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Rationality under Fire:
The Incorporation of Emotion into Rational Choice

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Revised MPhil Thesis for Social and Political Thought
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16 March 2015
Abstract

We are told that as many as 75% of soldiers did not return fire during World War II. Though there is some historical truth in this claim, what should be of greater interest is the controversy around it. The idea that we would do nothing in great physical danger, especially when there no cost to fight, challenges the very notion of what it means to be a rational human. As such, this thesis is less about the phenomena of combat passivity, than it is about the challenge it presents to rational choice theory, a challenge that it cannot survive. That we do not choose according to outcome but according to how we think we will feel is hardly a new idea. In its current state, however, emotion remains an irreducible 'black-box' for social theory, with terms like 'fear' and 'regret' being both ill-defined and culturally loaded. Drawing from a number of fields including therapeutic psychology, anthropology and the philosophy of emotion, this thesis proposes the precept *cognito ergo sentio*. Our thoughts always produce feelings. Even if we do not name them emotions, we choose based on these. This manifests in two reproducible ways: via schemas - whether or not an event or object or experience or person 'fits' - and by assignation, whether the self or other is, or will be, to blame for a schemic violation (or completion). This approach explains both irrational and rational choice, as well as the way in which we can imagine future feeling states within anticipated scenarios. In the case of violence and passivity, we will examine three such invocations: schemic breaks (lack of fit, or 'fear'), causal assignation of the self (or 'shame'), and causal assignation of the external (or 'anger'). Each of these thinking modalities generates a feeling which in turn determines a choice in the individual, whether to fight, freeze, slaughter, surrender or even break down.
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Introduction: Rationality under Fire

S.L.A. Marshall contended that during World War II, only 20 percent of soldiers in live combat returned fire. Although there is some controversy around this assertion (see Chapter 1), the core theory is sound: even when faced with imminent death, human beings usually do not resist or fight back. This violates a fundamental belief about ourselves: that we would act rationally to protect our lives. Yet many soldiers do fire back; soldiers will sometimes fire under orders, and they will sometimes resist orders if they consider them unethical. Soldiers may even massacre innocent people against orders, or under them. Worse yet, war is the longstanding institution that violates individual self-interest, at least for the soldier fighting it. One offers to kill or give up one's life for the sake of honor, or the abstract interests of the group.

The variety of behavior between violence and passivity offers us a challenge. Sometimes we act in our interests, and sometimes we do not. What is the fulcrum of this choice? If we do act emotionally, how can this be usefully described, other than in heavily overdetermined terms like 'fear' or 'panic' or 'vengeance' or even 'injustice'? Despite the fact that many of these behaviors would not be considered rational in either the conventional or academic/economic sense, I propose that the structure of rational choice can help explain both self-interested and self-destructive behaviors. We choose neither to outcome, nor to feel outcome, but according to how we anticipate we will feel. This remains an optimal choice, one that operates under both cognitive and feeling functions: how we imagine our feelings. Like the quickly discarded Christmas present, it matters not whether these outcomes are achieved, but that we choose
either because we think that a positive feeling might be achieved, or that a negative feeling might be avoided.

Before outlining how this formulation might take shape, it is imperative to answer: why use rationality as a model? There are several potential arguments for doing so. First, rationality has a long history of studying aberrations. This arguably begins with Max Weber's inclusion of the early human practice of magic as rational or 'predominantly economic' (Weber, 1963: A.1.b). Rationality as an academic field has a history of utilizing a case study that might not initially seem sensible—e.g. family dynamics, voting, the buying of lottery tickets—which it then attempts to include within the existing causal or economic framework. Especially relevant is the new work on the 'rational' suicide bomber; this literature following 9/11 is extensive (see Llusshe and Tavares, 2007 for an overview, and Chapter 2 where it will be discussed further). The case study of passivity and violence presents like challenges to rationality, and so follows the established practice, like many social sciences, of exceptions rebuilding the rule.

Rationality, secondly, is especially relevant to violence as a subject because of its instrumental nature. The field of rationality itself derives from economics as far back as ancient Sumeria (Rutger, 1999), with the understanding that one cannot choose rationally unless one has a scale with which to weigh a decision. In fact, most current interest in bounded rational choice is in relation to the way in which many actors will choose non-advantageous economic outcomes (less money) for seemingly no reason. Examples include the New York taxi drivers who drive less in the rain when there are more opportunities to make money, and more in the
sun when there are fewer (Camerer et al., 1997). The measurement of money, hours worked and rain vs. no rain are concrete variables from which we can then determine which action is more rational than the other. This case study of violence and passivity has an even starker scale: life or death, the calculus without which no other choice is even possible.

Furthermore, rationality has the quality of comprehensibility: 'the highest measure of "self-evidence"' (Weber, 1981: 151). Raymond Boudon described rationality's appeal: 'behavior is rational when it can be explained beginning "X had good reasons for doing Y because..." without risking objection, and without oneself having the feeling of having said something incongruous' (Boudon, quoted in Norkus, 2000: 266). Extending Boudon's formulation, I would construct it as X does Y to get Z. The appeal of rationality lies in the way it describes an action motivated by a comprehensible goal, as it relies on our most basic form of reasoning: cause and effect. Whether or not the goal is achieved, it is always perceived. In economic theory, the subject acts for gain, or to avoid loss. At first, our case studies—about life, death, violence and avoiding violence—seem like a contradiction in these terms, in that Z (the goal) is death or murder. This is the challenge this thesis must tackle: how to explain these choices and maintain the structure of rationality, its clear causal nature, and its appeal as an explanandum.

The fourth motivation acts tangentially to this appeal; rationality is communicable. This is slightly different to causal simplicity, in that it speaks to the goal of the thesis, which is not merely to be written. Writing is meaningless, literally, when ideas fail to be understood. Although rational choice, especially the heuristics and biases school, is violating this
basic tenet in favor of cute anecdotes, its appeal still remains in the way cause and effect can be easily grasped, not least because it is how we perceive our own actions. A useful theory requires more than just evidence and rigor; it must attempt to be understood. If one must choose between two theories of equal weight, the one that is more easily comprehensible has a greater chance of social impact.

This simplicity is not merely a matter of expediency. As we plunge into violence, rationality and emotion, the severe limitations of human comprehension will emerge. A causal glance at identity, Dunbar's number, the cognitive miser, and many other concepts and observations, makes it increasingly clear that human beings have a limited ability to cognate in real time. Even the famous rule of five plus or minus two—referring to the number of objects that we can hold in present-time consciousness—has now been downgraded to four (Dehaene, 1997, see Chapter 5). As per the previous paragraph, the explanation must be understood, but this works in a dual sense: if a theory is unnecessarily complex, it is probably incorrect. This is not a corollary of Occam's razor, but a statement about cognition in general. If we as human beings cognate simply, it is unlikely that a complex theory would correctly explain our beliefs, choices and actions.

The sixth appeal of rational choice is its focus on the individual. At first, this may seem counterintuitive in regard to social theory, which deals, naturally enough, with sociality or groups. In fact, the majority of writing in violence studies falls under a social milieu. Although there are many authors who have written on the subject of violence, two will be considered in detail: Randall Collins and Steven Pinker, two of the few
who have dealt with the phenomenon of combat passivity in any depth. Both these perspectives, although very different, describe violence sociologically. For Collins, 'violence is hard' and the individual engages in it to resolve emotional entrainment via the participation of groups or institutions (Collins, 2008). For Pinker, violence is Hobbesian, part of our nature, although he still maintains a sociological perspective. The socializing effects merely work in the other direction: the rise of the centralized states is 'the first form of social organization that shows signs of design for reducing violence within its borders' (Pinker, 2011: 167).

In opposition to the sociological perspective (also known as the 'macro' perspective), this thesis will utilize methodological individualism. The historical details of rates of fire, multiple loaded muskets, and individual accounts demonstrate both passivity in firing, with inconsistent conclusions. We see a variation in behavior, which is where the sociological perspective loses some ground. From the pro- and anti-Marshall camps, we are confronted with a dualist interpretation of the findings: 'Soldiers do fire back!', countered with an equally strident 'No they don't!'. In fact, what Marshall is saying is that soldiers tend to not fire, but exhibit different actions under different circumstances. Marshall notes the way in which almost all soldiers will fire under direct orders; the one exception to a low rate of fire was the instance where 'all junior leaders constantly "ride herd" on troops with the specific mission of increasing their fire' (Marshall, 1947: 51). On the other hand, we know from the results of battles that some fire perfectly well without supervision, just as a certain percentage will not fire under supervision. This leads us to what, at first, seems like a contradiction: that violence and
passivity can be understood as both situational and as a function of individual choice.

Methodological individualism allows explanations from both macro and micro points of view. This is the 'doctrine that all social phenomena (their structure and their change) are in principle explicable only in terms of individuals—their properties, goals, and beliefs' (Elster, 1982: 454). The advantage of methodological individualism is that it can subsume the sociological perspective. It can explain a situation as a function of individual interpretation and belief, allowing us to include both individual choice and situational pressures. It is the variation within methodological individualism that allows a more cogent explanation. This resolves a significant theoretical problem; despite what many social theories, including rationality, might propose, it is impossible to explain individual behavior using aggregate data.

The Rational Emotion and the Emotional Imagination

The final and most important motivation for using a rational choice paradigm is what Jon Elster refers to as its 'explanatory power' (Elster, 2007; 1984). This is best outlined by Raymond Boudon: 'I am not saying that socialization is a worthless notion, nor that there are no socialization effects, but merely that the notion is descriptive rather than explanatory. It identifies and christens various correlations between the way people have been raised and educated and their beliefs and behavior, but does not explain them' (Boudon, 2009: 180). Although this was written against descriptions in psychological explanations, 'descriptiveness', in all fields,
abounds. The current fashion in rationality allows for biases, such as the availability bias, which allows that a subject will choose according to what is familiar or 'available' (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). As it does not provide an explanation for the bias, or even a format according to which the choice of a bias would be made, this school of rationality becomes like the socialization Boudon outlines: it names, but does not explore. This is the question that will be asked of current theories, including this one, and it must remain at the forefront of the entire inquiry: is it descriptive, or explanatory?

As such, this thesis does not belong in rational choice per se, but within the philosophy of social science. It is akin, although not comparable, to the works of Jon Elster and Raymond Boudon, upon both of which this thesis will draw. It could be said that this field, as broad as it is, has two agendas. The first, like all social science, is to 'explain social phenomenon' (Elster, 2007: 3). Outside of a specific field, such as anthropology, international relations, sociology of violence and so on, it further seeks to do so via a critique or analysis of the current fields of social theory themselves: 'an inquiry loosely organized around the problem of scientific status of social knowledge' (Turner and Roth, 2007: 2). Like the philosophy of science, the philosophy of social science is epistemological in nature, a rigorous application of logic to our behavior, as well as the understanding of it.

This field further allows for a strong interdisciplinary aspect—the inclusion of rational choice, philosophy of emotion, anthropology, history, military history, psychology, experimental psychology, neurobiology, sociology of violence, and so on. Under the philosophy of social sciences,
the use of a wide variety of academic disciplines serves two purposes: firstly, access to a wider dataset, meaning greater confirmation or refutation of particular conclusions; secondly, fields like rational choice or violence studies may embody the same components that they are seeking to analyze, and, in turn, provide their own dataset. In this case, this thesis is an attempt not only to explain behavior, but to do so via a greater understanding of the nature of human reliance on causality, a concept deeply embedded in all forms of social science.

What this necessitates is both a critique and appropriation of rational choice theory. Appropriation as the basic structure (actors choosing optimally) remains central, and critique in the sense that even the causal structure of rationality must be seen within the context of feeling. Nothing can be optimal without being preferable, and nothing can be preferred without the accompanying feeling. We choose, as per above, optimally. The alteration proposed above is minor, that we choose not according to outcome, or even anticipated outcome, but according to anticipated feeling outcome. This is not a new or even radical idea, proposed before under decision affect theory (Mellers et al., 1999; 1997), as well as decision regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982)—both economic studies of payouts under gambling risk. In the case of the former, the subjects choose according to future pleasure; in the case of the latter, they are disinclined to choose according to future regret. Both studies call for a 'better understanding of emotions' (Mellers et al., 1999: 343).

If anticipated feeling state theory is not a unique contribution to the philosophy of social science, what will be? One hopes the answer will be
the introduction of a new model of emotions based on agency and causality. Emotion has a troubled history in the social sciences, often seen as an irreducible 'black box' (Rouse and Morris, 1986; Gigerenzer, 2001). The black box refers to something that cannot be opened, which cannot be further understood. If someone says 'he did that because he was angry' or 'she did that because she was ashamed', the terms are not defined, objective, or even understood across cultures, or even within a single culture, in the same way. Emotion is, for most social sciences, a fruitless terminus, a series of subjective, and often culturally particular, categories: shame, irritation, love, fear, anxiety, joy, humor, worry, anger, vengeance, suspicion, satisfaction, guilt, and so on. It is a long list, with ill-defined variables: 'The lack of agreement about what emotions are is paralleled by the lack of agreement on what emotions there are' (Elster, 1999: 241, emphasis in original).  

To explain emotion, it is necessary to jettison it. To do this, one must clearly distinguish between feeling and emotion—a distinction that already has a tradition in philosophy of emotion (Solomon, 2001; Lyons, 1980), psychology (Barrett, 2006; Barrett et al., 2007; Russell, 2003), and even neurobiology (Damasio, 2003). Emotions are 'intentional'; that is, they have an object and a reason. Feelings are what we experience in the present, immediately: 'the idea of the body being in a certain way' (Damasio, 2003: 84). Emotions are complex intentional thoughts that

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1. It should be noted that Jon Elster, upon whom a great deal of this thesis rests, said the following a year earlier: 'There is a large degree of consensus in the scholarly literature on what emotions there are, and a quite good agreement on what emotions are' (Elster, 1998: 48). The statement regarding 'a large degree of consensus' is less accurate, as will be outlined in Chapter 4.
produce feelings (Solomon calls them 'judgements'; Nussbaum calls them 'judgements of value'; Elster calls them 'cognitive antecedents'). Feelings are the body in its state, many times the result of emotional cognitions, but distinct from them nevertheless.

Within this model, we are always feeling something, either bodily, or through an association with a particular cognitive state, or, as is usually the case, a combination of both. The current paradigm asks if we are in an emotional state or not, and then asks which emotion we act under, even if this is a historically, individually and culturally defined index of terms. This model instead assumes that we are always thinking and feeling something, and asks: what is the thought and what is the feeling? Under the precept cognito ergo sentio (I think, thereupon I feel), our thoughts produce feelings, even if we do not name them emotions. This is a constant, inescapable and 'normal' state. The brain continually cognates, and, even if slight, the thoughts produce some type of effect. A perceived object—a banana peel on the ground, a stranger, a friend, a warm fire—is more than just 'there'. It has associations, either fond or fearful.

This is even more true of causal events: examples include a woman wearing white after Labor Day, a lottery ticket paying out, a train being late, or a plane being shot out of the sky. Causal attributions have an even stronger effect. Within this paradigm, nothing is neutral. For the last five millennia, we have been desperate to distinguish between reason and passion. Nevertheless, if the rational choice is a desirable one, it must produce feeling. Given the way in which we define particular emotions, it may be possible to distinguish between emotional and non-emotional states, at least within a particular culture, or a particular historical
moment. However, given the nature of embodied and experiential consciousness, it is not possible and not useful for academic purposes to distinguish between non-feeling and feeling states. We are always feeling something.

It is not enough to simply say that human beings are feeling beings. It is necessary to describe in useful and reproducible terms how those feelings are generated. Although the evidence and arguments, both theoretical and historical, will make up the next seven chapters, there are two important features of this model to consider at this juncture, however shallowly. Thoughts (sometimes) have (at least) two stages: apprehension and attribution. Specific interpreted causal conclusions lead, consistently and explicably, to specific feelings.

The first will be defined as a 'schema', a word with roots in the cognitive psychology of PTSD. What does 'schema' mean, exactly? Schemas 'are organizers of information processing whose forms both speed up appraisal and fill in for missing information' (Horowitz, 1990: 303), a concept possibly originating with the work of Jean Piaget (Piaget, 1937). It is perhaps more clearly understood via Mary Douglas' famous concept of dirt as matter out of place: 'a shared need to transcend the everyday limits of cognition by closing the metaphysical gaps in our classificatory system' (Fardon, 2002: 99). Given the limits of present time consciousness, an apprehension either is, or is not, a binary that speaks to our need or compulsion, or at least consistent action to categorize (Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1962). When the perception fits, there is order; when it does not, it is dirt—a violation.
After this stage—confirmation or violation—the next stage is the perfectly unexceptional construction of causality. If something has happened, it must have a cause. Taking a cue from cognitive models of anger (Averill, 1983; Aristotle, 1954; Powers and Dagleish, 2008), it follows that the event must also have a motive, and thus an agent. What are typically understood as emotions are, in fact, very concisely defined casual attributions. When a schemic violation takes place (e.g. a building collapses, a shoe is found on the kitchen counter, or a football team loses), we respond with a negative feeling state, just as we might respond with a positive one when the confirmation of a schema is achieved. In the sense of sequential time, this break or achievement appears as causal. If it led us to feel, it follows that there was intent; if there was intent, it follows there was an agent. Emotions like anger and impulses like obeisance occur under attributions to an external agent, even if that agent is an institution or an abstract object. Likewise, if we attribute the schemic break to ourselves, the feeling intensifies with self-attribution: this is shame or guilt (or other unnamed feelings). We avoid these feelings and the situations that provoke them.

We furthermore avoid the thoughts that provoke (or might provoke) those feelings. Jon Elster, who has written extensively on rational choice (see Chapter 2) notes the way in which it is difficult to utilize the rational choice model if the subject is self-deluded, what he calls 'self-deception' or 'wishful thinking'. Appropriate for this subject, this phenomenon is a major factor in the suppression of truth in Hitler's Final Solution. Quoting Walter Laqueur's history of this denial The Terrible Secret: 'while many Germans thought that the Jews were no longer alive, they did not
necessarily believe that they were dead'. Elster concludes that this 'failure may be due to defective cognition or, as is probable in the present case, to affective pressures' (Elster, 2001a: 152). These 'affective pressures' have no 'easy answer'. With a feeling choice model, however, this operates under an optimal future feeling state. If one anticipates the outcome according to feeling, this can apply to instrumental outcome as well as belief outcome. There is no real reason to distinguish the two; for the individual, they are both felt in any case, both internally. In other words, thoughts are the means, the feelings, and the end.

The AFST approach presents many advantages, most of which will be detailed along the way and in the conclusion, when the model has been fully outlined. Possibly the most important is the way in which it helps situate emotion and feeling within a model of choice, which Elster considers the most important single aspect to any social theory: 'Even though I am critical of many rational-choice explanations, I believe the concept of choice is fundamental' (Elster, 2007: 6; see also Little, 1992). This is a statement with which I must agree in its entirety. In relation to this thesis, choosing does not refer to what we will feel, but how we think we will. Understanding feelings as causal cognates resituates the process of choice. When choosing, we imagine outcomes, or scenarize, and these scenarios take shape within a framework as cause, effect and agency. We know (or at least anticipate) the negative feelings when a negative outcome is assigned to ourselves, just as we know the positive feelings when a negative outcome is assigned to others.

There are two variables in emotional theory that can easily be applied to choice: valence and arousal (Yik et al., 1999; Smith and
Ellsworth, 1985). The former refers to the general 'rating' of a feeling; shame may rate as high negative, while embarrassment rates as low negative (Elster, 1999). Arousal, then, is how much that particular emotion is activated ('activation' can be considered another term for arousal). Although the specificity of this approach, in regard to what and how many dimensions of emotion, is hardly resolved (Fontaine et al., 2007); it could be said that feeling states can at least be comparable. It is not necessary to say that one is 'high versus low positive affect and high versus low negative affect', but that one state could be seen as preferable to the other. Besides avoiding the culturally and historically specific language of emotion, the point of low or negligible arousal or valence is not that one is negative and the other positive but, in terms of choice, that they could be compared. This is as simple as choosing between two slices of cake: one is slightly larger; the other has more frosting. The actual affect in such a choice is fairly low (certainly compared to combat), but a choice can be made based on the anticipated feeling state.

Beyond choice, however, the cognate feeling model also allows for a more concise description of emotion. Two issues within emotional theory present as semantic, but are strong indeed. The first is that one term could incorporate many and significantly different feelings. For example, anger can refer to the violation and attribution of an agent, which is largely seen as negative. On the other hand, a strong component of anger is pleasure in the fantasy of revenge. Rather than being named anger, this is better understood as a schematic break followed by an external attribution, or the scenerization of the repair of that same break. These are specific (although still delineated) thoughts that consistently
reproduce the same feelings, instead of a broad over-determined single designation. By stating the exact violation and the exact attribution, we are able to improve our understanding of what a particular individual is thinking and feeling, and how they can be expected to choose.

What may matter even more for this thesis is the description of those feelings that are not called emotions, but probably are. If emotions are complex intentional thoughts that produce some type of affect, this allows us to include desires that are normally privileged beyond the emotional canon, such as the desire to be rational, or to have more money and power, the excitement of discovery or being right, or, in the case of violence, the pleasure of killing and even the desire simply to survive. Some of these thoughts are understood as normal, natural or, for our intentions, rational; some are not even considered at all. Yet each is a thought, or more specifically, an intention that produces a feeling, meeting the basic criterion for emotion. Within a cognate feeling model, the rational and irrational choice can be equally understood—the structure is substantively identical.

Perhaps the greatest unnamed emotion is *eunomia*—the pleasure in knowing. This is a feeling that motivates us daily, hourly even. It is possibly the most significant feeling reason behind academia (including this thesis and this sentence), and yet remains unexamined, without even the courtesy of being given a name. Yet the moment of sense when we know (or think) something to be true is powerful indeed. This could be no more true of rationality, which relies on a reliable causal universe. David Hume has noted that cause and effect cannot be proven unless you already believe in cause and effect. Although there is much reliable Newtonian
science that rests on causal principles, for the social sciences we instead ask: why, if cause and effect has no logical basis, does it remain a constant of cognition? The answer may seem tautological at this point, but it is hoped by the end there will be some explanatory sense to it: we believe in causality because it feels good to do so. At the very least, it feels bad, terrible even, not to.

**There Are No Rational Motives**

This thesis will attempt to incorporate emotion into rational choice. To do this, it is necessary to reformulate the general and diffuse cultural concepts of emotion so that they can be understood as future feeling states. Choice takes place in anticipation, and the various scenarios we envision carry with them various expectations of a feeling outcome, even if, as with revenge or attempts to find safety, that feeling may not actually be achieved or avoided. The situation within choice necessarily focuses, though not exclusively, on the types of feelings that can be generated by specific causal cognates, such as future states of blame, either directed at the self or at others, or at satisfaction when a particular schemic break, however insignificant, is repaired. As such, it is largely a work within the philosophy of emotion, itself within the philosophy of social science: the attempt to describe the currently obscure mechanics of emotion within a causal, attributional and choice-based model. Rational choice provides the *structure* for this theory (we do X to feel Y), but not the academic *discipline*. It is not a new model of choice, but an attempt to more concisely and completely describe the culturally contingent, dismissed,
and highly contested terms of emotion through a matrix of thought and associated feeling.

As such, we will be discussing many emotions and many feelings, but not all. The focus is on building a choice model, which means that feeling cognates that are easily anticipated in scenarios, like future states of blame, or resolutions of vengeance, are necessarily given priority. There are some, like humor, aesthetics, forgiveness and romantic love, that fit within this model that will be barely addressed, if at all. There are some, like compassion, love and gratitude, that simply do not fall under this paradigm. Bodily feelings like sickness and hunger can fit into the feeling aspect model, and even be a part of choice (especially in combat), but these will not be theorized. Furthermore, the state of 'mood' (the current feeling state) and its effect on outcome or even cognitive ability will be given short shrift. There is some attention on this subject in the chapter covering schemic breaks, but the focus remains on how future states are cognated, and how that affects preference and choice.

Even as an analysis of various fields of social science, it remains necessary to engage in a classical literature review for some of these fields in regard to both their relevance to the case study—i.e. violence and passivity—as well as their own theoretical underpinning. The first chapter will introduce one of the case studies (soldiers who do not fire) both the evidence for the existence of passivity as a phenomenon and its situation as a controversy. Chapters 2 and 3 review the fields of rationality and the sociology of violence, respectively. They will cover the way in which the current academic areas succeed and fail at describing violence at an explanatory level. The structure of these particular approaches will
provide further examples and evidence of the way in which seemingly neutral discourses are themselves imbued with feeling.

Chapter 4 begins with a very brief overview of the philosophy of emotion, and the specific areas of research from which this thesis will draw. What then follows is an elucidation of the processes of cognate feeling, related in order of how human beings themselves may experience them. Each of these stages is applied to the cases of violence and passivity in turn. Chapter 5 details the first step, apprehension, the attempt to categorize a perception, and the strong feelings (sometimes called terror) that are associated with the experience of chaos and unknowing. Chapter 6 details the negative feelings associated with self-designated agency (blame/shame/guilt), which can be scenarized easily as a state to avoid. Chapter 7 details some aspects of other designated casualty (anger), and how the repair of a schematic break, whether assigned to another or not, generates a positive feeling. Violence may be hard, but the imagination of its completion, especially with the fantasy of ourselves as the actor, can be a strongly positive feeling. Its lack of a conventional name as an emotion should not contradict the consistent reality of the feeling.

There are risks that come with this theory of feeling, of linking a specific model of causal attribution with so many emotions. It may be too simple and too abstract at the same time. As it has changed over the years of its writing, it is fair to say that it will change again. If it fails for the reader, I would ask one indulgence: take emotion seriously. This is intended in both meanings of the word. Emotion is something that can be taken seriously in the sense that there is enough structure to be studied, understood and usefully debated. If this seems implausible, then at least
heed the plea that emotion is more crucial than we currently hold. Philip Slater's proclamation that there are no rational motives (Slater, 2011) is as irrefutable as something can be in the social sciences, and yet the vast majority of the literature treats this central motivation as unnecessary, and spends equally wasteful time dividing and distinguishing what are structurally identical processes: reason and feeling. Fear of the irrational (itself, by definition, a feeling) motivates much more behavior than economists, political scientists, anthropologists and even psychologists are willing to acknowledge. Emotion is nothing to be afraid of.
Chapter 1: Resistance to Violence

To discuss a challenge to rationality, we must first decide if such a challenge has any legitimacy. The idea and history of irrational violence, either criminal or state-based, has been studied and documented at length. There is little dispute that many times we act violently both against the interests of others and ourselves: 'a central problem in international relations dubbed the "war puzzle": rational stateispute that many times we act violently both against the interests of others and ourselves: 'a central problem in international relations dubbed the of the literature treats this central motivation as e-based modebargain reflecting their relative power' (Johnson et al., 2006: 2513).

Less stable is the phenomenon of combat passivity or even victim passivity, which has the double disadvantage of being understudied as well as controversial. For whatever reason, violence against self-interest makes some sense; inaction less so, especially according to the rational perspective (sic) on fear, which ostensibly manifests as fight or flight. The question remains: is non-firing or passivity a real phenomenon? The following will act as both an answer to this question and an examination of the way in which controversy polarizes so easily around the nature of human behavior.
More Right than Wrong: SLAM's Combat Theories

In 1947, S.L.A. Marshall published *Men Against Fire*, a short book based on interviews conducted with soldiers in the fields of combat during World War II. Subtitled 'The Problem of Battle Command in Future War', Lt. Gen. Marshall's intent was to bridge the gap between how commanders thought soldiers behaved under fire, and how they actually did. Not an academic—Marshall was an ex-reporter with the acronymic nickname 'SLAM' (Chambers, 2003)—his conclusions were nevertheless semi-sociological in nature, locating him in the then-nascent field of combat psychology and motivation. His book contains, for example, one of the first voicings of the concept of the 'fighting for soldier next to you', (Wong et al., 2003; Stouffer et al., 1949), where it was noted that the bond between the combatants was a stronger motivation than ideology or command: '[m]en do not fight for a cause but because they do not want to let their comrades down' (Marshall, 1947: 161).

However, the claim that made him famous was the assertion that during active combat, only 15–20 percent of soldiers would return fire (Marshall, 1947: 51). This is not to say that soldiers were shirking their duties; some would call point, or reload for those who were firing (Grossman, 1996: 10; Dyer, 2006: 14; Holmes, 2003: 197), all the while under fire and in equal (or statistically speaking, greater) danger as the 'active firers': 'They were not malingerers. They did not hold back from the danger point' (Marshall, 1947: 59). It is vital not to view this information from a safe academic perspective; these are real, dangerous, fluid, ugly and terrifying battlefields, where each second of hesitation puts the soldier another second closer to a violent death or maiming. Here,
Marshall recounts the Makin Island Fight: 'The enemy, crazed on Sake, began a series of banzai charges at dusk, and the pressure thereafter was almost unremitting until dawn came. The frontal gun positions were all directly assaulted with sword and bayoneta Half of the American guns were knocked out and approximately half of the occupants of the forward foxholes were either killed or wounded. Every position was ringed with enemy dead' (Marshall, 1947: 55). Yet Marshall, to his own surprise, finds the same rate of fire, even in this most intense battle.

The one community that believed Marshall's claim—and from some perspectives, the only one that mattered—was the United States Army. After World War II and Korea, the army switched to a Skinnerian style pop-and-shoot conditioning, in which paper targets appeared suddenly and soldiers were repeatedly told to fire on sight. This was later refined, as the targets became more human-like (rather than simple round shapes), and would appear and disappear quickly, creating an automatic response to fire (Grossman, 1996: 253). According to David Grossman (Grossman, 1996; Grossman et al., 2000), this raised the firing rate from Marshall's claim of 20 percent during World War II to 90 percent during Vietnam. Grossman's data is confirmed by Moskos in Vietnam (1975) and Little in Korea (Little, quoted in Holmes, 2003: 325).

In the last two decades, Marshall's assertion has come under increasing scrutiny, more so today than when it was initially published (Field, 2009). One of Marshall's first critics, Roger Spiller, correctly pointed out that his methods were barely rigorous and could not be verified (Spiller, 1988). Although Marshall claimed to have amassed 800 notebooks of post-combat interviews, a review of his collected papers at the US Army
Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks found them to contain 'a couple' (Chambers, 2003: 121). There have been numerous counterclaims, including examples of Canadian soldiers undergoing Marshall-style post-battle interviews who were found to have fired 'too much' (Engen, 2008: 126). If we hold that The New York Times and Newsweek (and possibly Wikipedia) represent the conventional wisdom of our time, where once we believed Marshall's fire ratio conclusion to be correct, we now think his conclusion specious (Halloran, 1989; Thomas, 2007).

As is often the case with conventional wisdom, neither the old nor the new is correct. Critics and proponents of Marshall have one thing in common: an unwillingness to acknowledge legitimate concerns raised by either side. Authors like Gwynne Dyer and David Grossman, who use Marshall to bolster their view that soldiers are inherently pacifistic, conspicuously fail to mention what seems to be very strong evidence that Marshall fabricated his data. This is in contrast to sociologist Randall Collins,³ who is more than willing to admit Marshall's faults (Collins, 2008: 47). It does not help matters that Grossman has had a post-9/11 Dershowitzian about-face, where he argued for the humanity of the soldier and the deleterious effects of training to kill (Grossman, 1996). He now uses the same evidence to advocate for better ways to train, as long as they are within the hands of legitimate authority like the police and the military (Grossman, 2008). In either incarnation, critiques of Marshall remain unacknowledged.

2. We will address Collins' work in greater detail in the following chapter.
3. For purposes of historical verification, it bears noting that this incident was actually
Reading further into this subject, it was discovered that Marshall's critics may have even more ammunition (so to speak) than they thought. David Grossman, one of Marshall's great supporters whose work is often quoted as proof of the soldier's natural disinclination to fight, turns out to be an extremely poor researcher. He cites the following pieces of evidence as confirmation of Marshall's conclusion: 'Paddy Griffith's data on the extraordinarily low killing rate among Napoleonic and American Civil War regiments [and] Richard Holmes' assessment of Argentine firing rates in the Falklands War' (Grossman et al., 2000: 191). Upon reading Holmes' book, I was disenchanted to find that the assessment was as follows: 'When I explained [Marshall's thesis] to a group from 2 Para, there was immediate recognition that it applied to the Argentineans, whose snipers and machine gunners had been very effective while their individual riflemen had not' (Holmes, 2003: 326). It would be a stretch to say that this 'assessment' merits even anecdotal status.

Turning to Paddy Griffith's work, it is true that Griffith noted the low rate of fire among Civil War troops. Griffith's purpose was tangential to Marshall's; he was interested instead in disproving that 'the rifle musket revolutionized tactics', this view being representative of a commonly held tradition among military historians that the technology changes the fight. To Griffith, '[t]his is demonstrably false, simply by reference to the short range and long duration of the firefights' (Griffith, 1989a: 189). Despite Grossman's assertion, however, Griffiths did not mention the Prussian Army firing tests, upon which Grossman's conclusion rests. It is very likely that knew about these tests, as it is common knowledge among historians (Chandler, 1973; Holmes, 2011: 198), but he did not write about it, at least
not in either *Battle Tactics of the Civil War*, which Grossman cites, or *Military thought in the French army, 1815–51*, which Grossman does not cite (Griffith, 1989a; 1989b).

Although neither Marshall nor Grossman can be called academically rigorous, this does not mean that their argument is invalid, only that their data is misplaced. Marshall's critics have relied on what is often called strawman logic; simply put, your methods are wrong, and therefore your conclusions are wrong. As it happens, what might be called the Prussian Argument (since its provenance is for the time-obscure) works perfectly well on its own, despite the above incorrect attribution. Combining all sources, the argument is as follows.

The late 18th century and early 19th century saw the flourishing of face-to-face rifle combat. In a bizarre and perversely wasteful mixture of the phalanx formation and the recent invention of the rifle, large numbers of men were ordered to stand in line, usually between 50 and 100 yards apart, and shoot at each other until one side was weakened enough for the other to declare victory (or create a rout, see Chapters 3 and 7).

This phenomenon dwindled during the American Civil War, when soldiers finally realized the advantage of taking cover under rifle fire (Dyer, 2006: 245). During the Napoleonic era, however, the period of face-to-face firing happened to coincide with the rise of statistics and record keeping. This means that we have a fairly accurate picture of four important numbers: how well soldiers fired under practice conditions, how many soldiers there were on the field, how far apart they were, and how long the battle lasted.
To give an idea of the relative accuracy under practice conditions, below is a useful example of a target from the American Civil War.

These are not the blunderbusses of the 17th century, which required a mass effect approach. The rifles used miniunderbusses of t-rifled barrels with helical grooves allowing for increased accuracy over distance (Westwood, 2005: 83).

The Prussian Argument works because, whoever made it, it can be easily quantified. At the end of the 18th century, the Prussian Military tested their men's accuracy by erecting a canvas sheet, 100 foot by 6 foot, to simulate a line of men (Chandler, 1973: 342). It should be no surprise that they found that the closer they got, the more accurate the firing was:
at 225 yards, their accuracy was 25 percent; 150 yards increased to 40 percent; and at 75 yards, the range at which most battles took place, the men fired with 60 percent accuracy. If we imagine 100 men in this line (remembering that they were at least two ranks deep), that would mean 60 hits, as depicted below.

It would stand to reason that accuracy on the battlefield would be lower than in the calm of training. Given the confusion of battle, it would seem impossible to assess how accurately the opposing troops were firing. This would be true, except that what we do know is how long the battles would take—often hours before there were any decisive casualties.

With a reload rate of about 20 seconds, it would take less than a minute to hit every man on the field if the 60 percent rate of accuracy was perfectly reproduced. If we take attrition into account (that the other side is doing the same firing, and losing a proportional amount of men), a fight under training accuracy would take about two minutes. The battle time of Waterloo is fixed; we know one section to have lasted five hours (Hougoumont Farm), and another section six hours (Wellington's reverse). With time as a constant, now accuracy becomes the variable. As time
increases, assuming consistent firing (see next paragraph), it follows that accuracy must diminish. This is true, but what is surprising is by how much. Extrapolating from the time difference, what we would have after the first volley is a sheet that looks like this:

One could introduce a third variable: number of shots actually fired, but as per the record keeping above, this is also a known value. According to Griffith's (among other historians') assessment of the amount of ammunition used in the Civil War, it would reside anywhere from one hundred to \textit{one thousand} shots for each casualty (Griffith, 1989a: 85). Griffith's is not the highest estimate—Holmes gives an overview that ranges from 500 to 3,000 (Holmes, 2003: 167). This is a stronger confirmation of Marshall's conclusion, since the Napoleonic battles did not involve men in cover, on the own, etc., but instead men facing each other, usually fewer than 50 yards apart. Here, every second of delay is a risk, and yet they are missing at what can only be called an astounding rate.

As a possible corollary to Marshall's findings, it could be that soldiers do fire, but inaccurately. Dave Grossman additionally notes that the majority of rifles recovered after the battle of Gettysburg were found
unfired and often even loaded. During the civil war, the standard weapon was a muzzle-loading rifled musket. Before the mass production of the self-contained bullet, rifles required the user to tear the pre-weighed paper packet of gunpowder, fill with the powder, compress the padding with a tamp, loading the bullet, and so on, with musket rifles requiring between 9 and 22 steps to load (Griffiths, 1989a: 55). This was a process that took between 20 and 30 seconds (Grossman, 1996: 22). Of the 27,574 rifles recovered at Gettysburg, 24,000, or 87 percent, were loaded. Of these, 18,000 had two or more loads, with the fullest rifle having 22 loads. Grossman theorizes that the best explanation for this is that the majority of soldiers were loading, not firing, and then loading again and again, mechanically and according to drill. Even discounting the single loads, at least half the men facing a line of fire would automatically load and reload their weapons without firing back (Grossman, 1996; 2008).

Griffith counters that these rifles were discarded because they were useless, and estimates the number of actual misloads to be nine percent (Griffiths, 1989a: 91). Ultimately, this discovery fails to rise to the evidentiary challenge. Firstly, from a mathematical perspective, both Griffith and Grossman fail to show their work. Who was recovering the rifles? Why nine percent misloads? What were the criteria for the soldier leaving them behind, besides the obvious, mortal, one? On the one hand, the plentiful amount of rifles during the Civil War meant that it would be easy to jettison one and take another. On the other hand, the best explanation for a 'recovered' rifle would be a soldier who had died, meaning the sample population that qualify for X (those who abandon their rifles) are mostly deceased. Given that who dies and who lives in this
type of standoff battle is essentially random, a sample of found rifles would be statistically correlative to those carried away. If so, Grossman's conclusion would be based on a random sample; if more than half the soldiers were loading their rifles and not firing them, this is a significant finding.

The second problem with this conclusion, on both sides, is the data. It seems the original source cannot be found. Dodge (the earliest source, 1865) quotes J.G. Dudley, the Master Armorer for Washington; Benton, like many that follow, does not cite a source (Dodge, 1865; Benton, J.G. 1867: 241). Curiously, early 20th-century writers seem to drop the zero and use 2,400 as the number of rifles that were recovered loaded, a substantial difference (Minnigh, 1924; Gilbert, 1922: 144). The conveniently round numbers after the suspiciously accurate '27,574' should also cause us to be wary of the data. I am inclined to believe Grossman's conclusion: the higher numbers are from more sources closer in time to the original; furthermore, as we do not know how the sample was collected, random is the best default. In the end, however, there are too many variables to draw a conclusive result, and instead I would use the case study of the recovered rifle as an example of chasing the conclusion. In these controversial arenas, any conclusion tends to find its evidence, rather than the other way around.

The Stopped Clock: Evidence from Other Areas

Where does this author stand on the conclusions of S.L.A. Marshall? It is fair to say that Marshall failed to engage with even the most cursory
empiricism, very probably fabricated most of his data, and exaggerated what were only casual observations. Given the evidence from other fields, however, he may have just been happily correct, as 'SLAM was more right than wrong' (Collins, 2008: 52). The Prussian Argument satisfies some empirical criteria, but what confirms Marshall's general conclusion is the vast amount of historical evidence spanning across time, culture and situation. This thesis will explore these examples in greater depth, but it is important to give enough of a sample here to argue that inaction in the face of violence is common enough to be a legitimate phenomenon.

A gruesome but relevant example occurred during the pre-holocaust in the Eastern Europe—the 'Holocaust by bullets' (Desbois, 2008), so-called because of the sub-organized and personal nature of the violence. Obergruppenfy bullets' (Desbois, 2008), so-called because of the sub-organized and personal nature of the vig' (Rhodes, 2002: 114) at Rumbula in Latvia and Babi Yar in the Ukraine. In order to save time (as well as create a dehumanizing situation to ease the violence), victims were led to mass graves, and then asked to lie down on those who had been shot before, thereupon to be shot themselves. At the same time in Kaunas, Lithuanian *FrieKorps* were funneling men to the deaths at the hands of recently released convicts:

'On the concrete forecourt of the petrol station a blond man of medium height, aged about twenty-five, stood leaning on a wooden club, resting. The club was as thick as his arm and came up to his chest. At his feet lay about fifteen to twenty dead or dying people. Water flowed continuously from a hose washing blood away into the drainage gully. Just a few steps behind this man some twenty men, guarded by armed civilians, stood waiting for their cruel execution in silent submission. In response to a cursory wave the next man
stepped forward silently and was then beaten to death with the wooden club in the most bestial manner, each blow accompanied by enthusiastic shouts from the audience (Rhodes, 2002: 47).

On the one hand, it is dangerous to use instance of genocide as an example of passivity. It smacks of victim blaming in an instance where, in fact, it is difficult to imagine that we would behave any differently. Our empathic comprehension in turn locates this behavior in the matrix of obedience, a topic this thesis will address in Chapter 6. At this juncture, what we can say is that inaction on the part of the citizens at Baba Yar and Kaunas is, from a causal perspective, a more extreme example than soldiers under fire. Marshall’s veterans faced the risk of death, but were, in fact, statistically unlikely to see it; the Ukrainians and Lithuanians here faced certain death, and, unlike the 20 percent of soldiers who fire back, do not resist at all.

The point of describing these events in such detail is to challenge the notion that Marshall challenges: that, despite their beliefs, human beings tend not to fight for their lives, even when there is no cost to do so. One could argue that in cases of genocide, an untrained civilian population come face-to-face with an armed and trained militia. Historically, however, there are numerous instances of mass murder perpetrated against trained soldiers. After the fall of Nanking, the 50,000 Japanese troops were able to kill the 90,000 Chinese troops who had survived, again, without significant resistance. It was something that Japanese 3. For purposes of historical verification, it bears noting that this incident was actually photographed.
commander General Nakajima himself did not expect: 'It is tremendously difficult even just to disarm them... It would be disastrous if they were to make any trouble' (Chang, 1997: 90). Such behavior can be found with captured Soviet POWs (Goldhagen, 2009: 133; Jones, 2010), the sack of Carthage (Kiernan, 2007; Hoyos, 2010), and even hitmen (Hoffman and Headley, cited in Collins, 2008: 459). Although it is not possible to make a statistical claim to this effect, those who are trained in violence are seemingly no more likely to resist than those who are not.

Although, to my knowledge, there has not been a study specific to crime victimology, or a collate study to compare the different data collected, we find a similar percentage of passivity and resistance in peacetime citizenry. In her study of rape-avoidance strategies, Sarah Ullman found that, generally, about 25 percent of victims use any force against their attacker (Ullman, 2007: 417). Likewise, Robert Ressler found about 14 percent resistance in victims of so-called organized killers (Ressler et al., 1986). On the one hand, we can note the victims do not know if they are going to die (save for the exceptional cases of targeted killers), which would mean that not resisting is understandable. On the other hand, it is important to note that so few even resist by running (as part of the apocryphal fight or flight response), especially given that less than 11 percent of attackers use any weapon (Bachman, 1998: 11). Nor can it explain the phenomenon of 'immobility', where victims simply freeze and become non-responsive (Ullman, 2007: 414).

If each of these cases introduces new evidence that people under threat of death only occasionally act in self-defense or in their personal best interest, there is a reasonable (technically an emotional) explanation
for this: they were terrified. Griffith describes the following situation for the soldier in a two-rank firing line: 'soldiers in each rank almost touching each other's elbows, [t]hey would naturally jostle and shove each other as they drew their ramrods and pushed home their cartridges. Anyone in the second rank would have to lean forward to fire through the space between the two men in the front rank, who would receive a flash and a cloud of smoke in their eyes and a numbing explosion at the level of their ears' (Griffith, 1989a: 89).

It is only natural that soldiers would behave differently in combat than in training, just as anyone behaves differently when afraid. The cognitive effects of extreme stress has been called 'peritraumatic dissociation', with 'a lack of association in one’s thoughts and perceptions oneme stress has been called 'peritra and Brunson, 2009: 122). Human beings under extreme stress perform, and perceive, differently than they might in training, or in everyday life. Initially studied as a significant factor in incidents of PTSD (Marmar et al., 1998; Marmar et al., 1994), this has recently been a topic of study in real time. That is to say, the disassociation that occurs during stress is as significant during performance as it is after the fact. In the arguably less stressful (certainly less prolonged) occurrence of police shootings, this lack of association manifested specifically in spatial distortions (time slowing down or speeding up) and aural focusing (either no sound or heightened sound of specific objects or noises), and so on (Klinger and Brunson, 2009; see also Schade et al., 1989). Only six percent of police officers involved reported no distortions (Klinger and Brunson, 2009: 129).
This could potentially nullify the Marshall argument, as peritraumatic
dissociation of this kind would explain the above case studies as well as
provide an explanation for the length of face-to-face firing battles in the
Napoleonic era. Yet, for the larger consistent phenomenon of human
passivity, we must ask: so what? From a measurable point of view, what
the soldiers or victims or leaders are feeling does not matter as much as
what they did. In the case of the Napoleonic soldier, we know both that
they were firing and that they were not hitting their targets. A dissociative
explanation does not clarify why fear would cause them to be more
inaccurate, or, more to the point, why fear would cause them to be so
inaccurate. A reduction of 99 percent is not minor, especially given the
fact that each second the soldier delays is another moment of danger.
Engen notes that the post-combat interviews of Canadian Soldiers
indicated that they fired at a much higher rate than Marshall's 20 percent
(Engen, 2008). However, if these soldiers were not firing on target, or
even deliberately firing away from their targets, for the purposes of
discussion of passivity, this finding is meaningless. If fear is supposedly
fight or flight, why is neither working? If fear is at work here, is there a
useful definition that can explain this behavior? Or is there some other
feeling or thought at play entirely?

