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The emergence of mood in Heidegger’s phenomenology

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Summary

This thesis offers a genealogical-exegetical account of Heidegger’s phenomenology of mood (Stimmung), focusing on his Freiburg and Marburg lectures from 1919 to 1925. In Being and Time, moods manifest the transcendental factical ground of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) in which an understanding of Being is constituted. However, throughout Heidegger’s work, moods have operated as the ground for disclosure, the origin of authentic ontological understanding, the defining character of each historical epoch and as the enactmental urgency that will bring about an ‘other’ beginning.

This thesis contextualizes Heidegger’s accounts of mood within the broader phenomenological project concerning the constitution and grounding of meaning.

The first part of the thesis examines the neo-Kantian challenges to philosophy as well as Husserl’s response. It further explores the problems Heidegger identifies in Husserl’s phenomenology and shows how Heidegger offers a grounding of phenomenological understanding in lived experience, in order to provide a concrete account of a phenomenological “beginning” (Anfang). Heidegger’s turn to affects constitutes a radicalization, rather than a repudiation, of Husserlian insights.

The second part of the thesis explores Heidegger’s earliest accounts of affective phenomena in his interpretations of St. Augustine and Aristotle, where the terminology of Being and Time is developed for the first time. This involves an analysis of Heidegger’s accounts of love (Liebe) and joy (Freude) as they figure in the 1920 lecture course Phenomenology of Religious Experience, and analyses the emergence of Angst and other grounding moods (Grundstimmungen). The thesis then looks at Heidegger’s early interpretation of Plato and Aristotle in the lecture courses immediately prior to Being and Time, where the technical notion of disposition (Befindlichkeit) emerges, as well as his first analysis of fear (Furcht).
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been submitted, either in the same or different form to this or any other University for a degree.

Signature:
For Chrystalla. My mother’s mother.

Acknowledgments

This PhD has been written in politically tumultuous years, and amid a lot of adversity. During this time, I rediscovered the meaning of family and friendship. This PhD is dedicated primarily to my grandmother, Chrystalla, but also to all my family, friends and colleagues. I remember one night in Agros, a small village in Cyprus where my maternal family comes from: I was in bed about to sleep, and grandma came to my bed to kiss me goodnight. I was 32 years old, but it did not matter. I was reading Walter Brogan’s book on Heidegger and Aristotle, and grandma asked me what I was reading. Grandma can’t read English, but I asked her to try to read the title. She managed to identify the name “Aristotle”. I asked her: “Grandma, do you know who that is?” And she responded in all seriousness: “Yes, of course I know Aristotle! He lives in the neighbourhood next to ours!” I laughed, and told her that the book was not about him. But she was not wrong; we do have a neighbour called Aristotle.

So many people have been a part of this journey. I have received a lot of help and encouragement, in all sorts of different ways: financial help, psychological help, philosophical advice, mentoring, feedback, companionship. Let me try to thank some people by name.

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**ABBREVIATIONS**

**Works by Martin Heidegger in English**


Works by Martin Heidegger in German


GA 60… Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 2011.


Works by Edmund Husserl in English


Works by Edmund Husserl in German


Introduction

I. Overview

Generally speaking, activity has been linked to the process of “creating” and passivity to the process of “receiving”.¹ Both had already been posited by Plato, as two basic characteristics of being. In Aristotle we meet these two characteristics as the last two of his categories, the ninth and the tenth: “[...] how active, what doing (or Action), how passive, what suffering (Affection).”² “Affectus and passio were used commonly as philosophical terms for Latin translations of the Greek term pathos.”³ There exists a long history of affective phenomena that began with the ancient Greeks and has gone on to Sartre and to Hartmann, while undergoing a dynamic transformation: “from thumos to pathos and affectus, then from passion to emotion and feeling”.⁴ Heidegger’s philosophy has extensively covered affective phenomena, despite the fact that he did not develop full clarity on the distinction between emotion, feeling, passion, affect and mood. These have played a significant role in Heidegger’s entire philosophy. His analyses of Angst in Being and Time (BT), and of boredom in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (FCM), have been the obvious reference points for scholars who wished to show the importance Heidegger ascribes to affective phenomena. Much has been written on Angst partly because it is the fundamental mood [Grundstimmung] identified and analyzed in BT which is widely accepted as Heidegger’s magnum opus.

Heidegger’s project in BT can be analyzed from various perspectives. It can be seen as an engagement with the entire history of philosophy as regards the implicit or explicit understanding of Being. It can be seen as a critique of modernity, a critique of rationalistic and subjectivistic accounts of the human condition (Dasein instead of subject and rational animal), a

² Ibid, p. 2.
⁴ Ibid.
transcendental project of understanding and meaning in general, etc. In any case, mood remains an irreducible element and a key to understanding Heidegger’s task.

Generally speaking, Heidegger’s treatment of affective phenomena is terminologically disparate and inconsistent. Whilst he does at various times (for example, in the Nietzsche lectures) acknowledge distinctions between affect, mood, emotion, feeling, and passion, he does not conscientiously define them, or keep them distinct. However, in BT his accounts of affective phenomena are indicated by the words Stimmung (mood) and Befindlichkeit (disposition). But throughout his long career, Heidegger uses various words and concepts in

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5 In their forthcoming article “Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time” (Philosophy Compass), Andreas Elpidorou and Lauren Freeman provide a comprehensive account of how Befindlichkeit has been translated into English by various scholars, and rightly argue that no translation is really adequate to the German notion. Hence, they opt to leave Befindlichkeit untranslated. Whilst I agree that the safest option is to leave the word untranslated, I still think that we can translate it as “disposition”.

They are right in saying that Macquarrie and Robinson’s (1962) use of the phrase “state-of-mind” is problematic since Befindlichkeit is philosophically neither a “state”, nor does it refer to a “mind”; this is the most misleading translation of all, from a literal point of view. However, “state-of-mind” is an actual expression in everyday English that would be semantically equivalent to Befindlichkeit. Hence, if we are to stick to the phenomenological principle of starting from expressions used in everydayness, and use words said from oι πολίες, as well as the hermeneutic principle of starting from the more familiar and moving to the least familiar, then “state-of-mind” is not such an inappropriate term. But it does introduce significant problems once the ontological analysis proceeds, and thus must be avoided.

Haugeland uses “findingness,” whilst he had also used “sofindingness” (see 2013), without noting the drawbacks of these renderings. I think that whilst “findingness” is indeed the most linguistically accurate translation into English, since it is constructed from the same root verb finden, it is psychologically dry and relays a neutral spatiality, and is also too static. It does reveal the factical aspect though (the sense of “inheritance”). In addition, it sounds awkward in English.

Elpidorou and Freeman then note how Guignon (1984) uses “situatedness,” dismissing it because it lacks the important sense of finden in Befindlichkeit. I would add that whilst “situatedness” as a category is indeed linked to Befindlichkeit, translating the latter as “situatedness” risks conflating Befindlichkeit with another technical notion, that of Situation. Situation (as well as Lage) are not basic existentiales of Being-in-the-World; they are closed-off for the inauthentic Dasein, but they are disclosed to the resolute Dasein. Situation has its foundations in resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] (see BT §60), which may or may not be enacted, whereas Befindlichkeit is a basic existentiale that is always already there since it is a condition of possibility of Dasein. In sum, translating Befindlichkeit as “situatedness” is too close to committing a categorical mistake, according to the inner logic of BT.

Elpidorou and Freeman then note how Dreyfus (1991), Blattner (2007), and Crowell (2013) all translate Befindlichkeit as “affectiveness” or “affectivity”. They rightly argue that this captures the notion that Dasein is always already affected by and feels things, which is an important element of Befindlichkeit. The drawback of these notions though, they argue, is that they call to mind Kant’s notion of “receptivity” and thus import the very subject/object distinction that Heidegger attempts to overturn. Whilst they are right in their sensitivity to any notion that imports the subject/object distinction which Befindlichkeit is meant to overcome, I cannot see why the issue of receptivity is particularly reminiscent of Kant and not, say, Plato’s νόησις. In any case, whilst Befindlichkeit is indeed, from a historical perspective, Heidegger’s way of making sense of what have been historically termed as “affective phenomena”, he himself does not want to reduce Befindlichkeit to Affekt. In fact, in BT Heidegger explicitly writes that these “phenomena [associated with Befindlichkeit] have long been well-known ontically under the terms ‘affects’ and ‘feelings’ and have always been under consideration in philosophy” (BT, M&R, p. 318; §29), and then goes on to mention Plato and Aristotle on στίγμα, the Scholastics, as well as volition and other accounts that take affects to be of epiphenomenal character. So “affectivity” is indeed inadequate, as Elpidorou and Freeman argue, but for more reasons than the ones they invoke. What is more, Befindlichkeit is indeed something more than affect, precisely because Befindlichkeit is, philosophically speaking, more than a passive being affected: it is also about having a comportment, in the sense that it requires a certain, even minimal, (relational) enactment that relates to an other. For this reason, “disposition” is, in my opinion, the best option for translating Befindlichkeit. Elpidorou and Freeman note that Carman (2003), Dahlstrom (2001), Kiesiel (1992), and Wrathall (2001) all use “disposition” or “disposedness”, but they think that this is not a good word because it suggests more of an ontic state than an ontological structure, and thus fails to adequately convey Befindlichkeit’s ontological depth. In this context, they invoke Haugeland’s (2013)
order to indicate affective phenomena: Empfindung, Gemüt, Afekt, Gefühl, Befindlichkeit (and Grundbefindlichkeit), Sichbefinden, Stimmung (and Grundstimmung), Gestimmtheit, Leidenschaft, Motivation, Disposition, πάθος, διάθεσις, affectio. Some of these notions are consistently used in a pejorative sense (despite the lack of a clear definition), or in the context of his encounter [Auseinandersetzung] with the notions used by other philosophers (and thus, neither simply dismissively nor approvingly). In any case, most of the notions that Heidegger uses in his own phenomenological descriptions of affective phenomena, appear, disappear, and sometimes reappear throughout his career, in inconsistent ways.

These inconsistencies though are not only characteristic of Heidegger’s terminology for affective phenomena, but are also characteristic of most of the central notions in his work, and an inevitable “product” of his own method and hermeneutic style of philosophizing. Let us

argument that “disposition” risks implying subjectivity as well as conflicts with an established philosophical usage of the term, and carries behavioral connotations. Whilst I share these concerns to a certain extent, I still think that “disposition” is a suitable translation of Befindlichkeit. I cannot see why “disposition” (and its cognates) fails to render ontological depth. In principle, any notion whatsoever can be ontologically reduced and convey ontological depth. The fact that “disposition” is an already established philosophical term is not a sufficient reason for avoiding the word, since phenomenology in general offers the potential for appropriation and radicalization of any given notion, in a way that could free it from its baggage, based on phenomenological evidence. After all, if we are to accept Haugeland’s argument, then even the very word Dasein already has an established philosophical usage in the German Idealist tradition, but that did not stop Heidegger from using it and offering a phenomenology of Dasein. As regards the behavioural connotations of “disposition”, again, as long as an ontological reduction is in place, then that should not be a problem. Besides, the very same issue of “behaviourism” can be raised for other pertinent notions as well, for example the notion of Verhalten, in which everyday German means “behaviour”, or Haltung, which would normally be translated as “attitude” or “posture”, or Verfassung, which would normally be translated as “state” or “condition”, but that did not stop Heidegger from using these words. Granted, the notion of Befindlichkeit did fall prey to an anthropological interpretation, along with other notions used in BT, and that might have contributed to Heidegger’s favouring of Stimmung in his future analyses. But still, the behavioural connotations of Befindlichkeit cannot constitute a sufficient reason for Heidegger’s general replacement of Befindlichkeit with Stimmung (and Gestimmtheit) since if that were the case he should have also minimized the usage of several other notions, such as the notions of Verhalten and Haltung. So the behavioural connotations of a notion in themselves should not be a reason for avoiding such a notion. “Disposition” is an appropriate translation of Befindlichkeit, as it is a word that can account for the foundation of “affective phenomena”, it conveys the sense of situatedness in an environing world, and it also has the sense of findingness (being disposed is how one find themselves “available”), without reducing it to sheer passivity but seeing it as a kind of comportment. It is a word that conveys how Dasein is “positioned” in the world, and how it is oriented in it. In addition, it is a word in everyday English that precisely refers to what Befindlichkeit also refers to in everyday German. Another reason why we should translate Befindlichkeit as “disposition” is that Heidegger himself on a couple of occasions uses the French word Disposition, in order to refer to the same phenomenon. Finally, a genealogical account of the notion of Befindlichkeit in BT makes it clear that this is how he rendered the Aristotelian category of διάθεσις, a word whose best translation in English is indeed “disposition”. If one accepts the “Aristotelian reading” of BT, then one has to accept the homology between Befindlichkeit and διάθεσις.

Elpidorou and Freeman finally note how Stambaugh (1996) translates Befindlichkeit as “attunement” and note that the problem with this translation is that this is how Stimmung is often translated, and this introduces confusion as regards their distinction. Indeed, if one were going to use “attunement”, then it would have to be a translation for Stimmung. Even though Heidegger is not entirely clear and consistent in a philosophical distinction between Stimmung and Befindlichkeit in BT, something that contributes to the extinction of the word Befindlichkeit in his post-BT analyses, we would still need to translate the two words (Befindlichkeit and Stimmung) differently, and “attunement”, if it is to be used at all, is much closer to the word Stimmung (or Gestimmtheit) than Befindlichkeit.

For example, Empfindung is a notion used by Kant and Husserl that is associated with the sensuous or bodily aspect of affective phenomena, something that rests on the conceptual distinction between matter and form that Heidegger’s phenomenological account aims at overcoming.
recall that he himself chose to include all of his manuscripts (published material, lecture material, even his private notebooks) in the complete edition (Gesamtausgabe) of his work, and prefaced it with the motto “Wege – nicht Werke” meaning “Ways – not works”, because he considered his philosophical path to be one ridden with failed (but not futile) attempts to give expression to the problem of the meaning of Being. So whilst the deeper problem maintains a certain unity, Heidegger’s style, angle, and (unavoidably) words used vary, as does the “success” and cogency of each “attempt”. Affective phenomena are always a fundamental part, and always form a constitutive ground of the world, and of the various epochs of the history of Being. At the same time, they are constitutive of any understanding of Being, and hence each way of understanding Being is grounded in affect (mood), and affect is also what supplies the impetus behind the transition from one way of understanding Being (and world) to another. Affects have operated as what might be described as a transcendental “normalizing”, providing the ground for disclosure, the origin of authentic ontological understanding, the defining character of each historical epoch, as well as the enactmental urgency [Notwendigkeit] that will bring about Heidegger’s, famously elusive, “other” cultural beginning.

Looking at the way affects operate in the early work, it can be argued that the turn from the existential analytic of Dasein to the history of Being is, truly, without radical breaks. Right from the beginning, affects indicate an origin [Ursprung] that is neither subjective nor objective, but rather an in-between [Zwischen], and thus beyond the subject-object and passive-active dichotomies.

As I will show in this introduction, several important problems and enigmas persist in Heidegger’s analyses of affective phenomena, especially as regards his texts after BT. I shall mention the most important of these problems, as raised by certain Heidegger scholars. The ultimate goal is to consider in depth all of these problems and try to resolve them. Such a comprehensive project would take several years and a lot of space in order to be achieved – more space than a PhD thesis can accommodate. However, this thesis undertakes the task of how affective phenomena emerge and operate in the early work of Heidegger, contextualizing it and explaining it. In my opinion, this is a necessary and enlightening task that can already
resolve certain questions, whilst also setting the foundations for better understanding and resolving the problems and enigmas of the later Heidegger.

My thesis offers a genealogical-exegetic account of Heidegger’s early phenomenology of moods, through an analysis of his Freiburg and Marburg lectures that took place from 1919 to 1925. I reconstruct and analyze the questions that Husserl's phenomenology attempted to resolve, and show how it is in this context that affects become central for Heidegger. The first part of the thesis looks at Heidegger’s initial turn to phenomenology, and considers the neo-Kantian problems that Heidegger faces, as well as how Husserl’s phenomenology affords an initial breakthrough in resolving these problems. I explore how Heidegger goes beyond Husserl in order to offer a concrete grounding of phenomenological understanding in lived experience and provides a concrete account of “beginning” [Anfang]. I also investigate how Husserl’s account of intuition, which is the foundation of judgment and of ontological understanding, is restricted to a neutral grasp that excludes feeling at the foundational level. I assess the resultant inadequacies of Husserl’s account and show why Heidegger turns to affects so as to provide a factical ground for phenomenological understanding. This part of my thesis situates Heidegger’s early account of affects in relation to Husserl, Heinrich Rickert, Paul Natorp and Wilhelm Dilthey, and shows how Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn to mood constitutes a radicalization of, as opposed to a clear turning away from, Husserlian insights.

The second part of my thesis thematically explores Heidegger’s earliest accounts of particular affects, as well as the way the affective terminology of BT is developed for the first time in his interpretations of St. Augustine and Aristotle. The first section of this part analyzes Heidegger’s accounts of love [Liebe], joy [Freude] and Angst (as well as astonishment [Staunen], shock [Schrecken], fear [Furcht], and dread [Gruseln]), as they figure in the 1920 lecture course entitled Phenomenology of Religious Experience. I show how love is the very first affect that Heidegger pays attention to. In addition, I uncover an overlooked structural connection between love and Angst. It is through the experience of the love of God that the person arrives at the experience of radical groundlessness and experiences Angst.
In the second section of the second part, I look at Heidegger’s early interpretation of Plato and Aristotle in the lecture courses leading up to the writing of *Being and Time*, in which the technical notions of disposition [Befindlichkeit], comportment [Verfassung] and mood [Stimmung] are first developed, and show how they correspond to the Aristotelian notions of διάθεσις, ἐξίς and πάθος. In this context, I show how Heidegger’s account of mood in *Being and Time* ultimately leads back to Aristotle’s category of continuum, συνέχον, as Heidegger found it in Aristotle’s *Physics*. It is through this category that Heidegger understands, and interprets, Aristotle’s notion of comportment.

**II. Fundamental moods and persistent issues**

In BT, Heidegger offers an existential analytic of Dasein, where he identifies the basic constitution of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. He further identifies four basic structures (existentiales) that constitute this ground, and disposition is identified as one of them. Disposition is an a priori constitutive part of Dasein’s facticity (which is the way we are concretely thrown in a historical situation). Apart from facticity, Heidegger also identifies Dasein’s existentiality, which refers to the authentic or inauthentic way Dasein can exist. Both are possibilities that Dasein can *understand itself*. Dasein is either authentic, which means that it can “choose” to transparently understand itself in the fundamental way it *is*, or it can exist inauthentically, which means that it flees in the face of its being.\(^7\) In effect, authenticity and inauthenticity are the grounds on which a particular Dasein understands and projects its own possibilities.\(^8\) There is no agreement amongst scholars on whether Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic being are two different actual ways of existing, or whether the distinction is a formal one that refers to distinct, parallel ways that the human being understands its own being. No matter what it is, the most important issue here is the connection between facticity and existentiality: how these definite ways of existing (authentic and inauthentic) are a priori grounded in facticity and the role that fundamental mood plays in this

\(^7\) BT, §9.

\(^8\) BT, §12.
relation. The most crucial question is whether disposition is the structure that enables Dasein to overcome its inauthenticity and acquire authenticity.

Philosophical understanding, that is, the deeper structure of truth, nature, and the essence of the subject, has historically been the object of consideration of philosophy. Since Plato, the question of how one becomes interested in such essential questioning, i.e. of how one becomes sensitive to essence and truth, has been central. How does one begin to philosophize?

Fundamental mood is identified throughout Heidegger’s works, but especially in his later works, as the force behind such a beginning – as that which lies at the origin of the philosophical conversion, whereby one wonders about the nature of being(s). Mood is also identified by Heidegger as the structure that discloses “being-there” in its thrownness; the structure that discloses Being-in-the-World as a whole, and enables intentional directedness to emerge; the structure that enables the primary discovery of the world as something that matters, as such. A better understanding of the emergence of mood in Heidegger’s overall project can only be achieved by further investigation into his earlier works. This is not to claim that a more comprehensive genealogy resolves these issues, but sometimes it dissolves some of these problems by showing how they are wrong-footed. But inevitably, some problems still persist, especially as regards questions of what constitutes fundamental moods as fundamental, and Heidegger’s choice of particular moods.

The young Heidegger is searching for a “binding task” that supplies a compulsion to our thinking, a necessity [Notwendigkeit] for “initiating historical change”.9 Fundamental moods are what philosophically awaken humanity and form a philosophical culture, whereby we become captivated by the discovery that objectivity, presence itself, is encounterable through the grasp of the world of nature. Heidegger’s position is that the “world-horizon”, that is, the initial discovery of a world as such, stands open in and through fundamental moods. It is through a fundamental mood that humans discover the “world” in general, and the possibility of “truth”. Whereas modern philosophy holds that “truth” is a function of propositional logic, the

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equation between subjective representation and objective reality, Heidegger argues that it is pre-predicative mood that “founds all predicative truth”, and the “bindingness of philosophical propositions is thereby placed on an entirely new foundation that runs counter to the tradition”, a tradition that placed the foundation of truth in judgement.10 Moods are what supply the requisite bindingness – Heidegger turns to mood in his search for the ground of meaning and truth.11 This thesis takes inspiration from this insight and further analyzes moods in terms of bindingness, especially in chapters two and three.

Fundamental moods have the power of initiating historical change, and Heidegger’s analysis of the history of Being after BT is a hearkening to historical moods, a possibility opened up in the *resolute moment*, that is, the moment when Dasein transparently understands its essential nature, its facticity, and its transcendent futural possibilities in BT. The issue of *becoming authentic* and how fundamental moods are implicated in this becoming, as well as how fundamental moods are implicated in the very history of metaphysics, is crucial. Moods are fundamental only if they are enacted, that is, only if they partake in the “process” of *becoming authentic*. Heidegger believes that not every mood is fundamental, and also that every fundamental mood can be either authentically had (enacted) or inauthentically had. Each fundamental mood has the capacity for formative historical action, but it also has an inauthentic, derivative manifestation.

Resoluteness involves a readiness to be receptive to being overcome by a fundamental mood, and this *awakening* cannot come from reason-driven will, argues Held.12 Held argues that this must come from mood itself, since there is no appeal beyond authentic moods. But is it the authentic mood itself, or is it another mood that simply does this, awakening us to the fundamental mood?

A strange problem arises here. In this thesis, I argue that Heidegger’s turn to mood originally takes place because of the problem of *grounding* the phenomenological beginning.

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11 We will see in the next chapter what “bindingness” means. For the moment, suffice it to say that it is like the “reason” that legitimizes the knowledge of truth.
12 Ibid, pp. 292-293.
Heidegger turns to mood to ground the phenomenological epoché.

III. Mood in Being and Time

Overview of Being and Time

Being and Time is indisputably Heidegger’s magnum opus. In this chapter, I will give a schematic description of what kind of project BT comprised, and how affects (disposition and moods) figure in it.

In BT, Heidegger raises the ontological question of the meaning of Being, and this question leads him into a description and interpretation of the particular way that Dasein exists and (vaguely) understands the meaning of Being. It is an ontological project, which means that it examines the essential characteristics of the being of beings, characteristics that follow from inspection and analysis as regards the way they are, and the ground that enables their very being. The first task in BT is to re-awaken the forgotten question of the meaning of Being, as it was initially raised by Plato.\textsuperscript{13} Heidegger raises this question so as to identify and explicate the transcendental horizon upon which the understanding of Being depends. As it will turn out, the aim of BT is to show how time is this very horizon: the meaning of Being depends on time. In other words, Being has to be grasped in terms of time.\textsuperscript{14}

But this relationship between the meaning of Being and time is covered up, just as the question itself, as a genuine aporia, is not manifested in our normal, everyday existence. On the other hand, we, Dasein, are not total strangers to it either. We must have a certain familiarity with the meaning of Being, a “vague understanding of Being”,\textsuperscript{15} otherwise we wouldn’t be in a position to raise the question in the first place, since raising a question involves a certain minimal, vague understanding of that which the question addresses and seeks.\textsuperscript{16} Hence, the ontological endeavour, that is, the philosophical investigation of Being, must start by “interrogating” the being that raises the question of Being in the first place, since s/he is the one

\textsuperscript{13} Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 19 (SZ, 1).
\textsuperscript{15} Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 25 (SZ, 5-6).
who also vaguely understands it. Thus, Heidegger’s first task in BT is to carry out an
“existential analytic” of Dasein, in which he will describe the peculiar way Dasein exists in its
everydayness, describe the basic structures that make up Dasein’s existence, and how the
meaning of Being manifests itself in Dasein’s everydayness. Here, Heidegger makes a
distinction that helps set up BT’s ontological project: the distinction between “ontological” and
“ontic”. The former pertains to Being as such in general, whilst the latter refers to any particular
being, matters of fact about a being or a kind of being (for example, “natural beings” vs.
“artifacts”). The existential analytic of Dasein that Heidegger carries out in the beginning of BT
is an ontological investigation, not an ontical one; it is an analysis of the Being of Dasein.

It is widely accepted that Heidegger rejects the traditional philosophical definition of
man as “rational animal” on the basis that it is a derivative definition that does not do justice to
the way man’s rational understanding is constituted. Heidegger’s phenomenological account
redescribes the being of man, Dasein, in terms of care [Sorge].\textsuperscript{17} As Steven Crowell puts it,
Dasein’s “rationality cannot be understood ontologically by beginning with developed logical
systems or the ‘derivative’ [\textit{Abkünftig}] domain of theoretical assertions in the sciences. Its
meaning must be clarified through categories of Dasein’s being as care.”\textsuperscript{18}

Despite the fact that \textit{Being and Time} is an unfinished project, it succeeds in offering two
things: a phenomenological account of how Dasein exists and understands itself and the world
in its everydayness and what kind of structure this involves, and a deeper transcendental account
of how the meaning of Being involved in this existence is founded on a, normally concealed,
more original and deeper understanding of temporality. Heidegger published Division I and
Division II of the first part, and these two divisions more or less correspond to the two things
mentioned. Both Division I and Division II lay out the conditions for existing in a world, and
the second division making explicit the presuppositions of the first. This is characteristic of
phenomenology as a method, which is not just about describing the world and life in a new way

\textsuperscript{17} Steven Crowell, “Responsibility, Autonomy, and Affectivity”, presented at The German Philosophy Workshop,
University of Chicago (April 19, 2013), retrieved from
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
and describing “that which proximally and for the most part does show itself” but rather, ultimately, with the ground that lies hidden and yet “belongs to what thus shows itself.”

In the opening sections of BT, Heidegger points at the crucial fact that being is an issue for Dasein. Dasein comports itself in various ways, such that each comportment is (pre)ontological, in the sense that it has a vague understanding of Being and of itself, which is an issue for it. Dasein always understands itself in terms of its “existence” [Existenz], that is, it understands itself through the way it comports itself towards its possibilities of being. Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence. Thus, the question of what constitutes existence is an urgent one, if we are to properly raise the ontological question of the meaning of Being, and the interconnection [Zusammenhang] of these structures is called “existentiality.”

This is why an existential analytic of Dasein is the first task for ontology. Existentiality is the structure that enables Dasein to exist either authentically or inauthentically. These are both ways for Dasein to have a definite character, which are a priori grounded in Being-in-the-World. As Being-in-the-World, Dasein understands its existence as a “fact”, in the sense that it is thrown in a World, and its existence is already bound up “with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.” This is what Heidegger calls Dasein’s “facticity” [Faktizität]. One key question that Heidegger is grappling with is how can existentiality and facticity go together, how do they have an ontological unity, and whether facticity belongs essentially to existentiality. Dasein’s facticity is primarily revealed through disposition [Befindlichkeit] and moods, which account for Dasein’s thrownness [Geworfenheit]. This is Dasein brought before itself as Being-in-the-World, inheriting a fallen way of being a Self that is proximally and for the most part inauthentic. Can we then “discover” within facticity the

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29 *Being and Time*, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 59 (SZ, 35).
20 Ibid, p. 32 (SZ, 12).
21 Ibid, p. 33 (SZ, 12).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid, p. 78 (SZ, 53). Heidegger also mentions a third possibility of existing: that of “indifference”.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid, p. 82 (SZ, 56).
27 Ibid.
structure that enables Dasein to overcome its inauthenticity, that is to exist either inauthentically or authentically, which is Dasein’s existentiality? As Heidegger says:

If the existential analytic of Dasein is to retain clarity in principle as to its function in fundamental ontology, then in order to master its provisional task of exhibiting Dasein’s Being, it must seek for one of the most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure—one that lies in Dasein itself. The way of disclosure in which Dasein brings itself before itself must be such that in it Dasein becomes accessible as simplified in a certain manner. With what is thus disclosed, the structural totality of the Being we seek must then come to light in an elemental way.  

Heidegger then points out that the phenomenon that satisfies these methodological requirements is the fundamental mood of anxiety: “As one of Dasein’s possibilities of Being, anxiety—
together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it—provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of Being.” Hence, Heidegger identifies a particular aspect of the existential constitution of Being-in-the-World, i.e. a disposition, which enables Dasein to become authentic and hence reveal the unity of existentiality and facticity.

Part I, Division I, of BT explores how Dasein exists in the world in its everydayness, which is the normal, familiar way of being. This involves a description of how Dasein understands itself and its world, how the meaning of Being-in-the-World is manifested in everyday practices. This is the way Dasein exists primarily and for the most part, and it is in this everyday way of existing that the understanding of beings, the world, as well as self-understanding, is originally manifested. Meaning is primarily disclosed pre-conceptually and pre-theoretically. Intentionality, the capacity to understand and refer to any kind of thing (objects, concepts, relations, etc.) is thus shown to be grounded on and to emerge out of a more primordial level of practical existence.

So in Part I, Division I, Heidegger describes how Dasein’s basic constitution is Being-in-the-World [In-der-Welt-Sein], whose structure is then reduced to care. The structure of Being-in-the-World becomes the topic of analysis as the structure that needs to be further

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30 In §40 of BT, Heidegger says that disposition and understanding enable Dasein to disclose to itself ‘information’ about itself as an entity. Anxiety is a distinctive mood because in anxiety Dasein gets brought before its own Being; Anxiety reveals the Being of the totality of the structural whole (BT 229/184).
31 Polt 1999, p. 36.
described and elucidated. Division I is an analysis of the structures of how Dasein understands itself *inauthentically* [*uneigentlich*], that is, it understands its Being in terms of beings whose Being is presence-at-hand [*Vorhandensein*], hence failing to understand itself *authentically*, owning up to its “truth”. In this context, meaning (the meaning of Dasein itself and of its world) is “always a matter of understanding [itself] within publicly available normative space”.32 as anyone who inherits a self-understanding from the public domain. This mode of understanding is how *das Man* exists, a way of existing that involves an inauthentic self-understanding, reminiscent of Husserl’s notion of “natural attitude”.33 The way Dasein exists in everydayness is, as said above, Being-in-the-World, a structure which is constantly *whole*.345

In Division II, Heidegger sets about a *re-interpretation* of the basic structures of everyday Dasein identified in the previous division, hinting at a “transition” into a deeper, more fundamental, *authentic* self-understanding.36 In this context, Division II investigates phenomena such as death, conscience and resoluteness: it provides a phenomenological account of how the self achieves *resoluteness* [*Entschlossenheit*], a particular form of *disclosedness* [*Erschlossenheit*].37 Resoluteness involves an understanding and an embracing of our freedom in the face of ultimate limitations of our being-towards-death [*Sein zum Tode*].

Heidegger does not mean that Dasein can become authentic in the sense of purposefully differentiating oneself from others and society, changing the way one exists or acts in the world, creating idiosyncratic values and norms, etc. Authenticity is an *ontological understanding* that amounts to nothing practical, but rather is an “anticipatory resoluteness” where Dasein

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32 Crowell, 2013.
33 Heidegger generally identifies *das Man* with inauthenticity that is overcome in authentic understanding, but several scholars have argued that this is a simplistic way of understanding *das Man*. I agree with them, especially on the thesis that *das Man* is not a state that can be overcome by authenticity, but due to limited space, and since this issue of *BT* does not have a direct bearing on the arguments I am proposing in this study, I cannot get into this complex issue. Some scholars also reject parallelisms made between Heidegger’s notion of “inauthenticity” and Husserl’s notion of “natural attitude”. In my opinion, Heidegger and Husserl here do overlap, and a parallelism is useful, but again, I cannot go into more depth at this point beyond pointing out an operational resemblance.
345 *Being and Time*, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 225 (SZ, 180).
35 Anxiety is what reveals the world as world, in its totality (BT 231/187).
36 Tanja Staehler, in her article entitled “How is a Phenomenology of Fundamental Moods Possible?”, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 15(3), (2007), pp. 415-433, rightly argues that even though Heidegger mentions “authenticity” and “inauthenticity” as “possibilities” of Dasein, (e.g. see BT 235/191), there is no evidence of an argument in BT for a “transition” whereby Dasein “can move from inauthenticity to authenticity in such a way as to leave inauthenticity behind”, pointing out that the emphatic connection of authenticity to a “moment” [*Augenblick*] is indicative of how precarious “authenticity” is.
37 *Being and Time*, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 343 (SZ, 297).
understands its ownmost potentiality-for-Being [Seinkönnen] as anticipating [vorlaufen].\(^{3839}\) As Heidegger writes, “Anticipation discloses this possibility [i.e. resoluteness] as possibility. Thus only as anticipating does resoluteness become a primordial Being towards Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being.”\(^{39}\) This anticipation is the anticipation of death. As Heidegger writes: “As Being-towards-the-end which understands—that is to say, as anticipation of death—resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be.”\(^{41}\)

The internal connection of resolution with anticipation, then, allows Heidegger to rethink Dasein’s essential finitude, a finitude that is hidden in the “fallen” state of everydayness of das Man. Finitude is constitutive of Dasein, and resoluteness reveals that Dasein is in essence an ecstatic standing out, an opening of, Being. Heidegger thus tries to rethink care, Dasein’s basic constitution is Being-in-the-World, in terms of its ontological unity.

In a key section of Division II of Being and Time (§65), Heidegger further focuses on the claim that temporality is the ontological meaning of Dasein’s Being as care. Anticipatory resoluteness is the authentic mode of care, and “[t]emporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care.”\(^{42}\) Temporality is “the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been.”\(^{43}\) So Heidegger identifies temporality as the unity that is the ground of care itself: “The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality.”\(^{44}\)

**Disposition and the constitution of Being-in-the-World**

The first task in BT is to describe how Dasein exists in its everydayness and analyze the constitutive, basic structures of existence. Dasein is essentially a being who is always “there”, whose being is constituted and manifested as Being-in-the-World. Dasein is always already embedded within a World, within a complex referential system of meaningful relations. Dasein

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\(^{39}\) The fundamental mood of Angst is primarily distinguished from fear on the basis of their respective “objects”: whilst fear’s object is an entity within-the-world, anxiety does not have a definite object, no determinate threat. Anxiety’s “object” is Being-in-the-world as such, and this means that in anxiety no particular involvement [Bewandtnis] arises. Hence, its outcome cannot be a determinate prescription (BT 231/186).

\(^{40}\) Ibid.

\(^{41}\) Ibid, p. 353 (SZ, 305).

\(^{42}\) Ibid, p. 374 (SZ, 326).

\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Ibid, p. 375 (SZ, 327).
and world are not different or distinct entities, but rather Dasein is itself the disclosedness of its “there”.\textsuperscript{45} Being-in-the-World is the basic state of Dasein,\textsuperscript{46} and Being-in is the “\textit{formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state}.”\textsuperscript{47}

Heidegger in his analysis breaks up the phenomenon of “Being-in-the-World” and firstly analyzes the “worldhood” of the World. In the next chapter, in §§28-38, he analyzes the phenomenon of Being-in as such. The analysis of Being-in is an analysis of Dasein’s “there”, the way the “there” [Da-sein] of Dasein is constituted. In this chapter, Heidegger offers an analysis of the existential constitution of the “there” as well as an explication of the everyday Being of the “there” and the falling of Dasein.\textsuperscript{48} Heidegger’s chief aim is to redescribe the constitution of Being-in in such a way that being-in is not understood as a present-at-hand “insideness” where one entity is in another entity, a container.\textsuperscript{49}

Dasein’s “there” is ontologically constituted by four basic structures (existentials): disposition [\textit{Befindlichkeit}], understanding [\textit{Verstehen}], fallenness [\textit{Verfallensein}] and talk [\textit{Rede}].\textsuperscript{50} In effect, these four structures are the transcendental conditions of Dasein’s “there” that are identified through phenomenological description (as opposed to a logical derivation). Dasein’s “there” is co-constituted by these basic structures. There cannot be a “there” unless there is disposition and understanding, and each of these is \textit{equiprimordial}, meaning that they operate together at the same time, each of them enabling the other and together constituting Dasein’s “there”. Understanding is always accompanied by disposition, and disposition is always accompanied by understanding, and each cannot be what it is without the other.

Insofar as disposition is an \textit{existentiale}, this means that Dasein is always already disposed, finds itself in a disposition, just like for Kant the object-encountering subject is always already in space and time. Disposition is primarily manifested through moods.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, p. 171 (SZ, 133).
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, p. 78 (SZ, 53).
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, p. 80 (SZ, 54).
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, p. 171 (SZ, 133).
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, p. 170 (SZ, 132).
\textsuperscript{50} Heidegger is not consistent on whether talk is one of the existentials, sometimes excluding it or exchanging fallenness with talk. In §68 he lists all four. But this inconsistency need not concern us at this point, as disposition is consistently identified as one.
Heidegger makes clear that Dasein is *always* in some mood,\(^{51}\) since it is a basic structure of its existence, and this holds even when we *appear* to not have a mood, being indifferent or neutral, which is one way of describing the “impartial” character often attributed to the theoretical attitude. But Heidegger explicitly says that mood is a necessary condition for being “there” in a world, and the *appearance* of not having a mood is not the real absence of mood altogether but rather a particular way of being disposed towards our mood.

Heidegger analyzes the basic structures one by one. In §29 he analyzes being-there (Da-sein) *as* disposition. The German word he uses to refer to the structure of disposition, *Befindlichkeit*, is a substantive derived from the reflexive verb *sich befinden*, which literally means “finding oneself”. In everyday context, the colloquial German phrase “*Wie befinden Sie sich?*” means “how do you feel?” or “how is it going?” or “how are you faring?”, etc. It refers to the way Dasein finds itself *situated, affected by and attuned to* the world, and this is a fundamental way through which the world and particular entities in the world are disclosed to Dasein in a *meaningful* way.

Heidegger distinguishes between the ontological level of the phenomenon and the ontic level. Disposition is an *ontological* structure, and the *ontic* way in which this ontological structure is manifested is mood. Even though moods (as with other affective phenomena such as emotions and feelings) are normally taken to be psychological phenomena and hence the domain of psychology, Heidegger argues that psychology cannot see the ontological import of mood and he seeks to outline its structure from an ontological perspective. The way we slip from one mood to another is ontologically significant, and this phenomenon must be analyzed in terms of what it shows about Being, about being-there.

Heidegger identifies three essential, ontological characteristics of disposition. First: dispositions disclose being-there in its thrownness, and mostly in the manner of evasive “turning away”.\(^{52}\) Second: moods disclose Being-in-the-World as a *whole*, and enables

\(^{51}\) Ibid, p. 173 (SZ, 134).

\(^{52}\) Ibid, p. 175 (SZ, 136).
intentional directedness to emerge.\textsuperscript{53} Third: disposition shows a disclosive submission to the world, which enables the primary discovery of the world as something that matters, as such.\textsuperscript{54}\textsuperscript{55}

These three characteristics are ontological; that is, they are essential characteristics of the being of Dasein, characteristics that follow from inspection and analysis as regards the way they are, their very being. But before Heidegger identifies these characteristics, he needs to first analyze the phenomenon of disposition (mood) and provide phenomenological justification, lest he falls into a dogmatic assertion. In this context, and in typical hermeneutic fashion, Heidegger addresses his predecessors and the tradition he is encountering – a long tradition that consistently ignores the affective, or relegates it to the realm of non-being.

Heidegger begins by noting how we slip from one mood to another. Moods change, they are transient, and because of this precariousness, philosophy ignores them. Their contingent character appears as arbitrariness and relative to the individual subject; since philosophy is the study of essence and the a priori, then it must focus on that which does not change, hence that which is susceptible to change is banished from the area of study. But it is precisely this transience, contingency, and “irrational nature” that Heidegger wants to take seriously, because through it, through the shifting moods, a particular, albeit recalcitrant, aspect of being-there reveals itself (which ultimately has to do with the historical nature of being).

It is not only the transience of moods that puts off philosophical investigation, but also their enigmatic character. What they reveal does not match epistemic conventions, does not fit epistemic schemas and criteria, and hence they do not “make the cut”. \textit{Why} we slip from one mood to another, says Heidegger, we do not know. This enigma is inherent to the disclosure of moods. Moods disclose the sheer fact of the “there” without any further qualities. One could argue that an enigma is precisely the absence of disclosure, namely that moods are of no epistemic value whatsoever since all they offer to understanding is an enigma. But Heidegger’s philosophical move goes the other way: instead of applying rigid epistemic criteria onto an

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, p. 176 (SZ, 137).
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, p. 177 (SZ, 137-138).
\textsuperscript{55} Macquarrie and Robinson consistently translate Angehen as (a cognate of) “mattering”. This misses the temporal character of the German word that Heidegger uses. Angehen also means “the approaching” that concerns us; concern could also be used, but the word is used to translate besorgen.
obstreperous and vague phenomenon, Heidegger _expands_ the very meaning of meaning and what counts as ontological significance, by taking moods seriously, ontologically speaking.

This phenomenological breakthrough into the affective culminates in the three essential characteristics of disposition, which open up the entire ontological project and the insights afforded by the moment [Augenblick]. This breakthrough is not afforded from the outside, but rather it is initiated _immanently_, from within the inner “logic” (structure/manifestation) of disposition itself. This is the most important phenomenological gain regarding moods: their ability to initiate a phenomenological beginning per se. This capacity to afford a beginning is what we should see first, since it also helps us interpret and understand the first ontological characteristic of mood.

**Mood: Being-there as burden**

The primary, most originary insight given by mood is _burden_. Mood manifests being “there” in a particular way – it manifests it _as_ a burden [Last], and this is a character of being that is crucial for the ontological project of BT. The meaning of “burden” is not made immediately clear though, and some interpretive work needs to be done. _Burden_ is operating in three distinct (albeit interrelated) senses. Firstly, in the existentiell sense, i.e. in the sense of biographical _difficulty_. Secondly, in an epistemic sense, i.e. in relation to understanding: being-there is a burden to _understanding_, in the sense that it is an obstacle to it, it is something that challenges and antagonizes cognitive understanding, it is a puzzle that cannot be understood. (It is like an unreasonable fact that we simply have to accept.) Thirdly, and most importantly, in an ontological sense: being-there is a burden in the sense that being-there is an ontological question that _oppresses_ and _demands_ metaphysical articulation (explanation to follow). Let me analyze each of these three senses in some more detail.

The first sense of burden is the everyday sense, the existentiell sense. Life is difficult, tough, entangled in constant worry, intrinsically tied to problem-solving. Nothing happens

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automatically: we have to carry ourselves through activities, take care of tasks, and all of this within the rigid constraints of the environment, physical limits, and intellectual complications.

The second sense of burden is epistemic. Disposition, mood, orients and motivates understanding, but it also delimits understanding whilst enabling it. Mood is always a burden to understanding, a burden it necessarily bears and can never shake off. It is like a constant puzzle that is there and confuses understanding, an ever-present aporia that makes understanding understand its own limits. Even Dasein’s apparent “lack of mood” [Ungestimmtheit], connected to “neutral” theoretical understanding, manifests the “there” of being as a burden (theoretical understanding is never free from constraints).

The third sense is ontological. The burdensome character of being-there that mood discloses relates to the very fact that existence is an issue for Dasein, that it is concerned with the meaning of its existence. The burden is Dasein’s own demand for ontological understanding, indicating Dasein’s metaphysical condition and the need for the attainment of self-understanding, self-transparency, and freedom (or autonomy).

In BT, Heidegger explicitly ties the notion of “burden” with Dasein’s freedom and responsibility for ontological grounding, and guilt in the avoidance of it. The demand for ontological grounding is there, as a burden that Dasein can either take up or ignore, a demand for self-transparency and self-understanding that Dasein can either shoulder or ignore. But Heidegger does not spell out how the burden of mood makes this metaphysical demand for self-transparency and grounding. He does so later on though in FCM, where he says that “if [man] is to become what he is, in each case [he] has to

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57 In certain respects, moods can be said to be the “desire” that motivates understanding, even though moods cannot be reduced to “desire” and it would be a mistake to use desire here, since desire in modern and post-Kantian philosophy became associated with the striving subject. Let it be noted, however, that in his earlier accounts of how affective phenomena accompany understanding, Heidegger sometimes uses the word desire [Begehren]. What is more, in lectures preceding the publication of BT, Heidegger explicitly associates the phenomenological notion of intentionality (which was the Brentanian concept that allowed for the emergence of phenomenology) with ὄρεξις (desire).

58 Ibid.

59 I do not mean the “ontological”, as often ascribed to Division I, in opposition to the “ethical-existentialist” ascribed to Division II, where the second is so called in order to indicate a certain divergence from the former. This is a false dilemma that I do not subscribe to. According to my interpretation, both divisions are ontological (Cf. Withy 2012; Crowell 2013).

60 For an explicit thesis on this, see Crowell 2013.

61 See, for example, §§54, 58.
throw Dasein upon his shoulders […]".\(^{62}\) The awakening of fundamental mood is equal to the acknowledging and embracing of oppressiveness \([\textit{Bedrängnis}]\) that is at each time given in the fundamental mood\(^{63}\) In Heidegger’s own words:

This liberation of the Dasein in man does not mean placing him in some arbitrary position, but loading Dasein upon man as his ownmost burden \([\text{das Dasein als seine eigenste Bürde aufladen}]\). Only those who can truly give themselves a burden are free. \([\text{Nur wer sich wahrhaft eine Bürde geben kann, ist frei}]\ […] We must therefore \textit{really} question what this attunement gives us to question, we must question concerning what \textit{oppresses} \([\textit{bedrängt}]\) us in this fundamental attunement and perhaps simultaneously vanishes as a decisive \textit{possibility}.\(^{64}\)

And a couple of pages later, Heidegger speaks about how philosophy is an expression of freedom, which only arises “where there is a burden to be shouldered” \([\textit{Freiheit ist Nur, wo das Übernehmen einer Bürde ist}]\), a burden that “always represents an imperative and a need that \textit{weighs heavily upon man’s overall mood}, so that he comes to be in a mood of melancholy \([\text{Im Schaffen ist je nach seiner Art diese Bürde ein Muß und eine Not, an der Mensch schwer trägt im Gemüt, so daß ihm schwer zumute ist}]\).”\(^{65}\)

This ontological character of moods, the character of burden, is key in understanding the specific purpose that fundamental moods play in Heidegger’s ontological project. Fundamental moods supply the demand for an ontological \textit{beginning}. This is the most important operation that fundamental mood affords to ontological understanding. Several commentators have pointed out how fundamental mood is associated with a beginning, a break, an unsettledness capable of attuning to authenticity.\(^{66}\)

In “Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected ‘Problems’ of ‘Logic’”, a lecture delivered in the Winter Semester of 1937-38 (whilst Heidegger was also writing the Contributions to Philosophy), Heidegger offers an illuminating analysis of how fundamental mood inaugurates a beginning in philosophy, articulating a connection between mood, necessity and burden as an

\(^{62}\) FCM, p. 165.
\(^{63}\) FCM, pp. 166-167.
\(^{64}\) Ibid.
\(^{65}\) FCM, p. 182 (my italics).
opening of “space of meaning”. Referring to the Greek beginning of philosophy, Heidegger writes that fundamental mood supplies the need [Not] and necessity [Notwendigkeit] for the beginning, and this need “arises from the distress of not knowing the way out or the way in”, which is a compelling metaphysical burden that begets philosophy.

Klaus Held writes that Heidegger’s general project aims at awakening a new culture that is brought about via a binding task, which is supplied by fundamental mood. In this context, mood supplies a compulsion, a necessity [Notwendigkeit] (or, the other way around: necessity “speaks” through mood), and as such fundamental mood has “the power of initiating historical change”. The burden is Dasein’s own demand for ontological understanding, a demand supplied by mood. Held also draws a direct connection between the awakening of fundamental mood and resoluteness, and considers mood to be that which “leads Dasein from inauthenticity into authenticity.”

Tanja Staehler also accepts that mood supplies the motivation behind the movement from inauthenticity to authenticity, even though she (rightly) rejects the possibility of a clear transition from inauthenticity to authenticity, where inauthenticity is somehow left completely behind, and she also points out that the connection between anxiety and authenticity in BT is not clear.

Katherine Withy offers the most comprehensive treatment of fundamental mood in BT and the capacity to disrupt everydayness and initiate the philosophical attitude. Withy makes a compelling argument in an article entitled “The methodological role of Angst in Being and Time”, where she makes the case that Angst disrupts the movement of falling “by arresting the movement towards entities” and enables the philosophical attitude to arise, out of a failure, a breakdown, of the everyday. In the same vein, Richard Capobianco articulates the burden of mood thus: anxiety transforms being-in-the-world into “not-at-homeness” [Nicht-zu-Hause],

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68 See BQP, §§32-36.
70 Ibid, p. 290.
71 Ibid, p. 293.
72 Staehler 2007, p. 419.
revealing the *fundamental* character of facticity as “radically negativized finite existence”, unsettled at the core of its being.\(^{76}\) According to Capobianco, in anxiety one is ‘unsettled’ *[unheimlich]*: “Angst brings Dasein back from its absorption in the world of the they. Dasein is shaken to the core of its being, and ‘being-in assumes the existential “mode” of not-at-homeness *[Un-zuhause]*.”\(^{77}\) Hence, Angst has the power to inaugurate, to “move” Dasein from its absorption into the ontic and the world, to the uncanny, which constitutes the beginning of the ontological.

But not all moods manifest the ontological burden and this is a key to understanding *fundamental* moods and why Heidegger prioritized certain “negative” moods when it came to burden, particularly Angst and shock. Even though mood will be a necessary condition for grounding and inaugurating a beginning, it will not be a sufficient one, not least because *not all moods* manifest the burden. The fact that we have moods, the fact that we have a disposition, does not automatically bring Dasein face to face with ontological burden. On the contrary, some moods do the opposite: they cover up the burden! In addition, even fundamental moods that reveal the burden have the tendency to be covered up by declensions.\(^{78}\) Oppressiveness is covered up, the burden removed, and Dasein is dragged to a “fall” into the ontic. Moods can both conceal as well as unconceal the burden of existence. This refers to the aforementioned epistemic sense of burden, where mood is a burden to *understanding*, in the sense that it clouds understanding by hindering its grasp in such a way that understanding is motivated to turn to objects so as to alleviate this burden. In order to better understand this, we need to see Heidegger’s analysis of *how* moods disclose. This will illustrate why Heidegger ascribes priority to certain “negative moods”.

Heidegger’s preference for “negative moods”, especially in BT, is a consequence of the manner in which he analyzes how moods disclose the burden of being “there”. In BT,

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\(^{77}\) Ibid.

\(^{78}\) Heidegger consistently employs dualisms that orient his analyses: authentic and inauthentic, ontological and ontic. Each authentic/ontological manifestation has a corresponding inauthentic/fallen one. One way to understand this is by using the grammatical paradigm of declension (inflexion). A fundamental mood’s burden can be covered up by falling into an objective state, in the same way that a noun inflects (for example, a change in grammatical case). Whilst Heidegger does not make this linguistic connection in BT, he makes it expressly in Chapter 2 of his 1935 lecture *Introduction to Metaphysics*. 
Heidegger will particularly turn to Angst and fear, and the way he justifies this has led commentators to believe that it was unavoidable for Heidegger to associate ontology with negative moods (especially since the methodological need that reveals the burden is one of unsettling that brings about uncanniness), and rightly so.

**Five theses on mood and disclosure**

Moods can either disclose or conceal the burden. Disclosure is not automatic, since some moods conceal the burden, but also since those that unconceal the burden are unstable, precarious, and susceptible to immediate change. In §29 of BT, Heidegger offers five theses regarding disposition/mood and facticity, three of which I reconstruct thus:

1.Disposition is a *binary way of relating* to the relatum of facticity
2.Facticity is a *burden*.
3.In everydayness, disposition *turns away* from the *burden*, through *moods of elation that alleviate the burden*.
4.These moods of elation are “distorting moods” [*Verstimmungen*].
5.Distorting moods depend on, and betray, more fundamental (negative) moods (e.g. the mood of joy is dependent on a more primordial *fear* which is truer to the burdensome character of being-there)

How does disposition disclose? Through the first thesis, Heidegger tells us that disposition is manifested as either a “turning towards” or a “turning away” [*An-und Abkehr*] (174/135). In saying this, he sticks to a traditional theory of affective states, consistent with Aristotle’s notion of movement as *μεταβολή*, and his account of *πάθη* in the *Rhetoric* as movement between two extremes: the “calming” [*ἡδύ*] and the “upsetting” [*λυπηρόν*], the “beneficial” [*συμφέρον*] and the “harmful” [*βλαβερόν*].79 The second thesis holds that facticity is always already (i.e. necessarily) a *burden*: difficult, painful, and threatening. The third thesis holds that, for the most

79 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed account of Heidegger’s Aristotelian heritage on affective phenomena.
part, mood turns away from the burdensome character of Dasein, with moods of elation [Enthobensein] being exemplary of this “turning away” as they alleviate the burden (174/135). In Heidegger’s own words: “Ontologically, we thus obtain as the first essential characteristic of dispositions that they disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and—proximally and for the most part—in the manner of an evasive turning-away.”

Turning away is therefore identified as phenomenologically more valuable, in the sense that it is the primordial manifestation of the “facticity” of the “there”.

Dasein’s thrownness is disclosed as disposition, as Befindlichkeit. Thrownness can only be revealed in a particular way: it is a finding of one’s “there”, not through a direct perceptive seeking, but rather primarily through the movement of “fleeing” [es sich immer schon gefunden haben muß – gefunden in einem Finden, das nicht so sehr einem direkten Suchen, sondern einem Fliehen entspringt] which is enacted by way of disposition [Diese Abkehr ist, was sie ist, immer in der Weise der Befindlichkeit].

Since Dasein turns away from the burden of facticity via moods of elation, it follows that these moods of elation are “distorting moods” [Verstimmungen] (the fourth thesis). And since distorting moods are reactionary, they are derivative and hence depend on, and betray, the more fundamental, negative moods (fifth thesis). Moods such as joy are dependent on a more primordial fear, which is truer to the burdensome character of being-there, and which itself depends on the more fundamental mood of Angst.

In this context, the first essential characteristic of moods that Heidegger identifies seems to rely on – and affirm – a distinction between mood and that which mood (un)conceals, i.e. the burden of facticity. The distinction is inevitable if some moods conceal facticity. And this distinction causes some problems.

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80 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 175 (SZ, 136); translation modified.
Problems caused by the theses

Firstly, Heidegger’s binary way of describing mood operation replicates the dichotomy of truth/deception (being/non-being), and is dangerously close to an essentialism based on the principle of non-contradiction, as well as representationalism. Secondly, facticity, the “there”, becomes like a “state of affairs” to which mood relates, and mood is like a subjective “state”. Thirdly, it separates moods along the axis of pleasure and suffering, giving a clear methodological priority to negative moods that – at first glance – excludes positive moods such as love, joy and hope.

These problems arise because Heidegger qualifies “thrownness” (facticity) in a way that resembles ahistorical essentialism: being-there is a burden, a kind of suffering, regardless of the situation and historical particulars, and regardless of how one feels “on the surface” and what kind of mood one finds oneself in in its “everydayness”. There are moods that reveal the deeper essence of being-there, and then there are derivative, superficial moods that cover it up. This essentialist interpretation is further consolidated by the fact that moods of elation allocate the burden, and they do so by turning away from it, something that does not affect the ontological status of facticity (which remains burdensome), but rather is a mere veiling of it. Such an essentialist reading is encouraged by the monopoly of Angst in BT, but by its “replacement” by shock [Erschrecken] in Heidegger’s later works, and Heidegger’s comprehensive insistence on negative moods, which dominate his ontological discourses.

82 Ibid.
83 “For the most part the mood does not turn towards the burdensome character of Dasein which is manifest in it, and least of all does it do so in the mood of elation [Enthobensein] when this burden has been alleviated.” Ibid.
84 Perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling statement regarding the priority of “negative moods” is made in FCM, where Heidegger explicitly associates burden, philosophy and philosophical moods with the mood of melancholy [Schwermut]. As he writes: “In creative achievement this burden always represents an imperative and a need that weighs heavily upon man’s overall mood, so that he comes to be in a mood of melancholy [Im Schaffen ist je nach seiner Art diese Bürde ein Muß und eine Not, an der der Mensch schwer trägt im Gemüt, so daß ihm schwer zumute ist]” (FCM, p. 182). And then: “As a creative and essential activity of human Dasein, philosophy stands in the fundamental attunement of melancholy. This melancholy concerns the form rather than the content of philosophizing, but it necessarily prescribes a fundamental attunement which delimits the substantive content of philosophical questioning” (FCM, p. 183).
85 Schrecken as a fundamental mood corresponds to the historical dimension of Angst, as a sort of Angst’s “epochal counterpart”. This is something that Michel Haar insightfully points out in his essay “Attunement and Thinking”, in which he pairs these two moods and tries to make sense of their affinity. Inter alia, Haar is interested in pointing out how, and explaining why, Angst disappears from Heidegger’s later works. In trying to explain this disappearance, Haar analyzes moods in terms of historicality, that is, in terms of the way a fundamental mood relates to metaphysics as such, reveals metaphysics as metaphysics, as well as how the mood belongs to a particular historical epoch. Haar identifies an ahistorical relation between Angst and metaphysical understanding, thus explaining Heidegger’s
The danger in this essentialist interpretation is twofold: first, it misses the precise nature of the methodological exigency that urges Heidegger to turn to moods in general so as to ground ontology; second, it makes it impossible to see moods other than Angst, fear, terror (etc.) as fundamental, moods, such as love, hope, marvel, etc. This thesis points out how “positive” moods, such as love, have a central role even before BT, and sharply focuses on the methodological reasons that usher Heidegger to turn to mood in general in order to ground the project of fundamental ontology. In this context, the essentialist interpretation is a problem that must be overcome because it entails a misreading that hands over the inaugural capacity of moods in BT to phenomena of threat and uncanniness, as if the binding necessity cannot come from positive moods such as love. Or, it misleads the reader of Heidegger to take BT as an attempt to articulate a metaphysics of fundamental uncanniness that later turns to a metaphysics of homeliness. The problem with such interpretations is that they resolve the unresolvable conflicting essence of fundamental moods: their capacity to offer unity as well as urgency and ecstasis. They are the transcendental ground that unifies experience, they compel to action (movement), and they refer to an Other, to an exteriority. It is Heidegger’s own textual formulations that facilitate such a reading and interpretive problems.

