptions of teachers (bottom-up approach), this study has identified key issues and challenges arising from the teachers’ incentives that were introduced by the GoR during 2008-13. This chapter starts with a presentation of the discussion on the key issues and challenges emerging from this study. It then presents their implications to policy and practice. It then discusses the researcher’s reflections on the research process, with lessons learnt concluding the thesis.

7.2. Contribution of the thesis

7.2.1 Significance of individual teachers’ characteristics to their motivation

The majority of teachers surveyed in this study work in publicly-funded rural schools; as such they are employed by the Government of Rwanda. As discussed earlier, with the exception of teachers working in private schools (catering for high-income groups), most teachers working in rural public school systems in many low income developing countries are poorly motivated due to low pay and poor work and living conditions (Hyde et al, 2005; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). Teacher incentive policies should therefore mostly be targeted to teachers in publicly-funded schools, particularly those based in rural areas.

The study found that most teachers are middle-aged (on average, 38.18 years) and many (60.5%) are male. The number of single teachers is one-third that of married teachers. The majority (58%) of the teachers in the study do not have a teaching qualification, and one-half are employed in rural schools. These findings resonate with earlier research findings which show that many single teachers, particularly the newly qualified, tend to be quickly de-motivated and unstable in the teaching
employment, being associated with high levels of transfers and attrition (see Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008). The male dominated teaching force is characteristic of most African countries, many of whom tend to stay in the teaching profession in their middle ages, after which, they tend to leave (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Moon, 2007). Female teachers at publicly-funded schools prefer employment in schools that are easily accessible and near major towns because they do not want to be separated from their spouses. There are pervasive cultural concerns about posting single female teachers away from their family homes (Bennell, 2004; Adelabu, 2005). In Rwanda’s context of a decentralised governance system, teachers are recruited and posted by their respective districts, and hence deployed in their home areas which may motivate them to teach.

Similar to teachers in most SSA countries, teachers in Rwanda tend to be motivated to attain training as a way of increasing their earnings, once they attain a higher qualification (Osei, 2006). As discussed earlier, teacher education and training is a major source of motivation (Michaelowa, 2002; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Musikanga, 2005; Urwick et al, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Kadzamira, 2006; Osei, 2006; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Olantunji, 2011).

Spouse separation was not a common incidence among the surveyed teachers. Nearly all married teachers were living with their spouses and family. Exceptions were identified in two of the most rural districts, that is Gisagara and Karongi, where for whatever reasons, 5% of the surveyed teachers were separated from their spouses, which could be an important de-motivator. An earlier study in Rwanda (Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008) had shown that between 15% and 25% of married teacher respondents were not living with their spouses, and this was a critical motivational issue, particularly for female teachers. This study shows that the incidence of spouse separation reduced during 2008-13, which is an indication of decreasing demotivation.

Teachers posted away from their spouses and family are likely to feel socially disconnected from their families, as such tend to be unstable and less committed to
their job. This arises from having to commute between school and home, usually over
the weekends, which involves incurring transports costs and expenses involved with
sustaining two homes, sometimes leading to absence from duty on Fridays and
Mondays.

Over half of the teachers in the survey work in rural based schools. Nearly twice as
many male teachers than their female counterparts were teaching in rural schools. This
is contrary to previous research which shows that male teachers tend to be
concentrated in urban areas and their female counterparts are concentrated in urban
schools (see Adelabu, 2005; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Kadzamira, 2006).
Teachers at rural schools do feel underprivileged, as working in rural schools is
considered to be more problematic and de-motivating than in urban schools, due
mainly to the poor working and living conditions. Female teachers prefer deployment
in urban schools so that they can live with their spouses and families, who usually live
and work in urban areas, where, as argued they feel safer, stable at work and motivated
to teach (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; UNESCO, 2014). Younger, better educated
teachers tend to prefer employment in urban schools, while their older, less well
educated counterparts find employment in rural schools motivating. Schools in rural
areas are composed of a majority of children from poor families, who may not be able
to motivate teachers and will likely have unqualified teachers (UNESCO, 2014; Wolf
et al, 2015).

The unattractiveness of teaching locations in rural schools can be a strong cause for
low teacher motivation. In most SSA countries, the size of the rural-urban differences
is huge, and being posted to a rural school is a strong disincentive (Mukyanuizi, 2005).
In Rwanda, the rural - urban gap has contributed to a wide inequality in teachers’
income between urban and rural areas, adding to the difficulty of attracting teachers
to rural areas (UNESCO, 2014).

As discussed earlier, in Rwanda, under the decentralised governance system, teachers
apply for teaching positions in schools located in their home districts, which tends to
make them feel more motivated. This is because locally based teachers are more likely to have a supportive extended family and social networks, and be known to the community around them. They are generally better off because of lower accommodation costs and access to productive assets, in particular land and animals. The cost of living is generally much lower in rural areas than their colleagues who are “strangers” (Hyde et al, 2005). The deployment of teachers should be increasingly decentralised and should be based on clear and transparent regulations that are strictly enforced. In Rwanda, the teaching posting process is decentralised, where each district undertakes an independent recruitment process.

The study found that teacher absenteeism was considered low. Nearly all surveyed teachers had not been absent from their teaching posts for more than 6 months during 2008-13. As such, teacher absenteeism was not considered a big problem. Exceptions (9%) said that they were: “attending a professional training programme”, or “had temporarily left teaching to do a short-term job” to earn some income. These findings partly support earlier research which showed that teacher absenteeism is mostly a result of low pay which sometimes forces teachers to engage in private tutoring that may reduce teachers’ commitment to their regular teaching jobs (see, Bennell, 2004; UNESCO, 2014). The design of teacher incentives should take into consideration such reasons that cause teachers to be absent from teaching.

The study found that teacher transfers were also uncommon during 2008-13. Indeed earlier research indicated that in Rwanda teacher transfer rates from one school to another are relatively low compared to other countries in SSA. The small size of the country may significantly contribute to these low transfer rates (World Bank, 2011). Many surveyed teachers said that they did not transfer between schools. The exceptional cases where teachers transferred were for “seeking employment in their home area”. Other reasons were: “seeking a higher income”; “seeking opportunities for professional development”; and “seeking a school with accommodation facilities”. Indeed earlier research showed that most teacher transfers can be signs of growing
levels of dissatisfaction and de-motivation with regard to pay and other conditions of service (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

In summary, the discussions above show the key characteristics of the surveyed teachers, and their significance to teachers’ motivation. It covers age, gender, qualification, deployment, spouse separation and teacher transfers and absenteeism. The findings show that teachers in Rwanda share a lot with their counterparts in the rest of the SSA countries in terms of how their individual characteristics influence the levels of their motivation. As such, governments where these teachers work, should take this into consideration when designing teachers’ incentive policies. Further research will benefit from exploring further, the real impact of specific teachers’ characteristics to their motivation.

7.2.2 Impact of extrinsic incentives: Emerging issues

The study identified various extrinsic motivational issues with different impact on teachers’ motivation. While some of the issues seemed to motivate teachers, others had a de-motivational effect. This section presents a discussion of the key motivational issues.

Foremost, the study found that in attempting to address the challenge of low teachers’ salaries, the GoR established the teachers’ savings and credit cooperative (USACCO). The aim was to provide low interest loans to teachers to run small income generating businesses. The GoR wanted to use these loans to offset teachers’ demand for salary increases. Indeed, this study noted that, some teachers have taken advantage of this to improve their income, as such, this has served the purpose as sought by the government. This then raises the concern about the possible impact of these loans on the performance at the school level, and in terms of the unintended consequences. By engaging in business activities, it is questionable whether the teachers’ time and commitment is not likely to be diverted away from their primary teaching job, hence rendering the loans counter-productive (UNICEF, 1999). As such, the study found that the impact of the loans were mixed. While the incentive policy makers and
implementers (largely from GoR institutions) unsurprisingly view the loans not to have negative implications on the performance of teachers, policy facilitators (largely from Non-Governmental Organisations), and most of the policy beneficiaries (teachers) view loans as a potential distraction for teachers from their main teaching job.