Although the answers to these questions will come during subsequent
chapters, what can be said at this point is that some individuals
threatened with violence will not act violently for their own self-interests,
at least in great enough numbers to merit study. In other words, there is a
large enough percentage to say that a choice is being made. It would be
tempting to frame this in instrumental terms: that X fired and Y did not. If
seen under a rational choice paradigm, the choice not to fire is difficult to credit; both the large (meaning society) and small (within the military unit) group pressure is telling them to fire, as well as the authority figure under direct command. Beyond that, there is the individual's desire to survive within the zero sum game of combat: kill or be killed. How is this choice made?

While Chapter 3 will address more conventional views on violence and reactions to it, the following chapter covers this phenomenon (as well as the phenomenon of violence) from a rational choice perspective. How could dying or killing be seen as rational within differing rational choice perspectives, or, sometimes, how is it seen? Most importantly, what do these theories tell us about apprehension itself, and about the-feeling based process of making a rational choice.
Chapter 2: Is Rationality Emotional?

Within this thesis, the structure of emotions (defined as any feeling generated by a thought) has two components: apprehension and attribution. The two fields under review—rational choice and the sociology of violence—usefully demonstrate each of these components in order. Rationality requires a formulation of schemic order, just as sociological theories of violence (dealt with in the following chapter) require a causal agency—someone or something to blame. These will be addressed in the same order that they are in cognition; before we ask 'who did it?', first we must determine 'What is that?'

Rationality, despite its placement in the reason/passion divide, maintains a strong associated feeling in relation to cognitive order, that we 'want to be rational'. This construction can be seen as schemic: that certain orderings of causality (such as the cause and effect demanded by rationality) have a feeling component within them; that we desire sense; or, at least, that we shun anything perceived as a violation of that. First, we will address the case study of passivity and violence within established frameworks of rational choice, finding some partially, but not wholly, satisfactory explanatory value within these schools. The way in which academic systems fail to explain how we fail to fight, or fight when there is no need, will lead to an understanding of the weaknesses at the core of rational choice: that the desire for causal order is central to both these theories, and the behavior they attempt to explain.

§ § §
Surely, actions that lead to an individual's death, and which achieve no other goal, are the *sine non qua* of irrationality. In fact, calling these actors 'irrational' would be in keeping with the current state of any number of rationality theories. Although the concept of passivity and tonic immobility has not been discussed specifically within a rational choice framework, there are many behaviors that relate. Violence is a classically 'rational' behavior in terms of war and the state. The idea that violence was a means to an end may be one of the oldest social concepts, the self-interested actor at work. Strict rational choice approaches criminal violence from the same perspective—that the best way to deal with crime is as if the criminal is seen as a rational actor. Suicide, the seemingly inexplicable behavior of a subject that is self-interested, has also been the topic of debate within rationality circles, understood as the desire to gain 'social capital', or as a function of available means. Finally, entries on suicide bombing and rationality have exploded in the last 10 years, largely as a reaction to the typical depiction of the suicide terrorist as 'irrational'. This doesn't form a matrix per se, but it could be seen in the classical rational schema, like so:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End</th>
<th>Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence: Death of other;</td>
<td>outer directed violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide: Death of self;</td>
<td>inner directed violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide bombing: Death of self and other;</td>
<td>outer and inner directed violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive reaction: Death of self;</td>
<td>no violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This thesis will investigate four seemingly divergent rationality schools: Gary Becker's strict rational choice theory, Habermas' communicative rationality, Jon Elster's elaborate and highly critical version from the philosophy of social science, and Max Weber's early, and one
might say, untainted, formulation. The order of these presentations is important. Although not historical, it is chronological, moving in order of increasing critique, from total embrace to high skepticism. Despite the actual timeline, Gary Becker offers the most brute force version of rationality, just as Habermas emerges as a critique to that form in the incorporation of sociality. Jon Elster, writing contemporarily, has a generous 'toolbox', incorporating modern takes of heuristics and biases, game theory, and so on. Furthermore, Elster allows emotion into choice, and has written extensively on the topics of emotion and rationality. Finally, despite writing before any of the others, Max Weber's version of rationality paradoxically offers the greatest flexibility in interpretation. Like Elster, Weber maintains a strong suspicion of rationality, as well as a willingness to engage affect. The significant difference is Weber's formulation of verstehen ('understanding'), which allows for a sequential and explicable interpretation of feeling.

Each section will contain an account of their particular brand of rationality, how it relates to or critiques the other brands, and how it is critiqued itself by the others. The section will then continue to discuss how each is, or could be, applied to the case study of violence and passivity, with particular attention given to the topic of suicide bombings, and how each application fits, or fails to. The criterion that each theory will undergo originates from Raymond Boudon (see introduction), and ultimately from rationality itself: is it explanatory or descriptive? If not explanatory, why not? This approach will reveal two flaws of rational choice in its current state. The first is a failure to address (or to treat as irrelevant) the ends, and that rationality in each case only operates in
terms of the structure of its means. The second is a philosophical unwillingness to engage its core and unquestioned dependency on causality.

**Homo Economus: Gary Becker**

It would not be difficult to argue that rational choice theory has its origins in economics. Some propose that the earliest form of rational thought existed in tandem with early Sumerian and Egyptian bookkeeping practices; just as they were being taught numbers, the clerks were told how to deal with equals, superiors and inferiors, combining the 'ideal with the practical' (Rutgers, 1999: 2). This historically connects the rise of economics with the advent of the rational. Gary Becker, one of RCT's main proponents and founders, summed it up for his 1992 Nobel Prize acceptance speech: '[m]y research uses the economic approach to analyze social issues that range beyond those usually considered by economists' (Becker, 1993: 385). In this case, we are not necessarily approaching this school from a critical point of view, only trying to identify what makes this particular rationality distinct from the others to be discussed below.

As such, an economically minded approach has its costs, to be sure, but also its benefits. While Adam Smith may not be the 'father' of economic theory, it may be useful to consider Smith's postulate of supply and demand, given both his popularity in the canon, as well as Becker's own admission of Smith's influence (Roberts, 2006). We are able to overstep the controversy surrounding his 'invisible hand' thesis (that society is regulated by the economic self-interest of its component agents).
because Smith represents ideas that are *explicable* for rational choice.

Take, for example, the way in which unit price has been conceptualized: 'The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the proportion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price of the commodity' (Smith, 1904: 1,7 and 8).

Here we have one variable (price) being determined by two others (due to a desire to conserve money on the part of the buyer, juxtaposed with a desire to increase money on the part of the seller). Whether or not Smith has accurately described how the market self-regulates according to the baker and brewer, he has explained a social phenomenon in terms of what rational choice theorists would call utility maximization, where desire for capital is the easily graspable utility. This is Becker's attraction to rational choice as a theory—that it eschews 'black boxes...inscrutable, often capricious tastes' (Becker and Stigler, 1977: 76) that one encounters when using terms like 'norms' and 'psychological constraints'. This is not unlike Boudon's (and this thesis') preference for the explanatory over the descriptive.

This form of interpretation is then applied to non-economic phenomena, as was Becker's own work on crime. What motivates an actor to commit asocial and violent acts had been, and remains, understood by 'descriptive' paradigms: '(the) special theories of anomie, psychological inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits' (Becker, 1974: 2). Instead of the traditional and self-perpetuating explanations of poverty, cycles of violence, sociological factors, the character of the poor, and even evil, rational choice offers the economic model, used here to mean that
behavior is understood by utility maximization and preferences. Although initiated by Becker and others, it was the logistical formulation of Cohen and Felson (1979) and Meier and Miethe (1979) that came to be implemented in social policy as situational crime prevention (SCP). Here, crime is not a psychological or moral defect, but a function of the 'convergence of several factors: risky situations, suitable targets, motivated offenders, and an absence of capable guardians' (Ullman, 2007: 416). One can see the power of the rational choice perspective, not only in the explanatory sense, but in its measurable efficacy: police using this perspective have reduced crime (Clarke, 1997; Cornish and Clarke, 2003).

How then, might such an approach address the case studies of tonic immobility? We have an advantage here in that rationality theories (with the possible exception of Jürgen Habermas') are designed to explain specific phenomena, and, in fact, fail and succeed according to a particular case study under scrutiny. War, terrorism, family dynamics, shopping behavior, crime, drug addiction, voting—the list of behaviors under review is seemingly endless, the exception being, naturally enough, this case study of passivity under threat of death. Violence can sometimes be explained through the opportunity model, which views crime is rational, and needs only societal constraints to contain it. We are presented with the less than useful idea that passivity and non-productive violence is simply irrational, which is the black box we have been attempting to avoid.

However, if we consider suicide and suicide terrorism, we have case studies in which the end result is the same: the actor dies. RCT has seen a massive amount of literature arise around the topic of suicide terrorism
(Argo, 2009; Berman and Laitin, 2005; Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007; Gupta and Mundra, 2005; Hafez, 2006; see Llussà and Tavares, 2007 for an overview), and in what ways the behavior can be considered rational. Similar to the suitable targets' hypothesis above, Bermin and Laitin posit a correlation between 'hard targets' and suicide bombing as a rational strategy to overcome the discrepancy between technologically advanced states and non-state actors (Berman and Laitin, 2005). More along Beckerian lines, Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi propose a relationship between human capital and success of attacks, that older, better-educated suicide bombers are, by and large, more effective (Benmelech and Berrebi, 2007).

Another relational argument is found in suicide itself, the initial application of which was by Hamermesh and Soss (1974), providing the following formula:

\[ U_m = U \{ C(m, YP) - K(m) \} > O \]

where \( YP \) is permanent income, \( U \) is utility, \( m \) age, and \( K \) cost of maintenance. The point of these formulas may seem perplexing, or even deliberately obfuscating, but the idea behind the economic approach is to take measurable variables and, by aggregating mass data, discover which variables are positively correlated and which are negatively correlated. The subscript variable \( (m) \) refers to one individual's data so that the entirety of the group in question can be inputted at once. From this, one can extract which variables affect the outcome \( (O, \text{ usually expressed as a threshold, i.e. if greater than 1, the outcome is reached; if less than one, failed}) \). Assuming that the factors (or social capital) have been, or can be,
accurately measured, one can determine whether there is a correlation, and how strong it is. This with the caveat that correlative relationships are not necessarily causal; if for example, old age is positively correlated with suicide rates, as it has been in Hamermesh and Soss' study, this could be a function of disease, higher rates of senility, and so on.

Let us anticipate an RCT perspective that addresses combat passivity. We take as our case study the combat reaction during the Battle of Gettysburg during the American Civil War (Barton and Logue, 2002; Griffiths 1986; Grossman, 1996). Of the 27,574 muskets recovered from the battlefield, more than 90 percent of were found to be loaded, and 50 percent of those more than once. From this, combined with the speed at which breech-loading rifles may be reloaded, Dave Grossman calculates that at least 70 percent of the soldiers were not effective firers (Grossman, 1996: 136). This is despite the tactics of the day, which involved standing in a line facing one's enemy 30–60 yards apart, and shooting until the battle was decisive.

There are two arguments to be made: one from a classical perspective of economics, and the second from the concept of 'human capital'. Let us briefly address the latter. Human capital, according to Gary Becker, is the combination of social capital and personal capital (Becker, 1994; 1996; Becker and Rubenstein, 2011; Bolton, 2005), or 'the extension of the utility-maximizing approach to include endogenous preferences' (Becker 1994: 2). Rather than abandon the 'utility maximization' approach, Becker argues, for example, that actions that put individuals at personal disadvantage may increase 'social capital'. In the case of his theories of family dynamics, economics play a part in making a decision to divorce,
but other factors, such as 'feelings of duty' and altruism, can be seen as forms of capital to be increased and decreased for the individual (Becker, 1996: 138).

It could be said that the best argument using this model might be along the lines that shared humanity is a form of social capital. Evolutionary arguments have been made for animal behavior that 'empathy is a phylogenetically continuous phenomenon' (Preston and De Waal, 2002: 2). For our case study, and somewhat anecdotally, Gwynne Dyer notes how the Christmas Truce of 1914 emphasized that individual soldiers had more in common with each other than either their countries or their superior officers (Dyer, 2006). Rationality has studied empathy (as a function of non-rational behavior) in so-called helping behavior, where people risk their own lives for others with no self-interested gain, and at increased risk. In this case, 'a sense of belonging to humankind' (Opp, 1997; see also Kroneberg et al., 2010; Varese and Yaish, 2000; Staub, 1993) is a semi-established form of social capital within the field of RCT.

It would be easy to critique the seemingly arbitrary assignation of a number to a particular human capital, like conformity, or empathy. This remains, however, a classically human practice: 'The fact that there is no reliable way of assigning numbers to intrinsic levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction does not prove that the idea is meaningless, any more than our inability to quantify and compare the levels of satisfaction of different individuals shows that the idea of interpersonal comparison of welfare is meaningless' (Elster, 2009: 200). Unfortunately, even without what may be called numerical bias, numerating a desire or action or value does not actually promote any greater expiation. However numerical it is
expressed, if we propose that all behavior is interest, then all behavior is desire, which becomes its own tautology: this is no different than saying 'people are motivated by their motivations'. 'Valuesed, if we propose that all behavior is interest, then all behavior is desire, which becomes its own tautology: this is no different than saying 'people are motivated by their motivations'.

Even if we assume that social capital can be numerated, we run into a second problem, which I will attempt to demonstrate using classically economic RCT. If we look at the Civil War case study, there are many factors that can be counted: age, individual wealth, rank, position of soldier in formation, and so on. We are assuming information that we do not have on hand, since these were rifles acquired after the battle, but this is a theoretical argument in any case. The easiest and most empirical variable would be position on the battlefield. It has been demonstrated, for example, that the presence of a commanding officer increases the fire rate of a non-commissioned soldier (Grossman, 2008; Collins, 2010; Marshall, 1947). We will draw the simplest formula:

\[
R_m = \frac{1}{D_m} \times n
\]

Where R are the rounds recovered and D is the distance of an individual soldier (m) from the commanding officer. This could get more complex according to class, difference in rank, etc., but because we don't actually have the data, there would be little point in constructing it. Here,
we are just trying to show that a formula describing an inverse correlation between authority distance and firing rate is possible and testable.

A reasonable (or rational) enough argument, but we have unfortunately closed the loop of what is descriptive and what is explanatory—the 'costs' of an economic argument. Economic theory, by virtue of its subject, must always in some way address what can be counted or measured. Even if we accept the above are causal and not correlative, the problem arises in the exaggeration that occurs when this numerical practice is employed. Sociologist James Scott has written about the concept of 'legibility', the tendency for social projects to over-prioritize the countable, and the comprehensible over the more nebulous, but very real, alternate aspects of human behavior. Scott links this practice to the near-empty Brasilia housing project, and the disastrous Stalinist agricultural reforms (Scott, 1998, see final chapter). The practice of over- and undercounting is also known as the availability heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Elster, 2009), and is something to which even statisticians are subject (Sunstein, 2005).

This is not to say that rational choice is incorrect, merely a partial theory, something to which theorists seemed more attune during its infancy: 'In no sense do we claim that the individual agony in suicide stems from what is solely an economic calculation; the majority of suicides can perhaps be explained on non-economic grounds' (Hamermesh and Soss, 1974: 97). In rational choice and its application, the perception magnifies the observable over the intangible, to the point at which a very minor correlation is perceived and acted upon as a major causal link. This is not a mere theoretical problem, but leads to significant gaps in even the
most basic empirical research and its subsequent application. Crime, for example, is certainly reduced by a certain (calculable) amount by addition of cameras, or changes in neighborhood lighting. Unfortunately, this may be worse than a panacea, due to a phenomenon in criminology called displacement: while supervised neighborhoods do have improved crime rates, closer, poorer and unsupervised neighborhoods have an increase, or the limited scope of SCP (situational crime prevention) favors 'street' crime over abuse, organized crime, and so on (Hayward, 2007; Grabosky, 1996).

If we were to apply an RCT approach to the case study of passivity, we have the advantage of its default position of explicability; it would not assume such a behavior, or any behavior, would be irrational. Nevertheless, we would get a partial explanation, at best, where the actual motives of the actors may be missed, overlooking explanatory causes in favor of visible ones. With the current RCT approach, we are limited as to what data can be numerated, but we still attempt to incorporate all behavior as a 'total theory'. Psychologist R.J. Herrnstein argues that the concept of RCT is itself a rationalization: 'We start with a paradox, which is that the economic theory of rational choice...accounts only poorly for actual behavior, yet it comes close to serving as the fundamental principle of the behavioral sciences... The theory of rational choice, I conclude, is normatively useful but is fundamentally deficient as an account of behavior' (Herrnstein, 1990: 356). It is through this normative aspect that we relocate this concept to Jorgen Habermas.
Habermas: Communicative

Although despite fundamentally deficient as an account of bestrong critic of instrumental rationality, precisely because of its unproblematic stance towards its own societal construction: 'The acceptance or rejection of basic statements rests, in the last instance, on a decision; but the decisions are not made in an arbitrary fashion. Rather, they are made in accordance with rules. Such rules are only laid down institutionally, not logically' (Habermas, 1976: 201).

After his so-called 'linguistic turn', however, his work became more open to rationality in general, and even that of the instrumental kind, leading some to link it with hard rational choice theory (Bolton, 2005)—particular, game theory (Heath, 2001). In this construction, Habermas is a 'non-foundational rationalist' explaining 'conformity to social norms as a straightforward exercise of rational choice - except that 'rational' is now to be understood in a noninstrumental sense' (Heath, 2001: 2). It may be misleading to include Jexplaining 'conformity to social norms as a straightforward In contrast to the way that Gary Becker (and others) have staked all social and individual action on the rational choice approach of utility maximizing, Habermas' own work may be considered a political project, an attempt to understand the 'new social movement' and provide strategies for 'the problem of social order' (Finlayson, 2005; Heath, 2001; Edwards, 2004; Habermas, 1981; 1984).
Nevertheless, Habermas' rationality can be a productive concept, especially when one considers how it arises contextually. For Habermas, philosophy is at a crossroads, for which rationality is a kind of solution: 'that philosophy in its post-metaphysical, post-Hegelian currents is converging toward the point of a theory of rationality' (Habermas, 1984: 2). From this perspective, all action, even the critique itself, is problematized, rendering social theory and action immobile and irrelevant: 'For Habermas, the problem posed by "incredulity towards metanarratives" is that unmasking only makes sense if we "preserve at least one standard for [the] explanation of the corruption of all reasonable standards"' (Habermas, quoted in Rorty, 1985: 172).

A common antidote, positivism, is equally problematic for Habermas. Against the perceived skepticism of David Hume (whose work we will address shortly), positivism arises out of the argument that while reason may not be able to exist a priori, it is through the cognitive reshaping of nouema (things in themselves) into the structure of reason that we may accept reason as a concept as it arises from the mind. If truth of the real can never be known, Kant proposes that the way in which reason shapes it is consistent enough to create valid point of discussion. This position is equally untenable and rather solipsistic for Habermas: 'From this perspective, the distinction between appearance and "thing-in-itself" also becomes meaningless. Experiences and judgments are now coupled with a practice that copes with reality. They remain in contact with a surprising reality through problem-solving activities that are evaluated by their success' (Habermas, 2003: 114).
As a solution, he proposes communicative action (and within it, communicative rationality) which takes into account both the way in which rationality is a part of human social life (that people tend to see the world in rationality's terms), and is also constructed by it in the speech act. Here, rationality is able to proceed through the construction of objective truth communicatively, when there is consensus, or 'validity claims': 'In speaking we relate to the world about us, to other subjects to our own intentions, feelings and desires. In each of these dimensions we are constantly making claims, even if usually only implicitly, concerning the validity of what we are saying' (Habermas, 1984: 3). This approach successfully addresses the dual problems of subjectivity and inaction:

[I]f we start from the communicative employment of propositional knowledge in assertions, we make a prior decision for a wider concept of rationality connected with the ancient conceptions of logos. This concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views, and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world, and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld. (Habermas, 1984: 10).

In this context, then, rationality is a form of shared political objectivity, as well as a way of obtaining it.

Within this framework, instrumental rationality is not rejected outright. 'Cognitive-instrumental' action, as he calls it, does occur when certain conditions are met: 'A judgement can be objective if it is
undertaken on the basis of a transsubjective validity claim that has the same meaning for observers and nonparticipants as it has for the acting subject himself' (Habermas, 1984: 9). In this way, the rationality that Becker speaks of is subsumed by the larger sphere of communicative rationality, with the caveat that instrumental rationality is 'too narrow, because we use the term "rational" not only in connection with expression that can be true or false, effective or ineffective...the rationality inherent in communicative practice extends over a broad spectrum' (Habermas, from Roderick's translation, Roderick, 1985: 214). Habermas' work may provide difficulty in defining and separating out 'his' form of rationality. Nevertheless, it is hopefully clear as to the way in which it is distinguished from the more unproblematic RCT school.

Habermas shares with Becker a desire to explicate social phenomena, but differs in that he wants to find a solution to social injustice through his 'lifeworld' project, which he sees in opposition to the more typically proposed 'systems'. As a consequence, literature on one specific behavior or another falling under the rubric of communicatively rational is light. The real-world theories that have arisen from communicative action fall almost exclusively in the field of planning (Sager, 2009; Bolton, 2005; Healey, 1996a; 1996b; McNamee and Gergen, 1999)—so much so that, like RCT, an abbreviation has arisen (communicative planning theory is also known as CPT). 'Communicative planning is an open and participatory enterprise, involving a broad range of affected groups in socially oriented and fairness-seeking developments of land, infrastructure or public services, guided by a consensus-building process designed to approach the principles of discourse ethics' (Sager, 2009: 2).
This approach is not unlike the Beckerian approach to crime via changing the environment, the important difference being the inclusion of discourse ethics; instead of crime being seen as an instrumental action to be diminished or that is increasing through manipulation of environments, the CPT approach is more concerned with building consensus within groups: 'planning that emphasizes widespread public participation, sharing of information with the public, reaching consensus through public dialogue rather than exercise of power, avoiding privileging of experts and bureaucrats, and replacing the model of the technical expert with one of the reflective planner' (Bolton, 2005: 2).

For our purposes, Habermas might be able to show us how a breakdown in communicative action could lead to violence as a factor of whether or not consensus was built or even possible. This perspective may be less effective in the explanation of our test cases of violence and passivity, which involve individual decisions—the methodological individualist approach. And yet Habermas, especially post-9/11, is not silent on violence or suicide terrorism, and even incorporates his perspectives on these subjects into rationality. He acknowledges the way in which the structural violence of the West's imposition of tyranny has created a 'distortion in communication' (interview, Borradori, 2003: 35), which then leads to real violence.

Unfortunately, this theorization is fuzzy—not deliberately complex, but unformed. On one hand, the 9/11 terrorists have engaged in some type of means/end rationality, however misguided: 'In contrast to this, the global terror that culminated in the September 11 attack bears the anarchistic traits of an impotent revolt directed against an enemy that
cannot be defeated in any pragmatic sense. The only possible effect it can have is to shock and alarm the government and population' (interview, Borradori, 2003: 34). Here, the revolt, however 'impotent', serves to create an end: namely shock and alarm, or terror.

On the other hand, Habermas emphasizes the particular irrationality of these acts, which he refers to repeatedly as 'fundamentalism': 'Such orthodoxy first veers toward fundamentalism when the guardians and representatives of the true faith ignore the epistemic situation of a pluralistic society and insist—even to the point of violence—on the universally binding character and political acceptance of their doctrine' (interview, Borradori, 2003: 34). This position limits what participation these actors can have in a global society, or even, more practically, in simple negotiations: 'This model explains why attempts at understanding have a chance only under symmetrical conditions of mutual perspective-taking... Without the structures of a communicative situation free from distortion, the results are always under the suspicion of having been forced' (interview, Borradori, 2003: 39).

The description, which implies both rational and irrational traits on the part of the terrorists, is only one of the problems of this perspective. One could say that we are criticizing Habermas for his views and not his work; that his own statements may be incongruent with his theory of communicative action, and therefore not necessarily a valid criticism of it. But the fault line was extant in his work before 9/11; in 1997, Gerald Delanty pointed out that Habermas' rationality is especially occidentally rationalized, and specifically: 'As a result of its Enlightenment bias, Habermas' social theory, which presupposes a rationalized life-world, has
particular difficulty in answering new cross-cultural challenges, such as Islamic modernity, the politics of identity associated with new social movements' (Delanty, 1997: 31). Later critics have pointed to Habermas' 'methodological atheism' which leads him to exclude terrorists as irrational (Bugyis, 2010). This is both a theoretical and real problem as it excludes some (perhaps many) groups and individuals from participation in the rational, and leaves wide areas of behavior unexplained.

How does this affect our own test study? Rather than simply and non-descriptively stating that acts of violence and passivity are not communicatively rational, and thus not worthy of further discussion, let us briefly and somewhat controversially take the test case of the Rwandan Genocide. Here, the burgomaster of Musambira, Justin Nyandwi, recounts his near execution:

They told me a lot of things: that I was against the interahamwe, that I had a cont worthy of further discussion, let us briefly and somewhat controversially take

Nyandwi and his companions were brought to a pit where the dead were thrown, the former burgomaster told me. He described a scene of horrific violence and said he expected to die (Strauss, 2008: 261).

Here, the actors are shown to the pit in which they are to be thrown. There is no doubt as to the outcome. They were spared in this instance, but not through action or resistance on their own part, and many others who died would have gone through identical circumstances without having survived the experience. This is especially interesting as the people involved are three policemen trained in violence and a burgomaster, the elected head of the province, all used to wielding authority, yet suddenly
ready to relinquish it without resistance. In Habermasian terms, one actually could explain this phenomenon of giving up control to the killer as building a consensus, and not as controversy for controversy's sake. This is in line with Collins' observations across many social instances of violence, that the victim and victimizer are participants (Collins, 2008, see next chapter). In Habermasian terms, both the murdered and the murderers share a validity claim, in this case over the authority, however nihilistic and fatal, that the latter wields. Whether or not the authority is valid in terms of equal societal footing, the subjects involved act as if it is.

Although such a line verges on victim blaming, there is a great deal of empirical and historical justification, since genocidal violence often requires the participation of its victims, even if only in their passivity. How this participation arises cannot be ignored, especially as it is the case study of this thesis. Unfortunately, Habermas forbids this line of inquiry, for the reason that communicative action requires 'equals' in power and reasoning ability, which are arguably residual effects of the Eurocentric rationalism that he presents. If Habermas only allows a very narrow interpretation of who can be rational, we are forbidden from applying what may be a useful theory to actual instances of behavior.

Elster: Philosophy of Social Science

Rationality already has a history within the philosophy of social science, given that it meets the double requirement of an analysis of human behavior, as well as offering a perspective on social science itself. Although the following summation was written about the field in general,
it serves as a near complete introduction to the work of Jon Elster in particular, which 'deals with such problems as the role of understanding (Verstehen) in apprehending social phenomena, the status of rational choice theory, the role of experiments in the social sciences, the logical status of game theory, as well as whether there are genuine laws of social phenomena or rather social mechanisms to be discovered' (Mantzavinos, 2009: 2).

Jon Elster is an interesting case in regard to rationality, beginning as one of its strong proponents, and gradually using it less and less as a paradigm. In the new edition of Nuts and Bolts, he notes how his own views had changed since the first edition of the book: 'I now believe that rational-choice theory has less explanatory power than I used to think. Do real people act on the calculations that make up many pages of mathematical appendixes in leading journals? I do not think so' (Elster, 2007: 3).

Rational choice in Elster's formulation must involve at least two factors: real-world information, and the option to apply whatever theory has the greatest explanatory power. Unlike the potentially ex post facto reasoning of social and personal capital, not all actions are rational, nor are they rational in the same way. Rational choice still retains its explanatory power, if, and only if, these criteria are met: 'An action is rational, in this scheme, if it meets three optimality requirements: the action must be optimal, given the beliefs; the beliefs must be as well supported as possible, given the evidence; and the evidence must result from an optimal investment in information gathering' (Elster, 2007: 191).
From this perspective, rational choice theory presents a problem not in its consistency but in its unwillingness to confront the simple inherent contradiction: 'Rational choice theorists want to explain behavior on the bare assumption that agents are rational. This assumption includes the hypothesis that agents form rational beliefs, including beliefs about the options available to them. There is no need, therefore, to classify the determinants of behavior as either subjective (desires) or objective (opportunities). Rational-choice theory is subjective through and through' (Elster, 2007: 191). Nor does he necessarily see much solution in Jve through and through' (Elster, 2007: 191). Like Delanty's critique, there is the sense of elitism: that the body of participants who can leap the hurdle for participation are 'disproportionately found in the privileged part of the population' (Elster, 2001a: 37). The outcome is that 'the high ideals of rational discussion could create a self-elected elite' (Rienstra and Hook, 2006: 315). More importantly for this thesis, Elster sees a problem in Habermas' explanatory power: 'I am, in fact, largely in sympathy with the fundamental tenets of the view, yet fear that it might be dismissed as Utopian, both in the sense of ignoring the problem of getting from here to there, and in the sense of neglecting some elementary facts of human psychology' (Elster, 1989b: 114).

In contrast to the other rationalities, and per his location within the philosophy of social science, Elster is Catholic in his approach. He is willing to incorporate a variety of schemes to form a stronger explanandum, including game theory, bounded rationality, heuristics and biases, filter models, and even emotions. We will discuss each model as and if it relates
to our case study below, but this approach is deliberately distinct from the more rigid RCT, which tends to seek the evidence after the theory has been formed (i.e. that all actors are rational). Elster eschews total theory:

'Most writers try to make do with rational self-interest as a sole motivational assumption, while I have invoked a broader range of motives. Though I share their preference for a parsimonious explanation and their hesitation to get into a morass of ad hoc assumptions, I have concluded, with some reluctance, that there is no way in which the programme can be brought forward on this narrow basis. Ultimately, parsimony must take second place to realism' (Elster, 1989a: 248).

Elster has written personally about almost every behavior under the sun (except our case study, naturally); to understand this approach, we will examine his take on suicide terrorism, the theorization of which draws from a variety of sources: 'To make sense of these missions, we can adopt the usual explanatory machinery of the social sciences, the key elements being the motivations and beliefs of the actors, attackers, and organizers, and the constraints they face' (Elster, 2005: 233, emphasis in original).

Rational motivations are possible within suicides missions: 'In itself, there is nothing irrational in the willingness to sacrifice one’s life for a cause, and even less in the willingness to send others to their death for it' (Elster, 2005: 252), just as irrational motives can be rationally attempted: 'The conspiratorial frame of mind is irreducibly irrational... In standard rational-choice theory, this would not make the suicidal actions irrational. Yet it would still be true (a) that suicide attackers are irrational, and (b) that they would not have opted for SMs (suicide missions) had they been rational' (Elster, 2005: 252, emphasis in original). Even within this
irrational framing, Elster opens up the possibility of an academically reliable explanandum in emotion, noting that some suicide attackers will not back down because of the increased pressure from their peers and family, and that the cost of changing their minds is shame. This retains its validity as an explanation because shame is an interaction-based (social) emotion, which 'tend to be stronger than comparison-based ones' (Elster, 1999: 143).

As far as beliefs go, Elster notes, as per above, that incomes and education levels of suicide bombers tend to be higher than in the general population. To explain this, Elster allows that it is not necessarily the obvious objective observations (as per the RCT model) that are in play here. Drawing from his study on dissatisfaction levels between Military Police and Air Force promotions (Elster, 2001b: 452), Elster notes the way in which the one group of MPs that were promoted less have a higher job satisfaction. This seeming discrepancy is understood as a function of expectation. Since the Air Force has more promotions, the individuals in that group have a higher expectation of success and a greater loss at its frustration. This is the concept of 'relative deprivation': proceeding from the subjective point of view of the actor, it is not that they are economically poor that motivates (per an RCT model), but instead that differences exist between their expectations and their reality: 'A more plausible factor than absolute deprivation is relative deprivation, that is, the gap between expectations and reality experienced by the many educated Palestinians' (Elster, 2005: 248).

For constraints, Elster cites the usual suspects of heightened security measures and even the invention of dynamite. Moving over to his theory
of blister packs and suicide (not suicide terrorism), Elster invokes his own 'filter model' which emphasizes the importance of the constraints of choice within which the actor must operate. Unlike an existential actor, the options are not infinite. Opportunity forms part of the motivation for suicide, as he notes the reduction of suicide rates at the introduction of 'blister packs', which make it slightly harder to aggregate enough medication for an overdose: 'Why do suicide rates go down when dangerous medications are sold in blister packs rather than bottles? Answer: because many desires are so short-lived that by the time one has opened the blister pack the suicidal impulse has ended' (Elster, 2007: 353). This answer to suicidal motivation is partial, but includes an assessment of both emotion and opportunity.

If we take an Elsterian approach to passivity, we are required, at least, to address constraints and even emotion, which would then apply to the experience of combat and threat of violence. It should come as no surprise that fear leads to impairment of other cognitive tasking in both the experimental realm (Mineka and Sutton, 1992; Fessler, 2001) and the real world of combat (Grossman, 2008). If fear limits cognitive ability (greater detail on how this functions will be provided in Chapter 5), the actors would thus subject to a 'limitation of choice'. As per the three criteria above, Elster is emphatic that choice is largely dependent on what is available to the actor, not only in the existential sense of what they can do, but in the cognitive sense of what they think they can do. If the subject is afraid, the availability of choice is limited, and thus 'fighting back' or 'running away' simply disappears from the menu of options.
Yet, why, one might ask, might immobility be the default? As per further investigation, Elster is also willing to engage the sub-field of evolutionary psychology, that is, certain behaviors are inherent in the individual for the larger purpose of the species. In investigating the phenomena of investing, where 'people invest their money in projects undertaken by other agents even when the latter are free to keep all the proinvestigating the phenomena of investing, where 'people invest their money in projects undertaken by other a' (Elster, 2007: 353). Per the altruism studies cited above during the discussion of RCT, if 'social commonality', either normative or evolutionary, can override our desire for personal monetary gain, it could also override the need to survive. Here, two needs to cooperate (with the troop/legion/commander/state and with humanity) are put into conflict, leading some actors to fire, others to fake it, others to cooperate with the firers, and others to do nothing.

One potential conflict with this perspective is the way in which it explains one behavior as it negates another. If we are social, then no one will fight. If we are rational, then everyone will. Or vice versa. While it provides the model for each behavior, it fails to provide the model that allows us to determine what model should be used. The choice itself, the most crucial element within the paradigm, remains unexplained, as in why one would be chosen over the other, under what circumstances, by which individual, and so on. It is furthermore presumed (as is often the case in rationality) that the rational choice is the de facto path, when in fact, rational choice itself is not self-explanatory. Raymond Boudon exposes
this tautologic when he quotes rational choice theorist Martin Hollis back to himself: 'Rational action is its own explanation' (Boudon, 2003: 2).

Yet even when the strict rational choice model is not applied, the choice as to the application of models (either bounded, RCT, emotional, game theoretical, etc.) gives rise to subjectivity, where the weakest point is the theorist. To demonstrate how this operates, it is necessary to take Elster's position on violence seriously, especially as it relates to our case study. Similar to the above position on suicide attacks, he states that 'Nobody will or should think it a serious puzzle why people sometimes volunteer for war service, or lie about their age and disabilities to get into a situation that is quite likely to get them killed' (Elster, 2005: 239). This veers awfully close to, and may even state that, the idea that such violent acts, as long as they are state-motivated, are rational. The act of risking your life and killing for your country involves more emotional resistance and vastly more pure physical risk than voting, but the latter is seen as classically non-rational behavior: 'It is not clear why voters bother to vote at all in national elections, when it is morally certain that a single vote will make no difference' (Elster, 2007: 22). However, here, violence is presented with less investigatory spirit than the much less dangerous act of crossing the street to hit a few levers. The question why one might give their lives for their country (a group of people they do not know personally) is not the answered question Elster portrays it to be.

The greatest argument against this Catholic approach is that it is simply difficult to cognate. That is, from an individual point of view, it requires Elster's encyclopedic knowledge of perspectives, which are 1) still limited (cognitive psychology, for example, is not pursued), and 2)
subjectively applied. However explanatory they may be, this theoretical problem has a real-world counterpart: too much information. At the end of his analysis of suicide missions, having cited the above theories of rationality, emotion, game theory and heuristics, he is forced to conclude: 'Although some are more plausible than others, we may not ever know the exact motivational and cognitive states of the suicide attackers for the simple reason that (to some extent at least) there is *no fact of the matter* (Elster, 2005: 210, emphasis in original). Elster's devotion to empirical accuracy is admirable, and to be emulated, but is problematized for both its potential for subjectivity, and the fluidity of its conclusions. With a seemingly endless field of interpretations, and without any defined method of determining which one should apply, Elster's interpretation of behavior has finally violated his core tenet: explanatory value.

**Weber: Sociological**

Max Weber was an early proponent of what we recognize today as rationality. His pioneering work in sociology in the early 20th century is arguably the original basis for contemporary thinking on the subject; Elster initially considered him one of the two main theorists on rationality (Elster, 1979), just as Habermas uses him—critically—as a starting point for his theory of communicative action, devoting the first half of book one to Weber's theories (Schecter, 2010; Habermas, 1984). Weber remains an inescapable point of reference for all the theorists and theories discussed previously.
The reason for this centrality is undoubtedly the way in which he applied rationality within previously irrational spheres, both in 'primitive' religion (Weber, 1963), and then towards the protestant reformation (Weber, 1930: 181) in his attempt to explain why 'occidental' rationalism led to mass industrial capitalism. 'Against 19th-century French anthropology, Weber argued that man did not acquire his "rationality" with the Enlightenment and that individuals in all previous epochs were not incapable of rational action' (Kalberg, 1980: 1154). Weber situates religious action as purposeful in the material world, and not in the metaphysical one: 'religiously or magically motivated action is relatively rational action, especially in its earliest forms... Rubbing will elicit sparks from pieces of wood, and in like fashion the mimetic actions of a "magician" will evoke rain from the heavens...magical action or thinking must not be set apart from the range of everyday purposive action, particularly since the elementary ends of the religious and magical actions are predominantly economic' (Weber, 1963: A.1.b).

This view was not as positivistic as the strict RCT theorists would later make it. Weber was a critic of the instrumentally rational as a potentially destructive byproduct of modernist society (Kalberg, 1980: 2001), where '[i]n no sphere of life, according to Weber, has rationalization unambiguously advanced human well-being' (Brubaker, 1984: 3). For Weber, the character of modern society was a by-product of puritan values of work translated into capital concerns and increasingly focused on means–end rationality at the expense of the intangibles—the famous 'iron cage' of modernity: 'The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so... This order is now bound to the technical and economic
conditions of machine production which today determine the lives of all
the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly
concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force' (Weber,
1930: 181).

As Weber attempts to address other types of behavior than the
typically rational, it would not be fair to say that there was a single system
or typology, especially since his often referenced work, *Economy and
Society*, was incomplete when he died. Weber, for example, proposed 15
action types, in 'Basic Concepts in Sociology' (Weber, 1962; Norkus, 2000),
as well as four types of rationality formal and substantive (Weber, 1978)
and practical and theoretical (Kalberg, 1980). Rogers Brubraker proposes
no fewer than 16 individuals forms of rationality in Weber's typology
(Brubraker, 1984). However, because *Economy and Society* has been so
referenced (selected as the most important sociological work of the 20th
century by the International Sociological Society (Mommsen, 2000)), we
will focus on his four types of 'social action':

1. *Instrumentally rational* (*zweksrational*): when the actor seeks a
demonstrable end through a demonstrable means.
2. *Value rational* (*Wertzrational*), choices made for the belief of a
religious, moral, or other value 'for its own sake'.
3. *Affectual*: behavior determined by emotion and feelings.
4. *Traditional*: 'that is, determined by ingrained habituation' (Weber,

These action types open up the possibility that what was previously
seen as irrational behavior has a usefully explicable reason behind it.
Furthermore, the individual decisions, explained as rational, value
rational, and so on, are seen as the building blocks for the larger
sociological phenomenon of, to take Weber's example, the transition of Europe from Calvinist austerity to hard capital modernism and the pursuit of the industrial that accompanies it. In this way, others have noted that Weber's theories dovetail to classical economic Rational Choice (Norkus, 2000; Brubraker, 1984). Although influential, it could be said that Weber would be critical of this perspective, no doubt seeing such projects as bars of the iron cage.

Habermas may acknowledge his debt to Weber, but notes that Weber was especially vulnerable to seeing the zweksrational where it was not in place. Speaking in particular of Weber's tendency to associate the legal systems as purposefully rational, Habermas notes that 'Weber did not distinguish adequately between the particular value contents of cultural traditions and those universal standards of value under which the cognitive, normative and expressive components of culture became autonomous value spheres and developed complexes of rational with their own logics' (Habermas, 1984: 149). Habermas, naturally enough, would see such institutions as communicatively rational (or not); that is, any rationality that would arise, even for the means and end, would do so by agreement, or intersubjectively, and not through an objective rationalism. Elster notes his influence as one of the preeminent theorists of rationality (Elster, 1979), but later gives greater credit to the heuristics and biases school and Thomas Schelling's game theoretic approach (Elster, 2007). Game theory is the application of instrumental rationality to situations with multiple actors; in the case of the prisoner's game, for example, two actors receive a lighter sentence if they both, blind to one other, forgive the other (Elster, 2007; Kreps et al., 1981). It is Elster's
criticism that Weber lacks the perspective of game theory (Norkus, 2000), although this must, of course, be placed in the historical context that it had not yet been developed.

How would such sociological rationality approach passivity? I would say that there are two Weberian rationalities at work, the first taxonomic, as outlined above, and the second interpretive. The first might explain the passivity phenomenon as a function of the four large motivations that Weber describes. It is fairly easy to dismiss the zweksrational (instrumentally rational) in the case of tonic immobility, as its contradiction with the typically rational behavior (actors risking death for no visible reason) is the reason for its placement in this thesis. Furthermore, unlike Becker, Weber does not offer the possibility of human capital to figure into a rationality equation.

Instead, he offers the similar Wertzrational (value-rational), in that the subjects in question are risking their lives for the higher value of life itself. We have discussed this aspect human empathic capital in the Beckerian section, but for Weber the value is the ends in and of itself. This is problematic as the case studies in question (with the exception of one-on-one violent crime) are often social: that is, people acting passively in the presence of either their friends and family (in the case of genocide), or with their fellow soldiers, which may be an even stronger bond in some cases (Marshall, 1947; Grossman, 1999). In both instances, the strong social bond (the value) would be attached to the group, rather than the group which is attempting to kill them. This is not to dismiss the argument out of hand; Weber could argue, for example, that the actor values the ethical action of not taking a life over lives of those he loves. There is,
unfortunately, very little anecdotal or empirical evidence to support such an ethical stance as commonly held. What usually manifests after the fact in survivors of violence is great shame and guilt over what was not done (Jones, 2010; Ullman, 2007); shame is just as equally experienced, in seeming contradiction, for those who do act violently (Chappelle et al., 2012; Otto and Webber, 2013; Chapters 6 and 7).

Secondly, there is the normative aspect of authority, a subject on which Weber has written extensively. Authority is a topic that further coincides with our own subject matter, as Weber famously holds that violence is a monopoly of the state, and furthermore, and less often cited, that this is a function of the legitimacy with which we imbue that state (Weber, 1978). There is a notable exception to this 'rule', which we will address shortly, but in the meantime, normative behavior, in particular an actor's adherence to authority figures, could be invoked especially in the case of genocide, an argument made above in regard to Habermas. On the other hand, we have soldiers told and trained by authority figures to fight, but they don't, at the risk of their own lives. This is complicated by the fact that some systematic violence is committed against soldiers (not citizens) who do not fight back (as in the case of Nanjing), as well as by non-state and non-authority figures (as in the case of the Hutus in Rwanda).

In Weber's typology, the actor is pulled in four different directions, with the instrumentally rational (survival) seemingly the least important. The normative, in the authority, may have some explanatory power, but it is indifferently present at best. Ethical values are possible but dubious, leaving us with affect of a rather inexplicable type, in that fight or flight response of fear is not invoked. Once again, and similar to Becker, we
have run against the limits of what is explanatory and what is descriptive. As Zenonas Norkus puts it: 'As long as Weber's action theory does not include nomological statements, it can be seen only as a scheme of classification, not as explanatory theory. The same applies for all later efforts to construct a sociological action theory, from Parsons to Js, it can be seen only as a (s: 174).

There is no reason to exhaust the list of types which may or may not conform to this case study, since the point of these brief outlines is the demonstration of different positions that call themselves rational. This varietal version of rationality is close, although not as strictly defined, to Elster's, in that it assigns a classification (or more than one) to a particular behavior. We turn instead to Weber's second rationality, one to which Weber subscribes but might not propose himself. Via the work of Georg Simmel, Max Weber held Verstehen (understanding) as an underlying principle of the social sciences: 'This ability to share other people's minds is a special knowledge, distinct from the kind of perception gleaned from tests and statistics. Statistical knowledge without "emphatic" knowledge is superficial and unintelligent' (Abel, 1948: 212).

