NOTES

TRADE CRISIS? WHAT TRADE CRISIS?

Kristian Behrens, Gregory Corcos, and Giordano Mion*

Abstract—We investigate the 2008–2009 trade collapse using microdata from a small open economy, Belgium. Belgian exports and imports mostly fell because of smaller quantities sold and unit prices charged rather than fewer firms, trading partners, and products being involved in trade. Our difference-in-difference results point to a fall in the demand for tradables as the main driver of the collapse. Finance and involvement in global value chains played a minor role. Firm-level exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios reveal a comparable collapse of domestic and cross-border operations. Overall, our results reject a crisis of cross-border trade per se.

I. Introduction

World trade in manufactures fell by about 30% in nominal terms between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009 (World Trade Organization, 2009). This trade collapse was wide-ranging across industries and highly synchronized across OECD countries (Araújo & Martins, 2009). The trade fall also exceeded that of world GDP and the fall that a computable general equilibrium model or a simple IRBC model would predict (Benassy-Quéré et al. 2009; Levchenko, Lewis, & Tesar, 2010).

Many explanations for this disproportion have been put forward. Most of them focus on the supply side: a dramatic trade credit crunch (Auboin, 2009; Chor & Manova, 2010), the disruption of global value chains (Yi, 2009), or protectionism raising its ugly head again (Evenett, 2009; Jacks, Meissner, & Novy, 2011). Others involve the demand side: a disproportionate fall in the demand for tradable goods (Eaton et al., 2011), inventory adjustments (Alessandria, Kaboski, & Midrigan, 2010), or the postponement of durable goods purchases. In principle, all of these mechanisms may have played a role, and only empirical analysis can discriminate among them.1

Our contribution is threefold. Matching exhaustive data on Belgian exports and imports by firm-country-product with balance sheet information, we first decompose changes in trade values into an intensive and an extensive margin components.2 Second, we provide a microeconometric analysis of the determinants of the trade collapse. Finally, we assess whether international trade was hit more strongly than production and domestic activity. We aim to understand why Belgian exports and imports fell substantially (by 26.23% and 27.77%, respectively) and whether it is warranted to talk about a trade crisis—a crisis of the activity of trading across national boundaries per se.

Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, using a decomposition similar to Bernard et al. (2009), we find that virtually all of the Belgian trade collapse occurred at the intensive margin. Firm exit and the dropping of products and markets played only limited roles relative to price adjustments and output scaling. This finding is very robust and echoes results on the 1997 Asian crisis.3 Nonetheless, it is remarkable given the magnitude of the recent trade collapse.

Second, we estimate a model of changes in trade at the firm-country-product level in search of evidence for the conjectures on the causes of the trade collapse. Using a difference-in-difference specification—with both halves of 2007 and 2008 (henceforth, 2007S1–2008S1) as the pretreatment period and both halves 2008 and 2009 (henceforth, 2008S1–2009S1) as the posttreatment period—we estimate the differential posttreatment effects of particular firm, country, and product covariates on the fall in exports and imports. The most important factor explaining changes in exports is the destination country’s growth rate of GDP. Had growth rates between 2008S1–2009S1 been the same as between 2007S1–2008S1, Belgian exports would have fallen by about 54% less than what we actually observed. This result is quantitatively close to that reported by Eaton et al. (2011) despite a very different data set and methodology. Another finding is that trade in consumer durables and capital goods fell more severely than trade in other product categories, in particular, consumer nondurables. Had the fall in demand across product categories been equal to the fall in consumer nondurables, Belgian exports would have fallen by about 21% less than what we actually observed. Once country- and product-specific components have been controlled for, the remaining contribution of the firm dimension to the trade collapse is more modest. The Belgian

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The title of this paper is freely borrowed from Lindsey Brink’s March 7, 1990, Wall Street Journal article (p. A18, eastern edition). Both Brink and we, though dealing with different sets of issues, argue that trade is often said to be in a crisis even when closer scrutiny of the situation or the data suggest that there is no specific “trade crisis.”