As mentioned earlier, in BT Heidegger seems to hold that “facticity” and “disposition” are not the same phenomenon. He seems to posit that “facticity” is like Da-Seins “state-of-affairs”, like an “essential”, “factual” correlate, which disposition can either turn towards (affirm) or avoid (negate). If that is so, disposition cannot be constitutive of facticity, but rather is merely something that either conceals or unconceals it. If we accept this, mood loses its

dropping of Angst in terms of the shifting away from the transcendental phenomenology of the analytic of Dasein towards an epochal understanding of Being itself. In this context, Haar draws on the contiguity between Angst and Schrecken, arguing that the latter is the historical correlative of the former: after the Kehre, Angst becomes reabsorbed in Schrecken. See Michel Haar “Attunement and Thinking”, in Heidegger Reexamined: Art, Poetry, and Technology, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark A. Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 149-162.

Tanja Staehler pointed out to me that in the ‘Contributions’, Heidegger suggests that there is only one fundamental mood that presents itself differently at different historical moments. Something along these lines is also suggested in BT where he subsumes most fundamental moods as “modes of fear”, but also in FCM when he refers to melancholy.

Or: unsettledness.

For example, see Capobianco 2010.
ontological import and retains a restricted epistemological role, subservient to the ontological project of BT.\(^8^9\)

Thrownness and mood should not be taken to be two different entities, but rather as the same phenomenon addressed in two different ways, each having a distinct methodological function – they refer to the same ontological basic structure. Moods disclose thrownness by way of moods, and moods disclose thrownness. Thrownness is the “burdensome character of Dasein” \([\textit{Lastcharakter des Daseins}]\), says Heidegger. But why does Heidegger insist on the burdensome character of Dasein, what kind of statement is this, and how can this statement hold in situations where the disposition of Dasein is joyful since joy is \textit{also} a mood and hence a manifestation of thrownness?

Indeed, Heidegger’s strong association of thrownness with “burden” and “fleeing” seems like an ahistorical essentialist statement that being-there \textit{is} necessarily a kind of suffering, a burden. This essentialist interpretation is further consolidated by the fact that Heidegger says that the mood of elation \textit{alleviates} the burden but only by turning away from it, not by really removing it.\(^9^0\) The essentialist interpretation can be overcome by a careful analysis of “facticity” which is a burden that can be alleviated.

\textbf{Burden as facticity/thrownness}

In BT, mood discloses and is evidence for the “there” as sheer “\textit{that-it-is}”, and this “sheer fact” is disclosed in a way that the “from where” (the source, the reason) and the “where to” (the purpose) remain in darkness.\(^9^2\) Mood is the very \textit{delivery} into a “there”. Mood is at the same time an “illumination” of the “there” but it is also “veiledness” of the “there” that clouds the source and purpose (rational understanding) of the “there”. This “veiledness” is not

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\(^8^9\) If the distinction were an ontological one, then a mood of elation would at the same time constitute an overcoming of the “factual nature” of the Da of Dasein – something that is ontologically impossible. Sitting comfortable on a chair makes the fact that I am sitting on it disappear altogether, and recede into the background, but in no way does it mean that I am \textit{not} sitting on the chair. Likewise, when my feeling of my body stops being an issue for me, it does not mean that I have stopped having a body altogether.

\(^9^0\) \textit{Being and Time}, Macquarrie and Robinson p. 174 (SZ, 135).

\(^9^1\) “For the most part the mood does not turn towards the burdensome character of Dasein which is manifest in it, and least of all does it do so in the mood of elation [\textit{Enthobensein}] when this burden has been alleviated.” Ibid.

\(^9^2\) Ibid.
ontologically insignificant. Rather, it is that which discloses a fundamental characteristic of Dasein: “that it is”. Heidegger calls this “thrownness” [Geworfenheit].\(^\text{93}\) We are thrown “there”.\(^\text{94}\) Heidegger further elaborates on the phenomenon of thrownness by referring to the phenomenon of facticity [Faktizität].\(^\text{95}\) As he says: “The expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.”\(^\text{96}\) Moods disclose the facticity of Dasein. But what is facticity? The history of the term “facticity” is important here because it helps us better contextualize and understand what and how moods reveal in BT,\(^\text{97}\) which clarifies what “burden” means and why “burden” is not an existentiell notion, but rather an epistemic and ontological one.\(^\text{98}\)

Facticity was a notion firstly used by Fichte and widely employed by German Idealists and neo-Kantian philosophers, as well as Dilthey. Schelling used the notion as pertaining to the distinction between the “what” of being and the “that” of being (a distinction that grounded his Positive Philosophy). “What” refers to being qua essence, whilst “that” refers to being’s contingent existence.\(^\text{99}\) Existentiality is the very facticity of coming into being. Schelling distinguishes positive from negative philosophy upon this very distinction: negative philosophy

\(^{93}\) Ibid.

\(^{94}\) We should be careful not to think that we exist in any way prior to being “thrown”. Rather, our very existence is (in part) thrownness. Thrownness is constitutive of existence, of being-there.

\(^{95}\) Thrownness is a formal indication that Heidegger uses to refer to what others have called facticity. Whilst this indicates that Heidegger is trying to offer his own phenomenological description without being entangled in the traditional vocabulary, it seems to me that Heidegger here makes sense of thrownness in terms of facticity, and thus reverts to the language of German Idealism. I do not think this is a problem though, because we can think of this the other way round: Heidegger tries to rethink facticity in a new way, making sense of facticity in terms of moods and thrownness.

\(^{96}\) Ibid.

\(^{97}\) In my opinion, the only work of Heidegger that offers a systematic exposition, and can therefore be called a “treatise”, is BT. In this context, moods can be said to have an “operation”, but such a systematic role cannot really be ascribed to other works of Heidegger where moods play a prominent role.

\(^{98}\) The three senses were mentioned earlier in the text.

\(^{99}\) This is also reminiscent of the distinction Aristotle draws in Posterior Analytics where he analyzes the demonstrative syllogism. In that context, Aristotle distinguishes between understanding of ‘the fact’ (tò ótì) and understanding ‘the reason why’ (tò δiòtì). See Michael Beaney, “Analysis”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/analysis/>. It seems to me that facticity, as it was employed by German Idealists and appropriated by Heidegger, and the kind of “understanding” associated with mood and facticity in BT, is a descendant of this early Aristotelian distinction. A deeper analysis could point out the extent to which such a reference to Aristotle would be permissible and/or points out the critical boundaries of such a genealogical argument, however this exceeds the scope of this study. Suffice it to point out that whilst in BT facticity and the kind of “knowledge” revealed by disposition and mood has nothing to do with syllogistic thought (at least explicitly), and would normally be interpreted as something resists, or recalcitrant to, logic, what is disclosed by disposition and mood would still always already be necessarily accompanied by (the equiprimordial) understanding, and hence that which is disclosed by mood must be taken to have understanding always accompanying it, and hence that which is disclosed by mood must be taken to have understanding always accompanying it, and hence a complementary, corresponding way of articulating it in terms of understanding, from the perspective of understanding, despite the fact that understanding and disposition should not be formally conflated.
is rational philosophy that is concerned with the essence, the ‘what’ character of being, and positive philosophy is concerned with the pure actuality of the existence of “that” being which comes into its being. From this perspective, being is not a settled entity that is conceptually, rationally given, but rather is that which comes into being, it is becoming. Insofar as this coming into being is not a finished entity but still becoming and contingent, it cannot be conceptually grasped and explained. Existence and movement cannot resolve into a logical category because they cannot be grasped by conceptual understanding.  

As Heidegger says in §29 in BT, “the ‘that-it-is’ of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it [Das Daß der Faktizität wird in einem Anschauen nie vorfindlich].”  

Disposition discloses facticity in a manner whereby it remains an “inexorable enigma” which cannot be measured against the “apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of something”, but at the same time, Heidegger argues, without being simplistically banished to the realm of the “irrational”.  

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100 We must not forget that Heidegger’s project is an attempt to develop an ontology of becoming and temporality. In this respect, his closest ancestor is Aristotle (Heidegger repeatedly appeals to Aristotle’s Physics). Disposition and mood must be seen in this context of becoming. This explains Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotelian vocabulary, especially on affects, and his attempts to develop an existential analytic that would take moods and affects beyond Aristotle’s naturalism. The notion of Verfassung in BT is telling. Verfassung refers to the aspect of the existential structure of Befindlichkeit that accounts for the possibility of falling, in so far as falling is a certain movement that presupposes a stratum. In this context, Verfassung is the answer to the question of “Welche Struktur zeigt die Bewegtheits des Verfallens?” (GA 2, 177). Heidegger does not explicate this, but in §29 there are two ways that mood can fall: the first is through moods of elation, which cover up the burden; the second, which Heidegger does not explicitly mention (but which is discernible from context), is the falling from fundament (from Angst to fear). This is the fall from Befindlichkeit to Verfassung, from “disposition” to “constitution”. Whilst in BT there is no explicit connection with Aristotle, Heidegger draws the connection in “Vom Wesen und Begriff der φύσις”, where Heidegger for the first and – to the best of my knowledge – only time identifies Verfassung with ὕβολος, which is a determinate category of physical movement (see Chapter 4 for more on this topic).


102 I take it that the critical reference to seeing [Anschauen] is primarily directed at Husserl’s phenomenology. Disposition and mood discloses being in a way that a phenomenology based on Anschauen cannot grasp.

103 Ibid. p. 175 (SZ, 136).

104 According to my reading, Heidegger does not want moods to be understood as simply the binary opposite of rationality, i.e. as that which is irrational and remains completely absent. In my opinion, whilst Heidegger wants to clearly retain, to some extent, an irreducible incompatibility between moods and rationality, his hermeneutic position does to a certain extent overlap with linguistic realism, arguing for a quasi-organic relationship between moods and concepts; moods are, after all, definitively involved in concept formation. Moods are recalcitrant to rational understanding, but they can also be described to be “logos-like”, and in a way “present” in rational understanding. This is why, in What is Metaphysics?, Heidegger can argue that Angst enables us to speak about the Nothing. In a sense, Heidegger is consistent with Aristotle’s position in Peri Hermeneias, where in Chapter 1 he says that spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul. [Ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήμασιν σμύκλα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τὸν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, καὶ ὅσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πάση τὰ αὐτὰ, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ἄν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρῶτων, ταῦτα πάση παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὅν ταῦτα ὁμοιόμορα πράγματα ἡδὴ ταύτα.]
The way mood discloses the “there” of Dasein is not through “beholding” [Anschauen], but rather it discloses being-there as kinesis, in a dynamic and pre-conceptual way: the “there” is disclosed as a “turning towards” or “turning away” from something [An- und Abkehr]. Everyday dispositions are a self-effacing movement that pushes Dasein away from its own facticity, towards a self-misunderstanding and an accompanying misinterpretation of selfhood, worldhood and being. This counterintuitive way of indicating disclosure is indeed enigmatic, from a logical point of view, but the conservation of the enigmatic character of the disclosure of moods is crucial. Heidegger further expands on the “enigmatic character” of that which mood discloses that cannot be grasped by theoretical cognition, trying to tease out and offer a “positive” account of the mode of disclosure of moods.

Mood is therefore a phenomenon that resists conceptual understanding and constitutes an epistemological burden. This is the second sense of burden as described earlier. It is in this precise movement from the negative phenomenon to the positive, from the recalcitrant becoming to the positive description, the indication, that the burden is unavoidably identified with a family of “negative moods” which gives it a positive epistemic content. Epistemic burden is a burden to understanding, and in the case of facticity it is a burden that relates to a particular ontology/metaphysics. Here, it is the being of Da-Sein that gives the burden to understanding, and so the epistemic burden is not just an indeterminate burden put to a generic understanding, but it is a particular burden associated to the being of Da-Sein (which in BT will be the “temporal”/“historical”) – it is an epistemic burden associated with a particular ontological understanding.

105 Here, Heidegger clearly moves beyond Husserl’s phenomenology, which is based on “beholding” [Anschauen] [I would have rather translated Anschauen as “seeing” or “viewing”]. I believe that in this sentence Heidegger is tacitly criticizing Husserl, whose phenomenology failed to take moods as anything other than a “founded” level of intentionality.

106 As I will show later, this is indeed very close to Aristotle’s notion of movement as μεταβολή, and Aristotle’s account of πάθη in the Rhetoric, as σοφείρον or βλαβερόν, and as ἔρως or λυπηρόν.

107 This point is made clearer when one considers this: the burden placed on understanding regarding the being of a particular object, say the being of nature, is a different burden from the one placed on understanding by the being of Da-Sein. Likewise, the mood that makes manifest this burden would also differ.

108 Heidegger makes clear that fundamental moods are an epistemic burden with a particular ontological demand and ontological space, in BQP, where he says that the need “arises from the distress of not knowing the way out or the way in [Nicht-aus-und-ein-Wissen]; but that is by no means to be understood as a perplexity in some particular circumstances or other. What then is it? Not knowing the way out or the way in: that is to say, out of and into that.
The ontological essence of the facticity to which mood and burden refer in BT must come into relief in order to understand what facticity means, which mood can alleviate the ontological burden, which mood can take the burden, and why the mood that takes said burden is inevitably essentialized. Facticity in BT is the being of Da-Sein, the being of becoming, which is inherently “unsettled”. Hence, the mood associated with being-there as being-unsettled is Angst, and that is why Heidegger thematizes that mood in BT. Angst is specifically suited for the purposes of the ontological project particular to BT.

It bears repeating that BT is a project meant to awaken the question of the meaning of Being – in this context, the fundamental mood to be awakened must offer the ground for ontological authenticity, that is for overcoming inauthentic understanding and bringing temporality, the temporal character of Da-Sein, into relief, as that which constitutes care and Being-in-the-World. BT strives to show how the primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality.

Let us also not forget that there is circularity involved here, which in some respects compromises the methodological “purity” of the project. A circularity that Heidegger does not deny – rather he urges the reader to embrace it. The grounding mood to be awakened is already presupposed by that which is sought, by the interpretation proposed and the conceptual language employed. Hence, awakening the fundamental mood is not a matter of discovery that moves into the transcendental ground without presuppositions. This shows that the fundamental mood is contingent on the ontological project at hand. Fundamental mood and concepts mutually define and delimit one another. Hence, Angst is chosen to be awakened based on the which such knowing first opens up as an untrodden and ungrounded ‘space’. This is a ‘between’ where it has not been determined what being is or not-being is.” (BQP, §35).

In Basic Questions of Philosophy (BQP), Heidegger talks about how metaphysical questioning comes out of a necessity that is internally defined and delimited (“destined”) by the enacted fundamental mood. He explicitly says this when he analyzes the “first beginning”, i.e. ancient Greek philosophy. Heidegger writes that the Greeks began thinking as an inquiry into beings as such, in terms of an experience of unconcealedness (αλήθεια) as the basic character of beings (φύσις). But the Greeks did not deem truth itself and its essence worthy of any original questioning. It was not out of superficiality or of a debility in the power of thinking that the Greeks did not ask the most original question of αλήθεια but out of being equal to their destiny: “Their destiny was something into which they were compelled ever anew, something their thinkers, despite being basically different, nevertheless understood as the same, something that for them was therefore a necessity. Every necessity lays hold of man out of a need. Every need becomes compelling out of, and within, a basic disposition” (GA45, p. 112; my italics).
internal phenomenological necessity, the internal burden, of BT. This contextualizes Angst within particular historical demands, and in doing so relativizes Angst but without compromising its capacity to ground. Heidegger does not say this in BT, and this silence on his behalf misleads readers into thinking that Angst is an ahistorical mood, which is the ground of essentialist ontology. However, in FCM, Heidegger offers a number of theses on fundamental moods, four of which support my argument.

1. *Metaphysical* questions can be drawn out from every fundamental attunement [*aus jeder Grundstimmung des Daseins entfalten lassen*].

2. Which fundamental attunement we choose to awaken is not arbitrary. We do choose freely, but “in the deepest sense we are bound and compelled as well” [*Wir wählen zwar in gewissem Sinne und sind dabei frei, doch wir sind im tiefsten Sinne gebunden und gezwungen*].

3. The choice involves binding ourselves to the intrinsic character of metaphysics itself. [*Die Wahl ist ein Sichbinden an den in der Metaphysik selbst liegenden Zwang, den Einsatz eines bestimmten endlichen Daseins zu vollziehen, d.h. aber alle Darin beschlossene Bedingtheit seines Fragens zu übernehmen*]. The particular fundamental attunement is awakened when “we actually summon up the effort to be there [da zu sein].” This does not relativize fundamental attunement, nor does it make the awakened fundamental attunement as the “absolute” one.

4. When we ask from a particular fundamental attunement, this does not mean that this

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110 Michel Haar, in his essay “Attunement and Thinking”, in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), p. 170, raises the issue of whether anxiety is also trans-epochal. In his own words: “Such a mood [Angst] is temporalization of time and source of thought as well as source of history. This mood is not radically caught in history or floating above history as a ‘spirit of the times,’ but is the matrix in which being becomes an epoch. As such, it seems to be situated both within and outside of history. Is there not by this fact a ‘trans-epochal’ privilege attached to anxiety, and that in several respects?”

111 In FCM, Heidegger makes two incompatible statements regarding fundamental mood and philosophy. On the one hand, he states that philosophy is always associated with melancholy [*Schwermut*]; on the other hand, he speaks of the relative freedom in choosing which mood to awaken.

112 FCM, p. 181.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 FCM, p.182.
attunement overwhelms the others, prevents them or reduces their significance.\footnote{FCM, pp. 181-182.}

The first and fourth theses make it clear that no one fundamental mood can monopolize metaphysics. It cannot be true therefore that Angst should monopolize. The second thesis makes it clear that, on the one hand, there is a \textit{choice} involved in the mood that is awakened, but on the other, the mood is not arbitrarily chosen but is rather bound and compelled to do so by the metaphysical questions raised. Heidegger here acknowledges the aforementioned circularity. Finally, the third thesis further clarifies what determines the choice to awaken a particular mood: the decision is determined by the intrinsic character of metaphysics to enact being-there, to embrace the responsibility posed by the burden of the particular, historical, being-there.

\textbf{Disposition: neither subjective nor objective}

Having seen the first ontological characteristic of mood, and how it discloses and \textit{becomes} an ontological burden, let us see the other two, which are: moods disclose Being-in-the-World as a \textit{whole} and enable intentional directedness to emerge; and moods show a disclosive submission to the world, which enables the primary discovery of the world as something that matters, as such. In order for these two characteristics to make sense, we must understand how moods are neither subjective nor objective, but rather “in-between”. This is a critical distinction that serves as a compass in distinguishing \textit{Grundstimmung} from normal, everyday moods. Fundamental mood is neither subjective nor objective; it is neither about the subject nor about an object, but it reveals the “there” in a pre-intentional way.

The fundamental way mood discloses the “there” of Dasein is such that it overturns the modern paradigm of the human being as autonomous rational agent.\footnote{This is the Cartesian paradigm of selfhood that permeates Kant and that is also inherited by Husserl.} A mood does not disclose the “subjective” aspects of human being, in the modern sense of subject which is
rational and autonomous. A mood is something that assails us \[Die Stimmung überfällt\], but it comes neither from the “inside” nor from the “outside”.\(^{118}\)

Fundamental mood constitutes and discloses meaning before the subject-object, internal-external, data form, and also outside of the passive-active dichotomy. Fundamental mood discloses worldhood as the originary “in-between” which is neither side of an intentional relation, and therefore mood is that level of meaning that is “pre-intentional” but which enables intentionality to emerge. Heidegger’s phenomenology of mood therefore is crucial for his rejection of the subject-object model of understanding the relationship between human and world.\(^{119}\) Heidegger articulates “what” mood discloses thus: “The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-World as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something.”\(^{120}\) There are two important transcendental arguments here. Firstly, that mood is neither objective nor subjective, but rather something more originary that constitutes, and discloses, that which comes before the very distinction between the two poles, between a subject and an object; and also secondly, that it is what enables directedness in the first place. Disposition, mood, is what allows for anything to matter for Dasein, in general \([Diese Angänglichkeit gründet in der Befindlichkeit]\).\(^{121}\)

Fundamental mood discloses our prior embeddedness in the world, that is, in a “system” of meaningful references and relations, our inevitable “immersion” in meaningfulness as a whole. This means that mood is not about a particular object or thing, but rather is about meaningfulness itself in general. Fundamental mood is not about being thrown against a particular object that is present-at-hand and that affects us in such and such a way, but is pre-objective. Fundamental mood is horizontal, background disclosure of the “there” that cannot be attributed either to a subject or an object, which are derivative modes of disclosure. As I show in the thesis, this is Heidegger’s phenomenological version of “categorial intuition”, whereby Being in general is pre-reflectively grasped and disclosed.

\(^{118}\) Being and Time. Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 176 (SZ, 136).


\(^{120}\) Being and Time. Macquarrie and Robinson p. 176 (SZ, 137).

\(^{121}\) Ibid, p. 177 (SZ, 137).
As mentioned, this characteristic helps Heidegger distinguish between fundamental mood and normal mood. Remember how the characteristic of “in-betweenness” is crucial for the formation and experience of ontological burden, which is at the beginning of ontology/metaphysics. Everyday mood on the other hand has an object, and its epistemic demands and conditions of possibility of fulfilment of those demands are different. Angst is a fundamental mood, whereby no object can satisfy its oppressiveness, whereas its derivative, fear, is not a fundamental mood because it refers to an object and an intentional relation.

These two ontological characteristics can also be summed up thus: disposition is the foundational ground, the unifying ground that enables meaning in general to emerge. Disposition is like the transcendental “space of meaning”, the “container” that enables subjectivity and objectivity to emerge. The second and third ontological characteristics of mood pertain to the unifying, “gathering”, transcendental character of mood. In addition, this unifying character is not one of willing, or one of active synthesis, but rather is closer to a “world-submissive synthesis”.122

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122 It is tough to name this transcendental phenomenon, as it is neither an “act” nor a “passive syn-thesis”. The most appropriate word to use would be “dia-thesis”, disposition, which is indeed the Aristotelian notion that Heidegger renders as Befindlichkeit. Perhaps the best way to describe this is as a transcendental diathesis, a transcendental dispoitioning.
Chapter 1: Heidegger’s Early Freiburg Lectures and the Neo-Kantian Predicament

I. The narrative

Introductory remarks

The purpose of this chapter is to offer an account of the most pressing philosophical problems that shaped Heidegger’s early thought, especially with regards to the way it influenced his turn to affective states in order to identify the ground out of which phenomenology (philosophy) emerges.

The central textual and philosophical operation that the mature Heidegger ascribes to mood [Stimmung] is a key characteristic of his phenomenology. In BT, it is through mood that Dasein is brought before its facticity, and later on it is through mood that the truth of the Nothing is manifested, and it is through mood that the urgency and necessity of the “other beginning” is effectuated.

The young Heidegger tries to relocate the foundation of truth, on pre-propositional levels of understanding. The foundation is what legitimizes and justifies objectivity and logical validity. Heidegger relocates the foundation in pre-reflective levels of existence, in which the criterion for all truth, including the truth of propositional logic, is grounded. Mood also figures prominently in late Heidegger, for example in the lecture What is Philosophy? (1955), where he, following Plato and Aristotle, determines wonder, a mood, as the archē of philosophy. Before that, in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (1936-38), Heidegger envisioned a cultural transformation that would constitute a “new beginning” of thinking, whose beginning he connected with a fundamental mood [Grundstimmung]. In this context, it has been argued that moods supply the “binding necessity” for the cultural transformation that Heidegger himself envisioned.123

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123 See Klaus Held’s “Fundamental Moods and Heidegger’s Critique of Contemporary Culture”, in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). But there are other Heidegger scholars who have written on the important grounding capacity of mood in relation to the “other beginning” that the late Heidegger envisions. For example, Tracy Colony writes the following: “The importance which Heidegger accorded the grounding attunement of Contributions is unequivocal: ‘All essential thinking requires that its thoughts and sentences be mined, like ore, every time anew out of the grounding-attunement. If the grounding-attunement stays away, then everything is a forced rattling of concepts and empty words’ (C, 16). And yet,
But what would “binding necessity” mean, and why would Heidegger locate it in mood, as opposed to, say, predicative judgment (Urteil) as his predecessors did? According to Klaus Held, bindingness is that which binds our thinking, because in it lies a compulsion, a necessity [Notwendigkeit]. I take “binding necessity” to refer to the motivating ground of intentional acts. Its function is comparable to that of the categorical imperative; that is, the condition for the possibility of moral action; however, it is a transcendental imperative that is neither a natural, external law, nor an internal, voluntaristic construction. It is like the “reason” that legitimizes the truthfulness of acts, necessarily binding on Dasein insofar as it resolutely commits to complying with it in intending anything at all. By ascribing binding necessity to mood, the pre-predicative truth of mood is what legitimizes predicative truth. In this way, “bindingness of philosophical propositions is […] placed on an entirely new foundation that runs counter to the tradition. […] Traditionally, truth has its place in judgment” and it is precisely this logical tradition that Heidegger aims to radicalize. As this chapter shows, this was the most pressing problem that neo-Kantian philosophers, as well as Husserl, tried to resolve, and in any attempt to better understand Heidegger’s preoccupation with this problem, we must see how neo-Kantian philosophers and Husserl affected his thought.

The young Heidegger utilizes Husserlian terminology in order to radicalize the traditional conception of truth. The most fundamental problem for Heidegger, at the time, had to do with the methods of philosophy itself, the way philosophy is able to access and articulate transcendental truth. In this context, the main question had to do with the very nature of phenomenological understanding and the formation of philosophical conceptuality. Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses thematized these basic questions concerning the very definition of philosophy and its relation to life, and most importantly how philosophy gains access to the

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what is the grounding attunement of Contributions? Is the attunement that is the sustaining source of this ‘questioning along a pathway’ something that is already present as a continuous uninterrupted support? It would be more accurate to say that the grounding attunement of Contributions is an attunement that remains something to be unfolded through the enacted thinking and saying of Contributions itself. What this thinking is a preparation for is the breaking in of what Heidegger describes as: ‘the grounding-attunement of thinking in the other beginning’ (C, 11). Tracy Colony, “Attunement and Transition: Hölderlin and Contributions To Philosophy (From Enowning)”, Studia Phaenomenologica, VIII (2008), p. 429.

124 Held 1993, p. 287.
126 I am referring to the early Freiburg period and some of his Marburg period, so roughly from 1919 to 1925.
appropriate situation out of which philosophical interpretation develops (the *hermeneutic situation*).\(^\text{127}\) In this context, the young Heidegger developed, in the early 1920s, the notion of “factual life experience” [*Faktische Lebenserfahrung*], and re-defined the phenomenological project as a “hermeneutics of facticity”,\(^\text{128}\) the task of which was to *indicate* the fundamental characteristics of the situation out of which philosophical understanding and conceptuality emerges.

This radical relocating of the binding necessity of philosophy on mood was something that was already developing in Heidegger’s thought in the decade *preceding* the publication of the *Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning)*, in his hermeneutic of facticity. A narrative is needed in order to recreate the reasons that ushered Heidegger to ascribe a pivotal role to mood. The question becomes one of precisely when and how Heidegger’s own phenomenology turns hermeneutic and to what extent the pivotal function of mood is related to a radicalization of Husserlian phenomenology and the infusion of it with certain Diltheyan insights.

It is impossible to trace an exact linear development of Heidegger’s thought or to recreate an objective storyline. Heidegger was affected by various strands of philosophy,\(^\text{129}\) especially neo-Kantians (and here it is also important to note the very diversity that existed within neo-Kantianism itself), hermeneutics (Dilthey), *Lebensphilosophie*, Husserlian phenomenology, medieval Christian theology, and last but not least, Aristotle. None of these traditions, schools and thinkers fit in a pure and unmediated doxography; what we have are sedimented positions that mutually affect each other.

It is important to look into Heidegger’s early years, starting from his early Freiburg period, in some detail. Heidegger enjoyed a long career, his thought full of bifurcations, impasses and circularities (both fruitful and vicious). In effect, certain themes and insights gained in the early Freiburg period are abandoned in the Marburg period but recur in the later,


\(^\text{128}\) Granberg 2003, p. 95.

\(^\text{129}\) To the extent that he was even accused of syncreticism (see Friedman 2000).
post-Kehre, period. Thus, looking at the early Freiburg period helps us also to understand conceptual developments in the late period.

Two competing interpretations of Heidegger’s early phenomenological period

One must look into Heidegger’s early Freiburg years in order to understand his phenomenological breakthrough to the so-called “hermeneutics of facticity”, and how these issues shaped the increasingly important role that Heidegger came to ascribe to the disclosive and grounding character of the affective, pre-reflective experience, which he later calls “mood”. The disclosive character of moods is realized by throwing into relief the way philosophical understanding [Verstehen] is bounded with, and opened up by, comportment [Verhalten], which is the way the self relates to that which is given.

Comportment allows for the manifestation of the grounding character of the affective (pre-reflective) level of intentionality. As such, comportment has an enactmental character – it is a relating that operates both in an epistemological and ontological way. Comportment expresses the unity of both the methodological and existential origins of understanding and is thus the very ground of philosophical enactment [Vollzug] (and of all kinds of intentional enactments in general, on all levels and expressions of factical life). We will see in some detail how Heidegger defines philosophy as comportment, and how this move serves as a bridge for his turn to Aristotle, which follows right after Heidegger moves to Marburg, and which must also be embedded and interpreted within the context of the Natorp-Husserl affair, to which Heidegger was responding.

Some interpreters accuse the young Heidegger of indulging in “syncretism”, trying to situate himself in a very philosophically “busy” context that is an admixture of parallel, concurring and also antithetical spiritual currents: the two distinct neo-Kantians schools, Lebensphilosophie, hermeneutics, phenomenology, etc. The syncretistic reading of the young

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Heidegger is an unfair interpretation that signifies a failure to properly assess and understand where Heidegger is coming from and where he is trying to go.

Once these lectures are approached with the necessary fidelity and care, a clearer structured problematic manifests itself with Husserlian phenomenology as the basis of Heidegger’s approach. And once the Husserlian influences are better defined, this would also resolve another problematic interpretation of certain Heidegger scholars: the one that takes his early phenomenological period as a “stint” that is fundamentally incompatible with his late philosophy – the interpretation that reads the middle and late Heidegger as eventually abandoning Husserlian insights, rather than radicalizing them from within.

Such a reappraisal of Heidegger’s early Freiburg period also reveals the indispensible Husserlian elements of his work, and effectively undermines, or weakens, the “christian” interpretations of his thought, and qualifies the overtly religious tone that certain interpreters see in Heidegger’s philosophy. These interpretations draw from Heidegger’s appropriations of Christian terminology. During his early Freiburg years, Heidegger appropriated several notions and themes from Christian theology that remained in operation throughout his Marburg years and made it into Being and Time: notions such as Fallenness and Care [cura] (St. Augustine), the notion of Angst (Kierkegaard), and more broadly Heidegger’s thematization of facticity [Faktizität].

It is not only the thematic and notional appropriations that lend support to these interpretations, but also Heidegger’s biography as well as some of his self-descriptions contained in correspondence. As regards Heidegger’s religious mentors, the biographies out there, as well as his own accounts, refer to his relation to religiosity, his Church scholarship, and his deep relation to his mentor, the theologian Carl Braig: even after switching from theology to philosophy, Heidegger kept attending Braig’s lecture course on dogmatics because of his interest in speculative theology. Heidegger spoke of how, through Braig, he came to see the significance of Schelling and Hegel for speculative theology in a way that brought speculative

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theology in tension with the dogmatic system of scholasticism.\textsuperscript{132} And indeed, in following these words one can think that the young Heidegger turns to a phenomenology of religious life in the Winter Semester of 1920-21 \textit{contra} Aristotle, while approvingly taking note of Luther’s strong dislike of Aristotle because of his influence on the “hellenization of Christianity”\textsuperscript{133} The wording and the textual spirit indeed could lead someone into passing Heidegger off for a Christian philosopher of some sort. His approach to Luther and Paul is sympathetic, subscribing to a particular rhetoric of endorsement. But we must not forget that Heidegger keeps \textit{qualifying} his idiosyncratic Christianity and hints at a certain tension between philosophy and religion in the conventional sense. Biographical background attests to this.

In December 1918, Heidegger’s wife, Elfride, paid a visit to Father Krebs, the Catholic priest who in 1917 had presided over the wedding ceremony of the Heideggers, in order to inform him that they were not intending to have their child baptized because Martin had lost his faith in the Catholic church.\textsuperscript{134} Following this visit, Heidegger sent a letter to Father Krebs on January 9, 1919, in which he informed him about this decision, also informing him that it was his \textit{phenomenology} of religion that had transformed his basic standpoint. It is important to take note of the fact that Heidegger already ascribes priority to his obligations as a phenomenologist and philosopher.\textsuperscript{135}

In a letter to Karl Löwith on August 19, 1921, Heidegger identifies his philosophizing as irrevocably attached to his own facticity and existing, and he acknowledges a certain “Christian side” in this.\textsuperscript{136} But this Christian side is contingent. His hermeneutics of facticity does not emerge out of Christianity, but is encountered within an already enacted phenomenological analysis. One may well argue that the factual situation of Heidegger comprises a necessary existential experience out of which, and in which, his phenomenology emerges. This is correct, and this means that we are faced with a certain circularity as regards

\textsuperscript{132} I take it that “dogmatic system of scholasticism” refers to neo-Aristotelian ontology here.
\textsuperscript{133} See PRL (GA 60).
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{136} “It has always been clear to me that neither you nor Becker would accept the Christian side of me, and I have never understood you to be seeking agreement in this connection” (Ibid, p. 100).
the foundations of his own “Christian” facticity and his phenomenology: the two are different aspects of the same situation that feed back into each other. However, my point is that while his phenomenology describes an overall project, a method that is not exhausted, his “Christianity” is only contingently related to his philosophical method. The proximity with Husserl, neo-Kantianism and other issues of philosophical nature, are more fundamental for his philosophy than his “Christianity” is. The method is more important than the “worldview”.

If one were to take Heidegger’s “Christianity” at face value, as well as all those critical remarks against Aristotle in his lectures on religious experience, one would be very perplexed by what Heidegger does the very next year, after the Augustine lectures! Next year, during the Winter Semester of 1921-22, Heidegger delivers a lecture course on Aristotle, the so-called *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*: a lecture course that signifies the beginning of his protracted *Auseinandersetzung* [encounter] with Aristotle that culminates in BT. If our approach to Heidegger’s works takes his “Christianity” as fundamental, and if we take at face value the apparent opposing dualism of religious experience vs. dogmatic neo-Aristotelian Scholastic ontology, then we would think that when he turns to Aristotle, he “switches sides”. But the truth is that Heidegger’s phenomenological method is such that his encounters are not endorsements of any *Weltanschauung*, meaning that he neither unqualifyingly endorses, say, the anti-Aristotelian Christianity of Luther, nor does he unqualifyingly endorse Aristotle.

One way out of this apparent contradiction is given by Theodore Kisiel in *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, where he relies on Heidegger’s own information, on a letter sent to Karl Löwith in particular,137 where Heidegger justifies his “turn” towards Aristotle by appealing to certain extra-philosophical reasons, matters of practical necessities that encouraged him to go for Aristotle. Heidegger says that the choice of Aristotle was not “philosophically free”, as what he really wanted to do was focus on theology, but his students’ poor theological background prevented him from doing so. He therefore opted for Aristotle, as that would provide his students with a more comfortable philosophical environment.

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If we take this explanation to be exhaustive, then one could still assume that Heidegger’s main concerns were irrevocably Christian-theological: an Augustinian-Lutheran who appropriates the Christian vocabulary through and through. And in fact, several commentators who continue with Kisiel’s line of thought emphasize the strong “Christian”, or “mystical”, side of Heidegger’s phenomenology: John Van Buren’s book *The Young Heidegger*, endorsed by certain Derrideans, such as John Sallis and John Caputo, is the most important example of this reading. William Richardson’s comments are telling: “Van Buren spells out Heidegger’s debt to the Christian religious tradition in great detail. Concepts such as care, understanding, mood, anxiety, death, authenticity/inauthenticity and kaiologial time all have their antecedenec in it”.\(^{138}\)

But this interpretation undermines the other influences of Heidegger’s philosophy, especially Husserl. Self-biographical support for this is ample. In a later letter to Rudolf Bultmann, Heidegger wrote that his work was aiming at a radicalization of ancient ontology, which, at the same time, was aiming at a universal extension [*Ausbau*] of ancient ontology’s relation to the area of history. The foundation of this problematic, writes Heidegger, took its vantage point from “the Subject” in the sense of “human Dasein”, with Augustine, Luther and Kierkegaard being philosophically important for the construction of a radicalized understanding of Dasein and with Dilthey as being important for the interpretation of the “historical World”. Aristotle and the Scholastics were important for the rigorous formulation of respectful ontological problems, while all of this was made possible through the method, and in line with the idea of scientific philosophy, established by Husserl.\(^{139}\)

In his essay ‘My Way to Phenomenology’, Heidegger writes that as he “practiced


phenomenological seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl’s proximity after 1919 and at the same time tried out a transformed understanding of Aristotle in a seminar, [his] interest leaned anew toward the *Logical Investigations*, and especially the sixth logical investigation whose scope covered the determination of “the manifold meaning of being”. Thus, Heidegger’s turn to Aristotle after religious experience, and his encounter with Aristotelian thought which typified (what I call) his “middle period” took place within his hermeneutics of facticity which was enabled *through* Husserlian phenomenology. This neither means that Heidegger merely applied Husserl’s phenomenological method, nor that he abandoned it; rather, he radicalized it. Heidegger’s response to Richardson is telling:

Now if in the title of your book, *From Phenomenology to Thought*, you understand ‘Phenomenology’ in the sense just described as a philosophical position of Husserl, then the title is to the point, insofar as the Being-question as posed by me is something completely different from that position. [...] If, however, we understand ‘Phenomenology’ as the [process of] allowing the most proper concern of thought to show itself, then the title should read ‘Through Phenomenology to the Thinking of Being.’ [Ein Weg *durch* die Phänomenologie in das Denken des Seins, C.H.] This possessive [of Being], then, says that Being as such (Beon) [das Seyn, C.H.] shows itself simultaneously as that which is to-be-thought and as that which has want of a thought corresponding to it.

In order to come to terms with Heidegger’s later philosophy, we must discern a general phenomenological economy encompassing the whole of his work, and see how this goes back to Husserlian phenomenology. But such an appraisal would require us to understand his early phenomenological work not as a “stint” but as an indispensible and very fruitful encounter with Husserl and neo-Kantianism. In this context, it would be fruitful to see how, as Richardson writes, “[f]rom the very beginning, Heidegger’s exclusive preoccupation, hence the unique sense of his way, has been to lay a foundation for metaphysics.”

What is in order then is to be able to identify how the young Heidegger’s phenomenological breakthrough, whose key insights make up the phenomenological economy that runs through all of his periods, connects with Husserlian phenomenology as well as neo-

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140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Babich and Richardson, 1995, pp. XIV-XVI.
143 Ibid, p. 3.
Kantianism. Kisiel’s interpretation is inadequate, and an alternative interpretation must be
sought. The most important interpreter and commentator to pursue this is Steven Crowell.
Crowell sees Heidegger’s crucial discovery of Formal Indication *in continuity* with neo-Kantian
problems and especially with Husserlian phenomenological terminology. Matthew Burch sums
up the two major approaches thus:

[S]ome argue that formal indication is Heidegger’s first pass at a non-reflective
approach to what he would later call the ‘Event of Being’; others contend that
the method is Heidegger’s refinement of Husserlian phenomenology. Theodore
Kisiel offers the most developed version of the former thesis, while Steven
Crowell lays out the best defense of the latter. […] On the one hand, Kisiel
represents those who argue that Heidegger dedicated his career to the ‘Event of
Being’, with the exception of a notable (and errant) voyage into the

Dermot Moran also lends his support to Crowell’s interpretation. While Crowell endorses
Kisiel’s view of Heidegger as a philosopher of philosophy whose basic question was: how is
philosophy possible?, “he is rightfully critical of the absence of the figure of Husserl from

But in spite of siding with Crowell, I part with both him and Kisiel (and van Buren) on
their failure to see the continuities between Heidegger’s early pre-BT phenomenological work
and his late work (i.e. the *Contributions to Philosophy: from Enowning*). Crowell sees the
*Contributions* as, more or less, a wrong turn.\footnote{Ibid.} But I think that *had he seen* the relation of mood
in the young Heidegger’s phenomenology *as* an appropriation and radicalization of Husserlian
terminology, he would have also seen a continuity between the young “Husserlian” Heidegger
and the late Heidegger of the *Contributions*, in which Heidegger performs his thought exercises
on the other beginning (and where moods have a prominent role).

As we have seen in certain key autobiographical remarks of Heidegger, the
phenomenology of subjectivity that Husserl embarked upon was not an insignificant, erratic part
in the development of Heidegger’s thought. *Any genealogical account of the “affective” in Heidegger’s thought must pay heed to this aspect of his philosophy.*

Heidegger’s turn to Husserl should not be taken as a stint, or as an “exception” to a certain Heideggerian religious or mystical allegiance that some interpreters take for granted. There are genuine philosophical reasons that lead Heidegger to embrace Husserl in the first place, and the “radical breaks” that appear in Heidegger’s phenomenology do not appear so radical once we take a closer look at Husserl’s work at the time.

**Heidegger and Husserl as post-neo-Kantians**

We need to approach both Heidegger and Husserl as post-neo-Kantian philosophers. That is to say: as post-Kantian philosophers who are deeply engaged with the neo-Kantian problems of the early twentieth century, who participate in a serious dialogue with their contemporary neo-Kantian philosophers and who try to resolve problems that they think neo-Kantian philosophers are facing. I am using the term “neo-Kantian” here in a very broad sense; indeed in such a way that even Dilthey qualifies as a neo-Kantian.

I endorse Crowell’s thesis¹⁴⁷ that while phenomenology “attempted to go beyond Neo-Kantianism by rejecting the dualism of appearance and thing in itself, yet in many ways it remained squarely within it, specifically in its suspicion of both speculative metaphysics […] and naturalism”.¹⁴⁸ The young Heidegger did share with Husserl the neo-Kantian vision of overcoming psychologism as well as reestablishing the transcendental status of philosophy as “Queen of sciences”. At the same time, Heidegger was responding to the neo-Kantian predicament (as Heidegger himself saw it), whereby transcendental philosophy was left with an unbridgeable cleft between “being” (the factual level of the cognitive act) and ideal “logic” (value). Heidegger thought that Husserl’s phenomenology indeed offered a way of connecting these “two realms” through his notion of categorial intuition, which is given in sense-perception

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as it was articulated in an earlier work of Husserl (in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl grounds the truth of “state of affairs” [*Sachverhalt*] to intuition).

In one sense, the young Heidegger’s turn to affectivity was an attempt to ground the transcendental philosophy of Husserl back to facticity. Even if some commentators find the approach to the young Heidegger from a neo-Kantian perspective to be slightly alienating vis-à-vis the rest of Heidegger’s periods, it is my conviction that Heidegger’s early turn to the hermeneutics of facticity develops out of an encounter with transcendental-philosophical concerns which he does not exactly turn his back on. Besides, the explicit transcendental aspects of his approach do not subside: this is indicated by the retainment of the Kantian transcendental notion of *a priori* in BT.

Heidegger, along with Husserl, shared with neo-Kantian philosophers the vision of *overcoming psychologism*, which came hand in hand with the aim of restoring the transcendental status of philosophy as the “Queen of sciences”. The problem of psychologism, also called the “Psychologism dispute” [*Psychologismus-Streit*], had to do with the relationship between logic and psychology. The dispute was fought over most intensely in Germany and Austria between 1890 and 1914; indeed, during this period pretty much all of German-speaking philosophy was engulfed in the dispute, and it is in this environment that Heidegger’s own philosophy developed.149 The dispute centered on the question of whether logic is a part of psychology and whether psychology is the science most appropriate to the study of the structure of logic. Even though Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl were the most prominent figures involved in the dispute, the neo-Kantian philosophers Paul Natorp and Heinrich Rickert also shared this concern.150

With psychologism taking over the “realm of logic”, a traditional philosophical area, and the other sciences having already attained epistemological superiority in the realm of “objects” and nature, philosophy would become redundant. The response to this problem

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150 As has been pointed out by scholars, even though the label “neo-Kantian” is broadly used to describe the philosophical contributions of some philosophers, upon closer investigation the label fails to clearly demarcate the essential characteristics that unify said philosophers. In this chapter, the philosophers of interest labelled as neo-Kantian are Paul Natorp, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask, as well as Wilhelm Dilthey.
involved a definition of what philosophy was, what its role and area of study would be, and how it would relate to the other sciences. Thus, neo-Kantian philosophers distinguished philosophy from the empirical sciences by calling the specific theme of philosophy as *Geltungsbereich* (realm of validity). Husserl also had a similar response: he called it “phenomenological immanence”, but later changed it to “transcendental consciousness”. Both neo-Kantians and Husserl, but also Heidegger, concerned themselves with *meaning* and the grounding role that philosophy must have as regards the truth of all other sciences: philosophy has precedence as it studies meaning qua meaning.

At stake was the establishing of a transcendental science that would ground the a priori principles of transcendental logic, i.e. claim its binding necessity and universality. Also at stake was the way in which concepts were formed, in relation to matter, as well as how we could access and attain transcendental knowledge. The disputes amongst neo-Kantians ensued from different interpretations of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, its aims and scope. The neo-Kantians, as we will see, were divided into two “opposing schools”: the so-called “Southwest School” and the “Marburg School”. The respective philosophers that mostly affected Husserl and Heidegger, from these schools, were Heinrich Rickert and Paul Natorp; thus we will focus on these two as representatives of said schools, and examine the relevant characteristics in these two thinkers that pertain to our subject matter. We will identify those aspects of their thought that Heidegger adopted, and also the predicaments to which Heidegger reacted.

The neo-Kantian predicament (as Heidegger saw it) was that transcendental philosophy was left with an unbridgeable cleft between “being” (the factual reality of the intentional act) and the ideal “logic” (its validity and/or value). This cleft was especially exacerbated by the

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151 Crowell 2001, p. 3.
152 I agree with scholars who hold a “continuity thesis” in relation to Heidegger’s works. Tom Sheehan believes that the unifying character encompassing Heidegger’s whole corpus is the problem of “meaning”, and I generally agree with his interpretation, but with some critical reservations (which I cannot get into here). Mahon O’ Brien puts it eloquently: “Sheehan argues that though Heidegger might have jettisoned the ‘transcendental-horizontal approach of 1926-28’; that is not what die Kehre is concerned with. Sheehan is right of course; my only qualification here would be that the dynamic involved in Heidegger’s approach in *Being and Time* is not something which his later work is entirely bereft of. Rather this amorphous, evolving attempt to think and say die Kehre is already latent in Heidegger’s non-subjectivist attempts in *Being and Time* and the intimations of the shape which his approach was going to take are already identifiable”. Mahon O’ Brien, *Heidegger and Authenticity: From Resoluteness to Releasement*, (London: Continuum, 2011, p. 120). See also: Thomas Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift*, (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).
epistemology of the Southwest School of neo-Kantians, which maintained a radical break between the forms that make up logical judgment and the unsynthesized manifold of sensation; in other words, the gap between form and matter.

It is important to remember here that in this context, the locus of truth is the validity of the logical judgment itself, something that Husserl’s phenomenology did not reject. Quite the contrary, Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology of ideal meaning (or ideal object) reconfirmed the status of propositional judgment as being the locus of truth, even if Husserl managed to make some important contributions in distinguishing between the ontological status of a propositional judgment and that of an act-transcending state-of-affairs [Sachverhalt], the former being truth-bearing, the latter being truth-making. Heidegger thought that Husserl’s phenomenological discoveries did offer some significant progress towards reconnecting the realm of validity that makes up the truth of Logos, in its correspondence with a state-of-affairs, and the givenness of experiential sensation, by acknowledging the interrelation between the moments of “judging act”, the “judgment-content” and the indicated “state-of-affairs”, as being derivative of the respective (more foundational) level of intuition, as given in the respective moments of “presenting act”, “content of presentation” and “object of presentation”. But for Heidegger the problem of locating the necessity that binds the truth of a transcendental judgment and the factual realm of temporal being still persisted in Husserl’s work, especially as he proceeded in Ideas I, through his dependence on a reflective method and the accompanying marginalization of Dasein (temporal existence). Heidegger thought that Husserl’s phenomenology indeed offered a way of connecting these “two realms” through his notion of categorial intuition which is given in sense-perception as it was articulated in an earlier work of Husserl: in the Logical Investigations Husserl grounds the truth of “state-of-affairs” [Sachverhalt] to intuition. Categorial intuition was, in Heidegger’s opinion, the most important discovery. For example, in the 1925 Summer Semester lecture course entitled History

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155 Ibid.
Heidegger explicitly associates categorial intuition and its relation to sensuousness with the Kantian conceptual pair of form and matter: 
“Sensuousness is characterized as receptivity and understanding as spontaneity (Kant), the sensory as matter and the categorial as form.”

Despite Heidegger’s initial reservations with Husserl’s phenomenological method, he later wholeheartedly embraced Husserl. Heidegger was initially sceptical because of Husserl’s own ambiguity and regression as regards his refutation of psychologism that notably takes place in Husserl’s fifth investigation on “The Meaning of Brentano’s Delimitation of ‘psychical phenomena’”, section nine, in the Logical Investigations, where he “falls back with his phenomenological description of the phenomena of consciousness into the position of psychologism which he had just refuted”.

But in 1913, when Ideas I was published in the Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Investigation, Husserl offers there a clearer transcendental account of phenomenology. In Heidegger’s own words:

“Pure phenomenology” is the “fundamental science” of philosophy which is characterized by that phenomenology. “Pure” means: “transcendental phenomenology”. However, the “subjectivity” of the knowing, acting and valuing subject is posited as “transcendental.” Both terms, “subjectivity” and “transcendental,” show that “phenomenology” consciously and decidedly moved into the tradition of modern philosophy but in such a way that “transcendental subjectivity” attains a more original and universal determination through phenomenology.

In effect, this “transcendental revision” that Husserl makes in Ideas I (which, according to Derrida, was merely explicating what was already implicit in the Logical Investigations, and I agree), enabled the Logical Investigations, “which had so to speak remained philosophically neutral”, to “be assigned their systematic place”. Indeed, Heidegger considered Husserl’s
Logical Investigations to have supplied a kind of breakthrough [Durchbruch]. But the genesis of phenomenology as a method, and the breakthrough that Heidegger saw in the Logical Investigations, is not disengaged from the historical and contemporaneous context, the overlaps with neo-Kantianism, including Dilthey.

Concerning Heidegger’s (and Husserl’s) relation to neo-Kantianism, let us not forget the fact that Heidegger wrote his doctorate and habilitation under Rickert. During his studies at Freiburg, Heidegger firstly came under the influence of Heinrich Rickert’s version of neo-Kantianism (that of the so-called “Southwest School”) and subsequently to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Husserl succeeded Heinrich Rickert at Freiburg in 1916 after the latter had taken over Windelband’s chair in Heidelberg.

Inevitably, all these interactions mean that if one were at the time to push Heidegger towards an operational definition of “phenomenology”, one would be perhaps surprised to realize that certain neo-Kantians would be identified as “borderline phenomenologists”, not excluding Dilthey. One could point out that Dilthey was not a neo-Kantian philosopher; however, in the broad way that I understand and define neo-Kantian philosophy, Dilthey should pass as one (and here I am probably in disagreement with Crowell: amid all the diversity in Dilthey’s thought, one can safely say that there is one enduring theme that holds it all together, and that is his determination to write a Critique of Historical Reason). Despite his strong opposition to the a priori, Dilthey in some sense did work under the spell of Kant, and did endorse the critical aspects of Kant’s method. In a sense, Dilthey wanted to extend Kant’s critique so as to cover the aspects of historical and social knowledge, not just mathematical and natural-scientific knowledge that restricted Kant’s own project. Dilthey struggled with Windelband and Rickert for the leadership of this movement towards the philosophy of history and culture.

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163 Friedman 2000, pp. 4-5.
164 MWP, p. 78.
166 Ibid, p. xxvi.
167 Ibid, pp. xii-xiii.
In terms of the development of Heidegger’s phenomenology, we should not see it as an issue of oppositional choice between Husserl and Dilthey. And this is not because Heidegger himself manages to meaningfully bring aspects of the two together in BT, but rather, for a much more important reason that commentators, including Crowell perhaps, tend to miss: not only does Dilthey incorporate some of Husserl’s insights from the LI, but also Husserl re- incorporates some Diltheyan insights, already in the decade of 1910-20, as we see in his (then) unpublished notes of *Ideas II*.

Heidegger’s radicalization of the Husserlian notions of *Verhalten*, *Motivation* and *Tendenz* is based on the combined insights of Husserl and Dilthey. The development of these notions is an essential part of this thesis’ narrative, because that is how Heidegger will make sense of affective phenomena in his early phenomenological accounts. Motivation and tendency will be the notions Heidegger will initially employ in order to indicate how affective states form the ground of conceptual understanding (of intentional life, in general) and set philosophical motion in place, enabling the philosophical comportment to emerge. I will return to this point later on, explaining why and how Heidegger identified a certain continuity between Dilthey and Husserl, as well as between Husserlian phenomenology and Christian theology. This becomes clear once one pays appropriate attention to Section Three of *Ideas II*, entitled “The Constitution of the Spiritual World”, where Husserl analyses the “personalistic attitude”, which he opposes to the “theoretical attitude”. In that context, Motivation is identified as the fundamental lawfulness of the spiritual world. What is important to note is that Husserl in that part *explicitly* identifies Dilthey as the thinker from whom he took inspiration on these insights. This is important because Heidegger’s early affective vocabulary will involve precisely the usage of these terms.

In the Summer Semester of 1923 lecture titled *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, Heidegger says that “even Dilthey, who originally came out of history and theology, conspicuously relied on [the] Kantian approach”.

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is Dilthey from whom Heidegger takes the concern for historicity before turning his phenomenological analyses towards it. And the young Heidegger does take Dilthey to be striking some important phenomenological chords: the sentence just quoted comes from a small section that Heidegger entitled *On the history of “phenomenology”*, something that shows that Heidegger did in some respects see Dilthey to be conducting a sort of phenomenology.

What is more, we must come to see how Heidegger acknowledges how Husserl felt obligated to Dilthey for the establishment of phenomenology and the eminence of it. As Heidegger says in ‘My Way to Phenomenology’:

> Later in Freiburg, he [Husserl] often told the story of how the *Logical Investigations* came to be. He never forgot to remember the Max Niemeyer publishing house with gratitude and admiration, the house which took upon itself the venture of publishing, at the turn of the century, an extensive work of a little-known instructor who went his own new ways and thus had to estrange contemporary philosophy, which ignored the work for years after its appearance, until Wilhelm Dilthey recognized its significance.

But the implication of phenomenology with neo-Kantians – beyond Dilthey – is also evident, according to Heidegger, in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. Heidegger considered Husserl’s breakthrough not as one pertaining to a change of topic or area, but rather “simply” as one of changing the way of access. Ultimately, Husserl’s phenomenology did not amount to a shift in the domain of questions being asked by neo-Kantians, but instead was a matter of method. In Heidegger’s own words:

> Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* were not really understood and perhaps to this day still are not. Epistemology still does not understand that all theories of judgment are basically theories of presentation (cf. H. Rickert, *The Object of Knowledge* – its foundations are utterly dilettantish). Regarding what its object was, nothing had changed in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*. Rather, what was

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170 Besides, Dilthey himself considered Husserl’s early “descriptive phenomenological method” to be similar to his own “descriptive and analytic psychology”, and adopted a key Husserlian position that forms the crux of my analysis in this chapter. Namely, Dilthey adopts Husserl’s position that psychic acts “have contents that are related to the objects of the world by means of attitudinal stances [Einstellung]”. Elisabetta Basso, “Kierkegaard’s Influence on Wilhelm Dilthey’s Work”, in *Kierkegaard’s Influence on Philosophy. Tome I: German and Scandinavian Philosophy*, ed. Jon Stewart, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), p. 93. It is interesting how Dilthey also wants to bring the attitude to the forefront; however, in my opinion, Husserl would take issue with Dilthey in that he, Dilthey, is aiming at developing a “theory” that “regresses” from the object to the attitude, which reminds one of Natorp’s “reconstructive” method. As Basso puts it, for Dilthey, the “aim of theory of knowledge (Theorie des Wissens) would be thus to regress from objects to attitudes, in order to uncover the structural nexus of knowledge as grounded on cognition, feeling, and will” (Ibid). In any case, the important point here is to take note of how Dilthey (inter alia, also) adopts Husserl’s notion of *Einstellung*.

171 MWP, p. 82.
drummed into the philosophical consciousness of that time was simply the question of access. The subject matter remained the same – the only thing different was the how of interrogating and defining it, i.e., description versus a constructivistic and deductive method.\(^\text{172}\)

And as far as the subsequent turn to Aristotle is concerned, the mature Heidegger says that the “step-by-step training in phenomenological ‘seeing’” he received from Husserl “was fruitful for the interpretation of Aristotle’s writing”.\(^\text{173}\) In the essay ‘My Way to Phenomenology’, Heidegger writes that as he himself “practiced phenomenological seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl’s proximity after 1919 and at the same time tried out a transformed understanding of Aristotle in a seminar, [his] interest leaned anew toward the Logical Investigations\(^\text{174}\) and especially the sixth logical investigation whose scope covered the determination of “the manifold meaning of being”.\(^\text{175}\)

What is most important to prove is how Heidegger’s early account of affective life is performed in line with Husserlian phenomenological notions. Heidegger analyzes factual life in terms of the underlying motivations [Motivationen] and tendencies [Tendenzen]. Motivation and tendency are in fact the two key formal indications, or “categories”, that Heidegger employs in order to phenomenologically analyze how theories, belief-systems, or Weltanschauungen, are factically developed from within life itself. In this respect, we must come to see how Heidegger inherited, incorporated, and radicalized Husserlian notions, how this fell within the context of neo-Kantian discourse, and what kind of problems his analyses responded to and resolved.