This is especially relevant to our own thesis, as Weber proposes violence under the larger subject of Verstehen:

'Similarly we understand the motive of a person aiming a gun if we know that he has been commanded to shoot as a member of a firing squad, that he is fighting against an enemy, or that he is doing it for revenge. The last is affectually determined and thus in a certain sense irrational. Finally, we have a motivational understanding of the outburst of anger if we know that it has been provoked by jealousy, injured pride, or an insult... In all the above
cases, the particular act has been placed in an understandable sequence of motivation, the understanding of which can be treated as an explanation of the actual course of behavior. Thus for a science which is concerned with the subjective meaning of action, explanation requires a grasp of the complex of meaning in which an actual course of understandable action thus interpreted belongs... This involves a departure from ordinary usage, which speaks of intention in this sense only in the case of rationally purposive action' (Weber, 1978: 8–9).

Like Elster, Weber offers us the possibility of an 'affectively determined' interpretation of behavior, that is not dismissed as incomprehensible out of hand, but further exists as an invitation to greater understanding. Here, emotion exists within choice, and can be linked to rationality via cause and effect: 'an understandable sequence of motivation'. Before the possibility of such an affective system is laid out (in Chapters 4–7), we now explore the traces of feeling within rationality, which will, in turn, lead to how such a system might be constructed: through the positive feelings of completed schemas.

**The Persistence of Causality**

We have explored four types of rationality, each seemingly in conflict, if for no other reason than they actually critique one another's perspectives. Yet, what they share vastly outweighs whatever differences they may see in each other. In the act of invoking rationality, there is an unspoken and unexamined commonality: causality. Whether normative, instrumental, value-based, bounded, or through the human capital of face, all rationality demands cause and effect: When I do X, I (want to) get
Y. Although the concept of actions and consequences, of cause and effect, is seemingly natural, it is in fact heuristic. From a purely logical perspective, it is not possible to take causality at face value. At the level of social science, rationality depends on a method (causality) that cannot be proven.

Although cause and effect are everyday features of human reasoning, David Hume has famously argued against the process of induction (using past observations to form a theory about future events), presenting a problem for philosophy and the hard sciences from which it has never recovered. Building on the work of George Berkeley, Hume proposed that induction—the process of cause and effect—can never be proved absolutely.

'If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect. I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience... A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter a priori, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal?' (Hume, 1910: 140).

In reference to 'matters of fact', Hume is discussing his two objects of reason or representative states of mind: relations of ideas (abstractions of the mind that relate to purely one another, like \(2+2=4\)) or matters of fact, which are beliefs construed by the mind about the world (Hume, 1910:}
For Hume, causality cannot reside in either of these representative states of mind, and therefore cannot be proved. Whether or not there are in fact two objects of reason is debatable, but the implications of the floating piece of metal are as conspicuous as a black swan: one cannot prove the objective truth of cause and effect unless one already believes in cause and effect.

There have been many challenges to Hume's formulation. In the field of hard sciences, Karl Popper famously argued that, in practice, science was not inductive, and that its purpose was to 'falsify, not verify'. The job of the scientific method is to propose 'risky predictions'—the more radical better—as long as they contain the quality of falsification, that is, that they may be disproved. According to the principle of modus tollens, it is the disproof that advances knowledge: the confirmation of a theory by a causal observation does not confirm the theory, but the refutation of a theory by observation can negate it (Popper, 1959).

There are two main arguments against Popper. Firstly, that real scientists, simply by force of cognitive habit, employ induction in their reasoning and that this practice both does and doesn't lead to scientific discovery (Evans, 2007), sometimes called 'confirmation bias' (Nickerson, 1998; Sloman and Hagmayer, 2006; Oswald and Grosjean, 2004). Secondly, that modus tollens presumes that the observation of all data has been achieved. This the so-called 'black swan' problem, that the intervening period during which there is a lack of complete data (as with the time between having never seen a black swan), the absence of refutation indicates either that the theory is correct, or that the theory is incorrect but the contradicting data has not been observed.
As this thesis resides within the philosophy of social science and not the philosophy of science, it is worth noting that the debate over induction endures in the philosophical realm as well. We have shallowly discussed Kant, who credits Hume with waking him from his 'dogmatic slumber'. As per before, 'In his confrontation with Hume's scepticism, Kant makes causality a category of the understanding, such that it becomes a faculty of the human mind. This corresponds to his notion that objects and events are not simply given in time and space. They must be thought by a stable epistemological subject, in other words, a fundamental condition of rational knowledge is that objects and events have to orient themselves towards human understanding' (Schecter, 2010: 87).

Kant's solution is not unlike instrumental rationality or (despite his potential objection) Habermas' understanding of communicative rationality, in that it allows for causality to exist as long as it is understood as a process of reasoning. Jon Elster offers the following summary of the way in which rationality as a field skirts the Humean problem: 'As I have emphasized, consequences of a decision cannot explain it. Only the mental states that precede the decision enable us to explain the actions as optimal from the point of view of the agent rather than to characterize them as useful or beneficial from the point of view of an external observer (or of the agent at a later time)' (Elster, 2007: 209). Rationality may be inherently causal, but as it remains confined to the actor's point of view, it is not subject to Hume's critique.

This is not to argue against a stable mechanical universe of cause and effect; we all owe our lives to the causality of modern medicine. Real-world causality exists, and situating it within the mind as a cognitive
process is a valid logical and philosophical argument. Unfortunately, this position fails to address the second question that Hume's argument begs: if causality cannot be proved objectively, and yet exists subjectively, where has it come from? In other words, if Hume is correct and we cannot rely on causality, how on earth did we already do so, even before Hume told us it was impossible?

Montaigne, who Elster often invokes, proposes a human propensity for causal reasoning, or at least causality: 'I have observed that men, in the face of "facts", are more willing to seek the reason than to seek the truth: that they leave the things behind and proceed to their causes... We begin by saying, "How is this so?", when we should ask, "Is this so?"' (de Montaigne, 1950: III, 11, 1151, author's translation). Elster uses Montaigne to call greater attention to the importance of observation in understanding behavior, as an example of the way in which beliefs can filter choice before it is made. He misses the implications of the statement (this from an essay entitled 'Il faut savoir douter de ses certitudes') that asks: what are the ramifications of a reasoning for which default is causality?

Modern cognitive studies have noted the tendency towards default causal thinking (see below). As Weber puts it, 'We begin with the assumption that all action is rational based' (Weber, 1978: 5). Montaigne's observation of implicated cause has a long human history. The societal imagination of blood in Western culture indicates the way in which it must have a reason or purpose, even if that purpose may constantly be redefined. Blood begins as a container for the human spirit, then in the humoral theory, a combination of the four elements of water, earth, air
and fire (Longrigg, 1999), transforming to a source of contamination and sin in the European middle ages, then, through Galen's proposal, as a byproduct of the liver's manufacture, and finally to William Harvey's theory that it carries oxygen for use by the body (Starr, 2000). Whatever the interpretation, events don't just happen, they happen because; objects don't just exist, they exist because. Reasoning often proceeds as: (apprehension of) event —> (assignation of) cause. The human interpretation of blood is merely one example of the many types of understanding—philosophical, ethical, political, metaphysical, scientific or rational—that depend on inductive reasoning.

Within blood there are two causalities at play. The first, via Popper, is one where science progresses forward à la the Enlightenment: a series of failed theorems, in the positive sense, refined as each 'invalid' theory is rejected by empirical observation. Eventually, though trial and error, we discover better and better explanations. Rationality offers a second position. Contained as they are within the actor's belief system, each of these assignations may vary in empirical value, but they are all cognitively equal. From the actor's point of view, the belief was rational only inasmuch as it causally explained the phenomenon. Its empirical value was secondary. The structure of causality remains a continual cognitive function, whether or not the beliefs are 'true' in a scientific, occidental, or religious sense. Causality has a genealogy. In other words, the belief (or more accurately, faith) in causality came first, and only after thousands and thousands of years did we begin to see any scientific verification. It is only happenstance that the universe, through our slow, sheer and often backwards persistence, that we have seen induction come to bear
empirical fruit. Causality may be crucial to the scientific model, but from the cognitive side, our faith in it can also account for the slowness with which new explanations are adopted.

But can rationality explain its faith in itself? If we consider induction as a 'false belief', we can situate its manifestation within a sub-field of rationality known as the 'sunk-cost' fallacy. This model, along with 'path dependence' (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989) or 'groupthink' (Janis, 1982) has been used to explain such varied instances as typewriter layouts and the Vietnam War, instances where the actors face great cost in the material sense in the continuation of a behavior, but virtually no cost to abandon a now debunked belief. Jon Elster explains this behavior as 'loss aversion': 'the assumption that people attach value to changes from a given baseline rather than to the end states obtaining after the change... Loss aversion is the tendency for people to attach larger value (in absolute terms) to a loss from the reference level than to a same-sized gain' (Elster, 2007: 221). False beliefs are difficult to abandon as the cost to do so multiplies for the length for which we hold the belief. Unfortunately, the (logically) false belief of which we speak is causality itself, upon which rationality depends. We cannot use a rational framework to explain the phenomenon of the persistence of causality as an explainandum, for the simple fact we believed in causality before it was rational to do so.

Feminist critique will take us the next step further in understanding causality as a comprehensive default, as it positions rationality as a contested and usually male site of privilege. 'Abstract thought, objective judgement or general principles are seen as masculine characteristics, whereas subjectivity, emotions and orientation towards the concrete are
understood as female... This separation is not equal but organized in a hierarchical relation of subordination' (Ross-Smith and Kornberger, 2004: 283). Throughout this chapter, we have examined the concept of rationality as observed state, and even as a normative practice, but in so doing have ignored its situation as a normative category. From everyday discourse to political decision-making, the 'rational' is seen as unproblematically positive, in contrast to the feminine 'irrational'.

One might call the combined efforts of our four theorists (and more above) 'the rationality project', as it attempts to bring the irrational into the fold of the rational—the gradual and contested incorporation of traditionally non-rational (religious, criminal, familial, suicidal, suicidal attacking) behavior into a rational framework. What is not stated is that this act positivises whatever behavior is being discussed. The non-rational has the power of the dismissive insult, and if we note the wide variety in which some theorists hold some behaviors rational, and others irrational, just as arbitrary. It seems unwise to overlook the importance with which suicide terrorism has crept into this category, not as a form of empirical understanding, but as a form of legitimacy (Jackson, 2005; Ruby, 2002; Pape, 2003). Richard Jackson notes the way in which language constructs the war on terror.

'More than affecting perceptions language also structures cognition—it affects the way we think and particularly how we make strategic choices... the language we use at any given moment privileges one view over others, naturalising some understandings as rational and others as nonsensical... The language of the 'war or terrorism' has a similar effect, namely, it makes some strategic options seem rational and logical and others seem absurd, even taboo' (Jackson, 2005: 34).
If they are rational actors, their voices, or at least their underlying causes must be taken seriously; if irrational, they can be marginalized. The rational terrorist is political; the irrational terrorist is not.

Now we reach the final step, because feminist theory is not merely a critique of power, but an opening to understanding hidden motivations behind the masculine: '[F]eminist critique of reason is particularly concerned with rendering problematic the construction of an identity wherein strategic rationality is emphasized at the cost of the cultivation of emotions' (Nagl-Docekal, 1999: 68). Elster's secondary explanation of the 'sunk cost' now begins to have greater explanatory power, as it assigns a value to the holding of a belief itself: 'The emotion of pridefulness—based on the belief that one is a superior kind of person—will resist the acknowledgment that one has made a mistake. This may explain, in some cases at least, vulnerability to the sunk-cost fallacy' (Elster, 2007: 221).

The persistence, and origin, of causality is less about masculinity than the way in which it is constructed by emotion, on the longstanding and false duality between the passions and the intellect. 'Human beings want to be rational', says Elster (Elster 2007: 164), finally locating this correctly: in the realm of desire. What's missing—the next step—is the interrogation of the schema of that desire. Instead of becoming entombed in a debate about phenomenology, we must allow Hume's formulation to give us the opportunity to understand causality in a new way: not as a contested access point to what is true or real, nor as an assumed subjective position of how reason functions, but as a way to understand human behavior as a function of the cognition of emotion.
Elster continues, 'We do not take pride in our lapses from rationality. Rather, we try to avoid them or correct them, unless our pridefulness prevents us from recognizing them.' Rationality is a process that not only includes emotion, but one which itself is an intensely affective. The problem with Elster's formulation is its situation within normative terms of emotion ('pride') without adequate definition. By resituating rationality as a function of cognate feeling, the concept is able to maintain both its causal validity, and more importantly, its explanatory power.

The Ends of the Ends

Hume, who has caused this dilemma, also offers us a way out, of a sort: 'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions' (Hume, 1978: II.3.3, 415). This is not an essay on Hume's theory, but it is undeniable the way in which his major conclusions raise questions for rationality. Ultimately, Hume's own relationship between passion and reason may be too complex to unpack here, but the argument that emotion is the sole motivating factor in choice remains robust. In his discussion of determinism and free will, Ronald deSousa exposes the following problem in what he calls the 'angelic dilemma', so named for angels that must choose between two equally valid options:

'Free will is a cute trick invented to evade the following inevitable dilemma:

Either (1) the free decision is determined by something, or (2) it is determined by absolutely nothing. In case (2) it is simply a form of irrationality. But in case (1) then either (a) it is determined by nonrational principles, which contravenes the assumption that we are dealing with a perfectly rational being, or (b) it is determined by rational principles, which contravenes the assumption that free will escapes the determination of reason...
...the faculty of emotion is actually required for the more
c conventional mechanisms of rationality to function' (de Sousa,

In de Sousa's construction, valence cannot be removed from choice.
When it comes to rationality, we are discussing means and ends; if we
continue to trace what is behind the ends, we find that they are
inescapably emotional in nature. As sociologist Philip Slater says, there are
no rational motives (Slater, 2011).

To clarify this construction, we now confront another shared
paradigm in our four rationalities: the instrumental/non-instrumental
split. Each school of rationality proposes the existence of classically
rational behavior—the instrumentally rational—from which it then splits
(Habermas into communicative, Becker into social capital, and so on).
Although instrumental, rationality can be critiqued as unproblematically
modernist, or even normative. What is not critiqued is the sense that it
makes: 'Rational action is its own explanation'. The incorporation of non-
rational into the rational underlines the classic dualist assumption: that
which is rational by extension makes sense; it is the other behavior we
need to explain. It other words, the prejudice against the irrational is
inherent to any critique that uses rationality as a yardstick. But it is
impossible to both assume the rational and explain the irrational. What
need to be interrogated are not the exceptions, but the rules.

What if we were to imagine, however improbably, a truly
instrumentally rational action? Everyday examples could include investing
in a no-risk guaranteed 100 percent return, stepping out of the way of a
passing car, and, pertinent to our thesis, fighting back when one's life is
threatened. To be as strict as possible, it is not enough that the subject
believe that what he or she is doing is rational. The 'instrumental' aspect requires (at least) three things:

1) It must be physically represented in the world in a legible way (such as money, or one's life)
2) That the subject and an outside observer agree that the end is demonstrably achievable.
3) That there is no risk involved; that that action always creates the intended result.

Obviously, we are speaking very hypothetically, like a choice between two identical jobs, one with higher pay, fewer hours and closer to home. The criteria are satisfied in the sense that we can see the instrumentality in time, travel and money (clear to both subject and observer), and with no risk (if we limit the choice between two jobs, so the risk of taking a permanent vacation is not allowed as a factor in the decision). Even in this case, Habermas would correctly point out that even given the most obvious circumstances, the ends must be intersubjectively agreed upon. Something so seemingly obvious as money is a social contract, not an absolute; the fact that economic rationality represents a contested and violent split between non-materialist religious sects and Western capital-based society means that this is not a mere theoretical issue.

But we are here to assume the impossible: a purely, unquestionably, universally instrumentally rational choice. Using our case study as a starting point, what if one of our subjects fought back and managed to disarm their attacker, and in the way of Hollywood film, harmlessly knocked them out with a karate chop, achieving the ends to survive at no ethical cost. What could be more rational than that? The problem, as per Hume, is immediate, why would one want to? The desire to live, however
'natural' it has become normatively, remains a desire. The highly scientized medical community allows for 'rational suicide'; as long as 'depression is not a factor', the desire not to live can be considered rational in the context of great pain and terminal illness (Wanzer et al., 1989; Conwell and Caine, 1991; Lucas, 2011). Thus, even 'to live' cannot be seen as de facto rational. Rationality posits the possibility that the ends may be emotional and the means rational, but this formula is inescapable; the ends are always emotional. When the ends are called 'rational' (and what this may mean is always contested in any case), they remain desired, even if the desire is 'to be rational'. To prosper, to profit, even to survive, at the heart of all of these 'rational' ends (in the instrumental sense), is an irrational desire.

This will return us to a fundamental flaw in rational choice theory of all stripes. It seeks to be explanatory, and yet the ends remain incompletely described. Without the feelings associated with them, the goals, however instrumental, are valueless. This is not to say that they are worthless, but rather that they are empty of content, lacking the ultimate instrument of choice: feeling. The instrumentally rational has a strong affective component, without which it cannot operate. We do not rationally want money, or longer lives, or to protect our country or children; we want the feeling of having done so, or the feeling of having chosen. It remains necessary to provide greater empirical, historical and logical evidence for this claim, which will follow in the last four chapters. What matters here is the way in which a deeper examination of ends affects how the schools of rationality struggle as explanatory theories.
If valid, this perspective resolves a number of contradictions in our rationality schools. Firstly, it deepens the possibilities in unearthing the motives of our case studies, unsatisfactorily explained in terms of contemporary rationality theory. Because of the nature of violence and passivity, it is easy to focus on the instrumental aspect of 'what happened'. Did they fight? Did they not fight? In this new light, the actors are not choosing a manifest outcome, but an internal feeling outcome. The instrumental aspect and thus the action is, as it must be, secondary. This is true in cases of resistance and passivity; although one is obviously instrumental and one apparently not, both choices derive from the feelings and emotions, either expected, or achieved in the choice.

Secondly, this perspective could be used to explain Hume's problem of induction. Cause and effect, per Montaigne, is our default form of reasoning; even if it means eschewing logic, we want to be rational. And this is exactly the point: if induction cannot be logically inferred, and if it does not spring from reason, why not from desire? The origin of cause and effect lies not in the mind, or the construction of cognition, but in the construction of feeling: the feeling created by thinking causally. In this case, rationality (the desire to be rational) is a feeling. It could conventionally be called, ironically, a 'fear' of feeling, although I will argue in the coming chapters such contested and overdetermined terms suffer in their ability to adequately explain. Instead, we can say there is a choice made (to be rational) that relates to the negative anticipated feeling state associated with the schema of 'being emotional'.

There are two common objections to the centrality of emotion as the source of human choice and behavior. The first, within philosophy,
famously originates with Hume's finger: 'It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger' (Hume, 1978: 2.3.3). In Hume's scenario, there is no stable and reasonable basis for ethics. This statement engendered an immediate response from Kant, who proposed the 'ought' system of the categorical imperative (King, 1992: 241; Kant, 1934) that the rational actor should behave in such a way that he expected all others to behave. This an admittedly gross simplification, but we remain between the poles of the emotional and the rational. Here, '[T]he problem faced by 'sentimentalist' tradition...is how to derive morality from emotions without putting morality into emotions first' (Roberts, 2010: 364).

The question arises: why not derive morality from emotions? In purely logical terms, we must address the second part of Hume's passage, not coincidentally quoted more rarely than his deadly finger: 'It is not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. It is as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter' (Hume, 1978: II.2.3, 3). Hume posits an empathic action which causes the destruction of the actor, just as disconnected from a 'reason'-based choice; yet, the vast focus in the debate remains on the finger that destroyed the world. Strangers rescue strangers at great risk to themselves. Soldiers die rather than shoot back, and even play football with their enemy. Some even argue that violence is, despite what the Daily Mail says, actually diminishing over time (Pinker: 2007, 2011; Rhodes, 1999; see next chapter).
In Hume's formulation, the sway of emotion will make us just as likely to be ethical as to be unethical. This is not relativism. If we are controlled exclusively by passions, as human beings we tend to act ethically. Martha Nussbaum has long been arguing that emotions, as a part of human life, must be ethical (Nussbaum, 2001; 2004). She is part of a tradition as old (at least) as Hume: 'that that moral emotions and intuitions drive moral reasoning, just as surely as a dog wags its tail' (Haidt, 2001: 830).

If emotions are seen as black boxes, it would be not incorrect to see them as an unstable basis for ethical thought. This manifests in a way that might be called an objection to disorder. Let us consider the following from Kant:

'For the pure conception of duty, unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical attractions, and, in a word, the conception of the moral law, exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone (which first becomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical), an influence so much more powerful than all other springs which may be derived from the field of experience, that, in the consciousness of its worth, it despises the latter, and can by degrees become their master; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded partly of motives drawn from feelings and inclinations, and partly also of conceptions of reason, must make the mind waver between motives which cannot be brought under any principle, which lead to good only by mere accident and very often also to evil' (Kant, 1934: 29–30).

This vision of irreducible multiplicity is not dissimilar to Elster's objection to 'emotional choice', which leads to multiple 'action tendencies' (Elster, 2010: 264). Unfortunately, the same can be said for the same rational choice, as in the availability heuristic, or game theory, where one actor can choose many paths and still remain within a rational
framework. Reason was no less contested in Kant's time. Rationality offers just as much multiplicity, rancor and confusion as passion or emotion, and even if we ignore that rationality is itself (as to what is and is not rational, or even what is or isn't rationality) a contested field spread across many disciplines and even more authors. And yet, this obvious multiplicity of reason raises no objection. Why then object to the same feature of passion?

If deriving morality from emotion is not more (or less) multiplicitous than deriving morality from reason, we can consider the language of the above, preoccupied with what is and isn't mixed, and what is and isn't defined. Masculinity has often been drawn in opposition to that which is undefined to sometimes violent results (Theweleit, 1987, see Chapter 4). This is what Richard Bernstein calls 'Cartesian anxiety' (Bernstein, 1983), over 'the possibility of intellectual and moral chaos' (Bordo, 1987: 4). The third insight that the incorporation of feeling into rationality can offer can be explained as: when we say we want to be rational, what we mean is that we do not want to be irrational.

Whether it is associated with randomness, femininity, nature, lack of control, or simply chaos, emotion—in the sense that both Elster and Kant use it here—is present in the desire to be positioned rationally. Even Hume, the sentimentalist, expresses it to some degree: we are slaves of our passions. This could be called fear of emotion, although as fear has many definitions, it is more specifically understood as the negative anticipation of a future schemic break (see Chapter 5). However minor in valance it may seem (and given the long history of dualism, it is probably not minor), these objections, without logical basis, are expression of the
fear of emotion. Although feminist theory rightly places this in the masculinist tendencies of rationality, this is beside the point, as this is a question of tautology. When looking strictly at the ends of rational choice, fear of emotion is an emotion.

The second, and wholly understandable, objection to the centralizing of emotion in social analysis is the lack of a cohesive and logical framework. Jon Elster discusses this extensively in his 2010 essay 'Emotional Choice and Rational Choice', in which he argues that 'emotions cannot be rational: 1) they are typically unchosen and 2) rationality can only be a feature of choice...emotional choice will be minimally rational' (Elster, 2010: 267–9). This is fair enough. But if it is emotion that gives the structure to causality and thus rationality, and if, furthermore, rational choice is always predicated on emotional ends, it follows that feeling and emotion may be the aspects of conscious experience that have given rise to reason.

It remains then not to divide which motivation or feeling is reason and which is passion, but instead to concisely map how thoughts generate feelings. This occurs through (at least) two processes, schemas and attribution. Although the exact nature of this theory will be the subject of the last four chapters, we can note the way in which emotions are themselves constructed schemically within this debate, that 'our emotional responses represent the 'animal' side of our nature, rather than the rational side' (Goldie, 2010: 10). By virtue of placement in the wrong category, the very idea of an emotion itself generates emotion (feeling) within the individual making the rational argument.
Chapter Three: Attributions within Fields of Violence

In all forms of rationality, we have been introduced to cognitive dependence, or at the very least to a schematic attachment to the 'rational'. Acting emotional, despite being just as based on feeling as acting rational, is a future state imagined and then avoided. 'To be emotional' is a violative schema, and demonstrates the first step of the attribution/assignation process: what is this? The next step—who did this?—exists within both violence and theories of violence. On the one hand, actions of violence (and passivity) are motivated by feelings of agency. The external object of blame is a target of violence, just as the internal anticipated state of self-blame can both generate or restrict violent action. Additionally, the theories themselves depend, in some aspects, on what institution or idea is or is not held responsible for violence. When attributions are made to an agent beyond what has been observed, it demonstrates both a fault in logic and a fundamental aspect of feeling cognition.

What is Violence?

The rational and irrational aspects of violence and passivity have, naturally enough, been a subject within the study of violence. It might seem disingenuous to call this sprawling subject a field, as it crosses a variety of disciplines from sociology to tactics to psychology to genetics. International Relations—somewhat altered in its current form—was, in fact, founded at Aberystwyth University for the purpose of furthering peace as a reaction to the violence of World War I (Schmidt, 2002). Today,
there are available degrees in Conflict Studies (e.g. King's College, SOAS), Trauma and Violence (NYU), and Peace and Conflict Studies (UC Berkeley, UC Boulder), with the last subject connected to an influential eponymous journal. There is a growing tradition of treating violence (and its alternative) as a subject in its own right. The academic controversy over interdisciplinarity aside, we can say there is a congruence in the central question: why do human beings hurt each other to such an extent, many times with no discernible purpose?

The point of reviewing the literature within this field is two-fold. The first is obvious: has this motivation not to fire (or to fire when not threatened) already been answered? Although it will be argued that, from an explanatory point of view, it has not, there is much insight that sociological perspectives on violence have to offer; they are one of the few academic disciplines to cover passivity in any depth. The second aspect returns us to the field within which this thesis operates. The philosophy of social science allows inquiry into the nature of the studies themselves, and, in this case, the seemingly divergent perspectives on offer provide insight into concepts of agency, causality and feeling that may motivate violence itself.

Even when we consider violence a field in its own right, however, ambiguity arises. As is so often the case, a debate emerges over definitions—in this case, over what we can define as violence. Although there are many definitions of violence, and many disagreements, this controversy is best symbolized in Galtung's conception of structural, and then cultural, violence. In 1969, Johann Galtung published his influential paper 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', in which he posited that it
was possible to conceptualize violence structurally, and that it could be understood systemically, even if there was no subject or actor: [I]n a society where life expectancy is twice as high in the upper as in the lower classes, violence is exercised even if there are no concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others' (Galtung, 1969: 171). Galtung would later refine this more abstract concept of violence to include 'cultural violence'—those aspects of culture that legitimize violence, which make 'direct and structural violence look, even feel, right—or at least not wrong' (Galtung, 1990: 292). Religion, for example, may exist as a type of cultural violence. Galtung argues that Israel 'translate[s] choseness, a vicious type of cultural violence, into all eight types of direct and structural violence' (Galtung, 1990: 297).

The concept of other forms of violence has reached increasing social acceptance. In the field of anthropology, structural violence has gained ground as a paradigm inside a field that eschews judgmental or politically charged explanation. The violence in places like Haiti (Farmer, 2004), drug users in San Francisco (Bourgois et al., 2004), and the deprivation of hospitals in Columbia (Abadia and Oviedo, 2009) arise from the conditions, sometimes centuries old, that impose a violence of this intangible kind. The appeal of structural violence for this field is the appeal of an explanation that is 'both "sinful" and ostensibly "nobody’s fault"' (Farmer, 2004: 305). In terms of enacted policy, the UN publication of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1994) marked an attempt to broaden the concept of security. Whether this was influenced by Galtung's conceptions, it reflects the way in which the broadening of
concepts like violence and security are gaining social acceptance and even influencing policy.

These definitions are not without controversy. Human security especially is criticized as an attempt to politicize events and situations by 'securitizing' them (Paris, 2001; King and Murray, 2001). By redefining violence, governments prioritize changes. In the case of structural violence, C.A.J. Coady specifically critiques the practicality of Galtung's definition, whose 'extended concept of violence' creates a requirement of peace so broad that 'peace cannot be a worthy social ideal or goal of action unless it is the total ideal' (Coady, 1986: 27). Coady proposes the usefulness of 'restricted' violence—in other words, physical or instrumental violence—to clear up such confusion. This definition is opposed to what Coady calls 'wide' (like Galtung's) or 'legitimate' (defining the permissibility of violence according to whether it was sanctioned by a state or like authority (Coady, 1986: 24; Coady, 2008).

The definition of 'restricted' is one that will be employed for the purposes of this thesis. This is the most basic of definitions: the act, and more importantly, the choice, of physically hurting another or many other human beings. Using the strict definition is not a moralistic, rhetorical or political statement. As previously argued, it is the instrumental nature of physical violence which makes the decisions, anticipations and consequences of the acts resonate so well within the field of rationality. Rationality is about what can be measured, and this strict definition meets that requirement. Physical violence is also—to use a military metaphor—the tip of the spear. It is a moment of choice for the individual: to kill or not. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, the emphasis will be on obvious
(objective) violence, not for the ethical implications, but the cognitive ones.

If this is the case, why address Galtung’s or alternative perspectives on violence? This is because all attempts to recontextualize violence express, even if unintentionally, an apprehension or perception, or even a feeling of violence. The controversy over what violence is, and the way in which international policy changes over new definitions, expresses the idea that one can feel violated (in the root sense of the word) even if no physical violence is present. One of Galtung’s earlier definitions—'Violence here is defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual' Galtung, 1969: 168)—is echoed both in cognitive models of anger (see Chapter 7) and the field of rationality within the concept of 'relative frustration' (Elster, 2001b; Boudon, 1986, previous chapter).

Even with a pure definition, it will be increasingly important along the signposts of the argument to acknowledge what violence feels like (and vice versa). Charles Tilly invites us to consider the following: 'For relation people, collective violence amounts to a kind of conversation, however brutal or one-sided that conversation may be' (Tilly, 2003: 6). Extending this, it could be understood that violence is spectral. Even within the instrumental definition, it could be considered that two murders are worse than one, which is worse than assault and so on. The recent emphasis on stretching beyond the restricted definition underscores the way in which attacks to one's wellbeing, identity, and way of life feel like violence.

Returning to methodological individualism, all violence shares the singular quality of having been experienced by the individual. It is
therefore always interpretive, even when it can be objectively described as an event. Although the case study of violence will remain within the purely instrumental, the broader definitions allow the observation that violence is very often a response in kind, and that felt violence creates a real violent response. Given that the topic is passivity in the face of violence, it could be argued that real violence may not feel real (in the sense that it rarely causes a real violence response), whereas felt violence feels more real—real enough to provoke actual violence.

The 600-Pound Dichotomy in the Room

Around 350 years ago, Thomas Hobbes proposed the idea of the state as a useful instrument against human 'brutish' instincts. Within this concept, violence is an inherent quality of human beings, something that only an external force could temper: 'Hereby it is manifest that, during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man' (Hobbes, 1969: §7, XIII). Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the 'noble savage' are often seen as the counterpoint to this perspective, where the corrupt influence of society alters the pure state of humanity. Although it is important to note that Rousseau neither conceived the term of the noble savage, nor did he argue it too strenuously,⁵ the

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⁴ Interestingly, all the critics of the Noble Savage concept (e.g. Pinker, LeBlanc) cite Rousseau as the proponent of the inherent goodness of 'savage man', when, in fact, it seems to have originated with John Dryden. See Lovejoy, Arthur (1923). The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's 'Discourse on Inequality', Modern Philology, 21(2), pp. 165–186.
Hobbes/Rousseau question, though attributionally incorrect, remains a feature of social sciences: 'From the first perspective, society is the external guarantor of order that pacifies the beast within us all; from the second, modern society is responsible for corrupting the essential goodness of human nature' (Malešević, 2010: 3).

There are many perspectives on violence: anthropological, rationalist, realist, psychological, institutionally sociological, and so on. Charles Tilly, quoted above, links collective violence such as revolution or revolt to the 'central political process', and specifically 'claims over resources and privileges controlled by government' (Tilly, 1973: 438). Why choose this particular schism, over Tilly's more materialist claims, or any other number? The first is purely practical: the phenomenon of combat passivity is addressed rarely in an academic context, and the two books under discussion happen to fall across this particular divide. The second is the way in which the theoretical aspect of this thesis intersects with this system. Concepts of internal or learned behavior inevitably polarize around blame. It is the feelings generated by assignation that make this particular binary of definitions so pernicious.

Unconscious motivations erupt, from both sides, in a very specific way. First, authors will critique this dualism as a primitive appendage of Enlightenment philosophy, followed immediately by a strong position on one side or the other. Two of the very first scholars to speak about violence in terms of evolutionary psychology, Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, begin by calling this dichotomy 'an inane formulation that has spectacularly impeded progress' (Daly and Wilson, 1988a: 5). They then conceptualize spousal abuse as a function of 'fitness', that the male is
inclined to jealousy and violence as a function of maintaining the evolutionary imperative of his offspring (Daly and Wilson, 1988b: 522–4). Theorist Sinib: 522y and violen into a similar trap, first critiquing the debate: 'Although these two contrasting standpoints have commanded much attention for the past three centuries, neither provides a sociologically accurate account of the human relationship to war and violence'). He then goes on to state that 'when we act in the image of Hobbes's state of nature—as egoistic self-preservers—we do that for very Rousseauian reasons and nearly always in Rousseauian contexts our social embeddedness is the source of both our selfishness and our altruism' (Malešević, 2010: 3–5).

Finally, for better or worse, this dualist conception is still widely utilized in violence literature. A brief scan of evolutionary psychology (Gat, 2009; 2012; Thayer, 2000; 2004), anthropology (Le Blanc and Register, 2003; Keeley, 1996), animal anthropology (Goodall et al., 2013), neuropsychology (Anderson et al., 1999; Scarpa and Raine, 2000; 2007), and even International Relations (Morgenthau, 1961; Gat, 2009) makes the consistent claim that it is society that keeps human nature in check. The 'man as brute' perspective can be implied: 'For if, as I suspect, war is an archetypal phenomenon, only conscious awareness can save us from its grip' (Stevens, 2004: 24, this from a review of the war on terror). Alternatively, it can be stated outright: 'Hobbes was right, and Rousseau wrong, about the state of nature' (Azar, 2012: 1). The concept of the 'blank slate' or 'noble savage' seems equally popular. Our historians of combat, David Grossman and Gwynne Dyer, argue, without the strongest evidence, that man is inherently non-violent (Dyer, 2006; Grossman, 1996;
Military historians Jack Levy and William Thompson (2011) as well as anthropologist Raymond Case Kelly (2000) both assume that it was complex state civilization that introduced war violence, despite the growing evidence to the contrary.

In the last five years, two major works have been published that address passivity under threat of violence, both of which feature this seemingly inescapable dichotomy. Steven Pinker, writing extensively via the work of sociologist Norbert Elias (see below), sees social influences as Hobbes might: to control the nature of man, who is 'wired for violence' (Pinker, 2011: 1410). Even Randall Collins cannot escape a kind of Rousseauian aside, where he states at one point that '[h]umans are hard-wired for interactional entrainment and solidarity, and this is what makes violence so difficult' (Collins, 2008: 26).

One could say there is a quest for legitimacy in the attraction of pronouncement as to the nature of man, be it noble or savage. Using the term 'wired' carries the weight of nearly Newtonian weight. It might be rhetorically tempting to say that there is little scientific value to these pronouncements. In fact, there is none. Any theories about what is or is not human nature will remain purely conjectural, for the simple reason that it is impossible to design an experiment that can tell us which is which and under what circumstances. It is junk science similar to astrology and homeopathy; yet, unlike these last two, remains a serious subject for debate.

This somewhat outrageous assertion will be argued in greater detail further down, but at this point it can be noted that there is an appeal to making pronouncements on the nature of man, just as there is an appeal
to violence. This split is inane, but it is also telling; the fact that so many deny and then embrace it should tell us that. As it happens, these appeals are the same, or at least are generated by the same cognitive structure. We have a violation (violence), which is in turn explained not only within a causal framework, but within a causal agent framework. In each case, something can be understood to be responsible: the enlightenment, social networks, man's nature and so on, just as simultaneously future states of self-designated responsibility (shame and guilt) are avoided by giving up blame to agents outside the self (Chapter 6). It would be foolish to discount the many insights that Collins, Pinker, and others present. But under the dictum of a greater theoretical examination of social sciences, we will now attempt to congruently infer common aspects of human violence, as well as common aspects of the theories that attempt to explain them.

As Steven Pinker's work was published after Randall Collins' and contains criticism of same, it will be presented second, allowing us to address legitimate concerns with Collins' perspective. Pinker's take is distinctly more problematic, as it takes core observations about human behavior and extends them to impossible speculation. But as we learn more about the contradictions in the theories of violence, so too do we discover violence itself, and the conflicts that give rise to conflict.

**Violence is Hard**

Randall Collins, in *Violence: A Microsociological Theory*, presents a compelling and simple argument that violence is hard, or, more
specifically: 'Symbolic violence is easy, real violence is hard' (Collins, 2008: 24). He bolsters this assertion with a vast amount of data on the subject, including his original research on the photography of fighting. He reviews riots, soccer hooliganism, violent crime, spousal abuse, and even the amount of violence that exists between siblings and young children, which oddly accounts for the statistically greatest amount of family violence (Collins, 2008: 14, 142). Finally, of course, he addresses soldiers' non-firing in combat.  

Randall Collins is interested in explaining the phenomenon sociologically: 'Not violent individuals, but violent situations—this is what a micro-sociological theory is about...it is a false lead to look for types of violent individuals, constant across situations' (Collins, 2008: 11). Collins proposes what he calls 'emotional entrainment', the interactional relationship between individuals themselves, as well as larger groups. Violent situations arise out asymmetrical entrainment. When the aggressor feels dominant and the victim feels weak, this produces a feedback loop of potentially increasing violence. Here, violence only emerges situationally: '[t]he apex of the event is the actions of the violent few. The basis of the emotional energy...is the successive layers of helpers, co-participants, and spectators around them' (Collins, 2008: 413).

Collins uses many examples, and an attempt will be made to demonstrate his theory with two of them. The first, somewhat controversial, but right on point with the case study in question, is that of spousal abuse, where Collins notes that women who present as a victim

5. Collins, one of a few of whom it could be said have a 'pro-Marshall' stance, actually mentions the shortcomings of Marshall's research.
can incur the anger of their abuser. The violence is relational, and even without an audience, victim cues in this asymmetrical entrainment cause the abuser to fill his role: 'Crying is a weapon of the weak and it can be a dangerous weapon to use' (Collins, 2008: 142). When one partner manifests victim-like behavior, the other steps up and takes on the role of the perpetrator. Collins' intent is not so much victim blaming as it is an attempt to break this 'time-process in which conflict builds up emotional entrainment. Knowing the time-patterns would be helpful for practical measures in training to prevent violence' (Collins, 2008: 140).

Collins extends this entrainment to the interaction of a third party: the spectators mentioned above. In his own case study of photographs of riots and brawls, he first takes note of the fighters' inherent disinclination not to fight becoming a kind of dance. One approaches and blusters as the other retreats and vice versa, each trying to find an out. The crucial factor for Collins is the audience, who he notes greatly increases the probability of violence: 'The audience is crucial in a staged fight; it provides the support that circumvents confrontational tension/fear. A testable hypothesis: a focused audience lowers fighters' tension/fear and affects their willingness to fight at all, for how long and with what intensity' (Collins, 2008: 197–99).

In combat, this entrainment plays out in two ways. In the case of combat passivity, each individual soldier is neither presented with a victim for them to engage as the perpetrator, nor, as in the case of the ranks spread wide in the World War II theater, are they given an audience to egg them on. As such, '[t]he micro-situational reality of the home front or the rear staging areas is all us, even as its talk refer to the enemy as a symbolic
object defining the outer boundaries of the group. Coming nearer the
front, one's attention shifts more and more to the enemy as a real social
presence' (Collins, 2008: 80). This social presence, and the emotional
entrainment implied between any human beings, on whatever side, acts
as a buffer between violence, as it does between all the situations
outlined above.

If some soldiers do not fire back, some obviously do. If 'violence is
hard', what are the conditions under which violence will arise? Besides
fatalities from artillery, the greatest number of deaths occur in a rout:
when one side weakens, and the other side falls upon them with
devastating results. 'The greatest number of deaths' fails to describe the
rampage quality of the end of battle, where rape, evisceration, trophy
taking and so forth are common. Collins relates a story told by Marshall,
where having killed all the enemy, the soldiers 'moved into the barns of
the French farmhouse, where they killed the hogs, cows, and sheep. The
orgy ended when the last beast was dead' (Marshall, 1947: 183, cited in
Collins, 2008: 95). This is what Collins terms 'forward panic'.

Collins uses the word 'panic' instead of rage or shame through a
process of 'contagion of emotion': 'In atrocities, this mechanism is not the
mood of the sports victory or defeat, but ebullient killers feeding off the
hopeless passivity of those who are being killed, and the victims caught in
the helpless shock and depression by the emotional dominance of those
who kill them. This seems irrational against all self-interest of the victims.
Nevertheless, it is a factual pattern that characterizes virtually all major
atrocities' (Collins, 2008: 108). Although Collins does not provide a concise
modeling of how these emotions manifest, there seems to be
transformation from fear to shame to anger. The concept of forward panic is useful as a observable and repeatable historical reality. Collins' concept of a 'contagion of emotion' is not inaccurate but incompletely defined.

After the theory of cognate feeling has been fully laid out in this thesis, we will return to the subject of forward panic, and how these emotions might be broken down usefully into their component causal assignations and feelings.

What is missing in Collins' theory, as is appropriate given its sociological focus, is an accurate description of the attraction or desire to violence. In the above case of 'emotional contagion', why does fear lead to savagery instead of mutual flight, or even passivity? But there is the larger problem of why soldiers are in the war in the first place: what is the attraction of violence? Collins fails to address individuals who desire violence without the benefit of a group, or even dual, entrainment. Serial killers (to be discussed in a proposed volume two, Collins, 2008: 450) are an admittedly rare phenomena, but serial rapists and child abusers are not: these are people who both depend on a lack of an audience, and whose behavior cannot be attributed to their entrainment with their victim. Although Pinker's theories have problems (see below), he does at least proscribe that an individual may have a motive for violence (Pinker, 2011: Chapter 8).

In the case of combat, Joanna Bourke notes the savagery of some soldiers' behavior and accounts: '(killing) was like "getting screwed the first time" and gave men "an ache as profound as the ache of orgasm". In the words of a black Muslim Marine, "I enjoyed the shooting and the killing. I was literally turned on when I saw a gook get shot."' (Bourke,
2000: 42). Although this sexual aspect is but one of Bourke's paradigms of the desire for violence (see Chapter 7), there is a consistent historical expression of this desire, especially in war:

'Take the glamour out of war! I mean, how the bloody hell can you do that? Go and take the glamour out of a Huey, go take the glamour out of a Sheridan... Can you take the glamour out of a Cobra, or getting stoned at China Beach? It's like taking the glamour out of an M-79a Ohhhh, war is good for you, you can't take the glamour out of that. It's like trying to take the glamour out of sex, trying to take the glamour out of the Rolling Stones." He was really speechless, working his hands up and down to emphasize the sheer insanity of it. "I mean, you know that it just can't be done!' (Herr, 1997: 189–190).

Chris Hedges likens war to pleasure in a different paradigm: 'The rush of battle is a potent and often lethal addiction, for war is a drug, one I ingested for many years' (Hedges, 2003: 1), and goes on to argue that this pleasure manifests especially perniciously in the public in general, and its political leaders specifically. Although the addiction or even pleasure model is not fully expanded in this case, its existence does contradict Collins' larger conclusion that violence is hard. Instead, for some, it seems easy, even enjoyable, leading us back to the principle of methodological individualism: how acts of violence are interpreted by the individual.

This is not to discount Collins' insights, which are well-documented, and congruently argued. Nor is it to say that he ignores the possibility of the desire of violence, something that is seen in the creation of the concept of forward panic. It is merely to say that the imagination of violence (and even sometimes its execution) isn't so much easy (as in
requiring no friction) as it is desirable—the difference between a pull and a push. Although this thesis will address a different type of desire to violence than the sexual or bodily pleasures described above (see Chapter 7), these accounts demonstrate what is missing from Collins' descriptions: desire and pleasure, in the experience of the participants.

**Violence is Natural**

Although his methodology will prove to be flawed, Steven Pinker at least introduces a kind of dualism into the question of violence. Unlike Collins, his explandandum includes strong motivations both for and against violence. His main argument is that evolutionary pressure produced two intentional structures for human beings, what he colloquially terms 'better angels' and 'inner demons'. Within this paradigm, both the social desire prohibiting violence and the desire for violence exist side by side. His book, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, may not be strictly academic, but it has had a significant impact in human behavior circles, and Pinker is a highly regarded as a 'global thinker' (Swift, 2010).

It would be simplistic to characterize Pinker as a member of the 'nature' school, or that he believes exclusively in an inherent character of human behavior. Nevertheless, he situates himself, without apologies, in the Hobbesian paradigm that believes it is the job of society, and more specifically the state, to tame the rough nature of human instincts. Social interaction exists, but only inasmuch as it influences the inherent natural process. In his scenario, 'the focus of the book is on transformations that
are strictly environmental: changes in historical circumstances that engage a fixed human nature in different ways' (Pinker, 2011: 20).

These historical circumstances include the transition from hunter gatherers to farmers, the Civilizing Process, the Humanitarian Revolution (the increase and legitimization of non-violence), the Long Peace (the theory that democracies tend not to fight each other), the New Peace (the post-Cold War trending to less war), and the 'Rights revolution', or the increasing recognition of formally targeted minorities. It would be a book in itself to discuss these six processes, which Pinker sees as the motivational factors in reducing violence. The last four are controversial in their own right, and have been criticized, as well as championed, elsewhere. Instead, a specific focus on the Civilizing Process will hopefully be an elucidating condensation of Pinker's total argument.

