A University of Sussex DPhil thesis

Available online via Sussex Research Online:

http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/

This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details
University of Sussex

The Renovation of Western Hegemony
European Alternatives in International Relations

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

George Moody
Department of International Relations
June 2014
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been submitted, either in the same or different form to this or any other University for a degree.

**Signature:**
Summary

The Renovation of Western Hegemony
European Alternatives in International Relations

George Moody
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
University of Sussex

European intellectual production on international relations is central to the renovation of Western hegemony in the post-Cold War, ‘post-American’ world. This includes both policy and academic discourses and a focus of this work is an account of the fields in which these discourses are generated that relates them at a deep level.

Working within ‘Amsterdam School’ accounts of European integration, I develop the focus on class formation and the internal relation between class and the international for the post-Cold War era. The ‘shift to Europe’ within the previously Anglo-centric Atlantic transnational capitalist class alongside developments in the EU’s ability to cohesively project power means that a developing bi-polar West must be considered within any understanding of attempts to maintain and reformulate Western hegemony.

I consider the EU policy field in this context, focusing on the EU think tank field, as it relates to the ‘global power Europe’ discourse; this discourse concerned with harnessing the international legitimacy of the concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ for military interventions. I map the ‘global power Europe’ think tank network, and assess its position within the formation of a hegemonic bloc.

Turning to the field of IR I give a novel reading of the principal salient features of the field’s development, as well as allowing an exploration of the field’s limitations and possibilities through tracing the trajectories of European approaches to security, seen as the operationalization of European difference within IR. This methodology, focusing on trajectories rather than paradigms, allows an understanding of the effects of IR theories, as well as the limits and possibilities inherent from their conditions of production, beyond that which can be gleaned from the surface of theoretical debates and configurations.

Approached from these two different directions – through policy institutes as a capital-policy nexus, and academic discourse as related to its social conditions of production – and exploring the homologies across them gives a non-reductive grasp on the interaction of the ideational and material in the renovation of Western hegemony.
Acknowledgements

John MacLean’s inspirational seminars during his Economic and Political Organisation of the Global System course gave me a fascination for International Relations theory and its intersection with social and political theory more generally that, gruelling as thesis writing has been, I have not lost. So, thank you John (I think) for that initial impetus.

This work develops from a sustained engagement with the work of Kees van der Pijl, to whom I owe a huge intellectual debt. I was fortunate enough to have Kees as my supervisor prior to his retirement, and I am grateful not only for the inspiration his work has given to me but also for his personal support and guidance. In particular I mention the work we completed together on a British Academy project on the spread of IR in Central and Eastern Europe which has formed the base from which the rest has developed.

Without Anna Stavrianakis this thesis would never have been completed. I have relied heavily upon her encouragement, patience and support and am very grateful for it. Along with her sustained engagement with this work and insightful criticism Anna has also persisted in forcing me to express myself (more) comprehensibly. More than this though she has provided an example of professional politically committed academic work.

Andreas Antoniades generously agreed to come on board at a late stage in this project and his contribution has been invaluable, quickly giving an astute assessment of a draft of this thesis as a whole. I am very grateful for his efforts and hope he sees his sound advice reflected here.

Whether they know it or not, the IR faculty at Sussex have provided a stimulating intellectual environment over many years, and I feel lucky to have been able to have worked amongst them. In particular I would like to thank Earl Gammon, Sam Knafo, Louiza Odysseos, Jan Selby, Ben Selwyn, and Benno Teschke.

The PhD community have been a source of great inspiration and friendship; this would have been a much poorer experience without Sam Appleton, Tom Bentley, Neil Dooley, Clemens Hoffman, Cherine Hussein, Ole Johannes Kaland, Synne Lastaad-Dyvik, Bhabani Shankar Nayak, Maia Pal and Nuno Pires. The support of friends in Brighton too has kept me going – ‘cheers brothers’ to Paul Eastman, Roger Johnson, Tristan Kirby and Jade McShane. My thanks also to my office mates for sharing in coffee and stress and helping keep me sane: Markus Breines, Jasper Green and my ‘countdown comrade’ Sufyan Abid.

My life has changed utterly during the course of this thesis, and I would like to thank in particular for their friendship and support during good times and bad, Ishan Cader, Andrea Lagna and Yuliya Yurchenko.

Similarly too, my mother and sister have always been there when I needed them and I don’t thank them often enough – so thank you!

My partner Helen has been supportive above and beyond the call of duty, especially during the later stages – thank you for bearing with me. You’ve never known me when not writing this ‘essay’. Interesting times ahead.

Last, and whilst littlest certainly not least, thanks to my toddling daughter Agnes. You have provided a constant reminder that the joy and meaning in life is not (always) found in books. I dedicate this thesis to you.
For Agnes
## Chapters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Theory I: Class and the States System</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A Lockean Europe?</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Global Power Europe</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Theory II: Intellectuals and a methodology</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Thinking Cosmopolitan Power Europe</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Applied Cosmopolitanism: Two Trajectories</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents

Summary .......................................................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................................ iii
Chapters ........................................................................................................................................................ v
Contents ....................................................................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables and Figures ............................................................................................................................. ix

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 1
Global governance and the ‘new EU way of doing International Relations’ ......................... 2
The Renovation of Western Hegemony ....................................................................................... 6
  The ‘Ruined Fortress’ ............................................................................................................................... 6
European Alternatives in International Relations ........................................................................ 9
Europe within ‘Western IR’ ................................................................................................................. 14
Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................................................................ 17

1. Theory I: Class and the States System ......................................................................................... 22
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 22
Class and the states system .................................................................................................................. 23
  Political realism ...................................................................................................................................... 23
Capital and the states system ............................................................................................................... 25
Hegemony .................................................................................................................................................. 32
  The ‘Moment of Coercion’ ................................................................................................................... 33
Ideology - A Marxist Definition ......................................................................................................... 37
Think Tanks as ‘Ideological Apparatus’ ............................................................................................ 42
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 50

2. A Lockean Europe? ......................................................................................................................... 51
A Lockean Europe? .............................................................................................................................. 53
  A dynamic model of geopolitics ...................................................................................................... 54
  The EU as transnational juridical space ....................................................................................... 55
Neoliberal Europe: laissez faire and Ordoliberalism .................................................................... 59
A European Transnational Capitalist Class .................................................................................... 64
The Bi-polar West ...................................................................................................................................... 68
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 75
3. Global Power Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Power Europe</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Civilian to Global Power</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Global Power Europe Network</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The European Council on Foreign Relations</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Leonard – A European ‘Doctrine of the International Community’</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parag Khanna – Davos Man</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nick Witney – Maintaining a bi-polar West</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECFR and a hegemonic formation</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The hegemonic bloc</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Theory II: Intellectuals and a methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gramsci and Bourdieu</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Traditional Intellectual</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitus and Field</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology : ‘Persons not paradigms’</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Thinking Cosmopolitan Power Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan Power Europe</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan Europe</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arendtian Cosmopolitanism: liberalism vs liberal republicanism</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitanism and liberal political ontology</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘European IR’ as context for development of cosmopolitan Europe</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Applied Cosmopolitanism: Two Trajectories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trajectory 1: Mary Kaldor and the Field of Power</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War development</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘New’ Wars</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trajectory 1 – Conclusion: Retrieving the critical intellectual</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Trajectory 2: Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen School................................. 180
Barry Buzan – Security ............................................................................. 182
Wæver and securitization theory................................................................. 184
Trajectory 2 – Conclusion: Political consistency ....................................... 195
Conclusion................................................................................................. 199

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 204
Summary of the argument........................................................................... 204
Development of the argument................................................................. 205
Significance ............................................................................................... 214

Appendix A – Institutional development of independent European military capability ...... 216
Appendix B – Tabulation of Global Power Europe Think Tanks.......................... 218
Appendix C – Numbered reference list of Global Power Europe ‘linkers’ ............... 219
Bibliography ............................................................................................. 220
List of Tables and Figures

Figure 3.1 – Global Power Europe Network Visualisation 87
Figure 3.2 – Career backgrounds of European Council on Foreign Relations Experts 91
Figure 3.3 – The European Council on Foreign Relations and the formation of a hegemonic bloc 101

Table 5.1 – Geographical distribution of authors in CEU IR Theory course core readings 154
Table 5.2 – Geographical distribution of authors in CEU IR Theory course sections 2012-13 155
Introduction

... if the US is no longer in itself sufficiently large and resourceful to manage the considerably expanded world economy of the twenty-first century, then what kind of accumulation of political power under what kind of political arrangement will be capable of taking its place, given that the world is heavily committed still to capital accumulation without limit?

Harvey 2003

The next administration, even if it seeks to recapture the position the United States held previously, will have to rely on international cooperation to a greater extent than before. Its preferred partners ought to be the European Union, the broader community of democracies and international civil society.

Soros 2006

European intellectual production on international relations is central to the renovation of Western hegemony in the post-Cold War, ‘post-American’ world. This includes both policy and academic discourses and a focus of this work is an account of the fields in which these discourses are generated that relates them at a deep level.

This renovation of Western hegemony is visible in the emergence to dominance of human security and cosmopolitan ethics in legitimising and structuring Western interventions globally. However in accounts focused on this shift in global governance by the West it is not related to the crisis of US-led Western hegemony indicated in the opening quotations, and is seen as explicable as a result of ‘problem solving’ responses to difficulties faced by ‘the West’ as an undifferentiated whole. My argument is that the shift post-Cold War from a US-led to a ‘bipolar’ US-EU West underlies the changes in global governance discourse and practice. This shift to a bipolar West contains material, ideational, and military factors, out of which emerges the significance of European intellectual production on international relations.

In this introductory chapter I first outline the need to relate the post-Cold War changes in global governance to this development of a bi-polar West, and in turn to the EU’s self-conception as a different kind of international actor. This is not a deterministic relationship, and I suggest that neither can be understood without the other, and comprehension requires a
synthesis of the ideational and material. The second section relates the argument to the ‘Amsterdam School’, the principal body of work that I build upon.

I then draw out the relation to the International Relations discipline (IR)\(^1\). This third section looks at the problem of US IR as a constitutive part of the preceding US led hegemony, as well as the difficulties of defining a European IR. Such an attempt is necessary however as the elision between US and Western IR is a lacuna that weakens broader attempts to overcome the ‘problem’ of US IR through going ‘beyond the West’ – attempts that nonetheless demonstrate the relation between IR production and hegemony. Finally I outline the structure of the thesis and indicate where the many and various difficulties encountered in making such an argument are addressed.

**Global governance and the ‘new EU way of doing International Relations’**

The US has given up on hegemony through consent and resorts more and more to domination through coercion.

Harvey 2003: 201

My argument casts European difference, as it asserts itself against the assumptions of the preceding US-led Western hegemony, as part of a process of renovating this Western hegemony; more specifically the re-legitimising of post-Iraq War (Western) intervention on human security grounds, developing the preceding justification centred around democracy promotion.

The invasion and occupation of Iraq marked the nadir of US hegemonic power, representing a crystallisation of the ‘terminal crisis of US hegemony’ (Arrighi 2005: 61). In this reading the neo-conservative moment was a reaction to the decline of hegemony, an attempt to shore up and secure pre-eminence through direct use of the most powerful military machine ever known. Its failure - immediate in diplomatic terms, more drawn-out militarily - demonstrates this crisis of US led hegemony, in both coercive and consensual aspects. It supports one of the principal insights of theorising on hegemony, that raw domination cannot persist and some

---

\(^1\) As is standard practice I refer to the discipline as International Relations or abbreviated IR, with the object of study as international relations.
level of consent is required. The nature of the shift in the West this crisis precipitated is well captured by Alvaro de Vasconcelos, then Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) the EU’s agency analysing foreign policy and defence: ‘There is no going back to the nineties when US benign hegemony was happily supported by Europe. The day has come for a change of paradigm in Euro-American relations’ (de Vasconcelos 2009: 2).

Now ‘[t]he European approach to world problems matters [and] the European approach is the right approach’. Writing in the febrile aftermath of Barack Obama’s election to US President he suggests that with an American shift towards this European approach, the European Union and its ‘moral superiority’ is no longer the ‘only hope for the world’. Nonetheless, a unified West remains central as ‘the European project for global governance relies on the engagement of the US’. Significant is that this is a global governance approach – not a construction of the ‘West against the rest’ but an ‘all-inclusive order’ (ibid: 1-2). The change of paradigm then is one in which EU as morally superior international actor takes the lead, in defining the global management project at least.

The idea of post-World War Two Europe as in some way a different international actor, operating outside the expectations of traditional foreign policy and academic international relations, was captured most influentially by François Duchêne’s notion of a ‘civilian power Europe’ in the 1970s, a conception that has since dominated the debate on Europe’s role in the world (Orbie 2006). Despite, or indeed because of, the frequent vagueness of the nature of this supposed difference in the on-going debate on Europe’s role in the world, and the similar looseness of the use of ‘Europe’, this idea of difference has only strengthened post-Cold War, with variations such as ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners 2002), and, in the wake of US – European differences over the 2003 Iraq invasion, ‘post-modern Europe’ also gaining traction (Cooper 2003). Capturing this difference specifically in relation to the EU and what this political formation means for theorising within social science, alongside the relation of this to its global political role is ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ (Beck, Grande and Cronin 2007). The EU itself has also consciously sought to set itself apart from the rest of the world as an actor motivated by humanitarian concerns, most notably in the nature of the Petersberg Tasks and the adoption of human security rhetoric (if not a human security doctrine). Underlying all these various rubrics is a common belief in the progressive, humane, nature of this difference, seen as a genuine alternative to realpolitik and constituting ‘a new EU way of doing International Relations’ (Howorth 2011: 22).
However, it is significant that interpretations of European difference as a meaningful ‘alternative’ stem largely from within Europe or the EU itself, rather than from the US – the supposed other against which this difference is defined. There, in foreign policy, when EU difference is not seen as a delusion born of powerlessness (Kagan 2003), it is more usually subject to analyses of the optimum uses of hard and soft power, in the context of an enduring Atlantic Alliance. The focus after Western differences arose over the invasion of Iraq therefore being on creating ‘a renewed relationship animated by redefined goals and objectives and sustained by a modified division of labour among the participants’ (Ilgen 2006: 3). The difference then is in the tools each is best placed to use in a project of Western global management, as things stand embodying a ‘good cop/bad cop dynamic’ (Nye 2006: 34). That such a difference is not seen as an alternative is clear from the prescribed evening up of hard and soft capacities in both the US and EU (Nye 2004, 2006, the combination being termed ‘Smart Power’ Nossel 2004, Nye 2009).

The idea of a ‘modified division of labour among the participants’ is however based on a static view of the discourse and practice of Western interventions – with re-division assumed to have minimal effect on the Western global management project. Against this are studies of the change within post-Cold War discourses and practices of global governance finding it ‘incontestable that the dominant discourses of international security have been transformed over the last fifteen years’ (Chandler 2008a: 467). Human security and cosmopolitan ethics are central to this transformation with contestation centring over the best way in which to interpret how this shift is related to Western power (Duffield 2007, Chandler 2008a, 2008b, Owens 2012).²

The nature of the shift itself is significant containing a major change of principle in the intervention norm in international politics: sovereignty becomes conditional, most evidently in its development into the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, where focusing security on individuals creates a duty to intervene for their protection, with the conditions set by the ‘international community’, to whom sovereignty for the area passes if the conditions are not met. It also reverses the burden of justification, previously on the intervening powers, by talking of a state having to justify its ‘moral claim to be treated as legitimate’ (ICISS 2001: 136, Chandler 2004: 64-5).

² I use Mark Duffield, David Chandler and Patricia Owens as leading, contesting, mutually critical analysts of this shift: Mark Duffield as exemplar of the ‘biopolitics’ approach, Chandler the ‘political realist’, and Owens casting it within the ‘rise of the social’.
The introduction of a cosmopolitan ethics creates a shift within the overarching narrative of democracy promotion too, as it defines the individual not as the liberal individual as political subject, but as a social subject requiring empowerment in order to act within a legal and political framework. I take this up in the second half of the thesis, but here note that this merging with development discourses legitimates the increasing tendency to place target societies under Western institutions’ enduring patronage as part of democracy promotion. It is this construction of the individual as a social subject that gives such strength to the biopolitical interpretation of human security as a form of control, aimed not so much at the protection of individuals in target states but the transformation of these societies as a whole. As a form of global governance human security is thereby seen as seeking the pacification of the ‘global South’ through the “socialisation’ and disciplining of states’, intended to ‘prevent disruption to the circulation of global capital and the infliction of mass casualties on the consumer societies of ‘the West’” (Duffield 2007: 38; Owens 2012: 566).

Despite this suggesting a relation to a specifically European history of social control under capitalism, and Foucault’s understanding of neoliberalism, this specificity is not taken up in analysing the relation to Western power. The shift is seen as a ‘problem solving’ one, a response to failures in state building as well as shifts in the functional needs of capital with pacification not inclusion or integration of the South the overriding need. So whilst grasping the shift in global governance, within this it is this ‘the West’ that remains static, understood through the lens of the West and the rest. The policy shift then, for example, ‘reflected the needs of policy elites and reinforced existing hierarchies of power’ by operating in interests of the ‘dominant states and their international organisations’ (Chandler 2008a: 463, Owens 2012: 564) with no consideration of the mutability of these categories of ‘elites’ or ‘dominant states’.

I argue that if we wish to understand ‘[w]hy is it that leading Western states and state-based international institutions, from the EU to the UN, feel more at home with a post-national, post-territorial, post-interest agenda of securing the ‘human’ rather than the traditional object of securing the nation-state’ (Chandler 2008c: 466) we should also look for change within the

---

3 The shift sees the West ‘no longer concerned with helping support an often conservative pro-Western alliance of Southern elites; it is now in the business of transforming whole societies’ (Duffield 2007: 39).

4 Patricia Owens explores some of this relation to European history and theory, but relates human security to a generalised ‘rise of the social’ within the ‘West’. I address her approach in chapter five, placing it within the process she critiques, but note here that writing of political realism as merely ‘a description of government under capitalism rather than a theory of politics’ suggests why the shift within the West cannot be grasped.
West itself, and how this understood. The role of the EU as supposed ‘post-national, post-territorial, post-interest’ cosmopolitan international actor within the West being a good place to start.

**The Renovation of Western Hegemony**

I term the shifts identified above a renovation for three reasons. Firstly to stress the core structural and ideological continuity under change; this is not a new structure but a process of improving the ‘structure’ of the West in response to crisis. Secondly, to mark this as a willed, conscious strategic process, related to this structural change in the West, against accounts that see it as ‘problem solving’ in a strategic void (Chandler 2006). Thirdly, as a loose metaphorically architectural link to the primary literature I seek to build on, that of the ‘Amsterdam school’. The preceding two points are combined in locating where I differ from these literatures and seek to make a contribution, so my positioning in relation to this existing literature is the focus here.

**The ‘Ruined Fortress’**

The main body of work I seek to build upon (or better, within) is that of the Amsterdam School. Whilst the origins of the school in the late 1970s and 1980s work of Otto Holman, Henk Overbeek and Kees van der Pijl ‘predate the whole ‘neo-Gramscian turn’’ (van Apeldoorn 2004: 110), it is usually identified as one of two ‘strands’ in neo-Gramscian International Political Economy (IPE). Much is shared with this broader perspective, but the distinctions both to ‘neo-Gramscianism’ more generally, and the seminal figure of this broader ‘turn’ Robert Cox, are significant. I develop my engagement with the Amsterdam School in chapters one and two, so here highlight the significance of these differences, and introduce the development I seek to make in the terms of the argument above.

The Amsterdam approach developed against the contemporaneous mainstream understandings of European integration, which neglected both the significance of social power and class and of the Cold War context for integration (Overbeek 2004). Within it European

---

5 Internally there is a clear preference for the ‘Amsterdam Project’, unsurprising as such projects tend to get labelled as schools in disciplining moves by their critics (as for example did both the English School and Copenhagen School). Nonetheless, externally Amsterdam School is the usual term used when differentiating amongst strands of ‘neo-Gramscian’ IR/IPE, and I use it accordingly.

6 Indeed, Amsterdam School work is often specifically excepted from critiques of neo-Gramscianism more generally. See for example: Shilliam 2004; Worth 2008; Budd 2013.
integration is placed in an Atlantic setting and class is introduced in a related ‘particular class-theoretical framework’ in which ‘formation of (capitalist) classes transnationally is seen as a key process through which politics itself is increasingly transnationalised’ (van Apeldoorn 2004: 111). European integration is thus not simply internally generated, either politically or functionally, but related to the Cold War strategy/ies of a developing Atlantic ruling class. The US national capital formation is in the driving seat for this ‘American Plan for Europe’, but the result is a product of intra-capitalist struggle and consensus generation across the Atlantic (van der Pijl 2012 [1984]). This base serves to inoculate against the tendency in ‘neo-Gramscian’ work more broadly to a ‘global capital’ view that theorises a global (transnational) ruling class and an associated global capitalist discipline (especially for example Leslie Sklair 2001 and William Robinson 2005, cf. Carroll et al 2010: 2-7).

It also stands in contrast particularly to Robert Cox, as whilst his ‘work has helped to open the IR door to Marxists’ his approach is not Marxist, and his introduction of Gramscian concepts must be understood in context as a reaction to the state centricity of IR, particularly Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony (Budd 2013: 1-4; Worth 2008: 635). The problems generated by this are twofold: firstly, that his approach is additive to the state-centric model, generating a ‘Weberian pluralism’ (Worth 2008: 642; Burnham 1991); secondly, that in importing the concept of hegemony he renders the combination of coercion and consent essentially as opposites, and abstracts the relevance of hegemony conceptually away from its class base, in contrast to the Amsterdam School’s ‘orthodox class based analysis of hegemony’ (Worth 2008: 636, cf. Budd 2013: passim).

There is considerable significance here for the conceptualisation of global governance. For the Amsterdam School a central concept is ‘comprehensive concepts of control’, the ideological development of competing hegemonic projects. These concepts express the ‘ideological and [...] hegemonic structure of particular historical configurations of capital’, through which the dialectic of structure and agency is expressed (Overbeek and van der Pijl 2002: 3). That is, the struggle between competing comprehensive concepts of control allows us to grasp the inter-relation between the grounding structural conditions for, and the strategic agency of, blocs within the bourgeoisie, crystallised in this process of class formation.

---

7 Henk Overbeek provides an enlightening ‘genealogy’ of the Amsterdam Project, particularly useful here in outlining the debates this work developed within and against before it began ‘talking to the International Relations discipline’ (Overbeek 2004: 126).
The transnational nature of class formation gives a transnational field of contest for such concepts which allows us into the transnationalisation of politics, with obvious significance for changing ideas of global governance. Comprehensive concepts of control, as the crystallising resolution of intra-capitalist struggle through strategy are comprehensive in incorporating an ideology of hegemonic control of conflicts both intra- and inter-class, and domestic and external through the construction of a universalising ‘general interest’. As the struggle between concepts incorporates more of the globe through the expansion of the field of contest as well as the geographical expansion and social deepening of the effects of their hegemony, world politics is increasingly transnationalised towards a ‘global domestic politics’ (van der Pijl 1989: 19). Such an approach gives a solid theoretical grounding to the interrelation between the shifts within the West and within the discourse of global governance argued for above. Nonetheless, it is in this specific instance that my development of the school’s approach lies.

The key difference to this approach can be summarised here by reference to the driving assumption of the (at least at the time) ‘leading collection of the Amsterdam School, A Ruined Fortress?’ (Anderson 2011: 132). In the preface, Alan Cafruny and Magnus Ryner explain the title as ‘raising the question of whether European integration has generated a ‘fortress Europe’ capable of challenging American supremacy in the world’ to which the contributions in the volume answer that ‘[i]f there ever were such ambitions in the re-launch of European integration in the 1980s, the project is now in ruin’. The result of this lack of challenge is an EU ‘subordinated into a much larger neoliberal, transnational, structural, and institutional ensemble under American leadership’ (Cafruny and Ryner 2003: vii).

Contesting this, arguing for an emergent bi-polar West, also challenges the related conception that we do not see a new “ethicopolitical” conception - the defining feature of a hegemonic, or a counterhegemonic, movement’ (ibid: viii). Whilst the shift in global governance clearly does not represent counter-hegemony it does represent a renovation of hegemony and a new ‘ethicopolitical’ conception or comprehensive concept of control. Overall the move within global governance towards a conception of global domestic politics in the cosmopolitan sense of ethically ‘transcending’ sovereignty, understood as a comprehensive concept of control,

---

8 As noted above the field of contest is not ‘global’; the Atlantic West historically the sphere where rival comprehensive concepts of control competed.
9 The question mark in the title reflects the contingency of this situation and acts ‘as an implicit appeal for change in practices’, albeit one they are pessimistic about.
relates to a shift in global domestic politics in this Amsterdam School sense of struggle and consensus building within transnational class formation.

**European Alternatives in International Relations**

The relationship between European International Relations and the renovation of Western hegemony is not straightforward. I cover the theoretical and methodological challenges and my approach in chapters four and five, so here, as in the preceding section, I offer a summary in line with the overall argument of the thesis. To understand the relationship it is necessary to first grasp the relationship of IR to the preceding US led Western hegemony, and then the different developmental context for European IR, particularly as constituted as an alternative to both the preceding US led hegemony and the role of US IR within it. Doing so reveals an overall similarity in role but a more complex relationship between theory and practice. In looking at European alternatives in International Relations then I am not offering a survey of the field of IR in Europe, constituted in and of itself as somehow an alternative to US IR in theoretical terms, but the role and relation of a specifically *European* IR in this Western renovation.\(^\text{10}\)

Approaching this relationship builds also on the preceding discussion of the Amsterdam School in which comprehensive concepts of control are constitutive of class formation. Kees van der Pijl’s work on US IR is significant in this respect relating as it does directly to the formation and expansion of the transnational state-society complex allowing the formation of a transnational ruling class, and its concrete development and hegemony. It is also a natural development of this work’s origins, developed against contemporaneous mainstream understanding of European integration, and their imbrication with the construction itself. In this sense the European IR I examine is, in its cosmopolitanism derived from its theorisation of the EU, antithetical to the Amsterdam School understanding of the development of the EU. The extension here is to the comprehension of the externally oriented elements of this comprehensive concept of control, which are currently submerged by the understanding of the EU in a subordinate role. In continuity with US IR there is in this relationship an untheorised and /or ideologically accepted EU exceptionalism replacing the preceding foundation in American exceptionalism.

\(^{10}\) In this, methodologically similar to Kees van der Pijl in his assessment of US IR which is not an attempt at a comprehensive overview but just such a selective representation generated from this organic relation (van der Pijl 2014: xiv).
Cold War International Relations was an ‘American Social Science’ in two ways. Firstly, to the extent the discipline existed globally it was dominated by the US academy both in terms of numbers of scholars and volume of scholarly production and in terms of the theoretical terrain of the discipline. It was however also politically an American social science, its rise and development organically interlinked to the development of the US led West, both in providing the intellectual support needed and in shaping the form of that hegemony through this intellectual input. It is this second meaning of IR as an American social science – in the seminal characterisation of being ‘too close to the fire’ (Hoffman 1977: 59) - that truly makes Cold War IR American.

Whilst disciplinary IR is set in a longer history of Atlantic class formation and concomitant founding of policy networks and think-tanks – the ‘founding’ of IR in 1919 with the creation of the Woodrow Wilson chair at Aberystwyth must be understood in the context of its intimate connections with the Milner Group, the leading policy grouping of the British ruling class, for example (van der Pijl 2014: 80-82, 67) - the development of IR theory as a distinct enterprise lies in the post-World War II American context. As such it was part of the broader ‘political studies enlightenment’ – central figures of which were friends and fellow émigrés Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau, in political science and IR respectively (Katznelson 2004; Williams 2013cf. Rösch 2013).

The project of this enlightenment was to refound liberalism, after the near fatal blow of the Second World War and the Holocaust, rescuing its core values but ‘(all-importantly) without’ the unrealistic optimism and naïveté of so many of their predecessors’ (Jones 2005: 544). The attempt, for classical realism too, was to ‘move beyond both 19th-century visions of ‘classical’ liberalism and its 20th-century ‘progressive’ forms’ as ‘only a liberal politics shorn of its ‘utopian’ elements — both epistemic and political — could [...] be suitably equipped to advance a renewed liberal politics’ (Williams 2013: 652). ‘IR theory is thus better understood as a case of intellectual irredentism, resisting its own integration into American social science’ understood as this liberal idealism (Guilhot 2011: 129–130; cf. van der Pijl 2014: 8). Within this creation of IR theory foundations and policy networks were still central, Nicolas Guilhot extensively tracing these connections highlighting its ‘codification’ at the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored 1954 Conference on Theory (Guilhot 2007, 2008, 2011).

Tracing the European antecedents of realist thought, and the role of European émigrés has to be understood in this context (cf. Guzzini 2013b). The supposed fundamental tension of
worldviews within the IR field (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013) – the ‘poles’ of liberalism and realism - being therefore fundamentally over the means of bringing about a liberal world order, through the use of US power. Underpinning IR theory was US exceptionalism, as in this realist ‘enlightenment’ ‘the United States was central to any hope for the future of a liberal politics in its political meaning as well as its geopolitical power. America needed to provide a non-rationalist liberal alternative with both intellectual and political power — and the discipline of IR needed to support this enterprise’ (Williams 2013:654). It is this task and shared US exceptionalism that constitutes the political content of the field, and marks Cold War IR as US social science. Nonetheless in understanding the forms of this theory and its shaping of the hegemonic project the structure of the academic field and forms of theoretical expression within it once again acquire significance.

This leads to one final important point of the role of realist IR theory in disguising this power and its use. This role was captured by Ekkehart Krippendorff as the ‘great lie’ of IR of ‘a big power such as the United States’, which masked the constitutive role of overweening US power in world order behind the façade of an anarchic states system (Krippendorf 1987). This acquires even greater significance when the problem of US IR’s hegemony is understood primarily in terms of a hegemony within theory, divorced from this constitutive relation to power. Such an understanding, a ‘single’ theoretical reading of the field, is responsible for many of the problems of ‘critical’ IR theory – based in reacting to this theoretical façade, rather than the power it is part of - that have been painfully revealed as such critical discourses find themselves uncomfortably contiguous with the new global governance discourse of which realism is no longer a component (McCormack 2009; Hynek and Chandler 2013).11

Post-Cold War IR has developed rapidly across the globe in institutional and formal disciplinary terms. In the sense of the weight of scholars and production US IR is still dominant, but that dominance is declining, is less than in many other academic disciplines, and it is increasingly hard to make the case that IR is still an American social science in those terms (Kristensen 2013, Turton 2013). What this means in terms of the second political reading of the discipline is the focus of the research and argument of this thesis. This marks a contribution to both the

11 This role of ‘second order’ hegemony I address in part two of the thesis. One sees this most notably in those IR ‘dissidents’ who see the logic of realism, the internal/external division it is based upon and/or its positivist neo-realist rendering as the problem (seminally Ashley 1981, 1984, 1987; Walker 1987; Walker 1989; Walker 1993): writing together they define disciplinary ‘dissidence’ as an ‘insistence on regarding sovereignty as a question’, Ashley and Walker 1990: 368). The problem persists: ‘if critical international theory objects to anything it is sovereignty’ (Devetak 2007: 172-3).
exiting sociologies of IR - here I consider those focusing on Europe - and to the Amsterdam School understanding of this relationship.

In the European case the most notable recent considerations of IR in a European, rather than national, context are those by Ole Wæver and Jörg Friedrichs (Friedrichs 2004, Wæver 1998, Friedrichs and Wæver 2009). Within these accounts (Western) Europe is constructed as a semi-periphery - the structuring assumption is that the most ‘fundamental fact of life’ for non-US scholarship is the ‘situation of intellectual hegemony exercised by the American core of the discipline’ (Friedrichs 2004: 10). Their analysis is then constructed within this assumption of continuing academic hegemony, the aim to construct a strategic approach to the development of a ‘Euro-discipline’ through reflecting on different national/sub-regional academic strategies to ‘cope with’ US hegemony. Reflecting the longer held focus on theoretical hegemony as the central problem with IR, principally of realism and its positivist development in this longer history (cf. MacLean 1988, Smith 200212), this Euro-discipline would be a home for theoretical pluralism – a (secular) ‘house of many mansions’ (Friedrichs 2004).

Given the nature of the IR discipline, and especially of IR theory as a ‘codification’, outlined above this has all along been the wrong target, with the resultant wrong solution prescribed. In Bourdieusian terms, in considering European IR Friedrichs and Wæver compound a single reading of the IR field – that is of its theoretical terrain divorced from its political content – with a similarly single reading of the specific European terrain, again understood in theoretical and professional strategic terms only. Whilst the difficulties of all such surveys are then in seeing what is significant politically, they are nonetheless essential given the importance of the theoretical field, understood as semi-autonomous, in shaping the form of expression of political content of academic work, in turn giving particular shape to hegemonic projects with which it is entwined or used. Therefore, having considered these issues in more depth in chapter four, I use such ‘sociologies’ in tandem with a political reading of the field to give an account of the context in which the Europeans alternatives I consider are set.

Amsterdam School work has thus far set the shifts on global governance within a framework of continuing US hegemony. The general shift is therefore seen as it is refracted within US policy

12 I use these two considerations as whilst they do not restrict themselves to seeing neo-realism as the central problem they illustrate the central difficulty of locating the political within the epistemological, based on a related scholasticism that sees theory preceding policy and/or politics.
discourse – significant shifts are noted, for example in the ‘outlaw’ nature of ‘the very appeal to sovereign equality’ set in the context of ‘the projection of global justice’, and the development of contingent and ‘shared sovereignty’ (van der Pijl 2013: 25; van der Pijl 2014: 227; van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2012; cf. Duffield 2007: 122 for this US shift in the wider shift in discourse to human security) – and set within the continuity of the discourse of the War on Terror, which Europeans have reacted against (van der Pijl 2013: 25, van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2012). Nonetheless the changing centre of gravity within the global political economy, the crisis of US hegemony, and continued US reliance on coercion to overcome a deficit in legitimacy when acting outside of broader formations are all noted – solutions to this however are seen to be related to the internal US network of state and policy planning, which cannot set them within the hegemonic search for legitimacy through establishing a general interest. Whilst there is no doubt that the US remains dominant within the West, this hegemonic crisis and the ‘shift to Europe’ within the Atlantic transnational capitalist class (Carroll 2010), suggest that these shifts in global governance – distinct from the assertion of US coercive power and the War on Terror - must be seen within the context of a rebalancing within the West, towards a bipolar West. This I argue gives a better grasp of policy shifts and their relation to IR – giving concomitantly greater significance to the IR-policy relation within Europe.