This study found that teachers do not have the entire autonomy to participate in the decisions regarding the incentives provided through USACCO. As a cooperative, it is expected to operate independently of the government. However, since its establishment its capital investment is provided by the GoR through the annual budget. The three-member supervisory committee is composed of special representatives from the GoR (specifically from the Ministry of Education), a structure that is unusual with cooperatives. While cooperatives in Rwanda are formally answerable to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MINICOM), the teachers' cooperative is, in addition to this, answerable to MINECOFIN and MINEDUC. This situation raises the issue of whether the cooperative operates fully autonomously, and whether teachers - who are the final beneficiaries of the incentives - feel that their needs are being addressed or not. The study found that, while it is expected that the teachers' cooperative would allow teachers to take decisions concerning their incentives, the reality seems to be different; the GoR provides guidelines on the choices and related decisions on the incentives, while the teachers are expected to adhere to them.

The timely payment of teachers’ salaries was viewed by nearly all participants in the study as an example of innovative low cost strategies for improving teachers’ motivation. For many years, teachers had been paid their monthly salary late, when most of the other civil servants had already received their pay. What seemed to be a simple issue took many years to fix. It was indeed possible that, while the issues of low salaries could not be address immediately, the timely pay of the teachers’ salaries was something that could easily be fixed. Perhaps, one reason for the unexplained delay is related to the bureaucracies in the decentralised governance system, where the salary payment process (and other educational issues) has to under-go various
approvals by a series of institutions at the central and decentralised levels. Salaries for some professions in the civil service, such as in health and agriculture, did not have to go through the long bureaucratic process, as such the salaries for these categories were paid on time. The substantial issue at hand was the responsibility of each of the institutions involved in the process and how these can be harmonised to avoid unnecessary delays. In other words, what had been lacking was for the relevant institutions to agree on their specific roles on this process.

The Ministry of Education took the initiative to bring all stakeholders together to agree on the roles and timing of the salary payment process. This initiative was made possible by the creation of the teachers’ management information system (TMIS) and the expansion of the banking system in Rwanda. As earlier discussed, an efficient and wide spread banking system is likely to increase the reliability of teacher salary payments, thereby enhancing working conditions and consequently their motivation (Mulkeen et al, 2007). Such can be an example of an innovative and less costly strategy which can be explored as alternative incentives to motivating teachers, especially in low-income and resource-constrained countries such as Rwanda.

The study found that the low salaries, especially in publicly-funded schools, mainly in urban areas, are supplemented by the parents and communities whose children study at that school. As earlier discussed, salary supplementation for teachers by parents and communities is common in many SSA countries where primary education is supposed to be free. Given the plight of teachers and lack of learning materials, parents are frequently expected to pay various charges (Bennell, 2004). This contribution is viewed with mixed opinions and serious contentions. Based on the policy of free and compulsory education, some parents view this as an ‘additional levy’, and feel that they should not contribute to the cost of educating their children, and as such view the contribution as a burden imposed on them. Others feel that it is their responsibility to supplement the government’s role in financing education in basic education by contributing to the cost of their children’s education. This is especially relevant in rural areas where poverty is high (UNESCO, 2014). Schools in
rural areas are composed of a majority of children from poor families, who may not be able to motivate teachers and will likely have unqualified teachers (UNESCO, 2014; Wolf et al, 2015). This has contributed to the wide inequality in teachers’ income between urban and rural areas, adding to the difficulty of attracting teachers to rural areas (UNESCO, 2014; World Bank, 2011). In effect, the parents’ committees, where they exist, decide the amount of financial contribution per parents’ household, which some parents pay and others do not. The Ministry of Education’s position is that the parents should be left to decide on their own - without government interference - the amount of contribution. Children whose parents have not paid the contribution cannot be victimised in anyway or denied the right to education. This situation leaves some parents, especially in rural areas, with the choice of not contributing, while many others contribute. The issue has been left hanging, and for the respective districts to regulate. This study found that 46% of the surveyed teachers indicated that they had received some top-up from their schools. Such contributions, if well-conceived and managed, can be motivating.

The study discovered that coaching or private tutoring, although prohibited, is another way through which teachers - especially those working in urban secondary schools - earn a secondary income. As discussed earlier, this ‘shadow’ education system is occurring in many countries and seen as being central to the means of survival adopted by teachers to meet their basic living needs (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). Due to its high prevalence, especially in rural secondary schools, some regard this vice as ‘an addiction’ since ‘everyone feels as though they must do it’ (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005). Similarly, in Rwanda, while the Ministry of Education has issued clear instructions against coaching, as the study established, coaching takes place, in the evenings, weekends and during holidays. The study however did not establish the extent to which it is done in schools as it was beyond the scope of this study. Further studies could explore more on this subject. It shows that teachers view coaching as an important alternative source of supplementary income to their official salary. Similar to other SSA countries, in Rwanda the opportunities teaching offers for
earning extra income (through coaching or private tuition) encourages many teachers to stay on despite their dissatisfaction with the official salary and other conditions of service. Unfortunately, this means many teachers invest very little professional energy into public schools. Teachers may pressurise their students to attend their private coaching classes instead of teaching them in class (Haq and Islam, 2005). In remote rural areas, some teachers use unauthorised persons to do their teaching so that they can focus on their own private businesses (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007).

The study further revealed that there is a longstanding-unresolved issue of income differentials among the various teacher qualifications levels (Advanced Certificate, Diploma and Degree), and between teachers and other professions in the public sector. This is coupled with a rigid salary structure for public funded schools - with limited progression within the three qualification groups (World Bank, 2011). This was a major constraint to teacher motivation. Recent research indicates that, teacher pay must be similar to that of professionals in comparable fields to avoid the risk of teachers losing motivation or leaving the profession” (UNESCO, 2014). It is apparent that, while GoR recognises this challenge, like many low-income countries (Ololube, 2006), Rwanda’s economic conditions cannot support teachers’ demand for rises in pay and benefits. In 2004 and 2006, attempts were made to harmonise the teachers’ salary among the teachers, and with other professions, but due to “fiscal constraints”, this was not fully realised. As such, income differentials still remain a major motivational challenge among teachers in Rwanda. The introduction of loans was therefore a useful attempt to improve the conditions of teachers, which some teachers confirmed, but it also appears that it might have a negative knock-on effect on professional practice.

The high teachers’ households’ dependence burden is another critical demotivating factor, which could be linked to the recent history of war and genocide in Rwanda. The war and genocide of 1994 left many orphans and devastated families and greatly reduced the capacity of communities, including teachers, to meet their own and community needs (see Veale et al, 2001; Obura, 2003; World Bank, 2004;
MINEDUC, 2005). For example, Veale et al (2001) noted that, 95% of children did not have adequate access to education and health facilities. The community capacity to provide community-based support to the orphans was greatly diminished (MINEDUC, 2005). While The Genocide Survivors’ Support and Assistance Fund (FARG) 18 compared to the numbers of orphans and their needs is insurmountable. As such, teachers, as part of Rwandan society, are faced with the social responsibility to cater for the orphaned children in Rwanda (MINEDUC, 2005). As such, the study found that most teachers who are faced with a high level of dependence, on their already low incomes, find this demotivating, which may explain why teachers feel demotivated given their low pay.