Pinker does not simply and blindly argue that human nature is all that determines behavior. In his third chapter, he heavily relies on the social theories of Norbert Elias, and what is known as the civilizing process. As such, Elias' theory bears elaboration here. Elias argued that the years between the 13th and 19th centuries marked the slow formation of our modern civil society, pushed by the forces of a growing interest in manners, as well as a consolidating state appariati (among other factors). His arguments exist by inference. For example, Elias argued that a rude society could be understood to exist according to the increasing publication of manuals on mores in the 15th and 16th centuries. The remonstrations against defecation, farting, and even public masturbation and sex (Elias, 2000: 120–45) imply that there was something to rail against.
Pinker focuses on the role of the Hobbesian state: 'Leviathan's incentives make commerce more attractive, but commerce makes the job of the Leviathan easier' (Pinker, 2011: 320). This quotation demonstrates two things simultaneously: the pre-eminence of the concept of a state that exists to civilize its subject, and, less ideologically, the transition from a land-based to a monetary economy. In classic rationalist terms, land is a limited resource, making its use a zero sum game. Our actors are both rational, acting inside a monetary economy that is a 'classic positive-sum game where each person can confer a large benefit to another at a small cost to himself or herself' and evolutionarily justified. 'Examples include primates who remove ticks from each other's backs' (Pinker, 2011: 256).

Pinker pays special attention to Elias' understanding of violence. In service of this, he reproduces the medieval woodcuts that Elias shows to demonstrate the 'Knight's World' (Elias, 2000: 513). These illustrations from the 15th century depict violence as a casual affair: 'a peasant disembowels a horse as a pig sniffs his exposed buttocks. In a nearby cave a man and a woman sit in the stocks. Above them a man is being led to the gallows, where a corpse is already hanging, and next to it is a man who has been broken on the wheel, his shattered body pecked by a crow' (Pinker, 2011: 234). It is important to note that Elias' use of these images have elicited much criticism that a 'Knight's World' was less representative of reality than it was of how the knight saw the world (Schwerhoff, 1998, quoted in Ziemann, 2012; see also, Malešević and Ryan, 2013). This is not a criticism that Pinker addresses.

On the one hand, it can be said that these criticisms have some validity, since Elias' feelings on human nature may not have been so far
from Pinker's; Sinive some valid and Kevin Ryan note that the Civilizing Process 'is littered with references to humans as essentially animalistic creatures motivated by biological impulses, which are presented in the form of "elementary urges", "drives", "instinctual tendencies", "animalistic activities" and "animalistic impulses"' (Malešević and Ryan, 2013: 7). Such an underlying belief gives Elias a motivation to skew data to his perspective—not an uncommon phenomenon. The problem with these critiques is that, like S.L.A. Marshall before him, despite Elias' methods being subject to valid scrutiny, other data has proved him to be coincidentally correct.

Pinker offers the vast amount of evidence collected on levels of violence over the last 5,000 years. Despite what we may read in the newspapers, it seems that there may have been a dramatic decline of violence in modern times. This topic has been the subject of a great deal of scholarship, in the last 20 years especially. Beginning with Lawrence Keeley's work, *War Before Civilization*, and continuing onward (LeBlanc and Register, 2003; Gat 2006), research into the archeological records has shown that small tribes from over 5,000 years ago were in fact very violent, with some groups having death rates as high as 30 percent. This finding was confirmed anthropologically, in that small non-state societies have correspondingly high rates of violence compared to their state counterparts. Authors Steven LeBlanc and Catherine Register note that the last place on earth to be found by modern man, the New Guinea highlands, was also the most warlike (Le Blanc and Register, 2003: 151).

The story of violence is then a story of decline over the years, matched in terms of warfare. As horrible as 20th-century war wars seem
by sheer scale, in terms of percentage of population, they remain low by comparison to nearly any pre-20th-century society. For giving the term 'primitive', Keeley's research is reproduced here:

(Source: Keeley, 1996: 89).

Even the historically traumatic and extreme violence of World War II produced a death rate of only five per 1,000 people (Keeley, 1996: 90; Gat, 2012: 3).

Likewise, the death rate from homicide in European countries has actually declined dramatically in the last five centuries, 'due primarily to a decrease in the number of fights between young males, both among the elites, who had frequently killed each other in duels, and among ordinary people, who had engaged in frequent manly confrontations and knife
fights in public places' (Muchembled, 2012: 2). Pieter Spierenburg demonstrated that the homicide rate in Amsterdam dropped thirty-fold from 1550 to 1800, from 47 per 100,000 people to 1.5 per 100,000 (Butterfield, 1994). Eric Monkkonen notes similar drops in the US, in the even shorter historical period from 1800 to 1950 (Monkkonen, 2001; 2002).

Despite the obvious conflict to his central thesis of a decline in violence, Pinker acknowledges his debt to Collins, and discusses 'forward panic' (routs in battle) at length. His version focuses more on the rage aspect and less the panic: 'A rampage may be a primitive adaptation to seize a fleeting opportunity to decisively rout a dangerous enemy before it can remobilize and retaliate' (Pinker, 2011: 1421). For Pinker, this is part of the adaptive quality of the our past predatory qualities. These are interactive connections between the midbrain, forebrain and frontal cortex, where the 'Fear system' and 'Rage system' are linked: 'Mild fear can trigger freezing or flight, but extreme fear, combined with other stimuli, can trigger an enraged defensive attack. Forward panic or rampage in humans may involve a similar handoff from the Fear system to the Rage system (Pinker, 2011: 1456). A similar transition, as described in Collins, is taking place, but the emotional concepts remain vaguely defined.

In regard to our case study, passivity in combat or in life or death situations, it would be fair to say that Pinker is somewhat dismissive at

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6. This is a vast simplification. The actual processes are detailed, contradictory, controversial and, as I have argued, irrelevant. As George Mandler notes that we should not be surprised when something appears on a brain scan; only if nothing did.
least in terms of data, calling Marshall's study 'dubious', and seemingly ignoring the other evidence that I have cited in the introductory chapter, despite having clearly read Grossman and Collins (Pinker, 2011: 1416). Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility as follows:

'It's true, then, that when men confront each other in face-to-face conflict, they often exercise restraint. But this reticence is not a sign that humans are gentle and compassionate. On the contrary, it's just what one would expect from the analyses of violence by Hobbes and Darwin—often exercise restraint. But this reticence is not a sign that humans are gentle and compassionate. On the contrary, seemingly ignoring the carefully—a reticence experienced as anxiety or paralysis. Discretion is the better part of valor; compassion has nothing to do with it' (Pinker, 2011: 1416).

This is a seemingly sensical argument, that social self-interest is the overriding goal; and yet, this type of dualist explanation has its disadvantages. Firstly, it does not fit the data with which we have been presented. If self-interest is the goal, the soldier in a Napoleonic firefight, for example, engages in the opposite of self-interest by not shooting back. The irrationality of this action is the starting point of this thesis. Pinker, however, may be arguing that this evolutionary imperative is manifesting as a subconscious anxiety, a residual effect of evolutionary self-interest. This is perhaps even more problematic. For without a proper distinguishing criterion, there is no way to assign whether or not an individual is being demonic or angelic, or why. It would therefore be possible to argue for any dataset. If Marshall had found, for example, that 100 percent of soldiers had fired back, this would be due to their aggression, if 0 percent, because they were protective.
Impossible to Prove; Irrelevant if True

What follows relies heavily on a criticism of Steven Pinker's work, which in one sense is unfair, but necessary in another. It is unfair in that the large logical error—that human beings either have a nature or don't—applies equally to both sides of the debate. It is necessary, however, to demonstrate the error, and Pinker's work serves especially well because he either misrepresents, mistakes, and possibly lies about much of the research that he uses. Collins' work, besides being considerably more nuanced and more reliably researched, does not rely on a position that humans are inherently one way or another. Man as brute is Pinker's stated position. The attribution of human nature (or a lack of it) is a significant logical error as the experimental paradigm to prove this one way or the other does not exist; there is no human without biology, or without history. The blindness to this fallacy persists because the debate around violence is motivated, at least in part, by the same desires that engender it: the attempt to make causal order through attribution of blame. However problematic from a logical or empirical point of view, this schism operates because of the satisfaction (on either side) of knowing who is or is not at fault.

To examine this point, let us look at what seems to be a strongly varied level of violence, both across history and cultures. As previously stated, There is a great deal of evidence as to the dramatic drop in criminal and even war violence in the last 50 centuries. However, in our age of increasing statistical obsession, an interesting trend appears: in the
1960s, the murder rate went up in the US and Europe, only to go back down again in the 1990s. Pinker acknowledges the sudden rise in murder rates beginning the 1960s, what Pinker calls a 'tiny bounce in the last third of the 20th century' (Pinker, 2011: 84).

Pinker explains this via Cas Wouters, a student of Norbert Elias. Here, the civilizing process of the last 600 years is temporarily reversed, as observed by the increasing questioning of social mores, and popularity of Marxism (Pinker, 2011: 343). This rate then decreases in the 1990s as a function of the 'recivilizing' process:

'How can we explain the recent crime decline? Many social scientists have tried, and the best that they can come up with is that the decline had multiple causes, and no one can be certain what they were, because too many things happened at once. Nonetheless, I think two overarching explanations are plausible. The first is that the Leviathan got bigger, smarter, and more effective. The second is that the Civilizing Process, which the counterculture had tried to reverse in the 1960s, was restored to its forward direction' (Pinker, 2011: 387).

As evidence of the recivilizing process, Pinker introduces the seemingly Hobbesian notion of what is known as the Broken Windows Effect, or BWE. Here, the relative order in a given neighborhood (e.g. graffiti, trash, broken windows) is thought to be a contributing factor to the amount of crime, and by repairing it, one would see a commiserate drop in crime. It was the cornerstone of Mayor Giuliani's policing program as Mayor of New York (Kelling and Coles, 1998), and it has been shown to have some effect, both in a large real-world studies of cities (Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006) as well as within controlled experiments (Keizer et al.,
2012). The BWE remains an especially relevant concept in regard to how human beings process order, and how this order affects emotion and choice.

Obviously, the BWE is not without controversy. The rates of violence, when controlled for hospital care as we are about to do, indicate that the drop in crime may not be as straightforward as a single statistic can show. Furthermore, what has been strongly demonstrated is that the BWE only works within a fixed radius. While the crime rate may often drop in a neighborhood post-makeover, the surrounding areas experience a jump in crime (Grabosky, 1996; Harcourt, 2001).

The real effect of the BWE and the recivilizing process on violent crime is slowly coming into view. Firstly, the decline, rise, then decline of the rate of murder or death by violence is by no means as objective as we might believe. Siny no means as objective as we might believe.ming idataset of the violent past fails to analyze the way in which violence enacts at interpersonal, intra-group and intra-polity (micro, mezzo and macro) levels. Without disputing the general decline, Males at.ming into view.erience a jump in crime (Grabosky, 1996; Harcourt,-state societies is negligible and greatly varied (between 1232 and 1248, homicide rates in England were as high as 30 and as low as 6.8 per 100,000, just as modern-day San Francisco can be 8.1 and Washington D.C. rests at 42.9 (Males at 42.9 (Malen Given the variation year on year, the difference between medieval violence rates and current ones may be real in the aggregate, but are not as dramatic as might first appear.

Furthermore, although the rate of violence per person has dropped, the modern state permits the possibility of mass violence on a scale, in the
millions, which would have been impossible in pre-state societies, that 'inter-polity violence reaches unimaginable proportions. Our age is the most belligerent in all of history' (Maleess, which the c These 'unimaginable proportions' also apply to what could have happened, or rather what was expected to. There may be no point in speaking hypothetically about all the various close calls to nuclear annihilation that occurred over the 40-year period of the cold war, an historical moment that we seem to have erased from the lesson books. But as we are speaking of violence and its potential, there is something to be said about the fact that many classically rational thinkers considered either limited or total nuclear war a strategic option. This conceptualization of violence on a previously unimaginable scale would generally support Male that many cla Our thinking about war violence has either remained in line with our ancient counterparts, or it has increased.

Whether or not we accept the last two tenuous points, we are now at the center of the large logical error of Pinker's argument. Violence rates are, in fact, increasing, and have been since the 1960s. There was no bounce, or rather there was no fall after the bounce. What Pinker has conveniently ignored is that medical technology has greatly advanced, due largely and not unironically to the Vietnam War. In fact, the aggravated assault rate has been increasing since the 1960s. Homicide rates have dropped only via the survival rate of those injured.

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It could be said that Pinker simply did not know or consider this, and this is fair enough. But such data has the effect of utterly destroying his argument. To simplify: X (the civilizing process) has an inverse causal/correlative relationship to Y (the murder rate). X has increased over time until the 1960s, when it dropped, only to bounce back in the 1990s. Y has done the opposite, thus proving the relationship. There is no issue with the idea that Pinker is arguing for a quantitative character of what can only be qualitative data; for example, if the 'civilizing process' corresponds to the violence rate, in 1960 it was a '5', and in 1980 it dropped to a '3'. Qualitative and quantitative must exist side by side.
What we see in the dataset leads to two conclusions: that the general theory (civilizing process is correlated to violence rates) is wrong; or his observations about the civilizing process itself (that it was high then low then high) are wrong. The latter is the most likely, as the idea that the Marxist/revolutionary aura of the 1960s led to a rise in a questioning of the social order is extremely problematic as a unique phenomenon. Such cultural revolutions have, and will remain, common; the freak-out, drop-out attitude of the 1960s cannot be called any more or less radical than the socialist movement of the 1920s that led to an actual revolution in Russia and unprecedented labor conflicts in the US. And so accumulates the evidence of conclusions chasing their data, and not the other way around.

Note also that this error applies to both sides of the Rousseauian/Hobbesian debate over human behavior. Consider The Arc of War, in which historians Jack Levy and William Thompson argue a very different graph, and different theory, of war violence. Against recent theory, they propose that 50,000 years ago, there was little warfare among small hunter-gatherer bands. As complex social apparati took hold, so too did warfare and warfare violence, which then dropped in the last 200 years. Taking a different tack, they argue for 'co-evolutionary theory', where war evolves with other 'activities', such as economies, technology and political organization, and when one transforms, the others are affected, and in turn affect war (Levy and Thompson, 2011: 3, 28). They use the development of gunpowder as one example, the introduction of which did not change warfare per se, so much as it 'rationalized' warfare, leading to greater state centralization, in turn leading itself to greater war
violence (Levy and Thompson, 2011: 210–16). The arc, as well as their scholarship on a wide spectrum of wars, demonstrates the supposition that warfare is related directly to cultural changes and not to any inherent nature of man.

Azar Gat, positioned in the evolutionary school, argues correctly that Levy and Thompson have conveniently ignored the evidence of pre-state warfare (Gat, 2012: 3), asserting that many tribes are significantly more violent than even medieval European warring states. From an academic perspective, this is a valid criticism. But Levy and Thompson's theory is just as valid (or invalid) as Gat's and Pinker's. We could have learned violence from a single or multiple event and passed it along culturally like language. Work on the epidemiology of war—that outbreaks of war act in a similar fashion to diseases when mapped—would be ammunition for this point (Houweling and Siccama, 1985). Our ability to go on and on and appropriate whatever evidence at hand proves us right demonstrates the main point: both Levy and Thompson's social and Pinker's evolutionary theories are absolutely conjectural. This is not a question of a lack of accurate historical data—that we cannot be there 50,000 years ago, and thus cannot know what happened. No, questions about the nature or nurture of man cannot be answered for the simple fact that there is no way to test the hypothesis.

Consider the way in which one piece of research is used to prove opposite points. Psychologist James Gilligan (see Chapter 5 and 7) notes that Swedish adoption studies show 'no correlation' between violence in biological parents and children (Gilligan, 1997: 215). Pinker, on the other hand, uses the same studies to say that: ‘(when) one looks at adopted
children and shows that they act more like their adoptive parents than like their biological parents, cycles of violence prove nothing' (Pinker, 2002: 212). In the more recent volume, he cites the work of Angela Scarpa and Adrian Raine to back this up, that in fact damage to the prefrontal cortex can have a significant impact on future violent behavior (Pinker, 2011: 1451).

I did not have the opportunity to double check all of Steven Pinker's research, but it does not speak well that four out of four fact checks found him wanting. It is true that Raine and Scarpa discuss the neurological influence on violent behavior (Scarpa and Raine, 2000 and 2007; Raine, 2002). What is not mentioned is the authors are proponents of the 'biosocial', that is, the interaction of biological and social factors. In a summary paper, Raine discusses the Swedish adoption studies that examined petty criminal behavior (Raine, 2002: 213). Pinker would be correct that some correlation exists between having birth parents who engage in petty criminality and future criminality, even by individuals adopted by parents that do not have a history of crime. But this is far from the whole picture. Not only do environmental factors have an effect on future criminal behavior (nearly the same amount as the biological correlation), but more to the point, when combined, that is when children of criminals are raised by criminals, the factors multiply:
What the above studies, Levy and Thompson's arc of war and Pinker's angels and demons, actually show is the untenability of the natural or cultural perspective. It is impossible, through any empirical, inductive or deductive argument, to design a test for which affects what, and to what degree. Let us consider the ideal scientific scenario, conveniently free of ethics. We have, say, 1,000 genetically identical individuals, who can be raised in a variety of social environments. Which one is the control? Even raising a child in a black soundless box (as has been tried, rather unfortunately, with monkeys⁹) is a type of culture. What are the effects?

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When do they occur? To what extent are biological factors an influence? Which biological factors? When? Is it even possible, at this juncture in medical research, to individuate a single biological factor?

The opposite test is equally invalid, where genetically different individuals are raised identically. Besides the control question, there is the additional problem of the complexity of experience. The concept of what exactly is a determining factor in an individual's pathology can be demonstrated in the cases of identical twins and autism. Although autism is largely considered to be hereditary, it is an inescapable fact that identical twins raised in the same family will sometimes diverge, that one will develop autism and one will not (Szatmari, 2003). The same can be said of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (Plomin and Daniels, 1987; Lichtenstein et al., 2009).

Pinker is correct: the classically (and at this point, largely heuristic) psychological model—that mommy did X and therefore I do/avoid X—does not apply. There remains, however, strong evidence of some yet unknown experiential element. What was the personal experience, moment or cascade of moments that set one individual into categorical withdrawal and not the genetically identical other? What biological factors were activated, and how? It is, in the literal sense of the word, impossible to say. When such specific and individualistic traits develop under non-biological circumstances, it is difficult to argue that something like 'violence'—vague, socially contingent, and based on choice—could have even a significant biological component. Pinker himself argues earlier in

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his career: 'As long as the heritability of talents and tastes is not zero, none of us has any way of knowing whether a trait has been influenced by our genes, our childhood experiences, both, or neither' (Pinker, 2002: 378). In the case of something as contextual as violence, heritability will never be a one or a zero.

This complexity of this interaction has profound (annihilating, even) effects for any attempts at evolutionary psychology. For example, a hereditary link has been observed between craving for sweets and alcoholism, which itself contains sugar (Mennella et al., 2005; Mennella et al., 2010). It would be absurd to argue that there is an evolutionary imperative for alcoholism, but equally so to argue that there is no biological component. Neurological and adoption studies that point to a link between biological factors and violence, but like sugar and alcoholism, there is no one-to-one correlation. In the case of violence, it could manifest due to a propensity for anger or the cognitive processing of anger, the feeling of adrenaline that manifests with acts of violence, or even the shame after committing them. More likely the origin lies in something, as in the example of the autistic twin, that is simply beyond our human comprehension, either presently or eternally.

Let's say that we could design this magical experiment, one that would finally tell us that we are inherently violent or not. Even armed with this information, it wouldn't matter, as whatever solution we put forward will be a social one. The last ally imaginable, Richard Dawkins, states that 'it is perfectly possible to hold that genes exert a statistical influence on human behavior while at the same time believing that this influence can be modified, overridden or reversed by other influences' (Dawkins, quoted
in Ehrenreich, 1997: 89). Whatever the preference of the individual, the social remains the arena in which we must operate.

In the case of war (and we are talking about combat violence and passivity), whatever biological impulse there is, the amount of organization that is required in terms of material, logistics, uniforms, weapons design, social acceptance and even ritual, speaks to a majority social event. Whatever the original behavior, the solution will be found in the social arenas of desire, choice and understanding. This is not to say that Pinker discounts human cultural influence—quite the contrary. The objection lies is naming any behavior as purely inherent or social. And if it cannot be proved, and if it is not relevant, why discuss it? This is not a rhetorical question, but a real one: why?
Unseen Agency

The answer to this question lies in what might be called metacausality. Social theories of violence lose their explanatory value as they exceed the remit of the evidence, as they attempt to speculate about grander and grander fields of human nature, or lack thereof. To clarify how this might operate, we turn to Sir Karl Popper and Friedrich Nietzsche. This is not as a means of creating a debate over what is legitimate social science, but instead an interrogation as to why this type of sense-making is attractive. The answer serves as an introduction to the second half of the thesis, in the feelings, and the agency 'side effects' inherent in processing causality.

Popper is most famous for his attempt to address Hume's question of induction (see previous chapter), and laid out the limited ways in which the scientific method could be considered validly applied. But what is of interest here is his motivation in so doing, less a Humean dilemma than a general annoyance with the circular reasoning of social science: 'I found that those of my friends who were admirers of Marx, Freud, and Adler, were impressed by a number of points common to these theories. Once your eyes were thus opened you saw confirming instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory' (Popper, 1963: 33). The confirmation of theory despite contradictory evidence is seen, for the purposes of this thesis, under Pinker's take on combat passivity: 'It stands to reason that initiating serious aggression in a symmetrical standoff is something a Darwinian creature must consider very, very carefully—a reticence experienced as anxiety or paralysis' (Pinker, 2011: 1420). If no
one fights, or everyone does, or somewhere in between, the theory is verified.

Popper referred to this type of reasoning as 'metaphysics', and although that term in this context may seem a stretch, it describes a type of global explanation. Helpfully, it would; Pinker defines human behavior in terms of 'angels' and 'demons'. In this instance, what are the origins of this metaphysical theory, or, more narrowly, from whence the desire to think metaphysically? Nietzsche located this in what he called the will-to-truth. For Nietzsche, the death of God was not a statement of atheism, but an acknowledgment of a void. One dogma had disappeared, and another would—must—take its place.

Some have argued that the will-to-truth moved our faith in the modern state (Foucault, 1980; Elbe, 2003), which connects with Pinker's Hobbesian perspective. But Nietzsche's own concern was with the sciences: 'Against positivism,' he writes, 'which halts at phenomena—"There are only facts"—I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing' (Nietzsche, 1967: §481). Although Nietzsche would turn, somewhat tautologically, to Christianity for an explanation of this folly (Nietzsche, 2008: erhapsthere was also a prescience that the phenomena of making sense was both intrinsic (see 'fundamental human drive/Fundamentaltrieb des Menschen', Nietzsche, 1979: §15) and, more importantly, emotional:

"'Truth'' is therefore more fateful than error and ignorance, because it cuts off the forces that work toward enlightenment and knowledge...it is more flattering to think "I possess the truth" than to see only darkness
around one-above all: it is reassuring..."Peace of soul", "a quiet conscience": all inventions made possible only by presupposing that truth has been found' (Nietzsche, 1967: §452).

This quote reveals what I believe to be the feeling origins of these metaphysical conclusions: the quiet conscience of the ultimate explanation. The location of these nature vs. nurture debates within a charged field helps explain some familiar social phenomena, including the continued controversy over the teachings of evolution (at least in the US). This is not to argue whether or not creationism is valid (it is not), merely to say that this debate is about a higher level of importance to the construction of the self than other causal networks (dependent on the individual, of course).

With increased affect, comes the increased attribution of agency: blame. Although we will return to this subject under a more cognitive perspective (Chapters 6 and 7), there is a logic to these assignations. As negative feelings grow, as they might in the case of these larger truths, it follows that the emotional effect is the cause, and from that, something or someone must be responsible. Higher explanations, such as God, government and evolution, do more than just provide the piece of soul, they provide the scapegoat: 'a theory through which they can shift the responsibility for their existence, for their being thus and thus, on to some sort of scapegoat. This scapegoat can be God—in Russia there is no lack of such atheists from ressentiment' (Nietzsche, 1967: §765).

Indeed, within this debate over higher causes of violence, blame agents abound. For example, some have argued that rape is part of an
evolutionary paradigm of selection (Thornhill and Palmer, 2001),
provoking obvious and justified feminist criticism (Travis, 2003). Such
gendered comparisons are often found in popular culture, such as
supposed evolutionary advantages of male promiscuity or female
nurturing traits (Buss and Schmitt, 1993). In each case, the implied shift of
blame—'I can't help it, it's biological'—makes its way into the discussion,
embodied best in a recent *Daily Mail* headline: 'Born cheater? Why being
unfaithful could be in your genes' (*Daily Mail*, 2011). There is no point in
entering this debate, but simply noting the explicit stake at play could be
helpful: blame. If, for example, the male is genetically programmed to
rape, it is easily arguable that his responsibility is diminished, even if
Thornhill and Palmer both deny and then affirm this claim at the same
time (see Wilson et al., 2003: 679).

For Pinker (and the inverse, possibly, for Collins), this attention of
blame is directed towards an incorrect object and must be righted. In the
case of Hobbesians, there is a perfectly reasonable agenda to rescue the
state from its current status as a blame agent in war violence: 'The decline
in violent mortality under the leviathan agent in war violence righted.
at his responsibility is diminished, even if Thornhill and Palmer bo, 2006:
409). For Pinker, this manifests as an equally reasonable cause, rescuing
the Enlightenment: 'In reflecting on (the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars), it was natural for people to reason, "After this, therefore because
of this," and for intellectuals on the right and the left to blame the
Enlightenment' (Pinker, 2011: 562).

The classic motivation posited to these two poles of social debate is
one of rational politics: 'Loosely put nurture has been the rallying cry of
the scholarly left, because it seems to maximize human options, while nature has tended to be the province of the scholarly right, because it has been so often been deployed to ratify the status quo' (Ehrenreich, 1997: 88). Ehrenreich acknowledges the less-than-scholarly motives behind our inane dichotomy, but winds up putting the cart before the horse: it is the beliefs that motivate the politics and not the other way around. It is less about conventionally divisive politics than blame agents, or rather, what is at the core of politics lies in which blame agents are designated.

§ § §

What do theories of violence tell us? On the one hand, we see consistent and explicable phenomenon, like the links between emotion, passivity and forward panic. On the other, as the theories become more baroque, they explain violence in a different way: by demonstration. All arguments, this one included, seek to find causal order. When a certain threshold is reached, the pleasure of simple logic is not enough. The theories of violence, in these and many cases, are constructed by the same framework that engenders violence: the attempt to make a larger type of sense, and, within that, to find an agent responsible (or to shift responsibility).

This is not to discount either Pinker's, Collins', or any other theorists work in the sociology of violence. Pinker's assertion that we were more violent in pre-history and history is valuable and well-supported—Collins' observations on the group dynamics of violence equally, if not more, so.
Instead, it could be said that that the explanatory value of such theories remain robust inasmuch as they stay within a purely causal framework, and do not stray beyond the describable purvey. As a theory moves from causal to metacausal, it loses its explanatory power. Furthermore, it is necessary, vital even, to be mindful of what feeling motivation might lie behind the statements, even in such supposedly neutral fields as academia, rationality, and even politics. If the Rousseauian/Hobbesian split divides along conventional liberal conservative politics, this may not be ideological, but a question of identical paradigms utilizing different blame agents and an attempt at the satisfaction of future feelings.

This chapter remains an introduction to theories of confirmation and assignation, and we will return in Chapters 6 and 7 to discuss the case study of soldiers who do not return fire, as well as Collins' forward panic, applying the theory in greater depth. What can be said here is that what is often seen as emotionally neutral may have unseen motives—motives that engender endless debate over the irresolvable. The weakness of both these perspectives lies in the way in which emotion (rage, panic, shame) is not specifically defined, and especially fails to incorporate their manifestations into choice. Given the current state of emotional theory, as we are about to see, this flaw is quite understandable. It now remains to create a replicable structure of thought and feeling that can incorporate emotional choice within an explanatory framework.
Chapter 4: Are Emotions Rational?

The preceding two chapters have, at the very least, served as an introduction and critique of the literatures of the sociology of violence and rationality. Both fields rely on the use of emotional terms, especially when faced with behaviors that cannot be explained. Panic, rage and shame characterize extreme violence, just as fear might invoke immobility. We take 'pride' in our rationality, or are at least ashamed of a future state when we have behaved irrationally. An attempt at a new model of emotion, one that breaks specific named emotions into their component parts of thought and feeling, is the main goal of this thesis. What follows is not even a short review of the philosophy of emotions, although it does contain some introductory features as to the current state of the theory. And although there will be some critiques mounted, the purpose is rather refinement: a distillation of what features are relevant to choice.

'Eureka!' Always Has an Exclamation Mark

Ronald de Sousa argues that there are two schools of emotions, the physiological and the intentional, placing authors like William James and Antonio Damasio in the former and Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum in the latter (de Sousa, 2010: 100). Although there are arguably hundreds, or at least, each version is a combination of these two perspectives, it is nevertheless a useful starting point. In the shortest of shorthand, the physiological school locates the origin of emotion at the site of the body, while the intentional notes the way in which emotions are constructed from beliefs. William James, one of the first to construct a
theory of emotion, is firmly grounded in the physiological. He holds that we feel emotion as a part of a bodily action that follows an event: 'The more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful': James, 1884: 190). James famously uses the example of the bear, of whom we are not afraid, so much as the fear generates as a result of the bodily aftermath: 'Common-sense says...we meet a bear, are frightened and run... Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run...but we should not actually feel afraid' (James, 1890: 449).

Note first that James' is not the only perspective in the physiological school. In fact, his somewhat circular argument (I feel emotion because my body feels it) is used as a strawman to dismiss the useful parts of this perspective. As it happens, there is evidence to show that the feelings generated by actions cause the feelings we associate with emotions. Paul Ekman, for example, found that subjects asked to move the muscles of the face that were associated with an emotion (furrowed brows with anger, for example), began to experience that emotion (Ekman, 1992, cited in Damasio, 2003: 71, see also Ekman, 1990). This would make James' work surprisingly prescient.

The physiological school further privileges the body as the actual site of feeling. The works of Michel Foucault and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who reposition and positivize this denigrated arena of contention, have already attracted writers on war and violence: 'The body, in this view, is "the pivot
of the world"... By centring bodies both in the fleshy material sense and in the emotive sense, Merleau-Ponty’s work has important implications for the way in which we theorise the humane, Merleau-Pontyriters on war and violence: 'Thqvist, 2013: 546). Such a perspective is not unlike the goal of this thesis: to refocus attention away from the rational and towards the usually ignored emotional. The positive aspects of this perspective are best seen as a struggle against the false Cartesian dichotomy of the body (fluid, female, chaos) and mind (orderly, moral, male). This is what Antonio Damasio famously called Descartes' error: 'that thinking, and awareness of thinking, are the real substrates of being...the suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgment, and the suffering that comes from physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the body' (Damasio, 1994: 247–50).

The intentional school would hold that emotions arise from representations of consciousness, instead of vaguely from the body. Here, '(e)motions are intentional: that is, emotions are "about something"' (Solomon, 2001: 11). In this way, it is the beliefs that create the feelings, rather than the body. This tradition goes back as far as Aristotle, who saw fear arising from a 'mental picture' (Aristotle, 1954: 2:5:1–2). Martha Nussbaum bluntly refers to them as 'thoughts' (Nussbaum, 2001; Cates, 2003) and Nico Frijda as 'interests' or 'concerns'—'emotions result from the encounter of an event occurring at some given moment of time with a disposition that the subject carried with him to that moment of time' (Frijda, 1986: 333).

For philosopher Robert Solomon, the intentional aspects present a link with ethics: 'We have noted that emotions are interestingly similar to
beliefs. We can now explain this similarity by claiming that emotions are judgments 'We have noted that emoal judgments'. This school arguably extends into the realm of cognitive psychology, and appraisal, where 'different types of appraisal lead to different emotions; that is, it is not the external object per se that is important, but my belief about (appraisal of) that object' (Power, and Dalgleish, 2008: 25). Usually seen as a therapeutic model, and thus rarely used within philosophy and social theory, cognitive psychology provides a particular structure to emotion. The specificities of this model, or at least a condensation of this school, will be laid out in the next chapter.

Both these perspectives unfortunately have crucial flaws, making their continued use untenable. Just as passivity under fire presents an impossible contradiction to rationality, there are many real-life examples that these theories of emotion struggle to explain. The first—the horror film—may seem a bit odd. It has been theorized at great length within post-modern, feminist and post-modern feminist theory (Williams, 1991; Grixti, 1989), but these are neither theories of emotion, nor social theories. Psychologist James Russell asks if the Jamesian bear creates 'the same emotion Alice experienced when she first saw the film Aliens, even though she knew that she was in no danger, did not flee the theater, enjoyed the experience, and would pay to see it again?' (Russell: 2003, 143). Russell, as we will soon see, thinks that it does not, that there are a multiplicity of emotions not explicable under the rubric of fear. What's scarier, so to speak, is that it may be the same emotion, or rather the same feeling. In other words, this is not a case of two feelings having the same name, only that a mediated experience—a film of a bear—could
produce the same feeling as seeing a bear. In any case, this seemingly everyday experience presents two powerful dilemmas to any theory of emotion, as we are presented with a subject that 1) is able to feel fear in a dark room with no actual threat present, and 2) pays to do it, so the experience of being afraid is pleasurable enough to trade money to undergo the experience.

The horror film, and media in general, is difficult to theorize within the physiological school. Here, the Jamesian bear is both non-existent and pleasurable. Furthermore, there is no bodily action, as per above. The benefits of the intentional school are obvious, if for no other reason than we move out of the circularity of experiencing emotions and feelings bodily (what might be called 'we feel because we feel' argument). Intentionality gives us a higher explanatory value to understanding emotion, helping us, for example, understand the first aspect of the horror film problem (that our mind creates the fear through the appraisal of an image of someone in danger, or a vicarious immersion in a frightening environment). Unfortunately, the second (that we would pay to feel fear) is less well explained. Much of cognitive theory is either goal- or path-based, that we are seeking to achieve or resolve something personally (or evolutionarily) beneficial with our emotions. If this is the case, why would we then seek out a deliberate interruption or upset? Much in the way that rationality eschews emotion, emotional schools eschew theories of pleasure (which may yet return us to the physiological school). How is pleasure, or whatever feeling that causes us to see a horror film, generated?
A hint to an answer appears in our second riddle, which, like horror films, is an exchange of rational capital for feeling: games. How does one explain the pleasure of a crossword, or of collecting all the stars in a video game—the pleasure of completion? Let us call this the Sudoku problem (see Chapter 7 for a more complete analysis), as I am not speaking of the pleasures of violent video games, which would only serve to complicate and distract matters, but of the pleasure of a game itself. Violent games have attracted much attention from a research point of view, less so puzzle games, which are theorized either as neuropsychological (circularly, that, as pleasure, they activate pleasure centers of the brain (Andrews, 2007)), or as tests themselves, of memory, math ability, dementia, and so on. As to the attraction of the 'solve', the moment when the puzzle is complete, there seems to be no interest. This is especially troubling, as the phenomenon of seeking to solve is universal, ancient and pleasurable: we don't conceive of a nonplussed Archimedes discovering the principle of displacement; 'Eureka!' always has an exclamation mark.

The third point is less a riddle that it is a struggle of terms: what, exactly, is an emotion? This question is less semantic than it first seems. In fact, it reveals a deep contradiction within any theory of emotion, be it cognitive, physiological or even philosophical. There are (at least) two aspects to this issue. On one hand, there are a myriad, possibly infinite, kinds of one named emotion. This could additionally be known as the 'so many names' problem, that anger could also be known as, and be a form of, irritation, rage, injustice, indignity, even boredom, just to name a few. This is hardly a new question, as Seneca struggled with the language of Latin: 'Someone who is "angry" might not be "wrathful"; someone who is
"wrathful" might sometimes not be "angry."...we use the terms amarus [bitter] and acerbus [harsh], as also stomachosus [testy] and rabiosus [frenzied] and clamosus [ranting] and difficilis [difficult] and asper [prickly], which are all different forms of anger; you can also include among these morosus [peevish], a hypersensitive sort of wrathfulness' (Seneca, 2010: 18).

Seneca's use of 'a hypersensitive sort of wrathfulness' brings up another point, that emotions can be culturally and historically specific, further complicating any hope of a classification system. James Russell finds that even basic emotions like anger and fear are not universally defined: 'If English language categories regarding emotion are not universal, then we have no guarantee that emotion, anger, fear, and so on are labels for universal, biologically fixed categories of nature. Rather, they are hypotheses formulated by our linguistic ancestors' (Russell, 1991: 444). Even the very term 'emotion' has no cross-cultural definition (Russell, 2003: 153). This extends into the historical school of emotionology (Stearns and Stearns, 1985), where a particular culture influences what emotions are 'appropriate' to express (see Batja and Frijda, 1992, for a review). There may even be culturally unique emotions, like amok in Indonesia, where deep shame can motivation a blind and murderous rage (Averill, 1982). To a large extent, '[n]ot only ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artifacts in man' (Geertz, quoted in Bourke, 2005: 7).

Finally, there is a flipside to the attempt to categorize many emotions under one name, which is that sometimes experiences, choices and feelings that mirror one emotion exactly and should be considered a
manifestation of that emotion, are not. Although we return to James Averill in Chapter 7, we take a glance at his questionnaire study of 1983. Averill found that anger was not so much about personal injury, or even a reaction to a violation, but an imputation of motive: 'the major issue for the person in the street is not the specific nature of the instigating event; it is the perceived justification for the instigator's behavior' (Averill: 1983: 1149–50). If true, and it certainly seems a useful starting point, this formulation adds to our name problem. Here, the act of blaming—an act upon which society rests—follows the identical structure of anger, even though we traditionally see it as emotion-free. Under this understanding, many aspects of society and government, including war, the justice system, and even the very concept of mens rea, could be considered anger. To clarify: we use justice as a guiding principle of modern society. Being that its constitutive elements—assigning blame, feelings of (ethical) violation, and 'teaching' the violator—are essentially identical to that of anger, is it fair or even wise to differentiate between the two? Besides problematizing any hope of defining what emotion is and is not, this furthermore poses the question: what if decisions are being made following the structure of anger, choices and attributions that may contain unbeknownst, or more likely, unacknowledged, feeling?

The solution to the definitional problem is best characterized by the 'basic emotions school'. This is the principle that there are a certain number of basic emotions, whose constitutive parts would then make up the vast number of emotions that Seneca hinted at above: 'this idea is manifested in the belief that there might be neurophysiological and anatomical substrates corresponding to the basic emotions. From a
psychological perspective, basic emotions are often held to be the primitive building blocks of other, nonbasic emotions' (Ortony and Turner 1990: 315). This last quote is taken from Ortony and Turner's survey of the vast number of theories which, in turn, propose a vast number of basic emotions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Fundamental emotion</th>
<th>Basis for inclusion</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arnold (1960)</td>
<td>Anger, aversion, courage, dejection, desire, despair, fear, hate, hope, love, sadness</td>
<td>Relation to action tendencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekman, Friesen, &amp; Ellsworth (1982)</td>
<td>Anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise</td>
<td>Universal facial expressions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frijda (personal communication, September 8, 1986)</td>
<td>Desire, happiness, interest, surprise, wonder, sorrow</td>
<td>Forms of action readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gray (1982)</td>
<td>Rage and terror, anxiety, joy</td>
<td>Hardwired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izard (1971)</td>
<td>Anger, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, guilt, interest, joy, shame, surprise</td>
<td>Hardwired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James (1884)</td>
<td>Fear, grief, love, rage</td>
<td>Bodily involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDougall (1926)</td>
<td>Anger, disgust, elation, fear, subject, tender-emotion, wonder</td>
<td>Relation to instincts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mower (1960)</td>
<td>Pain, pleasure</td>
<td>Unlearned emotional states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panksepp (1982)</td>
<td>Expectancy, fear, rage, panic</td>
<td>Hardwired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutchik (1980)</td>
<td>Acceptance, anger, anticipation, disgust, joy, fear, sadness, surprise</td>
<td>Relation to adaptive biological processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson (1930)</td>
<td>Fear, love, rage</td>
<td>Hardwired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weiner &amp; Graham (1984)</td>
<td>Happiness, sadness</td>
<td>Attribution independent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be clear that the authors above take a somewhat dim view that basic emotions could be so neatly defined. Many psychologists and theorists obviously disagree, citing the universality of facial expressions, for example (Ekman: 1990; 1992). Although an argument can be made for some kind of universality of feeling, the strong cultural factors indicated in the plethora of names would argue that emotional terms may have too many and divergent associations to be the field in which to explore that
option. Ultimately, it may simply be an unproductive avenue of inquiry by virtue of its ceaseless and expanding debate: 'Basic emotion theorists cannot agree whether there are 3, 6, 12 or even more such building blocks, nor is there a consensus building; emotion theories are still procreating like rabbits' (Mandler, 2002: 103).

**Cognito ergo sentio**

'Emotions are a neglected topic, and the neglect of economists is second to none. I find this surprising. I take it that economics is concerned with the best ways of promoting human satisfaction in a world of scarce resources. With one exception, all human satisfaction comes in the form of emotional experiences. The exception is the hedonic satisfaction produced by the senses, such as the taste of sweetness on the tongue or the feeling of wind on your face after a long climb' (Elster, 1996: 1386).

Jon Elster presents us with two interesting conflicts here, both of which I hope we can now resolve. Firstly, the ultimate end of any rational goal is the feeling it generates; there is no such thing as a rational motive. And yet there is no need to reject the structure of rational choice out of hand. We can say that human beings still choose optimally, not according to what they will obtain, but instead according to how they think they will feel. The mechanics of this process are the subject of the next four chapters. As per this quote and this chapter, there can be a useful distinction made between feeling and emotion.

At this point, we can at least understand why emotions are often considered a black box, for even the theories seem to have the
impenetrable quality of the emotions they seek to explain. The path that I suggest is *not to theorize emotion* at all. It is here we return to the second aspect of Jon Elster's quote: feeling. Elster describes the way in which the wind feels on your face after a long climb, or sweetness on the tongue. We could consider this yet another problem for the emotional school, at least in terms of choice: how do these bodily feelings compare with being angry, or happy? What they describe are present-time body experiences, and this leads us to the next step in constructing how people choose.

Feelings and emotions are often used interchangeably; yet in a variety of fields, a clear distinction is made. As simply put as possible: feelings are the present-time feeling states—'the primordial phenomenological characteristic of self-experiencing life' (Strasser, quoted in Ratcliffe, 2010)—while emotions can be thought of as the cognitive, or bodily, processes that may have led to them. In other words, emotions are complex, and largely cognitive; feelings are simple and bodily. For example, panic attacks can manifest in symptoms identical in every way to heart attacks, including arm pain (Clark, 1986; APA, 2009). Here the feelings of the events of the mind mimic exactly the feelings created by the body in a crisis incident. The feeling (sweating, fear, shortness of breath) is experienced as an 'in the moment' state. An actual heart attack can produce identical symptoms, causing many problems during hospital admissions. With these two distinct events, the present-time bodily state (the feeling) is the same with a bodily and cognitive cause, we can see how a feeling might be considered distinct from the emotion that gave rise to it.
This distinction, under different names, has been proposed in a variety of schools. In the neurobiological (the physiological according to de Sousa), Antonio Damasio proposes that 'Feeling, in the pure and narrow sense of the word, was the idea of the body being in a certain way' (Damasio, 2003: 84). Solomon, from the philosophical side, argues the inverse, that emotions cannot be feelings because of their intentionality: 'emotions are not feelings and not occurrences, we have argued, but rather judgments' (Solomon, 2001: 11). Further from philosophy, William Lyons notes that it is the quality of irreducibility that separates the two. Using the work of James Bedford, he states that 'while emotions can be said to be unreasonable, unjustified, or inappropriate, feelings cannot, therefore emotions are not feelings' (Lyons, 1980: 8; Bedford, 1957).

James Russell, from the psychological side, eschews the very definition of emotion, and uses the term 'core affect' to create a better way to discuss the entire field. Linda Barrett builds on this concept with the term 'affective feeling'. For both Barrett and Russell, emotions are a 'folk' concept, an ex post facto construction to describe the bare feelings, and not an accurate representation of the experience (Barrett, 2006; Barrett et al., 2007; Russell, 2003). In other words, emotions arise, to a certain extent, as a way to understand feelings after they have been experienced, rather than a specific set of preordained categories to be triggered.

As with emotion, feeling can be described in the traditional dual axis of valence and arousal. 'Valence' and 'arousal' are terms in a variety of emotional schools that refer to the negative and positive aspects of a feeling or emotion, and the low or high affect or intensity of the feeling or
emotion, respectively (see Introduction). Russell inexplicably renames these as 'displeasure/pleasure' and 'activation/deactivation' (Russell, 2003: 149), just as he has renamed feeling to core affect. The concepts of valence and arousal have been used in rational choice: 'the only relevant aspect of the emotions is their valence' (Elster, 1998: 64; see also Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Johnson and Tversky, 1983), with yet another issue arising from ill-defined emotions—how to compare emotions of a different valence with the same arousal, or vice versa and so on. One critique sees this as a fundamental flaw: 'Implicit in this strategy is the idea that emotions of the same valence should sometimes influence judgement in opposite ways' (Lerner and Keltner 2000: 478).

By posing it as feeling, however, this contradiction is eased. The valence and arousal model allows feelings to be compared, even those of an extremely low affect or arousal. Valence is only necessary when we have emotional 'containers' to define certain experiences, either before or after the fact. On the one hand, the dual axis model is too simple; in terms of choice, for example, a feeling that is more easily comprehended would be more optimal than one that has a higher valence, but is harder to imagine. On the other, it may be too complex, for what matters in making choice is the comparison of only two feeling states. As such, it wouldn't matter what 'rating' a feeling had, or even that one was negative and the other positive, simply that it was possible to compare the two and choose one over the other.