This brings me to the different developmental context for the relationship of European IR to this shift, particularly as it is constituted as an alternative to both the preceding US led hegemony and the role of US IR within it, which is a notable feature of cosmopolitan rhetoric – seeking to bind the US in to a European led model. The most significant element within this for academic IR as a field is that unlike the original creation of IR theory it is no longer developing in a relative vacuum: IR theory and its relation to the preceding hegemony already exists. Indeed this is central to the development of cosmopolitanism within Europe as in seeking to ‘transcend’ sovereignty it is reacting precisely to this preceding relationship.

The institutional context for development is also different. The considerations of Friedrichs and Wæver above are aimed in large part at overcoming the limitations of fragmentation that the separation into national IR communities within Europe entails. As Peter Kristensen’s recent work uncovers this is less significant than it has been, with the networks of ‘Western IR’ forming transnationally across US and Western Europe (and in the US case to Israel also) (Kristensen 2013). More significant given the nature of the preceding relationship to US
hegemony is a less developed role for foundations and the think tank field in continental Europe. Whilst moving in the US direction, the number and size of foundations and think tanks is considerably smaller in continental Europe especially, and US foundations and think tanks have a strong role in the European field, in a way that is not replicated vice versa. As I will show however, the links are certainly there and there is a developing US style revolving door between politics, academia, policy institutes and business, as well as development towards a think tank style political culture more generally.

This development in the direction of the US model underlies the research in the first part of the thesis. The less developed nature also however conveys an advantage in forcing me to consider the relationship between academic production and its social conditions of production more generally. As Kees van der Pijl notes, his study of US IR is not only selective in the material covered – a practice I follow in delineating the object of study through its link to Western power, though in my case not excluding ‘progressive currents’ these being the self-identified core of the ‘European alternative’ – but also does not treat ‘its representatives as humans’ but as representative (van der Pijl 2014: xiv). With the US terrain so institutionally dense this presents less of a problem as direct and mechanical links between academia, policy making and state and private institutions are similarly dense. In the more sparsely networked European policy-academia environment understanding the role of scholars necessitates reintegrating them as just that – human scholars. Part two undertakes this task, taking seriously the genuine motivation, centrally salient for cosmopolitan work, of a desire for a better world, and particularly an ‘alternative politics’. From this the relationship between expression in academia and policy must also be understood in Bourdieusian terms as homologous – the expression of a similar politico-ethical drive and common understanding derived from the social context in different fields. In this the role of EU exceptionalism, of the internalisation of and common understanding of the EU, its creation and relation to the end of the Cold War, is analogous to the role of American exceptionalism in the preceding relationship of IR to hegemonic projects. The theoretical and methodological work undertaken in chapter four is thereby also framed as a contribution enriching the tools available to understand such interlinkages.

**Europe within ‘Western IR’**

Theories that take seriously the implications of geopolitics for the sociology of knowledge in IR have gained increasing prominence within disciplinary self-reflection since turn of the century. This reflects two shifts within the discipline: firstly, the continuing move away from even
nominal adherence to positivism in the US discipline, a trend started during the Cold War but gaining considerable pace thereafter, which gives a less markedly hostile environment to such considerations within the ‘global discipline’; secondly, the changing centre of gravity within the discipline as it grows outside the US. There are now significant IR communities around the world, and in facing up to the problems with understanding and applying established US IR work, or in assessing US IR’s role in the reproduction of global power relations from their perspectives, the relation of geopolitics to knowledge production becomes more readily apparent.

Thus far, however, whilst containing invaluable insights, these enriching perspectives have yet to sufficiently consider the elision between the US and the ‘West’ or ‘core’ definitive of Cold War considerations of the global political structure more generally; a conflation sitting alongside broad brush critiques of a formative and continuing ‘Euro-centrism’ (cf. Onar and Nicolaïdis 2013). This is hardly surprising as the intent of most such accounts is to ‘decolonize’, ‘decenter’, or ‘think past’ or ‘beyond’ Western IR, and Western political thought more generally (Jones 2006; Nayak and Selbin 2010; Bilgin 2008; Shani 2008; Acharya and Buzan 2009; Shilliam 2010; Tickner 2013; Tickner and Wæver 2009; though see Onar and Nicolaïdis 2013, n.1 below). However, as Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney put it ‘moving beyond the hegemony of the West requires the rediscovery and reimagining of the West’, yet ‘[r]eimagining the West is beyond us’ (Inayatullah and Blaney 2003, 15). Whilst they are referring to the daunting size of the project, it is their approach, characteristically focused on culture and ‘civilisation’ that hobbles this aspect of their reimagining. Divorced from the changing patterns of class formation identified earlier, such an approach gives a flattened monolithic West. 

Europe and its intellectual production is often a minimal presence within this, buried under an assumed continuation of a ‘US hegemony’ within the discipline, and the elision of US and Western IR. In a sense this is correct, as the ‘global discipline’ is still structured around the idea

13 This is a very thoughtful account, noting that with the rise of the US ‘Eurocentrism was thus embedded in a broader western-centrism with two twists: not all western-centrism is Eurocentric; and some forms of Eurocentrism patently challenge American-centrism’. They also seek to integrate consideration of European studies and its policy influence and European IR. The weakness is a focus on cultural ‘civilizational’ discourses, divorced from both class and material power. Nonetheless, this is precisely the kind of differentiation needed.
14 I pick Inayatullah and Blaney as exemplar here as theirs is a more IPE oriented account than most; they also explicitly seek to go ‘beyond and within Western IR’, by which they mean reconceptualising Western IR through provincialising it as a Western discipline, not examining the cleavages within it.
of US hegemony – a residual ‘second order’ hegemony that ever less reflects the first order reality of academic production within the discipline\textsuperscript{15}; what it misses is the intra-Western shift I have focused upon, and the increasingly central significance of the changing patterns of intellectual production within it.

Recent empirical investigations of the declining ‘domination’ of the US within the discipline, along with this proliferation of ‘de-centering’ accounts of IR itself, coupled with serious concerns from within the US IR mainstream that the discipline there is in a parlous state – weakened through a combination of parochialism and an enervating form of ‘professionalization’ (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013) – means this picture of Western IR as essentially a US hegemony is unsustainable. Even from within the citadel it is seen that contemporary ‘laments about the ‘end of IR theory’ might be the dying gasp of the ‘American social science’’ (Jackson and Nexon 2013, 560). Consideration of Western IR as a whole in the post-Cold War period, focusing on the neglected area of European IR, is therefore necessary.

Where European IR has so far been considered it has been from within this same frame of ‘US hegemony’, without reference to the changing geopolitical context. Western European IR remains a ‘semi-periphery’ ‘coping with hegemony’ (Friedrichs 2004; Friedrichs and Wæver 2009); Central and Eastern European a true periphery to the US discipline (Drulák 2009; Bátora and Hynek 2009a). This continental IR is also separated from the presumed continuity of the ‘Anglo-American’ condominium, or wider ‘Anglo-sphere’, where Australia and Canada tend to be included in a subordinate role, within US hegemony (Vucetic 2010; cf. Cox and Nossal 2009). Against this is a smaller body of work more alive to contemporary differences within the ‘Anglo-sphere’ that sees non-US Anglo-sphere work more within the ‘European’ camp, separated from an insular US standing alone (Sharman and True 2011; Smith 2002; Sylvester 2013).\textsuperscript{16} As we’ve seen, work within such a context then tends to focus on professional and institutional strategies for coping or even overcoming these subordinate positions – the

\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, as chapter four addresses, it is this focus on this idea of a continued US hegemony that is more significant than the actually significantly declining empirical US domination within the discipline in terms of publications, conferences etc. (Kristensen 2013).

\textsuperscript{16} My focus is on the post-Cold War shift as it relates to the US and Europe, the first part of this thesis supporting this specific focus. Nonetheless the significant role both Canadian and Japanese work has played in developing the human security concept supports the idea of a renovated ‘trilateral’ West following the crisis of US hegemony – recontextualised in this way, Nik Hynek’s study on these developments in Canada and Japan marks a useful entry, focusing on the specific state-society contexts of their divergent developments of the concept (Hynek 2012).
professional practice necessary for creating a ‘Euro-discipline’ - not on the meaning of changes within Western hegemony and its relation to European IR. Through this framing European IR is considered outside of ‘the West’, and constitutive of a challenge to hegemony (Tickner and Wæver 2009).

Within the renovation of Western hegemony, European IR as well as the EU as an actor are significant if we are to understand contemporary ‘Western IR’, its hegemony and effects; given the development of the argument above this follows naturally as the next stage of the argument – that where not ‘willed’ or artificial, European IR will relate in some way to the shift to the bi-polar West, albeit in a variety of possible forms. This marks a development in sympathy with many of the critiques of ‘Western IR’ identified above that are founded on just such an idea of an organic relationship between a hegemonic Western discipline and Western hegemony. Albeit approached in various different ways, they are broadly unified in seeing a continuity from a colonial West to a post-colonial Western hegemony, and the social scientific role within this refracted through and focused within IR.

Further differentiating within this conceptualisation of continuity beneath change, here focusing within the West, is significant because it explains the shift in global governance, less marked but of a kind with a shift from formal to informal imperialism. Finally, as seen in the preceding section, this also marks a necessary continuation of the recent work done by Kees van der Pijl in delineating IR as The Discipline of Western Supremacy. Van der Pijl’s focus here remains on the American discipline of IR, operating ‘as the handmaiden of a power that disciplines the world’ (Katzenstein 2014). As the preceding section suggests, this understanding of the development of IR is the bedrock for my own - I want to push such an analysis further however, in line with the argument so far of a developing bi-polar West, to account for the post-Cold War evolution of this discipline of Western supremacy, breaking down the elision of the US and Western disciplines to consider the European role.17

Structure of the Thesis
The argument develops in two parts. In the first part, I build towards an understanding of the global power Europe project, focusing on the think tank network involved in the policy

17 I note here that I worked under Kees van der Pijl’s supervision on a British Academy funded pilot study that contributed to Kees book, covering the spread of Anglo-American IR to Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, Kees has generously credited me with this work in his account (van der Pijl 2014: xiii, 215; Moody 2010). This thesis and Kees’ book represent divergent developments from this point on – constructed independently of one another following Kees retirement from Sussex.
preparations for the European Council meeting in December 2013 dedicated to military issues, its relation to a forming European transnational capitalist class, and positioning within a broader hegemonic bloc. The second part develops an understanding of related European academic discourse through the concept of cosmopolitan power Europe - homologous to the cleavages and debates within considerations of global power Europe, although in an abstracted form.

The first chapter starts by developing my overall understanding of the linkages between class and the states system. I develop a political realist approach, noting it as antithetical to the concept of politics within cosmopolitanism. I then consider the contemporary debate within Marxist thought on New Imperialism and from this the need for a focus on class formation and the constitutive nature of transnational class formation for understanding global politics. The focus on class formation leads to consideration of hegemony, both stressing the coercive moment within it, and then developing the contemporary role of ideology and think tanks within this.

The second chapter develops the specifically European context, making the case for understanding the West as an emergent bi-polar entity of the EU and US, and engaging with the development of Amsterdam School work through this. It covers the Lockean structure of the EU, the need to reconceptualise neoliberalism within the Amsterdam School to understand Europe’s role, the evidence for the existence of a European transnational capitalist class, and the military dimension of this bipolarity.

I analyse the global power Europe project in the third chapter. I start by setting the global power Europe discourse in the context of European self-perception, and its relation to conceptions of normative power Europe and cosmopolitanism. I then map the network involved in policy preparation for the December 2013 European Council meeting. This develops to a focus on the central institution within this network, George Soros’ European Council on Foreign Relations, developing the understanding of the global power Europe project itself and from this focus then building back out to the relation to a wider hegemonic formation.

Part two begins with the necessary elaboration of the theoretical framework and of the methodology to be followed in the section. Chapter four therefore focuses on the relative autonomy of the academic field, relating Bourdieu to Gramsci to do so and introducing the Bourdieusian concepts of homology and field and habitus that will be used. The synthesis
between the two gives the overall need for a political realist dual reading of academic fields, grounded in class analysis. The rejection of either a political or a philosophical reading of theory in favour of a ‘dual reading’ that grasps the ambiguity of academic expression is refracted back through political realist approach so that one must look not only at the effects of theory, but also the intention motivating it to understand it as whole. I then cover the methodology to be used, firstly how it relates to the understanding of first and second order hegemony in IR that structures chapter five, and then the focus on ‘persons not paradigms’ that structures chapter six.

Chapter five applies this first part of the methodology to consider cosmopolitan Europe conceptualisations as inherently related to cosmopolitan power Europe, understood as the external application of EU exceptionalism. The difficulties of coherence in the application of this concept are seen as driving the shift within cosmopolitanism to an Arendtian republican cosmopolitanism. Significant within this is the political ontology it contains, shifting from the political individual of the earlier cosmopolitanism to a social individual in tune with a European neoliberalism. The core element of tension in this self-conceptualisation, of the means of the establishment of normatively preferred social orders outside of Europe, are related to the more policy oriented discourses of the first half. It then considers the role of first and second order hegemony in formation of European IR, illustrating this via curricula analysis of the IR theory course at the Central European University.

Chapter six develops the focus on the problem of founding cosmopolitan political orders derived from the preceding chapter through two intellectual trajectories in the European field – again understood as developed in chapter five, that is in the relationship between peace research, IR and security studies, and the temporal crossing of these boundaries through these intellectual careers. I first take the ‘easy’ case of Mary Kaldor, a central figure in much critical analysis of cosmopolitanism, structuring my consideration around her self-identification as a critical intellectual. Secondly I consider a ‘hard’ case, of Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen School, seemingly removed from such cosmopolitan discourses, structuring my analysis around its consistent political core, widely missed or misunderstood in considerations and development of the school’s work. I develop these cases as applied cosmopolitanism, both concerned with this central question of the founding of cosmopolitan political orders and fundamentally related to the social condition of their production. They represent a European alternative through their explicit rejection of the preceding US led approach, and the
fundamental structuring organic link to the European Cold War experience and its understanding. This gives an understanding of their relationship to one another that the common theoretical split between human security and securitisation that pits one against the other, as well as the attempts to bridge the divide through a ‘critical human security studies’, cannot grasp. It thereby demonstrates the need for an analysis such as mine to understand the academic relation to shifts in global governance.

In conclusion I summarise and reflect on the two parts of the thesis together, bringing out their inter-relation; neither global power Europe nor cosmopolitan power Europe are explicable in isolation from the other and must be understood in this way together. This brings out the deep structuring role of social conditions of production – as noted earlier in this introduction this is true of the Amsterdam School approach also, and therefore my own development - just from the ‘other side’ so to speak, where class analysis is central rather than presented as ‘outmoded’. The central place this accords EU exceptionalism does however give some indication of where hope, and potential for fruitful engagement with these discourses lie. The tension at the heart of the discourse makes for a far less self-confident assertion of power, and in so far as it is built upon the conception of the citizen (rather than the preceding homo-economicus), developed in artificial isolation from its relation to capitalism, offers scope for development through being brought into contact with class analysis.
Part 1 – Global Power Europe
1. Theory I: Class and the States System

Introduction
This theoretical chapter covers the understanding of the relation between class and the states system that is integral to the thesis as a whole. I start by outlining a political realist approach as this both gives a relational understanding of power that develops the idea of comprehensive concepts of control as representing the dialectic of structure and agency, and provides the foundation for understanding the nature of the cosmopolitanism integral to the European alternatives covered here. I then consider the recent ‘New Imperialism’ debate as the latest iteration of Marxist debate over the nature of imperialism, demonstrating the need for the approach I take which identifies class as containing the internal relation between the supposed ‘two logics’ of capital and (a hierarchical) geopolitics, and as comprising the agency within imperialism.

The second half of the chapter focuses upon the concept of hegemony, seen as comprising the ‘how’ of this exercise of power. Firstly rejecting the discursive turn of much ‘neo-Gramscianism’ (or ‘Gramsciology’) I argue coercion and consent must be seen as ‘moments’ within one another within hegemony, developing the political realist concept of politics against the cosmopolitan assertion of an ontologically separable ‘political’ consensual sphere. I then turn to consider ideology, giving a depth model of ideology. This then allows a differentiation between the political contestation of hegemonic projects through comprehensive concepts of control, and the underlying core principles of liberalism and neoliberalism. It is this conception of ideology that underpins the differentiation from Amsterdam school conceptualisations of neoliberalism as laissez-faire, that I take up in the next chapter.

The subsequent interrogation of the role of think tanks as central ‘ideological apparatus’ introduces the need for a theoretical understanding that can grasp the significance of differentiation within the think tank field as well as its relative autonomy as it this that gives it power within the neoliberal politics of expertise. In considering this need for these most directly ‘organic intellectuals’ this prefigures too the further development of an approach able to integrate the relative autonomy of intellectual fields in the second theory chapter (chapter four) dealing with intellectuals in academic settings.

It is this theoretical framework that I use in the second chapter analysing the development of a bi-polar West. The specific study of a think tank network in chapter three is set within this theoretical framework as a whole, which allows it to provide an exploration of class formation.
Class and the states system

Political realism
The approach taken in this work is a Marxist political realism, taking Lenin’s question of ‘Who, Whom?’ as the fulcrum of politics. In this it is inspired by Raymond Geuss’s use of the question, extended to ‘Who <does> what to whom for whose benefit?’, expanding it thus to four variables: who; what; to whom; for whose benefit?. This gives an approach ineluctably drawn to ‘think about agency, power, and interests, and the relations among them’ (Geuss 2010: 25).

Framing issues with this question gives a concept of politics that cannot remain abstract, that must embed its notions of the good or rational in ‘the more motivationally active parts of the human psyche’ and must do so within the context of existing, rather than idealised, social and political institutions. As a Marxist approach these institutions reflect, at varying distances and therefore levels of determination, underlying class struggle. Taking motivations and interests seriously in the production of political theory in this context we then arrive at Lenin’s principle of partisanship: every theory is partisan and takes side in an ongoing war of worldviews (ibid: 29; cf. Cox 1981).

The four variables of the framing question give Lenin’s stark dichotomy a necessary complexity. Firstly it opens up class to individuals, and therefore the networks they are embedded in, giving space to breathe to ‘the inner structure of these intellectual networks which shapes ideas, by their patterns of vertical chains across the generations and their horizontal alliances and oppositions’ (Collins 1998: 2). However it also necessarily embeds them in their context by asking the fundamental question of the actual political implications of theory - for whose benefit it operates.

Integrating this classical focus of *cui bono* further allows us to give significance to the mediating class – the ‘specific stratum of functionaries’ needed for the ‘control and direction of collective labour, and the task of maintaining social cohesion under conditions of advanced division of labour’ (van der Pijl 1998: 137). These managers and planners have become increasingly important, and whilst they operate primarily in the interests of their employers, and thereby capital, they also, through their social management and socialisation role constitute ‘the class representing classless society within the limits of class society’ (ibid: 138). Kees van der Pijl refers to this as the cadre class to invoke a genealogy to ‘link the existence and orientation of the cadres explicitly to the process of socialisation’, but possible alternatives
in the literature such as ‘intellectuals’, ‘professional élites’, ‘experts’, or the ‘professional-managerial class’, make clear this class’s central significance for this work (ibid). The formulation, separating the ‘who’ from ‘for whose benefit’, allows both the tendency to operate in the interests of the ruling class and the tension of this with their own interests and worldview to feature.

Nonetheless, of note here is that Lenin saw this war at the meta-theoretical level as between materialism and idealism: the former the worldview of the proletariat, the latter of the bourgeoisie, and the conflict between them therefore reflects this class conflict. This materialism is of course a dialectical materialism, not a ‘crude, simple, metaphysical materialism’: the concomitant critique of idealism is that it is ‘a one-sided, exaggerated development of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge, into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature, apotheosised’ a development anchored in the class interests of the ruling classes (Lenin 1981 [1915]: 361). This insight structures particularly the assertion that the developments in European IR that I study constitute a reformulation of Western hegemony, particularly through their idealist concept of politics.

Raymond Geuss develops his position to attack the nature of abstraction in contemporary political philosophy, specifically that of John Rawls and Robert Nozick, and the view of politics as applied ethics. By this he means an approach that is essentially idealist, in which we ‘start thinking about the human social world by trying to get what is sometimes called an “ideal theory” of ethics’ derived from general principles and historically invariant. In such an approach the empirical and historical enter only afterwards when they are then judged against this ideal. He therefore sets against Rawls’s injunction that to think about politics is to think about our intuitions about justice, his own that, ‘if you want to think about politics, think first about power’ (Geuss 2010: 97).

I follow this not to reject ethics or morality in politics but to note that an idealised ethical approach, which Trotsky helpfully labels ‘bourgeois evolutionism’, ‘halts impotently at the threshold of historical society because it does not wish to acknowledge the driving force in the evolution of social forms: the class struggle’, and that ‘[m]orality is one of the ideological functions in this struggle’ (Trotsky 2000 [1938]: 17). The general ethical principles upon which the idealised approach relies are so broad as to be almost vacuous, a ‘shell without content’, the derivation of content for which lies in the concrete and thus in class struggle. The ethics, morality or justice that will then be developed by such theory is therefore dependent on the
class affiliation, conscious or otherwise, of the theorist. Thinking first about power, in a class society, means that power and class are constitutive of ethics – and that, as one cannot generate a free-floating system of ethics, ‘the appeal to abstract norms is not a disinterested philosophic mistake but a necessary element in the mechanics of class deception’ (*ibid*).

This then brings us to one last thought from Raymond Geuss: the necessity of *respice finem* – to consider the outcome; meaning ‘[d]on’t look just at what they say, think, believe, but at what they actually do, and what actually happens as a result’ (Geuss 2010: 10). This as a central assessment of theory I complicate in the second theoretical chapter to give consideration to the relative autonomy of the academic field and agency to those within it, to avoid reductionism and also take seriously what ‘they’ say. This is especially necessary for those who, as Trotsky suggests, approach the ‘threshold’, developing the bourgeois idealist conception of justice to its fullest extent in the figure of the ‘citizen’ which precedes the guiding image of the comrade’ (Ernst Bloch in Rehman 1999: 11). A focus on outcomes otherwise risks flattening them into a single category with the most instrumental of organic intellectuals.

This political realist approach focuses the analysis in the thesis, by stressing the relational nature of power and the realising of structure, and structural power, in agency: the central significance of social structures is to be found in agency, in what it enables who to do to whom (cf. Knafo 2010). As I outlined in the introduction, comprehensive concepts of control are a way of grasping the agent structure dialectic in the process of class formation, as a class takes on political agency, and it this agency that I focus on. The underlying binary of class interests allows assessment of theories and discourses in terms of interests, but comprehensive concepts of control are not generated automatically or functionally from structural interests but through a creative process drawing on the intellectual resources of society more generally, and in interaction with the specific problems confronted. This gives the salience to the focus on European alternatives in the response amongst a shifting Western ruling class to the crisis of US hegemony; it is not simply a functional problem solving response, but the creative development of a new comprehensive concept of control. All of which brings me to the relation between such an understanding of class grasped through its political agency and the states system.

**Capital and the states system**
The New Imperialism debate is the latest iteration of Marxist debate on the relationship between capital and the state. Whilst characterised by its main protagonist as the Lenin-
Kautsky debate redux, the debate marks a step forward in thought on this key issue.18 As Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher contend, the bounds of the original debate, must and are being broken to take account of the historical record of multiple forms of states and the ‘immense co-variation in the nexus between capitalist states and projects of territorialisiation’, as against a ‘structuralist view of an essentially invariant international order’ (Teschke and Lacher 2007: 577). The most significant change to the intervening British debates of the 1960s and 1970s, that surrounding the Nairn-Anderson thesis and the Miliband-Poulantzas debate (Clarke 1991: 18-20; cf. Martin 2008, Wickham Jones 2004, Wetherley 2008, Jessop 2008), is the focus on the significance of capital existing amongst a plurality of states – that is, the relationship cannot be understood in the singular, between capital and an individual state (Barker 1991).

Thus, the argument that the international must be understood as internal to social science seems to be accepted, as it is the implications of this that form the crux of the debate. I will briefly outline this debate, as salient to the relation between capital and the state that I will use. Its contours are clearest in the reaction to Alex Callinicos’ development of the schema outlined by David Harvey in The New Imperialism (2003). Here Harvey seeks to understand the nature and forms of contemporary imperialism, positing as central to this ‘a dialectical relation between territorial and capitalistic logics of power’: dialectical as the ‘two logics’ are irreducible to one another and whilst ‘tightly interwoven’ have a problematic, often contradictory, relation. The difficulty in analysis then is ‘not to lapse into either a solely political or predominantly economic mode of argumentation’ (Harvey 2003: 183, 30). In aligning themselves with this position19 Sam Ashman and Alex Callinicos note that this is very clearly an understanding based ‘in terms of the distinction between the economic and the political’ (Ashman and Callinicos 2006: 111).

The problem with this reification of the formal separation between economic and political power in capitalism is made clear in Callinicos’ development of Harvey to argue the necessity

18 This usage by Alex Callinicos creates a false binary in positions in the debate between a homogenised ‘global state’ category, including a diversity of work on transnational networks, as well as that by Hardt and Negri and William Robinson, and his own, state-centric view. His own is then shown to be superior to the extreme ‘global’ position.

19 ‘This formulation corresponds closely to our own view, according to which ‘[t]he Marxist theory of imperialism analyses the forms in which geopolitical and economic competition have become interwoven in modern capitalism’’. (Ashman and Callinicos 2006: 108, citing Callinicos 2003: 106; more generally see Callinicos 2007).
of a ‘realist moment’ in Marxist considerations of imperialism (Callinicos 2007). Here, he takes seriously the sparse Waltzian framework – the ‘banal truisms’ - in a way that even avowed realists often do not (Kagan 1998: 4). The danger of a lapse into ‘bourgeois theory’ this ‘neo-Weberian’ move to multiple logics poses is clear, with the possibility of the overcoming of class conflict through another logic, here ‘the nation’. More so, as realism and its irreducible territorial logic, and building on this, IR as a discipline of the strictly ‘high politics’ of state interaction, developed precisely as a counter to the power of Marxist theories of imperialism that integrated the political and economic - no matter how imperfectly at the time (Maclean 1988, cf. Bedirhanoglu 2008 for this in relation to Cox’s work).

We can see that its use has indeed had this effect, and thus the ideological power of realism, in Callinicos’ consideration of ‘failed states’. These he sees as manifestations of the failure of a state class to follow its ‘rules of reproduction’, a view that exposes the disciplinary effect of the realist framework in the use of the state as a container to internalise the effects of capitalism in the periphery and integration into the global market to those states themselves (Callinicos 2006: 113; cf. Morton 2007: 610). It is in fact more or less this argument, the failure of the state class in the third world, that underpins Niall Ferguson’s neoconservative argument for the beneficial effects of US Empire in providing governance (Ferguson 2003).

That in David Harvey’s hands this model does not degenerate in this way is in large part due to the very indeterminacy of the relationship between these ‘logics’: with both irreducible to and external from one another it remains impossible to specify which will predominate in any given case and their actual use is restricted to that of descriptive tools. Thus whilst I took as my starting point his argument that the decline of US hegemony led to a strategy of dominance without hegemony it is hard to see how this fits with the model – hegemony in realist thought essentially a synonym for dominance, and alternative definitions of hegemony incompatible with realist assumptions (see below). Nonetheless, as Adam Morton also notes in taking issue with the two logics approach, the actual analysis in The New Imperialism is compatible with other approaches (Morton 2007).

Against the two logics John Hobson points to international relations having been characterised by an enduring hierarchy over the last two hundred years, with a clear division between the West and the rest (Hobson 2007). Whilst (the quite spectacular) instances of intra-Western conflict then remain to be explained this reveals the folly of accepting a realist view of
geopolitics, which can only ever obscure this history — even within the more thoughtful neorealist quarters there is acknowledged a need to explain the contemporary lack of counter-balancing against the US: the unsatisfactory, as logically incoherent, answer being the legitimacy or benign intent of the US, which can have no meaning within a Hobbesian framework.

Hobson defines this primarily as a racialised and racist hierarchy. He neglects that in order to effectively define the other as inferior, or certainly for such a move to have any real implication, one has to have the power to enforce such a definition: the dialectic referred to in discussing agency above. Thus whilst he is correct in seeing imperial exploitation and Western racism as forming a developing self-validating complex (a comprehensive concept of control), at the critical juncture, the take-off, he provides a fudge: ‘I would argue that Western industrialisation and racism were born more or less simultaneously’ (Hobson 2007, my emphasis). By focusing his argument on those who see racism simply as epiphenomenal, merely as cover for exploitative capitalist interests, he avoids this critical question of the source of structural power which is realised through who does what to whom. In common with much constructivist thought there is an inability to explain which (or better, whose) ideas prevail — here whose definition of the other as inferior matters, as hierarchical racism is not confined to the West — and what drives change within ideology. Against his post-Marxist\footnote{In a typical move invoking the spirit, whilst rejecting the content, of Marx (Saccarelli 2008: 97): ‘For in the present context, perhaps the greatest irony lies in the point that I can think of few greater scholars who have allocated prime focus to the agency and resistance of subordinate groupings than Karl Marx’ (Hobson 2007: 594).} idealism\footnote{He asserts that ‘neo-Marxists are speaking to a debate that has [...] been superseded in IR theory by that between materialism and ideationalism (issued by post-structuralists and constructivists)’ which, given we have seen the Marxist argument against idealism (and crude materialism) is true only in the trivial temporal sense. Indeed, he offers here too an exemplary apolitical, theory driven, view of change in the discipline: Following the ‘fading away’ of Marxist inspired debate, ‘a new debate has emerged at the behest of post-structuralism and constructivism’ (Hobson 2007: 582; 588 and \textit{passim}).} then must be an account that, whilst respecting the complexity of imperialist ideologies, in the sense Hobson demonstrates, conceives of them ‘as material social processes through which signs become part of the socially created world’ (Bieler and Morton 2008: 105), and grounds itself in the material dominance of the West, and the challenge this issues to the rest of the world.

The starting point here must be the emergence of capitalism and the productivity thus unleashed. The emergence into the proto-states system in Europe can be considered
contingent, but it is significant that capital in its significant form as ‘mobile wealth’ and ‘extraterritorial social force’ emerged in the liberal West. It is this creation of an ‘organically unified group of states at the centre of the international political economy, of which the origins coincide with the primordial crystallisation of capital’ (van der Pijl 2007: 619) that is the basis of the enduring distinction between the West and the rest identified by Hobson.

As the World Systems Theory work tracing ‘capitalism’ defined as trade for profit throughout recorded history attests, merchant capital and commercially-minded landowners have existed across time in many different societies. However only in Britain ‘did they encounter the particular balance between centralised state power and local self-regulation and initiative in which alone capital can come of age’ as such a structure, and the flexible responsive legal system enshrined within it, allows a ‘civil society’, ‘a society of property-owning individuals free to arrange their mutual relations legally, and within certain limits, autonomously’ (van der Pijl 1998: 65). It was this state/society complex sanctioned by the Glorious Revolution that allowed the take-off into capitalism understood as relations of production in which workers find themselves ‘doubly free’: free from feudal exploitation, but also ‘free’ from ownership of their means of reproduction.

This is because capitalism involves ‘both a particular organization of production and exploitation and a particular differentiation between the public and private – a differentiation that could not hold in pre-capitalist societies as the relations of domination were identical with the relations of exploitation’ (Teschke and Lacher 2007: 568). It is this complex, with its conception of an ‘abstractly political’ state, that Kees van der Pijl terms ‘Lockean’. Use of this term, after John Locke’s 1689 Two Treatises of Government, indicates the significance of ideas as material processes. Here Locke’s ideas exploring and developing the still contested and developing social structure found at the resolution of battles over surplus allocation, take on a material power and reality once championed, and internalised as a worldview, by those whose interests they further.

This ‘abstractly political’ state-society complex was unique but rested on a transnational society from the beginning, enabled by settlement to the New World and the pattern of local self-government that accompanied it that predated the Civil War in England. With the Lockean

---

22 The ‘glorious Revolution’ brought into power, along with William of Orange, the landlord and capitalist appropriators of surplus-value. They inaugurated the new era by practicing on a colossal scale theft of state lands, thefts that had hitherto been managed more modestly’ (Marx and Engels 2007: 795).
pattern transmitted there emerged ‘on the foundations of industrial/commercial centrality and predominance, a heartland of the global political economy’ and a transnational society (van der Pijl 1998: 64 – 74). This unity of states under a society based upon this common state/society complex provides a further internal relation between capital and the state, geared to the international: ‘[Capital] profited historically from the structural free space and entry conditions prevailing in [this] Atlantic English speaking world; the West has all along pursued global liberalism and created the spaces for capital to expand transnationally’ (van der Pijl 2007: 619).

Set against this heartland, that is resisting the pressure it generates, van der Pijl further identifies contenders to this originally Anglophone West of the US and UK: France, Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR, now China – and thus incorporates intra-Western conflict into the theorising of the structure of the West in a way that, for example, a racialised hierarchy cannot. To compete, contender states are forced to restructure by this ‘whip of external necessity’ – though rather than allowing this to become abstracted and banalised, the central importance is that the whip hand has so far enduringly, remained that of this heartland. As existing ruling classes attempt to maintain control and keep power this process is one of passive revolution, that is a synthetic revolution from above - the process that Adam Morton similarly identifies as giving an internal relation between capital and the state and accordingly places at the centre of explaining international relations (Morton 2007). The key distinction here is that this is a national complex, without the appearance of an ‘abstractly political’ state, containing rather a directive state fusing together incompatible social forces.

With an internal relation between capital and the state-system established, any conception of two distinct and competing logics must be abandoned. What remains is the inter-relation between the economic and the political and its management. This then gives us more complex picture of class intra-relation, between state and capital managers; as far as they can in fact be distinguished, both roles often existing in the same individual either concurrently or sequentially. Again behaviour cannot be derived from ‘logics’ or structures: ‘The question is never what state managers or capitalists ought to do or ought to have done according to an ideal-typical logic, but what they actually did’ (Teschke and Lacher 2007: 570, their emphasis). Most significantly is the tension between capitalists competing against one another, and their

---

23 See below for the falsity of the view of incompatibility between Trotsky and Gramsci.

24 cf. Teschke and Lacher 2007, for this danger in work built upon the theory of uneven and combined development.
common interest against the working class – the image of the ‘warring brothers’. Resolving this requires the identification of these common interests, and the negotiating of differences deriving from competition.