Heidegger’s eventual turn to Aristotle, the decisive turning point as regards his phenomenological appraisal of affects, can only be properly understood in relation to his utilization of Husserlian phenomenology. In this context, it is crucial to recapture Heidegger’s turn to Aristotle and his subsequent encounter with Aristotle’s works and the appropriations that ensued, in its relation to Heidegger’s “tacit” dialogue with Paul Natorp, and the criticisms Natorp directed against Husserl’s phenomenology, and whose criticism significantly shaped

\(^{172}\) PIA, pp. 55-56.
\(^{173}\) MWP, p. 78.
\(^{174}\) Ibid.
\(^{175}\) Ibid.
Heidegger’s turn to a hermeneutics of facticity, in the context of which his phenomenology of moods emerged.\(^\text{176}\)

In this context, it is useful to thematize and follow a particular strand of conceptual connections that bring together the way Husserl appropriates the notion of intentionality [\textit{Intentionalität}] from Brentano so as to develop his own phenomenological response to psychologism, offering an alternative way out from the then dominant neo-Kantian method, along with its shortcomings (which we will see).

An exchange between Husserl and Natorp exposed the “deficiencies”, or “weaknesses”, of Husserl’s formulations, especially the reformulations that take place in \textit{Ideas I} (as opposed to the earlier formulations of the \textit{Logical Investigations}) with respect to the way of access granted by phenomenology to intentionality, and the way this access enframes intentionality within a theoretical conceptual realm due to the reflective nature of access. In order to resolve this problem, Heidegger will dig deeper into aspects that, on the one hand, are indeed implicit in Husserl’s accounts, and on the other, are suppressed by Husserl’s accounts. Unpacking these aspects involved a genealogical understanding of the notion of intentionality that Husserl derives from Brentano, which ultimately leads back to the medieval conception of directed consciousness, derived from Aristotelian \textit{ὄρεξις} (desire).\(^\text{177}\)

176 The tacit dialogue between Heidegger and Natorp, once thematized, enables us to understand various twists and turns of the young Heidegger, especially in his transition from Husserl to Aristotle, and the effect this has on Heidegger’s own phenomenology of moods. The most explicit indication of the importance of this dialogue is found in Heidegger’s introductory remarks for his lecture on Plato’s \textit{Sophist}, which took place just a month after Paul Natorp’s death, while Heidegger was teaching at Marburg University in the Winter Semester of 1924-25 (published as Gesamtausgabe, Volume 19). Even though there were other references in past lectures from Heidegger’s early Freiburg time, concerning his deep appreciation for Natorp’s criticisms of Husserlian phenomenology, in the lecture on Plato’s \textit{Sophist} he is much more direct and extensive, dedicating the course to Natorp. In the prelude dedicated to Natorp, Heidegger writes (inter alia): “Natorp was one who was best prepared to discuss Husserl. This is demonstrated by his works ‘Zur Frage der logischen Methode,’ 1901, where he takes up Husserl’s \textit{Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik}, and furthermore by his ‘Husserls Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie,’ which was published in 1914 and again in 1918, where he treats Husserl’s \textit{Ideen}. Natorp’s instigations were determinative for Husserl himself” (PS, pp. 2-3).

177 Heidegger draws the explicit connection in the Summer Semester of 1923: “Husserl was influenced here by the work of Brentano, and this was the case not only regarding his method in that he adopted Brentano’s method of description, but also regarding the basic definition of the domain of experience as his subject matter. Brentano had characterized consciousness of something as \textit{intentionality}. This concept arose in the Middle Ages and had at that time a narrower sphere of application, it meant a volitional being-out-for-something and going-toward-it (\textit{ὄρεξις})” (OHF, p. 55). “Hierfür wurde Brentanos Arbeit wirksam, und nicht nur methodisch, sofern Husserl die deskriptive Methode übernahm, sondern auch die Grundbestimmung der region. Brentano hatte Bewußtsein von etwas charakterisiert als \textit{Intentionalität}. Dieser Begriff entspringt im Mittelalter und hat da eine engere Sphäre, er bezeichnet das willentliche Aussein auf etwas (\textit{ὄρεξις})” (OHF, p. 70). Heidegger reiterates the connection of intentionality to Aristotle’s notion of \textit{ὄρεξις} in HCT (1925), in the context of refuting Rickert’s objections to
II. Neo-Kantian Philosophy and the Problem of Grounding [Begründung]

The Southwest School of neo-Kantianism and Heinrich Rickert

The neo-Kantians were divided into two camps. One of them was the so-called Southwest School of neo-Kantianism, which was founded by Wilhelm Windelband and further developed by Heinrich Rickert. They were called neo-Kantian because they actively put themselves in the trajectory of Kant’s critical project, seeing themselves as inheritors of it, but ultimately trying to push it further, since they saw it as unfinished in its attempts at establishing the transcendental grounds (i.e. “grounding”) of the sciences, scientific truth and objectivity. The Marburg School, which included Natorp, viewed Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a “theory of science”, which meant that philosophy only had indirect access to being mediated through scientific theorizing, whereby the object is that which is given in scientific judgments; in this context, transcendental logic is “a theory of knowledge that (in Natorp’s words) brings ‘ultimate unity’ to the system of sciences by uncovering the principles, or categories, according to which the sciences construct being”.

In Heidegger’s own words, the Marburg School’s works (the Marburg School included Hermann Cohen, Natorp and Ernst Cassirer) were “predominantly attempts at advancing and radically grounding logic”. For those from Marburg, the idea of science culminated in consciousness, i.e. the way something is objectivized in the subject, and in that context the logical foundation of the sciences manifested/disposed itself as “the basic problem of objectivizing overall”.

The problem that Rickert grappled with is better put as the problem of the relation of the faculties of Understanding (concepts) and Sensibility (intuitions). According to Kant, the a priori ground that enables the establishment of a relation between these two faculties is the transcendental schema. The Kantian transcendental schema, insofar as it is meant to provide an a priori ground for the knowledge attained by transcendental judgments, must be purely intelligible and thus void of all empirical content, but also at the same time it must be sensible.

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intentionality, saying that Rickert’s (ambivalent) criticism of Brentano is not enough to do away with the richness of intentionality (HCT, pp. 46-46).

179 BPH, p. 6.
Thus, the transcendental schema is the ground that enables the relation between the two heterogeneous faculties of understanding and sensibility. The schema bridges the cleft between pure concept and pure intuition in including universality and sensibility.\textsuperscript{181}

The difficulty that the Southwest School faced was, as has already been noted, a difficulty of expounding the ground of transcendental knowledge, partly as a critical response to psychologistic readings of Kant. At stake was the need to identify the binding necessity of a certain area of knowledge, namely to show that it is necessarily valid and binding to the subject.

In this context, the Southwest School understood bindingness in a cultural way, i.e. in a way that bindingness would effectively have a practical bearing on cultural values (in opposition to the more speculative approach of the Marburg School). For the Southwest School, only the ideality of cultural values could provide for such a bindingness, because it affords validity that goes beyond pure thought and reaches the realm of cultural reality.

The Southwest School identified the realm of logic, i.e. the ideality of logic, with that of value,\textsuperscript{182} which is about judgment that has validity \textit{[Geltung]}, in opposition to mathematics that the Marburg School privileged, which is indeed ideal but not valid, i.e. binding, in a meaningful way.\textsuperscript{183} The position that mathematics is ideal but lacks validity and thus lacks bindingness marks an attempt at resolving the dualism between the logical realm of categories and the pre-conceptual realm of fact/sensation (“heterogeneous continuum”).\textsuperscript{184} While the ideality of mathematics idealism is ahistorical and in no way connects with spatiotemporal reality, the ideality of logic has a meaningful bindingness in its validity. At the same time, this does not reduce validity to empirical psychology, and therefore the ideality of meaning is retained, thus differentiating the Southwest neo-Kantian project from psychology.

The Southwest School turns the gulf between pure logic and “reality” (as well as the...
gulf between pure logic and psychology) into the gulf between value and fact. Rickert maintained that the differentiation between psychological being and sense, from Logic and Psychology, must be upheld, and for this precise reason commended Husserl for showing that pure logic had not yet achieved a full delimitation from psychology. Rickert is in alliance with Husserl on this score, and this is something we must keep in mind. However, Rickert tacitly maintained that nobody, including Husserl, managed to resolve the problem of offering a ground for ideality that would not alienate it from historical being. In Rickert’s words, whereas a complete “system of epistemology” must find a way back “from the transcendent values at rest in themselves to the psychological process of cognition […] this way back has been cut off […] by an unbridgeable cleft between being and value [ideal logic]”.

Let us now offer a brief presentation of Rickert’s philosophical position, identifying the characteristics of his approach that affected the young Heidegger. Thus, we will achieve some clarity as to how Heidegger inherited from Rickert his interest in the historical in its tension with the ideal, but also how certain shortcomings on Rickert’s part paved the way for Heidegger’s appreciation of Dilthey and Lask.

Rickert identified how the Marburg School’s approach subjugated the particular to the universal, matter to form, in a way that closed off access to the reality of the historical. The transcendental idealism of the Marburg School developed an approach to validity based on the epistemological model provided by the natural sciences. In this respect, validity is broadly construed as a “universal law of nature” that is valid irrespective of the specificity of historical events. It is a universality that is value-free and does not depend on consciousness or intuition. As an alternative to this understanding of validity, Rickert tried to develop a historical approach to validity whereby science is meant to deal with the validity of cultural phenomena that are conceived as meaningful, as objects possessing value. He thus makes a logical distinction between the value-free natural sciences and a historical science that is oriented around a concept of value.

185 Ibid.
186 Ibid.
187 Rickert 1909, p. 218, quoted in Friedman 2000, pp. 33-34.
Thus, Rickert has a value-laden approach to concept formation that takes a cultural-historical perspective in trying to make sense of the interplay between form and matter. While the validity of ideal scientific concepts of the natural sciences is not conditioned through representations of reality (their validity being unconditional and general), the validity of cultural values is conditioned and grounded on historical specificity. To approach the value-laden cultural reality, historical concept formation must proceed in an “individualizing” direction, its interest being not in general laws but in understanding unique “value-individualities”.

Rickert’s approach would ascribe to judgment the crucial operation of binding together the two heterogeneous realms of ideal validity (i.e. the homogeneity of form) and experiential “reality” (i.e. the heterogeneity of singular matter). For Rickert, judgment is a kind of “ethics of thought” whose operation reconfigures bindingness in an ethical way. Transcendental truth attains an *ethical* bindingness through the act of judging that bears the binding necessity of an “ought” that compels the judging subject into taking a specific position. Steven Crowell writes that Rickert’s (Baden School’s) theory of judgment goes back “to Windelband’s idea of logic as the ‘ethics of thought’ and ultimately to Lotze’s theory of ‘validity’ (*Geltung*) as a ‘value’”, which involves two moments: a moment immanent to the subject in which irrational material is combined via logical form, and a moment of affirming or denying the synthesis. In this context, the object of knowledge is “not a function of thinking alone, as in Marburg formalism, but is of interest, position taking, and decision”.

I submit that this aspect of Rickert’s philosophy is important for Heidegger’s own approach, and is part and parcel of the methodological issues that Heidegger will have with certain aspects of Husserl’s phenomenological method, especially vis-à-vis the epoché, as well as Husserl’s marginalization of *feeling*. On the one hand: Heidegger will clearly adopt Husserl’s strict differentiation between philosophy as *phenomenology* and philosophy as *Weltanschauung*. The role of philosophy, according to Husserl’s phenomenological science, is not to lay down the conditions of possibility of a particular *Weltanschauung*, since that does not challenge scientific

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188 Crowell 2001, p. 27
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
naturalism. And this is something that Rickert’s philosophy effectively does: even though Rickert opposes the naturalism of the *Naturwissenschaften* and counterbalances it with a cultural science of the historical, due to the aforementioned sensitivities towards the singular and the spatiotemporally particular, nevertheless his differentiation between the two sciences is not one that overcomes naturalism or *Weltanschauung*. In this respect, as I will soon indicate, Dilthey is much more successful in articulating a science of history that more effectively moves towards an overcoming of naturalism and *Weltanschauung*, something that Heidegger will identify and embrace.

On the other hand: Heidegger will find Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology that depends on a bracketing of position-taking as “bloodless”. 191 Indeed, Heidegger does inherit something from Rickert’s philosophy, contra Husserl, and this has to do with Rickert’s attentiveness to the concrete historical situatedness that Rickert’s philosophy of culture attempted to vindicate. According to Heidegger’s own interpretation, it has to do with how Rickert tried to articulate the grounds of binding necessity in a way that is better attuned to the existential reality of acts of judgment, something that Husserl failed to do on account of his dependence on reflective intuition which exiled feelings (as well as values) from the “foundational level”, relegating them to the *founded* levels of intentionality. 192

Heidegger continues in the same direction as Rickert in believing that something in judgment supplies the binding (necessity) of existence and essence, but Heidegger radicalizes judgment by going before even propositional judgment and into the primary hermeneutic act of *ἀληθεύειν*, building on Lask’s and Husserl’s discoveries in the Sixth Investigation of *Logical Investigations*: there Husserl connects essence with intuition, thus grounding discovery of the categories not in the act of judging, but in the direct act of intuition. 193

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192 I am conscious of Heidegger’s fervent critique of “philosophy of value”. We must not however conflate the late Heidegger’s critique of “philosophy of value” with the argument I am trying to make here concerning the young Heidegger. Besides, the argument I am trying to make here is not that Heidegger was interested in vindicating or developing a philosophy of value per se; rather, I am trying to tease out certain insights that philosophy of value importantly retains, which early Husserlian phenomenology misses, especially vis-à-vis the historical situatedness of value and the “practical” aspects of it (in juxtaposition to the “theoretical”).

193 Friedman 2001, p. 55.
According to Heidegger, for Rickert “the problem of philosophy is the Validity of Axioms”, and “axioms are norms, laws, propositions, that is, ‘representational bindings’ whose validity “ought to be”. Establishing a binding necessity of an ethical nature is therefore the task that philosophy must undertake. Heidegger, in his *Kriegsnotsemester* lecture, says that establishing a binding validity means *establishing an originary foundation*, i.e. that of the *origin*. The connection made here between the categories of “foundation” [Begründung], “origin” [Ursprung] and also necessity [Notwendigkeit] are crucial for understanding the operation of moods, especially as they are described in the late Heidegger. We will see these categories returning in Heidegger in later texts precisely in the context of addressing fundamental moods. We cannot get into this now, but it is important to keep this indication as a guide, as the connection between these categories and the affective level of experience (feelings) is already made in Heidegger’s analysis of Rickert. Even if Heidegger does not provide a clear account of how these categories connect, it is crucial to note the intention and direction that his thought takes early on.

During that early lecture, Heidegger indicates that for Rickert philosophy is about the validity of such representational bindings [*Vorstellungsverbindungen*], which, while it itself cannot be proven, grounds all proofs with immediate evidence. Heidegger then poses the question: how will this immediate evidence of axioms be shown, through which method?

For Rickert, says Heidegger, it is *judgment* that supplies the binding necessity of the two realms, the realm of beings and the realm of validities, even though Rickert is unable to develop in detail this binding role of the judgment for the transcendental subject. Even though Heidegger will adopt Emil Lask’s position that Rickert did not manage to achieve clarity with
respect to establishing the connection between these two realms, he will commend Rickert’s contribution as regards the rejection of a method of “indifferent consideration” [teilnahmslosen Betrachten].

Heidegger is sympathetic to Rickert’s position on how judging [Urteilen], contra presentation [Vorstellen], does not happen in an “indifferent consideration”; rather it belongs in the same class as feeling [Fühlen] and willing [Wollen], which opposes the class of presentation. Heidegger takes note of Rickert’s ascription of a practical comportment [Verhalten] to the act of judgment, and in addition to the fact that for Rickert what holds as valid [gilt] for judgment must also be valid of cognition [Erkennen]. In this context, cognition is deemed to be a process [Vorgang] that is determined through feelings, through the affective, that is, through appetite [Lust] or slackness [Unlust], and thus feelings foundationally connect with the act of judgment and knowing in general. Note how this in a way anticipates Heidegger’s later turn to Aristotelian hermeneutics of everydayness, where he will explicitly identify the fundamental relationship between the λόγος ἀποφαντικός of rhetoric, pathos and understanding. This sympathy that Heidegger shows towards this aspect of Rickert’s position is also in line with his selective criticism of certain aspects of Husserl’s analyses, and the adoption of certain others. It is, though, completely contradictory with Heidegger’s 1925 analysis of intentionality and evidence, where he explicitly criticizes Rickert for insisting that knowing cannot be representing, whilst he himself, without acknowledging it, takes Brentanian intentionality “as the foundation of his theory of judgment and knowledge.” In effect, Heidegger argues,

Rickert’s position as regards judgment in its relation to feelings and appetite [Lust] determines the feeling that accompanies the experience of judgment as the certainty [Gewißheit].

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200 Perhaps “impartial” would be a more literal translation of “teilnahmsloser”, but it makes more sense in this context to translate it as “indifferent”.

201 I have translated Vorstellung here as presentation. But it could also be translated as representation of imagination.


203 “Im Urteil ein ‘praktisches’ Verhalten” (Ibid); “was für das Urteil gilt, auch für das Erkennen gelten muss […] Das Erkennen also ist ein Vorgang, der bestimmt wird durch Gefühle, d.h. durch Lust oder Unlust” (GA 56, p. 187).

204 HCT, p. 34.

205 One is tempted to translate Lust as desire here, but I retain desire for Begierde. But it is important to note the
of evidence [Evidenz], which constitutes the bindingness of judgment, giving to the judgment the character of necessity [Notwendigkeit].\textsuperscript{206} This is an important moment for our own research: the evidential certainty that constitutes the bindingness of judgment is ascribed to feeling and appetite! Feeling and willing are identified as fundamental parts of this bindingness.

What is also significant is how this kind of evidence is juxtaposed to “indifferent consideration”, which is reminiscent of Husserl’s own criterion of evidence, the “principle of principles” as it results from the institution of the epochē. As we will see in the section on Husserl’s phenomenology, Husserl’s commitment to the epochē led to the prioritization of originary presentive intuition [originär gebende Anschauung].\textsuperscript{207} As we will see, Husserl took the presentive level of intentional acts to be founding, but he took intentional acts of feeling and value to be founded. This is something that Heidegger will rectify through his own phenomenological accounts. (In effect, as we will later see, Heidegger re-interprets the categorial intuition, and what it means to be “founded” in a way that enables him to see categorial intuition already in operation in sensuous, simple intuition. I don’t think this is supported by textual evidence, and I think Heidegger is inconsistent on this.)\textsuperscript{208} However, it must be noted that Husserl did impart to motivation, a manifestation of willing, the most central role as regards the constitution of the unity of intentional experience [Erlebnis].

Let it be noted here that Husserl explicitly criticized a version of Rickert’s thesis in Ideas I, where he dissociated the evidence supplied by eidetic seeing from feeling.\textsuperscript{209} In this

\textsuperscript{207}See Ideas I, §24.
\textsuperscript{208}See Dahlstrom 2001, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{209}“To be sure, they speak of evidence; but instead of bringing it, as an act of seeing, into essential relations with ordinary seeing, they speak of a ‘feeling of evidence’ which, as a mystic index veri, bestowed an emotional coloring on the judgments. Such conceptions are possible only as long as one has not learned to analyze kinds of consciousness in pure observation and eidetically instead of theorizing about them from on high. These alleged feelings of evidence, of intellectual necessity or whatever else they may be called, are no more than theoretically invented feelings. This will be acknowledged by everyone who has brought any case of evidence to actually seen givenness and has compared it with a case of non-evidence of the same judgment-content. One then immediately notes that the tacit presupposition of the affective theory of evidence, namely that a judging which is the same with respect to the rest of its psychological essence appears on one occasion with affective coloring and on another without it, is fundamentally erroneous; and that, rather, an identical upper stratum, that of an identical stating, as a mere significational expressing, on the one occasion conforms step by step to a ‘clearly seeing’ intuition of an affair-complex, whereas on the other occasion a wholly different phenomenon, a non-intuitive, perhaps a wholly confused and unarticulated
context, I submit that Heidegger, in trying to press phenomenology towards a direction where feelings occupy the fundamental ground of intentional life, gets closer to Rickert’s position (in some of his lectures) than he is ready to admit, partly as a response to Husserl, but without rejecting all of Husserl’s phenomenological discoveries. But before I move into this, let’s look at a place where Heidegger explicitly criticizes Rickert for associating “evidence” with “feeling”. As Daniel Dahlstrom notes, Rickert’s talk of a “feeling of evidence” is an outcome of his failing to appreciate the true character of intentionality, and his “construal of evidence as a matter of feeling goes hand in hand, Heidegger submits, with Rickert’s insistence that the concept of intentionality is ‘dark, metaphysical, dogmatic’.”210 This would indeed be an inconsistency, violating the principle of non-contradiction, but only if it concerned a statement said of something in the same respect. I believe that the context in which Heidegger attacks Rickert’s association of evidence with feeling is not the same as when he commends Rickert for attacking “indifferent consideration” and reverting to feeling as testament for evidence. To start with, one cannot defend Heidegger’s attack on Rickert in the 1925 lecture, based on a defence of Anschauung that Heidegger ties with his defense of intuition. Heidegger’s search for something deeper than intentionality in his own phenomenology will remain unsatisfied by Anschauung, and this is explicitly shown when in 1927 he will explicitly associate Stimmung (and Befindlichkeit) contra Anschauung. So despite what Heidegger says in the 1925 lecture about Anschauung, and what, for example, Dahlstrom says about not reading anschauen in a consciousness of an affair-complex functions as the lower stratum. With the same justice in the sphere of experience one could conceive the difference between the clear and faithful judgment of perception and any vague judgment of the same affair-complex as consisting merely of the former being endowed with a ‘feeling of clarity;’ while the latter is not” [Zwar spricht man von Evidenz, aber anstatt sie als Einsehen mit dem gewöhnlichen Sehen in Wesensbeziehungen zu bringen, spricht man von einem »Evidenzgefühl«, das als ein mystischer Index veri dem Urteil eine Gefühlshäufung verleihe. Solche Auffassungen sind nur solange möglich, als man es nicht gelernt hat, Bewußtseinsteile rein schauend und wesensmäßige zu analysieren, statt über sie von oben her Theorien zu machen. Diese angeblichen Gefühle der Evidenz, der Denknotwendigkeit, und wie sie sonst genannt sein mögen, sind nichts weiter als theoretsicherfundeene Gefühle. Das wird jedermann anerkennen, der irgendeinen Fall von Evidenz sich zu wirklich schauender Gegebenheit gebracht und mit einem Fall von Nichtevidenz desselben Urteilsinhaltes verglichen hat. Man merkt dann sogleich, daß die stillschweigende Voraussetzung der geformten Evidenztheorie, nämlich daß ein dem übrigen psychologischen Wesen nach gleiches Urteilen einmal gefühlsmäßig gefärbt und das andere Mal ungefärbt sei, grundirrig ist, vielmehr eine gleiches Obersicht, die die linken Aussagens als bloßen bedeutungsmäßigen Ausdruckens, das eine Mal Schritt für Schritt angepaßt ist einer »klar einsendenden« Sachverhaltsintuition, während das andere Mal als Unterschied ein ganz anderes Phänomen, ein nicht intuitives, ev. ganz verworrenes und ungebildetes Sachverhaltsbewußtsein fungiert. Mit dieselben Rechte könnte man also in der Erfahrungshäfe den Unterschied zwischen dem klaren und getreuen Wahrnehmungsurtel und einem beliebigen vagen Urteil desselben Sachverhalts bloß dahin fassen, daß das erstere mit einem »Klarheitsgefühl« begabt sei, das andere nicht]. (Ideas I, pp. 39-40). 210 Dahlstrom 2001, p. 65.
Kantian way, or not ascribing it too much of a “mental power”, but instead interpreting it in its ordinary, everyday sense of “observation or examination”, this position is negated by Heidegger himself in the way he introduces Befindlichkeit in BT- precisely as something that Anschauung cannot grasp; hence, Heidegger wants to rearticulate the unthematic categorial grasp in a non-sensuous way. In addition, Dahlstrom himself accepts that Heidegger’s reading of the categorial intuition in 1925 is in some sense “more Heidegger” than Husserl, in the sense that “Heidegger links the question of the categorial intuition to the question of truth much more emphatically than Husserl does”, the reason for this greater emphasis being strategic on Heidegger’s part, even though, granted, Dahlstrom believes that this is not an artificial linking on Heidegger’s behalf. In addition, when Heidegger attacks Rickert in 1925, his concern is to offer a deeper analysis of intentionality and categorial intuition than Husserl ever did, and in this context he failed to see what was at stake in Husserl’s discovery of intentionality. But Heidegger’s understanding of intentionality in terms of desire, and the association of categorial, unthematic, pre-reflective grasp with feeling, is nowhere to be found in the Logical Investigations either, so in that respect –in associating feeling with truth and presentation- Rickert is closer to Heidegger than Husserl is, even if Heidegger will not admit it in the context of the 1925 lecture (despite the fact that Rickert’s explanations were utterly inadequate and missing the point of intentionality).

Heidegger in a way continued in the same direction as Rickert in identifying and trying to close the gap between the universally ideal and the historically concrete, logical form and intuitive matter, the problematic relation between the faculties of understanding and sensibility that Kant resolved through transcendental schematism. But, as mentioned earlier, Heidegger did not think that Rickert managed to articulate a theory of validity that would necessarily bind the two realms together and overcome the predicament. Rickert’s “ethics of thought” did have a positive appeal to Heidegger, especially in the way feelings and appetite bestowed the sense of necessity and evidence, and especially in the way of responding to the shortcomings Heidegger

\[211\] Ibid, p. 76.
\[212\] Ibid, p. 80.
saw in the Husserlian method.

The key to understanding Rickert’s failure of offering a phenomenology of the historical, and how Dilthey was the one who more effectively moved towards a resolution of this problem, is found in the criterion by virtue of which Rickert distinguished between natural science and historical science. For Rickert, the distinction between historical and natural science is merely epistemological rather than ontological. The opposition between history and natural science is the logical difference between the general, i.e. that which is universally valid and the real, individual world of the spatiotemporally specific event and change.\(^{213}\) This is the key difference between Dilthey and Rickert which will be decisive for Heidegger. According to Dilthey, the opposition between the natural sciences \([\text{Naturwissenschaften}]\) and the historical, spiritual, sciences \([\text{Geisteswissenschaften}]\) is not merely a logical, epistemological, opposition, but rather an ontological difference. The being of the objects that the natural sciences study is ontologically different from the being that the spiritual sciences study (i.e. the human being).

Rickert in the end did not manage to overcome the neo-Kantian distinction between the realm of pure logic, which is what supplies validity and binding necessity, from spatio-temporal objects (that are on the side of being, existence). This distinction led to the inability of connecting the logical realm with the real world of temporal being \([\text{Sein}]\), and the problem of establishing a binding necessity from within experience and intuition itself. Emil Lask pointed out how this problem persisted in Rickert, a position that Heidegger shared and whose exigency for resolution took on board. It is with this failure in the background that Heidegger moved towards a more originary hermeneutic of \(\alpha\lambda\theta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\nu\), building on Lask’s and Husserl’s discoveries in the Sixth Investigation of the \(\text{Logical Investigations}:\) it is there that Husserl connected essence with the intuition of being, thus grounding the discovery of the ontological categories in (categorial) intuition.\(^{214}\)

Before we move on to the next section on the Marburg School’s most relevant philosopher for the purpose of this study, Paul Natorp, let me recapitulate the main arguments

\(^{213}\) I am thankful to Phillip Homburg for this insight.
\(^{214}\) Friedman 2000, p. 55.
of this section that are relevant to our genealogical approach to the young Heidegger’s phenomenology of affects.

In many ways, the young Heidegger shared with Rickert his suspicion of both speculative metaphysics and the naturalism of psychologism, and shared the vision of reestablishing the transcendental status of philosophy as “Queen of Sciences”. Heidegger wrote his doctorate and habilitation under Rickert and during his studies at Freiburg, Heidegger firstly came under the influence of Rickert’s version of neo-Kantianism. Heidegger accepted the task of distinguishing philosophy from the empirical sciences by trying to identify the realm of philosophy in a non-empirical way. What neo-Kantians called the “realm of validity”, Heidegger called meaning, and he identified a grounding role that philosophy must have as regards the truth of all the other sciences: philosophy takes precedence as it studies meaning qua meaning. Heidegger also inherited from Rickert the problem that speculative approaches have in grasping the historically particular: Logical formalism is a homogeneous continuum that fails to connect with the heterogeneous continuum of matter. In this respect, Rickert identified and explored the discontinuity between concept and reality, form and matter, universal and particular and tried to resolve the two-world problem.

Furthermore, according to Heidegger, Rickert determines the feeling that accompanies the experience of judgment as the certainty [Gewißheit] of evidence [Evidenz] which constitutes the bindingness of judgment, giving to the judgment the character of necessity [Notwendigkeit]. Let it be noted in passing that Husserl explicitly criticizes a version of this thesis in Ideen I, where he dissociates the evidence supplied by eidetic seeing from feeling.

Ultimately, Rickert’s project failed to offer a solution to the problems it identified through its transcendental cultural philosophy, especially in the way it failed to articulate a proper philosophy of historicity the way Dilthey did.

This is an important moment for our own research: the evidential certainty that constitutes the bindingness of judgment is ascribed to feeling and appetite (cf. Husserl on Indication and Motivation, Chapter 3).
Natorp’s criticism of Husserl

Heidegger crucially found Husserl’s eidetic method to be susceptible to a criticism made against him by Paul Natorp. According to Natorp, the fact that Husserl relied too much on reflective intuition ultimately did not contribute anything new to what the neo-Kantians were already doing, which led Heidegger to the position that Husserl was not able to overcome the methodological problems (of theorization) that he was saying he overcame through the *epoché*.

Natorp had certain ties with Husserl, and Natorp was instrumental in steering Husserl away from psychologism (i.e. positivism), and would also inspire Husserl to later move from static to genetic phenomenology. Husserl’s phenomenology was also, like the Marburg neo-Kantianism of Natorp, a transcendental philosophy, but whereas Marburg neo-Kantianism retained a method of presenting the a priori principles of transcendental logic, Husserl grounded his theory of the a priori on an appeal to intuition.

Husserl’s phenomenology is in agreement with Natorp on the search for a transcendental ground (even if for Husserl this is not explicitly stated in the *LI*, it becomes explicated later on). This is also the idea that the young Heidegger has about Husserlian phenomenology, when he concedes that the problem of transcendental constitution, even if “not the most original or final” problem of it, is indeed “a genuine core of phenomenology.”

But some important disagreements between Natorp and Husserl persist, and the way these critical differences were uttered (primarily in the form of criticism from Natorp against Husserl) caused Heidegger himself to sharpen his own phenomenological stance. The gist of the

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215 This criticism was particularly aimed against the content of *Ideas I*, since the *LI* did not include an explicit reference to the *epoché* as such, even though the reduction was already implied. For example, see Derrida’s essay *Speech and Phenomena, Introduction and Sign and Signs* [proper reference needed].

216 Crowell 2001, p. 32. See also Dan Zahavi’s “How to Investigate Subjectivity: Natorp and Heidegger on Reflection”, *Continental Philosophy Review*, 36 (2003): pp. 155-176. Zahavi addresses a defining moment in the way Natorp affected Husserl in a footnote: “It is worth mentioning that it was Natorp who in *Allgemeine Psychologie* introduced the famous distinction between a *static* and a *genetic* investigation (Natorp, 1912, p. 285) that was later to become so important to Husserl. (Husserl carefully read *Allgemeine Psychologie* in September 1918)” (Zahavi 2003, p. 172).

217 Crowell 2001, p. 32.

218 It is important to note how for Heidegger, while agreeing on the essential compatibility and indeed qualified alliance between neo-Kantian concerns and phenomenology, insofar as they are transcendental projects, phenomenology does not get exhausted in this. There are overlaps but more importantly differences. However, at this point it is more useful to first point out the overlaps, before venturing on to show Heidegger’s radicalization of Husserlian phenomenology and distancing from neo-Kantian philosophy.

219 BPP, p. 13.
disagreement is this: According to Natorp, it is from inner life, “subjectivity”, that all things must spring, as with Kant; but whereas Natorp agrees with Husserl on the transcendental priority of the subject, he disagrees that this can be grasped in immediate reflection: rather, mental life is reconstructed via a process of “subjectification”, through a “regress” from an objectification which has a different kind of priority. For Natorp, the subject is indeed the ground out of which objectification (exemplified by science) occurs, but methodologically speaking we start with the objects and through them reflectively reconstruct the corresponding subjectivity that allows them to emerge in the first place. (We will see how this disagreement is articulated by Natorp in a way that Heidegger will find important to respond to precisely due to the effectiveness of Natorp’s critique).

This neo-Kantian version of scientific philosophy differed from Husserlian phenomenology in both form and aim, writes Crowell: firstly, in excluding the possibility that we can have access to transcendental subjectivity either by a practical orientation in the world or conscience, or in intuition in general; secondly, in taking scientific objectification as the ideal objectivity from which it proceeds and which it wants to ground, by recovering a universal transcendental subjectivity from which objectification springs. Natorp denied the phenomenality of the pure ego, as he held that it cannot be objectified, nor can it present itself at all, without ceasing to be genuinely subject. In this regard, Natorp retains a sort of transcendentalism for the subject that can never become an object for direct intuitive investigation: the two (i.e. subject and object) are in a reflective relation; however, one can never really become the other, since that would collapse the very irreducible difference between the two necessarily opposing poles.

Heidegger himself understands Natorp’s methodological remarks to have a critical bearing on Husserl’s phenomenological method of descriptive reflection itself. The

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220 Crowell 2001, pp. 30-31. In the lecture course Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression (GA 59), Heidegger writes of Natorp’s philosophical psychology as follows: “It is supposed to apprehend the ‘ultimate, fulfilled reality’, ‘life’ in the full sense of its concretion; at least it has to methodologically determine and pre-delineate this task as the task of an infinite process which can never be completed: ‘restoration of the entire concretion of the experience’” (PIE, p. 77, my emphasis).
221 Crowell 2001, p. 31.
222 Ibid, p. 32.
phenomenological method developed in Ideas I by Husserl, says Heidegger as early as 1919, moves through acts of reflection.\footnote{GA 56/57, p. 99: “Die phänomenologische Methode bewegt sich durchaus in Akten der Reflexion”.} In reflection we set ourselves in a theoretical manner \([\text{sind wir theoretisch eingestellt}].\footnote{GA 56/57, p. 100: “In der Reflexion haben wir es dastehen, sind darauf gerichtet, machen es zum Objekt, Gegenstand überhaupt. D.h. in der Reflexion sind wir theoretisch eingestellt.”} And even phenomenological reflection, argued Natorp, reaches out and grasps the evading stream of experience and thus \textit{stills the stream}.\footnote{GA 56/57, pp. 100-101: “[…] wir machen einen Griff gleichsam in den abfließenden Strom der Erlebnisse und greifen eines oder mehrere heraus, d.h. wir ‘stellen den Strom still’, wie Natorp, der bis jetzt als einziger wissenschaftlich beachtenswerte Einwände gegen die Phänomenologie vorgebracht hat. (Husserl selbst hat sich bis jetzt dazu nicht geäußert.)”.}

These particular problems that Natorp identified in Husserl’s descriptive method, and in \textit{any} descriptive method whatsoever, emanate from Natorp’s own belief about what (logical) concepts are and how they correlate to their respective objects. Heidegger appropriately quotes Natorp’s analysis on this: “For the pretension of phenomenology to remain mere description does not change anything of the theoretical character. Because description already also operates in concepts”.

Natorp, like Rickert, doubted that Husserl’s idealism, which was based on intuitive givenness, was in a position to claim \textit{scientific status}, which requires that the evidence given is able to justify and explicitly ground all of its assertions about transcendental cognition, because phenomenology could not provide the binding necessity or the universality demanded through the “evidence” afforded by the faculty of sense-intuition. Obviously, the vision of Natorp and Husserl appeared to be similar in its grounding intentions, but the evidential apparatus differed. As Crowell put it: “The question of whether philosophical cognition is grounded in concepts (logic) or intuitions (evidence) remains a crucial point of contention between phenomenological and neo-Kantian modes of thought”.\footnote{Crowell 2001, p. 32.}

As I already mentioned, Natorp’s criticisms of Husserl were instrumental in steering Husserl towards new directions; however, not all of these criticisms were successful in bearing a positive effect, from a Natorpian point of view, on Heidegger. Natorp’s rationalism and epistemological reading of Kant’s \textit{CPR} (namely that the transcendental philosophy of the \textit{CPR} should be a theory of scientific knowledge) and the way his criticisms, in Heidegger’s eyes,
effectively highlighted the rationalistic tendencies of Husserl’s phenomenology were instrumental in pushing Heidegger farther away from “theoretical rationalism” towards the direction of practicality. As Michael Friedman put it: “In a direct encounter with the most eminent contemporary representative of neo-Kantian ‘rationalism,’ he was able to stake out his own claim to be the author of a fundamentally new kind of philosophy destined to replace the _hegemony_ of the neo-Kantian tradition and to supplant the remaining ‘rationalist’ tendencies in Husserlian phenomenology as well”.\(^{227}\)

Some scholars have suggested that it was Natorp’s criticism of Husserl that forced Heidegger to reconfigure his methodological configurations by appropriating Dilthey’s notion of non-theoretical, hermeneutic “understanding” which brought about his hermeneutics of formal indication [Formale Anzeige].

In the lectures of _Kriegsnotsemester_, Heidegger refers to these criticisms in the third chapter of the lecture _Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem_, titled “Urwissenschaft als vortheoretische Wissenschaft”, in which he talks about Husserl’s descriptive reflection: The phenomenological method is executed through the act of reflection [Die phänomenologische Methode bewegt sich durchaus in Akten der Reflexion] (Husserl, _Ideen I_).\(^{228}\) The reflections are themselves experiences and can be further reflected. Reflection itself belongs to the sphere of experience and is a characteristic of it. As Natorp says, in reflection we grasp the fleeting stream of experience, we “still the stream”.\(^{229}\) Further on, Heidegger says that Natorp has up to now provided the only noteworthy objections against phenomenology, and that Husserl had yet to respond to them.\(^{230}\) Natorp insisted that the act of phenomenological reflection objectified experience and hence only accessed it as mediated through objectifying language.

\(^{227}\) Friedman 2000, p. 3, my emphasis.

\(^{228}\) GA 56/57, p. 99.

\(^{229}\) GA 56/57, p. 101.

\(^{230}\) “[…] wir ‘stellen den Strom still’, wie Natorp, der bis jetzt als einziger wissenschaftlich beachtenswerte Einwände gegen die Phänomenologie vorgebracht hat. (Husserl selbst hat sich bis jetzt dazu nicht geäußert.)” (GA 56/57, pp. 100-101). Tanja Staehler pointed out to me that Husserl does respond to Natorp’s criticisms, about ten years later, in his _C-Manuscripts_.
The objections of Paul Natorp against Husserl’s “pretheoretical science of experience”
deemed intentionality as already theoretical. Heidegger responds thus: “But how is a
pretheoretical science of experience at all possible? For its ‘object’ is the ‘experienceable as
such’ (Erlebbares überhaupt: ZBP 115f.) which is not an object at all”. 231

Natorp raises these objections against Husserl, but these objections affect Heidegger as
well and elicit his hermeneutics of “formal indication”. Natorp’s objections were: (1) “How is
the nonobjectifiable subject matter of phenomenology to be even approached without already
theoretically inflicting an objectification upon it?”; and (2) “Phenomenology claims merely to
describe what it sees. But description is circumspection into general concepts, a ‘subsumption’
under abstractions. The concrete immediacy to be described is thereby mediated into abstract
contexts. There is no such thing as immediate description, since all expression, any attempt to
put something into words, generalizes and so objectifies (ZBP 101, 111)”. 232

Heidegger found Natorp’s critique, stemming from the particular theoretical standpoint
of the Marburg School, so difficult [schwierig] that he would not venture [wagen] to extensively
treat it (he does so the year after). 233

Heidegger thought that Natorp’s own reconstructive method also suffered from the very
critical weaknesses that Natorp raised against Husserl: reconstruction is also objectifying
because as reconstruction it is constructive, and as such theoretical. 234 Heidegger undertook a
thematic “destruction” of Natorp’s reconstructive method the following year during his lecture
“Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression” (GA 59).

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231 Kisiel 1993, p. 47.
233 “Die Kritik Natorps und seine eigenen positiven Auffassungen sind so schwierig und vor allem ganz aus der
Grundposition der Marburger Schule heraus gewachsen, daß ich nicht wagen darf, sie hier extenso zu besprechen.
[…] Der ganze wissenschaftliche Typus der Marburger ist also in unser Problem hineingekommen, so daß ich gerade
deshalb Natorpsche Einwände hier einfließen lassen kann, weil sie vom Standpunkt des Theoretischen selbst
herstammen” (GA 56/57, p. 102).
234 “Leistet die Methode der Rekonstruktion das, was sie leisten soll? Kann sie es überhaupt leisten? Nein. Denn
einmal ist sie Objektivierung […] Denn auch Re-konstruktion ist Konstruktion […] und als solche theoretisch” (GA
56/57, p. 107).
In any case, Heidegger initially holds that Natorp’s criticism fails to appreciate the phenomenological attitude and its non-objectifying nature. Heidegger will insist that Husserl’s principle of principles does not offer any conceivable theory.\footnote{“Das methodische Grundproblem der Phänomenologie, die Frage nach der Weise der wissenschaftlichen Erschließung der Erlebnissphäre, steht selbst unter dem ‘Prinzip der Prinzipien’ der Phänomenologie. Husserl formu-

However, Heidegger will gradually become critical of Husserl. Whilst initially Heidegger will argue that the “principle of principles” is nontheoretical in nature, implying that the reduction leads to a “radically nontheoretical science”, even if Husserl had not gotten around to saying it, he will later on become dissatisfied with it. Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with Husserl’s method gradually emerges: he will start complaining about Husserl’s linguistic infidelities that betray a theory, and also point out that Husserl’s method relies on replacing one “attitude” for another, which was too reflective.

Heidegger will eventually reject the very notion of “attitude” \([\text{Einstellung}]\) as that which characterizes the distinctive character of phenomenology, and he turns towards a more Aristotelian vocabulary in order to demarcate the phenomenological approach from the theoretical-scientific. In this context, it is interesting to note the effect that Emil Lask had on Heidegger. Heidegger praises Lask for being the one who had gone far enough to see the problem of the theoretical in its essence and genesis.\footnote{Kisiel 1993, p. 56.} My hypothesis is that it was through Lask that Heidegger focuses on Husserl’s “Aristotelian moment” in the form of categorial intuition, and from there turns to the useful Aristotelian vocabulary in subverting the reflective elements that infiltrated Husserl’s transcendental turn. Heidegger distances himself from the reflective reconception of phenomenology of Husserl, selectively appropriating from Husserl’s \textit{Logical Investigations} (1900).\footnote{See \textit{Phenomenology: Responses and Developments}, Volume 4, ed. Leonard Lawlor, (Durham: Acumen, 2010), p. 132.}

Certain commentators, such as Theodore Kisiel and Stephen Crowell, have pointed out that Heidegger’s response to these Natorpian objections against Husserl’s method was his
hermeneutic of formal indications, which addressed the issue of the formation of philosophical concepts. Through the hermeneutic of formal indication, Heidegger opposed the theoretical conceptual paradigm and responded to the Natorpian criticisms.\textsuperscript{238} Heidegger’s solution was this: “Instead of objectifying concepts which seize life and so still its stream, this spontaneous access that life has to itself provides the possibility of finding less intrusive precepts or pre-concepts which at once reach back into life’s motivation and forward into its tendency”.\textsuperscript{239}

In trying to develop a method that grounds philosophy back to life’s motivations and tendencies, Heidegger establishes a new account of the phenomenological process that eventually leads him to mood. Heidegger shifts attention to the enactmental character of philosophy that will allow him to avoid reducing it to another theoretical attitude or objectivizing attitude. This starts being formed in his Winter semester of 1919-1920 (Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie) and Summer semester of 1920 (Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung).

\textbf{III. Concluding Remarks}

Heidegger inherited from neo-Kantians the project of bringing together philosophy and the truth of Logos (logic) with sensibility, in the context of a transcendental project (as opposed to a psychologistic reduction). This aim was important in his initial endorsement and adoption of Husserlian phenomenology, but also in his radicalization of certain aspects of it. Paul Natorp’s criticisms against Husserl’s reflective method helped to define Heidegger’s radicalization of Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger, following the Husserlian (and Diltheyan) notion of comportment radicalized Husserlian phenomenology from within and offered a way to resolve the objections posed by Natorp.

\textsuperscript{238} Note that while Kisiel took this to indicate that Heidegger accepted Natorp’s criticism against Husserl, Crowell disagrees in that he thinks Heidegger thought that he was only forced to explicate what was already inherent in Husserl’s phenomenological attitude, so as to say that Heidegger did not see himself as accepting that Natorp’s criticism was effective. My own opinion, attested through Heidegger’s gradual but steady and irreversible distancing from Husserl, is that initially Heidegger thought that Natorp simply misconstrued Husserl; however, Heidegger’s more radical ditching of Husserlian vocabulary later on (i.e. the altogether rejection of the word “Einstellung” and Schauung), with the increasing adoption of Aristotelian vocabulary (“Haben”), indicate that he came to find more merit and effectiveness in Natorp’s critical remarks.

\textsuperscript{239} Kisiel 1993, p. 48.
This entailed a move away from the early Husserlian conception of phenomenology as an attitude [Einstellung] towards an enactmental understanding, which reattached (grounded) propositional truth and understanding back to the pre-reflective motives and tendencies of factical life which supply the binding necessity and starting point of philosophical enactment. On the one hand, “binding necessity” refers to the necessary justification that underlies and indeed binds together [Verbindlichkeit] the act of a valid logical propositional judgment; on the other hand, it refers to the force that motivates a praxis, without reducing this force to “natural causality” but also without compromising the sense of urgency [Notwendigkeit] that drives the act of truth.

This engagement with neo-Kantian positions and criticisms enabled Heidegger to show how philosophical concepts as well as judgments emerge without a radical break from the flow of life, without stilling the stream, but from within a pre-reflective understanding in its togetherness to factical life. As we will see in the upcoming chapters, Heidegger felt the need to analyze Logos in terms of originating motives [Motive] and directional tendencies [Tendenz], terms which enabled Heidegger for the first time to thematize the affective states which he will later on more consistently call “moods”. The truth of judgment gets grounded [begründet] into the pre-reflective act of understanding, without a radical break, rather than the act of reflection which presupposes a break of the conceptual object and seeks a speculative reconstruction of subjectivity.

In this context, we will see how Heidegger’s employment of the notions of Gehaltssinn (content-sense), Bezugssinn (sense of relation) and Vollzugssinn (sense of enactment), which marks Heidegger’s early phenomenological analyses of the Situation through which his first breakthrough to the pre-reflective, affective realm of intentionality is achieved, is developed out of Husserl’s terminology. A very important, albeit not so well known, γναθομαχία μάχη περί της ουσίας has taken place, concerning the early years of Heidegger’s career and the way he managed to achieve a “breakthrough” into non-reflective phenomenology. On the one side stands the genealogical interpretation supplied by Theodore Kisiel (and also endorsed and

\[240\] “Bezugssinn, Vollzugssinn, Gehaltssinn ergeben die Urstruktur der Situation” (GA 58, p. 261).
further consolidated by John van Buren), which holds that Heidegger’s early breakthrough into a non-reflective phenomenology, via his discovery of “formal indication” [Formale Anzeige], which developed into his ontological breakthrough and later to the ‘Event of Being’, with his metaphysics of subjectivity (i.e. his short “stint” with Husserl) being an exception to the rule.

On the other side stands Stephen Crowell who sees Heidegger’s phenomenological inquiries, as well as the ontological turn that culminates in BT, opened up by Heidegger’s discovery of Formal Indication in continuity with neo-Kantian problems but especially through Husserlian phenomenological terminology. In this context, “Crowell argues that Heidegger developed formal indication for two main reasons: 1) to resolve some problems with the phenomenological method and 2) to reveal the method’s existential sources”. As has been shown, I side with Crowell on this reading.

In the next chapter, we will see how various relevant concepts operate in Husserl and how Heidegger radicalizes them in order to resolve, from within phenomenology, the problems that Natorp raises with respect to the reflective character of the Husserlian method. In this context, we will spend some time identifying the way Husserlian reflective regard and the epoché relate to the Husserlian notions of feeling [Gefühl] as well as emotion [Gemüt], and generally how affective aspects of phenomena figure in Husserl’s phenomenology and how they relate to the intentional grasp of categorial intuition. As we will see, for Husserl emotional intentions are founded, and hence derivative forms of intentionality, whose foundation is presentive intentionality and whose truth is expressed in propositional judgment which have a corresponding state of affairs [Sachverhalt].

Husserl sees the relation of founded emotional intentions [Gefühle] to foundational state of affairs as analogous to the relation between founded value-laden affairs [Wertverhalt] and foundational state of affairs. In this regard, one could discern how the theoretical regard’s

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241 As Matthew I. Burch writes: “Two major approaches have emerged: some argue that formal indication is Heidegger’s first pass at a non-reflective approach to what he would later call the ‘Event of Being’; others contend that the method is Heidegger’s refinement of Husserlian phenomenology. Theodore Kisiel offers the most developed version of the former thesis, while Steven Crowell lays out the best defense of the latter. […] On the one hand, Kisiel represents those who argue that Heidegger dedicated his career to the ‘Event of Being’, with the exception of a notable (and errant) voyage into the metaphysics of subjectivity” (Burch 2011).

242 Ibid.
priority over practical affairs, both in the methodological sense as well as in an ontological sense, reflects the way Husserl takes state of affairs to be foundational, with Wertverhalten and Gefühle being founded acts. The radicalization that Heidegger bears from within Husserlian phenomenology involves a reversal of priorities, from Einstellung to Vollzug, from the theoretical to the practical/enactmental, which amounts to a reversal in Husserlian priority from Sachverhalt to Wertverhalt. This will be one of the things that Heidegger will subsequently subvert: namely, that the state of affairs underlying intentional act of truth has always already a certain emotion.

At this precise point, as we will see, Heidegger sides with Heinrich Rickert, who (according to Heidegger’s own reading) held that judging [Urteilen], contra presentation [Vorstellen], does not happen in an “indifferent consideration” [teilnahmslosen Betrachten], but rather belongs in the same class as feeling [Fühlen] and willing [Wollen], which opposes the class of presentation. Heidegger takes note of Rickert’s ascription of a practical comportment [Verhalten] to the act of judgment, and in addition to the fact that Rickert says that what holds true [gilt] for judgment must also be valid of cognition\textsuperscript{243} [Erkennen]; in this context, cognition is deemed to be a process [Vorgang] that is determined through feelings, that is, through desire [Lust] or slackness [Unlust], and thus feelings foundationally connect with the act of judgment and knowing in general.

Furthermore, according to Heidegger, Rickert determines the feeling that accompanies the experience of judgment as the certainty [Gewißheit] of evidence [Evidenz] which constitutes the bindingness of judgment, giving to the judgment the character of necessity [Notwendigkeit]. It is crucial to note that Heidegger does not reappraise the foundational importance of feelings, with respect to truth, by a mere exchange of the two kinds of acts (from Einstellung to Vollzug, or from Sachverhalt to Wertverhalt): rather he manages to “deconstruct” Sachverhalt down to its ground from within the Husserlian descriptions and identify its enactmental character, as well as locate (following Husserl) the foundational characteristic of motive [Motive] to be the

\textsuperscript{243} I have translated Erkennen here as cognition. Other possibilities: recognition, knowledge.
pre-reflective unity of experience which cannot be expressed in the propositional format of judgment.

By adopting Husserl’s thematization of the operation of motive in Ideas II, Heidegger will manage to bring into prominence a silenced element in Husserl’s discoveries that will lead him to the subversion of the priority of the truth of propositional judgment qua state of affairs [Sachverhalt], in its neutrality, objectivity, and universal validity [Allgemeingültigkeit], and a more originary level of the operation of truth will be identified in Dasein’s comportment [Verhalten].\(^\text{244}\) It is through a reappraisal of the significance of motives and tendencies operative in comportment that Heidegger will, for the first time, formally indicate the pre-reflective phenomenon that will eventually be identified as mood [Stimmung].

It is the notion of motive that will serve as the fundamental notion that Heidegger will initially adopt from Dilthey and Husserl in order to refer to the pre-reflective aspects of facticity, which will later develop into mood. The transformation and development into mood is a slow one and not so straightforward; however, there are strong and cogent indications that establish this connection: firstly, as we will see, there are sporadic references to mood [Stimmung] in Heidegger’s analyses of motive; secondly, the examples he gives of phenomena that the young Heidegger calls motives are the ones he will later call mood [Stimmung], the most important of these examples being love [Liebe, ἔρως] and wonder [Erstaunen, θαυμάζειν];\(^\text{245}\) thirdly, some of the fundamental and defining characteristics that Heidegger later ascribes to mood and disposition [Befindlichkeit] – as, for example, bindingness necessity of truth, the archē of philosophy, and concatenation of experience – are also ascribed to motives. Hence, we can safely assume a continuity between what the young Heidegger calls motives and the later notions of disposition and mood. Of course, one important difference between motives and mood and disposition is the lack of reference to an ontological question, or the ontological

\(^\text{244}\) It is important, of course, not to miss the fact that Heidegger’s radicalization remains within the “spirit” of Husserl’s terminology since he will use a linguistic variant of the same root: from Sachverhalt to Verhalten. To my knowledge, no scholar has yet picked up on, in a meaningful way, this shift from Husserlian Sachverhalt to Heideggerian Verhalten, something that still maintains a relation by way of etymology.

\(^\text{245}\) Even if Heidegger will later not consider love or wonder as fundamental moods, they are still moods.
difference, but that does not constitute a problem, since at the time that Heidegger was writing about motives, he had not yet explicitly raised the ontological question.

In this context, we will see how Heidegger identifies the Husserlian moment of Vollzug of the act of phenomenological regard and is able to redefine phenomenology, from an attitude [Einstellung] (as Husserl clarified it in Ideas I) to the enactment [Vollzug] of the attitude. In effect, Heidegger redefined phenomenology from within Husserlian terminology, bringing the practical aspect of the act of phenomenological regard and understanding to the forefront. This enabled Heidegger to radicalize the Husserlian notion of “truth” from state of affairs to the truth of comportment in its enactment. In this context, we will also see how Husserl already identifies motive as that which supplies the concatenation of experience, out of which propositional judgment and state of affairs emerge. From then on, Heidegger will insist that the task of phenomenology is to identify the motives and tendencies inherent in understanding, and by doing so, to go further in a direction that was already implicit in Husserl’s own phenomenology.

We will trace Heidegger’s redefinition of phenomenology from an attitude to an enactment and to formal indication, and see how this manages to resolve the problems that Natorp posed against the Husserlian reflective method. We will then proceed with a presentation and respective analysis of how the young Heidegger understands and employs the key notions of content-sense [Gehaltssinn], sense of relation [Bezugssinn], and sense of enactment [Vollzugssinn], and how Heidegger relates these notions to motive and tendency, and mood.
Chapter 2: Husserl’s phenomenological breakthrough: from intentionality to motivation

I. Husserl’s first phenomenological breakthrough: intentionality and categorial intuition

Introductory remarks

In the previous chapter we saw the general neo-Kantian problems that shaped the context in which Heidegger’s early hermeneutic phenomenology of facticity emerged. It was through his encounter with those problems that Heidegger came to reappraise the disclosive character of the affective level of experience primarily manifested through moods, by throwing into relief the way philosophical understanding [Verstehen] opened up by comportment [Verhalten], which is the way the self relates to that which is given in intuition [Anschauung]. What is given to intuition is already conditioned by the way we relate to this intuition and find ourselves meaningfully bound to it.

Heidegger came to see how comportment itself is grounded in the affective, pre-reflective, level of intentional life, which Heidegger initially indicated through the appropriated Husserlian (and Diltheyan) notions of motivation and tendency, and later on by the notion of mood [Stimmung]. In the following chapter we will see how Heidegger first analyzed factual life in terms of the underlying motivations [Motivationen] and tendencies [Tendenzen]. But before we look at Heidegger’s own analyses of factual life, we need to look at Husserl’s phenomenological breakthrough, especially in the way he utilized these concepts. This will enable us to better trace the genealogy of Heidegger’s phenomenology of mood, and will also show how Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn to mood does not constitute an abandonment of Husserlian insights, but rather a radicalization of them. This genealogical reading will allow us to frame the issue at hand in a way that illuminates the philosophical problems Heidegger was trying to resolve, and the direction his phenomenology of mood took.

Heidegger’s early hermeneutic phenomenology utilized the notions of Verhalten, Motivation and Tendenz, and was based on the combined insights of Husserl and Dilthey, as part and parcel of a response to Natorp’s forceful critical objections to phenomenology. Heidegger followed Husserl in responding to the neo-Kantian predicament that transcendental philosophy was left with an unbridgeable cleft between “being” and “logic”. The problem that
persisted had to do with the distinction and relation between real thought processes that have factual being, and the ideal sense of logical validity that they intend.  

Heidegger took inspiration from Husserl’s account of categorial intuition, insofar as it afforded a non-linguistic, pre-conceptual intuition of being, and he repeatedly identified this contribution by Husserl as the most important one for his own work. In the Sixth Investigation Husserl connected essence with intuition and grounded the discovery of categories not in the act of judging, which is a complex act, but in the direct and simple act of intuition. Categorial intuition is the capacity of intentionality to intuit ideal objects, i.e. categorial objects, from simple universality and essentiality to complex relational intentions of state-of-affairs [Sachverhalte], all forms of predication, conjugation, synthesizing etc., including the meaning of “is”, that is, being. Husserl offered an account of intentionality that resolved the “truth vs. being” dichotomy and grounded judgment and understanding in intuition, by identifying a form of intuition that is able to intuit “true being”. Not only that, but this intuition, categorial intuition, constitutes a moment in which the initial categories or forms first present themselves as simply given in pre-reflective experience.

Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition, and his account of the way it binds truth and being, provided a breakthrough for Heidegger particularly because it grounded the truth of being (and being of truth) on the basis of a non-reflective experienceability instead of reflective knowability. Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition enabled Heidegger to identify in Husserl an account of originary intuitive experience wherein the Dasein lives in truth. As we will see, Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition offers an account of non-objectifying, pre-reflective intuition of truth and being, which constitutes a phenomenological precursor to a non-

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246 Friedman 2000, p.39
247 Heidegger on quite a few occasions identifies the Sixth Investigation of the Logical Investigations as the most important contribution of Husserl that inspired his own thought. For example, see his essay “My way to phenomenology” (1963).
248 Zahavi 2003, pp. 35-36.
249 Kisiel 1993, p.35.
250 In fact, Heidegger borrowed the phrase “living in truth” - a phrase that signifies a shift from phenomenology qua gnoseology (conditions of possibility of knowledge), to phenomenology qua aletheiology (knowing the truth of being, living in the truth) - from Lask. Heidegger borrowed the Laskian term in the context of his interpretation of Husserl’s Sixth Investigation. See Kisiel, 1993, p. 516.
Heidegger believed that Husserl’s early phenomenology offered a way of reconnecting the “two realms” of ideal logic and being, by grounding the understanding and validity of propositional judgments in the *givenness of intuition*, thereby overcoming the neo-Kantian predicament. This overcoming was achieved through *categorial intuition*, which is a mode of *sense-perception*. This was first described in the *Logical Investigations*, where Husserl grounded the logical truth of a “state of affairs” [*Sachverhalt*] in intuition.

