Belief is contingently involuntary

Booth, Anthony Robert (2017) Belief is contingently involuntary. Ratio, 30 (2). pp. 107-121. ISSN 0034-0006

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Abstract

The debate between “Normativists” and “Teleologists” about the normativity of belief has been taken to hinge on the question of which of the two views best explains why it is that we cannot (non-contingently) believe at will. Of course, this presupposes that there is an explanation to be had. Here, I argue that this supposition is unwarranted, that Doxastic Involuntarism is merely contingently true. I argue that this is made apparent when we consider that suspended judgement must be involuntary if belief is, that suspended judgment is not a belief (or set of beliefs), and that the aim or norm of suspended judgement cannot be constitutive if suspended judgement is not a belief (or set of beliefs).

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) > B0105 Special topics, A-Z
Depositing User: Anthony Booth
Date Deposited: 25 Jan 2016 08:24
Last Modified: 09 May 2017 17:20
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/59413

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