Before addressing how this might affect choice, three major dilemmas have been solved by placing emotions to the side in favor of feeling. The first is the semantic problem. By focusing on feelings instead
of emotions, it clarifies the way in which one emotion may be associated with both positive and negative sensations. The imagination of anger is both unpleasant in its steaming/hot/‘I can't believe you did that' quality. On the other hand, when we imagine a revenge scenario, also an act of anger, we might categorize that as positive: 'attended by a certain pleasure because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance, and the images then called up cause pleasure, like the images called up in dreams' (Aristotle, 1954: 2:2:1). What matters isn't whether or not it is anger, but what precipitated the two (or more) feelings that we may call anger. The feeling may be pleasant. It may be unpleasant. It may be mild, it may be strong, but in naming it (anger), we bring it into the realm of misunderstanding. What can be usefully and consistently described is 1) the structure of the thought (assigning blame, fairness, breaks in expectations, and so on) and the accompanying feeling (positive/negative, mild/strong) that is usually attached to the assignation. By avoiding the folk concepts which link these two events as a single emotion, a clearer and less contested picture of human experience and choice emerges.

The second advantage is a merging of the seemingly diametrical cognitive school and physiological school. That is to say, both the body and a conclusion can lead to a feeling, upon which one could then make a choice. For example, one might be hungry for a cake (feeling 1), but anticipating a sense of pride upon succeeding a diet (feeling 2). As situations change (e.g. exhaustion, the memory of a particular cake, the image of someone in a bathing suit), feeling 1 starts to look better than feeling 2, and we break (or continue) the diet. This is not a rational choice, as Elster attempts to frame it as 'using our future selves as allies' (Elster,
2007: 233). Instead, it is a choice that flows and changes according to, and 
within, the individual feeling and bodily states. Furthermore, it is an 
optimal choice in each case: the mind believes the feeling chosen will be 
better than the one avoided, even if that it turns out not to be the case 
(i.e. the cake was not that good, or the diet didn't matter that much).

This union extends into feelings that are both bodily and cognitive— 
which is to say, all of them. Elster discusses the taste of sweetness on the 
tongue, but what of the individual's history of food (or of diabetes for that 
matter). Seemingly basic impulses like food, sex and even emotion always 
carry a tiny bit of cultural, historical and experiential color. There is no 
reason to extend this into another nature/nurture debate, just to 
acknowledge that it is the memory of experience (cognition) that 
influences us to choose, and the body that experiences the feelings that 
create the end of that choice. Just as an expensive slice of chocolate cake 
might cause us to break our diet while a twinkie would not, all the 
vegetarians I have known go off the wagon with the worst possible meat 
imaginable (e.g. a trip to McDonald's). Feeling is best seen as a continuum 
between the body and the imagination of it. Antonio Damasio famously 
said, 'The mind is embodied...not just embrained', firmly placing him in 
the physiological school. But consider what proceeded that quote:

'What the brain must do to operate in this fashion is come 
into the world with considerable "innate knowledge" about 
how to regulate itself and the rest of the body. As the brain 
incorporates dispositional representations of interactions 
with entities and scenes relevant for innate regulation, it 
increases the chances of including entities and scenes that 
may or may not be directly relevant to survival. And as this 
happens, our growing sense of whatever the world outside 
may be, is apprehended as a modification in the neural
space in which body and brain interact' (Damasio, 1994: 117–18).

Here, the focus on feeling allows cognitive and bodily impulses and sensations to fall along a spectrum, rather than confusedly being either physiological or intentional. 'Feelings...arise from any set of homeostatic reactions, not just from emotions proper' (Damasio, 2003: 84). They are, and will remain, an appropriately messy combination of both.

Our third advantage of a focus on feeling provides the answer to our second riddle: things that are not called emotions, but probably are. It is plausible enough that many times our appraisals lead to emotions; when we are angry, it is always 'at' something, even if that something is an object, a deity, or ourselves. Yet, often, beliefs produce feelings for which we have no name, but which follow the structure of these appraised emotions exactly: belief ➔ confirmation/denial ➔ feeling. As with 'Eureka!' above, Jon Elster proposes that we want to be rational (see Chapter 2). Here, a thought gives rise to a feeling, presumably positive. Without that positive feeling, there is no reason to make the choice (myself in the future having made the rational decision). The simplest way to put it is this: we are always feeling. 'The ecology of emotional life is not one of long periods of nonemotional "normal" life punctuated by the occasional prototypical emotional episode. A frugal ontology may be all that is needed: Emotional life consists of the continuous fluctuations in core affect' (Russell, 2003: 151).

The desire to be rational, the great discovery, the completion of a puzzle, the denial of emotion, the sense of justice—these are the
unnamed emotions. They are emotions in the sense that they follow the same structure as the conventional 'intentional' emotions like anger, shame and even fear: a thought that generates a feeling. So when I began this section with the phrase 'cognito ergo sentio' ('I think therefore I feel'), the word 'therefore' is not used in the grand sense of all-encompassing meaning of life, but in the sense 'and then'. Every thought leads to a feeling—many slight, but always present, despite our pointless denial. It would be possible to go so far as to say that feelings are not mere byproducts of thoughts, but are the guides; thoughts are the means, and feelings the end. But such grandness, while potentially true in many cases, is not necessary. It is only necessary to observe that thoughts lead to feelings. With this structure, it is possible to supersede the common process of attempting to name which type or combination of emotion(s) an individual has experienced. Instead, it is broken down simply: what is the thought; what is the feeling?

Emotions present irresolvable conflicts theory-wise, but there is much to be mined from the cognitive model of emotion, which the next chapter will introduce. Here, emotions and feelings arise from breaks in order. The concept of schema—briefly outlined above as appraisal ➔ feeling—is able to explain many instances of affect, including those that are not usually considered emotions, such as fear-seeking, or the pleasure in games, or greed, or, finally, the attraction of violence. The cognitive path/schema/goal model (the so-called intentional school) will not answer all the questions we have in relation to emotion, but it does provide a structure for many feelings and folk emotions, especially the ones relevant to passive and active individuals under threat of violence and thus
relevant to choice. In retaining the cognitive model, we can effectively talk about how feelings are generated, ways that are typically called fear, shame, anger or disgust, as long as we resist the urge to name them.

This brief chapter has argued that the division of feeling and emotion allows for both a better definition of cognate feelings that are already named emotions, and those that might not be. The physiological and intentional perspectives on emotion may be more intermingled than can be reasonably addressed in this thesis. Since bodies are the site of all feeling, it is necessary to concede that there are abstract features of choice, such as mood or wellness, that will not be modeled here. The focus will be on the cognitive aspect of feeling, for the simple reason that it can be imagined in the future, and therefore as a factor of decision. Robert Solomon has argued that 'emotions are rational', but this is not enough. He continues, 'This is not only to say that they fit into one's overall behavior in a significant way, that they follow a regular pattern...that they can be explained in terms of a coherent set of causes' (Solomon, 2001: 16). It now remains to outline that serial, causal structure in the most concise way possible.
Chapter 5: What is it? The Process and the Importance of Appraisal

Having eschewed terms of emotions as overdetermined, subjective and culturally specific, I will nevertheless retain two cognitive models of emotion, the first of which—schemas—this chapter will outline and then apply to the case study of violence and passivity. It could be said that Chapter 2 (on the subject of rationality) was an introduction to the idea of schemas (also conceived of as 'goals', 'plans', 'expectations', 'frames', and so on). In the case of the reason/passion divide, it could be said that the schools of both rationality and emotion are less a semi-scientific attempt to create a workable model than a feeling-based drive to distinguish what is and what is not acceptable in certain areas of discourse. Although there are still useful ways to define and explain 'irrational' behavior, it remains that we also have a feeling reaction to it. Like the soldier who does not fire back, emotions are best understood as to where they do and do not belong.

Where Dirt Comes From

It is not enough, unfortunately, to pare down the sprawling field of emotion to a more concise description of feeling. It is necessary to define, or at least describe, the way in which feeling arises through the process of causal reasoning. The first step, appraisal, is an act of taxonomy: whether an object, person, group or ourselves fit into a category (or does not). This fit, or lack thereof, generates a feeling. We constantly choose between two feelings generated by these quick apprehensions. This is a process
that happens every fifth of a second or so, but it is a stark one. It is not
the subtle practice of considering many nuances and options (which
occurs over a longer period of a few seconds), but a difference engine, no
doubt a major influence on the use of this paradigm within computing.
This is our corollary of Occam's Razor: not that the simpler theory must be
the correct one, but that the simpler theory will be more descriptive of
the simple activity of present-time consciousness.

The crude and nearly binary aspect of this process is largely a
function of the very small capacity of the so-called 'working memory'. It
would be foolish to describe the entirety of cognition as small, if for no
other reason than the vast and contradictory amount of writing on the
subject. However, we are discussing choice, which takes place in the
moment, something which, by definition, limits its timeframe, and thus its
scale. Although the mind moves quickly from subject to subject, giving the
illusion of a larger and more complex function, the mind can only hold so
many bits of information at one time. Initially, this was thought to be as
many as nine (otherwise known as the rule of seven plus or minus two
(see Miller, 1956)), but it has been revised down to three or four: 'simple
mathematical arguments predict that only configurations of 1, 2 or 3
objects can be recognized. The special case of 4 might also be handled
since it might be coded with only two canonical configurations' (Dehaene,

10. Dehaene, 1997: 125. See also RSVP, or Rapid Serial Visual Processing, where
images, numbers and words are shown to subjects on cards to see if they are retained
in working memory. For example, words in sentence order can be understood at
twelve words a second: when randomized, at five. See Potter, Mary, Nieuwenstei,
Mark and Strohminger, Nina (2008). 'Whole report versus partial report in RSVP
Dehaene notes how groups in A can be held in immediate memory, less so for groups B and C:

Such a small working memory may seem far-fetched at first, but this merely underlines the vital importance of abstraction. If you close your eyes and imagine three or four objects, and then increase the number,
you will notice the way in which the objects begin to group; instead of visualizing six, you might see two groups of three and so on. This is called 'subitizing' (Dahaene, 1993: 12). As numbers grow larger, we use increasing amounts abstraction to count, even as we lack the capacity to know what a million is, ten thousand, or even ten.

Long-term memory is not small, as those working in the field will tell you (Brady et al., 2008). However, the modest capacity of present-time conscious limits—and, more importantly, shapes—the way we access memory, making the latter large, but stark. The intersection between limited present-time consciousness and nearly infinite memory necessitates binaries, a productive function of choice. 'Imagine consciousness as a parallel machine that permits everything currently relevant (or unconsciously active) to come to consciousness all at once. You would be overwhelmed by thoughts, potential choices, feelings, attitudes, etc. of comparable "strength" and relevance' (Mandler, 1997: 488). We are confronted with information: a shape, a color, a noise and so on. This could be, for example, one of the words you are reading right now, which is a familiar, but nevertheless learned, combination of light and dark scratches on paper, or dots on a screen. The present-time consciousness compares this to a vast long-term memory bank, and, being small, simply asks: is this X?

The realm of different layers—memory access, numeracy, rapid serial visual processing and so on—is hardly within the scope of this thesis. Yet, it offers one possible explanation of how a large memory and a small present-time thinking capacity gave rise to a particular type of cognition, referred to from this point on as a schema. This is a term proposed by
Mardi Horowitz under his work for post-traumatic stress disorder (Horowitz, 1986; 1998), a field that will offer addition insights into war violence and its psychological effects. What is a schema? Horowitz rather unfortunately defines it as: 'an organized composite of multiple features that persists unconsciously to organize mental processes and perhaps produce derivatives for conscious representation' (Horowitz, 1990: 303). For the purposes of this argument, the term will be used more widely and definitively, that is a category into which a cognitive appraisal either fits or does not.

Similar paradigms have been proposed in the same field of cognitive emotional psychology under the names 'goals' (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987; Power and Dagliesh, 2008), 'concerns' (Frijda, 1986; 1988), and 'plans' (Mandler, 1982; Pibram and Melges, 1969). Obviously, there are differences between each of these and other formulations, evident from their names alone. Nevertheless, it could be said that there is some agreement here. Consider, for example, the division into stages presented in Michael Power and Tim Dagliesh's SPAARS model (Schematic, Propositional, Analogical, and Associative Representation Systems). Here, the event moves through one or more of these (propositional, analogical and so on) systems to reach an emotion, from event, to analog (how it is interpreted), to associative (what it is related to), to 'output systems'—that is the psychological or interpretive reaction (Power and Dagliesh: 2008, 152–56).

Rational theorists Timothy Wilson and Daniel Gilbert likewise present the AREA (AREA: attend, react, explain and adapt) model to explain affective adaptation: that is, why we initially react strongly to bad news,
and then acclimate to it. As such, the event is quickly appraised as either 'explained and/or self-relevant' or 'unexplained self-relevant', which in turn causes a 'strong affective reaction' (Wilson and Gilbert: 2008, 370–71).

 Appropriately, this goal-based (self-interested) model has further been proposed as a motivator in combat:

'1. "What is it all about?" That is, is the perceived situation sufficiently clear that it can be understood and thus acted on?  
2. "Does this concern me?" That is, even if I understand, do I consider this relevant for me at this point in time?  
3. "Can I do something about it?" That is, even if I understand and consider it relevant, do I have the potential to cope with ita 'strong affective rea' (Shalit, 1988: 6).  

There is a strong danger in these models where emotions are often imprisoned, ironically by their own rationality. With the use of the terms 'goal' or 'plan', there is a tendency to focus on the way the feeling is generated according to how it affects the individuals. For example, Power and Daglish note that: 'In SPAARS, emotions are primarily appraisal based and appraisals are a function of goals; thus, within SPAARS, emotions are explicitly functional' (Power and Daglish: 2008, 167). When confronted with so-called 'aesthetic emotion', feelings toward beautiful objects, they pull a bit of a theoretical sleight of hand: 'These examples illustrate that any theory of emotion is necessarily complex and that there is, as yet, no completely adequate theory' (Power and Daglish: 2008, 176). In other words, the theory works, except when we need it to the most: to explain feeling generated by things and people that do not affect us in any
substantive way. Given the subject of this thesis, if the effect on the (physical) self was a paramount factor, the soldier would always fire back. He or she does not.

To resolve this, it is simply a matter of jettisoning the ego, so to speak. The focus on the self, its motives, desires, and survival is a perfectly understandable and appropriate perspective from a psychologically therapeutic environment—it is the subject of the subject, so to speak. Instead of thinking of the self (usually male) as a discrete individual, it behooves us to imagine the self as the blurry boundary between consciousness and the world. In other words, if the self is the way the world we imagine sees us back, the schema—how the world is constructed into comprehensible discrete categories—defines not just the world, but who and where we are. There are no objectively real threats—e.g. a black man drinking from a water fountain labeled 'white', or gay marriage—but both examples invoke schemic breaks which threaten the defined self. Reading a newspaper produces a similar effect: anger over the injustice of an event that has no relation to the person reading it, and over which that person has no power. As such, we jettison the dual question: 'what is it?' and 'how does it affect me?', and replace it with the simpler: 'is it safe?'.

As such, and to obtain a more concise and complete version of what a schema is, it is vital to look beyond just one discipline. Support for schemas—the impact categorical conceptions have on people's emotional and social lives—can be found in anthropology, rationality, international relations, abnormal psychology, philosophy, and even the physiological school of emotions. First, from anthropology, the term 'safe' (above)
recalls one of the clearest descriptions of what a schema might be, from Mary Douglas' book *Purity and Danger*. dirt is matter out of place. Here, a feeling is generated through the belief in a system of categorization, and then a reaction when something does, or does not fit. What is especially relevant to Douglas' observation is the way it reaches across cultures and individuals. Although what specifically qualifies as dirty is never universal, there is dirt, and we will have a markedly similar feeling reaction to it ('There is no such thing as absolute dirt' (Douglas, 1984: 2)). This concept of schema can apply to oneself, one's group, to others, to other groups, to events, even to emotions, as seen with the break between good rational motivations and bad emotional ones.

The concept of schema further mirrors the 'representativeness heuristic', from the bounded rationality, or the heuristics and biases school of rationality. Although touched on briefly in Chapter 2, this describes the act of choosing not according to optimal outcome, but according to a particular bias or heuristic, such as why people might believe in a run of luck, betting on red after six reds: 'In answering such questions, people typically rely on the representativeness heuristic, in which probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A is representative of B...when A is highly representative of B, the probability that A originates from B is judged to be high' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974:1124). What's interesting about this particular heuristic is the specificity with which they describe the importance of categorization (i.e. 'representative of') in the act of choice.

From social psychology is the concept of the 'cognitive miser', which was specifically designed to explain racial prejudice (Taylor, 1981; Fiske,
2000; Fiske and Taylor, 2013). Based on the work of Gordon Allport (Allport, 1954), Susan Fiske proposes that prejudice arises not out of bad Freudian experience (that the subject in question was taught to hate), but as a manifestation of cognitive shortcutting: 'That is, people oversimplify their experience by selectively attending to certain features of the information within the environment and by forming categories, concepts, and generalizations to deal with vast quantities of available data' (Taylor et al., 1978: 778). Although Fiske has since backpedalled from this position, the concept remains another instance in which a schema manifests as an individual cognition attempts manage, so to speak, the social world. We will return to the concept of the cognitive miser and how it might apply to the experience of combat exhaustion further down.

Further linking up the experience of schemic violations with violence is the work of Benedict Anderson. To a certain degree, this is the subject of Benedict Anderson's analysis of ethnic and nationalistic violence, what he calls 'imagined communities'. Anderson's theory is problematic as he sees nationalism arise from 'dynastic realms' (the religious and sovereign authorities of the earlier historical period), without explaining how these themselves arose. Nevertheless, there is a strong categorical component: 'It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them,

Nor, ultimately, can we blame unethical behavior on faulty but morally neutral programming of the human information-processor' (Fiske: 2004: 118). Even at the explanatory level, there is the utterly subjective use of the word 'blame', which is what many of the social analysis revolves around: apportionment and assignation of individual responsibility as ethical process. Fiske is correct that prejudice is not 'neutral'; it is merely a question of how such categorizations occur under pressure of affect, a process to be outlined in the next two chapters.
yet in the minds of each lives the *image of their communion* (emphasis added, Anderson, 2006: 6; see also Girard, below). If we combine this perspective with Douglas' concept, the term 'ethnic cleansing' is doubly troubling, since it both implies something like a territory may be categorized according to the dirty presence of a certain group, and further brings terms that are inherently charged into political decision making: 'Dying for the revolution also draws its grandeur from the degree to which it is felt to be something fundamentally pure' (Anderson, 2006: 144).

From the physiological perspective, schemas are very similar to Damasio's formulation 'dispositional representations', which 'exist in potential state, subject to activation, like the town of Brigadoon... Dispositional representations constitute our full repository of knowledge, encompassing both innate knowledge and knowledge acquired by experience' (Damasio, 1994: 104). Again, the advantage of Damasio's formulation is the inclusion of bodily and cognitive models. For Damasio, this tendency towards categorization is imagistic, as it arises out of a model generated by the body, namely 'neural representations', 'which consist of biological modifications created by learning in a neuron circuit, become images in our minds' (Damasio, 1994: 100). This is not unlike one of Damasio's predecessors, Fritz Heider, who noted the way in which visual, and thus cognitive, processing constructs: 'a stable phenomenal world for the person who is bombarded by unstable patterns of sensory stimulation. As one circles an egg, the size and shape of the retinal images are constantly changing, yet one perceives the egg's shape as invariant' (Gilbert, 1998: 95).
PTSD is the origin point of this use of the term schema, and although the experience of guilt and trauma in violence will be explored further, it is useful to touch on how this field imagines a schema. Mardi Horowitz's take is that it wasn't so much fear or death that manifested stress, but the 'central idea is that traumatic events shatter people’s basic beliefs and assumptions' (Brewin and Holmes, 2003: 344). This is able to explain why any of number of events can cause a later stress reaction: not just fear of death, but experience of others' deaths; not just experience of others' deaths but one's own participation, and so on. Thus, not only are drone pilots subject to PTSD (Chappelle et al., 2012), but are now found to have an even higher incidence of mental health problems than their active flying counterparts (Otto and Webber, 2013)—pilots in actual physical danger, versus those who experience none.14 Outside of moral implications (or perhaps generative of them), The Intact Body represents a kind of schema that violence violates:

'One moment, they would be laughing and joking with him with a twinkle in their eyes about what they would do when they left Vietnam. The next moment, they would be dead, lying in the grass or mud with a poncho covering them until they were picked up by a chopper and taken to "Graves Registration."... He was now burdened with unfinished business. Every night, the faces of his dead buddies visited him in his dreams. He saw their gray, cold faces, eyes open, staring out into space' (the experience of 'Joe', quoted in Paulson and Krippner, 2007: 89).

12. See Chapter 6 for a more complete discussion of violence trauma and unmanned aircraft.
As such, we are not so much talking about a 'rational' view that violence is bad or wrong, or that disgust at violence is natural, but the simple idea that bodies and people should be one way, and war violence renders them another. The following is written from the therapeutic point of view, but applies here: 'For example, a person expects a limb, an eye, or a body organ to always be present, both functionally and as a part of his or her self-image. If the person loses a body part or undergoes an amputation, a safe world can become a zone of terror' (Horowitz, 2003: 4).

In keeping with the perspective of methodological individualism, it is important to remember that schemas can be experienced with the exact opposite result. Also from Paulson and Krippner's book, a different post-war guilt is experienced, this time by the author: 'One major area of guilt for me was that I had tried to kill 21 NVAs as a personal birthday present to myself for my twenty-first birthday; having killed only 20 1/2, I was extremely upset. Someone else had finished off the twenty-first NVA for me, and I was credited with only one-half a body count for that one' (Paulson and Krippner, 2007: 102). As with the expectation that bodies should be whole and living, other, contrary, expectations are built. These schemas function in the same way: interruption causes upset. Interestingly, this guilt would later transform for the author into moral guilt over having killed: a dilemma where two categorical representations were in conflict.

These may be two useful ways of seeing how schemas manifest in combat, yet guilt and pleasure in completion are more subjects of agency, how completions or breaks relate to what intentions were present—a
topic that is the subject of Chapters 6 and 7. What matters here is the way in which schemas describes the universe, its stability, and our relationship with it. As we approach our case study and how we introduce the subject is via the experience of what happens when a schema cannot be found. If this is a process described by appraisal leading to feeling, an appraisal must be made. In the instant before we find dirt or purity, justice or violation, us or them, we must first find a category for our experiential impressions. Sometimes, there is no schema to describe an event, experience or sensation. This feeling of not knowing is a powerfully negative one, and can now, finally, begin to explain the contradictory behavior of our case study.

The Unknown

The fundamental nature of categorization cannot be overemphasized; we very literally are unable to function without it. Schizophrenia is a rare but extreme pathology, one in which the affected individuals are unable to perform even basic social or individual self-maintenance functions. Its manifestation is theorized by some as an inability to parse. This is the sense of being overwhelmed by information, the feelings, images and sensations that most people easily process under the constant flow of cognition: 'Difficulties with metaphor processing in schizophrenia are thought to reflect degradation of the semantic system so that it fails to represent the figurative relationships upon which metaphorical interpretation depends' (Humprey et al., 2010: 290). In their influential study of schizophrenia, this is what McGhie and Chapman
called 'the loss in the selective function of attention': 'Everything is in bits. You put the picture up bit by bit into your head. It's like a photograph that's torn in bits and put together again... If you move, it's frightening' (McGhie and Chapman, 1961: 106). The experience of schizophrenics can be seen on a scale: the fear (for our purposes, the strong negative feeling) of being situationally unplaced. This ranges from schizophrenia to the anxiety of dementia patients to the mundane forgetting of a close friend's name: 'Am I losing my mind?'

Joanna Bourke opens her article on fear in combat with a poem from World War I poet Shawn O'Leary:

'– And I
I mow and gibber like an ape
But what can I say, what do?
There is no saying or no doing.'

She adds that 'as historians we cannot leave it at that' (Bourke, 2001: 315). In an attempt to rise to this challenge, this sensical anarchy should be seen as a perfect encapsulation of how feeling is generated by cognitive processes in the schemic theory outlined above. If we as individuals are constantly parsing data and applying to what we know for a 'fit', it follows that not being able to do so would generate a negative feeling; that uncertainty, best understood as a schemic break, is a major factor in producing negative feelings, feelings we sometimes call fear. This is best understood when we compare it to a fear of death, which is the commonsense understanding of fear in battle. This can now be understood, not as separate from these uncertainties, but as incorporated in them. Being under fire or even under threat is not just the fear of the
physical danger, but the prolonged experience of not being able to categorize.

We may be tempted to call this feeling terror, but we should be careful. Fear in combat could be considered at field in itself (Bourke, 2001; 2005; Dollard, 1943; Grossman, 1996; 2008; Grossman et al., 2000; Holmes, 2003; Marshall, 1947; Shaffer, 1947; Stouffer et al., 1947). It is easily the most studied emotion in combat, and perhaps the most studied topic, at least in terms of individual soldiers. For example, many soldiers interviewed reported consistently high fears of 'being seen a coward' (Shaffer, 1947; Dollard, 1943; Bourke, 2001), or 'of letting your buddies down' (Marshall, 1947; Shalit, 1988). Many times, these fears were reported higher than fear of death, a challenge to rationality on its own.

Unfortunately, given the semantic problem outlined above, what fear are we talking about? The fear of being considered a coward is a complex cognitive event. In terms of this thesis, it might be called negative apprehensions of a future feeling state of self-assignated causality, 'shame', or rather, the anticipation of shame, which is a different state entirely. How does this compare to the 'gibbering' of which O'Leary speaks? They are both called fear, but they are as different as can be; their only commonality is our displeasure in experiencing them. Self-assignated causality is the subject of the next chapter. This chapter is a very narrow introduction to the schemic theory using its first stage: not knowing. This uncertainty could be seen as the first part of the process of cognitive feeling states; before we can even create a category, we experience the

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13. This is by way of demonstration, this is not even a complete list of sources on this topic for this chapter.
'what is it?' moment, which usually lasts a microsecond (or so), after which we then fit the perception into one of our categories. In dangerous situations, the unfamiliarly of the situation makes this categorical scrambling a sustained experience. In this theory's explication, I will attempt to demonstrate two things: the first is that many feelings that we name fear, even the fear of death, are largely cognitive in nature, even in combat—especially in combat, one might say. Secondly, and specifying this cognitive process further, not knowing, as represented by a schemic break, is a major factor in producing negative feelings: feelings we sometimes call fear.

To demonstrate the schemic nature of the feeling of not knowing, consider Laurance Shaffer's study of veterans of bomber missions, which, during World War II was statistically one of the most dangerous forms of combat, with only 26.8 percent of veterans surviving 25 missions (Sherry, 1987: 205). Like Dollard, Shaffer had similar findings in regard to fear of death, with first-time flyers reporting fear of being a failure (40 percent) or a coward (22 percent) over death (18 percent). And, if we can look at 'factors to increase fear in combat', what we find is a clear indication of the strong negative feelings associated with not knowing. The second of these (and we will address the others shortly) was '[s]omeone reporting an enemy plane that you can't see', at 80 percent. The specificity of this is extremely telling, indicating that it was not so much the threat the plane represented, but not knowing its location and not being able to place it. One of Dollard's interviewees specifically reported that the fear of their first battle was due to "not knowing what to expect" (Dollard, 1943: 17). This lack of fit, as opposed to the perception of physical danger, is best
expressed in one soldier's first utterly non-ironic impression of battle: 'They must be mad. Don't they know it's very unsafe shooting things at other people?' (David Tinker, killed in the South Pacific, quoted in Holmes, 2003: 146).

The emotional power of a lack of contextual 'fit' in combat is further supported by the idea of stress inoculation (Grossman, 2008: 104; Holmes, 2003: 53), practiced in its primitive form during World War II as live fire exercises. The idea, at its heart, is that combat is something that an individual can acclimate to, and that explosions, bullets whizzing overhead and so on can be habituated—familiar even. Whether or not this inoculation actually works, it is true that soldiers report a reduction in fear from their first time in combat to later, implying that one could become accustomed to certain aspects of combat (Dollard, 1943: 13). This supports the folk belief that the veteran will feel less fear than the 'green' soldier. In regard to the trenches of World War I: 'Gradually, they habituated to the frightening sights and sounds of the front and developed what Franz Schauwecker, an ex-front officer turned amateur psychologist, termed Dickfähigkei (“thick-skinnedness”)’ (Watson, 2006: 251).

An interesting exception to the idea that fear decreases over exposure to combat is the AAF flyers, many of whom reported an increase in fear as they continued to fly missions (Shaffer, 1947: 140; see also 'Combat fatigue', below). Given the actual risk is significantly higher than their battlefield counterparts, this is perfectly understandable. However, we must consider another factor. As Shaffer found that a percentage (29 percent to 20 percent) of the flyers' fears decreased over time, he
concluded that it was '[t]he uncontrolled factor of variation in the difficulty of missions probably affected these figures'. What remains when all other experiential data is removed is the uncertainty of the event.

To further stress the importance of uncertainty as feeling, we then examine the first and third factors to increase fears in combat, which were '[b]eing fired on when you have no chance to shoot back', at 85 percent, and '[s]eeing enemy tracers' at 74 percent. The experience of being out of control in a dangerous situation is a familiar one, one which has led to the model of 'learned helplessness'. The famed study that originated this concept was broken down into two groups: the 'naive' dog and the control. The former would be placed in an area with a shock floor, and barrier that allowed escape. After a few seconds of running around, the dog would discover how to jump the barrier, and when placed in the same area again, would quickly leap again until it was so fast, it wasn't shocked at all. The second group was subjected to shocks of random duration and intensity, and then put into the escapable room. Like the first dog, 'he runs around frantically for about 30 sec., but then stops moving, lies down, and quietly whines. After 1 min. of this, shock terminates automatically. The dog fails to cross the barrier and escape from shock...' On the next trial, the dog again fails to escape. At first, he struggles a bit and then, after a few seconds, seems to give up and passively accept the shock' (Meier and Seligman, 1976: 4; see also Seligman et al., 1968). Given the named theory of the study—'learned helplessness'—it is arguable and perfectly understandable that it is the soldier's lack of ability to respond, his or her powerlessness is the major factor in creating this feeling, and
not the one of uncertainty or a lack of fit into a particular structure of beliefs as proposed.

There are two reasons why powerlessness may not be the crucial factor, and why instead this feeling may be generated out of the perception of disorder. The first is Seligman's study itself. He notes that the shocks given to the dogs were random (Maier and Seligman, 1976: 7); this would have been crucial for his work in particular. Why? That year (actually 1968, when the original study had been conducted), he had conducted a similar, although less famous, study with rats. In this experiment, he sought to understand the difference between random and regular shocks, and found that the rats that received random shocks developed stomach ulcers and finally stopped eating, while the rats who received regular shocks—in the same amount—did not, and continued eating. He concluded that '[t]his prediction of safety may be at least as important for an organism as the prediction of danger' (Seligman, 1968: 405). Military historian Richard Holmes has already noted the implications of these types of studies for combat, noting that 'knowledge about when to expect the punishment served to reduce the threat' (Holmes, 2003: 233).

The second reason that helplessness or powerlessness may not, in and of itself, be the major factor in the feeling that we commonly attribute to 'fear' is the structure of the army itself, namely authority. Although the feeling operation of authority is a subject for Chapters 6 and 7, what we can discuss here is that lacking power is described as both increasing and decreasing the sense of fear, where 'Having confidence in your equipment' (93 percent), 'Having confidence in your crew' (92
percent) and 'Having confidence in the technical ability of your immediate superior or commanding officer' (88 percent) were the top three factors in decreasing fear in combat (Shaffer, 1947: 142). Each of these does not represent one's own ability, the classic and individuated rational subject, but one in which giving up one's own control reduces fear. Furthermore, each of these represents a type of ordered schemic belief: equipment that works, buddies and a commander that will act bravely. In other words, if we seek 'powerlessness' as the only common factor of fear, or even as a consistent negative feeling, it sometimes is, and sometimes is not. On the other hand, the way matter out of place increases fear, just as matter in its place decreases it, seems to argue for a kind of schemic mismatch as a common factor.

The other advantage to a schemic argument (as opposed to a sociological model, for example) is the way in which it can explain a variety of behavior. If we return briefly to Dehaene's concept of limited present-time consciousness, it becomes easy to turn statistics into absolutes. For example, if a majority of soldiers acclimate to battle, it presents as an interesting puzzle: why do soldiers acclimate to battle? Instead, some soldiers do, some do not, and there are even some that report never having had any fear of battle (Dollard, 1943; Shaffer, 1947; Stouffer, et al., 1947). This too, could be understood under a schemic approach, that fear of death is but one of many fears which might or might not be experienced, and not an absolute.

With suicide bombers, passivity and even the choice of combat itself, people are willing to die in ways that rationality cannot explain. One of the ways which this might be understood is seeing one's own physical body as
but one of the schemic categories we process. This is not such a stretch, since the body, its health, its safety and its future exists in some fashion within our imagination. Ideally, it would be high on the list of priorities, but if we consider the greatest fear in combat (being a coward, where the projected behavior doesn't fit with the belief of being brave, and more importantly, being seen by others this way), we know this schema is more important than the maintenance of one's physical body. Although other anticipated feelings are in play, what could be said is that there is negative feeling attached to uncertainty, and death is defined under this feeling—as itself a kind of uncertainty—rather than the other way around.

The powerful negative feelings generated by uncertainty or lack of fit can even lead to a choice where death is preferable to not knowing. A contemporary societal example of this are the families whose members are missing, whose status is unknown. This is what psychologist Pauline Boss called 'ambiguous loss' (Boss, 1999); in the case of those with family members with dementia (Boss' area of research) or missing children, it is not just the loss, but the not knowing, which interrupts the grieving process: 'The stumbling block for families of missing people is that often there is no explanation, so the progression to being able to "emotionally accept the loss" is virtually an impossibility' (Glassock, 2009: 45). The work in this area, for obvious ethical reasons, is more therapeutic than research-based; it would be useful, but academically impossible, to conduct aggregate interviews with families of missing children, using families with dead children as a baseline. Nevertheless, this phenomenon provides useful qualitative information, as many families report the same experience over and over, that knowledge of death is better than the
persistent uncertainty: "It's tough, but it's better than not knowing where they are" (Benjamin, 2005); "The not knowing that kills you" (Walsh, quoted in Gray, 2012); "That has got to be the worst thing that can happen to a parent, even worse than knowing they died" (Frankel, 2013). Here, the negative outcome (that the family member is dead) is preferable to the uncertain one. In contemporary Kashmir, this ambiguity manifests as the 'half-widow':

![Photo](Photo credit: BBC News, 12 December 2013)

Here the priority is clear: we just want to *know*.

This leads, tangentially, to the fourth greatest factor to increase fear in combat: 'Feeling that you have been in so long that the law of averages is bound to catch up with you' (Shaffer, 1947: 140). This is what is commonly known as the gambler's fallacy, which is seen as part of the 'representativeness heuristic' in the bounded rationality school, as discussed above. Put simply, the roll of the dice (or chances of being shot down) are always the same each time, but we attribute these chances
differently: 'After observing a long run of red on the roulette wheel, for example, most people erroneously believe that black is now due, presumably because the occurrence of black will result in a more representative sequence than the occurrence of an additional red as comprehensible' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974: 1125).

The above is a perfectly reasonably, and even consistent, explanation. However, as per the earlier critique of Chapter 2, this rationalist perspective still suffers from being descriptive rather than explanatory; it names a phenomenon, but not the structures, choices or beliefs that lay behind it. This time, the failure is compounded by the fact that it does not explain the variety of behavior experienced by the those in combat. For example, historian Alex Watson found the converse phenomenon in soldiers from World War I, and that besides this kind of fatalism discussed in Shaffer, on the part of some soldiers, there was 'an inner conviction that they themselves will not be killed' (Watson, 2006: 256). Furthermore, 'Often, fatalism was skewed. Plaut referred to the "elation of being able to die in the middle of wanting to live" and Captain H.W. Yoxall similarly found that in the trenches "while life becomes more desirable death seems less terrible"' (Watson, 2006: 252). Against the representativeness heuristic, which requires that the subject create a paradigm based on a uniform pattern, not only could the same subject experience both the belief in a positive and negative outcome, but this could occur at almost at the same time.

A greater explanatory value may lay in a deeper examination of Tversky and Kahneman's formulation: 'The heart of the gambler's fallacy is a misconception of the fairness of the laws of chance' (emphasis added,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1971: 106). Additionally, 'Chance is commonly viewed as a self-correcting process in which a deviation in the opposite direction to restore the equilibrium' (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974: 1125). What is happening here, as well as with relatives of the missing, is a kind of cognitive conversion, a fast and dirty version of what Ian Hacking calls the taming of chance. On the one hand, there are the numerical risks, which are random and ultimately incomprehensible, a fact made clearer and clearer by the length of the tour of duty. On the other hand, there is the schema of the fairness—of what is supposed to, or will, happen. This is not fairness in the larger sense of justice, but in the sense of balance. Thus, it is not representative of one particular side or another, as long as some sense of order emerges. Taken together, this indicates that both a negative certainty (I am doomed) and a positive certainty (I am invincible) trumps an uncertainty, underlining the vital importance of making schemic order, even if it creates the expectation of death.

**How Uncertainty Affects Passivity**

How would this narrow application of schemic theory—the experience of pre-schemic uncertainty—apply to our case study? Given that passivity does not occur in every person (some shoot, some do not, some run, etc.), it is probable that the subjects who do not shoot are themselves imbued with a variety of motives, and, as such, a single action may have more than one explanation. For example, some have argued that phenomenon is due to the 'taboo' of taking a life (Grossman, 1996; Collins, 2010). Given the nature of taboo in relation to schema, we will
discuss that in greater length in the next chapter. The subject of this chapter is the feelings generated during the experience of uncertainty. How might this be a factor in the act of not shooting back?

It might be enough to say that not shooting back would be the natural (sic) result of 'freezing': when we are afraid, we can't move. This is not fight or flight, but what is known in ethological circles as 'tonic immobility' (Archer, 1979; for a review, see Volchan et al., 2011). This term adds a third option to fight or flight, the more academic version of 'I just froze'. Archer argues that it is adaptive: for example, a song thrush, by freezing, escapes his cat, the 'would-be predator startled by the bird's sudden resurrection' (Archer, 1979: 67). One could dismiss this conclusion based on the fact that this is an individual observation, but from an empirical point of view, the argument that tonic immobility is adaptive is quite possibly where the utter fatuousness of the 'evolutionary' argument of behavior reaches its nadir—that freezing and being leaving oneself to be killed by a predator is adaptive.

Instead, and given that animals (and humans) can also think,\textsuperscript{16} the cognitive model, especially the schemic one, is a better explanation. The subject, whether animal or human, is overwhelmed by an inability to know how to fit what's going on into a familiar category. What are headlights to us would appear utterly baffling (like twin lights of the sun moving quickly?) to a deer, and hence the expression. For soldiers, we observe similar freezing, but also other strong, non-adaptive reactions,

including running into fire: 'He stands up in a firefight because his judgment is clouded and he cannot understand the likely consequences of his behavior. He loses his ability to move and seems paralyzed' (MCRP, 2000: 15).

Combat, for some individuals (but not all) represents a problem 'too difficult for the typical human mind to solve' (Gilovich and Griffin, 2002: 4), an extension of what has been proposed under the 'cognitive miser' model, as discussed above. Cognitive miser is not used here in its intended sense, but as a model to understand limits: that there is only so much cognition to go around. Many studies, and common sense, show that stress (Sarason, 1984; Eysenck and Calvo, 1992; Milburn and Watman, 1981) and anxiety (Eysenck, 1992) reduce an individual's ability to perform simple cognitive tasks. This is known as 'attentional control theory', or 'processing efficiency theory'. As with Dehaene's work, and the 'peritraumatic dissociation' discussed in the first chapter, it follows that many people struggle to process the noises, violence, and inexplicable experience of live fire, and thus experience a kind of cognitive shutdown.

Even without the existing research on the subject, it is possible to say that the brain has limits, and that there are physiological manifestations when those limits are reached. A different way to understand this is not that one system (emotion) negatively impacts the other (thinking), the old mind/body rearing its ugly schism yet again. Instead, '[o]ne effect involves cognitive interference by preempting the processing and temporary storage capacity of working memory. The worrisome thoughts consume the limited attentional resources of working memory, which are therefore less available for concurrent task processing' (Eysenck et al., 2007: 336).
So, as part of the same system, stress, fear, or any emotion, reduces cognitive problem solving because the feeling itself is a form of cognitive problem solving. If we have limits, one form of cognition or attention or attribution reduces another.

To demonstrate the idea of cognitive resource management, there is further the phenomenon of involuntary defecation, especially in initial combat. This has been reported in wars as far back as the Punic campaigns, where the changing color of the uniforms were the subject of Aristophanes' plays, redefining war as 'the terrible one, the tough one, the one upon the legs' (Aristophanes, quoted in Hanson, 2009: 104). Richard Holmes estimated involuntary urination and defecation between five percent and 21 percent, and six percent and 10 percent, respectively (Holmes, 2003: 205), just as Dollard quantified in his study involuntary defecation at five percent and urination at six percent (Dollard, 1943: 19). Like many symptoms of fear (pounding heart, sweat, trembling), this is considered to be a bodily reaction, reinforced by the way in which animals might do the same thing (Gray, 1987: 35–9; Hall, 1934).

From a cognitive perspective, however, the control of one's bowels is not autonomic, like heartbeat and breathing. For humans (and even rats), this is something that is learned. Although this thesis has attempted to eschew neurological explanations, an image of that model could be helpful here. Bowel control is thought to be part of midbrain, more specifically the periaqueductal gray (PAG) (Yaguchi et al., 2004), while choice and conscious thought is found in the forebrain, more specifically the frontal lobe. If the brain was being taxed, one can imagine a kind of
resource management strategy, using parts of the brain to process is not usually brought into play.

This idea may be more conjecture than hypothesis, and upon learning that involuntary urination and defecation can also be found in rats, this seemed to be even more of a dead end. That is, until a closer examination of the individual case studies were made. First of all, rats, like humans, learn to control their bowels, in that they do not fowl their nests or homes. Secondly, and most interestingly, the link between involuntary urination and fear was found in what was called The Open Field Test, first described by Calvin Hall (Hall, 1934). Here, the animal is taken from its usually enclosed environment to a large, open and illuminated space (hence the name of the test), where it often urinates, and, as with tonic immobility above, freezes.

Given what the animal is experiencing is utterly unique, is it the same sensation that we might call in the fear in the recognized predator? Instead, it is the feeling generated from the perception of the undefined and undefinable, following the 'normal' experience of the understood and mapped structure of the cage. With the later addition to the test of alternating lights and noises (Hofer, 1970, cited in Walsh and Cummins, 1987), the experience is not so different from the extremes of combat, at least from the point of view of the rat. Although the physiology of what happens to the brain under overload remains unresolved, at the very least, this demonstrates some strong cognitive element to what first appears to be natural or physiological. Furthermore, it is in keeping with what seems to be a consistent finding: that one strong cognitive activity (as with peritraumatic disassociation and stress) limits another.
If we return to the Gettysburg rifles from Chapter 1, we imagine many soldiers, under fire, reloading their weapons, over and over, some as many as 37 times. As this was before the psychological work carried out during World War II, we can see this as an unconscious form of fear management. The interviewees of Shaffer's (and Dollard's) studies agreed that the focus on tasks was an important way to fight fear (Shaffer, 1947: 142). Like the act of counting to ten, concentration (e.g. checking their gear or counting their ammunition) fought the chaos around them and made that feeling less accessible to present time consciousness. In other words, the narrow specificity of the action is a preferential tonic to the wide uncertainty of the combat environment. Purely unconsciously, this may be why the soldiers at Gettysburg reloaded their rifles over and over and over. The simple task was all that was left available within the cognitive processing headroom. Unintentionally, the men who designed this classic form of drill training gave the soldiers a task of many steps to focus on. Without realizing that the men may not want to fire (we will come to the taboo against violence in the next chapter), the complexity of this sequence meant that the removal of one step (firing the weapon) was incidental.

Over a longer time frame, another demonstration of cognitive limits under combat is the consistent manifestation of 'shell shock', 'combat fatigue', or 'combat stress reaction', i.e. psychiatric causalities of war. Having covered various reactions to the initial exposure to combat, what is of interest here is Swank and Marchand's finding of prolonged combat, the so-called '60-day rule'. In the unprecedented theatre of World War II, 'under conditions of continuous long and severe stress which (were)
infrequently, if ever, obtained before' (Swank and Marchand, 1946: 236), soldiers were called upon to fight in actual combat for extended periods of time, rather than the more common fight and wait around system found in armies up to and after that point. This is what differentiates the experience from the stress inoculation discussed above: unceasing fighting. They found the initial breakdown phase as above, but also found that virtually no soldier was immune to breakdown after about 60 days of combat exposure:

There are two things of importance to the thesis here of cognitive overwhelm. The first is the consistency (and the small exception): 'One thing alone seems certain: practically all infantry soldiers suffer from a neurotic reaction eventually if they are subjected to the stress of modern combat continuously and long enough' (Swank and Marchand, 1946: 243). The exception was how they referred to the psychotic man, 'No personality type dominates this small, "abnormal," group, but it is
interesting that aggressive psychopathic personalities, who were poorly disciplined before combat, stand out', following with this interesting footnote: 'This seemed true when this paper was written, in November 1944. Since then we have concluded that all normal men eventually suffer combat exhaustion in prolonged continuous and severe combat. The exceptions to this rule are psychotic soldiers, and a number of examples of this have been observed' (Swank and Marchand, 1946: 243). For a very small group, there is nothing, or at least not enough, disruptive about combat to cause a reaction.¹⁷

The second aspect relevant to cognitive headroom are the symptoms, which bear repeating in full here:

'(By Day 45): The soldier was slow witted; he was slow to comprehend simple orders, directions and technics, and he failed to perform even life-saving measures, such as digging in quickly. Memory defects became so extreme that he could not be counted on to relay a verbal order. There was also present a definite lack of concentration on whatever task was at hand, and the man remained preoccupied for the most part with thoughts of home, the absolute hopelessness of the situation and death. This constant dwelling on death did not indicate a state of fear but, rather, a certainty that it would occur' (Swank and Marchand, 1946: 241).