Heidegger took inspiration from Husserl’s “phenomenological regard”, which he saw as offering a change in the way these epistemological problems were approached, recognizing how theories of judgment and understanding are grounded in, and dependent on, theories of relation [*Bezug*] between the subject and the object, the act of judgment and the state-of-affairs, truth and being.\(^{251}\) The truth of judgment is seen as grounded [*begründet*] in the non-reflectively enacted categorial intuition which grasps “being”. Not only that, but categorial understanding offers an intuitional, non-reflective and experientially immediate way that the “world” as such, in its totality, is phenomenologically *given*. In effect, categorial intuition grasps the truth of being as *totality*, in a non-reflective experience.

For Heidegger, Husserl’s categorial intuition offered an initial route into an explanation of how it is that the Dasein, the human being, can intuit a totality of the world and a totality of being, in a way that is not reducible either to the object in sensuous intuition, or to the identity of the logical expression that makes up a judgment. *Categorial intuition is, for Heidegger, as close as the early Husserl got to discovering a factual way of grasping being and truth as such, or, in other words, the truth and being of facticity itself.*

Categorial intuition is a pure perception of the state-of-affairs in its totality, given pre-linguistically and thus *before* propositional judgment. In fact, it will be categorial intuition that *grounds* propositional judgment and furnishes the necessary intuitive evidence and legitimacy.

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\(^{251}\) I am explicitly referring to *Logical Investigations*, not *Ideas I*. 
for it. This is important for several reasons, including the fact that this insight predated Husserl’s transcendental work that was susceptible to Natorp’s critical objections.

Categorial intuition anticipates certain structures that Heidegger will ascribe to moods. They have a similar operational significance: Mood will be the way Dasein discloses totality before logical judgment, but also the way it discloses a certain “determinacy” of the world, a certain “objectivity”, the “facticity” of the being of the world as a whole, in a direct, non-reflectional way. Husserl’s account of categorial intuition does not, however, neatly correspond to Heideggerian mood since mood is not a form of intuition.

Once we identify the crucial breakthrough offered by Husserl’s analysis of categorial intuition in terms of granting access to truth and being, we will see how Husserl’s reformulation of phenomenology in Ideas I jeopardizes the immediacy and ontological access that his initial approach offered, making his phenomenological method susceptible to Natorp’s critical objections. In this context, we see that Heidegger opts to focus on certain terminological moments in Husserl’s analyses, whilst rejecting others. Heidegger dispenses with the reflective aspects of Husserl’s transcendental method by grounding the phenomenological regard in the enactmental aspects of experience, and through that achieves a way into the hermeneutics of facticity from within Husserl’s phenomenology.

The key characteristic of Husserl’s first phenomenological breakthrough was his rediscovery of the phenomenon of intentionality [Intentionalität], which allowed him to expand the field of philosophical research and thus move beyond the naturalism of psychologism and the narrow, scientific objectivism of neo-Kantianism. In his analysis of the structure of experience, commencing from the Logical Investigations, Husserl paid particular attention to a group of experiences that are characterised by their being a consciousness of something, that is, the experiences that possess object-directedness. This is, in essence, the phenomenon of intentionality. By looking at intentional experience, Husserl achieved two crucial aims: firstly, he was able to expand what counts as an object and was thus able to investigate objective

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meaning as opposed to merely empirical, real, objects. This turned philosophy into a phenomenology of consciousness that is able to study all forms of objectivity beyond the restricted way that the empirical sciences study it or presuppose it.

Secondly, the phenomenon of intentionality enabled Husserl to distinguish between the intended object and the act of consciousness, i.e. to distinguish the transcending objectivity from the immanent experience of consciousness, thus avoiding the reduction of the object to the intramental subjective content - a reduction that psychologism was guilty of. Intentionality is the phenomenon that shows how the subject is able to transcend itself and is able to refer to (other) things or states-of-affairs that transcend the immanent side of consciousness, that is, its own experience.

Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the intended object and the intentional act in the Logical Investigations enabled him to offer a theory of truth of propositional judgment based on intuition, founding the transcendental validity of truth on the self-evidence of intuitive givenness. Husserl offered an account of acts of judgment, i.e. of acts that involve understanding, that stayed within the realm of intuition, with no appeal to reflective speculation. This enabled him to bring together understanding with intuition (sensibility).

Husserl’s phenomenological account of intentional acts moves beyond straightforward intuition of simple objects given to perception to cover complex acts of judgment whose intentional meaning, and the pertinent truth (and being) of their fulfillment, is relational, ideal, categorial, and mereological. We will see what this means when we look at the bifurcation of intuition into sensuous and categorial intuition. In this context, there are two characteristics that we will need to keep in mind, vis-à-vis the relevance of intentional intuition with the affective level of feelings and moods.

Firstly, the fact that Husserl offers a breakthrough in thinking about the foundations of truth, shifting its foundation from the content-based account of the state-of-affairs of a propositional judgment to the relational aspect of the enactment of the judgment. This was an important breakthrough that Heidegger embraced and incorporated in his own phenomenological analyses, which was expressed as “comportment” (disposition).
Secondly, we must keep in mind how Husserl’s account of intuition, which is the foundation of all judging experience and of ontological understanding, was still restricted to a kind of neutral, presentive, grasp that excluded value and feeling at its most basic level. According to Husserl, acts of judgment are complex acts that are further reduced, or are based on, a more fundamental level of act that is presentive, stemming from direct sensuous intuition. Intentional acts that include value or feeling or ontological understanding are also founded levels of intuition. This will be something that Heidegger will turn on its head: Husserl’s failure to see how feeling acts are foundational will be something that Heidegger will subvert. Let us now turn to the pertinent analyses that Husserl provides in the *Logical Investigations*.

**The discovery of intentionality**

In the *Fifth Logical Investigation*, entitled “On intentional experiences and their ‘contents’” ([Über intentionale Erlebnisse und ihre „Inhalte”](LI, p.77)), Husserl gives a distinctive, phenomenological definition of the experience of objects, one that involves the reappraisal of the relation between the mental act and the intentional object. He invites us to distinguish between two different ways of grasping the relation between the conscious subject and the perceived object. On the one hand, we have the real, causal relation, and on the other hand, the intentional relation. The latter is one in which the conscious act of relating to an object, as it is given in a phenomenological manner, is different in kind from the relation that involves “empirically real existence”.[255] The phenomenological concept of intentional consciousness does not describe the relation [Beziehung] in the empirically objective sense, as empirical sciences do.[256]

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254 LI, p.77.

255 “Mental acts are often called ‘activities of consciousness’, ‘relations of consciousness to a content (object)’, and ‘consciousness’ is, in fact, at times defined as a comprehensive expression covering mental acts of all sorts” [Psychische Akte bezeichnet man ja oft als „Betätigungen des Bewußtseins”, als „Beziehungen des Bewußtseins auf einen Inhalt (Gegenstand)”, und mitunter definiert man „Bewußtsein” geradezu als einen zusammenfassenden Ausdruck für psychische Akte jeder Art.] (LI, p. 80).

256 “We may now point out that *this concept of consciousness can be seen in a purely phenomenological manner, i.e. a manner which cuts out all relation to empirically real existence*” [Es sei nun gleich darauf hingewiesen, daß sich dieser Erlebnisbegriff *rein* phänomenologisch fassen läßt, d. i. so, daß alle Beziehung auf empirisch-reales Dasein] (Ibid, p.82).
However, Husserl is not interested in rejecting or excluding the objectified, content-oriented sense of relation; what he tries to do is to redescribe the unity of the intentional experience in toto, by addressing the subjective parts that are involved in relationality, and thus by implication also maintaining the distinction between the immanent aspects of the conscious act of relation and the objective correlates of it. While the subjective side of the intentional act has an immanent relation to the object - it contains the object in the phenomenological sense - this does not imply that it really contains it in the empirical sense, or that the subjective side’s contents and relations exhaust the truth and being of the object (in other words: Husserl is not a metaphysical idealist).

According to Husserl, the content of what appears in consciousness, the object qua content, is not itself the experience of the intentional act, it does not exhaust the act. The intentional object, which is “had” by the experience, is not an empirical object, and vice versa. The relation established within the act of experience is not one that can be thought in terms of two empirical objects whereby the relation is that of a real object contained within an empirical ego. In order to illustrate the difference between phenomenological experience and “popular experience”, Husserl draws on the distinction between real content [reellem Inhalt] and intentional content, which he combines with the notion of “having” [Haben]: the intentional content is that which is had. (Note how the category of “having” re-emerges here as a phenomenological notion of relation.)

Based on these distinctions - distinctions that are enabled through the “phenomenological reduction” of the empirical ego - the criterion by virtue of which experience is epistemologically legitimized, and objectivity qua truth is attained, lies solely within the powers of intuition: the evidence is had and yielded by phenomenological perception itself, but without either reducing the content of objectivity to the intramental and the merely subjective, or deferring the content of objectivity to a metaphysical realm that is never given in intuition but

257 “If we ourselves appear to ourselves as members of the phenomenal world, physical and mental things (bodies and persons) appear in physical and mental relation to our phenomenal ego. This relation of the phenomenal object (that we also like to call a ‘conscious content’) to the phenomenal subject (myself as an empirical person, a thing) must naturally be kept apart from the relation of a conscious content, in the sense of an experience, to consciousness in the sense of a unity of such conscious contents (the phenomenological subsistence of an empirical ego),” (Ibid, pp. 83-84).

258 Ibid, p. 85.
only to speculative reflection. In Husserl’s own words: “What is adequately perceived, whether expressed thus vaguely or left unexpressed, constitutes the epistemologically primary, absolutely certain focus yielded by the reduction, at any given moment, of the phenomenal empirical ego to such of its content as can be grasped by the pure phenomenologist.”

Thus, even if Husserl’s notion of the intentional object is expanded to include anything that can be phenomenologically intended, this does not mean that there are no criteria by virtue of which we can attain fulfillment, or perceive the inadequacy, of knowledge. The cornerstone of Husserl’s epistemology is the phenomenological givenness of the intentional object, is its self-evidence in the presentive act: the coincidence of the intention with the percept, perception being the evidence of fulfillment. This regards simple presentive acts of intentionality that involve simple correlative objects. But what about the more complex intentional acts of judgment whose intentional correlates are not objects but states-of-affairs? What about the more complex acts of categorial intuition (i.e. understanding)? Here lies Husserl’s ontological radicalization of the grounding capacities of phenomenological intuition, which Heidegger will find most intriguing.

State-of-affairs: being and truth

Husserl followed Brentano in classifying mental phenomena into presentations [Vorstellungen], judgments [Urteile] and emotions [Gemütsbewegungen]. These mental acts differ in the manner in which they refer to their respective objects. According to Husserl, there are essential differences between the intentional relation of the different acts: the manner in which a “mere presentation” refers to its object differs from the manner of a judgment, which treats a state-of-affairs as either true or false. The act of judgment does not have a single object as its intentional correlate; rather its objective correlate is the state-of-affairs. In Husserl’s own words:

In the judgment a state of affairs ‘appears’ before us, or, put more plainly, becomes intentionally objective to us. A state of affairs, even one concerning

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261 Ibid, p. 115.
what is sensibly perceived, is not, however, an object that could be sensibly perceived and apparent (whether to our ‘outward’ or to our ‘inward’ sensibility). In perception an object is given to us as having full-bodied existence. We call it something which now is, in so far as our percept serves as our basis for judging that it is. [...] What plays the part of object to judgment and opinion we call the state of affairs judged: we distinguish this in reflex knowledge from the judging itself, the act in which this or that appears thus or thus, just as in the case of perception we distinguish the perceived object from the presentation as act.\textsuperscript{262}

The fulfilment of categorial acts, i.e. the acts of judgment, is also founded on intuition; however, there is a special kind of intuition involved. Husserl makes the distinction between sensuous intuition and categorial intuition: the former involves the intuition of individual objects (in the phenomenological sense), whereas the latter involves the intuition of categories that correspond to a state-of-affairs.\textsuperscript{263} It is therefore possible to achieve phenomenological fulfilment of an act of judgment, which is about an object having a predicate, but for this purpose mere sensuous perception (intuition) does not suffice because a categorial relation is never given in simple sensuous intuition. Rather, fulfilment of a categorial act depends on categorial intuition: the kind of intuition that is able to grasp the state-of-affairs in the categorial format of “S is P”. Categorial intuition enabled Husserl to resolve the neo-Kantian epistemological contrast between sensibility (intuition) and understanding,\textsuperscript{264} allowing him to ground the truth of judgment - the truth of categorial intentional acts, which are acts of understanding - in intuition, in the intuitive act, as opposed to grounding it in a transcendental atemporal realm of validity, as Paul Natorp did.

As a matter of fact, Husserl specifically names Natorp as one of his critical targets in this context, when he complains that for Natorp the richness of consciousness pertains to contents alone.\textsuperscript{265} The problem in Natorp’s position is that he collapses the distinction between (the act of) consciousness and content, the distinction between the manifold of the intentional experience and the objective being, or referent, of an intentional act. This holds true for all intentional experiences, simple presentations as well as judgments. But by focusing on

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid, p. 186.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid, p. 106.
judgments, we come to see how Husserl’s phenomenological account overcomes the neo-Kantian problematic conception of the truth of judgment, and offers a way out of the neo-Kantian predicament of separating the realms of validity and being.

Traditionally, states-of-affairs are the objects of categorial sentences in the format of “S is P”. States-of-affairs in themselves are considered to be facts (cf. Husserl’s notion of Tatsächlichkeit) whose being is independent of the sentence-sense that refers to it, i.e. the act of judgment or the proposition. Thus, states-of-affairs in themselves cannot be either true or false. Rather, states-of-affairs either “obtain” [gilt], or they do not; they either “are” or “are not”, exist or do not exist, and in the case that a false propositional judgment is made then the judgment will simply have no corresponding state-of-affairs. Only a true judgment will have a corresponding state-of-affairs. In effect, the state-of-affairs is distinguished from the propositional judgment thus: states-of-affairs are truth-makers, whereas propositional judgments are truth-bearers. This means that the two sides differ in ontological status: states-of-affairs can either exist or not exist - being falls exclusively on their side - but propositional judgments always have the same ontological status, i.e. they exist in the same way, they are always expressed, but what varies is their truth-bearing status: they can only be either true or false.

Husserl’s notion of truth, as it is supplied in the Logical Investigations, moves beyond the traditional correspondence theory of truth. As we already said, on the one hand, the phenomenological intentional object of the judgment, the intentional state-of-affairs, does not pertain to empirical matters of fact [Tatsächlichkeit]. The intentional object is not restricted natural facts. On the other hand, the intended state-of-affairs is not intramental either, because it transcends the act of judgment. However, the validity of the state-of-affairs is manifested in and through the enactment of judgment, as given to categorial intuition, and it is indeed attached to an understanding of being. This involves a radicalized intertwining of “understanding”,

268 Ibid, p. 100.
“intuition”, “truth” and “being”. What Husserl’s categorial intuition shows is how categorial knowledge itself, i.e. a true proposition, becomes understood as valid by being given to intuition, through being adequately had by the act of judgment, and this involves the act of judgment having the states-of-affairs, and thus already having being. Both truth and being are given to intuition simultaneously, and are phenomenologically “had” by the intentional act itself.

It is important to note here how truth and being can coincide, where the understanding of a valid act of judgment is ontological. The key to the relation of truth and being, as James Mensch writes, is the double correlation of thought (in this context: understanding) to perception, and perception to being: the achievement of knowledge is “the correlation of perception to being. Within this schema, we can say that the ‘interpretation of categorial acts as intuitions’ clarifies ‘the relationship between thought and intuition’ by making thought, which is taken by Husserl as a categorial activity, capable of intuition […] with respect to entities.”

In effect, the achievement of categorial intuition is the bringing together of intuition with ontological understanding. To quote Mensch again, on how categorial intuition counts as the thought that intellectualizes sensible intuition:

[T]he meaning of this intellectualization can be seen by noting that Husserl equates authentic thought – i.e., the capacity for categorial acts – with the understanding […] The thrust of the doctrine of authentic thought is, then, that of making the faculty of understanding intuitive. It is in some sense to be judged as an alliance with Plato and against Kant, the latter having declared that understanding is not intuitive.

Husserl brings together intuition, understanding and being in a way that distinguishes his account from Natorp’s and from other neo-Kantians. What is more, Husserl offers an expanded notion of consciousness as intuition of objective being, which is precisely what his analyses of intentional experience show. But in order to attain objective knowledge, i.e. truth, intentional experience must be intuitively fulfilled. True understanding, true judgment, attains its grounding in and through intuition. Ultimately, it is intuition that bestows epistemological

legitimacy. As Husserl writes: “Should intuition fall wholly away, our judgment would cease to know anything. […] Knowledge always has the character of a fulfilment and an identification: this may be observed in every case where we confirm a general judgment through subsequent intuition, as in every other case of knowledge.”

The attainment of truth is given in intuition, but this does not mean that truth, intuition, and being, are restricted to objectified being, as it also does not mean that truth is fulfilled through reflection. On the contrary, in this context, i.e. the Sixth Investigation, Husserl addresses fundamental aspects of truth and being that are not objective and are not reflectively given, within the context of intentional experience, which constitutes an effective response to Natorp’s objections.

Initially, Husserl addresses the more foundational and basic manner of fulfillment, which involves simple intentional acts in which the “concrete act of propositional meaning permits of a fulfilling identification with an objectively complete intuition of a matching material.” Husserl is in this context addressing truth in the fullest possible sense, namely, ultimate fulfilment where a presentative intention has achieved its last fulfilment, and where the “object is actually ‘present’ or ‘given’, and present as just what we have intended it.”

Fulfilment, then, is a matter of coincidence, a matter of identification between the intuitively given and the intentionally meant. Identification itself is an objectifying act and its correlative being is “being in the sense of truth”. Husserl wants to expand the traditional ontological conception of truth so as to ascribe truth and being not only to absolute, simple objects, but also to states-of-affairs. In his own words:

The concepts of truth, rightness, the true, are generally interpreted more narrowly than we have done: they are connected with judgments and propositions, or with states of affairs which are their objective correlates. ‘Being’ is meanwhile mainly spoken of in relation to absolute objects (not states of affairs), though no definite lines are drawn.

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272 SLI, pp. 342-343.
274 Fulfilment is a technical term employed by Husserl, which means that what is initially emptily indicated in an expression becomes adequately presentified in intuition, so that the demonstration becomes grounded in the state-of-affairs as given in originary perception.
275 SLI, pp. 328-329.
276 Ibid, p. 331.
277 Ibid, p. 333.
II. Transcendental phenomenology as a change of attitude: epochē, enactment and motivation

In Ideas I, Husserl “relaunches” phenomenology as “eidetic seeing”: a kind of intuition that grasps ideal, necessary and universal meanings. He makes a distinction between two kinds of intuition, which are operative at the same time: one pertains to the intuition of existence, the individual Dasein, the other pertains to the intuition of essence. Both are necessary, says Husserl, and neither is given without the other.  

But Husserl focuses on essential seeing, and further reduces it to eidetic seeing, because that is where necessity [Notwendigkeit] and universal validity [Allgemeingültigkeit], that which a proper science should be looking for, lie. Eidetic universality is “pure” and absolutely “unconditional”.  

Eidetic universality is “pure” and absolutely “unconditional”.  

Eidetic judgment has a corresponding state-of-affairs, and eidetic seeing involves the consciousness of necessity per se.  

Husserl here continues on the neo-Kantian path, trying to ground the universality and necessity of ideality in intuition. In this context, Ideas I offers a new beginning, and Heidegger is interested precisely in the problem of beginning.  

According to Husserl, this is achieved through a change in attitude that involves an instituting of an ontological epochē (an abstaining from ontological judgment), and by adhering to his epistemological “principle of principles”. The principle of principles defines the ultimate epistemological criterion: every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition.  

This restricts phenomenological truth to cognitive intuition. In addition, Husserl further qualifies the phenomenological method by imposing a firm distancing of the phenomenologist from the “natural attitude”: “Instead of remaining in this attitude [Einstellung], we propose to alter it radically”.  

The natural attitude involves generally positing that the real surrounding world is “a factually existing “actuality” [daseiende

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278 Ideas I, 10.
281 The crucial issue for Heidegger was the originary genetic aspect, that is, the problem of the beginning, in the sense of Urpsrung: how is it that phenomenological analysis, eidetic seeing, is enacted in the first place? How is it that we effectuate the kind of formalization that is specific to phenomenological seeing and discover eidetic intuition?
282 Ideas I, p. 44.
283 Ibid, p. 57.
What the phenomenologist has to do, according to Husserl, is to “exclude” or “put out of action” the natural attitude of everydayness - to suspend it. In a sense, it is a kind of doubt that stems from, and enables, perfect freedom. But the phenomenological epoché, Husserl says, is not a form of an other positing [Setzung], i.e. a positing of the negation of the factual being of the world [zeitliches Dasein], as in Descartes’ case, but rather a kind of “not taking into account”, a kind of ignoring.

Husserl’s transcendental turn was an effect of his discovery of the epoché, which was meant to be his own version of the “Copernican Revolution”. In Ideas I, as well as in his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl understands the epoché in terms of reflection, whose function is “to break with the world and transcend the natural attitude”. In his latest text, entitled “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”, Husserl will introduce new concepts in order to describe the phenomenological attitude, one of them being the concept of Besinnung (and Selbstbesinnung), in the context of rectifying problematic interpretations of his earlier works, partly stemming from his commitment to reflection [Reflexion]. Besinnung will be a case of existential self-meditation in which a person reflects upon the ultimate sense of his existence [Dasein], something that will enable a regressive inquiry into the ‘original motivation’ [Ursprungs­motivation] – a concept-reflecting that was central to his so-called genetic phenomenological enquiry.

The ascription of “perfect freedom” to the enactment of the phenomenological attitude, and the way it suspends Dasein, as well as the reflective character of it, is precisely what alienated Heidegger from Husserl’s early transcendental turn. Perfect freedom is discovered, or
operates, on a purely eidetic realm, but the question still remains concerning the way of enactment of this attitude: how is it that it comes about? Heidegger will find the way out of this methodological predicament from within Husserl’s own terminology, by focusing on the enactmental character of the epochē. We must penetrate deeper into the discourse of Ideas I.

Any intentional act has three aspects to it: the content of the intentional object (the ideal meaning itself, which applies to both the noetic and the noematic content); the establishing relation (the way the intentive act relates to the intended object); and the enactment of the intentional act. Heidegger comes up with three notions that he uses in his own analyses, which we can reapply to Husserl’s phenomenological analyses in order to make sense of Heidegger’s own interpretation of Husserl: the notion of Gehaltssinn (content-sense) for the first aspect of the intentional act, the notion of Bezugsinn (relational-sense) for the second aspect, and the notion of Vollzugssinn (enactmental-sense) for the third aspect.

In the case of eidetic judgment, the content-sense is the formal, pure, eidetic universal: the eidetic state-of-affairs. The relational-sense of an eidetic act refers to the “referential character” of the act, that is, the way the act itself intentively refers to its object (in this case, the eidos). The referential character can vary according to the object: for example, in the eidetic act of judgment the relation established is not a “real” spatiotemporal relation or a relation of a psychological nature. The relational-sense refers to the way the intentional act relates to the object: in perception it is a perceptual relation, in imagination an inventive relation, in liking a liking relation, in willing a willing relation, etc. Finally, the enactmental-sense refers to the very way the phenomenological attitude is instituted. It concerns the “actuality” of the comportment [Verhaltung] that is in place and enables and determines the kind of intuitive analysis that ensues.

Heidegger’s early phenomenological analyses focus on the enactmental-sense that actualizes the phenomenological attitude, and thus, eventually, formally bring into relief the

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290 Cf. the enactment of authenticity (from within inauthenticity) in BT.
291 Ideas I, p. 214.
293 Ibid, p. 76.
fundamental affective experiential elements involved in it, the aspects that are dynamic, in the
sense of genetic, pre-reflective and non-objectifying. Focusing on the enactmental sense of
intentional acts enables Heidegger to radicalize phenomenology from a pure theoria to a praxis,
uncovering the Aristotelian elements in Husserl’s own phenomenology. This interpretation also
explains Heidegger’s explicit shift to Aristotle.

It is crucial to recognize that “enactment” is not externally imported into Husserl’s own
phenomenological account. The operation of enactment permeates the whole of Husserl’s
phenomenological analysis, albeit in a covert way. For example, an ideation is indeed
enacted.\textsuperscript{294} Eidetic seeing is enacted\textsuperscript{295} But even more fundamentally, the very change of
attitude involved in the genesis of phenomenological seeing is a matter of enactment.\textsuperscript{296} The
epochè is enacted,\textsuperscript{297} and so are the reductions and the accompanying reflections.\textsuperscript{298} This does
not mean that enactment is an actualization in the sense of a “real action” that takes place in
space and time, replacing one real natural act with another. Enactment should not be understood
in the sense of “positing” a new judgment, a new thesis or a new “motivation”;\textsuperscript{299} it simply
grasps the practical aspect of actuality in a phenomenological sense.

The notion of “enactmental-sense” enables Heidegger to phenomenologically indicate
the “lived experience” as such, bringing into relief the “concrete” level of intentional and pre-
intentional life, and enabling him to address the very problem of beginning, the generation of
phenomenology as such in its vividness. The enactmental-sense accounts for the founding level
of any philosophical experience, not just of the experience of a phenomenological “world”, but
any philosophical experience, including those that produce a mere \textit{Weltanschauung}. Heidegger
picks out Husserl’s parlance of enactment and further analyses it in terms of its motivational
character, something that enables a comprehensive and genetic analysis of the unified structure

\textsuperscript{294} Ibid, p.10
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{296} “I appropriate to myself the arithmetical world and other similar “worlds” by effecting the suitable attitudes
\textit{[durch Vollzug der entsprechenden Einstellungen zueignen]}. (Ibid, p. 55).
\textsuperscript{297} “The phenomenological \textit{ἐποχή} will deserve its name only by means of this insight; the fully conscious effecting
\textit{[Vollzug]} of that \textit{ἐποχή} will prove itself to be the operation necessary...” (Ibid, p. 66).
\textsuperscript{298} “Instead, then, of living naively in experience and theoretically exploring what is experienced, transcendent
Nature, we effect \textit{[volziehen]} the ‘phenomenological reduction’ (Ibid p. 113).
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid, p. 59.
of intentional life itself. It is this route into Husserl’s own analyses that enables Heidegger to radicalize Husserl’s accounts from within, something that culminates in uncovering the grounding role of affects, while at the same time offering a genetic account of how phenomenology itself is brought about. This is an account of the beginning of philosophy and phenomenology that does not involve reflection or the theoretical positing of “principles”. This also effectively responds to the objections raised by Natorp against Husserlian phenomenology.

In his winter semester lecture of 1919/20, entitled Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Heidegger states that phenomenology is the original science [Ursprungswissenschaft] of life itself.300 In that lecture, Heidegger explicitly thematizes the problem of the beginning of phenomenology, complaining about Husserl’s “reflective” account of how phenomenology is “set in motion” by the notions of epochē and the principle of principles. He speaks about how the methods of the phenomenological science “must grow from the origin itself, out of the origin in original generation and in constant renewing preservation and evident fulfillment of its tendencies”.301 Later on he says: “Indeed, we should not reflect on the beginning, but rather factically begin!”[Reflektieren wir doch nicht über das Anfangen, sondern fangen faktisch an!]302 Insofar as phenomenology is an original science, says Heidegger, then its task is to arrive at an original understanding of itself through the generation of its task and through the genuine effectuation of its ownmost motives in the clarification and execution of the ‘task’ by way of research. […] In other words, only the genuine, concrete realization and the actualization [Vollzug] (following) of the “tendencies” operating in original science lead to it itself and to its ownmost problem area, which only responds when it is taken into the basic tendency of phenomenology itself.303

In other words, Heidegger here calls for 1) a phenomenology that does not begin by a certain theoretical reflection upon its own beginning - one that would entail the establishment of principles - as that already alienates the concreteness of the enactment of phenomenology by

300 BPP, p. 2.
301 Ibid, p. 2.
302 Ibid, p. 3.
303 Ibid, p. 2.
focusing on cognition and abandoning the pre-cognitive aspects of intentional life; and 2) a phenomenology that can indicate, or embrace, in a non-reflective manner, its own motivational foundations. Heidegger calls for a certain radicalization that even turns against phenomenological principles themselves, and in a way, “against the very master”, that is, Husserl. In Heidegger’s own words:

The genuine actualization \([\text{echten Vollzug}]\) of phenomenology lies in its radicalism in questioning and critique. And this “radicalism of phenomenology needs to operate in the most radical way against phenomenology itself and against everything that speaks out as phenomenological cognition. There is no \textit{iurare in verba magistri} [swearing to the words of a master] within scientific research. The essence of a \textit{genuine} generation of researchers and of subsequent generations lies in its not losing itself on the fringe of special questions, but rather to return in a new and genuine way to the primal sources of the problems, and to take them deeper.\(^{304}\)

Heidegger is in effect declaring that he will try to radicalize Husserl’s own phenomenology by “taking it deeper”, by reattaching the spiritual discoveries of Husserl to their motivational, factual, basis. Heidegger thought that this was a murky aspect of Husserl’s own account, that is, the question of beginning. By keeping in view the way in which Husserl based the phenomenological reduction on enactment \([\text{Vollzug}],\) and how (as we will see later in this chapter) the \textit{foundational unity}, the concatenation, of spiritual (intentional) life is identified, by Husserl, as founded by \textit{Motivation}, we shall come to see how Husserl provided the impetus for Heidegger’s turn to the hermeneutics of facticity and the affective.

Heidegger, presumably due to Natorp’s criticisms, identified this double-character in Husserl’s phenomenology and pointed out how Husserl had not achieved full clarity in his own methodical discoveries; that he did not achieve full clarity concerning his own motives and tendencies; and that this came down to the fact that he maintained a “double-direction” and a tension between “descriptive psychology” and “genetic-explanatory psychology”.\(^{305}\) According to Heidegger, phenomenology should therefore turn towards its own beginning, towards its own motivation and tendencies; but this cannot be achieved by seeing phenomenology as an

\(^{304}\) Ibid, p. 5.
\(^{305}\) Ibid, pp. 10-11.
“attitude” [Einstellung] in the way that Husserl defined it in Ideas I, as that is too cognitive a beginning – a beginning that conceals the lived aspects of the enactment.

Heidegger is already countering Husserlian Einstellung with a “letting-open-up” [Offen-Lassen], a precursor of Gelassenheit. Insofar as phenomenological research is scientific research, it must be able to begin from the motivations and tendencies that form the factual foundations of intentional life, thus offering a genetic account- this necessitates a method that can only be a letting-open-up.

Heidegger’s focus on enactment and motivation is, as already mentioned, derived from within Husserlian analyses. Motivation is a Husserlian notion that became central in Ideas II, even though it was there already in the Logical Investigations. Let us turn to Husserl’s accounts of motivation in order to see how, on the one hand, Heidegger’s phenomenology of factical life is in a sense a radicalization of what is already there, albeit suppressed, in Husserl’s own accounts, and how, on the other hand, Husserl’s own “genetic turn”, in the face of Natorp’s objections, is not a radical reconception of phenomenology but a thematic re-appraisal of an ignored part of Husserl’s own investigations. It is of important scholarly value to trace, if not exhaustively then at least schematically, the way motivation figures in Husserl’s phenomenology, since one of the central arguments made in this genealogical account is that Heidegger’s phenomenology of moods, his initial turn to facticity via motivation, does not constitute an abandonment of Husserl but rather a radicalization of his work.

306 In GA 29-30 (the lecture course titled ‘Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics’), Heidegger argues that working towards achieving a particular attitude [Einstellung] that emerges and is mediated through theories of consciousness and the stream of experience, won’t get us anywhere it terms of granting access to a certain level of consciousness-interconnections [Bewußtseinszusammenhängen]. What we need is a releasement, i.e. Gelassenheit: “Es kommt gerade nicht darauf an, eine Region von Erlebnissen zurechtzupräparieren, uns in eine Schicht von Bewußtseinszusammenhängen hineinzuarbeiten. Wir müssen gerade vermeiden, uns in eine künstlich zurechtgelegte oder aus fest verbreiterten Blickrichtungen aufgezwungene besondere Sphäre zu verlieren, statt die Unmittelbarkeit des alltäglichen Daseins zu erhalten und festzuhalten. Es gilt nicht die Anstrengung, uns in eine besondere Einstellung hineinzuarbeiten, sondern umgekehrt, es gilt die Gelassenheit des alltäglichen freien Blickes - frei von psychologischen und sonstigen Theorien von Bewußtsein, Erlebnisstrom und dergleichen.” - GA29-30, §22.

307 BPP, p. 21.
III. Motivation in Husserl

General remarks
Heidegger’s first methodical phenomenological analysis of life through the notion of motivation (and tendency, as we will see in the next chapter), in which he, for the first time, explicitly and thematically speaks about passions and Angst, is his 1920-21 lecture course on the Phenomenology of Religious Life. Heidegger analyses religious life in terms of the underlying motivations [Motivationen] and tendencies [Tendenzen] that permeate factical life. Motivation and tendency are in fact the two key formal indications, or “categories”, that Heidegger employs in order to phenomenologically analyse how theories, belief-systems, or Weltanschauungen, factically emerge from within life itself. The point here is to see how Heidegger’s phenomenology of religious life in that 1920-21 course - whereby the afflictions of the person, their moods, passions and temptations take centre stage - is enabled from within a Husserlian account of the self (the “person”) as it is described in Ideas II. But we first need to look at how the notion of motivation gains prominence in Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of spiritual life.

Husserl’s notion of motivation, as it figures in Ideas II, was affected by the Munich-based phenomenologist Alexander Pfänder. The other philosopher who drew Husserl’s attention to motivation, apart from Pfänder, was, by Husserl’s own admission, Wilhelm Dilthey. It is not only Dilthey who incorporated Husserl’s insights from the Logical Investigations (and we’ve seen before how Heidegger himself credits Dilthey for being instrumental in the general acknowledgment of Husserl’s contributions), but it was also Husserl who incorporated some Diltheyan insights, as early as the decade 1910-20, as we can see in his (then) unpublished notes that would later be published as Ideas II.

Motivation is a relatively well-known basic concept of Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl referred to motivation in order to describe non-causal relations between intentional and non-intentional experiences in general.308 The notion was already used in the first edition of the

Logical Investigations to designate “the relation between a perception of a sign and an act intending what is indicated by the sign”. But in the Logical Investigations it was a marginal concept. The concept only became a fundamental one for the first time in Ideas II, where it also attained a much broader meaning.

Let us see how Husserl turned to Motivation as disclosed through the personalistic attitude.

Husserl on Motivation

As mentioned earlier, Husserl had a marginal role for motivation in the Logical Investigations. In the Fifth Investigation, Husserl investigated the “sphere of Desire and Willing” in the context of the connection between intentional and non-intentional experiences [Erlebnissen]. For Husserl, willing pertains to the question concerning the operation of motivation itself, and leads to an understanding of the deep interconnections [Zusammenhänge] that operate in the realm of

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309 Ibid.  
310 Uemura and Yaegashi 2012, p. 270.  
311 Before we look at the way Husserl employed this notion, though, we must respond to this reasonable question: if the concept became a fundamental one for Husserl in Ideas II, and Ideas II was only posthumously edited and published by the Husserl-Archives in 1952, how is it possible that Heidegger could have (actively) inherited the concept of motivation from Husserl and not from someone else? We have no concrete proof that Heidegger took it from Husserl, as Heidegger never explicitly says this. But the circumstantial facts allow us to plausibly put this hypothesis forward. Ideas II was composed “in one stroke” by Husserl, in “pencil manuscript”, right after the completion of Ideas I, in 1912. In 1915 Husserl further elaborated and rewrote the text, and Husserl noted on the first page of the manuscript that the writings stem from lecture courses held between 1913 and 1915. The parts of the manuscript in which Husserl expands on the constitution of the world of spirit, where the concept of motivation takes centre stage, comes from the manuscript called “H-folio”, dating from 1913. This manuscript, the H-folio, was incorporated into the second redaction made by Edith Stein in 1918. It must be noted that Husserl further expanded this section in 1923 when Ludwig Landgrebe became his assistant. Husserl incorporated further annotations and other writings from the H-folio that Stein had not used. The manuscript was finished and was ready for publication in 1925, but Husserl kept revising the document up to 1928. To the best of my knowledge, there is no indisputable evidence concerning which paragraphs of the pertinent part III of Ideas II Heidegger would have read and incorporated in his analyses of motivation and tendency. But we do know for a fact - and this is by now an established belief among Husserl scholars - that Husserl was circulating his manuscripts amongst his students and assistants. We also know for a fact that section three was written in 1913. Judging from the content in Heidegger’s phenomenological lectures between 1919 and 1921 and from the way he employs the notions of “motivation” and “tendency”, and comparing this with what Husserl had written about these concepts in section III of Ideas II, it is more than highly probable that Heidegger had read these sections and was perhaps even working together with Husserl on those notions.

I submit, then, that Heidegger adopted these phenomenological concepts from Husserl, incorporated the jargon of motivation into his own analyses, and applied them to certain paradigmatic experiences that Husserl had not considered up to then, notably those of religious life. This is attested to not only by the fact that Heidegger employed, in the aforementioned analyses, the notion of “motivation” in a way that is consistent with the way Husserl reconfigures the concept in Ideas II (the parts that were edited by Edith Stein around the time that Heidegger was preparing to teach the phenomenology of religious experience), but it is also attested by the fact that Heidegger’s turn to religious life, the life of the religious individual, fits well within the “personalistic attitude” that enabled Husserl to thematize motivation. In that context, Husserl’s turn to the “personalistic attitude” (opposed to the “theoretical attitude”) enabled Heidegger to turn to religious experience from within Husserlian phenomenology. See Ideas II, pp. XI-XIII.

spirit [*Geist*] in general. Motivation is that which pertains to the connection [*Zusammenhang*] that moves [*bewegt*] and determines [*bestimmt*] spiritual wishings, willings and doings.\(^{313}\)

So the issue is that of the enactment of spiritual movement itself: finding a way to phenomenologically describe this deep structure of subjectivity without falling back into naturalism. In *Ideas II*, Husserl's description of motivation is indeed guided by the same aim as Pfänder's: to emancipate the enactmental character of the spiritual world, the phenomenological world, the sphere of immanence, from the categories of *natural causality*. Motivation in *Ideas II* is indeed the "ground law of the spiritual world", the interconnection [*Zusammenhang*] of the "Why and Because" that belongs to spirituality [*Geistigkeit*]. *It is the phenomenological equivalent of causality* [*Kausalität*].\(^{314}\)

But Husserl offers us a concept of motivation that is broader than the one offered by Pfänder. The broadening of the notion of motivation enables Husserl to describe the lawfulness [*Gesetzlichkeit*] that covers the whole area of spirituality; this is spirituality in the sense of *understanding*, not just “willing”, because for Husserl spirituality *is* the area of understanding [*Verständlichkeit*]. Thus, *every act*, every intentional act, can be indicated as “motivated” and enquired into in terms of the underlying motivation, without recourse to a naturalized causal reference.\(^{315}\)

Beyond its aforementioned broadening, Husserl’s notion of motivation differs from Pfänder’s in another crucial way: while for Pfänder motivation concerns the *active* moments of willing, *excluding the passive* (i.e. the “affective”), Husserl’s notion of motivation includes *both the active and the passive*. *The importance of this difference cannot be overstated.* The twofold nature of motivation in Husserl makes it possible to account for the intertwining aspects of the spiritual sphere: the rational and the irrational, the active and the passive or affective.\(^{316}\) This resolves the problem that Husserl identified in Pfänder, namely the fact that he left the entire sphere of *passivity* to naturalistic accounts of causality.\(^{317}\) But it also opens the way for

\(^{313}\) Ibid, p. 253.
\(^{314}\) Ibid, p. 256.
\(^{315}\) Ibid, p. 258.
\(^{316}\) Ibid, p. 259.
\(^{317}\) Ibid, p. 262.
Husserlian phenomenology to account for the genetic, constitutive levels of subjectivity that are pre-reflective and non-intentional.

Motivation, as we will see in the penultimate section of this chapter, will be identified by Husserl as the very foundation of the enactment of intentional life itself: that which establishes all meaningful acts, simple and complex, and which connects different acts among themselves. It is that which enables the internal constitution of a direct act of adequate as well as inadequate perception; it is that which enables the constitution of the more complex acts of judgment; but it is also that which enables the connection of different acts themselves (for example, as in the case of connected syllogisms).

It is important to acknowledge both aspects of the constitutive character of motivation: on the one hand, the dynamic, actively directing and referencing element of it, and on the other hand the affective, passive aspect of it, which already captures this foundational level of the spiritual self not as a solipsistic auto-affection, but rather as affected by something, or someone, other, an exteriority which motivates without this exteriority being reduced to nature: something that acknowledges the otherness of the constitution of the meaning of the “world” (or object) intended. As we will see, Husserl’s turn to the phenomenon of motivation signifies not just a turn in his phenomenology towards a genetic understanding of the “other-directed” character of spiritual life; it also achieves a certain overcoming of the otherwise strict “cognitivist perceptivist” approach, since, as we will see, motivation does not actually meet the strict epistemological criterion of “self-evidence” which sets the standards of scientificity and legitimizes intuition as the basis of the phenomenological science. Before we see how motivation gradually comes to the fore of Husserl’s analyses in Ideas I and, in particular, Ideas II, let us remind ourselves of the way it was defined, only to be immediately marginalized, in the Logical Investigations.

**Motivation in Logical Investigations**

The definition - and, by virtue of that very definition, the very marginalization of motivation - takes place in the First Logical Investigation, in which Husserl demarcates the area of
phenomenological science by making the essential, founding distinctions of his descriptive phenomenology. Husserl is after an identification of the ideal aspects of knowing by distinguishing between the temporal part of the act of knowing and the ideal part of knowing, i.e. ideal meaning, which is the intentional object. He therefore tries to clear the ground so as to enable the focus on acts that have ideal meanings and constitute “logic”, as opposed to those that don’t, and to focus on those ideal meanings themselves and the conditions that enable their fulfillment. The centre of phenomenological attention is therefore the “meaningful expression”: signs that express meaning. The distinction between meaning [Bedeutung] and expression [Ausdruck] must be maintained, since the former is the ideal intentional object, whereas the latter is the temporal manifold of the meaningful act; this distinction will constitute the cornerstone of his response to psychologism. But before Husserl picks up on meaningful expressions and embarks on the phenomenological analysis of them, he makes some other distinctions that are crucial to the study of motivation.

The first important distinction made is between indication [Anzeichen] and expression. Both expressions and indications are species of signs [Zeichen]. Signs that have the capacity to refer to an ideal meaning are expressions. But not all signs are expressive. Some of them are signs that indicate something without linguistically expressing something. These signs are not of interest to the project of the Logical Investigations because the “linguistic sign” is part of what enables Husserl to seek the foundation of scientific language, that is, of pure logic. Only meaningful expressions provide intuitive givenness that can qualify as scientific evidence [Evidenz] and is adequately “insightful” [Einsichtig].

The diagram below helps orient ourselves around the distinctions that Husserl makes.

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318 SLL pp. 103–104.
On the right hand side we have expressions and their essential characteristics: they are linguistic, they can have ideal meaning, and they are fulfilled through self-evidence. On the left hand side, we have indications: their essence is non-linguistic, they motivate belief in inapparent other being, and they are fulfilled via “felt” conviction. Bear in mind that while it is the essence of indications that is non-linguistic, as the schema shows, this does not imply that there cannot be any indications that are linguistic. It only means that even in the case of an indication that is enacted linguistically, the essence of the indicative relation would not lie in the linguistic part itself, but rather in the non-linguistic part of the indication.

Husserl does not offer a clear technical definition of what a sign is per se, but he does say that the most important characteristic of it is its capacity to refer to something other than itself. A sign is relational: it establishes a relation between that which appears in experience, be it linguistic (such as in meaningful expression) or non-linguistic (such as a gesture, picture,
generic symbol, etc.) and that *other* which is not itself given. Husserl does not offer a detailed account of the referencing aspect of signs in general, but gives an analysis of it for one kind of sign: the indication. The only definition of “referencing” we have is that of indicative reference, and that is where we find the operation of “motivation”:

In these we discover as a common circumstance the fact that certain objects or states of affairs *of whose reality someone has actual knowledge* indicate to him the reality of certain other objects or states of affairs, in the sense that *his belief in the reality of the one is experienced* (though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other. This relation of ‘motivation’ represents a *descriptive unity* among our acts of judgment in which indicating and indicated states of affairs become constituted for the thinker.

Upon analysing indication, we get an account of referencing, of *other-directedness*, which is established through *motivation*. To put it the other way around: *motivation is the way that referencing to an other being is achieved*. But because it is the way *indication* achieves its relations, Husserl does not pursue it further because he considers it “impure” and not based on intuitive evidence. Examples that Husserl gives are how Martian canals indicate the existence of intelligent beings on Mars, or how fossil vertebrae are signs of the existence of prediluvian animals.

What we have, therefore, in the phenomenon of indication, is a species of signification which is able to *motivate a belief* in a certain state-of-affairs, and/or motivate an other act of judgment which is not itself founded on intuitional evidence. Motivation is that which “connects”, that which establishes the relational togetherness [*Zusammenhang*] between different acts of judgment through the experience of “felt” togetherness, whereby the referent, the secondary judgment, is not itself based on intuitive givenness. Husserl writes that in indication the intuitively given state-of-affairs “A” summons an other state-of-affairs “B”, “but we usually *feel* their connection forcing itself upon us, a connection in which the one points to the other and seems to belong to it” [*Ruft A das B ins Bewußtsein, so sind beide nicht bloß*]

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321 D’Angelo 2013, p. 56.
322 SLI, p. 104. *[In ihnen finden wir nun als dieses Gemeinsame den Umstand, daß irgendwelche Gegenstände oder Sachverhalte, von deren Bestand Jemand aktuelle Kenntnis hat, ihm den Bestand gewisser anderer Gegenstände oder Sachverhalte in dem Sinne anzeigen, daß die Überzeugung von dem Sein der Einen von ihm als Motiv (und zwar als ein nichteinsichtiges Motiv) empfunden wird für die Überzeugung oder Vermutung vom Sein der Anderen].*
323 Ibid.
gleichzeitig oder nacheinander bewußt, sondern es pflegt sich auch ein fühlbarer Zusammenhang aufzudrängen, wonach eins auf das andere hinweist, dieses als zu jenem gehörig dasteht.]

Indication establishes a unity between the intuitively given state-of-affairs and the indicated, non-intuited states-of-affairs; and this commonality [Gemeinsamkeit], established through motivation, reaches into the realms of emotional phenomena [Gemütsphänomene] and phenomena of willing [Willensphänomene]. Thus, the binding unity that is afforded by motivation is not one that is found in ideal logical space given in intuition, but one that is afforded by a certain experiential “feeling” of unity between two acts.

But indication is not only an issue of non-linguistic signs, in which a certain state-of-affairs indicates, or motivates, the belief in another state-of-affairs that is unavailable to intuition, such as the presence of smoke indicating a fire behind that wall, i.e. the intuition of smoke motivating the belief in the being of a fire behind the wall. Indication also refers to the way beliefs are formed concerning subjective intentionality in the case of communicative speech acts, or non-verbal aspects of a communicative act, such as voluntary or involuntary gestures. That is, indication also includes the way a speech act can motivate a listener to form a belief concerning a state-of-affairs that cannot possibly be intuitively given, such as the case of a speech act indicating the state of mind of the speaker herself: her desire, willing, emotion, etc.

In this context, Philip Walsh offers the example of a speaker telling the hearer “Please pass the salt”. The act of desiring the salt belongs to the speaker and the desire cannot be directly intuited by the hearer, yet somehow the hearer experiences the speaker’s desire. This experience of one act of judgment connecting to another by indicating a state-of-affairs that is not, and cannot, itself be intuitively given, is enabled through motivation. It seems to me, therefore, that the subcategory of signs whose foundation is motivation, i.e. indications, is what pertains to the area of rhetoric, i.e. the phenomena of everyday language that has to do with doxa and pists and the unity of the speech act with the emotion and mood motivated in the

324 LI §4.
325 LI §3.
326 Walsh 2011, p. 74.
hearer. This is the area of language that is traditionally marginalized in favour of logic, because of the difference in the way truth is “given” and the stark difference in the demanded kind of evidence. Heidegger moved into a phenomenology of everyday logos, offering a hermeneutics of everydayness, and uncovered, through an Auseinandersetzung with Aristotle, the deep bond between motivation and affects (and moods), as these were operating in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Let us now see how Husserl further developed the notion of motivation in Ideas I and Ideas II.

**Motivation in Ideas I & II**

In Ideas I, Husserl does not offer a thematic analysis of motivation *per se*, but in the few instances that he does, it is already evident that a shift has taken place. He appeals to motivation in an interesting way in certain key instances, in order to appeal to *that which sets up the unity of experience*, the concatenation of experience out of which concepts and judgments are fashioned.\(^{327}\) Motivation is found at the very foundational kernel of the concatenated unity of experience [*Erfahrungszusammenhang*]:

*Experienceableness never means a mere logical possibility, but rather a possibility motivated in the concatenations of experience [*Erfahrungszusammenhänge*]. This concatenation [*Zusammenhang*] itself is, through and through, one of “motivation,” always taking into itself new motivations and recasting those already formed. With respect to their apprehension-contents or determination-contents, the motivations differ, are more or less rich, are more or less definite or vague in content depending on whether it is a matter of physical things which are already “known” or “completely unknown,” “still undiscovered” or in the case of the seen physical thing, whether it is a matter of what is known or unknown about it. It is exclusively a matter of the *essential structures* of such concatenations which, with respect to all their possibilities, can be made the objects of a purely eidetic exploration.*\(^{328}\)

In Ideas I, Husserl speaks about how each kind of act “comes together” with an appropriate, correlative object. He speaks of the noematic and the noetic having a certain *unity*, and he appeals to motivation in order to explain how the interconnection of the noetic and the noematic is achieved. For example, an act of perception, which is in the originally presentive

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327 Ideas I, §47.
mode, will have an appropriate and compatible noema corresponding to the noesis, and the fulfilment of the being of the noema will be achieved in a particular way that belongs to this complex. Likewise, an act of imagination will have its own set of noesis and noema, act and object. To each act “belongs” a correlative being and way of fulfilment.

The fulfilled noematic being is motivated by the noetic: for Husserl, in the case that fulfillment is achieved through evidence, the originary relation between the posited and the positing is achieved through motivation that results from originary givenness.329 Motivation indicates this phenomenological effective relation by virtue of which fulfilment (i.e. truth) is enacted. In Husserl’s words: “The word motivation is particularly suited to the relation between the (noetic) positing and the noematic positum in its mode of fulfilledness.”330

We must highlight the dramatic change in Husserl’s position as regards the notion and operation of motivation. As previously noted, in the Logical Investigations Husserl does not ascribe any kind of scientific importance to the notion of motivation, since he takes it to be the way the “other-directedness” of indication is established - indication being, because of its impurity, a non-scientific way of signification (as it is not based on intuitive evidence, as expressions are). In this context, one can distinguish the two sides, indication and expression, as involving a distinction between “pure logic” and “rhetoric”. In Ideas I, however, Husserl seems to change his mind and approach. His transcendental turn, which already carries within it an intention to provide a deeper genetic account of logic itself, takes motivation to have a central role in the very genesis of “logos”. In other words, his appeal to motivation is part and parcel of a phenomenological critique of logic itself, which he had not supplied in the Logical Investigations. And in this context, he appeals to motivation in order to explain how logic and rational structures emerge.

Looking at the 1910 programmatic text ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’ can help us to better contextualize Husserl’s realization of how phenomenology can, and must, offer a critique of reason - something that he tries to do in Ideas I through the phenomenon of motivation. In

329 Ideas I, p. 328.
330 Ideas I, p. 328.
the beginning of that essay, in the context of articulating philosophy as systematic and scientifically rigorous, he argues against the degeneration of philosophy into doctrines and worldviews [Weltanschauungen]. Philosophy must be self-critical and presuppose nothing. In this regard, Husserl commends Descartes, Kant and Fichte for realizing the critical impulses of science.  

However, he criticizes Hegel, whom he characterizes as “romantic”, for failing to provide “a critique of reason, which is the foremost prerequisite for being scientific in philosophy”. It is this critique that Husserl tries to provide in Part Four of Ideas I, entitled “Reason and Actuality” [Vernunft und Wirklichkeit].

In Chapter Two of Part Four, entitled “Phenomenology of Reason”, Husserl analyses rational objects, objects whose truth and actual givenness is grounded in rationality, and says that the spoken expression, the logical statement, must be something which can be rationally demonstrated. Husserl speaks about how a posited, rational, noematic characteristic is fulfilled if and only if an originarily presentive sense is given. The grounding of rational expression in the phenomenon given is explained in terms of “belongingness”: the emergent rational position [Setzung] that corresponds to the expression “belongs” [gehört] to that which is given, in the sense that it is “one” with the presentified (given) object/state-of-affairs. This “belonging” is then further explained in terms of motivation: the rational position belongs to the given in the sense that it is “motivated” by the appearing, that is, “rationally motivated”.

Husserl argues that intellectual seeing, evidence of any kind, is “the unity of a rational position with that which essentially motivates the position – this whole situation being understandable as noetic and also as noematic”. Thus, Husserl holds that if we are to look at how rationality, logos, is fulfilled, we need to look at the motivation by virtue of which the noetic and the noematic are unified. But apart from the cases of fulfillment, Husserl is also interested in instances in which conditions of fulfillment are not met, i.e. when evidence is not


332 Ibid.

333 Ideas I, p. 326.

334 Ideas I, p. 327.

335 Ideas I, p. 328.

336 Ibid.
ideal. According to Husserl, the issue of fulfillment is not one of an absolute either/or, that is, either we have knowledge or nothing at all: there are various degrees in evidentiary weight, and these degrees are also analyzed in terms of motives and, as he says, “counter motives” [“Gegenmotive”], such as in the case of conflicting or rival appearances.\(^{337}\)

As Husserl digs deeper into the structure of intentional life, the life of the spirit, the truth of logos, exploring the unity that is at the foundation of epistemic fulfillment, he uncovers the constitutive phenomenon of motivation: motivation is that which sets up the unity of experience, the concatenation of experience out of which concepts and judgments are fashioned. Motivation is that which enables the interconnection, the concatenation [Zusammenhang] of spiritual life. But what is this Zusammenhang and what is its significance?

Before the final part of this chapter, in which I present Husserl’s influential (in Heidegger’s case) analysis of motivation in Ideas II, it would be useful to provide an excursus that focuses on the Husserlian notion of Zusammenhang,\(^{338}\) in order to see its role in the unity of experience and in science itself, since it is precisely this characteristic that brings motivation to the centre of phenomenological attention following the “genetic turn”.

**Excursus: Zusammenhang as science**

As noted above, in the Logical Investigations the notion of motivation is marginalized as it is connected to the phenomenon of indication, which cannot afford scientific evidence. However, the notion of Zusammenhang, which is later identified by Husserl as being constituted by motivation, appears to have a central role with respect to the very definition of science itself, as early as the time of the Logical Investigations. The very definition and legitimacy of science itself will turn out to lie in the way it establishes (identifies) necessary unities, i.e. interconnections, between objects and their respective fulfilling acts. But let us see what Husserl writes on Zusammenhang.

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337 Ibid.
338 There is no consensus on how to translate the word. It is variably translated into English as “interconnection”, “concatenation” or “nexus”. Each of these English words brings out a different aspect, and the pertinent implications, involved in the notion of Zusammenhang. For this reason, I prefer to leave the word untranslated.
In the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl lays down the criteria of what makes science *science*. In Chapter 11, entitled “The idea of Pure Logic”, Husserl states that what makes a science science [*Wissenschaft*] is the establishing of an ideal interconnection which gives acts a unitary objective relevance and an ideal validity [*ein gewisser objektiver oder idealer Zusammenhang, der ihnen einheitliche gegenständliche Beziehung und in dieser Einheitlichkeit auch ideale Geltung verschafft*]. In science a particular unity of *interconnection* obtains and is expressed. However, not every unity, or “putting together of truths”, is a science. A certain unified, demonstrated interconnection must be in place in order for knowledge to be scientific; thus unity must be *grounded in demonstration*, in the sense of having the *interconnection* of these truths manifested as *necessary* - something that would elevate the interconnection to the status of a *law*. This necessary unity given through interconnection is twofold: on the one hand, it pertains to the interconnections of the “things”, i.e. the states-of-affairs; on the other hand, it pertains to the interconnections of truths. Both of them are given *a priori* and are inseparable, even though they are not *identical* (cf. the four definitions of truth in the Sixth Logical Investigation). In Husserl’s own words:

Two meanings can be attached to this objective interconnection [*dem objektiven Zusammenhang*] which ideally pervades scientific thought, and which gives ‘unity’ to such thought, and so to science as such: it can be understood as an *interconnection of the things* [*der Zusammenhang der Sachen*] to which our thought-experiences (actual or possible) are intentionally directed, or, on the other hand, as an *interconnection of truths* [*der Zusammenhang der Wahrheiten*], in which this unity of things comes to count objectively as being what it is. These two things are given together *a priori*, and are mutually inseparable. […] What hold of single truths, or single states of affairs, plainly also holds of interconnections of truths or of states of affairs [*Offenbar gilt dasselbe, was von einzelnen Wahrheiten, bzw. Sachverhalten gilt, auch von einzelnen Wahrheiten, bzw. von Sachverhalten*]. This self-evident inseparability is not, however, identity. In these truths or interconnections of truths the actual existence of things and of interconnections of things [*Zusammenhänge der Sachen*] finds expression. But the interconnections of truths [*Wahrheitszusammenhänge*] differ from the interconnections of things, which are “truly” in the former.341

339 LI (1), §62.
340 LI (1), §63.
341 LI(1), pp. 144-145.
In this early account of *Zusammenhang*, Husserl seems to refer to the way things themselves are interconnected, giving a *static* account which does not pertain to the interconnection between the truths and the things themselves, the nexus that internally unifies the act of expression and the nexus that unifies (i.e. holds) for the corresponding states-of-affairs. Husserl will later expand the notion of *Zusammenhang* into a more *dynamic* notion that will describe the way the two sides of intentional relation, i.e. the expressive part of the act and the objective side of the act, relate to one another, *come together* and mutually belong to each other in the form of interconnection [*Zusammenhang*]. Even though Husserl did not dwell on the notion of *Zusammenhang* in the *Logical Investigations*, the notion retained its centrality after the transcendental turn.

In ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’, Husserl notes how psychology’s task involves the exploration of the psychophysical nexuses of nature. Psychology discovers the laws that determine the way psychophysical nexuses are caused, come into being and disappear. According to Husserl, psychology indeed studies the *Zusammenhang* of the psyche, and in that respect it is a science. But it does so from a naturalistic standpoint and thus falls prey to *Weltanschauung*. It seems therefore that here Husserl is starting to think of *Zusammenhang* generally as the interconnection that concerns not just things-themselves, *die Sachen selbst*, but that *continuum* which permeates the attitude and the truth and things that correspond to it, in the genetic sense (cf. Heidegger’s interpretation of ἔκςεις as continuum). Thus, psychology is able to reveal the lawfulness of the interconnections that concern psychophysicality and, as we’ll see, phenomenology will be the *Urwissenschaft* that studies the psychical interconnections from a different attitude.

The problem with empirical psychology is that it is deceived into adopting a scientific method that is “modelled on that of the physicochemical method”, and thus “suffers from a false

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342 PRS, p. 171.
343 Ibid: “It is the task of psychology to explore this psychic element scientifically within the psychophysical nexus of nature (the nexus in which, without question, it occurs), to discover the laws according to which it develops and changes, comes into being and disappears.” [*Dieses Psychische nun, im psycho-physischen Naturzusammenhang, in dem es selbstverständlich da ist, wissenschaftlich erforschen, es objektiv gültig bestimmen, die Gesetzmäßigkeiten seines sich Bildens und sich Umbildens, seines Kommens und Gehens entdecken, das ist die Aufgabe der Psychologie*].
imitation” that reifies consciousness.\textsuperscript{344} This means that subjective, conscious appearances are treated in a naturalistic, spatiotemporal way, as having real properties - something that also determines the interconnection characteristic of the lawfulness of this unity as one of spatiotemporal causality. In Husserl’s own words:

\[T\]hey stand there as temporal unities of enduring or changing properties, and they stand there as incorporated in the totality of one corporeal world that binds them all together, with its one space and its one time. They are what they are only in this unity; only in the causal relation to or interconnection with each other do they retain their individual identity (substance), and this they retain as that which carries “real properties.” All physically real properties are causal. Every corporeal being is subject to laws of possible changes, and these laws concern the identical, the thing, not by itself but in the unified, actual, and possible totality of the one nature. Each physical thing has its nature (as the totality of what it, the identical, is) by virtue of being the union point of causalities within the one all-nature.\textsuperscript{345}

The important claim here is how Zusammenhang is a requirement for science, a criterion with reference to which it is decided whether a study constitutes a science or not. Even though not every Zusammenhang signifies a science, every science identifies a Zusammenhang: a structural law that interconnects things. As seen in the above quotes, science is defined in terms of its being able to reveal unity in the acquired knowledge. Psychology is a science because it studies such structures. The area of each science is then defined in terms of the kinds of conscious structures it occupies, studies, orders and reveals, and the respective objects of knowledge that belong to these structures. The implication here is that all types of consciousness that qualify as “knowledge” are grouped in accordance with object categories and (each) science studies the essential connection [Wesenzusammenhang] and relation between the object categories and the forms of consciousness, as given, belonging to them.\textsuperscript{346}

\textsuperscript{344} Ibid, p. 178.
\textsuperscript{346} Ibid, p. 173. In the original: “Alle Bewußtseinsarten, so wie sie sich unter dem Titel ’Erkenntnis’ sozusagen teleologisch ordnen und, näher, sich den verschiedenen Gegenstandes-Kategorien gemäß gruppieren - als die ihnen
Psychology indeed counts as a science of the psyche, but falls into the trap of reducing the lawfulness of psychical interconnections to the level of psychophysicality and natural causality. Phenomenology, in contrast, studies phenomena that do not have “substantial unity”, that have no “real properties”, no real parts, changes nor are subject to causality. Phenomenology studies the interconnections, the *Zusammenhänge*, and the unity of judgments that have adequate experiences (i.e. adequate givenness of states-of-affairs): what is contained in the experience of essences, and “how essences of a certain genus or particularity are connected with others” [mit gewissen anderen zusammenhängen] – how, for example, “intuition” and “empty intention,” “imagination” and “perception,” “concept” and “intuition” unite with each other [mit einander vereinigen], and how on the basis of such necessarily “unifiable” essential components “intention” and “fulfillment” come together. Husserl does not explicitly supply a connection between *Zusammenhang* and motivation - he will do in detail in *Ideas II*. However, a few pages later in the same text, in the context of addressing historicism, he approvingly addresses the important discoveries of Dilthey’s historicist approach as regards the “motivations and unities of structures” of spiritual life. Husserl commends Dilthey’s discoveries for supplying a kind of insight into the motivations of historical spirit, thus enabling “understanding” [Verstehen], explication [Erklärung], and the being peculiar to it [seiner Eigenart des “Seins”] to be relived from within in their structural togetherness. This is how Husserl puts it:

> Whatever seems to be enduring is but a stream of development. If by interior intution we enter vitally into the unity of spirit-life [die Einheit des Geisteslebens], we can get a feeling for the motivations at play therein and consequently “understand” [“verstehen”] the essence and development of the spiritual structure in question, in its dependence on a spiritually motivated

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350 Ibid.
unity and development. In this manner everything historical becomes for us “understandable,” “explicable,” in the “being” peculiar to it [in seiner Eigenart des “Seins”], which is precisely “spiritual being,” [das eben “geistiges Sein”] a unity of interiorly self-questioning moments of a sense and at the same time a unity of intelligible structuration and development according to inner motivation. […] With a view to such a philosophy there arises the enormous task of thoroughly investigating its morphological structure and typology as well as its developmental connections and of making historically understandable the spiritual motivations that determine its essence, be reliving them from within. That there are significant and in fact wonderful things to be accomplished from this point of view is shown by W. Dilthey’s writings […].

Husserl here does not offer a clear or systematic appraisal of Dilthey’s insights, and thus we cannot be sure which of them Husserl identifies with and is ready to take on board. For example, we know that later on, in Ideas II, he will follow up on some of the notions he mentions here and directly appropriate the notion of motivation and the way it relates to the constitution of the interconnection and unity of spiritual life. This much we know. But he seems to hesitate about the notion of “being” and “historicity”. This hesitation should not come as a surprise since in this text Husserl’s positive remarks on Dilthey are already qualified by the former’s reservations concerning the latter’s failings: Husserl believed that an historicism, such as Dilthey’s, even though it offers remarkable and important insights into the unity of spirit-life, and even though it is not a naturalistic approach, still falls prey to scepticism because it does not believe in universal and absolute validity. However, what we must note in these references to Dilthey is the way Husserl commends Dilthey’s work for (vaguely) bringing together Motivation and Zusammenhang. Husserl himself will finally – for the first time – make clear the connection between Zusammenhang and Motivation in Ideas II. Our excursus on Zusammenhang ends here, and we can return to the issue of Motivation as it appears in Ideas II – the last part of this chapter and of this study’s direct engagement with Husserl.

351 Ibid, p. 186. In the original: “Alles scheinbar Feste ist ein Strom der Entwicklung. Leben wir uns durch innerliche Intuition ein in die Einheit des Geisteslebens, so können wir die in ihm waltenden Motivationen nachfühlen und damit auch Wesen und Entwicklung der jeweiligen Geistegestalt in ihrer Abhängigkeit von den geistigen Einheits- und Entwicklungsmotiven “verstehen”. In dieser Art wird uns alles Historische “verständlich”, “erklärlich”, in seiner Eigenart des “Seins”, das eben “geistiges Sein”, Einheit innerlich sich fordernder Momente eines Sinnes ist und dabei Einheit des sich sinngemäß nach innerer Motivation Gestaltens und Entwickelns. […] Es ergibt sich also im Hinblick auf solche Philosophie die große Aufgabe, die morphologische Struktur, die Typik derselben, sowie ihre Entwicklungszusammenhänge zu durchforschen und durch innerstes Nachleben die ihr Wesen bestimmenden Geistesmotivationen zu historischem Verständnis zu bringen."

Motivation as the ground of the unity of intentional experience

Husserl provides a rather comprehensive analysis of Motivation in Section Three of Ideas II, entitled “The Constitution of the Spiritual World”. Husserl again begins by marking the area of phenomenological analysis, in contrast to the area of naturalistic explanation and the terms that come with the naturalistic attitude. In §48 he distinguishes between soul and spirit, upon which the opposition between nature and world of spirit depends.\textsuperscript{353} He contrasts the natural-scientific theory of the soul with the theory of the person (Ego, Egology) that phenomenology offers.

Husserl notes that this distinction is crucial for phenomenology, and he –again, as in the essay ‘Phenomenology as Rigorous Science’ - commends Dilthey for having recognized and put forward the position that modern psychology, being a “natural science of the psychic”, is incapable of providing the foundation for the specific essence of the concrete human sciences.\textsuperscript{354} Husserl here introduces the notion of the “personalistic attitude”, which is the phenomenological attitude that brings into relief the constitution of the phenomenological ego, and the deep phenomenon of Motivation, which constitutes the unity of spiritual life. Once we change attitude and replace the naturalistic attitude with the personalistic attitude, then we get access to the unity of spiritual life, the grounding unity of the interconnectedness of intentional life qua Motivation. It is noteworthy how in this context Husserl uses the notion “personalistic attitude” [personalistische Einstellung] interchangeably with “motivational attitude”[Motivationseinstellung] and the practical attitude. This is important because in a certain sense this analysis, and the continuity between the personalistic, the motivational and the practical, anticipates Heidegger’s own shift towards the personalistic (in his phenomenological analyses of religious life, as it is performed as an encounter with Augustine and Luther) and the practical (in his phenomenological encounter with Aristotle).

Motivation will be revealed as the fundamental law of spiritual life. It will be found to be the ground of the unity of spiritual experience, the experiential unity and interconnection of

\textsuperscript{353} Ideas II, p.181.
\textsuperscript{354} In Husserl’s words: “In the first rank Dilthey has here earned for himself everlasting merit. It was he who for the first time recognized the essential distinction here and first reached a lively awareness of the fact that modern psychology, being a natural science of the psychic, is incapable of providing for the concrete human sciences the scientific foundation they require according to their specific essence” (Ibid, §48, p.181).
intentional life, that which genetically explains the way the ego, the person, is able to achieve knowledge of objects and states-of-affairs. It is the ground upon which the transcendence of the “other-directedness” of intentionality is based. In this context, motivation will be that “stimulating cause” that drives intentionality. In Husserl’s own words:

[I]f we place ourselves on the terrain of the intentional relation between subject and Object, the relation between person and surrounding world, then the concept of stimulus acquires a fundamentally new sense. Instead of the causal relation between things and men as natural realities, there is substituted the relation of motivation [Motivationsbeziehung] between persons and things, and these things are not the things of nature, existing in themselves—i.e., the things of exact natural science with the determinations claimed there to be the only Objectively true ones—but are experienced, thought, or in some other way intended and posited things as such, intentional objects of personal consciousness. […] Phenomenologically, the unities of things (the noematic unities) are points of departure for more or less “strong” tendencies [“starken” Tendenzen]. Already as conscious but not yet grasped (hovering in the background of consciousness), they draw the subject to themselves, and if the “stimulating power” is sufficient, the Ego “follows” the stimulus, “gives in” and turns in that direction [es “gibt nach” und wendet sich zu]. Then the Ego exercises on these things explicating, conceiving, theoretically judging, evaluating, and practical activities. They now engage its interest in their being and their attributes, in their beauty, agreeableness, and usefulness; they stimulate its desire to delight in them [sie erregen sein Begehren sie zu genießen], play with them, use them as a means, transform them according to its purposes, etc. They then function in ever new strata as stimuli for its being active (and also, not to neglect the negative, for its being passive). Besides, the subject of motivation can at one time yield to the stimuli and at another time resist them. All these are phenomenological relations which can be found and described only in the purely intentional sphere. In a very broad sense, we can also denote the personal or motivational attitude as the practical attitude [In einem weitesten Sinn können wir die personale oder Motivationseinstellung auch als die praktische bezeichnen]: that is, what we have here is always the active or passive Ego and indeed in the proper intrinsic sense.  

In Chapter Two, entitled “Motivation As The Fundamental Law Of The Spiritual World” [Motivation als Grundgesetz der geistigen Welt], Husserl identifies the dynamic character of the constitutional ground of intentional life through analyzing Motivation in terms of “passivity” and “activity”. In this respect, Motivation captures both aspects of the originally subjective Ego: both the “active” and the “passive”. We never have one without the

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other. As Husserl says, “the Ego is always passive at the same time whenever is active”, and activity always includes a minimal level of “receptivity”, that is, “affectivity”. 357

By describing Motivation, the deep phenomenon of the constitutive lawfulness of spiritual life, as both active and passive, Husserl resolved the problem of determining the deep structure of the Ego in the restricted sense that Pfänder had adopted. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Pfänder determined the Ego, the “Ich”, as a willing whose enactment [Vollzug] is a “conscious projection” that is delimited by “blind striving and counterstriving”. In this respect, willing has a motive and is not a simple blind striving; rather willing is the internal force that moves the “Ich”. Pfänder’s account of motivation and the will is naturalistic and also based on a dichotomy that Husserl finds too restrictive in the way it addresses spiritual movement [Bewegung] as it consolidates the “inside-outside” structure. Husserl’s account of Motivation emancipates the accounts of spirit from naturalism but also from the “conscious”-“unconscious” (i.e. blind) dichotomy.

Husserl’s introduction of the notion of motivation undermines the very “active-passive” dichotomy on various levels. One of the ways it does this is through a reframing of intentionality itself as a mutual, dynamic relation between the subject and the object: intentionality is not a mere “active” positing whereby the subject posits the object, but also the subject is affected by the intentional object. Thus, Husserl writes how “the subject comports

357 The exact wording is this: “Therefore we find, as the originally and specifically subjective, the Ego in the proper sense, the Ego of ‘freedom,’ the attending, considering, comparing, distinguishing, judging, valuing, repulsed, inclined, disinclined, desiring, and willing Ego: the Ego that in any sense is ‘active’ and takes a position [stellungsnehmende Ich].” This, however, is only one side. Opposed to the active Ego stands the passive, and the Ego is always passive at the same time whenever it is active, in the sense of being affected as well as being receptive [sowohl im Sinn von affektiv als rezeptiv], which of course does not exclude the possibility of its being sheer passivity [bloß passiv]. To be sure, the very sense of the expression, “receptivity,” includes a lowest level of activity even if not the genuine freedom of active position-taking [Freiheit der tätigen Stellungnahme]. The “passive” Ego (in a second sense) is then also subjective in the original sense as the Ego of “tendencies,” [das Ich der ‘Tendenzen’] the Ego that experiences stimulation from things and appearances, is attracted, and simply yields to the attractive force. In addition, the “states” of the Ego [die ‘Zustände des Ich’] are subjective as well, states of the mourning, of cheerfulness, of passive desire, and of renouncing as a state [Zustände der Trauer, der Fröhlichkeit, passives Begehren, Entsetzung als Zustand]. “Being touched” [Das ‘Betroffenwerden’] as originating in a tiding is something subjective whose source is the Object; to “react” against, to revolt against, or to pull oneself together is something subjective whose source is the subject. From the properly subjective (the Ego itself and its comportment [Verhalten])—both the active as well as the passive—we must now distinguish, on the one hand, the objective, that over and against which the Ego comports itself [verhält] actively or passively, and, on the other hand, the material substratum of “stuff” upon which this comportment [Verhalten] is built. For in any life of consciousness whatsoever the stratum of position-taking [Stellungnahmen], of acts in general, is built upon substrata [Unterschichten].” Ibid, pp. 224-225.
itself [verhält sich] toward the Object, and the Object stimulates or motivates the subject […]

The Object ‘intrudes on the subject’. 358

**Motivation as pre-intentional unity**

But Husserl’s analysis here not only pertains to intentional subjectivity; it not only introduces an aspect of passivity in the subject-object relation, but it goes deeper into grasping the non-intentional and pre-intentional aspects of spiritual life. The problem of the “active-passive”, “conscious-unconscious” dichotomy can also be grasped from another perspective: the opposition between “intentional-non-intentional” spiritual experience, which ultimately leads back to the issue of “understanding”. If the ground of the enactment of understanding, i.e. motivation, is grasped as a “pure activity”, then understanding itself will be restricted to consciousness and intentionality: understanding and spiritual life in general are restricted to intentional acts. Husserl’s account of motivation, however, includes passivity, and thus his account of the ground of intentional life includes non-intentional levels, levels of passivity. The twofold nature of motivation in Husserl makes it possible to account for the intertwining aspects in the spiritual sphere: the rational and the irrational, the active and the passive (or affective), the intentional and the non-intentional. Motivation is thus a structure, a foundational stratum, of position-taking, the background of “understanding” which is neither active nor passive but both at the same time.

Husserl describes the way into the stratum of the Ego and intentional life thus:

> Running backwards through the strata of the constitution of the thing, we arrive finally at the data of sensation as the ultimate, primitive, primal objects, no longer constituted by any kind of Ego-activity whatsoever but, in the most pregnant sense of the term, *pregivennesses* for all of the Ego’s operations. They are “subjective,” but they are *not states or acts of the Ego*; rather, they are *what is had by the Ego*, the Ego’s first “subjective possession” [die erste „subjektive Habe” des Ich]. 359

> Husserl uncovers a deeper structure of subjectivity that subsists “beneath” the Ego, which he indicates as the “having” of the Ego that is not posited by it through acts, but is an

358 Ibid, p. 231.
already existing “comportment” [Verhaltung] that is pre-given. It is at this level, and from within this perspective and way of grasping the deep structure of the spiritual life of the subject, that the notion of Motivation is to be analyzed. Husserl here is explicitly moving away from a “phenomenology of the cogito” and offers an account of pre-reflective structures that are grasped once one abandons Egology and grasps spiritual life from the perspective of comportment and “having”. This is indeed close to Aristotle’s account of the self and the intellect qua ἐξε (habit). Let us conclude this section by going into some more detail concerning what Husserl says about Motivation.

In §55 Husserl explicitly identifies motivation as the fundamental lawfulness of spiritual life: we speak of the spiritual or personal Ego, the subject of intentionality; “we see that motivation is the lawfulness of the life of the spirit.” He then goes on to provide thematic analyses of how motivation forms the fundamental structure of various aspects of spiritual life. He describes the “motivation of reason” which pertains to the way perceptions motivate judgments and the way judgments are justified and verified in experience: how the attribution of a predicate is confirmed by the concordant experience of it, how being in contradiction with experience motivates a cancelling negation and how a judgment is motivated by another judgment. He also writes about how surmises or questions are motivated, how feelings, desirings, willings are motivated, and how position-takings in general are motivated. Husserl explicitly says that it is precisely here that the instance of logical grounding belongs: logical assertions and the full-lived experiences have “a connection of motivation”.

Apart from the analysis of rational life in terms of motivation, Husserl also analyses association and habit: the entire realm of associations and habits fits in the area of spiritual life constituted by motivation. Here it is not a matter of a motivation of logical position-takings by other position-takings (active theses by active theses), as is the case of motivations of reason, but of lived experiences of any sort whatsoever. Motivation of association is not active position-taking, motivated directly by another active position-taking. Rather, it concerns passive

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360 Ibid, p. 231.
apperceptive unities that are not accomplishments of reason per se, but which refer to the apperceptive unity motivated by “psychic grounds” that belong to the sphere of passivity, some of which are a-rational.\footnote{Ibid, p. 234.}

Motivation of association and habit is a “passive motivation” that is explained in terms of tendency: once a connection is formed in the stream of consciousness, we then have a tendency for a newly emerging connection similar to the previous one: the tendency to continue in the direction of similarity, and to strive towards completion in a nexus similar to the previous one. Association is a law of motivation that concerns existential positings.\footnote{Ibid, p. 235.} Husserl also describes these demands for complementary existential positings as demands of reason: as rational motivations that can also extend to taking up positions of belief, feeling and will. Thus, it seems to me that Husserl’s critique of reason here tries to reground reason in the multifaceted phenomenon of lived experience. It is a critique of reason that brings rational life back to the dynamic way that life expresses itself; it implies bringing reason back together with belief, feeling and will.

Husserl also speaks of how motives “are often deeply buried but can be brought to light by ‘psychoanalysis’ […] In some cases it can be perceived. In most cases, however, the motivation is actually present in consciousness, but it does not stand out; it is unnoticed or unnoticeable (‘unconscious’)”.\footnote{Ibid, p. 235.} Again, this is important to note, since this is reminiscent of what Heidegger will later say concerning moods: a mood can be there, can be “had”, but be “asleep” and in need of being “awoken”. This is also consistent with the hermeneutic intricacies involved in addressing the pre-reflective, non-objective aspects of experience, the way they are always already there and yet either unnoticed or even denied on the conscious level.

Husserl extends his analysis of motivation on various levels and facets of spiritual life, but we do not need to get into all of them here, as the ones covered suffice for the purposes of this investigation. Let us now turn to the last part of this chapter in which I address Husserl’s account of feeling and mood, and show that it is Husserl’s account of Motivation that is a
precursor to Heidegger’s account of affective phenomena, rather than Husserl’s account of affective acts, since Husserl, up to the 30s, maintained that affective acts are *founded* (derivative), not founding.

**IV. Feeling [Gefühl] as founded act, founded on presentive acts**

Husserl’s views on the “affective” and his phenomenology of mood are not compatible with Heidegger’s own understanding of mood, since mood for Heidegger is what *grounds* philosophical understanding in general. Mood is a founding level of spiritual being and understanding that fundamentally discloses the worldhood of the world and that, as said in the previous chapter, provides the necessary bindingness and direction of phenomenological understanding itself.

The Husserlian notions of feeling [Gefühl], emotion [Gemüt] and affective phenomena generally, are *founded*, and hence derivative forms of intentionality, whose *foundation* is *presentive* intentionality and whose *truth* is expressed in *propositional judgments* that have corresponding *states of affairs* [Sachverhalten]. Husserl saw the relation of founded emotional intentions [Gefühle] to foundational states-of-affairs as analogous to the relation between founded value-laden affairs [Wertverhalten] and states-of-affairs: both Wertverhalten and Gefühle are founded acts.

Husserl’s commitment to the epoché led to the prioritization of *originary presentive intuition* [originär gebende Anschauung].366 Husserl took the presentive level of intentional acts to be founding, and he took intentional acts of feeling and value to be *founded*. But his position that acts of feeling are founded acts was not shaped after his explicit adoption of the epoché; it was a position he already held in the *Logical Investigations*. Husserl’s treatment of feeling [Gefühl] takes place in the context of his analysis of intentionality in the *Fifth Logical Investigation*. Husserl seems to uncritically accept Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena, that is, intentional acts, into “presentations”, “judgments” and “emotions”.367 Even though Husserl acknowledges significant differences between these kinds of acts, the fact

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367 LI, p. 96.
remains that to him there exists a relationship of sedimentation and dependence between the acts, which is to say that some kinds of acts depend, or presuppose, another kind; thus we have founding acts and founded acts. In this context, emotional acts are founded; Husserl explicitly says that “[e]motional intentions are built upon presentive or judging intentions” [*Gemütsintentionen bauen sich auf Vorstellungs- oder Urteilsintentionen*].

Husserl’s analysis of feeling is an attempt to defend two claims: firstly, that acts of feeling are, as I already said, founded acts; but equally importantly, that acts of feeling are also different acts from the pertinent founding act. Husserl’s distinction between acts of feeling from presentive acts in this context is meant to provide a response to Natorp’s ascription of the richness and multiplicity of consciousness exclusively to the contents of it, marginalizing the importance of the act itself. Thus, Husserl draws attention to the various types of acts and their correlative objects (or states-of-affairs) in trying to show that “feeling” is not just something that belongs to the subjective side of the act, but is part of the richness to be found both in the intentional content as well as its corresponding act. Husserl here counters those who question the intentionality of feeling, holding that feelings are mere states, not intentions, not acts [*Gefühle sind bloße Zustände, nicht Akte, Intentionen*], and that feelings owe their relation to a “complication” with presentation.

Husserl takes this position to be one for which feeling itself does not add anything qualitatively different to the intentional content itself or have any inherently intentional qualities: the intention is one and the same, and feeling is not an essential part of the act or the intentional content. So in order to defend the position that the richness of the content of the intentional act is co-formed by the act itself, Husserl adopts Brentano’s position that acts of feeling are indeed intentional acts, but they are different acts from presentive acts. Thus, in trying to argue for the importance of feeling as part of the intended object, as part of the “content” of the intentional act, Husserl ends up preserving the Brentanian ordering of the

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368 Ibid, p. 97.
various kinds of intentional acts, relegating the act of feeling and its intended object to one of derivative status compared to the founding presentive sensuous act.

In the context of that first reference to “experiences of the genus ‘feeling’ [Gefühl]”, Husserl asks whether intentionality is only accidentally and unnecessarily a part of this class of experiences or whether it is an essential part. The crux of the problem pertains to the issue of whether intentionality only belongs to the founding presentive level of the act, upon which the feeling is then added - something that would mean that the feeling is epiphenomenal to the foundational essence of the intentional act: the presentation. This question arises because, as Husserl himself holds, some experiences have intentionality and some don’t, and he himself identifies the non-intentional level of acts as consisting of “sensory feeling” [Empfindung], something that indeed sounds like feeling but is not the same phenomenon as feeling.

The problem here is one of equivocation, says Husserl. Husserl is forced to highlight the distinction between sensory-feeling and intentional feeling. The former concerns non-intentional sensory experiences, that is, physical experiences, such as the experience of pain from burning oneself or being burnt. Sensory-feelings do not belong to the same class of phenomena as the class of feeling; rather, they belong “among tactual, gutatory, olfactory, and other sensations”, even though we do indeed in both cases speak of “feelings”. The sphere of feeling-acts is analogous to the sphere of desire and volition, argues Husserl, having a feeling is a complex, founded act, whose unity lies precisely in its intentional reference, and its richness is not alongside the act but precisely in it.

Husserl gives the example of joy [Freude] and sorrow [Unfreude] as feelings that are indeed always intentional, are always about something. In speaking about joy we can also speak of lustful pleasure [lustvolles Wohlgefallen] in something, and instead of sorrow we can speak

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373 Ibid, p. 110.
374 Ibid, p. 111.
375 Ibid, p. 115.
of a painful dislike, aversion, etc., an alternative way of addressing the act that reveals its intentional, relational, structure.\textsuperscript{376}

A feeling is \textit{essentially} intentional as it is a relational phenomenon. As Husserl writes, “\textit{[p]leasure without anything pleasurable is unthinkable […] because the specific essence of pleasure demands a relation to something pleasing.}”\textsuperscript{377}

But despite Husserl’s ascription of epistemic significance to feeling, and despite the fact that he appears to be interested in a fully-fledged phenomenological account of feeling that would include \textit{the way acts of feeling are fulfilled}, something that he does not manage in the end, he still remains committed to the Brentanian view that feeling acts are \textit{not founding acts}, but founded acts, having presentations as their foundations. As for Brentano, so for Husserl: one can have a founding intention of a presented object without having feeling, but not the other way around.\textsuperscript{378} The point here is that we have two different acts, and the fact that the feeling act is a founded act, founded upon the founding presentative act, does not mean that the latter \textit{produces} the former.\textsuperscript{379} But despite providing arguments against treating feeling as an epiphenomenon, Husserl does not provide a clear account of how exactly the act of feeling is constituted. He is clear, however, in saying that the presentative part and the judgment part of the act are fundamental to the act of feeling in the sense that they constitute the \textit{ground for the act}. In his own words:

\begin{quote}
On such a structured act (whose members may themselves be further structured) a new act may be built, e.g. a joy may be built on the assertion of a state of affairs, a joy \textit{in} that state of affairs. The joy is not a concrete act in its own right, and the judgment as act set beside it: the judgment rather underlies the joy, fixes its content, realizes its abstract possibility for, without some such foundation, there could be no joy at all. Judgements may similarly serve as foundations for surmises, doubts, questions, wishes, acts of will, etc., and the latter acts may likewise serve to found other acts in their turn.\textsuperscript{380}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{376} In Husserl’s own words: “It seems obvious, in general, that every joy or sorrow, that is joy or sorrow \textit{about} something we think of, is a directed act. Instead of joy we can speak of pleased delight in something, instead of sorrow we can speak of displeased or painful dislike of it, aversion from it, etc.” Ibid, p. 107. In the German original: “\textit{Statt Freude können wir dabei auch sagen lustvolles Wohlgefallen an etwas, Davon Angezogensein, ihm lustvoll Zugeneigtsein; statt Unfreude auch unlustiges oder peinvolles Mißfallen an etwas, davon Abgestoßensein usw.}”

\textsuperscript{377} Ibid, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{378} Ibid, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{379} Ibid, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{380} Ibid, p. 116.
Beyond this, Husserl does not explore or provide a detailed description of how acts of feeling are fulfilled, nor does he provide an account of how we could perhaps attain insight into the pre-reflective and/or non-intentional aspects of the act of feeling. In trying to establish the legitimacy of feelings as intentional acts, he seems to obfuscate or even deny the existence of non-intentional aspects of feeling, or passivity in acts of feeling, apart from mentioning the equivocation with “sensuous-feelings” that are described in naturalist, corporeal terms.

As mentioned before, Husserl introduces the notion of intentionality in the Fifth Logical Investigation, where he identifies the double-character of experience: on the one hand, intentional consciousness, on the other hand, non-intentional experience. Intentional experience is only a part of consciousness, but not all of consciousness is intentional; thus we have two classes of experiences: intentional and non-intentional. What is of interest here is that Husserl seems to hold that non-intentional aspects of experience provide the basis for intentional experience, as the underlying stratum upon which the intentional stratum is founded. This means that the latter cannot exist without the former, but we can indeed have an entity that exists without having intentional experiences.

According to Nam-In Lee, even though Husserl tries to discern and make a sharp distinction between the intentional and the non-intentional, i.e. that which is an act in itself providing a relation to an object and that which is not an act, an experience which does not relate to an object, he fails to secure the distinction as it is laden with many ambiguities that he fails to resolve.

Although Husserl seems to indeed show without great difficulty how the basic class of intentional acts, the presentive acts, are based on the non-intentional stratum, when he tries to show the same relation for the sphere of feeling-acts, the distinction between the intentional and

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381 Even though some commentators, such as Panos Theodorou, argue that in the Logical Investigations, Husserl paved the way “for something like the complete intentional correlate of the feeling act”. See Panos Theodorou, “Husserl’s Original Project for a Normative Phenomenology of Emotions and Values”, in Value: Sources and Reading on a Key Concept of the Globalized World, ed. Ivo De Gennaro (Brill, 2012), p. 280.


the non-intentional seems to become untenable, with the intentional subsuming the non-intentional. Thus, when he enquires about the existence of intentional feelings and tries to see if the feeling of the intentional relation extends to the non-intentional stratum of the act, he falls back on the Brentanian position whereby feeling is indeed an intentional act in its own right, different from but still dependent upon the founding presentive act. According to this position, “feelings with an intentional element owe a part of their intentionality to themselves, and not to something external”\textsuperscript{384}, something that maintains both a difference from mere presentive acts and a reference to them.

This is not bad \textit{per se}, since one could argue that Husserl manages to preserve the “dignity” of the feeling-act, in the sense that it is not \textit{reducible} to another act, that is, it is not resolved into the presentive act, and further, it does not become a mere “internal” state.\textsuperscript{385} For example, in joy, as Panos Theodorou shows, we do not only have the perception of the enjoyable object and the psycho-physical feeling, but we also have the intentional act of liking (\emph{Gefallen}) that interprets the pertinent sensory feeling as a transcendent “objective property”.\textsuperscript{386} In effect, the feeling of enjoyment is attached to the already represented object as a new “objective property”, without however having an effect on the underlying object of the founding presentive act.\textsuperscript{387}

Despite the fact that Husserl tries to ascribe to feeling a certain uniqueness in the way it contributes to our intentional life, in his account feelings remain subject to a certain “derivativeness”. Husserl distinguishes between primary and secondary intentions, one built on the other; the presentive intention is the primary, founding one and the intentional feeling is the secondary, founded one.\textsuperscript{388} Husserl writes that each intentional experience is either an objectifying act or has as its basis an objectifying act, thus conceding primacy to the intentional over the non-intentional, and this shatters his previous distinction between the intentional and

\textsuperscript{384} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{385} Theodorou, 2012, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{386} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{387} Theodorou, 2012, pp. 279-280.
\textsuperscript{388} Lee 1998, p. 109.
the non-intentional (feeling-sensation).\textsuperscript{389} In effect, this is the precise problem that will be an obstacle to Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling, especially from a Heideggerian perspective, since Husserl does not allow for pre-objective aspects of feeling to emerge. And in any case, when feeling does emerge, it is a particular kind of intentional relation that is founded upon the more basic presentive intention, and thus feeling has no grounding role to play, as fundamental moods have in Heidegger.

After the \textit{Logical Investigations}, Husserl’s position on acts of feeling - that they are founded upon more basic presentive acts - remains unchanged, despite the fact that he introduces new ways of analysing intentional experience and its qualities. In \textit{Ideas I}, he analyses intentional life from various perspectives, one of them being the so-called “quality” of the act. In this context, Husserl identifies the relational nuances that accompany each objectivizing act, and how these affect the regarding ego. As he says: “This Ego-regard to something varies with the act: in perception, it is a perceptual regard-to; in phantasying, an inventive regard-to; in liking, a liking regard-to; in willing, a willing regard-to; etc.”\textsuperscript{390} Husserl draws analogies between value and feeling: “[I]n the act of valuing, we are turned toward the valued; in the act of gladness, to the gladsome; in the act of loving, to the loved [\textit{im Akte der Freude dem Erfreulichen, im Akte der Liebe dem Geliebten, im Akte der Liebe dem Geliebten}] [...]”\textsuperscript{391} In that context, he says that all of these acts are founded acts, but he also explicitly says that the acts of valuing are simpler than the acts of emotion and the acts of willing [\textit{die Gemüts- und Willensakte}], which are founded on higher levels.\textsuperscript{392}

Husserl’s position on the foundedness of feeling as well as other analogous qualities, such as value, remains unequivocal and unchanged. This could not be clearer than when he writes that the “\textit{noeses of feeling, of desiring, of willing [...] are founded on objectivations}”.\textsuperscript{393} And as is the case with feeling, the same holds with values: the founding stratified whole is established on the level of direct \textit{perception}, which is of the primary “state-of-affairs”:

\textsuperscript{389} Lee 1998, p. 110.  
\textsuperscript{390} Ideas I, p. 76.  
\textsuperscript{391} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{392} Ibid, p. 77.  
\textsuperscript{393} Ibid, p. 276.
predicatively formed affair-complex which is the mere lay of things [*Sachlage*] that serves as the founding substratum of a predicatively formed value-complex [*Wertverhalt*].

Before we bring this section to a close, one last aspect of Husserl’s phenomenology needs to be addressed: his phenomenology of moods. In his essay ‘Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology of Mood’, Nam-In Lee brings to our attention Husserl’s own phenomenological account of mood in his *M-manuscripts* from the years 1900-1914. In the concluding remarks to his essay, Lee raises the plausible question of whether Heidegger had read these analyses, and urges us to consider the “real possibility that the M-manuscript might be one of the ‘unpublished investigations’ which Husserl handed to Heidegger at that time and that the phenomenology of mood which was developed in this manuscript might be one of those ‘diverse areas’ through which Husserl influenced Heidegger.” Whereas this question is a very plausible one, and one could indeed assume that Heidegger had read and – perhaps to a certain extent – been inspired by Husserl’s account of mood, it cannot be the case that Husserl’s account of mood played any significant role in Heidegger’s turn to mood, for the following reasons.

On the one hand, it is indeed interesting how for Husserl mood is a non-intentional structure and can be taken to be a background horizon “on which the character of individual feelings arising in the stream of consciousness can be determined”, thus mood is a certain non-intentional, passively constituting ground upon which a particular class of intentional acts, that is, acts of feeling, are based. On the other hand, while this horizontal constitutive aspect of experience, identified as mood, is reminiscent of Heidegger’s accounts of mood, the role that Husserl ascribes to mood is so restricted that it does not fit within Heidegger’s general schema or with the ontological significance that Heidegger ascribes to moods.

A mood, according to Husserl, argues Lee, is a unity of feelings that arises when individual feelings fuse together. One problem is that Husserl seems to imply that mood is

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396 Ibid, p. 118.
398 Ibid.
actually made up of various individual feelings that merge together, thus ascribing a certain constitutive priority to the intentional feeling rather than the non-intentional level of mood. It’s not clear whether it is the predicative, intentional state-of-affairs of a feeling act that constitutes the mood, or whether it is the mood, the (purportedly) non-intentional, that grounds the intentional. Apart from this problem, even if we accept that Husserl’s position is that mood is the non-intentional founding aspect of feeling-acts, this non-intentional background still refers only to intentional acts of feeling and the objects that belong to that specific class of objects. Even if the mood is a vague halo “surrounding” the intentional object of the feeling-act, something that surrounds the whole of the object of feeling, the fact still remains that mood does not constitute a part of the natural thing’s object-constitution, something that occurs at the foundational level of intentional life: the presentive level. As Panos Theodorou notes, in Husserl, “the moods contribute, unfortunately, only to something like a superficial colourful ‘decoration’ of an already constituted world as a horizontal unity of beings.” Husserl failed to identify any deep foundational role for mood. His account of founding consciousness is that upon which all judgmental phenomena, all predicative states-of-affairs, are founded; and this ultimately gets reduced to presentive acts. But as we’ve already seen, the phenomenon that the middle and later Husserl will identify in Motivation, is a constituting phenomenon that shares many more characteristics with Heidegger’s notion of Grundstimmung.

V. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we have seen how Husserl fits within a genealogical narrative of Heidegger’s phenomenological attentiveness to the facticity of life, from within the neo-Kantian environment. In this context, the guiding question is that of the possibility of philosophy itself, the origin of a phenomenological opening to the space of meaning qua being. Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn was heavily influenced by Husserl's discoveries, and his hermeneutic radicalization of phenomenology must be seen in light of his serious engagement with

399 Theodorou 2012, p. 281.
Husserlian phenomenology, as well as the critical objections of Paul Natorp, and the way Emil Lask read Husserl, as well as how Wilhelm Dilthey and Husserl mutually affected each other.

We have seen how Husserl’s phenomenological breakthrough indicated how the philosophical understanding [Verstehen] of truth is bound up with, and opened up by, comportment [Verhalten], which is the way the subject relates to that which is given in intuition [Anschauung]. Intuitive givenness and interpretive understanding are tied together at the foundational, pre-reflective and pre-intentional level of experience; the enactmental character of intentional life is unified in and through motivation, as a dynamic other-directedness that is constitutive at the originary levels of subjectivity, which is neither merely active or passive, but is rather both active and passive, both projective and receptive.

Heidegger’s first analyses of factical life, where for the first time moods attain a central function, was explained in terms of underlying motivations [Motivationen] and tendencies [Tendenzen]. Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn to mood does not constitute an abandonment of Husserlian insights, but rather a radicalization of them. This chapter has identified how Heidegger’s early hermeneutic phenomenology utilized the notions of Verhalten, Motivation and Tendenz and was based on the combined insights of Husserl and Dilthey, as part and parcel of a response to Natorp’s forceful critical objections to phenomenology.

We have also seen how Husserl’s accounts of feeling and mood should not be seen as the direct precursor to Heidegger’s own attention to feeling and mood. Rather, it was Husserl’s categorial intuition that offered an initial way of indicating how it is that Dasein can grasp the totality of the world and the totality of being, in a way that is not reducible either to the sensuous object or the expressed judgment. As I have tried to show, the categorial intuition is as close as Husserl got to discovering a pre-reflective way of grasping being and truth as such, or, in other words, the truth and being of facticity itself. It is the kind of intuition that intuits states-of-affairs in a non-reflective and non-objectified way.

It is important to keep in mind how Husserl’s breakthrough of categorial intuition offered an account of authentic thinking that predates the transcendental turn, which is enabled through the epoché. Thus, it is a phenomenological account of authentic thinking that is not
tainted by the reflective and “negating” aspects that Husserl’s transcendental accounts in Ideas I contain (due to the fact that they are founded on the quasi-skeptical and quasi-voluntarist epochē and the “principle of principles”).

Heidegger appropriated certain fundamental characteristics that Husserl accorded to categorial intuition, and existentially radicalized them and ascribed them to Stimmung: the way categorial intuition discloses states-of-affairs in terms of parts and wholes, and thus the way it discloses an ontological relationship of “being-in” and “having”: a part-being-in-the-whole, a whole-having-a-part. It is through categorial intuition that mereological states-of-affairs that have the relational character of being-in or being-a-part-of become manifested in a non-reflective way. In Being and Time Heidegger turns Husserl’s account on its head: the pre-reflective awareness of the “whole” is found to be the foundational one rather than the founded one, and it is also distanced from the very act of “intuition” [Anschauung].

Despite the breakthrough offered by categorial intuition, several issues remained: 1) the fact that categorial intuition is founded, with the founding act being simple sensuous intuition, devoid of affects; 2) Husserl’s transcendental reconfiguration of the phenomenological method entangled it in a reflective change of attitude [Einstellung] through the epochē; 3) Husserl’s account thus came too close to a particular interpretation of Platonic theoria that was unable to account for the facticity of the life-world, as its starting point entailed a kind of voluntarism that closed off the factual and the affective; 4) thus Husserl could not provide a complete phenomenological account of feeling, or an account that would ascribe a foundational role to feeling or moods.

However, in Ideas II Husserl offered another breakthrough through his analyses of Motivation, identified as the very foundation of the enactment of intentional life itself: that which establishes all meaningful acts, simple and complex, and which interconnects different acts. It is that which enables the internal constitution of a direct act of adequate as well as inadequate perception. On the one hand, motivation is the dynamic, actively directing and referencing element of intentional enactment. On the other hand, motivation is the affective, passive aspect intentional enactment that already captures this foundational level of the spiritual
self not as a solipsistic auto-affection, but rather as affected by something, or someone, other, an exteriority which motivates without this exteriority being reduced to nature: something that acknowledges the otherness of the constitution of the meaning of the “world” (or object) intended. Husserl’s turn to motivation opened the way for Heidegger to relaunch phenomenology from within and enabled him to thematize the factical and the affective and find it at the centre of spiritual life.

It is in the context of his analyses of Motivation that Husserl turned to the “personalistic attitude”, something that anticipated Heidegger’s own shift towards the personalistic (in his phenomenological analyses of religious life, as they are performed as encounters with Augustine and Luther) and the practical (in his phenomenological analysis of Aristotle).
Chapter 3: Heidegger’s phenomenology of enactment: motivation and tendency

I. Introduction

In the previous chapter, we saw some basic Husserlian themes that pave the way for a better understanding of Heidegger’s “affective turn”. We saw how Husserl offered a “breakthrough” as regards the intuitive, pre-reflective foundations of categorial (and ontological) thinking. We then saw his transcendental reconfiguration of phenomenological beginning, whereby Dasein was suspended and shut out from the reach of reflective analysis. We then saw the “enactmental” character in Husserl’s analyses, as well as the way he identified and analyzed the pre-intentional unified structure (Zusammenhang) of intentional life in terms of Motivation. Finally, we saw how he never reflected upon moods with sufficient seriousness, taking them to be founded intentional acts.

The main theme in this chapter is Heidegger’s own reorientation of phenomenological analysis, from intentional structures of consciousness to pre-intentional constitutive structures of enactment. This is an important moment in Heidegger’s development because it captures how and why affective phenomena become central in Heidegger’s analyses— in ways that are not necessarily inconsistent with some of Husserl’s own analyses.

In his early Freiburg years, Heidegger’s thought was undergoing a formation process that saw him radicalize phenomenology from within, while retaining Husserlian terminology. The process involved a selective appropriation of Husserlian insights that enabled the shift of focus to the factical ground of Dasein. This necessitated the dismissal of the reflective methodological character that Husserl employed in his transcendental reconfiguration of phenomenology, and the associated “theoretical Attitude”.

Heidegger followed Husserl in re-grounding the origins of intentionality in Motivation, without abolishing factical life (as Husserl’s epochē had done), but rather by showing how
Motivation is precisely the way in which factical life structures and enacts its movement. In this context, Heidegger redefined the arena and methods of phenomenological description, bringing into relief the motivational origins of understanding. This shift of attention from the conscious, abstract level of activity, to the pre-reflective, factical ground (necessitated by Natorp’s challenges to Husserl’s methodological beginning), paved the way for his later phenomenology of fundamental moods.

In this chapter, we will examine six distinct – albeit interconnected – issues in Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures. Firstly, the way Heidegger’s early “constitutional reflections” raised the question of philosophy itself; this enabled him to articulate phenomenology as “originary science” whose region of analysis is factical life itself, i.e. the way philosophical understanding is enacted. Secondly, Heidegger’s critique of the Husserlian determination of phenomenology as a “change of attitude” [Einstellung] that institutes the epochē. Thirdly, we will see the basic terminology that Heidegger employs in his own constitutive analyses, which look at the ground of intentional life with a new freshness. In this context, we will see how Heidegger utilizes “locutions such as ‘having’ (haben), [and] ‘comporting’ (verhalten) […] in order to emphasize that original, unthematic ‘having’ or ‘comporting’ is for the most part not some deliberate, meditative act of knowing something.” In this context, comportments will be structured by Motivation and Tendenz - the precursors of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung. Fourth, we will look at Heidegger’s exemplary interpretations of religious life, in which moods take centre stage. This is an important moment in Heidegger’s development since for the first time he will speak about the fundamental mood of Angst. Finally, we will see how the notion of authenticity first appears in relation to a way of having a mood.

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401 McManus 2012, passim.
II. Phenomenology as ‘originary science’

Originary science and factical life

As early as 1919, Heidegger was redeploying phenomenology as fundamental ontology, as the original science whose Sache is the origin of spirit in and for itself. In the 1919-20 Winter Semester lecture course entitled Basic Problems of Phenomenology (BPP), Heidegger defined phenomenology as the science of the absolute origin of the spirit in and for itself – ‘life in and for itself’, a science that must ruthlessly reject “every attempt to place itself outside of the vital return to the origin and the vital emergence out of it.” Heidegger calls our attention to the genuine, concrete realization and the enactment of spiritual life and it is in this context that he thematized the importance of feelings and moods, especially ἔρως (Liebe).

Heidegger’s early phenomenological accounts constituted a response to those aspects of Husserlian phenomenology which remained problematic, with Heidegger’s own hermeneutic phenomenology turning towards the factical richness of phenomenological life. Heidegger revealed those pre-reflective, affective states to be the very origin, the very beginning, of phenomenological understanding. In this context, Heidegger’s early fundamental ontology supplanted the residual “active” elements of Husserl’s transcendentental egological phenomenology, by further pushing for a phenomenology based on the category of comportment and the ground of Motivation and Tendenz, thus supplying an account of origin and beginning that is not purely active or voluntaristic, but is neither active nor passive.

In BPP, Heidegger is struggling with the threat of objectivization, as this was articulated by Natorp against Husserlian phenomenology, trying to come up with an account of the beginning of phenomenology that would render the Natorpian objections ineffective. He is trying to offer a phenomenological account of intentional life, while at the same time identifying and resisting the tendency toward objectivization.

Heidegger begins by identifying the problem of scientific beginning. In §1, Heidegger makes it clear that phenomenology is the original science [Ursprungswissenschaft] and as such

404 Ibid, p. 2.
it is the science of the absolute \textit{origin} of the spirit. Original science is then defined in terms of enactment of motivation: it is the science whose task involves an understanding of its own self and this is achieved through the genuine enactment of its own motives, by way of research.\textsuperscript{405} The only way that this science can be led towards its most recalcitrant area, the area of its vital origin, is by way of the manifestation and \textit{enactment} of the very tendencies inherent to the science itself. As such, the method of this science cannot be imposed from the outside, for example from the special sciences, but rather the method must grow from the origin itself and a renewal of the tendencies inherent within it.\textsuperscript{406} The problem is already one of expression: the way concepts grasp life without distorting the origin of life itself. In this context, the theoretical-scientific paradigm is what needs to be overcome.

In a rather typical hermeneutic manner, Heidegger is trying to probe and identify the intellectual space of phenomenology and in doing this he is addressing his immediate predecessors as well as the predominant figures of his time. Thus, any hermeneutic attempt to understand Heidegger’s own breakthrough must come to see how he responds to his contemporary philosophical context.

Heidegger makes it clear that he is aiming at developing phenomenology as originary science. This involves overcoming the theoretical-reflective character of Husserl’s method, i.e. the \textit{way to begin}, but in this he unqualifyingly \textit{accepts} Husserl’s definition of the structural \textit{origin} of spiritual life in terms of \textit{Motivation} and enactment, and the issue is how to grasp it and articulate it.

Heidegger also offers a critique of neo-Kantianism, but without being totally dismissive. He distinguishes between the two schools of neo-Kantianism, and approvingly says that the Marburg School (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer) is predominantly concerned with advancing and radically grounding logic, whereas the Southwest School was predominantly a philosophy of value that was preoccupied by the problem of history.\textsuperscript{407} Heidegger urges his students not to ignore the achievements of neo-Kantian philosophy since in both schools, “genuine motives are

\textsuperscript{405} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{406} Ibid. p. 3.
\textsuperscript{407} Ibid. p. 6.
alive and […] philosophical work is being accomplished”. Despite the fact that neo-Kantian philosophy leans towards creating worldviews [Weltanschauungen] and does not critically question many of the presuppositions it inherits concerning philosophical systematicity, it is still important in the challenges it poses to phenomenology. Clearly, Heidegger takes neo-Kantian objections to phenomenology seriously, and he has in mind Natorp’s objections to Husserl.

In addition to neo-Kantians, Heidegger also notes the contributions of Dilthey, whom he finds to have opened up a new aspect of intellectual history, despite his failure to penetrate the origin of meaning itself. Finally, Heidegger notes Henri Bergson, as well as Georg Simmel, as important figures.

Heidegger addresses the issue of the scientificity of philosophy, and how great philosophers have oriented themselves towards a “rigorous scientific philosophy” – an obvious reference to Husserl’s essay on phenomenology as rigorous science. But in this, both the notion of “science” and that which it is meant to overcome, namely “worldview”, remain unclear, and thus the starting point of philosophy, as well as its “object”, also remain unclear. The reference to an “object” of study leads to a reflective reversal that involves a “subject” that is undertaking the study, and this is part of the problem that Heidegger wants to resolve. Heidegger says that the point of departure must be the “factual life experience”, even though philosophy seems to be leading us out of factual life experience.

Factual life experience is peculiar since it is that in which philosophy is enacted, and it is not merely the experience of cognising something, but rather it “designates the whole active and passive pose of the human being toward the world”. The peculiarity of factual life experience is the fact that the manner of experiencing things, the how, merges with the what, the content of experience, to the extent that we become absorbed in the content, whilst also becoming indifferent to the manner of experiencing. Thus, factual life attains its

\[408\text{ Ibid. p. 7.}\]
\[409\text{ Ibid.}\]
\[410\text{ PRL, p. 8.}\]
\[411\text{ Ibid. My italics.}\]
\[412\text{ Ibid, p. 9.}\]
characteristic self-sufficiency (we will see later on what this means). This is precisely what originary science must analyze: factual life experience in its self-sufficiency, and the way it is enacted.

The way factual life is experienced is not as a complex of lived experiences or a conglomerate of acts and processes, or as an ego-object, continues Heidegger, but rather it is experienced “in that which I perform, suffer, what I encounter, in my conditions of depression and elevation, and the like.” Heidegger is indeed tacitly challenging Husserl’s phenomenology, which is concerned with, and reveals, the transcendental complexes of acts and processes, i.e. the “ultimate structural complexes of objecthood in general”. But for Heidegger, this approach amounts to a restricted mode of cognition that needs to be overcome; Heidegger wants to attain a mode of cognition other than “taking-cognizance-of” [Kenntnisnahme], which is the mode of cognition that characterizes Husserl’s phenomenology that fails to take account its own motivational ground.

How is this other mode of cognition to be motivated, then? This has to take place from within factual life itself, says Heidegger. As we shall see in the next section, the starting point of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology was precisely the suspension of the factual, so as to bring into relief the “phenomenological world”; hence Husserl’s explanation of how we go about the philosophical ascent, how phenomenological intentionality arises from the factual ground is not immanent, in the sense that he does not provide a phenomenology that is immanent to the factual. The everyday, the factual, hinders philosophy, and philosophy entails its overcoming. Heidegger, on the other hand, wants to show how phenomenology emerges out of the factual, and this is a paradox since it emerges out of something that hinders it! Science emerges out of non-science (cf. δόξα and ἐπιστήμη).

Heidegger proposes something that encounters the very paradox: while factual life is that which essentially hinders philosophy itself, it contains within itself the very motivation out of which philosophy springs! Thus, philosophy must perform a U-turn and return to that from

\[413\] Ibid.
\[414\] Ibid, p. 10.
\[415\] Ibid.
which it emerged. It has been customary for philosophers to degrade factical life. In
Heidegger’s own words:

Our considerations here have thus only increased the difficulty of the self-understanding of philosophy. How is a mode of cognition other than taking-cognizance-of to be motivated? Factual life experience itself, through its indifference and self-sufficiency, always covers up again the philosophical tendency that might surface. In its self-sufficient concern, factual life experience constantly falls into significance [Bedeutsamkeit]. It constantly strives for an articulation in science and ultimately for a “scientific culture.” Apart from these strivings, however, factual life experience contains motives of a purely philosophical posture [rein philosophischer Haltung] which can be isolated only through a peculiar turning around of philosophical comportment [philosophischen Verhaltens]. […] Heretofore, philosophers made an effort to degrade precisely factual life experience as a matter of secondary importance that could be taken for granted, despite that philosophy arises precisely from factual life experience and springs back into it [wieder in sie zurückspringt] in a reversal that is entirely essential.416

In this context, Heidegger directly refers to moods and the way degrading the factual precisely plays itself out in an indifference towards the role of moods, since instead of seeing moods in their motivational operation, we transpose their meaning back to the content, i.e. the object of significance. Facticity is itself a certain indifference to the way we comport ourselves and, as such, everything is experienced as the content of significance. Thus, we become indifferent to moods themselves, says Heidegger, and the difference between moods is experienced merely from the perspective of intentional content.417 Thus, a philosophy that degrades the factical also misses the motivations inherent in the factical, out of which the philosophical comportment arises: “We have to look around in factual life experience in order to obtain a motive for its turning around.”418 This is, then, the task of the originary science: to investigate the motivations in the factical way that the philosophical comportment is enacted.

416 PRL, p. 11.
Criticizing Husserl

The redefinition of philosophy as originary science, and the rethinking of the direction it must take, is partly a response to Husserl. Heidegger hints at where he thinks phenomenology needs to go, and that is, in a way, against Husserl himself. As Heidegger says:

[The] radicalism of phenomenology needs to operate in the most radical way against phenomenology itself and against everything that speaks out as phenomenological cognition. There is no iurare in verba magistri [swearing to the words of a master] within scientific research. The essence of a genuine generation of researchers and of subsequent generations lies in its not losing itself on the fringe of special questions, but rather to return in a new and genuine way to the primal sources of the problems, and to take them deeper.\(^{419}\)

Phenomenology is a radical science and, as such, it must maintain its radicalism by pressing on presuppositions and principal formulations so as to reach deeper into the primal sources, the origins. Phenomenology is a science that must not emulate the “progressive character” of the other sciences. In this context, Heidegger explicitly mentions Husserl as being at fault in creating this illusion about phenomenology, foremost in the way he formulates the issue in the essay ‘Philosophy as a Strict Science’, where he exemplifies mathematical science as the ideal science that other sciences should emulate.\(^{420}\)

We should not underestimate Heidegger’s “internal revolution” against Husserl in the way it involved the reappraisal of moods. When Heidegger speaks against the “master” to his students, he is indeed speaking about Husserl. Let us recall here what Heidegger wrote in the essay “My Way into Phenomenology” a few decades later concerning his relationship with Husserl in 1919, the year the lecture course in question took place. Referring to how he took on the practice of phenomenological seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl's proximity, and how his interest leaned anew toward the Logical Investigations, Heidegger spoke of how he “begged the master again and again [baten wir –Freunde und Schüler- immer wieder den Meister] to republish the sixth investigation which was then difficult to obtain.”\(^{421}\) Husserl was indeed the “master”, and Heidegger and other students were practising phenomenology alongside him,

\(^{419}\) BPP, p. 5.
\(^{420}\) Ibid.
\(^{421}\) MWP, p. 78.
whilst also espousing their own views on how phenomenology should be executed and what
sort of problems it should address. In this context, Heidegger will seek to redirect
phenomenology towards the facticity of life and with that to achieve more clarity as regards the
origins of phenomenological regard itself.

Heidegger believed that Husserl’s transcendental turn came at a cost, as Husserl’s
account for the beginning of phenomenology was too “negative” insofar as it involved a certain
reflection that moved away from the factual level of experience, from the Dasein itself, and
involved a certain abstraction and a sort of voluntaristic freedom on the part of the subject that
failed to make sense of life itself. In BPP, Heidegger tells his students how, despite Husserl’s
breakthrough, Husserl himself was not entirely clear about his own discoveries (referring to the
way Husserl did not realize the ontological significance of categorial intuition).\footnote{BPP, p. 10.} What was
overlooked, not only by Husserl himself but also by the way others received Husserl’s initial
breakthrough, was the transcendental motives and tendencies, amounting to the problem of
transcendental constitution inherent in the factual descriptions of the second volume of the LI.
In effect, Heidegger believed that the LI had already performed the transcendental analysis of
constitution, without being tainted by the reflective, sceptical character that Husserl introduced
in Ideas I. It is precisely the introduction of the reflective attitude of Ideas I that Heidegger will
take issue with. As Denis McManus writes, the “notion [of the theoretical Attitude] […] looms
large in Heidegger’s understanding of how he broke with Husserl—the latter supposedly
remaining in that Attitude’s grip.”\footnote{McManus 2012, p. 17.}

The first and most fundamental concern for Heidegger is the very beginning of
phenomenology- a question of both method and content. Heidegger asks us not to reflect on the
beginning, as Husserl did in Ideas I, but rather to begin factically. In Ideas I, Husserl re-
articulates phenomenology by instituting particular methodological demands, in typical
Cartesian (i.e. reflective) spirit. In §32 he announces the phenomenological epochê, which
establishes the criterion by virtue of which the phenomenological region is defined. In this
context, the phenomenological region is defined precisely in terms of a “shutting out” of (zeitliches) Dasein, which entails the suspension of the factual.\textsuperscript{424}

This very same methodological beginning was also announced in the 1911 programmatic essay entitled “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”, in which Husserl defined scientificity in terms of Zusammenhang (as was shown in the previous chapter). Husserl wrote that pure phenomenology as science, so long as it is pure and makes no use of existentially positing nature, can only be investigation of essences, and not at all an investigation of Dasein. Phenomenology can recognize only essences and essential relations, and studies the “origin” of all formal-logical and natural-logical principles.