This development of class-consciousness is central, as though class is not an identity but an objective position in the relations of production, to act as a class, that is to overcome their plurality as ‘warring brothers’ and form a coherent common interest, capitalists must be not just the objectively given class in itself, but a subjectively developed class for itself. This I have covered above, and it is this subjective development that defines actually existing capitalism and allows us to integrate, for example, racism not as epiphenomenal but as constitutive to class rule in the sense Hobson suggests. Capitalists are not capitalists in the abstract but as real human subjects occupying a structural position and defining the nature of existing capitalism through their agency.

Within this planning groups, explicitly dedicated to the formation of common understandings of interests and their strategic pursuit, are key – but formative too are broader social conditions and more diffuse networks within which those actively involved in the networks of planning groups also sit. Even more significant for us is this interest as it is turned beyond simply operating against a domestic working class, towards more regional or global interests, and the stronger intersection with foreign policy this entails, which intersects itself with broader cultural conceptions, here of the ‘West and the rest’.

This understanding underpins the focus on conceptions of European alternatives as a reconfiguring of Western hegemony. As Gonzalo Pozo-Martin notes ‘it is crucial not to confuse foreign policy ideology with realism. Examining the doctrines that articulate state managers’ views is an essential task’ giving information on and reflecting the ‘fundamental tensions or harmonies between the actions of state-managers and the class conscious influence of sections of national capital’, thus the ‘study of ideology is a necessary element in any examination of the state-capital link’ (Pozo-Martin 2007: 557-8), to which I simply add that the plurality of state forms, and the forms of the EU, along with their internal relation to capital must be borne in mind.
Hegemony

... the greatest modern theoretician of the philosophy of praxis [Lenin] has—on the terrain of political organisation and struggle and with political terminology—in opposition to the various tendencies of ‘economism’, reappraised the front of cultural struggle and constructed the doctrine of hegemony as a complement to the theory of the State-as-force.

Gramsci 1971: 56

Hegemony offers the ‘how’ to the ‘who/whom’ framing my approach as outlined above. As such it is centrally concerned with the means of power. Accordingly, hegemony is also an essentially contested concept, by which I mean its definition is methodologically dependent, as it lies at the politically significant intersection of structure(s) and agency: the use and construction of the former in the latter. Its definition having significant political import it is therefore not amenable to agreement across methodologies (cf. Cerny 2006: 67).

In his consideration of American empire, Niall Ferguson notes that ‘by far the most popular term among writers on international relations [for the US] remains hegemon’ (Ferguson 2005: 8). As so popularly used within the discipline, and summarised succinctly by Ferguson, hegemony is accordingly used in a state-centric way to characterise the American situation as one of politico-military dominance, or in hegemonic stability theory as leadership underwriting world order. The ‘great lie’ can permit little else within theory, and as we have seen such theory was an effective part of Cold War Western supremacy.

Ferguson himself instead subsumes hegemony under empire – distinction between the two is not ‘legitimate’ (ibid: 10) – to demonstrate overall continuity in American foreign policy and thereby the legitimacy and necessity of the Bush administration turn to coercion, in the process implicating earlier IR discussion of the ‘hegemon’ within informal American Empire. The shift in policy is a shift in means: ‘American empire has up until now, with a few exceptions, preferred indirect rule to direct rule and informal empire to formal empire’, the question provoked by the ‘conspicuously uninvited invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq’ is whether this marks a transition to more direct and formal imperial structures (Ferguson 2005: 12-13).

25 Both derive from a reading of the term’s ancient Greek heritage, in the realist reading the stress on Athenian dominance, the liberal on Athenian leadership – in common with most IR accounts of this supposed classical root for the discipline, relying on a dichotomisation of internal/external that does not hold up well to more considered historical study (Monoson and Loriaux 2006).
The unorthodox use by Niall Ferguson, a highly effective organic intellectual for Western power most prominently in the neocon moment - *homo atlanticus redux* as Pankaj Mishra put it (Mishra 2011) – is therefore revealing about the crisis of US hegemony and relation to mainstream US IR. It brings out the disjuncture between the two, revealing the difficulties and confusion of mainstream IR discourse on the taboo, and disciplinarily structurally difficult issue of US empire; Robbie Shilliam noted contemporarily that whilst the ‘recent unilateral turn in US foreign policy has yet to unsettle established theoretical traditions in the discipline [...] it has nevertheless thrown into sharp relief the limits of existing concepts of power, leadership and world order’ (Shilliam 2004: 59-60).

John Ikenberry represents the other ‘liberal’ side of the US foreign policy debate, arguing that analyses such as Ferguson’s overestimate US coercive power, and if they are to retain their pre-eminence the US should focus on leadership (Ikenberry 2005). Again however, both realist and liberal concepts of hegemony are explicitly intertwined in the analysis; their intellectual incompatibility noted but discounted. He argues that a beneficial global order of ‘democracy and capital flows’ requires US power to back it, which in turn legitimates the use of US power – albeit here in dialogue with other responsible states. The desired effect is the same: limited polyarchic democracy and (and as) safety for capital. With the aims agreed this is a strategic discussion as to whether the US alone underwrite this project, or must it draw in other coercive forces and bolster its legitimacy by broadening its base.

The limits of such discussion, that these shifts can be contained within an ongoing US exceptionalism and largely unchanged overall concept of global governance I covered in the introductory chapter. Nonetheless here consideration of hegemony within competing hegemonic projects post-Iraq demonstrates not only the limits of US IR as it relates to the crisis of US hegemony and the formulation of responses, but also how in practice the relation between coercion and consent within hegemony are implicitly understood. Whilst collapsing the ‘great lie’, Kagan and Ikenberry stop at the ‘threshold’ of declaring their class allegiance – analysis remains couched in terms of ‘the US’ and provision of universal benefit – a theory of hegemony we can use requires its foregrounding.

**The ‘Moment of Coercion’**

Deriving from Gramsci’s realisation that the ruling class rarely had to resort to force to maintain its position, his concept of hegemony is a theory of social leadership, in which power is seen as a combination of coercion and consent, with, in the quotidian run of Western societies, consent of primary significance. To gain such consent, rather than mere
acquiescence, the interests of the ruling social class must be universalised; that is either naturalised by being written in to the very nature of things, or presented as being in the interests of society(ies) as a whole, or at least a majority within it.

This definition of hegemony draws on Russian socialist, rather than Greek, roots and developed as a practical revolutionary strategy for winning power, referring to the formation of an alliance between the proletariat and peasantry against the oppression of the ruling class. It is the development of this concept within the Comintern, subsequent to the success of the October revolution, that Gramsci draws upon (Anderson 1976: 15-16). In drawing upon it, Gramsci stressed the need for concessions and sacrifices from the proletariat to secure its leading position, adding a cultural or ethico-political element to the more mechanical Russian conception of alliance – the metaphor of ‘yoking’ - to give a conception of a more organic whole, intellectually and morally unified, a ‘new historic bloc’ (ibid: 19).

The true novelty of Gramsci’s work however lay in taking this strategy, generalising its conceptions and applying them to the analysis of bourgeois rule in the West; taking up Lenin and Trotsky’s notion that the ‘dense organization of civil society in the West would require a different road to socialism than that taken by the Russian Bolsheviks’ to ‘vastly enrich and expand the implications of what was still a rather crude formulation in the early 1920s’ (Rosengarten 1984: 66-67). Here then we have the use of concessions to the working class by the bourgeoisie, as well as the role of ideological structures in generating a unified society under their rule. In generalising the concept of hegemony in this way, he drew upon Machiavelli’s conception of the dual nature of power – the centaur, half-human, half-animal – incorporating force and consent. In thus analysing bourgeois rule as hegemonic, the concept becomes a theoretical informing of counter-hegemonic strategy.

This second use to a degree negates the first, Russian one, for a Western context: it is this understanding of bourgeois class-rule in hegemonic terms that underpins the analysis of why a war of movement, from which this first definition stems, cannot succeed. That is, capture of the state in the West would be insufficient, as behind the rule of the state stands civil society – the whole apparatus of hegemonic rule generating consent. What is necessary then is a war of position – that is the building of a counter-hegemonic apparatus.

Focusing upon this need for counter-hegemony in ideology and culture (often in reaction to, and in preference to, economistic understandings of Marx) leads to a third ‘Gramscian’ reading of hegemony, one in which hegemony is abstracted away from this constitutive revolutionary
development to focus overwhelmingly on this ideational element and absorption into the reformism of social democracy through this. Much of the criticism of Gramsci from the left, from Perry Anderson’s 1976 Antimonies of Antonio Gramsci onwards, has been in fact concerned primarily with this use of his thought – Anderson targeting Euro communism and the influence of Foucault and Deleuze on the ‘politico-intellectual landscape’ of the left (Thomas 2009: 81), Robbie Shilliam more recently criticising neo-Gramscianism as a project restricted to ‘building alternative ideologies and political subjectivities to those constituting and upholding dominant structures’ (Shilliam 2004: 61).

What both are reacting to is, in Emanuele Saccarelli’s term for the great mass of Gramscian work in this ‘cultural’ vein within academia, ‘Gramsciology’: the residue of cultural politics and hegemony as discourse left once Gramsci’s work is traduced through its academicisation - that is its separating from its constitutive relation to a revolutionary socialist politics based upon a Marxist understanding of class (Saccarelli 2008). This is enabled by the fragmentary and highly abstracted form of writing forced upon Gramsci by his imprisonment and accompanying censorship. The forced shift from direct political engagement to a euphemised engagement, along with the posthumous work done in presenting these notebooks as the work of a ‘writer and thinker’, gives the appearance of a very academic form of abstraction to generalities. Academics, Saccarelli argues, can relate to him as ‘a familiar sort of intellectual—specifically, as a fellow academic’, and ‘as a result, moreover, Gramsci is turned into a figure he would have recognized and derided — a ‘critical critic’ confident in, or at least resigned to, the corrosive power of cultural criticism alone’ (Saccarelli 2008: 25).

The fragmentary form also, and here we travel with Perry Anderson’s concerns, ‘allows’ selective readings that fit with the academic habitus – containing an over-valorisation of the ideational, the field in which the professional academic expends their energies. The crux is Gramsci’s use of Machiavelli's centaur, which Anderson asserts allows an opposition of coercion and consent, through which ‘he allowed the conclusion that bourgeois class power was primarily consensual. In this form, the idea of hegemony tends to accredit the notion that the dominant mode of bourgeois power in the West -‘culture’- is also the determinant mode, either by suppressing the latter or fusing the two together. It thereby omits the unappealable role in the last instance of force’ (Anderson 1976: 44).

However, it is precisely the relation between the dominant and determinant mode, as put by Anderson, that is the key development made in Gramsci’s work on hegemony. After asserting
the need to develop a “dual perspective” in political action and in the life of the State’ with ‘two fundamental levels, corresponding to the dual nature of Machiavelli’s Centaur — half-animal and half-human. They are the levels of force and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation’, he explains the dialectical nature of this dual perspective:

Some have reduced the theory of the ‘dual perspective’ to something petty and banal, to nothing but two forms of ‘immediacy’ which succeed each other mechanically in time, with greater or less ‘proximity’. In actual fact, it often happens that the more the first ‘perspective’ is ‘immediate’ and elementarv, the more the second has to be ‘distant’ (not in time, but as a dialectical relation), complex and elevated.

Gramsci Q 13, §14, SPN: 169-70

The relation of coercion and consent is not then one of opposites, of one or the other, but of simultaneity, their ‘dialectical inclusion and implication’. Nor is this, or its relations to forms of state or forms of revolutionary strategy an abstracted one, their relation is determined by the concrete conjuncture the ‘immediacy’ of one or the other ‘depending upon the specific conditions of the conjuncture, as a form of appearance of the other (that is, as its essential conjunctural form)’. As Peter Thomas summarises, “[c]onsent and coercion now figure as moments within each other, theoretically distinct but really united as moments of a political hegemonic project (Thomas 2009:179). It is such an understanding of hegemony that underpins the relation between ideology and force in this thesis.

All of this will be developed further in the second theoretical chapter, where the need for elaboration of this conception of hegemony as it pertains to the contemporary academic field develops from this distinction from ‘Gramsciology’ – for example Owen Worth’s call to develop neo-Gramscianism through ‘[t]he work of Habermas, Hall, Laclau, Mouffe and even Foucault’ is rejected on these grounds (Worth 2008: 45).

What we must take from this here are two things. Firstly, the seemingly facile point that construction of a discourse on the legitimate use of global power implies the existence of such power, acknowledged or not: the shift from civilian power Europe to global power Europe I address in this first part of the thesis therefore reflecting the growth of European ability to project power. The argument here is then over how realistic assessments of capabilities, or near future generation of capabilities are; seen in Ikenberry’s questioning of the feasibility of Ferguson’s vision of empire for the US and the capabilities-expectations gap in EU literature
(Hill 1993; Toje 2008). Secondly, and giving this salience, it is just this relation between coercion and consent, the constitutive role of force in politics that the cosmopolitanism within Europe’s legitimating discourse seeks to deny, this disjuncture further stressed in the shift to Arendtian cosmopolitanism covered in chapter five.

**Ideology - A Marxist Definition**

Ideology is also central to understanding hegemony and here I offer a Marxist definition; as Jorge Larrain notes, with the development of a variety of Marxist traditions, such a definition can only ever be a rather than the Marxist definition. Nevertheless, whilst synthesis may be ‘impossible’, Larrain offers an account of the complementarity between the broad division in Marxist thought, between negative and neutral definitions of ideology, according to the ‘task’ it is best suited to – the former to uncover the distortion of undesirable social situations at the level of their appearance, the latter to analyse ‘political discourses in search of hegemony’ (Larrain 1991).

I follow this schema, with the distinction that this complementarity should be seen as structured by ‘depth’, related to Gramsci’s concept of historically organic ideologies, and cover them in that order here.

Marx used the term negatively against bourgeois theory, defining ideas as ideological to the extent they obscure the inequalities in the determining context which creates them. Bourgeois theory obscures through being a partial view of society, based upon the individual, necessary for the legitimation of liberal capitalism and bourgeois sense of self, against which he offered a ‘scientific’ holistic view in which socio-economic determinants become visible. Ideology as used critically like this is not simply equated to falsehood, rather it relates to distortion in two ways: distortion in the naturalisation and eternalisation of current social relations, their presentation as an immutable ‘fact of life’ the distortion; and, one-sided presentation of the truth, a partial presentation that has the effect of concealing the real relations it describes.

At the deepest level of ideology is the presentation of the essence of capitalism as residing in the free-market. Thus a focus on the labour market gives an appearance of equality and freedom to a system of production based on exploitation and unfreedom. The market is not a lie, but the effects of the transformations necessary to create it are obscured by a focus on its

26 Jorge Larrain is treating the incompleteness of Stuart Hall’s ‘Gramsciology’ (as Saccarelli defines it), asserting the need to move beyond discourse to the ‘reality of unfreedom and inequality’ as without this move all discourses are ideological, thus eliminating the critical edge of a focus on power and domination (Larrain 1991: 28, 5).
internal working. Uncovering this we ‘perceive a change in the physiognomy of our dramatis personae. He, who before was the money-owner, now strides in front as capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his labourer. The one with an air of importance, smirking, intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market and has nothing to expect but — a hiding’ (Marx and Engels 2007: 196).

Marx’s insights here revolve around seeing ideas as arising from and reflecting material conditions, and as being ideological in so far as they conceal social contradictions. In this they are the mental compensation for a deficient social reality – there is therefore continuity in the use of the term for both religious and bourgeois ideology. Similarly, the hold such ideas have over all of society must be understood in this compensatory characteristic – fairness in ‘fair exchange’ and a ‘fair day’s pay for fair day’s work’ the sigh of the oppressed creature. Against idealism therefore, ideology must be tackled at source, in acting not against ‘mistaken ideas but the misshapen nature of social reality which generated mistaken ideas’ (McLellan 1986: 13).

Accordingly for Jorge Lorrain the ‘task’ from this is therefore practical change, at the level of relations of production. Lorrain is clear that the ideational is a dialectical part of this, but holding on to this definition ensures the reality of inequality and unfreedom is not diluted into the purely discursive. This ideology is not merely a discursive trick on the part of the capitalist; it is only by perceiving the inner relationships of production that a competing view of possible social change can be constructed.

Taking seriously this conception of ideology, here capitalism as the market being the perception of all involved, Lenin builds upon it with the insight that the working class requires socialist ideology to penetrate this appearance, and transcend a merely reactive response to the degradations of capitalism: that is, being restricted to the level of appearance there is an inherent limitation to trade-union consciousness, to fight for more favourable relations of exchange within the labour market, not the uncovering of the true nature of it and subsequent call for the destruction of social relations that maintain it. Hence ‘the spontaneous development of the working-class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology’ (Lenin 1969). As Lenin labels the necessary intellectual and educative intervention for

---

27 This analysis of spontaneous working class thought is not intended to exclude workers from full involvement in a socialist movement but to highlight the need for all workers to become ‘socialist theoreticians’ – a natural tendency socially suppressed as Lenin sees it (ibid). In this we see the reality of Leninism’s relation to social democracy and
revolution ‘socialist ideology’, he is often seen as developing a ‘neutral’ or ‘positive’ definition of ideology, that is one that relates systems of thought to class interests. It is from here, usually then via Gramsci, that we get the expansion of possible interests considered as generative of systems of thought or worldviews, until, whilst still at least nominally within the Marxist tradition, we get to the idea of all discourse as ideological, and a non-correspondence between ideology and class (e.g. Hall 1988, cf. Grossberg 1986, Larrain 1991).

The problem stems from this idea of both Lenin and Gramsci’s definitions of ideology as in some sense general or ‘neutral’. Lenin’s is unrelentingly binary: ‘the only choice is — either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a “third” ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology)’ (Lenin 1969). For Gramsci, similarly, ‘neutrality’ is merely definitional between opposing class forces. Against the extension of ideology to all discourse he notes the concept loses its value when applied to both ‘the necessary superstructure of a particular structure and the arbitrary elucidations of particular individuals’, and he therefore distinguishes between historically organic ideologies necessary to a given structure that ‘organize’ human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.’ and ‘arbitrary willed ideologies that produce ‘movements’ and ‘polemics’’ (Gramsci Q7§19, SPN: 376-7). The former, as historically organic, are therefore accurate expressions of material interests. Thus for an historic bloc (a union of social forces) ‘material forces are the content and ideologies the form’. This though is a merely heuristic division as they are inconceivable without one another; ‘since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces’ (Gramsci Q7§21, SPN: 377). At the deepest level we see this again in the market as the practical expression and force of the domination of capital and the bourgeoisie, and at the same time its ideology.

Ideological struggle is again seen as critical, and extended from Lenin into a more sophisticated take on the role of institutions and thought in establishing particularly ‘common sense’. By this Gramsci is referring to the nature of spontaneous thought within the mass of the people, like Lenin, seeing it as embedded in, and expressing the assumptions of ruling class attitudes elite control —the inverse of the relationship more usually assumed: ‘Leninism is conceived as a more democratic form of organisation than Social Democracy. It rests on activity, organisation and participation. In contrast, Social Democracy rests on a passive relationship to its base, organising it socially, but keeping it separate from the political leadership’ (Joseph 2002: 51).
and interests, as generalized so as to appear simply as the natural way things are, or as operating in the general interest. Against this is ‘good sense’ - the kernel of which is derived from the practical experience of the common people, over which is overlaid common sense - ‘a conception of reality that has gone beyond common sense and become, if only within narrow limits, a critical conception’ (Gramsci Q11§12, SPN: 323-43).

I take forward from this the binary underpinning ideology at the deepest level, and the idea of a depth complementarity, that is an organic link between this core binary and strategic political discourse. This relationship of depth complementarity is captured by Gramsci’s concept of historically organic ideologies. The parameters of successful ideological mobilisation are set by the fundamentals of the situation – here class in a capitalist society. Within this context hegemony is a shifting and unstable achievement and ideology within this is therefore shaped by conjuncture and the balance of forces and change therein. Thus above the fundamental binary of bourgeois and socialist ideology there are more complex structures of thought: bourgeois nonetheless as they assert or naturalise this deep level of defence of property and the free market as the reality of capitalism, socialist as they focus on the unfreedom and inequality in the relations underpinning it.

This higher level contains political strategies – comprehensive concepts of control, such as the discourse at all levels building to the imposition of neoliberalism in the West (e.g. Hayek and Friedman via Keith Josephs and the Centre for Policy Studies to Thatcherism) – but also those not necessarily conscious of ‘strategy’, but that serve the same ends in working within the common sense of the time. It is to this kind of work, dealing with immediate problems within a given context that Robert Cox terms ‘problem solving theory’. The problem with this is that in setting up his own binary between this kind of intellectual work and ‘critical theory’ Cox obscures the radical nature of neoliberalism, the most globally socially restructuring project in history. It is the power of ideology at the deep level, the almost automatic expansion of the discipline of capital once the logic of the market and commodities is accepted, that gives the appearance of problem solving, or common sense, to a radical project extending this logic far beyond that contained within liberalism (cf. Cammack 2007). Mental subordination then is both embedded in the naturalisation of socio-economic structures, and a product of politically strategic discourse and coercive activity.

As a final consideration of ideology I briefly apply this model to US exceptionalism. Richard Hofstadter’s oft cited comment that for the US ‘[i]t has been our fate as a nation not to have
ideologies, but to be one’ (Hofstadter 1963: 43) brings out the central role of ‘Americanism’ in suppressing alternatives within the US to capitalist ideologies (a succession of comprehensive concepts of control), as they developed over time: the characteristics Hofstadter gives to this national ideology is centred on the protection of private property rights and (and acknowledged to be in tension with, if not against) democracy.\(^ {28} \)

This Americanism monopolises ideological space as whilst it is ‘what socialism is to a socialist’, it is also a unique formulation in that ‘ideology and nationality are fused and the disappearance of the former would mean the end of the latter’ (Leon Samson cited in Huntington 1981: 25; Huntington 1981: 27). Thus fused this Americanism has been ‘uniquely effective in overpowering other systems of beliefs and values’ (McKay 2009). It is also from this both inclusionary and exclusionary: to be part of the community one must ‘merely’ conform to set political values and ideals – one can retain ethnic identity and even hyphenated-national ties - whilst on the menacing reverse is the danger of being labelled un-American on political, rather than national grounds.

Robert Kagan, a prominent neoconservative intellectual with bipartisan influence,\(^ {29} \) captures the uniqueness, unique power, and global implications of this ideology when wedded to the globe’s most powerful political formation. He notes that ‘[t]o be an American is to believe in and be committed to what Americans, and only Americans, like to call “our way of life”’, but that this way of life is however also in principle universal: the American cause is the ‘cause of all mankind’ (Kagan 2012: 12; Benjamin Franklin cited in ibid). In its naturalisation Americanism becomes inherently universal so there is therefore a tendency from within this ideological frame to judge all people against their own society, seen as the universal standard. The idea of Americans as beneficent imperialists in denial is an effect of this ‘highly ideological

\(^ {28} \) Of course, such an Americanism did not just naturally occur, but is the result of long struggle, both coercively and ideologically. Dorothy Ross, considering the ‘Origins of American Social Science’ and relationship between it and American exceptionalism (Ross 1992), traces the conflict between egalitarian and liberal world views within this exceptionalism, with the liberal version of Americanism winning out (cf. Lipset and Marks 2000, for this struggle in the labour movement, though, in a nice example of such American social science, repression and the ‘idea of America’ are treated as independent variables).

\(^ {29} \) Kagan was a co-founder of the Project for the New American Century and is a member the Council on Foreign Relations. He is currently at the Brookings Institution and has advised both Mitt Romney during his presidential bid, and Hillary Clinton – Barack Obama was also seen toting his 2012 book cited here *The World America Made* (Landler 2012; Klein 2012).
view of the world’ which obscures the imperialist content of US actions to a domestic audience, and masks the interests furthered through it (*ibid*, cf. Ferguson 2004).

The crisis of hegemony is in part that the export of ‘our way of life’ has lost its universal veneer, and the increased difficulty of legitimising the form of neoliberal interventions without this. The rebuilding of such a veneer takes place most explicitly in policy discourse on the US and the broader West (compare Brzezinski 2012; Kupchan 2012). Both Niall Ferguson and Robert Kagan through their uncovering of US imperialism seek to ‘de-Americanise’ and re-universalise the interests pursued through it with a more universal liberal ideology, through this giving US imperialism an heroic, almost self-sacrificial bent (cf. Drezner 2004). Kagan reasserts the need for American leadership whilst distancing it from some of the more brutal and insensitive assertions of American universalism of the past. Identifying the core principles of Americanism as ideological allows a more sophisticated universalization of, and subsequent rallying to them, separable in principle from a rallying to America. The US just happens to remain the indispensable nation for the safeguarding of this ideology of democracy, freedom, and free markets (the holy trinity, as ever, distinct but of one essence) in a dangerous world.

As we saw espoused by Alvaro de Vasconcelos, at this level of reconstructing ideology we find an assertive EU. I argue that this contains an EU exceptionalism, with a (specific) neoliberal core, offering a more powerful universalisation of the interests of capital as shorn of attachment to a specific nation, and particularly as constructed against the preceding US model. The focus here on organic intellectuals attached to think tanks and policy planning bodies suggests their central role in this, and that is my next concern.

**Think Tanks as ‘Ideological Apparatus’**

Whilst mapping interlocking corporate directorates and boards can show that there is a corporate community, providing the necessary objective basis for the formation of a class for itself, to exist such a class must show conscious agency, and it is this dialectic that is grasped through comprehensive concepts of control. It is thus in the formation, interaction within, and activities of policy planning groups that we find evidence of the actual formation of such historic blocs, as actors seek to resolve disputes and co-ordinate interests to establish a consensus position, and formulate strategy to further this position hegemonically (Carroll 2010, Heemskerk 2013). This applies at both the more immediate concrete problem-solving level, and in broader projects aiming to reshape societies in line with amenability to discipline by capital, with the two clearly inter-linked.
Think tanks in various forms – and I come to the role of definitional questions below – are therefore central to this process, in providing an enabling platform for the formation and pursuit of such strategies. Enabling in the bringing together of the individuals, or representatives of institutions both state and private, funding their activities and the interconnections thereby to the corporate community, with organic intellectuals able to work to legitimise and universalise funders interests.

I focus here on think tanks, the informal discussion groups and conferences that form another part of this policy planning apparatus, such as the Trilateral Commission, or the Bilderberg Conferences, having been covered by others working in similar vein (e.g. Gill 1992, van der Pijl 2007). Nonetheless these groups do bring out the second of the two dimensions to think tanks that I will cover. The first dimension is their role as think tanks qua think tanks, as policy institutes staffed by employees and producing research reports and the like. However, secondly, they also act as conveners of members of an existing or potential class for itself pursuing or formulating a hegemonic strategy, brought together through the governance boards which formulate strategy and policy direction for think tanks. This second aspect tends to be neglected in the literature, though the World Economic Forum is an interesting example of the obverse focus, with the conference meetings attracting a great deal of media interest and coverage, whilst the year round work it carries out producing reports and convening policy panels and smaller regional meetings goes underreported.

The central importance of think tanks stems from the relation between these roles: the second as a critical part of policy planning as an historic bloc forms; the first in translating these specific interests into expert knowledge – that is seemingly independent, disinterested technical knowledge and advice. It is here that the role of organic intellectuals for capital is clearest, in the concealing of specific class interests in such legitimising and universalising garb. Such expert knowledge, as William Carroll rightly points out, is as central to hegemonic control as ‘common sense’ (Carroll 2010: 234).

Indeed, it is the presentation of such expert knowledge as independent and disinterested technical knowledge that allows the breaking of established common sense, in favour of the creation of a new status quo. The epochal shift from the prevailing status quo of Keynesianism and the welfare state to Thatcherism is the seminal neoliberal case in Europe, in which,
alongside considerable state coercion, reshaping common sense through politically selected ‘expert knowledge’ was absolutely central. Within this the Thatcherite think tank Centre for Policy Studies played a significant part. Established in 1974 by Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher, it was explicitly tasked to ‘think the unthinkable’ with regard to public policy, with the ‘unthinkable’ consisting largely of the application of neoliberal thought to the specific UK policy context (Stone 1996: 32-35, Stone and Garnett 1998: 13-14; Hall 1988: 271-282; Hall 1993; Peck and Tickell 2007: 38-45).

The effectiveness of think tanks in this role, and their birth and predominant existence in the Anglo-American context, relates to the relation between this politics of expertise and state – society structures. For Lockean structures, where the freedom of civil society is constructed as against the state, it is knowledge produced in civil society that is viewed as independent, as, regardless of the funding for its production, it is the state that is viewed as an interested political actor, and therefore illegitimate in this role. This contrasts with contender state traditions, where a centrally directing, civil society confiscating state has shaped society through expert and technical knowledge produced within the state apparatus. Such traditions vary, but offer a clear contrast to the Lockean model.

To fully understand the working of this politics of expertise within this structure I will treat think tanks’ intellectual production with Bourdieu’s field theory, as this allows for the reality of the semi-autonomy central to their ideological role, and maintains a focus on strategic agency. This anticipates the use of the same in considering academics’ role, but the think tank field is significantly different to the academic field. It is the structural nature of these differences that account for the power of think tanks. The central difference is that think tanks occupy an interstitial field – a field that exists between the fields of the media, academia, politics, and business (Medvetz 2012). As such it exists in a condition of ‘dependent independence’ from these fields, dependent upon resources and status from them, but also working to establish and maintain independence precisely in order to present itself as purveyor of independent policy relevant expertise. This character accounts for the seemingly antagonistic accounts of the two main traditions studying the field, as each contains one part of this unique character:

30 http://www.cps.org.uk/about/history/
31 This is ironically echoed in Diane Stone’s archetypally pluralist account, where she uses this anti-status quo activity as a defence against the charge that think tanks act in the interests of a ruling elite – confusing the status quo, an old class compromise, with the interests of capital. There are echoes of the problematic distinction between critical and problem solving theory here too.
pluralist accounts asserting the independence of think tanks, whilst more critical approaches stress their dependence and incorporate them into a larger apparatus of hegemonic control used by a ruling class.

Before developing this characterisation of the field as interstitial, I will outline these two established bodies of work on think tanks as it is precisely the tension between the two which gives the model such power. To give a first indication of the relationship between the two here, the contrast can be seen to be between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ viewpoints: for the former the field ‘appears highly competitive and pluralistic. No one organisation or individual controls the agenda or holds together a consensus’; whilst from outside it ‘may appear exclusive and structured through the interaction of elites’ (Stone 1991: 199). This is of some significance sociologically, with the majority of scholars in the pluralist tradition also working in the field, whilst the critical tradition emanates from academic fields further from, and much less entwined with the policy field, such as sociology (Medvetz 2012: 10-13).

As part of its naturalisation of the Lockean state-society structure, mainstream political science’s pluralist considerations of think tanks fulfil an ideological role, establishing think tanks, or more formally and euphemistically in the literature, public policy institutes, as independent and scholarly. They do so explicitly – for example defining them functionally as ‘third party vettors of trust’ who ‘edit and credibly validate information’ (Stone 2000: 160) - but also through dis-embedding think tanks from their social relations of production.

Think tanks are established as occupying a more or less hermetic field: that is as a competitive ‘ideas market’, a market, as ever, divorced from the underpinning relations of production. Thus dissociated, competition can be seen as representative of a plurality of interests, as different organisations engage in ‘the daily battles, the fight for funding or the jostling for media attention’, that are so central a part of life within the field (Stone 1991: 199).

---

32 Thomas Medvetz extends this to argue that this distinction and disagreement further contains a ‘euphemized battle between two sets of intellectuals over their own proper social role’ (Medvetz 2012: 10). Examples of insider status from the mainstream pluralist scholars include both principal examples used here of James McGann (president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute) and Diane Stone (consultant for the World Bank, and founder of the Public Policy Department at the Central European University, an academic-think tank nexus). Other notable figures mentioned in this chapter include R. Kent Weaver (fellow at Brookings Institution) and Andrew Rich (ex-President and CEO of the Roosevelt Institute).
This characterisation of a ‘fight for funding’ is typical of how the funding of think tanks is given technical attention (how do we acquire and maintain funding), rather than any political importance; indeed as noted above an inversion takes place where ‘private funding’ is a mark of independence, as it is presumed to be government that they will be advising. Where the motives of donors are considered, Diane Stone’s treatment is typical, suggesting support ‘because they have a sense of social responsibility and believe a healthy democracy requires people thinking about public issues and offering alternative views. Similarly, think tanks may be supported because they contribute to the basic knowledge of and about society and the economy’ (Stone 1997: unnumbered).

To establish such a restricted discrete field consanguineous forms of organisation that are more obviously tied to donor interests, such as lobbying, PR or for-profit consultancies must be excluded – hence a focus on definitional concerns, and from this, taxonomies of the organisational forms and strategies of think tanks become a considerable part of the body of work. Such accounts then are wilfully naïve in the sense that they therefore ‘take the organisation’s role on the organisation’s own assessment’, and thus ‘conflate function with organizational form’ (Pautz 2011: 420).

Despite then consisting largely of rather dull compendia and taxonomies, or ‘narrow pluralistic recordation’, of ‘a large number of private, semi-public and public institutions of knowledge and ideology production’ (Pautz 2011: 420), the impact of mainstream scholarship on think tanks is significant in this ideological sense of establishing a separate think tank field from which ‘disinterested’ expert knowledge emanates.

Opposed to this is a heterodox tradition, actively marginalised by this mainstream, building on the power elite theory of C. Wright Mills. This approach, with its focus on the interlocking of directorates of the corporate, military and administrative elites, views think tanks as the

33 Indeed, having long been on George Soros’ payroll, his wealth coming from a ‘colourful career in finance’ (!), Diane Stone’s 2010 article on his private philanthropy was explicitly oriented towards generating a theoretical framework on such a public interest role for intervention in civil society transnationally so that ‘[t]he role of private philanthropy thereby becomes legitimated’ (Stone 2012: unnumbered; Stone 2010: 270).
34 See for example the listings of think tanks that take up such great chunks of Diane Stone and James McGann’s earlier works, in which the organisational descriptions are lightly modified versions of those found on the website of the organisation concerned.
intellectual adjuncts of such an elite. Although in the earlier work of the 1960s and 70s thinking on the role of think tanks was still inchoate and saw them as peripheral, forming just another set of linkages amongst the elite, by 2006 G. William Domhoff sees them as carrying out ‘the deepest and most critical thinking within the policy-planning network’ (Domhoff 2006: 87). 35 Think-tanks, being usually financed by corporate or personal wealth whether directly or via foundations, are therefore viewed as doing policy research and planning in the interests of their financiers and communicating it to decision makers.