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1 Baldwin (2009) surveys a large number of empirical studies and concludes in favor of demand-side explanations. Bricongne et al. (2009) examine the margins of the collapse of French trade and find a more severe fall in sectors that depend more on external finance, and among firms that default on a payment. Levchenko et al. (2010) find some support for the global value chain and durables explanations in an analysis of U.S. industry-level exports and imports. Chor and Manova (2010) find stronger reductions in U.S. imports during the peak of the crisis from countries with higher interbank interest rates and in sectors that rely more on external finance.

2 Belgian raw trade data contains a large amount of re-exports. See the online appendix for details about how we deal with this issue.

3 Bernard et al. (2009) investigate the contributions of the different margins to changes in U.S. exports to, and imports from several Asian countries during the 1997 financial. They find that most of the adjustments occurred at the intensive margin, thus favoring a quick subsequent recovery.

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credit crunch seems to have somewhat affected exporters: differences in indebtedness and debt maturity can explain up to 33% of the firm-level fall in exports. Similarly, involvement in global value chains can explain about 24% of the fall in imports. Although there is some effect of inventory adjustment on imports, this is limited to the distribution sector only. In a nutshell, a generalized fall in demand that affected consumer durables and capital goods more strongly drives most of the changes. Finally, again using a difference-in-difference specification, we examine changes in Belgium’s firms’ exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios, as well as exports-to-production and imports-to-production ratios. To the best of our knowledge, no other study has so far analyzed the recent trade collapse using firm-level data on both trade and domestic operations, though doing so is necessary to gauge whether international activity has been disproportionately hit by the crisis. Looking across firms, our analysis reveals almost no significant differential posttreatment effects on changes in these ratios. Factors behind the trade fall affected domestic operations equally. In particular, we find no explanatory power for financial variables: though exporters indeed suffered from restricted access to credit, their domestic and foreign activities were equally hit. Supply-side conjectures therefore seem to have little explanatory power when used to compare changes in foreign and domestic operations. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II decomposes the collapse along various margins and along various country, product, and firm dimensions. Section III presents our difference-in-difference approach to disentangle the contributions of firm, product, and country characteristics to the observed changes in the intensive margin. Section IV analyzes the evolution of changes in domestic activity as compared to changes in international activity. Section V concludes. Details concerning data sources, as well as the description and the construction of variables, are relegated to the online appendix.

II. The Extensive and Intensive Margins of the Trade Collapse

To gauge each margin’s contribution to the Belgian trade collapse, we decompose the changes in export and import values along the lines suggested by Bernard et al. (2009). Exports $X$ in a given period can be written as $X = f(T, \pi T)$, where $f$, $T$, and $\pi$ denote the number of exporters, the average number of countries each exporter sells to, and the average number of products each exporter ships to each country, respectively, and where $T \equiv X/(f \pi T)$ are average sales per exporter-country-product. Defining $\Delta X \equiv X'/X$, where $X'$ refers to exports in another period and applying the $\Delta$ transformation to the other variables, we can decompose the change in Belgian exports between 2008S1 and 2009S1 as follows.

Changes in the first three terms are referred to as changes in the extensive margin, while changes in the last term are referred to as changes in the intensive margin. Information about physical quantities exported allows us to further decompose changes in the intensive margin into changes in average quantities ($\pi$) and unit prices ($\pi$): $\Delta X \equiv \Delta \pi \Delta \pi$. We provide more detailed information about how this latter decomposition is implemented in the online appendix. Changes in imports, $\Delta M$, can be decomposed in the same way.

The top panel of table 1 reveals that despite a total fall in exports of 26.23%, the number of exporters and the number of products shipped on average by each exporter to each country increased by 0.96% and by 0.16%, respectively. The average number of countries served by Belgian exporters decreased by 1.92%. Changes at the extensive margin hence reduced exports by (1.0096 × 0.9808 × 1.0016 − 1) × 100% = −0.82%. As can be further seen from table 1, changes at the extensive margin are dwarfed by changes at the intensive margin. Indeed, the average value of exports per firm-country-product fell by 25.63% between 2008S1 and 2009S1. Changes in the intensive margin are mainly driven by changes in quantities shipped. On average, Belgian exports by firm-country-product decreased in terms of quantities by 20%, while average unit prices also fell, but “only” by 7.04%. As finally shown by the last line of the top panel of table 1, the intensive margin contributes to more than 97% of the observed change in exports.

