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Between Nationalisation and Globalisation: Male Same-Sex Politics in Post-War Japan

by

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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, September 2015
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:.............................................
Acknowledgements

It is not easy for anyone to write a doctor thesis, but I persevered to complete my study about nationalism. Between 2011 and 2016, I developed this study while I was observing two countries I deeply relate to – Japan and England – leaning towards nationalism and xenophobia. Japan has dramatically changed since the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami, and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011 as if people are trying to look away from their unforgettable loss and uncontrollable forces of nature and nuclear technology through nationalism. Perhaps, people might have needed to hold on to something stable and a nation has become the object of people’s desperate desire. In any case, from the opposite side of the Eurasia continent, I kept looking at how Japanese society has changed from what I remembered in a very short period. At the same time, I have lived as a foreign student in England and I experienced with surprise and anxiety how the public sentiment was turning anti-immigrant under the Tories’ austerity agenda and political campaigns. This study was also a challenge for me to understand how suddenly national politics and people’s minds can change, and to find hope for a better future.

I would like to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to my University of Sussex supervisor Sally R. Munt, who gave me invaluable advice and inspiration during my Ph. D. research. Her encouragement really helped me, especially when giving me direction and casting a critical eye over my early research. She also helped me adapt to life in England which is the first country I have lived in outside of Japan.

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Finally thank you to my family, who provided me with help and patience to allow me to complete my thesis.

Kazuyoshi Kawasaka
Summary

This thesis employs an approach of discourse analysis on male homosexuality in post-war Japan from the viewpoint of the tense relations between Japanese cultural nationalism and the globalisation/Westernisation, along with the shifts of discourses of sexuality in the United States and the UK. Through analysing the discourses of sexuality in post-war Japan, I will theoretically indicate the historical and political relationship between problems of gender and sexuality, and national problems such as national identity between Japanese and Western cultures, ideal image of the nation, and its modern development. Firstly, I argue the works of Mishima Yukio (1925-1970), who is one of the representative writers in post-war Japan, especially famous for his gay-themed works and far-right political activism including his attempt of coup d’état. Then, I explore the political dynamics of gay shame in Japan, focusing on Togo Ken (1932-2012), a pioneer of Japanese gay activism who had challenged national elections since 1971 as an openly homosexual candidate. Next, I discuss how the AIDS crisis has changed the discourses of sexuality and the sense of national and cultural borders in Japan. I then discuss the Japanese homonormativity in the 2000s, analogous to Lisa Duggan’s new homonormativity in the US context. Finally, I analyse Japanese ‘LGBT’ political phenomena under the transnational influence of the Obama administration’s LGBT-friendly policy in the contemporary Japan, and point out problems under the influences of ‘global’ LGBT activism in contemporary Japanese society.
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Japanese names are provided in Japanese order (family name followed by given name). All English translations from Japanese text that appear in this thesis are the author’s work unless stated otherwise.
Introduction: Sexual Politics and Contradictory Narratives in Modern Japan

1. Introduction

This study explores how senses of cultural or national differences, or tension between Japanese nationalism and the presence of the West, have defined the sexual politics of male homosexuals in post-war Japan. Since its modernisation, Japanese sexual culture has often been discussed based on questions of whether it is a continuation of Japanese tradition or as a result of modernisation, or whether it is ‘indigenous’ culture or a ‘Westernised’ one. This way of asking aims to accent (un)changes in Japanese sexuality, constituting narratives that already presuppose the answers: either a narrative of ‘from “federal Japanese” to “Westernised Japan”’ or one of ‘looking for unique sexual habits in Japan which resist transformations of Westernisation’. Both narratives are based on temporality, which supposes that Japan is heading towards Westernisation or modernisation; therefore, the only question would be to what extent the project of Japanese Westernisation has achieved or failed. However, these analyses fail to explore the fundamental question that enables those narratives: *Why is it so important to presuppose a tense relationship between Japanese uniqueness and Western modernisation in order to analyse gender, sexuality and politics in modern Japan?*

In this research, I will change the question to analyse the sexual politics of male homosexuals in post-war Japan, focusing on the process rather than on the result. That is, I will investigate sexual politics in post-war Japan not by the question, ‘is it the result of Japanese tradition or of Western influence?’, but by the question of, ‘how have the dualism between Japanese tradition/national uniqueness and Westernisation/modernisation stimulated sexual politics and transformed it in post-war Japan?’ Focusing on the political dynamism associated with dualism between Japanese tradition/national uniqueness and Westernisation/modernisation, I will explore a more complicated process of sexual politics, rather than just ordering their political results, along with three political contexts.

Firstly, I will explore how the dualism between Japanese tradition/national uniqueness and Westernisation/modernisation defines relationships between Japanese nationalism and the sexual politics of male homosexuals. The dualism between Japanese tradition/national uniqueness and Westernisation/modernisation has often been utilised to
characterise male same-sex sexuality; either it is a part of Japanese traditional sexuality, for example the offspring of samurai’s same-sex sexual conduct, or as a result of Western cultural influence. These different characterisations closely associate with discourses of inclusion or exclusion of cultural nationalism. In this research, I will focus on Japanese nationalism in order to reveal the dynamism of political inclusions and exclusions, which is the foundation of politics through nationalism. Focusing on the imaginary national boundary, along with sexual politics in post-war Japan, I will try to analyse the frame of politics that conditions its members, means, purpose and historical and social contexts, as well as individual experiences, including personal emotions such as pride or shame.

Secondly, I will focus on discursive strategies of sexual politics to intervene in social issues in Japan. Cultural authority can occasionally be a useful political tool to attract social attention. Analysing discourses on sexual education in pre-war Japan, Sabine Frühstück points out that ‘the West’ had rhetorical and political functions: “‘The West’ was used as a synonym for certain claims to truth and the importance of scientific knowledge in general’ (Frühstück 2003, p.80). However, the cultural authority of ‘the West’ has not been stable in Japan, for instance, as ‘the West’ was perceived as ‘the foreign’ and understood as the source of danger, especially during the global AIDS crisis. In other contexts, calling for Japanese cultural nationalism can work well for another purpose, rather than using ‘the West’. Thus, in analysing sexual politics in post-war Japan, I will discuss the way in which the dualism between Japan and ‘the West’ enables particular political strategies for sexual minorities in each activism, and will emphasise how those political strategies have changed associated with changes in their situations.

Thirdly, analysing sexual politics through the dualism between Japan and ‘the West’, I will contextualise Japanese situations within international phenomena. Responding to the growth of international sexual politics in the 21st century, Ken Plummer (2015) pursues the possibilities of ‘cosmopolitan sexuality’ and international global movements. However, his view is still rooted in Euro-American centrism. For example, he writes about the historical development of the women’s movements as ‘moving largely from being Western-focused to being international’ (p.77). When we argue about ‘international global movements’ in the context of movements outside of the West, not only is this narrative inapplicable but also the Euro-American centric narrative itself has been one of the targets of activism. In this research, I will discuss international sexual politics from the viewpoint of post-war Japan and how the internationalisation of sexual politics has transformed Japanese political situations.
Through these viewpoints, this research aims to discuss male same-sex sexuality in Japan as sexual politics struggling and/or associating with the normative culture and politics in Japanese society, not just as a result of Japanese tradition or modernisation. In the following sections in this chapter I will discuss how the dualism between Japan and ‘the West’ has affected ideas of sexuality during modernisation in Japan, even as an essential factor to consider sexual politics in Japan.

2. Japanese or Western Culture? Contradictory Discourses and Narratives on Sexual Politics in Japan

2-1. Contradictory Discourses on Sexual Politics in Japan

Japanese sexuality has often been an object of Orientalism outside of Japan. Mark McLelland (2003), an Australian historian writing on Japanese sexual minorities, criticises the Western perspective on Japanese sexuality as a kind of Orientalism, which emphasises the social oppression of sexual minorities and applies a coming-out narrative – a narrative strongly connected to activism in Anglophone societies – to the people in Japanese society, where the history of sexual minorities is different from that of the West. On the other hand, Japan is sometimes caricatured as a place that has an overly liberated, quirkily developed, sexual culture dominated by technology and pornography. The Guardian (online) reports that many young Japanese men are not interested in a relationship with a woman any more, or even in having sex, as they are devoting their passions to virtual worlds: ‘Japanese women have become stronger socially and economically at the very same time that Japanese men have become more mole-lish and fully absorbed in virtual worlds, satiated by the very technological wizardry their forebears foisted upon them, and even preferring it to reality’ (Kelts 2011). Such Japanese sexual imagery indicates the dystopian future in which ‘feminism’ goes ‘too far’, as the article’s title, ‘Japan Leads the Way in Sexless Love’, suggests. The author of the article worries: ‘By 2009, the Japanese male’s lack of ambition, sexually or otherwise, had become a media meme. With the latest reports in Japan, of men who can’t get it up for real women who won’t get married or have kids, the mutual gender-chill phenomenon

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1 For his argument about the social and cultural differences in sexual politics between Japan and the West, see his article ‘Is there a Japanese “gay identity”?’ (2000).
has become mainstream. It may be the future, but is it really Japanese?’ (Kelts 2011). Although Japan is far from being a society gender-equality, coming 105th out of 136 countries in the World Economic Forum’s annual ranking of gender-equal countries in 2013, Japanese stereotypes – bizarre sexual cultures and technology – stimulate imaginary projections of the human future. These contradictory sexual stereotypes of Japan – premodern oppression and postmodern liberation – are cultural phenomena not only seen outside Japan. Indeed, there are many similar sexual stereotypes within Japan as well. In discussing Japanese sexual politics, I begin by introducing an intriguing discursive phenomenon in/about Japan, namely that these contradictory discourses coexist in society.

Firstly, there is a narrative that Japan is far behind the West in terms of sexual politics and sexual minorities’ rights.

These discourses emphasise the advanced aspects of Western societies and the backwardness of Japanese society. For example, Francis Conlan, translator from Japanese to English of a book by Japanese gay activists, writes in the Translator’s Note:

The Confucianist mentality, which favours uniformity and authoritarianism, would appear to be a major cause of Japanese society’s outward hostility toward homosexuality. […] The basic Japanese mentality is driven by the perceived validity of rigid hierarchy, conformity and obedience to authority. These values are so deeply rooted that the always difficult job of bringing about social change is even more difficult in Japan than in the West. (Conlan 2001, p. xv)

In this Translator’s Note, Conlan portrays Japan as a conservative and authoritarian society compared to the West. Similarly, Japanese news media introduce American and European society as being more LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender/sexual) -friendly compared to Japanese society. For example, a business magazine, Tokyo Keizai Magazine Online, in an article about LGBT movements at Oxford University, refers to the United Kingdom (UK) as the ‘leading country (senshin-koku)’ on LGBT human rights issues (Zixi 2012). In May 2013, the Japanese edition of The Huffington Post was launched, with a LGBT-related news story as one of its earliest articles (The Huffington Post 2013a). The article, entitled ‘Do LGBT take root in Japan? (LGBT wa nihon ni nezuku noka)’ reports Japanese social changes for sexual minorities who are newly called ‘LGBT’ in Japanese. At this time, the United States of America (US) is introduced as ‘the leading country of LGBT (LGBT senshin-koku)’, while Japan is described as a country that has slowly started to change towards acceptance of LGBT people. In these discourses,
Western societies are simply represented as the leading and developed societies on LGBT issues and sexual politics, whereas Japan is mentioned as a backward country compared to those of the West.

The second narrative is that Japan is different from the West, but Japan can learn from the West about sexual politics.

In the first book of Gay Studies in Japan, *Gei Sutadizu* [Gay Studies] published in 1997, the authors, Kazama Takashi, Kawaguchi Kazuya and Keith Vincent, started a controversy by pointing out the silence of homosexuals in history. They characterised homosexuals as the ‘silent people’ (Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent 1997, p. 19) in modern history. According to them, the silence of homosexuals consists not just of the lack of discourses by homosexuals. For instance, although they mention the existence of the gay pornographic magazine *Barazoku* in Japan in the 1970s, they do not count it as an example of a male homosexual voice that expresses homosexuals’ own interests and their future aims beyond sexual desire. Owing to the authors’ unique way of defining the silence of homosexuals, they trace the history of homosexuals’ voices in terms of Lesbian and Gay Studies. They define Lesbian and Gay Studies, that is, academic discourses by homosexuals, as their political voice, contrasted to the silence in the past. In their definition of Lesbian and Gay Studies, they characterise the academic discourses as parallel to the political movements of homosexuals, such as the Stonewall riots, German homosexual liberation movements in the late nineteenth century, and homophile movements in the United States in the 1950s. In their explanation of the history of Lesbian and Gay Studies, the homosexual political discourses only emerged in the West. Their genealogy of Lesbian and Gay Studies, focusing on the political background of homosexuals in its social context, is intended to provide a counter-discourse to Japanese academia. As Takemura Kazuko (2010), a feminist and queer theorist, notes, Japanese translations of academic works within Gender and Sexuality Studies were introduced as new intellectual trends in the United States, and were consumed in a process of depoliticisation:

This depoliticisation is the second consequence produced incidentally by recent sexuality studies. A typical example is shown in the reception of ‘queer theory’. Basically, this appellation is highly political, appropriating the derogatory term ‘queer’ in a performative way and transforming it into a positive concept for questioning the heteronormative system. For such critical performativity to be successfully implemented, the original offensive implication should remain cognisable to the receiver. But ‘queer’ was translated into Japanese in phonetic
symbols as ‘kuia’, which does not convey any scornful meaning but sounds, on the contrary, simply fashionable and cool. The Japanese translation deprives the appellation of the history of pain and sadness experienced by those who have been despised and denied, by being called ‘queer’. In addition, the overemphasis on the theoretical dimension of sexuality studies made such studies sound too puzzling and unintelligible to the people outside of academia and even to some feminist scholars who are not inclined to engage themselves in, as they call it, a ‘jargon-loaded mystifying language’. (Takemura 2010, p. 19)

In such a Japanese academic context, Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent emphasise the original political context of Lesbian and Gay Studies in the West.

At the same time, through contrasting the Western gay political and academic voice with the supposed Japanese political silence of homosexuals, they initially marked the national and cultural boundary between the West and Japan when arguing sexual politics. In their explanation, what erodes the boundary between Western and Japanese politics is globalisation. They insist that we should regard the political rise of homosexuality as a global phenomenon, and note:

> But the term ‘globalisation’ indicates the ‘Westernisation’ of the non-Western sphere in many cases. As many parts of daily life in Japan are Westernised, homosexuality and homosexuals’ situation are no exception. For example, the names ‘gei [gay]’ and ‘rezubian [lesbian]’ referring to homosexuals and their identities came from English. Now, for better or worse, we cannot completely deny the influences of Westernisation in our life. (Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent 1997, p. 46)

In their narrative, the globalisation of sexual politics, or the Westernisation of Japan, can lead homosexuals in Japan to gain their political voice in order to fight against discrimination and homophobia in Japanese society.

Their argument is distinctive in the historical context of sexual minorities in Japan. This is not only because they published the first book about Gay Studies in Japan, or employed Westernised identity politics in Japanese society (Asada et al. 1997; Suganuma 2012), but also because they introduced new criteria for sexual politics in Japan. Firstly, they insisted that sexual minorities in Japan need new discourses, both academic and political, for their activism. Secondly, they create the narrative of the history of homosexuals based not on their sexual activities or desire, but on their political activism. In their argument about homosexuals in Japan, they prioritised political activism over sexual activities to narrate a history of homosexuals that renders the relationship between culture and sexual activities a secondary matter.
The Gay Studies that they tried to establish in Japanese society was not an academic approach to Japanese gay culture and sexual activity, but an activist project that applied the political approach of Cultural Studies to Japanese society from the viewpoint of gay people. Thus, their perspective of cultural difference focuses not on the culture itself but on the homophobia and activism within it, although they noticed the important differences between Japanese and Western social and historical contexts, as well as the problems of globalisation. They argued:

In any case, homosexuality will be globalised more and more hereafter. However, there are many regions and countries where the situations of homosexuals are not changing. It is even dangerous to argue that the lifestyles of homosexuals in the world are going to gradually become similar and universal. In addition, it is certain that each region and country has cultural particularity and a way to be homosexual itself is influenced by it in local contexts. Therefore, in many cases, it needs to count the cultural particularity of the region to find a way to fight against homophobia. It may sound like a contradiction, but in the case of homosexuality, the phenomenon of ‘globalisation’ would go hand in hand with the ‘localisation’. (Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent 1997, pp. 47-48)

Therefore, their idea about cultural differences between Japan and the West is that, although Japan is different from the West, Japanese gay and lesbian scholars and activists can learn from the West to invent their own style of sexual politics against heterosexism in Japan.

The third narrative is that Japan is already a queer nation so that it is an advanced place in terms of sexual culture, and discrimination and phobia against sexual minorities in Japan have come from the West.

In the arguments about the history of sexuality in Japan, especially those focusing on male-male sex, the distinction between the premodern and modernised Japan, or the Edo (1603-1868) and Meiji periods (1868-1912), is often emphasised. For example, Mark McLelland, Katsuhiko Suganuma and James Walker (2007), in their introductory discussion of the historical background of Japan’s queer cultures, accentuated the historical fact that same-sex sexuality was widely accepted before Japan’s modernisation:

During the Edo period (1603-1868), for instance, there was no necessary connection made between gender and sexual preference because men, samurai in particular, were able to engage in both same- and opposite-sex affairs. Same-sex relationships were governed by a code of ethics described as *nanshoku* (male eroticism) or *shudo* (the way of youths) in the context of which elite men were
able to pursue boys and young men who had not yet undergone their coming-of-age ceremonies, as well as transgender males of all ages from the lower classes who worked as actors and prostitutes. (McLelland, Suganuma and Walker 2007, p. 6)

Homoerotic culture in the Edo period is contrasted with the prohibition of homosexuality that emerged during Japan’s Westernisation, which occurred extensively from the Meiji Period onwards, and consisted of ‘borrowing’ knowledge and technology from the West:

The elaboration of a realm of sexuality led to the designation of normal (seijo) and perverse (ijo) forms of sexuality and, accordingly, people. Indeed, from the end of the Meiji period, drawing upon theorists such as Sigmund Freud, discussions of ‘perverse’ or ‘queer’ desire (hentai seiyoku) began to circulate in popular magazines that advocated the improvement of public morals in pursuit of ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ – a popular slogan of the period. In particular, the previous discourses of nanshoku and the transgender practices associated with male prostitution were portrayed as feudal, incompatible with ‘civilised morality’, and something that ought to be eradicated. (ibid., p. 7)

Such a historical narrative, which regards the Westernisation of Japan as bringing about the control of sexuality, i.e. compulsory heterosexism, while accentuating the freedom of varied sexual behaviours in premodern Japan, is often employed in the research of Sexuality Studies, especially those concerning early modern and post-war Japan. Donald Richie, a critic of Japanese cinema and culture, writes in the foreword to the book edited by McLelland, Suganuma and Walker:

One of the results of this imitation was the incorporation of a Judeo-Christian bias that stigmatised homosexuality. There were no enduring laws promulgated against the practice in Japan as there had been almost everywhere else, but an imported prejudice became apparent, and still is. One of those quoted in this volume refers to ‘the disease of fellowship with the same sex’. This phrase would certainly never have occurred to an author in Japan prior to the Meiji Era. (ibid., p. xi)

These narratives create utopian images of sexual freedom that are devoid of homophobia in premodern Japan in the pure world which, detached from Judeo-Christian sexual morals, accepted alternative forms of sexuality, at least for mature gay men.

This view is utilised against the ‘Westernised’ gay activism in Japan which has blossomed since the 1990s. In Jack no danwashitsu (Jack’s conversation room), a blog started in 2006 to discuss the world’s homosexual cultures, blogger Jack explains why
gei-ribu, a derogatory slang term for Japanese gay liberation movements, has failed in Japan:

I think that there are two main reasons that gay lib (gei-ribu) movements did not succeed in Japan.

The first reason is that they completely ignored the cultural differences between the West and Japan and tried to directly import the Western gay lib movements into Japan. As I have already pointed out many times in this blog, Christianity is the foundation of discrimination against gay people in the West. Christianity, the dominant religion in the West, prohibits homosexuality so that discrimination against homosexuality is strong… In Japan where it is different from the Western Christian culture, people tend to regard one’s personality apart from his/her sexual preference and follow an unwritten code that one should not interfere in others’ sexual lives as it belongs to their privacy. This is a big difference from the Western society in which people boldly interfere with others’ sexual behaviours for the reason that ‘God does not allow it’. And, in Japan, even if people know that you are a homo [sic], it would not happen that they deny your humanity as it can happen in the West… It is enough for us that general Japanese people think that ‘we cannot understand same-sex love but acknowledge that there are people who have such sexual preference, and will not interfere with their behaviours unless they make others in trouble’.

In fact, the Japanese are the rare people in the world who can regard homosexuality with a level gaze. [Stress in original] (Jack 2012)

This narrative – that Japan is traditionally queer-friendly while homophobia has come from the West – can provoke criticism of LGBT social movements on the grounds that they are inspired by those in Western societies.

Furthermore, a similar narrative is utilised against the introduction of same-sex marriage in Japan. Hasegawa Michiko, an advisor to Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and a member of the management committee of NHK, the public broadcasting service of Japan, insists that Japanese culture is different from that of Western Christianity which has long banned and discriminated against homosexuality; thus, Japan does not need same-sex marriage, which has been introduced to protect the repressed homosexuals in the West (Hasegawa 2015) \(^2\). This discourse, which emphasises the cultural and historical differences between Japan and the West, is sometimes used to maintain the existing order in Japan, denying the introduction of new reforms.

\(^2\) She also insists, in the interview, that same-sex marriage is against the 500-million-year history of natural creation, as same-sex couples cannot make a baby naturally.
Each narrative also reflects its political attitude to sexual politics in Japan. The narrative, *Japan is far behind the West in terms of sexual politics and sexual minorities’ rights*, tends to argue for political and social reforms that introduce the social changes for sexual minorities that have already been institutionalised in Western societies. The narrative, *Japan is different from the West; however Japan can learn from the West about sexual politics*, insists that we need to analyse Japanese homophobia, which can be different from that in Western societies, and try to invent a new form of activism that is suitable for Japanese society. The narrative, *Japan is already a queer nation so that it is an advanced place in terms of sexual culture, and discrimination and phobia against sexual minorities in Japan come from the West*, can be critical of LGBT activism, which might be regarded as part of the ‘Western’ movement.

2-2. Sexuality and Historical Narratives

These discourses pose two difficult questions about sexual politics in Japan.

Firstly, there is a question of how these conflicting discourses can be understood in the context of Japanese history. Furukawa Makoto (1994) presents a theoretical framework of discourses on male same-sex conduct between the Japanese federal state and the modernised state: from the *nanshoku* (male eroticism) code to the *hentai-seiyoku* (perverse sexual desire) code. According to him, male same-sex conduct was regarded as *nanshoku*, which was usually practised among the warrior class or with kabuki actors before the modernisation; therefore, the code of male same-sex conduct was tied to a particular class and gender in premodern Japan. However, after Japanese modernisation, ideas about male same-sex conduct have changed due to the influence of popular discourses in Western sexology, so that male same-sex conduct is now regarded as an internal problem of perverse sexual desire. Scholars of Japanese queer sexuality, Ishida Hitoshi, Mark McLelland, and Murakami Takanori (2005), summarised the shift in sexual codes as echoing Michel Foucault’s terminology, moving from ‘sodomies’ in premodern societies to ‘homosexuals’ in modern societies: ‘[t]his new code turned attention away from sexual acts (which it had been supposed might be engaged in by men in general) towards internal, ontological factors which prompted specific types of individuals to express “perverse desires”’ (Ishida, McLelland and Murakami 2005, p. 35).

However, what is overlooked in this narrative of historical transition is the fact that *nanshoku* has actually failed to become a thing of the past, and cultural
representations of *nanshoku* have been remembered and regarded as part of Japanese ‘tradition’ following the modernisation (Faure 1998, p. 219; Reichert 2006; Vincent 2012; Takeuchi 2007, pp. 114-115). Furthermore, Gregory M. Pflugfelder (2007), a historian of the Japanese history of sexuality, criticises the simplified narrative of the ‘Westernisation’ of Japanese sexuality on grounds that the rise in interest in the medical approach to sexuality in Japan shares the same period of time with the West: ‘The historical timing of this restructuring of knowledge is significant, for it was during the same period in the late nineteenth century that male-male sexuality, under the rubric of “homosexuality”, began to receive attention from medical and scientific authorities in the West’ (Pflugfelder 2007, p. 12). Therefore, Pflugfelder insists that the Japanese adaptation of sexual science cannot be described as a unidirectional movement coming from the West. Rather, he notes the complicated circulation of knowledge among the world’s cultures in the modern era:

The medico-scientific model of sexuality that took root in Japan after the late nineteenth century constituted one form of Foucault’s *scientia sexualis*. The Orientalist temptation of narrating its development in terms of ‘East’ and ‘West’ – a romantic narrative in which the naïve charm of the former inevitably succumbs to the virile strength of the latter – must be resisted, however, because such geographical markers do not do justice to the global dimensions and local complexities of the knowledge system in question. Not only did the medico-scientific model of understanding sexual behaviour achieve cultural prominence at virtually the same point in historical time in Japan, Europe, and North America, but the flow of knowledge across geographic borders was by no means unidirectional. Japanese sexologists should not be seen as handmaids to what is sometimes nostalgically imagined as the corruption of pure and innocent native traditions merely through their act of introducing Western sexual science into Japan, but rather as engaging in an ongoing and creative dialogue with their non-Japanese colleagues, active participants in a global network of sexual knowledge in which they were not only tutees but mentors as well. (Pflugfelder 2007, p. 13)

In his critique, Pflugfelder notes the historical fact of scientific knowledge shared across countries, which transcends the simplified narrative of differences between the East/Japan and the West.

Therefore, the complicated relationships connecting ideas of sexuality and of cultural differences disturb the straightforward narrative of the Japanese history of

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3 This passage does not mean that Japanese scientific knowledge had been developed by their own community without Western influences. As Sabine Frühstück notes, Japanese intellectuals and scientists at the beginning of modernisation became familiar with German and English for their studies, so it is certain that Western influences are essential for Japanese academic knowledge (Frühstück 2003, p. 204).
modernisation, from a federal state to the modernised state, through ‘importing’ Western knowledge and habits, even though the straightforward narrative is an attractive and compelling way to describe Japanese society’s dramatic changes, as brought on by Westernisation/modernisation.

The second question is how these contradictory narratives have coexisted and what such coexistence means. The coexistence of various narratives on sexual politics and national identity can be understood as a struggle between two narratives of nationalism, which Homi K. Bhabha (2004) distinguished in his influential essay ‘DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation’. Discussing the ambivalence of the ‘nation’ as a narrative strategy, Bhabha identifies two forms of the nation as narration: the pedagogic and performative. The mode of nationalist pedagogy signifies the people as ‘historical objects’, giving ‘the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or constituted historical origin in the past’ [stress in original] (p. 208). On the other hand, the performative narration stresses contemporaneity, representing the people as the “subjects” of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principle’ and, thus, as ‘that sign of the presence through which national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive process’ [stress in original] (pp. 208-209). Hence, in the context of discourses on sexual politics, it looks like the pedagogic narrative employs the continuous historicity of moving from the Japanese tradition of same-sex sexual conduct to the contemporary gay culture, to incorporate same-sex sexual cultures into Japanese national history, while the performative narration presents the sexual minorities as the new subject, to demand change in Japanese culture and institutions so as to include them in the nation. Bhabha points out that not only is the monophonic national history of homogeneous people interrupted from within the nation, because the movements of signification of the nation are split by two narrations, but also histories of minorities will be possible between two temporalities of national narrations whose significations propagate heterogeneous histories of the nation and people:

Minority discourse sets the act of emergence in the antagonistic in-between of image and sign, the accumulative and the adjunct, presence and proxy. It contests genealogies of ‘origin’ that lead to claims for cultural supremacy and historical priority. Minority discourse acknowledges the status of national culture – and the people – as a contentious, performative space of the perplexity of the living in the midst of the pedagogical representations of the fullness of life… The discourse of the minority reveals the insurmountable
Bhabha attempts to theorise the complicated narrations used to represent minorities in the histories of the nation.

Furthermore, there are efforts to analyse Japanese history of gender and sexuality minorities from the viewpoint of the *in-between* of past and present, or the Japanese ‘traditional’ and the Western ‘new’ sexuality. In 2012, two books about Japanese queer sexuality and interculturality were published: *Two-Timing Modernity: Homosocial Narrative in Modern Japanese Fiction* and *Contact moments: The politics of intercultural desire in Japanese male-queer culture*.

Keith Vincent, the author of *Two-Timing Modernity*, analysed the homosocial narrative in Japanese literature in pre-war Japan, when the nation entered modernity and the international community. Vincent insists that Japan’s modernisation, which is heavily influenced by Western culture, changed social attitudes towards male same-sex desire and practice and that, therefore, male sexuality represents characteristics of its modern social shift and national identity.

In this patriarchal but not yet heteronormative world, moreover, relations between men in general could be mapped on an increasingly uneasy but still navigable topology in which ‘men-loving-men’ and ‘men-promoting-the-interests-of-men’ coexisted and colluded in relative harmony. By the first years of the twentieth century, however, as exclusive and compulsory heterosexuality became associated with an enlightened modernity, love between men was increasingly branded as either ‘feudal’ or immature. The resulting rupture of what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has famously theorised as the ‘male homosocial continuum’ thus constituted one of the most significant markers of Japan’s entrance into modernity. And yet just as Japanese modernity often seemed haunted by stubborn remnants of the premodern past, the nation’s newly heteronormative culture was unable and perhaps unwilling to expunge completely the recent memory of a male homosocial past now read as perverse. (Vincent 2012, p. 3)

Focusing on homosocial narrative in early modern Japanese literature, Vincent read same-sex male desire in early modern Japan as the national allegory of dynamic changes in Japan, with modernisation producing political and personal conflicts between the traditional and new Western culture, the provincial and the urban, individuals and the nation, adolescence and adulthood, feminine and masculine, abnormal and normal, and past and future.
Suganuma Katsuhiko (2012) analysed queer cultures in post-war Japan by focusing on the interculturality between the West and Japan in his concept of ‘contact moment(s)’. He defines this concept as ‘a certain historical moment (or a series of those moments) that allows us to imagine the discursive conditions and effects enabled by cross-culturation’ (ibid., p. 18). He summarises Japanese history as generating the interculturality of sexuality:

In the mid-nineteenth century Japan embarked on modernisation and industrialisation following Western models. As a result, modern sexual discourses were brought to Japan. However, the process of adapting those foreign discourses into the Japanese context proved to be far messier than a simple overwriting of local culture by the imposition of foreign knowledge. Conversely, the foreign concepts and discourses were often reshaped into a local context, so as to serve local needs. More often than not, this imported knowledge was utilised as a benchmark against which traditional as well as modern views of Japan’s identity were measured. Jim Reichert (2006), for example, compellingly argues in In the company of Men: Representations of Male-Male Sexuality in Meiji Literature that during Japan’s modernisation period (Meiji period), the imported Western concept of compulsory heterosexuality helped reinvigorate the literary representations of male-male eroticism called *nanshoku*, often discussed as a cultural shield against the Westernisation of Japanese traditions. In this sense, foreign knowledge did not always dominate the local construction of sexuality, but did quite the opposite; it consolidated the local identity. (ibid., p. 25)

Noting the interculturality of sexuality and local Japanese identity through modernisation, Suganuma suggests that the ‘traditional’ male same-sex conduct, *nanshoku*, is not simply Japanese sexuality before Westernisation, but rather a partial result of Westernisation: borrowing Vincent’s words, it is the nostalgic homoerotic past, which has emerged through Japan’s modernisation.

These studies indicate the limits of Furukawa’s historical narrative of the transition in Japanese sexuality, echoing the Foucauldian narrative of a radical historical shift from the premodern to the modern, or from the indigenous to the Westernised Japan. But, at the same time, Vincent’s and Suganuma’s research, which focuses on the interculturality of Japanese sexuality, fails to answer certain questions, especially in terms of the sexual politics in Japan. Firstly, why and how have political dilemmas, such as the dualistic tension between Japanese ‘tradition’ and ‘new’ Western sexuality, been argued with problems of ‘perversity’, especially in same-sex relationships? Secondly, what is the social and political meaning of the coexistence of two conflicting narratives of sexual
politics in Japanese society – one praising Japanese tradition and the other introducing Western culture and politics? Lastly, if the narrative of straightforward ‘progress’ or radical shift to a new period of history, which is prominent in the narrative of modernity, is not applicable to the history of sexual politics in Japan, what kind of historicity has contributed to Japanese sexual politics? What is interesting to me in Furukawa’s very influential narrative, therefore, is not his analysis of the historical formation of discourses but, rather, the narrative itself; why is it so important to distinguish between the premodern and modern, or ‘traditional’ and ‘Westernised’, Japanese sexuality when discussing Japanese modernisation and sexuality, which supposedly emerged only within a few decades?

What seems clear is that ideas of sexuality and politics in Japan are closely related to those surrounding cultural differences between Japan and ‘the West’. The relationship between sexuality and politics is reflected not only in accounts of Japanese national identity, but also in the imaginary position of ‘the West’, or Dipesh Chakrabarty’s ‘Europe’ (2000), which dominates the narrative of modernity and theoretical universality in subjects of history. To represent the imaginary position of ‘the West’ or ‘Europe’ in Sexuality Studies, I will analyse the theoretically influential works of Foucault and Sedgwick, and then discuss how sexuality has been merged with national and/or cultural identity through modernisation in pre-war Japan.

3. Sexuality and Cultural Differences between East and West

3-1. Sexuality and Western Modernity in Queer Theory

Regarding cultural differences between East and West in discourses of sexuality, Michel Foucault is an interesting and important theorist, especially when we consider those narratives that romanticise the sexual cultures of the East before its Westernisation. In his ground-breaking book, *The History of Sexuality Volume I*, Foucault famously distinguished between the knowledge of sexuality in the East and that in the West: *ars erotica* and *scientia sexualis*. As I have already suggested above, *ars erotica* – Foucault’s characterisation of Eastern sexuality – is considered a contribution to the ‘Orientalist’
understanding of sexuality outside the West (Boone 2014, p. 24)⁴. Joseph A. Boone relates:

As thorny as some of these questions may be, what now seems clear to many theorists is the degree to which the distinction Foucault makes between an eastern *ars erotica* (based on acts) and a Western *scientia sexualis* (based on identities) is not only, as Traub states, ‘historically inaccurate’ in terms of Middle East history but also orientalising. Indeed, by distinguishing the sexual economies of East and West in these broad terms, Foucault is able ‘to establish [the] pre-modern/modern periodisation’ that supports his arguments about the West’s evolution of a disciplinary regime of modern sexual types, while the East remains locked in a timeless *ars erotica*. *(ibid.*, p. xxx)*

In the Japanese historical context, Pflugfelder criticises Foucault’s dichotomy: ‘Foucault’s simple dichotomy of *ars erotica* and *scientia sexualis* is clearly inadequate to describe the differences that exist among and within sexual knowledge systems in these diverse societies, and, in typically Eurocentric fashion, makes little allowance for historical change outside the West’ (Pflugfelder 2007, p. 7). As historians specialising in developments outside the West have clearly explained, Foucault’s formulation of *ars erotica* in contrast to *scientia sexualis* is not only questioned by historians of the Middle East and East Asia, but also has ideological functions.

In *The History of Sexuality Volume I*, Foucault categorises numerous societies that exemplify *ars erotica*: China, Japan, India, Rome, and the Arabo-Moslem societies. According to Foucault, *ars erotica*, the erotic art, is defined as the realisation of the truth of sex through practices and pleasures, free from reliance on laws or rationality:

In the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a practice and accumulated as experience; pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute law of the permitted and the forbidden, nor by reference to a criterion of utility, but first and foremost in relation to itself; it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated in terms of its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the soul. *(Foucault 1990, p. 57)*

Illustrating *ars erotica* as the art of knowledge by/for pleasure, sexual cultures in the world of *ars erotica* are characterised as those which lack external authority over sexual activities, found in the laws that enforce prohibitions, morals, and medical knowledge:

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⁴ For Foucault’s ‘Orientalism’ and its influence on Sexuality Studies, see Leon Antonio Rocha’s detailed discussion (Rocha 2011).
thus, sexual cultures representing *ars erotica* are defined as those possessing the knowledge of the spheres of body and pleasure without absolute laws.

On the other hand, Foucault characterises Western society as the only civilisation that has developed *scientia sexualis*. In *The History of Sexuality Volume I*, Foucault devoted himself to tracing the development of *scientia sexualis*, a form of knowledge ‘strictly opposed to’ *ars erotica* (*ibid.*, p. 58). Foucault defines *scientia sexualis* as presentation of the truth of sex, which Foucault considered a form of knowledge-power in modern society. Foucault finds the source of sexual science in the confession of Christian tradition, observing that ‘we have since become a singularly confessing society’ [stress is mine] (*ibid.*, p. 59). Through the relentless confessions of Western society, sex has been transformed into the discourses that constitute sexual science and medical institutions.

In Foucault’s analysis, sexuality produced through *scientia sexualis* is at the heart of power in Western modern society. According to Foucault, the development of sexuality in the West is one of the most important factors establishing the technology of power in the nineteenth century:

This is the background that enables us to understand the importance assumed by sex as a political issue. It was at the pivot of the two axes along which developed the entire political technology of life. On the one hand it was tied to the discipline of the body: the harnessing, intensification, and distribution of forces, the adjustment and economy of energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the regulation of populations, through all the far-reaching effects of its activity. It fitted in both categories at once, giving rise to infinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls, extremely meticulous orderings of space, indeterminate medical or psychological examinations, to an entire micro-power concerned with the body… Sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. (*ibid.*, pp. 145-146)

Foucault characterises the modern ‘Western’ way of sexuality as the one which is associated with knowledge and power, and is thus doomed to serve the interests of efficiency and proliferation in society.

Foucault’s simple dichotomy of *ars erotica* and *scientia sexualis* is, therefore, reflected not only in his Orientalist fantasy of sexual pleasures outside Western society, but also by his *Westernisation* of power and sexuality in modernity, which constructs the West as distinctive and different from other regions. But what is important in his argument is that, through placing *ars erotica* outside Western civilisation, Foucault was also able to
suggest a realm outside the power-knowledge of Western sexuality. At the end of the book, he insists that bodies and pleasures – the sphere of *ars erotica* – offer possibilities of resistance, through sexuality, to the power of Western society:

> It is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim – through a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality – to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledge, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance. The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sexual desire, but bodies and pleasures. (*ibid.*, p. 157)

Foucault’s famous praise of bodies and pleasures as the sites of resistance has been made possible both by the Oriental otherness and the Westernisation of modern sexuality in his argument; thus, *his argument of sexuality/power and resistance to modern power, which influences contemporary queer politics as well, is culturally and geographically marked in his discourse*. As Boone (2014) and Pflugfelder (2007) criticised Foucault’s dichotomy for its Eurocentrism and inadequate allowance for historical change outside the West, Foucault’s arguments cannot be simply applied to Asian contexts. Furthermore, I want to focus on the way in which Foucault’s argument about the Western formation of sexuality and power – one of the most influential theoretical achievements in Sexuality Studies – forms part of the discursive mechanism of the Westernisation of sexuality-power in modernity, which spontaneously inscribes sexual politics onto geography.

Another influential queer theorist, Eve K. Sedgwick, also presents a correlation between modern sexuality and Western cultural attributes in her distinctive book, *Epistemology of the Closet*. Following Foucault, Sedgwick expands his argument to encompass the cultural epistemology of modern Western society:

> Furthermore, in accord with Foucault’s demonstration, whose results I will take to be axiomatic, that modern Western culture has placed what it calls sexuality in a more and more distinctively privileged relation to our most prized constructs of individual identity, truth, and knowledge, it becomes truer and truer that the language of sexuality not only intersects with but transforms the other languages and relations by which we know. (*Sedgwick* 1991, p. 3)

Arguing for the relationship between sexuality and politics, especially in modern Western culture, Sedgwick insists that the problems of homo/heterosexual definition are centred in ‘all modern Western identity and social organisation’ beyond the mere realm of homosexual identity and culture (*ibid.*, p. 11).
In arguing that homo/heterosexual definition has been a presiding master term of the past century, one that has the same, primary importance for all modern Western identity and social organisation (and not merely for homosexual identity and culture) as do the more traditionally visible cruxes of gender, class, and race, I’ll argue that the now chronic modern crisis of homo/heterosexual definition has affected our culture through its ineffaceable marking particularly of the categories secrecy/disclosure, knowledge/ignorance, private/public, masculine/feminine, majority/minority, innocence/initiation, natural/artificial, new/old, discipline/terrorism, canon/counter-canon, wholeness/decadence, urbane/provincial, domestic/foreign, health/illness, same/different, active/passive, in/out, cognition/paranoia, art/kitsch, utopia/apocalypse, sincerity/sentimentality, and voluntariness/addiction. (ibid., p. 11)

Through reading the categories that Western culture and politics have heavily relied on, Sedgwick regards inquiry into sexuality, especially into the ambiguity of homo/heterosexual definition, as the prominent role of Western modern thought. Although Sedgwick does not mention Oriental sexuality as Foucault did, she also defines the cultural identity of Western modernity through sexuality, especially through the problems of homo/heterosexual definitions.

It is notable that these ‘ground-breaking’ works of Sexuality Studies define Western modernity and its cultural and political identity – constituting ‘Europe’ and differentiating it from the other cultures – through sexuality. These influential theories of sexuality contribute to representations of ‘the West’ as the unique and singular civilisation, synonymous with modernity. This is the discursive ideology of ‘Europe’ in the academic discourses, criticised by Dipesh Chakrabarty: ‘[J]ust as the phenomenon of Orientalism does not disappear simply because some of us have now attained a critical awareness of it, similarly a certain version of “Europe”, reified and celebrated in the phenomenal world of everyday relationships of power as the scene of the birth of the modern, continues to dominate the discourse of history’ (Chakrabarty 2000, p. 28). As sexuality defines human beings in modern society, sexuality now defines geographic cultures and the narrative of modernity as well.

3-2. Interculturality: Sexuality and Japanese Modernity

Contrasting to the theoretical functions of ‘Europe’ as the singular scene of the birth of the modern, the ‘outside’ of ‘Europe’ needs to explain its modernity through its relationship with ‘Europe’. Adopting Sedgwick’s homosocial theory, Keith Vincent
analyses Japanese modern literature to open up a new understanding of modern heteronormativity and homoerotic desire in pre-war Japan. As modernisation brought dramatic changes in public attitudes against male same-sex desire and love, which had once been admired, male same-sex affection became an ambivalent subject for male adults in modernised Japan. Vincent defines ‘homosocial narrative’ as the narrative that sustains a double tendency ‘to preserve male homoeroticism in the past as something precious and worthy of remembrance while also working to quarantine it there as something that had no further claim on the present’ [stress in original] (Vincent 2011, p. 4). Thus, Vincent points out that ambiguity towards homoeroticism affects the attitude towards the categories of modern/pre-modern and West/Japan as well; that is, the sense of temporality, and national and/or cultural identity. Discussing homosocial narrative in modern pre-war Japanese literature, Vincent conceptualises a complex sense of temporality arising from Japan’s modernisation or ‘Westernisation’ as ‘two-timing’, a term which refers to tensions between two forms of temporality existing at once: the temporality moving towards a straight future and that moving towards a queer past; or the temporality moving towards a Westernised modern future and the one moving towards a Japanese traditional, homoerotic past.

Vincent insists that male homoerotic desire does not necessarily cause crises and tensions in the ‘two-timing’ narrative in Japan, as discussed by Sedgwick in her theory, which explains the mechanism of homophobia and homosexual panic in Western society through the ambiguity of homo/heterosexuality. Rather, Vincent suggests that homoerotic desire is a critical factor in preserving Japan’s cultural identity and mediating its fading past.

By Japan’s ‘two-timing modernity’ I mean the way in which male-male sexuality was both relegated to and simultaneously preserved within the past, both on the level of national history and on the level of the individual. Thus, while it is true that by the early twentieth century in Japan the influence of European sexology and ‘enlightened’ modernisation had colluded to pathologise and condemn male-male sexuality, it was also true that its full disqualification was prevented by the persistent and relatively recent memory of a cultural tradition of male-male love, celebrated in literature and in full collusion with the premodern patriarchy. (Vincent 2012, p. 24)

In his discussion, Vincent remarks on the coexistence of a heteronormative narrative for the new Westernisation/modernisation and a homoerotic narrative for the dismissed past in Japanese modern literature.
What is interesting in Vincent’s argument, which is inspired by Sedgwick’s homosocial theory, is his suggestion that modern Japanese sexual notions are not equivalent to Western ones, even though they are regarded as original; not only male homosexuality but also heterosexism had been altered through the Japanese adaptation of Western ideas of sexuality, fused in the modernisation with cultural tradition and memory. In the arguments of Foucault and Sedgwick, the emergence of power-sexuality is regarded as a peculiar feature of Western modernity. By contrast, in Vincent’s discourse, *interculturality and twisted temporality through sexuality are regarded as characteristic aspects of Japanese modernisation.*

In Vincent’s theory, however, even though he tries to resist essentialism and American-Eurocentrism, the difference between Western and Japanese sexuality is still well defined, analogously to hetero/homosexuality: Western sexuality is symbolised as ‘heteronormative’ and having a ‘straight future’, while Japanese traditional sexuality is symbolised as ‘homoerotic’ and ‘dragging past’. Thus, although he emphasises the interculturality of sexuality in early modern Japan, he presupposes a clear distinction between modern heteronormativity and pre-modern homoeroticism: as Western culture is clearly different from that of Japan, heteronormative modernity is different from the homoerotic feudal past. *In this dualism, Vincent preserves the clear distinction between hetero/homosexuality. Rather than through psychological terms, the distinction between hetero/homosexuality is achieved and reiterated through cultural and temporal themes: through the differences between the West/Japan and future/past.* In this sense, Vincent’s discourse is still akin to those of Foucault and Sedgwick. The theoretical narratives of Queer Studies are geographically marked and direct the gaze towards other cultures and politics, including those outside the West.

In the next section, I will explore how representations of same-sex sexual relations and desire are even more complicated and contradictory in pre-war Japan than Vincent tried to theorise. Then, I will point out that such confusing representations of sexuality stimulate types of political perception: the sense of historicity, images of national identity, or the sense of cultural differences between the West and Japan.

4. **Historical Representations of Same-Sex Sexuality in Pre-war Japan**

4-1. ‘Homosexuality’ as a New Future
If we follow Sedgwick’s argument in *Epistemology of the Closet*, rather than that of *Between Men*, noting the crisis of homo/heterosexual definition in modern Western culture, Vincent’s argument will appear more complicated. In the ‘two-timing narrative’ argument, Vincent characterises the discussion of homo/heterosexual definition as moving between medical and cultural discourses. Introducing an article titled ‘The Historical View of Homosexuality’, published in the popular opinion magazine *Chuo koron* in 1935 by Yasuda Tokutaro, a psychiatrist and leftist cultural critic, Vincent notes that there was an ambivalent view on homosexuality, which adopts the Western medical principle of marginalising and pathologising male-male sexuality, while honouring Japan’s traditional cultural values of male-male love as a ‘grand history of homosexuality the likes of which one would be hard-pressed to find anywhere in the world’ (*ibid.*, p. 32).

Vincent described Yasuda’s argument, which utilises both the Japanese native terminology *nanshoku* and the sexological term *doseiai* (equivalent to homosexuality in English) for male same-sex sexual conduct, as a ‘good example of the way that native Japanese terms could be strategically combined with newer sexological ones as new sexual identities and histories were being negotiated’ (*ibid.*, p. 32). When Yasuda mentions Japanese historical heroes, great warlords in the sixteenth century who each had a ‘favourite boy’, he differentiates their customs from medical categories of sexology.

Vincent observes:

> He mentions, for example, that each of the great warlords who unified Japan in the sixteenth century – Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu – had a ‘favourite boy’. Did this mean that these ‘heroes’ were ‘sufferers of sexual perversion [*hentai seiyoku no byonin*]’ he asks, using the language of sexology? Not at all, he responds, in the language of premodern Japan: ‘They were lovers of boys [*nanshoku-ka*] as well as women [*nyoshoku-ka*], masters of the twain path [of love] [*nido no tatsuji*]’. (*ibid.*, p. 32)

When Yasuda distinguishes between *nanshoku*, Japanese traditional same-sex sexual conduct, and the sexual perversion of modern sexology, he notes not only the Japanese cultural and historical contexts but also the differences between two major explanations of homo/heterosexual identity: the universalising model and the minoritising model that Sedgwick developed in *Epistemology of the Closet*. Yasuda employs a universalising explanation, celebrating bisexual activities or ‘masters of the twain path of love’, for same-sex sexual conduct by historical warlords in Japan, while using the minoritising model of sexology to identify sexual perversity. In this discourse, same-sex sexual
conduct, which can represent Japanese national tradition, is explicitly differentiated from the model of perversion found in Western science.

In discussions of homo/heterosexual definition, Vincent interprets the coexistence of the universalising model, representing the Japanese premodern past, and the minoritising model, representing new Western heteronormativity, as marking the emergence of two-timing homosocial narratives that reflect the ideas of temporality and national identity.

In Japanese two-timing homosocial narratives, love between men is not so much repressed as it is contained within the past as an always early chapter in a tale of its own obsolescence through maturation and modernisation. In these narratives, moreover, the personal and national pasts tend to be superimposed upon each other such that the achievement of heterosexual ‘normality’ on the part of the protagonist doubles as a kind of modernising national allegory. In most cases, however, far from unsettling or threatening the normative future of the individual or the nation with a ‘return of the repressed’ or a revelatory ‘coming out’, the homosexual past could be made to function much as ‘tradition’ does in relation to modernity: as an inert and unthreatening heritage ready for preservation in the museum of progress. (Vincent 2012, pp. 34-35)

In Vincent’s discussion emphasising sexuality, it is made clear that male homosexuality represents the past in the form of the heroic warlords of Japanese pre-modernity, while new heteronormativity represents the present in the form of Westernised modernity, although they coexisted at the beginning of Japanese modernisation.

However, the article ‘The Historical View of Homosexuality’, which Vincent refers to for his theory of the two-timing modernity of male same-sex love, was originally written in response to a scandal about a lesbian affair called ‘danso no reijin jiken (an affair of male-dressing lady)’: a new social phenomenon found in modern cities. In this case, a rich young woman, who wore male clothes and had short hair, eloped with a movie actress, using her parents’ money; then, after the police found the couple, they tried to commit suicide in a hotel room. Since Yasuda describes the ‘male-dressing lady’ as handsome and modern (Yasuda 1935, p. 146), he interprets the affair as a new social phenomenon of modern civilisation. Comparing the ‘male-dressing lady’ with the French writer George Sand, Yasuda writes ‘I’m impressed that Japan has become one of the first-rate countries in the world in this field’ (ibid., p. 147). By contrast with Vincent’s argument, which emphasises male homosexuality as ‘premodern’ and ‘past’, Yasuda
treats female homosexuality and cross-dressing of both sexes as new, modern social phenomena representing a new civilisation. He writes:

Japanese history had had two civilisations. The first one is a matriarchal society which is a female-centred civilisation, and the second one is a male-centred civilisation after it was overthrown. Now we are going to develop a new third civilisation. It is neither female-authoritarian nor male-authoritarian. It is obviously a new civilisation which should be built by cooperation between men and women. Today is a black transitional period to the third one and at the same time, it is a rapidly declining period of the old civilisation. I saw today’s female homosexuality as the phenomenon referring to this transition. Of course, it has positive and negative sides. The problem whether perverse women play a progressive role or a degenerating role depends on whether their homosexuality contributes to building the new civilisation or to the fall of civilisation. (ibid., p. 152)

In this passage, Yasuda regards female homosexuality, which is rarely found among Japanese historical figures, as representing the future of a gender-equal society which has not yet been achieved in history. Thus, in his view, same-sex love, or ‘sexual perversity’, is not necessarily the conduct of the past, or something that society must repress or overcome. It represents a certain social order: *male same-sex love represents the old male-authoritarian past, whereas female same-sex love, with its cross-dressing and gender fluidity, represents the new society of gender-equality that is to arise in the future.*

As Vincent points out, same-sex love can indicate Japanese national and cultural identity, in contrast to Western modernity and its historical temporality. However, discourses on homo/heterosexuality in modern Japanese society are more complicated than Vincent’s argument. Firstly, the definition of homo/heterosexuality is unstable, if not confused, even within the same essay about homosexuality; occasionally, cultural and historical difference is utilised to justify same-sex conduct in history, whilst modern sexology’s idea of sexual perversion is maintained. In Sedgwick’s terms, minoritising and universalising views are equally applied according to cases. Secondly, homosexuality is differentiated between men and women. Male homosexuality can connect with the past whereas female homosexuality cannot, so that, when faced with social exclusion, male homosexuality negotiates with the society through Japanese history, but female homosexuality sometimes provides inspiration for utopian views⁵. Thus, when the same-

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⁵ Akaeda (2011) regards female intimacy in early modern Japan, including erotic relations which could be labelled ‘homosexual’ today, as the practice of ‘romantic love’ which is considered the ideal relationship in modern society. Akaeda defines ‘romantic
sex relationship recalls the national past, it is understood through nationalisation; however, when a same-sex relationship that is rarely found in history is considered, it is seen in reference to the West and/or to a radical future, with Yasuda trying to identify the ‘male-dressing lady’ with the French writer George Sand and symbolising her as the future.

4-2. Samurai and their Nanshoku: a New Gender Norm and Old Sexual Activity

Through achieving modernisation, the legacy of the samurai has come to be regarded as a model of masculinity for the Japanese, differentiating them from other Asians and the West. Morris Low (2003) points out that representations of masculinity and the nation have been regarded as important in the development of modernity in Japan for their construction of the Japanese national image. According to Low, representations of the Japanese masculine body – mainly expressed through images of the Emperor and Japanese soldiers – were influenced by the West, and differentiated from other Asian bodies at the beginning of modernisation.

Notions of God-given whiteness and brightness linked the body of the Emperor to the lives and bodies of Japanese soldiers. In the late nineteenth century, the Japanese embarked on a programme of Westernisation that can be interpreted as the Caucasianisation of the Japanese and the appropriation of Western ideas of masculinity (Russell 1996). Images of the Emperor in Western-style military uniform were also used to promote progress and national cohesion. The notion of proximity to the Emperor’s body, and the idea that Japanese soldiers were his sons, facilitated the disciplining of soldiers’ bodies and the regulation of their lives. (Low 2003, p. 82)

With Westernisation, the Japanese were becoming more ‘white’. Woodblock prints depicting the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) show the Chinese in a cowardly light, with protruding cheekbones, mouths agape and effeminate pigtails. In contrast, the Japanese are portrayed more nobly, with European facial features, smart haircuts and military-style moustaches. (ibid., p. 83)

love’ in the early modern Japanese context as a relationship or intimacy based only on affection towards the other without any enforcement (ibid., p. 33); thus, it includes mutual respect and female agency. Through reading intimacy among women as ‘romantic love’, Akaeda reinterprets the intimacy among women in early modern Japan as the particular relationship that liberates women as modern individuals, free from domination, and insists that only women could achieve such relationships: ‘It seems that romantic love was possible only between women in modern society, and the form of intimacy has changed into another form’ (ibid., p. 215).
After Japan had grown into a modern and developed state that Western countries recognised, especially after the victory of the Russo-Japanese war (1904-5), the Japanese warrior class, the samurai, were re-evaluated as symbols of the glorified past and as a new ideal of Japanese masculinity. Through reappropriation of the samurai image as the new Japanese masculinity, Japanese soldiers came to be routinely portrayed as ‘modern-day samurai’ (ibid., p. 84), and *Bushido*, the way of the samurai, was utilised as one of the ideologies for the construction of masculinity.

In the reinvention of the samurai as the new masculine model for Japanese soldiers, their sexuality, *nanshoku*, became a difficult aspect of the samurai to fit into modern gender norms. Here, I will compare two representations of samurai as the Japanese masculine model in around 1900.

Jim Reichert focuses on the representations of *nanshoku* in the works of Koda Rohan, one of the greatest neoclassical writers, whose works try to re-evaluate the Japanese past and preserve Japan’s cultural heritage, as opposed to the rapid Westernisation promoted by reformists at the beginning of modernisation. According to Reichert, in the historical novel *Hige otoko* (The Bearded Man), published in 1896, Rohan succeeded in establishing the Japanese masculine model though a tale of medieval warriors. Reichert points out how the samurai’s homoeroticism functions in the story to mark both the past and modern patriotism:

Building upon developments from the late 1880s, when a group of powerful ideologues mounted a campaign to discredit militant anti-government activists by promoting a new, more conciliatory construction of masculinity known as the *seinen* (young man), Rohan’s novel projected these modern *seinen* values back onto his portrait of a medieval warrior. Central to this undertaking was a complex set of negotiations with the legacy of samurai *nanshoku*. On the one hand, the text endeavoured to disengage its proto-modern warrior hero from any overt association with his uncivilised practice. On the other hand, the text subtly exploited the aesthetic and erotic elements of male love to present the issues of samurai honour and devotion as timeless emotive responses that transcend the historical and political specificity of the late medieval epoch. In this manner, *Hige otoko* subtly re-presented the medieval warrior code of honour as a precedent for modern iterations of patriotic fervour directed toward the Meiji Imperial state. (Reichert 2006, p. 230)

While the representation of physical same-sex sexual activities signifies different lives in the past, an abstract translation of homoeroticism into emotional intimacy and a bond between men can be synchronised with patriotism, and especially with Japanese
militarism, which demands loyalty to the Emperor and a strong bond among soldiers. Reichert writes:

Through its opportunistic treatment of nanshoku, which involves a simultaneous process of relentless invocation and silent disavowal, Hige otoko thus illustrates the kind of representational sleight of hand that allowed neoclassical texts to reformulate the past to support the ideological demands of the mid-Meiji present. (ibid., p. 161)

After the Meiji period (1868-1912), however, nanshoku was still remembered as a habit of the past, but was rarely regarded as a model of masculinity for the general population.

Even after the Meiji period, nanshoku continued to resonate powerfully with certain segments of the Japanese population as a symbol of the past and as an alternative model for interpreting male-male sexuality… But its pre-eminence in the popular imagination of the general population waned dramatically post Meiji. (ibid., p. 231)

As Vincent notes in Two-timing Modernity, the nanshoku of the samurai-class marks the past in Japan, while the samurai have become the new model for Japanese militant masculinity.

In 1900, when Japan had dramatically enlarged its presence in international relations, Nitobe Inazo published Bushido: The Soul of Japan (A Way of Samurai) in the English language. Nitobe intended to explain Japanese moral codes to Western readers on the basis of his own experiences. As Nitobe was educated in a Christian-influenced school in Japan and became a Quaker while studying at Johns Hopkins University during the years 1884-7, Bushido was heavily influenced by his Christian ethical beliefs and his knowledge of Western manners, as if it were ‘a mildly exoticised version of the British public school ethos’ (Morris-Suzuki 1995, p. 765). In Morris Low’s description, ‘Despite being about traditional Japanese ethics and morality, the book is informed by his knowledge of Western ethics and literature’ (Low 2003, p. 84). Nitobe presents Bushido as an unwritten moral code deeply rooted in Japanese people’s consciousness, so that it is still alive following the Japanese Westernisation: ‘An unconscious and irresistible power, Bushido has been moving the nation and individual… Unformulated, Bushido was and still is the animating spirit, the motor force of our country’ (Nitobe 1905, p. 171). Even though the samurai were a privileged warrior class, a small part of the population in the federal period, Nitobe presents Bushido, the way of the samurai, as a moral
principle for all Japanese individuals and the nation. In his reinterpretation of Bushido, self-control, ‘a national trait of apparent stoicism’ (*ibid.*, p. 103), is emphasised as one of the samurai’s virtues, along with loyalty, politeness and so on:

It was considered unmanly for a samurai to betray his emotions on his face… The most natural affections were kept under control. A father could embrace his son only at the expense of his dignity; a husband would not kiss his wife, – no, not in the presence of other people, whatever he might do in private! (*ibid.*, p. 104)

Nitobe’s *Bushido*, which was translated into Japanese in 1908, was not only ‘an invented tradition’ (Benesch 2004) but had also become a new model of masculinity, especially for soldiers in the Japanese imperialism, which was set against Western imperialism (Karlin 2002).

What is distinctive about the change in the samurai image through Japanese modernisation is the altered view of their sexuality and the emergence of a new Japanese masculine identity. At the beginning of modernisation, the samurai were an object of denial of the past through Westernisation. Their *nanshoku* was remembered as an aspect of their ‘uncivilised’ habits. Nonetheless, its eroticism can be attractive to some people and can offer an alternative Japanese masculine model, distinct from the Westernised one (Maekawa 2011, Ch. 1). When Japan achieved sufficient modernisation, however, the image of the samurai became not an alternative model but, rather, the masculine model for all men, and for the Japanese in general. With the new ‘invention’ of the samurai, their *nanshoku* was rarely mentioned among their characteristics and the samurai has come to be regarded as a polite, loyal and stoical man. Now, *nanshoku* can represent the past, but rarely the samurai’s respectful masculinity. Analysing discourses on state-regulated prostitution, Hayashi Yoko (2009) noted that stoicism had been regarded as a symbol of ‘civilisation’ and masculinity, especially after the Russo-Japanese war, which made Japan a new presence in the world, and controlling sexual desire was described through the metaphor of fighting a war. For a country respected in the world, “‘fidelity of men” is the symbol of “patriotism” in the new era’ (Hayashi 2009, p. 107). As in Nitobe’s example of self-control, the Japanese men who exemplify *Bushido* are characterised by stoicism and heteronormative behaviour, such as the proper attitude in front of their wives and sons, rather than by the homoerotic bond portrayed in *Hige otoko*. Thus, even though the samurai has a historical legacy of same-sex sexual conduct, the samurai’s homoeroticism
was buried in the past and ‘samurai’, as the new masculine model associated with nationalism in modernised Japan, was transformed into the male model that can fit with modern heteronormativity.