The study notes a relatively low teachers’ expenditure on health. This may be attributable to the existing public service medical insurance scheme which covers 85% of teachers’ medical bills. As such, the medical insurance benefits accorded to teachers, especially in rural areas in Rwanda, have been a major contribution to teachers’ motivation, as compared to many SSA countries where teachers still view rural areas unattractive because of the danger of disease and because healthcare is less accessible there (Towse et al, 2002; Mulkeen, 2007). The motivational benefits accruing from the health insurance scheme show that there are many other ways in which teachers can be supported to make up for the relatively low pay. As such, this could be viewed as an innovative contribution in the case of Rwanda. So although teachers complain that in absolute terms their pay is low, the other benefits they enjoy limit the impact of low salaries on their motivation.

A rapid expansion in the education system in Rwanda over 2003-2014 impacted on teachers’ motivation. During the post-genocide period, children had earlier been denied access to school (see Obura, 2003) because of the discriminative ideology characterised by past governments. Rwanda was also committed to the international

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18 FARG: a French acronym for “Fonds de soutien et d’Assistance aux Rescapés les plus nécessiteux du Genocide”, was established in 1998 by the GoR to provide shelter, health and bursaries to genocide needy survivors.
educational goals of access to education for all through an innovative 9YBE and 12YBE programme which led to 96.9% NER at primary level by 2011, from 72.9% in 2000 (see MINEDUC, 2013, 2014). The 9YBE and 12 YBE programme filled a gap over the first decade for young people who had missed out on schooling during the mid-1990s, ensuring that they were able to acquire primary education as a springboard for other opportunities. This drastic increase in the number of children in school immediately brought in several challenges, including poor work and living conditions to which teachers are subjected. Teachers complain of such poor conditions as: teaching double shifts, poorly performing students, lack of quality teaching materials, teaching large class sizes and teaching many hours. Policy makers perceive these to be short-term challenges, as more teachers are being trained in pre-service teacher training institutions. However, in the meantime, these conditions do not only impact on the performance of teachers but also leave them demotivated (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005; Chireshe and Shumba, 2011).

7.2.3 Impact of intrinsic incentives on teachers’ motivation

This study concurs with previous research in most SSA countries in regard to the relative importance of extrinsic and intrinsic motivators in respect of the teaching profession. While extrinsic motivators, including teachers’ pay, work and living conditions, are viewed by the teachers as the primary motivators, intrinsic motivators are also valued by teachers as important in the attainment of teachers’ motivation (see Shaari et al, 2002; Bennell, 2004; Musikanga, 2005; Hyde, et al, 2005; Adelabu, 2005; Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007; Bennell and Ntagaramba, 2008; Seniwoliba, 2013; Igbafe et al, 2015). For example, Michaelowa (2002) notes that intrinsic motivators become significant motivators only when teachers’ extrinsic needs are satisfied.

This study found that in Rwanda teaching had increasingly become a respectable profession during 2008-13. Three-quarters said that at the time of choosing a career, they opted for teacher training as their ‘first choice’. Many agreed on having a desire
for the teaching profession. While most said that ‘they were willing to continue teaching in the next five years’, over one-half said that ‘they would choose teaching if there was an opportunity to start over a new career’. This differs from what is happening in most of SSA. For example in Tanzania, most secondary school teachers choose teaching as a last resort (Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005).

Teachers in the study did not view the national teachers’ union as having the requisite capacity to operate as an effective professional organisation for all teachers’ needs, which seriously undermines occupational solidarity, particularly when negotiating with government. Evidence shows that occupations that have high levels of solidarity are much more likely to have higher levels of self-esteem and thus status and motivation (Bennell and Akyeampog, 2007). The teachers’ union leaders themselves showed less enthusiasm and ability to handle teachers’ issues in a manner beyond simply ‘advocacy’ (see section 6.3.5). As such, most of the teachers in the survey said that they were not members of the teachers’ union. During the period of this study, the teachers union covered only primary teachers. This explains why over 60% of the surveyed teachers said that they did not have confidence in the teachers’ union as a channel to express their views and grievances. The study revealed that the existing teachers’ union (SNEP) is politically weak to influence government’s decisions on teachers and to demand higher wages and better working conditions for the teachers (see, Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 2005; Hyde et al, 2005). The post-conflict context in Rwanda - where the last thing you would expect from a group of professionals is doing their advocacy and resolving their grievance through strikes - seemed to be a key issue determining the teachers’ union’s activity. Normally, teachers look up to their union as a channel through which to air their voices, but note the way to achieve it as a sensitive thing, given the context in Rwanda. Coupled with this is the limited capacity of the only one teachers’ union in terms of under-staffed human resource, poor legislation and financial capacity. As such, this hampers the union’s potential to carry out their mandate effectively, and specifically to exert any pressure on the government
in demanding teachers’ rights. As such, the union heads resort to an advocacy approach as the only means of showing teachers’ plight.

In absence of a well-functioning teachers’ union, there seem to be no systematic mechanisms in place in Rwanda through which teachers are consulted, which is likely to demotivate teachers. While the policy makers (PM) and policy implementers (PI) stakeholder (top level) participants perceived that consultations with teachers is carried out, responses from policy facilitators (PF) and policy beneficiaries PB (bottom levels) indicated limited and sometimes no consultations at all. The disregard of the voices of classroom teachers in decision-making is an old vice, especially in SSA countries, as conceptualized by Kingdon’s theory of agenda setting (DeJaeghere et al, 2006). Indeed, practices excluding the participation of teachers in decision making around issues that concern them affect their morale and are likely to lead to their de-motivation.

The teachers’ savings and cooperative organisation (USACCO) brings a unique model of teachers’ participation in decision-making regarding the social-economic incentives. Again, the study notes mixed views about the extent of teachers’ participation. While policy makers and implementers (top level) perceive that teachers fully participate in the design and implementation of the incentives through the administrative and decision making structures of USACCO (see chapter 2, section 2.7.3), generally policy facilitators, teachers’ union and teachers (who are the final beneficiaries of the incentives) feel that teachers’ role in the consultative process is not clear, sometimes missing, which is likely to diminish their morale. The study found that sometimes teachers are deliberately left out, especially when key decisions on incentives of financial nature are being made. The reason given by the ‘top level’ is that discussing with teachers on financial matters that concern them may not reach a conclusion. As such, the relevant ministries (MINECOFIN, MINEDUC and MIFOTRA) have the responsibility to take such decisions. In such cases, the government retains the power to decide for the teachers.
A number of key issues emerge from this study, which add to the existing debate and literature on teacher motivation, particularly in the SSA countries. First is the unique model of how teacher incentives introduced directly by GoR to raise teacher motivation can also produce some unintended consequences. For example, the study notes that the teachers’ loans initiative aimed at supplementing teachers’ low pay, and indeed this was seen as likely to achieve this objective. As a result, issues of the potential impact of these loans to teacher commitment and classroom performance came up. Secondly, the sensitivity deriving from a post-conflict context in Rwanda in which the teacher incentives were designed and implemented to motivate teachers. This produces a complex situation where the teachers’ union and savings organisation are constrained in terms of their participation in decisions regarding the incentives. As such, this compromises the perceived status and autonomy of these teachers’ agencies. Third is the role of innovative and cost effective strategies to motivate teachers, especially in resource-constrained countries such as Rwanda. The study found that while increases in teachers’ salaries are a challenge, timeliness in payment of teachers’ salary was easily attained and this improved teachers’ motivation.

7.3. Implications for policy and practice

In the context of a rapidly expanding education system in Rwanda, if teacher motivation is not appropriately addressed many children who live in rural areas will continue to receive poor quality education, and in the long term there is a risk of failure of the education system in general (Bennell and Akyeampong, 2007). As such, major improvement in teacher incentives, particularly in rural areas, is desired. The findings of this study naturally lead to some recommendations that may result in improving policy and practice that seek to increase teacher motivation in Rwanda.

