Contrastive self-knowledge and the McKinsey paradox

Sawyer, Sarah (2015) Contrastive self-knowledge and the McKinsey paradox. In: Goldberg, Sanford C (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism New Essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 75-93. ISBN 9781107063501

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Abstract

In this paper I argue first, that a contrastive account of self-knowledge and the propositional attitudes entails an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts (the concepts of belief, desire, regret, and so on), second, that the final account provides a solution to the McKinsey paradox, and third, that the account has the resources to explain why certain anti-skeptical arguments fail.

Item Type: Book Section
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
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Depositing User: Sarah Sawyer
Date Deposited: 19 Oct 2015 14:02
Last Modified: 19 Oct 2015 14:07
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/57185

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