4-3. Ero-guro-nansensu: Representations of Gender and Homosexuality in a Modernised City in the 1930s

While the samurai had provided a new masculine model in modern Japan and their same-sex sexuality, nanshoku, was turned into a sign of the past, a new representation of modern homosexuals appeared. Gregory Pflugfelder pointed out that, due to the influence of sexology in the early twentieth century, same-sex desire had become represented as ‘perversion’. Recalling Foucauldian power’s repressive/productive dynamism, Pflugfelder argued that the emergence of ‘perversions’ opened up new kinds of representations of sexuality, not only in medico-science discourses, but also in popular culture:

[T]he pleasure of ‘perversion’ revolved equally around such acts as knowing, speaking, and seeing. The sexologist, for example, derived pleasure from his (and very rarely her) ability to categorise the different varieties of sexual behaviour according to an authoritative conceptual scheme, thus demonstrating his superior knowledge. Likewise for the popular writer, the license that the sexological idiom gave to speak of ‘perversion’ in a public forum sanctioned new forms of narrative pleasure, as well as new commercial opportunities. (Pflugfelder 2007, p. 289)

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the new cultural phenomenon called ero-guro-nansensu, celebrating the pleasure of the moment, arose between two disastrous events in Japan, the Great Kanto earthquake (1923) and the Second Sino-Japanese war (1937) (Kuroiwa 2013). Pflugfelder explains:

Each of the three elements implied a perversion, as it were, of conventional value. The celebration of the ‘erotic’ (ero) in its myriad forms constituted a rejection of the Meiji dictum that sexuality was unsuited for public display or representation unless it conformed to the narrow standards of ‘civilised morality’. The elevation of the ‘grotesque’ (guro) betrayed a similar disregard for prevailing aesthetic codes, with their focus on traditional canons of beauty and concealment of the seamier sides of existence. Finally, the valorisation of the ‘nonsense’ (nansensu) signalled a discontent with the constraining nature of received moral and epistemological certitudes. (ibid., p. 32)
As Pflugfelder characterises *ero-guro-nansensu* as a counter-cultural movement against the Meiji government’s regulation of people’s sexuality and morals, Miriam R. Silverberg (2006) also regards it as ‘an intense expression of cultural phenomena with profound political implications’ (p. 5).

Kuroiwa Yuichi (2013) discusses the representation of ‘sexual perverts’, especially of male homosexuals in *ero-guro-nansensu*, focusing on the ‘grotesque’. Kuroiwa argues that the artists of *ero-guro-nansensu* were fascinated by male homosexuals, seen as the ‘erotic’ and ‘grotesque’ in modern cities, and represented them as a ‘species’, similar to the new forms of discourse on sexuality found in medical science in the late nineteenth century, as noted by Foucault (Foucault 1976, p. 43). The representation of male homosexuals as a species is often characterised by the sexual space set aside for them, such as brothels and the night park for cruising, and their appearance is caricatured by their sexual gaze towards men, symbolising their sexual desire as differentiated from the ‘normal’. Analysing the description of homosexual men’s gaze in several novels, Kuroiwa notes that individualisation of homosexuals stimulates curiosity about homosexuals as unusual ‘grotesque’ beings but that, at the same time, the distinction between the ‘normal’ and the homosexual can be undermined by crossing gazes: the curious gaze towards homosexuals and the homosexuals’ sexual gaze towards the narrator as their sexual object. He suggests that the double movement of *ero-guro-nansensu*, which individualises the abnormal and undermines the rigid distinction, has political potential in the representation of the ‘grotesque’ (*ibid.*, p. 152).

Pflugfelder also points out that the male same-sex sexuality in *ero-guro-nansensu* represents the ‘grotesque’ urban environment. Through analysing various novels published between the 1920s and the 1930s, Pflugfelder (2007) illustrates three distinctive features of discourses on male same-sex sexuality. Firstly, ‘same-sex love’ was linked with a ‘grotesque’ urban environment at a time when cities such as Tokyo and Osaka were rapidly growing in Japan and new subcultures of male-male eroticism were emerging in the large cities. Secondly, prostitutes were frequently portrayed as the central actors in this subculture, embodying an ‘inverted’ trope of male-male sexual behaviour. Male prostitutes for men are often represented as having an insertee role in sexual intercourse, with their feminine gender identity (Pflugfelder 2007, p. 322). Thirdly, same-sex love is represented conceptually in a close relationship with criminality and mystery (*ibid.*, pp. 310-315). Pflugfelder suggests that these representations of male same-sex
sexuality reflect the social changes stemming from Japanese modernisation, or Westernisation. Firstly, the male-male erotic subculture, especially that of male prostitutes for men, marks the change in social morality on sexuality due to Westernisation, as well as the social diversity that had been made possible by urbanisation.

While the ‘new kagema’ and his world stood at the very heart of ‘civilised’ society, they contravened many of that society’s norms, and were constrained to resort to various strategies of self-concealment in order to survive in less than friendly surroundings. (ibid., p. 320)

While homosexual cultures in urban areas signify mysterious secrecy akin to criminality, they also represent a by-product of Westernisation, ‘the “shadow” of a mature capitalist society’ (ibid., p. 320). Secondly, the medical discourses had affected popular discourses and provided new words for explaining same-sex desire, especially when taking the discursive form of individualisation and the gender inversion model. Pflugfelder notes the emergence of a new term for homosexual men in popular culture in the 1920s and 1930s.

By the 1920s and 1930s, however, the term okama had typically come to signify a distinct type of individual: a male who enjoyed ‘passive’ sexual intercourse with men, who exhibited feminine gender traits, and who often received money or some other form of remuneration for his sexual favours (as reflected in the cognate okamayasan, literally meaning ‘pot seller’). It was as if a particular orifice and its penetrative possibilities had come to define the individual’s entire being. The okama, in other words, was a popular counterpart of the ‘passive’ and ‘effeminate’ male dôseiisha [the homosexuals], so that one 1927 source gives the word as a colloquial equivalent for the sexological term ‘urning’. (ibid., p. 323)

In the 1920s and 1930s, male homosexuals were individualised and regarded as a by-product of Westernisation in modern cities through the representations of ero-guro-nansensu.

In these images of ero-guro-nansensu, male same-sex sexuality does not signify Japanese tradition or masculinity but, instead, Westernisation/modernity and male gender ambiguity, a ‘shadow of modernity’.

5. History of Othering: National Identity, Temporality, Gender and Sexuality

5-1. The National Ideal and Representations of Homosexuality

31
Keith Vincent (2012) applies Sedgwick’s reading to Japanese early modern literature to focus on its homosocial narrative, in order to figure out the rupture of heteronormativity constructed by Westernisation. In his argument, homoeroticism undermines the project of modernisation of the Western model as Japan becomes a heteronormative and mature nation. Homosocial narrative indicates the ‘failure’ of modernisation and its heteronormativity within the Japanese modern canon, recalling the homoerotic premodern past. However, as reviewed above, representations of same-sex sexuality in pre-war Japan are varied, even contradicting each other, rather than consistent, as seen in Vincent’s formulation of Japanese homoerotic premodern past versus Western heteronormative modern future.

Representations of same-sex sexuality had changed along with the change in the Japanese national ideal. In pre-war Japan, same-sex sexuality is represented as something negative for present-day society, something that Japan has to overcome. For example, when Japan started to enter modernisation, same-sex sexual conduct was linked to the federal past that the government was eager to reform. Then, after a few decades had passed, same-sex sexual cultures came to be regarded as a ‘shadow’ of Westernisation, at a time when Japan needed to seek its national identity and the samurai become a model of Japanese masculinity, especially for soldiers. Representations of same-sex sexuality had functioned as an ideology with which to indicate national ideals through its negation.

What is notable is that various contradictory representations of same-sex sexuality had already emerged by the 1930s. In her ground-breaking book Epistemology of the Closet, Eve K. Sedgwick argued that contradictory definitions of homosexuality had contributed to the power of knowledge, or more exactly, to the power of ignorance. Following Michel Foucault’s theory of power-knowledge, Sedgwick regards ignorance as a part of knowledge and analyses how ignorance and secrecy work against homosexuals as a means of oppression in Western modernity.

This possibility, however, was repressed with increasing energy, and hence increasing visibility, as the nineteenth-century culture of the individual proceeded to elaborate a version of knowledge/sexuality increasingly structured by its pointed cognitive refusal of sexuality between women, between men. The gradually reifying effect of this refusal meant that by the end of the nineteenth century, when it had become fully current – as obvious to Queen Victoria as to Freud – that knowledge meant sexual knowledge, and secrets sexual secrets, there had in fact developed one particular sexuality that
was distinctively constituted as secrecy: the perfect object for the by now insatiably exacerbated epistemological/sexual anxiety of the turn-of-the-century subject. (Sedgwick 1990, p. 73)

While secrecy about homosexuality inflames people’s anxiety and fear in regard to sexuality, it also undermines the political strength of gay people’s speech and experiences. Comparing Esther’s Jewish identity and political activity with those of gays, Sedgwick points out how a secret, or the refusal of sexuality, de-authorises the influence of gay people’s speech and identity in society. For example, although, in *Esther*, Esther’s self-disclosure of Jewish identity is recognised without question and constitutes her as a political subject, Sedgwick notes that gay identity can be easily questioned or exposed by others without constituting it as a political subject in homophobic society. Then, reviewing various definitions of homosexuality, Sedgwick clarifies them into categories of minoritising/universalising models and gender/sexuality, and reveals how the modern definitions of homosexuality were built up as an incoherent dispensation, as if they had been constructed to form a double bind of gender oppression and heterosexist oppression.

In pre-war Japan’s case, definitions or representations of hetero/homosexuals are constructed not only with the binaries of minoritising/universalising models and gender/sexuality but also with the binaries of national identities – Japan/the West – and temporalities – the past/future, which have all been central political topics in modernity. Through more complicated definitions and representations of hetero/homosexuality than Sedgwick argued for in the context of modern Western cultures, discourses on homosexuality have contributed to Japanese national identity and political ideals, as well as to the construction of normative sexuality. In the following sections, I will argue how discourses of hetero/homosexuality have politically functioned in pre-war and post-war Japan.

5-2. Definitions of Homo/Heterosexuality, National Identity and Temporality

Following Sedgwick’s terms describing the definitions of hetero/homosexuality as minoritising vs universalising models, the Japanese discursive formation of sexuality is quite similar to the Western one discussed by Sedgwick: that is, as similarly constituting an incoherent dispensation. As I discussed above, the same-sex conduct, *nanshoku*, of the samurai is regarded as having been a custom in the past, not as an expression of individual sexual preferences; thus, it is categorised as a universalising model. On the other hand,
after modern compulsory heterosexism becomes rooted in Japanese society, the homosexual referred to by *ero-guro-nansensu* is often portrayed as an individualised figure, who is essentially different from others: therefore, representing a separatist and minoritising model. From the standpoint of gender, the *nanshoku* of the samurai is a symbol of their culture of gender segregation, while gender representations of homosexual men in *ero-guro-nansensu*, and the ‘male-dressing lady’ in Yasuda’s arguments, rely on an inversion model, depicting a transition towards the opposite gender.

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<th>Sexual Representation of Same-Sex Conducts:</th>
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<td>Homosexuality in <em>ero-guro-nansensu</em> (<em>Essentialist</em>, or Minoritising model)</td>
<td><em>Nanshoku</em> of samurai (Bisexual Potential, Constructionist or Universalising model)</td>
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<th>Gender Representation:</th>
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<td><em>Nanshoku</em> of samurai (Gender segregation)</td>
<td>Homosexuality in <em>ero-guro-nansensu</em>, The ‘male-dressing lady’ (Inversion model)</td>
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Figure 1. Models of Gay/Straight Definition Based on Sedgwick’s Mapping, Focusing on Overlapping Sexuality and Gender

When these representations of homosexuality are re-categorised through binaries between Japan and the West, based on whether behaviour is normative or non-normative, and between the past and the future, the incoherent dispensation of discourses becomes more complicated. The samurai’s *nanshoku* is regarded as Japanese traditional conduct (the past) while heteronormativity is regarded as the result of modernisation, a consequence of Westernisation (the present). On the other hand, in the gender-accented representations, the gender-inverted images of homosexuals are regarded as the product of modernisation and are even sometimes interpreted as a symptom of the coming-future (the future), whereas the masculine representation of the samurai who is sexually self-controlled, therefore corresponding to modern heteronormativity, is regarded as a model of Japanese masculinity that has endured from the past up to the present.
In the mapping of Figure 1, definitions of hetero/homosexuality in pre-war Japan cross separatist and integrative models of sexual and gender definitions, as Sedgwick pointed out, in the context of modern discourses. Furthermore, what is noteworthy in representations of normative/non-normative figures, closely related to those of homo/heterosexuality, is that those representations also constitute asymmetrical dispositions of cultural identities; whilst Western heteronormativity consists of norms of sexual conduct contrasted with male homoeroticism of the samurai class in premodern Japan, a new representation of Japanese masculinity of the samurai, an invented tradition, is considered the ideal for Japanese men, whereas a gender inversion of homosexuals is regarded as ‘grotesque’ and a ‘shadow’ of Western modernisation. These incoherent representations of cultural identities based on gender and sexuality have generated a sense of national temporality as well. On the one hand, the male homoeroticism of the samurai, as Keith Vincent (2011) argues, marks the past as contrasted with the present, that is, the new age of Western modernity. On the other hand, gender representations of homosexuals that emphasise gender fluidity indicate a sense of the future, collapsing the contemporary norms and the coming, new, hitherto unseen society, described as ‘a new civilisation’ (Yasuda 1935, p. 157).

In *Epistemology of the Closet*, Sedgwick insists that the crisis of homo/heterosexual definition is the peculiar feature of Western modernity and the source of its homophobic social mechanism. According to her, incoherent discourses of

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6 A close relationship between futurity and ‘queerness’ is not only a characteristic discourse in Japan, although Lee Edelman (2004) asserts that futurity is a heteronormative ideology associated with reproduction. For example, Judith Butler’s argument about the political subversion by gender performativity for political transformation, in *Gender Trouble* (1990), can be interpreted as futurism through queerness and, notably, José Esteban Muñoz (2009) explores ideas of utopian queer futurism.
homo/heterosexual definition, the double bind of minoritising and universalising models, have contributed to the modern Western identity and social organisation and enabled homophobic violence against gay people in the course of fuelling anxiety over sexuality. In the case of Japan, the crisis of homo/heterosexual definition is forged not only through the confusing coexistence of minoritising and universalising models, but also through the contradictory questions of national identity as between Japan and Westernisation, and of historical perceptions as between the past and the future. The result is the construction of the peculiar discursive formation in Japan, which is influential even now: discourses of gender and sexuality arouse political problems of national identity, especially between Japan and the West, and vice versa. Therefore, inevitably, discussions of nationalism in Japan must involve perspectives of gender and sexuality, which have often been ignored in previous studies, while studies of gender and sexuality in Japan also need perspectives of race, ethnicity and nationalism as essential elements.

5-3. Contradictory Politics: Theorising Repression against Gender and Sexual Minorities and Sexual Politics in Japan

The question of discourses of hetero/homosexual distinction, or of tolerant/intolerant attitudes towards homosexuality, in Japan has provided one of the critical arguments in

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The complex formations of temporality and contradictory relationships between the national and the West are not only the characteristics of Japanese sexual politics. Exploring the situation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Joanna Mizielińska and Robert Kulpa (2011) discuss that temporalities of sexual politics appear ‘queer’, the mixture of the past and the present all at once, compared to ‘straight’ Western time from the past to the future: “[T]hese “homophile-like” claims of acceptance and assimilation may be attempted by “jumping into the 1970s” and using some contestation strategies predominant at the time in America (and a handful of other countries). At the same time, other groups in CEE label themselves “queer” and draw directly on 1990s Queer Nation events such as “kiss-in” in public spaces. Therefore, the beginning of the 1990s for LGBT activists in CEE is truly a “queer time”: a time of mismatched models and realities, strategies and possibilities, understandings and uses, “all at once”. It is the time when “real” and “fake”, “the original” and “the copy” collapse into “the same”/“the one”; and yet, nothing is the same, nothing is straight any more’ (p. 16). In a different paper, Kulpa also points out lesbian and gay communities in Central and Eastern Europe embrace the national for one of the methods of their struggles, winning back the patriotism from homophobic and xenophobic nationalists (Kulpa 2011). Although there are different political, cultural and historical contexts of sexual politics between Japan and Central and Eastern Europe, sexual minorities’ activisms and discourses in both regions appear complicated and sometimes confusing when they need to negotiate with both Western centric views of ‘queer activism’ and domestic situations.
Japanese Sexuality Studies, as it characterises Japanese modernity, which has supposedly developed differently from that of Western society. As we have seen above, scholars in the field of Japanese Sexuality Studies have tried to establish a narrative of Japanese modernity that is strong enough to explain the discourses of sexuality, as well as those of Japanese/Western culture. Furukawa Makoto (1994) influentially provided the historical narrative that emphasises the discursive discontinuity between premodern and modern Japan. On the other hand, Keith Vincent (2012) and Suganuma Katsuhiko (2012) sought alternative narratives of history that stressed the interculturality of sexuality and the local identity of Japan through a modernisation that cannot be merely reduced to ‘Westernisation’. No matter whether the narrative emphasises the discursive discontinuity or the interculturality of Japanese modernity, these scholars tried to establish a strong, complex narrative, which well explains Japanese historical and social transformations of gender and sexuality in modernity.

However, as Sedgwick inspiringly shows, the impasse in homo/heterosexual definition lies neither in the problem of rationality nor in the lack of elegant theories of sexuality, but in the political apparatus that violently represses gay people, effectively depriving them of political agency. Sedgwick relates:

I have no optimism at all about the availability of a standpoint of thought from which either question could be intelligibly, never mind efficaciously, adjudicated, given that the same yoking of contradictions has presided over all the thought on the subject, and all its violent and pregnant modern history, that has gone to form our own thought. Instead, the more promising project would seem to be a study of the incoherent dispensation itself, the indissolubility girdle of incongruities under whose discomfiting span, for most of a century, have unfolded both the most generative and most murderous plots of our culture. (Sedgwick 1990, p. 90)

Focusing on the functions of power movements through the contradiction – the actual violent effects on gay people – rather than on the impasse of discursive confusion itself, Sedgwick has influentially changed the view of the discourses of homo/heterosexuality and opened up the possibility of queer critiques.

In pre-war Japan, discourses about the definition of homo/heterosexuality, the double binding of minoritising and universalising models, and of Japanese and Western cultural representations, did not necessarily produce the violent consequences against homosexuals that Sedgwick noted in the context of modern Western societies. Instead of contributing to the endless production of homosexual subjects and the violent denial of
them, it functioned to regulate Japanese normative identity through political implications, with male same-sex sexuality indicating the negativity of the past or the dark side of modernisation. In effect, the negation of sexual and gender deviance helps to mobilise Japanese self-identity by separating it either from the past or from excessive Westernisation, according to historical and social contexts, although sometimes it stimulates the imagination concerning the unknown future, as we have seen in Yasuda Tokutaro’s discussion. Certainly, in each historical context, this has resulted in the exclusion of same-sex sexuality in Japanese society. However, the method of exclusion is not to produce homosexual subjects within the society and culture and then violently deny them, but to construct the ‘outside’ of the society, such as the past, the future, or the ‘West’, and project same-sex sexuality onto the outside, and then to erase same-sex sexuality within the normativity of Japanese society or within the present.

What is an additional but more interesting consequence is that this kind of exclusion has ironically created discursive spaces for homosexuals through projection. This certainly functions as exclusion in Japanese society but, even so, appears as ‘tolerant’ or ‘queer’ compared to Western society, by seeming to preserve ‘homosexuality’ in the past or the future, and often mentioning it. It is notable that the Japanese history of sexual politics, featuring the struggle between repression of gender and sexual minorities and the politics opposing that repression, is ‘twisted’ compared to the history of gender and sexuality in the West. In North American or Western European countries, the history of sexual politics, like other politics of class, race, sexism, and colonialism, and so on, is often described as the story of a struggle against repression, as Dennis Altman (1971) narrated in the context of the emergence of social minorities’ movements in the 1960s. Even after Foucault’s influential critique of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ (Foucault 1990), the idea of repression-liberation, which constitutes a political arena for struggles, has been a powerful political driver. On the other hand, ‘repression’ of gender and sexual minorities in Japan is achieved through projection towards the outside of present-day Japan, treating the minority people as ‘foreign’ or anachronistic/futuristic objects rather than directly rejecting them within the culture and society: repression through denial rather than through violence.

Such a method of exclusion and preservation of same-sex sexuality is hardly contextualised as a political struggle, because the same phenomenon produces conflicting political interpretations. For example, people like blogger Jack (2006), who criticised gei-ribu (derogatory slang for Japanese gay activism), regard Japan as a tolerant culture, for
it has male same-sex sexual traditions and lacks Western-style gay activism and violent attacks against gay people. In this view, the absence of gay activism similar to that in Western societies shows that Japan is tolerant of gay people, while the situation of women, including lesbians, in the society is ignored. On the other hand, Kazama Takashi, Kawaguchi Kazuya and Keith Vincent (1997) insisted that Japanese heteronormativity functions through denying the political agency of gay people. While admitting that the Japanese media often covers gay culture out of curiosity, and society allows private same-sex sexual affairs without moral condemnation, they also emphasised that this does not mean that homophobia is absent in the society, but rather that homophobia is tactically hidden to sustain the Japanese heteronormative power structure (Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent 1997, pp. 109-112). Thus, they argued that the Fuchu seinen no ie trial in 1997, the first legal case in Japan in which the court recognised discrimination against homosexuals in public spaces, was a ground-breaking case as it revealed the existence of homophobia and the need for judicial protection of the human rights of homosexuals in Japanese society (Kazama and Kawaguchi 2010, pp. 70-71). For them, the denial of homophobia within Japanese society is proof of homophobia in Japan.

This is one reason why arguments about situation for Japanese sexual minorities often fail and go around in circles. One of the most complicated aspects of Japanese sexual politics is that the same social facts produce opposing political discourses, both denying each other and co-existing in Japanese society. Such discursive production makes it impossible to construct a linear narrative of the history of sexual minorities in Japan, thus undermining the grounds of political speech by sexual minorities on their own behalf. In Sedgwick’s account, the discursive apparatus that generates contradictory discourses associated with the binary of Japan/the West is a source of power for knowledge/ignorance, nullifying the political subject of sexual minorities in Japan: to be precise, I term it the source of power of knowledge/forgetfulness against social minorities in Japan. Tactically, the power of knowledge/forgetfulness against sexual minorities works well. It functions not only by utilising the homoerotic past to deny discrimination against sexual minorities in contemporary society, but also by utilising new discourses to deny or forget the political issues of the past. Thus, the questions of whether Japan is a gay friendly country or not, or whether Japanese homosexual culture is influenced by the West, or whether Japanese traditions are rather repressive, are pursued not only because they can incorporate Japanese cultural nationalism, Orientalism, or Eurocentrism, but also because they sustain the discursive production that is part of the Japanese modern sexual
scheme that artfully excludes gender and sexual deviances. The argument based on such questions can reproduce Japan’s contradictory sexual politics, but can never critically reveal the structure of political phenomena and their historical contexts. Instead of asking such questions directly, I focus, rather, on how people problematise their gender, sexuality, desire and lives in the present. To be precise, I shall focus on political dynamism and the failures caused by those questions associated with Japan/the West, in particular analysing what defines political struggles in each social context, then how such struggles are later forgotten or denied.

I posit three viewpoints from which to analyse the history of sexual politics in relation to male homosexuality in post-war Japan. Firstly, I will focus on the relationship between sexual politics and national and cultural identity in post-war Japan, discussing how sexual politics have involved Japanese national or cultural identity, or been culturally and politically influenced by the ‘West’ in praising or criticising Japanese society. As we have already seen from various discourses on sexual and gender normativity in pre-war Japanese society, the discourses had changed through the variation of relationships between gender and sexuality on the one hand, and Japanese national and cultural identity in social contexts on the other. Thus, when analysing discourses, I will accent the shifts of relationships between sexual politics and the national identity/the West. Secondly, I will consider the sense of historicity and temporality that enables us to contextualise the society between the past and future. In discussing the historicity and temporality of Japanese sexual politics, I will emphasise its discontinuity through the shifts of sexual politics and the relationship between sexual politics and the national identity/the West, to reveal the power of knowledge/forgetfulness in Japanese society, rather than trying to construct a grand narrative based on the linear temporality of history. Thirdly, to analyse sexual politics in Japan, I will note social contexts: how one tries to include race, nationality, health and economic issues in its sexual politics, while the other ignores them. Through these viewpoints, this study does not focus on ‘achievements’ of sexual politics in post-war Japan, but on the discursive conditions of political struggles: how the political struggles of sexual minorities were able to emerge in particular social contexts and how the people understood social injustice and exclusions, and expressed them in each context; then, how the political struggles would be depoliticised and later forgotten. Thus, the narrative of this study accentuates the discontinuity and heterogeneity of sexual politics in post-war Japan in order to clarify their political possibilities and limits in each
social context, rather than trying to construct a ‘big theory’ that can cover all sexual phenomena in Japan.

6. The Structure of the Thesis

In the first two chapters, I shall explore political relationships between masculinity/femininity and individual or national pride/shame in the sexual politics of male same-sex sexuality. Through modernisation, the dualism between Japan and ‘the West’ has affected the idea of Japanese ideal masculinity and their national pride. After the loss of Second World War, which denied pre-war Japan’s normative masculinity, shame has become a ‘national emotion’, which is considered as a moral principle in Japan, influenced by Ruth Benedict’s characterisation of Japanese culture as a ‘shame culture’ in her famous book *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946). In the beginning, I will argue how the relationship between homoerotic masculinity and national pride has been constructed in post-war Japan. Then, I will focus on the political functions of shame associated with femininity, which have contributed to homosexual counterculture against heteronormativity.

In Chapter 1, I will investigate the works of Mishima Yukio (1925-1970), who is one of the representative writers in post-war Japan, especially famous for his gay-themed, homoerotic works and far-right political activism, including his attempted coup d’état. In literary studies, Mishima’s early works, for example *Confession of Mask* and *Forbidden Colours*, are often discussed when he is described as a ‘gay’ writer in Japan. In this chapter, however, I will rather focus on his later works, such as *Patriotism* and *A Defence of Culture*, which are regarded as the representative works in which Mishima expresses his far-right political thought. Through analysing Mishima’s works, I will examine how homoerotic desire intersects with national politics and Japanese masculinity, which he tried to construct as the alternative Japanese traditional view against the post-war Japanese masculinity that focussed on economic activities. In Chapter 1, I will contextualise him as one of the most distinctive artists in post-war Japan, in terms of the history of sexual politics, in relation to male homosexuals.

In Chapter 2, I will explore the political dynamics of gay shame in Japan. Japanese culture has been described as a ‘shame culture’, in contrast to the ‘guilt culture’ of the West, since Ruth Benedict’s very influential book, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, was published in 1944. In her book, which is
regarded as having successfully described the Japanese national character, ‘shame’ is identified as a moral principle representative of Japanese culture. In the field of queer studies, on the other hand, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has influentially refined the theoretical and political potential of shame, and presented a shame-accented definition of queerness. Considering the two sides of shame, which are discussed as the national moral principle in the context of Japan, and as an emotion of queer political potential, Togo Ken (1932-2012), a pioneer of Japanese gay activism, is an interesting figure. His political ideology was a revolutionary left one, and he started to challenge national elections in 1971 as an openly homosexual candidate. In this chapter, I will examine the representations of his discourses and argue for Togo’s radical politics, focusing on his adaptation of shame.

Through analysing two political figures and their politicisation of homosexuality, I will discuss the function of nationalism, which politically includes male homosexuality within the nation, rather than excluding it through heteronormativity, which has often been discussed. In addition, I will show that heteronormativity has been politically challenged by Japanese national politics since the 1960s, and will explore sexual politics before the AIDS crisis, which is regarded as marking the beginning of gay activism (Shingae 2013).

In Chapters 3 and 4, I will focus on the dramatic change in the sense of the national border and sexual politics after the AIDS crisis, and how the sexual politics of male homosexuals has been transformed into the private domain.

In Chapter 3, specifically, I will discuss how the AIDS crisis in the 1980s affected Japanese society and the new gay politics. Then, after reviewing the English-language criticism of Westernised gay (gei) identity in Japan, I will analyse discourses of gay politics and gay studies that insist on gay identity in Japanese society. Through these investigations, I will discuss, firstly, how the AIDS crisis has changed the discourses of sexuality and the sense of national and cultural borders in Japan, noting the representation of ‘the West as the threat’, secondly, the discursive effects of Japanese studies and queer studies in the English language concerning Japanese gay identity and, thirdly, the political debate over coming out, arising from the institutionalisation of gay studies in Japan.

In Chapter 4, I will discuss the discursive phenomena, focusing on the concept of Tohjisha in gay discourses. The term Tohjisha, which means ‘the people who are directly concerned’, has been used in social minority activism to press their demands and insist on their political visibility since the 1970s, probably constituting a type of activism
comparable to the identity politics of US society. Despite the frequent use of the term *Tohjisha* in Japanese gay discourses, as well as in other social minority studies and activism, neither Japanese Studies nor Gender and Sexuality Studies in English and Japanese have paid enough theoretical attention to this word or concept. Through examining the characteristics and problems of the political concept called *Tohjisha*, I will discuss how the approach of *Tohjisha* has prepared the Japanese homonormativity of the 2000s, analogous to Lisa Duggan’s *new homonormativity* in the US context.

In the last two chapters, I will analyse the Japanese situation under the globalisation of LGBT politics, along with international capitalism, especially after the Obama administration’s change of LGBT human rights policy.

In Chapter 5, I will analyse the internationally influential queer criticism of homonationalism by Jasbir K. Puar and will try to point out her limits in the context of my discussion. Then, I shall analyse Japanese ‘LGBT’ political phenomena under the transnational influence of the Obama administration’s LGBT-friendly policy, notably expressed by Hillary Clinton in ‘Gay Rights Are Human Rights’, and neoliberal capitalism in contemporary Japan. In this chapter, I will note how the global LGBT politics driven by the US government, as well as several European ones, often represent ‘LGBT rights’ as Western values, implying Western superiority over other regions. As a result, the campaign can create divisions among sexual minorities and isolate the ‘LGBT’ community from Japanese history and society.

In Chapter 6, I will analyse discourses of LGBT rights in Japan in the 2010s under the influence of Western governments and international corporations’ campaigns, as discussed in the fifth chapter, especially focusing on the economic aspects and the political emergence of the topic of same-sex marriage. While LGBT rights have also advanced in the 2000s and 2010s in Japan, this is also a time when social and economic inequality has widened, and xenophobic and nationalistic movements have become dramatically influential in mainstream politics due to the notorious Japanese 20 year-long recession, deflation and neoliberal policy of the Koizumi and Abe administrations, whereas Japan had previously been regarded as one of most socially and economically equal societies. With such dramatic social changes turning Japan towards the ‘right’, retreating from issues of wartime responsibility, pacifism and human rights questions such as ‘comfort women’ or sex slaves for the Japanese military, I will investigate how global LGBT politics interacts with Japanese social and economic inequality and nationalism in the new neoliberal society. Through analysing international LGBT politics
in the context of Japanese society, which is due to hold the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics in 2020, I will discuss a new emergence of the political relationship between sexuality and the national identity in the 2010s, following the new Japanese nationalism of the second Abe administration.

In these discussions, I will analyse the history of sexual politics in post-war Japan, focusing on how sexual politics, especially with regard to male homosexuality, has emerged and been negotiated with discourses on the cultural identity of Japan and the West, masculinity and femininity, past and future.
Chapter 1: Mishima Yukio as a Homosexual Political Precursor

1. Introduction

Considering the political and cultural interactions between national pride or shame and masculinity, between Japanese tradition and new Western cultures, and between homoeroticism and the national identity in post-war Japan, Mishima Yukio is a distinctive artist. Mishima is not only one of the most popular writers in post-war Japan, but is also considered as an artist who was the successor of traditional Japanese culture (de Bary, Gluck, and Tiedemann 2006). He wrote more than 50 novels and plays, including Japanese traditional plays such as Kabuki and No play. In addition, he often represented himself in public as a traditional Japanese man, or samurai. His gender performance, acting the samurai in post-war Japan, is well remembered among the Japanese, for his portrayal collaborated with various artists and his most famous picture was when he spoke in front of officers at Japan’s Self-Defense Force for his attempt at a coup d’état. Even though more than forty years have passed since his scandalous death, his novels and photographs, and academic books about him, have been published constantly in Japan.

Mishima is also famous and still influential as an ideologue of far-right politics in Japan. He wrote several stories and political essays for nationalistic politics in Japan and passionately engaged in right-wing politics. His followers, who admire his far-right political beliefs, have organised events, called Yukokuki, which means the ‘anniversary of patriots’ death’, every year. He is certainly remembered as a national figure. Mishima ‘sought to resurrect the diminished glory and noble beauty of Japan, adopted the pose of an intrepid samurai, and beseeched the nation for a return to emperor worship’ (Piven 2004, p. 2).

At the same time, however, he is considered as a gay writer both outside Japan and in the Japanese gay community (Vincent 2003). Mishima published several ‘gay’ themed novels in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as his own homoerotic portraits. Barazoku (1983), a Japanese gay magazine, featured the rumour that Mishima was the writer who anonymously published his novel in the underground gay magazine. This shows how Mishima has been an important artist among the homosexual community in Japan, even though the story is merely a rumour among Japanese gay people.

Thus, Mishima has three faces: a popular and representative writer in post-war liberal Japan, a far-nationalist ideologue and a writer and artist of homoeroticism. He has
often been criticised from the viewpoint of the ‘left’ perspective in Japan: the anti-nationalism and heteronormative perspective. Once, however, we take the political position on anti-homophobia in Japanese society, Mishima becomes a controversial artist.

Although some literary and cultural critiques focus on Mishima’s sexuality, it is rare, if not at all, to discuss Mishima in the context of gay politics in post-war Japan, for he is regarded as too ‘nationalistic’ to be a ‘gay pioneer’. This essay aims to explore discursive relationships between the Japanese national identity, politics, Japanese masculinity and homoeroticism through analysing Mishima’s works and the critiques of him.

Firstly, I will summarise his major works and life. Secondly, I will review discourses about Mishima, focusing especially on relationships among Japanese culture, his sexuality and his death, and will then point out how these discourses contain homophobic presumptions and overlook the wider social and historical contexts of Mishima’s works. Thirdly, I will examine his far-right political discourses and how Mishima expressed his embodiment of nationalised gender and sexuality through his images in the context of the crisis of Japanese masculinity caused by the defeat in the Pacific War. Through these discussions, I will contextualise Mishima in the history of male homosexual politics in Japan and discuss not only how gender and sexuality are nationalised through Mishima’s performance and politics, but also the complicated relationships among nationalism or national pride, gender, sexuality and politics in post-war Japan.

2. Mishima Yukio: Life and Works

2-1. Mishima and Homoerotic works

In 1925, Mishima Yukio was born into an upper middle class family; his grandfather and father were government officers. His first successful novel, Confessions of a Mask (1949), is a semi-autobiographical account of a young homosexual who must hide behind a mask in order to fit into society. This novel expresses not only homosexual desire but also sadomasochistic fantasies of blood and death, and this scandalous work made Mishima a celebrity at the age of 24. Four years later, he published his third novel, Forbidden Colour (1953). ‘Colour’ can mean ‘erotic love’ in Japanese, especially erotic affairs outside of marriage or an official relationship. This novel is a story where an old ugly novelist
utilises a beautiful, young homosexual man for revenge against the women who have betrayed him. Mishima began to visit the homosexual bars and cafes in Tokyo in 1950 and he vividly described the underground homosexual scenes in this novel as an important factor of the story (Nathan 1974, p. 105).

Mishima is famous not only for his gay-themed novels, but also for his self-performance. He enjoyed self-exposure, often being described as pathologically ‘narcissistic’ (Piven 2004), especially after he started bodybuilding. When he was young, he had a slim body and poor health. During World War II, Mishima received a draft notice for the Imperial Japanese Army. However, at the time of his medical check-up, he had a cold, spontaneously lying to the army doctor about having symptoms of tuberculosis, and he was thus declared unfit for service. This experience of betraying his country traumatised him his whole life and affected his ideas of beauty, death and eroticism. Fukushima Jiro (1998), a novelist who used to be in a relationship with him, wrote that Mishima had been ashamed of showing his body even during having sex. In the summer of 1952, he began his athletic life when he started swimming. In 1953 and 1954, he proceeded to boxing, taking lessons once a week. Then, he began lifting weights in 1955. As he gained an athletic body, he started to actively show his naked body, and even some researchers about him have regarded his passion for showing his body as ‘narcissistic exhibitionism’ (Piven 2004, p. 45). John Nathan, a biographer, quoted his diary of 5 January 1959, showing how he cared about public judgement of his body:

In the Shukan Yomiuri [a weekly magazine] that came out today there is a story about the rumours that I have begun kendo [Japanese art of fencing] and a photograph naked from the waist up. I don’t know where they got it, but it’s a picture taken three years ago, only a week after I’d begun bodybuilding. It is very annoying that people may think of me even now as such a weak and anaemic creature. If it is assumed this is the shape I am in now, I will be thought of as an empty boaster. I have a mind to sue for defamation, but in view of the auspicious time of year [i.e., New Year’s] I’ll forbear. (Nathan 1974, p. 125)

In 1963, Mishima posed in the nude for a photographic study called Bara-Kei, ‘Punishment by Roses’, by Hosoe Eikoh. In 1970, the year in which he sensationally committed suicide, Mishima also posed for the young photographer Shinoyama Kishin for the first of a series of photographs to be called ‘Death of a Man’. This series developed from Mishima’s inspiration, and Mishima designed the scenes. Nathan wrote about his attitude during creating this series: ‘In all the hours of talk about each scene while it was being planned and photographed, Shinoyama’s only impression was that Mishima was
intensely serious about the project, “the most demanding and the most cooperative” model he had ever had’ (Nathan 1974, p. 267).

2-2. Mishima’s Political Commitment and Scandalous Death

Although he was involved in many projects, Mishima is most famous in Japan as a far-right ideologue. In the 1960s, he shifted to the politics of the right. He published the story titled *Patriotism (Yūkoku)* (1961), which was inspired by the Army Rebellion of the February 26 incident in 1936, which is considered to have put Japan on the path of militarism, the ‘most dramatic internal disturbance in twentieth-century Japan’ (Shillony 1973, p. ix). Young officers in the Imperial Army attempted to overthrow, with about 1400 troops, a government that they considered traitorous, for a ‘Showa Restoration’. They managed to occupy a strategic square of Tokyo in just a few hours and to assassinate three of the six key figures on their list in their homes. The list targeted the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, who was the ex-Prime Minister, the Inspector General of the Military, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and so on. The leaders of the rebellion asked the Head of the Army to talk to Emperor Hirohito, and demanded the establishment of a Showa Restoration. The Emperor himself was enraged and demanded that they be crushed for killing his loyal supporters, refusing even to consider ordering them to commit suicide due to their ‘terrible atrocities’. In the early morning of February 29, the orders were given for subjugation and all of them were arrested. Two of the young officers did commit ritual suicide; the others were executed. Mishima wrote the story in a highly sympathetic tone towards the soldiers and he also produced and co-directed a movie version of it in 1966, where he acted as a lieutenant of the rebellion. He devoted a long and detailed description to the seppuku of the lieutenant, a form of Japanese ritual suicide by disembowelment that had been practiced during the Edo-period (1603-1868) among the samurai class, but was symbolised as an honourable death in the name of the Emperor during militarism.

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8 For the details of the February 26 incident, read Shillony (1973), Kita (2003) and Tsutsui (2006).
In 1968, Mishima created a private militia, Tatenokai (the Shield Society), dedicated to traditional Japanese values and veneration of the Emperor. He thought that Japanese post-war democracy had lost the ‘Japanese soul’, which was, in his mind, Bushido, a way of samurai. One of his biggest problems was the Japan Self-Defense Force, which was created in 1954 under Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. It prohibited an Act of War by the state and declared that ‘the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the Nation’ and that ‘land, sea, and air force, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained’. Mishima thought, therefore, that the constitution must have been revised to permit the Japan Self-Defense Force to be a ‘national legitimate military’ that enabled Japan to fight again. Mishima insisted that being samurai meant preparing for fight and death: ‘The samurai’s profession is the business of death. No matter how peaceful the age in which he lives, death is the basis of all his action. The moment he fears and avoids death he is no longer a samurai’ (Mishima 1996, p. 26).
On 25 November 1970, Mishima and four members of the Tatenokai, in their uniforms, visited the commandant of the Tokyo headquarters of the Japan Self-Defense Force for an attempted coup d'état. With a prepared manifesto and a banner listing their demands, Mishima stepped onto the balcony to address the soldiers gathered below. His speech was intended to inspire a coup d'état restoring the powers of the Emperor. However, he succeeded only in irritating them, and was mocked and jeered. He finished his planned speech after a few minutes, returned to the commandant's office and committed seppuku with his long sword.

3. Mishima’s Scandalous Death and Critiques of Him

3-1. Mishima and Japanese Stereotypes

Mishima’s acting of the modern samurai, the Japanese man who embodied the Japanese soul, and who Mishima claimed post-war Japan had lost, succeeded in making people believe that he was one of few Japanese men who truly represented Japanese tradition and culture in post-war Japan. However, his exhibitionism as the authentic Japanese man has been criticised as strengthening Japanese stereotypes in the West, and some Japanese intellectuals have openly expressed their embarrassment about Mishima’s embodiment of anachronistic Japanese stereotypes.

In his book published just after the Showa period ended, Miyoshi Masao (1991) insisted that Japanese people had lost interest in Mishima as a writer and tried to historicise Mishima in the context of post-war Japan, resisting the portrayal of Mishima remembered as a legendary figure. Miyoshi interpreted Mishima’s aesthetics in the same light as the aesthetics of consumerism in post-war Japan, saying that ‘much of Mishima Yukio’s dazzling performance now looks merely flamboyant, or even kitschy’ (Miyoshi 1991, p. 149). Miyoshi’s efforts to strip Mishima of his samurai mask and to bind him with the past reflected Japanese intellectuals’ trepidation for Western interpretations that ‘misunderstand’ Mishima as being authentically Japanese.

Similarly, Ishiguro Kazuo, a Japanese-born British writer, and Oe Kenzaburo, the Japanese second Nobel Laureate in Literature, agreed in conversation that his death was a performance especially for Western audiences.
Ishiguro: I would be quite interested to hear what you feel about Mishima. I’m often asked about Mishima in England — all the time, by journalists. They expect me to be an authority on Mishima because of my Japanese background. Mishima is very well known in England, or generally in the West, largely because of the way he died. But also my suspicious is that the image of Mishima in the West confirms certain stereotypical images of Japanese people for the West. And this is partly why I think he is much easier for Western audiences. He fits certain characteristics. Of course, committing seppuku is one of the clichés. He was politically very extreme. The problem is the whole image of Mishima in the West hasn’t helped people there form an intelligent approach to Japanese culture and Japanese people. It has helped people perhaps to remain locked in certain prejudice and very superficial, stereotypical images of what Japanese people are like. Most people seem to regard Mishima as a typical response to this, because I know very little about Mishima, and very little about modern Japan. But that is certainly the impression that I get — in the West he is being used to confirm some rather negative stereotype. I wonder what you think about Mishima and the way he died, what that means for Japanese people, and what that means for distinguished author such as yourself.

Oe: The observations you just made about the reception of Mishima in Europe are accurate. Mishima’s entire life, certainly including his death by suppuku, was a kind of performance designed to present the image of an archetypal Japanese. Moreover, the image was not the kind that arises spontaneously from a Japanese mentality. It was the superficial image of a Japanese as seen from a European point of view, a fantasy. Mishima acted out that image just as it was. (Shaffer & Wong 2008, pp.55-56)

In this conversation, they openly expressed their discomfort and embarrassment for the fact that people outside of Japan, especially ones in the West, think of his performance as the authentic Japanese image. Ishiguro even accuses such stereotypes as a form of lack of intelligence toward Japanese culture.

Miyoshi (1991) compares Mishima to other writers in the Showa age, such as Tanizaki Junishiro and Oe, arguing that Mishima is a writer of a centralist position in Japan. According to Miyoshi, Tanizaki’s and Oe’s strategies were to place themselves in a ‘foreign’ place from the ‘centre’ of Japan, viewed as Tokyo, as Tanizaki wrote stories in the Kansai region and Oe created his fictional village in the mountains, to see Japan from distinctly off-centred perspectives. In contrast to them, Mishima was treated as just a fashionable man of his age in Japan, rather than the artist who represented the ‘authentic’ culture of Japan.

The 1960s, Miyoshi (1991) insisted, had a different meaning for the United States and Japan. In the case of the United States, the 1960s were a time of dissent and conflict, questioning social hegemony, and the emergence of idealism. The movements of anti-war, civil rights, women’s liberation and student protest divided the nation; as a result, the
global hegemony of the United States was, for the first time, visibly shaken. On the contrary, however, the 1960s was a time when Japan succeeded in developing its economy and its social struggles focused on the question of whether, and how, Japan should be independent from the hegemony of the United States. The minority problems, the working conditions of the poor, and Japan’s war atrocities in Asia, and even in Okinawa, inside of Japan, were excluded from the focus of the struggle organised by the progressives, especially when they opposed the ratification of the revised Japan-US Mutual Security Agreement in 1960 (Miyoshi 1991, p.155). While Japanese progressive intellectuals withdrew into their bourgeois daily lives after Japan’s economic expansion, they were primarily concerned with Japan’s national independence from the United States, or the ‘national pride’ that had been lost by the defeat in The Pacific War, as if they were the only problems in Japanese society.

While Mishima personally enjoyed consumerism, Miyoshi insists that Mishima’s political shift to a nationalist ideologue in the 1960s reflected changes in the Japanese society. Miyoshi recalls that Mishima was a snob, but was a popular writer in the age of consumerism, who liked to talk about Tiffany and Jaeger and was proud of his bizarre, self-designed ‘Western’ house, even though he is remembered as a samurai, who must be stoic. Thus, in his argument, Mishima’s ideas on nationalism and Japanese culture were superficial; his ideas on nationalism merely reflected the enthusiasm of a Japanese society that wasn’t facing the minority problems in the society and that adhered to regaining national pride.

Even though Miyoshi was correct about Mishima as a writer with superficial ideas about Japanese culture and politics that merely reflected the Japanese society, Miyoshi still ignored the fact that Mishima’s sexuality had been marginalised in Japanese society as well as in US society. At the time when Mishima enjoyed his public life, gay activism was not even imaginable for people in Japanese society. Although Miyoshi tries to represent Mishima synchronising with the main history of Japan, Mishima’s sexuality produces excesses that cannot fit such an explanation. Mishima’s sexuality is sometimes marked as the enigma, the sign of his extremism especially when people are interested in his death. Indeed, Mishima’s sensational death and his sexuality — homosexuality and sadomasochism — were often considered as being intertwined.

3-2. Mishima and Homosexuality
Jerry S. Piven, a psychologist in the United States, insists that psychological analysis is helpful in understanding Mishima’s works and life because ‘his life and writing are a palimpsest of early trauma, severe conflict, narcissistic injury, the obsession with death, sadomasochism, vengeance, and the terror of disintegration’ (Piven 2004, p. 2). His analysis of Mishima’s personality with reference to psychoanalytic theory simply goes on to explain his ‘perversity’ with psychological terms, but actually repeats the misogyny and homophobia that he found in Mishima. In his logic, analysing his non-secret sexuality reveals his ‘secret’ fantasies and sexualities which are supposedly pathological:

The elucidation of perverse sexualities thus entails tracing not only the obvious sadistic fantasies but also more elusive and unconscious rage and malice suffusing erotic desire. I believe that Mishima adopted and fantasised a number of perverse or neosexual strategies for coping with horrific terror and loss, including misogyny, the sexualisation of violence, sadomasochistic fantasies, even his homosexual interactions, which in his case (not necessarily in other cases) implicate real emotional problems — as he often knew. [Stress in original] (Piven 2004, p. 11)

Piven insists that the problems of Mishima’s ego were caused by the failure of proper gender identification in his childhood because of his weak father and his emasculated, authoritarian grandmother. According to Piven, Mishima is a poor victim of the failure of his father’s Oedipal Complex. What is intriguing is that he explains Mishima’s personality through gender identifications: either hyper-identification with masculinity, internalisation of femininity, or both. Firstly, he analyses that Mishima identified with masculinity through the rejection of femininity, which, in his diagnosis, was especially symbolised by his grandmother:

Note also that Mishima’s sadism and masochism also express the wish to punish the grandmother, not only act out her sadism. Mishima therefore becomes powerful and authoritarian, derogating weakness and impurity, and counteracting his own weakness through aggressive, exhibitionistic, and grandiose behaviour.

Annie Reich (1960) writes of the person whose ‘uncontrollable feelings of helplessness, anxiety, and rage’ are narcissistic injures that lead to the compensatory ‘overvaluation of the phallus, in contrast to the concept of the female organs as being destroyed, bleeding, dirty, etc.’ (Piven 2004, p. 44)

One page later, however, he insists that Mishima also identified with ‘perverse’ women too:
Mishima also developed an early inclination to transvestism in identification with narcissistic women. Mishima identified with the narcissistic exhibitionism of his grandmother, with the performer Tenkatsu, and with Cleopatra (*Confessions*, pp. 16-20). (Piven 2004, p. 45)

Thus, in his discussion, the homosexuality and sadomasochism of Mishima was always already perverse and the result of the failure of proper gender identification, which was caused by destructive women, in this case, his grandmother. He constitutes the double bind of Mishima’s homosexuality that Eve Sedgwick criticised: the gender separatist model or the gender inversion model (Sedgwick 1990, p. 88). According to Sedgwick, two contradictory tropes of gender have been utilised in explanations of same-sex desire in modern Western society. The gender inversion model functions as the preservation of an essential heterosexuality within desire itself, expressed in such words as: ‘a women’s soul trapped in a man’s body’ (Sedgwick 1990, p. 87). The gender separatist model, on the other hand, explains same-sex desire through the expectation that it is the most natural thing to group people together, including the emotional bonding, based on their gender. In the case of Piven’s explanations of Mishima’s homosexuality, it was caused by misogyny, when Piven focuses on his masculinity, while he also asserts that it happened through Mishima’s femininity when his performance, such as his exhibitionism of his naked body, exceeded ‘proper’ masculinity.

Furthermore, he characterised Mishima’s homosexuality as fatal. ‘Mishima continually fantasised about murdering his weak and shameful self-image and commingled this sadistic impulse with fantasies of sexual merger with murdered loves. Finally, Mishima was the murderer, erotically eradicating his sexual vulnerability as both perpetrator and victim. His suicide was a repetition of this erotic sadistic fantasy’ (Piven 2004, p. 19). Thus, Mishima’s sexuality and erotic performances were all about his scandalous death in Piven’s argument.

With Mishima’s scandalous death, homosexuality, ultra-nationalist politics, and his unashamed performance of Japanese samurai, it is easy to keep a distance from him through despising him or, in Vincent’s words, ‘Mishima became the writer that everyone loves to hate’ (Vincent 2003). On the one hand, as Piven’s critique on Mishima’s personality and Miyoshi’s suggestion of Mishima’s femininity that was fascinated by commodities in consumerism, discourses against Mishima’s performances tend to emphasise his homosexuality and gender dysphoria. On the other hand, as in the conversation between Ishiguro and Oe, Japanese intellectuals also express worries over
Mishima’s ‘misrepresentation’ of the Japanese for the West. But such embarrassments also share a concern about the Western interests of the Japanese and the desire for recognition of the ‘authentic’ Japanese by the West. These discourses about sexuality, masculinity and authentic Japaneseness well reflect Mishima’s strategy to construct his image as the authentic Japanese man, even though all of such discourses question his authenticity and masculinity.

If Miyoshi’s argument, which is that Mishima is a writer of a centralist position in post-war Japan, was correct, it is a critical question why there are so many discourses produced against Mishima’s masculinity and image as the authentic Japanese man. In other words, why do Mishima’s masculinity and sexuality disquiet so many men? In the following arguments, I will analyse his ultra-nationalist political arguments rather than his personality, focusing on the relationships between Japanese politics, masculinity and homoeroticism in his discourse.

4. Homoeroticism and Mishima’s Political Thoughts

When we read his political essays, Mishima certainly links eroticism to political terrorism for the reconstruction of Japan, especially in his famous political essays ‘The Defense of Culture (Bunka bouei ron)’ (2006a) and ‘The Manifesto of Anti-revolution (Han kakumei ron)’ (2006b), published in 1968 when left-leaning student activists were energetic and influential in society. In this section, his political thoughts will be analysed through his key elements: Japan’s historical uniqueness, the Emperor, and homoeroticism.

4-1. The Emperor and Japanese Uniqueness

According to Mishima, Japan is a unique country, which has had historical continuity and cultural wholeness since its beginning as a nation. The Japanese, he insisted, must protect such continuity and the cultural wholeness of Japan; therefore, his opponents, for example communists, are people who try to make divisions and schisms in Japan.

Japan is a rare country in the world which is an ethnically homogeneous and unilingual one and our nation, which shares the language, culture and tradition, has kept political unity since the dawn of time. Thus, our cultural continuity is entirely dependent on the inseparability of the people from the state. (Mishima 2006a, p. 60)
Mishima denied the criticism that his politics was based on ‘nationalism’ because nationalism is, Mishima argued, a passion to create a state of one people and, therefore, it presupposes discontinuities between the peoples and the state. As the United States and South Africa have suffered conflicts between peoples due to racial issues, ‘nationalism’ tries to overcome divisions and to achieve a unity of the people in the state. Mishima believed that Japan had always been united as a nation in its history, so it was inaccurate for him to label his politics as ‘nationalism’.

The left, however, has a contrary political purpose: they, Mishima insisted, try to find divisions and alienations in a society for a revolution that denies the Emperor. He claimed that the left utilises accusations of ‘nationalism’ for the political purpose of creating artificial conflicts between people in Japanese society. Mishima related: ‘Problems of Koreans and ethnic minorities in Japan, the left insists, are deceptive. […] They already need to claim the problems of human alienation and alienation of ethnic minorities based on a fiction. Then, when they find alienation of one group, they will rush at it and only think to utilise it for a revolution’ (Mishima 2006b, pp. 20-21). In spite of Mishima’s asseveration, his idea of Japanese ethnical homogeneity since the beginning of Japanese history is rather fictional, if not self-deceiving. Although Mishima emphasises Japanese history for his polemic against the revolutionary left, he ignores the historical fact that Japan, the Empire of Japan, used to be a multi-ethnic state including Koreans, Taiwanese, and so on, despite post-war Japan relinquishing its territory due to the defeat of World War Two in 1945. In addition, there is the Ainu, who are the indigenous people of northern Japan, ethnically distinguished from the majority of the Japanese, wajin or yamato (Siddle 1996). Thus, Mishima erased historical and social facts for his idea of historical continuity and ethnic homogeneity in Japan.

His political idea, however, becomes visible in his deception. His political purpose is not rising ‘nationalism’ in Japan, which unites various ethnic and racial groups in society, but to make a coalition of a specific people, the Japanese. The coalition of the people in his sense means: ‘At least in Japan, Japan becomes aware of what Japan should be, then the purpose of the people will meet with the purpose of the state through the cultural concept. Culture is the only key for it’ (Mishima 2006a, p. 63).

9 For the historical changes of discourses on who are ‘the Japanese’, see Oguma Eiji’s research (2002, 2014).
Thus, Mishima’s political purpose is to retrieve the figure of what Japan should be, that is oneness between the Japanese ethnic people and the state through the culture, not political institutions. His concept of culture includes eroticism and disorder. He argues that the concept of culture is in contraposition to the one of politics because politics supposedly exists for order whilst culture, such as poetry, exists for the diversity of human life and activity. This means, he notes, that his idea of cultural wholeness is neither totalitarianism nor fascism, which controls freedom of speech. Rather, his idea of cultural wholeness radically accepts freedom of speech because it must include anything indiscriminately in its space. Mishima believed that the Emperor embodies such cultural wholeness and historical continuity of Japan. This is Mishima’s idea of the Emperor System: ‘the Emperor System as a cultural concept’ (ibid., p. 66).

There are two features of his idea of the Emperor System as a cultural concept. Firstly, Mishima radically rewrites the character of the Emperor since the Meiji Restoration, which reformed Japan as a modern state with the Emperor as the monarch to maintain the political and social order in Japan: Mishima called it ‘The Emperor as the political concept’: ‘The Emperor as the political concept had to sacrifice a great deal of the Emperor as the cultural concept which is comprehensive and allows more freedom’ (ibid., p. 75). Thus, his view of the Emperor is both highly abstract and far removed from the actual modern Emperor System in Japan. Secondly, there is a critical contradiction in his idea of the Emperor System as the cultural concept. Mishima insists that his political purpose is to make a coalition among the Japanese people under the Emperor System as the cultural concept, but the Emperor System as the cultural concept radically allows for diversity of human activities, and is even open to anarchism, in his view (ibid., p.74). Thus, his idea of the Emperor System as a cultural concept conflicts with its purpose. This contradiction does not collapse his political philosophy. Rather, it demands actions for making a coalition in the radical diversity of human activities, as if the co-existence of freedom of speech and the political demands of concord in democratic society encourages people’s political actions. This means that Mishima’s idea of the Emperor System as a cultural concept evokes struggles among the Japanese, rather than being a solution for the coalition, for instance, Mishima’s extreme hostility against communists in Japan and his attempt at a coup d’état in the name of the Emperor.

In Mishima’s political thoughts, the Emperor represents not only Japanese cultural and historical uniqueness but also, supposedly, the political inclusiveness of the Japanese; therefore, in his discourse, the Emperor functions to define the ‘Japanese’ culturally,
historically and politically. Mishima’s Emperor System, as a cultural concept, functions as a fictional origin of the Japanese and marks the boundary between the ‘Japanese’ and the ‘other’ whilst endlessly producing exclusions of ethnic minorities from the political domain. In short, in his discourse, the Emperor is a fiction that defines the ‘Japanese’ and their politics.

4-2. Politics, Eroticism and the Emperor

Mishima was fascinated by political battles under the name of the Emperor and had created himself as a political subject through such battles. He claimed that his position is the minority of the strong, the last guardian of Japanese culture, history and tradition, opposing the weak majority of the revolutionary thoughts in post-war Japan. When he opposes communism in ‘The Manifesto of Anti-revolution’ (2006b), due to their hostility against the Emperor System and Hirohito himself, Mishima insists that their conflict must be a life-or-death battle, which can only happen once. He regarded such conflicts as the place for the samurai subject in the political battle in post-war Japan. In the book For Young Samurai (wakaki samurai no tameni), published one year before his death, he regards the male subject and his body as essential factors in the politics: ‘When a man finds the meaning of life in peace, he should help what women do rather than what men do. If a crisis is a conceptual role given to men, men’s life and men’s body must always be tense like the bow which is drawn toward a crisis’ (Mishima 1996, p. 29). Mishima ties together the Japanese male body, politics and culture aesthetically through a crisis.

Consequently, his politics evoke homoeroticism among men through the image of physical battles by well-trained, beautiful men. In addition, his concept of culture-eroticism is destructive in its nature, as Mishima was strongly influenced by Georges Bataille (Hirano 1991). Thus, his political battle is supposed to be both homoerotic and destructive. He constructs eroticism around the Emperor, who he tries to protect, and regards the Emperor as the legitimacy of destruction. He claims that the eroticism that is evoked by the Emperor System as the cultural concept is destructive, referring to Miyabi, the traditional Japanese aesthetic ideal of the Royal court.

The Emperor System as the cultural concept implements two requirements of the cultural wholeness: the temporal continuity is linked to the imperial rite and the spatial continuity sometimes accepts even a political disorder exactly as the
deepest eroticism closes to the ancient theocracy on the one hand, and on the other hand, it closes to anarchism.

*Miyabi*, which is both the flower of Royal culture and the admiration of it among people, has become even the form of terrorism in a time of emergency. That is, the Emperor System as the cultural concept is not only for the state power and the order but also for the disorder. (Mishima 2006a, pp. 74-75)

Through his conceptualisation of the Emperor as the erotic legitimacy for destruction in a time of crisis, he treats the Emperor as both the authority and the purpose of his politics.

If the Emperor defines the politics, and its purpose is destined for the Emperor, Mishima’s figure of the Emperor and its political nature will be tautological. In his response to the critique of ‘The Defense of Culture’ by Hashikawa Bunso, Mishima admits his logical weakness. On one hand, Mishima warns of the possibility that the communists might utilise the Emperor for justification of the communist government in Japan. He considers it as the end of the continuity of the Emperor System as a cultural concept, because the Emperor System falls into the political symbol for a certain government. On the other hand, however, Mishima also insists that the Emperor should directly lead the Japanese military because the Emperor must represent all kinds of honours in Japan for its cultural wholeness (Mishima 2006a, p. 79). Hashikawa points this out as the contradiction in Mishima’s politics. Firstly, Hayakawa recalls the historical fact that the modern Japanese Emperor System has been regarded as being political. Mishima’s idea of the Emperor System as a cultural concept, Hayakawa reveals, was already violated by the modern Japanese reformation, especially by the Constitution of the Empire of Japan promulgated in 1889, because it established the Emperor as the head of the government. Secondly, Hashikawa indicates that Mishima himself changed his own idea of the Emperor System as the cultural concept into the Emperor System as the political concept in his statement, as Mishima also demanded that the Emperor should lead the military directly, which is considered as opposite to the cultural concept.