From another study involving Vietnam, 'One response frequently associated with this form of combat stress is that the afflicted soldier often falls asleep amidst heavy battle conditions without being aware of it' (Oei et al., 1990: 357). These symptoms present, within this context, as

¹⁵ See Chapter 7 for conjectural thoughts about why this personality type might have such a reaction to combat.
processing malfunction. As the brain tries to make sense of the situation, initially it functions (hence the increase in efficiency around day 10). Over time, the conclusions drawn (such as digging in, and hiding under fire) don't seem to work; they neither end the situation, nor the randomness with which their buddies are killed. As the continuation to make sense fails (with the exception of the 'psychotic', to whom constant fire is possibly a normal environment), the other parts of the cognitive function shut down.

Why take a schematic approach to this case study? That is, how can it be said that this is a demonstration of the long combat veteran not being able to categorize his events and experiences? The disadvantage of combat stress is the lack of therapeutic environment, not just for the soldier afflicted, but for the purposes of research. Learning what is experienced or felt is not only impractical, but may be impossible given the lack of cognitive function described above—the individual cannot account for anything. PTSD, on the other hand—as it occurs in civilian environment—can not only be treated, but described by the individuals. What many researchers have found is the link between PTSD and CSR (combat stress reaction). For example, in the 1982 Lebanon War: 59 percent of those who experienced combat stress in combat later developed PTSD, as opposed to those who did not, who only developed PTSD 16 percent of the time (Solomon et al., 1987).

In Vietnam, the picture is less clear, as there was less reported combat stress as there was in World War II and the Lebanon War, whose 'psychiatrists were prepared for battlefield CSR’s and were aware of their possible antecedent status in the development of PTSD' (Oei et al., 1990:...
In Vietnam, there was a conscious attempt to avoid underreport combat stress as 'administrative disciplinary infractions' (Bowman, quoted in Oei et al., 1990: 361). What did exist was a strong correlation between high combat environments and PTSD (Card, 1987). In other words, the intensity of the combat, which was a factor in the speed at which the individual reached breakdown (see Swank and Marchand, 1946: 237, 240), was a factor in later development of PTSD, which itself argues for a cognitive limits model.

In other words, PTSD seems to be a manifestation of a break in the life schemas of the individual—the variety of situations, as well as the consistent qualitative descriptions of those affected, indicate that this is a good model. There is a strong link between combat stress and later PTSD manifestations. That fact, combined with the ways in which combat stress manifests, as detailed above, point to the important of the categorization function, and the powerful effects when the individual is not able to meet them.

**How Schemas Affect Violence**

If schemas and their definition have an influence on combat stress reaction and a possible lack of fighting, what about their effect on violence itself? Attempting to define violence as purely physical in Chapter 3, the work of Johann Galtung proposed that the difference between the potential and the actual was a legitimate definition of structural violence. What can be said within the context of attempting to apprehend schemas is that this is a legitimate *experience* of violence. The experience of
uncertainty, of the mixed, and of the uncategorizable invokes strong negative feelings on the battlefield; within a social context, the experience is the same, although the reaction different, as the field is more abstract. Violence is hard; symbolic violence is easy. From a purely sequential perspective, violence is consistently preceded by a strong violative interruption. This pattern can be found in Collins' subjects' attempts to balance emotional entrainment, and in Pinker's use of the broken windows effect; both cases of individuals presented with what could be called an upset, which is often followed by violent behavior.

There are numerous other examples, across a variety of fields. In *Male Fantasies*, Klaus Theweleit wrote in great detail on the literature of the *Freikorps*, the proto-fascist movement in early 1930s' Germany. He discovered some very interesting commonalities of his own: themes which united this group's fear of Jews, women and even communists. This was the apprehension (in both senses of the word) of the 'flood', the sense of the amorphous, the fear of being overwhelmed, by 'hoards' usually depicted in metaphors of being overwhelmed: 'Nothing is to be permitted to flow, least of all "Red floods."' If anything is to move, it should be the movement (i.e., oneself)—but as one man; information; on command as a line, a column, a block; as a wedge, a tight unit. Death to all that flows' (Theweleit, 1987: 232).

Theweleit went on to link these fears with early toilet training and Freudian ds." If esires (Theweleit, 1987: 259–61), which may be slightly more problematic (see 'nurture', Chapter 3). But the theme of masses, containment and violence continues in a growing body of literature making the connection of order and violence (Kalyvas et al., 2008; see also
North et al., 2007). Kalyvas, in his own contribution to and not unlike Collins, examines the 'microdynamics of civil war'. He finds, not unlike Theweleit, that it is the areas of dispute in civil wars that are the most violent. That is, areas that are fully controlled by the established government or by the opposition experience low levels of violence, while those that are contested, mixed and tentative have more instances of violence acts: 'The likelihood of violence is a function of control' (Kalyvas, 2010: 407). Kalyvas sees this as a product of rationality: 'On the one hand, political actors do not want to use violence where they already enjoy high levels of control (because they do not need it) and where they have no control whatsoever (because it is counterproductive, since they are not likely to have access to the information necessary to make it selective). Instead, they want to use violence in intermediate areas, where they have incomplete control' (Kalyvas, 2010: 407).

In the same volume, Scott Strauss writes about the genocide in 20th-century Rwanda, beginning with the turmoil after the death of President Habyarimana, and subsequent effects it had on each section or 'commune' of the country. He notes that this genocide was in no way monolithic; some communes had a great amount of slaughter, and some had nearly none:

'[The perpetrators] produced a climate of crisis, confusion, and fear—and in turn created a "space of opportunity" at the local level... Order had been ruptured, and power was indeterminately held. As such, an opportunity existed for influential actors at the local level to take charge, to establish control in a period of wartime disorder... This dynamic of order and disorder helps explain the onset variation at the local level' (Strauss, 2008: 318).
Although Rss, 2008: 318).and disorder helps explain the onset variation at the local level listed for influential actors at the local level to take charge, to establish con Violence constructs group order, forming the societal identity, in this case, through the human sacrifice: 'The community affirms its unity in the sacrifice, a unity that emerges from the moment when the division is most intense, when the community enacts its dissolution in the mimetic crisis and the abandonment to the endless cycle of vengeance. But suddenly the opposition of everyone against everyone else is replaced by the opposition of all against one. Where previously there had been a chaotic ensemble of particular conflicts, there is now the simplicity of a single conflict' (Girard, 1987: 24).

In the social and political realm (as opposed to the individual one in combat), disorder (perceived) precedes violence, on both the micro and macro level. Charles Tilly, echoing Hegel, famously remarked that war makes states (Tilly, 1975). Whether or not Tilly or Hegel are correct, the association between war and order—as well as the implication that disorder calls for violence—continues throughout seemingly every point of view of the debate. Although greater elaboration is due in the next two chapters on exactly how this process functions, there is a kind of historical consistency here, that violence fills a disorder vacuum with imagined order. In terms of cognitive staging, this the first interpretation—what is this?—is followed by the impulse to make sense of it, sometimes by the aberrant's destruction.
Limits to the Limits

There are many valid criticisms of the schemic perspective. For example, in the case of performance under stress, some individuals perform better (Byrne and Eysenck, 1995), as we have seen in the case of peritraumatic disassociation; under fire, the narrowing of vision and 'time slowing' effects actually allow for better accuracy and decision making (Klinger and Brunson, 2009; Schade et al., 1989). It might be possible to explain this under individual characteristic schemas, that each person's world view allows for some experiences to be unfamiliar (fearful) and others sensical (navigable). But there are problems with the very idea of schemas, at least within PTSD research. Although Horowitz's take on PTSD and grieving is very well established, the idea of schema is only one of many takes (see Brewin and Holmes, 2003 for an overview), and furthermore, seems to struggle, by Horowitz's own admission, with the treatment of combat veterans (Horowitz, 2003: 99). That being said, the application here is within the explanatory context of social theory. As categories and their strong feeling associations seem to emerge in a variety of disciplines, as outlined above, this thesis serves as an attempt to unite them under a single model, rather than a narrowly defined therapeutic or neurological theory.

More important than criticisms of theories on which this one is based, criticisms could be leveled from within the concept's own internal logic. As we have seen, not all fear is an interruption in a schema, and one could even say that not all interruptions are negative. As with the horror film, how do we explain combat addiction, or that some uncertainty can be pleasurable? Mary Douglas notes the interesting thing about the
The concept of purity and dirt was that the emotional reaction was varied. Like our combat addicted soldiers: 'it is not always an unpleasant experience to confront ambiguity... The experience can be stimulating' (Douglas, 1984: 24). As with sex, the keeping and the violation of the taboo both bring us pleasure. This makes historical sense, especially from an anthropological perspective, since otherwise culture would never evolve.

However, this state does not last: 'There are several ways of treating anomalies. Negatively, we can ignore, just not perceive them, or perceiving we can condemn. Positively, we can deliberately confront the anomaly and try to create a new pattern of reality in which it has a place' (Douglas, 1984: 34) It's not so much that one man's chaos is another man's order, but that one man's order is dependent on a particular form of chaos. As with the man who was haunted by the fact that he only was able to kill 20 and a half men on his 21st birthday, the desire for war and for violence takes an especially schematic turn: 'I wanted to go to war. It was a test I wanted to pass' (Holmes, 2003: 56), or, even more tellingly: 'I adore war. It is like a big picnic without the objectlessness of a picnic. I've never been so well or so happy' (Hynes, quoted in Jones, 2006: 233, emphasis added). In other words, a break in one schema (noise, blood, safety, etc.) defines the other (the heroic man) which for some, like danger junkies, is the more important of the two, obviously superseding the importance of the cognitive representation of the physical body. The concept of positive internal agency, and the way in which it motivates violent action is the subject for the seventh chapter, but what can be said now is that this is the taming of chance, literally. These are schemas that can only be defined by the seeking, then mastery, of chaos. The mastery
hers is strongly linked to agency; this is not the passive voice ('it was tamed'), but the active one that is the very heart of subjectivity: '/tamed it'.

§ § §

Not all negative feelings in combat, or anywhere else, are generated by a lack of schemic fit. Getting shot, for example, is a physical experience—it is not psychosomatic. Nevertheless, many feelings and emotions generically associated with other concepts, like death, authority and control, may have their origin in a lack of a schemata, in the feeling of not being able to categorize. These feelings are powerfully, sometimes overwhelmingly, negative, with the implicit admission that there may be some possible positive associations in a future of resolution. For this is the feeling most associated with uncertainty: the sense of anticipation. As when we hear a suspended ninth at the end of a symphony, we wait for it to resolve to its dominant major. In the state of unknowing, we will resolve, even if it means self-deception, internal pain, or both. The next chapter concerns internal assignations of agency, or shame, blame, and guilt. The impulse to resolution is so powerful that even the sense made from negative feelings of reproach are preferable.
Chapter 6: Anticipated Self-Agent Causality and Obeisance

Faced with the choice between changing one's mind and proving that there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the proof (John Kenneth Galbraith).  

In the 1940s, the corpus callosotomy was introduced as a surgical option in treating severe epileptic seizures. This procedure involves the complete severance of the corpus callosum, the veil that connects the right and left halves of the brain. When the procedure was finally successful (in 1962), the neurological arm of psychology went into overdrive. It had long been theorized that the two halves of the brain served different functions—the left, intuitive: the right, logical—and here was a chance to test this theory on an actual living individuals.

Although many interesting findings were made in regard to the separate tendencies of the left and right hemispheres, a new and unexpected phenomenon arose from the studies: that of confabulation. In neuropsychology, this is the act of making sense in the very literal lack of data. As the right brain is unable to communicate with the left, the subjects are shown a card: 'go to the other side of the room'. When they go there, another card is shown: 'why did you get up?'. Instead of the correct answer ('I have no idea'), the subject would inevitably invent an answer on the spot: 'I wanted to go get a Coke' (Gazzaniga, 2005: 148).

This has been confirmed in attractiveness studies, in which individuals initially rank photos according to whom they find attractive. When the order of photos is switched and shown to the other side of the brain, the

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subjects give elaborate reasons for a choice they didn't make (Johansson et al. 2005). One extreme example is the manifestation of reduplicative paramnesia: 'One such patient believed the New York hospital where she was being treated was actually her home in Maine. When her doctor asked how this could be her home if there were elevators in the hallway, she said, "Doctor, do you know how much it cost me to have those put in?"' (Gazzaniga, 2005: 150).

This may seem a strange place to begin a theory of agentic causality, but the phenomenon of confabulation solves, to a limited degree, Hume's question of induction (that we cannot prove cause and effect unless we already believe in it). As it happens, we already do. Thousands of years before the strict application of the scientific method, human beings were creating identical causal structures in the form of taboos and rituals. It can be said that cause and effect, in its corresponding existence found in natural events, was a lucky guess. Whether biological, experiential or, more likely, the addition of both, human beings process inductively; the parts of the brain indicated in these confabulation tests are those involved specifically in causal reasoning—'the singular capacity of the brain to make causal inferences' (Gazzaniga, 1989: 947).

This could amount to a tautology that we reason causally because we do, but it is more to say that we reason causally because it feels good, or, sometimes, that not to do so feels bad. As we saw in the previous chapter, there is a strong emotional price to pay for uncertainty, as manifests in the experience of schizophrenia or in the soldier in the constant chaos of battle. Conversely, there is the pleasure in the completion of a puzzle—the unnamed feeling of the solve—which might help us understand how
causal inferences are made: it feels good to know. When John Kenneth Galbraith (and Montaigne in Chapter 2) notes the ease in which we put the conclusion before the data, feeling is the motivation. It is no small irony that Hume's positivization of emotion would solve his own puzzle: it is feeling that gave us cause and effect, even before cause and effect could be demonstrably proven.

The induction problem is ultimately secondary to choice, as what matters for this section of the thesis is attribution—that the cause has an agent. For a Popperian application of the scientific method, cause precedes effect. For choice, blame precedes cause. We can therefore break (perceived) causal events into two admittedly conflated categories: mechanical and intentional. A rock falls. This is gravity working on objects, an instrumental event, with a mechanical cause. A rock falls on my foot. This is a painful feeling, which I do not like, suddenly I ask: who did that? An event occurs, we assign a cause. An event occurs which affects our feeling states, we assign an agent. As the effect is felt, it is logical to assume that there was a like intent. Just as the event had a mechanical cause, the feeling had an intentional one. It is not a strict division, with overlaps and shades of each in the other, but this could be called causality, and agent causality.

This chapter explores several examples of self-assignated causality, specifically in relation to our case study of violence and passivity. The act of assigning cause or even intent to oneself could be called shame, guilt, remorse, and so on. We have previously discussed the problems of using emotional terms as reference points, and the way in which their ill-defined nature can bring in unproductive associations. This is especially true of
shame and guilt and remorse, which have a different semantic problem in that there is great deal of energy devoted in the literature to distinguishing what are essentially identical experiences. In one formulation, guilt is a form of shame related specifically to action: 'shame as a result of evaluating one’s past performance as morally wrong' (Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1989: 114). In another, shame is concerned with 'self-image': for example, while guilt is a moral emotion, and one that allows positive change. 'In fact, a great deal of theory and research in psychology views guilt as the proill-defined nature can bring in unproductive associations.on and Leach, 2011: 476).  

Their core—negative self-designated causality for a perceived event—is identical. Michael Lewis calls these 'self-conscious emotions'. Lewis follows the same schemic pattern as this thesis, noting that these feelings arise according to 'a set of standards, rules, or goals (SRGs)' (Lewes, 2008: 743) and 'the evaluation of success or failure of one’s action in regard to these' (Lewes, 2008: 748). What's interesting about the attempt at distinction between shame and guilt is the way it intersects with the reason/passion divide once again: guilt is productive; shame is not. Guilt functions as societally beneficial, shame is selfish, while the attribution of the emotion itself contains an attribution.

For the purposes of this chapter, terms like guilt, shame and remorse are interchangeable for two reasons. Firstly, like above, they describe the same experience of self-blame for a violated schema. Secondly, and more importantly, choice is made according to future states, which means

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17. Notably, he goes on, like his counterparts, to distinguish them via various attributes, like global-self versus specific-self attributions. p. 743.
future scenarios. Whatever it is called, the scenario in the future is a negative designation of self-causality, which is to be avoided. This is especially true when reframing the process of non-firing out of the sociological and into anticipated feelings, where the individual must choose between two usually avoidable states of self-designated causality. One outcome makes them a murderer, and the other a failure, each a state of blame. Authority, then, operates not as a system of ideology or coercion, but by offering the individual an out in terms of feeling—a state of non-blame, a restructuring of agentic causality. The chapter continues with a brief application of the theory to passive citizens, and how feelings, both cognated and bodily, contribute to resignation and abdication, even in the face of certain death. It concludes with an analysis of how meta-decisions to violence made by leaders revolve specifically around attempts to manage self-directed causal feeling.

**The Act of Killing**

Confabulation demonstrates the way that we make sense, even if it means contradicting what we are seeing. From a rationalist view, it is impossible to have elevators in a single-storey home, and easy to conclude that such an observation is absurd. Many everyday assignations of self-blame are equally absurd and yet are seen as normal within a cultural context. We touched on the grief of the missing in the previous chapter transforming an uncertainty into a negative certainty (death). In this situation, if a parent were to express guilt over failing to have held their child one moment longer to save them, this feeling would be comprehensible, even though actual intent, or the ability to intervene,
was missing. One of the near universal conclusions of survivors of suicide is self-blame, even though it was the act of another: 'You tend to say "I have three children. Two are very successful; they did it all themselves. I have one child who killed himself; that was my fault"' (Colt, 2006: 491).

These events make cultural sense to us; if we were in the same situation, we imagine feeling the same way. And yet there is no logical component. The individuals involved do nothing actively or passively to harm their loved ones. Freud or a Freudian might argue there was subconscious intent towards a family member: 'And after death has occurred, it is against this unconscious wish that the reproaches are a reaction. In almost every case where there is an intense emotional attachment to a particular person we find that behind the tender love there is a concealed hostility in the unconscious' (Freud, 1950: 129). These desires may or may not be present, but from an evaluative point of view, this is beside the point. None of the survivors in question were omniscient, a necessary constituent of responsibility—that you knew an event was to occur, and did nothing—'(w)hat grief counselors call the "what ifs" and the "if onlys"' (Colt, 2006: 491).

To understand the preference of a known negative (self-assignated causality) over feelings generated by uncertainty, there is the example of the Iraq veteran 'Michael' suffering from severe PSTD over the death of a child: 'a part of me died with that little girl that night' (Wizelman, 2011: 44). That little girl was part of a family that his platoon accidentally fired at while an armed group attempted to force their way through a checkpoint. What is interesting in this case is that besides being unintentional, Michael, without the benefit of forensic evidence, could not know
whether his bullets killed that particular girl, or anyone, given that the entire outfit fired. He chose one victim, and became overwhelmed with severe guilt, with the alternative being not knowing. Not unlike the confabulist's reworking of causality, in this case the experience of the past is rewritten as if it was known. The impossible alternative appears not only plausible, but ordinary, even if it means that the individual suffers great psychological pain. Such impossible assignations should disturb us, if for no other reason that they remain commonplace and unexamined.

Feelings of responsibility for events not within the individuals purvey might be located in the psychological. As a child learns basic motor skills and object manipulation, he or she begins to link intent and action, cause and effect. Piaget makes such a distinction as developmental, that children's causal relationships progress from the first stage 'psychological, phenomenistic, finalistic and magical' to 'Artificialist, animistic, dynamic' and finally, and appropriately for this thesis, the 'more rational forms' (Piaget, 1930: 267). The first two are characterized by what he calls 'pre-causality', where 'Up to the age of 4–5 he thinks that he is "forcing" or compelling the moon to move...from 4 to 5 he is more compelled to think that the moon is following him' (Piaget, 1930: 260). In the case of assignating impossible causes, it is noteworthy that children of this early stage have difficulty distinguishing between the omniscient powers of God and their own (Gimtnez-Dasí et al., 2005). Given the way in which fantastic guilt manifests, it would not be surprising if there was a carryover of some kind of this childlike perception: that we experience consciousness as the center of the universe; therefore, on some level, we reason causally as if we are.
The above examples demonstrate the commonplace division in guilt: that it is either real or fantastic; that 'in guilt emotion, one believes one is to blame even when knowing that this is not actually the case' (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000: 54). The child who touches the stove learns a real lesson in causality, just as the same child believes it may be the moon that made the stove hot. This schism is echoed beyond the developmentally psychological, in moral, legal and scientific realms: creationism is fantastic attributive causality, evolution real, and so on. And yet, this seemingly stable ontology of false and real ignores the crucial question: how does it feel to know? This goes beyond the ordinary normative critique, which sees such divisions as constructed, and instead asks: what are the basic feeling mechanics of cognition? In this specific case, self-designated causality generates or avoids certain feelings associated with perceptions of causal action. On one hand, it may feel bad to blame oneself for something that was not in one's control; on the other, such an attribution may feel better than the alternative, which is the feeling of uncertainty encountered in the previous chapter. Both real and fantastic attributions of self-designated causality engender strong feelings in the individual, and these feelings unite, or rather blur, such distinctions as to who or who is not really guilty.

This ambiguity of real and fantastic blame is ably demonstrated in the case of the soldier who kills. From an instrumental point of view, there is no one else responsible; the soldier is the one who pulled the trigger. Yet society holds the soldier blameless, a fact made even stranger for the way the same view is held by the society whose people the soldier killed. The concept that the soldier is not a killer is ethically, societally, militarily, and
politically sanctified in the 'just war' concept, that the morality of going to war (\textit{jus ad bellum}) cleanses the morality of actions in war (\textit{jus in bello}). What matters most here is not so much an international relations doctrine, but how feelings might be the cause of such an elaborate system of absolution. Jeff McMahan, who argues that this is not the case, i.e. that an unjust war means soldiers \textit{could} be held responsible for their action, nevertheless states: 'It would be intolerable to suppose that all soldiers who are commanded to fight in an unjust war, or who fight in such a war without knowing that it lacks a just cause, are for that reason criminals or even murderers' (McMahan, 2005: 4). Even in this extreme polemic, it is an appeal to feeling: the 'intolerable'.

In contrast to the longstanding norms and any legal, ethical and political justifications, there are the perceptions of the soldiers themselves. The first chapter introduced the possibility that many soldiers feel guilt over killing, with a nod towards the vociferous controversy over S.L.A. Marshall's (and others') contention that so few soldiers in combat fire back. From this, we must ask, is there guilt? Or are there at least negative feelings associated with killing? We know that many soldiers experience strong post-traumatic stress disorder, but this could easily be a byproduct of the risk of death, or, along the lines of this thesis, the strong cognitive uncertainty experience detailed in the previous chapter.

David Grossman (among many others)\textsuperscript{22} has argued that much of this stress is due to the psychic cost of killing. Grossman cites as evidence the

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18. See Gywnne Dyer, Lonnie Athens, Rachel McNair, S.L.A. Marshall. Even Joanna Bourke, who is most famous for exploring the ways in which soldiers enjoy killing,
way in which prison guards during wartime, and under threat of being bombed, were subject to mental stress and breakdown, while their prisoners, equally in danger, were not (Grossman 1996: 58). Similar effects were found in medics, sailors and recon patrol—personnel at high risk of death, but little risk of killing (Grossman, 1996: 62). Likewise, sociologist Randall Collins has noted the numerous ways in which 'violence is hard': from the public displays of blustering in public fights that are ways of avoiding violence (Collins, 2008: 198) to soldiers ordered to kill civilians who miss at point-blank range (Collins, 2008: 78).

These examples, while telling, remain conjectural. What has emerged in recent years may qualify as true empiricism evidence. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, the last decade has seen a new form of combat, namely piloting RPAs.\(^{23}\) The amount of scholarship on the case study of RPA pilots is immense: legal, ethical and biomechanical issues are brought to the fore. We will focus on a very narrow slice, namely the psychological impact on the pilots themselves. We take as our control (in the experimental sense) bomber pilots, who \textit{are} at risk of dying. When compared with RPA pilots, who have none, it is found that RPA pilots experience greater psychological stress and breakdown than their real-life counterparts (MA or 'Manned Aircraft\(^{\text{a}}\)) by a significant amount: 'Rates of clinical distress and PTSD were higher among RPA operators (20 percent and five percent, respectively) in comparison to non-RPA airmen (11 percent and two percent, respectively)' (Chappelle et al., 2012: 1).

notes that 'combatants themselves constantly raised issues of personal responsibility. Indeed, they insisted upon it' (Bourke, 1999: 207).
19. Remote Piloted Aircraft, known colloquially as 'drones'; as an attempt to avoid semantic associations, I will use the Army's nomenclature.
Another similar study found that 'The unadjusted incidence rates of all MH ('Mental Health') outcomes among RPA pilots (n=709) and MA pilots (n=5,256) were 25.0 per 1,000 person-years and 15.9 per 1,000 person-years, respectively' (Otto and Webber, 2013: 3), concluding that 'remote combat does not increase the risk of MH outcomes beyond that seen in traditional combat' (Otto and Webber, 2013: 7). Given the numbers, this conclusion of not increasing mental health risk may seen as self-interested, but a closer look at the findings indicates that the MA ('manned aircraft') group includes combat aircraft, which holds a higher incidence of mental health issues (at 41 per 1,000 person years) and a lower incidence with supply aircraft (at 11 per 1,000 person years).

These studies noted that 'combat stressors' were a factor beyond the general working conditions, a fact confirmed in a recent regression analysis of American US–Iraq war veterans, concluding '[k]illing in combat was a significant predictor of PTSD symptoms and alcohol abuse, even after controlling for combat exposure, suggesting that taking a life in combat is a potent ingredient in the development of mental health difficulties', with positive correlations between 22 percent for PTSD and 32 percent for depression (Maguen et al., 2010: 90 and 87, respectively). A similar study conducted among Vietnam veterans found not only that killing contributed to PTSD, but the act of killing increased the chances of the soldier committing atrocities (Fontana and Rosenheck, 1999). Furthermore, when atrocities were controlled for the act of killing, 'atrocities, aside from killing others, do not play a substantial role in the development of PTSD once other stressors have been taken into account' (Fontana and Rosenheck, 1999: 124). A review of the National Vietnam
Veterans Readjustment Study found similar results, comparing those who saw killing, and those who actively participated (MacNair, 2002a; 2002b).

In short, we can answer the question (does killing invoke strong negative feelings?) with an equally strong yes. From a feeling perspective, this question is inane; guilt could be felt over a stolen parking space. One could, and possibly should, focus on why this debate continues, and why studies that focus on the most crucial aspect of war—killing—are only now coming to the fore. While certainly interesting from a political and normative point of view, this is a thesis about choice, and this chapter is about how future anticipations are felt. Killing is a predictor for PSTD and mental health problems, experienced as 'guilt' or 'shame' or 'depression', or any of the other member spectrum of contested and cultural defined emotions. Reorienting this experience within the cognate feeling paradigm, the individual attributes responsibility to him or herself: "During combat operations did you kill others in combat (or have reason to believe that others were killed as a result of your actions)?" (Maguen et al., 2010: 88). A causal conclusion is made, despite the legal and ethical exemptions put forth by society, and a feeling state results.

Within this representative scenario, there is a violation: the 'dirt' spoken of in the previous chapter. On one hand, it may be a break in the schema of the whole intact body, discussed in the previous chapter. The prohibition against killing can also be framed as a moral question, although, comprehensively speaking, ethics are themselves a schema, with violations crucially being contextual to situation. Soldiers seem especially vulnerable to the killing of civilians, whether accidental (see case study above) or under orders. Historian Christopher Browning
famously notes the way in which many of those in Police Battalion 101 were literally unable to execute civilians:

'The shooting of the men was so repugnant to me that I missed the fourth man. It was simply no longer possible for me to aim accurately. I suddenly felt nauseous and ran away from the shooting site. I have expressed myself incorrectly just now. It was not that I could no longer aim accurately, rather that the fourth time I intentionally missed. I then ran into the woods, vomited, and sat down against a tree... Today I can say that my nerves were totally finished. I think that I remained alone in the woods for some two to three hours' (Browning, 2008: 66–7, interview with August Zorn).

In regard to schema, civilians belong in one category, soldiers in another. Yet, even the enemy must undergo a categorical transformation: 'The basic aim of a nation at war in establishing an image of the enemy is to distinguish as sharply as possible the act of killing from the act of murder by making the former into one deserving of all honor and praise' (Gray, 1998: 131–2). Although stated as a representative of 'cognitive dissonance' (the act of turning people into objects so that they are easier to be killed), it is noteworthy in this context that the shift in one category (individual to soldier) necessitates two others (murder to killing; person to enemy), further underlining the way in which the act of killing can be understood as a schemic process.

Yet, there is incidence of PTSD among veterans who have killed other soldiers, indicating that even this shift (from human to combatant) cannot

20. See the next chapter for correct definition and discussion of this term.
be made completely. Note now the way in which the experience of killing is often reported, in this instance from a veteran of the Second Boer War:

'I killed a man at Graspan;
I watched him squirmin' till
He raised his eyes, an' they met with mine;
An' there they're starin' still.
Cut of my brother Tom, he looked,
...
Harder to dodge than my bullet is
The look that his dead eyes cast.
If the Empire asks for me later on
It'll ask for me in vain,
Before I reach to my bandolier
To fire on a man again'.

As with the incidence of the recollection of dead eyes staring back in the last chapter, the eyes of the dead loom large in the memory, or consciousness of the perpetrator, even in non-violent incidents: 'Eye-to-eye confrontations, however truncated, between holdup man and victim, appear to be unbearable for the gunman to sustain' (Collins, 2008: 80). For Dave Grossman, face-to-face contact is the pinnacle of the aversion to kill:

'Willis came abreast of him, his M-16 pointed at the man’s chest. They stood not five feet apart. The soldier’s AK 47 was pointed straight at Willis.
The captain vigorously shook his head.
The NVA soldier shook his head just as vigorously.
It was a truce, cease-fire, gentleman’s agreement or a deal-fire, gentlemans vigorously.erman of the aversion to kill: t inc' (Grossman, 1996: 137).

For Randall Collins, the eyes are the core embodiment of emotional entrainment; this is 'why eyes are so important in violent confrontations. Soldiers paralyzed in terror avert their eyes, just as they make childish-magical gestures to avoid being seen ' (Collins, 2008: 84). They are the origin and reflection of emotion, imbuing Clausewitz's fog of war with an emotional facet: 'The fog of combat is a metaphor for confrontational tension. That tension encompasses the various kinds of fear, which have real objects that the fighters can pay attention to: the safety of their own bodies; the enemy whom one doesn't want to see, or doesn't want to see killed' (Collins, 2008: 86).

Without disputing Collins' conclusions, there remains a vagueness to the construction of emotions. When he speaks of 'fear', we confront the problem outlined in the previous chapter: that fear, like many emotions, has a multiplicity of definitions, some related, others not. By refocusing the emphasis on feeling, and the way in which they are generated by causal conclusions, the victim's eye is less an aspect of the soul, a concept of humanity, or a undefined generator of emotion, as they are accusatory, a powerful assignation of causality. Returning briefly to the studies in the last chapter, Bourke specifies that it was not so much being a coward that was a source of fear, but being seen as a coward: 'the fear of being seen to be afraid was the only fear a man felt when going into battle' (Bourke, quoting Shaw, 2001: 323).

The eyes, as manifestations of another's view of you, so to speak, go beyond the emotional and into the realm of the ontological. In the natural sciences, this is embodied in the idea of consensus, that one's own
observation is not enough to determine a scientific truth. Even with the principle of falsification, it is the confirmation of others that allows for the stability of theories: 'Not every consensus is a sign of truth; but it is presumed that the truth of a statement necessarily draws a consensus' (Lyotard, 1979: 24). Although Lyotard is highly critical of this process 'that scientific rationality has as its criterion of truth the consensus of its peers and no more than that' (Rutgers, 1999: 30), Ian Hacking notes that this is simply an inescapable facet of the scientific process. In 'dynamic nominalism', even socially dependent paths can lead to legitimate science '(the Second Law of Thermodynamics) is a fact about the universe that we have discovered. The history of its discovery makes no jot of difference to what it is, was, and always will be' (Hacking, 1999: 32).

This is not an attempt to reopen the debate over the social construction of science. Instead, we must note that even within this seemingly objective realm, truth is social, defined by others. In the case of emotion, the usual focus lies, as it does with Collins, on the social nature of feelings. While descriptive to a point, there is a quality of 'truthiness' that affects the emotion. The appropriation of Stephen Colbert's gag here redefines truth not as an either/or, but as a spectrum, or threshold. Feelings are generated not by the undefined qualities of sociality and culture, but specifically, by the way in which the truth is constructed. This truth is not theory of gravity, linked to observation, mathematics and so on, but a designation of agency, which is explicitly found in another's gaze. The sequence might be understood as follows: feelings arise from causal conclusions, usually attributions of agency (blame). As a kind of truth, they are strengthened by the perception (the eyes) of others, which affects the
intensity of the feeling, e.g. that there is lower affect as a coward by oneself than in the presence of others. Intensity of feeling is dependent on how true, so to speak, a conclusion is, and choice, in turn, depends on that feeling.

**Eyes from the Other Direction**

Future self-designated causal agency accounts for many violence-avoidance behaviors; we will now turn to the way in which an identical structure can account for how violence may be instigated. Given the reality of war, many soldiers *do* fire, and even more surprisingly, give their lives with little reward to themselves. This begs the longstanding question: why obey? From Marxist theories of ideology, to Weberian descriptions of legitimate violence, to Foucauldian concepts of disciplined bodies, documenting the myriad of theories of authority would require an entirely new chapter, if not a lifetime of work. What we are able to do in this instance is discuss the individual cognates and feelings generated by the imaginations of authority which are specifically related to self-designated causality. As this operates on the micro level, such ruminations do not necessarily contradict these grander theories. In fact, an understanding of the feeling operation of authority may help fill the gaps in these more sociologically directed paradigms.

To take a single example, Jon Elster has critiqued Marxism's concept of ideology as tautological, or functionalist, with the view that because the ruling class benefits from a working class ideology of submission, ideology must have been engineered to benefit the ruling class, that 'the beneficial
effects of mobility also explain it' (Elster, 1982: 458). This is not to single out one particular theoretic school or model (or sub-model) for critique, merely to note that the attempt to see questions of obeisance under an instrumental or rational terms misses the most crucial component: how it feels to obey. Elster's solution of a game theoretic model is equally unsatisfactory; as far as explanatory power goes, we still fail to understand the actual motivations of the actors in question.

Understanding authority as a function of future causal assignation is best described through the process of how soldiers actually learn to kill: through their training. Theories of military socialization come in a variety of forms, from feminist critiques to simple practical advice: how to build a better soldier through a refinement of methods. The purpose here is less to critique these theories than to utilize them—to go one level deeper and provide a more mechanical explanation of the behavior on an individual level: how the decisions are schemically cognated and felt, and most importantly, how training reframes the way in which the individual assigns responsibility. The focus is less on perspectives than on two 'historical' periods in army training, which might be called abusive and post-abusive. Here the stricter definition of violence in Chapter 2, as physical only, clarifies the way in which self-designated causality manifests.

It is not fair to say that physical abuse is a consistent technique of all drill instructors (DI) in the United States, even as far back as the turn of the century. Regulations were tightened after an incident in 1956 where six recruits drowned during basic training (Eckholm, 2005), and finally even physical touching was outlawed in 1985. Nevertheless, it was a common enough practice, so much so that DIs would continue to kick and
punch even after the regulation that could lead to their court martial (AP, 2005; Eckholm, 2005, below). This abuse could take very extreme forms, as one case from the Vietnam era makes clear:

'One night three men who had been censured for ineffectiveness in their assigned tasks were called forward in front of the assembled platoon, ordered to insert their penises into the breeches of their weapons, close the bolt, and run the length of the squad by singing the Marine Corps Hymn. This violent ritual ended as the drill instructor left and the three men sank to the floor, penises still clamped to their weapons' (Eisenhart, 1975: 16).

Although one could cite any number of such examples of physical abuse—throughout the millennia—there are two reasons that this example is illustrative of causal agent linkage, i.e. the creation of a self-blame agent. The first is the way in which physical punishment is linked with individual action, that being 'censured for their ineffectiveness' meant that it was assumed that the result (penises locked into their rifles, and consequent humiliation) was 'caused' by the individual's action. A recruit is punched in the stomach and thrown on the floor for an infraction, and like a struck child, the consequence (violence) is swiftly and causally linked: you do X, you get Y. The action of the violence instigator (the DI) is not part of the causal chain.

The second aspect of the example cited here is the way in which masculinity is used to create discipline. Critiques of the basic training process note the way in which conformity to masculine norms are 'the

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22. As indicative of the US Army's transition to non-violent training methods, this example occurred in 2003, and led to the court-martial of the DI responsible (Eckholm, 2005).
major emphasis of basic training' (Arkin and Dobrofsky, 1978: 157); this emphasis on reinforcing masculine traits is something which even its proponents note (Faris, 1975). The obvious manifestation of a recruit's failure to measure up, so to speak, is linked by insults of 'ladies', 'faggots', and so on. These critiques see masculinity and war as self-reinforcing concepts; on one hand, to be a soldier is the most desirable type of masculinity: 'All questions, all ambiguities, all contradictions in what it means to be a man or a citizen are banished in the creation of the warrior' (Braudy, 2003: 7) Just as, circularly, the masculine ideal may itself be a causal factor in the perpetuation of war: 'Warfare and aggressive masculinity have been, in other words, mutually reinforcing cultural enterprises' (Ehrenreich, 1997: 127; see also Goldstein, 2003).

The feminist analysis remains valid, to a point. One of feminism's greatest triumphs was the separation of sex from gender, that masculinity, besides being constructed, not only changed over time in regard to fighting (Braudy, 2003), but also within armed forces at the same time (Barrett, 1996), that 'being a man' was always a contingent definition. Like the Marxist version of authority; however, it begs the question: what is the motivation for being masculine? The new regulations, besides reducing the incidents of physical abuse, has furthermore changed the way in which DIs speak: 'drill sergeants may address recruits only as "soldier" or "private," or by surname' (Eckholm, 2005). Whether or not this is practiced consistently, it indicates the way in which this means that the armed forces are still able to instill discipline without the reliance on reinforcing (specifically) masculine norms. Even as far back in the 1970s, consider this verbal abuse for the Air Force pre-

Masculinity, while powerful, remains a schema—a set of mobile and situational definitions against which one must measure. As a schema, it remains one of many for the individual. Insults and humiliation revolving around masculinity, while extent even to this day, are not necessary to humiliate and insult a recruit. What does remain universal is the sense of schemic violation. The cadets, whether sexually, according to manhood, decency, or even just motivationally (being that 'casual' was the worst insult you could dole out), were out of place in the Douglasian sense, and had to find a way back. Whatever the technique, the blame agent is maintained with the same structure in a both non-violent and non-masculinized environment.

This 'casual' schema—that an individual lacks intent, desire, or commitment and therefore is lacking—has become more and more incorporated into basic training as the US Armed Forces transitions to a volunteer force. Here 'washing out' is an option given back to the recruit. 'You can't hack it little girl!' (Eisenhart, 1975) is replaced by the more concise and gender universal 'You can't hack it'. The visible rituals around failure have always been a part of the higher levels of training; during Hell Week for the Navy SEALs, the washouts ring a bell to indicate, very audibly, that they have failed (Couch, 2009), leaving their helmets as a visual reminder of the shame of what might happen to those who remain. Without the obvious motivation of violence or intimidation, self-initiated elimination (SIE) (Wamsley, 1972) operates on the same principle as the immediate cause/effect of the physical kick or punch. In the volunteer
army, physical abuse allows the recruit to assign blame to the perpetrator ('the DI is an abusive jerk', or possibly stronger language) and exit without any assignations of blame on him or herself. In a non-abusive environment, the blame is shifted back to the self. The anticipated state to avoid is not being hit or being abused, but the state of having failed.

Another accusatory schema in basic training lies in the building of small group cohesion. This is what Faris euphemistically calls 'collective evaluation'. 'For example, an entire platoon may have passes withheld because the floor under one bunk—the responsibility of one individual—was inadequately swept' (Faris, 1975: 118). The intensity of this future shame state is increased as the group participates; one's 'fault' is no longer the assignation of the DI, or even the self, but the entire group. This can be combined with the instrumental nature of violence for even greater effect:

'It was obvious that those who had quit were scared senseless as they lay on the floor in the position of attention, all lined up close to each other. Then Gunny ripped off one of the racks and covered the quitters. Then he ordered the rest of the platoon to file by "the dead" as he referred to them, and kick them as we passed, calling them "quitters."... The men knew exactly what the new rules would be. If we had to pay, then they had to pay. No one had better fall out of another run' (Dark, 2009: 39-40).

As with the eyes of the dead, the eyes of your fellow recruits now reflect the blame, in a way that is clearly and powerfully comprehensible, so that it may be understood as a future scenario. The consistent throughline here is not masculinity or even behavioral technique but causal re-assignation, with a negative intensity that one avoids at all costs.
How Authority Operates: Availability and Abdication

The focus has been exclusively on negative aspects of self-designated causality, which would leave an incomplete picture. Obviously, when someone succeeds and is then credited, this is a future state that is desirable. Basic training does not just create a negative outcome to avoid, but a positive one to embrace. 'As they mastered the physical training room arrangement and drill, their confidence and self-esteem rose. That so much indignity and abuse had been suffered to reach these bits of status only enhanced their value' (Wamsley, 1972: 407). The implication for agent causality are clear. Fail, and you will be punished or shamed; succeed, and even the 'bits' of status are desirable. As with most writers on the subject of basic training, Wamsley sees it, not incorrectly, as a function of group dynamics and social conditioning: 'Thus, the first increases in status were within the subculture' (Wamsley, op. cit.) Likewise, Gwynne Dyer asserts that '[b]asic training, whatever its hardships, is a quick way to become a man among men with an undeniable status' (Dyer, 2006: 42).

What's especially interesting in Dyer's analysis is that this increase is less by accomplishment than by design. He notes the way in which tasks like running and climbing rope are not in themselves actually difficult: 'One of the most striking achievements of the drill instructors is to create and maintain the illusion that basic training is an extraordinary challenge, one that will set those who graduate apart from others, when in fact almost everyone can succeed' (Dyer, 2006: 44). While it's true that the
process is constructed within a social environment, what matters for this thesis is the way in which the individual experiences it as a shift in casual agency. Failure and success is redefined not as a random act, or even an act controlled by an external agent, but outcomes predicated on the individual. This is despite the fact that these assignations are largely cognitive, that they are ultimately more a function of confabulation, contextual reframing, or both. In each case, this affects future choice for the agent: to avoid the strong negative feelings associated with failure, and to pursue the less powerful, but still very tangible, positive feelings associated with success.

The introduction of positive causal assignation here does not discount the effects of group sociology, but does better explain the mechanics on the individual level. Dyer's example indicates the way in which agent causality ('blame' or 'pride') is constructed. The first two weeks of boot camp are often spoken about as the stripping of identity—clothes are taken, heads shaved and so on. But this is less relevant than the way in which agency is transformed. Everything the cadet does, from walking, standing, eating, sleeping, the way they look, is to be corrected, shamed or credited. This is the unifying principle of the abusive and non-abusive forms of coercion: to create a shift in agency. Whether conscious or not, the emphasis on causality serves the motivational function.

The final piece of the redefinition of causal agency is the creation of an external blame agent, one which allows the individual to avoid any future blame states. After creating an environment that assigns and relieves agent causality (blame and credit), the Armed Forces now offers the out:
'I was amazed how many American civilian soldiers appeared to put great weight on taking the oath of the soldier. Frequently, I heard the remark: "When I raised my right hand and took that oath, I freed myself of the consequences of what I do. I'll do what they tell me and nobody can blame me"' (Gray, 1998: 181).

After all the investigation into self-blame states, this statement is no coincidence. In terms of feeling states, the crucial operation of the act of obedience is not the instrumental one (that one does what the leader says), but the feeling it generates through the abdication of causal blame. This is no trifle; it is the freedom, so to speak, from any future negative feelings of self-designated causality.

This feeling may count as yet another one of our unnamed emotions. Blaming others is often the domain of anger, and there may be some connection to that larger emotion contained in the combination of resentment and respect that often accompanies our feelings towards authority, government, and power. But the shifting of blame, in this case, is more likely an unnamed, though not insignificant, emotion. It's less anger than relief, even if it means killing, as per the quote above, or giving up your life. For the citizen, this surrender of agency is a kind of contract, with potentially dangerous results in the case of highly violent states. "When I asked Guatemalans why they hadn't fled when the army requisitioned the local church and began to use it as a torture chamber, many adults told me, "We were doing nothing wrong so we believed that nothing would happen to us''' (Zur, 1994: 16). In this case, there is the specificity contained in the idea of 'doing nothing wrong'. As there was no assignation of self-blame, there could be no corresponding negative
consequences from the authority. It didn't make sense to the point that, from a comprehension perspective, it was not happening.