The bottom panel of table 1 performs the same decomposition for total Belgian imports, which fell by 27.77% across all firm-country-product combinations between 2008S1 and 2009S1. Observe that the overall picture is very similar to that of exports: the intensive margin accounts for almost all the changes, and most of it is driven by a sharp decrease in quantities. A first conclusion thus emerges: the collapse of both total Belgian exports and imports was overwhelmingly driven by a fall in exports or imports per firm-country-product, itself driven to a large extent by a sharp fall in quantities. To gauge whether these results roughly hold for all firms, sectors, and trading partners, we repeat the decomposition by splitting our sample more finely along various dimensions (for example, large and small firms, less or more productive firms, ownership status, debt structure). Such a finer decomposition can provide some first insights into the key explanations for the fall in trade. As can be seen from table 2, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Extensive Margin</th>
<th>Intensive Margin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>Quantities</td>
<td>Prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 S1</td>
<td>101.25</td>
<td>18,053</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 S1</td>
<td>76.64</td>
<td>33,576</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Letting EM and IM denote the extensive and the intensive margins, the total change can be expressed as $\Delta X = \Delta \pi \Delta \pi \times \Delta M$. Using logarithms, we compute the relative contribution of the intensive and the extensive margins to the total change in trade as $\ln(\Delta \pi \Delta \pi) / \ln(\Delta \pi \Delta \pi)$ and $\ln(\Delta \pi \Delta \pi) / \ln(\Delta \pi \Delta \pi)$. Total imports are in billion euros, and average sales are in euros. See the online appendix for further details.

Table 1. Changes in the Margins of Total Belgian Exports and Imports, 2008S1–2009S1

Notes: 703
The reasons are that the total trade of goods that are measured in kilograms has decreased less than the trade of goods measured in units and Belgium trades proportionally more goods measured in kilograms with lost because of the lack of balance sheet data required for figures on employment and other firm characteristics.

Products put forward in the literature and to quantify their contribution to the collapse being a heterogeneous treatment across firms with different characteristics—we can infer whether restricted access to credit played a role during the crisis and gauge its magnitude.

### Firm-, Country-, and Product-Level Characteristics: The Determinants of the Trade Collapse

We now turn to econometric analysis to examine the various conjectures put forward in the literature and to quantify their contribution to the fall in trade. To do so, we look at the differential impact of firm, product, and country characteristics before and after the start of the collapse. Looking at the differential impact is important for the following reason. If, say, highly leveraged firms experience lower export growth than other firms even in a normal period, nothing could be learned from the simple fact that they suffered a stronger fall in trade during the collapse. However, by comparing the negative effect on export growth of being highly leveraged before and after the start of the collapse—the collapse being a heterogeneous treatment across firms with different characteristics—we can infer whether restricted access to credit played a role during the crisis and gauge its magnitude.

#### A. An Econometric Model of Changes in Trade Values

We saw that the bulk of the 2008S1–2009S1 fall in Belgian trade occurred at the intensive margin. Furthermore, “stayers”—firms exporting in both semesters—accounted for 98% of both exports and imports in 2008S1 and 2009S1. Therefore, we can safely explore the determinants of the fall in trade by restricting our analysis to intensive margin changes in trade among these firms.

The primary data for our analysis are export and import values by firm-country-product in 2007S1, 2008S1, and 2009S1, as well as balance sheet data (see the online appendix for more information). We define size in terms of employment and small (large) firms as those being below (above) the two-digit NACE rev1.1 industry median size across all trading firms. Information on some exporters and importers is lost because of the lack of balance sheet data.

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As a robustness check (available on request), we also provide an alternative price-quantity decomposition where we only focus on goods reported by weight. Results slightly differ from those reported in the paper.

See section II for additional details on the decomposition performed. All figures are expressed in terms of percentage changes. We report results for both exports and imports only when the results for those two categories are qualitatively and quantitatively sufficiently different. This table presents only a subset of the results. The full set of results is available as a spreadsheet from the authors on request.