In his reply to Hayakawa, Mishima admitted that the criticism was accurate, especially in his logical weakness. However, his recognition of logical weakness in his political philosophy did not mean that he had to recant or refine his argument. He writes: ‘To begin from the conclusion, I was certainly beaten by your two questions but it is true that I did not feel any responsibility of them because the two points you asked were logical contradictions not of me but of the Emperor himself who is responsible for them’ (Mishima 2006a, p.80).
Mishima does not need to commit to the actual politics based on reason, nor to change his ideas based on the historical facts or logicality, because his political discourse is tautological: the Emperor defines politics and its purpose is the Emperor. While the Emperor engages his logical contradictions, he can attack the actual political issues, such as the left movements and the Japanese post-war, pacifist Constitution, in the name of Emperor. Mishima’s aesthetic politics justifies hostility against the order in post-war Japanese democratic society by the using the name of the Emperor, which is symbolised as the ‘erotic’ and the ‘desired’.

Homoeroticism functions at four levels in his political discourse. Firstly, homoeroticism toward the Emperor constitutes the foundation of his politics, which is destructive and combative in Japanese society. Secondly, the homoeroticism of his politics defines the domain of politics, where only Japanese men participate. Thirdly, his combative politics demands that Japanese men build up their bodies against other men. Finally, the homoeroticism in his politics, or his passionate love of the Emperor, isolates his politics from reality and logicality, as if we do not need an explanation for loving someone. Watanabe Eriko (1997) characterises his works as the paradise of death without women; he was obsessed with masculinity, death, male bodies and the Emperor.

As Mishima turned homoeroticism into a political ethos, the essential passion for men in politics, he regarded the Japanese male body as being political. Next, I will analyse how Mishima represents the male body as political through his own body and performance.

5. Mishima’s Body, Masculinity and Performance

5-1. Changes in Japanese Masculinity through the Loss of World War II

Before discussing Mishima’s particular masculinity, it needs to be contextualised in Japanese cultural and social history at that time. Modern Japanese masculinity has been constructed between the traditional Japanese model of the samurai and the Westernised model represented by whiteness, as Morris Low (2003) points out. In the beginning, Japanese masculine ideals also embraced a Western-inspired modernity, as did Japanese society in other fields, with representations of Japanese male bodies becoming increasingly ‘white’. Low discusses how the Emperor had played an important role in the promotion of the Westernisation of new masculine ideals at the beginning of Japanese
modernisation. While Japanese male bodies were homogenised and westernised through the disciplines in modern institutions, such as schools, the military, etc., bushido, the traditional ethical code of the samurai, was appreciated for its glorification of the past and of the culture for the construction of a Japanese identity differentiated from the West. Although Japanese male bodies were represented to resemble white people in the West, bushido, or the image of the samurai, was utilised as an ideology with which to define Japanese nationhood and to keep Japanese men loyal to the Emperor (Mason 2011). At the same time, however, as men were integrated into the nation as ‘sons of the Emperor’, women were expected to remain in the maternal sphere, reproducing the Emperor’s sons. Thus, the ideology of the Emperor System strongly influenced gender roles and private lives in modern Japan.¹⁰

At the time when Mishima came of age, there was a crisis of masculinity in Japan due to its defeat in World War II. The US-led occupation changed Japanese society in many respects and emasculated the Japanese masculinity constructed by the Emperor System and by militarism. The photograph of the first meeting between Emperor Hirohito and General Douglas MacArthur at the US Embassy revealed not only Japan’s loss, but also the dramatic changes in its old order. Hirohito, who had been a divine being in Japan, stood in a strained position, wearing a morning coat, next to General MacArthur, who simply wore an open-necked shirt and no decorations. Young and small, Hirohito looks like a child compared to MacArthur in the picture. Low describes the picture as a wedding photograph, with Japan cast as the bride: ‘The meeting represented a marriage between the two countries, with Japan as the bride’ (Low 2003, p.93). Three months later, Hirohito, at the request of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, issued the Humanity Declaration, which repudiated the concept of the Emperor as a living god. This picture represents the collapse of the Japanese masculine model, as embodied in the Emperor, and the feminisation of Japanese men by the defeat.

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¹⁰ For the construction of gender roles and family systems at the beginning of the modernisation of Japan, especially through the modern Emperor System, see Hayakawa (1998).
Japan’s transition to demilitarisation was represented as a gendered and racialised process. The US-led occupation especially affected women. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers reformed family law so as to promote women’s rights and encouraged female nationals to participate in the parliamentary process. Lisa Yoneyama (1999) points out that the prominent feminine presence in formal politics contributed to the emasculation of the nation’s image. While the new status of Japanese women symbolised a new national image of Japan as a democratic and demilitarised nation, Japanese women could also signpost the feminisation of Japanese men. Yoneyama writes:

The racialised stories of Japanese women flirting with foreign soldiers or suffering metaphorical or actual rape, which suggested the inability of Japanese men to protect the chastity of ‘their women’, underwrote images of Japanese men emasculated by the absolute power of the United States. Sexualised and gendered relations operated persuasively in popular memories of the period and helped figure the nation’s (that is, the masculine subjects’) inferior status in the post-war
global order - more precisely, its political and economic subordination to the United States. (Yoneyama 1999, p.190)

After the emasculation of Japanese men as national warriors, the Japanese reconstructed their national masculinity in the economic field, even though this was also often racially caricatured, for example in the stereotypes of middle-aged, grey-suited, characterless men or groups of rich men who embodied grotesque sexuality in nightclubs (Dasgupta 2003).

5.3. Defeated Heroes as the Japanese Masculinity by Mishima

Mishima’s masculinity embracing political battles was intended to counteract the emasculation by the US-led occupation, as well as the new found glory of Japan in the field of economics, replacing that of militarism. As discussed above, he developed his own political theory, together with the masculine political subject based on the combative character of Japanese men, on behalf of the Emperor, while excluding women. His image of politics rejects the emasculated figure of post-war Japan that constitutes a denial of the old masculinity and its past.

Mishima’s novel, *Voices of the Heroic Dead* (*eirei no koe*) (2005), expressed the sorrows of the dead soldiers of the February 26 incident, and of the *kamikaze* pilots (*Tokkotai*) who confessed their love for Emperor Hirohito, but criticised him, along with post-war Japanese society, through a spiritualist medium. The dead soldiers’ voices accuse Hirohito of his denial of divinity: ‘But, your Majesty, you should have been a god only twice in history of Showa. You should have been a god, how to say, as a duty of human being. […] But you missed both opportunities. You became a human at the most important time when you ought to have been a god. The first was when our senior spirits stood up for you [the February 26 incident]. The second was when Japan lost’ (Mishima 2005, pp. 66-67). Mishima criticises the Emperor through the voices of dead soldiers who were ‘betrayed’ by his Humanity Declaration, which ‘nullified’ both the meaning of their sacrifice and the foundation of Japanese masculinity. At the same time, Mishima disdained the contemporary Japanese society, which was peaceful and economically flourishing, as symbolised by the success of the Olympics in Tokyo in 1964 (Mishima 2006a, p. 56).

After the crisis in Japanese male masculinity following the defeat, it was not possible to simply replicate the militant masculinity centred on the Emperor. Instead,
Mishima romanticises the defeated men and constructs a new version of masculinity based on collapsed ‘heroes’, for instance, passionately identifying with the officers of the February 26 incident, the kamikaze pilots and his ideal samurai. As Michele M. Mason observes, bushido was argued as being the source of Japanese success in the economic and military fields in the book published in 1900 by Nitobe Inazo, who first introduced bushido, as the Japanese traditional ethical code, to the English language (Mason 2011). In Mishima’s interpretation, bushido remains ‘Japanese soul’, but becomes all about death. In the book devoted to his thoughts on bushido, he writes:

When Jocho says, ‘I found that the Way of the Samurai is death’, he is expressing his Utopianism, his principle of freedom and happiness. That is why we are able to read Hagakure today as the tale of an ideal country. I am almost certain that if such an ideal land were ever to materialise, its inhabitants would be far happier and freer than we are today. (Mishima 1977, p. 8)

The occupation of the samurai is death. No matter how peaceful the age, death is the samurai’s supreme motivation, and if a samurai should fear or shun death, in that instant he would cease to be a samurai. (ibid., p. 27)

Romanticising defeat, sacrifice and death, he presents blood and intestines as symbols of the national and erotic, which were essential to his political thoughts.

5-4. Mishima’s Performance in the Film and the Nationalised Male Body

Mishima directed the movie Patriotism in 1966 and acted as the main character, a young officer who fails in the coup d’étéat in the incident of February 26 and kills himself for the nation. In the film’s scene of seppuku Mishima acted passionately, devoting five minutes of the 28-minute movie to the scene of the officer’s painful death. After his shocking death by actual seppuku, the film was believed lost because his wife had ordered that all of his films should be burnt. However, the original film was found at his house after his wife’s death in 2005, and the DVD was released in 2006. From the planning stage, this movie was probably produced for release outside Japan, because its style is stereotypical of Japan and is, thus, easily comprehended by Western audiences. It is a movie set in the Japanese traditional theatrical style, without any speaking, with all of its story lines presented by subtitles. In the English version the letters are written in Japanese calligraphy, exactly as in the Japanese version, and the music of Wilhelm Richard Wagner plays in the background. The movie starts with a scene in which the lieutenant tells his beautiful wife
about his decision to commit suicide by seppuku. He and his wife make love for the last time in front of a wall scroll, on which is written ‘loyalty’, and then comes the scene of their suicide: sacrificing themselves for the Emperor and for the nation (Izumo 2010)\textsuperscript{11}.

The famous scene of seppuku in this film might be the best evidence for the interpretation that his performances were expressions of his ‘perverted’ sexuality and extreme sadomasochism. Piven writes:

Mishima created his body as a work of art. His literary images are poetic, vivid, and luxuriant, his physical images aesthetically striking. From helpless imprisonment in disease and shame to literary and physical elegance is an astounding triumph. Yet Mishima’s need for visual exhibition, his drive to transform himself from that diseased world into a resplendent, pure one, is the psychological issue here. (Piven 2004, p. 24)

However, what Piven misses is that Mishima tried to present himself not only as one of the beautiful men, but also as a model of the ‘authentic’ Japanese man after the crisis in Japanese masculinity.

In the movie, Mishima presented his body as a highly symbolic object. It is repeatedly shown either naked or uniformed; firstly, the lieutenant appears wearing his uniform, then he becomes fully naked for the sex scene. He wears his uniform again as part of the ritual suicide, with the help of his wife; then he becomes half-naked, opening his jacket for disembowelment. Finally, his wife puts his uniform back onto his dead body. His body is nationalised through repeatedly changing between naked and uniformed.

In the scene where he commits seppuku in front of his wife, his body is objectified by his sword and his wife’s gaze. During his ritual death, the viewer cannot see his facial expression because of the shadow of his hat, and the camera mainly focuses on his belly, though it sometimes gives a close-up of his mouth to indicate pain. When he stabs the base of his left leg to begin the seppuku and blood emerges from the wound, the camera focuses on the wife’s face with its expression of shock at seeing his blood. After the stabbing and slitting of his belly, with its massive outpouring of blood, the camera switches to his face in pain, to her face, to his blood, to her face, then to his face. When the camera returns from the pained expression on his face to his belly, his intestines have come out. By these repeated shots, his blood, symbolising loyalty to the Emperor, is

\textsuperscript{11} Izumo Maro (2010) points out that the movie is based on the triangle made up of three elements, the Absolute, a military man and a wife.
sanctified through the gaze of his wife, the only spectator, who recognises his painful death. Even though she commits suicide after his death, this symbolises her love for him, not for the nation. She puts on makeup after his death, then commits suicide by slitting her neck with a knife. Her dead body nestles against his in the last scene.

In this film, the image of his blood is differentiated from that of hers. While the film’s image of dark bright blood from his belly is realistic, the image of her blood is inversed, black and white reversed, so it appears as a white liquid splattered on the black wall. The images of blood in this film are gendered and differentiated through the classifications of love; one is love for a nation and the other is love for a person. This gendered expression of blood is inspired by the formation of gender roles in pre-war Japan: the male role is that of a warrior for the Emperor, and the female role is that of a mother for men.

6. Mishima and Homoeroticism

6-1. Male Bodies and Homoeroticism

Mishima’s highly symbolic use of a naked male body and blood amalgamates the celebration of masculinity for the nation with homoeroticism. In his exhibit on the theme of ‘Death of a Man’, photographed by Kishin Shinoyama in 1968, he posed naked, imitating Guido Reni’s painting of St. Sebastian, his bleeding body pierced by arrows. This image can be interpreted as a work that celebrates the death and sacrifice of men for the Absolute, as did his performance in Patriotism, his ideal masculinity. However, the image of his body as the hurt and sacrificed man for the sublime is literally translated into homoeroticism through his own ‘confession’ of homoerotic desire. In his first novel, Confession of a Mask, he wrote about a homoerotic fantasy centred on the aforementioned picture by Guido Reni.

A remarkably handsome youth was bound naked to the trunk of the tree. […] The youth’s body – it might even be likened to that of Antinous, beloved of Hadrian, whose beauty has been so often immortalised in sculpture – shows none of the traces of missionary hardship or decrepitude that are to be found in depictions of other saints; instead, there is only the springtime of youth, only light and beauty and pleasure. His white matchless nudity gleams against a background of dusk. […] The arrows have eaten into the tense, fragrant, youthful flesh and are about to consume his body from within with flames of supreme agony and ecstasy. […]
That day, the instant I looked upon the picture, my entire being trembled with some pagan joy. [...] The monstrous part of me that was on the point of bursting awaited my use of it with unprecedented ardour, upbraiding me for my ignorance, painting indignantly. (Mishima 1960, pp. 38-40)

The narrator is aroused by the naked young man’s white body and experiences his first ejaculation. Describing St. Sebastian in the painting as ‘a remarkably handsome youth’ displaying ‘white matchless nudity’, Mishima certainly regards the beauty of St. Sebastian in the young white body, which has long been a norm of male beauty in Europe. Hence, while his intention in ‘Death of a Man’ could be to celebrate the death for its ideal Japanese masculinity as the one of the samurai and the defeated military young Japanese men, he also eroticises himself through identification with Guido Reni’s St. Sebastian, the white youthful man whom he once erotically glorified.

George L. Mosse argues that the young, white, masculine beauty that evokes homoerotic desire was the national male ideal in modern Europe: ‘There is some irony that Winckelmann, the homosexual, made Greek art fit for the middle classes and supplied the model for the national stereotype’ (Mosse 1985, p. 14). Similarly, when Mishima exposed his naked body in front of cameras, he tried to present the stereotypical Japanese masculinity. When he posed holding a Japanese sword and wearing fundoshi, old-styled Japanese male underwear, for the photograph entitled Japanese Bodybuilders by Tamotsu Yagashira, he commented:

Now is the time we have lost all old attires, what is the only thing representative for the external norms of Japanese? It is the strong, masculine body, isn’t it? We do not have ideas nor thoughts anymore which can be a substitutive for such a body. Thus, this polite and refreshing powerful body can first be one of cultural values for Japanese, can’t it? (Mishima 1966, p.11)

As the Japanese lost their old cultural legacy for masculinity, Mishima tried to create the Japanese male bodies themselves as Japanese monuments. For Mishima, male bodies, made strong and beautiful by bodybuilding, with old Japanese symbols, such as the Japanese sword and fundoshi, are a part of the new Japanese culture. However, Mishima himself noticed that the exhibition of naked bodies was not originally a feature of Japanese culture. In an essay entitled ‘On Bodies’ (1996), Mishima discusses the differences between the Western and Japanese perspectives on bodies. He observes that Japanese culture did not share ancient Greek culture’s interests in physical male beauty. Rather, the Japanese regarded male bodies as something to be covered up, and spirituality
as the proper object of people’s concern, especially in higher cultures such as the Miyabi. He remarks that the Japanese perspective on bodies had changed only recently, as the result of American influence, and argued that Japan should adopt a middle way between the Western perspective and the traditional Japanese one; that is, that Japanese men should have a perfect body as well as a perfect spirit. Then he concludes the essay by pointing out why the Japanese people still despise physical beauty: ‘The biggest reason why people easily misapprehend bodies is that physical beauty cannot distance itself from sensual beauty and this fact is not only a part of human being but also a part of the beauty which humans perceive’ (Mishima 1996, p. 44). He well understood that the eroticism evoked by naked bodies was not rooted in Japanese tradition and caused excess and misapprehension.

As the excess of eroticism plays an essential role in Mishima’s political idea, which supposes chaotic situations and battles among men, his performances of masculinity display some excess and confusion as well. The homoeroticism in his imitation of St. Sebastian creates an ambivalence as to whether it is either an expression of his ideal of Japanese masculinity, the death for the Absolute, or an expression of his desire to identify with a young white man by whom he had once been erotically fascinated, or both. Mishima’s political aesthetics and his gender performance, which supposedly embodied his political aesthetics, are controversial subjects for gay critiques as he intertwined the homoerotic desire and the ‘fascist’ politics expressed in his works and activisms. The obvious connection between homoeroticism and his ultra-nationalist politics provides his opponents with a reason to attack his sexuality. In the book Homosexuality and the Emperor System in Mishima Yukio (Mishima Yukio ni okeru nansyoku to Tenno-sei) (1971), published the year after Mishima died, Yamazaki Masao argued that Mishima’s radical nationalist politics was caused by his sexuality, which failed to develop in the ‘proper’ way: into heterosexuality. In Yamazaki’s argument, all Mishima’s ‘ill’ behaviours, such as his sadomasochism, authoritarianism, uniform fetish, love for Nazism and narcissistic identification with the officers of the February 26 incidents, are explained by his homosexuality. Following Susan Sontag, who pointed out the eroticisation of fascism in Mishima’s works (Sontag 1980), Tanaka Jun (2008) also regards Mishima as the representative figure to explain the relationship between Japanese homosocial ties and fascist desires.

6-2. Queer Critique and Mishima
As Mishima’s homosexuality, as probably one of the best known homoerotic artists in post-war Japan, is often connected to far-right politics and his fascination with fascism, Gay Studies in Japan in its early stages had to analyse the connection between nationalist politics and homosexuality. Keith Vincent (1997) criticised Yamazaki’s homophobic connection between homosexuality and nationalist politics in the first book on Gay Studies in Japan. Then, Vincent (2003) tried to offer an alternative reading of the relationship between Mishima’s fascist politics, homosexuality and his ideal of being heterosexual in Japanese society. Vincent twisted the discourse of the relationship between homosexuality and Mishima’s fascism, stressing the homophobic society in which he lived.

The queer critics, which well recognise homophobia in Japanese society, try to interpret his works and performances as more than merely anachronistic works that express the close relationship between homoerotic desire and fascism. Izumo Maro, a film critic and lesbian activist, relates: ‘The existence form of Mishima Yukio holds the things deep inside which cannot be explained only by fascist aesthetics and disseminates an intense self-image: but ultimately, it disappears into the ambiguity of mysticism’ (Izumo 2010, p. 104). Izumo notes that it was the late 1970s when the critique of the alienation caused by sexuality and questions towards heterosexism emerged in the Japanese fourth estate. Before that, Izumo points out, representations of sexual minorities in underground culture, such as drag queens and lesbians, were a part of ‘freak show’, which existed outside of heteronormativity. Against such a social background, Izumo interprets, Mishima had spent his later life for daringly exhibiting his ‘man’s body’ as a spectacle. Izumo calls Mishima’s performance of Japanese masculinity ‘emotional right-wing kitsch’ (ibid., p. 105). Izumo writes:

Looking back at the 1960s from the present of 2010, Mishima’s kitsch representation, which utilises a ‘male body’ determinately subjected to the norm belonging to the supreme man in politics and power, seems a challenge against the demands of explanation posed by heterosexism. Thus, I think, for queer gazes, the existence form of Mishima Yukio is deeply tied to the rhetoric of a blatantly openly secret like being in the glass closet. (ibid., p. 105)

In her interpretation, Mishima’s ‘aestheticisation’ of fascism is not the result of his homosexuality but rather the reappropriation of history and politics for expressing his sexuality in a homophobic society. Izumo focuses on the gay symbols in Patriotism in
her close reading of the movie in which Mishima performs the role of a lieutenant in a heterosexual marriage. She tries to read Mishima’s performance as a self-expression of sexuality by a gay man in the closet in a homophobic society, rather than his yearning for fascism.

However, Izumo’s conclusion is pessimistic about Mishima’s efforts to express his desire and sexuality within social norms. She relates:

The alienation of sexuality is one of the important keys to read Mishima’s works. But, Mishima well acknowledged the structure of repression. That is the structure that even if an alien raises a question, the question is recognised as the only problem of the aliens, then excluded. Repressors never listen to aliens’ crying. Mishima must have known such a nightmare.

It is the 1990s, twenty years later since Mishima’s suicide, that studies which question heteronormativity – the dualistic repressive structure which sets homosexuality against heterosexuality – are introduced and discussed in Japanese fourth estate, but what Mishima attempted was the strategy to hide himself in his legend made by himself while accepting such the dualistic repressive structure. (*ibid.*, p. 128)

Izumo regards his attempt to be doomed from the beginning because his body performance represents emptiness and his existence form signifies ‘nothing’. Izumo suggests that his fascination with death and his attempt to be political, which was also hopelessly doomed, came from his emptiness, hiding his sexuality within the heteronormative norms as if it were ‘a phantom in the ruins’ (*ibid.*, p. 128).

Although his attempt seems hopeless, do his discourses and performances really only signify his desperate expressions of his desire? It is notable that critics which emphasise the relationship between his sexuality and fascist politics contextualise him in history, while queer critics tend to liberate his expressions of sexuality through individualising them, focusing on his closeted sexuality. How can we contextualise his expressions of sexuality in the Japanese history of male homosexuality?

7. Mishima’s New Discourse of Same-Sex Desire: Historicising Mishima Yukio in the History of Homosexuality in Japan

In reading Mishima’s works, a question has been repeatedly posed as to whether Mishima’s novels, especially his representative work, *Confessions of a Mask*, published
in 1949, can be called the first ‘gay’ literature in Japan and whether it expresses gayness in the sense of Westernised sexual identity or not.

Saeki Junko (1997) insists that we cannot identify the same-sex desire of ‘I’ in Confession of a Mask as ‘homosexuality’ in the modern Western sense, because she finds traditional forms of same-sex sexual relations such as existed in premodern Japan in his narrative, including his attraction to men of a different age group from his own. Furthermore, she also argues that ‘I’ is influenced by ‘Western prejudices’ about male love, as ‘I’ considers his same-sex desires sinful and shameful, compared to traditionally tolerant Japanese attitudes towards same-sex sexual conduct in premodern Japan. She therefore concludes that the character ‘I’ in Confession of a Mask represents the mixed characteristics of indigenous and exogenous elements of male love in modernised Japan.

Keith Vincent (2011) insists that ‘homosexuality’ in Confession of a Mask is not understood as an identity but, rather, echoes what he calls ‘homosocial narrative’, which is the early modern Japanese narrative of same-sex desire that regards same-sex sexuality as ‘a developmental stage belonging to adolescence that would eventually and inevitably give way to heterosexuality in adulthood’ (ibid., p.178). This is the opposite to the critic Atogami Shiro, who insists that Confession of a Mask is the ‘dawn of modernity in homosexual literature’ expressing same-sex desire as one’s sexual orientation (ibid., p.175), Vincent notes the movements of desire in a narrative rather than a fixed identity based on sexual desire, while admitting the possibility that Confession of a Mask can be retroactively interpreted as a ‘homosexual novel’. Thus, Vincent’s conclusion is close to Saeki’s. It expresses not both traditional homosexual narratives and new identity-oriented same-sex desire, but neither of them. ‘In my reading’, Vincent writes, ‘Mishima’s novel is neither a piece of “homosexual literature” nor a homosocial narrative, but text that hovers uncomfortably in between’ (ibid., p.182).

It is an intriguing fact that the critiques which focus on sexual minorities in modern Japan are divided over whether Mishima’s novel belongs to traditional Japanese sexuality or indicates the dawn of Westernised sexual identity, or whether it belongs to both of them or neither of them. However, the coexistence of opposing discourses rather suggests that the question that they both rely on is not a proper one in analysing Mishima’s works, as both of them only produce their interpretations but fail to contextualise the works, even though they have tried to. Nevertheless, what is notable in the coexistence of opposing discourses is the fact that Saeki (1997) and Vincent (2011) insist on the opposing conclusions but stand on common ground that Mishima’s work includes
something different about same-sex sexuality in Japan, alienating itself from the past and from contemporary Japan.

Here, instead of asking the question – the question non-Western cultures are almost always forced to answer – of whether Mishima belongs to traditional Japanese sexuality or to the dawn of Westernised sexual identity, I will focus on contextualising Mishima’s discourses in the history of same-sex sexuality in Japan and on clarifying the features of Mishima that still have an influence on ideas of same-sex sexuality in Japan. Although Mishima became a popular writer by producing works about homosexuality, in later years he did not write ‘homosexual’ novels anymore. However, his later works still retained elements of homoeroticism, as we have already seen, and those have often been linked to his far-right politics. What is notable in Mishima is not his homoerotic expression itself, but his change of style of homoerotic expression. Thus, what is the difference between his early style and later style of homoeroticism?

Contextualising Mishima’s works, Sabine Früstück (2002) and Gregory M. Pflugfelder (2007) have already shown that Western medical discourses on sexuality were translated into Japanese in the early stages of Japan’s modernisation. As early as 1890, the conduct of ‘homosexuality’ was beginning to be formulated through translations of Western medical concepts, and people’s sexuality was considered a subject that society had to deal with in Japan. As ‘homosexuality’ was already standardised as ‘same-sex love (dosei’ai)’ by the 1920s, and homosexuals and ‘pervert’ characters were often represented in popular culture after the 1920s, it is reasonable to suppose that Mishima, who was familiar with Western classical culture, was well acquainted with homosexuality in the modern Western sense when he wrote Confession of a Mask. Interestingly, it is written in the style of a confession of desire, which Michel Foucault characterises as the Western way of discursive productions on sexuality, by contrast with the supposedly Eastern approach to knowledge of sexuality, Ars Erotica (Foucault 1990, pp.53-73). Thus, it is rather anachronistic and misleading to focus on the question of whether he expresses the sexual identity familiar to homosexuals, or gay identity in contemporary society, or whether he expresses ‘traditional’ Japanese sexuality.

His second homosexuality themed novel published in 1951, Forbidden Colours, also echoes pre-war expressions of homosexuality: ero-guro-nansensu. Pflugfelder characterises the discourses about homosexuality in ero-guro-nansensu as demonstrating three elements: firstly, ‘same-sex love’ was linked with a vaguely ‘grotesque’ urban environment at the time when cities such as Tokyo and Osaka were rapidly growing in
Japan and new subcultures of male-male eroticism were emerging in the large cities; secondly, prostitutes were frequently portrayed as central actors in this subculture, embodying an ‘inverted’ trope of male-male sexual behaviour; thirdly, same-sex love is represented conceptually as having a close relationship with criminality (Pflugfelder 2007, pp. 310-311). Even though it is a heavy work of literature, rather than popular novels as *ero-guro-nansensu* were, *Forbidden Colours*, which portrays the underground culture of homosexuals in Tokyo in the early 1950s, clearly takes over the characteristics of the genre of *ero-guro-nansensu*. In addition, this novel holds the ‘Western’ idea of sexual identity, as one of main characters is a beautiful young homosexual man, who is self-conscious that he is incapable of loving women. Thus, even though it would be reasonable to regard *Confession of a Mask* as the distinctive work in regard to expression of same-sex desire, *Forbidden Colours*, which is less discussed as ‘homosexual’ literature, clearly shows the influence of ‘Western’ sexual discourse and pre-war cultural expression of homosexuality.

As Mishima turned from being a ‘homosexual’ writer to being a far-right activist, the expression and meaning of same-sex desire in his work also changed. In his early works, same-sex desire is expressed as being disturbing for the men who hold it; it is a shameful desire, or a desire isolating men from society. In his later works, however, homoerotic desire is not shameful but rather an essential desire to participate in national politics. As Mishima’s homoerotic desire functions as an expression of loyalty to the Emperor and identification with war heroes who also were loyal to the Emperor, homoeroticism, or a desire for strong male bonds, represents national politics, masculinity and a nation-state itself. In his discourse, homoeroticism builds a mutually complementary relationship with Japanese national politics. Now, homoerotic desire is something essential in a nation-state.

The emergence of the discourse that directly connects homoeroticism with a nation-state, is notable in the history of male same-sex sexuality because, as discussed in the introduction, same-sex behaviours used to be regarded as something negative, temporarily indicating the past or the future. In Mishima’s discourse, on the other hand, homoerotic desire has become something central in Japanese politics, relating the present, or the living tradition. Through Mishima’s efforts to establish the new Japanese masculinity and ideal image of the nation in post-war Japan, i.e. after Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, Mishima succeeded in involving homoeroticism, or something very close to homosexuality, in national politics, and in explicitly recontextualising it
from Japanese tradition to contemporary Japan. It is a politically distinctive moment for homosexual politics in Japan, as same-sex desire is now regarded as something not outside contemporary Japanese society, but central to Japanese society and politics. Even though his discourse belongs to the far-right, and is based on the exclusion of women and ethnic minorities from the political domain, Mishima Yukio is the first influential figure in Japanese culture and politics who has positioned male same-sex desire in the public domain, not as something private or that must be kept secret, but something essential in Japan as a nation-state. He redefined it as a political desire that allows Japanese men to access the Emperor.

8. Conclusion

Many critics of Mishima tend to treat his sexuality as the source of his far-right politics and extremism. Such critics suggest that Mishima is an exceptional figure in post-war Japan. Nonetheless, Mishima’s concerns, such as the Emperor, national pride, Japanese masculinity, and the problems of homosexuality are still critical, or becoming more so, in contemporary Japan, despite the growing economy – now declining – offering an alternative model of Japanese masculinity, the so called ‘salaryman’, a hard working Japanese man. When we read Mishima’s political arguments and performances within the wider context of post-war Japan, including the crisis of masculinity, social conditions in Japan, and contemporary nationalist movements, Mishima emerges as a controversial artist for the Japanese people, rather than just a ‘mad’ artist who killed himself by seppuku.

In one sense, Mishima can be seen as an ideologue of far-right politics who offered a new model of nationalised masculinity that suited his ideal Japan. As we examined Mishima’s male gender performances, which are considered as ‘traditional’ and ‘Japanese’, they seemed to be rather artificial performances, expressed through homoerotic fantasy and the appropriation of white masculine bodily ideals. His national fantasy, including homoeroticism, urged him towards a radical right movement, which tried to reconstruct a Japanese political domain based on the Emperor, a symbol of Japanese nationalism.

At the same time, however, his nationalist discourses have made room for male same-sex desire in Japanese ‘traditional’ cultures and national politics. In this sense, he is the first celebrity to invent the discourse clearly involving male same-sex desire in contemporary national politics in modern Japan. He shaped a new form of discourse on
male same-sex desire, differentiated from the medical discourses or the *ero-guro-nansensu* discourses, both of which marginalised homosexuals, found in popular culture in pre-war Japan. Interestingly, his political discourses, which constructed close relationships between the Emperor and homoeroticism, would be reappropriated by a far-left sexual dissident activist in the 1970s, after Mishima’s death, but against the Emperor. Togo Ken, a pioneer of gay activism in Japan, challenged the Emperor’s political holiness by grotesquely homoeroticising him. Although Mishima reformulated same-sex desire as something denoting loyalty and national unity, Togo insisted that Japanese society regarded same-sex desire as inferior, but he also utilised it against morals, norms and the Emperor by expressing his same-sex desire and identity openly. Togo’s political purpose is the opposite of Mishima’s but the latter’s discourse of same-sex desire, which admits it into the national political domain, enabled Togo to promote his desire as a political issue in Japanese society. In this sense, Mishima, we can say, is among the distinctive people who have broken new political ground for male sexuality in post-war Japan.
Chapter 2: Queer Shame and Togo Ken’s politics

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored representations of homoeroticism and national fantasy in the work of Mishima Yukio. Mishima is one of the first and most notorious artists who contributed to a representation that built up a close relationship between homoeroticism and nationalism in the modern Japanese context. Due to him, as Keith Vincent points out, homosexuality has been considered part of reactionary right-wing politics, akin to fascism, rather than liberal-leaning politics in Japan, unlike its position in the Euro-American context (Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent 1997, pp. 81-82). In this cultural context of homosexuality in Japan, Togo Ken (1932-2012) is an interesting figure. His political ideology was a revolutionary left one and he started to challenge national elections in 1971 as an openly homosexual candidate. He is now considered to be a pioneer of gay activism (McLelland 2005, 2012; Oikawa 2001). In this chapter, I will analyse representations of his politics and his own discourses, and argue that there is a gap between the way in which Queer Studies and activism understand his politics and the way in which he politicised his sexuality. In doing so, I will investigate not only the representation of Japan in Queer Studies and Japanese Studies in the English language, but also the relationships between gender, sexuality and national politics in Togo’s thoughts.

Firstly, I will discuss how Togo has been debated as a pioneer of gay activism or as a prototype of the queer figure in Japan since the 2000s, following the introduction of Queer Studies to Japanese society.

Secondly, I will analyse Togo’s politics, focusing on his adaptation of shame. But, before analysing Togo’s discourses, I will critically review discourses within Japanese Studies concerning shame in Japanese culture, and then argue for the originality of Togo’s political usage of shame, with reference to arguments of shame in Queer Theory.

Thirdly, considering the limitation of Togo’s politics, I will examine Togo’s ideas on gender and politics.

Finally, I will pursue the relationships between gender, sexuality and the national imaginary in Togo’s politics compared with those of Mishima Yukio, and then try to contextualise Togo’s politics in the history of sexual politics in Japan.
2. Togo Ken as the Legendary Okama

2-1. The Pioneer of Gay Activism

From mid-April 2012, a rumour started to spread across Twitter that Togo Ken had died of cancer. A few days later, the Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s national newspapers, reported his death, describing him as ‘a celebrity among gays’, who fought discrimination against homosexuals (The Asahi Shimbu 2012b). Two months later, a gay group organised a memorial party for Togo Ken, presenting a panel discussion, his songs, the drama he produced, and screening the movie he directed, as if to summarise his cultural and political contributions. Because people regarded Togo as a pioneer of gay culture and activism in Japan, when his death in his home became known, which was not until a few weeks afterwards (Oikawa 2012), he was remembered as ‘the legendary gay activist’ (Oikawa 2001).

Evaluation of Togo’s activism had grown in the 2000s, during which time gay or ‘queer’ activists were established in Japanese society. In 2001, Oikawa Kenji, a writer and activist, featured Togo in his article for a series in the liberal weekly journal Syukan Kinyobi, focusing on unique non-conformists in Japan or people devoted to the types of activism ignored by society. His article, entitled ‘Togo Ken, the legendary okama: Burning with sexual desire and revolt (Densetsu no okama: aiyoku to hangyaku ni moetagiru)’, presents Togo as a dissident activist and self-styled ‘okama’, a slang term for buttocks or homosexual men, especially stereotypical effeminate men, carrying an implication of anal sex. He presents Togo’s profile as follows:

He was born at Kakogawa city, Hyogo, in 1932: The representative of a political party, Zatumin-no-kai and Zatumin-tou12: The managing editor of The Gay (Za Gei). He is known as the legendary okama, working for various expressive activities including election campaigns, editing of gay magazines and theatrical performances. He is a father of one boy and two girls. He has many arrest records. His motto is, ‘At the very least, I want to sleep without being ashamed of myself’ (Oikawa 2001, p. 34).

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12 The word Zatumin means “a motley assembly of people” in Japanese. Togo explains that the Zatumin Party promotes solidarity among the people who are at the bottom of society (Togo 1979, p.155).
Stressing Togo’s arrest record, Oikawa aims to portray Togo not only as a pioneering gay activist but also as a radical anarchist.

Oikawa introduces the episode that best demonstrates Togo’s radical political attitude. In 1984, the Party of Zatsumin, organized by Togo, placed a political advertisement in the magazine Shin zasshi X, containing an illustration of Emperor Hirohito penetrated by General Douglas MacArthur. In response to this provocative advertisement, right-wingers, outraged by this ‘disrespect’, made phone threats and protested at the magazine’s office and Togo’s house for days. Kimura Mitsuhiro, a member of Issuikai, an organisation promoting Mishima Yukio’s nationalist politics, demanded a public debate with Togo because Issuikai was also under fire from other nationalist groups as another magazine had reported that its members, including the representative member, had attended Togo’s publication party just a month before the controversial advertisement came out. However, Togo did not even reply to his request. According to Kimura, he accidentally encountered Togo on the street when riding a bicycle in Tokyo. Although Kimura called out to him ‘Hi, Togo’, Togo just answered, ‘No, I’m not’ and tried to run away. Due to Togo’s dishonesty and cowardice, he insists, Kimura frenziedly hit Togo with his bicycle and beat him. Togo filed a report of the damage to the police and Kimura was arrested two months later.

Oikawa tells this story as an example of Togo’s political style, especially his dislike of the Emperor System, since violent attacks from right-wingers were quite predictable in Japanese society if one published a ‘disrespectful’ illustration. According to Oikawa, Togo’s strong hostility to the Emperor System stems from his childhood under the patriarchal influence of Japanese militarism. He quotes Togo’s words:

‘Back then the head of the nation was the divine Emperor, the head of the family was the father, and after his death, my first-born brother became the head. The authority of the household head was clearly related to the patriarchal authority embedded in the Emperor System’.

He goes on,

‘Although after the war, the Emperor declared that he was human, he continued to be the Emperor. He completely avoided accepting responsibility for the suffering of the victims of the war. The declaration of humanity was just a strategy to deflect attention away from his ultimate responsibility for the war and its consequences’. (Oikawa 2007, p.265)

In his election campaigns, Oikawa emphasises Togo’s provocative comments about the Emperor, such as; ‘If the Emperor’s “chin” (a first-person pronounce used only by the
Emperor) is a symbol of Japan, I prefer the symbol of a man, his *chinchin* (a slang term for penis)” (Oikawa 2007, pp. 265-266).

Oikawa also refers to the troubles Togo had faced during his sensational election campaigns. In 1983 Togo stood for the Upper House election on behalf of the party he organised, the *Zatsumin Party*, and made an election video in association with his colleagues, one of whom was visually impaired and the other of whom was physically disabled. In this video, Togo spoke of discrimination against disabled people, commenting, ‘[When he tried to sell tickets to his play] people told us “who’s gonna buy a ticket for a play by *mekanchi* and *chimba* [discriminatory words referring to people who are visually impaired and have a lame leg]?” and our tickets did not sell well. There is no such thing as happiness in the world, as long as such discriminations exist’ (Oikawa 2001, p. 36). NHK, the public broadcasting organisation in Japan, censored the words *mekanchi* and *chimba* without Togo’s permission, as the network considered these words highly inappropriate and unsuitable for broadcast on the public airwaves. Togo and the *Zatsumin Party* sued NHK for violating the principle of freedom of speech and the Public Office Election Law, which allowed candidates to express their unedited political views. Even though the Supreme Court of Japan ruled against Togo in this case, afterwards NHK changed its broadcasting policy on public elections and stopped editing its broadcasts.

Reviewing Togo’s life, whilst Oikawa describes Togo’s political actions as anti-establishment, Oikawa also characterises Togo’s ideas on sexuality as ‘humanism’, a creed based on the fundamental principle of human equality. He quotes Togo’s words: ‘It is difficult to understand that all people are equal, unless we think of them having sex. Even the Emperor has a dick—and he uses it. We are not so different from each other’ (Oikawa 2007, p. 266). Oikawa asked Togo why he continued to use the word *okama*, which sounds discriminatory and offends some gay people, as it emphasises anal sex when identifying gays. He relates Togo’s answer:

‘I love the word *okama* very much… I feel free to love this word because of the fact that I have been discriminated against through its use’. His face was still red, but his eyes showed sobriety, as if he weren’t drunk at all.

‘There is no need to justify love between men by adjusting the wording. What’s wrong with men loving each other, and women loving each other? What is shameful is to live your life lying to yourself, and not being able to love another person’.

Togo dares to embrace the word *okama*, a term that symbolises contempt for homosexuals.
‘I believe that okama originally comes from the Sanskrit word kāma, which means love. Therefore, the origin of okama is love’. (Oikawa 2007, p. 268)

In his report, Oikawa describes Togo, ‘the legendary okama’, not merely as the first person to stand for public office in Japan as an openly gay man, but as a highly political figure who insisted on radical equality between people through sexuality and, in his own life, had confronted social norms, including the Emperor System, censorship, Japan’s obscenity laws and the norms of sexuality13.

2-2. Togo is a queer model of Japan

Mark McLelland (2005, 2012), an Australian historian of sexual minorities in Japan, also pays considerable attention to Togo Ken in his study of Japanese sexual minority politics in the 1970s. He summarises the context of sexual minority movements in Japan since the 1960s, explaining that, compared to the United States, gay activism was limited in Japanese society until the mid-1980s. Since homophobia in Japan was less pronounced and there were no laws against homosexual conduct and cross-dressing, McLelland argues, the police surveillance and harassment of sexual minorities that had proved a unifying factor in the US were absent in Japan. In addition, there was no powerful moral authority, such as the church. Thus, it was more difficult for varied sexual minority groups to imagine that they shared a common predicament and agenda within society (McLelland 2005, p. 160). Even though there were countercultural movements in Japan, such as ethnic minority movements and feminist movements, McLelland concludes that these movements failed to reach out to sexual minorities during that period14. He focuses on

13 All these problems, which Togo had challenged, still remain in contemporary Japan in the 2010s. For example, Megumi Igarashi, a feminist artist, who creates art works shaped as her own vagina was arrested twice in 2014 for breaching obscenity laws.

14 Following Vera Mackie’s studies, McLelland regards lesbians as marginalised in both ‘mainstream’ feminist groups and male homosexual social groups. He writes:

Indeed, the few lesbians who were out about their sexual orientation ‘felt marginalised from “mainstream” feminist groups and activities’ (Mackie 2003: 160). Although social groups of homosexual men were by this time well established, as were extensive homo [sic] print media, male homosexuals had little interest in establishing coalitions with lesbian women – not that such overtures would necessarily have been welcomed, since, as Mackie reports, lesbian groups considered homosexual men to be as sexist as their straight counterparts (1980:108). (McLelland 2005, p.160)
Togo as a radical exception, despite Togo’s having failed to galvanise a broad range of interest groups: ‘there was at least one activist who understood that a broad range of sexual nonconformists- both hetero- and homosexual - were similarly disadvantaged by Japanese social practices’ (2005, p.162).

In McLelland’s view, Togo was a unique activist, not only because he questioned the Japanese family system as one that disadvantaged both heterosexuals and homosexuals, but also because he had practised a confrontational style of activism similar to, but 20 years in advance of, queer activism in the West. McLelland remarks that Togo’s promotion of the term okama and confrontational projection of the effeminate stereotype of gay men were ‘queer’ and that he was ahead of his time, in an era when even US activism, characterised by its militancy, rejected the effeminate gender stereotype.

[T]hrough embracing queerness in such a confrontational manner while also engaging in social critique, Togo was to develop in the early 1970s a mode of activism that was very close to contemporary queer positions. (McLelland 2005, p. 163)

In many ways, then, Togo’s perverse politics can be seen as an uncanny precursor to the ‘queer’ activism that developed in Anglophone societies in the late 1980s. (ibid., p. 167)

Furthermore, McLelland argues that Togo’s cross-dressing performance is also a queer act, expressive less of homosexual desire than of a wish to challenge the rigid gender norms that constrained all men. Arguing for the queer aspects of Togo’s activism, McLelland stresses Togo’s femininity and his transgender performances.

Unlike Oikawa, who reviewed Togo’s life and activities in terms of his left radicalism and confrontational attitude, McLelland tries to explain his politics in terms of

The narrative of marginalised and isolated lesbians, however, is too simplified and trivialises lesbian activism. As Sugita Ikuko (2011) shows, there were lesbian members, who were influenced by the ideals of lesbian feminism, who participated in the women’s liberation movement and published their newspaper for educational purposes; namely, to eradicate internalised homophobia among lesbians. Sugita points out that their newspaper, like others that followed, clearly shows the influence of lesbian feminism in its claims, such as that the roots of lesbian oppression could be traced to the existence of patriarchy, and that one must value one’s own womanhood (Sugita 2011, p.165). Their problematisation of patriarchy and their efforts to accept their own sexuality were rather similar to Togo’s, except for their differences of style and activist targets. For further studies of lesbian activism in Japan, see Sugita (2008) and Iino (2008).
his ideas about gender and sexuality. He views Togo’s opposition to the Emperor System as exemplifying not only his battle with right-wingers, but also his queer attitudes to gender norms. Togo insisted that, just as Japanese people could accept the Emperor’s dramatic shift from divine being to human being, ‘they surely should be able to come to terms with the different forms of love that exist between human beings or with, indeed, the relatively minor shift in a person’s identity occasioned by a change of sex from man to woman’ (ibid., p. 164). McLelland also refers to the fact that Togo’s Zatsumin-no-kai was not an exclusively homosexual organisation, but was open to a wide range of people, including sex workers. He describes Togo’s politics as operating in terms of gender and sexuality rather than in the traditional leftist political style.

In McLelland’s narrative, however, Togo’s progressive politics increasingly fell out of sync with the wider homosexual community, as the understanding of ‘gay identity’ in Japanese society became more masculine under the influence of US gay culture. At the same time, while gay identity in Japan had been masculinised by the influence of Western gay culture, Togo also suddenly came into vogue under the influence of the new ‘queer’ approach to sexuality at the beginning of the 21st century. McLelland writes:

Togo, although he was the most visible homosexual activist of the 1970s, was not the figure who had the most impact on developing notions of gay identity in Japan. Despite his tenacity, Togo’s queer approach to activism never caught on; he appeared an anachronism to a new generation of gay activists who felt they had more in common with the masculine-identified gay movement of the United States and Europe. (McLelland 2005, p.167)

Thus, McLelland casts ‘Western’ activism as the opposite of Japanese gay activism: on the one hand, it caused the Japanese gay identity to become more masculine and gay people to turn away from Togo’s activities but, on the other hand, it offered a new perspective from which to understand his radicalism. Briefly, he suggests, Japanese gay people did not understand Togo’s progressive politics of the 1970s, which was similar to queer politics in Anglophone societies from the late 1980s, because they had been influenced by the masculine-identity based politics of the United States and Europe before queer politics emerged.

Arguing for the Japanese queer figure who was ahead of his time, McLelland presents an intriguing narrative. Firstly, he considers Japanese culture and sexuality based on ‘Western’ ideas, such as ‘gay identity’, ‘transgender’, and ‘queer’. Even though McLelland tries to present a Japanese ‘unique’ or ‘progressive’ sexual culture and politics,
such cultural activities are expressed either through presupposed images of ‘queer’ or ‘gay’, or through differences from them. Secondly, presupposing the model of the history of Anglophone sexual politics to pass from homophile movements to gay activism, then to queer politics, he constructs a complicated temporal narrative of the Japanese history of sexual minorities. When he introduces Togo’s politics as ‘queer’, he describes Togo as ‘an uncanny precursor’ (ibid., p.167), comparing his style in the 1970s with Euro-American queer politics in the late 1980s. Characterising Togo as the ‘progressive’ activist, McLelland suggests that the Japanese gei (gay) identity, which, he insists, is more masculine and influenced by the Western gay identity, is anachronistic, with the result that Japanese gay people dismissed Togo’s queer activism. Therefore, when McLelland calls Togo ‘queer’ in the 1970s, his narrative creates a complex temporality in Japan: Japan was ahead of its time compared to the West in regard to queer politics in the 1970s, but gay politics wrongly imitated the masculine Westernised gay politics, and sacrificed Japanese cultural ‘progressiveness’ from the 1990s.

McLelland presents this narrative to criticise earlier gay and lesbian accounts within Japanese Studies. He insists that supporters of sexual minorities in Japan stressed repression in Japanese society so as to represent Japanese sexual minorities as ‘the hapless victims of a repressive regime’ (ibid., p. 6). For example, McLelland cites comments from the translators of first-person narratives by sexual minorities in Japan. Francis Conlan (2001), a translator of Coming Out in Japan, an autobiographical book by a Japanese gay couple, characterised Japanese society as mired in tradition: ‘The Confucianist mentality, which favours uniformity and authoritarianism, would appear to be a major cause of Japanese society’s outward hostility toward homosexuality. […] The basic Japanese mentality is driven by the perceived validity of rigid hierarchy, conformity and obedience to authority. These values are so deeply rooted that the always difficult job of bringing about social change is even more difficult in Japan than in the West’ (Conlan 2001, p. xv). His essentialist approach to Japanese society, which reduces problems in Japanese society to the ‘Japanese mentality’, constructs not only the image of the ‘Japanese’ but also that of the privileged (Western) subject, who knows about the ‘Japanese’ and their problems, within the ‘advanced’ society of the West, which has been moving towards acceptance of homosexuals. McLelland ironically observes that Japan was less homophobic than the
West during its feudal period, by contrast with Conlan’s suggestion that ‘the Confucianist mentality’\textsuperscript{15} produced homophobia in Japan:

Explaining Japanese people’s supposed negative attitude toward homosexuality in terms of their ‘feudal’ mentality is particularly ironic given that male-male sexual relations were not only common throughout Japan’s feudal period (1600-1867) but were, in fact, highly valued in certain circumstances. (McLelland 2005, p. 5)\textsuperscript{16}

McLelland criticises the representation of gays and lesbians in Japan as victimised and the paternalistic inclination of researchers to ‘give voice to lesbian- and gay-identified Japanese whose existence has largely been passed over in silence by “Japanese Studies” as it is taught in western academic institutions’ (ibid., p. 7). He remarks that these narratives relied on metaphors of the journey, from oppression to freedom, from darkness to light.

Instead of the narrative of the ‘journey’, McLelland pays close attention to non-heterosexual subcultures in Japan, in order to avoid representing the West as the liberated society that must be the standard for sexual minorities outside it. He stresses the methodological importance of prioritising Japanese over English terminology in order to reflect Japanese nuance and categories. In this sense, he is certainly sincere in his aim of understanding and representing Japanese sexual minority cultures in the English language. However, he is still influenced by ideas of sexuality contained in the English language and by its history of cultural representations. For example, when he calls Togo ‘queer’, accenting his transgenderism and femininity, while analysing Japanese gay people’s reactions to Togo’s activities caused by their identification with the masculine gay male and the influence of Western gay culture, he interestingly reappropriates Orientalist stereotypes of the masculine West and the feminine Orient. By his logic, the femininity

\textsuperscript{15} Interestingly, in the book that Conlan translated, the authors explain that homophobia in Japan is rooted not in ‘the Confucianist mentality’ in Japanese society, which favours uniformity and authoritarianism, as Conlan explains in the Translator’s notes, but in the influence of Christianity. They write: ‘Since the Meiji period the status of homosexuality has plummeted. This co-incided with the rapidly growing influence of Christianity, a phenomenon which is directly related to Japan’s modernisation. After the Second World War, the place of homosexuality in Japanese society dropped to the point where its existence could only be verified through a genre of soft pornographic magazines’ (Ito and Yanase 2001, p.85).

\textsuperscript{16} For homosexual cultures in pre-modern Japan, see Leupp (1997).
of the gay male body represents radical queerness in Japan, whilst Japanese masculine gay identity is reductively ascribed to the influence of Western culture.

Keith Vincent (2010) points out the problematic aspects of McLelland’s writing as it stresses queer culture in Japan. On the one hand, Vincent agrees with McLelland that some researchers criticised by the latter have taken a condescending and neo-imperialist approach toward Japan. On the other hand, Vincent criticises McLelland for placing too much emphasis on ‘queer’ culture in Japan:

Perhaps in reaction to those who have overemphasised the prevalence of homophobia in Japan, McLelland almost completely avoids any discussion of the suffering experienced by Japanese ‘queers’ at the hands of mainstream society. The result is that one comes away from the book with the impression that Japan is a very queer place indeed, a place where virtually anything goes. And this, of course, is just the other side of the Orientalist coin from Conlan’s and Summerhawk’s excessively gloomy vision of a Japan groaning under a restrictive ‘confucianist’ morality. (Vincent 2010, pp. 178-179)

Vincent notes that McLelland’s narrative avoids serious discussion of the discrimination and violence faced by Japanese sexual minorities, as well as misrepresenting Japanese society.

Similarly, Diana Khor (2010) criticises the English-language studies of same-sex sexuality in Japan that claim that Japan is quite different from ‘the West’, suggesting a high level of tolerance of homosexuality in Japan. Khor disputes such claims of tolerance, which are based on the existence of various types of perverse (hentai) press in the post-war period and the absence of laws prohibiting homosexuality or of strong political or religious coalitions condemning it. Although there was some influence from sexology and a tendency to pathologise homosexuality, she argues, some scholars, including McLelland and his associates, emphasise queer culture in Japan. She writes:

Indeed, citing Fushimi (2002), a Japanese gay activist, who translated hentai as ‘queer’, the same researchers claim that the hentai press was the first Queer Studies in Japan, way ahead of its Western counterparts but showing many parallels with the current Queer Studies ‘in which a wide range of individuals whose sexual and gender identities are not sanctioned by the mainstream culture, come together in a variety of forums to consider the dynamics at play in the construction of some desires as normal and others as perverse’ (Ishida, McLelland & Murakami, 2005, p. 40). (Khor 2010, p. 46)
As a result, these representations of ‘abnormal’ desire and practice in Japan veil the power of normalisation among the people and of gender asymmetry in Japanese society. She notes that the argument for tolerance of sexual transgressions in Japan was based primarily on observations of male homosexuality, and remarks that ‘considering female same-sex relationships in Japan, one could find ample evidence of a history of intolerance or dismissal’ (Khor 2010, p.48).

Thus, there are two kinds of criticism of English-language representations of Japanese society in regard to sexual minorities. One is criticism of how Japan is represented, erasing the culture of sexual minorities and their politics, and stressing its repression of them, as well as the backward aspects of Japanese society in regard to sexual politics from the viewpoint of the West. The other criticises the representation of Japan that exaggerates its difference from the West, stressing ‘queer’ aspects of Japanese culture, such as the perverse (hentai) press and transgender culture, but ignoring violence and problems in society. The arguments about Japanese sexual politics in the English language are often also formed in the dichotomy of Japan and the West, which contribute to each other’s cultural identities, rather than discussing Japanese politics and cultural phenomena in historical and social contexts.

Considering McLelland’s description of Togo, we can see that he certainly casts a spotlight on Togo as an example of Japanese progressive queer politics, in contrast to the representation of Japan as a ‘Confucianist’ conservative country, which ‘favours uniformity and authoritarianism’, and from which queer activism is absent. He emphasises the ‘queer’ aspects of Togo’s activities as being more or less similar to queer activism in the US since the late 1980s because Togo is a highly political person in Japanese society. McLelland’s focus on Togo contradicts Khor’s criticism that his argument ignores political conflicts in Japan. However, McLelland did not explain in what sense Togo could be ‘queer’ in that society, beyond pointing out the similarity between Togo’s activism and queer activism in the United States.

This criticism can also be applied to Oikawa’s portrait of Togo. Oikawa describes Togo as a radical left activist only by virtue of Togo’s resemblance to the traditional radical left, which is also against ‘authority’ in such forms as the Emperor and law and order. Their interests in Togo are mainly focused on his achievements and performances, rather than on the ideas of social equality, gender and sexuality that motivate his social activities.
To avoid simplifying Japan as either a ‘Confucianist’ conservative country or an ‘anything can happen’ queer country, I will closely analyse Togo’s thinking on society, discrimination, gender and sexuality. There is some common ground between the ideas of those who stress Japanese conservatism and the image of Togo as representing ‘queer’ or ‘radical’ Japan. Just as Conlan (2001) uses the term ‘the Confucianist mentality’ (p. iv), the scholars who regard Japanese society as conservative often refer to the Japanese mentality as the root of such conservatism, especially in terms of emotions such as shame and fear. On the other hand, Togo himself often mentioned, in his book, in speech and on his personal website, his motto: ‘At the very least, I want to sleep without being ashamed of myself’ (Togo 1979; ‘Togo Ken wo shibobu’ 2012).

In the next section, I will explore how Japanese studies have regarded ‘shame’, or ‘haji’ in Japanese, as the essential emotion in society or, should I say, the ‘national emotion’, and then I will analyse how Togo utilised this emotion for his politics, which are closely related to gender and sexuality.

3. Shame and Japanese Culture

3-1. A Shame Culture in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword and Cultural Wholeness

Before analysing Togo’s discourses on shame, gender and sexuality, I will present an overview of discourses surrounding haji, or ‘shame’ in Japanese Studies, as haji has long been treated in these studies as the essential emotion in Japanese society. As early as the 1940s, American cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict, in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (1946), famously described Japanese culture as a ‘shame culture’, in contrast to the US ‘guilt culture’. Her research into Japanese culture was initiated by a US government commission in 1944. Even though Benedict was not an expert on Japanese culture, as she had never been to Japan, could not speak Japanese, and conducted her research by interviewing Japanese migrants to the US and investigating Japanese documents, her book has become one of the most influential works on contemporary Japanese culture and society, both in the United States and in Japan. As Ozawa Kazunori (1995) points out, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was widely read in Japan and has contributed to the close-knit network of interests concerned with Japanese culture following the Pacific War.
Benedict defines ‘shame cultures’ as those that ‘rely on external sanctions for good behaviour’, whilst ‘guilt cultures’ rely ‘on an internalised conviction of sin’ (Benedict 1946, p. 223). She notes the differences in moral principles between shame cultures and guilt cultures. In shame cultures, people behave in accordance with the judgement of the public regarding their deeds, while people in guilt cultures behave in accordance with their conscience or for avoidance of sin. Such a clear distinction between cultures presupposes that each culture has a coherent and consistent character. In her theoretical book, *Patterns of Culture*, originally published in 1934, she insists that cultural behaviours need to be understood from the viewpoint of a culture as a whole. ‘A culture, like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern of thought and action. Within each culture there come into being characteristic purposes not necessarily shared by other types of society’ (Benedict 1989, p.46). Thus, when she compares two different cultures, she focuses on the incommensurable differences between them.

They [cultures] differ from one another not only because one trait is present here and absent there, and because another trait is found in two regions in two different forms. They differ still more because they are oriented as wholes in different directions. They are travelling along different roads in pursuit of different ends, and these ends and these means in one society cannot be judged in terms of those of another society, because essentially they are incommensurable. (*ibid.*, p.223)

As she clearly argued, her idea of cultural patterns, or a culture as a whole, is based on cultural relativism\(^\text{17}\).

When Benedict (1946) compared Japanese culture to that of the US, she emphasised the differences in moral principles between the two cultures, now well-known as, respectively, a ‘shame culture’ and a ‘guilt culture’.

In anthropological studies of different cultures the distinction between those which rely heavily on shame and those that rely heavily on guilt is an important one. A society that inculcates absolute standards of morality and relies on men developing a conscience is a guilt culture by definition, but a man in such a society may, as in the United States, suffer in addition from shame when he accuses himself of gaucheries which are in no way sins. […] In a culture where shame is a major sanction, people are chagrined about acts which we expect people to feel guilty about. This chagrin can be very intense and it cannot be relieved, as guilt can be, by confession and atonement. (Benedict 1946, pp. 222-223)

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\(^{17}\) For detailed analysis of Benedict’s theoretical view of culture and *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, see Lie (2001).
Stressing the fact that people in the United States, which she categorised as the guilt culture, can also suffer from shame, she defines the characteristics of a shame culture as the lack of a sense of guilt and of absolute standards of morality, interestingly similar to Foucault’s characteristics of ars erotica.

Although The Chrysanthemum and the Sword is now regarded as a classic on Japanese culture, Japanese scholars criticised Benedict’s view of Japanese culture as a coherent whole just after the Japanese translation of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was published. The Journal of Folkloristics, in 1950, featured a special issue titled ‘The Problems Raised by The Chrysanthemum and the Sword’. Yanagida Kunio (1950), a founder of Japanese native folkloristics or minzokugaku, criticised her work as overlooking the Japanese people’s sense of sin, which was developed by the Buddhist tradition. After expressing his interest in Benedict’s work from the viewpoint of a native folklorist, he ironically writes: ‘One can rarely find even among the Christian nations a people such as the Japanese who have so often and for so long used the word tsumi’, which means sin or guilt in Japanese (Yanagida 1950, p. 290). Giving examples of how commonly the word tsumi is used in Japanese idiomatic expressions, Yanagida notes that the influence of Buddhism, especially the ideas of guilt, sin and life, has been strong among Japanese people, even though their understanding of Buddhism was not theoretical.

Referring sarcastically to Benedict’s gender, Yanagida argues that the idea of sin was gendered, since Buddhism had encouraged the Japanese people to believe that women were sinful beings. According to the Buddhist idea of a circle of reincarnation, Yanagida writes, people came into the world as women as a consequence of sin in previous lives; hence, the ideal, for women in particular, was to live without sin in this life.

In addition, he extends the idea of ‘shame’ in Japanese culture. As Yanagida explains, shame primarily meant ‘being laughed at’, and it was only allowable to laugh overtly at an enemy (1950, p. 291). Thus, he points out that the moral force of shame, stressed by Benedict, was distinctive only for the Warrior class and not for the majority of Japanese people. By such counterexamples, Yanagida questions Benedict’s understanding of Japanese culture as a whole and as a shame culture.