It is this Husserlian beginning that Heidegger found problematic, because it shuts out the factical Dasein and thus marginalizes the everyday, limiting phenomenological inquiry in such a way that it leaves a region of being out of reach. Heidegger’s reformulation of phenomenology as an ontology of facticity that “lets the open” region manifest itself is repeated again in a similar way in the late period as Gelassenheit, which is again introduced as a radical alternative to the Husserlian beginning: In §22 of the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929-30)\textsuperscript{425}, in a very similar wording to the 1919 lecture course where he calls for a deepening of phenomenological research contra the master, Heidegger says the following:

Now we can see for the first time what is decisive in all our methodological considerations. It is not a matter of concocting a region of lived experiences, of working our way into a stratum of interrelations of consciousness [Bewußtseinzusammenhänge]. We must precisely avoid losing ourselves in some particular sphere which has been artificially prepared or forced upon us by traditional perspectives that have ossified, instead of preserving and maintaining the immediacy of everyday Dasein. What is required is not the effort of working ourselves into a particular attitude, but the reverse: what is required is the releasement [Gelassenheit] of our free, everyday perspective – free from psychological and other theories of consciousness, of the stream of lived experience and suchlike.\textsuperscript{426}

\textsuperscript{424} Ideas I, §32: The phenomenological ἐποχή: I am not negating the world or doubting its factual being [zeitliches Dasein], but I fully “shut out” every judgment about temporal being: „Die zum Wesen der natürlichen Einstellung gehörige Generalhesis setzen wir außer Aktion, alles und jedes, was sie in ontischer Hinsicht umspannt, setzen wir in Klammern: also diese ganze natürliche Welt, die beständig »für uns da«, »vorhanden« ist, und die immerfort dableiben wird als bewußtseinsmäßige »Wirklichkeit«, wenn es uns auch beliebt, sie einzuklammern. Tue ich so, wie es meine volle Freiheit ist, dann negiere ich diese »Welt« also nicht, als wäre ich Sophist, ich bezweifle ihr Dasein nicht, als wäre ich Skeptiker; aber ich übe die »phänomenologische« ἐποχή, die mir jedes Urteil über räumlich-zeitliches Dasein völlig verschließt.“ (my italics.)


\textsuperscript{426} FCM, p. 91.
Heidegger’s “break” from the Husserlian beginning is more evident, in the sense of elaborate and nuanced, in the 1920-21 lecture course entitled *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* (PRL). There he poses anew the problem of beginning, thus: “How do we arrive at the self-understanding of philosophy?” Heidegger says that if one grasps the problem radically, then one finds that *philosophy arises from factual life experience*, something that is at odds with grasping philosophy as a cognitive comportment that falls prey to the ideal of an exact, theoretical science. Here, Heidegger also explicitly relates the concept “factual” with the concept of the “historical”, by saying that the “factual” is not that which is naturally real or causally determined, but rather it can only be made intelligible by means of historicity. So while Husserl’s point of departure after his “transcendental turn” is the suspension of the everyday Dasein, the temporal and the factual that reveals the eidetic structures of meaning, Heidegger goes in the opposite direction and begins not from a reflective change of attitude, but rather from within that very “sphere” which Husserl has suspended: factual life experience itself.

Commencing with *Ideas I*, Husserl reconfigured the phenomenological method via a transcendental turn, something that raised new challenges for him. In articulating the way we “enter” into phenomenological analysis he configured the reductions in terms of a change of attitude (*Einstellung*), involving a particular kind of ontological suspension, the so called *epochē*. This re-introduced reflection and risked devivification and objectivation of intentional life.

The problem of transcendental constitution then, which is a central problem of phenomenology, must be posed in terms of factuality, that is, it must be explored in terms of its *vital grounds* in life, posing it as a radical problem of origin, without this analysis to fall back into an empirical psychology. In Heidegger’s own words, genuine problems will not be solved

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430 Ibid.
by the invention of another system or world-view, or by starting from an already constituted idea of “science” (as Kant and the neo-Kantians did), but rather “by letting the problems themselves become problematic in their factuality […] and then pos[ing] radical problems of origin.”

Thus, Heidegger identifies life as the original region of phenomenology. Life will be the dynamic way that intentionality is enacted, Dasein’s factual flow and fulfilment. (We will see how Heidegger defines ‘life’ in the next section).

As original science then, phenomenology must study the motivations and tendencies that shape world-views and sciences in general; studying the tendencies is the primary research task of phenomenology which involves a letting-open-up [ein Offen-Lassen] of perspectives. Phenomenology opens up to the concrete, it concretizes “abstract” problems, and it is through phenomenology that the concrete is enacted. This means that phenomenology, as the science of the original region [Ursprungsgebiet], involves an original mode of experiential apprehension [erlebendes Erfassen] of an origin which is still “far” [fern]. The original region is hidden from life, it is not given in life itself since life’s basic aspect itself is self-sufficiency [Selbstgenügsamkeit].

In this context, Husserl’s “beginning” of transcendental phenomenology shows itself to be inadequate, and indeed it becomes Heidegger’s object of criticism. Heidegger’s appeals to the letting-open-up the original region is a radicalization, a subversion of Husserl’s “principle of principles” and the change of attitude that the epochē involves. “Indeed, we should not reflect on the beginning, but rather factically begin!” says Heidegger in the 1919 lecture course, right before he refers to this “letting-open-up”, the precursor of Gelassenheit, to this originary region that is the object of phenomenology. So instead of a radical change of attitude [Einstellung], which is the way Husserl introduces the phenomenological beginning, Heidegger proposes something that, at a first glance, appears to move in the opposite direction to Husserl.

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431 BPP, p. 16.
433 Ibid, p. 22.
434 Ibid.
Heidegger further clarifies what the sense of “historical” is and how we are to relate to it; in this context he clearly critically demarcates his own approach from Husserl’s. Heidegger holds that even though every “attitude” \([\text{Einstellung}]\) is a “relation” \([\text{Bezug}]\), not every relation is an attitude. An attitude, says Heidegger, is a type of comportment \([\text{Verhalten}]\) that is absorbed in the material complex \([\text{Sachzusammenhang}]\).\(^{435}\) Heidegger then points out the ambiguity in the very word \(\text{Einstellung}\), which can also mean “to cease”, and starts constructing a critique based on this double-meaning. As he says: “With this ‘attitude’ \([\text{Einstellung}]\) the living relation to the object of knowledge has ‘ceased’ \([\text{eingestellt}]\)”.\(^{436}\) Heidegger thus wants to distinguish phenomenological understanding from attitudinal understanding, something that is at odds with Husserl’s programmatic proclamations in PRS and in Ideas I. And a few pages later, he explicitly shows how Husserl’s phenomenology is not radical enough.

As was noted in the previous chapters, Heidegger’s most important hermeneutic discovery was the notion of “formal indication” \([\text{formale Anzeige}]\) which was a radicalization of Husserl’s phenomenological formalization which Heidegger carries out as a result of Natorp’s critique. Formal indication was Heidegger’s response to the question of how can a philosophy attend to the stream of life without objectivizing it and, thus, without “stilling the stream”. Heidegger thought that to see philosophy as a matter of attitude allowed for such criticisms to be raised as it involved a cessation, and because it made it impossible to turn towards the factual in a way that would not reduce it into a region of being that would be just one part of the totality of all beings. This is a metaphysical problem that Husserl’s phenomenology falls foul of, since the way it formalized consciousness turned the latter into a region of being, the most general region of being and, as such, subjected it to the regional consideration of transcendental phenomenology.\(^{437}\) A new way into the phenomenological was thus sought, and as we will see in the following section, this will be founded on an earlier Husserlian distinction: the distinction between generalization \([\text{Generalisierung}]\) and formalization \([\text{Formalisierung}]\).

\(^{435}\) PRL, p. 33.
\(^{436}\) Ibid.
\(^{437}\) Ibid, p. 39.
Heidegger focuses his attention on this distinction made by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*. Heidegger was to deepen the distinction so as to resolve the issues phenomenology faced. Generalization is the categorization of experience and the subsequent ordering of the categories into a hierarchy. For example: joy is an affect, and affect is an experience.\(^{438}\) So generalization entails a metaphysical ordering, and it is one whose enactment is contained within a certain material domain. Formalization, on the other hand, is not an ordering, and it is not the material domain, as it is free from material contents and involves the formal predication of phenomena and objects of “essences” and “things, free from any order of stages. The formal character arises out of the *relational meaning*, which is motivated by the sense of the attitudinal relation itself [*Einstellungsbezug*].\(^{439}\)

But phenomenological analysis must go deeper than the attitudinal relation of formalization that Husserl enacted, in order to see how this relation itself, which is *theoretical*, is an enactment [*Vollzug*]. Husserlian formalization is still dependent on generalization, according to Heidegger, in that it stands within the meaning of the “general” (a logic of logical “ordering”).\(^ {440}\) At first glance, Heidegger’s analysis of formalization here, in terms of materiality, that is, in terms of the general, sounds awkward. How can he both acknowledge that Husserlian formalization moves away from the content-based general to the relational-formal, whilst also saying that formalization still relies on materiality? How can Heidegger say that Husserlian formalization stands within the meaning of the general, of the “content”, since Husserlian formalization says nothing about the content, the what, and does not prejudice anything on that level?

Heidegger says that exactly there lies the problem: because the formal determination is indifferent to the content, this is decisive for the way the formal relation is determined. *The fact that it is indifferent to the content hides the enactmental character which is more originary.*\(^ {441}\)

This is the fate of Husserl’s theoretical “principle of principles” and the *epoché! Formal*
indication goes deeper than Husserlian formalization, in that it is more original and has nothing
to do with a region and also falls completely outside of the attitudinally theoretical.\(^{442}\) It allows
for the enactmental aspect of formalization to appear as such, and thus instead of turning away
from the factical, it allows for the factical and the motivational to appear and be described.
Thus, formal indication allows for the pre-reflective, affective, character of factual life to
emerge as that which grounds and, at the same time, motivates the enactment, something that
Husserl’s phenomenology concealed.

**III. Heidegger’s enactmental phenomenology**

Heidegger’s own analyses aimed at analyzing deeper structures of knowledge and being, by
virtue of fresh formal indications. Heidegger further radicalized Husserlian “formalization”, by
trying to create notions that would formally indicate the enactmental character of factual life. In
this context, Heidegger employed the notions of Gehaltssinn (content-sense), Bezugsinn (sense
of relation) and Vollzugssinn (sense of enactment), which formally “organized” his early
phenomenological analyses of the factical situation\(^{443}\) through which his first breakthrough to
the pre-reflective, affective, realm of intentionality was achieved. This was developed out of
Husserl’s terminology, not against it.

Heidegger picked up on Husserl’s notion of Vollzug, i.e. of the enactment of the
phenomenological regard, and was able to bring into relief the praxial elements of Husserl’s
phenomenological regard. In effect, Heidegger redefined phenomenology from within
Husserlian terminology, bringing the practical aspect of the act of phenomenological regard and
understanding to the forefront. This enabled Heidegger to radicalize the Husserlian notion of
“truth” from an issue of correspondence legitimized by an objective sense of correlative states-
of-affairs, to the truth of comportment as the enactment of a pre-reflective kinetic (as opposed to
static) relating.

Husserl tried to describe the structure of intentional experience by addressing the unity
of, but also the distinction between, the immanent aspect of relationality (intentionality) and the

\(^{442}\) “Bezugssinn, Vollzugssinn, Gehaltssinn ergeben die Urstruktur der Situation” (GA 58, p. 261).
objective correlate. According to Husserl, the content of “what” appears in consciousness, the “object” qua “content”, is not itself the experience of the intentional act - it does not exhaust the act. The relation established within the act of experience is not one that can be thought in terms of two empirical objects whereby the relation is that of a real object contained within an empirical ego. In order to illustrate the difference between phenomenological experience and ‘popular experience, Husserl drew on the distinction between real content \[\text{Reellem Inhalt}\] and intentional content which he combines with the notion of “having” \[Haben\]: the intentional content is that which is had.\footnote{LI, p. 85.} Thus, Husserl appealed to the notion of “having” in order to illustrate the unity of intentional life from a phenomenological perspective. He analyzed categorial intuition in terms of “having” and effectively opened the way for an account of categorial knowledge as a matter of comportment: a proposition becomes true by being adequately \text{had} by the act of judgment. This involves the act of judgement having the states-of-affairs, and thus already \text{having being}. Both truth and being are given to intuition coterminously, and are phenomenologically “had” by the intentional act itself. Without the “having”, the relation compromises the ontological transcendence of the state-of-affairs.

Thus, as was indicated in the previous chapter, in categorial intuition Husserl points at a way for truth, being and thought to coincide, and this is achieved on a pre-reflective level. Truth is given in intuition, but this does not mean that truth, intuition and being, are restricted to \text{objectified being}, as it also does not mean that truth is fulfilled through \text{reflection}. On the contrary, in the \text{Sixth Investigation}, Husserl addresses fundamental aspects of truth and being that are \text{not objective} and are \text{not reflectively given}, within the context of intentional experience. In the \text{Sixth Investigation}, Husserl offers an account of how “authentic thinking” can be fulfilled through categorial intuition. Husserl in this context offers an account of \text{authentic thinking} that predates the transcendental turn as it is enacted through the \text{epochē}. It is a phenomenological account of authentic thinking that is not tainted with the reflective and “negating” aspects that Husserl’s transcendental accounts in \text{Ideas I} contain.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Heidegger took inspiration from Husserl’s
account of categorial intuition, insofar as it afforded an intuition of being, and he repetitively identified this contribution by Husserl as the most important one, for his own work.\(^\text{445}\) The truth of judgment gets grounded \([\text{begründet}]\) in the non-reflective understanding of the enacted categorial intuition. This already offers a way out of Natorp’s objections to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, and it offered Heidegger a first account of how ontological understanding, a grasp of the “whole”, is given and fulfilled in experience.

Returning to the 1919 \textit{Kriegsnotsemester} lecture course, we can now make better sense of Heidegger’s hermeneutically charged sentences on how the original open region that phenomenology tries to bring into relief is, at the same time, the closest but also the farthest. Phenomenological science must begin by looking at life itself; that is practical life as it is manifested in everydayness. It is in this life of self-sufficiency that the motivation and tendency, the very beginning of phenomenology itself, the open region, is to be found.\(^\text{446}\) However, at the same time, the original region is not \textit{in life} itself, it is not in this self-sufficiency of life itself, as life in itself is not philosophical but rather pre-philosophical. Hence, there is a need for an encounter with factual life, so as to formally indicate its structures and identify therein the tendencies and motivations out of which the original region emerges.

\textbf{Factual life: enactment and self-sufficiency}

Husserl’s crucial contribution to philosophy, from Heidegger’s perspective, was his rediscovery of intentionality and the way it bifurcates into sensuous intuition and categorial intuition. Husserl had also (already before Heidegger had become his assistant) started to analyze the pre-intentional levels of subjectivity through the notion of motivation, and started to become sensitive to Natorp’s critique as regards the genetic levels of intentional life. How does intentional life, in its dynamic other-directedness constitute itself? Heidegger was precisely taking up this problem: the problem of the origin of intentional life, the methodological problem

\(^{445}\) Heidegger on a number of occasions identifies the Sixth Investigation of the \textit{Logical Investigations} as the most important contribution of Husserl that inspired his own thought. For example, see MWP.

\(^{446}\) \textit{BPP}, p. 22 and p.153.
of beginning, and the ontological problem of becoming as such, the dynamic character of factual life out of which sensuous and categorial intuition emerge.

Heidegger was interested in showing how intentional life – intentionality in all its forms and variations – is grounded in the affective, and that would include both the active aspects of intentional directedness as well as the passive, receptive aspects. Thus, Heidegger’s early project involved the radicalization of the Husserlian-Brentanian notion of intentionality, so as to uncover the deeper ground that constitutes the unity of intentional life at the pre-theoretical level. In this context, he tried to capture in a non-theoretical, non-psychologistic way that which provides the impetus of the directionality of intentional life. Ultimately, Heidegger identified ἔρως, Liebe, as the motivation of philosophy, the ground out of which the original region emerged. ἔρως manifests itself as desire and it is important to see how Heidegger’s phenomenological account of ἔρως is carried out through an analysis of desire and temptation, as these are initially formally indicated by the notions of motivation and tendency.

In the summer semester of 1923, during the lecture course Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Heidegger says that the notion of intentionality [Intentionalität] that Husserl inherits from Brentano, ultimately leads back to the medieval conception of directed consciousness, itself derived from Aristotelian ὀρεξίς (desire). 447 Even earlier on, in the winter semester of 1920-21 in which Heidegger taught his now well-known lecture course on The Phenomenology of Religious Life, we see how Heidegger sees in Augustine a phenomenological

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447 This genealogical reference made by Heidegger must be properly contextualized. It follows the interaction between Husserl and Natorp which, according to Heidegger, exposed the “deficiencies”, or “weaknesses” of Husserl’s formulations, especially the reformulations that take place in Ideas I (as opposed to the earlier Husserlian formulations in the Logical Investigations) with respect to the way of access granted by phenomenology to intentionality, and the way this access manages to entrap intentionality in a theoretical conceptual realm due to the reflective nature of access. In order to resolve this problem, Heidegger digs deeper into aspects of intentionality that, on the one hand, are indeed to some extent implicit in Husserl’s accounts on the other hand are suppressed by Husserl’s accounts. It is in the context of unpacking these suppressed aspects of intentionality that Heidegger referred to the connection between intentionality and desire in the Summer Semester of 1923: “Husserl was influenced here by the work of Brentano, and this was the case not only regarding his method in that he adopted Brentano’s method of description, but also regarding the basic definition of the domain of experience as his subject matter. Brentano had characterized consciousness of something as intentionality. This concept arose in the Middle Ages and had at that time a narrower sphere of application, it meant a volitional being-out-for-something and going-toward-it (ὄρεξις [desire])” (OHF, p. 55). “Hierfür wurde Brentanos Arbeit wirksam, und nicht nur methodisch, sofern Husserl die deskriptive Methode übernahm, sondern auch die Grundbestimmung der region. Brentano hatte Bewußtsein von etwas charakterisiert als Intentionalität. Dieser Begriff entspringt im Mittelalter und hat da eine engere Sphäre, er bezeichnet das willentliche Aussein auf etwas (ὄρεξις)” (OHF, p. 70).
account that considers desire\textsuperscript{448} as one of the forms of temptation, tentatio, “not in a biological-
psychological and theoretical attitude, but according to the characteristics of the how he has
factically experienced it”\textsuperscript{449}.

The sphere of phenomenology is defined as the ‘presentation’ or ‘givenness’
(Gegebenheit) of life.\textsuperscript{450} Heidegger calls our attention to the ‘genuine, concrete realization and
the actualization [Vollzug]’ of life.\textsuperscript{451} Heidegger asks here that life be thought not on the basis
of the biological disciplines, but rather approached anew on the basis of its own character, so as
to allow new forms of manifestation and expression to be understood from out of themselves.\textsuperscript{452}

Heidegger begins by noting an ambiguity in the word “experience”, whereby the substantive
designation names both the experience itself but also that which is intentionally encountered,
and so “experience” is inherently twofold, in the sense that it refers to a self as well as to that
which the self encounters.\textsuperscript{453}

Heidegger begins his analysis of experience, intentional life, by prioritizing the
enactment [Vollzug] of life. Intentional life is enactment. Heidegger takes the fulfillment that
comes with intentional givenness (i.e. the fact that a being can “intend” an object or a world) as
the accomplishment of life which shows that life has a certain “self-sufficiency” (Selbst-
Genügsamkeit). “Self-sufficiency” is the form of intentional fulfillment, it is the form that
achieves transcending directionality. This self-sufficiency is what he also calls the “in-itself of
life”, which is so invariable in its types that it also includes what we take as ‘the exact opposite
of the self-sufficiency of life’.\textsuperscript{454} The self-sufficiency of life is not a structural ‘overcoming’ of
life (in the sense of a transcendence that is somehow beyond life), but the tendency of life

\textsuperscript{448} Concupiscencia carnis, which is a strong desire of the flesh, and which Heidegger translates as Begierlichkeit.
\textsuperscript{449} ibid.
\textsuperscript{450} PRL, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{451} BPP, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{452} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{453} “Let us think about the biological disciplines that are familiar to us today under the name of descriptive sciences
and not look at the fact and at the attitudinal tendencies that are factically expressed [ausgesprochen] in each case.
Rather let us pay attention to the basic motives to approach, somehow, the primitive forms of life that were cultivated
earlier. In this way, with this tendency, there emerge new forms of manifestation and expression that must be
understood from out of themselves and that one may not explain by providing more or less daring analogies with the
mathematical natural sciences” (Ibid, p. 40).
\textsuperscript{454} In Heidegger’s own words: “Experiencing [das Erfahren] or the experience [die Erfahrung] – the substantive
designation usually also means yet something else. Not just factual encountering as such but that which is
encountered is also co-meant […] We intentionally want to leave the double meaning in this word. All effectuation of
factual life—that means, of the tendencies in which something encounters life itself—and all factual modes of such
fulfillment we can describe as experiencing” (Ibid, pp. 54-55).
\textsuperscript{454} Ibid, p. 25.
towards fulfilment from within life itself.  

Self-sufficiency is thus a teleological direction of life in itself, characterized in such a way that it takes its motivation from its own factical flow. We can therefore discern that self-sufficiency is an expression of life. We can rephrase it thus: life is a tendency towards fulfilment, towards enactment, towards actualization, whose motivation lies within itself.

But life is not exhausted by self-sufficiency. Life has the tendency to fulfill itself and self-sufficiency is the form of intentional fulfillment, but fulfilment is still motivated by tendency, and hence self-sufficiency follows from tendency (not vice-versa). Thus, motivation and tendency, the affective dynamism of life, as the interplay of the passivity and activity of life, is what essentially comprises the enactment of life. Heidegger here defines selfhood as the movement of life that is understood from within life itself, without being reduced to a perfect, self-sufficient subject, but as a self-transcending and other-directed being whose movement is co-constituted by its finitude. In Heidegger’s own words:

[Life] itself poses tasks and demands to itself that always remain solely in its own sphere, so that it seeks to overcome its limitations, its imperfections, to fill out the perspectives [ergebenden Perspektiven auszufüllen] arising within it, again and again, only “in” the basic character that is prefigured by its ownmost self-sufficiency and its forms and the means derived from them.  

The fulfillment of self-sufficiency is never final, says Heidegger, since the tendency-character of life “unleashes ever-new starting goals, and from there, manifolds of motives and motivations are brought into effect”. Life’s self-sufficiency is the way in which motivation of new tendencies manages to fulfill itself. Self-sufficiency is the basic character of the “self-world” [Selbstwelt].

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455 Ibid.  
457 Ibid, p.25.  
458 Ibid.  
459 Remember, at this stage Heidegger has not yet coined the term Dasein. Instead, he uses Selbstwelt.
**Motivation and Tendenz as the structure of factical life**

Heidegger identifies tendency [*Tendenz*] and motivation [*Motivation*] as the basic structures of factical life. Even though Heidegger does not here achieve full clarity regarding tendency and motivation, he gives us some crucial insights. Firstly, he identifies tendency and motivation as *the structures that constitute the ground of experience*, the so-called “naked homogeneity” [*nackten Gleichartigkeit*].

This does not mean that tendency is something self-identical, stable and always present, since Heidegger acknowledges a *plurality of competing tendencies*.

Tendency accounts for the development of “stability” in our relations, as well as for ‘the new’ that we may encounter. Tendency is that which gives *direction*, either explicitly, consciously posited, or even when it “sneaks up on us”. And just as there are many directions in life, so there is a multiplicity of tendencies in life, in the things we encounter.

Heidegger’s description of tendency here is – in some respects – reminiscent of his description of disposition in BT, and that it is these basic characteristics that will be developed into his account of disposition. Tendency accounts for the development of “stability” in a similar manner that a basic disposition forms a sense of security and calm; but it also has the capacity to disrupt, to open up the encounter of something new and uncanny, and to even “sneak up on us”! In addition, there is a multiplicity of tendencies, competing tendencies, just as there are moods and counter-moods.

It is through tendency that something new becomes available, by an exchange of one tendency for another, and it is through tendency that an interruption of the *habitus* of the self-world takes place (*habitus* here denoting developed habits, i.e. tendencies that have become stable and have created a certain “structure of everydayness”).

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460 Ibid, p.56.
463 One cannot easily discern that this notion ultimately refers to pre-reflective affectedness and will later on be entirely replaced by mood [*Stimmung*]. But it is useful to keep that in mind, and take note of the associations that Heidegger makes of tendency with emotion, when he says, for example, that the directionality of tendencies “are absolutely of a non-theoretical, *emotional* kind.” (Ibid, p. 31) A concrete example Heidegger gives, connecting motivation with emotion is when at the end of this lecture course he says that ἔρως is the motive-ground of philosophical enactment: a motive that requires the releaseasion into the ultimate tendencies of life and a return into its ultimate motives (Ibid, p. 198).
464 Ibid, p. 56.
Heidegger seems to use tendency and motivation interchangeably, but if we look more carefully we can detect a distinction between the two. Enactment emerges out of motives. Motivation is the “coming-from” [Herkommen] in life. On the contrary, tendency refers to the “going-forth” [Fortgehen] and the “inclination-toward” that exists in life. Tendency and motivation are distinguished in relation to one another, i.e. they should not be understood as two objective, independent “states” or “parts” of a process, but rather as two ways of describing the very same kinesis. Because of this, they can exchange their functions, or their functions can be seen to coincide, so that a tendency can become a motivation and vice versa. (An example, perhaps, would be the automatic opening of a door: “The door is pushed opened” [Fortgehen], “The door is pulled opened” [Herkommen]).

Finally, Heidegger says that tendency and motivation are what establish manifestation [Bekundung]: they are behind the phenomenon of “taking-notice” [Kenntnisnehmen]. They are the structure that provides the “directional force” behind the intentional phenomenon. (Heidegger also draws a connection between manifestation and self-sufficiency: manifestation is that which self-sufficiency means and achieves.) Therefore, motivation and tendency are what enables the world to matter to us, which is one of the basic ontological characteristics that Heidegger will ascribe to disposition in BT.

“Taking-notice”, sometimes translated as “taking-cognizance-of”, is the mode of cognition that Heidegger ascribes to Husserl’s phenomenology, an account of the phenomenon of intentionality that needs to be overcome, by a deeper account of factual life itself: that in which philosophy is enacted that is not merely the experience of something in cognition, but rather as that which “designates the whole active and passive pose of the human being toward the world”. Heidegger’s focus on factual life in terms of its motivations and tendencies is an attempt to account for the deeper originary foundations out of which philosophy springs, deeper

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465 PRL, p. 100.
466 BPP, p.196.
467 Ibid.
468 Ibid.
469 The phenomenon of “taking-notice” [Kenntnisnehmen] is “motivated in each case by the prevailing tendency of expectation and receives directional force from it” (Ibid, pp. 88-89).
470 Ibid. My italics.
than the cognitive accounts that the early Husserl gives. In this context, Heidegger will speak of
the origin of intentional life, and of philosophy itself, in terms of motivation (as opposed to a
reflective epochē)- and the first motivation that Heidegger will identify will be that of ἔρως.

**Ἔρως as the first motivation of philosophy**

The *first time* Heidegger mentions (Platonic) ἔρως is in the end of the lecture course *Basic
Problems of Phenomenology*, where he identifies the very motivating ground of philosophy,
where for the first time he identifies the factical ground out of which philosophy originates! In
the notes of Oscar Becker, we encounter the following paragraph:

> The true philosophical posture is never that of a logical tyrant who through his gaze
scares life away. Rather, it is Plato’s ἔρως. But it has an even more lively function
than it has in Plato. ἔρως is not only the motivating ground of philosophy, rather it is
the philosophical activity itself that demands for a self-loosening towards the last
tendencies of life and a return to its last motivations. The posture that opposes
phenomenological philosophy is a self-attaching onto something. That philosophy
demands a self-loosening towards life, though not towards its surface, rather what is
called for is an absorption of the self in its originariness.471

After this scant but crucial reference to Platonic ἔρως, which seems to be the
culmination of where the lecture was leading up to in terms of motivation, Heidegger offers a
more nuanced and deeper analysis of ἔρως in his Augustine lectures. But the path that enabled
the turn to ἔρως, the passion of factical life, has already been laid down in BPP: the emphasis on
the self-world [*Selbstwelt*], with Christianity as the historical paradigm for the shift in focus into
the facticity of the self-world.472

This shift was carried out from within Husserlian terminology since, as pointed out in
the previous chapter, in *Ideas II* Husserl’s breakthrough into motivation, as the concatenating
ground of spiritual life, was enabled through the *personalistic attitude*. Further to this,
Heidegger deepened the analysis into the factical life of the self-world, by further focusing on
the enactmental character, formally indicating the way motivations and tendencies shape and
direct the flow of experience of the self, in terms of *habit*. It is this approach that will finally
bring Heidegger closer to Aristotle’s ethics and revive an Aristotelian account of truth, albeit

471 BPP, p. 263.
from a phenomenological perspective. However, before Heidegger turned to Aristotle in 1924, the afflictions of the *person*, his or her desires, passions and temptations, took centre stage through his re-reading of Augustine. It is there that his first serious account of affects takes place.

**IV. Religious experience, love and joy**

*Phenomenology of religious life and the self*

In this section we will turn to Heidegger’s interpretation of Augustine and look at the thematic account of ἔρως which it offers. Heidegger’s first analyses of factical life are not direct first-person phenomenological descriptions, but they materialized through interpretations of early Christian life as described by Paul and Augustine.

In the Winter Semester of 1920-21, Heidegger focuses on Augustine’s confessional accounts of how he experiences his own life in relation to God. Heidegger identified in Augustine an account that articulates desire in a phenomenological way, i.e. as one of the forms of temptation [tentatio] described “not in a biological-psychological and theoretical attitude, but according to the characteristics of how he has factically experienced it.”

For Augustine, factical life gets reduced to the experience of temptation: “life is really nothing but a constant temptation.”

Heidegger identified Augustine’s notion of temptation with his own phenomenological notion of tendency. Temptation, as we see in the Augustine lecture notes, is defined by Heidegger as tendency and is the fundamental character of factical life. It seems that Heidegger finds common ground with Augustine in his definition of the unity of factical life: while Augustine identifies the unity of factical life as temptation, Heidegger translates temptation back into the phenomenological notion of tendency, which is the notion through

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473 *Concupiscientia carnis*, which is a strong desire of the flesh, and which Heidegger translates as *Begierlichkeit*.  
474 PRL, p. 157.  
475 Ibid, p. 152.  
which the unity of factical life is constituted. Heidegger’s rendering of *tentatio*, normally translated into English as *temptation*, as *Tendenz* is not unwarranted; on the contrary, Heidegger is conventional here since *Tendenz* is etymologically derived from the Latin *tendentia*, from *tendo* (or *tento*, or *tempto*), which is the root of *tentatio*, the primary meaning of which is “to handle, touch, feel a thing”. Consequently, it is not at all far-fetched to point out that *Tendenz is to feel*.

As mentioned in the previous section, Heidegger’s turn to the phenomenology of the factical *self*, as exemplified in religious experience, chronologically coincides with Husserl’s shift to the personalistic attitude. I submit that Husserl’s turn to the personalistic attitude in *Ideas II*, the turn to the person, and Heidegger’s turn to religious life, the facticity of the religious *self*, are connected. Heidegger’s turn to religious experience is not done for theological reasons, but rather in the context of a formal analysis of the way the *self factically exists*. Religious experience is important for Heidegger not because of God, but because of the way the facticity of the self becomes *transparent*. Part and parcel of this turn to the self is the analysis of experience through the unifying notions of motivation and tendency, which are the phenomenological “categories” that account for the spiritual equivalent of causality [*Kausalität*].

**Augustine and love**

Heidegger’s interpretation of Augustine will turn out to be crucial in his development of the hermeneutic of facticity as, through his encounter with Augustinian thought, he will develop some of the key insights and terminology that constitute the *existential analytic of Dasein* in *BT*.

In looking at some aspects of his reading of Augustine, we come to see how Heidegger, thematizes the pre-reflective aspects of factical life, its grounding *motives and tendencies*, with affects and moods taking central role. Heidegger will identify concern [*Bekümmerung*, *cura*, as

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477 These are the etymologies given in Tufts Perseus library online. The same meaning is also given though in Michiel de Vaan, *Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages*; *tempto*, -are ’to feel, test’ [v. 1] (P1.+; also tentare).
478 Ubiali 2011, p. 256.
the unified character of the manifold of ways of enactment factical life. Various ways of concern are the various ways that the self enacts, has, its own factical life. Concern is the way that Dasein becomes absorbed in the world and in this context Heidegger identifies in Augustine three ways of having of factical life: the mode of dealing-with [Umgehen],\(^\text{479}\) the mode of looking-about-oneself [Umsehen],\(^\text{480}\) and the mode of self-significance [Eigenbedeutsamkeit].\(^\text{481}\) Heidegger also identifies in Augustine a certain overcoming of these inauthentic ways of having factical life through continence [continentia], which involves the affirmation of authentic anxiety-inducing experience and the radical ungroundedness of the factical self.\(^\text{482}\) It is crucial to note that it is in these very analyses that Heidegger will, for the very first time, refer to Angst, as the mood that is associated with authentic experience of nothingness and the overcoming of fallen ways of having the factical life. It is in this very analysis that the cornerstone of what later in BT becomes the mood that corresponds to the “understanding of oneself in one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being”\(^\text{483}\), as the anxiety of conscience discloses, will be laid.

What is also important in the account is how Heidegger arrives at Angst, as indicative of understanding of the ungroundedness of the self, through Augustine’s existential account on love [Liebe] that seems to be the motivation directing the various ways of self-understanding of factical life, i.e. the various ways of having factical life. Scholarship seems to have overlooked how the first account of Angst comes about through an experience of love. What is more, in his reading of Augustine’s Confessions, Heidegger does not only account for the fundamental mood of Angst but also mentions for the first time how other moods are awakened: wonder [Wunder], astonishment [Staunen], joy [Freude], sadness [Traurigkeit], startled dismay/alarm [Erschrecken], alarm/shock [Schrecken], fear [Furcht], and dread [Gruseln]. Before we move into a more detailed analysis, let us make some general remarks concerning Heidegger’s interpretation of Augustine.

\(^{479}\) PRL, pp. 159-162.
\(^{480}\) Ibid, p. 128. NB: In Being and Time this is translated as “circumspection”.
\(^{481}\) Ibid, p. 170.
\(^{482}\) Ibid, p. 180.
\(^{483}\) BT, §60, p. 342.
Heidegger read Augustine in a way that allowed for the enactmental character of the *Confessions* to be formally indicated. In this context, he focused on particular parts of the text that he deemed to offer an existential breakthrough. In particular, Heidegger chose Book X as in this book Augustine moves beyond an account of his own past and into the experience of the present, talking about “what he is now.” Book X is more important for Heidegger since it is there that Augustine gives a phenomenological-existential account of the experience of the enactment of factual life.

According to Heidegger, Augustine manages (at certain points) to go beyond the objective-historical account and offer an existential account of facticity that goes *beyond the natural-scientific attitude*. Augustine’s existential breakthrough comes by way of his confession that his *relation* to God is one of faith and, as such, it is not a matter of comprehension [*Begreifen*]. Thus, Augustine offers a different relational account to the Christian worldview. This different way of relating is primarily enacted through the certainty that Augustine lives *in the love of God*. It is *in the love of God that he sufficiently intends God*. This, Heidegger adds, indicates an existential stage “which can ‘hear’ and see, that is, the stage in which loving, in such loving, is opened up for something definite” (i.e. God). Heidegger here in effect analyses intentionality and worldhood in terms of love: it is love that establishes a relation to God, and opens up the religious world itself. The “opening” is not explained in terms of the natural-scientific attitude since it is made sense in terms of the affect of love, a motivation that enacts religious experience. Meaningfulness is not explained in terms of a subject intending an object present-at-hand.

As already mentioned, Heidegger’s initial opening towards love was made in the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* where the turn to ἔρως, the passion of factual life,

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484 PRL, p. 128.
485 Heidegger does not explicitly use the notion *enacted* (vollzieht) here, but he uses the Husserlian phrase “what gives a *fulfilling intuition*” [was dem *erfüllende Anschauung* gibt]. According to my reading, Heidegger’s reversion to Husserlian notions does not constitute a regression from his own discoveries that he so insistently distinguishes from Husserl’s own. It is precisely for this reason that he uses fulfilling intuition in inverted commas. I do not think it would constitute any kind of hermeneutic violence to replace *fulfilling intuition* with *enactment* here; it is supported by the context.
486 PRL, p. 130.
487 Ibid.
had already been laid down by referring to Plato. Heidegger was interested in indicating how philosophical understanding stems from factual life, and further analysis into the enactmental character of it would indicate the motivations and tendencies that shape and direct the flow of experience of the self. In that respect, ἔρως was the motivation of philosophy. And this is not a strange comment to make concerning Plato’s philosophy since it was he who associated philosophy with ἔρως, notably in the Symposium.

But while in Plato ἔρως is the motivation, in Augustine it is identified with tendency. As it was noted in the previous section, tendency and motivation are two aspects of the very same phenomenon, each emphasizing a different aspect of the enactmental structure, so to treat these two notions as separate events or entities is unwarranted. However, Heidegger’s exchange of one for the other when it comes to ἔρως does signify a shift in his perspective, a shift which indicates Heidegger’s own turn from a static transcendental account of origin, to an ecstatic opening up of the philosophical endeavour itself towards a “letting-go”, an open-ended structure.

As Tatjana Noemi Tömmel writes, Heidegger wants to go beyond Plato; for Plato ἔρως is only a “motivator”, a moment that initiates philosophy but then ceases to be an inherent part of the ongoing philosophical activity, whereas Heidegger wants to show how ἔρως is not only a grounding motive of philosophy, but rather the philosophical endeavour [Betätigung] itself which demands a letting-go [ein Sichloslassen] in the ultimate tendencies of life and a return to its last motives. 488 Thus, love for Heidegger is not a “cause” that stands behind the philosophical kinesis, or an ἡποκείμενον that stands “below” it, but rather it enactmentally accompanies the experience, it “has” the experience as the ground of the enactment that dynamically persists. For Heidegger, ἔρως is not just “in the past”, as the moved mover of the happening, but it is there in an ecstatic way, both within the immanent experience as well as in the potential and actualization for ecstasis. Heidegger’s ἔρως has a futural element, and hence renews its letting-go into an enacted anticipated future (cf. the temporality of Angst).

Heidegger believes that Augustine’s account overcomes the theoretical attitude, offering an account of how the person experiences her or his own facticity in relation to the absolute intentional object, that is God. The breakthrough identifies in love the many tendencies of enactment. It is important to see how this constitutes a radicalization of the Husserlian personalistic attitude: it takes it one step further by connecting the structure of motivation with the affective, something that Husserl had not done, without either reducing that which is “had” to the affective and collapsing everything to the affect, or by reducing the affective to a naturalistic state (as psychologism did). The breakthrough comes in the fact that the intended object (God) is not reduced to a theoretical object, and nor is the experiencing person reduced to a natural subject. Rather, we get to examine the relational character of factual life, as it is manifested in Augustine’s confessions, and that which motivates and affords the tendencies of this opening: love.

Metaphysical understanding is grounded in love. Love, for Augustine, is an absolute starting point that provides the necessary certainty by virtue of which he orients his radical inquiry. Love is what characterizes the way Augustine has his own experience. Heidegger will follow Augustine in identifying conflicting tendencies of love, centered around the distinction between the authentic way of how oneself “has” this love, that is how the “having-of-oneself” is enacted as the authentic having of historical facticity, and the inauthentic ones which give in to the possibility of “falling”, that is, of becoming self-absorbed and lost in the secular world. The former will be identified by being directed and keeping with the love of God, sustained by continence [continentia], which enacts the overcoming of inauthentic “having”. The latter will be identified with the manifold ways that love diverges into the various ways that love directs itself at the secular world. In rough terms, this corresponds to the two distinct aspects of love, ἔρως and ἀγάπη, erotic love and divine love.

489 “You, God, bestow this honor upon the memoria by living in it. But “in qua ejus parte maneas, hoc considero” [in what part of it, I now consider]. I have not found You in the representations of material things and not “ubi commendavi affectiones animi mei” [where I had committed the affections of my soul], where I entrusted the experienced conditions and moods [Zustände und Stimmungen]. […] You Yourself are not an “affectio, vivendis, qualis est cum laetamur, contristamur, cupimus, metuimus, meminimus, obliviscimur, et quidquid hujusmodi est; ita nec ipse animus es, quia Dominus Deus animi tu es” [affection of a living person, such as when we rejoice or are sad, or when we desire, fear, remember, forget, or anything of that kind; nor are You the soul itself, for You are the Lord God of the soul]” (PRL, p. 149).
Heidegger begins at the place where Augustine’s confesses that the only certainty, what he knows, is that he loves God. Augustine then quickly turns this into a question: *Quid autem amo, cum te amo?* But what do I love when I love you? Heidegger considers Augustine’s question from a phenomenological perspective: “Augustine attempts to find an answer to this question by investigating what there is that is worthy of love [...] or what gives a ‘fulfilling intention’ if he lives in the love of God, what suffices for, or saturates, that which, in the love of God, he intends”. 490

Augustine turns his question concerning the soul that seeks God into a question of seeking beata vita, that is, the happy [glücklich] life that is the way knowledge of God enacts itself. The objective seeking of God is thus reflected, or phenomenologically “reduced”, into the affective certainty of love that accompanies this relation to the object sought, and is thus turned into an inquiry into the mode of having, a how of seeking and of having the happy life. The relational correlate of the seeking and loving of God is the seeking and loving of beata vita. Augustine’s question of “how do I search for God” becomes a question of “how do I search for the good life”, which turns into the how of having the happy life. 491 Heidegger is interested in how Augustine leads his inquiry from an objective-theoretical seeking into an existential question about the motivation and tendencies that characterize this factual life.

The shift from seeking and loving God to seeking and loving beata vita marks a shift from seeking for, loving and having an objective correlate, to seeking for, loving and having the enacted relation itself. In this regard, the being of God, and the search for the being of God, is turned into a mode of “having”, or, to put it the other way round, the “having” is appropriated such that it becomes the meaning of the “being” of God (without this passing any ontological judgment on the being of God). In Heidegger’s own words: “The primacy of the relational sense, or of the sense of enactment, is remarkable.— What it is: this question leads to the How of having it. The situation of enactment, authentic existence.—Appropriate the ‘having’ such

490 Ibid, p. 130.
491 Ibid, p. 141.
that the having becomes a ‘being’

In other words, Heidegger argues that Augustine manages to turn the questions of “what is God?” and “where do I find Him?” into a discussion about the conditions of experiencing God, which essentially turns to the problem of the self. It is the same question, albeit in a different form of enactment. This enables Augustine to turn to the way one desires and loves the happy life.

Having established then that love supplies the ground, in the form of certainty, of his knowledge about God, and how the intuition of God is enacted in love, he then inquires whether and how he can find God “therein”. Since God is not given in enactments of sensuous intuition, Augustine turns to other forms of enactment, in memory in particular. Augustine’s turn to memory is noteworthy, as it signifies an introspective reversal, from the outward to the inward, a reflective tendency whose progressive outcome will be the culmination in the fall into inauthenticity. But the first moment of this inward turn is connected with two particular fundamental moods: astonishment [Staunen] and wonder [stupor; Wunder]!

Augustine encounters the “enigmas” of enactment, and he discovers in memory, in which God may be found, a “vast and infinite interior”. He wonders at how such an infinite interior belongs to him, and yet he cannot grasp it: “Stupor apprehendit me”! “I am seized by wonder”, writes Augustine. In the face of this infinity, something wonderful is enacted [Wunderbares vollzieht] that awakens astonishment. Augustine then asks whether the “I”, the self to which this infinity belongs, is God after all: perhaps “I” am what I am seeking? But Augustine immediately rejects that, determined to continue the investigation “until the one [he] wants is awakened [wecken].”

Before we move on, it is crucial to note two things here. Firstly, we must take note of how the fundamental moods of wonder and astonishment are for the first time invoked in

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492 Ibid, p. 143.
493 Ibid, p. 150.
494 Ibid, p. 130.
495 Ibid, p. 132.
496 Note how the Platonic dialectic between knowledge and memory is repeated in Augustine, and is also a recurrent motif throughout Heidegger’s works, one way or another, for example through Heidegger’s invocations of forgetfulness, retrieval, awakening, etc.
497 Ibid, p. 133.
498 Some translators use “amazement”.
500 Ibid, p. 133.
Heidegger. Even though Heidegger does not offer a thematic analysis of these moods, they are clearly given a central role, and it seems that what Heidegger writes later on these moods remains within the spirit of this initial context, expanding on it and further analyzing it.\textsuperscript{501} Secondly, the way these moods are manifested, the dialectic of emergence and concealment of fundamental moods, is similar.

Both astonishment and wonder are moods associated with the disclosure of an infinite presence that overwhelms understanding. Astonishment and wonder are begotten by infinity given as presence, and associated with “the distress of not knowing the way out or the way in”, that is, “a not knowing the way out of or into this self-opening ‘between,’ […] in which man arrives or perhaps is thrown and for the first time experiences, but does not explicitly consider, that which we are calling ‘in the midst’ of beings”\textsuperscript{502} The mode of givenness of being is in essence the same as with θαυμάζειν, the mood that, according to Heidegger, grounded ancient Greek philosophy, the so-called “first beginning”.\textsuperscript{503}

\textbf{Awakening a fundamental mood}

The way a fundamental mood conceals and unconceals itself is articulated in accordance with the paradigm of wakefulness and sleep.\textsuperscript{504} Finding God is here reduced to the enactment of a fundamental mood, which belongs to the finding of (i.e. the fulfillment of intending) God.

Augustine experiences astonishment and wonder, but he quickly “rejects” them because they are not the moods that fulfill the intention of God: the mood he wants is still not awakened. The implication here is that while the fundamental mood that accompanies the fulfilled intention of God, i.e. the \textit{knowledge} of God, is in a certain way already in place, it still is not \textit{enacted} as such, but lies rather hidden as if asleep. Thus, it needs to be awakened.

\textsuperscript{501} Heidegger offers a detailed analysis of θαυμάζειν and its relation to Sichwundern (wonder), Staunen (amazement), Bestaunen (admiration), Erstaunen (astonishment), and Erschrecken (terror/shock) in the Winter semester 1937-38 lecture course entitled \textit{Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte ”Probleme” der ”Logik”}, volume 45 of the \textit{Gesamtausgabe}. (Martin Heidegger, \textit{Basic Questions of Philosophy Selected ”Problems” of “Logic”}, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994)

\textsuperscript{502} BQP, p. 132.

\textsuperscript{503} One difference is that for Plato, who is emblematic of the first beginning, disclosure of the infinite present-at-hand had to do with the world as φύσις, whereas in Augustine it arises upon reflection onto the self.

\textsuperscript{504} I am indebted to my colleague Patrick Levy for bringing to my attention the problem of sleep in Heidegger’s work.
The fundamental mood that opens up to the presence of God is not that of love, as, despite the fact that love is already felt and enacted, the affect that signifies the presence of God, *joy*, remains hidden/absent. This is the first time Heidegger will encounter the problem of *awakening a fundamental mood*. While Heidegger only mentions the notion of “awake” twice in this lecture course, the dialectic remains in place and is invoked again and again, such as in BT, but especially in the 1929-30 lecture course *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* where he says that the fundamental mood of his time, which will turn out to be boredom [*Langeweile*], needs to be *awakened*.

So the mood intended but not enacted is joy [*Freude*]. Joy would confirm the presence of God; but this is still sought as it is still hidden. Heidegger follows Augustine in searching for this “apodictic” mood that would confirm the presence of God, which is “somehow already there” in memory. Memory is a mode of givenness: it is that *in which* something is vaguely given as an object (of memory) and yet not partaking in the enactment, not enactmentally “had”. What sort of givenness is this then? According to Heidegger, in memory we have things “*ad manum positum*”, that is, things that are present-at-hand in the sense of being “ordered” at one’s disposal [*zur Verfügung*]. Memory is a mode of givenness that is present-at-hand but which is somehow “alienated” from the act.

What is at one’s disposal in memory is not only “material things”, not only “objects”, but rather anything that can be intended as such, including affects [*affectiones*]. The way affects are “had” in memory is distinct from the way they are “had” enactmentally, in that the latter is present as “lived”, vivid and not objectified, whereas the former is enactmentally absent, vaguely present in an objectified way. In memory, affects are “had” in a different manner than they are “had” in current experience. In other words, the way the affect is given in memory does not coincide with the way the affect is *enacted* in the situation, as the former is objectified in intentionality whereas the latter is pre-reflectively *experienced*. Heidegger gives the example of how one can intend joy [*Freude*] while experiencing sadness [*Traurigkeit*]. It is important to note that at this stage, while Heidegger distinguishes between the intended affect and the lived

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505 PRL, p. 136.
affect, he does not technically distinguish between “affect”, “feeling”, “emotion” and “mood”, as he uses interchangeably *Affekte, Gemütsbewegungen* and *Stimmungen*.

The distinction made here by Heidegger between the affect as intended in memory and the affect as experienced, implies a certain hierarchy in the mode of disclosure: the affect as experienced is non-intentional, that is, it founds and structures the intentional experience itself, but without being discharged into the objective side of intentionality, whereas the affect as intended does not partake in the enactment, as it is thematically grasped. This confirms that the manner of intentional “having” differs from the enactmental “having”.

But the relation between these two modes of having, which are fundamentally implicated and yet distinct, is peculiar and demands clarification. The fact that the intentional act can enactmentally have one affect but intend an other, different affect, even the opposite affect, means that some aspects of the founding enactment do not extend into the object itself. How can an affect that grounds the intentional act recede and not discharge into the objectification itself? And wouldn’t this neat distinction between the act as experienced and the object of the act make the two poles impossible to be unified? Or would it not make the communication between these two poles reciprocal, whereby an objectively grasped affect would be re-introduced back into the enactment and thus be “re-awakened”?

A “communication” between these two modes of having is needed in order to: a) be able to speak of a founding level of having upon which another way of having is founded; b) retain even a minimal truth in the object intended, and; c) allow for a “reverse enactment” whereby what was once pre-reflectively had, and then objectified, can be re-enacted, “awakened”. Heidegger finds a way to make sense of this nexus, but in order to achieve this he is forced to modify Husserl’s analysis. This is the moment phenomenology undergoes the hermeneutic modification; the moment phenomenological regard attains its hermeneutic dimension, opens up to its hermeneutic nature and attains maturity with regard to the impurity of intentionality itself, the finitude in relating to objects as well as in self-relating. Intentionality

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506 This is a problem that is also present in BT, whereby Heidegger has to explain how we move from inauthentic elevating moods, which he calls *Verstimmungen*, to fundamental moods that supposedly are somehow already there (but avoided, covered up by derivative, or even opposite, moods).
becomes hermeneutic. But the way Heidegger radicalizes Husserlian intentionality is unclear at this stage, and it takes some effort for the differences to be unpacked.

In Heidegger’s account of Augustine’s confessions, of the experienced affect as distinguished from the intended affect, indeed closely resembles Husserl’s own account in Ideas I, where Husserl differentiates between the various kinds of “having” joy. In Ideas I, Husserl distinguishes between the reflecting act that objectivizes joy as it regards it, and joy as it is lived but not regarded. Concerning lived joy that is not reflected upon, Husserl says: “The first reflection on the rejoicing [Freude] finds it as actually present now, but not as only now beginning. It is there as continuing to endure, as already lived before, only not looked at”. 507

Here, Husserl already ascribes a specific temporal character of the reflective “having” of the affect, which Heidegger reiterates in BT: the affect that is reflected upon has the temporal character of “having-been”, i.e. pastness. The reflected affect is given to intentionality as something that belongs to the past and hence something that is in memory. In teasing out the distinction between the two ways of “having” joy, Husserl writes that:

with respect to the rejoicing which has subsequently become an object, we have the possibility of effecting a reflection on the reflection which objectivates the latter and of thus making even more effectively clear the difference between a rejoicing which is lived, but not regarded, and a regarded rejoicing; likewise the modifications which are introduced by the acts of seizing-upon, explicating, etc., which start with the advertence of regard. 508

It seems that according to Husserl the reflective regard involved in memory objectivizes and thus neutralizes the affect. As he says: “In the neutrality modifications of rememberings, […] we have attentional potentialities the transmutation of which into actualities yield, to be sure, “acts” (cogitationes), but entirely neutralized”. 509 Thus, a reflective having of an affect in memory, reflecting on affect, cannot bear an existential awakening of the affect. This is consistent with Heidegger’s own analyses regarding awakening a fundamental mood.

But a problem arises here that Heidegger does not explicitly address at this stage. If affect grounds the worldhood of the world, along with intentional acts, and if it enables the very

507 Ideas I, p. 176.
508 Ibid.
opening up and revealing of the world, along with the encountering of intended objects in that world, this means that the affect always already partakes in the way the object is given. In other words, insofar as the affect grounds the experience, then it must extend to permeate the intentional act on the whole, also “tinting” the intended object itself. An analogy would be this: if sight grounds the encountering of visible objects, then any object encountered will be visible. In the case that a green filter is fixed on the lens, then all objects will appear in variants of green. How can a red object be encountered if the lens is green?510

If the lived affect is that of sadness, how can the object itself be experienced in a joyfull manner; even worse, how can the very affect of joy be intended in sadness? How can the fundamental affect be sadness when the object intended is joy itself, the opposite of sadness? Can there be “sad joy”? To repeat this in Augustinian terms: how can Augustine intend joy (in seeking it) when what he feels is love?

This need not be a problem for Husserl, since he does not consider affects as part of the foundation of the act; the act at the foundational level is devoid of affects, and thus the correlative object intended is also “neutral” at the foundational level. For Heidegger, on the other hand, no act is devoid of affect; in fact, all acts are constituted by affect (mood). Insofar as an affect is foundational, the intended object must always already be tainted by that affect, such that even when the object intended is an affect, the affect grounding the act must somehow also characterize the affect as intended object. Hence, we may intend “joy” while feeling sad. How can we make sense of this without admitting absurdity?

Focusing on the distinction between the ways of “having” helps us make sense of this paradox. Despite the fact that Husserl takes the act of feeling to be grounded on objectivation (the “noeses of feeling, of desiring, of willing […] are founded on objectivations”),511 Husserl draws a distinction that helps us resolve the apparent paradox: the distinction between the way of “having” the object from the perspective of the act, and the way of having the object in the sense of seizing the object itself.

510 I am aware that one may find ways to respond to this example; it is only given as an example to illustrate my point.
The matter of seizing the object is a neutral regard that has nothing to do with the quality of the act, and the affect is part of the quality of the act. Husserl writes that “in the act of valuing, we are turned toward the valued; in the act of gladness, to the gladsome; in the act of loving, to the loved [im Akte der Freude dem Erfreulichen, im Akte der Liebe dem Geliebten, im Akte der Liebe dem Geliebten][…]”\(^5\) Being turned lovingly to a thing, in this case the thing being “happiness”, does not mean that the affect that accounts for the quality of the act is in the object itself, despite the fact that the affect is the quality of the intending act.\(^6\) The way we have the quality of the act is not reduced into the way we have the object itself. The pure object remains unaffected by the qualities of the act. This distinction between the quality of the act and the intended object allows for Husserl to say that the act can have the quality of sorrow while the intended object is “joy” itself, which would be an object whose essence does not include affective qualities. The distinction lies in the way the act and the object are respectively “had”, which amounts to two distinct modes of relating.

If we turn this distinction on its head, we start making sense of Heidegger’s analysis of Augustine on love and joy. Husserl’s distinction shows that the affective act is ultimately grounded in the neutral object and the neutral, presentive act, whose state-of-affairs is pure objectivity. The distinction hence undermines the transcendental status of the affective act deeming it as a derivative kind of act: a loving act (an affective act) can intend sadness because sadness as objectified is in essence unaffected by the quality of the act. Heidegger, on the other hand, in accepting and maintaining the distinction between act and object, does not do so in order to undermine the affective quality of the act, but rather undermines the “neutrality” of the object (the neutral object that belongs to the neutral presentive act, upon which the derivative affective act is founded), and argues that the way we “have” the quality of the act is grounding and prior to intentionally having a neutralized object: the former “having” is part of the experience at the foundational level, whereas the latter is abstract, derivative, and somehow alienated from the ground. Thus, it is indeed possible to have the affect of joy that indicates that

\(^5\) Ibid, p. 77.
\(^6\) Ibid.
joy itself as experienced is “somehow there” in memory, without it being explicitly enacted: it is vaguely given “ad manum positum”, present-at-hand, “alienated” from the enactment and yet somehow relating to it.

In adopting the Husserlian terminology of intentionality, Heidegger still needs to overcome the static subject-object vocabulary, as Heidegger’s intention is not only to show how objectification is a derivative mode of givenness, but at the same time not to compromise for subjectivism. The enactmental aspect of givenness is not ontologically rehabilitated because of a privileged “subjectivity” contra an “alienated” object. Heidegger’s aspiration is to make manifest a more originary level of experience that has affect at the deepest level of constitution, and at the same time overcome the subject-object dualism.

If we are to apply the Husserlian stratified economy of givenness on Heidegger’s analysis of Augustine, on the problem of seeking the affect of joy as given in memory while enacted through love, then we still need to explain how Heidegger overcomes the subject-object economy. As noted earlier, Heidegger appeals to the dialectic of wakefulness and sleep so as to explain the two modes of givenness of affects: the affect of enactment is “awake”, whereas the affect as intended is “asleep”. The Husserlian distinction between the two different ways joy is given, the subject-object distinction, appears incongruent with the paradigm of “awakening”. If joy as an object of memory is taken to be an object intended that is relationally understood in opposition to the lived act, and joy as enacted is lived, then the dialectic of sleep and wakefulness helps clarify how the subjective and the objective are not understood as polar speculative opposites, but are rather two modes of givenness that are not a matter of speculative inversion or reconstruction of two opposing realms.