### Table 2. Changes in the Margins of Belgian Exports and Imports, by Subgroupings, 2008S1–2009S1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroups</th>
<th>Total Extensive Margin</th>
<th>Intensive Margin</th>
<th>Salesa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>Firms Countries</td>
<td>Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports class. as ‘Other goods’</td>
<td>−21.03</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>−1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports class. as ‘Intern., Capital, &amp; Dura.’</td>
<td>−28.98</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>−2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports class. as ‘Other goods’</td>
<td>−25.64</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>−1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports class. as ‘Intern., Capital, &amp; Dura.’</td>
<td>−29.17</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>−3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional components</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to EU member states only</td>
<td>−26.06</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>−3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to OECD non-EU countries</td>
<td>−27.70</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>−1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to non-OECD non-EU countries</td>
<td>−26.22</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>−0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm types</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports by small firms</td>
<td>−20.52</td>
<td>−2.44</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports by large firms</td>
<td>−27.35</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>−2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports by small firms</td>
<td>−12.80</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports by large firms</td>
<td>−30.46</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>−1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports by multinational firms</td>
<td>−23.34</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>−1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports by multinational firms</td>
<td>−36.61</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>−1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports by nonforeign-owned firms</td>
<td>−19.91</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>−1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports by foreign-owned firms</td>
<td>−34.57</td>
<td>−0.45</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports, low share of debts over liabilities</td>
<td>−24.53</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>−1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports, high share of debts over liabilities</td>
<td>−29.72</td>
<td>−1.55</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports, low share of financial debts</td>
<td>−24.25</td>
<td>−0.70</td>
<td>−0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports, high share of financial debts</td>
<td>−29.36</td>
<td>−0.72</td>
<td>−1.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See section II for additional details on the decomposition performed. All figures are expressed in terms of percentage changes. We report results for both exports and imports only when the results for those two categories are qualitatively and quantitatively sufficiently different. This table presents only a subset of the results. The full set of results is available as a spreadsheet from the authors on request.

aAs a robustness check (available on request), we also provide an alternative price-quantity decomposition where we only focus on goods reported by weight. Results slightly differ from those reported in the paper.

bThe product classification follows the EU’s Main Industrial Groupings in official statistics, as described in the European Commission Regulation No. 566/2001 (March 26, 2001). This classification separates products into intermediate, capital, consumer durable, consumer nondurable, and energy products.

cWe define size in terms of employment and small (large) firms as those being below (above) the two-digit NACE rev1.1 industry median size across all trading firms. Information on some exporters and importers is lost because of the lack of balance sheet data required for figures on employment and other firm characteristics.

dA multinational firm is one registered in Belgium that owns, either directly or indirectly, more than 10% of the equity of at least one firm registered in another country. A foreign-owned firm is one a registered in Belgium with 10% or more of its equity owned by a foreign entity.

eThe ratios are computed from balance sheet data. The share of financial debts is the ratio of financial debts to total liabilities (thus excluding commercial debt). Information on some exporters and importers is lost because of the lack of balance sheet data.

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overall decomposition of margins, while not identical, remains qualitatively very stable across all specifications. In particular, the intensive margin remains dominant, whereas changes at the extensive margin are uniformly small. The key points worth noting from table 2 are that (a) trade in intermediates, capital, and durables fell more than trade in other goods; (b) the extensive margin was more strongly affected for Belgian trade with its EU partners than for trade with the rest of the world; (c) larger firms were hit more severely, especially for imports; and (d) firms with larger debt-to-liabilities ratios or with a larger share of financial (as opposed to commercial) debt experienced slightly larger declines in exports. While firms were therefore to some extent affected differently by the crisis, it is fair to say that the magnitudes of those differences are relatively small.
that can make sense of aggregate changes in trade, and focusing on continuing triples avoids giving too much weight to low-value triples.\footnote{See the online appendix for more information on continuing triples. We also used (trade) weighted least squares for the continuing triples. The results, given in Behrens, Corcos, and Mion (2011), are almost identical, thus in what follows, we present only the unweighted results with continuing triples.}