Despite such criticism of Benedict’s idea of ‘the Japanese culture’ immediately following the book’s publication in Japan, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword has been
enthusiastically accepted as the work that successfully described the Japanese national character (Mead 1959, p. 248; Modell 1983, pp. 286-290). After the Japanese identity crisis caused by defeat in the war, studies of ‘Japoneseness’, Nihonjinron, which attempt to pinpoint the essential nature or uniqueness of Japanese people, culture and society, became popular in post-war Japan, and The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was regarded as the source of this interest (Kent 1999).

John Lie (2001) discusses the similarities between analyses of Japanese culture in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword and discourses of Nihonjinron. Firstly, they both lack a comparative perspective and exaggerate Japanese distinctiveness. He notes that these discourses also treat the West as a homogeneous unit: ‘In creating a polar contrast between Japan and the West, they reify and homogenise the West and ignore altogether non-European societies. The West appears as an antipode of Japan’ (Lie 2001, p. 255). Secondly, both works are ahistorical and presuppose static essences of Japan and the Japanese people. ‘Although the rapidity and urgency of Meiji state-making heighted the importance of top-down control and vertical hierarchy, egalitarian and horizontal sentiments and relations persisted in the twentieth century’ (Lie 2001, p. 255). Lie (2001) argues that the popularity of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword in post-war Japan contributed to the idea that the West and Japan are distinct and that, therefore, Japan is unique¹⁸.

Harumi Befu (1987, 2001), regarding Nihonjinron as a kind of mass consumer good rather than as an academic discourse, insists that it has functioned as a national ideology in Japanese society. Because symbols of national identity, such as the Emperor, the flag, the anthem and national shrines, were for some people contentious reminders of the wartime regime, Befu (2001) asserts that Nihonjinron ‘has entered the arena of post-war nationalism as a way of defining Japan’s new identity, unblemished by past symbols’ (p. 101). Jack Eisenberg (2007) suggests that Nihonjinron has played a prominent role in Japanese politics, contributing to Japanese nationalist politics, especially its xenophobic anti-multiculturalism. As Nihonjinron presupposes Japanese racial or ethnic features as

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¹⁸ For critical analysis of Nihonjinron, see Aoki (1990) and Sugimoto and Mouer (1995). Oguma (2002) also genealogically investigates discourses of Japanese self-image in pre-war Japan and asserts that discourses of the homogeneous Japanese have become dominant in Japanese society after the defeat in the war, which caused Japan to relinquish its colony.
the basis of Japanese homogeneity, it has been used to ignore racial and ethnic minorities in Japan in favour of preserving the ‘core of Japaneseness’. He writes:

In light of this preoccupation with Japanese identity, which continues to play out on several platforms of life, including graphic art, pop culture, and literature, politicians can exploit these assumptions about core identity in attacking foreigners. *Nihonjinron* is not a new concept. It has been built into the social fabric of Japanese society for centuries, but now seems to manifest itself in the political rhetoric of anti-immigration. (Eisenberg 2007, p. 94)

The idea of Japanese culture as a whole, which *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* and *Nihonjinron* have promoted, has been regarded not only as an Orientalist view that unduly simplified Japanese culture, but also as a nationalist one that masks the diversity of Japanese society.

Altogether, the discourses of Japanese culture as a shame culture in the thinking of *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* and *Nihonjinron* have decidedly disputable aspects. Firstly, as Sugiyama and Mouer and Befu point out, these discourses, considered as academic achievements, have serious methodological flaws (Sugiyama and Mouer 1986; Befu 1987, 2001). They mostly tend to ignore the perspective of history, the diversity of Japanese culture, class issues, and ethnic, gender and sexual minorities in Japanese society. Secondly, their methodological presumption of a culture as a whole can be useful in representing the Japanese culture for a general reader, but at the same time, such simplification can function as an ideology that contributes to cultural nationalism and, even worse, to xenophobia in the Japanese political arena (Eisenberg 2007; Lie 2001). Thirdly, labelling Japanese culture a ‘shame culture’ in such a way only emphasises moral norms of ‘shame’ in Japanese society, resulting in neglect of political and cultural struggles by social minorities. Although Benedict defines shame as the moral discipline contrasting with guilt in the West, it results in contributing to the national ideology in post-war Japan, differentiating it from the West, as well as marginalising social minorities.

3-2. Shame and Order

As might be expected, Benedict’s categorisation of Japan as the one of ‘shame cultures’ is applied to the analysis of Japan as being a society with a low crime rate. Komiya Nobuo (1999), a former research officer in the Ministry of Justice of Japan, utilises Japanese moral principles such as shame, loyalty and *giri* (duty), which Benedict analysed in
explaining the low crime rate in Japan. According to him, the Japanese legal system is an imitation of the Western legal system, accepting the form of the legal system but with the Japanese government leaving Japanese traditional morality and custom intact: that is, he insists, ‘Japanese legal system is Western in guise but Japanese in spirit’ (Komiya 1999, p.372). He regards that Japanese social order has been maintained through group-based informal rules in local contexts: the moral principles, such as loyalty and shame, of each small group.

Differences in the quantity and quality of such rules provide a significant basis for an understanding of the lower crime rate in Japan vis-à-vis the West. To put it simply, the difference in the strength of informal social control over individuals in Japan as compared with the West offers the key to an understanding of Japan’s relatively low crime rate. (ibid., p. 380)

Thus, according to Komiya’s analysis, Japanese social order and its low crime rate is achieved not by the national legal system but by a local informal control over individuals.

Although his analysis of the mechanism of negative emotions in Japanese society is different from Benedict’s, Komiya considers that the Japanese sense of shame has social effects in maintaining order. Opposing Benedict’s view of the Japanese sense of shame, Komiya relates:

This [Benedict’s discussion] seems to be based on the assumption that Japanese lay emphasis on the judgement of others, whereas Westerners place emphasis on inner standards of conduct. However, the Japanese sense of shame is not a superficial concern for others, but a function of the inner mind. In other minds, the Japanese sense of shame arises as a result of going against the ‘belief’ that one should confirm to rules. Therefore, what is important is the difference in the characteristics of Japanese and Western rules. Japanese rules are personalistic and particularistic, whereas Western rules are universalistic. (ibid., p.386)

In Komiya’s view of Japanese social order, shame among the Japanese functions to produce self-consciousness and obsession with rules shared with others in the community. Thus, shame in Japanese society has inner and social functions: producing self-consciousness and a sense of the community that one belongs to. As shame sticks to the sense of community, someone else’s ‘shameful’ conduct can also mean shame for the community to which the person belongs. Therefore, shame works not only as a self-discipline but also in maintaining order in the community. Komiya notes the differences in sanctions against offenders against social rules between Japan and the West: ‘What is
interesting here is that, as a means of differentiation of offenders, Japan adopts the deprivation of membership because of its emphasis on groups, whereas the West uses official stigmatisation because of its emphasis on individuals’ (ibid., p. 387).

As Komiya applies the functions of shame to his explanation of Japan’s low crime rate and the order of local communities, shame has been regarded as emotion functioning conservatively in Japanese society for Japanese self-consciousness, self-discipline and the order of communities. As Benedict says, for some scholars, shame is ‘the root of virtue. A man who is sensitive to it will carry out all the rules of good behaviour’ in Japan (Benedict 1946, p. 224).

Considering sexual politics in post-war Japan, I will try to explore the cultural and political movements of social minorities that arise through shame rather than looking at the functions of the moral principle in Japanese society. In the following section, I will discuss the politics of Togo, focusing on the political functions of emotions, and especially of ‘shame’, as reflected in the on-going discussions in queer theory concerning emotions and their affects. Through analysis of shame and Togo’s politics, I will discuss how the emotion of shame does not only work as moral enforcement in Japanese society, as Benedict and her followers insist, but can also be utilised as the voice of a minority, even producing ‘counter discourses’, in the Foucauldian sense, in sexual politics (Foucault 1980).

4. Shame and Queer Politics

When exploring a new horizon of cultural politics, many interdisciplinary studies have taken note of the cultural, social and psychological meaning of painful emotions, for example, shame, debasement, humiliation, disgust and so on (Nathanson 1995; Honneth 1995, 2007). In the field of Queer Studies, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003) has influentially refined the theoretical and political potentials of shame in the context of post-structuralism. Along with interpreting Silvan Tomkins, Sedgwick suggests that Affect Theory might offer an alternative understanding of sexuality, which has often been discussed in terms of psychoanalysis. According to Sedgwick, Tomkins thought that Freudian theory was flawed in its use of sexuality to represent drives in general (ibid., p. 18). For Tomkins, the difference between the drive system and the affect system lies in degrees of freedom: while the drives are relatively narrowly constrained in their aims and time scales, affects have greater freedom in both respects. In relations to aims, drives are
more constrained than affects, in that, for example; ‘breathing will not satisfy my hunger, nor will sleeping satisfy my need to excrete waste’ (ibid., p. 18). Affects, however, can have any object: ‘Affects can be, and are, attached to things, people, ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions, institutions, and any number of other things, including other affects. Thus, one can be excited by anger, disgusted by shame or surprised by joy’ (ibid., p. 19). Similarly, drives are time-constrained: ‘I need to breathe within the next minute, drink something today, and eat within the next few weeks to sustain life’ (ibid., p.18). Affects, on the other hand, have greater freedom than drives in respect to time as well: ‘anger can evaporate in seconds but can also motivate a decades-long career of revenge’ (ibid., p. 19). In contrast to the teleological nature of the drives, Sedgwick argues, affects can be autotelic, so that Affect Theory can be useful in resisting the teleological presumptions of the discipline of psychology, including heterosexist teleologies long left unquestioned by psychology. Following Tomkins’s critique of Freudian theory, to the effect that it overlooked functions of the affect system in sexuality, Sedgwick reconsidered sexuality and the human psyche with reference to the freedom of the affect system.

In her notable article, ‘Shame, Theatricality, and Queer Performativity: Henry James’s The Art of the Novel’, Sedgwick (2003) explores the intriguing relationships between shame and queerness, or queer performativity. Firstly, Sedgwick notes that shame is a form of communication: ‘Blazons of shame, the “fallen face” with eyes down and head averted – and, to a lesser extent, the blush – are semaphores of trouble and at the same time of a desire to reconstitute the interpersonal bridge’ (ibid., p. 36). Secondly, shame forms identity: ‘The conventional way of distinguishing shame from guilt is that shame attaches to and sharpens the sense of what one is, whereas guilt attaches to what one does’ since ‘in the developmental process, shame is now often considered the affect that most defines the space wherein a sense of self will develop’ (ibid., p. 37). However, Sedgwick emphasises the peculiar feature of shame that it is at once both contagious and individuating. For example, even though it seemingly has nothing to do with me, seeing someone else’s embarrassment or stigma can overwhelm me with the sensation of shame as if I were a shame-prone person. Speaking of the identity-making function of shame, Sedgwick insists that shame makes the double movement: ‘toward painful individuation, toward uncontrollable relationality’ (ibid., p. 37). Thirdly, shame interacts with sociability. Sedgwick interestingly expands these interactions into a sort of theatricality by quoting Michael Franz Basch:
‘The shame-humiliation reaction in infancy of hanging the head and averting the eyes does not mean the child is conscious of rejection, but indicates that effective contact with another person has been broken…. Therefore, shame-humiliation throughout life can be thought of as an inability to effectively arouse the other person’s positive reactions to one’s communications. The exquisite painfulness of that reaction in later life harks back to the earliest period when such a condition is not simply uncomfortable but threatens life itself’ (pp. 765-766). So that whenever the actor, or the performance artist, or I could add, the activist in an identity politics, proffers the spectacle of her or his ‘infantile’ narcissism to a spectating eye, the stage is set (so to speak) for either a newly dramatised flooding of the subject by the shame of refused return, or the successful pulsation of the mirroring regard through a narcissistic circuit rendered elliptical (which is to say: necessarily distorted) by the hyperbole of its original cast. (ibid., pp. 37-38)

Then, Sedgwick concludes, shame is a ‘theatrical performance’ (ibid., p. 38).

Through her refinement of the theoretical features of shame, and the peculiar constructions/distractions of identity and dynamic movements between self and others made by shame, Sedgwick also redefines ‘queer’ as not necessarily simply meaning ‘homosexuality’ or a kind of ‘gayness’ in Euro-American cultural contexts:

If the structuration of shame differs strongly between cultures, between periods, and between different forms of politics, however, it differs also simply from one person to another within a given culture and time. Some of the infants, children, and adults in whom shame remains the most available mediator of identity are the ones called (a related word) shy. (‘Remember the fifties?’ Lily Tomlin used to ask. ‘No one was gay in the fifties; they were just shy’.) Queer, I’d suggest, might usefully be thought of as referring in the first place to this group or an overlapping group of infants and children, those whose sense of identity is for some reason tuned most durably to the note of shame. […] [T]he shame-delineated place of identity doesn’t determine the consistency or meaning of that identity, and race, gender, sexuality, appearance, and abledness are only a few of the defining social constructions that will crystallise there, developing from this originary affect their particular structures of expression, creativity, pleasure, and struggle. I’d venture that queerness in this sense has, at this historical moment, some definitionally very significant overlap, through a vibrantly elastic and temporally convoluted one, with the complex of attributes today condensed as adult or adolescent ‘gayness’. (ibid., p. 63)

Her careful reading of personal shame and her shame-accented definition of queerness suggests the rich potential of shame for exploring ‘queer’ politics in Japan, avoiding both the Euro-American-centric narrative of queerness and the orientalist or nationalistic narrative of Japanese culture, which reduces all cultural phenomena into the crystallised Japaneseness.
Even though Sedgwick confesses her suspicions of Foucauldian power theory – she herself was undoubtedly influenced by it in her earlier works – in that ‘its very elegance seems also to make its promise unfulfillable’ (ibid., p. 9) while devoting herself to evolving her Affect Theory, some queer theorists, particularly Kathryn Bond Stockton (2006) and Sally R. Munt (2007), have applied discussions of shame to political struggles.

Stockton (2006) focuses on the functions of shame and debasement for exploring cultural and historical entanglements between ‘black’ and ‘queer’ in the US:

Shame itself proves exceptionally composite, as I am going to show. There is no purely black form of debasement --- nor a queer one. Only blended forms of shame. A circuitry of switchpoints keeps associations sparking between ‘black’ and ‘queer’ and the signs attached to them: between cloth and skin, between sexual dirtiness and the filth of neighbourhoods, between tabooed attractions and acts of racial punishment, between miscegenation and sexual sameness, and between the autoimmunities of memory and those of the body. (Stockton 2006, p. 23)

Although her efforts to link ‘black’ and ‘queer’ through shame ironically imply the ‘whiteness’ of ‘queer’ in the premises of her discussion, her work still indicates the theoretical fruitfulness of shame as social dynamism intervening between race and sexuality, or between stigmatised bodies and desire.

Munt (2007) explains how shame can create counter discourses, recalling Foucault’s famous example, in The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, of the occurrence of reverse discourses, whereby the pathologised homosexuals, who supposedly were shameful people in society, have started to claim their identity and rights by using the themes of psychology that had previously pathologised them (Munt 2007, pp. 3-4).

Applying these theoretical features of shame to the politics of Togo Ken, I will analyse how haji or shame functions in his discourses and performances and in the audience’s reactions to him. Thus, I will focus on his ideas about gender, sexuality and Japanese society, rather than on a wider analysis of Japanese society and history and on contextualising him within them as Oikawa and McLelland did. How did he define himself when he performed his famous political acts and what was his political legitimation for actions that nobody before him had ever undertaken?

5. Togo’s Sexual Politics and Shame
5-1. Togo’s Autobiographical Narrative and Shameful Life

When we investigate Togo’s thoughts and the meaning of his performances, the first thing we notice is that he always talked about his own life. Indeed, it is remarkable that Togo’s publications and his personal website contain detailed profiles and autobiographical accounts of his relationships with his parents (especially with his mother), his school life, his first sexual experiences and life as an owner of a gay bar. As he narrates, Togo was born into a high-profile Japanese family in 1932. His grandfather was a member of the House of Representatives of Japan and his father was a prefectural assembly member. He repeatedly tells the autobiographical story of how an upper-class man, who graduated from an elite university with good grades and used to work in a major bank, became just an owner of a gay bar. His autobiography is impressive for readers, especially those who are interested in him, so much so that both Oikawa (2001) and McLelland (2005) have mentioned Togo’s life in their articles.

Although his life story seemingly gives a clue to his character, it is uncertain as to whether or not the story is altogether true. For example, in the profile on his personal website, he relates that the British newspaper *The Daily Mirror*, in June 1971, introduced his public activities as an openly gay activist with a photo in its leading article describing Togo as ‘a twenty-first century Angel from the East’ (‘Togo wo shibobu’ 2012). But, in fact, *The Daily Mirror* farcically discussed him on the page dedicated to ‘weird news’, illustrating its report with a photo of him and half-naked men: ‘MORE Gaiety: Ken Togo, 39, is running for office in Japan’s Upper House elections as a sort of one-man homosexual party. His bodyguards are members of his party or persuasion, whichever way you look at it’ (*The Daily Mirror* 1971, p. 4). Of course, there is no word in this report about ‘a twenty-first century Angel from the East’. Hence, his autobiographical story, which he sometimes narrates in overly camp language, cannot simply be read as a memoir based on fact. Rather, it might be part of his performance.
Interestingly, since he insists that he has learnt ‘the truth’ of human life and society through living as a homosexual, his autobiographical narrative is performative, indicating what ‘the truth’ of human life and society is and how he learnt it. In his discourses, living as a homosexual, or an okama, is an essential factor in capturing ‘the truth’ of the world. He writes:

So far, I have lived, so to speak, in an underground society. As I have come down to the lowest place in society and found the truth, I will keep crying out from the other side of the world. […] I have nothing to be ashamed of in being called a ‘homo’ and ‘okama’. In fact, I have lived such a life. Rather, now I’m turning 50 years old, I think that I have gained a glimpse into ‘the truth of humans’ through an unashamedly homo life. (Togo 1979, p. 9)

Togo’s narrative has the structure of a classic literary genre, the Bildungsroman or coming-of-age story, in which an innocent, naïve boy becomes an adult who understands the world well though the difficulties he has faced. What is intriguing in Togo’s story is that the goal of the story is reversed, as he moves from an economically and politically privileged young boy to a homosexual or okama living in an underground society. Thus, a query arising from Togo’s discourses is what he meant by ‘the truth’, and how he could learn ‘the truth’ through life as a homosexual or okama.
In the book *Zatsumin no ronri* (*the logic of a motley assembly of people*), he repeatedly relates where and with whom he happened to have homosexual sex. His affairs with men are far from romantic; rather, they are grotesque, shameful, disgusting, and sometimes violent. For example, he calls a middle-aged guy with whom he had sex in his undergraduate days a ‘drowned rat’, as the man was a perspirer, and describes sex with him in detail. Elsewhere, he relates how he forced an employee in his gay bar, who smelled bad as a result of syphilis, to go to a clinic.

The most disturbing episode that he recounts is of the violence or, in his own words, the ‘*okama* lynch’, which he personally witnessed in the underground world. What happened was that a group of ex-staff members of Togo’s establishment beat up the most beautiful and popular transgender woman in his bar, putting a lighted cigarette in her nose and cutting her hair and clothes, as she had been the cause of them having to leave Togo’s bar and had spread reports of their bad behaviour. In his writing, this incident and its violence are closely related to homosexuality, gender divergence and ‘undergroundness’.

When his ex-employees visited him to meet their target, he says he did not wonder at all since, ‘in a normal society’, he explains, ‘it is not common that one comes to the bar which she ungratefully left and asks the owner to see an ex-colleague, but she won’t follow such normal rules’ (*ibid.*, p. 84). While Togo emphasises their femininity when explaining their rudeness, he describes their violence as masculine: ‘Even though people call them an *okama*, gay, or sister, they are still men. They punished Miki by baring their nature under the covering masks’ (*ibid.*, p. 85). Then, Togo describes how they changed after the attack: ‘After the lynch, they acted feminine as usual, as if they were completely different people from the ones who had just finished a tough fight and they left with a typically feminine way of walking among homos’ (*ibid.*, p. 86). Along with episodes of his economic problems as an owner of a gay bar, Togo describes the underground world of *okama*, with its dramas of homosexuals, transgenders, prostitutes, hostesses, and *yakuza* (Japanese mafia), as the chaotic place of abnormal sex, violence, money and illegality: the shameful place.

5-2. Towards a Politics of Shame

Togo reflects on a young boy with whom he had a relationship, asserting that this young boy was a key person in Togo’s political development. According to Togo, when they met he was seventeen or eighteen years old and a high school student, but during his time as
an undergraduate he became a leader of the student movements of the 1960s. Through his relationship with the student activist, Togo was influenced by the Marxist ideas of the student movements:

The student movements in the late 1960s had a wonderful word, self-criticism, and as this word indicates, they tried to radically deny class-consciousness and cast a new light on human equality. I understood that their purpose was closely related to me who lived as a social outcast and suffered from that burden. Listening to their discussions, I felt that they talked about me.

‘Yes, we should not deprecate ourselves as okama. Isn’t it lying that we live hiding the fact that a man loves a man? There is no true peace nor equality until all lies are gone from the world’.

So, self-criticism of okama is that one declares in public, in broad daylight, ‘I am an okama’. It was a tough thing to do. But just thinking that I had made the declaration, I enjoyed a feeling of refreshment from removing the weak people’s, loser’s shame, which belongs to a social outcast, from myself. (Togo 1979, pp. 109-110)

From his encounter with the left student movements, Togo came to regard his own shame as a result of repression in society and started to turn away from shaming himself and towards social activism.

Togo’s political ideas are influenced by, so to speak, the ‘leftist ideology’ of the student movements in Japan, inspired by Marxism, as Togo himself admits. However, his analysis of social repression and strategies for combating it differ from the traditional Marxist account. Leftist ideology under the Marxist influence of the 1960s defines politics as the struggle between classes, explaining social injustice as the result of repression of one class by the other. By contrast, Togo does not posit a tense relationship between the homosexuals, or okama, and people who are not, since class relations cause economic and social exploitation but the relationships between homosexuals and non-homosexuals do not necessarily lead to such exploitation. Rather, in Togo’s view, there is no distinct difference between homosexuals and people who are not because homosexual desire is not something belonging to some people from birth, but something all people

\[\text{Sunada (1969) points out that the ideology of student movements in the 1960s is primarily based on Marxism, aiming at overthrowing the existing capitalist system, and the differences in the interpretations of Marxism distinguished among the groups; ‘Marxism is the only ideology among the student groups’ (p. 491). Although, for the Japanese Communists, the main enemy that embodied capitalism was the United States, which had strongly influenced Japanese politics and the economy since the end of the Second World War, the class struggle of the working class was also regarded as the essential for a revolution.}\]
have: ‘From my experience, all men have homosexual desire. Therefore, there is no one who completely fails to relate to a homo. People only live their life ignoring their homosexual desire in themselves’ (ibid. p. 111). To support this claim, Togo autobiographically describes numerous sexual encounters with married men and men in high positions.

Instead of the class struggle of the left-wing theory, he uses the spatial distinctions in Japanese society to explain social injustice. His way of distinguishing social spaces is not based on the approach of modern politics, which distinguishes between the public and the private, as discussed in early Lesbian and Gay Studies in the English language (Schneider 1986; Sedgwick 1990; Griffin 1992; Plummer 1995; Halperin 1995). He identifies social spaces on the basis of shame, distinguishing between ‘a place of sunlight’, or the place of common-sense (in his words, hi-no-ataru-basyo), and ‘a place of shade’, or the shameful place (hikage-no-basyo). He asserts that okama are alienated because they belong to the shameful place, so their liberation will shift their whereabouts from the shameful place to the place of common-sense. Togo writes, ‘I insist that I convey my thought to okama and we should liberate okama from a place of shade to a place of sunlight’ (Togo 1979, p. 111).

Even though the difference in sexual desire between homosexuals and people who are not is subtle, the spatial distinction functions separately. Some people can come and go between both spaces, whereas people who are marked by shame must exist and stay in the shameful place. Togo says, for example, that professors or executive-level employees are able to enjoy homosexual affairs secretly in the shameful place while living with honour in society, but cross-dressers or owners of gay bars must stay in the shameful place for life (Togo 1979, pp.152, 156; Oikawa and Togo 2002, p. 150). Thus, Togo redefines social class based on emotions, honour and shame, to include sexuality in politics, and categorises discriminated-against people as those who live only in the shameful place. He calls them ‘Zatsumin’, meaning ‘a motley assembly of people’, and has tried to act as their political representative.

By contrast, for Togo, the Emperor is the symbol of the space of honour in Japan, so that he has to struggle with it. This is why Togo continued to press the issue of the Emperor, even though the subject was considered politically taboo in Japan. For instance,

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20 For analysing ‘the left-wing theory’, the discourses and ideology of Japanese student movements in the 1960s, see Oguma (2009).
he challenged the Emperor’s holiness by distorting the symbol of his national power into an obscene image in his electoral campaign. In an election broadcast on a national public network in 1977, Togo said, after coming out as an okama and an owner of a gay bar: ‘I will abolish the Emperor System by the Constitution. If the Emperor is the national symbol, then a symbol of men is more important to me. I don’t need the Emperor System’ (Togo 1979, p. 149).

According to Togo, the okama represents the paradox that all human beings are sexual, while the space of common sense is supposedly asexual, excluding the sexual subject. He argues:

It is said that okama is against common sense. What is common sense? Common sense is exactly what restricts people. From my experience, all men have homosexual desire. Therefore, there is no one who completely fails to relate to a homo. People only live their lives ignoring the homosexual desire in themselves. I'm not insisting that all humans should be homos. From my own experience, I say that it's better not to be a homo as long as the society stays as it is, for society, through common sense, alienates a homo. And those who are on the side of common sense are alienating themselves by alienating homos. (Togo 1979, pp. 111-112)

Consequently, his political strategy would be to subvert the spatial distinction. There are two methods for his particular politics to adopt. In the first method, a social outcast or okama comes out from the shameful place into the place of common-sense and makes people accept his existence there. This method is exemplified by Togo’s notorious campaigns for public office as an okama, from the 1970s to the 1990s, despite having no chance of being elected. The second method consists of pulling people in honourable positions down to the same level as the social outcasts. This is why the word ‘equality’ in Togo’s politics tends to function not by elevating the lower people to respectable positions in society but, rather, by making the higher people fall into the shameful positions. In a poem published in a public newsletter for the Upper House election in 1977, he declared,

We are marked, discriminated against as an okama, whore, mistress, hostess, sadist, masochist, and lez.

A song to you.
If people call you abnormal, treat you like a pervert,
I would say, politicians in corruption, those who shamelessly lie in public, are rather perverts…
Now, let’s pull down your zipper,
Erect your gun and fire
Toward capitalists associated with the Emperor. […]

Now, rub your symbol with sweat and semen,
Erect your gun and fuck asses,
Of hereditary conservatives associated with bankers. (Togo 1979, pp. 143-144)

When Togo uses sexual rhetoric against capitalists and politicians, and constructs political relationships between social outcasts or sexual deviants and the governing class through sexual metaphors, it can be seen that his political strategy is not to expand people’s ideas on normality and put outsiders into it. Rather, he radically tries to expand the sexual domain in society, as expressed by his comments on human equality: ‘I think that talking about sex is the best way to evoke people’s understanding of human equality. Anyone has a “bulge” and “hole”. No matter who you are and what your occupation is, this fact is true; we are all the same’ (ibid., p. 8).

Intriguingly, Togo’s autobiographical story and political purpose are synchronised: his life story represents his own political possibilities, whereby people can give up their own privileges and realise a ‘true’ idea of human equality through sex, as he did. This is what he calls the ‘truth’ of humans when trying to legitimate his politics. Therefore, even when telling his autobiographical story in public, Togo actually is intensely engaged, for the story is part of his politics: in his politics, his life itself is performative.

5-3. Shame and Politics

Indeed, Togo’s eccentric assertions and appearances in public have provoked not only the general public, but the homosexual audience as well. Hasegawa Hiroshi, a gay AIDS activist, said of Togo: ‘To be honest, at that time, every time when I saw Mr. Togo Ken on TV, I felt that I did not want to be something like that, not want to be lumped together with him even though I liked a man’ (Fushimi et al. 2002, p. 53). His comment is significant in understanding Togo’s politics, since his political message was that the disgusting people in the shameful place, like Togo himself, and the people who believed they were normal, like the majority, were the same human beings and were equal. Thus, performing as a shameful, disgusting man was an important part of his politics. Togo’s political style is like a theatrical performance; he appears in outrageous costumes and
expresses provocative opinions to attract public attention, then denies the difference between himself and his audiences, trying to pull them down to his own position, which is supposedly that of a shameful person.

While Hasegawa felt that he did not want to be lumped together with Togo, some people actually felt a ‘closeness’ with Togo that, at the same time, they had to deny. Sara Ahmed (2004) and Sally R. Munt (2007) argue that disgust and shame are ‘sticky’ affects. For Ahmed, ‘sticky’ emotions, such as disgust and shame, are shaped by relationships, developed through a history, between objects, subjects and objects, or subject and signs (Ahmed 2004, pp. 84-92). Ahmed describes the ‘stickiness’ of affects:

As a result, to get stuck to something sticky is also to become sticky. In the event of being cut off from a sticky object, an object (including the skin surface) may remain sticky and may ‘pick up’ other objects. Stickiness then is about what objects do to other objects – it involves a transference of affect – but it is a relation of ‘doing’ in which there is not a distinction between passive and active, even though the stickiness of one object might come before the stickiness of the other, such that the other seems to cling to it. (Ahmed 2004, p. 91)

Because Togo had intentionally projected the shameful stereotypes of the okama, he himself became the sticky, shameful object, not only for straight audiences, but also for homosexuals who tried to establish a respectable image of themselves in order to build gay pride. After Oikawa (2001) published his article about Togo, a polemic was directed against the discriminatory connotations of the word okama in the gay community. Sukotan kikaku, a gay organisation, criticised a weekly journal for using this word in an article’s title and in its advertisement (Fushimi et al. 2002)\(^{21}\). A year later, Oikawa and Togo co-authored a book entitled ‘Joshiki wo koete (Beyond common sense)’ about Togo’s life and ideas. In this book, Oikawa also devoted pages to the critical responses to Togo’s activism from gay communities, especially gay people who worked for political reformation in Japan. According to Oikawa, Miyahara Junpei, a representative of Forum-Aquarius, which aims to promote the political visibility of gay people in Japan, explains that in organising the Forum-Aquarius, he was motivated by antagonism towards Togo’s political style. Oikawa quotes Miyahara’s comment on Togo in the Forum-Aquarius newsletter:

\(^{21}\) For more activities of Sukotan kikaku, see Ito and Yanase (2001).
The biggest harm done by his [Togo’s] activity is that it has impregnated Japanese society with the wrong idea that ‘an openly gay man can never be publicly elected’. It is possible that there will be a gay politician if our strategy works well. But for him to emerge, there must have been an openly gay politician in Japan long before, mustn’t there? (Oikawa and Togo 2002, p.217)

Just as Miyahara clearly shows his hostility towards Togo, many gay activists, especially those of the generation slightly older than Oikawa’s, describe their ‘traumatic’ experiences of seeing him – a homosexual man who projected the effeminate gay stereotype on TV– in their childhood (Oikawa and Togo 2002, pp. 212-220). Oikawa relates having been told by a gay activist that his article on Togo opened a Pandora’s Box, raising an unmentionable subject for gay activists and leading to a bitter argument as to whether the publisher could use a discriminatory word like *okama* against gays. Ironically, shame and the sign ‘*okama*’ were tightly bound together through Togo’s performances in the political domain in Japan, and for some gay activists, gay shame is still something they need to fight in order to attain political visibility and respect.

For this reason, his politics can be considered as a failure, and even harmful, for gays in Japan. Yet, considered as a political strategy, his approach, which tries to build equality on the basis of disgust and shame, is radical and can be of interest within queer politics.

Martha C. Nussbaum (2010) discusses how the politics of disgust and of humanity are engaged in a complicated struggle with each other in sexual politics in the United States. In the first type of politics, disgust is utilised to debase some groups of people, such as those with disabilities, homosexuals, and gender, racial and religious minorities. By contrast, the politics of humanity offers all persons equal respect in relation to human dignity and natural rights, as protected by the Constitution. Nussbaum notes two features of disgust: projection and attachment. Firstly, disgust can be extended from object to object:

Disgust is then extended from object to object in ways that could hardly bear rational scrutiny. This sort of extended disgust is what I call projective disgust. Rozin calls the principles of disgust-projection ‘laws of sympathetic magic’. One such magical idea is that if object A is disgusting and B looks like A, B is also disgusting. (Nussbaum 2010, p. 15)

Thus, objects of disgust and the effects of disgust can be extended through analogical similarity. Secondly, disgust is attached to human animality:
The so-called primary objects of disgust are reminders of human animality and mortality: feces, other bodily fluids, corpses, and animals or insects who have related properties (slimy, smelly, oozy). Rozin concludes that it is the filth and stench of humanity itself that underlies all of disgust’s more parochial instances. (Nussbaum 2010, p. 14)

Even though Nussbaum tries to secure equal respect for all people based on the rational ability of humans and on the Constitution - the so-called politics of humanity - the politics of disgust can undermine it by recalling human animality, which is a natural attribute of human beings. Thus, the politics of disgust is not something the politics of humanity can overcome but, rather, it is the conditions of the politics of humanity, or the starting point of the politics of humanity, which negates disgust by rationality. In addition, disgust can be rationally utilised in the field of Law, as Nussbaum observes when criticising Sodomy laws (Nussbaum 2010, pp. 27-28). Therefore, her politics of humanity is not as clear as the politics of disgust. Nonetheless, her distinction between the politics of disgust and the politics of humanity is useful in understanding the mechanism of the exclusion or inclusion of people considered ‘sexual’, and often caricatured by images of faeces, human fluids and disease.

What Togo meant by his spatial distinction, that is, between the space of common-sense and the shameful space, is akin to Nussbaum’s meaning in distinguishing between the politics of humanity and the politics of disgust. For example, when Togo describes the shameful place, he often symbolically mentions the semen of homosexual affairs and the blood flowing from the violence that takes place there. However, Nussbaum’s discussion in the context of legal philosophy can be seen as a denial of sexuality in itself, since the politics of humanity, which relies on rationality and the Constitution for equal respect to be accorded all people, tries to overcome the politics of disgust, which is rooted in natural human attributes such as affects and the body. Her politics always needs to rationalise human sexuality in order to gain respect. In contrast, Togo insists that all people are equal because all people are sexual, so that our ideas on equality and the existing rules of sexuality should be changed. Thus, in his thought process, equality must be grounded in human animality. ‘Unity of outsiders should hold to the slogan “equality for all”, especially equality in sex. I believe that equality in love can be the starting point of new forms of humans, for all humans equally have sex and sex is fundamental to a human being’ (Togo 1979, pp. 157-158). His radical ideas on
sexuality and equality can be disturbing even now, for he asserts that not only homosexual acts, but also incestuous affairs and paedophilic acts, should be liberated in society.

I do not discuss here whether his political purpose is realistic, or whether we should follow him nowadays. Rather, I will focus on the role of shame in his politics and identity. In Japanese studies, or nihonjin-ron, shame has been considered to function ‘conservatively’ in Japanese society; shame works to sustain morals or is the key emotion of the homogeneous Japanese culture. In Togo’s politics, however, shame functions distinctively: constructing a minority identity, explaining social injustice, and facilitating political performances. Togo’s radical political performances, or exhibitionism, are the reverse side of the shame he has suffered as a homosexual in Japanese society. He used shame for his theatrical-political performance, trying to attract the attention of the general public through his eccentric appearance and opinions; then he denied the difference between himself and the general public for claiming human equality. Contradictory affects operate simultaneously in his theatrical politics: his performance indicates his exquisite shame and pride as a social outsider or okama. In addition, it conveys his denial of occupying a shameful place in society, and his assertion that all humans are equal in regard to sex. This contradiction in his politics allows him to insist on contradictory political messages; on the one hand, he tried to gain respect for people, like himself, who live in the shameful place, but, on the other hand, he claims equality for all, which would mean abandoning the political importance of the people in the shameful place, and even Togo’s own importance. Shame and his ambivalent relationship with it have produced his contradiction, but shame has also certainly opened up the possibilities of radical ‘queer’ politics in Japan.

5-4. Gender-bending Politics, or the Paradox of Togo’s Politics

As Sally R. Munt points out that shame is discursively linked to femininity in the context of Western culture (Munt 2007, p. 2, 97), Togo’s shame is marked by femininity in his descriptions of homosexuals, sexual identity and political representations. Reading carefully Togo’s description of the shameful place, in his discourse shame is distinctively gendered. When Togo emphasises the marginalised position of okama, he refers to the okama’s feminised figure and conduct (Togo 1979, pp. 81-89). Reflecting his childhood and his sexual identity as a homosexual, Togo expresses his strong love for his mother and considers that his homosexuality came from her influence (ibid., pp. 15-23). In his
political address, Togo appealed to the people who he considered himself to represent: ‘We are marked, discriminated against as an okama, whore, mistress, hostess, sadist, masochist, and lez’ (ibid., p. 143). Since he mentions a ‘whore, mistress, hostess, and lez’, who are all females, the people in the shameful place are largely female or feminised people. Thus, the female image is important in understanding his shame, as Mark McLelland noted when considering Togo’s feminised transgendering performance as an element of his ‘queer’ politics (McLelland 2005, pp. 166-167). Since shame is regarded to be a close relation to femininity, his political performance, which represents the marginalised ‘shameful’ people, exaggerates his femininity as an okama.

However, when he turns from the shameful person to the political one in public, he returns to the image of a masculine being, or at least distances himself from the female subject.

Some struggle to climb up from the bottom while others impose undesirable things on the bottom. I have talked about women as vulnerable. But dominators in the Emperor System cleverly try to utilise the ambition of people in vulnerable positions. Women are especially susceptible to control through their love for home and children. (Togo and Oikawa 2002, p. 150)

In this comment, he describes women not only as victims of the hegemonic society within the Emperor System, but also as people who are easily controlled and affected by the system to reproduce injustice.

In Togo’s thoughts, therefore, femininity represents two types of inferiority: a source of shame in society and a lack of political ability to oppose it. As Togo asserts, women are repressed since femininity is often marked as sexual and is marginalised in the hegemony of Japanese society. Nevertheless, Togo thinks that women are too weak and naïve to fight this hegemony. This ambiguity towards femininity leads Togo to a contradictory position. He tries to represent the powerless people in the role of an okama, a feminised man, but, in his political role, he cannot be fully a woman because, by his logic, women are too naïve to be political.

Hence, he must be a male subject with regard to politics but must adhere to femininity as a repressed subject. In this sense, what McLelland evaluates as queer politics in Togo’s transgenderism, was not positive at all, since misogyny is intricately involved in it. Firstly, there is the misogyny that looks down upon femininity, and excludes it from society, as being sexual. This femininity is what Togo identified with,
attacking Japanese hegemonic society for its view of the repressed subject. However, there is also Togo’s own misogyny, causing him to reject femininity as a political man. This femininity makes a person an inferior subject in the political arena, suggesting illogic, stupidity, emotionalism and powerlessness. Even though Togo’s political performances seem interestingly ‘queer’ from our viewpoint, since he used gender-bending performances to criticise society, such performances are motivated by his ambivalent attachment to, and avoidance of, femininity.

His shame certainly motivates his radical politics but, at the same time, it can lead him to turn his back on his own radicalism, which denies social inequality from the standpoint of the shameful place. Although shame and femininity are closely related, Togo cannot completely embrace femininity as a political man. It is not the reservations about Togo among gay activists in Japan, but his own reservations about femininity, that limit his radical politics by undermining his political purpose.

When McLelland rereads the history of sexual minorities in Japan as ‘queer’, based on its similarity with queer theory from the Anglophone society, which offers new perspectives on gender and sexuality, the problem is not simply that McLelland reappropriates Orientalist sexual fantasy, including the stereotype of the masculine West and the feminine Orient. Firstly, he dismisses the problem of misogyny, as associated with sexuality, in Japanese society, which deeply affected Togo’s political thought. Secondly, he reinforces Togo’s misogyny through failing to mention it when evaluating Togo’s transgendering politics. In light of these problems, it can sometimes be misleading or oversimplified to apply the concept of ‘queer’ to the cultural phenomena of other cultures just because of the similarity between what they look like and what the word ‘queer’ represents.

6. Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken: Historicising Togo’s Politics and the Nation

At first glance, Mishima Yukio has nothing in common with Togo Ken, except that they were both homosexuals. On the one hand, Mishima was a notable Japanese novelist and radical nationalist who openly adored the Emperor, while Togo, on the other hand, was an owner of a gay bar and radical leftist who passionately attacked the Emperor, which was politically taboo in Japanese society. I argued in the previous chapter that Mishima tried to represent the Emperor as the homoerotically desirable ideal, and then expressed his homoerotic desire as tragically heroic. When he endeavours to re-masculinise his
desire and himself, he converts his homoeroticism to legitimate political passion through the image of the Emperor. Togo, who appears to be an activist at the other end of the political spectrum from Mishima, also comes compulsively close to the Emperor.

Togo aggressively criticised the Emperor System and the Emperor’s holiness as symbols of the hegemonic Japanese society. He considered that the hegemony of Japanese society is reproduced through the class hierarchy and people’s desire for upward mobility: ‘Some struggle to climb up from the bottom while others impose undesirable things on the bottom. […] But dominators in the Emperor System cleverly try to utilise the ambition of people in vulnerable positions’ (Oikawa and Togo 2002, p. 150). Accordingly, his politics is defined in terms of that which exactly opposes the Emperor System, reversing the hegemony of the Emperor and trying to degrade honourable men, such as politicians and the Emperor. Togo describes himself as the opposite face of the Emperor.

With the Emperor on top of the pyramid, Japanese people confirm their existence through discriminating against each other. At the bottom of the pyramid are okama, the most discriminated against, and on the top, there is the Emperor. (Oikawa and Togo 2002, p. 158)

With this logic, as the opposite face of the Emperor, Togo tried to convert the Emperor’s holiness, honour and political symbolic power to shameful objects such as himself, leading to an actual violent attack on him by a right-winger. At the same time, however, his politics eroticised the Emperor in that his insults were always conducted through sexual messages. By placing an okama in the position exactly opposite to the Emperor, Togo narcissistically identified with the obscene version of the Emperor as an okama, although in a different way from Mishima’s fantasy, which homoeroticised the relationship between himself and the Emperor. Despite differences of political ideology, this common aspect of Mishima and Togo indicates how useful the political symbol of the Emperor was for marginalised men when they tried to politicise themselves and to reconstruct their masculinity within the Japanese national imaginary.

It is interesting to compare Togo with Mishima. Mishima transformed the representation of homoeroticism from underground desire and something taboo to the patriotic homoeroticism of Japanese iconic figures, such as samurai, and the tragic but heroic soldiers of the Pacific War who had died for the Emperor. In this type of representation, Mishima has nationalised homoeroticism and situated his desire as a
Togo politicised the spatiality of homosexuals, by contrast with the legitimate space, including that represented by the Emperor. Togo’s politics were made possible by a history of underground homosexuals in Japan, well known as *ero-guro-nansensu* (Kuroiwa 2013, Plungfelder 1999, pp. 290-335), as well as by Mishima’s nationalist homoeroticism, which was associated with the Emperor, and by leftist movements and new democracy in post-war Japan. When we interpret Togo’s politics with reference to Mishima, we also observe a shift in the politics of homosexual desire in relation to Japanese national imaginary. In comparison to Mishima, Togo did not treat homoeroticism as a politically legitimate desire but, rather, as a form of anti-establishment activism against the Emperor System. However, as Togo easily asserted his political position in terms of the Emperor System without the efforts of Mishima, it is evident that there were already contexts that allowed homosexuality to exist in a Japanese political-social context. Thus, in Togo’s discourse, we can see a nationalised homosexuality in Japan, which can intervene in national politics, not as an ‘imported’ identity or position from the West.

**Conclusion**

Togo Ken is an interesting figure, not only as a pioneer of radical gay politics in Japan, but also as a person who delivers new political discourses of gender and sexuality in Japanese society. In the context of relationships among gender, sexuality and national norms in Japan, he is worthy of attention. Firstly, he has become a model of radical gay activism or ‘queer’ figures at a time when gay activism and queer studies have gained influence in Euro-American societies and people have tried to locate the same kinds of politics outside Euro-American contexts. As an openly homosexual person, who campaigned in national elections before Harvey Milk did in San Francisco and fought some cases in the Supreme Court in Japan, he stands as a representative figure of progressive left gay/queer politics in Japan. In such representations, Togo has often been discussed in the essentialist binaries of Right and Left, West and East, progress and backwardness, liberal society and repressive society, and queer and normative.

Secondly, when we focus on Togo’s discourses rather than on his public acts or performances, it is understandable that shame can have politically subversive functions
in Japanese sexual politics. In Japanese studies, or *nihonjin-ron*, shame is a characteristic
emotion of Japanese society and culture, perhaps one of the national symbols of Japan. Yet, Togo has adapted shame and utilised it against the hegemonic Japanese society, which Japanese studies or *nihonjin-ron* treat as a ‘homogeneous society’. His political theme of shame can be called ‘queer’ in Sedgwick’s sense (Sedgwick 2003, p. 63), and as Mark McLelland actually calls it. However, it is often overlooked that Togo’s ‘queer’ politics is still motivated by his misogyny. Femininity induces a sense of shame in him, so that he conveyed his sense of being discriminated against through his feminine performance, while at the same time expressing the wish to distance himself from women. Togo’s ambivalent relationship with shame leads him to express his politics by a sort of transgenderism, as a feminised male homosexual, although this political image is considered ‘queer’ without acknowledgement of its creator’s misogyny.

Finally, when we compare Togo with Mishima, Togo is a symbolic figure whose discourses indicate a new relationship between homosexuality and a Japanese national imaginary. On the one hand, Togo challenges the Emperor System but, on the other hand, he still has a desire that he sexually identifies with the Emperor through his shame. If we regard Mishima as the first person who tried to utilise homoeroticism in nationalist politics in Japan and to reconstruct a new Japanese masculinity, Togo is the person who situates *okama* as an emblem of the repressed people in Japanese national politics. In this sense, we can interpret his *okama* as repressing nationalised sexual minorities in Japanese society.

However, as McLelland points out, Togo’s politics did not have a strong influence on the gay community in Japan (McLelland 2005, p. 166). McLelland argues that Togo fell out of sync with the Japanese homosexual community because, due to Western influence, ‘gay identity’ had come to be understood as masculine, with the result that his feminine representation of *okama* was not appreciated by homosexual people. However, I think that this explanation is too simplistic. Firstly, as Togo uses his autobiographical story as an allegory of his political purpose, his politics is characterised by his personal life. This factor makes it difficult to share his politics with the wider population. Secondly, McLelland overlooks the impact in Japan of the globalisation of sexual politics, featuring the emergence of the global HIV epidemic and the institutionalisation of gender and sexuality studies. These events have changed the problems and discourses of homosexuals in Japan as well. In the next chapter, I shall
show how these events recontextualised Japanese sexual politics, especially in regard to male homosexuality.
Chapter 3. Questions of Gay Identity and Coming Out after the AIDS Crisis in Japan

1. Introduction

While ‘pioneers’ of cultural representations of homosexuality, such as Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken, have been regarded as ‘indigenous’ models of Japanese homosexuality, gay activism that insists on gay identity has been considered an ‘imported’ model of gayness from the West, mainly from the United States, in Queer Studies in the English language (Altman 1997; Lunsing 1997, 2005; McLelland 2000). These views are based on the social and discursive shifts among Japanese sexual minorities taking place between the 1970s and 1990s. Additionally, they suggest that there are ‘indigenous’ Japanese homosexuals and ‘Westernised’ gay people in Japan. The questions that arise here are: what are the differences between so-called ‘indigenous’ Japanese sexualities and not, and what do the differences mark politically?

In this chapter, I will explore how the AIDS crisis affected Japanese society and the new gay male politics in the 1980s. Then, after reviewing the criticism of Japanese gay male identity in the English language, I will analyse discourses of gay male (‘gei’) politics and Gay Studies that assert gay identity in Japanese society. Through these investigations, I will discuss, firstly, how the AIDS crisis has changed the discourses of sexuality and the sense of national and cultural borders in Japan; secondly, the discursive effects of Japanese Studies and Queer Studies in the English language concerning Japanese gay identity; and, thirdly, the political debate over coming out, arising from the institutionalisation of Gay Studies in Japan.

2. The AIDS Panic and Identities of Sexual Minorities

2-1. The Virus, Homosexuality and the Border

For perspectives on national borders and sexuality in Japan, the AIDS epidemic is regarded as one of the most significant events in the history of Japanese sexual minorities. As Susan Sontag (1991) argues in the US context, the symbolic power of AIDS, or the metaphors attached to AIDS, were distinctive. AIDS had become identified with evil; therefore, to contract AIDS was regarded as scandalous, and the shame of AIDS carried
an imputation of guilt (Sontag 1991, pp. 101, 110). Sontag points out a dual metaphorical genealogy of AIDS: one metaphor is that of ‘invasion’, whereby AIDS is described in the same way as cancer; the other is ‘pollution’, which focuses on the transmission of the disease. Nonetheless, according to Sontag, what is particularly significant in the description of AIDS is the military metaphors used:

With cancer, the metaphor scants the issue of causality (still a murky topic in cancer research) and picks up at the point at which rogue cells inside the body mutate, eventually moving out from an original site or organ to overrun other organs or systems – a domestic subversion. In the description of AIDS the enemy is what causes the disease, an infectious agent that comes from the outside. [...] This is the language of political paranoia, with its characteristic distrust of a pluralistic world. (ibid., p. 103)

As Sontag notes, metaphors of AIDS are associated with ideas of ‘invasion from the outside’, evoking the fear of insecure borders and a pluralistic, postmodern world.

In Japan, AIDS was represented in terms of foreignness, the danger coming from foreign countries or foreigners.

The ‘first discovery’ of a person with AIDS in Japan reflected the strong stereotype of AIDS already present in society, relating it both to homosexuality and to foreign countries, especially the United States. The Ministry of Health and Welfare introduced AIDS surveillance in 1984, with the AIDS Surveillance Committee announcing the identification of Japan’s first AIDS case in 1985. This patient was a gay male Japanese artist living in the US, who was diagnosed as HIV-positive during a return visit to Japan.

However, some researchers were sceptical about this identification (Hirokawa 2003). The first outbreak in the AIDS epidemic in Japan was among haemophiliacs infected by contaminated blood products, imported mainly from the United States. Although groups of haemophiliac patients had already pointed out the risk of HIV/AIDS from contaminated blood products from the US, demanding in 1983 that the government approve the use of heated blood products, the government continued to allow the use of unheated blood products until 1985. As a result of this official medical policy, approximately 40 percent, or 1800, of the haemophiliac patients treated with these blood products were infected by 1985. As noted in a report from the Japan Centre for International Exchange, ‘the history of the epidemic in Japan differs greatly from that in the North American and European countries where HIV/AIDS was originally identified
in the public mind with sexual transmission’ (2004, p. 19). The infections among haemophiliac patients, caused by the government’s inaction, had a big impact on Japanese society. This is why researchers speculate that there were quite a few HIV-positive people in Japan before the announcement of the first AIDS case by the AIDS Surveillance Committee in 1985.

Kazama Takashi (1997) observes that, according to the national newspaper *The Asahi Shim bun*, haemophiliac patients were infected by HIV through imported contaminated blood products two days before the AIDS Surveillance Committee’s announcement of the first Japanese person with AIDS (p. 407). Keith Vincent and Kazama argue that the Japanese government utilised homophobia among Japanese people to smother their failed AIDS policy (Vincent 1996; Kazama 1997). As a result, Kazama says, ‘homosexuality’ came to mean ‘something’ in Japanese society (Kazama 1997, p. 407)\(^{22}\). Iino Yuriko also comments that the government’s announcement reflected the Japanese stereotype of AIDS as a foreign disease, arising in far countries: the first person with AIDS was a ‘homosexual artist living in the US’, who was easily conceived of as a special person unrelated to the generality of Japanese people (Iino 2008, pp. 145-147). At this time, AIDS was understood as a disease only of special groups, such as drug users, haemophiliacs, male homosexuals and foreign sex workers.

The ‘biggest AIDS panic’ (Iino 2008, p. 148) was the ‘Kobe incident’, in which the first Japanese heterosexual woman, an alleged sex worker, was diagnosed with AIDS in 1987. Shiokawa Yuichi, the chairperson of the AIDS Surveillance Committee, declared 1987 to be ‘AIDS Year One’ in Japan and commented:

> The emergence of AIDS through heterosexual sexual intercourse means that we must develop renewed AIDS strategies in our country. This is because the disease is not limited to a small number of homosexuals but now shows a dangerous sign of spreading to people who are leading ordinary lives. We take this year ‘AIDS Year One’ seriously. (Cited from Kazama and Kawaguchi 2003, pp. 182-183)

The discovery of an AIDS patient infected by heterosexual sexual intercourse was perceived as shocking news since it meant there was a possibility of ‘ordinary’ Japanese people contacting the disease.

\(^{22}\) Shingae Akitomo (2013) analyses how the AIDS Surveillance Committee targeted male homosexuals from the beginning and created the case of the ‘first discovery’ of a person with AIDS.
To allay the panic in society caused by the Kobe incident, the Japanese government introduced an AIDS Prevention Bill, which became law in 1987 and took effect in 1988. This law includes the following provision:

1. When doctors believe that persons with HIV are not following their instructions and are deemed likely to spread the disease, the physicians are obligated to report the patients’ names, addresses, and other information to the prefectural governor.

2. When the governor deems that individuals justifiably suspected to be HIV carriers may spread the disease to an unlimited number of other people, or when s/he otherwise decides it necessary, s/he may require those persons to undergo physical examinations. If diagnosed to have contracted HIV, the governor may issue further prevention-oriented directives.

3. Foreigners with HIV or PWAs who are suspected as likely to spread the disease may not enter Japan. (Kazama and Kawaguchi 2003, p. 184)

This Bill, intended to prevent the spread of HIV among ‘ordinary’ Japanese citizens, was seen as encouraging discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS, so that groups of haemophiliac patients, male homosexuals and feminists organised movements to oppose the bill. Kazama and Kawaguchi note that ‘this bill essentially treats all people suspected of possible HIV infection – essentially, homosexuals and foreigners – as potential assailants and legitimates the strengthening of state surveillance and control over these people’ (Kazama and Kawaguchi 2003, p. 184).

Sandra Buckley (1997) analyses the way in which AIDS was represented in relation to foreigners in Japanese society. She shows that AIDS was implicitly portrayed, in statistics, educational material, posters and newspaper articles, as a disease emanating from foreign countries or foreigners. Buckley points out that some Japanese government HIV/AIDS statistics provided a second figure, representing the number of foreigners separately from the figure for Japanese nationals, because this figure, the Japanese government explained, reflected the large number of illegal immigrants working in sex industries. She writes that, according to reports from sex workers, blood tests were much more actively encouraged among foreign workers than among Japanese nationals: ‘Such extensive publicity might represent an official attempt to reassure the public that the government is acting to “protect” against any further incursion by the “foreign disease”’ (Buckley 1997, p. 267).

John Whittier Treat (1999), a gay scholar of Japanese literature in the US, describes the ‘hysteria’ over AIDS in Japanese society in the 1980s. The AIDS panic that
he faced in Japan forced him to reflect on race issues, both his own and those seen in Japan: ‘Any mention of “blood” panics a society nervous about its health or ethnicity, and Japan is more nervous than most. Racial purity is important to Japan, but it seems impossible to preserve these days’ (Treat 1999, p. 10). He relates having seen a large poster warning of the danger of AIDS near his residence in Tokyo:

   Its notices are normally restricted to letting residents know what days the garbage is collected. But in the spring of 1987 a large poster covers almost the entire board. It shows the four main Japanese islands outlined in black. The spot where Tokyo should be projects out, as if a spotlight, and forms the map of another country: my own, a most ungainly shape. But within the crudely drawn contours of the United States loom the large, solid black roman letters AIDS. And the simple caption for me and my neighbours? Eizu kara mamoro, or ‘Let’s Protect Ourselves from AIDS’. (Treat 1999, p. 154)

Treat describes the AIDS panic in Japan through metaphors of race.

   In Japan, [AIDS] is a white man’s disease; in America, if it isn’t mine it belongs to a black man. (Treat 1999, p. 10)

Encountering his own ‘foreignness’ in Japan though AIDS, no longer symbolising privilege but rather racial otherness subject to the gaze of fear and biopolitical surveillance, like that experienced by a black man in the US, he deliberates, in his book, on his own race, sexuality and Orientalism.

   The AIDS epidemic was a significant event, obliging people in Japanese society to face the fluid borders of the nation, the body, and sexuality, and the fear and shame they evoked. At the same time, it unveiled contradictions and injustices in society, including ableism, xenophobia, racism, sexism and homophobia. These contradictions in Japanese society were often featured in AIDS art in Japan. For instance, S/N (1994), which is considered Dumb Type’s most outstanding work, was created in such circumstances (Saito 2011; Fujita 2003). Dumb Type was an art group founded in 1984 as a collaboration of various artists, including musicians, architects, visual artists, choreographers and computer programmers. For its characteristically multimedia approach and political messages, its work, especially S/N (1994), was among the most notable AIDS and queer performances of the 1990s in Japan. Asada Akira (2000), a

23 For a close analysis of his narcissistic circuit of reflection on his race, sexuality and Orientalism in front of his mirror, ‘Japan’, see Suganuma (2012, Chapter 4).
Japanese philosopher and critic, describes Furuhashi Teiji (1960-1995), a leading member of Dumb Type, as the most profound artist of the fin-de-siècle in Japan. Furuhashi, who learnt drag performance in the US, found that he was HIV-positive in New York in 1987, and disclosed his disease to close friends by letter in 1992 when he began medical treatment\(^{24}\). After he came out as a person with HIV, his works acquired political leanings (Fujita 2003). His last creation, S/N, contributed to AIDS phenomena in Japanese society and conveyed many direct political messages, unlike his earlier abstract works\(^{25}\). At the start of S/N, three performers, wearing various labels, appear onstage and wittily talk about their labels: Furuhashi’s stating ‘Japanese’, ‘male’, ‘HIV+’ and ‘homosexual’; another saying ‘male’, ‘black’, ‘American’, and ‘homosexual’; and the third saying ‘male’, ‘deaf’, ‘Japanese’, and ‘homosexual’. Peter, a black American performer, explains: ‘There still are so many unlucky people in the world who have never had the chance to see real, living, breathing homosexuals in front of them before. The first gays or lesbians that people meet should not be their own children. So, hello’. After introducing himself as ‘male’, ‘black’, ‘American’, and ‘homosexual’, he asks the audience ‘And how are you’? Then, in a scene with the light turned down, dancers move intensely against a wall, onto which the images of parts of naked bodies are projected, while a woman at the wall screams with a megaphone: ‘I dream my gender will disappear. I dream my nationality will disappear. I dream my blood will disappear. I dream my rights will disappear. I dream my worth will disappear. I dream my common sense will disappear. I dream my race will disappear. I dream my property will disappear. I dream my style will disappear. I dream my fear will disappear. I dream my duty will disappear. I dream my authority will disappear. I dream my power will disappear’. As the impressionistic opening of S/N successfully expresses, AIDS contributed to the acute sense of differences in Japanese society, and at the same time expanded the political scope of activism both based on, and militating against, differences in the 1990s.

2-2. A Male Homosexual Identity and AIDS Activism

\(^{24}\) For an analysis of his letter and dominant media discourses of AIDS in Japanese society, see Takeda (2009).

\(^{25}\) For a close analysis of Dumb Type’s series of works, see Neave (2001); Hood and Gendrich (2003).
While representations of AIDS are bound up with *foreignness* in Japanese society, the AIDS crisis contributed to the consummation of homosexual identity, both as a target of AIDS policy and as a new form of subjectivity in Japanese politics. On the one hand, homosexuals were distinctively categorised as a ‘risk group’ by the Japanese government just after the identification of the first person with AIDS in 1985. But on the other hand, according to Kawaguchi Kazuya and Kazama Takashi, a gay community comparable to those in European and North America was formed through the fight against AIDS (Kawaguchi and Kazama 2010, Chapter 1).

Kawaguchi and Kazama discuss how an identity of the homosexual was targeted by the Japanese AIDS policy. For example, they refer to the classification of infection routes by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in Japan:

In this scheme ‘male homosexuality’ stands out in comparison with the other categories since without ‘contact’ appended – as is done in the case of heterosexual contacts – it refers to an *identity* called ‘male homosexuality’ based on sexual orientation while the other four items suggest some kind of ‘behaviour’ (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997: 124-127). (Kawaguchi and Kazama 2003, p. 181)

Since male homosexual *identity* itself is constructed as a risk factor, the AIDS phenomenon serves to stigmatise male homosexuality in Japan. The authors call the stigmatisation of male homosexuality through AIDS the ‘gaying of AIDS’ (Kawaguchi and Kazama 2003, p. 185; Kazama 1997).