Foremost, there is need for the GoR to recognise the importance of involving teachers in the design and implementation of the incentives that are intended for them. Teacher incentives need to be those that answer the real needs of the teachers. Currently, there is no systematic mechanism or channel through which teachers are consulted on issues
that concern them. The capacity of the teachers’ union to operate as an effective professional organisation for all teachers needs to be strengthened significantly. It should be recognised by government, its legal mandate reviewed to cater for all teachers, and be appropriately resourced in terms of financial and human capacity.

The involvement of teachers in the design and implementation of the incentives that are intended for their benefit, should be enhanced. The policy makers’ view that teachers are consulted indirectly in their other capacities, as part of the general community, as members of the local administrative councils, citizens or parents, is not sufficient and should not be taken as meriting their mainstream participation in the discussions on issues concerning the teaching profession. Instead strategies should be put in place to listen to the voices of classroom teachers.

There is a need to put in place mechanisms to enhance the professional recognition of teachers. The government and communities in Rwanda should communicate clearly to teachers that their contribution is valued, that they are important people in society and that their low pay is not because they belong to a profession in the civil service that is not recognised. GoR should go beyond this to demonstrate this by creating a more conducive work and living conditions for them. Teachers should be informed regularly of plans in the pipeline for improving their welfare and raising the status of the teaching profession in general. This should not only be done during a crisis or when teachers have complained, and not only by the Minister of Education; rather, it should be the responsibility of all levels of leadership, including the Head of State, the Prime Minister, Ministers, parliamentarians, the provincial Governors, District Mayors, so that this message is put across and in an effective way. Equally important is to recognise the role of the teachers’ union as the voice of teachers. But the union also needs to enhance its capacity and to widen its mandate to represent all basic education teachers, not only primary teachers. This will enable it to perform its role especially in the design and implementation process of teacher incentive policies.
A particular challenge is in regard to the current teacher remuneration structure in publicly funded schools in Rwanda. It does not permit the upward movement in terms of promotion and salary rise for the teachers. There is need to harmonise the pay structure among the teachers and across the professions in the public sector. As a basic requirement, teachers’ salaries should also be increased to match those of other public servants. The national budget share of teachers’ salaries should be increased progressively each year, mindful of the fact that increased remuneration and improved career progression both have significant costs, but the benefits to teachers’ motivation are possibly more.

Some of the teacher incentive policies that were designed are still pending approval, while others were approved but have not been implemented, either partly or fully. It seems that the design process does not carefully consider most of the key aspects and assumptions that can lead to the successful implementation of the incentive, for example, the implementation of the Rwanda Public Sector Pay and Retention (RPSPR) policy which was aimed at increasing teachers’ pay and harmonising it across the entire public service, was hampered by fiscal constraints. Again this could be due to the limited consultations with the teachers. As a result, their implementation usually fails. Realistic considerations should be made in the design of the incentives so as to avoid making policies that will remain on shelves. It is necessary for the GoR and stakeholders to consider realistic and attainable teacher incentive policies.

There is need to recognise teaching as a distinct and valued profession within the public service, governed by its own code of professional ethics, and to offer attractive pathways for the teaching profession by establishing the teaching profession as a career pathway. The TDM policy (MINEDUC, 2007) approved in 2007 proposed various policy documents most of which at the time of this study were in draft form pending validation and approval. As such, there is need to expedite the approval and pave the way for the implementation of the: special teachers’ statute (to treat teachers as an independent profession with its own recruitment, training and promotion programme, and its own retirement benefits scheme; the national teacher registration
system (as a tool for teacher management at central and decentralised levels); the national teacher licensing system (which will define the teaching profession career pathway); the national teacher code of conduct (to define the professional standards for teachers); terms and conditions of services (which will serve as a guide to treating teachers); and the teacher appraisal and evaluation system (that will define the way teachers would be assessed and evaluated for improvement and for career progression).

7.4. Reflections on the methodology

This research project involved a mixed methods design, underpinned by both the constructivists and positivists theories. As such, the methods were varied. Quantitative data was largely collected through a survey, while qualitative data was obtained through interviews. These were complemented by a review of reports and databases. By combining both approaches, this research generated rich data which helped me to derive the contributions to existing knowledge on teacher motivation, with focus on Rwanda and the SSA region in general. I was able to construct a basis for generating an understanding of the issues concerning teacher motivation in Rwanda, thus this research has contributed to the clarification of both the literature and methodology for future research on teacher motivation.

Initially, my research was planned to be a longitudinal design, the intention was to monitor - over a five-year period between 2008 and 2013 - the changes in teachers’ motivation by studying the same teachers surveyed by Bennell and Ntagaramba (2008). This was not possible since the survey data on teachers was anonymised, and as such, it was not possible to link the earlier study with the current one. Upon realising this, the design was modified, maintaining the Bennell and Ntagaramba mixed methods study design and aimed at providing an understanding and evidence on the impact of incentives and the perceived changes in the teachers’ motivations following the introduction of new incentives during the 5 years (2008-13).
While the MM research design was appropriate for this study, I found it challenging in several ways, given its complex nature. At first I was indeed apprehensive of these challenges. The MM research design involves a multitude of choices within and between the qualitative and quantitative components; for example, the choices of an appropriate paradigm, methods, tools, points of integration of the data and so on. As such, this required me to be more knowledgeable and critical about the MM research theory and the different research steps and techniques associated with research design, specifically during sampling, data collection and data analysis stages. I spent a lot of time searching and reading the voluminous literature on this MM research design and understanding the ontological and epistemological methodological underpinnings associated with it.

Indeed it could have been possible to employ a monomethod approach, due to reasons of easiness, theoretical and methodological straightforward, less complexity, time and cost considerations. But owing to the complex nature of the topic of “teacher motivation and the RQs, (top-down and bottom-up approach), it was appropriate to employ a mixed methods design.

Another methodological challenge was in regard to the possible bias resulting from my relationship between the participants. I was confronted with the question of how, as a member of the Ministry of Education who is conducting an unbiased investigation with the participants with whom we have been interacting, and who perceive that I am in a senior position to theirs, I would ensure that the study would be free of bias. As such, although I presented myself as a detached outsider during the study, I wonder whether the responses given were completely as they were if it was someone a truly outsider researcher. During the interviews, I maintained an interactive approach which allowed mutuality, especially during the interviews.

In general, the journey has been both challenging and rewarding and I believe that the research has adequately addressed the key research questions, made a unique
contribution to the knowledge base and drawn out some valuable recommendations for improving policy and practice on teacher motivation in Rwanda.

7.5. Some lessons learnt from the study

The professional doctorate in general and the research in particular has been a life changing experience. As such, the process has been fulfilling and a form of capacity building. Specifically, as a member of the Ministry of Education management team, the doctorate has exposed me to scientific inquiry into the theoretical and empirical reality on teacher motivation, and what the GoR is doing to improve the motivation of teachers in Rwanda. As such, the study brought me closer to the teachers than before and has left me with a better understanding of their views and plight.

I am now in a much better position to question relevant policy issues, such as the extent to which teachers - the ultimate beneficiaries of the teacher incentives - perceive they have been motivated by the incentives introduced by the GoR, and the extent to which they are consulted in the design of incentive policies.

I perceive that, completing the doctorate programme is not the end in itself but an impetus in my various roles at the Ministry of Education to contribute to the improvement of teaching and learning in Rwanda.

7.6. Areas for further research

As a result of undertaking this research, I have realised that there remain many areas of uncertainty that are worth more research. As such, this study could invoke further studies. Some of these areas are presented here below.

First, future studies could explore the impact of individual teacher characteristics to their motivation. In particular, the relationship between: teachers’ age, gender, civil status, spouse separation and their levels of motivation; and whether, or how these characteristics depict variations in teacher motivations between primary and
secondary school teachers; and between teachers employed in public and private schools or rural and urban settings.