We will return to civilian victims of mortal violence shortly. Instead, we may now begin to answer the question posed by this thesis: 'Why don't soldiers in imminent danger of death always fire back?' Without the rationalist bias, this might be now rephrased as 'What internal feeling states lead some to inaction, and others to violence?'. As an expression of two behaviors, this has been seen as a kind of tension, the concept of 'riding herd', as noted in several instances in the introductory chapter and in the chapter covering violence. This allows proximation to authority to increase the chances of firing (Grossman, 1996; Collins, 2007; Marshall, 1947, du Picq, 1880). One can imagine a kind of fulcrum, that as the soldier moves closer to the kills, they become hesitant; closer to either their fellows or superiors, and more like to kill. If this is a worst of two evils scenario, it implies tension within the individual. Otherwise, the choice would be simple and quick. For Grossman, this tension is an inversion of the Hobbesian perspective put forth by Steven Pinker: '[inside] the mammalian brain of most healthy human beings is this powerful resistance to killing your own kind' (Grossman, 2004). Collins introduces the more sociological 'non-solidarity entrainment' perspective: 'the deepest emotion is the tension of conflict itself...it comes from trying to act against another person, and thus against one's own propensities to fall into solidarity with that person' (Collins, 2008: 81–2, see Chapter 2).

Both these observations have a kind of descriptive value (per Boudon), but it is imperative to go deeper. The use of a tension implies two dynamic forces, and yet only one (that 'violence is hard') has been
explained, or even described. What is the attraction of violence, authority or both? In order to better understand this as a tension, I propose that the individual is choosing between two essentially identical negative feeling states, identical because each choice implies a future state of causal assignation (blame). 'I killed' and 'I disobeyed/let my buddies down' are future scenarios where the individual has violated a schema. This is a damned if you do scenario, whose understanding as identical causal states ('I will be at fault') explains the tension more clearly. As future states, it is only proximation (to the victim, to the authority) that causes one version to be overridden by the simple virtue of being more comprehensible to the chooser.

In this paradigm, feelings arise from thoughts, more specifically causal conclusions. We have examined the ways in which many people experience negative feelings, specifically related to their perceived responsibility in another's death (or the loss of a child, or an act of cowardice, and so on). This feeling, sometimes caused guilt or shame, arises only in combination of an event and an causal assignation of guilt. In making sense, especially about results that invoke strong feelings, we assign an actor, even if that actor is ourselves.

However, these feelings exist via a past event, as in the PTSD experienced by the veterans discussed above. In terms of choice, the feeling must be anticipated as a future situation. This has been colloquially, but imprecisely, referred to a 'fear' ('I was afraid of being seen as a coward'). One could argue that the anticipation of a feeling is a feeling, perhaps future pluperfect guilt ('will have had done'). In other words, the imagination of the future event of self-designated causal
agency (guilt) itself creates a present-time feeling. Although interesting, and possibly a factor in choice (that strong feelings invoked may have add-on cognitive effects as we saw with the uncertainty experienced by individuals in Chapter 5), this discussion must be saved for another day. What matters here is not so much the feeling, but that the future experience can be replicated cognitively—it arises from a particular set of circumstances that can be comprehended or scenerized. There is a schemic outcome (violation of role, death, completion of goal, etc.), each of which has an actor assigned. In terms of choice (and thus anticipation), it's less important that we would feel 'guilt' or 'shame' over killing than it is that we can anticipate that we would.

Rational choice theory operates on the principle of instrumentality. The idea that one choice is less optimal than the other relies not only on the idea that one choice is instrumentally superior (say, more money), but that this outcome can be understood by the chooser. When dealing with complex probabilistic outcomes, critiques within the field have arisen over whether the individuals were choosing sub-optimally, or simply weren’t able to do the mathematics required to answer the question. For example, a sample of female veterans found that only 16 percent could answer three simple probabilistic questions, converting a percentage to a proportion (one percent to 10 in 1000), a proportion into a percentage (100 in 1,000 to 10 percent), and to estimate how many out of 1,000 coin tosses would come up heads (Schwartz et al. 1997: 967). Even in a sample screened for higher education, only 80 percent of respondents answered 'Which represents the larger risk: one percent, five percent, or 10 percent?' correctly. This is not to say that the subjects didn't know that
one was less than 10, merely that the question could be interpreted as inversion of risk. Such findings obviously call into question many studies of optimality within rational choice, that bias may simply be confusion.

Jon Elster has defined an action to be rational as follows: 'An action is rational, in this scheme, if it meets three optimality requirements: the action must be optimal, given the beliefs; the beliefs must be as well supported as possible, given the evidence; and the evidence must result from an optimal investment in information gathering' (Elster, 2007: 191, see Chapter 2). In this case, beliefs must take comprehensibility into account: the choice or outcome is understood. This facet goes beyond the question of subjectivity that Elster is attempting to address. This is why the schemic approach has been integrated into the anticipated feeling state theory within this thesis. The point of schema, both theoretically and for the individual, is the ease in which it is understood. It is a binary: something is either in or out of place, which in turn is able to define someone or something the agent of blame or cause. Returning to the effect of distance of authority and killing, each scenario (killer/coward) presents more clearly as the moment of choice approaches. As the situation increases in comprehensibility, so too the feeling, which finally motivates the choice in the moment.

As stated in the opening chapter, the strongest evidence for S.L.A. Marshall's assertion that soldiers did not commonly fire during combat in World War II are examples from other academic and historical fields. One such example can be found in rape resistance studies. For a preamble, it must be understood that the majority of rapes occur in instances where the victim knows their attacker—78 percent by a non-stranger, 38 percent
by a friend or acquaintance (USDOJ, 2005). In this instance, 'women who were less concerned about the offender’s judgment, engaged in less self-blame, and had greater resentment were more likely to use more resistance' (Nurius et al., 2004 quoted in Ullman, 2007: 421). Within the context of agent causality, each of these three factors are assignations of blame, where positive self-assignation was a factor in resistance, while negative designation ('self-blame', 'offender's judgment') produced the opposite.

Rape is both a risky and perfect subject for the attribution of blame, since blame is itself a topic within rape studies, that it is a crime unique for the way in which society and the judicial system focuses on the mistakes the victim made (Krah the evider the former; Feild, 1978 for the latter, see Grubb and Harrower, 2008 for an overview). Although over 30 years old, Feild's study even found 'No differences...between the police and rapists on behalf of the attitudinal dimensions' (Field, 1978: 156), including 'victim precipitation'. The idea that the actual perpetrator and the justice system can hold the victim responsible has further implications for the arbitrary yet powerful way in which agency can be assigned.

Likewise, with the victims of any genocide, it is taboo to even discuss the idea of physical resistance. This is known in popular parlance as 'blaming the victim', which one could argue I am in fact doing. However, the subject is the cognitive nature of blame itself, making both the taboo and its violation an artifact of causal agent reasoning. That is to say, there is a strong difference between finding actual responsibility (or more neutrally, implementable methods to reduce violence of any kind) and the feeling we get when we assign blame, either to ourselves or to someone
else: feelings that in many instances, rule our decision-making processes.

In fact, it could be said that our avoidance of blaming the victim has prevented the closer scrutiny of the operation of blame in the furtherance of violence. The idea is that soldiers can both kill and be blameless, just as rape victims can be perceived as guilty, would indicate, at the very least, some type of causal misperception at work. Such debates are closed when we blame the blamer, instead of attempting to address the feelings involved in these events, and their understanding in the aftermath.

From a purely practical perspective, there is a second problem in victim blaming in that non-victim categories, like police and soldiers, can easily fall into the same passive behaviors. Randall Collins uses the example of the hitman, who encounters little resistance when killing his counterpart:

'The rival hitman, who presumably has some of the same techniques, recognizes what is being done, but is unable to do anything about it. He proceeds to give in emotionally, falling for the tactics of being calmed down by a deception that neither hitman really believes in; he shows unwanted moments of fear, as he bargains and pleads for his life; having lost emotional control, he even shits in his pants—like many policemen and soldiers under fire' (Collins, 2008: 459).

Collins' assertions are confirmed by other examples: 'Soviet POWs, young militarymen with organization, and leadership, and initial vigor, died passively in German camps' (Jones, 2010: 248). The massacre on Nanjing, the annihilation of Carthage, and of course, the case study of this thesis—the passive soldier—all provide further evidence that 'victims' can exist both inside and outside authority structures. Although, notably,
soldiers were at the core of some instances of resistance (at Sobibor, Czechoslovakia, etc.), there is no one-to-one correlation between military or violence training, and resistance.

For Collins, this is an example of the sociological nature of violence, that training or personality is not as important as the situation, which produces a victim and a perpetrator, and each takes on the role. Collins describes this as an exchange of emotional energy, which while descriptive, fails at the analytical level (i.e. 'what is an emotion?'). What exactly is going on in the conclusions and feeling states of the individuals? There are many feeling factors here, each with an influence, and while the analysis offered is neither simple nor complete, it is consistent: choice, sense-making and feeling follow a set of rules. Put most generally, uncertainty is less desirable than self-assignation is less desirable than other-assignation, with sense being made by schemas.

Taking the case studies above, the powerful unfamiliarity of battle detailed in the previous chapter could be extended to any crime or political arrest or genocide: like the first time in battle, the experience is so new and so uncertain that it leads to basic immobility. Furthermore, and in keeping with anticipated feeling states, immobility and submission on the part of a victim of deadly violence goes beyond simple future causal assignation ('I don't want to take another life'), but combines with a very specific and immediate bodily feeling (he's (sic) got a gun on me, which could shoot, which would hurt). It is a question of proximity and comprehensibility. The immediate fear of violence (being hurt or shot) combined with the future blame state forms a kind of procrastination, until the moment when it is too late, when the death blow comes.
The passivity exhibited in the case of violence victims is not a literal freezing, but a compliance. As the people make sense, either in the moment or afterwards, there is an assessment of causal agency: either of the self, in the case of victims, or in passing it along to an authority figure, as in the case of many perpetrators of violence. In considering the hitman in Collins' example, the two individuals share many traits: both killers, and both familiar with what's going to happen. The important difference isn't the vague assignment of 'roles', but the presence of authority. Simply put, one has orders, the other does not. One has the ability to abdicate responsibility, the other does not. With the inclusion of the hitman, the soldier and the citizen, the common factor is the presence (or absence) of a figure taking responsibility.

**Attribution Exchange**

Let us say that there is a feeling of relief when the soldier takes the oath, or follows the order, knowing that a future blame state has been avoided. Even though the individual actually experiences blame, in the form of extreme guilt and psychic symptoms of PTSD, the choice is based on an anticipated feeling state, rather than an actual feeling outcome. If the soldier can both attempt to avoid, and then experience blame over killing, it is now imperative to ask: how do those giving orders manage or experience their cognitive feeling states? Though we would be right to be suspicious of 'personality types', a brief, and possibly polemic, examination of sociopathy in leadership may reveal how the cycle of abdication operates.
Given the recent economic pattern of overinvestment and inflationary collapse, it should be no surprise that those ostensibly responsible are singled out for study. One such paper found that business leaders have a higher incidence of sociopathy than the general population, with future business leaders rating four times higher in psychopathic traits (Babiak et al., 2010). Likewise, a study of 604 participants in Australia found such traits an advantage in entrepreneurship: 'even when the experimental conditions changed from rewarding to punishing, participants who were high in either psychopathic tendencies or entrepreneurial intentions continued to behave as if still rewarded' (Palin, 2013). Entrepreneurs were also subject to another classification: narcissism. Steve Jobs or Bill Gates are 'productive narcissists', where their ego both drives them and allows them to ignore the feelings of others (Maccoby, 2003).

There is a certain absurdity to this claims, the imagination of 'snakes in suits'. Even if true, those in prison rate 25 times higher on the Hare PCL-R checklist than the general population (or six times higher than business leaders), the tool used above to rate sociopathy. Furthermore, this form of cognitive appraisal conveniently ignores a version of the ideological question posed above: if they're all psychopaths, why would we do what they say? There are additional legitimacy concerns: as with many instances of social science, the second study has not yet been peer reviewed, although it has been heavily quoted in the media. However, there is a larger truth to be had in these assertions of mental disorder in positions of power. If we forgo the naming characteristics of terms like
sociopath, psychopath\textsuperscript{27} and narcissist, we can instead focus, very narrowly, on the causal conclusions of what occurs in these types of decisions. That is, instead of investigating the quantitative aspects of how many, of what type and in what environment psychopaths may or may not be prevalent, we can think qualitatively: how particular traits associated with these personality types function within an authority structure.

These personalities depend on a peculiar sense of self-designated agent causality. Martha Stout describes sociopathy as follows: 'Imagine no struggles with shame, not a single one in your whole lifec and pretend that the concept of responsibility is unknown to you' (Stout, 2005: 1). On the less florid side of the spectrum, the originator of the modern conception of psychopathy, Hervey Cleckley, describes 'him' as follows: 'Whether judged in the light of his conduct, of his attitude, or of material elicited in psychiatric examination, he shows almost no sense of shame' (Cleckley, 1988: 343). Psychopathic subjects further show 'poor judgment and failure to learn by experience', another criterion included in the Hare PCL-R, above (Skilling et al., 2002: 35). Both perspectives outline a very specific trait: a lack of causal assignation to the self, and sometimes failure to even make causal conclusions at all. This can be seen not as a moral or even a conventionally psychological question, but a cognitive one: the instance of being unable to make a particular type of agent causality (blame).

This is not a statement that all leaders are psychopaths (or extreme antisocial/psychopathic types, as named in the current DSM-V). Although

\textsuperscript{27} These terms are technically interchangeable at this time, as the recent DSM-V has reclassified this disorder under the 'antisocial/psychopathic type'.

\textsuperscript{28} We refer to the preceding chapter for detailed discussion of this point.
it is likely that those in positions of authority exhibit these traits in larger numbers than the general population, the common lack of basic cognitive function of a true sociopath precludes this. In fact, the proponent of this theory even notes that actual psychopathology is, in the long term, damaging to the companies involved: 'employees high on psychopathic traits will exhibit few behaviors that facilitate organizational functioning and many behaviors that harm the organization and its members' (Mathieu et al., 2013: 301).

If the focus is on the traits, and not the individuals, one is able to explain why there might be a higher preponderance of this behavior within higher ranks of authority. Here, the leader has a very specific cognitive function within the group. If the larger element of the group is attempting to avoid the negative feelings of self-attributed causality (as seen with the soldiers raising their hands to the oath), the missing puzzle piece would be those individuals, situations or combinations that allow the head of the hierarchal order not to cognate the scenario that leads to that feeling.

This is not a matter of blame ('all leaders are sociopaths!'), but a question of cognitive resource management. Though his ethical argument retains this blaming problem, note the way in which Hebert Kelman constructs his case against 'transcendent missions' in central authority:

'What is important to note is that, according to this view, the freedom from all restraints devolves on the central decision maker from a higher authority, the state, of which he is merely the servant... This whole doctrine is, of course, extremely dangerous because of its total circularity... In effect, this doctrine authorizes central decision makers to use their power without restraint by invoking a
transcendent mission that is not subject to principles of personal morality' (Kelman, 1973: 45–6).

When examined, narrowly, from the point of feeling, this is an attempt to avoid feelings of responsibility from every level of society.

President Harry Truman is famous for at least two things: the decision to drop the atomic bombs at Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and a plaque on his desk that read the 'the buck stops here', possibly inspired by that same-self decision. Reading through his diaries and letters during July and August 1945, there are two moments of note. On 25 July 1945, the decision had been made to drop the bombs, but 'military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children' (Ferrell, 1980: 55). By August 11th, obviously, the decision had changed, motivated by a kind of vengeance, the 'murder of our prisoners of war' and, six years after the fact, the bombing of Pearl Harbor (Truman, 1945).29

In the end, there is no stated self-reclimation: 'I have no regrets, and, under the same circumstances, I would do it again—and this letter is not confidential' (Truman, 1963). Leaving aside all the moral, tactical and political second-guessing that has gone on in the years since, what matters here is not so much the 'regret', but the way in which the field was constructed to allow a decision. 'It was done to save 125,000 youngsters on the American side' (Truman, 1963). Whether or not this was true historically, and whether or not it is true that Truman personally didn't feel regret over the decision, it serves as a way to understand how

24. For the structure of vengeance, see next chapter.
future states of responsibility construct a matrix in which authority
decisions are made and then followed.

Truman is responsible for the soldiers' lives, and would anticipate his
negative feelings if he did not drop the bomb. He gives orders to the
soldiers who drop it, who are absolved of blame via their taking of the
orders from someone who has been absolved of blame by their existence.
Leaving aside Kelman's ethical concerns, the problem from a functionalist
point of view (the actual achievement of a defined instrumental goal
through a law or institution) is that in this environment, no one is
responsible. This is less about whether or not there are 'snakes in suits'
than to reframe the debate of how social authority operates: according to
shifting states of causal attribution. The citizen follows the rules of the
state, just as the state takes its mandate from its citizenry. The buck stops
nowhere.

§ § §

This is a gross simplification that no one is responsible. Obviously,
other feelings and thoughts can override our potential anticipations of
responsibility, leading to a variety of actions and choices. Actions that lead
to self-recrimination are nothing if not educational, even if it is a child
touching a hot stove, and are the functionalist definitions of guilt versus
shame. Yet, there is a strong reality to this circular dynamic: that the
follower abdicates to the leader via orders, the leader via mandate. The
positive associations of relieving oneself of future blame states are not
rational in the conventional sense, but they operate under the same
principle of optimality—the best future state is chosen. The problem is
one of schema, that the safety of the individual's physical self is only one
of many 'self-schemas' (masculine self, obedient self, familial self, heroic self and so on), and under many circumstances, even in the everyday experience of driving automobiles, the physical self schema is deprioritied.

This chapter has focused on states of internal causal assignation. On one hand, 'blame' is preferable to the chaos of unknowing; on the other, its future experience is something we can both cognate and attempt to choose against. For some individuals, this can mean passivity in avoiding the future state perceived in the violation of killing; for others, the future state of having failed an authority figure is equally to be avoided. Another method to escape these anticipated states is via de-cognition; the self-delusion that Elster speaks of is in fact a choice to avoid feeling. If feelings are the end, their influence on the structure of authority—on both sides—is powerful indeed.

Yet, future states of negative self agency only partially explain violence; indeed, the cycle of abdication discussed above is largely only the sphere in which it operates. Future blame states are passed along endlessly until no one is to blame, but there must be a motive to act in order to begin this process in the first place. One impulse—anger—is nearly undeniable as a motive for violence. Although ostensibly the subject of the next chapter, it is the cognitive sense that anger promises within choice that is the real motivation. The cycle of violence is paradoxically marked by the feeling of order it anticipates, followed by the reality of chaos it engenders.
Chapter 7: Working through Anger: Three Facets of Cognitive Feeling Resolution

'The paranoid mentality is far more coherent than the real world, since it leaves no room for mistakes, failures, or ambiguities. It is, if not wholly rational, at least intensely rationalistic; it believes it is up against an enemy who is as infallibly rational as he is totally evil' Richard Hofstadter.  

In one sense, this is a chapter on anger, a seriously studied emotion, especially in regard to violence. But a better way to understand this might be to say that the topic at hand is actually the particular structure of anger, and the way in which it seeks completion. This manifests in the way in which anger is first experienced: not by a perceived violation, but as the motive to that violation. A crime is not a crime without intent, even if that intent is formed after the fact. The second manifestation is more obvious, although just as insidious; the commonality with which we expect a resolution to injustice in the form of vengeance. What is peculiar is the way in which the impugned external agent is less the object of action than their motives, which must be constructed, reconstructed. If the body of the offender is destroyed, this is merely one way to redirect or erase the aberrant motive.

It would not be fair to say that all or even most violence exists within this particular motive-transformative aspect. In keeping with experiences that are not called emotions, but probably are, war is often fought, and certainly planned, in low affect resolution. Like a game or film, there is a

transgression, and a mechanical way to right it. At least some of the pleasure of violence can be understood within this paradigm, a goal set, then achieved. These three facets—of assigning motives, of imagined completion through vengeance, and finally of resolution as a confirmation of agency as seen in both media and violence—each share the pattern of a broken schema and the imagination of that feelings will resolve.

The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters of this thesis are an attempt to explicate how feelings might be understood in relation to causal thoughts. Each chapter can be used to describe a stage in the process. The fifth chapter dealt with the strong negative feelings arising from perceptions of uncertainty, what might be called pre-schematic. Until we know what it is, we are out of sorts, in both the feeling and cognitive senses of the phrase. This feeling is to be avoided by making sense, even if that sense is arbitrary or contradictory. In many cases, avoiding this state by knowing comes with a vestigial association: the assignation of causality to an agent. The assignations are very often equally arbitrary, and many times direct towards ourselves, as seen in Chapter 6. Self-designated causality (blame) is a state to be avoided, although not as much as the state of not knowing. Remembering that an event can be perceived as quickly as a fifth of a second, this could be understood simply, but not inaccurately, in three stages:

What is it?
Who did it?
What were they thinking?

As we reach the end of this theory, as well as the final step in the cognitive feeling process, imagine a scenario to address each stage in turn.
A man dreams about his dead father. No event, in the instrumental sense, has occurred, but the schemic fit (father=alive) generates a feeling (happiness, frustration, depending on which schema the father fits, or modulation, as the subject fits the father=alive input into a variety of schemas/memories). This is merely to demonstrate that when talking about choice and cognitive feeling generation, we are not talking about discrete events, but assessments, what have also been known as appraisals. Whatever ontology of choice there might be remains internal, not instrumental, or rather, an appraisal model explains both instrumental and internal based-choice, whereas conventional rationality can only explain the former.

The man awakens, and for the sake of moving procedurally to the next step, has forgotten his dream. The house is there, his clock is there. Everything is as it should be: a schemic fit. Not a strong positive feeling, but certainly not a negative one. As he walks downstairs, a break. The door to the study is closed. The first appraisal: no appraisal. I don't know why, or what, or who, and fear (strong sense of schemic uncertainty). Then he remembers, my mother is staying overnight. Relief (schemic fit: I know), and after the relief, embarrassment (how silly of me). As with the dream, this cognitive assessment was of the subject's own feeling—not an event or an appraisal of an event, but an internal reaction to an appraisal. In this case, the negative self-designated causality (how silly of me) arises from an internal feeling state, or the appraisal that led to it, or both (I was afraid, but for no reason: subject=stupid).

The man walks into the living room, to find the television and stereo gone, and the back door open. After an initial reaction of uncertainty
(what is this?), he realizes that he has been burgled. He feels a sense of violation, disbelief or fear, followed by a sense of anger. Let's assume that our man is in the 30 percent of men (women report a higher sense of violation, for example) who recall feeling angry when discovering a burglary (Maguire, 1980: 263). Breaking down anger into its cognitive parts, instead of 'anger', there is a schematic break, an assessment of causality (an external agent), and finally, an imagination of intent: who would do this? And then, why?

It could be said that we will be working through anger (so to speak), with the important admonition that many feelings discussed are not traditionally linked with this named emotion. Other designated causality, then, has (at least) two stages: attribution and resolution. The first, and first section, resides in manufacturing intent, that when there is upset attributed to an external agent, this attribution requires a motive. Sometimes, this motive corresponds to the other's actual intent, sometimes it does not, but as with self-designated causality, this is besides the point. It is always manufactured as it must originate from within the injured subject. The second section deals with the distinct solution offered by other designated causality. Unlike self-designated causality, you can erase intent. This is the 'teaching' element of injustice, the 'I'll show you/ them', the 'only way they'll learn' that often precedes the use of violence. Violence tricks us; since it has been defined here as concrete, the physical act as opposed to the social, and so our focus remains on the instrumental. Yet this is a kind of blindness, as the contested areas are less feelings, or even concrete actions, but states of knowledge. When it
comes to violence, what matters is that the intent has been redirected or altered. Erasing the person is merely one of the ways to do this.

Yet, it would be simply inaccurate to say that war is fought in anger; this is rarely the case, especially for those actually fighting. Nor are most decisions to go to war made (entirely) under this anticipated feeling of completion (what might be called vengeance). The avoidance of loaded terms like anger will again pay dividends as other designated causality leads to instrumental solutions in war, the feeling of completion. Like the Sudoku puzzle, war lends itself to resolution through self-agency confirmation, sometimes with very low affect—as with the planning of war—sometimes with very high, as with the killing that war necessitates. This is the arena of territories, populations, PowerPoint presentations, firing rates, war games, numbers, troop carriers and so on. Logistics offer feeling solutions not because of our violent natures, or inexplicable feelings, but because of their near numerical clarity. Violence, in the form of killing, offers the ultimate feeling solution, the binary switch from a one to a zero, and more importantly, the clear confirmation of our own agency in doing so, as well as the very concept of agency itself. The cycle of violence, so often lamented, could be seen as a reciprocal relation between the simplicity of the cognitive feeling state, and the reality of the complex interconnected social world, where death is anything but the isolated incident that our emotions are telling us that it is.
Manufacturing Intent

This last aspect, the intent, may seem incidental at first, but it is in fact the most crucial aspect to other assignated causality: what were they thinking? This can be expressed legally in the way in which crime is prosecuted through *mens rea*. A man spills a drink, causing another to fall to his death. Without intent, there is no crime. He *pours* the drink, and there is. The action is the same; the intent determines the crime. As previously mentioned, James Averill's study of anger found an identical centrality to the concept of intent. It was his stated goal to contradict 'the presumed link between anger and hatred' (Averill, 1983: 1149), and as such, focused on the causes of anger, as reported by the individuals experiencing it. Not surprisingly, Averill found that 'the typical instigation to anger is a value judgment. More than anything else, anger is an attribution of blame' (Averill, 1983: 1150). More significantly was the final shared element: 'But the major issue for the person in the street is not the specific nature of the instigating event; it is the perceived justification for the instigator's behavior. Anger, for the person in the street, is an accusation' (Averill, 1983: 1149).

Cognitive and appraisal psychology has made impugned intent a crucial component of anger. It may even be possible to credit Averill's research with this, as the focus arises around this time, in the early 1980s, and it continues to be referenced in works of cognitive psychology even by those who ignore his central thesis (Power and Dalgleish, 2008). Bernard Weiner uses 'controllability' as a major aspect of anger: 'an ascription of a negative, self-related outcome or event to factors controllable by others'
(Weiner, 1985: 562), with factors of attribution including locus, stability and controllability. Given Averill's work, this distinction may be semantic: 'Intent and control generally covary highly... Individuals intend to do what is controllable, and can control what is intended' (Weiner, 1983: 554; see also Weiner, 1986).

For Kelly Shaver, blameworthiness is the central motive, with the five variables being causality, intentionality, coercion, appreciation, and foreknowledge (Shaver, 1985). Blameworthiness can even be a factor in blame, as odd as that may initially sound. One survey found that people were between twice and four times less likely to attribute blame if an automobile accident was caused by a neutral act (hiding an anniversary present), or an immoral one (hiding cocaine); as such, 'the degree of culpability in an act can influence perceptions of causation' (Alicke, 1992: 376).

This is not a thesis on cognitive psychology, and, much like basic emotions, there is a tendency to follow the rabbit down its hole over which factors cover what aspect and so on; although the subject is 'trait' anger\(^{31}\); see Wilkowski and Robinson (2008) for a summary of attribution and anger. As an attempt to incorporate feeling into rational choice, however, what we can distill from these theories and case studies is the consistent sense that the object of anger is assigned a motive. It could be said that we manufacture the intent of the object of anger no matter what; as an internal appraisal, even if someone explains that their intent was identical to the one that we assign, we still must credit them. But the

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26. State versus trait refers to a transitory feeling in the former, and a tendency in the latter. Obviously, each affects the other.
assignation of intent goes far beyond this kind of Berkeleyian sophistry, in that in many cases the intent assigned is separate from the object's. For example, as Averill attempted to disconnect anger from hatred, he noted the way in which the blame agent (or anger object) was well known to the subject, a child, or spouse, suggesting the intent is a deviation from the established relationship.

More significantly is the way in which inanimate objects were easily imbued with intent: 'In 9 episodes there was a strong tendency to personify the target and imbue it with human characteristics' (Averill, 1983: 1149). You swing a hammer and accidentally strike your thumb. You didn't intend to hit your thumb, therefore the hammer did. Given the pain, it is a reasonable one-to-one conclusion. Likewise, we have the capacity to imbue a non-present object, i.e. God, with intent and even existence, with one study finding that nonaffiliates (including atheists, agnostics, and those reporting "none" for religion) reported greater anger toward God in terms of lifetime frequency' than believers (Exline et al., 2011: 144). It is important to note that this study found that, in general, that people experience more positive feelings towards God than negative, but the negative feelings still exist.

At the beginning of the violation, one can see the near instantaneous process of cognition at work here, what is sometimes called cognitive

27. Although relations of cognitive emotions and God are not the subject of the current discussion, these positive feelings could be akin to the abdication of self-designated causality found in the earlier discussions of authority, as when fighter pilots found comfort in trusting external sources like their plane, crew or leaders. The purpose here is simply to establish that external blame agents need not be physically there for the existence of anger.
dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is the state, occurring 'when people believe that two of their psychological representations are inconsistent with each other' (Cooper, 2007: 6). Like the unsure and undefined experience of combat, this is a state that is unpleasant and requires resolution. The concept was put forth over 50 years ago when Leon Festinger observed a doomsday cult on the day after their predicted Armageddon. As people who believed with certainty that the world was to end on December 21, 1955, Festinger predicted that they would find a way to rewrite their beliefs if the earth survived. It did, and they did (Cooper, 2007: 3). For Festinger, the need to resolve inconsistency was not a mere impulse or desire, but a drive: 'Just as hunger impels a person to eat, so does dissonance impel a person to change his opinions or his behavior' (Festinger, 1962: 93).

The concept of cognitive dissonance confirms the previous theorization of pre-schemic feelings as strongly negative, that uncertainty is an unpleasant experience that leads to a cognitive resolution. The concept is introduced in this chapter as it has a particular history with violence. Within genocide studies, the cognitive dissonance is seen after the fact, as part of the denial process: 'over time perpetrators of mass violence further devalue their victims as a means to maintain their sense of a just world and to avoid cognitive dissonance' (Woolf and Hulsizer, 2005: 110; see also 'denialist' stance, Jones, 2010: 518). In this framing, cognitive dissonance is the feeling, and dehumanization is the means to eliminate it. This has been captured evocatively in the 2013 film The Act of Killing, where perpetrators of the mass killings in Indonesia re-enact their murders as genre plays.
But given the function of anger, it makes more sense to see it the other way around. That is, the dissonance occurs before the acts of violence, in the form of schemic interruption, and the action solution follows through causal assignations of blame. The focus on cognitive dissonance in violence is much like PTSD, seen—legitimately—as a manifestation of psychic reconciliation between an ethical self, and one who has killed. Unfortunately, within this context, the origin of genocide remains a kind of rational black box. When Alexander Hinton argues for 'psychosocial dissonance' in the case of Cambodia, the motives for the génocidaires are a given, almost Machiavellian: 'the Khmer Rouge instituted a number of social and ideological reforms that served to facilitate genocide by altering the environment in which agents of death perpetrated their deeds' (Hinton, 1996: 824). For Hinton, the attempt to eliminate a threatening other group is an uncomplicated expression of the instrumental goal of one's own group to survive, despite the obvious strong emotions involved.

Like many behaviors that have been examined herein, genocide has been categorized along the pole of rational/irrational, with Hinton's examination falling on the former. Arguably, rational choice is increasingly becoming the 'most popular' approach, in opposition to the 'social-psychological' (Kaufmann, 2006: 46–7). The dilemma that genocide presents—that elites benefit while those under their authority do not—is explained by the dual strategic action of personal gain, such as 'looting, land grabs, and personal revenge' or the possibility 'to raise their in-group status' (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 874. For a more comprehensive overview and critique of rationalist perspectives on genocide, see Kaufmann, 2006).
Yet, these models still rely on emotion to function, revenge in the above case, and in the case of Slobodan Milo still relied on manipulation of Balkan hatreds: 'In our model, cold calculations based on fear induce the pivot to side with Milotion falling on the former. Strong emotions involved. Of death perpetrated their deeds' (Hint' (de Figueiredo Jr. and Weingast, 1997: 265). Fear over what? What type of fear? How manipulated?

We can see these views of a kind of reproduced version of the sense making that they are attempting to describe. Returning now to the literature of the 'sociopath' in leadership positions, the act of calling someone a psychopath, or evil, or of a type, carries with it a bit of pleasure, captured so well in Jon Ronson's rather purple prose: 'Why is the world so unfair? Why all that savage economic injustice, those brutal wars, the everyday corporate cruelty? The answer: psychopaths. We aren't all good people just trying to do good. Some of us are psychopaths. And psychopaths are to blame for this brutal, misshapen society' (Ronson, 2011: 99). We categorize another person as a type an act that is, historically at least, one of the stages that occurs before an act of violence. This type of categorization exists within a series of causal negotiations as to who or who is not at fault, a discourse that seems to be at the very heart of societal negotiations. It is not a question as to whether or not blame should be assigned, or if it is a useful concept, or that is largely a byproduct of cognitive feeling completion. Instead, we are certain that someone or something must be at fault, and society must organize to find that someone or something and transform it.

Within the schools of dehumanization and objectification, the act of categorization precedes violence. For example, it has long been noted that
verbal abuse is a precursor to domestic violence and even murder, so much that can be quantifiably correlated (Murphy and O'Leary, 1989; Schumacher and Leonard, 2005). In the case of serial killing and genocide, this falls into the category of 'dehumanization': 'Dehumanization is a process of ridding the other of the benefit of his humanity. The process extends along a continuum, leading to the ultimate step of removing the other person’s opportunity to live' (Charny, quoted in Hickey, 2010: 92. For genocide, see Haslam, 2006: 253; Kelmar, 1973; 'Devaluation' in Staub, 1989).

Not surprisingly, such instances occur during and not after genocides: removing the other person’s humanity. He said something to the effect that for him first came pigs, then nothing at all, and only then, far down the list, came Jews' (Rhodes, 2002: 222). The category of the 'Jew' is not even enough to deserve a category. But even in warfare, supposedly rendered neutral via its political ends, dehumanization plays a part. It would be pointlessly ugly, and perhaps impossible, to list all the degrading terms for enemies used over the years, but consider the way reporter Robert Fisk finds this type of language, after only three weeks, and during a press conference about a bombing run during the First Gulf War: "'It was like turning on the kitchen light late at night and the cockroaches started scurrying,' [Marine Lieutenant Colonel Dick White] said. "We finally got them out where we could find them and kill them.'" (Fisk, 2007: 623).

Yet even though re-categorization of another human being precedes violence, this is still seen within the rationalist or self-interested paradigm. In other words, offenders or génocidaires want to commit violence, and
turn their enemies into objects to do so. Neutralization theory, a common perspective in treating violent criminal offenders, allows for justifications, or 'defenses to crimes' to come before the act itself: 'justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the delinquent but not by the legal system or society at large...precede deviant behavior and make deviant behavior possible' (Sykes and Matza, 1957: 666). The problem being that these are, rather subjectively, seen as cognitive errors. They fail to explain, or even be interested in, the original motivation: 'Some work in the cognitive distortion tradition suggests that all offender accounts are created equal: essentially any explanation is a bad explanation' (Maruna and Mann, 2006: 170).

The issue at hand is the limitation of these perspectives, a limitation we have seen in the many behaviors described within this thesis; the rational offers a more explanatory model with significant gaps over how to define irrational behavior, still relying on a generalist definition of emotions. Ultimately, the real missing piece is the motive and how it is experienced by the individual. Given the manifest horrors about which we have all read, feeling and emotion are a factor, both the most important and most ignored. This perspective does not preclude rational or social-psychological schools, but seeks to further their explanation. In the case of cognitive causal sense making, this begins with the act of naming.

**Cognitive Assonance**

The problem with the theories of cognitive dissonance, or neutralization theory, or dehumanization isn't their accuracy, but the lack of completion (so to speak). What's missing is how, in the experience of
dissonance, assonance might be formed, in this case the enemy as other. To expiate how this might occur, we will now consider another commonly observed belief of violent actors, that of the shifting of blame. Within Neutralization Theory (and many others), there is the strong sense that the individual responsible credits everyone but themselves with the act: the 'disavowal of a sense of personal agency by diffusion or displacement of responsibility' (Bandura, 1999: 193; see also, cycles of attribution in authority, previous chapter). This goes so far as to actually invert the process of blame, in what is called the Condemnation of the Condemners 'The delinquent shifts the focus of attention from his own deviant acts to the motives and behavior of those who disapprove of his violations' (Sykes and Matza, 1957: 668).

Therefore, we have (at least) two strong co-factors of violence: 'diffusion of responsibility and dehumanization of victims' (Bandura et al., 1975: 253). This is usually as seen as justification either before or after the event. A man wants to hit his wife, or a group wants to commit genocide, and in the above explanations, the dehumanization and blame shifting either allows it to take place, justifies it post facto, or both. Bandura argues that this is a moral disengagement, that it does not so much explain violence as pave the way for it: it is 'disinhibition'. Unfortunately, this leaves violence to the vague self-interested or even rational origins we have seen before. But what if the objectification and causal assignation are part of the same process that motivates violence itself?

To understand how this might occur, we turn to another study of anger: Jack Katz's of Los Angeles drivers. Katz followed a similar methodology to Averill's (interview subjects), albeit with a more
philosophical bent than Averill's. This theorization of anger was more in line with the android synthesis proposed by Donna Harraway, merging the driver/car as a single social object whose cut-off becomes a bodily amputation (Katz, 1999: 47). This highly abstract bent was especially strange because previously Katz had noted the way in which murder was perceived by the offender as a moral act: 'One feature of the typical homicide, then, is its character as a self-righteous act undertaken within the form of defending communal values' (Katz, 1990: 20). Like Gilligan, violence was for Katz an act of seeking justice.

Nevertheless, the case studies themselves reveal an interesting pattern of transformation: 'Acting as folk sociologists, drivers (use)...'unobtrusive measures' to infer subjective realities, in particular to characterize others as self-absorbed (diet-coke and cell-phone)' (Katz, 1999: 23). The interviews published are very telling for attributed motives, and the way in which they can be constructed after the fact.

'Sometimes angry drivers create novel character types by mixing features of the other’sometimes angry driv Patrick...imputes a “imputes a's complex” complex angry drivers create novel character types by mixing features of the otherch they can be constructed after the fact.l-phone)' (Katz, 1999: 23).Homicide, then, is its character as a self-righteous act undertaken within the forl. He thought for a second and with some hesitation he claimed it would have not made a difference. He said that he would have reacted just the same' (Katz, 1999: pp. 53–4).

Sartre famously stated that emotions were the magical transformation of the world, but it is important to note here how he saw that process unfold:
'Emotion is a phenomenon of belief. Consciousness does not restrict itself to the projection of resonant signs onto the world that surrounds it; it lives in the new world that it has just created. It lives it unmediated; it is interested in it; it suffers the elements that its directions have outlined. This means, since all paths are blocked, consciousness flows into the magical world of emotion, and flows entirely by diminishing itself; this is a new consciousness facing a new world, and it constructs itself with that which it is most intimate, its own presence, which holds no distance between itself and its point of view unto the world' (Sartre, 1965: 98–9, author's translation).

It could be said that within Sartre's formulation that process is reflexive, that as the world is magically transformed, we then proceed to live in it, allowing for further transformation—an observation that is not out of place here. If we replace the overdetermined concept of 'emotion' with the concept of schemic order, the transformative power of sense making completes our picture of how cognitive assonance is formed.

Here we return to the concept of blameworthiness as proposed by Shaver, although this will operate just as well with any theory of motive-based anger. The individual is trying to make sense of a perceived violation. The object of our anger is de facto blameworthy. It follows that the slight, if other designated, was like motivated, that the violation was the intention. When then faced with an ordinary person as the blame agent, the act of transformation into a category creates the blameworthiness necessary to complete the causal assignation. The object of our anger cannot be human because it lacks (comprehensibly) human

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28. Consider the reason often given: a woman or ethnic minority who 'doesn't know their place', a literalization of the schemic concept of dirt.
motivation. The path of least resistance is quite logical, or rather, has a clear logic. What kind of person, asks the subject, would do that? The blame agent must be a named category (bitch, gook, queer, etc.), because only a non-person could have that violative motivation. In making sense, rather than change the perspective, the external blame agent is transformed through the act of categorization, through the act of naming, is an intermediate process between assignation and resolution.

This is not to say, obviously, that perpetrators of violence are not using post facto justifications; they may be (although obviously, after the fact). However, there are two distinct advantages to using this model over moral disengagement, neutralization theory or cognitive dissonance. The first is a more complete understanding of the contradictory nature of the excuse itself. Justifications are absurd to the other party: either the justice system, or to any victim of violence, state or non-state. As such, there can be no rational expectation of a quid pro quo. The arrestee cannot expect the police officer to be freed upon hearing "'I didn't mean it." "I didn't really hurt anybody." "They had it coming to them." "Everybody's picking on me." "I didn't do it for myself." (Sykes and Matza, 1957: 669), and still he or she makes exactly this justification.

According to the current string of social theories, the subject is attempting to address his or her cognitive dissonance, which is motivated by a sense of social, the alignment of the actual self with the ideal, and the 'ought' self (Topalli, 2005: 799; see also Higgins, 1989). If this is the case, there would be no reason to act to create those negative feelings in the first place, i.e. to act violently. If this is a case of 'role conflict' (Sykes and Matza, 1957: 669), from whence came the criminal role, or for that
matter, the normative societal one? Again, these theories are not so much inaccurate as incomplete. A causal agent model expands for dehumanization, blame shifting and the motives of violence, that generate, and are generated by, them.

With this in mind, we approach those who engage in criminal violence via the modalities in which they engage it: causal agent assignation and naming. For the inherent contradiction in this practice, consider the batterer paradox:

The batterer paradox, namely that we have sympathy for the male child exposed to inter parental aggression and recognize the fact that a significant consequence of such exposure is an increased risk of becoming a batterer when he matures, yet once that prophecy is fulfilled, the empathy and understanding is shifted from him to his victim and children (Rosenbaum and Leisring, 2003: 17).

Both individuals have experienced violence. How could one deserve our sympathy, and not the other? This seems obvious: the child is innocent and the adult, being able to form intent, is guilty. And once again, the blameworthiness is tied to ability to comprehend intent, not whether or not that intent was actually formed. In the traditional model, the adult was inexplicably, or selfishly motivated to hurt, and simply formed a convenient excuse afterwards, while the child must be innocent of all action due exclusively due to his or her presumed lack of cognitive capacity. The facileness of this argument is demonstrated by the constant fudging of adult age crime limits. Is the 10-year-old guilty of a serious crime? The nine-year-old? On which day does this occur?
What is missing from this conception isn't a deeper understanding of empathy, or even an awareness of the irrationality regarding circularity of crime, justice and violence. What is missing is an acknowledgement of feeling: that it feels good to name. Calling someone a 'bitch' or a 'wife beater' may have extremely different implications and manifest effects, but they feel the same, or rather arise from the same structure of violation, assignation and intent creation. The seeming satisfaction in the term 'psychopath' is useful to consider here, just as the phrase 'put in their place' can be seen as literal, in the sense that the place in question is a social category that exists within the individual's conception of self and world schema.

How would this generate positive feelings? In Chapter 5, we were introduced to the concept of the schemic break, that feeling could be generated by violations of expectations in the expected world, just as in Chapters 3 and 5, Galtung's concept of structural violence as a break between the expected and actual. Although it can be argued that stereotyping can be a factor in cognitive headroom ('cognitive miser', Chapter 4), the act of categorization, especially when linked to a schemic violation, embodies the end of the tension. At last, we know. Order is restored. In terms of choice over anticipated feeling states, we scenarize the future state of 'having named'. If thoughts are the means, and feelings the end, adjustments can be made, magically, if you will.

In the case of the driver, minor transformations are made over physical characteristics. We turn to our right as we pass the one who cut us off, appraise the person as a category and exclaim 'I knew it', even though we knew no such thing. In the case of state making and war, the
ramifications are more significant. Consider, for example, the well-known 'security dilemma' in International Relations. Put simply, one state increases its armament stockpile, causing another state to feel threatened, increase their stockpile, and so on. As both sides attempt to become more secure, they create an atmosphere that is more likely to create war (see Herz, 1950; Jervis, 1976: 58–113). There are a vast number of theories as to how this happens within a rational state. But what about a feeling state, or rather, a state composed of decision makers that choose according to feeling. When there is a violation (in the form of a potential threat), we impugn a motive. In the case of military security, the enemy's motive can only be the state's destruction, which, naturally enough, can only be manifested by a blameworthy agent, a named object. It is no insight to say that the security dilemma revolves around the inability to see the other person's true motivation or perspective, but in the case of anticipated feeling (and cognitive) states, that inability is built into causal agent reasoning.

Violence as Information Management

In the case of casual driving or spousal arguments, or workplace flare-ups, naming is usually enough. We have faced a violation, and we have found the responsible party and annihilated their aberrant motivation by transforming them into an object that makes their motivation congruent. Disorder has become order, the break has been healed, having originated, and then been repaired, entirely within the subject's schematic field. It should not surprise us that naming is not always
enough. Randall Collins has noted the dance up to the act of violence, and this type of dehumanization is part of that dance. Sometimes it ends with no action taken; other times, it does not. Collins, unfortunately, fails to provide the motive for violence, which we will now attempt to address.

It would be easy to ask: under what conditions do individuals choose violence? Obviously, the answer is multiplitious, for as we have already seen, soldiers may choose violence to avoid future shame states, just as some may kill with the desire for agency confirmation (see below). It is fairly certain violence can manifest through anger, and what differentiates our common conception of anger from shame and fear is that it has a positive anticipated state built within it, the 'certain pleasure' that Aristotle spoke about. From the rationalist viewpoint, exchange theory names this 'sweet revenge', 'that it is rewarding to inflict costs on someone who has hurt you' (Gelles, 2007: 411). Not unlike Aristotle, how this might be pleasurable is not explained.

When discussing self-designated causal attributions and schematic breaks, it is possible to imagine how these are states to be avoided. The transformation of shame into an actual to a positive state, in the case of PTSD, is part of a long therapeutic process of understanding and dismantling self-schema (Horowitz, 2003: 54). In the case of other designated causal attribution (anger), the satisfaction is an expected part of the process. As with any anticipated feeling state, whether or not this satisfaction will be achieved is irrelevant to its factor as a choice. In fact, one such study by heuristic and bias specialist Daniel Gilbert found that

29. 'Revenge, at first though sweet, Bitter ere long back on itself recoils', Milton, Paradise Lost IX, 171, quoted in Carlsmith, Wilson and Gilbert.
subjects 'believe that punishing an offender will improve their mood and bring about psychological closure, but in fact punishment will increase rumination about the offender and lead to a continuation of negative affect' (Carlsmith, Wilson and Gilbert, 2008: 1316). In this case, even the feeling result is not achieved, even if the choice is made according to an anticipation of feeling.