We describe our econometric model for exports only, the one for imports being identical. Using data on continuing triples, the dependent variable is the change in (log export values of firm $f$ to country $c$ for product $p$,
\[
\Delta X_{fcp} = \log X_{fcp}^{t+1} - \log X_{fcp}^t, \text{ between two consecutive halves of the year (log export growth between 2007S1 and 2008S1, as well as between 2008S1 and 2009S1). Using the difference-in-difference terminology, the pretreatment period (trade collapse) corresponds to 2007S1–2008S1 while the posttreatment period is 2008S1–2009S1. Together with the posttreatment time dummy variable $T_C$, we take as regressors a number of firm, country, and product characteristics that proxy for the various conjectures to explain the trade collapse, along with their interactions with $T_C$. Formally, the estimating equation is given by
\[
\Delta X_{fcp} = \alpha + T_C + \beta_1 W_{fcp}^1 + \beta_2 W_{fcp}^2 T_C + \epsilon_{fcp},
\]
where $W_{fcp}^1$ is a vector of firm, country, and product characteristics together with a set of two-digit NACE rev 1.1 industry dummies and where $\epsilon_{fcp}$ is a residual term with the standard properties for the consistency of OLS. In the case of firm covariates, we use one-year lagged balance sheet information—2006 (2007) data for 2007S1–2008S1 (2008S1–2009S1) export growth—to somewhat mitigate the endogeneity of firm characteristics. Having data that vary along three dimensions, we follow the procedure developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) and apply multilevel clustering to obtain more reliable standard errors. The coefficients $\beta_1$ measure the impact of our covariates in a normal period (2007S1–2008S1), while the coefficients $\beta_2$ capture differential changes induced by the trade collapse treatment (09S1). We are therefore especially interested in the $\beta_2$ coefficients.

Table 3 lists the covariates we use in equation (1), as well as their description. All firm characteristics prefixed by $D$ are binary variables, taking a value of 1 if that characteristic is above the sectoral median across all trading firms and 0 otherwise. This choice allows us to maximize the number of firms we can use while reducing the risk of bias due to measurement error and potential outliers. It also provides us, as in the case of standardized regression coefficients, with a relevant metric to compare the contribution of the different firm characteristics to changes in trade values.

**B. Results**

Table 3 reports estimated coefficients and standard errors obtained by OLS from equation (1). We run two separate regressions, one for export growth and one for import growth. For each regression, we report two sets of coefficients in separate columns. The third and fifth columns ("Base") report $\beta_1$ parameters for, respectively, the export and import growth regressions of the pretreatment period (2007S1–2008S1). The fourth and sixth columns ("DD") provide $\beta_2$ parameters: i.e., changes in the responsiveness of export and import growth into the posttreatment period (2008S1–2009S1) of the trade collapse.

Firm characteristics. Table 3 shows that firm-level difference-in-difference coefficients are in general, small and insignificant and that the model’s explanatory power is very weak. At first sight, our results thus suggest that (a) the trade collapse has been quite symmetric across firms within a given industry and (b) some of the supply-side explanations are likely to play a second-order role only.

We now discuss results for each group of covariates. As indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of $D_{size}$ in the column “Export-Base” of table 3, exports by large firms grew on average 3.71% faster than those of other firms in a “normal” year. As further shown by the coefficient of $D_{size}$ in the column “Export-DD,” there was no significant change in that pattern after the start of the trade collapse. The latter finding also holds for productivity $D_{prod}$. As for import growth, more productive firms did suffer more during the collapse, though the implied contribution to the fall is small. To assess the magnitude of this effect, we can compute the counterfactual 2008S1–2009S1 import growth without a differential effect of $D_{prod}$ by letting $D_{prod} \times T_C = 0$. Had firms with above-median productivity been affected by the collapse as those with below-median productivity, the overall fall in imports (27.21%) would have been less severe by 14.74%–4.01 percentage points.

Involvement in global value chains (as measured by the value and the significance of $D_{intern}$, $D_{share_exp_sales}$ and $D_{value_add_chain}$ in the column “Export-DD”) did not differentially affect export growth in 2008S1–2009S1 as compared to 2007S1–2008S1. This casts doubt on the hypothesis of a disruption of global value chains. Observe further that the differential effect of $D_{share_imp_intern}$ is actually positive and significant, indicating that firms with above-median ratios of imports to intermediates experienced a smaller fall in exports. When computing the counterfactual 2008S1–2009S1 export growth in the absence of a differential effect of $D_{share_imp_intern}$ by letting $D_{share_imp_intern} \times T_C = 0$, we find that the overall fall in exports would have been 22.71% stronger. Turning to imports, an above-median involvement in global value chains, and in particular $D_{intern}$ and $D_{share_exp_sales}$, does correspond to lower import growth in 2008S1–2009S1. However, the contribution is not very large. When both $D_{intern} \times T_C = 0$ and $D_{share_exp_sales} \times T_C = 0$, all else equal, we find that 23.84% of the overall import fall would not have occurred in this counterfactual world.