Secondly, this study focused on the extrinsic and intrinsic factors of motivation and how they impact on teachers’ motivation to teach. It did not explore the connection between teachers’ motivation and their criticized and undesirable behaviours (such as teacher absenteeism, lack of preparation, encroachment of private tuition on classroom teaching time, sexual abuse, and corruption), and improvement in the quality of teaching and learning. Hence, it is possible to argue that poor teachers’ work and living conditions (such as poor housing) contributes to low teacher motivation, but how does it possibly relate to quality teaching and learning? Future studies in this area would help unpack the black box that obscures the relationship between teachers’ conditions, their level of motivation and improvement in teaching and learning.

Thirdly, teacher professional development was identified in this study as a key intrinsic motivator. While the GoR provides opportunities for teachers to pursue all forms of education and training, teachers have also sought for these opportunities themselves. It was also revealed that some teachers, especially in secondary schools, pursue non-education qualifications, which is revealing their intentions to leave the teaching profession. Owing to the important role of teacher competence to the motivation of teachers, the question of how the professional development of teachers can be organised by GoR and the various stakeholders so as to enhance the commitment of teachers is another area that can be explored further.

Finally, the study established that the impact of the loans offered to teachers by USACCO were viewed with mixed perceptions by teachers and other stakeholders, particularly in regard to their consequences for teachers’ commitment to teaching and motivation. As such, whether these loans are actually leading to the intended objectives or are a distraction for teachers from their teaching job, would seem to be an interesting topic to explore further.
7.7. Concluding remarks

Similar to many countries in the World, Rwanda needs teachers who are well trained and motivated to teach the increasing number of children in basic education. However, as this study noted, many Rwandan teachers have very low levels of motivation, which is detrimental to children learning (VSO, 2002). The fundamental importance of the teachers’ role in ensuring effectiveness in education must be recognised, understood and taken into account in order to secure and strengthen their own commitment to achieving quality education for all (VSO, 2002).

The Rwandan education delivery system, similar to many in SSA countries, is characterized by among others: poor working and living conditions, a lack of resources, low salaries and poor teacher management (including recruitment, deployment, career advancement, motivation, incentives and retention) (Dembélé and Rogers, 2013). These characteristics drain the motivation of even the most energetic and committed teachers. Likewise, the low regard with which teachers are often held, the low status of the teaching profession in many contexts, the professional hopelessness many teachers feel and education systems in which teacher voice is excluded. Not surprisingly, the result is a teaching force that is at high-risk for non-compliance of duties, attrition, poor performance, professional misconduct and poor well-being which further depresses motivation. This in turn weakens the overall system and depresses the quality of teaching and learning.

From a policy and practice stance, there is need for the Rwandan Ministry of Education to understand teacher motivation for several reasons. First, motivated teachers are more prepared to implement educational reforms and less likely to be absent or leave the teaching profession (Jesus and Conboy, 2001), which results in substantial savings in terms of recruitment and retraining costs. Second, teacher engagement is an important determinant of student academic success. Third, teacher well-being (both a cause and effect of teacher motivation) is also an intrinsically desirable outcome.
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19 In 2004, MIFOTRA was known as Ministry of Public Service, Skills Development, Vocational Training and Labour.


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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Organisation of the Rwandan education sector: structure and roles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Roles and management responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINEDUC</td>
<td>District and sector administrations have responsibility for various basic services, including education, and do not fall under the direct authority of MINEDUC. Typically, the District Director of Education, Youth, Sports and Cultural Affairs spends 80 per cent of his or her time on education and has a dedicated assistant for this role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous education agencies</td>
<td>Rwanda Education Board, Workforce Development Authority and Higher Education Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts (30)</td>
<td>Overall district school management: planning, budgeting, implementation and monitoring; secondary school supervision; new and expanded school planning in conjunction with the Central Construction Unit; teaching staff allocation from enhanced staff recruitment numbers; teacher payroll preparation; and MINEDUC policy implementation. Heavy involvement in policy implementation, monitoring, and, to a lesser extent, school performance monitoring, especially in respect of publicly funded schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectors (416)</td>
<td>School action planning and annual budget preparation, with the participation of teachers and pupils (at both primary and secondary levels), and presentation at general meetings with the community for approval; expenditure monitoring through the School Management Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>School budget planning and spending, and general administration require school–community joint approval, which is implemented through the Parent Teacher Association and Parent Teacher Committee, and school leadership–community liaison, respectively.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2011: p.37) report.
Appendix 2: Components of the TMIS in Rwanda

Components of the TMIS in Rwanda

1. **National Teacher Registration System** - to be the cornerstone of teacher management at central and decentralized levels.

2. **National Teacher Licensing System** - to provide motivation, quality assurance for teachers and create a teaching profession career pathway.

3. **National Teacher Code of Conduct** - to define the professional standards for teachers in Rwanda, including the pedagogical and professional knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes needed by teachers to teach in primary and secondary schools of Rwanda.

4. **Terms and Conditions of Services** - a guide to treat teachers fairly in their professional development and act as a motivator for teachers to take teaching as a valuable profession that offers livelihood and carrier path.

5. **The Teacher Appraisal and Evaluation System** - to define the way teachers in primary and secondary schools, at different levels of their profession, would be assessed and evaluated for improvement and for career progression.

*Source: MINEDUC (2010)*.

Appendix 3: The GoR funding disbursement plan for USACCO

The GoR funding disbursement plan for *Umwalimu* SACCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount to be disbursed (Billion RWF)</th>
<th>Cumulative amount (Billion RWF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 3</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 4</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 7</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 8</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 9</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 10</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Rwanda Cabinet resolutions dated: 31 October, 2012*
Appendix 4: Survey questionnaire

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR TEACHERS SURVEYED IN 2008, AND ARE STILL IN THE TEACHING EMPLOYMENT IN 2013

My name is Emmanuel Muvymi, a doctoral student at the University of Sussex (UK). I am carrying out a study on teacher motivation in Rwanda. The study is entirely for academic purposes. As part of this study, I am administering a questionnaire with teachers who participated in the Bennell and Ndagaramba (2008) study, including yourself.

I am requesting you to complete this questionnaire. It should take between 15-20 minutes. Your responses will be kept anonymous and confidential. I will ensure that any information I include in the report does not identify you as the respondent.

---

INSERT A TICK [✓] AGAINST APPROPRIATE RESPONSE(S) OR FILL IN THE APPROPRIATE INFORMATION

SECTION A: PERSONAL INFORMATION: Fill in the following information
First name:............................................

1.1 Family name:............................................

1.2 What is your gender? [ ] Male [ ] Female

1.3 What is your age? .............................. (Years)

1.4 Marital Status: [ ] Single [ ] Married [ ] Divorced [ ] Widowed [ ] Separated

1.5 If married, do you currently live with your partner? [ ] Yes [ ] No

1.6 Is your spouse working? [ ] Yes [ ] No

1.7 If Yes, is your spouse employed as a teacher? [ ] Yes [ ] No

SECTION B: TEACHING EMPLOYMENT: Fill in the following information

2.1 Which best describes your current school setting? [ ] Rural school [ ] Sub-urban school [ ] Urban school

2.2 Are you teaching in the same school in which you were teaching in 2008? [ ] Yes [ ] No

2.3 If NO, why did you change school?
[ ] To seek for a higher income
[ ] To seek for a school with accommodation facilities
[ ] To seek for a location with a low cost of living
[ ] To seek for opportunities for professional development
[ ] To seek for a school near my home area
[ ] To seek for a school with a conducive administration

2.4 Were you absent from school for more than 6 months during 2008-13? [ ] Yes [ ] No

2.5 If YES, what was the reason for your absence?
[ ] I was attending an in-service (short) training course
[ ] I was attending a teacher professional training programme
[ ] I was sick/my family member(s) was/were sick
[ ] I had temporarily abandoned teaching so as to look for other income generating activity
[ ] I was on my annual leave
[ ] I had been suspended from work by my employer
SECTION C: EXTRINSIC MOTIVATORS INTRODUCED DURING 2008-13

The objective of this section is to assess the teachers' knowledge of the extrinsic incentives introduced during 2008-13 and their perception on whether these incentives changed, or not, their levels of motivation to do their job.