In such discursive construction of the male homosexual *identity* as a risk factor, with the emphasis on anal sex and prolific sexual activity, representations of male homosexuals were associated with the image of death (Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent 1997, pp. 124-149; Kazama 1997, 2003). Noting that research into HIV contact among MSM (Men who have Sex with Men) Groups characterised the passive penetrated role of homosexual men in anal sex as ‘a destructive form of sex, leading to death by AIDS’ (Kawaguchi and Kazama 2003, p. 190), they argue that the ‘passive’ homosexual role was considered fatal because men playing the ‘female role’ threatened gender roles in heteronormative society. Thus, in their argument, through the AIDS phenomenon, a homosexual identity essentially different from others was constructed and portrayed as destructive not only to their own lives but also to the heteronormative gender order in society.
Hence, in the argument of Kawaguchi and Kazama on AIDS and male homosexuality in the late 1980s and 1990s, the problematisation of homosexuality in Japanese society departed from that of Togo Ken in the 1970s, as I argued in Chapter 2. Firstly, a male homosexual identity was constituted as a risk factor by Japanese governmental AIDS policy and by AIDS research, with homosexuals being treated differently from various groups of heterosexuals. Since, as Kawaguchi and Kazama note, such a categorisation of homosexuals always focuses on their (risky) sexual activities, a homosexual identity refers not to psychological identity or identification with specific cultures but, rather, to their sexual orientation and high probability of infection with HIV/AIDS. Within this perspective, they had to face the individualisation of male homosexuality through the AIDS panic in Japan. By contrast, Togo insisted that all men have homosexual desire, so his argument did not posit distinct differences between homosexual and heterosexual men at the level of desire. In his politics, the social space where people belong and the sense of shame function so as to differentiate okama, or feminised homosexual men, from ‘normal’ people.

Secondly, between Togo’s discourse of okama on the one hand and analysis of the AIDS panic on the other, a significant shift occurs in the discourse surrounding the gender deviance of male homosexuals. In Togo’s thoughts, femininity and the sexualisation of homosexual men are crucial factors in their shame and debasement, but such shame and debasement still dwelt in the Japanese hierarchy, signifying the opposite pole of the Emperor’s honour. Reflecting his political ideas, Togo’s political style had become akin to class struggles, although he rather focused on sexuality and emotions than on economic injustice. Therefore, Togo thought that he, as an object of discrimination, could represent other ‘weak’ people politically, including sexualised women, such as prostitutes and lesbians, as the communists could do for the working class. However, male homosexuals as represented during the AIDS panic are isolated by their ‘particular’ sexual behaviour: anal sex. According to Kawaguchi and Kazama, anal sex, especially in its passive form, was regarded as a sign of gender subversion, while this gender subversion, in turn, represented homosexuals’ fatal threat to their own lives. Although foreign female sex workers were stigmatised by AIDS, they were seen as threatening ‘ordinary’ people in society, but not marked as engaging in ‘strenuous sexual activity’ like male homosexuals (Kazama 1997, p. 413). Thus, a male homosexual identity is visualised and isolated as an AIDS risk category, with homosexuals essentially differentiated from other groups in Japanese society through the AIDS panic.
Kawaguchi and Kazama regard the isolation of homosexuals in Japanese society as an aspect of repression. They consider that even the absence of laws banning homosexual conduct, and of religious pronouncements against homosexuality, is one of the difficulties that homosexuals have faced in Japan.

There are no laws in Japan similar to those prohibiting sodomy in the West, nor are there clear religious bans on homosexuality. However, this does not mean that Japanese society tolerates homosexuality without any discrimination. Rather, the problem lies in the fact that there is no clear or obvious homosexual ‘object’ of prohibition. If, as Foucault (1987) has said, ‘prohibition’ or the ‘prohibition of desire’ generates its objects and if bans invite resistance, then Japanese society offers no locus for homosexuals’ resistance. Under these circumstances, individual homosexuals have been isolated and placed in contexts where it is difficult for them to organise or form groups. (Kawaguchi and Kazama 2003, p. 190)

However, as Kazama (1997) observed, the homophobia and isolation imposed on homosexuals by the AIDS panic have also constructed a new political subjectivity of homosexuals. In the year following the discovery of the first person with AIDS, OCCUR, Ugoku Gei to Rezubian no Kai (Organisation for Moving Gays and Lesbians) was founded by gay youth, who were still teenagers. OCCUR has been considered the most successful of all Japanese gay organisations (McLelland 2005, p. 177). Its early purposes were to build movements on social issues and provide support for gay youth. These purposes reflected a reaction against the older generations of homosexuals, the group’s activist rationale being expressed as follows: ‘We are going to practice a new mode of life and movements for avoiding the failures and pains of our predecessors who could not live as a gei (gay)’ (Kazama 1997, p. 412). The word gei (gay) supposedly points to a new, positive identity, differentiated from okama or homo, the popular Japanese words referring to male homosexuals at that time. For instance, Kawaguchi writes:

At the beginning of the 1980s the requisite elements for being able to identify as ‘gay’ were comparatively few; of course today the number of people who identify themselves as ‘gay’ is large but I think that 20 years ago, as you’d expect, it seems that almost no-one did so. Rather, most people around me claimed to be ‘okama’ or ‘homo’; and if you asked older people about the word ‘gay’ [they said] it connoted ‘gay boys’ or ‘those people who dress as women and work in the bar world’, it seemed difficult to take on gay as an identity. (Kawaguchi 2003, p. 146)

26 I followed Mark McLelland’s translation in this citation (McLelland 2005, p. 175).
Thus, with reference to Foucault’s famous interview suggesting that being gay is a new paradigm of a way of life (Foucault 2000), Kawaguchi insists that being ‘gay’ is a political project by male homosexuals in Japan (Kawaguchi 1997).

OCCUR members regarded the emergence of a gay identity and the activism based on it as constituting the first gay activism in Japan. Kazama writes: ‘The political discourses of homosexuals have rarely existed in Japan before AIDS’ (Kazama 1997, p. 412). Similarly, McLelland cites OCCUR’s statement: ‘The Japanese lesbian and gay movement did not begin in any real sense until the late 1980s, more than fifteen years after Stonewall’ (McLelland 2005, p. 180). These comments can be interpreted as showing ignorance or dismissal of earlier activists, including Togo Ken and the lesbian groups of the 1970s and 1980s, as Mark McLelland suggests (McLelland 2005, p. 180). Thus, his historical investigation is apt to focus on sexual politics before the emergence of AIDS politics, insisting how rich the sexual politics in Japan used to be before the emergence of ‘American’ influenced gay activism. At the same time, however, the view of the emergence of gay identity and the activism based on it as the first gay activism in Japan indicates the discontinuity of political consciousness and contexts of homosexuality in Japan before and after the AIDS epidemic. For example, Togo tried to represent the people in the underground world politically, as it is supposedly the space in which homosexuals live, consisting of bars and the sex industry, but activists in OCCUR saw the emergence of male homosexuals from the confines of the sexual world as an important political project. The presumptions and meaning of ‘politics’ shift dramatically between the discourses of Togo and OCCUR.

As the impact of AIDS in Japanese society redefines the necessity and meaning of gay politics, the AIDS epidemic has affected the historical perspective on Japanese sexual politics too. For example, McLelland’s view on Japanese gay activism is well reflected by the discursive changes caused by AIDS in Japan. While he evaluates sexual politics, especially of Togo, before the AIDS epidemic as ‘indigenous’ (McLelland 2005, p. 180), or the one rooted in Japanese society and history, he analyses gay politics that

27 As Kazama writes, ‘Another purpose [of OCCUR] was a support for isolated gay youth. It arose from their own experiences of suffering disadvantage in gay neighbourhoods in terms of age, social status and economic power’ (Kazama 1997, p. 412). They were not downgrading the homosexual night cultures, but rather criticising the hegemony in the night culture and seeing it as part of homophobia in Japanese culture.
accents gay identity after the AIDS epidemic as the one influenced by American activism (*ibid.*, pp. 174-180). It is not hard to see the influences of AIDS in Japanese society; on the one hand, AIDS individualised and isolated gay male people as a different category from the others, consolidating gay identity marked by the fear of AIDS; on the other hand, in Japan, AIDS is tied to foreignness, especially in US society. Through the metaphors attached to AIDS, the representations of gay men after the AIDS panic have become individualised and signifying something ‘outside of Japan’, in many cases, ‘America’.

2-3. AIDS and Lesbian Politics

The AIDS panic affected lesbian political identity as well. In the atmosphere of hysteria, the bill setting out the AIDS Prevention Law was widely opposed by gay groups who criticised its homophobia and discriminatory policies, by feminist groups who criticised its discrimination against women and foreigners, and by groups of haemophiliacs who were already suffering discrimination in clinics, schools and workplaces. Even though lesbian activists were not as publically prominent in AIDS activism as other groups in Japan, Iino Yuriko (2008) focuses on lesbian people committed to opposing the AIDS Prevention bill.

Iino (2008) analyses the newsletters of Regumi Studio, the first lesbian organisation in Japan, the character of their discussions of the bill, and their manner of interpreting the AIDS crisis as a problem for lesbians, even though lesbians were regarded as the group least at risk of AIDS infection. Iino points out three ‘stories’ through which the AIDS crisis was interpreted as a lesbian problem. In the first one, the AIDS Prevention Bill was seen as targeting male homosexuals and female sex workers, who thus faced AIDS both as women and as homosexuals. The second account offered a narrative of HIV/AIDS as a problem of sexuality, in this sense criticising the government’s policy on AIDS as negating independent female sexuality. In this story, HIV/AIDS is essentially a problem for them as women. The third story understands AIDS as a problem of life and sexuality, and regards the Japanese government’s action as normalising people’s lives only within heteronormative, monogamous relations. In this discourse, Iino argues, life and sexuality are viewed as something actively and autonomously created by each person, each form of which, although not necessarily successful, must be respected as part of the process of self-creation, however ‘imperfect’ it may seem (Iino 2008, pp. 168-170). This story, Iino notes, is not distinct from the others but is rather the fundamental one on which
the other stories implicitly rely. Iino’s study shows how lesbian people have adopted the social issues connected with AIDS and others’ lives as their own problem, related to their identity and lives, despite not seeming so on the surface.

While AIDS strengthened the sense of boundaries among Japanese people, it also forced gay and lesbian people to rethink their identity, politics, and lives. In the following sections, I shall investigate how new notions of gay and lesbian identity have generated new activism and political theory concerning sexual minorities in Japan.

3. Facing Discrimination and New Styles of Activism

3-1. Fuchu seinen no ie Trial

In 1991, OCCUR sued the Tokyo metropolitan government over the decision to refuse the group the use of public facilities for its residential seminars. This event is known as the *Fuchu seinen no ie Trial* and is considered the first trial to promote ‘gay rights’ in Japan, ensuring the recognition of sexual orientation and identity as an aspect of human rights (Kazama and Kawaguchi 2010, Chapter 2; Fujitani 2008; Lunsing 2005).

This trial was brought about by harassment of OCCUR members at *Fuchu seinen no ie*, a public facility of the Tokyo metropolitan government. Kazama, a member of OCCUR, describes what happened when they used the public facility in Fuchu, a city in Tokyo (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997, Chapter 3). In February 1990, OCCUR held a study camp at *Fuchu seinen no ie*. In the public facility, there was an interactive meeting among leaders of groups sharing the facility, with a Christian group, a university choral society, and a primary school football association, along with OCCUR, participating in it. After the interactive meeting, members of OCCUR started to suffer various types of harassment by members of the other groups. For example, when OCCUR members used the public bath, some people from other groups came along to take a look; they knocked on the door of the meeting room when OCCUR members were using it for studying; other residents called out ‘They are homos’ when members of OCCUR passed by in the corridor; at breakfast, people shouted ‘homo’ and ‘okama’, and then laughed.

Kazama wrote that the members of OCCUR had to learn that those reactions against them constituted harassment and that they should get angry about them:

At the beginning, two members, who were high school students at that time, were looked at in the public bathroom. They didn't tell it to other members. Not a few
of us have grown up habitually with the words ‘homo’ and ‘okama’ since childhood. As being bullied and ridiculed was a part of everyday affairs for us, we have come to regard this kind of behaviour as not something to talk to somebody or get angry about. After they were called “homo” by the members of the Christian group again when they were passing that night, then, for the first time, they reported that they were ridiculed as ‘homo’. (…)

We talked about how to deal with these harassments till midnight. At this time, each member expressed a range of opinions. Although some members were furious, associating this incident with their own past of being bullied with the word ‘okama’, these were in a small minority. Some said that a series of harassments was caused by their ‘ignorance’ and negative information about homosexuality so that we could not accuse only them of their behaviour. Some members were even shocked to realise that there was a choice of ‘being angry’ about harassments because these were already a part of their life. (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997, 173-174)

As Kazama describes members’ reactions at that time, their activism, aimed at overcoming their hesitation over resisting harassment in public, focused on questioning the knowledge of homosexuality in Japan, as well as trying to construct a ‘gei (gay)’ identity, which would allow homosexuals to get angry about the injustice towards them in Japanese society. Members of OCCUR decided to talk to the other groups that had harassed them. However, at the meeting, a leader of the Christian group started to quote the Bible’s prohibition against same-sex intercourse, and declared that homosexuals were morally wrong. Even though they tried to oppose this statement, the staff of the public facility intervened in the argument and indirectly supported the Christian group.

One month later, OCCUR demanded a meeting with a director of the public facility, who had not been there when the incidents of harassment had taken place, and asked for the directors’ view on discrimination against homosexuals taking place in the public facility, as well as their plans for preventing such discrimination in future. The director’s answer was the opposite of what they had expected. The director read a statement to the members of OCCUR, saying, firstly, that what had happened in the facility was not discrimination against homosexuals but a kind of prank; secondly, that as the facility was an educational institution for healthy young people, and as OCCUR was a group of homosexuals who could create trouble with other groups, OCCUR was refused any further use of the facility. The director explained, citing an encyclopaedia, that it was inappropriate for homosexuals to occupy the facility, since the definition of ‘homosexuality’ made reference to sexual conduct, which was prohibited in the facility. He asked the members of OCCUR whether they had practised in real life what the
encyclopaedia described. At the trial it would later be asked whether or not the director’s statement, based on lack of knowledge about homosexuality, was slander.

After suing the Tokyo metropolitan government, OCCUR held a press briefing to present their view and to distribute leaflets explaining their activities, including activity against stereotypical images of homosexuals in the mass media. However, national networks reporting the trial called them ‘homo’ or ‘okama’, the words that had offended them in the public facility; for example, some news media called OCCUR ‘Organisation for Moving Homos and Lesbians’ or ‘Organisation for Moving Gays and Lezzies’, not ‘Organisation for Moving Gays and Lesbians’, while another reported that okama were suing the Tokyo metropolitan government for their rights (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997, 207-211).

In the 1990s, some members of OCCUR, including Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent, who published the book *Gay Studies*, started to theorise the way in which heterosexism and homophobia function in Japanese society, as revealed by the *Fuchu seinen no ie* episode. Thus, while pursuing the trial, they targeted their activities at various sectors of society. Firstly, they urged publishers of dictionaries and encyclopaedias to remove the definition of ‘homosexuality’ as ‘one of abnormal sexuality’, which had been used in the decision to ban OCCUR’s use of the facility and in the defence of that decision in the trial. Secondly, they appealed to the mass media to abandon discriminatory words and stereotypes of sexual minorities. Thirdly, they tried to inculcate positive knowledge about homosexuality through the introduction of Gay Studies in Japanese academia.

Both the Tokyo District Court and the Tokyo Court of Appeal ruled for OCCUR, agreeing that refusing the group the use of public facilities infringed the rights of homosexuals. In particular, the ruling of the Tokyo Court of Appeal acknowledged that the government should protect the rights of minorities, including homosexuals, and that lack of knowledge or ignorance of the issue did not excuse people from the duty to respect human rights. After the ruling of the Tokyo Court of Appeal in 1997, the Tokyo metropolitan government withdrew a further appeal to the Supreme Court and the decision of the Tokyo Court of Appeal became final.

3-2. Westernised Activism?

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28 For close analysis of the judges’ verdict, see Fujitani (2008).
The activism of OCCUR is regarded as an example of the Westernised gay and lesbian movements in Japan, especially among scholars outside Japan (Altman 2001, p. 97). According to Altman, ‘Westernisation’ or ‘globalisation’ of sexuality primarily means the emergence of ‘gay/lesbian’ identity:

Globalisation has helped create an international gay/lesbian identity, which is by no means confined to the western world: there are many signs of what we think of as ‘modern’ homosexuality in countries such as Brazil, Costa Rica, Poland, and Taiwan. (Altman 2001, p.86)

Following Altman’s view, many scholars who are interested in the ‘Westernisation’ of sexuality in Japan focus on the role of gay identity in OCCUR’s activism and among Japanese people (McLelland 2000).

McLelland (2005) criticises OCCUR’s identity politics based on the identity of cisgendered people as, according to McLelland, it alienated other queer communities, especially transgender people. Since, for McLelland, ‘queer’ in Japan apparently refers to gender deviance or transgender people, especially in the sex industry, he criticises ‘gay identity’ outside of night culture, which embodies the normative male gender, in response to an OCCUR member’s comment that he was a man:

OCCUR’s tactic of presenting lesbians and gay men as ‘normal’ in their interactions with official bodies, such as the law courts and government agencies, has resulted in alienating broad sections of the queer community. OCCUR member Niimi Hiroshi’s testament that he was ‘completely male (kanzenna otoko)’, in a 1991 interview with the women’s magazine Josei sebun (Lunsing 1999:312), while understandable given the transgender connotations that gei had long held, did little to recommend that organisation to Japan’s large transgender community, let alone to senior figures like Togo Ken who continue to identify with the indigenous category of okama and embody queer desire in a much more confronting manner than the salaryman persona adopted by more recent gay activists. (McLelland 2005, p. 180)

Although McLelland knows that there was a masculine model of homosexuality in Japan, such as that presented by Mishima Yukio, and that a transgender man can describe himself as ‘completely male’ as well, he regards the gay identity adopted by OCCUR as a ‘foreign identity category’ and a mode of ‘homonormativity’:

Organisations that, like ILGA Japan and OCCUR, have taken a prescriptive, ‘hard-line’ approach to gay and lesbian identity can be seen as promoting a mode
of ‘homonormativity’ (Duggan 2003) that is at odds with Japan’s well-established queer community, within which transgender identity and performance has a long history. (McLelland 2005, p. 180)

In Duggan’s definition of new homonormativity, the term refers to the new neoliberal sexual politics in the US, which ‘does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institution, but upholds and sustains them, while promising the possibility of a demobilised gay constituency and a privatised, depoliticised gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption’ (Duggan 2005, p. 50). Since OCCUR has questioned dominant Japanese heteronormative assumptions and institutions in a political manner, it is inaccurate to call OCCUR’s activism ‘homonormativity’ in Duggan’s sense. However, McLelland still labels their image as one of homonormativity, accenting their masculine gay identity, far from the transgender manner that he suggests the ‘Japanese queer’ must demonstrate. It is notable that, when he criticises the masculine identity of gay politics in the 1980s, he emphasises transgender cultures in the Japanese ‘queer’ community; Japanese ‘indigenous’ queerness is represented by gender fluidity. On the other hand, when McLelland criticises Eurocentric views in Anglophone academic discourses, which regard Japanese ‘queers’ as being backward in comparison to those in Anglophone society, he mentions Japan’s tradition of samurai same-sex conduct, which is masculine and male-centric as well (McLelland 2005, p. 5). Here, the distinctions of West/Japan, masculine/feminine or gender separatist/integrative not only define the critical discourses (against Japanese masculine gay politics in the 1980s or Eurocentrism in Anglophone academic discourses), but also constitute a double bind against Japanese sexual minority politics. Even though they formed their politics in context of Japanese society, against the heteronormativity of Japanese society, their politics is judged on whether it’s influenced by the West or not, or whether it looks ‘Japanese queer’ enough or not.

Wim Lunsing (2005) also argues that OCCUR’s strategy in the courts has been strongly influenced by mainstream American gay movements.

The definition of homosexuality the court now uses is borrowed from U.S. mainstream gay movements, referring to it as a sexual orientation (seiteki shiko) inherent to particular individuals, which signifies a departure from existing Japanese constructions. The goal of this definition, as in the United States, is to stress that gay men (Occur hardly discusses lesbians, even though their English name is Organization for Lesbian and Gay Movement) identify themselves on intrinsic qualities rather than external actions. (Lunsing 2005, p. 144)
Thus, he negatively evaluates OCCUR’s legal achievement of ‘a legal definition of male homosexuality’ (Lunsing 2005, p. 144) created for the first time in Japan, compared to an earlier law, which existed for a brief period in Japan and similarly mentions homosexuals, namely the Sodomy law (Keikan-zai). Lunsing suggests that the activism of OCCUR marks the emergence of a homosexual identity in Japanese society, along with the discursive shift in society towards regarding ‘homosexuality not so much as something personified in particular individuals, but rather as an activity in which people may or may not engage’ (Lunsing 2005, p. 144).

Lunsing’s narrative, which detects the birth of the homosexual identity and a new stage in the Westernisation of Japan, not surprisingly, echoes Foucault’s famous, and very popular, assertion of the birth of homosexuals in the middle of the nineteenth century:

As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts. (…) The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. (Foucault 1978, p. 43)

If we consider Foucault’s schematic model of the history of sexuality in Western Europe to be applicable to Japanese society in the 1990s, as Lunsing implicitly does, we would be neglecting historical facts about the course of sexuality in Japan. It is not simply that, as Kazama (1997) argues, the construction of a homosexual identity fundamentally different from that of heterosexuals began with the reaction against AIDS in Japanese society in the 1980s. Historians observe that the idea of homosexuality, which is exactly what Foucault considers the birth of homosexuals (Foucault 1978, p. 43), was introduced and translated in Japan in the 1890s and had its influence on society (Pflugfelder 1999, p. 175; Frushtuck 2003, pp. 69-70). Apart from the fact that, according to historical research, the date of the ‘birth of homosexuality’ in the Foucauldian sense in Japan was not so different from that in Western Europe, the narrative in Foucault’s impressionistic scheme, progressing from ‘sodomy as an act’ to ‘homosexuality as an identity’, was often used in describing OCCUR’s activism, which emphasises the group’s gay identity.

What is notable here is that even though Foucault does not argue that the ‘birth of homosexuals’ refers to ‘the birth of gay activism based on their identity’, but rather that it referred to the emergence of énoncé, or new knowledge and thematisation of
sexuality in *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault’s narrative is still utilised to criticise OCCUR’s activism in insisting upon their gay identity in Japanese society. Thus, the question here is not whether OCCUR’s activism signals the birth of homosexuality in the Foucauldian sense. Rather, the question I want to pose is: what can Foucault’s narrative, which discusses European society in the nineteenth century, mean when scholars of sexuality use it to describe Japanese society in the 1990s?

Firstly, the application to contemporary Japanese society of a narrative analysing nineteenth-century European society creates the impression that Japanese society is over a hundred years behind in modernisation, or alternately that it is a unique society that has eluded the influence of ‘Western’ modernisation. This amounts to a kind of fetishising of Japanese ‘native’ culture, differentiated from that of the ‘West’.

Secondly, as Lunsing uses the words ‘borrowed from U.S. mainstream gay movements’ (Lunsing 2005, p. 144) in regard to OCCUR’s gay identity, the US or the West emerges as the model of sexual identity, to the neglect both the agency of Japanese people who embrace identity politics, and the effects of ‘translations’ of gay identity stemming from the United States or the West. Although cultural translations always depend on cultural contexts, and can thus produce new meanings, the interculturality of gay identity is easily overlooked. Doing so amounts to Western superiority and an attempt to secure it.

Thirdly, the valuation of ‘acts’ over ‘identity’ without considering political contexts in other cultures effectively extinguishes the subjectivity of same-sex activities in those cultures, while sustaining their (sexual) identity as persons from the West. In Foucault’s argument, identification or subjection through sexuality characterises the modern power of the West; however, avoiding identification does not always result in liberation from such power, because, according to Foucault, modern power functions through medical institutions and knowledge, education, the military and the family as well. Even so, since the Foucauldian idea of power analyses the network of power from a holistic viewpoint, we cannot simply address ‘lack of sexual identity’ without considering how power works in society. However, the ‘lack of sexual identity’ in Japanese society is often discussed positively, with reliance on Foucault’s passage unaccompanied by detailed research into the structure of Japanese society, corresponding to Foucault’s investigation in the European context. Diana Kho (2010) points out that such discourses construct ‘Western sexual identity’ rather than referring to the ‘lack of Japanese sexual identity’.
An alternative way to think about these assertions of unstable identities and meanings is to consider instead ‘the West’, as arguments of instability and queerness are made with reference to a coherent ‘Western sexual identity’. In other words, rather than disputing that identity is fragmented and unstable in Japan, I’d contend that in these studies the coherence and stability of identity in the West are exaggerated and ahistorical. (Khor 2010, p.51)

Through trying to prohibit the construction of sexual identity, reducing same-sex culture in Japan into mere ‘acts’, while sustaining a stable Western sexual identity, Japan will become the place where people from the West can enjoy same-sex conduct consisting merely of ‘acts’, without worrying about politics. In other words, Japan will be where ‘the (male) (homo)sexual paradise’ (Khor 2010, p. 53) exists. Thus, although discourses that evaluate the lack of sexual identity and criticise identity politics in Japan as imitating the West seem to be following Foucault, they rarely deal with questions of power or social hegemony as Foucault did. Rather, these discourses offer a touristic gaze towards other cultures; they appreciate and consume differences as if they were exactly what they expect, and if not, they can openly express their disappointment.

Finally, the dualisms of Japan and the West, pre-modern and modern, indigenous and foreign identity, oversimplify the discourses and political phenomena of sexual politics in Japan. Discussions of whether gay identity is indigenous or not, or whether Japanese gay politics in the 1990s is borrowed from the American politics or not, aim to trace the origins of identity and sexual politics. If, however, results and effects are also important for understanding politics, these discussions are not only inadequate but misleading.

Interestingly, feminism in Japan has suffered from the same discursive concentration on the dualism of East and West. Ueno Chizuko (1994) points out how Orientalism undermines female discourses in Japan:

Feminism in Japan has been under cultural pressure to argue at a distance from Western thought to prove that it is not an imported idea from the West. However, since the East is already female from the viewpoint of the West, the male discourses in Japan, insisting that they were female since antiquity, try to destroy the female discourses of feminism. For example, men strongly insist that women don't have to be stronger because they have already been strong enough through the ages, and that Japan was, at the beginning, the country which professed the ancestral goddess, Amaterasu-Omikami. The discourse of ‘the mother Emperor’ is a version of this idea. (Ueno 1994, p. 188)
Orientalism emphasises the feminised male figure ironically but, quite predictably, obstructs politically feminist discourses as well.

This narrative not only fails to consider Japanese social factors regarding the cultures and activism of social minorities, but also constructs fixed oppositional models of ‘Japanese’ and ‘Western’ culture. Such a narrative itself, however, indicates a new stage of globalisation of the identities and activities of sexual minorities: now, it is not only medical or scientific discourses, but also discourses of Cultural Studies or Queer Studies that, in effect, can set norms of sexuality, although their political agenda is externally ‘anti-normalisation’. Therefore, in the following sections, I will analyse discourses of gay politics in Japan in the 1990s, how they considered homophobia in Japanese society, and their strategy against it, focusing on their political contexts and effects on the community and society rather than discussing their gay identity as either Japanese or ‘foreign’.

4. Theorisation of Homophobia and Gay Identity in Japan

4-1. Project of Theorising Homophobia and Politics of Anti-homophobia in Gei Studies

In 1997, Kawagushi Kazuya, Kazama Takashi, and Keith Vincent published the first academic volume of Gay Studies in Japan, entitled Gei Studies (Gay Studies). Their aim was to analyse homophobia and the logic of exclusion of homosexuals in Japanese society, as revealed by the Fuchu seinen no ie trial, and to establish an academic discipline countering homophobia in Japan. Their work mainly analyses the discourses of the Tokyo metropolitan government as utilised in the trial, with critical reference to the achievements of Gay Studies in the United States since the 1980s. Thus, their work is not simply an academic discourse ‘imported’ from the West. Rather, this book, at least for their purposes, was an ambitious work aimed at analysing homophobia in Japan and criticising the structure of Japanese society: it was an attempt to establish Gay Studies consistent with their view of activism in Japan.

In the Fuchu seinen no ie trial, the Tokyo metropolitan government insisted that their decision to deny the use of the public facility for an educational purpose by homosexual groups was legitimate, since sexual affairs might be taking place if homosexuals were staying in the same room. According to the Tokyo metropolitan government, it was equivalent to the situation of male and female students occupying the
same room, which is prohibited by the rules of a public facility used for educational purposes. In other words, for the Tokyo metropolitan government, homosexuals can be excluded from the public facility since they subvert the proper boundary between the public, which must be asexual space, and the private, which can entail sexual involvement.

Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent argue that the separation in Japanese society between the public and private realms amounts to the structural oppression of homosexuals (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997; Kazama 2002). According to them, the separation between the public and private realms constitutes a privilege of heterosexuals: their sexual affairs are protected as private while, in the public space, their relationships are respected through the system of marriage. In the case of homosexuality, however, the identity of homosexuals is regarded as sexual, which must be a private matter, so that homosexuals in Japan are not offered an opportunity to talk about problems related to their sexuality, including their relationships, in the public space. Vincent points out that the definition of the private itself is different for heterosexuals and homosexuals. The private, for a heterosexual, means the privilege of choosing not to talk about her/his sexual life; for homosexuals, by contrast, the private functions so as to deny them opportunities to talk about their relationships and identity in society (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997, pp. 93-94). They insist that homosexuals are forced into the ‘private’ realm, which functions as the closet within society, and cannot exist as social and political beings as long as they accept the unequal definitions of the private and public as applied to heterosexuals and homosexuals.

In addition, Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent criticise the gay community for not trying to develop an overtly political gay identity in Japanese society. According to them, ‘gay identity’ does not always mean something associated with exclusion, as criticism of identity politics suggests. They distinguish between an identity and a category: while defining ‘category’ as functioning to fix meanings, they defend ‘identity’ as a political project that can change in specific social contexts. Vincent writes, ‘identities gain their meaning in contexts of specific struggles’ (Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997, p. 68) and ‘the meaning of being gay can change in the process of making theory as a gay’ (ibid., p. 63). Therefore, they define ‘gay identity’ as a political agency that emerges through networks of social context, cultural theory of society and political struggles. It is important that, according to the definition in this book, ‘gay identity’ is not something one can borrow from other cultures, as McLelland (2005) and Lunsing (2005) suggest.
Thus, in asking why a political identity had not emerged in Japan despite the many critical theories, including Gay and Lesbian Studies as well as Queer Theory, that have been translated in Japanese society in the 1990s, they examine the Japanese situation that obstructs the constitution of gay identity as an element of heterosexism, a political ideology in Japan. Firstly, they criticise the Japanese academic system, which accepts foreign theories through de-politicisation: even though all theory subsists in political backgrounds and social contexts, the Japanese academic system functions by removing political aspects and lived experience from theories once they are accepted.

In Japan, as if a museum safely displays them as a part of an exhibition, theories are commercialised and consumed so that people can continue to live the same as before. To keep theories inside the walls of the museum means to insulate the theories from life and politics. Even though the theories are insulated from politics as a part of an ‘exhibition’, such activity does not become objective and apolitical. Rather, it is a quite political action. (Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent 1997, p. 70)

One of the queer theorists who was accepted through de-politicisation, they argue, was Michel Foucault. They insist that Foucault’s scepticism about the liberation of the subject, which he called the repressive hypothesis (Foucault 1977), is utilised to undermine the political discourses of minorities and functions so as to drown out the voices of homosexuals in Japan. Although the theories were originally born to resist the hegemony, they work for the hegemony when they are translated and accepted by Japanese society.

Secondly, they suggest that the strong national identity of people as ‘Japanese’ interferes with possession of a gay identity, that is, the identity of a social and political minority (Kawaguchi, Tasaki and Vincent 1995, pp. 26-27; Kazama, Kawaguchi, and Vincent 1997, pp. 155-161). They analyse the essay on Derek Jarman by Fushimi Noriaki, the first popular and openly gay writer, arguing how the issue of Japanese gay identity turns into the issue of Japanese identity as contrasted with ‘foreigners’ and ‘foreign cultures’, which are often regarded as presenting ‘authentic’ gayness and gay culture. As the strong and fundamental identity is a national one for Japanese people, as ‘Japanese’, it is difficult to develop a minority identity that challenges the hegemony in Japanese society, while at the same time, they note, political discourses of minority groups can also turn into xenophobic ones.

Their strategy, both for opposing the heteronormative separation between the public and private realms and for constituting gay identity, is ‘coming out’. In a society
that is ‘tolerant’ towards homosexuality and has not criminalised homosexual conduct, homosexual men can enjoy these benefits as long as they stay in the closet. However, the authors argue, once a homosexual man comes out of the closet, the gay agent starts to emerge as a political and social one, since the difference between heterosexuality and homosexuality is made clear to society. They define ‘coming out’ as the ritualised moment for gay identity and as a political tool against heteronormative society: ‘Coming out is essentially to redefine the distinction between the public and the private, and through the process of such redefinition, the gay agent will emerge’ (Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent 1997, p. 95). Thus, within their Gay Theory, coming out is an essential weapon of resistance to heteronormative society, exposing the unfair system of segregation of the public and private realms that excludes gay men, and allowing the constitution of a gay identity in the form of the political agent that demands social reformation.

4-2. Coming Out or Not, That is the Question

Following this theorisation of coming out both as political resistance and as constituting the gay political agent, coming out became an important subject for Gay Studies in Japan. Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s argument was not the first to discuss coming out in Japan. For example, Fushimi Noriaki published Private gay life in 1991 as an openly gay man and Kakefuda Hiroko, as an openly lesbian woman, wrote “Rezubian” de aru to iu koto (To be “lesbian”)’ in 1992. In articles and books by activists – especially in the early 1990s – coming out has been regarded as something positive for gays and lesbians, constructing new relationships with others and society, as well as with themselves (Ito 1993; Oishi 1995; Sunagawa and Ryoji 2007). However, their insistence on the importance of gay identity and coming out with reference to academic achievements in the US was very influential, especially among young scholars who were also interested in Gay Studies and had read Queer Theory, which, as they interpreted it, was against identity politics. Those who were influenced by Queer Theory were sceptical about the political functions of coming out as asserted by Kazama, Kawaguchi and Vincent.

Kaneda Tomoyuki (2003) points out that, on the basis of interviews with gay men, they can be visibly a sexual minority to their friends even though they have not ‘come out’ in speech. Kaneda writes, ‘In some cases, one does not have to come out to express their sexuality and if one can sustain their social relations, coming out does not necessarily become the central problem in their social life’ (Kaneda 2003, p. 71).
According to him, in actual Japanese gay life, coming out is not utilised for a political purpose but reserved for intimate human relationships, so that the choice of whether or not to describe one’s sexuality to friends is determined by each relationship. What Kaneda demonstrates in his argument is that coming out does not necessarily redefine the public space but rather functions in private life as a practice within friendship.

Ino Shinichi (2005) criticises the strategy of coming out as ‘identity politics’. The problems with identity politics are: it imposes homogeneity within the identity while emphasising differences outside it (Ino 2005, p. 43); the identity politics of coming out is relevant to the ‘repression/liberation’ type of politics (ibid., p. 61); and it is impossible, for Ino, to see varied ways of coming out (ibid., p. 62). Ino regards Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s politics as problematic, since their gay identity can become a norm among gays.

Their argument about coming out is problematic for lesbians too. Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent analyse the distinction between the public and private realms in Japan as relevant to the distinctions between men and women, and between heterosexuality and homosexuality. In their analysis of Japanese society, gay men can be political through coming out because their gender and sexuality expose the unequal distinction between the public and private realms and its arbitrariness: on the one hand, their male gender is regarded as public in principle but, on the other hand, their sexuality must remain in the private realm. Therefore they can demand a change in this distinction through their public gender role, as men who have the right to be in public. Yet, in the case of lesbians, as both their gender and their sexuality are traditionally regarded as private, their coming out does not reveal the contradictions in society. Kakefuda had already insisted, in 1992, that it was more difficult for lesbians to come out than it was for gay males.

In fact, a woman is threatened with losing a lot if she comes out saying ‘I am a lesbian’. It is probably a far greater risk than for male homosexuals, because she is first a ‘woman’, and additionally she is a ‘lesbian’. Lesbians are discriminated against as ‘women’ in this society at first and then they are discriminated against as ‘homosexuals’. And such discriminations physically deprive lesbians of the power to come out. Even if there were no direct discrimination against lesbians, discrimination against ‘women’ is enough to make it difficult for lesbians to live as lesbians.

In the past one or two years, male homosexuals have come out one after another as a result of gay rights activism and started to fight in the court for their
rights. However, the circumstances of lesbians are not changing so much. (Kakefuda 1992, p. 201)

Their argument is clearly built on the privileges of male gender in Japanese society.

Horie Yuri (2008) also explores the difficulty for lesbians of coming out of the closet in Japanese society. Following Kakefuda, she argues that, for lesbians, coming out can create dissociation between their identity and social prejudices about lesbians, who have been portrayed in a pornographic light for heterosexual men. According to Kakefuda and Horie, lesbians coming out can be exploited as pornography for male heterosexuals, creating an obstacle to speaking as lesbians in society.

As seen from the above, the political effect of coming out has been frequently discussed in Gender and Sexuality Studies in Japan, initially as an academic discipline, until the mid-2000s. At the same time, however, gradually coming out is regarded as an apolitical act in the private realm outside academia. For example, there are comments about coming out in a queer magazine published in 2005:

Frankly speaking, nobody is following if I now call for coming out, and I feel slightly turned off about myself when talking about coming out. (Fushimi 2005, p. 129)

Talking about coming out, it is not about a social issue but only about an individual issue. It ends just as: ‘Coming out? Why don’t you do so if you want’? (Fushimi 2005, p. 129)

Citing these comments, Moriyama Noritaka (2012), a sociologist in Gay Studies, observes:

In the arguments about coming out in the 1990s as well, individuals who did not want to were not forced to come out. Now, however, coming out is regarded as a totally personal choice. The political background of coming out has stepped back in relation to personal choice, and the political reality among people has been completely withdrawn. The change in meaning of coming out from the 1990s to the present can be summarised as dismantling the meaning of coming out as a political project. (Moriyama 2012, pp. 136-137)

Therefore, when we survey the discourses of coming out in Japan between the 1990s and the 2000s, we see an interesting phenomenon emerging in Japanese gay politics: while people in academia actively discuss the political impact of coming out in society,
discourses regarding coming out as personal issue rather than a political project have gradually become influential and more mainstream.

5. Conclusion

The AIDS crisis in Japan redefines Japan as a heteronormative society in contrast to foreign society and represents homosexuality as something differentiated from ‘normal’ Japanese life, as well as something closely connected with foreignness. At the same time, however, the AIDS crisis and Japanese society’s reaction to it contributed to the development of homosexual identity as political agency. Thus, in regard to gay politics in Japan in the 1990s, as suggested by English-language queer studies focusing on Japan, the question of whether homosexual identity is indigenous, or whether it is imported from US mainstream gay activism, is an oversimplification. Rather, in terms of the effects of discourses, such a narrative retroactively recreates the ‘traditional sexuality’ of Japanese culture while constructing a fixed sexual identity in the West.

With regard to the relationship between gay identity and politics in Japanese society, the theorisation of Kawaguchi Kazuya, Kazama Takashi and Keith Vincent is innovative since their work is not only the first example of gay studies to analyse homophobia and heteronormative social structures in Japan, but also analyses the reasons why gay identity finds it difficult to be accepted in Japan, and points the way to resisting heterosexism. Their advocacy of gay identity and discussion of the political effects of coming out opened the door to academic debate within gender and sexual studies at the beginning of the academic institutionalisation of these fields in Japan. At the same time, the de-politicisation of coming out was taking place in Japan outside of academia. This discursive phenomenon indicates two facts: firstly, the same kinds of discourses of coming out have circulated both inside and outside academia but, secondly, the political meanings attached to the discourses can differ between the two realms.

In the next chapter, therefore, I will investigate why the same kinds of discourses about coming out can be perceived as ‘political’ in academic disciplines while being regarded as an apolitical, private issue outside of it, my focus being on political arguments both in academic discourses and in gay discourses outside academia.
Chapter 4: Politics of Tohjisha and Homonormativity in Japan

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I pointed out the phenomenon of similar discourses about coming out being considered ‘political’ in academic discussions, especially in the field of Gay Studies, while being regarded as ‘a totally personal choice’ and ‘the political reality among people has been completely withdrawn’ (Moriyama 2012, pp.136-137) in the ‘gay community’ outside academia. Observing discourses of the sexual politics of gay men in Japan in the late 1990s and 2000s, four characteristics can be found. Firstly, the fact that the same discourses have circulated in the academic world, among gay activists and in the community, does not mean that the discourses can function politically in the same way. Secondly, the heated arguments about gay politics taking place in Gay Studies have focused on the same topic from a political standpoint, for example, over gay people’s perceptions of coming out or identity. It is noteworthy that these ‘political’ disputes in Gay Studies arose at a time when the Japanese political environment was leaning towards conservatism over gender and sexuality issues, especially in the 2000s (Nozaki 2005; Wakakuwa and Fujimura-Fanselow 2011). Thus, there was political logic in the Japanese Gay Studies approach, in that discussion of gay people’s coming out, identity or community could be ‘political’ by contrast with discussion of the heteronormative, or conservative-leaning, Japanese society at that time. Thirdly, the ‘political’ discourses in academia have fallen into the ‘personal’ sphere and have been perceived as related to private matters in the gay community outside academia, even in the conservative-leaning society. Lastly, these discourses of gay men in Japan have revolved around questions of national identity, such as whether or not the ‘gay identity’ is rooted in ‘Western’ culture, and whether the activism style of OCCUR is similar to that of American gay politics.

In this chapter, I will discuss these discursive phenomena, focusing on the concept of Tohjisha in gay discourses. Despite frequent use of the term Tohjisha in Japanese gay discourses, as well as in other social minority studies and activism, neither Japanese Studies nor Gender and Sexuality Studies in English or Japanese have paid enough theoretical attention to this word/concept, with the remarkable exception of Mark McLelland’s study (McLelland 2009). The term Tohjisha, which means ‘the people who are directly concerned’, has been used in social minority activism to press their demands and insist on their political visibility since the 1970s, probably constituting a type of
activism comparable to the identity politics of US society. However, the term has acquired theoretical connotations, especially since academia adopted it for discussions and institutionalised minority studies, known as Tohjisha studies. Thus, I shall theoretically analyse discourses of both gay activism and academia in Japan.

Although the term Tohjisha has been employed within broader academic and political fields in Japan, including Disability Studies, Ethnicity Studies, Women’s Studies, Lesbian Studies and Gender Identity Disorder Studies, I will mainly focus on gay men-related discourses here, since the discourses in gay activism and academia fittingly represent the characteristics and problems of the political concept called Tohjisha.

2. Tohjisha and Academic Disciplines

2-1. The Political Meaning of Tohjisha

As McLelland (2009) points out, the word Tohjisha is frequently used both in sexual minority activism and academic discourses. According to a Japanese dictionary, Daijirin, the word Tohjisha means ‘the people who are directly concerned’. The word was, as McLelland notes, originally used in the field of Law, meaning ‘the people who are directly involved in the legal matter’, as differentiated from third parties. In the 1970s, this word was employed in various minority social movements, including women’s and disability rights movements, by those whose opinions and wishes had not been respected even in connection with issues directly affecting their bodies, lives and dignity (Nakanishi and Ueno 2003; Bethel’s house 2005). Thus, the term Tohjisha in minority activism and studies refers to ‘the person who is directly concerned’, with the implication that he or she must be respected since the topic is that person’s issue.

Nakanishi Shoji and Ueno Chizuko (2003) redefine Tohjisha in terms of academic knowledge and politics, including Women’s Studies, Lesbian and Gay Studies, and Disability Studies. Nakanishi and Ueno regard the institutionalisation of Women’s Studies as a good example of Tohjisha studies (Nakanishi and Ueno 2003, pp.15-17). As

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29 As the word Tohjisha can refer to an actual person as well as to a theoretical concept, it has become a very complicated or, rather, confusing term even for a Japanese native speaker. In this chapter, I will distinguish between the term in its objective sense, referring only to the actual people, called tohjisha, and its usage as a subject or theoretical concept, called Tohjisha.
Women’s Studies change the woman from an object of knowledge to the subject of research, Tohjisha reconfigures a traditional system of knowledge: Tohjisha (women), not male specialists, know best about tohjisha (women). The idea that the topics related to tohjisha-people should be researched by Tohjisha challenges traditional academia, which is both specialist-centric and objectivist, and which tries to exclude any subjective views. Nakanishi and Ueno regard the objectivism of traditional academia as harmful when considering social minorities and discrimination, since traditional specialists have contributed to the existing order of society in the name of neutrality and objectivity.

Tohjisha studies, the academic discourses and theories reflecting tohjisha’s experiences and voices, challenges the hegemonic institutions of traditional education and aims at social reformation. Nakanishi and Ueno call the new politics based on Tohjisha ‘the sovereignty of Tohjisha (Tohjisha syuken)’, a term referring to the right of self-determination of minorities, as if the State otherwise had rights of sovereignty that could not be violated by others (Nakanishi and Ueno 2003, p. 3).

In this chapter, I term the discourses that emerged along with the idea of Tohjisha as ‘Tohjisha discourses’. Then I will examine how these discourses affected both academic Gay Studies disciplines and gay activism in Japan between the 1990s and the 2000s.

2-2. The role of Tohjisha and the Institutionalisation of Gay Studies in Japan

Along with disability and women’s movements, gay activism also adopts the term Tohjisha in describing its concerns and life. For instance, when establishing Gay Studies in Japan for the first time, Kawaguchi Kazuya, Kazama Takashi and Keith Vincent defined ‘Gay Studies’ in their book as: ‘the knowledge conducted by the gay people as Tohjisha, for the gay people to think about themselves and to contribute to improving their life, and furthermore, the useful knowledge fighting against homophobia through analysing social consciousness and structure where people value only love between a man and woman as the supreme one and discriminate against the homosexuals’ (Kawagushi, Kazama and Vincent 1997, pp. 2-3). Since they defined Gay Studies as ‘the knowledge conducted by gay people as Tohjisha’, the idea of Tohjisha was an essential factor in the establishment of the new discipline.

Their definition of Gay Studies clarifies their idea of the power relationships in society that they try to confront. In Togo Ken’s politics, discussed in Chapter 2, the
dualism between the shame of *okama* and the honour of the Emperor was considered the source of social hegemony; thus, he dramatised his provocative activism through the tension between *okama* and the Emperor. In Kawagushi, Kazama and Vincent’s argument, on the other hand, the power relationships in Japanese society were discussed in terms of the production process of knowledge: they ask, when discussing the social structure that reproduces the weak position of homosexuals, who possesses the specific knowledge and who can speak in society? In the round-table talk published by the magazine *Gendai shiso* (Contemporary Philosophy), Kawaguchi Kazuya talks about the relationship between the production process of knowledge and politics:

Thus far, scholars have asked what is homosexuality; but it is one of our purposes that we will break free from such a question and challenge the scholars’ or public’s curiosity and interests about homosexuality itself, then pose a new question why they need to know about homosexuality, and even further, we overcome such questions. The question here is who will gain what by knowing homosexuality, or who will understand what from their research about homosexuality. We, as homosexuals, have always been forced to explain our existence itself while being exposed to people’s ignorance as well as knowledge. Or, there is a history of others explaining homosexuality because we cannot explain it by ourselves.

As there is such a history, for homosexuals, the essential first step is to resist the power of knowledge and truth. I think that statements or researches about homosexuality itself, whatever the content is, are not transparent and innocent but always related to politics. We have to acknowledge this relation between politics and knowledge. (Asada et al. 1997, pp. 18-19)

This comment expresses well the differences in the understanding of what they must recognise for their politics between Togo Ken and the young 1990s activists who tried to establish Gay Studies in Japan. The young gay activists who are interested in Gay Studies now focus for their politics on the production process of knowledge in society, rather than on Togo’s challenge to the social distinction between the shame and honour spaces.

This political shift explains their way of challenging the social distinction between the public and private realms in Japanese society, which seems also a spatial problematisation of politics similar to Togo’s. However, Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s problematisation of the social distinction between the public and private realms was related to the question of who can rightfully speak in public, since the identity of homosexual men and problems related to their sexuality were regarded as ‘private’, with their political claims thus considered inappropriate topics for public discussion, while heterosexual men derived unproblematic advantages from the social distinction between
the public and private realms (Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent 1997; Kazama 1999). Thus, their political problem was essentially the question of the political right of speech: how gay men can rightfully speak in public, and how society’s view can be changed to establish homosexual men themselves as the politically appropriate people to speak out about their problems in society. The question ‘Who can rightfully say what?’ was considered essential for them, and their way of discussing the social distinction between the public and private realms indicates their political concern with the relationship between power and knowledge.

The term Tohjisha, meaning ‘the people who are directly concerned’, was utilised in addressing the question of power and knowledge in Sexuality Studies in the 1990s, especially when people discussed who should study and speak about sexual minorities. With Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent having defined Gay Studies as ‘the knowledge conducted by gay people as Tohjisha, for gay people to think about themselves’ (Kawagushi, Kazama and Vincent 1997, p. 2), Tohjisha was discussed in order to specify the subject of knowledge in questions of who can rightfully deliver particular discourses and who might gain (dis)advantage from them. Furthermore, such a discursive community based on Tohjisha might exclude people considered not-Tohjisha, or hi-Tohjisha in Japanese, as persons without the right to speak or gain advantage from the discourses of sexual minorities. In other words, Tohjisha is discussed as constituting ownership of particular discourses.

2-3. Polemics and Authorisation of Tohjisha

The dispute surrounding Tohjisha, incorporating questions of who can rightfully deliver particular discourses and who would gain (dis)advantage from them, defines many polemics and much activism in Japan since the mid-1990s. For example, Oikawa Kenji’s report on Togo Ken (Oikawa 2001) gave rise to this argument when he used the word okama – a discriminatory word towards gay people – in the title, whereupon Ito Satoru, a prominent gay activist, complained to the magazine’s editors that the use of that word in the title was ‘discriminatory’30. The polemic, ‘Is “okama” discriminatory?’ (Fushimi et al. 2002), was not about Togo’s activism but about the question of who is Tohjisha: who can use the word okama or who would suffer from the use of the word, etc. The same

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30 For the detailed background of this argument, see McLelland (2009).
kind of discussion took place in regard to the name of the Pride parade in Tokyo. The event in question, the Tokyo Lesbian and Gay Parade, was held between 1994 and 2006, although sometimes it was cancelled and organisers were changed. The name Tokyo Lesbian and Gay Parade had been criticised for representing only gays and lesbians, not transgender people and bisexuals, even though they also participated in it. Some activists proposed changing its name to represent various identities, but the name Tokyo Lesbian and Gay Parade was utilised until 2006 because, as one organiser explained, most of the volunteers were gay men. In this discussion, the term Tohjisha, ‘the people who are directly concerned’, indicates two different subjects: on the one hand, Tohjisha refers to participants in the parade, on the other hand, it refers to the promoters and volunteers who organise the parade.

Within the academic world, Tohjisha is often utilised for criticising others’ opinions. Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s Gei Studies (Gay Studies) was often discussed in relation to their insistence on gay identity and coming out, as we saw in Chapter 3. Interestingly, the scholars who criticised them relied on Tohjisha, which Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent tried to place at the centre of the new academic discipline, Gay Studies. The academic discipline based on Tohjisha enabled these critics to argue against Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s political insistence on gay identity by relying on differences between their argument and interviews with or writings of Japanese gay people who are considered Tohjisha (Ino 2005; Kaneda 2003; Moriyama 2008, 2009). Therefore, references to what Tohjisha ‘says’ have become strong academic weapons in this discursive community. For instance, Ino Shinichi (2005) severely criticises Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s argument, which posits a close relationship between gay identity and coming out. In Ino’s argument, he depends on interviews with gay people who are not comfortable with the category of ‘gei (gay)’. His argument, however, only succeeded in drawing a subtle distinction between his and Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s arguments, in that his politics searches for a comfortable category for homosexuals who feel uncomfortable with the name of ‘gei (gay)’, while Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent try to establish a new political subject bearing the name ‘gei (gay)’. The political argument takes place among gay scholars: on the one hand, Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s politics raises the homosexual subject as Tohjisha against

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31 For detailed points of discussion of the name Tokyo Lesbian and Gay Parade, see the blog FemTumYum (2005).
heterosexuals who intellectually exploit homosexuals and, on the other hand, Ino supports other homosexuals as Tohjisha against the gay political theory of Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent. Such arguments do not merely mean that criticism of Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s gay theory accepts and repeats their definition of Gay Studies — *the Gay Studies by the gays, for the gays* — even though they are against Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s theory itself; rather, such discourses indicate that reference to Tohjisha has become the best way of downgrading the authenticity of other discourses in Gay Studies in Japan. In Japanese Gay Studies, Tohjisha has been authorised both as the source of its political foundation and as a measure of the veridicality of academic arguments, and has been proactively utilised.

Such authorisation and utilisation of Tohjisha is not limited to the academic world. Fushimi Noriaki, an openly gay popular writer, mentioned the ‘real people’ to restrict the authority of academia at the symposium of the Japan Association for Queer Studies:

The people who came to the symposium on such a typhoon day are very geeky *[mania]*, or very strange people. And when the strange people come to gather, the association would be strange as well. In such circumstances, it can easily depart from reality. So, it is important to make it comfortable for the people here as well but, I think, it is very important to imagine the people who are not here. As I have a prejudice about academic disciplines, I’m not sure if I would participate in this association. (Kawagushi et al. 2008, p. 54)

Thus, Tohjisha has been utilised both for establishing the authority of knowledge and for dismantling it. One who can be successfully identified with tohjisha can speak politically with authority as representing ‘repressed sexual minorities’, while differentiating oneself from others who are not Tohjisha. But in such a discursive community, it is not certain at what point a person will be regarded as Tohjisha and at what point someone else will challenge his or her status as such, since the term Tohjisha, which means ‘the people who are directly concerned’, is too abstract to determine the context, especially as a political or academic term, unlike the legal term which is always used with reference to a particular legal case. McLelland points out the difficulties of making political statements based on Tohjisha:

Indeed, the move toward championing the right of the tohjisha, which establishes the individual as the final arbiter of truth about the self, is difficult to reconcile with a prescriptive, identity-based politics. Since each individual is unique and different, it is problematic when organisations seek to speak on behalf of widespread identity
categories such as ‘homosexuals’, because not all people will feel comfortable with
the chosen terminology or sense that their needs or individual differences are being
respected. (McLelland 2005, p. 183)

As no one can say who truly is *Tohjisha* in the given context, the *Tohjisha* discourse
constructs an agonistic situation within which one can be *Tohjisha* or gain a right of access
to *tohjisha*. Alternately, people can speak in advance as not-*Tohjisha*, in order to avoid
the polemics, by using the category ‘*arai* (ally)*’.

Therefore, the *Tohjisha* discourse in the gay community has two functions: it
restricts the people who can rightfully speak as *Tohjisha* on the one hand, but at the same
time, since the content of *Tohjisha* (the people who are directly concerned) is very
ambiguous, it also raises new arguments among the people who consider themselves
*Tohjisha*.

It is doubtful that the *Tohjisha* discourse can solve the ‘exploitative’ relationship
between power and knowledge, as Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent supposed at the
beginning of Gay Studies. Firstly, as the idea of *Tohjisha* has now come to frame the
academic disciplines of Gender and Sexuality Studies in Japan, the importance of
*Tohjisha* has become a reason for utilising the ‘same *tohjisha*’ for their research by
scholars who consider themselves *Tohjisha* on the basis of interviews, citations and
political engagements. In such academic disciplines, the *Tohjisha* discourse might be
critical of existing academic authority but, at the same time, constitute a new authority
itself. For example, sociologist Moriyama Naotaka writes about the gay community:

For now, let’s discuss the way to consider a gay community by researchers. The
most naïve but general approach is based on the presumption that because a
researcher is *Tohjisha* – i.e. a gay male – it means that his research correctly
comprehends the gay community. In fact, most *Tohjisha* studies are certainly
given ‘authenticity’ based on this presumption. (Moriyama 2009, pp. 11-12)

As Moriyama points out, *Tohjisha* already constitutes one of the presumptions in Japanese
academic work and produces new discourses.

Secondly, the academic and political ‘authenticity’ of *Tohjisha* defers
exploration of new ways of discussing topics related to sexual minorities. After his remark
on ‘the most naïve but general approach’ of *Tohjisha* in Gay Studies, Moriyama continues:

However, I do not think that we should jump to an alternative approach from
*Tohjisha* studies. If we try to manage research based on ‘objectivity’ which is
independent from positionality, the only possible research would be conducted in reliance on the definition of gay community which researchers determined in advance. For example, this definition might be: ‘in this article, the term gay community indicates the gay town in Shinjuku 2chome in Tokyo’. But, if we observe this definition carefully, the presumption that the definition is suitable for studies about gay community is as certain as the one about Tohjisha studies. (Moriyama 2009, pp. 11-12)

Moriyama’s argument is not just one of postmodern cynicism, which admits the impossibility of perfect neutrality and objectivism in academic discussions. Rather, it indicates how deeply the idea of Tohjisha has been rooted in Gay Studies in Japan, especially in Sociology, which is the most popular discipline encompassing Gender and Sexuality Studies. Tohjisha authorises the verisimilitude of academic discourses and implies the possibility that there might be other tohjisha whom researchers have never discussed, thus evoking the desire to keep searching for tohjisha as academic interests. Such a discursive system discourages new ways of discussing sexual politics in Japan while justifying utilisation of the people of tohjisha for academic interests.

In the next sections, I will examine how the idea of Tohjisha affects relationships between activism and academia.

3. Tohjisha and Queer Theory

3-1. Differences and Similarities between Tohjisha Studies and Feminist Standpoint Theory

At first glance, Tohjisha Studies is very similar to Feminist Standpoint Theory as the latter was also intended to connect academic research with feminist politics. For overcoming the ‘neutrality’ and power of science, standpoint theory was proposed as an alternative academic method and epistemology for feminist research and politics about relationships between the production of knowledge and power in the 1970s and 1980s. As Tohjisha Studies bring people in society, whom academic society had treated only as objects of research, to the position to academically and politically speak for themselves, Feminist Standpoint Theory defines feminism as a mode of analysis for their own politics of women and the ‘standpoint’ as a key concept to analyse society and politics. Nancy Hartsock writes: ‘At bottom feminism is a mode of analysis, a method of approaching life and politics, rather than a set of political conclusions about the oppression of women’
Defining feminist Standpoint Theory as a new epistemological and political project, Hartsock adopts Marxism. Emphasising that women’s social situation is different from that of men in dominant positions, Hartsock insists that ‘women’s lives make available a particular and privileged vantage point on male supremacy, a vantage point which can ground a powerful critique of the phallocratic institutions and ideology which constitute the capitalist form of patriarchy’ [stress is mine] (Hartsock 1983, p.284). While, as with Tohjisha Studies in Japan, Hartsock accents that standpoint theory is interested in the sense of being engaged, she also regards that it can provide a better scientific method than masculine-dominant science. Thus, the question here is: in what sense is Feminist Standpoint Theory a better epistemological tool for analysing society and what are the differences between standpoint theory and Tohjisha Studies?

Hartsock interprets Marxism by focusing on two points: biased knowledge and engagement of the people. She summarises Marxist epistemological and political claims as: firstly, that class positions in Marxist theory not only consist of social structures but also set limits on the understanding of social relationships and reality and, therefore, the social views of the ruling class will be incomplete, partial and biased; secondly, the vision of the ruling class constructs the society and reality in which all classes are forced to participate so that the view is not simply false but is the ideology reproducing the social hegemony; and thirdly, while the vision of the ruling class is partial and reproducing the social cognitions, the adoption of a standpoint and the understanding of the oppressed expose the truth, the real relations among human beings and society (Hartsock 1983, p.285). As Hartsock’s interpretation of Marxism shows in defining standpoint theory, as a scientific method it is premised on not only the partial understanding of the standpoint of the subject but also on the need for truth and complete understanding of society through its recognition of partiality. Thus, Sandra Harding (1993) clearly notes against the criticism of standpoint theory that it is not relativism or ethnocentrism but, for the standpoint epistemologist, ‘the problem with the conventional conception of objectivity is not that it is too rigorous or too “objectifying”, as some have argued, but that it is not rigorous or objectifying enough; it is too weak to accomplish even the goals for which it has been designed, let alone the more difficult projects called for by feminisms and other new social movements’ [stress in original] (p.51).

On the other hand, Tohjisha Studies also recognises the partial understanding of society as well as the power relationships created by knowledge. However, when
Tohjisha Studies have tried to reformulate the relationship between the subject of knowledge and social relationships, it was rare to discuss the problems of epistemology for strong objectivity or complete views of society differentiated from the ones of existing science, as Feminist Standpoint Theory does. Instead of discussing epistemological and methodological arguments, Tohjisha Studies have been keen to produce new academic discourses that have simply relied on the veridicality of tohjisha, the people in marginalised positions in society. Thus, as already analysed in Moriyama’s argument above (Moriyama 2009), Tohjisha Studies have tended to produce new political discussions rather than developing an epistemology and a scientific methodology beyond their own partiality and social positions. Thus, comparing Tohjisha Studies with Feminist Standpoint Theory, it is notable that Tohjisha Studies do not share the need for strong objectivity and ‘hope’ of universalism through the partiality that Feminist Standpoint Theory was inherited from Marxism.

In next sections, I will argue how Queer Theory from the United States, especially in the works of Judith Butler, was (mis)interpreted through Tohjisha, which focuses on subject, social positions and politics rather than on epistemological problems, and why such interpretations were circulated as ‘politics’.