Within such a perspective think tanks are one part of a larger ideological apparatus, tying them into the longer tradition of societal and ideological reshaping through funding for academic and policy relevant social scientific research more generally, carried out through the philanthropy of the great American foundations (historically the largest being the Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, established in 1911, 1913, 1936 respectively) (Berman 1983). Hartwig Pautz usefully develops this strand to place think tanks alongside other such ‘ideological apparatus’, such as management consultancies, which are taking over more and more of the public sphere on a prospectus of technical expertise (Pautz 2011). He points as example to the central role globally operating management consultancies such as McKinsey & Partners and Roland Berger Strategy Consultants played in the German government’s reform efforts, also identifying the role academically originated concepts such as ‘New Public Management’ played in increasing demand for just such services.

This is useful in re-emphasising the central importance of the changing politics of expertise to think tanks’ role, with management consultancies achieving an even more depoliticised stance than policy institutes. Nevertheless, the use of such an Althusserian derivation as ‘ideological apparatus’ points us to the structuralist weakness of this tradition,36 within which the effects of the field in which such expert knowledge is created, precisely the effect of apparent competition which gives claims to independence and expertise their great power, disappear as organisations tend to become presented as merely functional for capital.

35 Thomas Medvetz traces this evolution more fully (Medvetz 2012: 29 – 31).
36 Hartwig Pautz aims to create a neo-Gramscian approach of Coxian derivation to think tanks. The need for something like the Bourdieusian model I employ can be seen as in Pautz attempting to bridge the agent-structure problem through use of discourse theory he ends with a de facto structuralist account as indicated.
This second tradition is marginalised by the mainstream in two ways. The first is simply to ignore it: almost all pluralist accounts assert a lack of previous scholarship on the field (Andrew Rich rather dubiously asserting this in 2005 - Rich 2005: 6), and identify the seminal work as R. Kent Weaver’s 1989 account. This account itself lays the foundation for such an exclusionary enterprise, containing very few citations of scholarly work, with sources predominantly journalistic or think tank produced materials such as annual reports. The parameters of the field have barely changed from those established by Kent Weaver, with his typologies, definitions and focus on operational practices still the bedrock for most accounts - updated where necessary as US parochialism is slowly eroded (e.g. the addition of ‘party affiliated think tanks’ to encompass the German field, cf. Kent Weaver and McGann 2000, Boucher 2004).

The second, less frequent method, but useful for us to understand the nature and significance of the interstitial nature of the field is an attack on the structuralism of these alternative accounts. Diane Stone, a central figure within the academic literature on think tanks, succinctly sets out the problems of: ignorance, or suppression of the diversity of the field in these accounts; an a priori assumption of ‘real power holders’ operating behind ‘formal power holders’ which ‘presupposes prior knowledge of the real elite in advance of the empirical research’; and the simple ‘inference of a causal relationship between social and economic status and political power’ (Stone 1996: 30-31).

Understanding think tanks as occupying an interstitial field allows us to see how marrying the two views together accounts for the power of think tanks as ideological apparatus creating expert knowledge. It is precisely the existence of and competition within the field – the reality of semi-autonomy - that gives the appearance of independence, as those within it must locate themselves within and play by the rules of the field itself; thereby expression takes on a language and form divorced from specific interests it represents. Similarly though, the nature of the field and its conditioning of possible expression within itself must also be understood through its dependent relation to the field of power, the field of economic and political struggle proper – more directly here than in the case of academia. Within this, co-constitution between fields and the field of power becomes significant, placing think tanks as part of hegemonic projects through which a class, or contending groups, of ‘real power holders’ (including ‘formal power holders’) is formed, and can be identified. Thus both established accounts capture elements of the field, which when brought together through this use of
Bourdieu's field theory account for the central significance of the field in establishing hegemony.

The role of governing boards captures this relation, existing in fact at its nexus, with external representatives, often from funding foundations or companies, setting strategy and direction for the organisation, but not its expression within the field. Diane Stone suggests a minimal role for such boards citing Hugh Heclo’s consideration that these are ‘self-important and vacuous big names that sit on their boards with little effect’ (Heclo 1989, cited in Stone 1991: 211) and indeed interventions from board members in the quotidian activities of an institution are usually infrequent. However, it is undeniable that such boards establish the direction of these organisations, and more active members often involve themselves in directing streams of work. Again understanding the field makes sense of this: staff must understand the field and concomitant rules of the game (illusio for Bourdieu), and therefore there should be no need for direct involvement or correction once the direction and parameters are understood.37

The central significance of this semi-autonomous relationship can be seen in the negative when it breaks down. Andrew Rich, ex-President and CEO of the Roosevelt Institute, traces the rise of the influence of policy expertise, but, from the vantage point of 2005, points to the declining power of US think tanks as they become more obviously ideological and interest based; the field effect destroyed by too direct a relation to the interests of sponsoring capital. David Frum’s comments after being forced out of the American Enterprise Institute in 2007 reinforce this point, bringing out the political implications. Fired for failing to toe the donor dictated line – ‘the message sent [...] was clear: We don’t pay you to think, we pay you to repeat’ – he makes clear that establishing too clear a link to capital’s interests is disastrous as in doing so donors ‘are actually acting against their own longer-term interests, for it is the richest who have the most interest in political stability, which depends upon broad societal agreement that the existing distribution of rewards is fair and reasonable’ (Frum 2011).38 Frum’s account, whilst not couched in Gramscian terms, powerfully attests to both the importance of the field

---

37 The example trajectories of ECFR experts below demonstrate this point. Heclo derived this view of boards from his work within think tanks – from my own experience of working in the sector, in both political lobbying and public policy, the need for any intervention from a board member would be seen as a significant failing in the work of any staff member.

38 And bear in mind here that David Frum is a central neoconservative thinker coining ‘axis of evil’ in his role as George W. Bush’s speechwriter – from which role he moved straight to the AEI in 2000.
to universalising and legitimating specific interests and concomitantly the need for organic intellectuals to enjoy semi-autonomy.

**Conclusion**

The focus of this chapter has been firstly on grasping the dialectic between structure and agency through a political realist focus on power as relational and the development of comprehensive concepts of control as the salient form of political agency associated with class formation. Such a focus on class as it forms in the concrete demonstrates the internal relation between the otherwise opposed ‘two logics’ of capital and (a hierarchical) geopolitics, and locates class formation as comprising the agency within Western hegemony.

Developing the means of this class power through consideration of the concept of hegemony gave an understanding of the political as constituted by both coercion and consent – both ‘moments’ within one another. With this relationship understood I developed a definition of ideology that relates to both its deep role distorting and compensating for a deficient social reality, and its development in concrete formation of hegemonic blocs where various comprehensive concepts of control, all nonetheless organically related to the fundamental ideological core, compete. This then gives significance to the agency of ‘organic intellectuals’, here represented by think tanks, as they develop such concepts of control.

Concepts, as Leslie Sklair says, are where theory and the empirical meet. This chapter has set the theoretical approach to be used, which the succeeding two chapters use to develop the conceptual understanding of Europe (chapter two) and analyse the significance of the Global Power Europe network of think tanks (chapter three). It will then be developed further in chapter four for use in considering the academic field.
2. A Lockean Europe?

This chapter establishes the existence of a Lockean Europe, as an entity separable but not separate from the broader West. This sets the material conditions for Europe’s role in the renovation of Western hegemony, providing the basis for considering the policy and academic formations considered as, in Gramscian terms, organic, rather than willed or artificial movements. I take the title from Kees van der Pijl’s 2006 article ‘A Lockean Europe?’ (2006a), which I use to frame an engagement with the Amsterdam School’s consideration of Europe more generally. As already introduced the Amsterdam project was constructed against and forms a correction to the liberalism of the bulk of theorising on Europe, most notably in European Studies (Anderson 2011: 131-2). My task in this chapter is to continue the great dynamism it has brought to the study of European integration during the immediate post-World War 2 and Cold War periods, to the post-Cold War world where it is on less sure footing with a tendency not to take Europe’s distinct role seriously enough as it is folded too completely into the US led West as a whole. The chapter proceeds through four sections, each both setting part of the context I am establishing and working to retool the work of the Amsterdam School for the post-Cold War world.

First, I establish the argument for considering the EU as a Lockean entity in its own right. Here I interrogate van der Pijl’s equivocation over the nature of the EU in theoretical terms, agreeing with him that different developmental dynamics formed the Atlantic heartland and the EU. Whilst for van der Pijl this inserts some caveats to seeing the EU as Lockean Europe, I suggest that these provide an entry into considering the development of Lockean spaces politically. In doing so I seek to maintain the geo-political dynamism of his approach, that sees the expansion of the original heartland as the central drama of international relations in the modern period, extending it to allow the formation of Europe as its own distinct Lockean space, bound into, but also a central constitutive part of the broader West.

In the second section, this develops into a discussion of neoliberalism that discounts the model of political change that sees neoliberalism as external to Europe, and therefore places European neoliberalism in a reactive, backward, position to the US, as a continuing ‘Americanisation’ of Europe. This model, central to van der Pijl’s account of Europe continuing as a subordinate extension of the heartland and prevalent throughout the Amsterdam School’s work, tends to equate neoliberalism with the US-UK model, neglecting both the strong history of neoliberal thought in Europe, and Europe’s own agency, again central and essential, in
constructing neoliberal globalisation. Thus, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn constructs European neoliberalism as ‘embedded neoliberalism’, ‘inherently contradictory’ in its concessions to social democratic traditions, contrasted with a ‘pure laissez-faire perspective’ (van Apeldoorn 2009: 24-25). However, neoliberalism must be understood as more than simply the laissez faire model of Anglo-American neoliberalism, with, for example, founding ordoliberal concerns for social stability and market compatible protections seen as integral to neoliberalism, not antithetical to it. In this light, ‘embedded neoliberalism’, which van Apeldoorn agrees has a greater sustainability and stability, is a development within neoliberalism - which was always an attempt to move beyond liberalism, not, as the Amsterdam School parses it, an intensification of liberalism - and therefore, whilst distinctions between neoliberal forms is necessary qualifiers such as ‘embedded’ should not be seen as ‘contradictory’. The more general importance of this distinction lies in the merging of neoliberalism with ‘Atlanticism’ operating as a key conceptual error, leading to the omission of real European agency throughout much of the school’s work.

The third section then studies the economic field, looking at the formation of a European transnational capitalist class. Much of the work I draw on here is a development, and updating of the work of van der Pijl. What is striking in this development is the centrality of the Europeanisation of capital to the formation of a broader Western transnational capitalist class. Here again the need is for a conceptual shift to accommodate the realities of the post-Cold War world, against van der Pijl’s tendency to both retain a belief in the centrality of national capital formations and an overall subservience to US capital.

The fourth section focuses on the changing role of the EU within Western military structures, and its post-Cold War achievement of coherence and capability for independent projection of power globally – albeit with more limited intensity and duration than the US. Here the preceding reconsiderations of the Amsterdam School’s work come together as, with a conception of neoliberalism as a US capitalist class interest, the EU pursuing its own interests is interpreted as evidence of ‘Atlanticism’ and US power over the EU. Where acknowledged, European military capability and action then becomes simply symptomatic of the US ‘shadow over Europe’, with the focus then turned to potential conflict between a declining US and a rising China – a power still militarily far weaker than the EU – rather than the changing dynamic within a bi-polar West reconfiguring its hegemonic control globally.
Overall I establish, as a basis for the study of policy and academic work, that there is a consolidating European transnational capitalist class, and an increasingly independent and Europeanised military force, pursuing a neoliberal agenda, but one in which market compatible attempts to achieve social, and even environmental, sustainability are integral. This gives both the base for, and coercive moment within, hegemony – which the articulators of Western legitimacy naturalise. It is this legitimating function that is so important in renovating Western hegemony in the light of the US’s hegemonic crisis.

This chapter then achieves two things: Firstly, setting the context to understand assertions of European difference as neither ‘Kant or Cant’ (Layne 1994), but as implicated in an objectively based hegemonic project. Secondly, it also seeks to make a contribution to further developing the transnational historical materialist approach to European integration from which the understanding of such a hegemonic project is derived. As such, when considering the Amsterdam School the focus is on vacillations, lacunae and inconsistencies, somewhat taking for granted its great strengths. It should be clear however that I am seeking to build on this work.

A Lockean Europe?

There are two inter-related reasons why Kees van der Pijl equivocates over establishing a ‘Lockean Europe’ in his 2006 article on the subject: one theoretical-structural, relating to the configuration of EU institutions; one cultural-historical, highlighting the ongoing salience of the contender state experience of continental European powers in the construction and actions of these institutions (van der Pijl 2006a). This section deals with the first of these, the next section covers the second, primarily through a consideration of the understanding of neoliberalism it contains. Whilst significant for any analysis, both arguments, I argue, are subordinate to class development: that is both the structure enabling class formation and the intellectual resources drawn upon in constructing comprehensive concepts of control are not best understood as abstracted entities based on their preceding Atlantic formations. In doing so I am positing a more reflexive relation between structures and class formation, reintroducing dynamism to the idea of a ‘heartland/ contender state structure of modern international relations, through which class formation and democratisation are thenceforth refracted’ (2006b: 158). It is the value of this dynamic model I turn to first, to establish the analytical utility of resolving this question of ‘Lockean Europe?’
A dynamic model of geopolitics

One of the great contributions of van der Pijl’s heartland/contender model is its integration of a spatio-temporal element as integral to political analysis. In essence this reflects the structural position of contender states to the heartland overdetermining their political complexion, whether left or right (seen in the structural similarity of Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia). The dynamism of this can be seen by contrast to the anti-totalitarian thought developed during the Cold War which sees far-left and far-right political thought as inherently totalitarian, necessitating the aggressive defence of the ‘vital centre’ of liberalism: in such a static model the structurally determined behaviour of a confiscatory state is ascribed to its political ideology, whereas in the heartland/contender model ‘totalitarianism’ is not a static attribute of political thought, left or right, but a response to the dynamism and threat of the heartland.  

This model is reflexive, in that the achievements of the leading contender states in turn pressure the heartland.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, through this capital as an extra-territorial force is therefore able to ‘impos[e] its discipline in both directions through geopolitical competition’ (van der Pijl 2006b: 21).  

Central to the model then is change in response to challenge and the contingent forms of class rule that this generates. I highlight the need to reintroduce, or maintain, the dynamism at the heart of the model – to understand the expansion of the heartland in a way that also allows for change in its spatial configuration, to accommodate a Lockean Europe, which is necessary if we are to make sense of Europe’s role in a West now containing a declining US.

Failure to do so, and a tendency towards implicit conflation of the US and the West, means that US decline and the failure of Bush’s ‘War on Terror’, as a ‘global state of emergency’, to generate support either within or outside the West is seen as the ‘demise of the liberal project itself’ (2006b: 406-7; cf. Amin 2000, Kagan 2012) as examples of the prevalence of this view of European irrelevance across the political spectrum).  The only non-negligible role for Europe

---

39 Which is not to disavow a relation between such ideologies and structural position, but to uncover the primacy of this dynamic model of geopolitics. The development of such ideologies in such contexts speaks to the constitutive role of social structure in political thought, as outlined in the previous chapter. Separating out Marxist thought from its development through the contender experience then becomes a vital task.

40 The heartland enjoys the initial advantage, forcing the society it confronts into the contender posture. The actions and achievements of the contender state in turn affect developments in the heartland; in the process, capital becomes an autonomous force, imposing its discipline in both directions through geopolitical competition’ (van der Pijl 2006b: 21).
then is as a new, non-liberal power, ‘emancipated’ by the decline of the US, and able to
flourish through both a more appropriate (corporatist) mode of relations of production and
alliances with rising powers in Russia and China41 – a vision drawing heavily on Emmanuel
Todd’s projection in *After the Empire* (Todd 2004). However, as both the current conjecture
(and unfair advantage of hindsight), and the thread of European rivalry with the US within a US
led and dominated West throughout van der Pijl’s historical account suggests, this captures
neither the endurance of the ‘liberal project’, or Europe’s role within this satisfactorily.

Thus whilst I go a long way along with van der Pijl’s account of European integration into a post
WW2 Atlantic unified West, the differences that I elaborate below, principally concerning the
implications of the European contender experience and the nature of neoliberalism, ultimately
give a view of post-Cold War Europe as separable but not separate from the US within a
bipolar West, as the best description of both where we are and the direction of travel. The
reintroduction of dynamism and reflexivity to the idea of a ‘heartland/ contender state
structure of modern international relations, through which class formation and
democratisation are thenceforth refracted’ (2006b: 158), therefore means that formation of a
European transnational capitalist class is of vital significance as it relates to the construction of
a Lockean European space.

From this, we see the importance of outlining the development of a class project, creating and
developing a European Lockean space, and its impact globally. In this then it is significant that
van der Pijl’s overarching, over-determining, geopolitical structuring device of an expanding
Atlantic heartland set against a succession of contender, and secondary contender, states,
developed from his work tracing the historical development of an Atlantic Ruling Class (2006b,
1984). The establishment of a transnational Lockean space acts as an enabling condition for
the formation of a transnational class for itself, as in the original transnational Anglophone
heartland.

**The EU as transnational juridical space**

To return then, to the first of the two reservations: The theoretical-structural argument relates
to van der Pijl’s conception of a transnational Lockean space – that is a space unified in the

---

41 These two positions compatible on the assumption an emancipated Europe would not pursue a liberal
project – this externalisation of neoliberal globalisation a central point of disagreement with van der
Pijl’s account, developed below.
legal enforcement of private property rights, whilst remaining split into separate territorial jurisdictions. As we saw earlier, it was this construction in the original Anglo-American Lockean heartland that is responsible for the take-off of capitalism, understood as a force that must be able to discipline societies from the ‘outside’, that is extraterritorially. The subsequent geopolitical competition with contender states then further entrenches this discipline, from the outside, in both directions.

At first blush the EU as an overarching political body does not seem to fit this model well – indeed the supposed normative superiority of the EU over those still mired within the states system rests upon a conception of it transcending territorial jurisdictions. However the key to understanding the power of the Lockean model is in its enabling capital’s disciplining from outside, and the inability for the representation of the popular will at the same scope, thus capital escapes national and democratic control. This lies at the core of Friedrich Hayek’s vision for Europe of a single European market coupled with an interstate federation where transnational competition within such a regime would discipline states’ ability to intervene in or protect their economies, with the social solidarity required to implement interventionary policies at the level of the single market assumed to be impossible to achieve. The fundamental problem such a model sets out to overcome is that of national control over capital, through redistribution and taxation, seen as linked to national solidarity (Hayek 1948 [1939]). In this context then the EU is a Lockean entity to extent that it represents such a disciplinary competition regime, and not Lockean to the extent that the popular will is represented at the same geographical level.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is in this light, seen as a centrally Lockean institution, creating ‘a legal space in the Lockean sense – where the discipline of capital can be enforced by court actions… rather than by a political institution’ (2006b: 17). However, this ‘structural similarity [to the original Anglo-heartland] at the end of the road has been achieved by different, often incompatible, strategies’ (2006b : 15), thus set against this legal space is precisely the danger of a state-like political institution over the space, here especially in the form of the European Parliament.

Giving this some initial contemporary credence perhaps is the current example of the European bankers’ bonus cap (capped at 1x salary) developed by the European Parliament and

---

42 As noted earlier, this creates an internal relation between capital and state forms.
agreed by EU finance ministers on 5 March 2013. There is however potential for this too to be taken to court as ‘the EU’s Lisbon Treaty forbids interference on pay by the European Parliament or European Council’, such action stymied by public opinion, not by any power of the European Parliament (The Economist, 9 March 2013). Pay is not an isolated element, in continuance of the core EU project of the construction of a single market and competition regime for all such matters related to competition the initiative and enforcement lies with the executive body of the EU the European Commission, as indeed it does for legislation. But, whilst for the latter the process of ‘co-decision’ means the European Commission proposes new laws, and the European Parliament and Council of the European Union adopt them for the former the Commission ‘effectively serves as a prosecutor, judge and jury in antitrust investigations’ (Kanter 2012: u.n.). The final arbiter as court of appeal, for both member governments and companies is the ECJ.

Beyond the schematic of ECJ as Lockean structure and the democratic potential of the European Parliament, analysis of this most complex and opaque of structures tends to give an image not of a comprehensively structured ‘Fortress Europe’ but of a ‘Maze Europe’ of transnational governance both above and below the state (Christiansen and Jørgensen 2000). Such governance is organised along functionally differentiated lines, to create different social, political and identity spaces that map onto neither states or the EU, focusing on regions within or across states or through specific non-state territorial funding streams creating ‘coastal Europe’, ‘trans-border transport linkage Europe’, etc. This brings out the technocratic governance of the EU as a project of functional integration and control around the core of single market and competition regime, with state borders increasingly seen ‘as the reason for governance’, with cross-border regions each becoming a ‘space bounded by policy-making and politics (Christiansen and Jørgensen 2000: 68-9). As identified above the danger of the state which an overarching Lockean structure disciplines is that of solidarity, ‘Maze Europe’, in which instances of governance increasingly match neither state nor EU borders organised around functional spaces for coordination and control leave ‘most confused as to their precise whereabouts’ creating a political ‘fog of uncertainty over the role of European institutions, the

---

43 This is from an American perspective – and the difference in perspective signalled by labelling this ‘antitrust’ has a significance I come to momentarily.
44 Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 these cases are handled initially by the General Court (pre-2009 the Court of First Instance), with appeals progressing to the ECJ (the ECJ’s official name was also changed by the treaty, from ‘Court of Justice of the European Communities’ to the ‘Court of Justice’, both generally referred to as ECJ).
location of final responsibility and the representation of political interests’. This means that seeking a democratic solution to this problem through an enhanced role for the Parliament cannot address this ‘Maze Europe’ which ‘can only be understood by an inner circle of decision-makers’ (ibid: 74-75).

This essential powerlessness of the European Parliament leads to the more significant general argument that the actual historical impact is its role in controlling far-left parties nationally, diluting the pressure of popular protest and organisation at national level into the European level (van der Pijl 2006a: 19-20, and 2006b: 143; Holman and van der Pijl 2003). So, whilst van der Pijl keeps alive a social democratic belief in the parliamentary road to change at the hypothetical-theoretical level45, in practice, and in some contradiction, what is outlined is the European Parliament as a supra-national form of parliamentarism - even more deracinated of democratic content, reflecting the existence of a Lockean space.

This, as indicated, is quite apart from, and again against, the common ‘democratic deficit’ argument that sees the problem as institutional, relating to the relations amongst EU institutions and Parliament’s lack of control thereof (one of the central strands of EU studies, see for example Journal of European Public Policy, special issue 20:2 2013; cf. van der Pijl 2006b: 9, passim), as this latter sees any de facto parliamentarism of the European Parliament’s role as a rectifiable failure of implementation, not constitutive of the institution (cf. Christiansen and Jørgensen 2000).

Overall then, the greatest effect of the EU is disciplining from the outside and embedding a juridical competition regime across Europe. The recent March 2013 European Commission consultation on ‘guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020’ gives a good example of this role (European Commission 2013). State aid – that is any public intervention that potentially advantages one company over another within the EU – is prohibited. The prohibition is tempered however by a minimal concern for the social sustainability of the model, with accordingly some leeway for a technocratic concern for amelioration of regional economic disparities46 - this idea of a more socially sustainable European neoliberalism I come back to

45 ‘In the end, a parliament with real powers can legislate for emancipation and social equality too’ (van der Pijl 2006a: 22).
46 State aid is defined as ‘an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national public authorities…. A company which receives state aid obtains an advantage over its competitors. Therefore, article 107 of the TFEU generally prohibits state aid’. This is mitigated by, ‘in some circumstances,
momentarily. Overall this militates against national activist economic policies as, taking the UK as an example, the guidelines would require EC blessing, even where interventions are deemed legal, for implementation of schemes such as the Regional Growth Fund (RGF) in England, Enterprise Zones (UK wide), Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) in Scotland, Selective Finance for Investment (SFI) in Wales, ‘and any similar successor schemes granting aid for inward investment or expansion’ (LGA 2013).

In this, ECJ case law is of overriding significance, as ‘[i]rrespective of [current] Commission reform activities, European courts have recently taken a number of important decisions in the field of state aid rules’ (Brüggemann and Haak 2013). The UK’s Department of Communities and Local Government therefore provides guidance to public bodies on the implications for their activities of ECJ rulings (DCLG 2013).

Thus whilst the space constructed is different in form from the original heartland, it performs in the same way as a juridical space. The analysis of Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, delineating the EU as just such a Lockean space, shows it as more effective than the original space in imposing the discipline of capital extra-territorially, through this institutional difference - able to both enshrine competitive pressures more completely, and operate hegemonically in generating consent (van Apeldoorn 2009). Indeed, his earlier work showed precisely the how formation of a nascent EU transnational capitalist class developed in tandem with the forming of the EU as a Lockean space (rather than the earlier alternative direction of a protectionist neo-mercantilist entity) through this institutional structure (van Apeldoorn 2004a). This brings to the fore again, the significance of delineating the EU in this way: the Lockean space, here created through political action, is an enabling factor in the formation of a European transnational capitalist class in itself, and this space is here able to be further developed in their interests by a class for itself.

Neoliberal Europe: laissez faire and Ordoliberalism

Neoliberalism is best thought of, and defined by its constitutive class projects: accordingly here I seek to identify both a core common to, and an understanding of divergences between comprehensive concepts of control which constitute neoliberalism in relation to Europe. David government intervention is necessary for a well-functioning and equitable economy. Consequently, the Treaty leaves room for a number of policy objectives for which state aid can be considered compatible’ (European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/state_aids/state_aids_en.htm ).
Harvey refers to it as a restoration of class power, and of a continuation of class warfare in the post-Cold War world – but only by one side, by capital. It is best thought of in this way, as when the theoretical strictures of what is most often identified as neoliberal theory – that is neoclassical economics – run counter to the interests of the ruling class, it is the former that give way. Similarly, whilst the neoliberal justification for the social restructuring of the last few decades has been the promotion of economic growth, its record in this area has been mixed to poor, succeeding however in a huge redistribution of wealth upwards (Harvey 2007). Whilst I will argue that neoliberal theory is rather more complex than that, and that the common aligning of neoliberalism and neoclassical economic theory serve to cloud the waters, I return to confirm this contention that it is only truly possible to understand as practice, as developed by hegemonic blocs.

The most common presentation of neoliberalism is as a theory politically activated in the 1970s and progressively enacted thereafter. In this way the theory was incubated by the Mont Pelerin Society (and a few other academic departments, and marginal think tanks) before being taken up when the economic crisis of the 1970s presented the opportunity to impose capitalist discipline more absolutely – thus the first wave is associated with the names of Pinochet, Thatcher and Reagan (as well as incorporating the less often noted Antipodean experiences of the time). It becomes in this reading a fundamentally Anglo-American ideology, the seminal Chilean experience driven by the US and managed by trainees of the ‘Chicago School’. In this reading neoliberalism is associated with laissez faire, and limitation of government, especially in its ability to intervene in the market and control entrepreneurial activity. Thus this interpretation sees neoliberalism as a development of liberal principles in its supposed setting of civil society against the state. This is both the starting point of David Harvey’s history of neoliberalism, and the underlying understanding of the Amsterdam School (Harvey 2007; e.g. Cafruny and Ryner eds. 2003; van der Pijl 2006b; for a review of such understandings in social sciences more generally Jessop 2013).

Yet, as close study of the history of the Mont Pelerin Society, and of the variety of ‘neoliberal constellations’ developed since then show, this is a simplistic reading (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Plehwe, Walpen, and Neunhöffer 2006). Historically tracing neoliberalism and US hegemony, back to the 1950s and 60s, rather than starting at the US moment of the late 1970s, and their non-correspondence, gives a more complex relation – one where the way challenges are reinterpreted by neoliberalism as a practice, is central to its comprehension. Neoliberalism has historically consisted of a family of theories, often in conflict with one
another, unified to varying degrees through strategizing to solve problems and mobilising for political action (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). Such a form of mobilisation and ‘improvisation in specific spatio-temporal contexts and conjunctures in all their messiness produces immense variations in neoliberalisms’, each, including the US model, as sui generis as another (Jessop 2013: 73). Purity, on the lines of neoclassical economics, is therefore less characteristic of neoliberalism than its pragmatic orientation and recognition of the need to incorporate ‘important external alien elements, correct mistakes of the past, and transform doctrine in light of new insights and convictions’ in overcoming the limitations of traditional liberalism (Ptak 2009: 99). Contrasts between, and attempts to align, this historical complexity with the common essentially fixed and geopolitically derived reading has led neoliberalism to come to seem a ‘chaotic concept’: clearest perhaps in the way it frames criticism and resistance than in its content (Jessop 2013: 65).

Beneath the great diversity of neoliberal thought there is however coherent justification for the ‘neo’ prefix, in line with the depth ontology of ideology I developed in the preceding chapter: that is a common belief in markets aligned with a rejection of the laissez faire of classical liberalism. Neoliberalism at its core sees the necessity of political action to establish and maintain the market, requiring the state to act beyond the confines of the liberal nightwatchman concept of the state. The market is then denaturalised in order to actively extend its scope, through reconfiguring the state as well as ever greater swathes of society, justified by theorising market mechanisms and competition as the most efficient way to allocate resources and drive productivity (Gane 2012). Indeed, ordoliberalism, a fundamental strand in the development of neoliberalism (for Foucault the neoliberal avant garde), is based upon the strong state, with the free market a constantly renewed political intervention (Ptak 2009). It sees the necessity ‘not only of a firm legal framework, but also of a robust social and ethical framework’ for a free economy, requiring not laissez faire but ‘vigilance, activity and intervention’ (Bonefeld 2013: 235; Gane 2012: 613). Born in the post-World War 2 crisis in Germany, it ‘demanded the strong state as the means of restoring and sustaining free economy’, but a state with the free market as its ‘organizing and regulating principle’ – a ‘state under the supervision of the market, rather than a market supervised by the state’, as in the liberal conception (Bonefeld 2013: 235-6; Gane 2012: 626).

With this in mind we can see that the neoliberalism that took hold in the 1970s in the US and UK took on a more classically liberal character, extolling laissez faire, reflecting the Lockean experience; hence the common perception of neoliberal theory now being anchored in neo-
classical economics. This made sense for the class project of the time – with the crisis of profitability the need was primarily to return *laissez faire* to the labour market in a unionised corporate society, alongside the extension of the scope of exploitation through expanding the areas of society covered by the market in privatisation drives. The great danger to social stability presented by the proletarianisation of the masses, central to ordoliberal thought, could however be handled by creating social division through buying off selected groups of society and coercively crushing the resistance of others; this neoliberal hegemony having a more strongly accented coercive moment.

However, more contemporary neoliberal practice, and especially that in Europe, is better understood drawing on this fuller history, to see it not as a ‘contradictory synthesis’ or ‘hybrid’ form with this specific Anglo-American neoliberalism (van Apeldoorn 2009; van der Pijl 2006b), but as a characteristic development within neoliberalism. Such an understanding makes sense of the neoliberal character of the restructuring of the role of European states and development of the EU, not in their withdrawal, but in their enforcing of a ‘comprehensive concept of competitiveness’, with accompanying focus on audit and benchmarking across all organisations, public and private (Holman and van der Pijl 2003: 84). These newer forms of governance draw on a more ordoliberal influenced neoliberal trajectory, with the shift from a focus on exchange in the market to competition within the market – and extension of such forms into the public sector through pseudo markets and competitive benchmarking characteristic (Gane 2012).

David Gerber’s seminal article on the significance of the Freiburg School’s ordoliberalism and a developed ‘German tradition’ makes this clear, identifying how the EU’s competition regime is best understood from this vantage (Gerber 1994; Gerber 1998; cf. Wigger and Nölke 2007; Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2010). As indicated above the comprehensive structuring of social

---

47 For example, in their very brief consideration of the role of ordoliberalism in the ‘Making of Global Capitalism’, Gerber’s 1994 article is Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin’s only citation. Misrepresenting his argument they render ordoliberalism as simply the contemporaneous term for ‘neoliberal monetarist policies’. By this means ordoliberalism is integrated into the ‘Political Economy of American Empire’ without regard for the European tradition of thought itself (Gindin and Panitch 2012: 97).

48 These last two offer a very useful tracing of the development of the EU as predominantly a competition regime, especially in convergence from a more ordoliberal/Rhenish model toward the US/Chicago School/Anglo-American antitrust model. Nonetheless within a conception that sees only the latter as neoliberal, as *laissez faire*, the social model of Europe in which the construction of markets for the common good plays a part – the ongoing ordoliberal conception – appears as merely hypocrisy. As I return to in the conclusion to this chapter, this renders those building this European model as merely
stability flows from the construction of the competitive market – and here the shift from the liberal conception of the market as natural to its central role in creating a good society is significant, removing any charge of cant from Europe’s social model. The ordoliberal conception that ‘the economy was the primary means for integrating society around democratic and humane principles’ remains, as does intervention to ensure sufficient social support for it (Gerber 1994: 38-9).

The construction of this competition regime stems not from the ‘traditional liberal bastion’ of England, and is thus not a simple extension of, or absorption into the Lockean heartland. As van der Pijl notes, ‘specific characteristics of the continent are not just relics of the past, doomed to be swept away by ‘reform’’, nor should the historical contender experience be fixed in aspic, giving a path inherently standing opposed to the discipline of capital, once states are absorbed into the heartland (van der Pijl 2006b: 290). This should not be understood unidirectionally though, in maintaining the political dynamism of comprehensive concepts of control, considering shifts within the mode of social control within the ‘liberal bastion’ itself from this European direction become significant and demonstrates the usefulness of conceiving of neoliberalism not as a reified image of laissez faire, but as developing strategies of a (shifting) ruling class, organised however around this conception of the state not as ‘night-watchman’ but as market maker, enforcer and social guarantor.

The Third Way, and its development in the Big Society are characteristic of this form, with both the restructuring of the public sector and associated shifting of responsibility for handling competitive pressures to the individual enforced by and enabled by the state, through restructuring of welfare systems and associated pressures for ‘lifelong learning’. Often seen as a synthesis of neoliberal and communitarian thought, such moves rather show the salience of this understanding of neoliberalism for the British experience also (Sage 2012a, 2012b), and the use of particularly German experience in forging this ‘synthesis’ (Gane 2012 and Bonefeld 2013 for the specific ordoliberal elements). The political media characterisation of convergence on this model form both left and right of the British political spectrum, exemplified by Philip Blond’s ‘Red Tory’ism, and Maurice Glassman’s ‘Blue Labour’, as ‘post-liberalism’49, whilst the socialist left characterises it as neoliberalism confirms this, and the

instrumental for capitalist interests and, whilst these scholars talk of convergence, they delineate a process of conversion to and dominance by the Anglo-American model.