How can the act itself correspond to wakefulness, while the intended object corresponds to sleep? From a Husserlian perspective, this would be a category mistake: the act and the object are not “opposite categories”. The act and the object, or the subject and the object, are not just opposing poles as Natorp would have it, whereby the object is what is given and the subject is the opposite pole that is not given and must be reconstructed. In Husserlian phenomenology, and this is a defining characteristic of phenomenology in general, both subject and object, act
and intended states-of-affairs, are *given*, albeit in different ways. Subject and object signify
distinct ways of givenness, two distinct ways of “having”. How then could we describe one pole
as “wakefulness” and the other as “sleep”, or, to use the Aristotelian categories, how can we
describe the subjective act as “actual” and the intended object as “potential”, without bluntly
opposing one side to the other? How can we avoid sentencing the object to death, as a frozen
moment of the dynamic subjective, an inanimate object present-at-hand that is infinitely distant
from the act? And how can we allow for a “reverse enactment” whereby what was once pre-
reflective, pre-objective, can be re-enacted, “awakened”? The problem is thus already one that
pushes phenomenological understanding beyond transcendental epistemology: it is not simply
an issue of understanding and interpretation, but it is at the same time a genetic issue of
“beginning”, of enacting the fundamental mood that is at the constituting origin of metaphysical
understanding.

As already mentioned, Heidegger’s shift to the enactmental aspect of understanding is
the moment phenomenology undergoes the hermeneutic modification. The issue of how
Heidegger’s turn to the paradigm of “wakefulness” and “sleep” is best clarified by turning to
Heidegger’s hermeneutic structure of formal indication, as was already pointed out in the
previous section of this chapter.

Even though Heidegger’s analysis of Augustine resembles Husserl’s analysis of
“having joy” in memory from *Ideas I*, we must remember how Heidegger criticized the way
Husserl’s formalization remained dependent on “generalization”, and remained anchored on
materiality and content in the sense of presence-at-hand (which is what enabled Natorp’s
critique to attain its force). Heidegger’s formalization involves a radicalized way of grasping the
intentional experience itself, opened up by way of a formal indication that does not objectify.
This allows for the phenomenologist to indicate the general situation and see the act and the
intentional object as moments of a structural nexus. From this perspective, the intentional object
is *indicated* as something that is not a natural object present-at-hand, but is rather a way that
*Dasein* manifests itself and relates to the world. At the same time, the act itself, the enactment,
is a mode of givenness that is not reduced to the subjective side of a metaphysical dualism. Both
subjective and objective are seen from the perspective of an originary “in-between” and thus neither the subjective nor the objective have self-grounding legitimacy, rather they are manifestations of the grounding “in-between”. Viewed from this perspective, both object and subject, intended object and act, are not substantiated entities present-at-hand, but rather formal indications, expressive variations of enactment.

Heidegger does not offer a clear account of this in his Phenomenology of Religious Life, but the hermeneutic nexus in operation is the same, albeit at an incipient stage, as that in BT. Applying the tripartite hermeneutic structure of §2 of BT helps seeing how Augustine’s search for God is enacted as love, given as love, whose sought after object is the joy coterminous to God, the joy of beata vita that is given in memory as if “asleep” and needs to be “awakened”. Let us turn to BT then.

In BT Heidegger’s definition of philosophy as phenomenology is strongly hermeneutic, and the hermeneutic character of his inquiries will remain in place even in the later period when he will no longer associate his project with the transcendental. Philosophy will be the finite process of starting from that which is phenomenologically given and trying to uncover the foundations that ground the phenomenon, while knowing that the very process of uncovering is finite and cannot discover unadulterated, pure, transcendental, foundations. Philosophical reflection as it takes place in BT is, in a way, reminiscent of Augustine’s Confessions, the practice of interpretation of pre-reflective elements of Dasein’s world involvement. And interpretation is the articulation of Dasein’s pre-reflective understanding of being. Heidegger’s discovery of “formal indication” concerns, and affirms, the hermeneutic nature of understanding and conceptuality, whereby the concept that indicates an originary phenomenon is delimited by indeterminacy: it lies between conceptual determinacy and indeterminacy, it is vaguely present and thus somehow necessarily absent. Therefore, Augustine has a vague understanding, knowledge, of beata vita, of holy joy, and the very act of indicating it does not amount to an objective presentification of it, nor to a self-transparent experience of it.

Heidegger explicitly addresses this problem and the proposed solution of it, indeed in PRL where he argues that philosophical concepts themselves arise out of ‘factical life experience’ and then point back to tasks of performance, i.e. of enactment. Once we come to see concepts as arising out of factical being-in-the-world, then we can also see how and why concepts, however explicit or vague, formal or informal, must be seen as embedded within a structural nexus of meaning-relations. Invoking and interpreting a concept then involves the process of transformation of experience whereby the re-interpretation and reflection recovers the covered-up experiential aspects that enable the arising of vague understanding in the first place. And a repetition and analytic “refinement” of this vague understanding explicates the originary existential circumstances- a process that resembles the phenomenon of “awakening”. Hence, that which is initially conceptually given, as δόξα, is a legitimate starting point that conceals, but in that concealing, or rather, because of it, unconcealment and awakening of originary experience and understanding is made possible.

In §2 of BT Heidegger’s hermeneutic ontological project, the question of Being, is a project structured in terms of three formal aspects: the Gefragtes, the Befragtes and the Erfragtes. The Gefragtes corresponds to what is intended by the question: Being. The Befragtes corresponds to what is interrogated as regards what is sought: “beings” are interrogated with respect to their Being. As it will turn out, the preferred Befragtes will be Dasein itself. The Erfragtes refers to that which will be disclosed through the interpretation, and that is the meaning of Being (as time). If we apply this structure on Augustine’s search of God, we get the same hermeneutic structure, whereby what is sought is not Being itself but rather God.

Applying the formal structure on the Augustinian inquiry then, “Being” is replaced by “God”, “Dasein” by the “having of love”, and the “meaning of Being” by the “joy of beata vita”. For Augustine, what is intended, the Gefragtes, is God; what is interrogated, the Befragtes, is the person as the one who enactmentally experiences (i.e. “has”) the love of God; and that which is provisionally, formally, indicated, the Erfragtes, in this confessional self-

interpretation, is the joy of beata vita, the joy of the “happy life” in which God’s meaning is present. At this initial hermeneutic stage then, love is the sense of enactment, it is that which enables the relation to God, which opens up the experience and constitutes the Christian world. It is, in other words, the affect that indicates how being in the Christian situation is enacted, the “how of having” God.

As mentioned earlier, in encountering his own memory Augustine is apprehended by astonishment, but he rejects his own memory as a satisfying result of his inquiry. He must proceed until the one he wants is awakened, and that is joy. Love is that which is “had now” and joy is that which is sought, intended in memory. Even if joy is “lost”, still having lost something is a mode of having it. The real motive behind this inquiry then is the joy, as having this joy is having beata vita. Joy is the end of concern [delectatio finis]: it is joy that everyone wants in wanting beata vita. But not all joy is the same: Augustine is not endorsing affective relativism. It is possible to pursue another joy than the one that pertains to the truth of God. Love of joy bifurcates into an authentic way of having life, and an inauthentic way of having it. Both possibilities involve the experience of life as a constant temptation [ständige Versuchung; tentatio] and what is at stake is how one comports oneself and relates to this factual situation. Authenticity then involves a way of having the experience, which will be shown to be continence, which does not involve a change of the content of experience itself, rather a modification in the way we comport ourselves to the situation. Inauthenticity, likewise, involves ways of comporting ourselves to the factual situation, which are ways of “giving in” to factual life, becoming absorbed by it and “falling”. Let us firstly analyze these inauthentic ways of having factual life before we turn to the authentic way of having God, which opens up an authentic relation to world in general.

Through Heidegger’s analysis of Augustine, we come to see how the joy of beata vita, the joy of the truth of God, which is self-sufficient life in-itself, is opened up by the experience of ēρως itself. The ambiguous status of joy in memory, as something intended that is

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517 PRL, p. 140.
518 Ibid, pp. 143-145.
519 Ibid, p. 145.
contemporaneously present and absent, reflects back on the very love of the enactment, bringing into the open the double character of love itself, the inherent ambiguity of love which is both ἔρως and ἀγάπη, erotic love and divine love: desire that lacks and intends the Other in and through insufficiency and radical absence, and love that achieves self-sufficiency.

VI. Authenticity and Continence

Loving as having joy

Heidegger follows Augustine in identifying conflicting tendencies of love, centered around the distinction between the authentic way of how oneself “has” love, that is how the “having-of-one’self” is enacted as the authentic having of historical facticity, and the inauthentic ones which give in to the possibility of “falling”, that is, of love becoming self-absorbed and lost in the secular world. The former will be identified by being directed and keeping with the love of God, sustained by continence [continentia] enacted as the overcoming of inauthentic having. The latter will be identified with the manifold ways that love diverges into the various ways that one loves the secular world.

No matter how the happy life is had, writes Augustine, everyone desires it [volunt] because they love it. Loving and desiring are coterminous to having and knowing: “we can love [the happy life] only by somehow knowing about it”. What we desire in the happy life is the very taking delight, the joy [freuen]. Heidegger notes then that the real motive behind the desire for the happy life is “the desire to take delight (or the desire to avoid pain)” [Das Sichfreuenwollen (bzw. Vom Leiden wegwollen) is also dabei eigentliches Motiv: die Freude zu haben].

But this desire and love that indicates that we “have” (as an end) the happy life, is not a guarantee of authenticity in itself. Not everyone strives for the authentic happy life, notes Heidegger. Some ways of loving/having are inauthentic. Heidegger quotes Augustine:

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520 Ibid, pp. 142-143.
521 Ibid, pp. 143-144.
522 Ibid, p. 144. Both “delight” and “joy” are translations of “Freude”.
Thus seeking the authentic happy life ceases to be significant as they lose interest in it. This comes with a reversal: the person ceases to love and desire the authentic happy life, and they actually come to hate it. In this hatred, they take what they already have at hand as the authentic, and love it.

The most striking example that Augustine gives concerning this reversal and fall into inauthenticity, is the joy we get when we experience truth [veritas]. Everyone wants the truth, says Augustine, because everyone enjoys the truth. And the happy life is precisely that: the experience of truth! Here Augustine makes the same connection between desire, enjoyment and truth that Plato does. Wanting the happy life is wanting the truth: the “happy life is the joy of truth”. The desire for the happy life is therefore guided by the rejection of deceit and the delight of truth [delectatio veritatis].

But a sustained analysis brings Augustine to the realization that most people do not authentically love the truth. They become intensely occupied by other things and are captured by the activity in which they are absorbed, something that makes them lose the happy life more and more. Through the absorption by the activity, one is already occupied with, “the real truth is not being loved but rather hated”.

Absorption in factical life is an abandoning of oneself over to it, writes Heidegger. This factical life becomes that which fulfills the effort toward truth. In Augustine’s words: “Hoc quod amant velint esse veritatem”: what the love they want to be the truth. “[W]hat is loved at the moment, a loving into which one grows through tradition, fashion, convenience, the anxiety

524 Ibid, p. 146.
525 Ibid.
526 Ibid.
527 Ibid, p. 147.
of disquiet, the anxiety of suddenly standing in vacuity; precisely this becomes the “truth” itself, in and with this falling enactment”. 528 Heidegger continues with his interpretation:

Amant eam lucentem, oderunt eam redarguentem” [They love the truth when it enlightens them, but they hate it when it reprehends them]. They love it, when it encounters them as glitzy, in order to enjoy it aesthetically, in all convenience, just as they enjoy every glamour that, in captivating, relaxes them. But they hate it when it presses them forcefully. When it concerns them themselves, and when it shakes them up and questions their own facticity and existence, then it is better to close one’s eyes just in time, in order to be enthused by the choir’s litanies which one has staged before oneself.529

Augustine leads his confession deeper into an analysis of factical life. The experience of desiring the authentic good life becomes a striving that deforms and disperses life. One’s “life is no cakewalk” [Spaziergang]; rather, one becomes a burden to one’s self: “Oneri mihi sum” [I am a burden to myself].530 Factual life is characterized by dispersion [Zerstreuung], what Heidegger will later call “falling”. Augustine experiences the facticity of life as molestia (trouble): a burden of life that drags life down.531 The burden of life and the possibility of being dragged down grows out of the enactment of experience itself (cf. mood as burden in BT).

Augustine experiences the love of God and the desire for the good life to be as concern for joy: delectatio finis curae.532 Love itself, in its ambiguity, opens up the experience of factical life as a constant concern that is directed at joy. And this can be enacted in various ways and possibilities. Factual life is a concern for joy that tends to pull life towards a dispersion, a dissolution “into the many”: in multa defluere.533 This pull towards dispersion is enacted, according to Augustine, as timere (fearing) and desiderare (desiring; erwünschen) as well as cupiditas (lust).534 In concernful life, desire for joy is at the same time experienced as a counter-movement: concern is an interplay between desire for something, towards something, but also aversion from something: in prosperity I fear adversity, while in adversity I desire prosperity.535

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528 Ibid.
530 Ibid, p. 151.
533 Ibid, p. 152.
535 Ibid.
At this precise moment of the analysis, Heidegger powerfully introduces for the first time the affects of Angst and shock [Schrecken]. As concernful life seeks to fulfill its desire for joy and fulfill its potential for self-sufficiency, it becomes absorbed by factical life. Remember that ontologically speaking, these “ways of being” are ways of being in truth, ways of knowing truth: the way we exist and comport ourselves is the way we unconceal the truth of being. Or, to put it the other way around: truth is always going to be effectively “reduced” to a mode of being, a way of comporting ourselves, towards the world and ourselves. Hence, an analysis of the way we comport ourselves towards factical life reveals something about truth itself. The intentional character and self-sufficiency (cf. Husserlian “fulfilment”) that can be achieved by factical life pertains precisely to the way we understand truth. Insofar as affects are the ground of factical life, their role in the experience of truth is foundational.

In desiring the joy of beata vita, that is the joy of truth, the self may become absorbed by what is immediately given in the factical situation. Thus, through tradition, custom and convenience, what is given in the moment is loved and the given becomes truth itself.536 The obverse of this habitual comforting in identifying truth with what is given is, “the anxiety of disquiet, the anxiety of standing in vacuity” [Angst vor Unruhe, Angst davor, plötzlich im Leeren zu stehen].537 The identification of truth with the given, the love and happiness with the given, is coterminous with an aversion towards that which can radically disrupt it: the aversion towards becoming startled or shocked! In loving the given as the truth, “they do not want to be shocked [Sie wollen sich von hier nicht aufschrecken lassen].”538

This is the initial context in which the fundamental moods of shock and Angst emerge; both of them follow love, they belong to, if I may put it thus, an economy of love. I am not arguing that shock and Angst are modes of love, since they are different affects, but the way Heidegger describes their emergence in the Augustine lectures does connect them with the love of God. Because of this affective trajectory, it is worth looking at the temporal character of shock comparatively, that is, in relation to the temporal character of love and Angst.

536 Ibid, p. 147.
537 Ibid.
538 Ibid, pp. 147-148. (My italics; translation modified).
Shock and Angst are the counterparts of a “fallen” relation to, an inauthentic having of, factical life’s desire to fulfilment of truth. In desiring fulfilment, the self identifies the readily given with truth and fulfills its desire. To repeat this in Augustinian parlance: the love of God and the desire for the good life manifests itself as a concern for joy, conveniently fulfilled by that which is given in secular everydayness. God’s (divine love’s) absence develops an aversion to vacuity, an aversion to shock and Angst, and this aversion makes the self find truth in facticity. According to Heidegger, this “fallen” way of loving truth is fulfilled by error, whereby the apparent aversion to being shocked is motivated by “truth.” Thus, they end up loving error more than truth.

But we must not be misled into thinking that Heidegger here interprets truth as a mere psychological effect. Heidegger points out how tendency has three possibilities: to love, to know and to be. This shows that love, knowledge and being are three manifestations of the same essence, they are three distinct possibilities, which are essentially united in “having”. This also explains why even though in the Augustine lectures the ontological question is not thematically addressed, that does not sever facticity from ontological understanding, but rather the analysis does not thematically pursue it from that perspective.

Augustinian truth is not reduced to a psychological effect then, and not only because Augustine’s perspective is not psychological, but also because he maintains a distinction between the truth of God and the affects that open up the relationship to God. God is not identical to the affections, and Heidegger takes note of how Augustine confesses this non-coincidence between God and affect: he is not where Augustine had committed the affections of his soul, “where [he] entrusted [his] experienced conditions and moods [Zustände und Stimmungen].” This also shows that Heidegger is not reading Augustine as a metaphysician of affect. God is not reduced to an affection of a living person, joy or sadness, desire or fear. God is not joy. How does desire fit in factical life then?

539 Ibid, pp. 147-148.
541 Ibid, p. 149.
542 Ibid.
543 Ibid, p. 150.
Augustine experiences life as a constant temptation \[\text{ständige Versuchung}\];\(^{544}\) this is how he comports himself to factical life. Thus, \(\varepsilon\rhoος\) is experienced as a continuous “conflict” that cannot be resolved, as there is no resolving “middle ground” but always conflicting possibilities and counter-possibilities. According to Heidegger, life is experienced as concern, as a “determinate manner of enactment according to their own sense—the sense of \text{finis curae delectatio}.\(^{545}\) Experience is always insecure about itself because, in the complex of experience, “there is no \textit{medius locus} [middle ground] where there are also counter-possibilities […] In experiencing, a devilish being-torn-apart has been uncovered”.\(^{546}\) It is this dispersion in life that constitutes for Augustine the phenomenon of temptation \[\text{tentatio}\], what turns life into a constant temptation and a trial. As Augustine says, “\textit{vita est tota tentatio sine ullo interstitio} [life is all trial without intermission]”.\(^{547}\)

Heidegger considered Augustine’s notion of temptation to be the equivalent of his own phenomenological notion of \textit{tendency}, which is what \textit{constitutes the unity of factical life}; tendency explains the intentional character of factical life. However, temptation, tendency, is not experienced as \textit{simple} unity. Rather, it is \textit{unity with differentiation}, a unity in difference whose overcoming does not involve the abolition of movement or the overcoming of it, nor does it involve the absorption of either side into the other, i.e. the reduction of the “outside”, the object, into a subject, an “inside”, but rather involves the more originary experiencing of affect enactmentally from the perspective of the originary \textit{in-between}.

Before we see how Augustine accounts for the authentic experience of unity though, let us see the inauthentic ones, i.e. the ways the experience of factical life “falls” into inauthentic ways of having tendency, that is, the inauthentic ways of relating to the very “erotic structure” of intentional life. Let us turn to the forms of temptation that Augustine identifies, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, and see how desire and love determine these existential possibilities.

\(^{544}\) Ibid, p. 152.
\(^{545}\) Ibid, p. 154.
\(^{546}\) Ibid.
\(^{547}\) Ibid.
Inauthentic forms of temptation

Augustine identifies three forms of temptation: *concupiscentia carnis* (desire of the flesh), *concupiscentia oculorum* (desire of the eye) and *ambitio saeculi* (secular ambition).\textsuperscript{548}

According to Heidegger, Augustine derives the distinction between these three forms of temptation from John, through a juxtaposition of the divine with the secular: “Μὴ ἀγαπᾶτε τὸν κόσμον μηδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. ἐὰν τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν κόσμον, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν αὐτῷ· ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ ἡ ἀλαζονεία τοῦ βίου, οὐκ ἔστιν ἔκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἔστιν”: do not love the world, neither the things in the world. If anyone loves the world, the Father’s love is not in him. For all that is in the world, the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, and the secular ambition, is not the Father’s.\textsuperscript{549}

Temptations, manifested as desires, are attached to secular things in the world, and thus constitute the inauthentic way of being; they belong to the phenomenon of falling [Verfallsphänomen].\textsuperscript{550} Heidegger argues that while “it looks as if Augustine only gave a convenient classification of the different directions of *concupiscentia*, of ‘desire’ [Begierlichkeit]”, he does not merely describe these phenomena objectively.\textsuperscript{551} Rather, “he confesses how temptations grow on him through these phenomena and in this posture [Grundhaltung]”, and how he relates, or tries to relate to them, through the fundamental posture of confession (the “how” of relating).\textsuperscript{552}

The three forms of temptation correspond to different ways of “having” our factical life, three different ways of enacting concern [Bekümmerung, cura]: the mode of “dealing-with” [Umgehen], the mode of “looking-about-oneself” [sich-umsehen], and finally the mode of “secular ambition”. (These modes of relating to facticity are reiterated by Heidegger in BT). For the purposes of this analysis and for matters of economy, we can skip the first two forms of temptation which, according to Heidegger, “aim at something that has to do essentially with the

\textsuperscript{548} Ibid, pp. 155-180.
\textsuperscript{549} Ibid, p. 156; my italics.
\textsuperscript{550} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{551} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{552} Ibid, p. 157.
surrounding world, and not with the self [Selbstliches]” and as such they see the significance of the object.\(^{553}\) Concerning these first modes of “having” facticity, what needs to be mentioned is that Heidegger explicitly connects some fundamental moods with “looking-about-oneself” \([\text{sich-umsehen}]: \text{fear [Furcht], shock [Schrecken] and horror [Gruseln]}.\(^{554}\) But also boredom is here, in my opinion, implicitly associated with this mode of enactment, as Heidegger says that in this mode of enactment, the temptation to know, the desire to know, gets superfluously directed at entertainment, and being entertained by something is about “passing time” \([\text{Zeitvertreib}]\).\(^{555}\) Here, curiosity also finds its place. As Heidegger says: “\textit{Curiositas}, curiosity as the greedy desire for the new \([\text{Neugier}], \text{‘cupiditas, nomine cognitionis et scientiae palliata’ [the lust, hidden under the title of knowledge and science]}\)”\(^{556}\)

Whereas Heidegger in the earlier part of the lecture-course analyses \textit{Angst} and shock in tandem, as we see he later on distinguishes them in terms of their respective modes of enactment. \(\text{Angst} \text{will be associated with secular ambition}.\) What does that mean then with respect to Michel Haar’s analysis of terror and \textit{Angst}? Heidegger’s remarks here concerning shock and \textit{Angst} are made in passing, and, therefore, we do not have much textual help. But we can indeed make sense of Haar’s thesis precisely by reference to Heidegger’s distinction between the two respective modes of enactment.

“Looking-about-oneself” is the desire to know that gets absorbed by entertaining epistemic edifices. Thus, when this desire fails, experience of failure will be such that it involves an affect appropriate to the mode of enactment. Shock will be an affect that amounts to the experience of vacuity after the failure of the pertinent kind of epistemic givenness. Heidegger associates epistemic givenness of this enactmental kind with “perverse science”, namely, a science that from the beginning gives up any criticism about its own sense of enactment.\(^{557}\) This epistemic structure is reiterated after the \textit{Kehre}, precisely in the context of analyzing shock.

\(^{553}\) Ibid.
\(^{554}\) Ibid, p. 167.
\(^{555}\) Ibid, p. 166.
\(^{556}\) Ibid.
\(^{557}\) Ibid, p. 167.
In the Winter Semester 1937-38 Basic Questions of Philosophy lectures (GA 45), Heidegger describes shock as the basic mood of the other beginning. Here, Heidegger mentions Nietzsche as the thinker through whom “the other need comes into play”, that is, the need for the other beginning. Heidegger is here already thinking from a historical perspective, where wonder is the fundamental mood of the first beginning, and shock is the fundamental mood of the other beginning, revealing “a dark emptiness of irrelevance and a shrinking back in face of the first and last decisions.”

But despite the turn to a historical account of the truth of Being, from an epistemic standpoint the structure attached to shock is reminiscent of “looking-about-onceself” from the Augustine lectures: “This terror [shock] becomes aware that truths are still claimed and yet no one any longer knows or questions what truth itself is and how truth might belong to beings as such”. The sense of enactment of metaphysics, from the beginning of wonder to the other beginning of shock, is in essence the same. It is through this sense of enactment that the very history of metaphysics, both its beginning as well as its failure, makes sense. From the standpoint of “looking-about-onceself”, metaphysical understanding begins with wonder and ends in shock.

Angst then comes about only from a different sense of enactment, which apparently does not find an equivalent after the Kehre. It is the sense of enactment that pertains to the self, the Selbstliches. It is the sense of enactment of secular ambition where “the self articulates itself enactmentally in a certain way, insofar as this form explicitly revolves around the self itself.” This sense of enactment also has its corresponding possibilities of being authentic or inauthentic, of experiencing fulfilment and the void, and the affect associated with the experience of the void is Angst.

558 BQP. p. 168.
559 Ibid. p. 169.
560 Ibid.
561 PRL p. 170.
562 Ibid.
563 Ibid.
Self-significance and Angst

The joyful end [finis delectationis] of secular ambition is self-significance itself, which involves the communal-worldly contexts of life and the issue of self-validation (the equivalent of Mitsein in BT).\(^{564}\) It is the mode of “having” of facticity that appraises selfhood.

The first concern [curare] that comes in this form of temptation is timeri velle (wishing to be feared) along with amari velle (wishing to be loved). The concern at work is one of gaining a particular position in relation to the communal world, “consciously organizing one’s life such that one is feared or loved by others”.\(^{565}\) Heidegger interprets it thus:

In the timeri velle, one views oneself as the superior one, and makes an effort at such communal-worldly assertion. In the amari velle, one takes oneself to stand out as the valuable one who deserves the esteem of others.—Both velle can be the expression of a certain inner vehemence of existence, but they are just as much, and mostly, motivated by cowardly weakness and insecurity, the dependence upon models, a need of being allowed to go along, or by the concealing prevention, and pushing away, of confrontation. (In giving in to this tentatio, the self is lost for itself in its ownmost way).\(^{566}\)

The second concern is amor laudis, the love of praise. This is the desire to validate oneself, which is motivated and enactmentally maintained by a certain self-importance [Selbstwichtignahme].\(^{567}\) As Heidegger says, the “bustling activity for the sake of praise, for a communal-worldly standing of validity, is a cura [concern] for being liked or being pleasing [Gefallen].”\(^{568}\) According to Augustine, the problem with giving into his temptations is that it marginalizes God and makes him unimportant, since care is shifted from the truth of God to the opinion of human beings.\(^{569}\) This means that the one desiring to be praised and loved partakes in the deposition of God, since one prefers to be loved and esteemed in God’s place.\(^{570}\)

Finding joy in being praised is a falling, since the human being is “nothing” on its own regard: through praise we can experience joy for a while, but then we “fall” as joy leaves us, as

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\(^{564}\) Ibid.
\(^{565}\) Ibid, p. 171.
\(^{566}\) Ibid.
\(^{567}\) Ibid, p. 173.
\(^{568}\) Ibid.
\(^{569}\) Ibid, p. 174.
\(^{570}\) Ibid.
we -again- need validation from the others.\textsuperscript{571} It is interesting to note that Heidegger repeats this very economy of recognition in the context of his analysis of the fundamental mood of the first beginning, namely wonder \([\text{Erstaunen, } \thetaαυμάζειν}\), in \textit{BQP}. There, Heidegger offers an in-depth analysis of the various ways that we have historically related to wonder, especially an account of the inauthentic ways. In this context, Heidegger identifies amazement \([\text{Sichwundern}]\), marvelling \([\text{Verwundern}]\), admiration \([\text{Bewundern}]\), astonishment \([\text{Staunen}]\) and awe \([\text{Bestaunen}]\). What is interesting to note is that Heidegger describes admiration in a very similar way that he describes self-significance in the Augustine lectures, which culminate in \textit{Angst}.

While self-significance involves the desire to validate oneself, motivated by self-importance, admiration \([\text{Bewundern}]\) involves the desire to bestow admiration and thus to judge the admired, something that involves self-affirmation. In Heidegger’s own words:

No matter how wholly and genuinely admiration may be carried away by what fulfills it, yet it always involves a certain freedom over and against what is admired. This occurs to such a degree that all admiration, despite its retreating in face of the admired, its self-deprecating recognition of the admired, also embodies a self-affirmation \([\text{so etwas liegt wie ein Sich-selbst-mit-zur-Geltung-bringen}]\). Admiration claims the right and the capacity to perform the evaluation which resides in the admiration and to bestow it on the admired person. The admirer knows himself – perhaps not in the ability to accomplish things, though indeed in the power to judge them – equal to the one admired, if not even superior. Therefore, conversely, everyone who allows himself to be admired, and precisely if the admiration is justified, is of a lower rank. For he subordinates himself to the viewpoint and to the norms of his admirer. To the truly noble person, on the contrary, every admiration is an offence.\textsuperscript{572}

In similar vein, the Christian self, the \textit{Dasein} of the Christian individual, can fall into a love of being praised which ultimately leads to a falling into \textit{nothingness} and into the \textit{void} \([\text{ins Leere und Nichts verflüchtigt}]\). Different possibilities result as different modes of rejoicing, always taking oneself as important, as the highest good, the \textit{bonum}: a) taking as important what one does, one becomes conceited; b) elevating the self into taking ones goods as if they are one’s own (self-appropriation); c) taking the self as worthy of the “gift”, \textit{deserving} the bonum; d) even if the self possesses the joy of the good \([\text{gaudium bonum}]\) without deserving it, the self

\textsuperscript{571} Ibid, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{572} BQP, p. 142.
finds joy not in sharing it with others but in keeping it locked up and not wishing it for others (pride, self-love, conceit).

In all these possibilities, the direction of pleasing [placere] and joy [Freude] is moved into the self in a way that self-world becomes the dominant communal world, and in this the self is lost. The more the self engages in self-concern [Selbstbekümmernung], the more the self is taken as less important and is lost. Thus, in this manner, giving in to these inauthentic ways of having the factical self culminates in a fall into the void and the nothing. According to Heidegger, it is through this falling that the self is able to have its full facticity; thus, what in one sense looks like a nihilistic falling, in another sense it is only through this falling, these tendencies, that the self can overcome the falling. According to Heidegger, Augustine recognizes this double-character: self-concern is precisely the most difficult: the more the self engages in self-concern, the more the self is taken as important and is lost. In this context, “Augustine clearly sees the difficulty and the ultimately ‘anxiety-producing character’ of Dasein in such having-of-onself (in full facticity) [Istzlich ‘Beängstigende’ des Daseins in solchem Sichselbsthaben (in der vollen Faktizität)].”

Overcoming temptation: continence as a way of having tendency

As it was mentioned earlier, tendency is what constitutes the unity of factical life. Temptation is not experienced as simple unity, but rather it is unity in difference whose overcoming does not involve the abolition of movement or the overcoming of it, nor does it involve the absorption of either side into the other, i.e. the reduction of the “outside”, the object, into a subject, an “inside”, but rather involves the more originary experiencing of affect enactmentally, from the perspective of the originary in-between.

There exists, for Augustine, a mode of enactment, a way of relating to the temptations that make up our factical life that overcomes [Überwindung] the dispersion and the fall into

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573 PRL, p. 179.
575 For the capacity of continence to “overcome”, see Ibid, p. 177.
inauthenticity: *continence* [*continentia*].

It is a kind of “counter-movement” against the dispersion, against the falling apart of life, demanded by God. Through continence, “we are brought into the One”.

According to Heidegger, continence is a kind of “containment” [*Zusammenhalten*], a “pulling back” from dispersion. However, it is not a “negation” of relation, it is not a counterposing in the sense of “abstinence” [*Enthaltsamkeit*] that annuls or denies the desires. Rather, it is a new way of *relating* to these desires, *a way of having*, which in a certain sense brings the person *closer* to the desire, makes them *think* of the desire and accept that “life is really nothing but a constant temptation”, a constant desire.

It is through continence that Augustine is able to experience life *as a constant temptation* and endure it as such, without turning the burden into a delight, without a dialectical overcoming (in the sense of *Aufhebung*). It is in this precise direction that temptation finds its sense and motivation.

Continence “represents the mode and direction of the overcoming and the halting of the fall [*Aufhalten des Abfallens*], but it does not move away from the unrest of facticity.

Continence therefore has a peculiar character. While it is that which “contains” the self and in a certain sense constitutes a counter-movement to dispersion, it is one whereby the experience of this very dispersion through the temptations is *accentuated*: it is through continence that life is experienced as a constant *temptation* and as a *burden*.

What then of love? Is there a way of being continent and loving? As we’ve seen above, the temptation that manifests itself in the pleasure we take in being praised and loved is a fall from authenticity. However, the reverse is not: *to love and praise* is the authentic conduct in the communal-worldly life context. This is because praising and loving the Other is the refraining from the love of things, but it is the love of the Other because of the gift he or she was given by God.

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577 Ibid.
578 Ibid.
579 Ibid.
580 Ibid, p. 177.
The continent way of loving lacks the direction of pleasing others [placere aliis] but also represses the communal-worldly. In effect it involves the overcoming of the love of praise [amor laudis].\textsuperscript{581} Continence involves the demand for justice [iustitia] and “love’s bringing-toward, leading-toward, and genuine direction of concern. Iustitia is the authentically and originally sense-like directedness […], in its entirety, of the factual experience of significance.”\textsuperscript{582} This involves, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, a competition [certamen] between two directions of loving: the loving of oneself that comes in the direction of pleasing that points towards the communal world, and the loving of God’s gift in the other.

Heidegger identifies in Augustine a way of loving and praising that is at the very heart of authentic experience of the joyful end [finis delectationis] of the form of the temptation of secular ambition, an authentic way of relating to self-significance through love. The pressing question though is this: if Heidegger ends up appropriating so many notions from Augustine why does he not also follow Augustine on the affect of love?

If we carefully read Heidegger’s interpretation of Augustine’s analysis of the sense of “self-importance” right to the very end, we come across the evidence for why Heidegger will later prioritize Angst rather than love. Heidegger’s analysis of Angst in BT seems to follow from his interpretation of Augustine on love. Taking delight in the love of God and/or his gift to an Other person ultimately leads to the experience of Angst.

If we give in to the temptation of taking delight in being loved and praised, then this constitutes a falling into inauthenticity, in which lurks the danger of “taking-oneself-to-be-important”. This involves a number of different possibilities of experiencing the Dasein of the self-world, all of which are states of excessive self-importance and conceit.\textsuperscript{583} All of these hubristic possibilities end in the self-world becoming a communal world, in the sense that the self-world is still dominated by the communal world, a “worldly” positioning whereby the “self” is actually lost.\textsuperscript{584}

\textsuperscript{581} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{582} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{583} Ibid, pp. 178-180.
\textsuperscript{584} Ibid, p. 179.
On the other hand, the overcoming of the temptation (via continence) “can lead to insight and self-revelation […] A genuine enacting or understanding of enactment”. In that mode whereby the self no longer attributes importance to itself and rejoices before God, the enactment of concern becomes novel: it becomes an experience whereby through this hidden “movement” everything falls into the void, *inanescit* [becomes vain or void], and everything is invalidated […] In the last and most decisive purest concern for oneself lurks the possibility of the most groundless dive [*abgründigsten Sturzes*], and of authentically losing oneself. (“Groundless,” because the dive has no longer any hold, and it cannot be enacted before anything, so that one could finally turn it into a secular importance after all[…]). […] Really: self-concern is precisely the most difficult, taking oneself to be less and less important by engaging the self all the more”.

In other words, through the love and praising of God or of God’s gift, we come to authentically experience the groundlessness of self-importance. And this leads to the experience of a fundamental *Angst*. As Heidegger writes: “Augustine clearly sees the difficulty and the ultimately “anxiety producing character” of *Dasein* in such having-of-onself (in full facticity)”.

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587 Ibid.
Chapter 4: Aristotle on πάθος, διάθεσις and λόγος

I. Introduction

The young Heidegger was interested in offering a more originary account of intuition in its relation to truth, the formation of conceptuality and the way it grasps Being. Heidegger tried to provide a deeper account of intentional life as enacted and as constituted. In this context, he appropriated notions from Dilthey and Husserl, such as the notions of “having” [Haben], “comporting” [Verhalten] and “understanding” [Verstehen] in order to emphasize how knowing is for the most part unthematic and pre-reflective, and not some sort of deliberate, meditative act of knowing something.\(^\text{588}\) It is in this context that Heidegger also employs the notions of Motivation and Tendenz, in order to describe the way intentional life is a matter of comportment that is twofold in its unity and concatenation [Zusammenhang], whilst also dynamic and diverse. Affects are loosely identified as the constitutional element of the disclosure of meaning. But it is not until Heidegger turns to Aristotle that his affective phenomenology attains a terminologically determinate footing, where intentionality and judgment itself are shown to be constituted in affective experience.

For this reason, it is of crucial importance to our study to look at Heidegger’s early lectures on Aristotle. First, his interpretation of Aristotle comprehensively shapes the ontological project that culminates in BT, in the account of the fundamental moods of Angst and fear. Second, the notion of Befindlichkeit that is central in Being and Time (BT) takes us directly back to Heidegger’s Marburg lectures on Aristotle and Plato. Thus, looking at his early Aristotle lectures is crucial for our genealogical account of mood.

Concerning the contextual importance of the Aristotle lectures, Theodore Kisiel writes that “[i]t was against this academic backdrop that the project of BT first came into being and underwent its initial drafting.”\(^\text{589}\) In the summer semester of 1921, Heidegger gave the first of a series of lectures on Aristotle, which would last without interruption every semester until the

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\(^{589}\) Ibid.
end of 1924.\textsuperscript{590} The \textit{Lebensphilosophie} language of BT perhaps conceals the depth of the relationship between Heideggerian phenomenology and Aristotle.\textsuperscript{591} However, there are certain facts that betray this strong bond, without hermeneutic violence: the fact that before BT Heidegger was writing a “book” on Aristotle; that in the 1950s, Heidegger advised his students to postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years, etc.\textsuperscript{592} What is more, many scholars, such as Franco Volpi\textsuperscript{593} and Walter Brogan,\textsuperscript{594} have noted the homologies between the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} (NE) and BT.

I identify three (overlapping) ways in making sense of the turn to Aristotle: the first has to do with Heidegger’s well-known general interest in the question concerning the meaning of \textit{Being}, a problem that directly descended from Aristotle’s \textit{Metaphysics}; the second has to do with Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s theoretical, cognitivist, approach, and Heidegger’s radicalization focusing on the practical, enactmental, elements of it (under the influence of Lask’s interpretation of Husserl, and Natorp’s critique of Husserl); third, in the context of the aforementioned radicalization of Husserlian phenomenology, the terminology Heidegger chose in order to formally indicate facticity was strongly reminiscent of Aristotelian notions, hence already anticipating a return to Aristotle.\textsuperscript{595} (In essence, I am arguing here that Volpi’s thesis concerning the homologies between NE and BT must extend to parts of Heidegger’s phenomenology even before his explicit encounter with Aristotle).\textsuperscript{596} These issues have already been described in section one, but a more explicit analysis of the third way of making sense of the turn to Aristotle is in order.

A genealogical investigation into the notion of \textit{Befindlichkeit} as defined in BT leads us back to Heidegger’s Marburg lectures on Aristotle and Plato. In addition to the philological fact that the word \textit{Befindlichkeit} first appears in Heidegger’s work as a translation of the Aristotelian

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\textsuperscript{592} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{595} I am referring here in particular to the notions mentioned above: the notions of “having” (\textit{haben}), “comporting” (verhalten), and “understanding” (verstehen).

\textsuperscript{596} I am not saying that earlier lecture notes and notebooks should be equated with \textit{Being and Time} in terms of systematicity, as that would be hermeneutically impermissible. BT is a treatise, whereas lecture notes are not.
notion of διάθεσις (disposition), Heidegger himself makes certain suggestive hints as to such a relation in his analysis of Befindlichkeit in BT, when he names Aristotle as the first philosopher to have investigated the πάθη (passions) in his Rhetoric.

Heidegger considered Aristotle’s Rhetoric to be “the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being-with-one-another”, and thus saw it as particularly relevant for grounding understanding within the accompanying moods from which, on an ontological level, it had wrongly been separated. In BT, Heidegger complains that “[w]hat has escaped notice is that the basic ontological Interpretation of the affective life in general has been able to make scarcely one forward step worthy of mention since Aristotle”. I take these remarks to be clues for the conceptual genealogy of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger’s own philosophy.

A fully comprehensive comparison between Heidegger and Aristotle on this topic would require more space. However, the basis of this encounter can already be set by exploring Heidegger’s understanding of the Aristotelian notion of διάθεσις. The most fruitful point of entry into this genealogy is through the early Aristotle Freiburg lecture, but most importantly the Marburg lectures that immediately followed. Indeed, a genealogy of the problems and characteristic interpretations offered by Heidegger in Being and Time would have to start from the Freiburg lecture entitled Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung, delivered during the Winter semester of 1921-22, followed by the lecture titled Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie.

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597 Kisiel 1993, p. 293.
598 Certain parts of this chapter pertaining to the genealogy of Befindlichkeit have been published as Christos Hadjioannou, “Befindlichkeit as retrieval of Aristotelian διάθεσις. Heidegger reading Aristotle in the Marburg years”, in Heidegger’s Marburger Zeit: Themen, Argumente, Konstellationen, (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2013).
599 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 138.
600 Ibid, p. 139.
602 Heidegger, Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung, GA 61.
603 Heidegger, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, GA 18.
delivered during the Summer semester of 1924, and the lecture titled *Platon: Sophistes*, delivered during the Winter semester of 1924-25.

The Freiburg lecture course was focused on the theme of human life, “factual life” as Heidegger called it, which did not directly take on Aristotle per se, but was rather a preparatory introduction for a projected work on Aristotle that Heidegger eventually abandoned. However, the course anticipated the themes of the rigorous interpretations of Aristotle that followed.

In the Summer of 1924 lectures on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, Heidegger focused on Aristotle’s account of the “everydayness” of existence [*Alltäglichkeit des Daseins*], whereupon conceptuality and theoretical activity are founded. As Panayiotis Thanassas points out, in the 1924 lectures, Heidegger explores the “relationship between conceptuality in general and an achronic, quasi-eternally existing everydayness”, something that suggests that in these lectures, Aristotle functions only as a pretext for the formation of the systematic project of a conceptuality founded in everydayness and logos as rhetoric. Hence, in this lecture course, Heidegger turns to Aristotle in order to indicate how philosophical logos, how propositional judgment of philosophical discourse, is grounded in everyday speech, originating from factual existence and the way language operates on that level.

In this context, Heidegger’s reappraisal of Aristotle puts a new emphasis on language as “rhetoric” rather than “logic” (i.e. scientific expression), and provides Heidegger an opportunity to reconsider the meaning of truth, ἀλήθεια. Insofar as truth is a matter of a comportment in the face of an inherited, albeit variable, situation, affects, moods, are that which...

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604 Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19.
605 Already in this lecture course, Heidegger explicitly names the notion of comportment, *Verhalten*, as a re-definition of philosophy. Philosophizing is a comportment, says Heidegger. Heidegger invokes the formal notion of *Haben* and juxtaposes it with the notion of *Verhalten*; the former is something indeterminate, whilst the latter is something determinate. He then goes on to say that (Self-)comportment has two meanings, one of which “is more original as regards the genesis of sense.” The first sense denotes enactment [*Vollzug*] in the broad sense, whereas the latter denotes objectivated relation; see Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 40-41. Here, the definition of *Verhalten* resembles the definition of *έξις* that Heidegger gives in Heidegger, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, GA 18, pp. 116-117.
607 Ibid.
608 Compare and contrast this with Husserl’s distinction between “indication” and “expression” in the *Logical Investigations*, as analyzed in this thesis’s section on Husserl. As I argue there, indication is a priori rejected from Husserl’s pure phenomenology, since it can only give rise to belief, constituted through motivation, which lacks the certainty of self-evidence.
primarily disclose the heteronomous determination of Dasein, the way the psyche is moved in a determinate, yet pre-conceptual, way. Affect is thus a constitutive phenomenon of discursive disclosure, and logos is a fundamental characteristic of the Dasein, whose capacity for meaningful disclosure is grounded in affect.

A genealogical investigation into the Heideggerian notion of Befindlichkeit as defined in BT directs us back to Heidegger’s Marburg lectures on Aristotle and Plato. In addition to the philological fact that the word Befindlichkeit first appears in Heidegger’s work as a translation of the Aristotelian notion of διάθεσις [disposition], Heidegger himself makes certain suggestive hints as to such a relation in his analysis of Befindlichkeit in Sein und Zeit, when he names Aristotle as the first philosopher to have investigated the πάθη (passions) in his Rhetoric.

In his own account of Befindlichkeit, Heidegger will retrieve the character of being-there as “Being-In” (the World), as well as the character of “turning towards or turn away” from mood. These are also characteristics in Aristotle’s notion of comportment.

II. Dasein: λόγος, ἀλήθεια and ἔξις (comportment [Verhalten])

Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle enabled him to retrieve a more primordial account of truth, whereby truth is not a matter of adequatio (coincidence) between that which the subject or mind perceives and the objective state of affairs, or a matter of validity of a proposition and a corresponding state of affairs, but rather is a dynamic revelation (unconcealment), a capacity of Dasein to unconceal being(s) through its comportment. Dasein’s capacity to grasp being and truth, the truth of being, is intimately connected to its capacity to speak: the having of logos, as it permeates the various ways in which it comports itself in the world.

Logos and truth have historically been intrinsically connected: the (transcendental) value of truth has traditionally been considered to reside in “judgment”, and has been associated with the essence of judgment as synthesis and diairesis (σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις), and/or

609 Kisiel 1993, p. 293.
610 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 135.
affirmation and negation (ἀπόφασις and κατάφασις). Heidegger follows Aristotle’s definition of judgment as constituted by affirmation and negation, and wants to go deeper and see how the truth of judgment is actually constituted pre-reflectively and pre-thematically, and at that level affects have a crucial constitutive role to play.

According to Aristotle, truth is a function of the soul (ἀλήθεια ἢ ψυχῆ). As Heidegger writes, “Truth is […] a character of beings, insofar as they are encountered; but in an authentic sense [aber im eigentlichen Sinne] it is nevertheless a determination of the Being of human Dasein itself.” This Aristotelian conception of ἀλήθεια as a function of ψυχῆ, is a more precise way of articulating the connection that Plato had already seen and expressed in the Sophist as ἐπ’ ἀλήθειαν ὀρμομένης ψυχῆς, which Heidegger translates thus: “the soul sets itself by itself on the way toward truth, toward beings with which Dasein cultivates an association.”

Heidegger underlines the connection between ἀληθεύειν and ψυχῆ in order to re-establish the primacy of a more primordial mode of ἀλήθεια, which is practical in nature and which connects to contingency, choice and deliberation. Heidegger argues that the original meaning of ἀλήθεια, as attested by the etymological root of it, is “unconcealment.” He argues

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612 The traditional, Aristotelian theory of judgment held that the essence of propositional judgment is twofold: it establishes a relation (mereological function: uniting or separating the subject and the predicate), and has a quality (affirmation or negation). The quality is subjugated to relation (quality is relation, and relation is judgment). After Hume, relation and quality became distinctive characteristics and some logicians emphasized the function of quality, independently of relation. Husserl believed that the essence of judgment cannot lie on quality, because truth is not established in the act of judgment because the subject already has a belief in the being of what is presented before the act of judgment is carried out (see Andrea Staiti’s paper, referred to in the previous footnote). I think Husserl would want to defend a theory of judgment whereby relation is essential, focusing on synthesis (which is the essence of his phenomenological project of identifying structures, suspending the existential). I believe that Heidegger and Husserl are not on the same page on this. Heidegger’s return to Aristotle means that he is not willing to follow Husserl’s critique of Rickert and Brentano that rejects quality (affirmation or negation) as essential to judgment. I think he wants to retain both quality and relation as equiprimordial to judgment. Heidegger’s emphasis on the Aristotelian categories of having and comportment means that he keeps the function of quality (itself one of the ten categories that Aristotle identifies). Heidegger agrees with Husserl that propositional judgment is derivative of something more fundamental, and that truth is not established in judgment. Heidegger also agrees with Husserl that there is belief (πίστις) that predates the act of judging. However, as it will be shown in this chapter, Heidegger makes sense of belief in terms of πάθος, whose essence is expressed by either turning towards something, or turning away from it – the structure of affirmation and negation. Hence, I think that Heidegger analyzes the more fundamental level upon which judgment is based. He then makes sense of both aspects of judgment, being-part-of-something (being-in), i.e. relation, as well as quality (affirmation and negation), in terms of comportment.
613 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, p. 16.
614 Ibid, p. 228c1f.
615 Ibid, p. 16.
616 Ibid, p. 11.
furthermore that if we remain faithful to this originary meaning of truth, then objectivity is equivalent to compliance [Sachlichkeit], “understood as a comportment [Verhalten] of Dasein to the world and to itself in which beings are present in conformity with the way they are [der Sache nach]. This is objectivity correctly understood. The original sense of this concept of truth does not yet include objectivity as universal validity.”617 This original concept of truth qua unconcealment does not implicate that truth is necessarily theoretical knowledge or any determinate possibility of theoretical knowledge, for example mathematics.618

Indeed, the closest [nächste] kind of αληθεύειν is speaking about things (speaking will be thematically explored in the Rhetoric). Λόγος takes the primary function of αληθεύειν.619

Aristotle is interested in describing how the being-there of humans, the ψυχῆ, has the capacity to reveal things, the world, and why it is in a position to know, in the various ways that it does. In the NE, Aristotle enumerates five ἔξεις of αληθεύειν, ἔξεις meaning “habits” or “comportments”620: τέχνη (producing), ἐπιστήμη (science), φρόνησις (circumspective insight), σοφία (wisdom), and νοῦς (perceptual discernment; cf. Husserl’s categorial intuition).621622 Νοῦς is the highest possibility for human beings – it is the highest possibility of being-there, and it is that which grounds the disclosive character of comportments, of any encountering as such, as well as λόγος. Even though Aristotle does not achieve clarity as regards νοῦς (for example, the way it is co-present in all comportments), he declares νοῦς as the condition of possibility for anything to be encountered in general, the possibility of “being-opened-up” [die Bedingung der Möglichkeit ist, das dem Lebenden überhaupt etwas begegnet, für das Leben etwas ist].623 As far as I know, Heidegger does not explicitly associate νοῦς with Husserlian categorial intuition, but I think that despite the lack of textual evidence, it is plausible to think that Heidegger takes Husserlian categorial intuition as a retrieval of νοῦς.

617 Ibid, p. 17, my italics.
618 Ibid.
619 Ibid, pp. 17, 19.
620 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 3.
621 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, p. 15.
622 Επιστήμη and σοφία constitute the two comportments (ἔξεις) of ἐπιστημονικόν. Επιστήμη is a deficient habit of ἐπιστημονικόν, while the highest habit (βέλτιστη ἔξεις) of ἐπιστημονικόν is σοφία. Allow me to bypass any further analysis of ἐπιστημονικόν and σοφία since we are concerned here with λογιστικόν as that which contains βούλευσις (deliberation).
623 BCAP, p. 135.
Grounding νοεῖν in corporeality and πάθος

In Chapter 2 of this thesis, it was mentioned that Husserl did not associate categorial intuition (and thinking) with affect (at least not in the Logical Investigations). But when Heidegger turns to Aristotle's νοῦς, he explicitly raises the question of its relationship with πάθος. Heidegger asks: what enables νοεῖν? Thinking is a φαντασία (imagination) that makes-present-to-itself the world [das »Sichvergegenwärtigen« der Welt], and φαντασία is the ground for νοεῖν [Die φαντασία ist das Boden für das νοεῖν].

Heidegger argues that Aristotle acknowledges the tension between νοῦς, which is in its pure actuality itself ἀπαθές, “that which nothing can touch”, with ψυχή. Νοῦς is something more than the human being can be, insofar as the human being is being-in, because being-in is determined by πάθη. The question that Aristotle poses but does not answer regards the being determined in the genuine being-in-the-world, humans as having being-in-the-world-there-opened, discoveredness, openedness of being-in-the-world [im eigentlichen Sinne das Sein des Menschen als In-der-Welt-sein bestimmt ist; ob das Sein des Menschen als In-der-Welt-aufgeschlossen-Dahaben, Entdecktheit, Aufgeschlossenheit des Seins-in-der-Welt], whether all of this is determined and grounded in νοῦς, and whether νοῦς arises in being of the human beings or enters from the outside [daß er im Sein des Menschen aufgeht [oder] von außen her in den Menschen hineinkommt].

Insofar as νόησις is the highest possibility for the human beings, the entire being of human beings is determined so that νόησις must be apprehended as the bodily being-in-the-world of human beings (otherwise it makes no sense to speak of human δια-νόησις). Heidegger points out that we have to read Aristotle as having provided an account that only begins in phenomenology, namely, with no division between “psychic” and “bodily” acts. In this context, Heidegger writes that “one must note that the primary being-there-function of bodiliness secures the ground for the full being of human beings” [Man muß darauf sehen, daß

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624 Thinking: this is an appeal to φαντασία “making-present-to-itself” of the world. [Denken: Es wird nicht rekurriert auf einen Gehirnvorgang, sondern auf die φαντασία,] Φαντασία is the ground for νοεῖν.
625 Ibid.
627 Ibid, p. 135.
Despite the fact that there is no explicit, decisive, argument made with regard to an establishing connection between πάθος and νοῦς, because Aristotle himself is not entirely clear on that point, this is what Heidegger is interested in here, by pointing out that in phenomenology (and he counts Aristotle as a phenomenologist!) the psychic and the bodily are not divided. Heidegger wants to show that Aristotle discusses passions in this context of the ψυχή in its capacity to διανοεῖσθαι, which is all that constitutes the being of a living being.

Heidegger asks whether νοῦς belongs to the concrete being of human being, whether it is a passion of the soul, or whether νοῦς is a separate part of the psyche [μύρος τῆς ψυχῆς χωριστῶν]. Aristotle’s answer is based on evidence: the human νοῦς is a διανοεῖν, not pure, and hence it is also “encountered with a view to its corporeality.” The νοῦς of human beings, the “making present”, depends on fantasy, is grounded in fantasy, the retrieval of what once was present (cf. Augustine on love and having the beata vita, in the previous chapter): “In this way, the νοῦς of human beings is related to φαντασία, and so is related to αἴσθησις and the πάσχειν of the σώμα.” Hence, a relation between disclosing, logos-infused comportments, and disclosure, is established.

Heidegger goes even deeper in pursuing the relation between the grounding of νοῦς, that is, the capacity of grasping everything beyond the human being and its concrete being, to

630 Aristotle’s ambiguous position on the relation between the soul and the intellect is precisely what allowed Aquinas to argue that Aristotle taught personal immortality, because the agent intellect can be read as somehow being a faculty of the soul: “[I]n his interpretation of Aristotle’s De anima Thomas defends a view that was as contested in his own time as it is almost an orphan in our own. Among the tenets of so-called Latin Averroism was the view, first held by Averroes, that the move from perceptive acts to intellection is not one from a lower to a higher set of capacities or faculties of the human soul. Aristotle contrasts intellection with perception, and argues that the former does not employ a sense organ because it displays none of the characteristics of perception which does employ an organ. Thus insofar as sensation can be said to be in some respects material and in others immaterial, intellection is said to be completely immaterial. But on the Latin-Averroistic view, Aristotle is not thus referring to another capacity of the human soul, the intellect, but, rather, referring to a separate entity thanks to whose action human beings engage in what we call thinking. But the cause of this, the agent intellect, is not a faculty of the soul. (Aristotle had distinguished at least two intellects, a possible and an agent.) The proof for incorruptibility which results from an activity that does not employ a corporeal organ is therefore a statement about the incorruptibility of this separate entity, not a basis for arguing that each human soul is incorruptible because it has the capacity to perform incorporeal activities. The Latin-Averroists consequently denied that Aristotle taught personal immortality.” Ralph McInerny and John O’Callaghan, “Saint Thomas Aquinas”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), retrieved from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/aquinas/, on 16 June 2015.
631 BCAP, p. 135.
633 Ibid.
the πάθη, and for the first time raises the crucial event of losing comportment. In De Anima, Aristotle investigates the extent to which νοῦς is a basic characteristic of human being. Νοῦς differs from all other ways of grasping because it grasps “the whole”, τὰ πᾶντα; it is a possibility of grasping that grasps all possible beings, so that the being in question need not necessarily be objectively present (cf. categorial intuition). Heidegger argues that in connection to the question of what grounds this possibility of grasping that goes beyond the concrete being that is in the moment, Aristotle discusses the πάθη as those phenomena in which it is shown that the concrete being of human beings can only be understood if one takes it in its fullness, and on the basis of various considerations. “It is, above all, decisive that we lose composure, as in the case of fearing without encountering something in the environing world that could be the direct occasion of fear. In this being-a-matter-of-concern of the πάθη, corporeality is co-encountered in some mode or another.” [Vor allem ist entscheident daß wir aus der Fassung geraten in der Weise des Fürchtens, ohne daß wir der Umwelt uns etwas begegnet, das direkter Anlaß der Furcht sein könnte. In diesem Angegangenwerden von der πάθη wird die Leiblichkeit in irgendeiner Weise mitbetroffen].

It is unclear whether Heidegger is arguing here that (a) losing composure by the experience of fear in the absence of something fearsome grounds the possibility for experiencing corporeality in its wholeness, corporeality as such, which is tied to the particular situation of the corporeal moment, without any grounding connection to νοῦς (and so what is grounded here is only the experience of corporeality), or (b) losing composure shows precisely that what grounds the possibility of νοῦς is corporeality, passions. I believe that this dilemma is beside the point though, a false dichotomy. It is clear from the context that Heidegger is trying to draw connections between the grounding of νοῦς to human passions, and both arguments establish that losing composure reveals “the whole”, and “what whole” is revealed, even if that “whole” refers only to corporeality, the fact remains that revealing “wholes” is νοῦς! Besides,

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634 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time Heidegger explicitly connects the event of losing comportment with the development of grasping the whole.
635 Ibid, p. 139.
636 Ibid, pp. 139-140.
Heidegger here is trying to overcome the dichotomies of corporeal vs. spirit, perception vs. intellect, and he does this by way of an account of the passion of fear.

**III. Λόγος as πίστις: Speaking and Hearing**

**Rhetoric: The possibility of speaking and being-with-one-another**

In Chapter 3 of his 1924 lectures on Aristotle, Heidegger turns his attention to Aristotle’s analysis of being-there, the μηχών, in its capacity (or possibility) to speak to each other, and this is a crucial part of the being-there and the way truth is disclosed by human beings, whose being-there is defined as λόγον ἔχον.637 The chapter is entitled “The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings [*Daseins des Menschen*] with regard to the Basic Possibility [*Grundmöglichkeit*] of Speaking-with-One-Another guided by Rhetoric.”