3-2. Interpretation of Judith Butler through Tohjisha

The 1990s was also the time when Lesbian/Gay Studies and Queer Theory in the English language were actively translated into Japanese, and applied to the analysis of Japanese society, while activists and scholars discussed the role of Tohjisha. At the theoretical level, however, the notion of Tohjisha can have a tense relationship with Queer Theory, since queer theorists have been critical of notions that presuppose fixed categories and divisions between majority and minority individuals in society. For example, Judith Butler writes:

As expansive as the term ‘queer’ is meant to be, it is used in ways that enforce a set of overlapping divisions: in some contexts, the term appeals to a young generation who want to resist the more institutionalised and reformist politics sometimes signified by ‘lesbian and gay’; in some contexts, sometimes the same, it has marked a predominantly white movement that has not fully addressed the ways in which ‘queer’ plays – or fails to play – within non-white communities; and whereas in some instances it has mobilised a lesbian activism, in others the term represents a false unity of women and men. Indeed, it may be that critique of the term will initiate a resurgence of both feminist and anti-racist mobilisation within lesbian and gay politics or open up new possibilities for coalitional
alliances that do not presume that these constituencies are radically distinct from one another. (Butler 1993, pp. 228-229)

On the other hand, *Tohjisha* discourses authorise *Tohjisha*, who are supposed to be differentiated from non-*Tohjisha* or hi-*Tohjisha* in Japanese.

In *Gei Studies (Gay Studies)*, Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent were well aware of the theoretical tension between Queer Theory and the notion of *Tohjisha*. They insisted that it could be politically harmful to assimilate the ‘deconstructionist’ Queer Theory in Japan, where a gay political subject had not yet emerged, since ‘deconstructionist’ Queer Theory can disturb the establishment of political representations of *Tohjisha*:

Recently, the research of western Lesbian/Gay Studies which mainly discusses the ‘deconstruction’ of the subject [*shutai*] is often introduced in Japan. So-called postmodern research is rapidly translated, one study after another. Of course, it is not bad that those are translated and people can read them in Japanese. But there is a situation in which the only discourses of deconstruction of the subject [*shutai*] are becoming general outside their academic context, especially that of the early important academic achievements. If people understand them in an extreme way without any contexts, they might insist that it is ‘nonsense’ or ‘harmful’ to have agency [*shutai*].32 Through such a process, it can happen that homosexual *Tohjisha* are erased rather than enabled to exist [in society]. (Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent 1997, p. 49)

They were concerned that translations of deconstructionist theory without its political context could dismantle political discourses of sexual minorities who have just begun to be visualised in Japanese society.

Ino Shinichi (1997, 2005), who regards Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s politics as identity politics, seeks to theoretically combine Queer Theory with *Tohjisha* politics. In his theoretical exploration, along with a reading of Judith Butler, he focuses on the possibilities of negotiation between category and self-definition, which cannot be understood when identified with the existing category of ‘gei (gay)’. Ino proposes to utilise categories of sexuality as a political tool, in the way in which people (*Tohjisha*)

32 The words of the original passage might be better translated as ‘it is “nonsense” or “harmful” to have the subject’. In Japanese, the term *shutai* can indicate ‘the subject’, ‘agency’, ‘individuality’, and ‘independence of will’. Thus, ‘to deconstruct the subject’ (*shutai no datsukouchiku*) can mean ‘to deconstruct the subject/agency/individuality/independence of will’ in Japanese. This is why they interpreted deconstructionist theory as undermining the political agency of homosexuals that had just emerged in Japanese society.
reappropriated the word *queer* for themselves in the US, while suspending the integration of political identity with the name ‘*gei* (gay)’. He distinguishes between an identity and a category, arguing that the notion of identity refers to an ontological state of being that cannot be verified or rebutted, but which, at the same time, functions as a norm. In contrast, a category is a social space constructed for a subject by discourses, so that there is always a gap between a category comprised of discourses and the subject. This is why the subject, Ino argues, can negotiate with categories through the gap between the category and the subject. Ino interprets Butler’s reading of the failure of the subject’s identification with the Law or the Symbolic, the linguistic dimension that is the determining order of the subject, in Lacanian psychoanalysis as the operability of categories by the subject. Ino argues that ‘the subject is given the locus of discourses by an interpellation through a category’ but, because Butler insists that an identification of the subject with the Law will always fail, ‘we can develop the idea of agency which is able to talk about the self through manipulating the gap between categories and the self even though one cannot be completely free from the categories’ (Ino 2005, p. 46).

On the surface, Ino’s argument is similar to Butler’s idea of identity and agency. Butler writes:

> Indeed, to understand identity as a *practice*, and as a signifying practice, is to understand culturally intelligible subjects as the resulting effects of a rule-bound discourse that inserts itself in the pervasive and mundane signifying acts of linguistic life. Abstractly considered, language refers to an open system of signs by which intelligibility is insistently created and contested. As historically specific organisations of language, discourses present themselves in the plural, coexisting within temporal frames, and instituting unpredictable and inadvertent convergences from which specific modalities of discursive possibilities are engendered.

> As a process, signification harbours within itself what the epistemological discourse refers to as ‘agency’. (Butler 2008, p. 198)

Although Butler also advocates the possibilities of the pervasive signifying act through identification within a linguistic process, Ino’s argument is particularly distinctive in its notion of the self which negotiates and operates with categories. With the notion of the self that is able to negotiate with a category, Ino transforms Butler’s notion of agency into the prelinguistic subject, which Butler herself criticises in Lacanian theory as ‘slave morality’, since it romanticises and idealises the ‘failure’ before the Law (Butler 2008, pp. 74-77). Although Butler regards the inevitable failure before the Law as an ideological
narrative of Lacanian theory since ‘the dialectic between a juridical imperative that cannot be fulfilled and an inevitable failure “before the law” recalls the tortured relationship between the God of the Old Testament and those humiliated servants who offer their obedience without reward’ (Butler 2008, p. 76), Ino considers it as the political possibility of talking about the self through manipulating categories.

In his ‘politics of categories’, Ino presupposes the authentic self, which cannot be represented by language but still adheres to the utopian view of the perfect language that could fully express such a self. For example, Ino writes about the possibilities of Queer Theory:

We can rewrite significations of categories through negotiations with them while exploring narratives beyond the prescriptions of categories which bind us. We should learn such possibilities from Queer Theory. (Ino 2005, p. 70)

Thus, what he calls politics means exploring the possibilities of talking about the self as such, avoiding the simplified story of the self. This is why he regards Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent’s politics of coming out as problematic, since the representation of identity through coming out can cause simplification of the self and confusion with others of the same name, the so-called ‘gei (gay)’. In this regard, Ino’s theoretical interest is closer to that of Charles Taylor (1989, 1991), who considers morality based on authenticity, or the ideal of self-fulfilment (Taylor 1991, p. 16), rather than that of Judith Butler, who pursues the political possibilities of subversion.

As Ino pursues the proper language for expressing the individual ego, the Tohjisha discourses, which challenge the politics of Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent, contribute to the politics of self-liberation through linguistic acts. Because the term Tohjisha has been developed through questions about the authority of institutional knowledge, Tohjisha can cause one to become sceptical about all discourses by others, leaving only the discourse of self-reference. Ironically, it is exactly the politics of coming-out, which seeks the fully expressed-self, that Ino tries to criticise.

On the theoretical level, therefore, Tohjisha discourses have contributed to two kinds of politics. One is what Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent tried to establish as Gay Studies in Japan: we may call it the representative gay male politics. The other one is what Ino expressed in his criticism of Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent: that is, the gay male politics of self-liberation.
3-3. A Constitution of the Political ‘Reality’ through *Tohjisha*

As Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent or Ino disputatiously adopt their positions on Queer Theory in Japanese social contexts, discussion of the relationship between *Tohjisha* and Queer Theory could be one of the most important achievements of Japanese Gay Studies. In particular, these political and academic arguments could contribute to the problems of translation of Cultural Theories into politically, socially, historically and culturally different contexts, whichever Japanese gay theorists might choose for Japanese society. They might either temporarily suspend applying Queer Theory to Japanese society, as Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent insist, or they might pursue the interpretation of Queer Theory through *Tohjisha*, as Ino did. This argument essentially comprehends questions of how cultural and political contexts could affect understanding of the Cultural Theories of a different society, as well as of what translations, beyond cultural differences, might generate as they depart from the original contexts – a perspective analogous to how new questions related to gender and sexuality have opened up new horizons for the interpretation of classic texts in Feminist and Queer Theory.

However, such intellectual tensions can be transformed into relatively clear-cut problems such as the antinomy between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, or between ‘theory’ and ‘reality’. For Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent, the assimilation of ‘deconstructionist’ Queer Theory in Japanese society was the actual problem of Japanese heteronormative ideology, which utilises the discourses of foreign cultural theories against political voices of sexual minorities in order to maintain the homophobic society of Japan. However, in the dialogue between Noguchi Katsuzo, a philosopher, and Sunagawa Hideki, an anthropologist and gay activist who was the representative member of Tokyo Lesbian & Gay Pride between 2000 and 2007\(^{33}\), the problem is regarded as that of the gap between the ‘theory’ of the United States and the ‘reality’ of Japan. In a discussion among Fushimi Noriaki, Noguchi Katsuzo and Sunagawa Hideki, Noguchi said:

The new generation rapidly started to enjoy being gay without problems in the way previous generations cannot even imagine although they might deny themselves as gay when they were junior high school or high school students. This change can be expressed as the shift from ‘man lover’ to ‘gei/gay’ but this is not the shift from ‘gei/gay’ to ‘queer’ nor going to be ‘queer’. This is obvious if you are in gay scenes for a while and you have to make an issue based on this shift.

\(^{33}\) In 2007, Tokyo Lesbian and Gay Pride changed its name to ‘Tokyo Pride Parade’.
when you discuss gay identity. So, the current form of criticism by Queer Theory is, in my words, metaphysical thought. I think that the way of applying the notion of queer in Japan today reflects the ignorance, or low sensitivity to today’s historical-social situations of gay people. (Fushimi, Noguchi and Sunagawa 2001, p. 247)

In this remark, Noguchi presupposes two ideas: the superiority of the ‘reality’ over the theory and the adversarial relationship between the theory and the ‘reality’. Furthermore, they both are based on the tautological notion that the people who refer to Queer Theory are ignorant of the ‘reality’, because you cannot critically think in the way in which Queer Theory does if you know the situation of gay people properly. With those presumptions, theoretical collisions between the political approach of Tohjisha and the queer approach no longer posed a philosophical and political problem for him, since he can replace theoretical and political problems with the supposed ignorance of Japanese Queer theorists, even though it is caused by the differences in their political and intellectual backgrounds, rather than by the differences between theory and practice.

More importantly, the basic question hidden by such a transformation in the approach towards the relationship between Queer Theory and Tohjisha is: what is meant by the ‘reality’ of sexual politics in Japan? Even if there were collisions between the respective approaches of Queer Theory and Tohjisha studies, we need to ask whether the ‘reality’ should always mean the specific activities of gay men in big cities, or whether Tohjisha could properly represent the ‘reality’ of sexual politics. Since Tohjisha is regarded as the authentic subject that researchers must approach, the ‘reality’, which researchers should consider, becomes the self-evident concept.

4. Tohjisha Turns into Homonormativity

4-1. ‘Gender-Free’ and Fushimi’s The Issue of Desire

When reviewing discourses of gay men in Japan, focusing on Tohjisha from now on, it can be inferred that some of those discourses indirectly resulted in disturbing criticism of the exclusive Japanese social system. It is worth noting that the rise of Gay Studies, which claims to present the new knowledge of gay men for gay men, shares its era with the rising nationalist backlash against feminism and the gender-equality it promoted in Japanese society in the 2000s. In the field of Queer Studies in the English language, for

However, it was at that same time that conservative politicians and activists started to attack gender-equality policy and sex education in schools in Japan. An anti-feminist movement of Japanese conservatives, the so-called Bakkurasshu (the backlash), rose rapidly in the early 2000s just after the implementation of the Danjo kyodo sankaku shakai kihonho (Basic Law for a Gender-Equality Society) in 1999, and the issue of ‘Comfort Women’ during the Second World War became the subject of heated public debates. The backlash movement was characterised by two features: the anti-gender-equality discourses, often utilising grassroots rhetoric, and popular neoconservative politicians, including Abe Shinzo who became the Prime Minister between 2006 and 2007, and again from 2012, openly supported the movement (Wakakuwa and Fujimura-Fanselow 2011; Kato 2011; Yamaguchi, Sato and Ogie 2012). Wakakuwa and Fujimura-Fanselow (2011) note that the backlash movement affected sex education, the government’s gender-equality policy and Japanese diplomatic policy on the issue of ‘Comfort Women’. The backlash movement especially attacked the term ‘gender-free’, which started to be used by Japanese feminists in the 1990s, to indicate freedom from socially gendered roles and arrangements. However, the backlash movement interprets this term as ‘denying all physical differences between male and female’ and accused it of ‘denying masculinity and femininity altogether’ (Wakakuwa and Fujimura-Fanselow 2011, p. 343). Unsurprisingly, the backlash movement utilised homophobia to exaggerate the alleged harm done by the term ‘gender-free’ and sex education. For example, the conservative opinion journal featured an article entitled ‘Background of the Ideal – Free Sex, Homosexuality and Extreme Sex Education’ in 2003 (Wakakuwa and Fujimura-Fanselow 2011, p. 340)\textsuperscript{34}.

However, Fushimi Noriaki (2007), a pioneer of openly gay popular writing in Japan since the early 1990s, expressed his sympathy with conservative criticism of the term ‘gender-free’. In Yokubou mondai (The Issue of Desire) (2007), Fushimi insists that discourses of sexual minorities in Japan have failed to recognise the importance of desire

\textsuperscript{34} For more about homophobic arguments in the backlash movement in Japan, see Kazama (2007) and Maree (2007).
and pleasure as issues of sexuality and, instead, have been dominated by discussions within the framework of social justice and anti-discrimination. Thus, departing from social justice arguments, the issues of sexuality need to be repositioned within the wider framework of problems of desire, since, he argues, discourses of minorities are not necessarily always right simply because they are minorities. McLelland (2009) introduces Fushimi’s argument as a successfully inclusive argument about sexual minorities in Japan by virtue of its deployment of the discourses of Tohjisha:

Fushimi, although deploying the discourse of the tohjisha to some extent, has skilfully avoided the politics of recrimination, instead arguing for a more inclusive debate about sexual minority status. His latest book, which might be titled in English as Problems of desire: It’s not about people working to just end discrimination [sic], sidesteps the essentialising tendencies inherent in the tohjisha debate as conducted by groups such as Sukotan, by focusing not so much on discriminated identities as on stigmatised desires – a more universalising perspective. As the book’s subtitle suggests, working to end discrimination against a few new officially recognised ‘sexual identities’ such as gay men, lesbians and transsexuals does little to offset the negative repercussions of what Fushimi terms the ‘hetero system’ overall. (McLelland 2009, p. 18)

In his book, Fushimi considers examples of discourses focusing only on issues of social justice and anti-discrimination, such as those of gay activism in the 1980s and 1990s, and of feminism, especially discourses on the ‘gender-free’ concept. He argues that while it is right for feminists to deny masculinity and femininity altogether in the sense of abolishing all kinds of discrimination caused by gender roles, not only is it impossible to deny all gender roles in society, but it is also harmful for sexual minorities who derive fantasy and pleasure from existing gender roles (Fushimi 2007, Chapter 2).

His opinion is that he accepts the caricaturised criticism of the ‘gender-free’ idea in conservative discourses while trying to promote gay male acceptance by society. In the 1990s, one of the topics that Japanese feminists such as Ueno Chizuko and Osawa Mari, who are regarded as influential feminist theorists of ‘gender-free’ activism (Yamaguchi, Sato and Ogiue 2012), focused on was the Japanese labour system based on the gender division of labour (seibetsu-yakuwari-bungyo) (Ueno 1990; Osawa 1993), and the term ‘gender-free’ was originally utilised for consciousness-raising about this problem in society. In these arguments and activism, the social and economic problems of women, such as income inequality, labour conditions, female education and the ideology of the
full-time housewife and mother, are mainly targeted by the term ‘gender-free’. In Fushimi’s discourse, however, the term ‘gender-free’ is interpreted as the ‘feminist ideology’, which denies all gender roles, abolishing existing femininity and masculinity completely, as stereotyped by backlash activism. As a result, the term gender in his discourse becomes highly abstract, rarely recalling the cultural, social, political and economic inequality of women in Japanese society, as if gender issues are ‘postmodern’ problems of signs that only refer to attributes of desire, fantasy and pleasure. Similarly, Moriyama Noritaka (2012), a sociologist of Gay Studies, argues that gay male Top/Bottom roles are analogous to sexual differences, although he does not criticise Japanese feminism as Fushimi does. Both of them symbolically treat gender or sexual differences in terms of the sexual activities of gay males, without considering the social injustice of gender inequality or the violence that gender minorities actually face in Japanese society.

In regard to the practical potential of Fushimi’s politics of desire, he is not eager to apply his argument to wider social issues. When he discusses the problems of discrimination in Japanese society, he mentions such discriminatory issues as the Burakumin (the discriminated-against hamlet people) and Zainichi Korean (the ethnic Korean residents of Japan), which are considered results of the Japanese national system and the Emperor System, as well as problems of male homosexuals in Japan. But he rarely pursues such issues.

He insists that, instead of social criticism and activism based on the idea of justice and anti-discrimination for social minorities, we need social movements that enhance the social possibility of actualising people’s desire. In his argument, however, desire, the possibility of which we should promote in society, is always that of homosexual men. If he applies his idea of movements for the actualisation of people’s desire to all social issues, he should respect people’s desire to achieve justice in society just as much as homosexual desire. Yet, he always gives priority to homosexual desire, which is not so controversial in society. For example, he understands the difficulty and pain for people who only have

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35 For example, the booklet entitled GENDER FREE, published by Tokyo Women’s Fund in 1995, which was attacked by backlash activism and criticised by some feminists due to its inappropriate introduction of terms from feminist studies, mainly focused on the gender roles that can contribute to the sexual division of labour. For criticism of this booklet by feminist scholars, see Yamaguchi (2006).

36 For relationships between the Emperor System and discrimination against the Burakumin and Zainichi Korean, see Uesugi (2008), Park (2003) and Chapman (2008).
desire for minors, but he concludes that such desire cannot be actualised in society without any consideration. On the other hand, he talks about the gay community after discussing the possibility that an identity and community could function repressively and result in the exclusion of some people:

In regard to gay people, it is necessary to examine if the inevitable norms of the establishment of gay community function repressively to some people as well as challenging stereotypes of gay people.

But we cannot deny their identity and community only for the reason that boundaries of categories can function violently against the people who are in between, or that the norms of community can repress some people in that community. It is because the desire of people who think they should dissolve the identity and community is not necessarily always prior to the desire of people who want to take delight in Eros there. (Fushimi 2007, pp. 148-149)

While, on the surface, Fushimi’s argument in *The Issue of Desire* tries to involve a broader range of people and topics than ‘old fashioned’ activism based on justice for social minorities, as McLelland (2009) evaluates, his discussion results in support only for gay men who can enjoy their sexual life without any problems from the community, and never extends to other social problems, because the *Tohjisha* of desire is always arbitrarily determined in his argument. Thus, his argument amounts to the exclusive promotion of male homosexual pleasure, without the complicated discrimination-related issues, such as sexism, nationalism, classism, and racism in Japanese society, as if the selected group’s pursuit of their own desire would eliminate social injustice.

The *Tohjisha* discourses, which politically authorise themselves in the political arena as *Tohjisha*, can provoke the question ‘*Who are the Tohjisha?*’ and can establish agonistic debates between people; however, when *Tohjisha* is bound up with a specific group and automatically refers to them, for example the Japanese, middle-class, mature, gay male in Tokyo, the term *Tohjisha* can function conservatively to secure the group identity.

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37 See his introduction to the book (Fushimi 2007). In Japanese society, paedophilic desire is not stigmatised in the same way as in Anglophone societies, as long as a person does not actually threaten children, and it is characteristic that queer activists, especially of an older generation, often express sympathy with the pain of paedophiles compared to that of homosexuals in the era when society openly discriminated against them, as Ito (2006) writes. As the relations of hetero/homosexuality and paedophilic desire in Japanese culture and society are very complicated and beyond the scope of this paper, I will not discuss them further here.
4-2. *Tohjisha* within National Identity and Homonormativity

Fushimi’s argument in *The Issue of Desire* is characterised by the de-politicisation of gay identity in the social context, while maintaining the community of pleasure secure from criticism. Shimizu Akiko (2007)\(^{38}\) notes that his politics is distinct in its neoliberal inclination. She points out similarities between Lisa Duggan’s analysis of the *new homonormativity* of neoliberalism in US society and Fushimi’s discourse (Duggan 2003). Fushimi redefines ‘justice’ as a personal matter, not a social or economic one. Shimizu relates how:

> [T]his ‘justice’ is based and ‘justified’ merely on the grounds of the ‘pain’ of the discriminated, and therefore can only be ‘a feeling of one person, a personal justice’ (Fushimi 2007, p. 58). According to Fushimi, the ‘pain’ of a discriminated person is an issue of desire just as much as the pleasure or convenience of another person is, and therefore should be justified through a negotiation with other forms of desire. He thus redefines discrimination not as a public and social issue of injustice regarding a structural and institutional inequality, but as a matter of personal feelings. (Shimizu 2007)

Duggan also describes how the rhetoric of US neoliberal gay activists labelled progressive left politics campaigning against social and economic injustice as being obsessed with victimhood (Duggan 2007, p. 55). With the redefinition of ‘justice’ characterising it as a personal objection against individuals’ own pain or victimhood, Shimizu argues, both Fushimi’s and the US neoliberal gay politics effectively depoliticise sexual politics by shifting it from the public to the private realm, and redefining it as an issue of personal endeavour, rather than of structural or institutional discrimination.

While observing that Fushimi and US neoliberals redefine and promote the politics of sexuality as belonging to the private sphere isolated from the social system that reproduces social inequality, Shimizu emphasises that their politics are still marked by nationalism. Analysing discourses of the Independent Gay Forum (IGF), which Duggan regards as an example of the politics of *the new homonormativity* (Duggan 2003, p. 50), she argues that their promotion of gay rights, focusing on gay access to marriage and the

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\(^{38}\) You can see part of this paper in the blog: tummygirl (2007). Here, I quote her from this blog.
military, conforms to US nationalism following 9/11 (ibid., p. 60). Duggan cites IGF’s principle, as found on their site:

We share a belief in the fundamental virtue of the American system and its traditions of individual liberty, personal moral autonomy and responsibility, and equality before the law. We believe those traditions depend on the institutions of a market economy, free discussion, and limited government. (ibid., p. 60)

Thus, in their discourses, the form of gay activism that focuses on personal issues of gay rights, rather than pursuing social justice against structural inequality, is considered part of ‘American’ traditional culture. Jasbir K. Puar later conceptualises such discourses and activism as ‘homonationalism’ (Puar 2007, p. 2).

Correspondingly, Shimizu remarks that Fushimi’s argument, too, in its implicit effort to assimilate into the existing public institutions of Japan, can be easily connected to a fundamental affirmation of the national.

Answering his own question whether ‘this society is worth maintaining’, Fushimi says he would like to think so, and continues: ‘Surely one can endlessly keep pointing out what is wrong about this country, Japan . . . but my experience and my gut reaction tell me that this society can get so close to my ideal’ (Fushimi 2007, p. 63). Following this casual rhetorical replacement of the social and the national is the affirmation of ‘Japan’ as that which should be maintained as it is: ‘Overall, not everything about this country is getting worse’ (ibid., p.64); ‘Enabling the desires of the others as much as possible, while trying to accommodate them so they will not contradict the formation and sustenance of this country… I would like to share this country with others as the forum for such endeavours’ (ibid., p. 64). Considering how many backlash discourses also promote ‘patriotism’, we could argue that Fushimi is trying in this book to secure gay existence by upholding the kind of gay politics that not only reformulate the sphere of the public and the political according to neoliberal principles but are also accommodated to national orders, thereby contravening the kind of gay politics that have endeavoured both to secure and expand the right to sexual privacy against the powers of the state and to open the question of sexuality to the sphere of public interference to the existing institutions. (Shimizu 2007)

However, Shimizu accentuates Fushimi’s turn between his argument in Issues of Desire in 2007 and his interview in 2000 with a leading Japanese sociologist, Miyadai Shinji, about activism in Japanese society, and maintains:

One may consider Fushimi’s attempt in The Issue of Desire to survive under the backlash by discarding ‘un-Japanese’ identity politics and by endorsing the national as an incontestable precondition, as following this observation. The
crucial difference is, however, that while in this interview Fushimi still talks of possible social reorganisation through ‘non-typical forms of activisms’, seven years later in The Issue of Desire the search for possible public forms of intervention and reorganisation has been replaced with neoliberal and nationalistic gay ‘politics’, if they can be still termed as such, that are reduced to the personal effort to ‘make friends’ without radically questioning the existing social structures. (Shimizu 2007)

Her remark about Fushimi’s nationally-accented gay desire in the guise of ‘politics’, or, as she suggests, the Japanese homonormativity, is important since it indicates how easily the personalisation of gay ‘politics’ in Japan can go hand in hand with the national and can reinforce the sense of unity of the Japanese, which the conservatives are eager to secure during the era of globalisation or the ‘crisis’ of Japanese society\footnote{For example, the Japanese government internationally promoted the Kizuna project (the bound project) to display Japan's revival efforts in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake. Such a term as kizuna (bound) has been utilised in Japan, accenting national solidarity, as described by Samuels (2013): ‘Social solidarity is hardly a new tile in the mosaic of Japanese national identity, but social solidarity is always tested in a crisis, and if it passes, it is always reinforced. 3.11 was no different’ (p. 108).}

Correspondingly, in his study of the gay community in Japan, Moriyama (2012) brings the sense of the national into the sphere of Japanese gay people and naturalises it without any qualifications. He focuses on gay men’s ties (tsunagari) through gay magazines, bars, cruising space and the Internet in his sociological research. However, his description of these cultures is highly abstract, with many references to discussions of social theory, such as those of Niklas Luhmann and Judith Butler. With his theoretical tendency, he rarely specifies his actual field of study of the gay community except as being ‘of Japan’, nor does he pay attention to the political background of the term ‘gay community’. Instead of analysing culture, human practices, economic and social dynamism among gay people, or political contexts in a certain area, he tries to explain the Japanese gay community\footnote{The English title of his book is Sociology of the Japanese ‘Gay Community’.} as the ‘ties with privileged others’, for example, ‘love’, ‘partnership’ and ‘fuck buddies (sekkusu furendo)’ (Moriyama 2012, p. 57), and abstractly universalises it.

Furthermore, he uses interviews with gay people to explain his prepared frameworks. Arguing from the features of gay slang, Moriyama insists that the term kocchi (here/this side) has played a significant role in constructing gay/bisexual men as ‘we’ in Japan (Moriyama 2012, pp. 200-203). In his book, he does not usually give...
detailed information about interviewees, such as their race/ethnicity, nationality, age, occupation, locality, health condition, education, the location of interviews, how often they go to gay scenes, or whether or not they are openly gay/bi men, other than the simple fact that they are gay or bisexual men, in the interest of ‘reducing a risk of specifying the individual’ (ibid., p. 182). The only exception occurs when, in his discussion of the way the linguistic practice of using the term kocchi (here/this side) contributes to the sense of ‘we’, he emphasises the nationalities of the interviewees:

The third reason for choosing the term kocchi is in regard to a question of ‘we’.

Mr. H (South Korean) says:

Mr. H: Today, listening to people’s talks, I felt so far that understanding of the word can change depending on their culture and individuals. For example, in the case of myself, especially in South Korea, the word [which is equivalent to the term kocchi] is just utilised as slang, I don't have any sense of fellowship. It is only the word for concealing myself from ordinary people. So, in kocchi [Japan], when I talk and hear, I get an impression of the sense of fellowship or something similar. This is what I felt.

Here, it is expressed with surprise that the term kocchi utilised by gay/bisexual men in Japan has an implication of ‘sense of fellowship’. Japanese interviewees as well express the implication of the term kocchi with words such as ‘sense of fellowship’, ‘friendship’, and ‘fellows’. (Moriyama 2012, p. 185)

In his citation, although Mr. H, a South Korean man, said that he felt a ‘sense of fellowship’ due to listening to the others’ talks during the interviews at that time, Moriyama interprets his words as expressing cultural differences, especially regarding the characteristics of the Japanese gay culture, without explaining what kinds of conversation took place in this interview prior to Mr. H’s comment. Then, following the comment, Moriyama introduces Japanese men’s comments about the implications for them of using the term kocchi (here/this side), but he does not make it clear when and where these comments were made; whether it was before Mr. H’s comment, which is the impression given, or in another of Moriyama’s interviews. In this unclear description, Mr. H’s personal reflection and feeling of ‘cultural differences’ at that time, accompanied by the observation that ‘understanding of the word can change depending on their culture and individuals’ [emphasis mine], is essentialised and crystallised as the fact of cultural differences, and the sense of fellowship among Japanese gay/bisexual men is framed by the gaze of a foreigner, Mr. H. Here, the ‘we’ that emerges through the linguistic practice of the use of the term kocchi (here/this side) among gay/bisexual men is not only organised by sexual
orientation and their culture, as Moriyama argues, but is also subtly marked by the national commonality of the Japanese, as differentiated from the cultural other, South Koreans. Furthermore, what is observable in his writing is that Moriyama only mentions Mr. H this one time in his discussion, to stress the sense of fellowship of the Japanese, as if Mr. H only needs to be there to represent the ‘Japaneseness’ of the sense of fellowship among gay/bisexual men through his national difference.

4-3. Politics of Disregarding and Japanese Ethnocentrism of Homosexuality

Iino Yuriko (2006) argues that the ethnocentrism of Japanese sexual minorities can limit the possibilities of sexual politics in Japanese society. Referring in her argument to an episode that took place in the second Asian Lesbian Network, Iino Yuriko stresses the differences and power relationships amongst lesbians in Japan, especially focusing on differences between Japanese lesbians and Zainichi Korean. Zainichi literally means ‘residents in Japan’, but is commonly used to refer to Korean residents, who, due to the Japanese colonial past, are the largest group of foreign residents in Japan. Iino follows arguments in the monthly newsletter of Regumi Studio, the first lesbian organisation in Japan, following an ‘incident’ during the second Asian Lesbian Network conference held in Tokyo in 1992. The incident, which sparked criticism in the lesbian community, took place during the opening ceremony of the conference. Iino quotes the description of the incident, as recalled by one of the presenters of the meeting:

When a participating nation reported on the conditions of each country, a group of emcees introduced the participants by their country, saying, ‘Asians who come from (name of the country), please stand’. However, when they introduced the participants from Japan, they said, ‘Japanese lesbians who live in Japan, please stand’. There were many lesbians in the hall who were resident of Japan but were of foreign nationality, and they lost the opportunity to stand. (Iino 2006, pp. 77-78)

In response to the presenters’ insensitivity towards the foreigners and ethnic minorities in Japan, Park MiJwaJa, a Zainich Korean lesbian, wrote a criticism of the organisers in the newsletter of Regumi Studio, remarking on the ethnocentrism of the Japanese:

The Asian conference, organised by the Japanese, who are not conscious of being Asian, was very successful from the perspective of the Japanese but was an utter failure from the viewpoint of Zainichi Koreans. It is widely acknowledged that
the Japanese lack the consciousness of being Asian. In addition to this, the consciousness that only Japanese live in Japan surfaced at this conference. This Japanese consider foreigners to be English-speaking people or whites. They do not regard Zainichi foreigners who speak fluent Japanese as foreigner. (…)

By virtue of nature, Japanese are born and live in Japan naturally, have the right to vote, are guaranteed their human rights, are not discriminated against, and are alive. It is not surprising that they could not understand the meaning of gathering together only with Asians. (Iino 2006, p. 70)

In this ‘politics of disregarding’ (p. 69), as Iino (2006) calls it, the Japanese ignore other Asian ethnic minorities in Japanese society, as a result of the power relationships between the Japanese and other Asians, together with the colonial legacy of contempt for the latter. Iino relates:

As noted earlier, the Japanese and other Asians are differentially located in a power relationship. This difference in positionality exists not only between the countries but also between the Japanese and these other Asians living in Japan as well. However, many Japanese tend to disregard this fact, whether intentionally or unintentionally. The statement of ‘Japanese lesbians who live in Japan, please stand’ might have been an unintentional mistake on the part of the emcee. However, in the relationship between the Japanese and Zainichi Koreans, it is always the latter’s existence, culture, and history that have been forgotten. (Iino 2006, p. 79)

Considering Fushimi’s and Moriyama’s ethnocentric characterisation of gay desire, identity and community in the light of Iino’s criticism, their arguments are also part of the politics of disregarding by the Japanese towards foreigners and ethnic minorities in Japan. They both not only fail to respect differences and power relationships among gay people in Japan and to recognise foreign and ethnic minority gay people as necessary members of the ‘gay community’ in Japan, but also construct the gay identity and community in terms of Japanese national/ethnic identity and through the exploitative use of the ‘foreign gaze’. However, it is not enough to point out the implications of Japanese national identity in their discourses. The question here is: what is the political significance of this approach, compared to that of their precursors who pursued the sexual politics of male homosexuals in Japan?

In the discourses of Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the national symbols, such as soldiers of World War Two, samurai and the Emperor, have been utilised to create a bridge between national politics and the marginalised desire that is supposed to reside in underground society. In their political arguments, homoerotic
desire functioned to reconstitute the domain of politics and was central in political struggles, whether right or left leaning. Just after the AIDS panic in Japan, for example, Kawaguchi Kazuya, Kazama Takashi and Keith Vincent insisted that gay identity was political, radically questioning normative distinctions between the public and private realms in Japanese society under the influence of both American Gay Studies and stereotypes of Japanese society, according to which gay identity was a ‘foreign’ concept. In their discussion, ‘Japan’, including Japanese national identity, is regarded as a national ideology, depoliticising social minorities, while they opt to overemphasise the political aspects of US gay politics (Kawagushi, Kazama and Vincent 1997, pp. 159-161). Thus, their usage of Tohjisha was intended to counter the discourses that connect gay identity with foreignness, while securing Japan as the heteronormative nation after the AIDS panic in the country.

A decade later, discussions of gay men’s desire, identity and community only refer to the human relationships of gay people and the sexual activities among the Japanese, differentiated from cultural and ethnic others and isolated from political struggles. Originally, Tohjisha discourse emerged to question the power relations of institutionalised knowledge in social minority activism and academic research; ironically, however, it prepared the ground for the depoliticised or assimilated figure within the heteronormative society of ‘Japanese gay men’, equivalent to Duggan’s new homonormativity in the US context.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the discursive phenomena of gay politics in Japan, focusing on the Tohjisha discourse. At the beginning of the discussion, I pointed out the four characteristics of gay male discourses in Japan between the late 1990s and the 2000s. In regard to the Tohjisha discourse, I analysed these phenomena as follows. Firstly, it is distinctive that the idea of Tohjisha has strongly influenced the discourses of both academia and activism in Japan. In this respect, the concept of Tohjisha has played a significant role in bridging the gap between academic discussions and activism in gay politics. However, Tohjisha is not always referred to with the same political implications and in the same contexts by various academics and activists, so that it generates many kinds of political style, depending on what the word Tohjisha means when a commentator uses it. Thus, the Tohjisha discourses do not function politically in the same way.
Secondly, because the term *Tohjisha* is so abstract and confusing as a concept, with multi-layered political significance, it prompts heated arguments about gay politics in Gay Studies and constitutes a peculiar discursive arena among the people. At the same time, such arguments have also defined Japanese gay politics. Through the academic arguments, the *Tohjisha* discourse produced two kinds of gay politics in Japan: *the representative gay male politics* and *the gay male politics of self-liberation*. Thirdly, however, when *Tohjisha* comes to refer simply to ‘Japanese-middle-class-gay-men-in-a-big-city’, the term is easily associated with the representation of specific gay activities in the private realm, without radically questioning the Japanese politics and social norms that marginalise several social groups, including women, foreigners and ethnic minorities. Lastly, representing normative Japanese men as the ‘gay people in Japan’, the term *Tohjisha* in the gay culture can rather reiterate or even enforce the national norms of Japan while suspending political approaches to the nation and its heteronormativity. We can call such gay ‘activism’ *the Japanese homonormativity*.

With the turn of Japanese gay politics towards private issues through the *Tohjisha* discourse, topics related to the national, that is, the Japanese, are discussed not as political issues but as private or individual matters, forming part of the identity or gay culture, or constituting a ‘unique’ element of communication among the people. This does not simply amount to the depoliticisation of Japanese gay politics since, as Iino (2006) argues, the ethnocentrism of Japanese sexual minorities is rooted in the Japanese colonial past and often results in the exclusion of foreigners and ethnic minorities in the community. Now, the tension existing between homosexual desire and national politics has vanished, while the ethnocentric and its cultural identity, along with the exclusions caused by it, are preserved in gay politics.

On the other hand, it is also true that such redefinition of gay issues in Japan has emerged in the midst of the globalisation of LGBT politics as a human rights matter. Today, the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender/sexual) issues are regarded as human rights issues that the government should protect, especially in western democratic societies, as the former United States Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton proudly declared at the anniversary of the passage of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in Geneva in 2011. In the next chapter, I will discuss how the globalisation of LGBT issues emerging from Western countries has affected sexual politics in Japan.
Chapter 5: Representations of International Politics and LGBT Politics in Japan

1. Introduction

While the concept of *Tohjisha* has been utilised for ethnocentric gay discourses and the depoliticisation of same-sex desire and gay identity in Japan, the topic of ‘globalisation’ has become a subject of heated debate. The influence of the globalisation of sexuality has also been extensively discussed since the 1990s in the English language (Altman 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2001; Harley 2001; Binnie 2004). In the discussions of the globalisation of sexuality, gay identity outside the West is said to be influenced by gay cultures from the West, especially those of the United States.

In addition, especially since the 2000s, LGBT issues have become international human rights issues. In June 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council passed a resolution on human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity for the first time in its history (*International Gay & Lesbian Human Rights Commission* 2011). Countries in the European Union and North America have become more serious with regard to LGBT issues as international human rights issues and diplomatic issues.

In this chapter, I will examine how the representations and narrative of global LGBT human rights can affect Japan. In the beginning, I will examine the internationally influential queer criticism of ‘homonationalism’ by Jasbir K. Puar (2007) in contextualising Japanese phenomena in international political movements of LGBT human rights. Although her concept is intended to criticise the idea of Western superiority, I will show that homonationalist critics still remain and reproduce the power relationships of the Western superiority to the others. Secondly, I will analyse a narrative of the speech ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ delivered by former US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in recognition of International Human Rights Day. Through examination of the speech, I will point out characteristics of the language of the Obama Administration’s international LGBT human rights policy, constructing the relationship between American democracy and LGBT human rights. Lastly, I will analyse the political influence by the Obama Administration’s LGBT-friendly policy promoted in Japan as the Obama Administration’s international human rights issues.

2. Western Supremacy and Representations of LGBT Rights
2-1. International Changes in LGBT Politics

Considering the contemporary political shifts on international issues, the changes in LGBT-related human rights issues are significant. In June 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council passed a resolution on human rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity for the first time in its history (International Gay & Lesbian Human Rights Commission 2011). In October 2011, David Cameron, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, declared that the UK government stands for LGBT human rights and warned that the UK government would cut aid to African countries that persecute homosexuals unless they suspended the relevant laws (The BBC 2011a). Then, on 6 December 2011, Hillary Rodham Clinton, the Secretary of State of the United States, delivered a speech called ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ in recognition of International Human Rights Day in Geneva. Her speech, which was delivered just 8 years after the US Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, struck down as unconstitutional the sodomy laws in the United States of America, symbolically represents the US government’s rapidly changing attitude towards LGBT issues. Among contemporary democratic societies, LGBT rights are becoming regarded as human rights, which governments and people should protect and respect.

However, it is not so easy to appreciate such international changes on LGBT issues as positive in all aspects. For instance, in response to Cameron’s warning about LGBT issues in African countries, it was not only politicians in the targeted countries such as Uganda, but also social justice activists in Africa generally, who criticised Cameron’s aid policy. They released a statement that cutting the aid would affect the lives of LGBT people in Africa as well as others, creating the real risk of a backlash against LGBT people (The BBC 2011b; African Men for Sexual Health and Rights 2011)41. In the context of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, international Israeli promotion of itself as

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41 Anna Agathangelou (2013) points out the relationship between racial politics, especially of ‘African blackness’, and neoliberal, global queer politics, saying: ‘In saving the queer from the “African” and the slave, the leadership of imperialism engages in a reconstruction of the new neoliberal entrepreneurial self that requires more than biopolitics: the US and certain European states turn against the populations that rupture their attempts to reconstruct a necro-economic-political order whose foundations depend on sustaining a material and metaphorical matrix and mobilising militias to eliminate “white but not quite” queer corporealities’ (p. 471).
a gay-friendly country was criticised as ‘pinkwashing’ and it was seen as propaganda designed to represent Israel as ‘relevant and modern’, while labelling the Palestinians as ‘homophobic fanatics’ and expunging the existence of Palestinian gay-rights organizations (Schulman 2011).

Considering such transnational politics in relation to LGBT human rights issues, Jasbir Puar’s argument about ‘homonationalism’ has been very influential, both in academia and in activist circles, since the publication of her book *Terrorist Assemblages* in 2007. Before considering US-Japan relationships on LGBT issues, I will analyse her argument and point out its limits, especially in the light of transnational LGBT politics beyond American society.

2-2. Homonationalism and the Critique of LGBT politics in the age of the War on Terror

In *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*, published in 2007, Jasbir Puar poses an interesting argument about the complicated relationships among various forms of bio-politics comprised within the ‘War on Terror’ after 9/11: neoliberalism, racism and queer politics in the United States. Puar insists that mainstream gay politics, or queer politics in the US, has been assimilated into nationalism, as well as xenophobia and racism. She conceptualises and criticises as ‘homonationalism’ the new form of gay politics assimilated with US nationalism. She defines ‘homonationalism’ as follows:

> At work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism – the emergence of national homosexuality, what I term ‘homonationalism’ – that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of American empire. Further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. (Puar 2007, p. 2)

In the case of what I term ‘US sexual exceptionalism’, a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. [Stress in original] (*ibid.*, p. 2)

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42 Jasbir Puar points out that the ‘pinkwashing’ of Israel functions to silence Israeli radical queers as well. Puar relates: ‘Israeli democracy, through its promotion of LGBT rights, offers golden handcuffs – a beautiful gift that comes with control – to Israeli queers’ (Puar 2012).
In her definition of homonationalism, she characterises the term in relation to her notion of US sexual exceptionalism, which sustains the American empire. She also defines ‘US sexual exceptionalism’:

One mapping of the folding of homosexuals into the reproductive valorisation of living – technologies – includes the contemporary emergence of ‘sexually exceptional’ US citizens, both heterosexual and otherwise, a formation I term ‘US sexual exceptionalism’. (ibid., p. 3)

Even though her term ‘homonationalism’ has now been adopted in broader areas of social critique, such as the social exclusion of Muslims in the UK, Netherlands and Germany, and pinkwashing in Israel (El-Tayeb, 2012; Puar, 2010, 2011; Schulman, 2011, 2012), Puar argues, in Terrorist Assemblages, that homonationalism in the context of US sexual exceptionalism is a narrative presenting the United States as the heteronormative nation-state, while pointing to its exceptional tolerance of homosexual difference as a sign of its national and cultural supremacy. Thus, although the term US sexual exceptionalism is not mentioned as often as homonationalism, Puar regards the concept of US sexual exceptionalism as essential to analyse the role of homonationalism during the War on Terror in the Bush Jr era following 9/11.

Her notion of US sexual exceptionalism refers not only to the cultural production of the United States as an exceptional nation-state but also to the production of sexual others:

Further, a more pernicious inhabitation of homosexual sexual exceptionalism occurs through stagings of US nationalism via a praxis of sexual othering, one that exceptionalises the identities of US homosexualities vis-à-vis Orientalist constructions of ‘Muslim sexuality’. (ibid., p. 4)

In her argument on US sexual exceptionalism, Puar notes not only a new form of homosexual subject, which is complicit with heteronormative nationalist discourses, but also a process of sexual othering through Orientalist constructions of Muslim sexuality. By examining reactions to the homophobic violence committed by US guards at Abu Ghraib, Puar explains how discourses about Abu Ghraib have produced ideas of homosexuality as taboo and of sexual repression in Muslim culture, while representing US society as occupying a superior position of knowledge regarding Muslim sexuality,
as well as being a liberated society in which homosexuals are able to enjoy their freedom. She writes:

Given the unbridled homophobia (among other phobias) demonstrated by the US guards, it is indeed ironic, yet predictable, that the United States nonetheless emerges as sexually exceptional: less homophobic and more tolerant of homosexuality (and less tainted by misogyny and fundamentalism) than the repressed, modest, nudity-shy Middle East. (ibid., p. 94)

Thus, US sexual exceptionalism functions through the construction of sexual others to secure US supremacy and cultural boundaries, besides inscribing homosexuality, in certain forms, as a nationally and morally acceptable subject in US society.

Even the queer subject, she argues, is a part of US sexual exceptionalism. According to Puar, the queer agential subject has been fathomed as outside the norms of religion or, indeed, as an agency against them. While a ‘queer’ is characterised as a secular, resisting and transgressive subject with a white, Western or Westernised body, Arabs and Muslims are regarded as homophobic, fundamentalist and improper sexual subjects.

Visually, the body reclaims the faggotry, the effeminacy, the failed masculinity, always already installed in the naming of the terrorist, staging further defiance in the face of such easily rendered accusations of being a terrorist. The (white) secular norms by which queerness abides contributes greatly to (racist) Islamo-and homophobic representations of terrorists… Queer secularity is constitutive of and constituted by the queer autonomous liberal subject against and through the reification of the very pathological irrational sexualities that are endemic to discourses of terrorist culpability. (ibid., p. 14)

In the argument on queerness, Puar stresses how a certain body is supposed to be a proper ‘queer’ subject, while bodies of Arabs and Muslims are regarded as perversely sexualised ones outside the cultural representations of ‘queer’.

She also questions multiculturalism as a cultural movement that includes other cultures and ethnicities within US society, and also applies her discussion of racial formations to a context of multiculturalism in contemporary liberal policy. Puar, following Rey Chow (2002), argues that the ‘ascendancy of whiteness’, to which modern biopolitics has contributed, incorporates multicultural bodies complicit with this ascendancy in contemporary liberal society. She notes, however, that such incorporation is limited by class, gender and, especially, sexuality. Even though liberal diversity includes the ethnic minorities, this inclusion redefines the realm of exclusion because a
person whom a liberal society welcomes is ‘usually straight, and usually has access to material and cultural capital (both as a consumer and as an owner), and is in fact often male’ (Puar 2007, p. 25). Puar argues that heteronormativity is the most pivotal of attributes, which, in many cases, distinguishes tolerable ethnics from intolerable ethnics, as ‘certain Orientalist queernesses (failed heteronormativity, as signalled by polygamy, pathological homosociality) are a priori ascribed to terrorist bodies’ (ibid., p. 25).

Puar radicalises a cultural logic of differentiating US society from others in her account of US sexual exceptionalism and homonationalism. Her analysis of cultural movements, which seem to open up the society to gender, sexual, ethnic and racial minorities, always reduces them to the narrative of US sexual exceptionalism as well as racial hegemony in the US society, even interpreting them as core elements in sustaining US hegemony. Furthermore, Puar emphasises differences created by the dichotomy between US sexual politics and its sexual others, so-called ‘Muslim sexuality’, by rendering them as metonymical relationships between biopolitics and necropolitics, such as those between US citizens and terrorists, or Israel and Palestine. In her book, she attempts to examine ‘the process of disaggregating exceptional queer subjects from queer racialised populations in contemporary US politics rather than proffer an overarching paradigm of biopolitical sexuality that resolves these dilemmas’ (ibid., p. 35). Her narrative itself not only exemplifies the dichotomy but also performatively creates and emphasises an abyss between the West and ‘Oriental others’, who are a cultural construct of the West.

2-3. The Limits of Narrative of Dichotomy in Transnational Politics

It is undeniable that Puar’s discussion of homonationalism has been innovative and influential, in both academia and activism, in its analysis of the contemporary sexual politics of Western societies. It offers a new viewpoint from which to argue about Euro-American centric discourses of gender and sexuality. The dualistic narrative of the West vis-à-vis Oriental others is also distinctive among criticisms inspired by her argument. Maya Mkdashi, a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University's Department of Anthropology, correlates Clinton’s ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ speech with a pinkwashing movement promoted by the Israeli Government on the website Jadaliyya of the Arab Studies Institution, which provides both local news and critical analysis of the Arab world. She notes how a discourse of human rights itself regulates people’s lives through
identities of ‘LGBTQ’ and repeats a colonial distinction between people who deserve protection along with political rights, and people who ‘enjoy’ full civil rights as human beings but not political rights. She says:

Today, the promise of ‘gay rights’ for Palestinian goes something like this: The United States will protect your right to not be detained because as a gay, but will not protect you from being detained because you are Palestinian…

Pinkwashing only makes sense as a political strategy within a discourse of Islamophobia and Arabophobia, and it is part of a large project to anchor all politics within the axis of identity, and identitarian (and identifiable) groups. Thus critics of pinkwashing who assume an international queer camaraderie repeat a central tenet of homonationalism: homosexual should be in solidarity with and empathise with each other because they are homosexual [stress in original]. (Mikdashi 2011)

Her analysis, focusing on the radical difference between the ‘West’ and ‘others/Islam’, is representative of an interpretation of homonationalism following Jasbir Puar. Despite this critique, however, Secretary Clinton actually spoke against Islamophobia in this speech, as well as confirming her position against homophobia: ‘Combating Islamophobia or anti-Semitism is a task for people of all faiths. And the same is true with this struggle for [LGBT] equality’ (Clinton 2011). It is noteworthy that the dichotomy asserted by the homonationalism critique may cause one to overlook one of the characteristics of Clinton’s ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ speech, which tries to avoid a confrontational relationship between the West and Islam.

The narrative of radical dichotomy between the West and Oriental others helps to represent the critique of homonationalism itself as political. However, because the Oriental others are considered as a cultural construction of Western sexual politics, the politics of the criticism of homonationalism tends to dwell in a self-critique of the ‘West’, so as to avoid both homonationalism and the construct of sexual others. Ironically, Puar’s expansion of the critique of homonationalism reaches so far as to find ‘homonationalism’ in anti-homonationalism movements, especially in ‘pinkwatching’ which is an international movement challenging Israel’s pinkwashing (Puar and Mikdashi 2012). In an article by Puar and Mikdashi, they argue that pinkwatching reiterates the narrative of pinkwashing by focusing on sexuality, identity, homophobia and queer solidarity rather than pointing out the racism, colonialism and homonationalism in pinkwashing.
Pinkwashing produces endless questions about the status of gays, lesbians, and trans Palestinians in the West Bank and in Gaza, as well as in Israel. Pinkwatching in the United States not only produces these very same questions, but it also responds to them citing the presence of Arab and Palestinian activist groups and individuals in the Middle East as proof that there are native and authentic LGBT activists in the Arab world. In this way, the relationship between pinkwashing and pinkwatching produces a call and response feedback loop that stabilises the discourse that pinkwatching claims to critique. (Puar and Mikdashi 2012)

They regard pinkwatching’s ideas of sexuality as American-centrist, employing the terms ‘queerness’ and homophobia in the United States sense, despite applying them to Palestinian contexts. In doing so, they insist that the pinkwatching movement, as well as pinkwashing itself, both promote globalisation of the term homophobia, which is ‘a purportedly transparent form of violence that all queers are subject to, regardless of geopolitical locations or historical, cultural, and economic variability’ (Puar and Mikdashi 2012).

In addition, Puar and Mikdashi criticise the simplified narrative of pinkwatching, which isolates transnational sexual politics from other historical, political and cultural elements supporting US and Israeli colonialism.

Pinkwashing ignores the settler-colonialism of Israel. Unfortunately, pinkwatching ignores the settler-colonialism of the United States and its own entrenchment in homonationalism. More often than not, pinkwatchers in the United States rightly critique the structural violence of settler colonialism in Palestine, but do so without recognising the fact that they (we) are also settlers who live in a settler colony. Often, critique of the illegal settlements in Palestine is rendered through a disidentification with those settlers, rather than recognition of a common historical, political, and ongoing practice of settling the United States.

The United States is Israel’s greatest benefactor – its diplomatic and military blank check. Without a critique of US complicity in Israel’s occupation of Palestine, queer solidarity efforts are reproducing homonationalist versions of queerness and colluding with US imperialism...

In addition to shared history and practice of settler colonialism, the United States and Israel are the largest benefactors of homonationalism, as it operates on three scalar registers: internal, territorial, and global. (Puar and Mikdashi 2012)

Their intersectional critique of US and Israeli colonialism in terms of homonationalism is meaningful for the consideration of contemporary transnational sexual politics. However, their critique of homonationalism, which functions transnationally in their discussion, is almost always stuck in reflections on American politics, tracing these back
from the Israeli occupation of Palestine to the origins of US history as a settler nation. Here, the authors confine themselves to talking about US politics, while pinkwatching activists work for Palestine liberation and try to build a relationship with Palestinian activists.

In response to Puar and Mikdashi’s critique, Heike Schotten and Haneen Maikey, Palestinian and American anti-pinkwashing activists, criticise Puar and Mikdashi’s argument for relying too heavily on the conceptual framework of homonationalism and for coming dangerously close, in their criticisms, to a rehearsal of academic critique at the expense of contributing to movement building (Schotten and Maikey 2012). What is questionable in Puar and Mikdashi’s critique in this context is that their argument itself fails to fall outside of their critical target: US exceptionalism. In their criticism of homonationalism, they only discuss politics in the context of the West, especially US politics, even though they consider the politics of homonationalism to be expanding globally. Their overemphasis on the influence of US politics can be interpreted as part of US exceptionalism, causing other parts of the world to look like passive recipients or ‘victims’ of American politics. Such a narrative is one of the most popular expressions of the Euro-American centrism already discussed in previous chapters: while European or American activism is constructed as authentic political subjects or as the true forebears of the globalisation of sexual politics, other cultures are treated as mere outgrowths of Euro-American politics, lacking agency of their own. Schotten and Maikey point out:

Initially, pinkwatching activism was based on the dismantling of Palestinian erasure, the reclamation of international queer spaces, and the promotion of new queer Palestinian bodies, images and voices. Today, pinkwatching continues to uncover and make visible the racial, ethnic, and sexual violence that informs Zionist ideology.

For these reasons, the authors’ focus on ‘authenticity’ (sorry – at least one of us does not know how to articulate a non-authentic queer Palestinian voice) is limited by a critique of homonationalism that ignores the specificities of Palestine. This oversight may be read as slightly patronising, suggesting that Palestinian queers are either too naïve or lacking in enough critical insight to discern between activist commitments that are appropriate and those that tokenise them. More problematic still are the ways in which an emphasis on authenticity ultimately overlooks queer Palestinians’ strategic uses of recognition and visibility. (Schotten and Maikey 2012)

Puar and Mikdashi’s criticism, which too heavily emphasises homonationalism in the US context, ironically helps to erase the possibility of the queer Palestinian subject emerging.
Puar and Mikdashi’s critique of pinkwatching soundly indicates the limits of Puar’s criticism of homonationalism as a global phenomenon. Her term ‘homonationalism’ is fruitful for conceptualising the relationships between contemporary queer politics and a new form of emerging nationalism and imperialism in Western societies. However, the critique of homonationalism tends to discuss global sexual politics only within Western contexts, dwelling in self-criticism of the West while carefully rendering suspect the existence of sexual others in relation to the West, as if they were their own constructed others. Firstly, such scepticism forecloses an alternative way of recognising the others while consolidating self-awareness through continuous reflection. After all, this criticism results in constructing a new Euro-American centrism and erasing its others. Secondly, discourses focusing on self-criticism of the West fail to see where the narrative of American or Western sexual politics can interact with strategies of ‘local’ activism in the global age. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse global phenomena representing the sexual politics of homonationalism both from Euro-American viewpoints and in other cultural contexts that seem to be politically influenced by it.

It is noteworthy that Puar’s argument on homonationalism was developed during the presidency of George W. Bush. Thus, the characteristic dichotomy in her analysis of homonationalism in the United States might reflect the narrative of George W. Bush administration on the War on Terror and their promotion of American exceptionalism. Thus, there is a question of how far her conceptual frame can be applicable to the policy of the Obama administration.

Michael Ignatieff (2005) points out three types of American exceptionalism: the United States exempts itself from international human rights and humanitarian law convention; the United States maintains double standards between their friends and enemies; and the United States denies jurisdiction to human rights laws within its own domestic law (p.3). He distinguishes types of explanations of American exceptionalism: realism, culture and institutions. Along with the US political and legal institutions and international power that enable the US to be ‘exceptional’ in the international community, Ignatieff points out American culture, which has a desire for moral leadership: ‘American presidents have articulated a strongly messianic vision of the American role in promoting rights abroad’ (Ignatieff 2005, p. 13). Similarly, Harold Hongju Koh relates, on American exceptionalism:
I must address a fifth, much-overlooked dimension in which the United States is genuinely exceptional in international affairs. Looking only at the half-empty part of the glass, I would argue, obscures the most important respect in which the United States has been genuinely exceptional, with regard to international affairs, international law, and promotion of human rights: namely, in its exceptional global leadership and activism. To this day, the United States remains the only superpower capable, and at times willing, to commit real resources and make real sacrifices to build, sustain, and drive an international system committed to international law, democracy, and the promotion of human rights. (Koh 2003, p.1487)

In terms of LGBT rights, the Obama administration seems to find its exceptional role as being a world leader of humans rights rather than being a solely ‘exceptional’ nation of democracy and justice in the world. In the next section, I will analyse a narrative of ‘Gay Rights Are Human Rights’ as exemplifying the narrative of the subsequent Obama administration’s policy on LGBT human rights, and will then discuss the contemporary influence of American sexual politics in Japan.

2-4. The Narrative of ‘Gay Rights Are Human Rights’ and the Politics of Progress

On 6 December 2011, the US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton delivered her speech ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ in Geneva in recognition of International Human Rights Day. Her speech and the presidential memorandum issued by President Obama and released on the same day are regarded as the historical landmark statements on LGBT rights and on the new US diplomatic policy, and were welcomed by international LGBT human rights groups as affirming the Obama administration’s vow to fight for LGBT people (Hudson 2011). The New York Times reported that her speech was symbolically important, like President Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy emphasising human rights, although neither Obama nor Clinton specified how they might lead the world on this controversial issue even amongst US allies (Mayer & Cooper, 2011).

Reading Secretary Clinton’s Geneva speech, it is notable that a narrative of ‘US sexual exceptionalism’, which critics of homonationalism stress, is rarely expressed. Rather, it is significant that the speech is carefully written to avoid asserting US superiority or cultural conflicts between the West and others, the only exceptional part

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43 For example, Pride London, and the global LGBT organisation Kaleidoscope Trust, honoured Hillary Clinton by offering the ‘World LGBT Award’ for her speech in 2012 (Reid-Smith 2012).
being her declaration that the United States, and the millions of American people, supported LGBT men and women worldwide. The BBC report notes her denial of gayness as a Western invention:

‘Gay people are born into and belong to every society in the world’, Mrs Clinton said in Geneva. ‘Being gay is not a Western invention. It is a human reality’. (The BBC 2011c)

Her narrative, which begins with the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, tries to present human rights as universal values; therefore, in her speech, she tries to convince audiences that progress towards acceptance of human rights, including LGBT rights, is inevitable. Speaking against cultural relativism, she noted that human rights were universal and cut across all religious and cultural differences. Thus, progress, which actualises such universal values beyond ‘superficial’ differences in the world, is an essential concept in her speech.

Clinton defines progress in three domains: truth, politics and morality.

Firstly, she establishes the principle that truth is superior to belief. Clinton says: ‘Progress starts with honest discussion. Now, there are some who say and believe that all gay people are paedophiles, that homosexuality is a disease that can be caught or cured, or that gays recruit other to become gay. Well, these notions are simply not true’ (Clinton 2011). She stresses that discussion allows people to reach understanding of these issues and change their ‘wrong’ beliefs. Although she focuses here on the importance of discussion and conversation, she presupposes that the truth will overcome ‘beliefs’ that are relevant to cultural and religious differences.

Secondly, she insists that laws precede broader recognition of rights and have an educational effect: progress comes from a change in law. Her comments are intended to refute the opinion that a government should not act for LGBT rights when the people in the State are not ready for it. At the same time, however, she supports the idea that politics is the special domain in which progress emerges.

Thirdly, morality, including such characteristics as sympathy and compassion, is characterised as the cognitive field in which one changes in the direction of progress. She says:

Progress comes from being willing to walk a mile in someone else’s shoes. We need to ask ourselves, ‘How would it feel if it were a crime to love the person I
love? How would it feel to be discriminated against for something about myself that I cannot change?’ This challenge applies to all of us as we reflect upon deeply held beliefs, as we work to embrace tolerance and respect for the dignity of all persons, and as we engage humbly with those with whom we disagree in the hope of creating greater understanding. (Clinton 2011)

These notions of truth, politics and morality are plain expressions of the ideas of the Enlightenment, while her notion of progress is deeply influenced by modern ideas of knowledge, politics and morality, such as those discussed by Jürgen Habermas. Characterising modernity as an unfinished project to ‘encourage the rational organisation of social relations’, he referred to the Marquis de Condorcet, who believed that the Arts and Sciences would promote ‘the understanding of self and world, the progress of morality, justice in social institutions, and even human happiness’ (Habermas 1997, p. 45).