49 For example, New Statesman, 27 March 2013, (http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2013/03/leader-liberalism-now-feels-inadequate-
need to overcome the use of neoliberalism as a ‘chaotic concept’ referring to both an intensified liberalism and its transcendence.

Indeed, in supporting his classification of the EU as ‘embedded neoliberalism’, van Apeldoorn draws on this shift to the ‘Third Way’ in Europe. The argument then is not over the potentially far greater social sustainability of this move, but over its contrast with a supposedly purer *laissez faire* neoliberalism. This comes to the fore in van Apeldoorn’s understanding of the role of the state as tempering (in van der Pijl’s phrasing ‘compensating’) national societies within an overall neoliberal drive by the EU. As seen above, this simplifies the relationship between the state and market in neoliberalism. Overall, the understanding of the shift in form from a *laissez faire* to a juridical competitive state, concerned with social stability within the parameters of the market is strong in the Amsterdam School’s work on the EU, the problem is its mischaracterisation due to the conceptualisation of neoliberalism. With a less schematic understanding of neoliberalism, the full neoliberal agency of Europe, separate from ‘Atlanticism’ can be understood.

Against the Amsterdam School model I therefore work with a conception of neoliberalism which sees the Anglo-American model as at least as *sui generis* as any other – rather than as a *purer* neoliberalism. Such a conception, particularly in its pragmatic incorporation of alien elements, reveals its character as class power practice: that is as a shift in core ideology to transcend liberalism expressed in a variety of competing ways, grasped by the idea of competing comprehensive concepts of control. The ideology is then at core in tune with the base of a capitalist class’s power, that is in privileging the market and competition, but more heterogeneous at a higher level. Such a conception allows European agency, where its exercise furthers a neoliberal agenda, to be understood in its own terms – not necessarily as part and parcel of a sweeping ‘Atlanticism’.

**A European Transnational Capitalist Class**

In offering a synopsis of the work to date on the transnational capitalist class hypothesis in 2005, Michael Nollert found it lacking in empirical rigour, tending towards hypotheses derived from ascribed logics to capital, rather than sociological work. In particular he found the work on ‘global capital’ and a related global transnational capitalist class (for example that of Sklair [*new-age-insecurity*]; David Goodhart, May 11, 2012, *Financial Times*, ‘Welcome to the Post-Liberal Majority’ – launching Demos’ ‘post-liberal’ ‘citizens programme’ ([http://www.demos.co.uk/citizens](http://www.demos.co.uk/citizens)) .
2001; Robinson and Harris 2000; Robinson 2004), characterised by a ‘new geographically undefined division of the world into a global bourgeoisie and a global proletariat’, was based on a ‘lack of empirical evidence’ (Nollert 2005: 293-4).

William Carroll, testing the propositions of this more abstract ‘global capital’ work, and building especially on the territorially embedded work of both Kees van der Pijl’s delineating of an Atlantic ruling class, and Bastian van Apeldoorn’s account of the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) role in the formation of a nascent European capitalist class (acting ‘for itself’ in shaping the formation of the EU through the European Commission), regrounds the study of the transnational capitalist class in just such a sociological way, with powerful results. Noting that ‘globalization transforms but does not transcend territorial division’ (Carroll 2010: 5) he finds that ‘most of the corporate interlocking that has been taken as evidence of the formation of a transnational capitalist class has occurred within Europe’ (ibid: 176). Thus much of the evidence given for the development and existence of a transnational capitalist class qua transnational capitalist class, that is almost as an abstracted a priori, relates in fact to specific geographically located activity, and increasingly a dominantly European agency.

The European corporate community, upon which this class for itself is formed, emerged in the latter half of the 20th century, and consolidates itself until the crisis of 2007-8. At this point ‘Europe’s corporate community had achieved unprecedented unity as a key component of a transnational capitalist class in the making’ (ibid). Whilst the financial crisis has strained the political coherence of the EU, the network of corporate interlocks has grown ever denser, with the bulk of this increase new European interlocks. The ‘shift to Europe’ then has continued, despite the crisis (Heemskerk 2013).

Such a shift cannot be seen as national capital reasserting itself within a European framework, as speculated by Kees van der Pijl, Otto Holman, and Or Raviv (2011). This is a Europeanised European network of corporate interlocks: ‘Europe is the reality for big business in the twenty-

50 These interlocks being where the same individual serves on the boards of two or more organisations. Such interlocks create a social fabric that serves both a communicative and community formation function.
51 Van der Pijl et al’s conclusions here do seem to be based more upon the theoretical premises they bring to the data, than the (somewhat sketchy) data they use. Eelke Heemskerk’s more thorough findings contradict them both on the significance of national versus European interlocks, and in the significance of German capital: ‘[T]he relatively modest role of German firms in this European network seems to counter the conclusion of van der Pijl et al. (2011) that Germany will be the cornerstone of the emerging European network. Rather, French firms continue to be the most dominant’ with the most significant finding the overall Europeanisation of these firms (Heemskerk 2013).
first century’ and a ‘European’ mindset exists amongst the CEO’s of these large European firms (Heemskerk 2013: 94). Most notable in this context is the changing geographical distances between interlocking directors home and ‘away’ boards, shifting from a domestic and neighbouring country radius, to a more fully European radius: ‘most of the increase in number of interlocks takes place in the 300- to 600-kilometre range’ (Heemskerk 2013: 89).

This European network remains anchored in North West continental Europe, whilst also increasingly including UK based firms. The core then consists of companies based in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, and increasingly the UK and Sweden (Carroll 2010: 162-3). Nevertheless, despite the persistence of historic unevenness, the trend is towards pan-European equity in participation (ibid). Whilst this trend is in the early stages of development, the more recent increase in European interlocks is ‘concentrated in the firms that were sparsely connected in the European network in 2005’ with the ‘fringes’ becoming more integrated with an already well-connected core (Heemskerk 2013: 95).

Nevertheless, Eastern Europe hosts a paucity of large stock listed firms, and therefore remains minimally linked into this community. This means that within this kind of interlock mapping, the integration between Western and Eastern European corporate elites ‘remains clouded’ (ibid). Overall however we can note here that their ‘semi-peripheral position [...] has made Eastern Europe strongly dependent on foreign investment’ (Bohle 2009: 83), a situation reflected in the members of European Council on Foreign Relations, which I analyse in the next chapter, where representatives from Eastern Europe are largely linked either to venture capital opportunities in the region or developmental projects.

Overall Europe reflects the general global trend of decreasing national interlocks (again mitigating against interpretations that privilege national capital formations), but bucks the trend in its increasing transnational, mostly European interlocks. This European community remains set within a broader Euro-Atlantic network, but since the turn of the century especially, these European interlocks are at the expense trans-Atlantic interconnectivity (and again here Europe includes the UK). The shift away from ‘Atlanticism’ is notable as

52 I return to the methodological limitations to this network mapping approach in the next chapter, but here note that both Carroll and Heemskerk acknowledge the need to supplement this outlining of the objective condition of a class in itself, with its activity, principally in policy planning groups, as a class for itself, to get any real picture of its salience.

53 Though cf. Yurchenko 2012 who in the case of Ukraine finds much of this FDI is local capital, accumulated by dispossession, recirculated via off-shore tax havens.
‘significantly, most of the European firms with multiple interlocks outside Europe are well-ensconced in the European corporate community’ (Carroll 2010), and the relative ‘sparseness of ties spanning the North Atlantic, underscores both the robustness of corporate Europe and the comparative lack of integrative capacity between North America and Europe’ (Carroll et al 2010: 836).

This shift in the global network’s centre of gravity, and increased differentiation from the trans-Atlantic network is mirrored in the fact that ‘the most central corporations globally are based in Europe’ (Carroll 2010: 173). Beyond this ‘what also stands out is the rarity of ties beyond the Euro-Atlantic’ (ibid: 174). This is then a development within the West, to a West in which a distinct European corporate community becomes visible within the broader Euro-Atlantic network.

To speak of this community as a class however is premature. Whilst the evidence so far suggests the existence of a community with a common set of interests – a foundational social fabric - a class for itself forms in seeking to actively further those interests and overcome common problems it is faced with. In talking of transnational class then, within both this European formation, and the broader Euro-Atlantic, policy planning groups play a central role. It is these planning boards that signal that a cohesive class of itself – that is an integrated European corporate community – is becoming a class in the strategic sense I use, that is, a class for itself. It is these policy groups that speak to structural consolidation, and the formation of a transnational historic bloc, working to consolidate a hegemonic project of neoliberal globalisation. It is they that give the capacity to speak as a class for itself, and to formulate and present corporate interests as in the general interest; and as noted in the previous section, the role of Europe in the global hegemony of neoliberalism has been central.

In Europe, the ERT, having acted as a driver of the formation of this community, remains central. The increasing involvement of UK companies has seen a shift from an organisation dominated by French and German capital, to one reflecting French, German and UK capital (van Apeldoorn, 2002: 134, Carroll 2010: 163). With the overall shift to Europe, the ERT plays an increasingly central interlinking role in the broader network also, Carroll seeing it as increasingly the core organisation (Carroll 2010: 201-2). Carroll identifies the wider community as centralised around four other boards also, the identity of which is in keeping with other, more anecdotal accounts of the formation of a transnational capitalist class (e.g. Gill 1995). These organisations are the ICC, Bilderberg, Trilateral Commission, and the World Economic
Forum. In addition, and in keeping with the move to ‘sustainability’ the World Business Council for Sustainable Development is increasingly significant (Carroll 2010: 179-202).

The makeup of the boards of these organisations also speaks of the shift to Europe, as whilst a Euro-North American ruling class remains at the centre, they are weighted increasingly towards Europe - increasingly constituted of ‘pan-European transnationalists’, and most densely tied to corporate Europe (ibid).

We have then a sketch here of the class base upon which the subsequent chapters build – of a European corporate community, active on policy planning boards, increasingly central to what remains an overwhelmingly Western network of capital and corporate power. This then speaks of a particular base for hegemonic activity that I argue reflects this changing position of Europe within a broader West.

To establish that this European formation is important in the reformulating of Western hegemony we then must focus on the cultural and political spheres. In particular, noting that ‘the ideological trump card is representing not just common sense but also ‘expert sense’’ (ibid: 234). Before I do so however, I turn to one of the neglected or taken for granted elements in much of this work on transnational capitalist classes and its putative hegemony – that of the coercive moment in hegemony. This is integrated into the following chapters as the condition for the intellectual work studied, and the integration of military structures into policy planning groups.

The Bi-polar West

The changing make-up, and role of both successful and failed initiatives in the field of European security must be understood as set within and constituting a European field of power, and this itself within a broader transatlantic field of power (Cohen 2011). Focus on developments in isolation, or just within Europe as though discrete from this broader field, render understanding more difficult, rather than offering any simplification (Toje 2008). I therefore trace here the development of European military capacity as developing through a ‘separable but not separate’ capacity to form a bipolar West, primarily through the relationship between the EU and NATO, adapting Asle Toje’s conception of a focus on change within a ‘transatlantic bargain’: this bargain having both an EU-US, and an intra-European
element.\textsuperscript{54} Such an approach has the great benefit of avoiding both the inter-governmental rationalism common to much EU security analysis, and the de facto stripping of European agency common to many critical political economy approaches, as identified earlier. I first outline the need to overcome these limitations, before tracing the most salient elements of the post-Cold War history of the relationship between EU and NATO.

The weakness of intergovernmental approaches, and their rejection of class analysis, can most easily be seen in their ignoring, and thereby obscuring, the implications of the central, dramatic, post- Cold War shift in Western security institutions focus from territorial defence to expeditionary force. The central drive of their analysis retains a focus on the need for defence under new conditions of insecurity following the collapse of the bipolar system – this then giving European states rational cause to drive forward military cooperation (Muftuler-Bac 2007). However, the need for territorial defence is minimal – seen for example in the decision not to bolster the new ‘frontlines’ of NATO after expansion – and for European states remains within the function of NATO. The development of EU expeditionary force must then be seen alongside the shift in NATO focus from Article 5, covering territorial defence, to Article 2, ‘promoting conditions of stability and well-being’. It should therefore be seen in the context of the post-Kosovo war shift to conceptualising the role of the West, in the guise of the international community, as ‘defending’ human security, and therefore the expansion of capitalist liberal social structures, by actions ‘illegal but legitimate’ if necessary (Hehir 2008).

This relates also to modifying Asle Toje’s understanding of the intra-European bargain. Despite basing his analysis on the overlapping and relation between the two ‘fields’ of Europe and US-EU he retains a state centric high-political focus, beyond its usefulness. Whilst the post-World War 2 and Cold War periods can be somewhat understood within this frame, as capital formations remained primarily national, transnationalisation and Europeanisation become ever more important in the post-Cold War world, including for the UK. Thus whilst characterising Cold War security arrangements as designed, in the words of Lord Ismay, the

\textsuperscript{54} It is worth noting here that Toje is that relatively rare beast, a European neo-realist scholar, and I take only the central argument, that post-Cold War EU and NATO must be understood together, with European agency given due respect. I use it here, as I have used (neo-)realist work earlier, to identify the surface appearance of the change that needs to be explained. His subsequent, more explicitly neo-realist account of EU power sees it as a ‘small power’ (Toje 2010). However as Hanns Maull notes of Toje’s argument ‘[b]ecause the EU lacks strategy and purpose in world politics, it usually punches below its weight. But this does not mean it is a small power’, particularly as when it does act it is ‘effective far beyond what small powers could achieve’ (Maull 2011: 185)
first NATO Secretary General, ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’ may be accurate, Toje’s adaptation to characterise the ESDP’s role as ‘keeping the Americans out, the British in, and the French down’ is outmoded, as can be seen most clearly in Franco-British military cooperation. This cooperation has been intensifying since the Lancaster House Treaties of 2010, and is best seen as a ‘new engine for European defence’—albeit taking place outside of the Lisbon Treaty’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (Jones 2011). After all, combined Britain and France account for some 40% of Europe’s defence budget, 50% of its military capacity and are the only remaining European full-spectrum militaries with independent expeditionary capabilities (Gordon et al. 2012).

Dispute between these two post 1945 military powers of Europe has historically been the central stumbling block in European defence cooperation — the great danger in this context of European disagreement over the invasion of Iraq lying in Franco-British alienation, coming so soon after St Malo and the formation of ESDP (Howorth 2003). Overcoming such disagreement, to create the unprecedented European military cooperation of the Lancaster House Treaties, and the survival of such cooperation beyond the tenure of the ‘Atlanticist’ Sarkozy government, also suggests that ‘Atlanticist’ and ‘Europeanist’ conceptions of the roots of divergence in perceptions of European security institutions’ nature and purpose — assigned to Britain and France respectively - are no longer the most useful tools.

This last point is significant in its differentiating of my assessment from that of the ‘Amsterdam School’. It is this differentiation that lends the conception of ‘separable, but not separate’ its weight. Alan Cafruny, of the Amsterdam School’s New York chapter (Anderson 2011: 131), asserts that ‘the common foreign and defence policy has merged into Atlanticism’, and that ‘[t]he increasingly fragile US imperium is casting a widening shadow across Europe’ (Cafruny 2009: 82-83). As his argument here builds upon and draws together those of the school as a whole, briefly outlining its problems is here worthwhile (Anderson 2011: 131-2).

The principal difficulty, as before, is the negation of European power and agency. This occurs across three areas: neoliberalism as a political project; European military force; and US influence over the EU, and its expansion. The first I have already covered, and the importance of doing so can be seen in Cafruny’s assertion that ‘Atlanticism and neoliberalism are indivisible’ (Cafruny 2009: 82, see also van der Pijl 2013), with all the implications of such a conflation for negating European agency that is not either directly anti-American or anti-‘neoliberal’.
Alan Cafruny’s assertions that a European demographic decline and its military weakness mark its increasing irrelevance, are the ‘conventional wisdom’; as too is his belief in the eclipsing of Europe by China (Cafruny 2009: 72-3, Moravcsik 2009). Yet as he concedes, by 2005 the EU was ‘the second largest military force in the world, was conducting seven separate operations in Africa, Iraq, the Caucasus and South-eastern Europe’ and ‘[h]aving formed a 60,000 troop rapid reaction force the EU was deploying 7000 troops in Bosnia and had conducted more modest interventions in Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (Cafruny 2009: 73).

As Andrew Moravcsik notes, it is also the only force other than the US capable of global force projection; for all the talk of US competition with China, Chinese military capabilities ‘[a]t best, [...] might compete with a single European country’ (Moravsk 2009: 409).

Cafruny then is only able to assert that there has been no ‘development of genuine European global military capabilities or autonomy from the USA’ because the EU has not ‘develop[ed] military capacities that would enable it to approach the USA on a remotely equal terrain’ – but equivalence with the US is only a definitional requirement for global military capabilities if there is an assumption of conflict with the US and thus that there can be only one such power possessing such capabilities (Cafruny 2009: 73). In fact, real concerns over declining European hard power under the impact of governmental austerity relate to a reduction in the number of missions with global reach that can be undertaken simultaneously, and the duration of such interventions that can be sustained (Gordon et al. 2012).

The final area is the alleged continuity of overweening US influence in post-Cold War Europe, exemplified by NATO and EU expansion – the dual track enlargement designed by and entrenching a conflated US power/neoliberalism (Cafruny 2009: 69-70, 75-76). Certainly, NATO expansion was driven by and shaped primarily by the US. However, the relation between the dual enlargements was not simply hierarchical, as presented, and in fact EU enlargement, driven by the EU, took the lead in the early nineties, before the delays of EU decision making allowed NATO to recapture the initiative, to some degree then setting the agenda.

Nevertheless, both sequencing and inclusion of new members in the EU and NATO reflected as much European as US interests - ‘Visegrád first’ as much a German as US interest (cf. van der Pijl 2013 for the US interests seen as derived from heredity and diaspora lobbying) – and, as Asle Toje argues, given the level of shared US and European interests and values it is hard to see how the process would have been different without US pressure. Most tellingly, ‘when Washington encouraged the EU to do something that went beyond the established consensus,
this failed’ (Toje 2008: 96). Only by first (correctly) characterising the EU expansion as a neoliberal project, and then subsuming all such neoliberal projects under ‘Atlanticism’ can EU expansion be seen as a product of US power rather than a process driven by European interests, operating in partnership with the US through NATO.

Overall accounts such as Cafruny’s that minimise European agency, fail to capture post-Cold War shifts adequately. We can see this most clearly in Cafruny’s reliance, in 2009, on Zbigniew Brzezinski to elucidate US foreign policy strategy, thereby missing the critical element of generational change in foreign policy advisers that has marked the more recent US foreign policy shift under Obama to an accommodation with at least relative decline (Mann 2013).

Given that relations between a changing NATO and a developing European security infrastructure have been marked by a common and fundamental assumption of a compatibility of interests, and complementarity in roles, we can see that framing an argument around ‘US Power and the Limits of European Autonomy’ (as Cafruny’s is entitled) is to miss the point – what we must assess is rather Western power and its organisation.

**Development Towards a Bipolar West**

The desire for an autonomous integrated European military force has been a consistent post WW2 European aspiration. Nevertheless, the exigencies of the immediate post-war period, combined with an insular French focus on the ‘German question’, ensured that the over-riding European pre-occupation was to keep the US in Europe. Thus 1947’s Dunkirk Treaty, and 1948’s Treaty of Brussels, which perhaps had potential for forming Europe as a ‘third force’, especially as it drew the UK in, fell victim to anti-German concerns, preventing them being a precursor for common European security. As consolidation of Soviet power across Eastern Europe progressed, alongside a French realisation that cooperation with the US would be needed to contain Germany, there was a shift to Trizonia as the political and economic means

---

55 This generational element missed also from Naná De Graaff and Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn’s otherwise excellent account of the continuity within change of post-Cold War US foreign policy. They do however capture Obama’s foreign policy as a response to the ‘passing of the unipolar moment’ whilst still expecting a renewed hegemonic project within the US state-society complex, rather than generated by and incorporating the broader West (van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2012). Alán Cafruny seems also to miss the change in tone from US primacy, to ‘marriage’ with Europe, between the earlier and later works of Brzezinski he cites (Cafruny 2009: 75, vs. 83 n4.). The latter, 2004 work, is in particular incompatible with the supportive role towards George W. Bush’s foreign policy that Cafruny assigns it (Brzezinski 2004).

56 Again, the earlier discussion of neoliberalism is central here – Cafruny sees ‘core Europe’ as resisting US neoliberalism, rather than pursuing its own, currently neoliberal project.
of controlling and rehabilitating Germany, and NATO as a stronger military guarantee against potential German or Soviet aggression.\textsuperscript{57}

Once created NATO was then necessarily the context in which European goals were pursued; despite chafing for autonomy, even René Pleven’s European Defence Community Plan proposed the force be commanded by the American commander of NATO forces in Europe, and be ‘destined to cooperate with the American and Canadian Forces’ (Pleven 1950).

NATO’s force goals as outlined in Lisbon in 1952 were never realized, nevertheless the initial plan for NATO was always of an essentially ‘two pillar’ structure, and the division of labour laid out at Lisbon had the US providing only strategic air force and nuclear deterrence, alongside naval force in concert with the countries that later formed the Western European Union. This view of NATO was made explicit in President John F. Kennedy’s vision of a two-pillar NATO formulated in 1962.

Thus the various attempts to form an integrated European military force must be understood in terms of what they were – genuine aspirations – as well as in their effects as precursors to increased US involvement to fill the voids of successive failures, but must also be set within the context of an assumption of shared goals and cooperation. US military dominance in Europe therefore progressed, most notably under President Jimmy Carter’s defence build-up of the late 1970s and Ronald Reagan’s Conventional Defence Improvements (CDI) programme of the 1980s, through European unwillingness to spend at the same rate, as well as European reliance on conscription based force structures that pushed up personnel costs, at the expense of research and development and procurement. It is no coincidence that it is during this period, and the concurrent strategic transatlantic divergence over détente, that the concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ was formulated and gained ground.

Despite this history of partnership unfulfilled due to European reluctance to actually form a coherent European military structure and capability, the idea of a ‘Europeanist’ force as a potential challenger to NATO or as an alternative global pole persists. Tension between this development of EU security identity as a second pillar of NATO, or as a counterbalancing pole, supposedly remains a central issue, with the end of Cold War an enabling condition. However,\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{57} Though see Creswell and Trachtenberg (2003) for the greater compatibility of US, British and French positions throughout than is usually accorded, and for the mutual recognition all along that the Soviet threat was a far greater concern than a resurgent Germany.
as the EU has developed an independent military capability the best characterisation is the one the historical outline above would suggest - as the development of a bipolar West.

The table I have constructed compiling the institutional development of independent European military capability in Appendix A traces this development, starting with 1992’s Maastricht Treaty (TEU) establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy as the second pillar of the EU and extending until 2003, marking the point at which European military capacity and determined cohesion, tested by disagreement over the invasion of Iraq, can be said to truly have the makings of a bi-polar West. This can be seen in the Anglo-French ‘Declaration on Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defence’ and publication of the European Security Strategy, the agreement of Berlin Plus, and Operation Artemis – the first independent ESDP mission: the immediately preceding and succeeding ESDP military operations, EUFOR Concordia (2003) and EUFOR Althea (2004) both reliant on NATO assets and undertaken under Berlin Plus arrangements.58

EUFOR Concordia as the first ESDP military operation, and a Berlin Plus operation, helped to prove that a partnership between the EU and NATO was possible, whilst despite its limited scope and duration Operation Artemis shows, as it was intended to, European capacity for independent out of area action. In this way Artemis marks the culmination of the move from ESDI in NATO, allowing European states to borrow NATO assets, to the ESDP as a new political project of the EU ‘with its own internal dynamics and self-fuelling logic’ (Howorth 2010). The Le Touquet declaration, made in the shadow of disagreement over the Iraq War between the ‘Atlanticist’ and ‘Europeanist’ military powers in Europe, and the drafting and agreement of the European Security Strategy after the invasion demonstrate the determination and political will to form a coherent military force.

58 Berlin Plus refers to the 2002 agreement between NATO and the EU, coming into force in 2003, allowing the EU to draw on NATO assets in its own operations. EUFOR Concordia was the first ESDP operation under this agreement, with this EU peacekeeping mission taking over NATO’s ‘Allied Harmony’ operation in the Republic of Macedonia. EUFOR Althea is a military deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement, which replaced the preceding NATO operations there in 2004.

Operation Artemis was the EU mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, spanning June to September 2003. This short term military intervention was to stabilise the Ituri region, before handing responsibility back to the UN’s MONUC mission. It was the first autonomous EU military mission outside Europe.
Since 2003 the UK – France connection as the driver of European security and defence cooperation has only strengthened, as seen in the Lancaster House treaties, and France’ s strategic defence review in 2013 (Livre Blanc 2013), suggesting, as this was an enabling condition here, that current reduction of military budgets may well lead to greater cooperation still. Similarly the Lisbon Treaty, coming into force in 2009, has strengthened the institutions supporting coherent European action, through the merging of the posts of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, to become High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the formation of the European External Action Service to serve as a foreign ministry and diplomatic corps for the EU, and the enabling of Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence – this area being one of the least controversial elements of the treaty.

The above suggests that against conceptions that ‘the common foreign and defence policy has merged into Atlanticism’ and that ‘the increasingly fragile US imperium is casting a widening shadow across Europe’, we must set the more nuanced view of Jolyon Howarth that whilst ‘[t]here will undoubtedly be regular occasions in the future when NATO and ESDP will collaborate and will assume different functions reflecting their different natures’, there will also ‘be increasing occasions when they do not interact at all and when the very notion of a division of labo[u]r between them ceases to have any meaning’ (Howorth 2010). As the outline above has shown, once one moves beyond a simple comparison of US – EU deployable force to contrast instead with the rest of the world, and accept the unlikeliness of military confrontation between the US and EU, the ‘developments all point in the direction of a bipolar transatlantic connection’ (Toje 2008).

**Conclusion**

As far as possible within this chapter I have used work that could be loosely grouped as part of the Amsterdam School as one of the central arguments is that such an approach is best placed to grasp the renovation of Western hegemony. Indeed, with the recalibrating I have performed throughout this chapter it becomes clear that the work of the Amsterdam School contains all the evidence necessary to understand the post-Cold War development of Europe as a development to a bi-polar West, and a ‘separable but not separate’ Lockean entity in its own right.
As I have shown, this work characterises the EU as a transnational juridical space, as a neoliberal formation, as containing a developing transnational capitalist class, and as a major military actor with global power projection capabilities. The conceptual retooling of the work I have engaged with in this chapter, and additional empirical evidence, allows Europe to come out from the US shadow and become more than merely an extension of the Lockean heartland, conflicted and contradictory in its neoliberal identity. Instead it can be seen as a partner in the project of renovating Western hegemony, its different form of neoliberalism and its strong focus on human security in external interventions, which I focus on in the second part of the thesis, aiding in rebuilding the West’s legitimacy in the wake of the US’s unipolar moment. Indeed in transcending the liberal reliance on the structuring of the state in favour of functional spatial differentiation that still maintains the same disjuncture between the discipline of capital and the expression of popular will democratically it could perhaps be characterised as a neo-Lockean formation.
3. Global Power Europe

Introduction
The idea of comprehensive concepts of control seeks to capture the dialectic of structure and agency in class formation, relating changes in the structural formation of capital to the ideologies through which its control is exercised hegemonically. The preceding chapter gave an account of the development of a bi-polar West, pointing also to a competing comprehensive concept of control in a distinguishably different construction of neoliberalism. This chapter builds upon this by looking at the development of the externally facing element of this concept, captured in the idea of ‘global power Europe’. Doing so thus also solidifies what has come before, as it is in the construction of such a concept that we can discern class formation. Central to this development is, again, its distinction to the model of the preceding US led West. There is no doubt that this concept seeks to open societies to the discipline of capital, but the social (re-)structuring through which this is to take place both transcends the preceding model of the construction of liberal state forms (polyarchic democracy promotion) and builds its legitimacy on the construction of Europe itself as an alternative to the preceding model – both in the supposed transcendence of the nation states system within Europe and its non-laissez faire model of capitalism, Europe’s ‘social model’. The focus here is on the external facing element, but the integration with internal conceptions of Europe comes through clearly.

I start with the discussion within European Studies on the changing nature of Europe’s self-perception of itself as an actor in the world. Here I focus on the relationship between the antecedent concept of civilian power and the concurrent development of contemporary visions of normative power and global power Europe. Two scholars most concerned with the shift towards a more militarily interventionist concept of global power Europe, Ian Manners and James Rogers, identify a group of ‘eurostrategists’ driving this change based in a transnational policy network, and it is this opening I seek to build on.

The second section maps the network of policy institutes involved in developing the global power Europe vision in preparation for the December 2013 European Council meeting – a focal point as defence was on the agenda. I do this through analysing the interlocks between their governing boards and the resultant network mapping reveals the core institutes involved. The limitations of this methodology are as suggested in the preceding chapter; this flat mapping needs both qualitative enrichment and vertical integration into the broader and multi-faceted process of class formation.
Accordingly the third section focuses on giving a more qualitative account of the institution lying at the core of the network; the George Soros founded European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Here I note the conditions surrounding its founding, explore the nature of its role as it operates in the interstitial field of think tanks through an analysis of its staff experts, and finally give more in depth profiles of three of its most prominent experts. The final section then examines the interlocks of the ECFR’s governing Council outside of the think tank field to map how the institution is integrated into a wider hegemonic formation.

In conclusion I draw out the ‘billionaire agency’ of founder George Soros as well as the need to integrate the process of this formation of a competing comprehensive concept of control – a clear long-term project of Soros – into a broader intellectual field; that is the dialectic as it relates to intellectual structures also. It is this broader set of resources as developed by a European IR that part two then examines.

**Global Power Europe**

I take the term global power Europe from James Rogers considerations of a post-Cold War shift in the EU’s ‘grand strategy’ from one focused around conceptions of civilian power Europe, to this global power Europe conception. Rogers is, in turn, building on Ian Manners work excavating the ‘militarisation’ of the EU’s ‘normative power’ based on this civilian power Europe conception. Here I will outline these concepts and the transition, before indicating why the approach I take in the rest of this chapter is able to explain this shift better than either Rogers or Manners whose approaches are both based in the mainstream European studies against which the approach I have developed so far is set. Before I begin I note here then two things: firstly, that I use Rogers and Manners as representative of a far broader literature that both of them review and critique extensively in the articles of their I cite here, and I therefore do not undertake any wider literature review; secondly, that underlying this shift is the enabling condition of the end of the Cold War – civilian power Europe was necessarily an inward looking conception, whereas both normative power Europe and global power Europe are explicitly global views. This then is about an argument set within a post-Cold War European studies.

**From Civilian to Global Power**

There are multiple conceptions of the EU as a novel kind of international actor, ranging through 'civilian', 'normative', 'ethical' and 'gentle' power. Alongside this constitutive common thread of the sui generis nature of the EU, there is a core commonality structured around an assumed reliance 'on civilian rather than military means [used to] pursue the spread of
particular norms, rather than geographical expansion or military superiority’ (Diez 2005: 613).
In this then Francois Duchene’s concept of ‘civilian power’ continues to dominate debate as it has for the last 40 years (cf. Orbie 2006).

Duchêne coined ‘civilian power’ during his tenure as Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the early 1970s, the concept therefore borne of the Cold War context. The focus was accordingly primarily internal, with the overcoming of war within Western Europe making it the first region to achieve civilized politics. This made it a ‘new type of power, which had a unique international role to play, not only as an exemplar, but also a catalyst, of superpower détente and complex interdependence’ (Rogers 2009: 840). Accordingly the European Community’s ‘grand strategy’ ‘should concentrate on ‘domesticating’ or ‘civilianizing’ relations between its component Member States, as well as those on its immediate periphery, especially those under Soviet domination. This would continue to reduce the likelihood of European war, and produce a lasting peace’ (ibid). In a construction that underpins the EUs legitimacy to this day, this strategy was then cast against Europe’s war-torn past, making this internal peace project a ‘chronopolitical European grand strategy’ (ibid: 841). The success of this project – the construction of a ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘post-modern’ Europe internally - is the source from which the EU’s assumed normative superiority and thereby legitimacy derives. Always within it was the underlying principle of how Europe was standing out as a third actor, an actor of a unique kind, which could be seen as a catalyst for a new kind of power in international relations – though hemmed in by the Cold War context of its development. How this concept is developed and used in the post-Cold War context is the central question in debates over the EU’s sui generis identity as an international actor

Most influential, certainly academically, has been Ian Manners normative power Europe.59 This is principally an ‘updating’ of the civilian power concept with a focus on exporting ‘sustainable peace’ through (dominantly) non-military means - the central shift is from an insular regional orientation to a global one (Manners and Diez 2007) - though Manners also draws on both Johan Galtung and E H Carr in delineating the diffusion of European norms as central to Europe’s power and role in the world. In developing this role he points to the end of the Cold War as a central significant example of the role of norm diffusion, seeing this not as a ‘heartland’ victory after a long drawn out struggle isolating and impoverishing of the Soviet

59 In 2007, his 2002 article developing the concept was voted one of the five most influential works in the field over the preceding decade by the European Union Studies Association (Forsberg 2011).
Union, but due to a collapse in the legitimacy of elites in Central and Eastern Europe due to norm diffusion from Western Europe (Manners 2002: 238). This introduces ‘civil society, civil activism and collective action’ as a key actor in this process, particularly pointing to the role of the peace movement, and the influence on this movement (and on dissident movements in the East) of ‘[p]olitical philosophers such as Hannah Arendt’ (Manners 2006: 185).

The normative power of the EU, as for the civilian power of the EC, stems thus from ‘what it is’ rather than principally from ‘what it does or what it says’ (Manners 2002: 252). So the EU is a normative power as it represents this vision of Arendtian cosmopolitanism, of political expression through collective political action. As Manners highlights, this is a continuity with the civilian power concept of Europe based on there being ‘a built-in sense of collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance [and] the international open society’ (Duchêne 1972: 47, cited in Manners 2006: 185). Arendtian political ethics therefore ‘have, and should, inform the public political philosophy of the EU’ and from this stems its normative power (Manners 2006: 185; cf. Guisan-Dickinson 2003 providing empirical support for this contention).

To the degree this is operationalized for external action it translates this conception of ‘sustainable peace’ built on this political ethic to the broad human security concept, of ensuring both freedom from want and freedom from fear. Such intervention then is socially restructuring at a deep level not necessarily focused on the construction of a liberal state but on such a political ethics: ‘In contrast to humanitarian assistance and intervention’, ‘[s]ustainable peace is not simply about the conjunction of short- and long-term methods but, in line with Arendt and Duchêne, is informed by the need to build indigenous capacity for resolving internal tensions before they lead to violent conflict’ (Manners 2006: 185).