In order to understand how this satisfaction process 'completes' anger, we examine the specificities of the physical manifestations of violence. In other words, it follows, to some extent, that what anger does might tell us what anger wants. In a recent interview study, it was found that the knowledge state of the object of anger was a crucial aspect in satisfaction: 'In one condition, the partner understood that taking tickets would be a punishment for his prior unfair behavior. In another condition, the partner stated that he would not understand that tickets were deducted from him. Participants experienced less anger, more satisfaction, and more deservingness in the former condition' (Gollwitzer et al., 2011: 370). That is to say, it matters that the offenders know that they were punished.

Many forms of violence, including organized genocides and rape, carry with them an attempt to shame, which must be understood through agent causality and assignation. If anger arises out of a schematic break and an attempt to restore order according to the motive, it follows that the target is not the blame agent, but their intent. The transformations here are not attempts to shame, so much as they are to force the blame agent into an awareness of their own guilt. This is why shaming the enemy, an unnecessary aspect of violence were it rational, consistently arises. The
violative object is not the enemy, but their knowledge state is. The transformations of war, torture, abuse, and even street crime are about information; the target is the motive, and secondarily, its proponent. The violence, however horrible, is incidental.

Professor deMause has proposed an approach to history that acknowledges psychological motives—reasonable enough, and hardly revolutionary (Norbert Elias, 70 years ago, proposed the same). Unfortunately, his insistence on seeing child abuse as the singular cause of war, crime and violence has relegated his work to the dustbin of academia. In a recent speech, he made clear: "'Aw, deMause, come on—that's too simplistic! Just love your children and you'll eliminate wars? You expect me to believe this?" Yes, I do, I always answer' (deMause, 2005). The fact that he calls his field 'Psychohistory' does not help matters. Nevertheless, he makes a compelling argument that might be useful in understanding the nature of agentic correction in a more substantive way.

deMause has studied at great length the history of childhood, and makes an argument about the Holocaust that I find especially resonant. The torments visited upon the victims of the camps find a nearly one-to-one correlation with what German children experienced. Note that this behavior was specific to Germany (and, to some degree, Austria), where children were seen as inconvenient appendages, meriting the terms: 'little eater' and 'little shitter'—phrases still in use. Concentration camp prisoners were just as specifically made to endure 'an excremental assault', in which 'they were forced to defecate and urinate upon each other, were often thrown into the cesspool if they were too slow, lived in barracks "awash with urine and feces," walked about "knee-deep in
excrement... Later toilet training of German children was also restaged, often in precise detail, as by having the ghetto-latrine supervised by a guard with a big clock, whom the Germans dressed comically as a rabbi and called the "shit-master" (deMause, 2002: 182). Most disturbing of all, Germany from the 1900s to the 1920s not only had a high infanticide rate, but 'specific methodspervised by a guard with a big clock, whom the Germans dressed comically as a rabbi and called the "shit-mMause, 2002: 184), acts that were used on the children in the camps.

deMause's observations merit further study, yet it is hard to credit an unhappy childhood as the cause of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, he describes the specificities in which violence is enacted on victims, and the importance of the act of shaming. This figures in countless genocides, forward panics and collective rage killings. We can find similar abuses from Mao's cultural revolution, where teachers, targets via their being intellectuals, are subject to the exact punishment they might inflict on their students:

'...black ink poured over their heads and faces so that they were now in reality a eblack gang."lack gang.oured over their heads and faces so that they were now in reality a ets via their being intellectuals, are subject to the exact punishment thels filled with rocks... All were barefoot, hitting broken gongs or pots as they walked around the field crying out: "I am black gangster so-and-so."' (Jones, 2010: 315).

Yet, beyond the standard childhood re-enactments, there is an informational shift. Like the Christian torture inflicted during the Inquisition, the object is the confession: the subject must name his or her own agency.
It is therefore necessary to go beyond the one-to-one psychological relationship of childhood experience and adult action. What is this behavior, beyond the simple and ugly transformation of dehumanization? Jones argues specifically that it was the felt humiliation of the perpetrators that motivated their violence: 'Humiliation thus figures prominently in the most extreme manifestations of human aggression: murder, war, genocide. Indeed, it is difficult to find a historical or contemporary case of genocide in which humiliation is not a key motivating force' (Jones, 2010: 394–5). While certainly evident, there is also the reflection of this humiliation found in the acts of violence itself. Although this following example from the Nanjing Massacre of 1937 is considerably more violent, it is to be considered within the context of created a shift of agency:

'Chinese men were often sodomized or forced to perform a variety of repulsive sexual acts in front of laughing Japanese soldiers. At least one Chinese man was murdered because he refused to commit necrophilia with the corpse of a woman in the snow... Fathers were forced to rape their daughters, and sons their mothers, as other family members watched' (Chang, 1997: 128 and 208).

The character of shame is tied to the subject, with forced sex with family members, and the 'forcing of celibate men to have intercourse' (Wood, 2008: 326). Looking past the horror, or perhaps focusing on it, this is an attempt to cause the victims to participate in their own suffering, one which underlines an attempt to shift causal attribution.

Going beyond the semantically loaded terms of emotion, humiliation could be understood as a forced self-blame. As with survivors of rape or
abuse, there is a misattribution of self-assignated agency (see Chapter 5). The perpetrator of violence is the actor, yet attributes responsibility to the victim, just as the victim accepts it. James Gilligan talks about the attempt of violent offenders, even rapists, to right a perceived injustice. Ross L. was a 19-year-old man who had raped and then stabbed a woman in her genitals and eyes (for 'eyes', see Chapters 5 and 6). In this case, his 'moral system' was 'a defense against the threat of being seen as a weakling, not "a real man"' (Gilligan, 1997: 63).

Gilligan extends this reflected gaze to genocidal violence as well. He notes that the word in German for evil eye, Judenblick, is translated as 'Jew's glance'. As with the victims of violence after the fact and dead comrades, the eyes reflect back a reality, this time an accusation that serves as a precursor to violence. For Gilligan, the solution to the shame problem is violence; by killing the source of shame, you kill shame. As Erik Erikson posits: 'he who is ashamed...would like to destroy the eyes of the world' (Erikson, quoted in Gilligan, 1997: 64). This completes the sense of 'truth' engendered by another's gaze. Seen previously as a confirmation of action (fear of being 'seen' a coward') or in the silent accusation of the dead, this is a truth that must be extinguished: 'the mutilation served as a magical means of accomplishing something that even killing one's victim could not do, namely that of destroying the feeling of shame itself' (Gilligan, 1997: 85).

Once again, we are mired in loaded terms of emotion. Instead, we can say that the violent offender's intent is not violence, per se, but instead an attempt to demonstrate—not just to shift agency, but to cause the victim to feel or think that way as well. Rape is far too complex a
subject to address in a single paragraph, but what the extreme example from Nanjing and the destruction above points to is a raw attempt to shift agency to the target, to make them participate in their own torment. The viciousness of the rage is a transfer of shame to anger, manifesting not in violence, which is also incidental, but in education, in the act of showing the enemy 'how you made me feel'. This is referred to the educational aspect of retribution (Schmid, 2005), that the punishment is a function of the guilty actor 'knowing' what he/she did. If violence is, as Charles Tilly said, a form of communication, this is the message: 'the only language they seem to understand' (Truman, 1945). This furthermore explains the cycle of violence not as a pat statement, or even retribution following retribution, but as a cognitive attempt to change current or future feeling states via a shift of causal attribution. Humiliation begets humiliation, to be sure, but only inasmuch as agency is assigned.

We return now to Randall Collins' conception of asymmetric entrainment as a precursor to violence—again, not with a critique but with an elaboration. Collins proposes that it is the role, not just of the victim and aggressor, but of the audience, that contributes to violence: 'The woman is playing the victim role all too well, and this is part of the micro-interactional feedback that keeps the dominator entrained in his aggression' (Collins, 2008: 145, see Chapter 3). What, then, are the stakes of this micro-interactional feedback? Given the above observations regarding domestic abuse and blaming the victims, dehumanization, and attributions, I would argue that the intentional object is fault itself.

Anger has an intention, even if this may seem incomprehensible to an outsider—or even the one experiencing the anger later on, as with ex
*post facto* justifications. The aggressor feels violated by a schematic break, their partner's 'jealousy, poor anger control, emotional instability, unwillingness to compromise, and relationship insecurity' (Henning et al., 2005: 137). The victim confirms this, and the abuse results in a physical attribution of agency. In other words, as one individual or group assigns agent causality to another, violence occurs via a threshold of assigned agency when both sides 'agree' that one is to blame. As Collins notes, this is but one way that domestic violence in particular can manifest. If the victim does not take the victim role, this can lead to stalking or other violent behaviors. In either case, however, the pole around which this revolves is causal agency, violation followed by restoration of order.

**The Justice Motive**

The idea that the assignation of causal agency is the motivation behind domestic and genocidal violence may be controversial. The concept of restorative order, however, is inescapably clear in the practice and theory of justice and retribution. Justice, whether individual, political or legal, depends on its scales: after imbalance, can balance be achieved? This statement is hardly radical. Instead, we introduce the same concept of the reapportionment of causal agency seen in abuse and genocide as found in the punishments, and even reforms, of legal or state justice. Like the humiliations experienced by victims of violence, the real focus is directing the offender to recognize their own agency.

Continued replication of this model exists on the individual level in both senses of the word. That is to say, that collective violence and
individual violence often share a common feeling: injustice. Beginning with the individual, a sense of feeling 'wronged' may be the greatest motivator for violence in general. As James Black noted: 'There is a sense in which conduct regarded as criminal is often quite the opposite. Far from being an intentional violation of a prohibition, much crime is moralistic and involves the pursuit of justice' (Black, 1983: 35). Black's thesis relies on a concept of 'murder as self-help', a rationalist sense of an underclass attempting to regulate in a non-state environment (see also Katz, 1990).

What are they experiencing? Tiptoeing around moral qualifications for or against criminality, injustice is a kind of violated expectation, an imbalance that must be set right. James Gilligan's own work on violence and injustice (see above) consists of a series of interviews with over 200 offenders, avoiding the classical rational actor thesis. It focuses instead on the emotional elements of felt slights, where 'all violence is an attempt to achieve justice' (Gilligan, 1997: 11). Gilligan's work is especially important as it largely concentrates on how feelings operate in these circumstances, and how the punitive legal system is not tied to any social function, but to the feeling of injustice. To wit, that we've had 3,000 years to test the punishment theory of preventing violence, and that '3000 years is enough to test any theory' (Gilligan, 1997: 94).

The feeling of injustice as interruption of expected order has been further linked to the large-scale violent behavior of war. Scholar David Welch surveys five wars (the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War of the 19th century, World War I, World War II and the Falklands/Malvinas War) and found what he calls the 'justice motive' the key motivation is all but
one (World War II, and this is only with some qualification). The justice motive is defined 'as the drive to correct a perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits', which gets us very close to Galtung's expectation thesis. For our purposes, he adds that '[t]he word 'perceived' is crucial' (Welch, 1993: 19). Welch is considerably less critical of institutions than Gilligan, and calls for a moral agreement as what consists of justice and what does not (Welch, 1993: 197–203). Less forgiving is Frederick Manning, who may be taking a swipe at our natural school as well: 'War is waged by men; not by beasts, or by gods. It is a peculiarly human activity. To call it a crime against humanity is to miss at least half its significance; it is also the punishment of a crime. That raises a moral question, the kind of problem with which the present age is disinclined to deal' (Manning, quoted in Coady, 2008: 42).

My own work on the Bush White House's war on terror unites the themes of justice and creation of order through violence (King, 2010). Sparked by the single event of the attacks of September 11 2001, the messy chaos of terrorism, which can strike at any time and for no reason, was pressed into the order of war (see Chapter 5, violent reaction to schemic breaks). This was crystallized by Dick Cheney's famous comment, blissfully free of logic but not of causal thinking: 'If there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping AQ build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response' (Suskind, 2006: 54). The Bush White House was consumed with notions of justice and the sense of balancing the imbalance: 'when we find out who did this, they're not going to like me as president. Somebody is going to pay' (Woodward, 2002, 75). Attempts to restore order in the justice
motive were also found on the part of Al Qaeda, who, not unlike the US, pursued formula of retribution.

There is an imbalance of response in these actions—what Cambodians call a 'head for an eye' type of revenge (Jones, 2010: 287)—as well as the breakdown of classical means/end state making. These phenomena demonstrate neither rational actors nor moral actors seeking an objective and clearly defined form of justice, but individuals acting according to the maintenance of cognitive emotional order. The Stoic Seneca observed the contradiction of injustice years previous, when he said that 'a wrong not exceeded is not revenged' (Seneca, 1917, Thyestes, 176). 

Although ostensibly a rational realm, politics has a long, and surprisingly unabashed history with anger, where 'one can define anger as the essential political emotion' (Lyman, quoted in Holmes, 2004). This tradition goes back as far as Aristotle: 'any one can get angry—that is easy get angryck as far as Aristotlehhas a long, and surprisingly unabashed history with anger, where 'one can define angevery one, nor is it easy' (Aristotle, 1999: 37). In this view, anger is actually appropriate, necessary even: 'those who do not get angry at things at which it is right to be angry are considered foolish, and so are those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the a right time, and with the right people' (Aristotle, 1934: 4ven:). Anger remains a 'moral' emotion. It merely behooves us to

30. As it happens, this concise observation was made by a character from one of his plays; in his philosophical writing, he was not far from the intentional school of emotion: 'though anger is reason’s enemy, it comes into being only where reason resides' (Seneca, 2010: 17).
distinguish between 'good' anger and 'bad' anger, an action whose main obstacle for Aristotle was *akrasia* (weakness of will).

Given the variety of ways in which anger manifests, and the ways in which each side in any war believes in its own righteousness, it would be easy to argue that this is a false dichotomy. It may be wiser instead to argue that it is an irrelevant one, and that attention must be redirected towards the feeling which is generated by the causal conclusions and assignations built within anger. What both 'good' and 'bad' anger contain is pleasure, at least the pleasure of an anticipated outcome. This becomes clearer as we look at the way which conventional political justice manifests in the same form that genocide and abuse do: the pursuit of an alteration of the blame object's motives.

There is a longstanding divide within the justice community over retributive vs. restorative justice. The former is classic punishment, where 'transgressions disturb the moral balance... in the same for levelled before justice is truly achieved, restoring moral proportionality to the situation' (Okimoto et al., 2012: 255). Alternatively, restorative justice seeks to rehabilitate the offender 'a utilitarian, deterrence perspective, in which the focus is on preventing future harms against society' (Carlsmith, Darley and Robinson, 2002: 284; see Wenzel et al., 2008 for a review of the perspectives). To introduce a historical and political pole, Michel Foucault has famously argued for the 'sovereign' and 'disciplinary'; where the former is absolute, violent and public, the latter is insidious and written upon the body of its subject (Foucault, 1991; 2008). Although Foucault's concern was very much about the concept of power, his thesis originates within the field of justice—the transition from the brutal public...
execution of Damiens the regicide in 1757, to (80 years later) the implementation of exact places to be, and actions to take upon the prisoner, from 'torture to the time-table' (Foucault, 1975: 13).

Each of these seemingly unrelated justice 'systems' has the intention of their blame agent at their core. For the disciplinary practice and reform, this is more evident, since the intentions of the docile subject is the stated object of change. In the case of restorative justice, neutralization theory, touched upon above, puts the offender's ability to assign blame at the center of its practical application: 'The term "cognitive distortions"...describes various thoughts, perceptions, beliefs and ideas that are understood to present obstacles to the offender taking responsibility for his crimes, and that taking responsibility is understood to be essential to effective treatment' (Marshall et al., 2011: 118). The therapeutic target is very much to get the subject to acknowledge their part in the crime, even if this has been shown to have negligible effect (Hood et al., 2002; see Maruna and Mann, 2006 for an analysis of the efficacy of this perspective).

The blame agent's intentions are just as much at the fore in Foucault's conception of the sovereign. As he details Damiens agonizing suffering, there is constant mention, as there would be in any historical document during the period, of the 'confesseurs', (Foucault, 1975: 11–3). Although Foucault is detailing what is visited upon the body of this man; the fact that he is able to can only be due to the presence of these men. Their purpose, as one might assume from the name, was not to be historians, but to hear, in detail, what the man said in relation to his own sin. In other words, their presence is required only according to the
offender's motive, and what the offender believes about it. If the point was physical pain, or even dismemberment of a body, they would not be necessary.

To complete the picture of how the process of schemic cognition and feeling might motivate choice and action, we return to complete an examination of forward panic seen in Chapter 3. To review, this is the point in a pitched battle, where one side runs, and the other falls upon them, almost always with terrible violence. Collins summarizes it as follows:

'[A] period of prolonged tension/fear, with a hidden enemy and strong suspicions that the normal surroundings and civilian population are a cover for sudden attacks; forward-advancing operations in this danger zone, building up frustration and anticipation at finally catching the enemy, and triggering moments when the enemy seems to have been caught; a frenzied rush of destruction' (Collins, 2008: 88).

Eschewing terms like 'tensions', 'frenzy' and 'frustration', this can be seen, in terms of schemic agent causality, in three phases: unknowing, attribution, and restoration. The fear that Collins speaks of is, naturally enough, the bare and raw uncertainty of not knowing, as seen in Chapter 5. This goes beyond living or dying, but alludes to the profound chaos, noise, mud and smoke of battle. On a second-by-second basis, nothing is known.

To Collins, and as per the abuse discussion above, by running, one side takes the 'role' of the victim. This means that to the (now) aggressor, the chaos has order and a transgressive agent. This is amplified by the
audience that Collins speaks about: 'the stance of the audience has an overwhelming effect on whether and how much violence is carried out' (Collins, 2008: 9). For Collins, this is a question of emotional energy 'that the audience also provides the social energy and solidarity to overcome tension/fear and make fighting possible at all' (Collins, 2008: 199).

Additionally, this is a question of what is known. Truth, as noted in Chapter 5, is social in nature, where even scientific theorems are subject to a collective agreement. Here, the attribution of blame is confirmed as absolute en masse: who is at fault, who deserves it.

Finally, the violence, especially in this form, has the caste of blame shifting: it is about more than simply killing. Keeping in mind that this is not the murder of civilians, but the violence that follows a pitched battle, here is one of the oldest examples. After years of uncertainty and frustration (according to a schematic perspective), the Roman army breeched the city walls of Carthage:

'To keep the streets open for their attacks, Roman Soldiers threw the dead and the living together into holes in the ground, sweeping them along like sticks and stones or turning them over with their iron tools, and a man was used for filling up a ditch. Some were thrown in head foremost, while their legs, sticking out of the ground, writhed a long time (Appian, quoted in Kiernan, 2007: 50).

As the victims are made to suffer, the consequent humiliation is best understood as an apprehension and then reassignment of causal agency. When one side, for whatever reason, breaks off and runs, this confirms their role as a victim, but only inasmuch as it does their agency. But, as with the model of anger, it is not enough to know the blame agent. The
real target is the transgressive motive (‘you were trying to kill me!’), and violence results from this restoration of order.

If humiliation is a factor in genocide, justice and forward panic, using the structure of basic emotions makes little sense, that we would say, tautologically, that anger leads to shame. However, a structural understanding, that anger is generated by the assignation of a violative motive to a blame agent, begins to reveal a logical balance. The balance to other designated causality isn't 'revenge', but attempts, however magical, to transform the blame agent's own beliefs about their responsibility. In other words, revenge, and whatever resolution it anticipates, is in the inversion of the violation. It is necessary to force the blame agent to acknowledge its agency in the violative action. It takes the form of shame only because shame is self-designated causality.

Affect Resolution via Confirmation of Agency

Although many casualties in matched battles do occur via forward panic (what might be called forward assignation), killing in war, and certainly planning for it, does not (always) occur with such extreme violence or passion. Modern warfare, in fact, is characterized by distant killing such as bombing, or artillery, which accounts for 45 percent to 58 percent of causalities in WWI, 50–75 percent in WWII, 60 percent in Korea and so on (Bailey, 2004: xvii). The planning process itself, which leads to the orders that cause these deaths, can be almost excruciatingly rational, from the sand tables and icons used by the Roman Empire, to the 1960s' statistical analysis and body count used by Robert McNamara, to the
PowerPoint presentations in warfare's more contemporary incarnations (Perla, 1990; Anderson, 2005: 51; Franks, 2004: 336; Bumiller, 2010).

It would therefore be extremely reductive to credit this type of violence to the higher affect causal reassignment system outlined above (i.e. anger/retribution). And yet, obviously, these acts do occur, and many times, as in the case of both Vietnam and the US–Iraq War of 2003, and even World Wars II and I, do not lead to instrumentally rational outcomes, a knowable advantage for the instigating player. However, although traditional forms of emotion like anger and shame are not at play in these decisions, feeling is; more importantly, it is feeling that manifests according to causal assignation. In this case, we are speaking of the pleasure of confirming one's own agency in an instrumental act; these positive effects were briefly touched on in the previous chapter, where the relative ease of basic training allows for feelings of accomplishment. It is the job of this section to outline how this feeling manifests.

To begin to understand this process, we will first examine how pleasure presents in killing. This is not a traditional emotion, but there is strong evidence that it is experienced by many soldiers. Joanna Bourke has examined at length the emotions and feelings experienced by those in combat (see 'fear' in Chapter 4). She is arguably most well known for her analysis of the pleasure that soldiers take in killing. Bourke notes at least three forms of pleasure in this environment, including sexual pleasure linked with killing, but we will turn to a form that most closely ties in with this thesis, instrumentality and agency: 'Major William Avery Bishop thought it "great fun" to train his machine gun on Germans because he
"loved" to watch them running away "like so many rats" (Bourke, 2000: 20).

In the above quote, we can note the dehumanization, but there is a further sense of 'fun', which Bourke links with the enjoyment of sport or films. William Broyles 'likened the happiness generated by the sport of war to the innocent pleasures of children playing cowboys and Indians, chanting the refrain, 'bang bang, you're dead!'. This creates a type of pleasure feedback loop, where films provide the context for war and vice versa: 'Films, then, provided both pleasurable, and deathly, scripts' (Bourke, 2000: 17). In modern times, this continues in new media: video games, which are referenced here by two separate pilots in the US-Iraq of 1990: 'It was fun, like a video game in real life. It was awesome. I was the right guy at the right time. I was scared. It was like a great video game and I had the keys to the car' (Barrett, 1996: 134–5).

There is a long history of relating media to violence; TV shows, movies and video games create or at least encourage it (USDHHS, 2001; Cline et al., 1973; Anderson et al., 2003). These studies are problematic for many reasons. Not unlike the nature/nurture question of violence, it is difficult to tease out whether or not desire for violence in media creates or is created by violence in practice. Furthermore, even when some causality is demonstrated, it is surprisingly slight (Anderson et al., 2003). But what is of larger concern is the way in which these types of studies serve as a distraction from the real question: what motivates the desire for violence in the first place? People would not purchase or participate in violent video games or TV shows unless there was some appeal to begin with. The link between media and violence is correlative but not causal (in
either direction). That is, both violence and media are telling the same story and creating the same feeling within the individual: satisfaction in self agency.

To improve understanding of how violence might satisfy in a confirmation context, it is necessary to explore another schism that falls along the lines of the liberal political project, between 'autonomous man' and communitarianism. Liberal politics holds the individual as the ultimate unit: 'The first premise of liberal political theory is that only individuals count. Individuals formulate projects. Individuals conceive values. When values and projects come to fruition, individuals experience the joy of their attainment; when they fail, individuals feel the frustration that results' (Johnston, 1994: 191). This perspective is also known, critically, as 'atomism' (Taylor, 1985: 187–199) or 'individualism' (Sandel, 1998).

Additional critiques have emerged of this view from feminism, which sees them as 'political traditions that historically have been hostile to women's interests and freedom' (MacKensie and Stoljar, 2000: 2). Often directed at liberalism primacies of the self, this is a critique of masculinist norms, of a rational and wholly separate individual that controls his destiny: 'the myth that humans are independent, separate beings. While there may be times in our lives when humans are independent and autonomous, there are other times in our lives in which we are not independent... We do not view these relationships as a set of interconnected political relations, nor do we view them as defining who we are as humans' (Tronto, 1996: 147–8).

As with war, there is a fundamental awareness of sociality, that our choices and the effects of our choices only matter inasmuch other people
choose themselves to allow them to matter, and further how their subsequent choices and actions in turn affect ourselves and others. This presents yet another dilemma for rationality, that one would even be able to choose outside of a web of social interaction, instead of, as traditionally posited, as an agent that controls their own outcome. Rational choice depends on an individuated actor whose choices and outcomes have a one-to-one relationship. This is true even in game theory, where expanding choice to a second actor changes the potential outcomes, but not the underlying assumption of agency. The underlying assumption that a choice can lead to an outcome, is strongly contradicted, in most real-life situations, on a series of social connections.

The reason this myth continues is not for politics or power, or even rationality, but for its cognitive vitality. It could be said that methodological individualism itself holds such an autonomous view, although it is hoped that the thesis is attempting some reflexivity: not that we are individuated, but many times this is how we cognitively process our own agency, as distinct subjects. Causality, as we have seen time and time again, is assigned an agent, which depends on the belief, naturally, that agency is possible. In complex social interdependency, we can really only vaguely affect the outcome, even if in apprehension, we believe that we determine it. This belief in agent causality is the cornerstone of feeling, both positive and negative, and we make the world according to it.

Communal interconnectivity could be no more evident than in war, which is, naturally enough, mass fighting. The leader's commands must be followed by the sub-leaders, those below them, and so on. But beyond the concept of, and possible breaks in authority lies the fog of war; the
complexity of mass fighting is simply beyond our comprehension to understand. Charles Carrington on the battle of Ypres: 'What surprises me is that historians have elevated it into a tactical masterpiece like Messines. It was just all in wrestling in the mud' (Holmes, 2003: 155). On one hand, we know that war is chaotic, unformed, and inexplicable. On the other are timetables, material, and PowerPoint presentations. It would be easy and fair to say that this is a component of everyday cognitive parsing, taking the complex into the knowable.

What this misses, naturally enough, is how it feels, specifically in regard to the subject's own agency. We have seen the effects of chaotic input on the soldiers that fight it, but this applies as well to those who plan it. If autonomy is a contradiction when it comes to social systems, why pursue it? Whatever political or feminist issues are at stake, what matters here is the way in which it feels to be autonomous. In terms of anticipated feeling states, the individual imagines a positive scenario in which 1) the world has been numerically transformed (in terms of advance in rank, money, death, territory and so on), and 2) the individual was or could be the instrument of that change, even if social interconnectedness makes such a one-to-one relationship impossible. In other words, the instrumental world is built not only to cognitively simplify our overwhelming flow of input, but to create a field in which agency can manifest.

If there is a link between war, video games and narrative, it is this. From a recent 'bible' on video game design: 'The player does an action (hitting, shooting), sees the immediate result (enemy is killed by attack), which grants a reward (experience, money, power-up). This elegant
feedback loop allows for quick and frequent player-to-world interaction. It's Freud's pleasure principle in practice. Ring the bell, a reward is gained. Why stop ringing the bell?' (Rogers, 2014: 214). Although possibly not the most cogent interpretation of Freud, these similarities of agent causality and warfare demonstrate a stronger link between media and violence than the standard exposure/action model currently in favor. 'As the button is pressed, the action should happen' (Rogers, 2014: 116).

Film narrative has a similar dependence, seen in the reliance on the protagonist. From Robert McKee's famous book on screenwriting:

'A story cannot be told about a protagonist who doesn’t want anything, who cannot make decisions, whose actions effect no change at any level... Rather, the protagonist’s will impels a known desire. The protagonist has a need or goal, an object of desire, and knows it. If you could pull your protagonist aside, whisper in his ear, "What do you want?" he would have an answer: "I’d like X today, Y next week, but in the end I want Z."' (McKee, 1997: 138).

What's striking here is the near rationalist language of variables ('X', 'Y'). It's true that war and stories feed off each other, but only inasmuch as they demonstrate the desire for instrumental and individually demarcated agency.

Once recognized, this desire for proof of agency manifests in warfare in compelling ways. Throughout the procedures of fighting, there has been a long history of trophy taking. From a practical point of view, this serves no purpose; an enemy counterpart is killed, and there is no reason to go beyond that. Initially, this seemed indicative of the humiliation seen before, and while there is an element of that, the more I read, the more a
strongly practical element struck me. Ears—the most common trophy in Vietnam and Iraq—keep their shape over time. In World War II, '[t]eeth and skulls were the most commonly taken "trophies"' (Harrison, 2006: 246). One soldier in Vietnam took this preservation element a step further: 'I was also introduced to his ear collection of four to six ears. Each ear was in a small clear glass jar and preserved in formaldehyde or alcohol. Yes, I received instruction on how to correctly remove a trophy ear from your freshly killed opponent' (Roach, 2011: 12).

Souvenirs, then, are less a manifestation of dehumanization—though they are that as well, as some would take breasts, penises, and even vaginas (Jones, 2010: 115), then a demonstration: 'We used to cut their ears off. We had a trophy. If a guy would have a necklace of ears, he was a good killer, a good trooper... The officers expected you to do it or something was wrong with you. It was generally regarded as a sign of combat effectiveness' (Bourke, 2000: 30, emphasis mine). Although indicative of the masculinity and the myth of the subject, from a cognitive feeling perspective, this seemingly gruesome act is a totem against the true chaos of combat: I have agency.

The attempt to create agency extends naturally enough to state actors who must manage the impossible complexity of intra- and inter-institutional interaction and attempt control. It is imperative to consider the planning of war from the perspective of satisfying the desire for low affect instrumental agency. Gen. Tommy Franks 'solution' to Iraq, as put forward to President George Bush Jr. in Dec. 2001, is a grid of lines and slices:
'The starbursts at the intersections of Lines and Slices represented points of focus we would use to develop the specifics of a detailed plan. For example, the starburst at the intersection of "Operational Fires" and "Leadership" meant we would attack leadership targets using bombs and missiles. Simply stated, the starbursts helped the Component Commanders and staff match specific military tools to specific targets, resulting in better synergy among traditionally independent arms and services' (Franks, 2004: 340).

This is not to say that war or state action can't be planned, only to be mindful of the way in which we may be under the sway of beliefs generated by the desire for the feeling of a future state of completion and agency. General H.R. McMaster: 'It's dangerous because it can create the illusion of understanding and the illusion of control. Some problems in the world are not bullet-izable' (Bumiller, 2010).

**What is Bulletizable?**

The use of Iraq presents an additional dimension on the political level, especially given recent events. This statement from former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair on the 2014 Sunni insurgency underlines, with virtually every sentence, the centrality of agent causality in political war thinking.

"Don't believe washing our hands of it and walking away will solve the problem"

Writing on his website, the former prime minister warned that every time the UK puts off action, "the action we will be forced to take will be ultimately greater". He said the current violence in Iraq was the "predictable and malign effect" of inaction in Syria.
"We have to liberate ourselves from the notion that 'we' have caused this," he wrote. "We haven't."

"Where the extremists are fighting, they have to be countered hard, with force" (BBC, 2014, article entitled 'We didn't cause Iraq Crisis').

Besides the attempts to shift agency, and presentation of future states of self-blame if nothing is done, action is seen as a solution by virtue of its being an action. In this case, action and choice arise not out of genuine causal relationships, but out of vestigial manifestations of causal thinking. Instead of the real effects of what violence has rent, demonstrated in Iraq (at least) twice, choice is based on agency; historical causes and effects are ignored. In the above instance, Mr. Blair seems so preoccupied with blame (and avoidance of same), that the ineffectiveness of the previous military solution in Iraq, or whatever facets of the military intervention might have been effective, cannot even be addressed.

James Scott, and others from the Science and Technology Studies school, has detailed the many disasters that occur when 'seeing like a state', and when complex social interactions are conceived as solvable through simple instrumental changes, there is an 'assumption that spatial order (in architecture) is the same/will create social order' (Scott, 1998: 133; see Chapter 2). In addition to Scott's work, we add the concept of agency, that it is not a mere question of countability, instrumentality or numeracy, but the way in which action pleasurably demonstrates the agency upon which cognition depends. Katz has proposed the impossible driver/car object, where cut-offs are amputations. Instead, driving, like war, is a field of perfect instrumentality: the anticipation of extended
agency, roads, paths, choices, times, actions. 'Her anger heated up as she glanced at the speedometer and noticed that we were only going forty miles per hour' (Katz, 1999: 34). Such an emotive reaction only matters inasmuch as it count be counted. When interruptions occur in such an agentist space, they are strongly violative, hence anger.

Returning to the theory of media violence, we see attempts of precisely this type of instrumentality in its correction. There is a violation (the 'offense' of media violence), a planned and countable outcome (elimination of violent media), and the sincere belief that this will necessitate a like reduction in violence. Although the goal is very different, the same cognate feelings in violence, driving, revenge and war exist within this paradigmatic solution. This example is not meant mockingly, but according to efficacy. State-based attempts to address complex, cognitive feeling problems as if they are mechanical agentic puzzles will fail until the underlying feelings are addressed, both of the subjects, and of those who study them.

What we have seen in the examples of narrative, video games, sports, driving, retribution, quantitative studies, injustice and war are the pleasurable feelings of accomplishment, which can be understood only as a sense of an instrumental change via individual agency. In simple terms, it feels good to have done: a feeling that depends on a world that is controllable. The myth of the rational masculine individual has been much, and justly, critiqued. In the social world, the idea that one person could have control of any outcome seems absurd on the face of it, yet remains the foundation of modern society. A focus on the importance of positive feelings through agency helps explain the perpetuation of both
this myth and the instrumental fields around it, i.e. maps, money, bullets, scores and so on. In order for an individual to generate positive feelings, he or she must exist in a world with measurable and comprehensible outcomes. The norms and institutions that have arisen in the last 10,000 years must conform to the cognitive feeling framework of subjective agency. It is, in fact, the desire for this agency that gave rise to them.
Conclusion: Cause, Effect and Affect

The core argument, that we choose optimally according to how we think we might feel, is not so controversial, depending on how broad the definition of 'feel' is. Rational choice is feeling choice, at least in the sense that we feel ('feel' being defined as sensed or even thought) the rational version is better than the irrational—unless, of course, we feel the opposite. This is why the contributory argument is so important: what feelings are associated with thought, especially causal thought? How do they function? How do they manifest? I have argued that feelings generated by causal reasoning, especially agency-based causality, are a prime mover in choice. This paradigm has (at least) five distinct advantages.

It is able to describe culturally, historically and broadly defined emotions. The use of the word 'fear' has meant both the type of overwhelming panic described in Chapter 5, as well as the more cognitively based anticipation of a future event ('I'm afraid of that outcome') as seen in Chapter 6. This 'fear' can further be tinged with shame (or at least the anticipation of it), in the way that a soldier's major fear before combat was being seen a coward. The current approach, of combined and conflated emotions, is descriptive in that we can understand what happens; setting it within cognitive scenarios has more explanatory value as well as a clear repeatable structure.

Moreover, this approach is able to incorporate or describe things that are not called emotions, but probably are. The 'probably are' here refers to the way in which emotions (if defined intentionally) are cognitive
antecedents that lead to feeling. To resolve the horror film question, we seek not so much to be afraid, but to be afraid with the foreknowledge of the type of schemic resolution coming our way, the anticipated feeling state of agency itself. Likewise, the pleasure of battle (Chapter 7), anticipates fear followed by the rush of power when one survives. The horror film, especially in its current iteration of 'torture porn', confirms this: the characters do not escape, but the audience does. We buy the ticket not necessarily anticipating the tension, but the resolution of that tension at the end, which is always found when the lights come up.

Crucially, ideas of cognitive completion allow us to explain feelings associated with rationality, and rational choice. It feels good to be rational (just as it feels good sometimes not to be), but it is the feeling that drives it. Although there is some strong evidence that this is an avoidance of negatively associated weak or non-masculine feeling states, there is a carrot with this stick: the right answer, the solved puzzle, the perfect sentence, all are associated with pleasure. Rational choice in its current state deems the rational self-explanatory, and it is hoped that this critique will, at the very least, generate greater attention to this syllogism.

Rational choice has its origins in economics, with a strong focus on measurable results of actions and countable rewards. If we forgo these rewards, either it could be said that we are either choosing irrationally, or according to a particular bias. The fundamental error here is that both choices are in fact internal; the actor is not choosing between an instrumental and a feeling or heuristic, but between two different anticipated feeling outcomes. Internal explanations can encompass external ends, but not the other way around.
Finally, this perspective is especially qualified to explain choice. Instead of emotions; it posits that particular thoughts generate feelings. These thoughts, when anticipated, allow the feelings themselves to be anticipated. This process determines, or at least influences, which action the actor will take, even if that action is itself another thought, with its own associated feelings and so on. By theorizing emotion as cognates, they can be understood easily by the subject as future states to achieve or avoid. This prioritizes feelings that can be scenarized more easily. In terms of feeling, it could be said that fields of instrumentality, like money, rank and territory make feeling decisions clearer. Limited in present-time cognition to four, we cannot comprehend the difference between $1,000 and $1,010. We choose the latter based possibly on the feeling of agentic satisfaction, possibly on the anticipation of the negative sense if we don't, but in either case, the countability informs the decision. Negative self-designated causal anticipations (shame) are extremely easy to imagine, largely due to the way in which the outcomes appear so clearly in the mind's eye; trust, forgiveness, understanding, and so on, become less so, and consequently less optimal by virtue of being harder to cognate as a future state.

These less scenarizable feelings are a weakness contained herein. What of love, trust, forgiveness, gratitude or even laughter? As a theory to describe motivational feelings (feelings that affect choice), there are

31. One way to imagine a joke is when we take a 'jump' between how an event is seen through two schemas. This, naturally, takes the joke right out of it. Although a potential future area of research, what amazed me in the cognitive emotional and basic emotions school was the way in which this wonderful, unique and powerful feeling is almost totally ignored.
many limits, some of which are prescribed by the limits of the research, 
some of which may never be understood, or at least explained. This 
preceding has been an extremely narrow theorization of feeling and 
emotion. Focusing on so many negatives, as in the pre-schematic feelings of 
not knowing usually associated with fear, or the avoidance self-designated 
causality through authority, has ignored the wide (though still limited) 
spectrum of feelings available. If the soldier fights for the soldier next to 
them, it is a feeling of love that motivates—a bond that soldiers often say 
can never be replicated in civilian life. An exploration of the ontology of 
love, which may be the core of all these choices, would be necessary as 
counterpoint if nothing else.

Another limit: where do schemas come from? In a sense, nearly all of 
them are learned behaviors; it would be hard to credit the exchange of 
money or identity with a particular group, language or ethnicity being 
biological. Nevertheless, the formation of schemas has some type of 
biological/cognitive component, given visual acuity (Heider) and the 
manifestation of schizophrenia (McGhee and Chapman). Nevertheless, the 
thesis has barely addressed the way in which these schemas might be 
constructed. Masculinity might be a productive area of research via this 
perspective, especially since it has amassed a considerable body of 
literature on violence. This is with the caveat that schemic masculinity can 
be understood situationally: that a man in one place acts differently than 
in another, and further that each man has a different definition of what it 
is to be a man in those situations. Masculinity, understood as a group of 
schemas (how a man acts as a father, as a warrior, as a coward, as a 
leader, ad astra) could be a productive model, and a further exploration of
how schemas function in choice. The vast number of schemas, and the situational way in which they apply, does not contradict a concise model. Violations and assignations of agency to the self or others manifest, in feeling terms, according to a reliable pattern. We are different, but in the same way.

Another piece of research lacking from this thesis is the dual process model of cognition (Kahneman, 2003). Under this theory, there are two systems: system 1, which is quick thinking and always in operation; and system 2, which is 'rule-based' and considerate (Gilovich and Griffin, 2002: 16). If system 1 tends to be seen on the emotional side of the equation, it might be useful to consider the concepts of cognitive headroom. It has been demonstrated how cognitive upset can affect thinking performance (Chapters 5 and 6), but how might it affect change? In other words, if we are to consider how a causal theory of feeling might be implemented, it would certainly require the considerate examination of the beliefs that generate the feelings, or at the very least, a closer look at the difference between the anticipated feeling result and the probable one. If the brain is processing agent type causality (who to blame, how to correct their motives, etc.), it leaves less room for system 2 type cognitions, which, in turn, leaves less room for potential alteration.

This leads to a very important issue, not unique to any social theory: its practical use. How can positive change be implemented via a cognate feeling model? It is arguable that the deconstruction of the concept of injustice has led this paradigm to a kind of moral relativism, but here we can simply define positive change as a reduction of physical violence. To demonstrate how this might come about in regard to system 1 and system
2 thinking, consider one way that this paradigm might be applied historically. One subject of particular interest, and one which has not undergone this scrutiny under these criteria, is the Enlightenment. There is no controversy to the statement that it was a slow transition away from religious doctrine and towards reason that characterized this great explosion of real scientific advancement. Yet, as with the conception of God as a blame agent (Chapters 3, 6 and 7), it may be this metacausal type of thinking that was the impediment to the application of the scientific method. If physical phenomena like gravity, fluid dynamics, and the health of the human body are related to an intent, their mechanics remain fixed and obscure. As agentic and physical causality separated (as symbolized by the Deist conception of the grand watchmaker), great advances were made. This is due to both the wasted energy over searching for a metacause, as well as possibly the addition of cognitive headroom afforded without the assignation of a blame agent.

The application of agentic causality to areas of violence, like war and criminality, could be especially productive. As noted in Chapter 7, ordinary citizens in Western countries are most than happy to trade retributive justice for reductions in crime. As Scandinavian models of criminal justice prove more and more productive, we will need to ask: is our feeling of satisfaction, which in any case is seemingly never sated, more important than the our actual safety? 'Generally speaking, in this region, it is recognized that going to prison is itself the punishment for crime...rather than being allowed to degrade and debase all within' (Pratt, 2008: 119). This reflects a counter against the seeming importance of the shifting causal attribution (shaming) prevalent in other models. The fact that it
seems to be having a strong positive effect would underline the importance of the difference of these two approaches.

As far as war decisions relate to future research, this author is currently working on an attempt to reframe the decisions on the American side to continue in the Vietnam War. Traditionally seen within the 'groupthink' paradigm (itself rather circular—we form consensus within groups because we do), it is better contextualized in time-based feelings of future self-designated causality. This case offers an immense amount of archival material, allowing for a close reading of what would be qualitative in nature. The approach has further advantage in that it does not seek emotion words, but particular beliefs and conclusions that lead to specified feelings. Even so, the feeling basis can be especially clear, as in the proposed solution 'Peace with Honor', tying the outcome directly to the emotion 'pride'. It is hoped that future understanding of feelings within seemingly rational institutions and players would better distinguish between actual and anticipated feeling outcomes.

Outside my own area of expertise, cognate/feeling theory might begin a productive re-examination of emotional theory in cognitive psychology and the philosophy of emotion. There seems to be an unceasing debate over what is or is not shame, fear or anger, just as what is or is not emotion. This seems driven by both the need for categorization, but more importantly, the need to deny feeling, and the way in which it seems to, or that we fear it might, invalidate an argument. The problem is less that decisions are made, and essays written, under feeling influence, than the contradiction that arises when we stake that
they are not. Feeling does not invalidate an argument; we can still rely on lack of logic and evidence for that.

And what of ethics and relativism? This system is a strong critique that all feelings of injustice are equivalent: that the rapist that feels victimized by women is the same as black Americans who felt victimized by the segregation laws of the 1910–1950s, the batterers' paradox in reverse. I would caution instead that what might be true is that they are experiencing the same feeling. The best approach is to specify, as best one can, the feeling ends one seeks, so that it is possible to determine if the action taken can achieve that. When we attempt to justify it with higher ethical systems, this leads to metacausal and agentic reasoning, which, in turn, can lead to the strong contradictory actions like murder and war. As a stated goal, feeling states can be achieved; as an anticipated goal tied with injustice, they cannot. Instrumental rationality can be usefully applied if we accept that feelings are the end, and the search for practical ways to achieve those ends.

It is here on the intangible that we conclude. In the beginning, it was asked that the reader take emotion seriously, and it is sincerely wished at this point that this has been the case. At the end, one more indulgence is requested: a reprioritization of the immaterial, the bodily, the felt. James Scott, Ian Hacking and the entire Science and Technology Studies field have focused on the importance of legibility and numeracy as motivations for decisions, and we come to this discipline too little and too late in the game. In the above formulation, within a system 1 and system 2 paradigm, choices are not only prioritized over negative and positive, but around
comprehensibility, that like the drunk who loses his keys in the dark, and looks for them in the light, only that which can be counted counts.

To explain how this might be reconceptualized, Dietrich Dörner has proposed, under the very different paradigm of social management, the concept of goal degeneration (Dörner, 1996: 62). For Dörner how this might be reconceptualized, Dietrich Dörner has proposed, under the very different paradigm of social management, the concept of goal degeneration (Dörner, 1996: 62). For example, we want to be happy, to be connected, to love (intangibles), and, with this in mind, seek a romantic relationship. Once defined by this instrumental category (being in a relationship), the primary goal (the feeling) becomes less important, and we may stay by virtue of the category and not the feeling. So follows the endless pursuit of fame and wealth and power, when any of those achieved have long since worn out their hopes of feeling satisfaction. To resolve our moral question of which feeling to pursue, it may be a question of focusing on the basic and intersubjective: the basic safety (physical, not schemic) and the love that lies at the heart of all our goals. Whatever we do, we are pursuing feeling in any case, however unaware. It remains only to be more mindful about which intangible we choose.
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