Indeed, Clinton’s vision of progress can be regarded as Eurocentric, as well as Colonialist, in its possible effects. She proclaims the universality of human rights of LGBT people as going beyond religious and cultural differences, then legitimates the political reforms that she regards as important with the notion of progress, including cultural and moral enforcements. As Gauri Viswanathan (1988) points out in the context of British colonialism in India, cultural assimilation was the most effective form of political action, while the figure of the ‘ideal’ man was a tool of colonialism and governance. She quotes the statement by a high-ranking British official in the Bombay administration:

The Natives must either be kept down by a sense of our power, or they must willingly submit from a conviction that we are more wise, more just, more humane, and more anxious to improve their condition than any other rulers they could possibly have. (Viswanathan 1988)

However, when we compare Clinton’s speech with the statement of the British official in the nineteenth century quoted above, it is characteristic that her speech denies national supremacy rather than claiming that her country is the best in the world. In the statement of the British official, what was at stake was the Indian people’s view of who would be the best ruler. By contrast, Clinton has repeatedly stressed the fact that the United States also has made many mistakes. She mentioned the sodomy law that existed until 2003 in the USA, as well as the violence and harassment that LGBT people currently face.
Hence, if we follow Puar’s critique of US sexual exceptionalism, it is possible to interpret Clinton’s narrative as constructing an exceptional image of the USA on the basis of its ability to acknowledge errors and to move towards progress even though it has made many mistakes, as other countries have. More importantly, however, what is distinctive in her speech is the fact that she mentions many countries outside the West, such as South Africa, Colombia, Argentina, Nepal and Mongolia, which have changed their laws to protect gay people. The universality of the US historical path and the legitimacy of US diplomatic policy for LGBT people are secured by such countries, which appear to be following the policy of the United States on human rights even though they do not share the same cultural and religious background.

Just after Clinton’s speech in Geneva, gay news media, such as Advocate.com and Seattle’s LGBT News, reported positive reactions by women’s and LGBT rights activists from Asia, Russia, East Europe, South Africa and Africa (Anderson-Minshall 2011; Seattle’s LGBT News 2011). For justification of their political insistence on LGBT rights, not only Clinton’s narrative but also gay news media in the United States, gave importance to the third countries in the area of global sexual politics; that is, those which are neither the ‘West’ nor the countries strongly against LGBT rights, and which have been changing their social system as the West has done already. These third countries are used as representative of the historical path that Clinton called progress, and which the world must embark upon. The third countries can be characterised as follows: ‘even though they are culturally, politically, and historically different, they still agree with and follow us’. Through comparing and understanding their political changes for LGBT people in terms of changes in Western countries, the third countries will become the representatives of historical movements.

This is the political dynamic that Puar’s critique of homonationalism, which focuses on radical differences in sexual politics between the US and others, or between the West and Islam, opts to miss. While US sexual exceptionalism certainly relies on the belief in US cultural and political supremacy, such a representation of supremacy always rests not only on others’ inferiority but also on others’ support, which seems to follow from supremacy.

In Clinton’s narrative, LGBT rights represent new progress in human rights. However, her narrative of progress produces oppositional effects as well. Firstly, Clinton’s narrative of progress characterised by truth, politics and morality already presupposes the notion of LGBT rights as they should be; as a result, it ironically indicates,
rather, the terrain of ignorance. According to a Pinknews report, Clinton told an audience at Syracuse University that many foreign leaders in Africa and Asia considered gay rights and women’s rights to be a ‘totally foreign concept’ (Park, 2012). Her comment is reported as a kind of joke about cultural differences rather than a political problem, although it was possible that the political leaders pretended to be ‘ignorant’ in order to avoid political intervention by the USA, or seemed ‘ignorant’ just because they did not agree with her ideas. Through the suggestion of ‘ignorance’, her concept of progress can disturb political dialogue by treating the denial of LGBT rights as a form of ignorance rather than as a political strategy. Secondly, even though Clinton tries to present the concept of progress as universal, her attitude towards other cultures undermines her universalism. As the Pinknews report is nuanced so as to suggest Western superiority towards other areas such as Asia and Africa, her universalism entails the local nationalism of the USA or Western European societies. Thirdly, the dichotomy between universality and cultural differences, or between progress and cultural backwardness, fails to pay attention to the complicated political negotiations between traditional culture and new, or foreign, culture in the local context. It can be represented simply as ‘Westernisation’, ‘political success’ or ‘progress’, as in Secretary Clinton’s account. This narrative is not only a form of cultural imperialism, but also secures the idea that the West is the origin, even though Clinton tried to avoid such Euro-American centrism.

The Euro-American centrism in the discourses on sexual politics is not a new subject at all in Sexuality Studies, especially when the topic is global LGBT politics, as Puar and Mikdashi (2012) already pointed out. Yet, considering the Gay Rights and Human Rights speech, it is characteristic that the US government starts to appropriate a Euro-American centric narrative for the language of LGBT politics itself. As LGBT politics has been increasingly considered an important political issue, major news media, both in Japan and in other countries, have gradually reported on LGBT conditions in Japan. Thus, the Euro-American centric narrative of LGBT politics now seems to affect not only ideas of sexuality, such as a category of identity or the discourses of academia and activism, but also the language of politics used by governments and global mass media. In the next section, I will analyse how the Euro-American centric narrative in governmental statements and major news media affects Japanese politics and its representations.

3. LGBT Rights: New American Values
3-1. American Democracy and the Representation of LGBT Politics in Japan by the News Media in the English Language

As Clinton explicitly states, the discourses that represent the progress of human rights or democracy through LGBT liberation have emerged in public to a remarkable extent since the 2000s. For example, the legitimation of same-sex marriage, which symbolises the achievement of equality for gays and lesbians, is discussed in terms of democracy, with the legitimation of same-sex marriage considered representative of the progress of democracy itself. R. Claire Snyder writes:

> By the end of the book, I hope to convince the reader that the fundamental principles of American democracy not only allow, but also require the legalisation of same-sex marriage. While it may be true at this moment in time that the majority of American citizens oppose allowing lesbians and gays the equal right to marry, it is my position that democracy cannot be reduced to a process of majority rule; it requires a number of other principles as well. Most importantly, by definition democracy requires equality among citizens in order to exist. [Stress in original] (Snyder 2005, p. 2)

Snyder discusses the legalisation of same-sex marriage as the symbol of equality and American democracy. Similarly, Michael Bloomberg writes in the Guardian online: ‘Across Europe and the US support for same-sex marriage is growing, and for a simple reason: it is consistent with democracy’s promise of equal rights for all people’ (Bloomberg 2013). After the historic decisions of the US Supreme Court in cases of same-sex marriage in 2013, the Defense of Marriage Act and California Proposition 8, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg told the National Constitution Centre that acceptance of gay marriage reflects the genius of the US Constitution (The Washington Post 2013). In these discourses, the progress of gay rights, especially the legalisation of same-sex marriage, is regarded as the result of progress not merely of ‘democracy’ but of American democracy.

The American-centric narrative of gay liberation is employed in contemporary American news media to describe Japanese politics concerning sexual minorities. For instance, the news of the first elected openly gay male politicians, Ishikawa Taiga and Ishizaka Wataru, in Japan in April 2011 was widely reported compared to other LGBT-related Japanese news by the news media in English. Interestingly, this news is interpreted
as showing Japan’s slow development as a modern democratic country in the context of gay politics, especially compared to American democracy. For example, *The Huffington Post* identifies the first Japanese openly gay politician as Harvey Milk, who was actually the first American openly gay politician 30 years ago (*The Huffington Post* 2011). The report stressed the politician’s intention to work for gay marriage, which is the symbol of gay rights currently spreading among ‘liberal’ states in the US, although he was elected as a member of a ward council in Tokyo that has no power to decide on same-sex marriage in the Japanese political system. This article presupposes that Japan is slowly treading the same path marked out by the United States, as expressed in Secretary Clinton’s narrative.

On *CNNGo*, a reporter directly asked a new gay politician, Ishizaka Wataru, if he also thought that Japan was relatively advanced among Asian countries for its acceptance of gay people, but was still ‘behind’ much of the Western world (Robinson 2011).

This kind of teleological discourse, Clinton’s speech at Geneva being another example, is based on a narrative of the history of sexual minorities along the lines of premodern homoerotic sexuality becoming Westernised as ‘gay’, following which these gays would fight against the repression in their society and transform it into a modern, tolerant, multicultural society like that of America. However, the narrative in the news media, which aims to present American society or Western society as the model of the history of LGBT activism, misrepresented the situation of LGBT politics in Japan. The *Huffington Post*, *CNNGo*, *PinkNews* and *AFP* reported that Ishikawa Taiga is the first openly gay politician in Japan, elected in 2011, and many news media even failed to mention Ishizaka, who was elected at the same time, as one of the first openly gay male politicians.44 Furthermore, in fact, there were already openly gay and transgender politicians in Japan before them: Otsuji Kanako, who was a member of the Osaka Prefectural Assembly, came out as a lesbian when she was in office in 2005, and Kamikawa Aya, a transgender politician, was elected as a member of a Ward Council in 2003. Thus, in the news media in the English language, the legacy of Harvey Milk, the first American openly gay male politician, ironically functions to erase the achievement of female gay and transgender politicians in Japan, through the media’s attempt to report Japanese LGBT politics on the basis of American history.

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44 For example, the *Huffington Post*, *PinkNews* and *AFP* also did not mention Ishizaka Wataru as the first openly gay male politician.
Therefore, applying American LGBT history to Japanese LGBT activism is not only inappropriate but also actually misleading to the audience, as it misrepresents Japanese society. Analysing the narrative of the Japanese organiser of the LGBT news website in Japan, Gay Japan News, Suganuma (2012) points out the presence in the narrative of a ‘Japanese desire to be like the West’ (pp. 175-6)\(^4\). However, in the narrative of the news media reporting the earliest openly gay male politicians, there is rather the Western desire for Japan or Asia to be like the West. This desire further misrepresents Japanese LGBT politics and its history.

4-2. Obama’s America: The ‘New’ Country which Protects LGBT Rights

After Clinton’s speech ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’, it is remarkable that the Obama Administration has started to work internationally for improvements in LGBT rights. Focusing on Japanese-American relations, the government’s educational activities centring on LGBT rights and support for local LGBT groups, including Pride events in Tokyo, are distinctive in Japan\(^4\). These LGBT-related events, held by the US Embassy, are part of the Obama administration’s LGBT-friendly policy, as expressed in the ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ speech and President Obama’s Proclamation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Pride Month, released on 31 May 2011. In the Proclamation, he states:

> Because we recognise that LGBT rights are human rights, my Administration stands with advocates of equality around the world in leading the fight against pernicious laws targeting LGBT persons and malicious attempts to exclude LGBT organizations from full participation in the international system. We led a global campaign to ensure ‘sexual orientation’ was included in the United Nations resolution on extrajudicial execution – the only United Nations resolution that specifically mentions LGBT people – to send the unequivocal message that no matter where it occurs, state-sanctioned killing of gays and lesbians is indefensible. No one should be harmed because of who they are or who they love, and my Administration has mobilised unprecedented public commitments from countries around the world to join in the fight against hate and homophobia. (Obama 2011)

\(^{45}\) I will discuss his argument of international cultural phenomena and LGBT politics in the context of Japan in the next chapter. 

\(^{46}\) The US Embassy supported and put up a booth at Tokyo Rainbow Pride in 2013 and has actively organised LGBT-related educational events for Japanese people since 2011.
As Obama makes clear in the Proclamation, the Obama administration had recognised LGBT rights as an international issue even before Clinton made the same commitment in her speech in Geneva.

In the Proclamation, Obama places the repeal of the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy at the head of his list of achievements for LGBT Americans, such as eliminating discrimination against LGBT Americans in Federal housing programs, prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity in the Federal workplace, establishing the right to visit partners in hospital, and appointing openly LGBT individuals to executive branch and judicial positions.

Since taking office, my Administration has made significant progress towards achieving equality for LGBT Americans. Last December, I was proud to sign the repeal of the discriminatory ‘Don't Ask, Don't Tell’ policy. With this repeal, gay and lesbian Americans will be able to serve openly in our Armed Forces for the first time in our Nation’s history. Our national security will be strengthened and the heroic contributions these Americans make to our military, and have made throughout our history, will be fully recognized. (Obama 2011)

In the political rhetoric of the Obama administration, as well illustrated by the Proclamation, improvements in LGBT rights are closely relevant to US national development, especially national security.

Such political representation of LGBT rights is utilised by the US Embassy in Japan as well. On 4 June 2012, the US Embassy held a reception celebrating LGBT Pride Month and invited around 150 people including Diet members, representatives of LGBT rights and other human rights organisations, business leaders, government officials, religious leaders, academics, students and artists in Japan. As Stars and Stripes, the American newspaper focusing on news of the US armed forces, reported, gay male soldiers in US Forces Japan were invited as well and Stars and Stripes introduced the words of one of these soldiers:

‘I can’t believe I’ve been in the Air Force 23 years living in secret, hiding who I am’, Maschhoff said before heading to the reception, which was closed to the media, ‘and now I’m invited to a reception by the emissary of the president of the United States’. (Reed, 2012)

The political change from a society in which homosexuals had to hide their sexuality to one which welcomes them is often utilised as a narrative representing the progress in
LGBT rights achieved by the Obama administration. On the new website of the US Embassy in Japan, Patrick Linehan, who is Osaka-Kobe Consul General and openly gay, is reported as saying:

Osaka-Kobe Consul General Patrick Linehan spoke about the positive changes within the State Department since he became a Foreign Service Officer in 1984, when being gay was considered a security risk. ‘It made me feel unwelcome. But it never made me want to give up and leave. I knew I had earned my place in our diplomatic service, and I was determined not to be removed by bigotry. So I kept my head down, and I kept quiet for many years, but I remained true to myself and to my identity’. Today, he said, the State Department provides LGBT officers and their families the same respect and rights as all of their colleagues in the diplomatic service. (Embassy of the United States TOKYO 2012)

However, the narrative of a change in American politics from the viewpoint of gay men effectively erases the fact that discriminatory US military regulations still practically prohibit transgender persons to serve (Kerrigan 2012).

Moreover, in the context of Japanese-American relations, the US military in Japan is a more controversial subject than it is in the US context: while, traditionally, Japanese conservatives, especially in the Liberal Democratic party of Japan, which has been the ruling party for most of the time since 1955, have regarded the presence of the US military in Japan as essential for Japanese national security and the US-Japan Alliance, its presence also reiterates the negative legacy of the Japanese Empire. Okinawa was incorporated by Japan in 1879 and now more than 70% of US Forces bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, the place where the most severe ground battles in Japan took place during the Second World War and which belonged to the US until 1972. People in Okinawa have suffered from the noise, accidents, crimes and sexual violence of US troops. Thus, Okinawa has been in (post)colonial relations with both Japan and the United States, and the US troops in Okinawa are one of the symbolic institutions of Japanese history (Sarantakes 2000; Inose 2007). The political representation of improvements in LGBT rights through the American military, from the old institution, which repressed gay and lesbian people, to the new one which protects their rights, can function as an ideology justifying its existence in Japan as the ‘ideal’ institution, which shows and ‘teaches’ the Japanese people how to protect human rights, while hiding Okinawa’s continuing pain.

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47 For more analysis of the Japanese national security agenda in the post-war era, see Hughes (2004).
caused by the military bases. In this case, the representation of LGBT rights can have postcolonial effects in Japanese society, similar to pinkwashing by the Israeli government.

Considering the Obama Administration’s new policy on LGBT rights in international politics, the new representation of LGBT rights through the experiences of gay middle-class men working in the US government, and also often of white people, symbolises the change from the ‘old America’ to the ‘new America’ and is utilised as the model of new human rights, thus promoting American values as well as universal ones.

4-3. LGBT Rights from the United States to Japan

In April 2013, in the final year of his term as US Ambassador to Japan, John Roos contributed an Opinion entitled, ‘Seneca Falls, Selma and Stonewall: Civil rights and equality for all’ to The Asahi Shimbun, one of the biggest national newspapers. In the opinion, he remarks on the significance of gay rights in the context of the US history of improvements in civil rights. He writes:

The inclusion of gay rights in this arc of civil rights struggles highlights Obama’s commitment to equality, for members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community in the United States and also for LGBT persons throughout the world. As the president noted at the United Nations: ‘No country should deny people their rights because of who they love’. (Roos 2013)

Then, he emphasises the US Embassy’s activities for LGBT rights in Japan during his term:

Here in Japan, the US Embassy and our consulates have sponsored a number of activities to emphasise LGBT rights. I have hosted LGBT Pride Receptions at my home to underscore our continuing support of the gay community. Based on the ‘It Gets Better’ campaign in the United States, the US Consulate General in Osaka-Kobe created an ‘It Gets Better’ video in Japanese and organized an event to discuss the prevention of bullying and youth suicide. The US Consulate in Fukuoka hosted a symposium on LGBT rights. And the embassy is now engaged with local LGBT leaders to support Tokyo Rainbow Week from April 27-May 6, during which we will join the effort to celebrate diversity, raise awareness of LGBT issues, and promote dialogue and inclusion among all members of society. (Roos 2013)
In the Opinion, LGBT rights characterise the progress of human rights in Japanese society, thanks to the United States, as well as his legacy as US Ambassador to Japan. Thus, he ends his opinion with an impressive phrase:

In recent years, LGBT persons have made great strides in the advancement of equality – yet hurdles remain. Let us remember the courage of those men and women at Seneca Falls, Selma and Stonewall, and let us continue to make clear that the struggle for gay rights is part and parcel of the long-term fight for civil rights that has made better places of America, Japan and the entire world. (Roos 2013)

As he traces the progress of human rights, embodied in the struggle for civil rights, from Seneca Falls, Selma and Stonewall to Japan and the entire world, the history of the United States becomes the centre of the global human rights narrative, interestingly as Puar and Mikdashi connect from American settler-colonialism to Israeli settler-colonialism when they trace the history of violence. And here, he effectively erases the local history of struggles for human rights and of LGBT activism in Japan.

Actually, the US Embassy’s promotion of LGBT rights seems to be gradually influencing Japanese politics at a policy level. On 1 September 2013, Yodogawa-ku, one of the 24 wards of Osaka, issued the ‘Proclamation of Supporting LGBT individuals (LGBT shien-sengen)’. Sakaki Masafumi, a director of Yodogawa-ku, relates: ‘It is government’s role to support the minority and protect their human rights’ (Endo 2013). According to the Maihichi Shimbum, a Japanese national newspaper, Sakaki arrived at the Proclamation through a lecture by the openly gay US Consulate General in Osaka-Kobe, Patrick Linehan, delivered in Yodogawa-ku, and through listening to LGBT individuals’ stories in the ward (Endo 2013).

On 7 June 2013, the US Embassy held a reception at the Ambassador’s residence celebrating the start of LGBT Pride Month in the United States. On the night of the reception, Kamikawa Aya, a member of Setagaya ward council, posted pictures on Twitter of all the openly LGBT politicians in Japan, including the US Ambassador John Roos and the openly gay US Consul General Patrick Linehan. Kamikawa (2013) explained on Twitter that the room was the same place where Emperor Hirohito met General MacArthur after the Second World War and the picture was taken that later symbolised the Emperor’s Humanity Declaration and Japan’s post-war democracy. It might be a coincidence that they took the pictures in the place where the meeting of the Emperor and General MacArthur symbolised change in Japan; however, this coincidence
interestingly overlaps with the story of Japanese democracy, which the United States ‘forcibly’ institutionalised through the Constitution of Japan as an occupation policy. As a result, the Constitution of Japan and Japanese democracy, famously opposed by Mishima Yukio, have been the target of Japanese nationalists in post-war Japan seeking to regain national pride. On the one hand, it is undeniable that support from the US Embassy can be politically powerful and helpful for the LGBT community and politics in Japan, especially when the Japanese government is not enthusiastic about LGBT human rights policies. On the other hand, however, US support can incidentally function to divorce the activism and politics of sexual minorities from Japanese society through the Americanisation of LGBT politics and human rights.

![Figure 6: From left to right: Ishikawa Taiga, a member of Toshima ward council in Tokyo; Ishizaka Wataru, a member of Nakano ward council in Tokyo; John Roos, the US ambassador; Kamikawa Aya, a member of Setagaya ward council in Tokyo; Otsuji Kanako, the first openly gay member of the Diet; and Patrick Linehan, the US consul general. Courtesy of Shimada Akira, photographer and documentary director.](image)

There are two characteristics of the representations of LGBT matters by the US Embassy in Japan.

Firstly, human rights campaigns for LGBT people in Japan are utilised to justify and suggest the need for US influence in Japanese society, as if the presence of the United States in Japan, including the US military, will secure the improvement of LGBT human rights. Through the Americanisation of LGBT rights, the need for activism on behalf of sexual minorities, as well as LGBT people’s pain, is politically translated as the Japanese need for American influence.
Secondly, the narrative of LGBT rights centred in the context of the United States effectively functions to erase the history of activism for, and by, sexual minorities in Japan. When the improvement in LGBT rights in Japan is discussed in comparison to that in American society, the history of the politics of sexual minorities in Japan is rarely mentioned. For example, although there is a wealth of arguments about coming out in the community in Japan, as discussed in Chapter 3, the US Embassy employed an ‘It Gets Better’ campaign in Japan derived from the US context, without considering the Japanese social context48. As a result, the identities and lives of sexual minorities are again represented as something imported from the United States49. One of the earliest articles in The Huffington Post Japan, which was launched in association with The Asahi Shimbun on 6 May 2013, featured LGBT issues in Japan. The article was entitled ‘Does LGBT take root in Japan? (LGBT wa nihon ni neduku noka)’ and introduced the United States as ‘the leading country of LGBT’ (Huffington Post Japan 2013a). The title implies that there were no ‘LGBT’ people and activism in Japan before the concept of ‘LGBT’ was introduced from the United States.

The Euro-American centric narrative is not new at all in the field of Sexuality Studies in both the Japanese and English languages. However, these discourses are distinctive in respect of their political impact: perhaps for the first time in Japanese history, the US government politically and strategically supports the LGBT community in Japan, and the Euro-American centric narrative on LGBT activism in Japan is widely employed by major mass media in both languages and circulated through the Internet. Therefore, such discourses will be read by, and influence, far more people than could be reached by the discourses of academia and activism before the emergence of the Internet. In the last section, I will explore how the appearance and spread of the Euro-American centric political discourses on LGBT issues affect the contemporary politics of sexual minorities in Japan.

5. Conclusion: the Globalisation of Sexual Politics and the Political Language of LGBT politics

48 For the argument about the problems of the ‘It Gets Better’ campaign in the US context, see Puar (2012).
49 For analysis of the discourses representing gei (gay) as an imported identity in Japan in the 1990s, see Chapter 3.
After the AIDS panic in the 1980s, which functioned to project homosexuality as something foreign outside Japan, the idea of *Tohjisha* emerged as a strategic term for homosexuals in Japan to promote their existence and specific problems in Japanese society. However, a decade later than *Tohjisha* became a popular term, both in academia and activism, it is also utilised to present same-sex desire as a private matter, not the desire that can radically question contemporary politics and social order. On the other hand, while *Tohjisha* is becoming de-politicised, ‘politics’ relating to LGBT people, which is also the movement integrating LGBT people into society for their private rights, rather than radically challenging heteronormativity, is introduced and represented as the ‘foreign’ or Western value again.

It is notable that the promotion of LGBT human rights is strategically conducted by the mainly Western governments as their important value of democracy. While LGBT issues are becoming international human rights issues, as promoted by the Obama Administration and the United Nations’ human rights campaigns, the problems of the political representation of LGBT rights are not discussed as often or, if they are, the discussion tends to consist of self-criticism of the West, as in the critiques of homonationalism. However, such self-criticism can itself reproduce Euro-American centrum and dwell in it. Because LGBT identities and activism are regarded as a Western idea, it results in disconnecting them from the history of activism of sexual minorities in Japan, and from Japanese society itself, as if their politics and demands are part of Americanisation following the path of American democracy, despite being centred on their own lives. What is ironic in this global phenomenon about LGBT issues is that the anti-homonationalism critiques in Queer Studies, which aim to counter the Euro-American centrum and imperialism based on it, can serve for them.

In the last chapter, I will analyse the relationships and the political influence in Japanese society among neoliberalism, the idea of LGBT rights as a private issue, representations of LGBT politics as ‘Westernisation’, and Japanese new nationalism centred in politics in the 2010s, especially after the second Abe administration.
Chapter 6: Marriage in Relation to Nationalism, Neoliberalism and Globalised LGBT Rights in Japan

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored the representation of ‘global’ LGBT politics and the critique of it in the United States, especially regarding homonationalism from the late 2000s to 2010s. During this period, Japanese society leaned towards nationalism and neoliberalism. Under the Koizumi cabinet (2001-2006), neoliberal policy was employed to overcome Japan’s notoriously deflationary economy, called ‘Japan’s lost generation’, while promoting nationalist rhetoric and gestures by domestic politicians aimed at smothering social discontent aroused by drastic reformation: for example, visiting the Yasukuni shrine, which honours Class-A war criminals from the Second World War along with the war dead, thus causing controversy with China and Korea. At the economic level, social inequality has been visibly widened, while national unity is emphasised at the cultural and political level. Japan has become a ‘divided society’, with Ryukogo-taisho, which awards a high-profile prize for the buzzwords of the year, symbolically choosing the phrase ‘kakusa shakai (an unequal society)’ in 2006 – although in the 1970s the Japanese had thought of Japan as the country of the ‘all-Japanese-middle-class mentality’, with approximately 90% of people identifying themselves as ‘middle-class’ (Chiavacci 2008).

On the other hand, while the Euro-American centric narrative of LGBT rights is prominent in Japan, this does not mean that the Japanese government has never done anything for LGBT people in Japan. It is certain that the Japanese government has improved its policy on LGBT issues since the 2000s, albeit at a slow pace. For instance, in 2003, the National Diet passed the Act on Special Cases in Handling Gender for People with Gender Identity (‘GID Act’), allowing an individual with GID to legally change his or her gender in the family registry, on the strict condition that he or she had already undergone sex reassignment surgery, was not married at the time, and had no children. In 2008, the Diet changed the condition from ‘have no children’ to ‘have no minor children’. As Taniguchi Hiroyuki (2013) points out, the ‘GID Act’ appears to have helped in improving the quality of life for many transgender people living in Japan, although it contained critical problems, such as requiring an applicant to undergo sex reassignment surgery and to be unmarried, the latter condition being intended to prevent his or her
marriage status turning into same-sex marriage, which Japanese Family Law does not yet allow. In 2009, due to the Democratic Party of Japan taking power, defeating the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, which had held power almost continually since 1955, the Justice Ministry changed its policy and agreed to provide the certificates necessary for Japanese citizens to marry same-sex foreign citizens overseas. Until then, the Ministry had rejected the issuance of such certificates to Japanese citizens seeking to marry same-sex partners of foreign nationality, even when their partner’s country allowed same-sex marriage, because these marriages are not approved under domestic law in Japan. In 2012, when Patrick Linehan, the US Consul General in Osaka-Kobe, revealed in an interview with The Asahi Shimbun that he was married to his same-sex partner, the Japanese government issued a visa to his husband as a ‘diplomat’s spouse’, taking up the honorary position traditionally given to the Consul General’s wife (The Asahi Shimbun 2012a). At least the Japanese government exceptionally recognises the same-sex couple as ‘family’ in the case of diplomats.

In the last chapter, I will explore how the globalisation of LGBT rights, also adopted by the Japanese government, along with neoliberalism and nationalism in the 2010s, relate to each other in Japan and how they define Japanese sexual politics.

Firstly, I will analyse arguments about the globalisation of sexual culture and politics in the context of Asian society and point out the undisputed premises of the discourses of global sexual culture and politics, especially those discourses that focus on the locality of movement of globalisation. Through this examination, I will show how the superiority of the West is constructed through arguments of globalisation.

Secondly, I will explore the paradoxical progress of LGBT rights in Japan; while these rights are considered expanded in Japan, the security of privacy of sexually non-normative people has actually been diminished for vulnerable people in Japan compared to the past. Through analysing the political situation, I will point out that LGBT rights in Japan are coming to be represented as part of the new lifestyle of the West, signifying the privileges of the cultural and economic elite.

Finally, I will explore the political discussions of LGBT rights in Japan as stimulated by the introduction of ‘gay marriage’ in the Shibuya ward in Tokyo in 2015. I will investigate how, under the new Japanese nationalism of the Prime Minister Abe

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50 Minister of Justice Tanigaki Sadakazu answered, in the Legal Affairs Committee, that it was an exceptional measure applying only to diplomats. For details, see the 183rd Diet Legal Affairs Committee (2013).
Shinzo, and international pressure for LGBT rights in anticipation of the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics in 2020, ‘LGBT rights’ have been transformed within Japanese society.

2. Discussions surrounding Globalisation and the Role of the Internet and Information

2-1. Queries on Global Sexual Politics and Asian Local Contexts

In their book *Mobile Cultures: New Media in Queer Asia*, published in 2003, its editors Chris Berry, Fran Martin and Audrey Yue insist that the recent emergence of gay and lesbian communities in Asia is closely correlated with the development of information technology in the region: ‘The fluidity and ubiquity of information, from storage and image to media markets, has increased with digitisation, making it more powerful and accessible. Information has crossed national boundaries, enabled global gay and lesbian coalitions, and formed new queer cultures incorporating Asian imaginaries’ (Berry, Martin and Yue 2003, p. 1). According to Berry, Martin and Yue, the new information technology creates two kinds of possibilities for Asian queer communities. Firstly, it contributes to these communities in Asia, allowing new kinds of connectivity and increasing self-awareness for queer people in Asia. Secondly, such globalisation of sexual cultures, enabled by the new media, redefines the locality of sexual cultures.

With an emphasis on the new sense of locality following the emergence of globalisation by the new media, Berry, Martin and Yue point out the Eurocentrism present in discussions of globalisation, and challenge presumptions that ‘globalisation’ is synonymous with homogenisation in the realm of sexuality. Addressing discussions of globalisation by neo-Marxist theorists, such as Masao Miyoshi, Fredric Jameson, Michel Hardt, Antonio Negri and so on, Berry, Martin and Yue criticise their focus on global capitalism as ‘a homogenising view of cultural globalisation’ and ‘the erasure of cultural difference’ (Berry, Martin and Yue 2003, pp. 3-4) because, in neo-Marxist discussions, the process of globalisation is reduced to cultural ‘Americanisation’ (Jameson 2000) or the new ‘empire’ (Negri and Hardt 2000), which Berry, Martin and Yue regard as a highly Eurocentric notion. Rather, they insist that it is theoretically fruitful to contemplate the locality that mediates the effect of globalisation:
The more nuanced approach to the intricacies of cultural flow in the era of globalisation does not claim that cultural forms and identities emanating from the United States have now altogether ceased to act as a compelling influence in cultures worldwide. Rather, it asks that we recognise that Americanisation is not the only influence and that the effects of American culture are not felt equally or in the same way at every location. Such an approach, we believe, has much to contribute to the postcolonial project of ‘decentering the West’ by challenging narrowly Eurocentric forms of knowledge. [Stress in original] (Berry, Martin and Yue 2003, pp. 4-5)

According to Berry, Martin and Yue, Eurocentric knowledge can be challenged by analysing the globalisation of sexuality while focusing on the locality, in order to emphasise the disjuncture and instability of the process, rather than describing it merely as Americanisation or Westernisation.

2-2. Gay Politics and the Internet in Japan

Suganuma Katsuhiko, a Japanese Queer Theorist, conceptualises the cross-cultural effect of globalisation, Berry, Martin and Yue note, as ‘contact moment(s)’, which refers to a ‘certain historical moment (or a series of those moments) that allows us to imagine the discursive conditions and effects enabled by cross-culturation’ (Suganuma 2012, p. 18). Following Berry, Martin and Yue’s case for globalisation focusing on the locality, Suganuma analyses the Japanese gay news site in the 2000s through his concept of ‘contact moment(s)’. Suganuma examines and recontextualises Japanese local LGBT discourses in cyberspace in the context of the globalisation of sexual cultures and politics.

In his research, Suganuma focuses on the World Wide Web site Gay Japan News [GJN], launched in 2005 by the Japanese Mochizuki Hiroshi and his American partner, for the distribution of LGBT-related international news to a Japanese audience. In 2007, GJN was introduced as ‘Japan’s largest LGBT news site’, having ‘about 35 additional contributors located both in and outside of Japan’ (Keiser 2007).

Suganuma observes that GJN intends to ‘educate’ Japanese people, thus presupposing that Western gay culture is ‘advanced’. In the interview, the Japanese founder, Mochizuki, explains his personal motivation for the gay news site:

I was always looking over my partner's shoulder while he was checking out English LGBT news sites. Overseas it's completely normal to have sites devoted to LGBT news, but there is very little information in Japan. At the time same sex marriage laws and partnership laws were in the news, and I thought that if that
information could be shared with people here, that might be a good way to help Japan start to change. (Keiser 2007)

Suganuma also pays attention to his words, as a chief editor of GJN, in an article in the web version of the English daily, *The Japan Times*: ‘we are trying to educate Japanese people about the advances in gay rights around the world’ (Larkin 2006; Suganuma 2012, p. 159). Suganuma stresses that the articles in GJN are mainly about homosexuality-related news throughout the world, and are translated and edited into the Japanese language from various sources in English, while less attention is paid to local issues in Japan. He reports:

Undeniably, the writing varies article by article according to the translators’ abilities and individual style, yet each article follows the conventions of journalistic writing. That is, while GJN’s stated aim is to ‘educate Japanese people’ by providing ‘advanced’ knowledge about homosexuality overseas, the articles themselves are often written in an objective style. Yet the composition and design of the portal page can be read as a reflection of GJN’s intent and purpose. The homepage mainly foregrounds international news as ‘Today’s Headlines’ which is far more frequently updated than a small section of local (Japanese) ‘information’ that is located at the bottom of the page. It can be interpreted that the composition of the website strictly follows the editorial commentary quoted above whereby Western gay culture is deemed as ‘advanced’ and ‘mobile’ whereas Japan’s queer culture is ‘backward’ and ‘static’. (Suganuma 2012, p. 160)

In addition, Suganuma shows how the representations of ‘gay liberation’ in the website are marked by class and race. For example, he indicates an advertisement for fee-paying ‘English lessons’, which reads ‘GJN English lessons aim to provide a gay-friendly English learning environment while studying about homosexual [cultures] around the world’ accompanied by an image of a smiling white male teacher (*ibid.*, p. 160). Suganuma interprets such representations of a mixture of English-speaking ability and gay-friendliness as ‘the implication that it is only via a white English-speaker that Japanese gay men can find such an “open environment” for obtaining global queer knowledge, which symbolises GJN’s use of the West as a sort of imagined fantasy space’ (*ibid.*, p. 160). Similarly, Suganuma analyses an advertisement for the ‘first gay charity ski event in Japan’, organised by GJN, the profit from which is to be used for an LGBT community centre in Japan. The photo of the advertisement shows a white man clad in ski-wear, shirtless and with buttocks half-exposed, despite ‘the fact that the charity event itself will be held in Japan and participants will presumably be predominantly Japanese’
Suganuma argues that, through GJN’s usage of a white male model for the gay charity ski event in Japan, ‘the mobility and access (in the context of commodified spatiality) embodied by middle class white men who reside in Western Europe and North America have acted as a metonym for “ultimate liberation” and “freedom”’ and ‘an invitation to imagine Japanese gay men as being like Western gay men: all members of the global gay citizenry’; thus, it represents ‘the fantasy or desire of “being like the West”’ (ibid., pp. 162-3).

Suganuma interprets GJN’s representations of Western society as the ‘advanced gay society’, not merely as proof of the global dissemination of Western gay identity and culture in the Internet age, but as a fantasy of the Japanese, which produces the side-effect of recognising the reality of Japanese queer culture. Referring to Rebecca Suter’s reading of the Japanese novelist Murakami Haruki, Suganuma writes:

For Murakami, the fictive West functions as a fantasy with which to contact the reality of Japan, or expose the relationship between the self and the conditions of its reality. What is more, as is central to Jackson’s contention, the process of finding reality through fantasy is not to consolidate reality, but to seek reality’s discursive limits. In other words, such a dialogic comparison allows us to see the constructed nature of each reality in which we live. Although working in a different context, I find Suter’s reading of Murakami’s work helpful in discussing GJN’s use of the image of the West. In particular, the idea that the use of foreign reference is a device for realising the local culture, as well as its constructedness, is central to my reading of GJN. GJN’s friendly reference to the West can be read as analogous to the ways in which Murakami appropriates things ‘Western’. Furthermore, Suter argues that Murakami’s work is not only self-serving in terms of fulfilling his own personal concerns, but provides readers with the opportunity to imagine different worlds through which to put their own identities and lives into different contexts. (ibid., p. 167)

Furthermore, Suganuma examines ways of recognising queer situations in Japanese society and of constructing Japanese queer identity in cyberspace, as reflected by GJN’s appropriation of Western society.

Recalling audience interactivity in cyberspace, Suganuma intriguingly draws attention to audience feedback on GJN’s Bulletin Board System (BBS). For instance, he mentions a thread entitled ‘fukkatsu! Gei japan nyusu ni tsukkomi o ireru sure (Revival! A thread for those who have a “word” to say to Gay Japan News)’, in which a reader accuses GJN of being too Euro-American centric. He also refers to polemics criticising the Euro-American centric narrative of GJN in the threads entitled ‘doseikon ni tsuite (About same-sex marriage)’ and ‘hinon no gei wa reberu ga hikuika? (Is the level of
Japanese gays low?), through these polemics, emerging as the problematisation of the West/non-West binary, Suganuma shows how readers ‘rediscover’ the queer history of Japanese society and redefine the localness of Japan’s queer culture. What is important in his reading of the multi-layered discourses on the BBS is that the local queer identity has emerged through diverse voices, and that the interactivity that contributes to local queerness is not determined in advance, being open to the future:

The binary of the West and Japan, ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’, was ubiquitous in GJN’s cyberspace. Yet this binary did not necessarily eradicate the local Japanese queer self in the context of globalisation. What was at stake was that the multiple forms of locality were recognised, then refined, challenged and transformed. GJN can function as a space, like Murakami’s literature, for many users to realise the realities as well as the limits of Japan’s gay culture through imagining the West. (ibid., pp. 173-174)

Suganuma’s perceptive reading of interactivity between a fantasy and desire directed towards the West and a local identity in cyberspace indicates the limits of the simplified narrative offered by critics of globalisation’s Euro-American centrism, especially in the Internet age.

2-3. The Double Bind between Human Rights and Transcultural Identity

Both Berry, Martin and Yue’s criticism of the Euro-American centric narrative within globalisation, and Suganuma’s alternative reading of Japanese local queer identity in cyberspace as reflected by globalisation, effectively reveal the limits of the critique of globalisation as the ‘Americanisation’ of the rest of the world. In particular, Suganuma’s study of localisation and the identification of Japanese queer culture, as inspired by the image of Western societies, shows the cultural dynamism that the globalisation of sexuality can create, and the way in which the criticism of globalisation as Euro-American centrism has overlooked it. Their studies, focusing on localness permeated by transcultural effects, reveal what general theorisations of globalisation can fail to grasp. However, both arguments present an intriguing assumption as the basis of their discussion of globalisation: while they treat political, economic and technological phenomena stemming from the West as ‘global’, cultural phenomena, especially identity and discourses emerging in Asia, are regarded as ‘local’. Here, I will analyse Suganuma’s
discussion of how the dualism between the global as Western and the local as Asian also contextualises relationships between the politics and culture of Japan.

Analysing the discourses inspired by GJN, Suganuma argues that references to the West paradoxically result in constructing *Japanese identity*. Suganuma writes:

I asked myself whether a website such as GJN represents a desire to depart and move away from Japaneseness, or alternatively to stick to or invoke it? As I have pointed out in this chapter, at GJN an imperative to ‘become like the West’ is evident. At the same time, all the references to the West shed light, in return, on the domain of ‘not being the West’: Japan. Thus they can also be read as a mean to reflect back upon who queer Japan could be or wishes to become … As he [the Japanese creator of GJN] confessed in his interview, his fundamental motivation was his desire to bring change to Japan, and make progress *within Japan*. It is in this sense that it can be said that GJN, from its inception, is a very local, in other words, *Japanese*, project. Far from moving away from Japaneseness, Japanese queerness needed to be recognised in the ‘other’ in order to change itself. (Suganuma 2012, pp. 175-6)

As he clearly formulates it, Suganuma considers that not only are projects related to Japan very local ones but that, in addition, the motive of the Japanese creator of GJN to change Japanese society is equivalent to a desire to ‘become like the West’. Yet, in Suganuma’s argument, the interpretation that he desires to ‘become like the West’ is based only on Suganuma’s reading of the photos of advertisements on the website and GJN’s appropriation of the discourse of Western gay liberation, whereas his ‘Japaneseness’ is regarded as an attribute of ‘not being the West’. Thus, in Suganuma’s argument, the dualism between the global and the local is exactly equal to the dualism between the West and the non-West, as if ‘to be or not to be like the West’ were the only important problem for Japanese queer people in the global age.

Ironically, due to his focus on the Japanese desire to ‘become like the West’, Suganuma overlooked the ‘local’ problems that queer people face politically in the global age. For example, in the interview that Suganuma refers to, Mochizuki, the Japanese creator, relates:

‘Overseas it's completely normal to have sites devoted to LGBT news, but there is very little information in Japan. At the time same sex marriage laws and partnership laws were in the news, and I thought that if that information could be shared with people here, that might be a good way to help Japan start to change’. In addition, his experience as part of a bi-national couple personally confronting visa problems, Mochizuki saw the ways that politics directly impacted both him and his partner; this also fuelled his interest in news from abroad. (Keiser 2007)
Here, Mochizuki’s motivation in founding GJN stems not only from the desire, if any, to be like the West but also from the conditions of his own life with his partner in the face of political and legal problems caused by Japanese government policy, as he makes clear in the interview. At that time, the Japanese government refused to issue a key document, which states that a person is single and of legal age, to Japanese citizens wanting to enter into same-sex marriages or partnerships with same-sex foreign partners in the countries where such marriages or partnerships were legal, because, the government explained, Japan had not yet legalised same-sex marriage\(^5\). Therefore, Mochizuki’s motivation for political change in Japan must be understood as both very local and very global from the outset: the Japanese political problems caused by the Japanese government’s policy against international same-sex couples, together with its strict visa rules.

As Mochizuki mentions, immediately following the sentences that Suganuma quotes, it is certain that Suganuma knew about Mochizuki’s personal, but also highly political, motivation. However, Suganuma interprets it not as a demand for political and institutional reform, but as a Japanese desire to be like the West, which is doomed to fail because the Japanese are not, in fact, the West. Thus, Suganuma’s reading of Japanese local identity in cyberspace contains two problematic presumptions regarding globalisation. Firstly, even though the political, legal or economic problems that sexual minorities face are not unique problems in Western societies but are generally common in many other societies, such problems and discussions of reform being understood as ‘Western’ due to the political representations and discourses issuing from the West. Secondly, although institutional injustice against sexual minorities is originally a local problem, such localness is recognised and redefined within a Western political context. In other words, local issues outside the West are regarded as local from the perspective of the West, even in arguments that sharply criticise the Euro-American centrism of the globalisation of sexuality.

In the previous chapter, I focussed on the representations of ‘global’ LGBT politics from the United States, pointed out a Western desire to become the others like the West and analysed the mechanism to transform the needs and political activities of LGBT people in Japan to the needs and activities of American influence and Americanisation.

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\(^5\) Japan started to issue the certificate for same-sex couples in 2009, as authorised by the new government of the Democratic Party of Japan.
On the other hand, as Suganuma shows, there are discourses within Asia to read the desire to be like the West in society. In this chapter, I will not discuss which view is right, nor which desire is stronger, but will explore social phenomena in the Japanese context that have emerged through the desires complementing each other.

3. New Political Circumstances of Japanese LGBT Politics

3-1. Political Gaps between LGBT Rights from the US and Japanese Non-normative Sexual Life

It is becoming the case in Japanese society that more openly LGBT politicians are being elected and LGBT issues are gradually being treated as human rights issues, even by the Japanese government\textsuperscript{52}. Through the narrative employed by the US government and the US embassy in Japan, and the analysis of Suganuma, these movements are understood to indicate Westernisation, the desire for it, the improvement of LGBT rights, and the growth of social tolerance towards minorities.

However, that does not necessarily mean that the lives of sexually non-normative people have come to be accepted and protected in society. In 2009, the Japanese police investigated several sexual orgy parties and arrested some of the participants for ‘public indecency’, violating Section 174 of Criminal Code\textsuperscript{53}. Even though the parties were held in a hotel room or on private property, such as at the house of one of the participants, and not actually in a public space, the Japanese police insisted that such a party is illegal, since public indecency in sexual activities takes place in the presence of people, no matter whether it is held behind closed doors (ZakZak 2009). Similarly, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) announced that they had charged two owners of hattenba, gay cruising spaces, in a residential area of Tokyo, in November 2011 with being accessories

\textsuperscript{52} Kamikawa Aya was elected as an openly transgender politician in the Setagaya ward assembly Tokyo in 2003. Otsuji Kanako came out as lesbian in 2005 when she was a member of the Osaka Prefectural Assembly, and then became the nation's first openly homosexual member of the Diet in 2013 after her party member of the House resigned. In 2011, Ishikawa Taiga and Ishizaka Wataru were elected as openly gay male politicians for ward councils in Tokyo.

\textsuperscript{53} Article 174 of the Japanese Criminal Code is: ‘A person who commits an indecent act in public shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 6 months, a fine of not more than 300,000 yen, misdemeanor imprisonment without work or a petty fine’.
to public indecency because customers were ‘free to move around an interior arranged like a maze and containing private rooms with peep holes and an open space called the “Mix Room”’ and engage in sexual activities, or ‘indecent acts’ (Okuda 2012). On 14 February 2012, the police raided another hattenba in Osaka and charged an employee and customers with public indecency. According to The Asahi Shimbun, the police consider hattenba, gay cruising spaces, as problematic as they are associated with drug abuse and also increase the risk of the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. However, there is no law for regulating gay cruising spaces, as the Japanese law that obliges sex businesses to report to the authorities applies to heterosexual services. The Asahi Shimbun cites the comment of an MPD official:

An MPD official who supervises criminal investigations said: ‘Without the authority to enter, it was a difficult decision to charge them with being an accessory to public indecency, but we were afraid of them spreading STDs, not just drugs. We need some sort of regulation’. (Okuda 2012)

Despite the police’s explanation for raiding the gay cruising spaces, there is no report that they found illegal drugs. In addition, the Japanese Police Department does not have the authority or the know-how to regulate the spread of STDs and improve public sexual health care. The operator of a gay cruising space is quoted as follows in the report:

The operator of a hattenba in the Tokyo metropolitan area said: ‘The impact from this incident is huge. It's a matter of life or death. Most shops work hard to keep clean and try to make sure that nobody spreads STDs or brings in drugs’. (Okuda 2012)

As the operator suggests, the police’s action brought pressure on the hattenba business rather than regulating illegal drugs or preventing STDs among gays.

Matsuzawa Kureichi (2012), a writer, explains in his blog that the police announcement might have been intended to gain public understanding about raiding gay cruising spaces for the first time, by raising the illegal drugs matter. Furthermore, he warns that the police are suggesting a need in Japan for regulatory power over gay cruising spaces by making reference to STDs, which are not even the province of the police department. Sunagawa Hideki (2011a), an anthropologist and gay rights activist, also wrote in his blog about the police raiding the gay cruising space, having heard the rumour about it in advance of the official police announcement. He interprets the police’s
action in the context of the society of control. Sunagawa points out that, if the police can charge the owner of a gay cruising space with being an accessory to public indecency, all gay cruising spaces would be illegal in principle. He emphasises that the police have recently started to raid sexual orgies that are not conducted for business purposes but are held in a private space, such as a room in a hotel or in a personal dwelling. Furthermore, the police have also started to raid dance clubs and discos for violating Japan’s Adult Entertainment Laws, enacted in 1948, which forbid dancing after midnight. For a long time the law had been rarely enforced, but the police started enforcing it around 2010, presumably to regulate the abuse of drugs (Adelstein 2013). Sunagawa interprets these police actions as those of a society of control:

It is important that a stream of police actions is based on the desire of many people: the desire which wants to strictly police the people who do not fit their values (morals), or the others who they cannot understand. (Sunagawa 2011a)

Sunagawa pessimistically expected that it would now be more difficult for minorities to live in Japanese society (Sunagawa 2011b).

On the surface, there are contradictory phenomena surrounding LGBT lives in Japan: on the political and legal level, the recognition of LGBT human rights has advanced; however, on the social level, the police have tightened up control over the lives of non-normative people who are not necessarily categorised as ‘LGBTs’. These phenomena might signal the fact that the Japanese political circumstances of sexual minorities have dramatically changed since the time when Kawaguchi, Kazama and Vincent argued about gay politics in *Gei Studies (Gay Studies)* in the late 1990s. As I argued in Chapter 3 and 4, their politics and theorisation of gay men’s situation in Japan were concerned with how gay men could rightfully speak in public, and how society’s view could be changed to establish homosexual men themselves as the politically appropriate people to speak out about their problems in society. They considered that the ‘tolerance’ of homosexual activity in the private sphere in Japanese society, by such

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54 For example, in May 2013, the business magazine, *Toyokeizai online* (2013) featured Japanese National Diet members for LGBT rights who belonged to the Japan Liberal Democracy Party, which is traditionally conservative and supports ‘traditional family values’. Thus, ‘LGBT rights’ are becoming the new ‘human rights’ which even conservative politicians are starting to recognise in Japan.
means as allowing gay bars and *hattena*, functions to deter homosexuals from politically coming out in the public sphere. They write:

> It is because of cultural differences that Japan is described as ‘the country is tolerant of homosexuality’ when people compare the gay situations in between Japan and the United States. In Japan, there are few people who openly express hate towards homosexuality and the police won’t harass or bust gay bars nor *hattena*. There is no religious activity against homosexuality. These things make many homosexuals in Japan believe that they are in a better situation than the homosexuals in the United States. (Kawaguchi, Kazama, and Vincent 1997, p. 110)

Ironically enough, now that the time has come for the political rights of LGBT people to be recognised in the public sphere in Japan, the security of the privacy of sexually non-normative people is being undermined by the police. Furthermore, because ‘LGBT rights’ are represented as the political and legal ‘progress’ that the United States and Western European countries is currently promoting, by such means as the presentation of openly LGBT politicians and legalisation and recognition of same-sex marriage, the security of sexually non-normative people’s privacy is rarely regarded as one of the ‘problems of LGBT human rights’, since, as Matsuzawa (2012) notes, the police had been raiding the sex parties and events of straight people for public indecency, on the same grounds, before they started raiding *hattena*.

3-2. Are LGBT Rights a New Social ‘Class’ Privilege?

While the Japanese government gradually started to recognise ‘LGBT rights’ and the political, economic and cultural phenomenon of ‘LGBT issues’ as something ‘important’ (Yanagisawa 2013), the lives of social minorities, including sexual minorities, as Sunagawa (2011b) warns, have become harder in Japanese society. On the one hand, some kinds of same-sex partnerships, those of people in high-ranking government jobs and the US military in Japan, are recognised as legitimate families but, on the other hand, the security of sexually non-normative people's privacy is being technically undermined in Japanese society. What does this now mean politically for sexual minorities in Japan?

It is noteworthy that the representations of ‘LGBT rights’ in Japan are associated not only with the ‘West’ but also with the successful cultural and economic elite.
Two different weekly business magazines coincidentally featured the ‘LGBT market’ in Japan in the same week in July in 2012 (Shukan Toyokeizai 2012; Shukan Diaond 2012). Both magazines emphasised the potential purchasing power of the LGBT community in Japan, as well as introducing the institutionalisation of LGBT rights in Western society. Therefore, their focus was on the activities of successful global companies, such as Apple, Goldman Sachs and IBM, on LGBT issues, rather than on economically disadvantaged LGBT people or on the lack of social care in addressing specific demands of LGBT people in Japan. In such magazines, action on LGBT issues firstly means institutionalising the means of recruiting elite LGBT people who can choose their positions from among global giant companies, such as Goldman Sachs or Apple, or improving the marketing strategies aimed at the LGBT community.

The website of the business magazine Toyokeizai Magazine has, since 2012, featured a news series related to LGBT issues, entitled ‘LGBT frontline: Sexuality in the Changing World’, following a successful feature on the LGBT issue in the magazine. The first article of this series discussed the news that Oxford University has changed the laws detailing its strict academic dress code to allow transgender students to wear ceremonial clothing of their own choice (Zixi 2012). As the title of article, ‘“Sex revolution” starts from Oxford University’, suggests, the policy for LGBT people is relevant to the world-famous, elite University of Oxford, although its strict academic dress code itself is not so much revolutionary as ‘queer friendly’. In the article, the United Kingdom is introduced as the ‘leading country (senshinkoku)’ on LGBT human rights issues, where pink money, that is, the purchasing power of the gay community, affects its economy (ibid). Then, the article refers to Oxford’s LGBT students’ next goal: working with students in Cambridge University, another elite British university, to install gender-neutral toilets in colleges. Finally, the article concludes with these words:

Actually, it is told that an international student from Oxford University who had been involved with LGBT issues created an opportunity to establish an LGBT society of the University of Tokyo, which is famous for the best talent. Members of the LGBT society in the University of Tokyo take the change in Oxford University as ‘welcome news’. I hope the changes of Oxford University forge ahead and young LGBT students in Japan as well make any actions in universities. (ibid.)
The article presents the story about LGBT rights to emphasise that the change comes not only from the advanced West to Japan, as promoted by the US Embassy, but also from the top Western universities to the top Japanese university containing the ‘best talent’.

Considering LGBT activism in Japan as widely reported by the news media, especially since the 2010s, it is evident that the new LGBT rights are promoted hand-in-hand with commercialism, especially that of global corporations from the United States and Europe. At the beginning of March 2013, a few weeks before the oral argument about California Proposition 8 and the 1996 Defence of Marriage Act (DOMA) was conducted in the US Supreme Court, a lesbian couple ‘performed’ a wedding ceremony, not legally recognised in Japan, at the Tokyo Disney Resort, which had initially refused to allow the couple to hold the ceremony. This news was widely reported by Japanese news media and by those in the English language, such as The New York Times and the Guardian (Higuchi 2013; Tabuchi 2013; Hodgson 2012).

In Japan, the performance of a private wedding ceremony by a same-sex couple themselves is not common, but nor is it a totally new phenomenon. As early as the 1970s, Togo Ken mentioned in his book a wedding ceremony conducted by a lesbian couple (Togo 1979, p. 80). Otsuji Kanako, the first openly lesbian politician, also performed a same-sex marriage ceremony and uploaded the video of the ceremony when running for election to the Upper House in 2007 (Shimada 2007). Furthermore, as Claire Maree (2004) points out, some same-sex couples undergo an adoption procedure (yoshien-gumi) to become a legal family, because, under Japanese law, it is possible for an adult to adopt another adult, whereby the two become parent and child enrolled on the same family register. Although entering into an adoptive parent/child relationship is a bypassing strategy, historically ‘adoption has been considered the only way to protect same-sex partnerships rights’ (Maree 2004, p. 543).

Thus, legal commitments and marriage ceremonies of same-sex couples were not at all new in Japan, except in the place where the wedding ceremony was held: Tokyo Disney Resort. Boris Dittrich, a former Dutch parliamentarian and an advocacy director of the LGBT program of a global human rights group, interprets this event as a sign that the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Japan is near:

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Dittrich, who is married to a man, referenced the story of a Japanese lesbian couple who had a wedding ceremony at Disney Sea in March, as well as IBM Corp. supporting a gay couple who are going to have a similar ceremony in November. Dittrich said that with these situations, legal same-sex marriage in Japan is not something ‘far away’. (Hofilena 2013)

In his view, the wedding ceremony at Tokyo Disney Resort, which costs approximately 7.5 million yen ($75,000), together with international corporations’ support for gay marriage in Japan, symbolises the progress of Japanese LGBT politics. On the contrary, Nichi Hodgson, a freelance writer on sexual politics, still thinks the wedding at Tokyo Disney Resort will do little for LGBT political rights in Japan, not because she is sceptical about promotions of human rights through consumerism, but because she considers that Japanese ‘traditional morals’ cause people to perceive shame in publicly displaying their sexuality. She writes in the Guardian Online:

In fact, Disney's decision probably says less about shifting Japanese attitudes to gay partnership and more about how a western corporation's diversity duty can be commandeered by an Asian company anxious not to offend national sentiment. The Tokyo Disney Resort is actually run by a Japanese entity called The Oriental Land Company, which licenses the name and characters from the Disney Corporation. Notably, international companies of Japanese origin that sponsor Pride events in the rest of the world have often refrained from doing so within Japan. Japanese morals, traditionally informed by Shinto, Buddhist and Confucian teachings, may not be burdened by a concept of homosexual sin, but public sexual display, whatever the orientation, is still generally perceived as shameful, hence the reluctance to publicly support LGBT events. (Hodgson 2012)

She explains that public sexual display, which in this context means publicly supporting sexual politics, no matter what the orientation is, is regarded as shameful within Japanese ‘traditional morals’, although, in fact, heterosexual marriage is still considered a social duty and the wedding industry is enormous in Japan as well (Lunsing 2001, Ch. 3). What is interesting in her argument is that she contrasts the diversity duty of Western international corporations that support LGBT people with Japanese ‘traditional morals’. While Japanese ‘traditional morals’ are regarded as something consistently sustaining Japanese society, diversity for LGBT people is regarded as the Western international corporations’ duty.

Similarly, the Tokyo SuperStar Awards, established in 2010 to promote increasing visibility for the LGBT community in Japan, set up the award for the best
corporation and, by 2012, had honoured only Western international corporations: Google, the Body Shop and IBM Japan.

One of the most remarkable forms of activism sponsored by international corporations that try to promote LGBT rights is probably Tokyo Rainbow Pride (TRP). Tokyo Rainbow Pride, established in 2011, is a new organisation managing the Pride Parade in Tokyo. It split from Tokyo Pride Parade (TPP), which had organised Pride Parades for a decade, due to a dispute over the event’s management. In an interview in their first year, TRP organisers pointed out that one of TPP’s problems was its financial structure (Ogiue 2012). According to Otsuka Kensuke, one of the TRP organisers, TPP had been too dependent financially – for example, for gay bar advertisements – on the gay community in ni-chome, Tokyo’s gay neighbourhood, famous for one of the highest concentrations of gay bars in the world. However, because of Japan’s long-lasting recession, such financial relationships between TPP and the gay community have become difficult. Thus, it is reported that TRP’s structure is financially minimised through recruitment of foreign members as its core workers, in order to acquire the know-how of overseas Pride Parades. As a result, its official sponsorship has changed in 2013 from that of TPP and, while visibility of gay bars in Tokyo is downplayed, Western international corporations, such as Alfa Romeo, Philips, Google, Armani Exchange, Audi, Volkswagen, Red Bull, Belvedere Vodka and so on, have become its official sponsors for ‘mutual benefits’ (TRP 2013).

In addition, it is characteristic that many foreign Embassies and tourist boards participated in TRP in 2013: embassies or tourist boards of the United States, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Brazil and Israel ran booths at TRP. According to TRP, this was the first time that foreign embassies had participated in the Pride Parade in Japan for promoting LGBT rights as human rights (ibid.).

The promotion of LGBT rights by Western governments is also accentuated by economic advantages. On 28 April, Tim Hitchens, British Ambassador to Japan, attended Tokyo Rainbow Pride 2013 and delivered a speech to event participants in which he said that ‘the United Kingdom government is a proactive supporter of equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals’ (British Embassy 2013). Less than one month later, an article about IDAHO, International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia, was posted on the blog of the British Embassy in both the English and Japanese languages. This article expresses the British Embassy’s support for the Japanese LGBT community. Tom Burn, head of the Embassy’s Media and Communication team, writes:
The situation is not nearly as bad here, of course, but Japan is still not an easy country to live in as an openly gay, bisexual or transgendered person. Though discrimination is not as extreme as in some countries, pressure to conform to social norms is strong, and public role models are limited. (Burn 2013)

As he did in the earlier article about IDAHO in 2011, he again emphasises that opportunities to which LGBT people can harness their talents are limited outside the entertainment industry in Japan (Burn 2011, 2013). By contrast, British society is presented as an open society for talented LGBT individuals. Commenting on the British Embassy’s booth at TRP, he writes:

> Alongside a number of other Embassies, we organised a UK stall (together with the British business community), encouraging those attending the event to consider visiting the UK, as a liberal, welcoming destination for tourism and business. (Burn 2013)

In describing the UK as ‘a liberal, welcoming destination for tourism and business’ in the article about the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia, for protecting LGBT human rights, he implies that the article is written for LGBT people in Japan who have business talent and/or are socio-economically advantaged enough to support tourism in the UK. Through the British Embassy’s promotion of British society as a more LGBT-friendly, ‘better society’ than the Japanese one for LGBT people, they also imply that the LGBT individuals who they welcome are the socially, economically and culturally advantaged ones.

Through spreading such representations of LGBT rights in the discourses of the Internet, mass media and activism, LGBT rights emerge in Japanese society as something you have to be in an advantaged position to enjoy, by, for example, graduating from an elite university or getting a job in a Western international corporation. Ironically, this is better defined as privilege than as human rights.