It is this vision he sees as being ‘militarised’ in an attempt by the EU to ‘have-its-cake-and-eat-it-too’ in using this normative power conception to legitimatise direct military interventions. Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy amongst other things, and a significant figure in the global power Europe network I identify below, links it together for us: ‘Where did we start? As a peace project among adversaries. What is our

---

60 In chapter six I develop the significance of the centrality of this view of the end of the Cold War being brought about by pressure from below to cosmopolitan constructions of Europe.

61 Chapter five below discusses Arendtian cosmopolitanism further in the context of the relation of cosmopolitanism to liberal imperialism.
greatest accomplishment? The spread of stability and democracy across the continent. And what is our task for the future? To make Europe a global power; a force for good in the world’ (Solana 2006).

Through this process of militarisation, beginning in the 1990s and picking up pace from 2003 on, in this way the EU will ‘turn away from the normative path of sustainable peace towards a full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention’ (Manners 2006: 186). This identifies the central rift in the debate on Europe’s role: not the global order to be pursued – all agree this should reflect the EU as they see it - but on the role of force within constructing this order. Manners links this process within Europe to the broader shift within global governance as this move contains ‘the diverting of the human security agenda both in Brussels and at the UN’ a ‘misdirection of the normative concerns of the human security agenda away from sustainable peace’ (Manners 2006: 192). Central to this latter process he identifies Mary Kaldor in her work for Javier Solana constructing a ‘Human Security Doctrine for Europe (Albrecht et al. 2004; Glasius and Kaldor 2006). These questions and Kaldor’s role I cover in the second part of the thesis, so here I offer a summary of the transition to the global power vision, but note here the shift is achieved through a narrowing of the human security concept to a focus on immediate physical threat – a narrowing even of the freedom from fear component.

This marks a shift away from Europe’s power stemming from what the EU is, to what it is – its cosmopolitanism - legitimating action ‘out there’. Europe’s past is used to legitimate the EU as normatively superior, but a return to the past is no longer the threat; the danger shifts from the potential for intra-European war to external threats menacing this successful construction of a zone of ‘civilised politics’. The EU’s legitimacy stemming from this ‘civilised’ politics is integral to its success in intervening externally as there is a clear understanding of the need for legitimacy to achieve the lasting social structural change externally which is seen as the way to neutralise the variety of threats – from terrorism to irresponsible climate polices – identified.

James Rogers highlights this constitutive element of the ‘need for legitimacy when the Union operates abroad’ within this global power discourse, which means that in developing a militarily interventionist stance this global power ‘European approach to foreign affairs should be founded on a delicate strategic and tactical operation to turn forms of violence and authority into a legitimate and lasting order’. For the ‘eurostrategists’ developing global power Europe the ‘Union should enhance its ability to commit violence, while not undermining
its ‘civilian’ forms of power; it should then attempt to synthesize both into lasting legitimacy, by co-opting others into the strategy’ (Rogers 2009: 850). This he sees as the heart of both Robert Cooper’s ‘liberal imperialism’ (Cooper 2002, 2003), and Mark Leonard’s ‘European power’ (Leonard 2005), in which ‘[f]rom this perspective, the Union attempts to underpin a world order’ (Rogers 2009: 850).

Robert Cooper’s has been the most enduringly influential vision within this global power Europe discourse, an influence I indicate below in considering figures such as Mark Leonard within the network, but that is also evident from the positions he has held as adviser to Tony Blair, and currently to the current High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton. Cooper classifies the EU as a ‘post-modern world’ having transcended the ‘modern’ inter-state structured world. He notably does not include the US in this post-modern world, but does include fellow human security proponents, Canada and Japan, in this setting the EU centrally within a wider Western renovation away from a US led West. The dangers to this civilised realm emanate from this modern world of states and the ‘pre-modern’ world of failed and failing states, operating outside the post-modern realm of community and law. In dealing with this the ‘challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards’ that ‘among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle’. To deal with the dangers the jungle presents these operations must seek to create a ‘world in which the efficient and well governed export stability and liberty, and which is open for investment and growth’. ‘What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values’ (Cooper 2002: u.n., cf. Cooper 2003). This then is the core of the global power Europe vision.

Mary Kaldor and Robert Cooper are two of the group of ‘eurostrategists’ that Manners sees as driving this shift to global power Europe – members of a ‘transnational policy network’ centred on ‘transnational policy institutes based in Brussels’ (Manners 2006: 191-2). It is this policy network, that Manners does not develop beyond a few illustrative examples, and that James Rogers only sketches out, that I map in the next section, updated to cover the network involved in preparing a global power Europe vision for the December 2013 European Council meeting (the individuals and institutions in Manners’ and Rogers’ treatments can be found in appendix B). This mapping, based on interlocks among the institutions governing boards, allows us to get beyond what can seem a free-floating stratum of ‘eurostrategists’ in these
earlier accounts. In locating the centrally placed organisations and studying one of them in more depth it therefore also allows us to locate this network within the process of class formation identified in the preceding chapter.

**The Global Power Europe Network**

The think tank community agitating for a more strategic and interventionary Europe has grown ‘tired of waiting for Brussels to initiate the necessary debate, [and] have decided to do it themselves’, December 2013’s European Council meeting, where defence is on the agenda, has intensified the level of activity by those ‘by those anxious to ‘prepare’ the Council’s discussion’ (Witney and de France 2013: 3). This has given a new drive to the global power Europe discourse coalition.

This contemporary work falls into two and a half groupings. The two primary groupings are: *Think Global Act European* convened by Notre Europe; and the *European Global Strategy* project convened jointly by Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Real Instituto Elcano (RIE), and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), on behalf of their respective national ministries. The half is the Riga Process - now explicitly developed to ‘dovetail’ with the *European Global Strategy* project.

The final reports of the two groupings in the run up to the meeting show clearly their global power nature. The Notre Europe project published ‘*Think Global – Act European: Thinking Strategically About The EU’s External Action*’ (Notre Europe 2013). The intention is to create the ‘impetus for new strategic reflection on the EU’s role as a global power’ arguing ‘strategic cooperation between the EU and the US is required to create a global level-playing field promoting Western values in global economic governance and address the ever more recurrent abuses of state capitalism.’ To do so European states must ‘maintain and develop military capabilities that give them the agility and autonomy they need to respond to future

---

63 http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/
64 The Riga Process is a series of workshops, held on the margins of the Riga Conference (‘Northern Europe’s leading foreign and security policy forum’) organised jointly by the Latvian Transatlantic Organisation, the Latvian Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. As the Riga Process does not form part of the analysis below, I only note here that George Soros and the ECFR are well connected here also. The 2013 workshop was part funded by The Soros Foundation-Latvia, had several ECFR attendees, as well as those from PROVIDUS: Centre for Public Policy, an organisation itself established by the Soros Foundation-Latvia. This last point a reminder that Soros funding is deeply imbricated with civil society organisations throughout especially the former Eastern bloc and FSU.
crises and challenges [...] look beyond their current ‘pooling and sharing’ efforts towards integrating military capabilities’. All of which is part of a global order project as the ‘emerging powers challenge the liberal order based on Western values and institutions (open markets, social bargains, democracy, multilateral institutions and cooperative security) and what until the crisis was expected to be a progressive Westernisation of the world through globalisation. Europeans have to prepare to engage in an ever more intense competition over values’ (Notre Europe 2013: 7, 14, 17).

The European Global Strategy group published ‘Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European influence in a changing world’ (EGS 2013). This interlinked external action and the nature of the EU creating an ‘obligation to base its external action on the principles that inspired its own creation and to promote its values abroad’. This external action aimed primarily at the EU’s strategic neighbourhood, extending as far as ‘the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Arctic and adjacent sea-lanes’; a neighbourhood that presents ‘a challenge that will seriously test its capacity for concerted external action’. In meeting the challenge the ‘EU should also be prepared to undertake autonomously the full spectrum of civilian and military missions in the strategic neighbourhood’ which ‘implies the ability to project both civilian and military capabilities, and the capacity to link timely crisis management and humanitarian assistance to longer-term development efforts as part of the EU’s comprehensive approach’ (EGS 2013: 1, 5-6).

To construct the network of organisations involved in this contemporary global power Europe discourse coalition I tabulated the core and affiliated organisations in these projects, alongside both James Rogers and Ian Manners earlier identifications of the components of a Global Power Europe discourse to give a longitudinal dimension (2009 and 2006 respectively), this table reproduced in Appendix B.

From this table I developed a core group of think tanks involved in this discourse. In doing so I focused on the core convening organisations, and those central to Rogers and Manners analyses, with the addition of those from the broader groupings that appear twice across the groups. This removed the semi-defunct and more marketing oriented groups found in the larger Notre Europe project, as well as the minnows such as the Kosovo Group. It also had the effect of removing the university departmental centres. Whilst this direct involvement is useful to note in illustrating the continuum between academia and policy institutions it is not a
primary conduit for private values expressed as expert knowledge, operating according to other logics - supported by their peripheral position in this discourse coalition.

Similarly, whilst both the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), and Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) are core institutions and were included in the analysis undertaken below there were no linkages to the rest of the network, so they have been removed from this core post-hoc. This isolation is unsurprising as both are governmental advisory spin offs, with governance boards made up of purely domestic politicians and academics accordingly. Whilst these, and other similar quasi autonomous governmental bodies demonstrate continuity through state and private policy bodies, as the overall argument on the interpellation of state and capital mangers in a ruling class suggests, the focus here is on the construction of a vision for Europe in the think tank sector proper and thus the capital- policy nexus.

This left a core network of thirteen institutions: the Bertelsmann Foundation; Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS); Centre for European Reform (CER); Demos; Egmont Institute; Elcano Royal Institute (RIE); European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR); European Policy Centre (EPC); Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP); International Affairs Institute (IAI); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS); Notre Europe; and, SWP - German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

I analysed the relationships between the component organisations through looking at their board interlocks – that is where the same person sits on the governing boards of two or more institutions. This method of analysing interlocks is often used in establishing the existence and nature of a corporate community (as in seen in the preceding chapter). Its suitability here rests on the same premises, that it is through such interlocks that organisations communicate and coordinate to establish a social fabric. As noted, the next stage for a corporate community is actively pursuing hegemonic projects, with policy planning institutions central to this (Carroll 2010, Heemskerk 2013). This method then gives an overview of a community, and the position of organisations within it – here as these organisations are of a policy planning/strategic nature we have an overview of a strategic community.

A number of the think tanks concerned had more than one governance board, most usually one concerned with executive governance, and one with policy governance. As is standard practice, in these instances I combined the boards (Carroll 2010). In most of these cases the executive governance board was preponderantly domestic politicians, business people, and
academics who were not linked into broader networks, whilst it was in the policy governance board that the interconnections with the network tended to be found.

The shortcoming of this method is that it likely underestimates the density of linkages between the organisations as staff were not included (cf. Carroll 2010: 189). Overall whilst staff experts certainly collaborate amongst these institutions, and thus fulfil the communication part of a community’s social fabric they do not decide direction of overall work, or sit on strategy across organisations. However there are also interlinkers between the staff and governance level, with board members for one organisation working as outside experts for another, and also links through career trajectory, for example the trajectory of Mark Leonard which I outline below. Whilst these links were excluded from analysis, my sense from having carried out this research is that these linkages conform with the findings below – the linkages are amongst the core group of organisations.

To establish the nature of the network between the governing boards of these institutions they were analysed using UCINET (Borgatti et al 2002) and NetDraw (Borgatti 2005), an established set of software packages for this purpose (Carroll 2010, van Apeldoorn and de Graaf 2012). The results are seen in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 makes clear that the ECFR is the central node of the network, with CER, EPC and Notre Europe forming the core of the network with it. Of the various boards the CER contains the densest collection of network links having a board of only 34 people. It is heavily linked into ECFR with 11 interlinks, whilst EPC has 13 and Notre Europe 8 links to the ECFR. Most of the linkages between non-ECFR boards are carried by only one or two individuals, with only the links between Notre Europe and Egmont, and Notre Europe and EPC carried by as many as three individuals. This is perhaps unsurprising as the ECFR’s council is three to four times the size of nearest largest two groupings consisting of 205 members (EPC with 75 members, Notre Europe with 58: mean grouping size was 47.6; mode 31; median 34, making clear the ECFR as an outlier).

From the 619 board positions analysed, there emerges a group of 55 ‘linkers’ – people acting as interlinks through having more than one affiliation – the list is reproduced in Appendix C. Within this most carried only one interlock amongst this core group of thirteen think tanks, though 13 of them carried two interlocks, and one, Antonio Vitorino, the former Portuguese defence minister and deputy prime minister and ex-European Commissioner, who is now President of Notre Europe, carried three. Of this group of linkers, only 14 were not on the ECFR council – significant amongst these are the two within this group with multiple interlocks: Etienne Davignon linking Notre Europe, Egmont and CEPS) and Francois Heisbourg (CER, ELIAMEP and IISS). Etienne Davignon has however previously served on the ECFR Council in 201165.

Overall then the ECFR’s Council places it at the centre of the Global Power Europe discourse coalition. It’s greater size suggesting a deliberate move to establish such a position, especially in the increase in members from 141 members in September 2011, to 205 in September 2013.

65 François Heisbourg also indicating the difficulties in fixing the idea of a Europeanist/Atlanticist rift, having served in French governmental positions (member of the French mission to the UN, international security adviser to the Minister of Defence), in the defence industry (vice-president of Thomson-CSF (antecedent to Thales), and senior vice president for strategy at Matra Défense Espace (now EADS)) and in academia (professor of world politics at Sciences-Po Paris), whilst also serving as Chairman, and previously Director, of that most Atlanticist of organisations, the IISS (van der Pijl 2012 [1984]: 220). He is a special advisor of to the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris.
The European Council on Foreign Relations
This section looks in more depth at this centrally placed think tank, adding the necessary qualitative dimension to the analysis. I briefly outline the organisation’s founding before using its staff of experts to establish its location in an interstitial field, supporting the earlier theoretical contention and helping situate the production of expert knowledge in this field. I then finally focus on three of the more prominent experts within the ECFR to give more insight into the global power Europe vision it develops.

The circumstances of the ECFR’s founding support the idea of its creation being a strategic move to strengthen and develop the global power Europe network. Billing itself as the first ‘pan-European’ think tank as it has offices in Berlin, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw as well as its base London office, the ECFR was founded by George Soros in the pursuit of his vision of a values based foreign policy, aiming to recalibrate Western intervention in wake of US hegemonic crisis. As Soros sets out in the *Age of Fallibility* this hegemonic failure requires Europe to play a more important role in the West, setting an example for America to follow, and thereby creating a ‘legitimate international community capable of exercising the responsibility to protect’ (Soros 2006: xxiv). His role in bringing this about he moots, one year before launching the ECFR, lies in ‘launching a European open society foundation’ (*ibid*: xix).

James Rogers identifies its first ‘statement’, taking the form of a letter to various press, as crystallising the global power Europe discourse he has been charting (Rogers 2009: 849). Entitled *The EU Cannot Afford to Become a Symbol of Weakness or Decline*, it’s a pugnacious encapsulation, for example: ‘The threat of a nuclear Iran, the risk of war in the Middle East, the fight against extremism in Afghanistan, the challenge of climate change and the plight of Africa all require a stronger Europe better able to promote peace and prosperity. The new administration in Washington will need a strong European partner to reaffirm the Atlantic Alliance and restore its moral prestige. Europe’s place in the world will be challenged if the Union indulges in self-doubt and paralysis’ (ECFR 2008). The letter is signed by 44 prominent figures from across Europe, a microcosm of the ECFR’s governing council, which I analyse below, that contains ‘serving ministers, members of parliament, EU senior officials, former NATO secretary generals, intellectuals, journalists and business leaders - from the EU’s member states and candidate countries’ (ECFR u.d.).

In my earlier discussion of think tanks, I developed Thomas Medvetz’s idea of think tanks occupying an interstitial field – that is occupying a space between academia, business, media and politics. We saw that the simultaneous relations of dependence and independence of
these fields is what gives think tanks their power, as developed through generating independent but relevant and usable expert knowledge. To understand this position I have applied this to the ECFR’s ‘Experts’, those who produce their primary reports (comprising their fellows and senior fellows, as well as their CEO, Director, and even communications manager – who also works as a consultant to other think tanks; they also host guest reports/papers). To do so I have coded the career backgrounds and current concurrent roles of the 34 experts according to the field they occupy: academia, business, media and politics, with the addition of think tanks to cover the interlinking of the organisation with the field itself via its experts. Business here refers to work in business consulting on strategy, rather than corporate management roles, as it is this policy entrepreneurialism that is salient to working within the field. Figure 3.2 below visualises the results.

As is clear, whilst no-one occupies the ‘perfect’ middle spot, there are very few whose background lies in purely one area. The experts of the ECFR can be said to reflect the existence of a think tank field that has developed the characteristics of a Lockean interstitial field.

Even those occupying only one area by career background also demonstrate this inter-mixing of fields in other activities. The ‘pure’ academic is Jan Zielonka Senior Policy Fellow working on ECFR’s Reinvention of Europe project. He is a Professor of European Politics at the University of Oxford and Ralf Dahrendorf Fellow at St Antony’s College, and also directs a large international project funded by the European Research Council on the Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. One can see the relevance of this Polish political theorist’s academic work: his book *Europe as Empire* exults at a European enlargement whose ‘design was truly imperialist’, demonstrating ‘power politics at its best, even though the term ‘power’ was never mentioned in the official enlargement discourse’, an example of a ‘benign empire in action’ (Zielonka 2006, cf. Anderson 2007). More significantly he also sits on the research council of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), central to the West’s shift to democracy promotion as means of hegemonic control (Robinson 1996).

---

66 [http://www.ned.org/research/research-council/forum-research-council-members](http://www.ned.org/research/research-council/forum-research-council-members)
Figure 3.2. Career backgrounds of ECFR Experts

The pure media career background is Hans Kundnani, a former journalist still published in The Guardian, The Observer, Financial Times, Prospect and the Times Literary Supplement. Whilst not an academic he does however also have several papers published in academic journals (e.g. Kundnani 2013; Kundnani 2012), as well as contributing policy papers to the German Marshall Fund.

67 List of ECFR experts available at http://www.ecfr.eu/content/experts/, last accessed 1 September 2013.
The five with a purely political career background are generated by my coding, in which in the interests of a usable visualisation I have amalgamated civil service and lobbying NGOs as similar in providing experience of influencing political action. It does however obscure the variety of roles covered. To take one of the five in this segment, Susi Dennison’s career background includes roles in advocacy for Amnesty International, civil society representation in the Human Rights and Good Governance partnership of the EU Africa strategy, and policy work within the British civil service (HM Treasury and Home Office).

Rotation through the think tank sector is also quite high; of significance for us are the officer level links to other think tanks in the Global Power Europe network including: Notre Europe, DGAP, SWP, Foreign Policy Centre, German Marshall Fund, Centre for European Reform, Elcano Royal Institute for International Affairs, RIIA /Chatham House.

I restrict the media group to those who have worked directly for media organisations – for example Thomas Klau, Head of their Paris Office, who participated in the conception and launch of the Financial Times Deutschland - as almost all the experts regularly contribute to high profile news outlets, such as the Financial Times, International Herald Tribune, Economist, Le Monde, New York Times etc., as well as many appearing in Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs. Overall this media visibility and the really rather glittering collection of CVs this expert cohort possesses, give the organisation great credibility, weight and reach.

Three examples from this panel of experts will serve to illustrate this, as well as how their intellectual trajectory suggests that as an autonomous research fellow they will produce expertise in line with Soros’ mission for a rebalanced West embodying and promoting a more developed sustainable neoliberalism. It should also be noted however the frequency with which ECFR papers acknowledge the input and guidance of members from the ECFR Council, the organisation’s guiding body – which I come to below. I focus on founding director Mark Leonard, ‘Davos Man’ Parag Khanna, and Nick Witney, founding chief executive of the European Defence Agency, and through them also give some of the development of the Global Power Europe discourse within the ECFR.

**Mark Leonard – A European ‘Doctrine of the International Community’**

Mark Leonard is the founding, and current Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, having previously been the New Labour ‘foreign policy Wunderkind’ (Anderson
2007\textsuperscript{68}) in roles as director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform, and founding director of Tony Blair’s Foreign Policy Centre.\textsuperscript{69} Both of these organisations were prominent in the earlier generation of a ‘global power Europe’ discourse that seeks precisely to renovate Western hegemony, with Tony Blair’s ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ expounded in 1999 a touchstone for the conception of an alternative European approach to intervention – at least before the invasion of Iraq (Leonard 2002\textsuperscript{70}; contrast Kaldor 2001, 2003 with Kaldor 2007, 2011 for example).

Accordingly Leonard himself is a prominent figure in this discourse, Ian Manners noting his vision of European power is of an imperial liberalism, as expounded by his fellow foreign policy guru to Tony Blair, Robert Cooper. Three examples from before the founding of the ECFR show the development of this thinking. As part of the Foreign Policy Centre’s Global Europe project, Leonard co-wrote ‘Global Europe: Implementing the European Security Strategy’. Notable are firstly the call to ‘[p]romot[e] doctrines within the United Nations to provide Chapter VII support for ‘the responsibility to protect’’, that is to allow preventative military intervention under Chapter VII ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace’ (Leonard and Gowan 2004: 28-9). Secondly that Europe ‘has developed a new type of power that starts not with geopolitics but domestic politics’ focusing on ‘what values underpin the state? What are its constitutional and regulatory frameworks?’. Thus as ‘democracy and human rights are too important to be left to Neo-conservatives’ he develops an approach to foreign policy that promotes political reform in other target countries as a good in itself, rather than as one means to international stability, and considers this a distinctly European contribution to global security (ibid: 11-12).

2005 saw Why Europe Will Run the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century. This ‘New European Century’ will be ‘a world of peace, prosperity and democracy’. Much of this change will be achieved through the

\textsuperscript{68} Perry Anderson here links Mark Leonard’s view to that of Jürgen Habermas, sharing an ‘apparently illimitable narcissism, in which the reflection in the water transfigures the future of the planet into the image of the beholder [here the EU]’, a flattering European self-image constructed through a contrast with the US. (Amusingly the letters in response largely ignore the content of this piece, indulging in pedantry focused on his use of ‘referenda’ as plural for referendum. The price you pay for publishing in LRB.)

\textsuperscript{69} Prior to this he also worked for Demos and was a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

\textsuperscript{70} Mark Leonard writing in the Observer to bolster the humanitarian case for the Iraq War, likens it to the case for intervention in Kosovo (Could the left back an Iraq war? Mark Leonard, Observer, 11 August 2002).
The seductive power of European values and way of life, as ‘Europe represents a synthesis of the energy and freedom that come from liberalism with the stability and welfare that come from social democracy’; an established discourse in establishing the superiority and therefore right to intervene of European civilisation. Nonetheless for recalcitrants unswayed by this vision of Europe ‘pre-emptive intervention’ from Europe is valid; pre-emptive as non-liberal democratic states have been established as illegitimate and a likely source of threat. In Leonard’s distinguishing of this from the Bush Doctrine, the comprehensiveness, and dangerousness of the ‘new type of power’ he outlines become clear:

The contrast between the two doctrines is stark. The Bush doctrine attempts to justify action to remove a threat before it has a chance of being employed against the United States. It is consequently focused very closely on physical assets and capabilities, necessarily swift in execution and therefore short-term in conception and unavoidably military in kind. The European doctrine of pre-emption, in contrast, is predicated on long-term involvement, with the military just one strand of activity, along with pre-emptive economic and legal intervention, and is aimed at building the political and institutional bases of stability, rather than simply removing the immediate source of threat.

Leonard 2005

Finally, written immediately prior to the founding of ECFR in 2007, is ‘Divided world: The struggle for primacy in 2020’ (Leonard 2007: i). Here he identifies four emerging poles of ideological competition: the US, ‘which will seek a balance of power that favours democracy’; China and Russia, ‘which will use international law to protect autocracies from external interference’; the EU, ‘which will favour a world of democratic states bound by the laws of multilateral institutions’; and the Middle East, ‘which will become a faith zone, governed neither by democracy nor the rule of law’ (Leonard 2007: 2). Not all countries will fit neatly into one sphere or another so a ‘global battle to co-opt ‘swing countries’ will ensue’ (ibid: 47). This thus established a clear source justifying an active interventionary policy spreading ‘European values’ hegemonically (as well as anticipating the argument in Parag Khanna’s The Second World (Khanna 2009)).

Whilst ‘the EU shares so many values with the US that it should be able to forge a common agenda with Washington on many issues’ (Leonard 2007: 53), the grave danger for the EU is ‘paradoxically’ its respect for the law – hence whilst within Europe democracy and the rule of law are mutually reinforcing, ‘outside the cosy warmth of the European continent, the EU often has to choose between these two values’ (ibid: 37). Rather than remain thus in thrall to UN mandates, and thereby the veto power of Russia and China ‘the EU should openly
recognise its [UNSC] limitations and explore other mechanisms for giving legitimacy to international interventions for example through regional organisations like NATO and the African Union’ (ibid: 51-52).

We have a recipe for unifying Western intervention and a seeking for legitimacy. A search that concludes that the EU’s character in itself serves as sufficient legitimation – again a strong echo of the ‘hypocrisy’ advocated by Robert Cooper in dealing with the non-European world. As such, Leonard has been central in aligning the myth of Europe as an alternative within international relations and Global Power Europe conceptions – the former feeding the latter.\textsuperscript{71}

**Parag Khanna – Davos Man**

Parag Khanna ties this back into the broader Western configuration and the use of Western power, having served on the foreign policy advisory group to Barack Obama during his Presidential campaign and as senior geopolitical advisor to United States Special Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007. Which is not to imply a US nationalist viewpoint; Khanna is the archetypal ‘Davos Man’ (Reid 2011) – Samuel Huntington’s term for the global elite whose interests transcend the national – having not only worked for the World Economic Forum, but also been anointed a ‘Young Global Leader’ by them (in 2009, a distinction he shares with Mark Leonard), and regularly attending their annual conference. He readily acknowledges it as one of the real centres of global governance, calling for the establishment of more such fora for informal governance (Khanna 2011b). He has also worked in both the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations.\textsuperscript{72}

His views then are influential.\textsuperscript{73} They fit quite neatly into George Soros’ world view also, seeing the end of US hegemony (notably Khanna 2008), generating the need for a more consolidated West to follow the ‘new’ European ‘style’ of foreign policy – embarrassingly labelling the EU the ‘Metrosexual Superpower’, this boils down to hegemonic power; the ability to pursue interests through generating consent and maintaining legitimacy whilst using or threatening force (Khanna 2004).

\textsuperscript{71} Ian Manners, in setting this Global Power Discourse against his own conception of normative power Europe sees the latter as co-opting the former, whereas Leonard demonstrates further the internal relation between the two (Manners 2006).

\textsuperscript{72} See the acknowledgements of *How To Run The World* (Khanna 2011a) for some of his more informal network – immediately notable for our purposes are the Bertelsmann Foundation, Demos and SWP.

\textsuperscript{73} In a nice demonstration of the contemporary field of power, this is despite all his works simultaneously being near universally panned in academic reviews.
Consent is critical as in the Post-American world the nature of world order will be decided by second tier states, deciding the balance between the great powers of the US, the EU and China. The US then must follow the European example and work to persuade these ‘tipping point’ states to follow Western norms (Khanna 2009). In this, it is very much a call for renovating the preceding US based hegemony on an broader basis, whilst also seeking to re-legitimise the concept of empire for the West (again cf. Cooper 2003).

Perhaps most interestingly, and in considerable tension with the latent realism of this earlier work – unwittingly illustrative of the instrumental fluctuation between the use of realist and universal frameworks in IR (Khanna’s PhD is in IR from LSE) - his humbly titled 2011 work How To Run The World is a paean to private political philanthropy of the Soros kind (Khanna 2011a). Framed as a ‘new colonialism’ this intervention by private sphere ‘megadiplomats’ (George Soros, Bill Gates – Žižek’s Davos ‘liberal communists’), overcomes the failings of traditional development efforts by combining entrepreneurialism with dedication to public service. As Slavoj Žižek identifies, and Khanna lauds, this entails a move to seeing problems as discrete practical challenges – not politically or as containing ideological elements (Žižek 2006b; Žižek 2006a). For example: ‘rather than even talk about poverty, we should focus on need. Poverty is amorphous and sounds incurable, but needs are specific: food, water, shelter, medical care and education’ – solvable in civil society through ‘cosmopolitan, or cause-mopolitan’ participation (ibid: Chpt. 9 (u.n. epub)). All of which operates within the framework of an interventionary West, whose interventions can legitimately include targeted assassinations.

**Nick Witney – Maintaining a bi-polar West**

Nick Witney gives concrete content to the vision as outlined above. Having seen senior service in the UK’s Ministry of Defence, lastly as Director-General of International Security Policy where he was responsible for NATO and EU policy as well as missile defence, Witney was also the first Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA), serving from 2004 – 2007. As such he is extremely well placed to judge both Europe’s military capabilities and strategy, as a whole and disaggregated – to wit he carried out a review of all EU member states’ security

---

74 Hard not to draw the titular comparison to Hobsbawm’s How to Change the World (Hobsbawm 2012) and its implications for the author’s relationship to power.
strategies on behalf of the French ministry of defence in 2012 (findings from which are developed in Witney and de France 2013).

The creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) was a great success for European arms firms lobbying\(^75\) – for Ian Manners the EDA is the embodiment of the European ‘military-industrial simplex’’s militarisation of EU foreign policy: termed a ‘simplex’ ‘to capture the way in which both the military-armaments lobby and the technology-industrial lobby have worked at the EU level to create a simple but compelling relationship between the need for forces capable of ‘robust intervention’, and the technological and industrial benefits of defence and aerospace research’ (Manners 2006; 193). As such ‘a carrier and shaper of the political order of EU defence, the Agency may serve as a litmus test of the emerging nature of that order’ (Bátora 2009: 1092). With that in mind, in an overview of literature on the agency Jolyon Howorth notes the ‘remarkable successes of the EDA in pushing forward defence industrial integration’. That is whilst complaints about fragmentation and duplication remain, voiced not least by Nick Witney himself, given the intergovernmental terms of reference of the EDA (its Board consists of the 27 Ministers of Defence) the reasonable successes of breaking out of such a framework towards a cohesive European capability are notable – more so for us as abetted by ‘the direct input of industry and the common mindset linking industrial lobbyists to the EDA officials’ (Howorth 2012: 440).

At the ECFR Witney has continued in this vein, of the need for cohesive European military capacity, most recently through call for a European defence capability assessment linking strategic vision to the materiel needed to achieve it (Witney and de France 2013). In doing so however the justificatory emphasis has shifted from the industrial and economic arguments of the ‘military-industrial simplex’ towards arguments based on the unique contribution Europe makes to world order and the need for force to continue to realise it –armed forces are ‘necessary instruments of power and influence’ (Witney 2011: 1). Thus 2009’s Towards a Post-American Europe: a power audit of EU-US Relations, starts from the position of a post-US hegemonic world and argues that the West needs the emergence of a more assertive ‘post-American Europe’ – not as a counterweight to the US but to strengthen the relationship between these two poles of the West and ‘handle […] and influence the ongoing

transformation of the international order in directions they find congenial’ (Witney and Shapiro 2009: 14-15).

Notably he goes against the ‘Atlanticism’ vs. ‘Europeanism’ paradigm, arguing from interviews with foreign ministries of all member states that all states believe they have a ‘special relationship’ with the US and that they are more committed than average to both this relationship and Europe. This is hardly a contradiction as a stronger Europe makes for a stronger West. Demilitarisation must therefore be resisted: whilst Europe is far from demilitarising, spending far more than China and Russia combined, the lack of direct territorial threat has led to concerns other than security driving this spending (*inter alia* regional /national industrial policy and employment, prestige). Both the effectiveness of Europe’s soft power, and Europe’s freedom and security, require the ability to mount ‘early and robust intervention’. More even than just such self-interest, for Europe the ‘readiness to undertake “expeditionary operations”’ is a ‘moral imperative’ (Witney 2011: 4).

Establishing that progress towards a truly bi-polar interventionary West has clearly been made, he notes that European ‘fatigue for liberal interventionism’ has become a problem, leading to a noticeably less interventionist EU after the promising start of ‘more than 20 European crisis-management operations launched in the period from 2003 to 2008, in conflict areas as far-flung as Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (Witney 2011: 2). Hopes for a rejuvenation of such liberal interventionary political will now lie with December 2013’s European Council meeting, where defence is on the agenda (Witney 2013).

**ECFR and a hegemonic formation**

Having located the ECFR at the centre of the Global Power Europe think tank network, and given some consideration to the organisation itself, I now turn to locating it within a European hegemonic formation set within the West.

A hegemonic formation requires a variety of disparate elements if it is to succeed: it must establish a consensus over interests to overcome capital’s concrete character in capitalists as ‘a band of warring brothers’, agree therefore on the shape of a favourable future operating environment, and form strategies to further and universalise these interests and visions, and, finally, it must be capable of taking political action to realise them. It must therefore integrate
dominant capital formations and business interests, organic intellectuals of all kinds, as well as politicians and other controllers of governance and coercive apparatus, into a hegemonic bloc.

To demonstrate the position of the ECFR in relation to just such a hegemonic formation for Europe within a bipolar West, I have developed the method used by Kees van der Pijl, in analysing the 2007 Istanbul Bilderberg conference as another instance of the gathering of such a potential hegemonic formation⁷⁶ (van der Pijl 2007). There he categorised attendees into: representatives of the liberal West as a political formation; transnational capital; and the instances of hegemonic order on which the two converge (intellectuals, the media and international economic organisations). Dividing attendees up amongst these groupings suggests how through such meetings and organisations a transnational ruling class coordinate themselves to ‘utilize the levers of power available’ to master the challenges they face (ibid: 636).⁷⁷

A similar approach to the members of the ECFR Council produces a similar grouped listing with all of the elements well covered. I have taken this breakdown and translated it into a ‘map’ of the components of such a hegemonic formation, as interlocked into the ECFR Council, along geographical and class formation axes, in figure 3.3 below.

Missing from this map however are two elements central to the universalising of interests – the creation of expert knowledge to reshape common sense, and the dissemination of such knowledge and universalised worldviews through media of various kinds.