Ἀλόγος had a much broader sense to the Greeks than it does so nowadays, argues Heidegger. For the ancients, it meant conversation and discourse [*Gespräch* and *Rede*]. The Greeks, so Heidegger claims, “were serious about the possibility of speaking. That is the origin of logic, the doctrine of λόγος” [Sie machten Ernst mit den Möglichkeiten des Sprechens. Das ist der Ursprung der Logik, der Lehre vom λόγος].639 In this context then, “[r]hetoric is nothing other than the interpretation of concrete being-there, the hermeneutic of being-there itself” [Die Rhetorik ist nichts anderes als die Auslegung des konreten Daseins, die Hermeneutik des Daseins selbst].640 The one who has ἀρετή and εὔδαιμονία has ability to let something be said by others and by himself, and this is λόγον ἔχον in a new respect: “He lets something be said insofar as he hears [...] This ability-to-hear is a determination of ὀρεξίς”, and ὀρεξίς here is that which Aristotle also indicates as ἄλογον – because it receives logos without being itself logos.641

Heidegger connects the ability to speak with the ability to hear, and he believes that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* supplies an account of the “everydayness” of existence, whereupon

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637 Ibid, p. 72.
638 Ibid, p. 74.
639 Ibid, p. 75.
640 Ibid.
641 Ibid, p. 76. I take it that when Aristotle refers to ὀρεξίς as ἄλογον he means that whilst it refers to logos, and can receive logos, it still is “not-yet” logos-like, and in that respect not logos (albeit not entirely incapable of receiving logos)!
conceptuality and theoretical activity are found. Here it is indicated how philosophical logos, how propositional judgment of philosophical discourse, is grounded in everyday speech, originating from factual existence and the way language operates on that level. An analysis of logos in terms of speaking and hearing is part and parcel of Heidegger’s emphasis on language as “rhetoric” rather than “logic”. Aristotle’s Rhetoric constitutes “the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being-with-one-another” \footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Sein und Zeit}, GA 2, p. 138.} and thus Heidegger saw it as especially relevant for grounding \textit{understanding} within the accompanying moods that it had wrongly been separated from on an ontological level.

Heidegger begins by pointing out how the being of human beings has the character of speaking, which is \textit{πραξίς μετά λόγος}; \footnote{BCAP, p. 71.} this is associated with the basic possibility of Dasein for concept-formation [\textit{Begriffsbildung}], \footnote{Ibid.} and it is in this expression of life, the possibility of speaking, that Being-with-One-Another [\textit{Miteinanderseins}] has its basic possibility. \footnote{Ibid.} In \textit{Miteinanderseins}, one is the one speaking and the other is the one hearing \footnote{Ibid.} [\textit{Hörende}]. Speaking on its own is meaningless though, since one cannot speak if there is no one to hear, but this does not necessitate the presence of another person, since one can speak and hear themselves (think of auto-affection). Hence, the mode of being of \textit{λόγον ἔχων} also includes the possibility of hearing oneself. \footnote{Ibid.} Aristotle’s analysis of the \textit{πάθη} in the \textit{Rhetoric} has the intention of analyzing “the various possibilities of the hearer’s finding himself, in order to provide guides as to what must be cultivated on the part of the hearer himself” \footnote{Ibid, p. 115.} [\textit{die verschiedenen Möglichkeiten des Sichbefindens beim Hörer selbst ausgebildet werden muß}].

But the \textit{Rhetoric} is also about setting forth the hearer’s determinations in order to direct the speaker herself as to what is to be taken into consideration when she chooses the \textit{προαίρεσις} (of the \textit{ήθος}). \textit{Πάθη} are that through which a change [\textit{Umschlag}] sets in for us, is on the way, from one \textit{Befindlichkeit} to another. It is that which differentiates the self from the self with
respect to the position [Stellung] and the view [Ansicht] of Dasein.\(^{649}\) Πάθη is the changing itself; it is the very undergoing of the change.

Heidegger here explicitly associates this double character of logos, logos as speaking as well as hearing/listening (ἀκούειν/ὑπακούειν) with ὀρέξις, the precursor of intentionality (see previous chapter). Hearing/listening is one way that concernful being is enacted. This possibility of hearing, the ἄκουστικόν, is found together with ὀρέξις, and every concern has Tendenz in itself [Jedes Besorgen hat in sich Tendenz], that is, it has a “being-after” [Aussen] that listens to what is spoken.\(^{650}\)

**The three πίστεις: ήθος, λόγος, πάθος**

Plato’s negative depiction of rhetoric cast a lot of shadows and disrepute over public speaking and the art of “convincing”, but Aristotle’s approach was different. He offered a rehabilitating account of rhetoric whereby it was rearticulated in terms of its possibility [δύναμις] of making manifest, in seeing, what is given in the moment.\(^{651}\) Rhetoric is a power in the sense that it sets forth a possibility to speak and hear in definite ways. Its task is not to convince as such, to merely cultivate a particular conviction (which is sophistry), but to point out, to make visible, to “see” that which is possible in each case, the περὶ ἐκαστοῦν πάθον.\(^{652}\) As Heidegger notes, rhetoric “gives an orientation with regard to something, περὶ ἐκαστον” [Sie gibt eine Orientierung über etwas, περὶ ἐκαστον].\(^{653}\) Speaking is therefore seen as a mode of being-there which deals with the situation [Situation] and the particular circumstances of being-there [Sachlage], and this situated speaking is what grounds concept-formation, ὀρισμός.\(^{654}\)

Heidegger zeros in on the essential relationship between rhetoric and πιστεύειν, something that will enable him to further analyze rhetoric (logos, in general) in terms of comportment, disposition, passion, and their temporal character. Heidegger hence defines rhetoric thus: the capacity to see “that which speaks for a matter” [was für eine Sache spricht]

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\(^{649}\) Ibid.
\(^{650}\) Ibid, p. 72.
\(^{651}\) Ibid, p. 78.
\(^{652}\) Ibid, p. 79.
\(^{653}\) Ibid, p. 80.
\(^{654}\) Ibid.
and “to cultivate, in speaking itself, πιστεύειν with those to whom one speaks, specifically, about a concern [Angelegenheit] that is up for debate at the time; to cultivate a δόξα.”

Πιστεύειν literally means “believing”, having “faith”. Heidegger associates it with holding a “view” [Ansicht], a δόξα “on which speaking depends, and which, therefore, is presumably something that governs, or guides, [leitet, beherrscht] the everydayness of being-there, the being-with-one-another, […] upon which discourse itself depends”.656

It is important to follow Heidegger’s analysis of πίστις, because it clarifies the way in which passion (which he will later call Stimmung) is grasped, and the crucial operation it has in grasping and disclosing the (possible) future (and, by extension, the truth of Being). Πίστις is that which cultivates a πιστεύειν, in the sense of πιθανόν (the possible), that is, it cultivates a possibility of ἄληθεύειν.657 Aristotle distinguishes between πίστεις that we can artfully accomplish, and those that are not brought about in self-accomplishment, and Heidegger wants to focus on the former, since rhetoric is talk about the ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, sets forth the ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. It is a speaking-with-one-another that has three ἔντεχνοι πίστεις: (1) speaking-being itself, Ἡθος (Haltung); (2) speaking about something (λόγος); and (3) speaking to someone (ἀκούων, πάθος).658

We are mostly interested in πάθος here, but let me also briefly explain what the other two are. Ἡθος refers to the comportment of the speaker [die Haltung des Sprechenden], the way s/he comports himself/herself in his/her discourse. Prior to Aristotle, treatises held that Ἡθος “contributes nothing to what is πιθανόν”, but Aristotle subverts this. Actually, for Aristotle, one’s comportment is “the most excellent” πίστις. Πίστις is also expressed in λόγος: Λέγειν is πίστις as the basic function of being-there itself. In speaking, what is ἄληθες is exhibited as what is possible.659

655 Ibid, p. 81.
656 Ibid.
657 Ibid.
658 Ibid, p. 95.
659 Ibid, p. 83.
660 Heidegger identifies three distinct types of λόγος, based on the different τέλη in the hearer, the ἄκροατης. Λόγος comprises the speaker, the “about which”, and the hearer. The τέλος is in the hearer (ibid, p. 86). Because the τέλος is in the hearer, and because Aristotle identifies three ways a hearer can be, Aristotle identifies three distinct kinds of λόγος: deliberative discourse (συμβουλευτικός), judicial (δικανικός) and eulogy (ἐποδικτικός) (ibid). Deliberative
But most important for the purposes of this study is how πίστις is brought about in mood, how passion is one of the ways in which πίστις is enacted. Πίστις also refers to the ἐν τῶ τῶν ἀκροατῆν διαθειναὶ πῶς: “in the bringing-into-a-disposition”, [in dem In-eine-Befindlichkeit-bringen] “in the manner by which the hearer is brought into a definite disposition”, [in der Weise, wie in eine bestimmte Befindlichkeit gebracht wird der Hörer], the hearer who also belongs to λέγειν.661 How the hearer is also positioned toward the matter, which position he is in, the manner and mode of bringing-the-hearer-into-a-disposition [Wie der Hörer sich dabei zur Sache stellt, in welcher Stellung er ist, die Art und Weise des Den-Hörer-in-eine-Befindlichkeit-Bringens, darin liegt eine-πίστις, etwas, das für die Sache sprechen kann. Die διάθεσις des Hörers bestimmt seine κρίσις, seine “Ansicht”…].662

The διάθεσις of the hearer, their Befindlichkeit, affects their view, their belief and their judgment. Being sympathetic or unsympathetic, sad [traurig] or happy [uns freuen], the πάθη, the “affects” [die “Affekte”], are decisive.663 Not only is the passion decisive for the hearer’s judgment, but it also reflects on the speaker himself, since “[t]he one discoursing must himself, in his discourse, have his eye toward transposing the ἀκροατὴς into a definite πάθος, toward inspiring the hearer as to a matter” [Der Redner selbst muß im Reden es darauf absehen, den ἀκροατὴς in ein bestimmtes πάθος zu versetzen, die Hörer für eine Sache zu begeistern].664 Still, despite the fact that πάθος also affects the speaker, as a πίστις it indicates the being of the hearer, it is πίστις that lies on the side of the hearer (or the speaker as hearer). Heidegger further clarifies the ontological significance of passions, and the homology with what he writes in BT on Befindlichkeit is glaringly obvious: “These πάθη, ‘affects,’ are not states pertaining to ensouled things, but are concerned with a disposition of living things in their world, in the mode of being positioned toward something, allowing a matter to matter to it. The affects play a fundamental role in the determination of being-in-the-world, of being-with-and-toward-others” [Diese πάθη, “Affekte”, sind nicht Zustände des Seelischen, es handelt sich um eine

discourse points out the βλαβερόν or συμφέρον; judicial points out the δίκαιον or ἄδικον; the eulogy points out καλόν as opposed to ἀστρόν (ibid, p. 86).
661 Ibid, p. 83.
662 Ibid.
663 Ibid.
664 Ibid.

\[665\] 'Ηθος and πάθος constitute λέγειν

Taking his lead from Aristotle’s Rhetoric B1 and NE B4, Heidegger juxtaposes διαλέγεσθαι with rhetoric, everyday discourse – a juxtaposition which enables him to focus on the constitutive, grounding role of πάθος (and ήθος). Rhetoric is not situated in the realm of διαλέγεσθαι because there is a definite concrete orientation, a βουλεύεσθαι (deliberation), and therefore who speaks, his/her ήθος makes a difference (whereas in διαλέγεσθαι the ήθος of the speaker and the πάθος of the hearer are irrelevant). As far as rhetoric, everyday speaking, is concerned, Heidegger is explicit on the grounding role of ήθος and πάθος: “For both of these determinations [ήθος and πάθος] ground the manner and mode in which δόξα is possessed” [Denn diese beiden Bestimmungen begründen die Art und Weise, wie die δόξα gehabt wird, wie der, dem die Ansicht beigebracht werden Soll, selbst zur Ansicht steht].

\[666\] ‘Ηθος and πάθος are constitutive [konstitutiv] of λέγειν itself.

The “object” that rhetoric grasps and addresses is one that cannot be transmitted within a science (διαλέγεσθαι), because rhetoric deliberates about situations that change, circumstances that are contingent and alterable; rhetoric is about cultivating a decision, a judgment, a κρίσις, according to the concrete circumstances of being-there [Angelegenheiten je nach Umständen des Daseins selbst]; therefore, mood is constitutive of the view, the Ansicht, and the change of mood is indicative of an essential characteristic of being-there. For this reason we must concretely consider the ήθος [Haltung] of the speaker and the πάθος, disposition [Befindlichkeit], of the hearers.

The way disposition constitutes being-there and shapes the respective λόγος can also be illustrated differentially, i.e. by pointing out how some dispositions are “weightier” than others,
how disposition supplies a criterion by virtue of which the truthfulness of expressed λόγος is ascertained. As Heidegger writes:

[It makes a great difference] in the conveying of what speaks for something, especially in deliberations, but also in the judicial court, how the speaker appears and accordingly how the hearers consider his disposition [Befindlichkeit], and also whether they themselves [the hearers acquire], at that time, the right disposition [die rechte Befindlichkeit] [i.e. attitude toward the discussed matter]. The manner and mode in which the speaker appears is weightier in deliberation, and the disposition of the hearer at the moment is weightier above all in the judicial court.\(^{669}\)

Later on in the lecture course, Heidegger is even more determinate as regards the very grounding of deliberation, of λόγος, in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Πάθη are the ground of λόγος [Die πάθη als Boden für den λόγος]: Insofar as humans come into disquiet, they become deliberative – fear makes humans deliberative! [Aristoteles sagt: Sofern der Mensch in diese Unruhe kommt [...] wird er bereit zum Beraten [Rhet. B 5, 1383 a 6 sq.: ὅ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικὸς ποιεῖ]]. It is precisely the passion of fear that shows itself to be the disposition that brings to speaking [die Furcht als diejenige Befindlichkeit, die zum Sprechen bringt].\(^{670}\) As Heidegger says: “The πάθη are topics insofar as they are co-decisive for the manner and mode of λέγειν, how the λόγος has its basis in the πάθη themselves” [der λόγος in den πάθη selbst seinen Boden hat].\(^{671}\)

Here, in his reading of Aristotle and his analysis of fear, Heidegger will explicitly introduce the more originary counterpart of anxiety and dread, as the originary foundation of speaking, in relation to the uncanny [unheimlich]! In his own words:

What appears here in the circle of everydayness is a phenomenon that has a much more originary foundation [ein viel ursprüngliches Fundament hat], insofar as, in the being-there of human beings, it can be a question of fear in another sense, what we designate as anxiety or dread [was wir als Angst oder Grauen bezeichnen]: where it is uncanny for us, where we do not know what we are afraid of. If it is uncanny for us, we begin to discourse [wo es uns unheimlich ist]. This is an indication of how the γένεσις of speaking is measured by being-there, as speaking is connected with the basic determination of being-there itself, which is characterized by uncanniness.\(^{672}\)

The πάθη are not merely an annex of psychical processes, but are rather

\(^{669}\) Ibid.
\(^{670}\) Ibid, p. 175.
\(^{671}\) Ibid, p. 119.
\(^{672}\) Ibid, p. 175.
But before we further analyze passion and the way fear is constitutive of, and related to, the uncanny, we must look at Heidegger’s analysis of ἐξίς. The reason for looking at ἐξίς is because through it we begin to understand the πάθη, as those determinations that characterize the audience, and because passions only make sense insofar as there is ontological comportment.

IV. Πάθος and ἐξίς (comportment)

Πάθος from an ontological point of view

In his lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger offers the first and most comprehensive account of passion from an ontological point of view, and explains the role it plays in the establishing of different ways of being, as well as its constitutive role in the understanding of being, its role in interrupting established ontological composure. The philosopher, argues Heidegger, must consider the passions neither in terms of their materiality, nor their eidos, but rather in terms of their “being” as such.674

Passion is analyzed in terms of its “being”, from the perspective of ἐξίς, composure (a mode of “having”), namely as a phenomenon of the soul of ontological significance.675 It is thus crucial to understand that the phenomenon of passion is made sense of in terms of comportment, and Heidegger stresses this point. Comportment is what raises the whole phenomenon of passion to an ontological level. It is by “looking at πάθη through ἐξίς [that] we can see the πάθη as possibilities of finding-oneself, of being-seized.”676
Comportment characterizes the manner and mode [die Art und Weise] in which we are in such a πάθος.\textsuperscript{677} In a sense, the eidos of passions is a comporting-oneself to other human beings, a being-in-the-world. Only from this standpoint can the materiality of passions be examined [Das είδος der πάθη ist ein Sichverhalten zu anderen Menschen, ein In-der-Welt-sein. Von daher ist die ὥλη der πάθη erst eigentlich erforschbar.]\textsuperscript{678} One can already see that Heidegger is here subjugating passions to the more general, ontological category of comportment, that is, makes sense of passions in terms of comportment, in a manner similar to that of BT in relation to Stimmung and Befindlichkeit.

Ἐξίς is the πῶς ἔχουμεν πρὸς τὰ πάθη, “how we carry ourselves” [wie wir uns halten], “what composure we have” [in welcher Fassung wir sind] with such a πάθος. The πάθη can be had; in having there lies a relation to being. With the orientation of πάθη towards ἔξίς, the πάθη are themselves oriented towards being-there as being.\textsuperscript{679} Thus, the πάθη, the affects, are not merely “of the soul”, but because of their relation to ἔξίς, which is a determination of being, πάθη themselves are determinations of being. They express the being of human beings.\textsuperscript{680}

Heidegger, in typical Aristotelian fashion, argues that passion has various meanings, and identifies three basic meanings:

(1) the average, immediate meaning is that of “variable condition” [veränderliche Beschaffenheit]; (2) a specifically ontological meaning, which is important for the understanding of κίνησις: πάθος in connection with πάσχειν, what one most translates as “suffering” [Leiden]; (3) a resulting meaning: variable condition in relation to a definite concrete context, variable condition within a definite being-region of life: “passion.” [Leidenschaft] Πάθος in this last sense is the topic of the Rhetoric and the Poetics.\textsuperscript{681}

It is the third meaning that Heidegger is most interested in. The proper context in which this meaning becomes visible is Book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle begins the investigation into what ἀρετή is, the γένεσις of ἀρετή. Ψυχή is the ousia of the ζῷον, its being-in-the-world, and in the ψυχή three things are variables, “come to be”: πάθη, δυνάμεις, ἔξεις

\textsuperscript{677} Ibid, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{678} Ibid, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{679} Ibid, p. 119. [Die πάθη können gehabt werden, im Haben liegt eine Beziehung auf das Sein. Mit der Orientierung der πάθη auf die ἔξις werden die πάθη selbst orientiert auf das Dasein als Sein].
\textsuperscript{680} Ibid, pp. 119-120.
\textsuperscript{681} Ibid, p. 113.
Passion is here important in its genetic capacity, that is, in its capacity to form comportment, and the possibility of disrupting it. In fact, being-composed [Gefäßsein] or losing composure [aus der Fassung bin] are grasable only by way of undergoing various situations involving risk [gefährliche Situationen durchgemacht werden], which are enabled through passion.  

Even though the genetic operation of passion here is suppressed, one could plausibly simply connect the dots and see how the notion of having a passion, the way a comportment “has” the passion, is homologous to Heidegger’s own schema of Dasein authentically having, owning up to, the fundamental mood that strikes Dasein. Once this homology is brought to the fore, we can more clearly see passion as that which “makes or breaks” the comportment, and how passion partakes both in the constitution “having”, as well its disruption. It is about the authentic “having” of a fundamental mood, and how passion, the interruption of comportment by passion, constitutes the genesis of this “having”.  

Heidegger further focuses on this interruptive capacity of passion, and the necessary relation to comportment. The most important way of “having” a Grundstimmung (πάθος) is by “[a]cting in such a way that [one] is thereby βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακίνητως ἔχων,” “stable and not to be brought out of composure [fest und nicht aus der Fassung zu bringen].” This is defined in terms of πάθος which is defined as δι᾽ ὅσα μεταβάλλονται – we are brought out of one frame of mind to another [wir geraten aus einer Fassung in die andere]. The characteristic here is not the resulting condition [nicht das Resultat, das In-eine-andere-Fassung-Gekommensein], but rather the having-lost-composure, being on the way from one state to another, the peculiar unrest that is given with πάθος itself in relation to φόβος (fear) characterized as ταραχή, “tumult” [perplexity/confusion] [sondern das Aus-der-Fassung-Sein, das Unterwegssein von einem Zustand zum anderen, die eigentümliche Unruhe, die mit dem πάθος selbst gegeben ist, bezüglich des φόβος als ταραχή charakterisiert, “Verwirrung”].

682 Ibid.
683 Ibid. p. 120.
684 Ibid. p. 123.
685 Ibid.
686 Ibid. p. 124.
Heidegger is explicit in the ontological significance he ascribes to passions. Passions are *modes of being itself* [Weisen des Seins selbst] and insofar as we are living they are modes of becoming [Weisen des Werdens] relating to being-in-a-world [Sein-in-einer-Welt]. What we designate with πάθος defines being-in-the-world in a fundamental sense [in einem fundamentalen Sinne bestimmt]; it is fundamental in the cultivation of κρίσις, as this is made manifest from within an analysis of the everydayness of Dasein qua speaking-being, that is, as a rhetorical being.

Πάθος is defined in the same way as μεταβολή and γένεσις, as change and genesis, as becoming: it is a “changing” [Umschlagen], and therefore a determinate “coming to be” [Werden zu] out of an earlier situation, but without having its own course set for itself. But the only way to make ontological sense of πάθος is as a mode of finding-oneself in the world [eine Weise des Sichbefindens in der Welt] and so only in relation to comportment [Verfassung].

Πάθος (Stimmung) is a relation to comportment and is enabled by comportment, because changing from frame of mind into another frame of mind (Verfassung) and being in a new one, in relation to the old one, “has in itself the possibility of being-seized, being-overcome [hat in sich selbst die Möglichkeit des Ergriffenwerdens, Überfallenwerdens]. The manner and mode of losing-composure, being-brought-out-of-composure [Aus-der-Fassung-Kommens, Aus-der-Fassung-gebracht-Werdens], is, according to its sense, such that it is able to be composed once again. I can regain my composure once again. I am, at a definite moment, in a dangerous situation [in einer Gefahr], in a moment of terror [im Moment des Schreckens], in a state of composure [Fassung]. I can relate the disposition characterized by terror to a possible being-composed with regard to it.” Thus, Heidegger argues, “πάθος already has within itself the relation to ἕξις.” Let us take a closer look at how the ontological categories of comportment and disposition are constituted, while also considering their distinction, before we finally return again to the interruptive operation of passion.

687 Ibid, p. 120.
688 Ibid.
689 Ibid, p. 115.
Comportment and disposition

Heidegger’s account of disposition [Befindlichkeit] occurs in the context of analyzing human comportment. The notions of disposition and comportment denote the same phenomenon, in a similar manner to the way in which Heidegger’s Verfassung and Befindlichkeit denote the same phenomenon in BT.\(^{691}\) They also retain a technical difference in Aristotle, even if they denote the same kind of quality.\(^{692}\) Disposition is how comportment is grasped in the moment of resolved, i.e. virtuous, praxis. As such, disposition is the resolved moment of comportment.

Heidegger analyses comportment in relation to human praxis, which he calls existence.\(^{693}\)

Insofar as the grasping is virtuous, it is accompanied by resoluteness [προαίρεσις].

Resolute comportment is directed towards the moment, the καιρὸς. Heidegger argues that resolute comportment captures the particular being-there in Aristotle’s understanding of Dasein. In Heidegger’s own words, resoluteness is a comportment that shows being-there “more precisely in its particularity […] The Being of human beings, human being as being-there is particular, at the moment”.\(^{694}\) At that very moment, comportment is grasped as disposition: in the moment of resolution, the human being grasps its Being-there as disposition.\(^{695}\) In other words, in the authentic moment of resolute grasping, comportment is grasped as disposition.

Despite the concrete particularity of the situation, the virtuous grasp of the moment is meant to “seize the moment as a whole”.\(^{696}\) This means that the moment is indeed concrete and particular, yet it also belongs to and maintains a relation with a structural unity as the whole.

\(^{691}\) According to my reading, the distinction between Befindlichkeit and Verfassung is hermeneutically precarious as both notions refer to the same factual phenomenon. Yet, each grasps the phenomenon from a different angle. The safest way to distinguish the two notions is by looking at how Heidegger employs them while keeping in mind the etymologies entailed in each word. Verfassung refers to the aspect of the existential structure that accounts for the possibility of falling, insofar as falling is a certain movement that presupposes a stratum. In this context, Heidegger’s question contextualizes the very notion of Verfassung eloquently: „Welche Struktur zeigt die »Bewegtheit« des Verfallens?” (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 177). Verfassung accounts for the structure that allows Befindlichkeit to fall. In Heidegger’s own words: „Die Befindlichkeit erschließt nicht nur das Dasein in seiner Geworfenheit und Angewiesenheit auf die mit seinem Sein je schon erschlossene Welt, sie ist selbst die existentiale Seinsart, in der es sich ständig an die »Welt« auslieft, sich von ihr angehen läßt derart, daß es ihm selbst in gewisser Weise ausweicht. Die existenziale Verfassung dieses Ausweichens wird am Phänomen des Verfallens deutlich werden” (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 139). According to my reading, the duality of Befindlichkeit and Verfassung emulates the Aristotelian duality of ἔξος and διάθεσις, as Heidegger interprets them.

\(^{692}\) Aristotle, Organon 8b.

\(^{693}\) BCAP, p. 176.

\(^{694}\) Ibid, p. 180.

\(^{695}\) Ibid, p. 175.

\(^{696}\) Ibid, p. 191.
Heidegger further explains how for Aristotle disposition occupies a particular position within the structural whole. Disposition is a “middle” \[\mu\varepsilon\sigma\omega\tau\eta\varsigma\]; it is an orientation that maintains the mean, in the sense of “middle position”. Heidegger defines this middle position as that which we “apprehend as being-equally-far-away from the ends […] that which is equally far removed from both ends is addressed as \[\mu\varepsilon\sigma\nu\] of the matter itself”.\(^{697}\)

Despite the quasi-quantitative delimitation of disposition, Heidegger insists that Aristotle acquires here an existential understanding of disposition that grasps the character of Dasein′s particularity \[\kappa\alpha\theta\ \varepsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu\]. Heidegger juxtaposes disposition with geometrical position, which is also a grasping of the particular point of relational character embedded into a structural whole. However, it is mathematically measurable and as such it is oriented towards grasping the being of a thing, such as a line. In distinguishing the two, Heidegger explains that for Aristotle disposition is a virtue and virtue is neither a thing in its constitution nor does it have a thing as its object.

Insofar as Aristotle defines virtue as a middle-position, thinks Heidegger, “one can determine the mean of a thing geometrically”.\(^{698}\) However, insofar as Aristotle is offering an interpretation of the being of Dasein, the matter is not one of pertaining to a thing \[\pi\rho\alpha\gamma\mu\alpha\], rather it is something that relates to us as it appears to us \[\pi\rho\alpha\ \eta\mu\alpha\ \gamma\nu\omega\rho\omicron\mu\omicron\circledast\tau\omicron\nu\], relative to our own being. In this context, Heidegger warns against understanding virtue as normative ethics. Rather, virtue signifies a “basic relation to the being-there of human beings”.\(^{699}\)

### Disposition as comportment

The analysis of disposition in Heidegger′s lectures takes place in the context of the discussion of \[\pi\acute{a}\theta\omicron\varsigma\]. What is of interest to Heidegger is how pathos is a fundamental characteristic of beings that have the capacity to move.\(^{700}\) In analysing the kinetic phenomenon of \[\pi\acute{a}\theta\omicron\varsigma\], Heidegger holds that its structure can only be understood in relation to comportment, which

\(^{697}\) Ibid, p. 186.
\(^{698}\) Ibid, p. 186.
\(^{699}\) Ibid, p. 179.
\(^{700}\) Ibid, p. 168.
characterizes the “manner and mode in which we are in such a πάθος”.\(^{701}\) In a certain sense, comportment supplies some sort of ontological “basis” for the experience of change through pathos: “πάθος is a ‘changing,’ and accordingly a determinate ‘coming to be…’ out of an earlier situation, but not a changing that would have its course set for itself. Rather, it is a mode of finding-oneself [Befindlichkeit] in the world that, at the same time, stands in a possible relation to ἔξις”.\(^{702}\)

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, comportment provides the “place” of human movement in which movement can be appropriated or “had” as a way of being. Heidegger shows how comportment is the actuality [ἐνέργεια] of having [ἔχειν]: ἔξις is the ἐνέργεια of having and of what is had.\(^{703}\) Heidegger thus offers an analysis of how Aristotle understands human comportment through an analysis of having.

Even though “having” has several meanings for Aristotle, Heidegger identifies a unified underlying meaning. Heidegger articulates the unified meaning to indicate “beings with the being-character of being after a definite being-possibility, or its negation, which, in the case of negation, is the same as that of holding off something from being genuinely as it would like to be” [des Abhaltens davon, eigentlich zu sein, wie etwas sein möchte] (cf. Augustinian continentia in previous chapter).\(^{704}\)

This shows that the structure of comportment is not static and therefore its relational character is kinetic. In explaining the character of this kinetic relationality, Heidegger introduces the Aristotelian notion of continuum. According to Heidegger, one of the meanings that Aristotle ascribes to “having”, which is the actuality of comportment, is that of “holding off” something from moving [κολύειν].\(^{705}\) This “holding off” has the character of continuum, says Heidegger, insofar as it has both the character of togetherness, as well as the character of movement.

\(^{701}\) Ibid, p. 168.
\(^{702}\) Ibid, p. 171.
\(^{703}\) Ibid, p. 175.
\(^{704}\) Compare this with what Heidegger writes in Sein und Zeit: „Die Stimmung erschließt nicht in der Weise des Hinblickens auf die Geworfenheit, sondern als An- und Abkehr” (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 135).
\(^{705}\) BCAP, p. 173.
But herein lies a problem: Heidegger explicitly mentions that continuum is drawn from Aristotle’s *Physics* where the issue is how beings of nature move.\(^{706}\) Besides, one can readily confirm that continuum pertains to the movement of physical objects present-at-hand from the examples given to illustrate “having” in the sense of “holding off”: the example of Atlas holding the vault of heaven not letting it fall, and the example of pillars holding weights.\(^{707}\) It is evident that even though the context of discussion pertains to Dasein’s affective life, the paradigm of movement used pertains to natural objects present-at-hand. In addition, Heidegger also points to the fact that the actuality of “having” is also characterized to be an “in-between”, a characteristic of continuum that is attached to Heidegger’s analysis of continuum as it is developed in Aristotle’s *Physics*.

In addition to this, it is not only the notion of continuum that bears the character of natural objects present-at-hand. Another characteristic of the “having” of comportment supplied in those pages is that of being a container [περιέχον] that has the character of “being-in”.\(^{708}\) The having of the container, the phenomenon of containing, is defined by Aristotle as the same kind of having that the whole [ὅλον] has of its parts [µέρη]. To this extent, comportment is ascribed the unity of the whole that has parts, in the same sense that a container contains items inside it. Again the examples given by Aristotle betray a world that consists of things present-at-hand: the example of a basin containing water and the example of a ship having sailors, etc.\(^{709}\) Therefore, even though disposition qua moment (i.e. in the sense of a part), which maintains a relation to the whole, is supposed to be a mode of being radically different from a geometrical quantitative account that refers to human existence, Aristotle’s notion of “container” fails to deliver such an existential account.

Because of Aristotle’s “contaminated” view of continuum and containment, his understanding of comportment is grounded within a conception of the world qua physical

\(^{706}\) Ibid, p. 174.
\(^{707}\) Ibid.
\(^{708}\) Ibid, p. 173.
\(^{709}\) Ibid.
world. It makes up a mode of being-in-the-world whose components make comportment a category that betrays a world whose structural unity and wholeness is a “quantifiable sum”.\textsuperscript{710}

It is still important to see in more detail how continuum is analysed in Heidegger’s lectures. In looking at Heidegger’s analysis of Aristotle’s understanding of geometry, we will see that geometrical position has a relational character, and as such it has the character of continuum. In this context it is important to note that the continuous character of position and disposition is precisely their relational character, which is found to be the same: continuous. In following this path of analysis we will also uncover how continuum is explained in Aristotle’s \textit{Physics}, and how the characteristics of continuum identified there are also found in the continuum of comportment.

\textbf{Geometrical position and continuum}

The structure of geometrical position is analyzed by Heidegger in his lecture course titled \textit{Plato’s Sophist} (GA19), delivered during the Winter semester of 1924-25. The discussion of geometry takes place as Heidegger tries to show how theory involves a countermovement against the immediacy of that which is given in sense-perception [\textit{αἴσθησις}], that which is given in the particular [\textit{καθ’ ἔκαστον}], even though indeed it does take sense-perception as its point of departure.\textsuperscript{711}

Aristotle grounds the grasp of geometrical position to sense perception. Geometrical structures are grasped in mere sense-perception.\textsuperscript{712} Geometrical objects, such as the triangle, maintain a kinship to the structure grasped by sense-perception in that they possess a continuous structure: “This peculiar structure of the \textit{αἴσθητον} is preserved in the geometrical, insofar as the geometrical, too, is continuous, \textit{συνεχὲς}. The point [the geometrical position, \textit{θέσις}] presents only the ultimate and most extreme limit of the continuous”.\textsuperscript{713}

\textsuperscript{710} Heidegger, \textit{Platon: Sophistes}, GA 19, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{711} Ibid, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{712} Ibid, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{713} Ibid, p. 112: „Diese eigentümliche Struktur des \textit{αἴσθητον} erhält sich noch im Geometrischen, sofern auch das Geometrische stetig, \textit{συνεχὲς}, ist. Der Punkt stellt nur die letzte und äußerste Grenze dieses Steigens dar“.
Position therefore depends on the prior grasp of the continuum of the whole object. The underlying assumption is that the geometrical position is a moment that denotes relation; it is a relating per se. As such, it is a moment within a totality, in the sense that it denotes the limits of this totality in a way that does not constitute the position as a self-subsistent entity, but rather contains within its being a relationship with other positions within the totality. That which lies in-between the positions themselves has the character of continuum. The character of the whole, as well as the mode of relation between its moments, its positions, has the fundamental character of continuum.

It is in reference to this mode of relation that the Aristotelian categories of position and disposition acquire their relational character. Heidegger, in that very analysis, points out the similarity between position, disposition and comportment: “Θέσις has the same character as ἔξις, διάθεσις. ἔξις = to find oneself in a definite situation [sich befinden in einer bestimmten Lage], to have something in oneself, to retain, and in retaining to be directed toward something. Θέσις= orientation, situation; It has the character of being oriented toward something. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρὸς τι ὀλὸν ἔξις, διάθεσις, ... ἔσις (Cat. 7, 6b2f.)”.714

Despite the categorical closeness between position and disposition, in that both are modalities of continuum, there persists a differentiation between the two that Heidegger identifies: sense-perception involved in grasping geometrical structures in their wholeness differs from sense-perception that grasps the practical situation in its wholeness. As such, insofar as disposition belongs to praxis, its continuum must be grasped differently.

In praxis, writes Heidegger, sense-perception maintains its practical character as its grasp is characterized as circumspection, whereas in geometrical sense-perception it is a matter of pure onlooking, a sheer inspection.715 As such, circumspection grasps the concrete and temporally momentary in its practicality,716 whereas inspection grasps that which is eternal in the sense of autonomous and unmovable [ἀκίνητον]. We can imagine Heidegger finding in Aristotle two different ways of grasping the continuum, one pertaining to geometrical sense-

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714 Ibid, p. 104.
715 Ibid, p. 163.
716 Ibid.
perception, and the other pertaining to practical sense-perception; the first supplying the understanding of the moment qua an entity’s position, the latter qua Dasein’s disposition. However, Aristotle does not give us different accounts of continuum in these two respects; the only distinction we find is a continuum that accounts for time and another for space, but ultimately the notion of continuum is derived from the *Physics*.

Heidegger shows in greater detail how Aristotle acquires the notion of continuum in the *Physics*. Ultimately, continuum is meant to explain the phenomenon of co-presence, the phenomenon of “being with and being related to one another”\(^\text{717}\). Continuum is determined as a mode of connectedness between things whereby “the limit of the one that touches the other is one and the same limit”\(^\text{718}\). One example of continuum given in that context is when the limits of a house are identical to the limits of another house: continuum means that there is nothing in-between the two related objects.

Furthermore, continuum is identified as the “in-between” itself \([\mu \varepsilon \tau \alpha \zeta \dot{v}]\).\(^\text{719}\) Heidegger illustrates this definition of continuum by reciting Aristotle’s example of a boat moving upstream, the stream being the “in-between”, the medium through which motion takes place.\(^\text{720}\) “Betweenness” is the way Aristotle understands changing being \([\mu \varepsilon \tau \alpha \beta \alpha \lambda \lambda \dot{\iota} \nu]\). In Heidegger’s own words: “This basic phenomenon is the ontological condition for the possibility of something like extension, \(\mu \varepsilon \gamma \varepsilon \theta \omicron \omicron \zeta\): site and orientation are such that from one point there can be a continuous progression to the others; *only in this way is motion understandable*”\(^\text{721}\). Ultimately the character of continuum extends to characterize both time and place \([\chi \rho \omicron \omicron \zeta \text{ and } \tau \omicron \omicron \omicron \zeta]\).\(^\text{722}\)

We have thus seen how Heidegger moves into a treatment of Aristotle’s notion of continuum through his analysis of geometrical position and its relation to sense-perception. We have also seen how Heidegger distinguishes between the grasp of practical sense-perception and geometrical sense-perception. Insofar as disposition is a moment of practical life, we would anticipate that Aristotle would have supplied a notion of continuum appropriate to Dasein’s

\(^{717}\) Ibid, p. 113: „Seins mit oder zu einem anderen”.
\(^{718}\) Ibid, p. 115.
\(^{719}\) Ibid, p. 113.
\(^{720}\) Ibid, p. 114.
\(^{721}\) Ibid, p. 119.
\(^{722}\) Ibid.
affective life. However, continuum, as Heidegger shows, is a category that emerges out of the 
*Physics* and indicates the mode of connectedness between physical entities that move.

The basic distinction between the continuum involved in geometrical position and 
disposition seems to correspond to the distinction between the kind of continuum involved in 
spatial relations that are devoid of movement and the kind of continuum involved in temporal 
relations that have movement. In this context we may even discern in Heidegger’s reading a 
certain hierarchy between spatial continuum and temporal continuum, in the sense that insofar 
as the very notion of continuum occurs in order to explain kinesis of natural objects, the 
continuum involved in geometry is derivative. In sum, the distinction that Heidegger seems to 
find in Aristotle between the continuum involved in disposition and that of geometrical position 
is not one that sustains the distinction between the mode of being of Dasein and the mode of 
being of an entity present-at-hand. Both notions of continuum refer to relations between objects 
present-at-hand.\(^{723}\)

In concluding this section, let me reiterate that comportment is a being-possibility 
[*Seinsmöglichkeit*], that is, a continuum that establishes spatiotemporal continuity which is 
“related in itself to another possibility, to the possibility of my being, that within my being 
something comes over me, which brings me out of composure” [in sich selbst auf eine andere 
*Möglichkeit* bezogen ist, auf die Möglichkeit meines Seins, daß innerhalb meines Seins etwas 
über mich kommt, das Mich aus der Fassung bringt].\(^{724}\) Furthermore, being thrown out of 
composure, losing composure, is analyzed in terms of affects, *in terms of “positive” and 
“negative” moods*, in terms of burden and the alleviation of it. This is precisely the way

\(^{723}\) Even though, in his lectures on Aristotle, Heidegger does not offer a systematic grounding of quantified space and 
time to a particular mode of manifestation of Nature, he does so in *Sein und Zeit*. For example: „Das klassische 
Beispiel für die geschichtliche Entwicklung einer Wissenschaft, zugleich aber auch für die ontologische Genesis, ist 
die Entstehung der mathematischen Physik. Das Entscheidende für ihre Ausbildung liegt weder in der höheren 
Schätzung der Beobachtung der »Tatsachen«, noch in der »Auswendung« von Mathematik in der Bestimmung der 
Naturvorgänge – sondern im *mathematischen Entwurf der Natur selbst*. Dieser Entwurf entdeckt vorgängig ein 
ständig Vorhandenes (Materie) und öffnet den Horizont für den leitenden Hinblick auf seine quantitativ 
bestimmmbaren konstitutiven Momente (Bewegung, Kraft, Ort und Zeit)” (Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, p. 362). He 
also makes explicit the connection between nature as present-at-hand and continuum: „Man sieht die Stetigkeit der 
Zeit im Horizont eines unauflosbaren Vorhandenen“ (ibid, p. 423). Further on, he explicitly refers to Aristotle: „Die 
erste überlieferte, thematisch ausführliche Auslegung des vulgären Zeitverständnisses findet sich in der »Physik« des 
zusammen“ (ibid, p. 428).

\(^{724}\) BCAP, p. 119.
Heidegger will make sense of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung, not only in BT but throughout his works. In itself, writes Heidegger, following Aristotle, comportment is the sort of being-in-the-world in which the world is encountered in the character of συμμέτρων, βλαβερόν, ἡδόν, and λυπηρόν. Our being-in-the-world is always characterized by this disposition of being-elevated and being-burdened, specifically in a way that we find ourselves within the degrees of a bad mood or an elevated mood. Ἐξίς is the determinate being-composed within this way of being. [Unser In-der-Welt-sein ist immer charakterisiert durch diese Befindlichkeit des Gehoben- und Gedrückteins, und zwar so, daß wir uns in den Ausschlägen befinden, von einer Mißstimmung oder gehobenen Stimmung mitgenommen.]725

Along with the basic πάθη of ἡδονή and λύπη, a “being-disposed-as-higher-or-lower” [Höher-oder Niedergestimmtheit] is co-given.726

V. Πάθος as ἡδονή, λύπη, αἱρέσεις and φυγή

Passions are the ways in which we lose composure, the way κινεῖσθαι occurs. They are “modes of being-taken with respect to being-in-the-world.”727 Heidegger organizes them in terms of a binary logic, whereby passions will have their positive character and their negative counterparts, and they are made sense of in terms of motivation and tendency. So, for example, ὀργή and φόβος are given together with ἡδονή and λύπη, and as such they signify definite finding-oneself [Sichbefinden], which is either “being-elevated” [Gehobensein] or “being-depressed” [Herabgedrücktein].728 A ἡδονή or λύπη is always there at each moment.729

Aristotle treats ἡδονή in NE, and it is an affect that accompanies finding the end; it is after genuine being-there-completedness, and so is the tendency that sets up intentionality: “[In all beings that are alive there lies the determination that it is after genuine being-there-completedness. Every living thing is to a certain degree tendentious; it has the tendency toward being as being-completed.” [Das will nichts anderes sagen, als daß es aus ist auf die eigentliche Daseinsfertigkeit. Jedes Lebende ist gewissermaßen tendenziös, es hat die Tendenz zu sein als

726 Ibid.
727 Ibid, p. 162.
728 Ibid, p. 113.
729 Ibid, p. 162.
Fertigsein.  

*Hṇoṇi* is a fulfillment of seeing, of knowing, and so the strive for knowing, and knowing itself, is grounded in it! It is the primary “mode of having-itself of a being that is there” [Die ἡδονή als Befindlichkeit ist die Weise des Sichhabens eines Daseins]. Heidegger notes how Aristotle constantly says that with every passion, ἡδονή is an inseparable companion, and this, in my opinion, is why Heidegger believes that ἡδονή and the way it operates is a constitutive part of all affects, which enables him to analyze all affects in terms of the specific motivational character of ἡδονή.

Heidegger further breaks down ἡδονή in its motivational character, that is, in terms of fleeing and its opposite, choice terms that he will reiterate in BT in his analysis of disposition. Fleeing and choice are the “basic motivations of being-there.” So ἡδονή belongs to the being-there itself, and has a dual possibility: (1) it is a finding itself that has the character of αἵρεσις; or (2) it is a finding oneself that has the character of φυγή. It is a going-forward [Zugehen], a seizing [Zugreifen], or a recoiling [zurückweicht], a fleeing [fleht].

In this context, Heidegger turns to fear, which is the affect that corresponds to one of these motivations, fleeing. Ἀφόβος is apprehended as λύπη, as a determinate disposition that is determined by being-toned-down-in-attunement [φόβος als λύπη gefaßt, als eine bestimmte Befindlichkeit, die durch Herabgestimmtsein bestimmt ist]. Let us conclude this chapter by looking at Heidegger’s first detailed analysis of fear, in the context of his interpretation of Aristotle.

VI. Φόβος

Heidegger begins his analysis of φόβος (fear, Furcht, timor) by noting how Aristotle’s doctrine of the πάθη had a major influence on subsequent philosophers and theologians, notably St. Thomas Aquinas, but also Luther. Generally, Heidegger says, the πάθη are a basic question [Grundfrage] in theology that played a special role in the Middle Ages since fear has a special

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730 Ibid, p. 163.
731 Ibid, pp. 164-165.
732 Ibid, p. 165.
733 Ibid, p. 166.
734 Ibid.
735 Ibid, p. 165.
connection with sin. See, for example, pure fear (timor) in the presence of God and fear of punishment (timor servilis). Fear, in theology, goes all the way back to Augustine, writes Heidegger, bridging his account of affects in the lectures on Augustine that preceded his courses on Aristotle, with his subsequent turn to Aristotle in the lectures we are covering here.

Heidegger points out that Aristotle analyzes fear in the Rhetoric, Book 2, Chapter 5, along two pathways: fear as πίστις and fear as πάθος. The former is an account of “being-afraid” as a basic determination of the being-there of the hearer, becoming conclusive about an affair that is to be settled [des Daseins des anderen, des Hoerers, mitspricht im Beraten, Schlüssigwerden ueber eine zu erledigende Angelegenheit], and Heidegger explicitly calls fear in this regard as one possible determinate disposition [bestimmte Befindlichkeit] in which the hearer finds himself. The latter is an account of “being-afraid” [Sichfürchten] that represents a fully determinate concretion of “being-out-of-composure” [Ausser-Fassung-Seins].

The φοβερόν, the fearsome [das Fürchtliche, das Furchtbare] is what sends me into fear upon meeting it. Fear is “the aspect that constitutes the givenness of the fearsome [das Moment, das die Eigentlichkeit des Fürchtlichen ausmacht].” Heidegger zeros in on the specific temporal character of fear, as it is analyzed by Aristotle himself – an analysis that will have lasting consequences in, and comprehensive effects on, his own future analyses, in BT and elsewhere. Fear becomes genuinely intelligible when Aristotle supplies the πῶς ἔχοντες, the how one has it. Aristotle characterizes φόβος as λύπη τις ἡ ταραχή ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθηντικοῦ ἡ λυπηροῦ, that is, as sadness in the sense of tumultuousness that arises out of imagination of a future bad, detrimental event. What shows itself is something that is not yet there, it is not present in sense intuition, but is rather given in imagination, showing itself from itself, through a future that is “noch nicht da”

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736 Ibid, p. 120.
739 Ibid, my italics.
740 Ibid.
742 Ibid.
but which is a realistic possibility, a possibility that can “bring me out of composure” [aus der Fassung bringen kann].

So fear is something like a “toning-down” [Herabgestimmtsein], a disposition that is characterized as φυγή, “fleeing”, the opposite of αἵρεσις [keine αἵρεσις], in the face of tumultuousness. Tumultuousness is a ταραχή, a Verwirrung in the face of the κακόν, the bad thing which interrupts my Dasein so that one opts to be led by another, chooses to be through an other, a sort of alienation from the self, in the sense that one recoils from oneself, from one’s own Dasein. As Heidegger says, ταραχή is characterized as ‘being-led-by-another’ [“Durcheinandergeraten”], ‘being-through-another’ [Durcheinandersein]: I recoil from myself, my own being [von mir selbst bzw. vor meinem Dasein zurückweiche].

The conditions of possibility of fear: threat, proximity and possibility

Fear, and the fearsome, is further analyzed in terms of its conditions of possibility. What are the conditions of possibility of fear? Heidegger tells us: that which we fear must be in proximity [σύνεγγυς; in der Nähe]. What is away [in der Ferne ist] cannot be feared. Here, Heidegger crucially refers to Aristotle’s reference to death: “We do not fear death even though we know we will die, writes Aristotle, because death is not in proximity.” In addition, Heidegger takes note of Aristotle’s genuine characterization [eigentliche Charakterisierung] of the φοβερόν, the situation that presents “what is frightening in the highest sense”, as the “unavoidable, not in an absolute sense, but only for me” [das Fürchterliche im höchsten Sinne: das Unabwendbare, aber nicht schlechthin, sonder nur für mich.].

It is important to take note of this, because it somewhat undermines the interpretation according to which Heidegger’s turn to death in BT is more or less an appropriation of Kierkegaardian themes. That is true, and it is, in my opinion, untenable to argue that

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744 Ibid, p. 168. I have corrected the English translation. There is a spelling mistake in the translation, which makes it read as if Heidegger is defining fear as the presence of choice as opposed to the absence of choice and the phenomenon of fleeing.
746 Ibid.
747 Ibid.
Heidegger’s analysis of death in BT is not heavily influenced by Kierkegaard. But this reference here shows that Heidegger’s analysis is informed not only by Kierkegaard, but also by Aristotle! Heidegger takes inspiration from Aristotle so as to want to bring fear “closer”, develop a phronesis that takes into account the end of Dasein, so as to bring fear “closer”. Being near is a way of encountering the world that is constitutive of the possibility of being-afraid [Konstitutiv für diese Möglichkeit des Sichfürchentens ist diese bestimmte Begegnisart der Umwelt]. Being afraid [Sichfürchten] must be grasped in terms of being-possible [das Mögliche]. That which comes towards me has the character of the harmful [Abträglichen]; it is both there and not there [da und nicht da] and announces itself in φαντασία (not αἴσθησις).

So the fearsome has to have the character of threat [Das, was in der Umwelt begegnet, muß den Charakter der Bedrohung haben, das So-in-der-Welt-Sein ist ein Bedrohtsein]. Even though being threatened is a necessary condition for the possibility of fear, being threatened is not already being-afraid: In every fearing lies a being-threatened, but not vice versa.

The φοβερόν [das Bedroliche] is grasped in three ways: (1) it must show itself [es muß sich zeigen] as something, but as something not really present, because it is a possibility, a being-possible, in the sense of indeterminate [im Sinne des Unbestimmten]. The character of indeterminacy heightens the possibility of the disposition of fear and heightens the threat; (2) The determination of having a lot of “powerfulness” [Mächtigkeit], δύναμιν ἐχειν μεγάλην. This powerfulness is constitutive of the threat. Over and against this threat I find myself in great weakness [in einer bestimmten Ohnmacht befinde]; and (3) Πλησιασμός turns threat into danger [Gefahr].

It is through πλησιασμός [Annäherung] that the finding-oneself [Sichbefinden] in the face of something threatening becomes a situation of danger. But πλησιασμός, which enables the Befindlichkeit of Furcht, must also be accompanied by belief – it is a sort of belief (οἴσθαι):

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749 Ibid.
750 Ibid.
751 Ibid.
753 Ibid.
754 Ibid.
the one threatened must “believe” [glauben] that the threat threatens him.\textsuperscript{755} You need belief in order to have fear, because being aware of the threatening thing is not enough.

Here Heidegger introduces the connection between fear, hope, danger and the power of being saved – connections that he will keep throughout his writings, and which seem to have their origins in this reading of Aristotle. So if one were to make sense of Heidegger’s statements about danger and the saving power of danger, one must begin from these very lectures on Aristotle. Heidegger says that the same belief involved in threat and fear also operates in ἐλπίς (Hoffnung): one hopes to escape, and here Heidegger draws an internal connection between fear and hope: “The ἐλπίς σωτηρίας is as constitutive [ebenso konstitutiv] of being afraid as believing is for being threatened.”\textsuperscript{756}

Only now is ταραχή (Unruhe) intelligible. Unruhe is the opposition [Gegeneinander] to belief and hope, and so it is a sort of totalizing thrown out of composure that interrupts the hope in something possible and positive, or the belief in something determinately negative that can be overcome: it is an indeterminate hopelessness that does not relate to anything in particular, anything possible as such, and the only reaction to this is fleeing. So ταραχή has two aspects, δίωξις and φυγή, both of which are basic determinations of the genuine being-moved of being-there [beides Grundbestimmungen der eigentlichen Bewegtheit des Daseins].\textsuperscript{757}

Heidegger finally offers a way of “having”, of not giving in to fleeing from ταραχή: The possibility of salvation [Die Möglichkeit der Rettung] must be held fast, and the “recoiling” [das eigentümliche “Zurückweichen”] from that which threatens me must operate – λύπη as φυγή, must be affirmed, owned up.\textsuperscript{758}

Fear as passion has the possibility of a comportment, which is courage [Mut].\textsuperscript{759} Fear is the condition of possibility of courage. It is a question of being afraid in the right manner, and thereby coming to resoluteness, which is also Augustine’s thesis: initium sapientiae timor Domini [in den rechten Weise sich zu fürchten und dadurch in die Entschlossenheit zu

\textsuperscript{755} Ibid, p. 174.
\textsuperscript{756} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{757} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{758} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{759} Ibid, p. 175.
kommen]. Thus, from this reading of Aristotle and Augustine, the way towards Heidegger’s own account of authenticity, of resoluteness in BT, has been paved.

\[360\] Ibid.
Concluding Remarks

This thesis is part of a larger project that aims at exploring the role of mood in Heidegger’s philosophy, both on the structural level as well as on the level of particular moods that Heidegger focuses on.

The way I initially grasped the significance of moods for philosophy, was via “the problem of beginning” [Anfang] in Hegel’s Logik. I became fascinated by that problem and how any account of a beginning would have to focus on the pre-reflective level of experience; in this context, I saw this great potential in Heidegger’s focus on facticity through his account of mood.

Throughout Heidegger’s work, moods have operated as what might be described as providing the ground for disclosure, the origin of authentic ontological understanding, the defining character of each historical epoch, as well as the enactmental urgency that will bring about Heidegger's, famously elusive, “other” cultural beginning. Fundamental mood is identified throughout Heidegger’s works, but especially in his later works, as the force behind such a beginning – as that which lies at the origin of the philosophical conversion, whereby one wonders about the nature of being(s).

I was always fascinated by the later Heidegger’s emphasis on mood - both the moods associated with metaphysics, as well as the ones connected to the “thinking” to come. But I soon realized that before I could tackle the later Heidegger on mood, it was necessary to look into his earlier works. There was, in any case, a lacuna, and it is this lacuna that this thesis tries to overcome. A better understanding of the emergence of mood in Heidegger’s overall project can only be achieved by further investigation into his earlier works. This is not to claim that a more comprehensive genealogy resolves these issues, but sometimes it dissolves some of these problems by showing how they are wrong-footed. But inevitably, some problems still persist, especially as regards questions of what constitutes fundamental moods as fundamental, and Heidegger’s choice of particular moods.
The thesis offers a genealogical-exegetical account of Heidegger’s early phenomenology of moods, through an analysis of his Freiburg and Marburg lectures that took place from 1919 to 1925. It reconstructs and analyzes the questions that Husserl’s phenomenology attempted to resolve, and shows how it is in this context that affects become central for Heidegger. The first part of the thesis looks at Heidegger’s initial turn to phenomenology, and considers the neo-Kantian problems that Heidegger faces, as well as how Husserl’s phenomenology affords an initial breakthrough in resolving these problems. I explore how Heidegger goes beyond Husserl in order to offer a concrete grounding of phenomenological understanding in lived experience and provide a concrete account of “beginning”.

The thesis also thematically explores Heidegger’s earliest accounts of particular affects, as well as the way the affective terminology of BT is developed for the first time in his interpretations of St. Augustine and Aristotle, such as love [Liebe], joy [Freude] and Angst (as well as astonishment [Staunen], shock [Schrecken], fear [Furcht], and dread [Gruseln]).

Several problems persist, but the hope is that this thesis has set the initial cornerstone for a better approach into these problems. One question that my future research will attempt to take on is a more detailed analysis of how Heidegger turns to mood to ground the phenomenological epochē. It seems to me that Heidegger is able to ascribe to fundamental mood what Husserl ascribed to epochē, and the key to understanding this relation is once we recognize the structural connection of epochē with the category of ἔχειν (and the latter with the structure of Befindlichkeit).

Another question I would be interested in further researching has to do with the fundamental mood of boredom [Langeweile] as described in FCM. According to Heidegger, boredom defines the essence of our cultural epoch, but this is not immediately evident since it conceals itself and needs to be brought into unconcealment. It is thus the task of the philosopher to awaken it. The question concerning the dialectic of emergence and concealment of fundamental cultural moods has not been adequately understood. A better understanding can be achieved by looking at Heidegger’s early phenomenology of religious life, where he explores happiness [Freude], and see how in that context Heidegger develops the paradigm of awakening.
as a response to Husserl’s analysis of intentionality and affect in Ideas I. In addition, I would also look into Heidegger’s reference to Aristotle’s treatise on waking and sleeping [Περὶ ὄσπου καὶ ἑρημόφασως] in FCM so as to see how sleep is understood in kinetic terms, namely as ἀκινησία, and explore how this leads back to comportment and the issue of overcoming (norms).

A third issue would have to do with a careful analysis of fundamental, and leading moods as they operate in CP, and in particular try to make sense of the mood of Verhaltenheit.

A fourth issue would be a political one. The question of “rootedness” [Bodenständigkeit] in its relation to Heidegger’s political choices. A leading question would be this: If we think of Heidegger’s focus on facticity and moods as part and parcel of a reaction to Husserl, would it be possible to retroactively trace his insistence on rootedness and his remarks on “World-Jewry” (in the 30s), back to this earlier reaction to Husserlian phenomenology?

A fifth, overarching project would involve the revisiting of the discontinuity thesis from the perspective of moods. This would involve an assessment of the Kehre thesis, and the role of mood in both the early Heidegger as well as the late Heidegger. My suspicion is that the fact that the failure to properly understand and assess Heidegger’s earlier accounts of affective phenomena, contributed to the failure to see that the so-called Kehre is anticipated and, hence, there was no Kehre after all but only a Wendung. There is systematic consistency between the themes of early Heidegger and the themes of late Heidegger.

Finally, a sixth overarching research project would be a study of each mood Heidegger identifies throughout his works, trying to further analyse the defining character of each so as to provide a more organized outlook. Heidegger refers to many moods, but, to the best of my knowledge, there has not been a comprehensive account of them all and how they structurally relate to one another. Moods include, Angst, boredom, wonder [Wunder], astonishment [Staunen], joy [Freude], sadness [Traurigkeit], startled dismay [Erschrecken], shock [Schrecken], fear [Furcht], dread [Gruseln], diffidence [Scheu], etc.
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