TEACHERS' SALARY, ALLOWANCES AND OTHER INCOMES

3.1 Is your salary paid by Government? [ ] Yes [ ] No
3.2 If YES, do you receive a supplementary income from your school? [ ] Yes [ ] No
3.3 Do you receive income from activities other than the teaching employment? [ ] Yes [ ] No
3.4 How can you describe the changes in your net monthly income between 2008 and 2013?
   [ ] Increased [ ] Remained the same [ ] Reduced
3.5 If your net monthly income increased, by how much did it increase?
   [ ] 1% and below [ ] 11-35% [ ] 36-60% [ ] 61-85% [ ] 86-100% [ ] Over 100%
3.6 If your net monthly income increased, what are the main reason for the increase?
   [ ] Due to a Government decision/policy to increase teachers' salary
   [ ] Due to annual statutory salary increases [ ] Due to a higher qualification that I obtained
3.7 When was your previous salary increase? [ ] Within last 6 months [ ] within the last 1 year
   [ ] within the last 2 years [ ] More than 1 year ago
3.8 Did you or teachers at your school receive their pay on time during the past 6 months? [ ] Yes [ ] No
3.9 Which of the following allowances are you currently entitled to?
   [ ] Housing [ ] Health insurance [ ] Transport [ ] Pension [ ] Childcare
3.10 What is the impact of your current salary, allowances & other incomes to your motivation to teach?
   [ ] Motivating [ ] De-motivating

TEACHERS' EXPENDITURES AND COST OF LIVING

4.1 What is your current (2013) monthly expenditure on the following items? [Fill in the amount]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>(Rwf)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1 Housing</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.2 Food</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.3 Transport</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.4 Personal/Family health</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.5 Children/personal education</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.6 Others (specify)</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 How many biological children depend on your income?...
4.3 How many other legal dependents depend on your income?...
4.4 What is the impact of the level of your expenditures & cost of living to your motivation to teach?
   [ ] Motivating [ ] De-motivating

TEACHERS' WORKING CONDITIONS

5.1 Which of the following working conditions are the teachers in your school currently experiencing?
   [ ] Double shifts [ ] Large class sizes [ ] High teaching load
   [ ] Lack of quality learning materials [ ] Poorly performing students
   [ ] Limited teachers' participation in decision making

5.2 Do the existing working conditions at your school motivate teachers to teach? [ ] Yes [ ] No
TEACHERS' ACCOMMODATION

6.1 What is the nature of ownership of teachers' accommodation at your school?
[ ] Owned by the school [ ] Owned by teachers [ ] Rented by the school [ ] Rented by teachers

6.2 Describe the conditions of the accommodation in which teachers of my school live during 2008-13:
[ ] Deteriorated [ ] Remained the same [ ] Greatly improved

6.3 What is the impact of the existing accommodation facilities at/around your school towards your motivation to teach?
[ ] Motivating [ ] De-motivating

IMPACT OF HEALTH

7.1 The teachers at your school become healthier than before, during 2008-13.
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] Strongly agree

7.2 The teachers' health status had a negative impact on their motivation to teach.
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] Strongly agree

STUDENT BEHAVIOUR

8.1 What is the current situation of student indiscipline at your school? [Tick in the appropriate box]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Excessive</th>
<th>Few</th>
<th>Not aware</th>
<th>Existing</th>
<th>Non existent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bullying and fighting fellow students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indecent language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Destroying school equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fighting teachers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Drug use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Genocide and discriminatory ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2 The extent and frequency of student indiscipline in my school during 2008-13:
[ ] Worsened [ ] Increased [ ] Remained the same [ ] Reduced [ ] Completely eliminated

8.3 What is the impact of the student behaviour to your motivation to teach?
[ ] Motivating [ ] De-motivating

SCHOOL LOCATION

9.1 What is the distance from your residence to the nearby trading centre, town or city? ............ (in Kms)

9.2 What is the distance from your residence to your school? ................. (in Kms)

9.3 Do you spend any money for transport between your residence and school? [ ] Yes [ ] No

9.4 If YES, how much do you spend on average per day? ......................... (RuF)

9.5 If NOT, by which means do you get to school? [ ] I walk [ ] I ride my own bicycle/motorcycle

9.6 How do you describe the changes in your daily expenditure on transport between your residence and school during 2008-13?
[ ] Reduced significantly [ ] Reduced [ ] Remained the same [ ] Increased [ ] Increased significantly

SCHOOL INFRASTRUCTURE

10.7 Which of the types of school infrastructures below currently exist at your school?
[ ] Classrooms [ ] Science laboratory [ ] Administration offices [ ] Kitchen & Dining hall
[ ] Fencing & school environment [ ] Toilets [ ] Teachers' housing [ ] Sports grounds
10.8 Do you agree that the conditions of school infrastructure at your school improved during 2008-13?
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] strongly agree

10.9 What is the impact of your school location and infrastructure to your motivation to teach?
[ ] Motivating [ ] De-motivating

10.10 Which ONE of the following work conditions do you consider key in determining your motivation to teach? (Insert a tick)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teaching double shifts</th>
<th>Lack of quality teaching materials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large class sizes</td>
<td>Teachers' participation in decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High teaching load</td>
<td>Poor performing students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION D: INTRINSIC MOTIVATORS DURING THE PAST 5 YEARS (2008-13)

The objective of this section is to assess the teachers' knowledge of the new intrinsic incentives introduced during 2008-13 and their perception on whether these incentives changed, or not, their levels of motivation to do their job.

TEACHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING

11.1 During 2008-13, I sought for opportunities to pursue further studies on my own [ ] Yes [ ] No

11.2 During 2008-13, I was given an opportunity by my employer to pursue further studies [ ] Yes [ ] No

11.3 What level of teacher professional training did you pursue during 2008-13?
[ ] Masters [ ] Bachelors/As[ ] Diplomas/A [ ] Advanced certificate/A; [ ] Certificate/D

11.4 Did you attend any in-service short training course during 2008-13? [ ] Yes [ ] No

11.5 What motivated you to attend the professional and in-service training?
[ ] To obtain a teaching qualification which I did not have in 2008
[ ] To obtain a higher qualification and relevant skills I need to do my job better
[ ] To qualify for a raise in the pay
[ ] To merit promotion at the workplace
[ ] To raise my status so that I am respected at school and community around school

11.6 Do you consider teacher education and training a source of your motivation to teach? [ ] Yes [ ] No

TEACHER MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT

12.1 The administrators of your school show commitment and competence to lead the school well
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] strongly agree

12.2 The school management promotes good relationship between the various categories of teachers
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] strongly agree

12.3 Do you consider the way teachers at your school are managed & supported as a source of your motivation to teach? [ ] Yes [ ] No

TEACHER INSPECTION, PROMOTION AND TRANSFERS

13.1 During 2008-13, School Inspectors regularly visited your school
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] strongly agree

13.2 During 2008-13, promotions of teachers were well managed and done fairly
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] strongly agree

13.3 During 2008-13, transfers of teachers were well managed and done fairly
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] strongly agree

13.4 The ways in which teacher inspection, promotions and transfers are done at my school are sources of my motivation to teach.
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] Strongly agree
STATUS AND ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION:

14.1 During 2008-13, parents and community around your school got involved in school activities, and provided support to your school:
[ ] strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] Strongly agree

