Minds and morals

Sawyer, Sarah (2014) Minds and morals. Philosophical Issues, 24 (1). pp. 393-408. ISSN 1533-6077

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that an externalist theory of thought content provides the means to resolve two debates in moral philosophy. The first—that between judgement internalism and judgement externalism—concerns the question of whether there is a conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation. The second—that between reasons internalism and reasons externalism—concerns the relationship between moral reasons and an agent’s subjective motivational set. The resolutions essentially stem from the externalist claim that concepts can be grasped partially, and a new moral theory, which I call ‘moral externalism’, emerges.

Item Type: Article
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) > B0105 Special topics, A-Z > B0105.M4 Meaning
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Depositing User: Sarah Sawyer
Date Deposited: 16 Oct 2015 12:01
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2017 08:41
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/57184

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