Variables proxying for firms’ financial structure (as measured by the value and the significance of $D_{fin_deb}$, $D_{share_deb}$, $D_{value_add_imp_deb}$, $D_{share_deb_dua}$ after one, and $D_{share_fin_deb}$) appear to play some role in 2008S1–2009S1 export changes. Firms with shorter debt maturity and a larger fraction of financial (as opposed to commercial) debt experienced a significantly larger fall of exports during the trade collapse. Our findings thus lend some support to the trade credit crunch hypothesis (Auboin, 2009; Chor & Manova, 2010; Amiti & Weinstein, 2011). How large is that effect? Firms with above-median debt maturity experienced a 4.56% higher export growth, whereas firms with above-median financial debts saw their exports shrink by about 6.68% more. Both values must be contrasted with the 27.21% total fall in export values in our sample. Predicting the counterfactual export growth in the absence of negative financial effects, we find that about one-third (33.06%) of the 2008S1–2009S1 fall in exports can be attributed to our measures of finance. It is worth noting, however, that financial variables do not seem to affect changes in import values at all.\footnote{Our variables only imperfectly capture access to credit in general and trade finance in particular. However, contrary to most other work on the trade crisis, we use firm-level measures and do not rely on even more imperfect sectoral measures.}
The difference-in-difference coefficient for $D_{stock}$, proxying for inventory capacity, is not significant for export or import growth. The latter finding contrasts with the inventory adjustment explanation as we would expect imports of firms with greater inventory capacity to contract more, all else equal. Still, one may argue that inventory adjustments occur primarily among distributors. Therefore, we also run the same regressions on the subsample of firms from the distribution sector (NACE industries 50, 51, and 52), which represented 40.25% of Belgian imports in 2008S1. We find that imports of distributors with above-median inventory-to-sales ratios fell significantly, by 3.23 percentage points, more than those of other distributors in 2008S1–2009S1. This coefficient accounts for 11.80% of the fall in imports of the distribution sector. However, we find no effects of stocks in the export growth regressions. Overall, we conclude that although inventory adjustment
accounted for some of the import fall in an important sector, it played a minor role in the trade collapse in general.

To conclude, note that neither multinationals nor foreign-owned firms have been differentially affected by the trade collapse. Both the export and import difference-in-difference coefficients are insignificant, lending further support to the finding that there was no major disruption of global value chains. Interactions of two-digit NACE industry dummies with the trade collapse treatment $T^c$, the reference industry being Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers, are significant in only nine cases, thereby suggesting that strong industry patterns are not to blame either.

Country characteristics. We view GDP growth as the key variable to gauge the contribution of a demand shock to the collapse of exports. Two results stand out from our analysis. First, the coefficient differs widely between 2007S1–2008S1 and 2008S1–2009S1. In a normal period, a 1% increase in the aggregate demand of an export destination, as proxied by its percentage growth of GDP, translates into a 0.0138, or 1.38%, increase in exports to that destination. Our coefficient is broadly consistent with standard cross-section/cross-country gravity models in which the elasticity of trade flows to GDP of the destination is close to unity. However, during the trade collapse, the responsiveness of changes in log export values with respect to percentage growth of GDP of the destination increased significantly $(0.0138 + 0.0115 = 0.0253)$, suggesting that the global recession induced a disproportionate fall in the demand for tradable goods.

To gain further insights, we consider the presence of nonlinearities. In particular, we include GDP growth to the powers 2 and 3, both alone as well as interacted with $T^c$, as further regressors in our estimations. Results indicate that there are indeed nonlinearities at work in a typical year. However, difference-in-difference coefficients reveal that the trade collapse caused a structural change in the relationship between GDP growth and export growth rates. As can be seen from figure 1, plotting the estimated marginal effect of GDP growth on export growth in both periods, the post-treatment curve deviates more from the 45 degree line (the unit-elastic benchmark), especially for countries with large GDP drops, than the pretreatment curve. In other words, exports to countries hit by sharp recessions dropped disproportionately more, and by more than in tranquil times.