14.2 During 2008-13, teachers in your school were respected by the parents and community around the school:
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] Strongly agree

14.3 During 2008-13, teachers at your school participated in teacher incentive policy decision:
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] Strongly agree

14.4 During 2008-13, teaching has increasingly become a respectable profession:
[ ] Strongly disagree [ ] Disagree [ ] Not sure [ ] Agree [ ] Strongly agree

VOCATIONAL COMMITMENT

15.1 Which of the factors below motivated you MOST to remain in the teaching profession until today?
[ ] I have a personal strong desire for the teaching profession, I regard teaching as a calling
[ ] I want to use the teaching profession as a "stepping stone" to my other preferred profession
[ ] I failed to secure alternative employment opportunities
[ ] I was receiving a sufficient pay with my teaching employment
[ ] I benefited from the long school vacation while students are on holidays

15.2 If you had the opportunity to start over in a new career, would you choose to become a teacher?
[ ] Yes [ ] No

15.3 Do you intend to continue teaching in the next 5 years?
[ ] Yes [ ] No

OCUPATIONAL SOLIDARITY

16.1 Are you currently (2013) a member of SNEP teachers union?
[ ] Yes [ ] No

16.2 If YES, do you consider SNEP as a source of your motivation to teach?
[ ] Yes [ ] No

16.3 Are you a member of Unionilim SACC0 teachers' cooperative?
[ ] Yes [ ] No

16.4 If YES, have you benefited from the incentives offered by USACCO since 2008?
[ ] Yes [ ] No

16.5 If Yes, do you consider the Unionilim SACC0 to be contributing positively to your better welfare and hence a boost to your level of motivation to teach during 2008-13?
[ ] Yes [ ] No

16.6 How do you describe your level of motivation since 2008?
[ ] Declined significantly [ ] Declined [ ] Remained the same [ ] Increased [ ] Increased significantly

Thank you for completing this survey.
Appendix 5: Interview guide for policy makers (PM) stakeholder group

Interview guide for policy makers (PM) stakeholder group

(OPM/MINEDUC/MIFOTRA/MINECOFIN)

Introduction: Self introduction, name and general affiliation

Purpose of the interview
Since 2008, a number of teacher incentives have been implemented in Rwanda with the aim of improving teacher motivation. It is not known how far these incentives have led to changes in the motivation of teachers. The purpose of this study is to understand how these incentives have impacted on teacher motivation during 2008-13, and how that is the teaching profession is better or not, than what it was back before 2008.

You are requested to participate in this interview. The interview is estimated to take 45 minutes to 1 hour. It will be flexible depending on your convenience. In the event that it takes longer, or if extra time will be required as a result of the flow of our interactions, I will request you for your convenient additional time. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I can’t possibly write fast enough to get it all down. I, therefore, intend to audio tape the session because I don’t want to miss any of your comments. All responses will be kept anonymous and confidential and I will ensure that any information included in the final report does not identify you as the participant.

Interview Begins

General information
1. Describe your role in the OPM/MINEDUC/MIFOTRA/MINECOFIN.
2. What (policy level) roles does the OPM/MINEDUC/MIFOTRA/MINECOFIN play towards improving teacher motivation in Rwanda?

RQ1: Awareness of and participation in the process of incentive policy change
1. What roles does OPM/MINEDUC/MIFOTRA/MINECOFIN have in the teacher incentive policy formulation process?
2. How do you describe the process through which teacher incentive policies are conceptualised, approved and implemented? Does the process involve consultations? If yes with whom? Are teachers involved? Why would you recommend the involvement, or not of teachers?
3. Have there been any noticeable trends during 2008-13 in the overall level of teacher motivation? Give reasons.
4. What further actions are needed to improve teacher motivation? (open-ended)
5. What do you think will happen if teacher motivation is not addressed effectively?

Thank you for participating in this study
Appendix 6: Interview guide for policy implementers (PI) stakeholder group

Interview guides for policy implementers (PI) stakeholder group
(REB/Umwalimu SACCO/District/School)

Introduction: Self introduction, name and general affiliation
Purpose of the interview

Since 2008, a number of teacher incentives have been implemented in Rwanda with the aim of improving teacher motivation. It is not known how far these incentives have led to changes in the motivation of teachers. The purpose of this study is to understand how these incentives have impacted on teacher motivation during 2008-13, and how that is the teaching profession is better or not, than what is was back before 2008.

You are requested to participate in this interview. The interview is estimated to take 45 minutes to 1 hour. It will be flexible depending on your convenience. In the event that it takes longer, or if extra time will be required as a result of the flow of our interactions, I will request you for your convenient additional time. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I can’t possibly write fast enough to get it all down. I, therefore, intend to audio tape the session because I don’t want to miss any of your comments. All responses will be kept anonymous and confidential and I will ensure that any information included in the final report does not identify you as the participant.

Interview Begins

General information

1. Describe your role at REB/Umwalimu SACCO/District/School.
2. What (policy implementation) roles does REB/Umwalimu SACCO/District/School play towards improving teacher motivation in Rwanda?

RO1: Implementation of the various incentives introduced during 2008-13

1. What teacher incentive policies have been approved by government, (or others) and implemented by REB/Umwalimu SACCO/District/School during 2008-13 to improve the level of teacher motivation in Rwanda?
2. How do you describe the process through which teacher incentive policies are conceptualised, approved and implemented in Rwanda?
3. Are teachers who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the incentive schemes involved? Or Consulted? Why would you recommend the involvement/consultation of teachers?

RO2: Changes in teacher motivation

1. Giving specific examples, explain how you understand the incentives have changed, or not, teachers' motivation to perform their job during 2008-13?
2. What further actions are needed to improve teacher motivation?

Thank you again for participating in this study
Appendix 7: Interview guide for policy facilitators (PF) stakeholder group

Interview guide for policy facilitators (PF) stakeholder group

(Introduction: Self introduction, name and general affiliation)

Purpose of the interview

Since 2008, a number of teacher incentives have been implemented in Rwanda with the aim of improving teacher motivation. It is not known how far these incentives have led to changes in the motivation of teachers. The purpose of this study is to understand how these incentives have impacted on teacher motivation during 2008-13, and how that is the teaching profession is better or not, than what is was back before 2008.

You are requested to participate in this interview. The interview is estimated to take 45 minutes to 1 hour. It will be flexible depending on your convenience. In the event that it takes longer, or if extra time will be required as a result of the flow of our interactions, I will request you for your convenient additional time. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I can’t possibly write fast enough to get it all down. I, therefore, intend to audio tape the session because I don’t want to miss any of your comments. All responses will be kept anonymous and confidential and I will ensure that any information included in the final report does not identify you as the participant.

Interview Begins

General information

1. Describe your role at UNICEF/IEE/VSO/VVOB/Wellspring
2. What (policy facilitation) roles does UNICEF/IEE/VSO/VVOB/Wellspring play towards improving teacher motivation in Rwanda?

RQ1: Awareness of teacher incentives introduced during 2008-13

1. What are the teacher incentives which UNICEF/IEE/VSO/VVOB/Wellspring has facilitated in implementing them during 2008-13? In your opinion, how have these incentives contributed in improving teacher motivation in Rwanda?
2. In your opinion, how were these incentives designed, and implemented?
3. Did UNICEF/IEE/VSO/VVOB/Wellspring participate in the design of these incentives?
4. In your opinion were the teachers, who are the final beneficiaries consulted? And in your opinion, what implication does this have to level of teacher motivation?

RQ2: Awareness of and participation in the process of incentive policy change

1. In your opinion, have there been changes in the teachers’ motivations during 2008-13?
2. What should be done to improve teacher motivation?