The first is covered in the Global Power Europe network illustrated above. The latter is touched on in the identifying of the interstitial position of the ECFR as a think tank through the analysis of its staff’s career backgrounds. There we saw the bulk of the ECFR’s experts regularly publish and appear in media with a high international profile. The same is true for many of the council members, especially of course those there specifically for that reason, such as public and academic intellectuals, or journalists and writers, such as Timothy Garton Ash, Mary Kaldor, Maria Kuffaro, Teresa de Sousa, Diana Pinto, Ian Buruma, or Goran

---

⁷⁶ The disparate nature of the elements makes the social network analysis used in the preceding section inappropriate. Where such methods have been used in relation to similar conceptions of hegemony they have sought to link only internally within one, or at the most two of these elements – for example William Carroll integrates the organisations within my global policy planning box into his corporate network, and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graaff analyse the interlocks between recent US administrations and, separately, their commercial interests, and the (US delimited) policy planning field. ⁷⁷ As noted earlier, he does so in order to demonstrate through a transnational class analysis the internal relation between capital and the state system manifested in class formation.
Stefanovski. Whilst the various media fields operate according to their own rules, and are semi-autonomous in that sense, the ‘crudest’ basis of the censorship and control of the field is still economic ownership (Bourdieu 1998: 15-16). With that in mind, the Council also contains numerous board members and owners of media outlets and conglomerates, themselves further entrenched in networks of media ownership external to this study, including, Corelio, Die Welt, Dogan Gazetecilik, El Pais, Le Monde, and RAI.

The focus of the map is on the translation of the formation of a corporate community through to strategic political action, on an axis of class formation. This focus on formation and development is central to arguments on the existence and hegemony of a transnational class, (as seen in my arguments earlier), both developing the work of the Amsterdam School to accommodate the development of such a formation within Europe, and against the pluralist critique of the structuralism of power elite theory – a focus on class formation is central to both. The ECFR through linking all of these elements presents a forum for the formation of a class for itself, above and beyond merely a corporate community and against, through its regional geographical specificity, its absorption into a diffuse un(der)specified ‘global’ class and policy planning apparatus.

From this can be seen this further interstitial nature of think tanks I identified above, in their role in class formation through bringing together components of a potential hegemonic formation on advisory boards. The boards of most of the other global power Europe think tanks examined above perform similar functions, uniting think tank directors, academics, media interests, with other business interests and, though less often, military organisations. Overall however, they tend to a national core of board members with some cosmopolitan linkers, and are limited in size. The combination found on the ECFR Council is uniquely comprehensive.

This extends to another significant aspect that falls outside of this study, the societal restructuring within the newer EU members and the membership on the council of appropriate representatives. Thus it is notable that for example Marek Belka, Governor of the National Bank of Poland and former Polish Prime Minister and Finance Minister, who was also both a consultant to the World Bank and Director of the IMF’s European Department, sits on the council; exemplary in that numerous serving ministers from accession states sit on the Council, whereas for older EU states the members tend to be ex-ministers, backbenchers or advisers (e.g. Jo Johnson MP, Head of No 10 Policy Planning Unit in the UK).
Figure 3.3 - The ECFR and the formation of a hegemonic bloc

Class Formation

Corporate Community | Policy Planning | Political Action
--- | --- | ---
Tritonal Commission | Club of Madrid | World Economic Forum
Advisory board | CFR (Global) | World Policy Groups
International Chamber of Commerce | Sladege Forums | Economic Governance

Global Business Councils

Transnational Business Councils

European Commission | European Parliament | European Union

European External Action

NATO | Hard Power

Hard Power

Transnational Corporate Business (Allianz, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, EON, GDF Suez, Siemens, Thyssen Krupp)

Transnational Business Councils

National Business Federations (Confederal B.B.W., Polish Council, etc.)

Energy

(Marcel Engineering, ThyssenKrupp Tuifler, Financiers, Lemoine, Wirtz, Group, etc.)

Industry

(East, Blackstone Group, JPM, KKR, Group, Rockwell Bank (Lloyds), etc.)

Financial

(Credit Suisse, Citigroup, JPM, Morgan Stanley, etc.)
The hegemonic bloc

Such a diagram, as is indeed the case for any such network analysis, struggles to convey the quality of the links visualised; here therefore I elaborate on the diagram above, focusing on the implications for global power Europe and the class formation driving it.

Space precludes much analysis of links to individual businesses. The diagram gives the three largest sectors linked into, by size from left to right—with banking and financial firms over-represented in relation to this sector’s role in the European corporate community, though perhaps reflecting a new found interest in political projects incorporating the EU that the founding of the European Financial Services Roundtable (EFR), in the model of the ERT, suggests (Heemskerk 2013). Notable also is interlocks at the most senior possible level with both McKinsey and Company and Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, the significance of whom in the restructuring of European public services was mentioned above (Roland Berger himself, and Robert Reibestein, senior partner McKinsey and Company sit on the Council).

Starting with the corporate community links, the ECFR is heavily interlinked with the European core of the transnational corporate community, as identified by William Carroll (2010). Most significantly of the seven European firms that have remained within the core of this community for the decade 1996-2006 – such continuity indicating politically active directors and boards – the ECFR is linked to four (Allianz, BP, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank). This measure also indicates the centrality of European firms to the political activism of the community as only one non-European firm, the American AIG, demonstrates the same continuity (Carroll 2010: 193). The same is true when we aggregate William Carroll and Eelke Heemskerk’s separate, consecutive, identifications of core temporal continuity, bringing it up to 2010: this gives a consistent core of three firms, two of which are interlocked with the ECFR Council: BP, BNP Paribas, and the non-ECFR linked Unilever (Heemskerk 2013: 90-91)

Also notable is that most central to Heemskerk’s network in 2010, and ‘one of the organizing pillars of the European network, was Compagnie Nationale a Portefeuille SA/NV’ (ibid: 86). In 2011 the remaining independent shares in this Belgian holding company were bought by the

---

78 It is worth noting that the interlinking of ECFR to the core of the community must follow this shift to Europe as membership of the Council is restricted to European nationals (including Turkey). Some members are also included as dual nationals –such as Soros, here listed as Hungarian/US, and Karin Forseke (Sweden/US), Steven Heinz (Austria/US), and Minna Järvenpää (Finland/US).
Frère family and BNP Paribas, who between them already held the rest of the company. BNP Paribas now owns 47 per cent of the investment firm.\textsuperscript{79}

When the corporate community is aggregated with policy planning groups the ECFR is also linked to 9 of the top 10 most core organisations in William Carroll’s mapping of the network in 2006, by virtue of interlocks with the five central policy planning groups (Global Policy Groups box, excluding the Club of Madrid which does not feature in the core of the network).

We now move up a level to these policy planning boards, which in terms of the generation of a ‘values based’ foreign policy for Europe and the consensual aspect of the hegemony of capital is the most significant level. The ECFR is interlinked into all of the five core policy planning groups identified by William Carroll (2010). For the Bilderberg grouping, the Council contains a recent member of the steering committee, as well as two attendees of 2013’s conference, six at 2012’s, and four at 2011’s meeting.\textsuperscript{80} For the Trilateral Commission there are 14 interlocks.\textsuperscript{81} Javier Solana provides an interlock with the Global Advisory Board of the Council on Foreign Relations (one must be a US citizen to be a member of the CFR itself, the advisory board is made up of 24 non-US figures).

The International Chamber of Commerce is linked through national chambers of commerce, as well as large firms within the European corporate community, but significantly also through Maria Livanos Cattau, former Secretary-General of the ICC from 1996 to 2005. During this tenure she dramatically increased its political activism and forged a ‘global partnership between businesses and the United Nations’, which has led to a greater role for businesses in the formation of UN economic policy (Corporate Europe Observer 1998).

Cattui was also Managing Director for the World Economic Forum in Geneva, having worked there from 1977 to 1996, and was responsible for the organisation of their annual meeting. In

\textsuperscript{79} The Frère family are a highly significant family node in the European network, only indirectly interlocked with ECFR. Compagnie Nationale a Portefeuille SA/NV was the holding company of Belgian multi-billionaire Albert Frere, who gained his fortune in the Wallonian steel industry. Indirect links include his history as a large shareholder in \textit{inter alia} Bertelsmann, Total and Suez.

\textsuperscript{80} Jaakko Iloniemi for the steering committee; Carl Bildt and Thomas Leysen as 2013 attendees; Luis Amado, Gunilla Carlsson, Wolfgang Ischinger, Bassma Kodmani, Pascal Lamy and Loukas Tsoukalis for 2012; Carl Bildt, Pascal Lamy, Thomas Leysen and Loukas Tsoukalis for 2011. (\url{http://www.bilderbergmeetings.org/meetings.html}).

\textsuperscript{81} Carried by Urban Ahlin, Marek Belka, Carl Bildt, John Bruton, Lykke Friis, Wolfgang Ischinger, Meglena Kuneva, Bruno Le Maire, Thomas Leysen, David Miliband, Dominique Moïsi, Andrzej Olechowski, Karel Schwarzenberg, Antonio Vitorino.
addition to the links to the World Economic Forum established earlier, and the ever-presence of George Soros within it, the nature of the Council members means large numbers have attended WEF meetings over recent years – including 15 in 2013.\(^\text{82}\)

I have also included the Club of Madrid in this grouping as whilst it doesn’t feature in the core of the transnational networks, in part due to its character as a limited group of ex-heads of state, so whilst certainly linked to business interests, its significance lies more ‘upwards’ in the direction of more directly influencing political action.

The second significant group at this level contains the transnational business councils. Again the ECFR has interlocks with all the most significant organisations, linked into transatlantic organisations such as the Transatlantic Business Council/Dialogue, and the Turkish American Business Association.

The most significant of these however are the European business councils, with an established influence on policy shaping within the EU. All of the major policy planning and lobbying groups for business are interlocked with the ECFR. Thomas Leysen interlocks with the ERT, as well there being indirect links through ENI, Siemens and Telefónica Europe (the boards of these businesses linked into the ECFR and ERT by different individuals).

BusinessEurope is linked through national industry and employer federations and their representatives, but also through Emma Marcegaglia, newly President of it and CEO of Marcegaglia S.p.A. Whilst president of Confindustria, the Italian employers’ federation, she succeeded in beating down Italian unions from sector based bargaining to negotiating contracts on a plant-by-plant level. Whilst the ERT is an elite organisation, representing 45 of Europe’s largest transnational companies, BusinessEurope, as the European employers’ confederation, can be seen as the main voice of big business in Brussels. In Marcegaglia they have a President clearly committed to political activism (Sanderson 2013).

The Corporate Social Responsibility Alliance is a joint venture of the European Commission and Business Europe, with support from the ERT. I include it here as whilst indirectly linked to the ECFR from all three sides it shows both the closeness of the working relationship between the

three bodies, as well as the central ideological role of corporate social responsibility in the development of a sustainable neoliberalism – in the development of which Business Europe has taken a globally leading role (Sklair and Miller 2010).

Finally in this group, the European Financial Service Roundtable is also well linked into the ECFR. Membership is by company not individual, and as ECFR corporate interlocks are skewed towards the financial sector, the linkage here is unsurprising. As indicated above the founding of the EFR in 2001, along the lines of the ERT, indicates a shift in consensus in this sector to include the EU as a significant focus for political projects (Heemskerk 2013).

These three, the ERT Business Europe and EFS, are the most dominant organisations in terms of lobbying and shaping the EU in the interests of capital, as well as through this forming the basis for a European transnational class. The final element of a hegemonic bloc I will cover here is that which contains the ability to realise the strategies generated in the formation of this class, that of political action.

For political bodies such as national governments and the EU there are a multitude of interlocks. There are 14 Members of the European Parliament, a head of state and 19 ministers of state, including thirteen Ministers for Foreign Affairs, or Chairs of Foreign Affairs Committees – with a similar number of former ministers and numerous former presidents. The European Commission is linked in directly only at officer level, with seven ex-European Commissioners also sitting on the Council.

Shifting to hard power, the links to NATO are multiple through the various foreign and defence ministers and the only serving head of state Toomas Ilves, President of Estonia. The ECFR Council also contains three former NATO Secretaries General: Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, George Robertson, and Javier Solana. These three sit on the boards of many organisations, including think tanks within the global power network analysed here, but the ECFR Council is the only one to contain more than one (George Robertson sits on the boards of CER and IISS, Javier Solana RIE and Notre Europe, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on CEPS).

Similarly for the European External Action Service, there are numerous links through Foreign Ministers, who collectively ultimately set policy for the EEAS through the Foreign Affairs Council, as well as the Director General for Enlargement of the European Commission, Stefano
Sannino, with whom the EEAS cooperates within that area. Nonetheless, it is significant that there is a head of division of the EEAS (Fernando Guimarães), as well as both an advisor and counsellor to Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Steve Everts and Robert Cooper), as the High Representative is both head of the EEAS and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council.

I have intersected these instances of primarily hard power with a category of ‘Imperial Governance’ as both NATO and EEAS and its antecedent bodies have been involved in the most notable instances of Western imperial governance – where hard power meets economic governance in nation building. Within this category there are direct links and a wealth of experiences for the Council to draw upon if needed, especially relating to Kosovo. Most prominent amongst these in Iraq is Marek Belka, who in 2003 he was responsible for economic policy in the interim coalition administration of Iraq, ‘forcefully’ privatizing Iraq’s economy and opening it up to foreign investment – for which he drew upon the experience of the reforms of Eastern Europe (Kurata 2003). Experience of a justificatory build up to such intervention is also present with Rolf Ekeus, former head of the United Nations Special Commission on the Council (Ekeus 2003). Much other expertise is available from the experience of NGOs in the reconstruction of Iraq, for example Martti Ahtisaari’s work with his Crisis Management Initiative organisation.

Ahtisaari was also a United Nations Special Envoy for Kosovo, charged with organizing the Kosovo status process, part of a process of ‘normalizing intervention as an exercise in risk management’ by the West (Sahin 2013). We also find Samuel Žbogar, EU Representative to Kosovo, and Wolfgang Ischinger, the EU’s representative in the troika mediating negotiations about the future status of Kosovo, on the Council; these links supplemented also by interlocks with the Economic Initiative for Kosovo and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

This brings us finally to economic governance more purely, and here we find a Senior Advisor within the World Bank alongside the former Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank Group, the Chief Economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and, at the time the Council list was frozen for the purpose of this study, the then Director-General of WTO, Pascal Lamy. Taking advantage of such governance, there are also

83 This timing notable as prior to his fall from grace Dominique Strauss-Kahn was also a council member.
numerous regional initiatives for development and investment in peripheral European, and European peripheral states, as well as Melak Investments, focusing on foreign investment in Iraq.

Even at this surface level of interlocks of direct links to the most significant bodies, the point is made – if the Bilderberg Conferences are part of a ‘process of establishing and renovating the hegemonic consensus of the West’ (van der Pijl 2007: 628), the ECFR Council exists as a similar forum but notable in the context of the shift of the transnational capitalist class towards Europe, in its focus on establishing Europe’s role in a bilateral West, and by this renovating the legitimacy of Western hegemony as a whole.

**Conclusion**

Having outlined the development of the global power Europe discourse and its relation to both a preceding civilian power and concurrently developing normative power conception of Europe, I then mapped the contemporary network of think tanks developing this global power vision. Within this I found that the ECFR sits at the centre of this network strengthening the links between the core organisations within it, and bringing in organisations that otherwise would not be linked into it.84 I also noted that the centrality is somewhat unsurprising given the size of the Council – that this is a deliberate strategy is suggested not only by Soros’ comments on the need for such an organisation in the pursuit of his political vision prior to its founding, but also by both the prevalence of central linkers on the ECFR council, and the increased size of the ECFR Council, from 141 members in September 2011, to 205 in September 2013.

In this Soros is demonstrating what William Carroll found to be of surprising significance to the transnational capitalist class overall – the linking role of individual billionaire networkers in pulling together more organically developing business community groupings that otherwise would not intersect (Carroll 2010: 132-5). The surprise comes from the tendency to overstate the ‘managerial revolution’, the ‘claim that the ownership of capital has been divorced from its control, leaving salaried managers in charge’; there has been a shift, but at ‘the heart of global corporate power, we find a combination of super-affluent owners, top managers and organic intellectuals, constituent elements of a transnational capitalist class that is irrevocably

84 This being quite apart from the broad array of other civil society and political lobbying organisations outside of this specific global power network that George Soros himself and the various executives of his Open Society Foundations organisations and offshoots would also interlink into this constellation.
grounded on the *terra firma* of property ownership* (ibid: 152). The stratum of senior executives and directors make up the social fabric of corporate communities, with individual billionaire owners helping weave them together to form a class for itself.

One important facet of this is that embodied in an individual, such interlinking will more readily have a clear strategic role – consciously bringing together otherwise organically formed groups of businesses, across sectors to make possible the formation of a class for itself. Think tanks and policy planning groups in particular require just such strategic agency for their formation, and Soros’ own view is that the political edge of his organisations’ work will be dulled when continued through a board of directors after his demise (Soros 2011: *passim*). The collection of individuals on the ECFR Council then provides a good example of just such ‘billionaire agency’.

George Soros early diagnosed the crisis of hegemony in the US led West and set about doing his part to reconstruct Western hegemony around a bi-polar West; the establishment of the ECFR being his institutionalisation of the project. The positioning of ECFR shows his success in cohering discursive constructions of Europe’s role within the European think tank field around this vision. On the flip side of this, his success also demonstrates the organic link between contemporary conditions and such a vision – the wide compatibility of his vision with others contemporaneously developed, and their reliance on and development out of preceding conceptions of Europe, make clear that Soros is not a perspicacious haruspex, but well positioned within and sensitive to the changing context. As we saw, the broader discourses around civilian power, normative power and global power Europe all rely upon a contrast of Europe with an assumed Hobbesian anarchic states system outside of it. It is this idea of cosmopolitan Europe, transcending this anarchic system that I now turn to.
Part 2 – Cosmopolitan Power Europe
4. Theory II: Intellectuals and a methodology

Introduction
This chapter takes up the theoretical challenge identified in the conclusion of part one – understanding the dialectic of structure and agency as it relates to the ideational structures used in constructing comprehensive concepts of control. The focus is on this dialectic as it relates to academic production. As such it is a development of the first theoretical chapter, allowing it to be brief, and providing the methodology for the subsequent chapters.

These issues were introduced to some degree in considering think tanks as occupying an interstitial field – tied to capital but able to universalise its interest through its semi-autonomy; dependent yet independent of the fields of politics, media, business and academia amongst which it is set. The consideration of the academic field here sets it at a further remove from the direct determination of capital and so the task here is to develop a way to consider academic work beyond direct linkages into policy work which offer no such intellectual puzzle. More though, even where considering those directly linked into policy making circuits, I seek to avoid their reduction to representatives or ‘functionaries of bourgeois hegemony’ (Saccarelli 2007: 771), returning to them a humanity as, in the example of Mary Kaldor in chapter six, a critical academic intellectual.

The chapter progresses through four sections. First I consider the complementarity for this task of the theories of Gramsci and Bourdieu, seeing each as filling a lacuna in the other. For Gramsci the missing element is the development of the tools to grasp a more complex and variegated intellectual realm than that of 1920s and 30s southern Italy. This is a task acknowledged by much neo-Gramscian work, but undertaken through recourse to incompatible discourse theories, leading to the Gramsciology criticised in chapter one. Bourdieu’s work is shown to be compatible and, as its use in mapping think tanks shows, provides the tools needed. However, for Bourdieu the missing element is class-formation and even more so, transnational class formation. Bourdieu’s theory, concerned primarily with intra-ruling class struggle in a national context, is unable to capture the shifts to neoliberalism of the late Cold War and post-Cold War world. Here a neo-Gramscian approach provides a solution.

The second section explores the principal difficulty of integrating their theories this way – seemingly antagonistic interpretations of the potential for contemporary university or ‘traditional’ intellectuals. Here I contrast two attempts to use Gramsci to get to grips with the
contemporary academic in this way which lead to the contention that this is a question of structure and agency. Thus as my earlier theoretical consideration argued it is not resolvable in the abstract, but through the dialectic of intellectual production. I then develop how I will analyse this dialectic, first through an overview of Bourdieusian field theory, and then through developing a methodology of ‘persons not paradigms’. This latter I develop from Ole Wæver’s 1997 consideration of using such a methodological approach to get a far firmer grasp on the nature of IR theory.

**Gramsci and Bourdieu**

Enmeshing Bourdieu’s theory within a Gramscian account of structure may seem counterintuitive or even anachronistic – certainly Bourdieu himself sets his position against, and temporally beyond a ‘Marxist vulgate’ that has ‘clouded the brains of more than one generation’ (Bourdieu 2000: 8). Nonetheless it is only such a common economistic construction of Marxism that Bourdieu is in contention with, as his argument that ‘the scholastic disposition calls forth the illusion that knowledge is freely produced, and that it is not the product of specific material conditions’ is in accord with the sociology of knowledge of Marx (*ibid*: 12, Burawoy and Von Holdt 2012).85

Gramsci, as the classical Marxist most focused on what Bourdieu would term symbolic domination within modern Western societies, is even more akin. I follow Michael Burawoy in seeing the highly enriching potential of careful synthesis of their accounts (*ibid*). Here I focus on their complementarity, of their filling of respective lacunae, which helps position the two approaches in relation to one another. The next section considers where they diverge and its overcoming.

Gramsci was writing when the institutions of ideological production were far more rudimentary than today. To take the most obvious change that was central to the first part of this thesis, the rise of think tanks in the late twentieth century has fundamentally altered the politics of knowledge production and the politics of expertise and its use across, at least, the West. Whilst this needn’t, and doesn’t, invalidate the fundamentals of Gramsci’s thought on intellectuals, Bourdieu as our near contemporary does provide more attuned tools for understanding the current context – as seen in Thomas Medvetz’s powerful Bourdieusian analysis of think tanks used earlier (Medvetz 2012).

---

85 Michael Burawoy draws direct parallels with the Marx of *The German Ideology*, and indeed Bourdieu draws on this attack on the ‘German philosophers’ in an assault on Habermas (Bourdieu 2000: 66).
These are tools that have also not thus far been developed in neo-Gramscian work in International Relations, which accordingly do not always account well for the practice of generating consent within hegemony. Whist the concept of comprehensive concepts of control covers this area, application remains methodologically underdeveloped. Seen in its most general terms as the lack of a developed intermediation between structure and agency we can see this lacuna through noting the abrupt shifts in focus from structural imperatives to agential action in Kees van der Pijl’s work (see esp. van der Pijl 2006b), tending towards a mechanistic, almost conspiratorial, impression of the relation. Giles Scott-Smith, giving a ‘neo-Gramscian’ account of the role of the Congress of Cultural Freedom in constructing US hegemony in post-War Europe, also notes this lack, grafting a Foucauldian approach onto van der Pijl’s work to bridge it (Scott-Smith 2002). However as noted in the first theory chapter, such a move is characteristic of a post-Marxist ‘Gramsciology’ in which the material, and the ‘moment of coercion’ are stripped from conceptions of hegemony (Saccarelli 2007).

This discursive focus is one that Bourdieu attacks as one of the central ‘scholastic fallacies’, giving an indication of the compatibility of his methodology for use here. As this fallacy also underlies the problematic political ethics found in the cosmopolitanism covered in the next chapter I elaborate on it here. Bourdieu identifies three inter-related and mutually reinforcing scholastic fallacies, in epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, deriving from the conditions of the exercise of ‘pure thought’ – that is detachment and separation from necessity (especially economic necessity), and a related gratuitousness. These are: ‘scholastic epistemocentrism’ – the divorce from practical experience and the embodied and embedded logic of practice, which leads to the suppression of the practical viewpoint by the theoretical viewpoint; ‘intellectual universalism’ - in which the view that reason is given in the structure of mind or language suppresses its historical invention within fields of cultural production and their conditions of existence; and, an ‘aesthetic universalism’ in which the judgement of taste is divorced from its ‘impure conditions of possibility’, the social conditions allowing the creation and class monopolisation of a cultured habitus.

I focus here on how this relates to the conception of politics; certain conceptions of politics themselves being a product of skhole – the conditions of leisure necessary to the ‘serious

86 Van der Pijl acknowledges this himself: ‘intentionality is my personal weakest link – the danger of conspiratorial approaches always lurks and looms’ (van der Pijl 2008).
87 A play on the etymology of the term ‘scholastic’ from the Greek skhole which means ‘leisure’(Lane 2000, 90)
play’ of academic work, that underlies these fallacies, and the repression of this distance from necessity, so that its influence is not reflected upon. Bourdieu attacks Habermas on these grounds, significant for us as the role of the conception of politics of Habermas and Arendt, and the distinction between them, is central to the next chapter. I note also though that in these terms of scholastic fallacy there is commonality between them: Habermas having ‘claimed that he had learned from Hannah Arendt how to approach a theory of communicative action’ (Brand 1986) and referring to Arendt’s *The Human Condition* as ‘an anthropology of communicative action’ (Habermas 1977). Indeed, when even Habermas finds Arendt guilty of ‘a politics that is cleansed of social and economic issues’ it is clear that the criticisms Bourdieu levels at Habermas apply to Arendt *a fortiori* (Habermas 1977: 15).

Criticism of Habermas’ conception of politics from Bourdieu is recurrent in his work, and translates for me to the destruction of Marxism through its expression through a scholastic habitus, *homo scholasticus* (Bourdieu 1991, cf. Bookchin 1982). His position Bourdieu summarises neatly as ‘moralism as egoistic universalism’, which transferred to Habermas’ political pronouncements is captured in Perry Anderson’s critique of the ‘illimitable narcissism’ of both his thought and of the homologous current liberal imperialist directions in EU foreign policy discourse (Anderson 2011; again, I treat this assessment of Habermas in the next chapter). The claim here is that it is an effect of *skhole*. Habermas’ representation of political life, based upon the public sphere is accordingly divorced from reality, based upon a particular abstract vision of rational action and language, in turn deriving from the specific scholastic position which is thus universalised. The contrast is relating politics to the actual use of language, and its limits: ‘that the force of arguments counts for little against the arguments of force’ (Bourdieu 2000: 65). The political failure is thus the way in which such universalism ‘obscures and represses the question of the economic and social conditions that would have to be fulfilled in order to allow the public deliberation capable of leading to a rational consensus’ (*ibid*: 65).

This repression of the conditions of access to the public political sphere is what this construction of the political is ultimately founded on: this is well captured in for example feminist critiques of Habermas (Fraser 1985), but best captured in its totality by Bourdieu’s phrase of an ‘invisible property qualification’ (Bourdieu 2000: 67). Overcoming these limitations of access to open the public political sphere to all is not possible because to do so would fundamentally change the nature of the sphere being admitted to. As Arendt’s historical focus on especially classical and American republican political conceptions demonstrates, this
conception of politics is theoretically constructed precisely on the divisions of the
discrimination of access to the public political sphere; in this sense The Human Condition is a
critical contribution in that it is indeed a damning ‘anthropology of communicative action’
(Habermas 1977; Arendt 1998).

What we see then is that embedded within Bourdieu’s idea of the intellectual is a relation to
both economic and social conditions, and a constitutive relationship also to ‘the arguments of
force’. Nonetheless this does not include either inter-class conflict, or a macro picture of class
formation. The gaps become most apparent with his later political activism, with a simplistic
and journalistic account of neoliberalism (Callinicos 1999, Plehwe, Walpen, and Neunhöffer
2006). As his work is predominately on intra-class conflict within a national context this gives
him little material for theorising change within the structure itself; particularly if one sees an
internal relation between national state-society structures and the inter- and trans national
level (Leander 2001), and thus structure, especially as manifested in a ruling class is rather
taken for granted within his generative structuralism.

The need for such an account of class formation can be seen in recent applications of his work
within International Relations where a central question is over the existence of trans-national
or global fields of power (Adler-Nissen 2011; Bigo 2011). The field of power is the overarching
field of political and economic intra-(ruling) class conflict, which within the approach
developed earlier we would see as the transnational site for contestation between
comprehensive concepts of control (I elaborate further on Bourdieu’s field theory below). A
neo-Gramscian approach with its focus on the changing geographical coordinates of class
formation and its implications for global structures provides a base for answering such
questions, if we see the field of power and struggle within it also containing Gramsci’s
contribution of the ‘elucidation of culture as a complex set of norms in the domain of ideas,
and how such norms are solidified through the influence of specific elite networks operating in
the interests of a ruling group in the economy’ (Scott-Smith 2002, 3). Overall then I here set
Bourdieu’s work as a meso-level theory offering accordingly the tools for grasping the dialectic
between structure and agency as it is manifested in comprehensive concepts of control, and
more so, as this struggle within the field of power relates to fields – such as academia – that
are semi-autonomous from this field of struggle.

The Traditional Intellectual
The central claim for using Bourdieu is the need to ‘update’ Gramsci for a contemporary academic context. Ernesto Saccarelli attempts to understand this changed intellectual terrain from within a purely Gramscian frame, structured around the concepts of traditional and organic intellectuals. For Gramsci everyone is an intellectual, but only some have the social role of intellectuals; of these, there are two archetypes the organic and the traditional intellectual. The former emerges with class formation and with this ‘the social affiliation and origin of the intellectual becomes in an objective sense direct and unmediated: capital demands, gives life, puts to use, and discards a broad array of specialists’, contemporarily we may think of bankers, brokers, management consultants and the like (Saccarelli 2011: 761).

The traditional intellectual here was the already existing established intellectual ‘those who existed in historical or geographical conditions largely undisturbed by the development of capitalism’ – thus whilst in some ways outmoded, reflecting a previous social formation, through their appearance of being divorced from class interest they serve to universalise the interests of a ruling class of which they are a part. It is this ideology of a class apart, a timeless tradition of thought carried by generation after generation of thinkers that is central to the legitimacy of intellectuals as a whole.

Of the huge growth of academic intellectuals and the university in the last half century, which is his central concern, Saccarelli notes ‘this was not a purely quantitative, demographic expansion, but rather the standardization of hitherto diverse forms of intellectual labor and engagement [in] the post-World War II period. [...] the bohemians, the freelance writers, the eclectic critics and the party intellectuals were replaced by a more prosaic and dependable figure: the university professor’ (ibid: 758). That these structures are now under significant attack and a rapid rate of transformation only reinforces the point that the academic intellectual must be located within history.

To understand the contemporary academic intellectual then we must look below the myth of the traditional intellectual that sustains their position, belied as it is by the clear historical rise and (beginning of the) fall of the academic intellectual. Doing so means that as ‘the intellectual comes into being by default within the political orbit of the ruling class, exactly because on the social plane he or she is born with manifold attachments to it [then] in the case of the contemporary academic intellectual, he or she is quite literally produced - trained, regulated, employed - by capital. Severing these manifold links, according to Gramsci, is no mere matter of adopting a generic ‘leftist’ disposition, or even activism’, it is in essence
inescapable from within the position (ibid: 768). Even ‘earnest political intentions’ opposing contemporary power relations ‘perform a useful and organic political role for the bourgeoisie exactly when they were not so directly implicated with its interests and operations’ (ibid). From here Michel Foucault is rendered an exemplary ‘functionary of bourgeois hegemony’, and any independence found in the ‘pure domain of abstract intellect’ is ‘illusory’ (ibid: 771). We may as well pack up and go home.

Edward Said develops Gramsci rather differently to argue that ‘the Western university, certainly in America, still can offer the intellectual a quasi-utopian space’, in which with a set of values ‘fuelled by care and affection rather than by profit, and selfish, narrow specialization, collectively ‘amateurism’, true [critical intellectual] work can go on’ (Said 1994: 49, 50-62). To do so Said uses Gramsci to set up the distinction between the traditional and organic intellectual: the former he understands as a permanent static class of intellectuals, ‘teachers priests and administrators who continue to do the same thing from generation to generation’; the latter, directly ‘connected to classes or enterprises that used intellectuals to organize interests, gain more power, get more control’ (Said 1994: 3-4). This he does not to critique the claimed detachment from worldly interest that organic intellectuals adopt from the concept of the traditional intellectual (which presents itself, though cannot be, a class apart from society), but to reverse Gramsci and argue precisely for the concept of the intellectual as a class in itself against the organic, professional intellectual.

That power interacts with intellectual production he acknowledges, but this is an external interaction, a set of pressures acting upon the intellectual, not constitutive of them. Thus Said further distinguishes between the professional and amateur intellectual: the distinction not in the fact, but the attitude towards being paid to think. Here he cites many of the external pressures on academics, such as specialisation and US governmental influence on universities. Yet these remain external – the academy a somewhat insulated utopia. Resisting these pressures then is a class of true intellectuals. This is a class of individuals though: he is contemptuous of the ‘faceless’ professional intellectual, ‘anonymous functionary or careful bureaucrat’, setting against them the intellectual as (heroic) individual separate from social

---

89 In a further reverse claiming that ‘Gramsci’s pioneering suggestions’ are that ‘intellectuals and not social classes [are] pivotal to the workings of modern society’ (ibid: 8).
class and representing society’s conscience, acting as leader for emancipatory causes s/he himself has brought into being (Said 1994: 3-19, 49-63).

By the time he has finished this is hardly a recognisably Gramscian account; Saccarelli noting that it contains only ‘carefully calibrated ‘Gramscian’ features’ (Saccarelli 2011: 777 n.8).

Epifanio San Juan Jr. is more scathing: ‘Said conceives of the intellectual outside of the hegemonic struggles of the major social classes, aggrandizing its function in a way that is completely idealist and antithetical to Gramsci’s vision’ (San Juan, Jr 2006: 48). Though the problem San Juan is attacking is that Said’s approach ‘arrogates all agency’ from subaltern groups to these intellectuals - Said identified as the seminal figure of, and his conception of the intellectual central to the problem with, post-colonialism for San Juan. Regardless of the accuracy of San Juan’s assessment of the effect of Said on such movements, surely this then is precisely the point – that he does have such agency, and the question is of its use. There is no doubting that Said in fact lived his conception of the committed intellectual, becoming for many the most faithful representative of the Palestinian cause and their most powerful voice, and in the process seemingly becoming a model for being engaged in political activities outside the university (Barghouti 2003; Fisk 2005). His notion of the ‘secular critic’ was embodied and proven in his life. Said’s conception may not be Gramscian but these Gramscian attacks point to the need now for a more sophisticated understanding of the potential within the academic field. In fact what Said is giving is an account far more in tune with Bourdieu and his confidence in the potential for scholastic truth generated in the academy – though as we’ve seen Bourdieu introduces considerable qualifiers that Said omits tied precisely to trying to grasp the complex position of the academic field in relation to its socio-economic context, as we saw in his attack on scholastic fallacies.

I have focused on these two accounts here as they bring out the tension between Bourdieu and Gramsci well. Perhaps the most salient point from this consideration is support for the claim that their fundamental divergences here are closely tied to the very different historical contexts within which they theorised the intellectual. A broad determinism that captured the historic role of traditional intellectuals before the great merging and supposed homogenisation that Saccarelli points to cannot capture this much larger, socially broader and more variegated sphere now. Thus whilst universities may still be dominated by those born into socially advantaged social strata this is by no means always the case – and of course here Bourdieu himself stands as exemplar. It is not so true then that the contemporary academic is
‘quite literally produced’ by capital, even though – and qualified by a significant remove – they may, ultimately be ‘trained, regulated, employed’ by capital.

