Propositions, dispositions and logical knowledge

Besson, Corine (2010) Propositions, dispositions and logical knowledge. In: Quid Est Veritas? Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes. Bibliopolis, Napoli. ISBN 9788870885941

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Abstract

This paper considers the question of what knowing a logical rule consists in. I defend the view that knowing a logical rule is having propositional knowledge. Many philosophers reject this view and argue for the alternative view that knowing a logical rule is, at least at the fundamental level, having a disposition to infer according to it. To motivate this dispositionalist view, its defenders often appeal to Carroll’s regress argument in ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’. I show that this dispositionalist view, and the regress that supposedly motivates it, operate with the wrong picture of what is involved in knowing a logical rule. In particular I show that it gives us the wrong picture of the relation between knowing a logical rule and actions of inferring according to it, as well as of the way in which knowing a logical rule might be a priori.

Item Type: Book Section
Keywords: Logical Knowledge, Dispositions to Infer, Modus Ponens
Schools and Departments: School of History, Art History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
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Depositing User: Corine Besson
Date Deposited: 27 Aug 2015 11:17
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2015 11:17
URI: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/56259

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