Thank you for participating in this study.
Appendix 8: Interview guide for the teachers' union

Interview guide for the teachers' union
(National Primary Teachers' Union)

Introduction: Self introduction, name and general affiliation
Purpose of the interview

Since 2008, a number of teacher incentives have been implemented in Rwanda with the aim of improving teacher motivation. It is not known how far these incentives have led to changes in the motivation of teachers. The purpose of this study is to understand how these incentives have impacted on teacher motivation during 2008-13, and how that is the teaching profession is better or not, than what is was back before 2008.

You are requested to participate in this interview. The interview is estimated to take 45 minutes to 1 hour. It will be flexible depending on your convenience. In the event that it takes longer, or if extra time will be required as a result of the flow of our interactions, I will request you for your convenient additional time. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I can’t possibly write fast enough to get it all down. I, therefore, intend to audio tape the session because I don’t want to miss any of your comments. All responses will be kept anonymous and confidential and I will ensure that any information included in the final report does not identify you as the participant.

Interview Begins

General information

1. Describe your role at SNEP.
2. What roles does SNEP play towards improving teacher motivation in Rwanda?
3. In your opinion, does SNEP operate freely and with no restriction from anybody?
4. Does SNEP participate in the design of teacher incentives policies?

RQ1: Awareness of the teacher incentives introduced by the GoR during 2008-13

1. Are you aware of the teacher incentives that were introduced in Rwanda during 2008-13? If yes, what are they? Which institutions introduced them?
2. How do you perceive these incentives to be answering the question of teacher motivation?
3. In your opinion, have the various teacher incentives in anyway impacted on the levels of teacher motivation during 2008-13? If yes, how?

RQ1: Awareness/participation in the process of teacher incentive policy change

1. How do you describe the process of teacher incentive policy formulation and implementation? Are stakeholders/SNEP/teachers consulted?
2. Why would you recommend the involvement, or not of teachers?
3. What were the main industrial action (if any) by teachers during 2008-13? What are the current demands by SNEP for the benefit of teachers?

Thank you for participating in this study
Appendix 9: Interview guide for policy beneficiaries (PB) stakeholders group

Interview guide for policy beneficiaries (PB) stakeholders group

(Teachers who left the teaching employment during 2008-13)

Introduction: Self introduction, name and general affiliation

Purpose of the interview

Since 2008, a number of teacher incentives have been implemented in Rwanda with the aim of improving teacher motivation. It is not known how far these incentives have led to changes in the motivation of teachers. The purpose of this study is to understand how these incentives have impacted on teacher motivation during 2008-13, and how that is the teaching profession is better or not, than what is was back before 2008.

You are requested to participate in this interview. The interview is estimated to take 45 minutes to 1 hour. It will be flexible depending on your convenience. In the event that it takes longer, or if extra time will be required as a result of the flow of our interactions, I will request you for your convenient additional time. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I can’t possibly write fast enough to get it all down. I, therefore, intend to audio tape the session because I don’t want to miss any of your comments. All responses will be kept anonymous and confidential and I will ensure that any information included in the final report does not identify you as the participant.

Interview Begins

Tell me a little about yourself: Non-threatening warm-up

1. Your name.................................................. Marital status: S [ ] M [ ] D [ ] W [ ] S [ ]
2. Your former school........................................ District:.................................
3. Qualifications and training: ......................... Date left teaching: __ / __
4. Current employment/occupation..................... Employer:.................................
5. Are you living with your partner? Yes [ ] No [ ]
6. Was your partner employed when you were still teaching? Yes [ ] No [ ]
7. Is your partner employed as a teacher? Yes [ ] No [ ]

RQ2: Reasons for leaving the teaching employment

1. What were the reasons for leaving the teaching employment? Was it entirely your own decision to leave teaching, or you were influenced by others? Explain the circumstances/process under which you decided to leave the teaching.
2. What have you been doing since after leaving the teaching employment? Do you find your new employment/occupation better than teaching? If yes/no, in which ways? Would you come back to the teaching employment in future? If yes/no, in which circumstances would this be? If no, what are the reasons for this?
3. What, in your opinion needs to be done to improve teacher motivation in general?
4. What do you think will happen if teacher motivation is not addressed effectively?

Thank you for participating in this study
Appendix 10: Participants' consent form

PARTICIPANTS' CONSENT FORM

Project approval reference: ER/EM95/1 Date of approval: 05/04/2013

I .......... (full name of participant) agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project explained to me and I have read and understood the information sheet, which I may keep for records. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to take part in one or several of the following research proceeding: participate in the questionnaire survey, be interviewed, be audio taped, make myself available for a further interview should that be required, be visited at my place of work or residence as will be necessary and agreed upon with the researcher.

I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either by the researcher or by any other party.

I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the research project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

Name: 

Signature ___________________________ Date: .... / .... / 2013

Address ___________________________ Tel: ___________________________

E-mail: ___________________________

Independent witness

I believe that .......... (full name of participant) understands the above project and gives his/her consent voluntarily.

Name: 

Signature ___________________________ Date: .... / .... / 2013

Address ___________________________ Tel: ___________________________

E-mail: ___________________________
## Social Sciences & Arts Cross-School Research Ethics Committee

### CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Number:</th>
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<td>School:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title of Project</td>
<td>Teacher motivation and incentives in Rwanda: An exploration into teachers’ perceptions of the changes in their motivation to teach during the past five years (2009 - 2013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principal Investigator: (Supervisor)</td>
<td>Emmanuel Muvunyi (Sabates)</td>
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<td>Expected Start Date:*</td>
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*NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures.

This project has been given ethical approval by the Social Sciences/Arts Research Ethics Committee (C-REC). Please note the following requirements for approved submissions:

- **Amendments to research proposal** - Any changes or amendments to the approved proposal, which have ethical implications, must be submitted to the committee for authorisation prior to implementation.

- **Feedback regarding any adverse and unexpected events** - Any adverse (undesirable and unintended) and unexpected events that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported to the Chair of the Social Sciences C-REC. In the event of a serious adverse event, research must be stopped immediately and the Chair alerted within 24 hours of the occurrence.

### Authorised Signature

[Signature]

### Name of Authorised Signatory (C-REC Chair or nominated deputy)

Professor Stephen Shute 05/04/2013
Appendix 12: MINEDUC’s permission to carry out research in Rwanda

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

Kigali, 14 December, 2012
Ref. 5938/12.00/2012

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
P.O BOX 622 KIGALI

Re: Permission to carry out research in Rwanda - No: MINEDUC/S&T/0112/2012

Permission is hereby granted to Mr. Emmanuel, MUVUNYI a student at the University of Sussex (UK) to carry out research on: "Teacher Motivation and Incentives in Rwanda - a mixed methods study of the teacher motivation trends over five years (2008-2013)". The research will be carried out in various districts in the country depending on the selected sample of teachers. Data to be used will include: national teacher records such as teacher recruitment and deployment, payroll and the teaching profession policy documents.

The period of research for which this permission is granted is one year, from 15th December, 2012 to 14th December, 2013. It may be renewed if necessary, in which case a new permission will be sought by the researcher.

This permission shall be cited in the final research report as follows: "Research conducted under permission No: MINEDUC/S&T/0112/2012".

Please provide Mr. Emmanuel MUVUNYI any support he may require in course of conducting this research.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Dr. Marie Christine GASINGIRWA
Director General,
Science, Technology and Research
Ministry of Education
Appendix 13: Statistics of teachers’ expenditure across survey districts

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<th>District</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Sum</th>
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Source: The Author

Appendix 14: Agreement on whether teachers were healthier or not during 2008-13

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<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<td>Disagree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
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<td>49.6</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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Source: The Author

Appendix 15: Agreement on whether teachers’ health status had a negative impact on their motivation to teach during 2008-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<td>Strongly disagree</td>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>27.9</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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Source: The Author