Finally, we again make use of our model to gauge the contribution of the demand shock to the change in log export values. To this end, we consider the counterfactual situation where GDP growth rates for 2008S1–2009S1 are replaced with those prevailing in 2007S1–2008S1, all else equal. We find that had GDP growth between 2008S1–2009S1 been the same as in the previous period, the export drop would have been 54.15% less severe. We may thus conclude that more than half of the export collapse can be attributed to a generalized fall in the demand for tradable goods. The interpretation of the GDP growth coefficient for imports, which now refers to the exporting country, is more difficult. Yet as can be seen from table 3, both the “Base” and the “DD” coefficients are insignificant. We can still compute the counterfactual decline of Belgian imports, had Belgian GDP growth remained constant, by using the coefficient found in the export regression and data on Belgian GDP growth. We find that 44.65% of the import drop can be attributed to a fall in demand for tradable goods in Belgium. Hence, slightly less than half of the fall in imports is due to a demand shock.

The difference-in-difference coefficients of the two dummies for trade with non-EU countries and outside the OECD are both positive, sizable, and significant for export and import growth. This means that trade with countries outside the EU helped to mitigate the trade collapse. In a counterfactual world in which trade growth outside the EU would have followed the same trend as within the EU, exports (imports) would have fallen by 20.86% (38.27%) more than what we observed. The fact that non-EU trade, especially imports, fell less than EU trade suggests indirectly that protectionist measures played only a small role in explaining the Belgian trade collapse (see also Eaton et al., 2011). As for fluctuations in exchange rates, the magnitude of the coefficients indicates that they have affected exports (imports) more (less) strongly during the trade collapse period. However, the implied magnitudes for changes in export and import values are small. From our estimates, fluctuations of the euro can be blamed for only a small share (5.92%) of the total drop in Belgian exports.

Product characteristics. Our reference group for products in table 3 is consumer nondurables. Therefore, the previous discussion and the magnitudes of the fall in demand apply solely to this category. However, in line with the margin decomposition of section II, interactions of product dummies with $T^c$ for the categories Intermediates, Consumer Durables, and Capital Goods are all negative and strongly significant in the export growth analysis, indicating that these goods experienced a larger fall. As for imports, the same result holds for Intermediates and Consumer Durables.

What are the causes of such different behavior across product categories? Based on our analysis, the answer is likely to be a differential fall in demand.\textsuperscript{10} Evaluating a counterfactual scenario in which the fall in trade would have been the same across product categories and equal to the one of the reference group consumer nondurables, that is, letting the significant interactions of product dummy coefficients with $T^c$ be equal to 0, delivers the following results: 21.47% of the export

\textsuperscript{10} We also estimated our export growth model separately for each of the broad product categories. Results are omitted to save space but are available on request. Our estimates of the growth\_rate\_GDP coefficient are in line with the ultimate conclusion of Baldwin (2009) that postponable goods have been particularly hit by the negative demand shock affecting tradables. More precisely, the difference-in-difference coefficient we obtain when restricting the sample to consumer durables (0.0127) is higher than that when restricting the sample to consumer nondurables (0.0022). Even higher coefficients (0.0156 and 0.0186) are obtained in intermediates goods and capital goods regressions, respectively.
collapse is due to a more severe shock affecting postponable goods, the equivalent figure for imports being 10.95%.

Last, it is worth noting that the difference-in-difference coefficient of the Rauch (1999) measure of product differentiation (frac) is positive and significant for both export and import growth. This suggests that more differentiated goods experienced a smaller fall in trade. In particular, had the fall for differentiated goods been as hard as for other goods, the export (import) drop would have been 21.47% (23.32%) more severe.

IV. Trade Crisis or Trade Collapse?

Our findings thus far do not imply that there has been a trade crisis per se. To investigate whether international trade suffered more than domestic activity, we now examine in detail changes in exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios at the firm level. We complement this analysis with evidence about firm-level exports-to-production and imports-to-purchased intermediates at the firm level. For which production data are available for our period of analysis. The latter set of results, given in Behrens et al. (2011), conveys the same message. It is not reported here to save space.