In 2013, The Asahi Shimbum reported a new LGBT action organised by young university students who were planning an educational tour to New York City to acquire know-how about LGBT activism and rights (Yamamoto 2013). The article emphasises the organisers’ and participants’ experiences, leading to their recognition of the importance of LGBT issues and of the need to produce LGBT activists to solve LGBT problems in Japan through study in the United States and Canada. Jasbir Puar (2002)
argues that LGBT activist-tourism can function to create ‘queer cosmopolitan elites’ and establish global ‘queer solidarity’ based on privilege:

Several diasporic activist organisations, often in conjunction with gay-friendly travel agencies, offer tours back to the homeland for the purposes of educating and engendering queer solidarity and support. These tours, ostensibly promoted to encourage ‘queer solidarity’, operate within a missionary framework of sameness and difference, assuming some rubric of queerness that is similar enough to create solidarity around but is different from and, as such, not quite on a par with metropolitan queerness. The insistence on educational exchange conveniently effaces the privileges determining which citizens can travel where to learn and transmit what information. (Puar 2002, p. 124)

Puar discusses this activist-tourism in the context of economically and politically asymmetric relations between two nations, such as the United States and the homeland of the diasporic activists. Even though the relationship between the United States and Japan is relatively less asymmetric, economically and politically, than the ones Puar has in mind, the activist-tourism, which consists of travel to the United States from Japan, can constitute privilege among LGBT people. This privilege does not necessarily correspond to transnational power relationships among nations, as in the notion of ‘queer solidarity’ argued by Puar, because, in this case, the Japanese activists visiting the United States can be in socially and economically better positions, and have more mobility, than many activists in the United States. However, it does represent privilege among LGBT people in Japan. Activist-tourism can function to symbolise LGBT rights and activism as something you need to learn about by gaining access to the West, and especially by mastering the English language, even though you want to work to address Japanese situations in Japan.

Through such representations, LGBT rights emerge as the rights of privilege for people possessing high economic and cultural capital in Japanese society, whether they want to enjoy these rights or work for them.

4. Promoting LGBT Rights with the Nationalist Government: The Introduction and Discussion of Same-sex Partnership in Japan

4-1. The New Nationalism of the Abe Administration and the Introduction of Same-sex Partnership in Japan
After three years of the government of the Democratic Party of Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by Abe Shinzo, won a landslide victory in the Lower House election in 2012. Along with his neoliberal and aggressive monetary policy, referred to as ‘Abenomics’, Prime Minister Abe has received a lot of attention for his nationalist ideology and revisionism. The Editorial Board of the *International New York Times Online* criticised him, saying ‘Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s brand of nationalism is becoming an ever more serious threat to Japan’s relations with the United States’; and ‘he also whitewashes the history of the war’ (*The International New York Times* 2014). What is significant in Abe’s brand of historical revisionism and nationalism is that he presents his ideology as *new* Japanese ideas, which have emerged from the fusion of contemporary society and traditions overlooked by post-war Japanese society, not as the mere revival of old ideology. Abe’s infamous slogans, such as ‘Departure from the post-war regime’ and ‘Bringing back Japan’, were understood as reflecting not only his intention to seek revision of the post-war pacifist Constitution, which symbolised post-war Japan, but also his ambition to establish the new role of Japan in international society (Scanlon 2014; Takahashi 2014).

This new international role of Japan, as sought by the Abe administration, is called ‘*kachikan gaiko*’, an alliance based on Value and Interest among democratic nations, as opposed to China, the new rising state in Asia. In December 2012, the day after Abe formed his administration, he published his diplomatic policy on *Project Syndicate*, described as ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’. Warning that the South China Sea is becoming a ‘Lake Beijing’, or ‘what the Sea of Okhotsk was to Soviet Russia’, Abe promised: ‘Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Developments affecting each are more closely connected than ever. Japan, as one of the oldest sea-faring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role in preserving the common good in both regions’ (Abe 2012). In his apparent expression of hostility to China, which he compares to the Soviet Union, he presents Japan as one of the oldest democratic nations that respect ‘universal values’:

> [T]o improve Sino-Japanese relations, Japan must first anchor its ties on the other side of the Pacific; for, at the end of the day, Japan’s diplomacy must always be rooted in democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. These universal values have guided Japan’s post-war development. I firmly
believe that, in 2013 and beyond, the Asia-Pacific region’s future prosperity should rest on them as well. (ibid.)

Thus, in his domestic and international policies, there is a critical contradiction: on the one hand Abe attempts to re-value the Empire of Japan or pre-war Japan, and to redefine the meaning of the wars Japan waged and the regime of post-war Japan; on the other hand, when he confronts China, he promotes, for international consumption, an image of post-war Japan’s democracy and human rights record, which have been built on the rejection of pre-war Japan.

Promoting his new Japan as a democratic nation, in an effort to convince international society that his ideology is not merely a revival of the Empire of Japan that fought the United States, he symbolically utilises representations of women. As an aspect of his economic policies, or ‘Abenomics’, Abe introduced ‘womenomics’, a policy of reducing pay disparity by gender and expanding the number of female workers in the Japanese economy. His ‘womenomics’ is not merely part of his reformation of the stumbling Japanese economy, but a part of his international campaign. Just after his successful upper house election, Abe published an Opinion in The Wall Street Journal entitled ‘Unleashing the Power of “Womenomics”’. Introducing his ‘Womenomics’ as based on the policy suggested by a Goldman Sachs economist in 1999 (Matsui et al. 2005), he emphasises that his government represents a new political generation that can embrace a solution the Japanese government, including his own first administration in 2006-2007, has long ignored: ‘Fourteen years have elapsed since then, and the idea has finally entered Japan’s political lexicon. Womenomics will feature prominently in my address on Thursday at the United Nations General Assembly’ (Abe 2013). In addition, his promotion of ‘Womenomics’ is not only intended to bring a new solution to the troubled Japanese economy, but also represents a promise to bring change to Japan ahead of the Tokyo Olympics in 2020:

The target year 2020 will coincide with the return of the Olympics to Tokyo. I am determined that by that time Japan's boardrooms will be enhanced by a greatly increased number of female directors. I will do all that I can to facilitate this change. (Abe 2013)

In 2014, for his new cabinet, Abe appointed five women to the 18-member cabinet, the highest number of female ministers in Japanese history, thereby ‘sending the strongest message yet about his determination to change deep-seated views on gender and revive
the economy by getting women on board as workers and leaders (Kageyama 2014). Thus, for the Abe government, internationally regarded as nationalist, gender politics, and the appearance of an administration that empowers women, is an important factor in promoting his image of the new Japan, as well as confirming his historical Revisionism, which, for example, denies Japan’s crime involving ‘comfort women’ or sexual slavery in WWII.

His contradictory political strategy has brought trouble rather than successful promotion. A week after the formation of the government, three female senior politicians were criticised for their connections to the neo-Nazi party, the National Socialist Japanese Workers Party, or Zaitokukai, an anti-Korean ultra-nationalist group, in a report showing photographs of them posing with its leaders (McCurry 2014). At the same time, two other female ministers had to resign over alleged misuse of political funds. As Abe appointed female politicians who either had far-right leanings or were from political families (for example, an ex-prime minister’s daughter who lacked the ability to manage political funds), the female ministers sent a message more about Abe's nationalist ideology and his privileged class, as he was also the offspring of a political family, than about reform of a gender-biased society.

The representations of LGBT rights are more complicated under the Abe administration. The administration was the government that immediately accepted the request by the US Department of Defense for benefits for same-sex couples in the US military in Japan. Following the US Supreme Court’s ruling in 2013 that the Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional, Japan, along with the UK and Spain, agreed with the United States that its treatment of same-sex couples of US military personnel in Japan would be equivalent to that of heterosexual married couples. Among the countries that agreed with the US on same-sex benefits just after the policy change by the US Department of Defense, Japan was the only country where same-sex marriage or partnership was not legal in domestic law (Harress 2014). The Abe administration itself, however, has never moved for LGBT rights in its domestic policies and has even openly expressed opposition to them. Replying to a survey by Rainbow Pride Ehime, a sexual minority advocacy group, for the general election in 2012, Abe’s LDP answered the question on ‘the need for measures to protect the human rights of sexual minorities’ as follows: ‘Measures are necessary for people with gender identity disorder but not for homosexuals’; although other major parties answered that they recognised that ‘Active enlightenment and measures are necessary’ (The Japan Times 2012). In the survey, the
LDP also replied that social security and inheritance benefits ‘should be intended for heterosexual couples’, not for same-sex couples, even though it allowed benefits for same-sex couples among US military personnel in Japan, without argument, in 2013. Similarly, in a survey for the general election in 2014, the LDP was again the only party to respond that LGBT issues did not need to be dealt with as human rights issues (Rainbow Pride Ehime 2014). While the Abe administration accepted the policy change on same-sex benefits for US military personnel in Japan, the LDP, led by Abe, also apparently expressed ignorant and homophobic views on LGBT issues during general elections.

What is more confusing is that his wife, Abe Akie, the first lady of Japan, openly supports LGBT communities. In April 2014, she participated in a Tokyo Rainbow Pride event for the first time, sending the message: ‘I want to help build a society where anyone can conduct happy, enriched lives without facing discrimination’ (The Japan Times 2014). In December 2014, Tokyo SuperStar Awards, the awards honouring individuals or groups who were contributing to the advancement of equality and social acceptance for LGBT people, chose Abe Akie for its Community Award for her promotion of AIDS issues and LGBT rights, since her ‘brave activities brought hope to many LGBT people’ and she was ‘acting as a bridge between the LGBT community and society at large’ (TSSA 2014). While Prime Minister Abe is regarded as ‘without question, the most conservative Japanese leader in Japan’s post-war history’ and a historical revisionist (Takahashi 2014), his wife, known ‘for her liberal inclinations’ (The Japan Times 2014), was rewarded by the LGBT group for her activities.

In February 2015, against this complicated political background, the Shibuya ward in Tokyo, one of the busiest and most famous fashion centres in Japan, announced that it was issuing certificates to same-sex relationships to strengthen gender equality and human rights for sexual minorities and to prevent discrimination against same-sex couples, when, for example, they were contracting to rent an apartment or visiting critically ill partners in hospital. In the following sections, I will analyse how the representation of LGBT rights – the rights of contemporary, Western, economically-privileged people – and Japanese contemporary nationalism, disguised as the Japanese new ‘internationalism’ represented by the Abe administration, are related to each other, by analysing the discourses of the proposed recognition of same-sex couples in Shibuya, which is regarded as the progress of LGBT rights or ‘same-sex marriage’ equivalent to heterosexual marriage.
4-2. ‘LGBT-Friendly Japan’ for the Tokyo Olympics

The announcement of Shibuya’s recognition of same-sex couples opened up the discussion about problems of LGBT rights and diversity in Japan, where the Tokyo Olympics are expected to be held in 2020. As the Winter Olympics held by Russia in Sochi drew international criticism and boycotts because of Russia’s ‘LGBT propaganda’ law, and the International Olympic Committee has moved to add an anti-discrimination clause including LGBT people following the embarrassment caused by the Sochi Winter Olympics, Japanese officials have also recognised the need to improve LGBT circumstances in Japan. Following Shibuya, 38 lawmakers from multiple parties organised a group on 17 March in 2015 to discuss the issues of discrimination against sexual minorities in advance of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Hase Hiroshi, who leads the group and is a member of the Liberal Democratic Party, which openly opposed the inclusion of LGBT rights as human rights in the general election in 2014, explains the purpose of the group as follows: ‘As it hosts the Olympic Games, there is no doubt that Japanese society will be questioned on how it treats its sexual minorities. We must substantiate the principles described in the basic plan of the Games’ (Nikaido 2015). LGBT activists also share the narrative of LGBT equality for the Tokyo Olympics in 2020. Oe Chizuka, a co-representative of Network for Partnership Law, calls for a Partnership Law resembling the PACS in France as one of the Japanese changes towards diversity, since ‘In terms of equality and human rights, as Japan needs to internationally show by Tokyo 2020 Olympics and Paralympics that Japan is the country where the society embraces diversity, I think Japan has to take some approach to issues of same-sex couples’ (Oe 2015). In this narrative, the Tokyo Olympics in 2020 is the event at which Japan must prove to the international community that it is a society that sufficiently respects diversity and human rights, especially of LGBT people.

Such a narrative overlaps that of the Abe administration on the Olympics. In his statement for the New Year in 2015, Abe redefines his commitment to historical issues, such as the Second World War, as contributing to a ‘new Japan’ and its international promotion:

This year we mark the milestone of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II.
Throughout its post-war history, Japan has, based on feelings of deep remorse regarding World War II, walked the path of a free and democratic nation and of a consistently peace-loving nation, while contributing to global peace and prosperity. As we reflect on the past, in heading towards the 80th, 90th, and 100th anniversaries to come, what kind of nation will Japan be and what kinds of contributions will we make to the world?

Taking this opportunity, I wish to make this a year in which we send out to the world a message about the kind of country we aim to be and get off to a dynamic start towards building a ‘new Japan’. (Abe 2015)

Recalling how the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 became the symbolic event for post-war Japan as a new, rising nation of growing economic power, Abe again associates the coming Olympics with a ‘new Japan’ of increasing economic and international power:

Our predecessors accomplished rapid economic growth, making Japan one of the greatest powers in the world. There is no reason whatsoever that the Japanese of that era could achieve this but the Japanese of today cannot.

Now, as we mark the new year, I have renewed my determination to, together with the Japanese people, make Japan a country that once again shines on the world’s centre stage. (ibid.)

In Abe’s narrative, the Tokyo Olympics of both 1964 and 2020 are the key events of a ‘new Japan’, the rising nation of expanding economic and international power.

On the surface, two images of the ‘new Japan’ seem very different: on the one hand, there is the image of a ‘new Japan’ where human rights and diversity are respected as in Western countries; while Abe’s ‘new Japan’, on the other hand, is a country that desires to regain economic and international power to secure Japan’s status in the international community. However, in the interview with lawmaker Hase Hiroshi, an LDP member and a leader of the multipartisan group on the issue of discrimination against sexual minorities, the gap between political movements for LGBT equality and diversity ahead of the Olympics, and movements for economic and international power, appears obscure. Admitting that he organised the group for LGBT equality and diversity for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, Hase was asked how long it would take to achieve the group’s goals for LGBT equality and diversity. He replied:

To answer the question, I think it would take about 10 years to change the society to socially accept sexual minorities. This issue should not be something

56 For the relationship between the Olympics and Japanese national identity, see Nagayoshi (2006).
that politics mandatorily intervenes in. For frankly speaking, it is a part of politicians’ work that politicians get an earful from the people. So, we are rather waiting for the public sentiment like ‘why doesn’t the government recognise sexual minorities’ rights more?’ (Nikaido 2015)

His answer, suggesting that it would take 10 years to achieve political reform on LGBT rights in time for the Olympics, when the Olympics are taking place in 5 years, exposes the lawmakers’ move to organise a multipartisan group for LGBT rights as more of a performance for the international media, to deter criticism of the LGBT situation in Japan ahead of the Olympics, than an effort to achieve actual change. Thus, the movement for LGBT equality and diversity is utilised by the majority party in the Diet for their political campaign as if the actual political change had already started in Japan, in advance of the Olympics and Paralympics.

Similarly, Hasebe Ken, a Shibuya ward assembly member who proposed the bill for recognition of same-sex couples, stated in the Symposium in 2012, when Tokyo was still a candidate for the 2020 Olympics and Paralympics, that the keyword for the next stage of urban development was ‘diversity’, and that LGBT issues could be harnessed for the purpose (Ecozzebria 2012). To promote his idea, Shibui Tetsuya reports that Hasebe Ken proposed to the ward mayor a plan to issue certificates to same-sex couples in the context of developing an international city that adopts ‘diversity’, because ‘to issue the certificate attracts LGBT people and they are going to move to Shibuya. Their sensibility will be a big factor to strengthen fashion and art scene’ (Shibui 2015). Coincidentally, in April 2015, Dentsu Diversity Lab, a market research report by Dentsu, the biggest advertising and public relations company in Japan, where Hasebe Ken worked before assuming public office, states that LGBT-identified people made up approximately 7.6% of the people surveyed and estimates that the LGBT market in Japan is worth as much as 5.94 trillion yen (40 billion US dollars) (Dentsu 2015). These discourses suggest that LGBT rights are not only human rights that should be protected for the sake of Japan’s international reputation, but also present a big business opportunity.

In early discussions about ‘gay and lesbian marketing’ and activism in the 1990s in the United States, one of the important questions was whether consumerism, or the economic power of gay and lesbian people, could contribute to their activism and visibility in society or not, and what the ‘liberation’ of sexual minorities truly meant. In these arguments, while some activists like Andrew Sullivan adopted a marketing strategy for their purpose, critics from progressive movements also defined their political goals,
as eloquently expressed by Tony Kushner in *The Nation*: ‘But are officially sanctioned homosexual marriages and identifiably homosexual soldiers the ultimate aims of homosexual liberation? Clearly not, if by homosexual liberation we mean the liberation of homosexuals, who, like most everyone else, are and will continue to be oppressed by the depredations of capital until some better way of living together can be arrived at’ (Kushner 1994). Now, with Tokyo expecting the Olympics and Paralympics, and under international pressure on LGBT rights, mainstream politicians in Japan, whether belonging to conservative or liberal parties, discuss whether ‘diversity’ and ‘LGBT rights’ can contribute to Japan’s branding image for political and economic purposes, rather than to the minorities’ lives or political goals.

4-3. Capitalist Diversity and the Exclusion of Homeless People

Although the proposed bill for ‘same-sex marriage’ is intended only to publicly recognise same-sex couples as partners equivalent to those who are married, but does not offer the same level of legal protection and benefits for the couple, such as rights of inheritance, tax benefits, social insurance, and visa sponsorship, it is regarded as a surprising move for LGBT people. *The Japan Times* reports the announcement of the Shibuya bill as if it offers great political hope for LGBT people in Japan: ‘Shibuya resident Koyuki Higashi, who is lesbian, said she was “over the moon” when she learned about the news’ (Osaki 2014). In the article, openly gay politician Ishikawa Taiga also remarks that ‘cases overseas suggest that local municipalities’ move to grant same-sex couples more legitimate status sometimes affects national policies. So I’m very happy about it’ (*ibid*.). Indeed, as Ishikawa hoped, several local municipalities, such as Setagaya ward, Yokohama City and Takarazuka City, announced that they were considering similar recognition of same-sex couples, without benefits, following Shibuya’s announcement.

On 31 March 2015, the Shibuya ward passed the bill, ‘an Ordinance for Gender Equality and Diversity’ and became the first local government to issue the certificate of same-sex relationships on its authority. Predictably, this move was compared to the situation in the United States rather than explained in the context of Japanese politics, or the history of LGBT politics in Japan. *Reuters* reports: ‘The vote by Tokyo’s Shibuya

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57 For an explanation of the kind of legal rights and benefits for same-sex couples Shibuya’s ‘same-sex partnership’ can achieve, see Shimizu’s commentary (2015).
ward may seem insignificant compared to the United States, where gay marriage is legal in all but 13 states, but just proposing the statute set off an unprecedented discussion over equality, and is likely to pave the way for similar measures elsewhere in Japan’ (Lies 2015). When comparing the Japanese LGBT situation to that of the United States, the latter must be presented as an LGBT friendly country, not the place where several States are trying to pass bills that allow discrimination against LGBT people on religious grounds, a move described by *Human Rights Watch* as ‘legally indulg[ing] prejudice based on their subjective interpretation of religion’ (Reid 2015).

Although the international news media generally treat Shibuya’s recognition of same-sex marriage as a progressive step for LGBT rights as human rights in Japan, not all human rights groups in Japan were satisfied with the Shibuya proposal. Immediately after the announcement of the plan for the recognition of ‘same-sex marriage’ by Shibuya, human rights activists, including the LGBT group *Rainbow Action*, immediately expressed their concerns over Shibuya ward’s intentions for human rights and diversity, because the plan was announced just after the ward violently closed the public parks to remove about 200 homeless people and their support group at the year’s end and throughout the New Year holidays. As the support group, which had organised the soup service for the homeless in the public parks, criticised Shibuya ward’s decision, saying ‘[s]hutting the parks obviously suggests the ward’s intention to deny the homeless their sleeping places and bar their entry altogether’ (Osaki 2014), Shibuya’s policy was understood as a sign of their contempt for the human rights of homeless people. In the political context of parks in Shibuya and the lives of homeless people, before Shibuya’s decision to close the parks in 2014, Shibuya ward sold the name of Miyashita Park to Nike and removed local homeless ‘squatters’, to renew the park for a fee in 2009. Thus, for 5 years previously, the municipality had been threatening the lives of homeless people in the city.

In an article headlined ‘Is Shibuya using human rights differently?’, *The Tokyo Shimbun* reports the critique of Shibuya’s plan by a lesbian activist, Tsuchiya Yuki, who said: ‘I am not convinced by the fact that the municipality which has forced the homeless out launches a human rights measure. I think they find the value in LGBT issues for producing the “stylish Shibuya town” which is a centre of fashionable trends from the West, not LGBT issues as human rights’ (Sawada 2015). An LGBT group *Rainbow Action* noted that the idea of privatising the public park as Miyashita Park was proposed by Hasebe Ken, the same Shibuya ward assembly member who proposed the recognition of
same-sex marriage, and criticised the Shibuya ward on the grounds that their policy tactically utilises the terms ‘human rights’ and ‘diversity’ for their economic purposes and political image. In its criticism, Rainbow Action clearly points out the economic connection between the ‘diversity’ implied by the recognition of same-sex couples and the exclusion of the homeless for privatisation of the public park.

Discussing diversity in academic institutions, Sara Ahmed points out that diversity has commercial and aesthetic values. She relates:

Part of this appeal of diversity seems to be about newness. Using a newer word allows you to be aligned with the value system of the institution given that ‘newness’ is often what is given value. ‘Diversity’ as a newer word is a buzzword: what we can hear might be the sound of its busy-ness. (Ahmed 2012, p. 61)

Through ‘diversity’ as a new word, people are given the impression that something new is happening in institutions. However, what is distinctive in Ahmed’s view is that the use of diversity can actually function to maintain an old order rather than to bring transformation:

What I want to note here is how in official language, the word ‘diversity’ derives its value from what is already valued. Diversity is incorporated as an official term insofar as it is made consistent with the organisation’s goal… The use of diversity as an official description can be a way of maintaining rather than transforming existing organisational values. [Stress in original] (ibid., p. 57)

In her analysis of the use of ‘diversity’ in contemporary society, diversity offers commercial and aesthetic value through conferring a brand of ‘newness’ while maintaining existing values in the organisations.

In the case of Shibuya’s recognition of ‘same-sex partnership’ for the sake of ‘diversity’, it is noteworthy to focus on what has actually changed by the ordinance. Even though it is intended to expand diversity in the town, instead it resulted in inscribing discrimination against same-sex relationships into law. For recognition of ‘same-sex partnership’, the municipality demands that same-sex couples acquire notarised certificates from private legal advisers as assurance of their relationship, so that the Shibuya ward only officially describes the existing legal bonds of same-sex couples.

See their blog Rainbow Action (2015).
authorised by legal contract as ‘same-sex partnership’, equivalent to ‘marriage’. In addition, the ordinance gives a ward mayor the power to deny recognition to ‘same-sex partnership’ in case it harms ‘public order and morals’, although the Constitution of Japan (Article 24) recognises heterosexual marriage on the basis of consent alone, not on agreement by any authority. Thus, although the ordinance for recognition of ‘same-sex partnership’ was announced for the purpose of establishing LGBT rights, equality and diversity, and for combating discrimination against LGBT people, it was actually accompanied by the discriminatory prejudice that public recognition of same-sex relationships can harm ‘public order and morals’ and should be differentiated from heterosexual marriage.

There is a distinctive difference when we compare Shibuya’s recognition of ‘same-sex partnership’ with British legalisation on equal marriage of same-sex couples. In July 2013, the Cameron administration passed a bill for equal marriage with large support from opposition parties, including the Labour Party and the Green Party, although there was strong opposition within the Tories. With the introduction of same-sex marriage, the Cameron administration now calls itself a champion of equal rights, as ‘[o]ur historic introduction of gay marriage has helped drive forward equality and strengthened the institution of marriage’ (The Conservative Party 2015, p. 48). At the same time, in July 2012, under their anti-immigrant policy, the Cameron administration introduced new regulations on marriage for British citizens, which demanded that British spouses prove that they have a disposable annual income of £18,600 if they want to sponsor a foreign spouse from outside the EU. According to The Guardian Online, the sum is not only just above the earnings of full-time workers receiving the national minimum wage but, indeed, would ‘exclude up to 47% of Britain's working population’ and ‘the government's own estimate is that the new rules will break up as many as 17,800 families every year’ (Nichols 2013). Thus, British reformation of ‘equal marriage’ under the Cameron administration does not expand equality among British citizens. Rather, it is a redefinition of marriage exclusion: from exclusion based on spouses’ gender to that based on their nationality and income. In the case of Shibuya’s recognition of ‘same-sex marriage’, there is no actual change in the legal status of same-sex couples; if anything, they face the cost of notarised certificates from private legal advisers to obtain their symbolic status from the municipality. It is not an expansion of LGBT rights or equality. Rather, it just changes the names: from ‘discrimination’ to ‘diversity’.
4-4. Exclusion of Homosexuals from Legal Rights

Although same-sex ‘partnership’ is regarded as acceptable in Shibuya, the centre of fashion and art in Tokyo, for its contribution to diversity, the national discussion by lawmakers appeared hostile to same-sex relationships. Responding to a question about same-sex marriage in the National Diet, Prime Minister Abe, who adopted same-sex benefits for the US military in Japan, said that same-sex marriage is ‘unconstitutional’ as ‘the Constitution was written when same-sex marriage was not contemplated’, and expressed antagonism towards same-sex marriage on the grounds that ‘Constitutional revision in order to recognise same-sex marriage requires extremely careful discussion’ as it ‘concerns the foundation of how families in our country should be’ (Nikaido 2015). This was the first time that the Japanese Government had expressed its view on the problem of legalisation of same-sex marriage, although some local authorities had already rejected marriage registration by same-sex couples, basing its decision on the Constitution.

The Asahi Shimbun also reported that lawmakers on the committee for ‘Preserving Families’ bond (kazoku no kuzuna wo mamorui iinkai)’ in the LDP expressed the same constitutional view, one of them adding that it amounted to discrimination against heterosexuals if only same-sex couples were allowed to form partnerships (Nikaido 2015).

Article 24 of the Constitution states, ‘Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes’. Abe and the lawmakers in the LDP interpret the term ‘the mutual consent of both sexes’ as meaning that the Constitution allows marriage only between ‘both sexes’, a man and a woman. However, the Article was originally intended to protect equality between men and women in the family, as part of the democratisation of Japan through reform of the pre-war patriarchal family system, and has been understood as protection of individuals’, especially women’s, rights (not) to marry, free from intervention or arrangement of marriage by the head of the family. Thus, there are legal scholars who argue that the Article does not exclude same-sex couples from marriage and that, therefore, same-sex marriage is allowable under the Constitution of Japan.

For example, in June 2014, a female same-sex couple tried to register their marriage in Aomori City; however, the City Hall rejected their registration on the basis of the Constitution (Josei 2014). As the couple did not bring the case to court, there is, as yet, no judicial opinion on same-sex marriage under the Constitution of Japan.
Japan (Sakuma 2014; Shimizu 2008; Ohno 2009). Thus, Abe’s contention that the Constitution does not allow same-sex marriage in Japan reflects not the general interpretation of constitutional scholars but rather his personal view. While Shibuya’s ordinance of same-sex partnership hardly expands on any actual legal rights and benefits of same-sex couples, the Prime Minister now openly expresses his view that same-sex couples’ rights of marriage or partnership should be, and are, constitutionally excluded in Japan.

This is one of the most ironic aspects of the ‘progress’ of Japanese LGBT rights as achieved by Shibuya’s ‘same-sex marriage’. The symbolic gesture of embracing LGBT rights for the sake of ‘diversity’ actually consolidates legal exclusions and divisions, even provoking the comment from the Prime Minister in the National Diet that LGBT rights are proscribed by the Constitution of Japan. From the proposal’s inception, Shibuya’s ‘same-sex marriage’ has repeatedly been compared with the institutionalisation of same-sex marriage in the West, such as that in the US or Europe. *USA Today* [online] reports on the subject as if this movement stemmed directly from American influence: ‘As the U.S. Supreme Court considers whether to sanction same-sex marriage across the United States, gay couples in Japan are belatedly making strides of their own’ (Spitzer 2015).

Although, as I have indicated, it is at least 50 years since ‘gay movements’ began to try to change Japanese politics, their history can easily be erased by political specialists and used to feed US narcissism:

> Western influence may finally be propelling the issue here, said Gregory Noble, professor of comparative politics and public administration at the University of Tokyo’s Institute of Social Science. ‘Just in the last six months or so I have noticed more attention paid to gay marriage, probably mostly because of developments in the U.S.’. (*ibid.*)

Despite the erasure of the history of LGBT activism in Japan, such a political narrative – ‘gay marriage movements have flourished in Japan thanks to Western influence’ – can indeed be true if applied to the way in which Japanese politicians act when facing the issue of same-sex marriage. For politicians promoting ‘same-sex marriage’, such as Hasebe who proposed it in Shibuya, it is not only a ‘human rights issue’ for LGBT people, but is also useful for branding Shibuya the ‘diversity town’: the town that opened up the

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60 Kimura Sota, a constitutional scholar, expressed the same view in a public forum (Watanabe 2015).
opportunity of ‘marriage’ for LGBT people for the first time in Japanese history, even though it offered hardly any actual legal benefits beyond the symbolic name. For opponents, such as Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, it is not a problem at all if foreign citizens who can bring benefits to Japan, such as diplomats and US military personnel, enjoy same-sex marriage in Japan, but it is unacceptable if the measure can force change upon the Japanese family system and society. What is tragicomic in this story is that these two political sides are not so different from each other. The introduction of same-sex marriage in Japanese politics was not an interpretation or translation into Japanese social contexts of the Western model of LGBT rights but, indeed, was an exact copy of the rights that Western governments have enthusiastically promoted in Japan: the new human rights with economic merits which LGBT people outside the West cannot yet enjoy.

5. Conclusion

When homosexuality was considered a desire that was outside ‘normal society’, Togo Ken (1979) utilised it to deny the existing institutions that reproduced social privileges. He talked about the relationship between the marriage system and Japan’s welfare system in the election broadcast for the upper house of the National Diet in 1977 on NHK, the national public broadcasting organisation:

On the subject of welfare of our country, single people are in a disadvantaged position and they cannot be advantaged until they marry. Especially, women are in a vulnerable position. So I will make it work for the people who do not marry for life. (Togo 1979, p. 150)

In his book, he explains this passage with a footnote:

As the Constitution of Japan says in Article 24 that ‘Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes’ and supposes that all marriages are between man and women, neither homo nor lez is allowed to marry. If they can do, it means merely to make their relation official (seki wo ireru); but if we can conquer the commonsense that it is a shame if men and women are not married, we don’t need to think about marriage. So, this means that it makes it easier to be homosexuals if we abolish the marriage system. (Togo 1979, p. 150)

In Togo’s policy during an electoral campaign for the upper house of the Diet, exclusion of homosexuals is seen as relevant to the social exclusion of singles, and especially of
women, from the welfare system. In Togo’s radicalism in the 1970s, politics for homosexuals also meant politics against the social exclusion of the poor.

Now, when LGBT rights have started to gain consideration within existing institutions, there is a tendency for ‘LGBT rights’ to mean economic and political benefits for Japan as a nation, rather than for actual LGBT people. At the same time, ironically, the security of the privacy of sexually non-normative people, such as those who engage in sexual activities with multiple partners or go to gay cruising spaces, has been undermined in Japanese society, and such rights of privacy are rarely regarded as ‘LGBT rights’ by the mass media and policy makers. In this sense, ‘LGBT rights’ in Japan now are not for the people Togo tried to represent. International LGBT rights and politics are now marked by the lives and culture of transnational elites and neoliberal consumerism. The actions on LGBT issues of Western governments, global corporations and elite universities are presented as a new political stream within the advanced culture. Thus, LGBT politics has become a new manifestation of the Western lifestyle, or something consumable for those with enough economic, social and cultural capital. This sort of ‘LGBT politics’ fails to address the political issues of the security of people’s privacy, of the poor, and of gender and sexual normativity itself.

Ironically, however, such representation of international LGBT issues stimulates the motivation of Japanese politicians and makes it possible to advance LGBT rights even in a nationalistic political environment devoted to economic gains, as in the case of Shibuya – although part of the motivation comes from fear of international criticism from the West, such as Russia experienced, when the Tokyo Olympics are held. At the same time, due to the representation of LGBT issues as part of the new Western lifestyle of the privileged, the ‘progress’ of LGBT rights in Japan fails to protect their legal rights and lives and is reduced to commercialisation and promotion of the new lifestyle. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that even this symbolic, but small step forward, in LGBT rights does actually help some LGBT people, and can encourage Japanese society to accept them, and offers hope for further improvements of LGBT circumstances in future. However, the price of LGBT rights as the new lifestyle is to forget the history of queer politics in Japan and to rediscover LGBT people as if they were a new species imported from the West.

**Conclusion: Sexual Politics and Political Contradictions in Postwar Japan**

1. **The Question of Modernity and Sexuality from a Non-Western View**
In this study, I have examined how a sense of cultural differences defines and limits sexual politics in Japan. Views of modernity and sexuality, or discourses of power and knowledge in Queer Theory, of which a large proportion of the related disciplines have been developed in Anglophone academia and activisms, are culturally and geographically marked. While the ‘modernity’ and new emergence of sexuality in modern society are regarded as universal and a product of the ‘West’, non-Western modernisation (some of which was developed in the same period as the modernisation of Western countries) is marked as ‘local’ or the result of ‘Westernisation’. At the same time, sexuality before modernisation and outside of the West is sometimes considered the alternative, against the impasse of modern sexuality which endlessly produces power and knowledge, as seen in Michel Foucault’s famous praise of pleasures, the sphere of *ars erotica* (Foucault 1980). I called such discourses ‘the Westernisation of modern sexuality’. In this sense, Queer Studies is not the exceptional subject based on ‘the formation of discourse of “the West and the Rest”’ that was designated by Stuart Hall, in his influential article ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’ in *Formations of Modernity* (Hall 1992).

In Japan as well, the issue of modernity has been one of the most discussed topics during the institutionalisation of Sexuality Studies, especially after the publication of a translation of Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality Volume I* in 1986. As Foucault revealed the production of power and knowledge through sexuality in modern Western society, Sexuality Studies in/about Japan have explored the relationship between Japanese modernity and Japanese sexuality, asking: how has Japanese modernisation transformed Japanese sexuality; how far has the sexuality of the Japanese been westernised; and what are the characteristics of Japanese sexuality compared to that of the West? Reflecting the relations between Japanese modernity and sexuality, Sexuality Studies in/about Japan have been divided between three popular narratives on Japanese modern sexuality. A first narrative notes that Japanese sexuality is westernised by virtue of its modernisation; as Furukawa Makoto (1994) influentially formulated it, discourses of sexuality had changed between the federal era and modern era, from the *nanshoku* (male eroticism) code to the *hentai-seiyoku* (perverse sexual desire) code. The second narrative rather focuses on Japan as the alternative to Western modern sexuality, as Mark McLelland, for example, strongly argues:
It is not the case that Japan is simply one among many sites for the elaboration of a kind of homogenised, international queer culture; rather, Japan is home to an alternative sexual modernity, a modernity produced by hybrid globalising process as much as by the continuation of identities, practices and mentalities inherited from the past. (McLelland 2005, p. 222)

According to this view, Japanese modern sexual culture is not simply the westernised and ‘homogenised’ one influenced by modernity, but the alternative one ‘inherited’ from the premodern past. The third narrative, as notably developed by Keith Vincent (2012) and Suganuma Katsuhiko (2012), pays attention to the ‘cultural hybridity’ of Japanese modernity and regards Japanese modern sexuality as the result of cultural hybridity between Japan and the West.

In this study, I asked: why do these contradictory narratives continue to exist side by side and how do they function in Japanese society? Although these narratives contradict each other, they are based on the same assumption: We can clearly mark the differences between Japanese and Western modern cultures as if they exist separately and independently, and modern Japan has somehow been heading towards Westernisation, from the past to the present. Thus, each narrative asks a question about Japanese identity as opposed to the West, indeed an identity that is ethnocentric and can become xenophobic, and about how Japanese modernisation has dealt with cultural differences and has changed Japanese society and its people.

As I pointed out in the Introduction, these narratives contain two problems. Firstly, representations of cultural differences between Japan and the West over gender and sexuality are incoherent and often contradictory, and more importantly, they have changed historically. For example, heteronormativity is regarded as the result of Westernisation, while the heteronormative family system is often insisted on and politically sustained as a Japanese ‘tradition’. On the one hand, homosexual relations can be referred back to Western culture and lifestyle, but in another context, homosexual conduct can recall the Japanese tradition of nanshoku. What is important is that all these discourses have been produced in modern Japanese society, rather than being relics of premodern Japan. Thus, their presumptions of clear and coherent differences between Japanese and Western cultures are inadequate, if not inaccurate, in regard to discourses in modern Japan. Secondly, they also fail to analyse the dynamism of sexual politics in postwar Japan: how (non)normative genders and sexualities would be attached to the national in some contexts, and what would be excluded when some expressions of gender
and sexuality were accepted or normalised in Japanese society. What is problematic in the narratives presupposing the projection of Japanese modernisation as Westernisation is that they reduce the dynamism of sexual politics in Japan to a struggle between Japanese ‘indigenous’ tradition and Western modernity; portraying it as either the result of Westernisation or as a residue that Westernisation has left unchanged. By this approach, these essential questions are left as collateral ones in sexual politics in Japan: how have Japanese people defined ‘Japanese culture’ in some contexts, or what features are counted in describing their sense of national boundaries and ethnicity? In other words, the question of the scope and limits of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983) in discourses of gender and sexual politics, and the facts of their dramatic changes in modern Japan, have been underestimated.

When analysing sexual politics with close attention to what is political in their movements in Japanese society in each context, Japanese sexual politics appear plural, even in conflict with each other. I have examined how the sense of cultural differences between Japan and the West is variably shaped, with sexual politics having largely contributed to it in postwar Japan and vice versa. Instead of employing the narrative of a historical trajectory towards the modernisation/Westernisation of Japan, I rather focused on the way a sense of cultural differences and national borders in Japanese society has shifted according to changes in Japanese society and the environments of the international community, and how that has characterised discourses of gender and sexuality in Japan. When analysing how the discourses of Japan’s national self-image define and limit sexual politics in Japanese society, at the same time following those discourses as they have shifted through history, the history of sexual politics of male homosexuals in postwar Japan appears discontinuous, which would not fit a single historical narrative of, for example, ‘progress’, ‘modernisation’, ‘Westernisation’, ‘tradition’, or ‘inheritance from the past’, because the meaning and social contexts of sexual politics have also altered. Some, for example Mishima Yukio (Ch.1), recalled cultural nationalism for his sexual politics, while others referred to Western cultural authority for their political purposes. On the other hand, neither the narrative of simply swaying between Japanese tradition and the new Westernisation, nor a hybrid of the two, is accurate, because the possible meanings of ‘Japanese tradition’ or ‘the West’ have not been consistent. In this study, following Eve K. Sedgwick’s strategy in Epistemology of the Closet (1990), I emphasised the power dynamism emerging from contradictory discourses of gender, sexuality and national identity in postwar Japan, rather than constructing a universal narrative that
would rationalise these discursive contradictions and the resulting dynamic shifts of sexual politics, within which it is, I assume, impossible to find an internal logic.

2. Sexual Politics and Japanese National Figures

Chapters 1 and 2 discussed the sexual politics of Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken, who were often referred to as homosexuals in Japan before the emergence of ‘Westernised gay identity’ (McLelland 2005). Mishima transformed homoeroticism into nationalist passion and a spirit of loyalty to the Emperor through his identification with the samurai and those fallen in war. Translating homosexuality in postwar Japan’s economically emerging society into a passionate love for the Emperor during the period of Japan’s war crisis, through his creative talent for literature and art, he recharacterised homoeroticism as close to the patriotism of the past. His performances representing Japanese patriotism as a passionate love for the Emperor reappropriated national tragic figures such as the samurai and the war dead, who were abandoned by Japanese modernisation and the war regime, i.e., the Japanese emperors, thus also recalling the situation of male homosexuals who were neglected in contemporary society. The element of homoeroticism in Mishima’s politics, which was intended to reconstruct Japanese ‘tradition’ and revive national pride, has contextualised homoerotic desire into Japanese masculinity and national frames. As a result, Mishima, whose performances retrospectively look ‘camp’, that is, exhibitionist and awkwardly hyper-masculine, is now regarded as one of the most important ‘gay’ artists in Japan prior to the appearance of ‘Westernised gay identity’. On the other hand, Togo Ken regards homosexuals as victims under the Emperor System and challengers of social norms associated with the Emperor. By contrast with Mishima, who loved to act like a national hero resembling the samurai and the war fallen, Togo rather performed and embodied the stereotypical ‘shameful’ image of homosexuals, emphasising the femininity and gender fluidity of homosexual men in nightclub culture. Whilst Mishima tried to implant homoeroticism into men’s national pride, Togo politically utilised the shame ascribed to homosexuality to oppose social norms. For Togo, homosexuality is far from akin to the passionate loyalty of national heroes to the Emperor; instead it is sexual desire which is repressed and shamed in the society of the Emperor system.

Although there are enormous differences between Mishima and Togo – the former a popular and respected novelist committed to a far-right political movement aimed at restoring politics centred on the Emperor, the latter an owner of a gay bar who
continued to violently reject the Emperor System in public and was never elected to public office, it is fruitful to pay attention to their similarities and then to clarify what it is that makes their political attitudes different. Indeed, their political characterisation of homosexual desire in Japanese society had attitudes in common: they regarded homosexual desire as universal among men and contextualised it in relation to the Emperor System of Japan. Both of them were passionately in favour of anarchism and utilised homosexual desire to challenge the social norms of postwar Japan, whose normative masculinity was heterosexual and devoted to economic success. In this sense, Mishima and Togo are political pioneers who situated homosexuality within a national politics and characterised it as a political force with which to challenge contemporary Japanese society and create an alternative society.

What made their political attitudes different is their respective views of a national order which excludes homosexuality and their strategies for change. Mishima understood postwar Japan’s pacifism as the order he had to challenge, and he constructed the idea of the Emperor System to justify his denial of it. In this characterisation by Mishima of Japan’s contemporary problems, his homoeroticism appeals to the past, before the introduction of postwar Japan’s pacifism. As the Emperor had formerly embodied Japanese masculinity, Mishima’s homoeroticism, which involved the romanticisation of the Emperor, was also supposed to provide a proper Japanese masculine model in his discourses. By contrast, Togo regarded the Emperor System as the foundation of heterocentrism and social hierarchy in Japan and his political purpose was to remove that system’s centrality from Japan. Thus, Togo’s image of homosexuality recalls the social outsiders of the social hierarchy at that time, including transgendered people, sex workers and disabled people. For Togo, homosexuality represents male femininity as opposed to the Japanese masculinity associated with the Emperor. In light of their shared views of homosexuality alongside their different ways of politically challenging the social order which excludes their sexuality, the view of the national emerges to define their sexual politics and its limitations.

However, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, through the AIDS crisis the connection between homosexual desire and the nation, often represented by the Emperor, was loosened and homosexuality came to represent Western society as diseased. New discourses have emerged as if to comply with a demand that Japan must be defended against such disease and its global effects: homosexuality is now the problem of modern Western society, and rarely related to Japanese masculinity, with homosexuals
individualised and isolated in Japanese society. Responding to new discourses of homosexuality and the disease sent from the West, gay movements – also influenced by AIDS activism in the US – had to face the political need to recontextualise their issues within Japanese society. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Tohjisha approach was one of the most popular and politically effective ones for Japanese homosexuals to use to reclaim their own issues as Japanese people within Japanese society.

What is surprising in this discursive shift of homosexuality in Japan is not the shift itself but the fact that it was often dismissed, even forgotten, in the later history of sexual politics in Japan. The Sexuality Studies which regarded gay activism after the 1980s as based on a ‘Westernised’ or ‘Americanised’ gay identity failed to observe the social changes in political circumstances created by the fear of AIDS and the relation between the national imaginary and sexuality (including heterosexuality). Rather than analysing the discursive discontinuity of the national imaginary and sexuality, it confirmed the cultural and national binary between Japanese and Western sexuality which emerged with the AIDS crisis. As discussed in Chapter 3, Mark McLelland (2005) and Wim Lunsing (2005) discussed Japanese sexual politics in the 1980s and 1990s in terms of the dualisms between ‘Americanised’ gay masculinity and Togo’s embodied Asian femininity in the 1970s, and between activism based on the ‘Westernised’ and individualised gay identity and the Japanese sexuality that preceded it. What complicates the discussion of Japanese sexual politics is that criticism of identity politics from Queer Theory is also often appropriated to reinforce the discourses about Japanese (Asian) sexuality apart from the identity aspect – an approach which can represent both an Orientalist view within the Western context, and a culturally narcissistic one within the Japanese social context, when differentiated from the West. Through reaffirming the dualism of sexual politics as between Japanese and Western sexuality, what is efficiently repressed is the issue of sexual minorities who are neither Japanese nor Western in Japanese society, which can be related to the history of the Japanese Empire and its colonisation. In this sense, to construct a new relation between the national imaginary and sexuality is not only to secure the national normality of gender and sexuality but also to whitewash the inconvenient Japanese past.

When the approach of Tohjisha incorporated the discourse of individualised homosexuality, rather than universal desire, and emphasised the self-determination of minorities who are differentiated from others, especially from people considered as a majority, it prepared two styles of activisms: the representative gay male politics and the
gay male politics of self-liberation. These two kinds of activisms are still influential following the discourses of individualised sexual minorities, including discourses of sexual orientation and sexual identity, which have now been widely accepted. However, when Tohjisha loses its original political context and comes to refer simply to ‘Japanese-middle-class-gay-men-in-a-big-city’, the term is easily associated with the representation of specific gay activities in the private realm, without challenging the Japanese politics and social norms that marginalise several social groups, including women, foreigners and ethnic minorities. When normative Japanese men have become the ‘gay people in Japan’ representing the individualisation of homosexuality which is associated with Japanese ethnocentrism and exceptionalism, as in the ‘characteristics of Japanese gay desire and community’ (Moriyama 2012), the term Tohjisha in the gay culture can rather reiterate and even enforce the conventional boundaries of gender and sexuality, while suspending political approaches to the nation and its heteronormativity. I call such gay ‘activism’ the Japanese homonormativity. What is ironic in Tohjisha discourse is that, although it was originally invented and utilised within very political contexts, such contexts have come to be regarded as the ‘old style of movements’ or have merely been forgotten, so that it has contributed to the ‘new’ idea that homosexual issues are a private matter, and prepared the context in which sexual politics is associated with neoliberalism after the 2000s.

In Chapters 5 and 6, I discussed the new Americanisation of narratives of sexual politics and the emergence of LGBT rights in Japan. Whilst Tohjisha discourse prepared the ground for a ‘new political movement’ within which each gay man pursues his desire and enjoys his private life (Fushimi 2007), a new global political phenomenon surrounding sexual minorities appears, especially after the birth of the Obama administration in the US: LGBT rights. Now, sexual politics refers not to the domestic political situation in relation to the Emperor, as in the work of Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken, nor to a repoliticisation through Tohjisha discourse, as in the work of Keith Vincent, Kawaguchi Kazuya, Kazama Takashi, and Ino Shinichi, but to something else, which is contextualised within the US history of sexual minorities. As both John Roos and Caroline Kennedy, the US ambassadors to Japan appointed by President Obama, commonly characterise LGBT rights, even in Japan, in the context of American Civil Rights Movements (Roos 2013; Kennedy 2016), the Americanisation of LGBT rights is promoted not only by Japanese mass media but also by narratives of the US government.

What is distinctive in the influence of LGBT rights discourses is the indication of a new political field for sexual minorities: that of economic activities. In contemporary
Japan, which looks forward to the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics in 2020, new LGBT neoliberal rights discourses appeal to the Japanese government and corporations by promising these interests a new way of marketing and representing LGBT rights as something each private company should contribute to, rather than indicating how the government must act to change the system for equality and justice. Thus, the Americanisation of the narrative of LGBT rights works as part of the commercialisation of new movements/markets. Whilst it erases the Japanese history of sexual minorities’ political movements since Mishima Yukio – many of which opposed capitalism and Japanese economic nationalisms, it introduces and promotes a new, American political or business style which cares about ‘LGBT rights’ vis-à-vis ‘LGBT markets’.

As a result, a new Japanese national self-image and history of Japanese sexuality are retrospectively constructed in relation to the ‘new’ LGBT rights discourses issuing from the US. That is, although Japan lacks understanding of LGBT rights and modern institutions supporting them when compared to the US, Japan was originally an LGBT-friendly country before its Westernisation. In such a Japanese national self-image, the Japanese ‘ignorance’ of LGBT rights has two functions. On the one hand, it indicates a better future when Japanese people will know about LGBT rights in contrast to today’s ignorance. On the other hand, ‘ignorance’ also denotes Japanese ‘innocence’ regarding LGBT issues in contemporary Japan: that is, because the Japanese do not know about LGBT issues, which are supposedly an originally ‘Western’ idea, the existence of discrimination against LGBT people and a discriminatory social system are not intentional, but merely the result of such Japanese ‘ignorance’. The Americanisation of the narrative of LGBT issues ironically functions to preserve and excuse discrimination against LGBT people in Japan.

3. A Coherent History and the Functions of Knowledge/Forgetfulness of Contradictory Discourses

Investigating the relations between Japanese national figures and ideas of gender and sexuality through history, we see that contradictory discourses about homosexuality have contributed not only to constructing normative Japanese identity and images but also to transforming them. As the normative Japanese national figure and its gender and sexuality

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61 See the report about LGBT issues in Japan by the Liberal Democratic Party (2016).
have often changed, sexual minorities’ politics which have challenged the social norms of each period have been nullified and depoliticised, even perceived as ‘outdated’. Japanese heteronormative society will be protected by transforming the normative Japanese national figure and its gender and sexuality and labelling sexual minorities’ activisms and their identity as ‘outdated’ or ‘non-Japanese’, here utilising the image of the West.

What is notable in the transformation of Japanese normative national figures is that the temporality of sexual politics also shifts as the national figure has changed. For example, Mishima Yukio formed his politics by leaning towards the past. He found a place for his homoerotic desire in the past which contemporary Japan is denying, and utilised his interpretation of Japan’s traditional culture and its past for his oddly homoerotic but reactionary far-right politics. On the other hand, under the influence of discourses of sexual politics issuing from Western society, bringing concepts such as ‘LGBT’ issues, sexual politics often represent themselves as ‘new’ movements, reflecting their transferral from Western society. Thus, a more productive way to analyse sexual politics in Japan is not to ask whether they form a ‘Japanese’ traditional movement or a Western one, but to analyse the way they contextualise themselves within Japanese history and society, what political effects they have on Japanese society, and what kind of temporality they present in the society.

Though my interests have focused on changes in the discourses of gender, sexuality, and the national imaginary, and on the discontinuity in the history of Japanese sexual politics, rather than on constructing a universal narrative and theory to explain political phenomena in modern Japan, I have also tried to show the effects of attempts at unifying a historical and cultural story which constitutes a linear history and a simplifying narrative. This is what I called the functions of knowledge/forgetfulness of contradictory discourses of sexual politics.

A historical narrative based on the stable and successive national figures of Japan poses a question as to whether some aspects of sexual politics and culture are authentic or not in Japanese culture, and enquires whether it would fit the narrator’s view of Japan or of the West. However, such questions are not only historically inappropriate but also reinforce an idea of normativity, as they function to marginalise social minorities who are considered outside that which is ‘authentically Japanese’. For example, as I discussed in Chapter 3, some critics and homosexuals dismissed gay activists in the 1990s because they regarded their ‘gei’ identity as being influenced by the US and of little
relevance to Japanese society. Here, the question is whether some sexual politics and culture are authentic or not, as the Japanese actually worked against the call for gay people’s dignity in Japan and sought, on the basis of sexuality, to erase some people’s identity from the ‘authentic’ Japanese culture.

Constructing a national image of Japan based on contradictory discourses about gender and sexuality constitutes a double bind imposed on the sexual politics of male homosexuals. What is political in contradictory discourses about gender and sexuality in the context of Japanese nationalism is that the discursive contradictions are often utilised to disqualify sexual politics which fail to fit in with a certain national figure, without referring to the contradictions or plurality of that national figure. For example, as I discussed in the Introduction, when some activists challenge discrimination against sexual minorities in contemporary Japan, the Japanese ‘tradition’ of nanshoku or onnagata – homosexual customs or transgender cultures in theatre before the modernisation – which is supposed to represent a ‘Japanese national figure’ in this context, can be recalled to deny their claims. In another context, when new LGBT movements emerged and it was understood that they could contribute to the Japanese economy, thus representing a ‘Japanese national figure’ in this context, sexual minorities’ activisms of the past which challenged capitalism and Japanese economic nationalism, such as the activism of Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken, can be easily erased. This strategy serves not only to veil contradictions in the national imaginary shared by the people, but also to establish the nation as a political goal which sexual politics must adapt to and follow. What is tragic for social minorities in such characterisations of the nation as a political goal is that efforts to conform to the national image never succeed, any more than efforts to catch a mirage can succeed, since contradictory discourses endlessly create different national ideals and social practices.

To expose the shifts in representations of Japanese national figures and the contradictions which sexual politics in Japan must always have faced, it is useful to investigate discursive shifts in the past, as this study has shown. What is also important in reviewing history is to focus on the problems and limits of sexual politics which have dealt with national norms or utilised people’s admiration for the West. Many activisms, if not all, have tried, consciously or unconsciously, to appeal to national norms to gain recognition in Japanese society whilst the national norms themselves been revised through the constant reinvention of new norms for gender and sexuality.
4. Problems of Material and Historical Conditions for Politics in Japan

Japanese national identity – like all national identities – is constructed through the body and desire. Thus, the contradictions that exist between Japanese nationalism and Westernisation are politically negotiated by constructing and transforming ‘Japanese’ bodies. It is essential to pay attention to both normative and non-normative bodies to analyse Japanese nationalism and national identity.

It is true that my research relies on the already existing large volume of male discourses concerned with their desire and sexuality in Japan. However, there are considerable differences between studies of male homosexuality and those of female homosexuality in terms of accessibility and the number of academic publications. Research on Japanese female sexuality is very limited compared with that of male homosexuality in Japan, due to the history of women’s limited access to education and publication, women’s economic disadvantage, women’s social difficulties in gaining independence and securing privacy, and the neglect and undervaluing of female desire and sexuality as social issues. Despite the existence of several innovative studies of female discourses on same-sex desire and identity in Japan since the 2010s (Akaeda 2011; Horie 2015; Iino 2008; Koyama, Akaeda, and Imada 2014; Takemura 2002, 2012, 2013), it is still more difficult to access the historical archive of female homosexuality than to access the research and archive of/about male homosexuality. This study is not exceptional in reflecting and being limited by the asymmetric material conditions of men and women in Japanese society.

My purpose in this study was to expose the political dynamisms created by contradictory discourses concerning definitions of hetero/homosexuality and Japanese/Western cultural differences in Japan, and to explore how sexual minorities, especially male homosexuals, have tried to constitute themselves as political subjects within Japanese politics. Although each social minority is marginalised in a different way in Japanese society, homosexual men are relatively easier to present as political in the Japanese political domain than other gendered minorities. Firstly, this is because of the treatment of gender relations in Japanese politics, which have been dominated by men. Such gender relations have reflected sexual politics conducted by men. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Mishima Yukio and Togo Ken represented themselves as the political within the Japanese public domain by distinguishing themselves from women; politicising themselves by depoliticising women’s positions. Also, the social assumption
of the male public identity was also unquestioned in the strategy of gay men coming out in the 1990s, as discussed in Chapter 3. Secondly, female sexuality and desire may not be politically visible in the national imaginary as male sexuality and desire are. As I discussed in the Introduction and when considering the case of Mishima Yukio, it is possible for male homosexuality to find its ‘antecedents’ in history, not as a few exceptional people hidden in the past but as a common custom followed by historic heroes who are highly respected and regarded as models of masculinity. Thus, Japanese homosexual men have the political choice of justifying their sexuality in the context of ‘Japanese’ culture and tradition, though such a strategy will not necessarily succeed. By contrast, for feminism and female same-sex sexuality, it is more difficult to find similar ‘antecedents’ in Japanese ‘formal’ history that is widely shared among people. In this sense, I share the hypothesis proposed by Eve K. Sedgwick that the question of gender and the question of sexuality are not the same question, and that it is more fruitful to carefully distinguish one mechanism of social marginalisation from another (Sedgwick 1990, pp. 27-39).

5. Political Possibilities of Non-Western-centric Queer Studies

The limitation of this study suggests that there are different mechanisms of national inclusion/exclusion, and different material conditions for gender and sexual politics in Japan for women, from the ones Japanese homosexual men have faced. Thus, this study only revealed a part of the political dynamisms that have emerged through the national, gender, and sexuality. In particular, it would need to investigate the material conditions of gender and sexual politics in Japan: not only how some discourses are excluded from or integrated within the national as this study examined, but also how the material conditions for politics are formed; who can rightfully gain access to political resources and who cannot. In regard to the aspect of this study that focuses on the cultural relations between sexual politics and the national, although I have discussed the national in connection with economic success in postwar Japan, rather than the material conditions and their maldistribution, which often undermines the voices of people experiencing economic and social disadvantage, this study does not overcome the criticism of Queer Studies that it focuses too heavily on culture rather than on the economic structure. Nancy Fraser (2013) insists that Judith Butler’s critique of heterosexism fails to recognise the dynamism of capitalism which no longer needs heterosexism and that Butler’s
deconstruction of the economic and cultural structures undermines the advantages of Fraser’s theoretical distinction between recognition and redistribution (Ch. 7). From Fraser’s critical viewpoint which opposes cultural critiques, this study also focuses too much on the politics of recognition and does not pay enough attention to the problem of redistribution. This is a weakness I acknowledge and wish to develop further in future research.

At the same time, however, Fraser’s dualism between economics and culture, or the politics of redistribution and recognition, fails to recognise the problem that the views of both economics and culture in contemporary society are marked by the history of modernity, in which Western centrism is disguised as a universal model. As a response to Postcolonial Theory, Queer Theory has also criticised Western centrism and has sought alternative narratives, especially about how other parts of the world should be theorised in relation to the West. Yet, the efforts to overcome Western centrism faces the theoretical dilemma that Western centrism itself is a product of a combination of Western universalism and particularism. Sakai Naoki (1997) points out a paradox of the connection between Western particularity and universality, observing that ‘the West must represent the moment of the universal under which particulars are subsumed’ (p. 155). In the double movement of universalism and particularism and the shift of the centre from Western Europe to the United States, Sakai notes that universality and the particularity of modernity have now been closely woven together with American nationalism. What is problematic in the paradox of US exceptionalism and universalism is that it is not only utilised to establish the US supremacy employed by US government narratives such as Hillary Clinton’s ‘Gay Rights are Human Rights’ address, but it is also found in critiques of US exceptionalism and universalism, such as the critique of homonationalism. As I pointed out in Chapter 5, both homonationalism and the criticism of homonationalism treat American society and history as the place where global politics emerge, and reproduce US exceptionalism, whilst political subjects in other regions are either erased or reduced to the effects of US politics.

The double movement of US universalism and exceptionalism is of the same coin as Japanese nationalism; it can be expressed as a narcissistic self-identity of Japanese uniqueness or sometimes as a motive for holding global leadership. In his critique of

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62 See also the debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (Fraser and Honneth 2003).
Western universalism, Sakai not only portrays the relationship between the West and the non-West as still following a master/slave formula, but also suggests that efforts to challenge the universalism of the West can fall into the very universalism which critiques try to overcome. From reading the discussions of Japanese philosophers of the Kyoto school in the 1930s who tried to establish a new philosophy to overcome the limits of Western modernity, and seeing how similar efforts of postmodernism ironically resulted in the ideology of the Empire of Japan during the Second World War (Harootunian 2002), Sakai reveals that their desire was to bring themselves to the centre of world history, serving the Japanese nationalism which drove the country to war:

What they were opposed to was the fact that, in that Eurocentric arrangement of the world, the putative unity of the Japanese happened to be excluded from the centre. They want to change the world so that the Japanese would occupy the position of the centre and of the subject that determines other particularities in its own universal term. (Sakai 1997, p. 170)

The double-movement between universalism and particularism is not only the foundation of Western superiority over other regions but is also sometimes the motivation for criticism of it which asserts the other regions’ own supremacy.

Through the study of Japanese sexual politics, I wanted to suggest that it can be more productive to focus on discursive contradictions and power relations emerging in them between the West and others, or Western universalism and nationalistic particularism, rather than challenging Western-centric universalism itself or seeking a new kind of universalism. It is impossible, and unproductive even if possible, to try to establish a theoretical ground which will easily resolve the dualisms between Japan and the West, and between heterosexism and queer counterparts, so as to establish one coherent narrative. The approach focusing on discursive contradictions and power relations may not directly solve all problems emerged by Western-centric views and their nationalistic counterparts in politics and cultures. But it is still a better approach not only to analyse the social phenomena created by the double-bind of Western-centric universalism and counter-discourses against it, but also to avoid reproducing Western-centric universalism, as the anti-homonationalist critiques and Japanese philosophers of the Kyoto school ironically did. As the history of sexual politics in Japan against normativity and for social change has been a series of discontinuities and self-redefinitions, what is needed to understand such history and society is not to establish a
universal theory which covers the discontinuity, but to examine what is happening behind the desire for universalism.
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