Table 4 reports our results for exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediate purchases ratios. As can be seen from that table, only the difference-in-difference coefficient of Dnec is significant in explaining changes in exports-to-turnover ratios for the trade collapse period. We may thus conclude that the negative effect of financial variables identified in the previous section has affected foreign trade and domestic activity equally. Put differently, the credit crunch has not putatively identified in the previous section has affected foreign trade and domestic activity equally. Put differently, the credit crunch has not putatively identified in the previous section has affected foreign trade and domestic activity equally. Put differently, the credit crunch has not putatively identified in the previous section has affected foreign trade and domestic activity equally. 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disproportionately hurt the activity of trading across national borders per se.

Turning to magnitudes, the differential effect of \( D_{\text{interm}} \), during the trade collapse is rather small. Starting with an average exports-to-turnover ratio of 0.3627 in 2008, large firms would see their ratio decrease by 0.3627 \times 0.1020 = 0.0370 points. This is hardly strong evidence of a major trade crisis. Turning to imports-to-intermediates ratios in table 4, there is slightly more action, with five of the difference-in-difference coefficients being significant. The positive value of \( \text{for} \) in column 6 points to foreign-owned firms increasing their imports-to-intermediates ratios with respect to other firms during the collapse. However, three measures of involvement in global value chains are significantly negative: \( D_{\text{interm,share}}, D_{\text{share,imp,interm}}, \) and \( D_{\text{value,add,chain}} \). Again, given the value of the coefficients, none of them implies stark changes in imports-to-intermediates ratios. As for interactions of NACE dummies with \( TC' \), the reference industry being again Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers, they are generally insignificant. For example, in both exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates regressions, only 1 of the 22 manufacturing industry dummies has a significant coefficient at the 5% confidence level.

The fact that almost all coefficients in the exports-to-turnover, imports-to-intermediates, exports-to-production, and imports-to-production regressions are insignificant and that even when they are not, their magnitude is small, leads us to conclude that it is not a trade crisis, just a trade collapse caused by a strong decrease in the demand for tradables that has equally affected domestic and foreign activity.

V. What Have We Learned?

A few clear results emerge from our analysis. First, the overwhelming part of the trade collapse occurred at the intensive margin and is due to a fall in average quantities and unit prices. Exporters and importers showed remarkable resilience in foreign markets. There was no massive exit, which may be explained by large sunk costs of entering foreign markets that create an option value of remaining an exporter or an importer during the crisis (Roberts & Tybout, 1997). Since most of the adjustments took place at the intensive margin, Belgian trade expectedly bounced back quickly after the collapse.12

Second, overall we find little support for supply-side-based explanations of the trade collapse. On the one hand, GDP growth of the destination countries is the most important determinant of trade growth in our econometric analysis, explaining up to 54% of the fall in exports and 45% of the fall in imports. This applies particularly to the demand for durables and capital goods: trade in these categories fell systematically more, with a greater elasticity to GDP. While studies using more aggregated data (Baldwin, 2009) or calibrated simulations (Eaton et al., 2011) reach qualitatively and quantitatively similar conclusions, we are not aware of any other firm-level analysis confirming these results to date. On the other hand, few firm- or product-level characteristics are systematically related to the fall in trade, especially when compared with the fall in domestic operations. For instance, access to credit (as proxied by financial balance sheet variables) can explain about 33% of the fall in exports but has no explanatory power regarding exports-to-turnover or exports-to-production ratios. In other words, financial constraints affected foreign and domestic operations equally. Similarly, involvement in global value chains, as measured by either the share of imported intermediates or by export intensity, explains quantitatively some of the collapse of imports but has little explanatory power on imports-to-intermediate or imports-to-production ratios.

To conclude, we point out two caveats of our analysis. As we acknowledged, we do not observe the number of trading partners a firm has for each product-market combination. The conclusion that trade collapsed due to a price and quantity adjustment relies on the stability of this “hidden” extensive margin, which we can only conjecture. Also, we do not know to what extent our results generalize to other countries. Developing countries might have been much more severely affected by the credit crunch and the drying up of trade credit. This would cause a larger fall in trade at the extensive margin there and make a quick recovery less likely.

REFERENCES