As can be seen then this is about the relation of structure to agency - and one in which being ‘born with manifold attachments to’ capital is seen as significant: background too counts here. The task is not so simple then as simply applying Gramscian categories intellectuals unmodified; in considering the contemporary academic field we must treat it as a specific historical phenomenon, but one in which individuals from a (relatively) diverse set of backgrounds increasingly enter, and in which their subsequent disciplining by capital takes place at some remove. Without such a mechanical link between capital and intellectual production we are again presented with the Gordian knot of the agency structure debate - ever more complexly tied when dealing with this field so obviously critical and central to hegemonic rule, but also so clearly structurally at least one divorce form the immediate directives of power. I return then to the earlier discussion where the solution lies in a focus on politically significant agency, but do so now with an indication of the appropriateness of Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of this agency and the nature of this semi-autonomous academic field.

**Habitus and Field**
Against both the notions of the heroic academic individual and the possibility of rational disinterested discourse threatened by external pressures, and that of the determining role of structural position, I wish to place Pierre Bourdieu’s use of the concepts of the ‘habitus’ and ‘field’, which theorise the inter-relation between the individual and their context. The habitus is an individual’s history and (historical) social context internalised – it is thus derived from class position, education, training and occupation, as well as more individual elements such as family and taste, though these themselves reflect class. Habitus is ‘embodied history, internalized as second nature and so forgotten as history - is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product’ (Bourdieu 1990: 56). This produces a durable set of dispositions which structure practice. Practice however can only be accounted for by ‘relating the social conditions in which the habitus that generate them was constituted, to the social conditions in which it is implemented’ (*ibid*). This latter is the field, that is a system of social positions – such as a profession (law, journalism, academia).

Different fields stand in hierarchic relationships to one another, and have differing relations with the socio-economic context (the field of power, incorporating class relations). There is
then a hierarchy of fields both between political and academic discourse, and within academia between disciplinary fields – for Bourdieu, in France, Philosophy crowns the pile. In the Anglo-Saxon world, at least in social science, we may think of economics fulfilling the same function. We can see this in relation to the field of IR: low in the pecking order, thanks to its proximity to policy, often subsumed under political science, with other disciplines tramping freely over its terrain without feeling the need to familiarise themselves with the disciplines’ content (notably, and related to the cosmopolitan discourse I examine, in globalisation theory (Rosenberg 2000)); perhaps only security studies and area studies stand in an inferior relationship to IR. This brings out Bourdieu’s point, that the hierarchy is in inverse relation to the empirical: the greater the distance the greater the ability to euphemise, that is express a political position in terms that refer more to the historical form of the field than the immediate context.

This field effect in academic production is powerful and requires any adequate analysis to contain a ‘dual refusal, rejecting not only any claim of the philosophical text to absolute autonomy, with its concomitant rejection of all external reference, but also any direct reduction of the text to the most general conditions of its production’ (Bourdieu 1991: 2). This means that whilst the form of any production relates to ‘the inner structure of these intellectual networks which shapes ideas, by their patterns of vertical chains across the generations and their horizontal alliances and oppositions’ (Collins 1998: 2), that network, understood as a hierarchic field of struggle, must also be understood as existing in its external social context, and the ultimate content, the social meaning of this production, cannot be understood outside of this context.

Bourdieu uses the concept of homology to relate the forms of such content across different levels of euphemisation. Bourdieu’s treatment of Heidegger’s philosophy, tying it into the broader political milieu of the time, giving a powerful account of the salience of Heidegger’s Nazism to his thought (Bourdieu 1991). Here he uncovers the expressive drive, the politico-ethico message, as a socially conservative one, radicalised both by the direct circumstances of the crisis of Weimar Germany and Heidegger’s own trajectory as a first-generation academic. The field effect, the effect operated upon discourse within a field by the specific constraints of the field can be ‘invoked to prohibit or reject a priori any comparison of the work of Heidegger [...] with the works of economists like Sombart or Spann or political essayists like Spengler or Junger, who would appear to be temptingly similar to Heidegger (ibid: 2).
Expression then is independent, reflecting individual habitus and an individual’s trajectory and struggle within a field, but this is independent only in that this is an individual negotiating of dependence on the specific rules governing the field it is expressed in. Expression in ‘scholarly language, which is produced in fields wracked by the interest and values of the dominant classes, are in a way primary ideologies, which lend themselves ‘quite naturally’ to uses conforming to the values and interest of the dominant classes’ (ibid: 81). The imposition of this form serves ‘to express its distance from all determinations, especially social ones, which reduce the priceless individuality of a thinker to the banality of a class’ (ibid: 82).

In approaching the philosophical field Bourdieu then insists we must abandon a political or philosophical reading in favour of a ‘dual reading’ of writings that are defined, due to the effects of the field, by their fundamental ambiguity – that is by reference to existing in two social spaces at once (ibid: 3). For much of IR this ambiguity is close to non-existent: one cannot mistake the thrust of Robert Kagan’s arguments, and his adherence to even the minimal theoretical rules of IR, and their service to the euphemisation of US power, is itself minimal. Nonetheless, as we approach the greater ‘sophistication’ of critical theories this dual reading becomes more relevant.

In this field effect the ‘decisive mediation’ represented by positions and oppositions within a field, and the related imposition of specific disciplinary form, produces an ‘alchemical transformation’ that protects such discourse from direct reduction to the class position of its producer. The structure of the field and its history is therefore central to understanding the relationship to the external. The ‘great debates’ for example have defined the structure of the IR field – euphemising the political exclusion of Marxist approaches which integrated the political and economic in analysing imperialism (Maclean 1981; Maclean 1988).

The implications of this field effect are drawn out in next chapter where this adds another dimension to the idea of first and second order hegemony. In brief, the argument is that in the second order hegemony – scholars’ self-conception of the discipline as an American social science and concomitant positioning of their work in relation to this, oppositional or otherwise – it is a single reading of the field, of theory qua theory, that is being reacted to. This tends to hold even where there is seen to be a relation between the ‘hegemonic country’ and ‘hegemonic discipline’ as the hegemony within the discipline is still reacted to in this way, within the field understood as a theoretically defined field – the image of the discipline, as a theoretical field dominated by positivist realism is taken to also constitute the socio-political
expression being objected to (cf. Smith 2002). What is missed by this is precisely the ‘great lie’ (Krippendorff 1989) – the various forms of euphemisation and partiality that the theoretical field constructs. Opposition restricting itself to this field taking it as proxy, or even on face value as a constitutive part of that being opposed therefore misses the complexity of the relationship that underpins the construction and development of the theoretical field. This becomes clearer in the trajectories in chapter six, where especially in Ole Wæver’s construction of security as ‘critical’ we see the implications of such a single reading and the use of theoretical positions as a proxy for socio-economic relations.

Before I turn to discuss the application of this theory I note here finally that both to effect ‘revolutionary’ disciplinary change, and to succeed at the highest levels in the field (and the two are internally related, as to succeed one must offer something new, and for the acceptance of novelty’s validity one must have sufficient cultural, field specific, capital) one must first internalise successfully all the rules and positions of the field, to naturalise them within oneself. These conditions apply then a fortiori to the notable individual academic figures considered later, and support the contention that their consideration in fact gives an understanding of the field represented.

Methodology: ‘Persons not paradigms’
This question, of the interaction between politico-ethical expressive drive and the context in which it must be expressed and comprehended, is what the concept of habitus and the field and their interaction in the form of individual’s trajectories within a field captures. As the discussion above concluded, whilst Bourdieu’s approach does not cut the Gordian knot of the agent-structure debate, casting the debate in terms of power, understood in the relational terms set out in who/whom?, invites an approach analysing strategic action within divergent fields, themselves imbricated with one another and the political-economic field of power. This approach focuses then on strategic action within these fields, rather than structure or agency per se. Ole Wæver offers a preceding example of a theoretically sympathetic focus on individual IR scholars and their trajectories, the closest to a Bourdieusian consideration of IR theory we have yet had.90 This work demonstrates the relative novelty of this approach within the field, and through a contrast with the methodology used by Wæver I outline the additional purchase my Bourdieusian model gives.

90 The recent Bourdieusian/practice turn in (European) IR theory being outward facing – that is applying field theory to diplomacy or policing, or subjecting ‘IR concepts to a Bourdieusian reinterpretation’ (Adler–Nissen 2013: 14). All excellent work, but not what we are aiming for here.
In this earlier project, Ole Wæver summarises it as focusing on ‘persons not paradigms’, this focus marking a ‘break with the usual procedure in the [IR] field’ which tends to represent IR ‘as consisting of a number of disembodied ‘schools’ or ‘paradigms’’ (Neumann and Wæver 1997: 1-2). As Wæver argues this obscures the actual production of work in the field, as such work requires that ‘theorists make personal choices’, and, indeed, the most interesting theorists and work tends to operate across the boundaries of the paradigms, reflecting ‘points where numerous cross-pressures meet; different academic projects and discourses combine with numerous extra-academic factors’ (ibid: 3).91

Wæver focuses down on the operation of this cross-boundary work at the individual level, noting ‘an integrated academic persona(lity) is not secured once and for all by picking a ‘position’’ (Wæver 1997: 2). However, as I argued earlier the prevalence of such ‘cross-boundary’ work is also understandable politically at a more aggregate level – that is IR, through this kind of work containing an admixture of approaches or paradigms, can be better understood in its effects (in the maintenance of Western hegemony), than through a focus on surface theoretical battles or ‘debates’.

Wæver then here brings us to a focus on the question of agency, but what is lacking is integration with the field of power. Wæver is of course not blind to this, but treats it through ‘layers’: ‘One has to work inside-out, starting with scholars in their immediate social context, which is mainly other scholars in relation to whom they act strategically, then adding as a second layer their working conditions, funding and academic institutions, and then finally larger political and economic processes’ (Wæver 2010).92 In contrast the Bourdieusian model covers the integration of these levels, which allows us to approach the crux of the argument of the relation of the IR field to the field of power and the field effect on politico-ethical expression – not just perspectives on how ‘personal choices’ are made, but how and why individual expression can have effects at odds with its nominal intention.

As one of the most thoughtful of sociologists of IR, Wæver does also considers the effect of the field as it is understood through the maps and images participants carry of it; the ‘self-images which the discipline has established and used to guide its course’, which individual scholars use

91 Written at arguably the peak of post-structuralist influence within the field – as the works and maps of the field he uses suggest – he also has to defend this approach against the ‘death of the author’, which this characterisation of a ‘meeting point’ reflects.

92 This is his explicit statement on such a sociology of knowledge in considering Buzan and Hansen’s Evolution of International Security Studies (2009); the model is implicit in the 1997 work.
to locate their work. In this he points out the enigmatic nature of the neo-realist hegemony in the discipline – in an argument extendable to the related positivist hegemony\(^93\) – that whilst self-identified neo-realists, or indeed paradigmatic or dogmatic neo-realist works, are far fewer than one would expect for such a hegemonic position, it is the constructing of all other positions in relation to neo-realism that maintains its hegemonic position.

So I take up Wæver’s injunction that we ‘take seriously the question of how [self-images of IR] function, what they are, and what could be achieved by trying to reshape them’, especially as they ‘are implicit operators in (and thereby shape) actual academic practice’ in setting the scene for the two trajectories (Neumann and Wæver 1997: 9). In doing so in relation to European IR, I also address the question of US hegemony through this relation between hegemony within self-images of the discipline (second order hegemony) and the actual content of the work produced and successfully published (first order hegemony). Moreover, this development of the fields is also related to both the Cold War experience of a US led West, and the developing post-Cold War bipolar West. All of this is taken up in the next chapter, before I progress to the final chapter where these consideration are brought to bear through studying two academic trajectories: those of Mary Kaldor and Ole Wæver himself.

\(^93\) For example, Steve Smith railing against positivist hegemony to an ISA audience largely not self-identified as positivists (Smith 2002).
5. Thinking Cosmopolitan Power Europe

Introduction
In considering European IR what I offer here is not an exhaustive history or comparative exercise – though I build upon such work that has already been done - but a reading of it as significant politically, through the role of a specifically European IR in the renovation of Western hegemony. Building from the discussion of more policy related conceptions of Europe in chapter three I contend this centres on the concept of cosmopolitan Europe. Through this the chapter is implicitly structured by Gramsci’s distinction between the cosmopolitan and the international, the latter encompassing ‘production and exchange, while cosmopolitanism is cultural and class-based, the narrow perspective of a small elite, ‘that of the bourgeois, who travels for business or pleasure’” (Ives and Short 2013: 638, Gramsci cited in ibid.). In line with such a class analysis, Jonathan Friedman and Kajsa Ekholm Friedman see the rise of cosmopolitan discourse as linked to both growing inequality and hegemonic crisis (Friedman and Friedman 2013). This is the context that marks the emergence of both an explicit ‘cosmopolitan Europe’, and ‘cosmopolitan power Europe’ discourse as well as the implicit cosmopolitan content of contemporary, especially constructivist European IR theory (Diez and Manners 2007; McCormack 2009).

I start by arguing that cosmopolitan Europe is an idealist account of European integration antithetical to that I have given, and trace the development within cosmopolitanism as its consanguinity with liberal imperialism became apparent, conflicting with its proponents self-identified ‘critical’ stance. This development, towards an Arendtian cosmopolitanism, demonstrates the need to go beyond the surface of conceptual and theoretical development to understand the interaction between ethico-political drives, the field they are expressed in and their political effects. This is made clear in the last section of this first half of the chapter in which the political ontology of cosmopolitanism is considered, noting that it builds to the idea of the citizen as height of human fulfilment, thereby placing itself on Trotsky’s ‘threshold of historical society’ through its abnegation of the constitutive role of class struggle.

The second half gives both the contemporary and Cold War historical context for this development as it relates to the IR discipline in Europe and US hegemony within the discipline. To do this I distinguish between first and second orders of hegemony: the former is the make-up of the contemporary work in the discipline and the disciplining thereof – what scholars actually do, and the publication gatekeeping, impact on job prospects and funding that shapes this; the second is the self-image of the discipline that scholars work with, how they relate
their work to the field and conceive of its oppositions and cleavages. In setting cosmopolitanism as a reaction to US hegemony as it manifested in these forms the significance of this history, particularly in European peace research and the understanding of US hegemony as a positivist realist hegemony, becomes clear.

Signal here then are the enduring legacy of a foundational Cold War US hegemony within the discipline and the concomitant expression of European interests outside of this hegemony in European peace studies. As there is a considerable extant literature here what I offer is sets of summary contentions focused on the ongoing salience of this history. As it is a more contentious assessment I demonstrate more fully that the IR field has developed to contain a bi-polar Western hegemony, building on existing analysis of publication patterns to give an illustrative longitudinal curricula analysis of the Central European University’s graduate IR programme, which shows both the continuance of a second order US hegemony (in the description of the field’s theoretical coordinates) and the shift to a developing bi-polar Western first order hegemony (in the concepts and logics of action introduced to the students).

**Cosmopolitan Power Europe**
Underpinning European legitimacy in interventions, especially as through the EU, is the concept of cosmopolitan Europe. It is this conception that underpins the characterisations of Europe as an international actor found in normative and ethical power Europe discourses (Sjursen 2006; Aggestam 2008). It also closely ties into global civil society discourses, which in turn legitimise interventions from the ‘international community’ more generally, and the operationalization of all of these conceptions in the framing of actual or potential European responses to the post-Cold War challenges of ‘new wars’ as also a new and progressive form of action.

In all of this, cosmopolitanism and associated conceptions, there is a transcendence both of ‘atavistic’ nationalisms or racisms, but also of liberal principles of political ontology. First naturalising the divisions – of polity and economy and associated conception of the state, the individual, civil society and the relations between them - in order to transcend these ‘outmoded’ structures. Thus cosmopolitan democracy and global civil society radicalise the

---

94 Aggestam in particular captures the submerged tension between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism in the universalisation of such a constitutively European cosmopolitanism.
liberal individual against the state – placing political rights over the state, not set within it - through civil society incorporating private economic actors as well as NGOs, to place the state under the supervision of the private sphere, with civil society, rather than the state, the legitimate guarantor of individual rights. There is therefore a continuity between the neoliberal restructuring of the state discussed earlier, in which the ‘state [is] under the supervision of the market, rather than [the] market supervised by the state’ (Gane 2012: 626), and concepts such as ‘monitory democracy’ attempting to give power to ‘global civil society’ in the form of transnational private actors (Keane 2009).

In this section I will work through the argument above, in the order given, building to a Gramscian understanding of this cosmopolitan power – most apposite as it is (more or less wilful) misreadings of Gramsci that much of the self-consciously progressive work in this vein is constructed against. In this, we are seeing another iteration of the post-Marxist tactic described in chapter two – Marx, or Gramsci, being misrepresented and this caricature used to allow a retreat from holistic Marxist approaches in favour of idealisms. Jürgen Habermas is a consistent link here, in shifting ‘Marxism’ away from relations of production to a post-Marxist ‘angelism of language’ – a conception of language and its role entirely opposed to that of Marx and Gramsci (Anderson 1983; Ives 2004: 134-171) - in that both his work on the public sphere underpins much of this civil society work, and that he is a significant proponent of cosmopolitan power Europe himself. As he puts it in the NED’s Journal of Democracy:

‘Cosmopolitans see a federal European state as a point of departure for the development of a transnational network of regimes that together could pursue a world domestic policy, even in the absence of a world government’ (Habermas 2003).

**Cosmopolitan Europe**

Cosmopolitan Europe represents an idealist account of the interrelated questions of the post-Cold War existence, constitution, and role of Europe. In this it represents an antithetical take to that I have developed above to the same processes – an ‘alternative’ ‘**new critical theory of European integration**’ (Beck, Grande, and Cronin 2007: 27, their emphasis).

Cosmopolitan Europe is then fundamentally a creation of the EU and the struggles to understand it as a polity outside of a class framework; from this starting point the transcendence of the state-system and creation of a post-modern political formation – or ‘post-national constellation’ - requires a new conceptual apparatus and associated form of identifier for Europe. In this construction both analytical and normative are intermingled, building the ‘illimitable narcissism’ of European thought on the EU, upon this transcendence of
‘outmoded’, repressive, war-prone state structures. Through this the EU is constructed as an inherently progressive normative actor against preceding modern European history, understood through an inter-state lens. This then gives meaning to the idea that those outside this post-modern configuration - sometimes extended to include the US in a broader Western ‘zone of peace’ – are trapped in a historical condition which Europeans have overcome. It thus continues the longer history of European thought in which the rest of the world can be helped to catch up with civilized Europe, through European tutelage of one form or another.

Ulrich Beck, prominent within the formation of this vision, lays out the brave novelty of his conception: ‘In fact, advanced research on Europe has scarcely dared venture beyond the conventional basic pattern of nation-state thinking’ even ‘when speaking of ‘governance’ or a ‘multilevel system’’ research on Europe serves ‘to conceive of and cast the EU in the image of the nation-state’, and is accordingly ‘blind to Europe’ (Beck 2007: 109). What this ‘advanced research’ misses is the ‘European miracle’ in which enemies can become neighbours fundamentally through a transcendence of national ‘containers’ and the creation of non-national liberal democracy. This Nobel Prize winning ‘miracle’ and its development into a ‘European Way’ is set-up in clear separation from the ‘American Way’, as the latter retains a nationalist frame, whilst the former is built upon transnational civil society and cosmopolitan democracy.

Cosmopolitan approaches then set themselves against the methodological nationalism of the social sciences, and especially IR’s realism and/or neo-realism95 - approaches that, significantly, are seen to be becoming fallacious, not as always having been ideological. Instead then of the internal relation between class and state-society formations and change I have argued for above, class based approaches too are similarly becoming outmoded – belonging in fact to such defunct ‘nation-state’ thinking. Instead cosmopolitanism is ‘post-class’, and, as unable to deny the reality of ‘global capitalism’, constructs instead a ‘global civil society’ against ‘global capital’ (Beck 2005; Beck, Grande, and Cronin 2007).

Thus visions of global civil society are derived from the authors idealised vision of an EU Europe and its possibilities – of nation separated from state and of democracy separated from citizenship with a European civil society that precludes talk of ‘democratic deficit’. Jürgen

95 There is no meaningful separation between them in these cosmopolitan analyses.
Habermas, for a long time the philosophical anchoring point of this discourse, lays this out in the European context:

> discussions have to be synchronized within national public spheres that are networked across Europe—that is, conducted at the same time and on the same topics—so that a European civil society with interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, citizens' initiatives, and so on, can emerge. Transnational mass media, in turn, can construct a multivocal, communicative context only if national educational systems provide for a common linguistic basis.

(Habermas 2003: 98)

Ulrich Beck in turn stresses the intertwined internal and external elements in ‘cosmopolitan Europe’, a phrase ‘intentionally ambiguous denoting both internal development and the possibilities of Europe’s shift towards cosmopolitan democratic ideals, and the ‘global contribution the project of cosmopolitan Europe could make to the realization of a regime of multiple cosmopolitanisms’ (Beck et al 2007: 26). This in turn ties in to the role of Europe in a bi-polar West as '[o]nly a cosmopolitan Europe - and that means a transatlantic Europe that seeks and finds its global political role in the threatened world and does not confuse a cooperative balancing policy towards the United States with an antagonistic policy against the United States’ (ibid: 26) can fulfil such a role within the conditions created by the end of US hegemony (ibid: 217-219).

This is rather too explicit for cosmopolitanism’s critical credentials to remain untarnished. Such Habermasian liberal cosmopolitanism is too clearly legitimating of Western interventions – as Habermas’ explicit political judgements too make clear (see for example the collection in Habermas 2006). For critical European thought that both seeks to avoid class analysis and maintain a progressive position, most importantly without the conflict that class based analysis entails, a more euphemised relation to this organic situation must be developed. Here the recent ‘turn’ to Arendtian cosmopolitanism, as an internal reaction to liberal cosmopolitanism, becomes significant.

**Arendtian Cosmopolitanism: liberalism vs liberal republicanism**

During her lifetime, and beyond through the Cold War, the main political implications of Hannah Arendt’s thought were clear. The usefulness for the West during the Cold War of her focus on the individual against totalitarianism, and concomitant drawing of equivalence between Nazi Germany and the USSR, is obvious and a central plank in legitimating liberalism at the time as the ‘vital centre’ against such states. Focusing on this Cold War applicability,
Kees van der Pijl notes her affiliations with the Rockefeller and Guggenheim foundations and how the claim that totalitarianism itself is inclined to ‘radical evil’ ‘impart[s] a friend-foe matrix on Morgenthau’s realism’ (van der Pijl 2014: 90, 101). As well as contemporaries and fellow émigrés, Arendt and Hans Morgenthau were also friends – more than this though both were central, if not the central, pillars of the ‘political studies enlightenment’ in political theory and the emergent International Relations discipline respectively (Katzenelson 2004; Williams 2013; cf. Rösch 2013, cf. Owens 2009).

The project of this enlightenment was to refound liberalism, after the near fatal blow of the Second World War and the Holocaust, rescuing its core values but ‘(all-importantly) without the unrealistic optimism and naïveté of so many of their predecessors’ (Jones 2005: 544). The attempt, for classical realism too, was to ‘move beyond both 19th-century visions of ‘classical’ liberalism and its 20th-century ‘progressive’ forms’ as ‘only a liberal politics shorn of its ‘utopian’ elements — both epistemic and political — could […] be suitably equipped to advance a renewed liberal politics’ (Williams 2013: 652).

It is this that gives the true character and role of classical realism in IR, as an attempt to save US liberalism from itself – rather than as its antithetical ‘other’, this latter a role it only took up with its caricaturing by Waltz. This link makes the post-millennial surge of interest in Arendt within International Relations of particular interest, giving the underlying politics to what can otherwise seem faddishness in the picking up of thinkers within IR. Arendt’s relevance for International Relations has recently received book length treatments by Patricia Owens (2007) and Patrick Hayden (2009), alongside Anthony Lang and John Williams’ edited volume (2008), with numerous journal articles too, and an increasing inclusion in volumes drawing together thinkers of relevance for the discipline (Edkins and Vaughan-Williams 2009, Moore and Farrands 2010, Bell 2010).

Patrick Hayden’s trajectory demonstrates the position of this interest within cosmopolitanism’s development, as he shifts from a development of cosmopolitanism from Rawlsian starting points (Hayden 2002), to a more general development of Cosmopolitan Global Politics (in line with my treatment above as a transcendence of IR realism, understood as realpolitik), drawing in Mary Kaldor’s work on global civil society and the transformation of war to cosmopolitan law enforcement (see below) (Hayden 2005, and cf. Hayden and el-Ojeili 2006 for more of this cosmopolitan ’critical globalisation’ theory). In this latter work Arendt appears only for her expression of the need for a permanent international criminal court –
However, by the 2009 volume Arendt’s work is a central focus (Hayden 2007; Hayden 2009; Hayden 2010).

This suggests Arendtian cosmopolitanism should be located as a solution to problems within cosmopolitanism, as the intellectual projects intertwined with cosmopolitanism (and with one another) of global civil society and globalisation theory have lost their lustre as both their analytical weakness and shallow grasp of the political have become increasingly exposed and obvious, most notably as their arguments have been used in the justification of actual liberal imperialist endeavours. As Anthony Burke puts it, ‘what Arendt argues in her work is of great importance for a reconstructive critique of cosmopolitanism’ (Burke 2008: 45).

This critique of the political implications of this preceding liberal cosmopolitanism from the Arendtian direction is strong. Patricia Owens in particular sets Arendt’s work against that of the liberal cosmopolitans exemplified by Habermas. She correctly sees that the effects of Habermas’ political vision cannot easily be separated from that of the neoconservatives he is nominally so stridently against. This is a problem with Habermasian cosmopolitanism noted elsewhere. Vivienne Matthies-Boon identifies the shared ‘core ideological values and perceptions’ between Habermas and the neoconservatives as a belief in the universal value of democracy, understood in procedural terms as formal democratic processes, tied to a neglect of history, particularly of colonialism and post-colonialism.

It is this vision that means that whilst he is nominally ‘fervently opposed [to] the neoliberal and neoconservative policies of the Bush administration’ his own work is easily appropriated by just such a discourse (Matthies-Boon 2011: 167; an example of appropriation is to be found in Delahunty and Yoo 2009), despite being arrived at from radically different starting premises (neoconservatives rarely accused of scholasticism or excessive academic rigour). Matthies-Boon however holds that Habermas can escape this danger, that it does not necessarily follow

---

96 Craig Calhoun and John McGowan highlight the resurgence of interest in Arendt’s thought within political science more generally in the 1990s as a search for a solution to the ‘widespread crisis in critical imagination’ within the academy created by the end of the Cold War. In this, they note Arendt’s work is ‘deep and rich enough’ to be helpful to the development of postmodern and deconstructive as well as Habermasian approaches, as well as having a role in bolstering identity politics (Calhoun and McGowan 1997: 5, 8).

97 The problem with Habermas’ position can also be seen in the central significance he gives to George W. Bush representing a break in US foreign policy. An indication of the falsity of this can be seen discursively in the historical breadth of US political resources drawn upon in Francis Fukuyama’s creation of a ‘realistic Wilsonianism’ in his strange anti-*mea culpa ‘After the Necons’* (Fukuyama 2006), and empirically in anything but the most idealistic study of US foreign policy (cf. van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2012).
from his basic positions, so Habermas meaningfully can and ‘needs [to] explicitly differentiate his cosmopolitanism from theirs and to anticipate the contours of how such misappropriation might occur’ (*ibid*: 180).

However Habermas does indeed offer just such a differentiation in his cosmopolitanism, focused on the individual under international law, or where this is judged ethically lacking under ‘cosmopolitan law’ as the highest arbiter. The distinction then rests on the cosmopolitan transcending of nationalism and the state – on conceptions of post-national democracy and global civil society – with a central role for monitoring of state actions and legitimacy deriving from this global civil society. This though does not tackle the central issue of the ‘potentially constitutive role for humanitarian violence in the creation of a ‘global public sphere’ with cosmopolitan intent’. This then is a deep problem for cosmopolitanism and in constructing a solution ‘Arendt’s thought offers […] significant critical tools to question’ this link to ‘coercive interventions and liberal imperialism’ (Burke 2008: 514, 516)

Before moving to these tools, note that Patricia Owens’ attack is intended against more liberal interpretations of Arendt too – Owens is constructing Arendt as a non-liberal thinker. As Owens notes of Hayden’s work, in failing to ‘pursue Arendt’s more radical argument’ whose ‘target was capitalism and liberal ideology more generally’ ‘ Hayden leaves us with an image of Arendt as a sort of chastened liberal’ imbricated with the cosmopolitanism of Ulrich Beck (Owens 2011: 884-5). He thus ‘assimilate[s] Arendt to a reformed liberal cosmopolitanism. The effect is that one of the most idiosyncratic, iconoclastic and nonliberal thinkers of the 20th century is reduced to a normative international theorist’ (Owens 2011: 885).

It is something of a commonplace to note that Arendt is relatively uncategorisable in contemporary political philosophical terms, particularly as structured by the liberal/cosmopolitan and communitarian divide. This reflects the decline of a distinctive civic republicanism as it has been absorbed into the broader liberal tradition, as it is within this (classical) civic republicanism that Arendt’s thought, and her cosmopolitanism sits (Lloyd 1995, Passerin d’Entrèves 1994). This tradition of individual human freedom and development realisable only through political association and action within a community lies outside the ‘stale’ oppositions of liberal and communitarian thought (Calhoun and McGowan 1997: 7). The tools identified to reconstruct cosmopolitanism below relate to this tradition, whilst my summation of the political ontologies of cosmopolitanism of both kinds indicates why the civic republican tradition is so often merged into liberalism more generally.
The tools useful in reconstructing cosmopolitanism therefore include space for political communities, rejecting Habermas’ focus on the individual within a global public, through noting the constitutive and limiting role of particularistic political communities – a cosmopolitan order must therefore exist between these communities (Owens 2007, 146–148). As Arendt’s approach, though highly individualistic, is not just based on the liberal individual but on the space for debate and deliberation between them, this generates not a straightforward Habermasian model but considerations of both the limits and possibilities of cosmopolitan politics (Owens 2010, cf. Villa 1997, cf. Cocard 1997).

Most particularly Arendt takes seriously the question of the founding of such cosmopolitan orders, the failure to address this leaving ‘liberal and Habermasian cosmopolitanisms’ ‘unable to conceive the transcendence of nation-state politics and identities in a non-ideological and non-imperialist manner’. Habermas’ focus on the individual and the transcendence of the nation-state left him open to a ‘top-down emphasis on the need for supra-national authority’, whereas directly against this ‘Arendt held that a legitimate order must be a horizontally founded international authority’ (Owens 2010: 82; Arendt cited in ibid).

Central though, and the central problem, is the separation of politics from power, through separating power from violence, with war and violence for Arendt sited as the antithesis of politics. She is thus totally at odds with political realism. Patricia Owens puts it pugnaciously claiming political realism ‘debases the very possibility of meaningful politics; it is simply a legitimated form of domination. This is a description of government under capitalism rather than a theory of politics’ (Owens 2012: 567; cf. Owens 2007: 13-32). This can only leave a theory of politics outside of the reality of power as it is exercised, revealing itself as pure idealism. David McGowan approvingly agrees seeing in Arendt an ‘idealistic purification’ of politics, giving us what we should look to politics to provide, not what the political actually is (McGowan 1997; cf. Owens 2007: 31).

This then is scholastic fallacy redoubled. Firstly, if Habermas is convicted of ‘moralism as egoistic universalism’ as the suppression of the constitutive role of the conditions of access to

---

98 Rejecting any kind of continuum between, war and politics (principally against Foucauldian based reversals of Clausewitz’s maxim) Patricia Owens gets to the nub of the disagreement seeing it as an ontological disagreement over the potential existence or otherwise of the ‘integrity of a distinct public, political realm’ (Owens 2007: 31).
his public sphere means his theory of politics is abstracted away from power, then when even Habermas finds Arendt guilty of ‘a politics that is cleansed of social and economic issues’ it is clear that the criticisms we saw Bourdieu level at Habermas apply to Arendt a fortiori (Bourdieu 2000: 65 (see above); Habermas 1977: 15).

Magnifying this is the assessment of Arendt’s thought itself outside of political context. Many accounts point to Arendt’s personal experience and the contemporaneous political conjuncture she lived through: none of those seeking to build on her thought however place her work within the structural context given by van der Pijl and Katzenelson. Indeed, this relates to using Arendt’s thought itself, as the ‘framework of Arendt’s analysis cannot incorporate socio-theoretical considerations of this [dynamic] kind’ (Fine and Cohen 2002: 154). Within Arendt’s work there is no conception of the relation of the creation of liberal universalism to the reaction against it (ibid), her thought here is therefore static, in the sense of political thought sheared from its geopolitical moorings, and creates a flat model of a liberal centre set against the ‘political evil’ of the extremes of left and right. The effect is to replace politics with ethics in the idealist sense criticised in chapter one, worse but accordingly unsurprising this ‘ethical vision is strangely immaterial’ (Burke 2008).

**Cosmopolitanism and liberal political ontology**

Take up of Hannah Arendt then provides an answer to the problem of liberal cosmopolitanism’s complicity in liberal interventionism, up to and including that of its putative ideological foe the Bush Jr Administration. It does so through moving beyond liberal individualism to a republican focus on the individual as actor in the world, on achieving identity and freedom – even creating authentic politics - through action in concert with others. This founding of politics therefore disallows the creation of true democratic politics through violence, possible within a more formal proceduralist vision.

There is then a strong critical voice against specific imperial military interventions, and indeed the focus on the mutual creation of politics is hard to object to as an ideal. The question however is an ontological one – of whether such an ideal has or can exist, and under what conditions (cf. n. 98 above). Following from this also, whether attainable in the absolute or not, how one could approach it. In this the ‘citizen is one of the most powerful ‘wishful portraits of being truly human’’, but ‘bound to remain abstract and rhetorical in bourgeois society’, and in this way the image of the citizen ‘precedes in however overblown and general a way the guiding image of the comrade’ (Rehmann 1999: 11, Ernst Bloch in Rehman 1999: 11).
The objection here then centres on the neglect, in taking up her thought, of the implications of the strongest and most common criticism of Arendt from the left. This criticism is focused on her strict distinctions between and rigid separation of spheres of social life, and it is this that places her within a liberal political ontology. In particular the strict distinctions between public and private reflect the liberal reification of the separation of the political, social and economic seen in the ‘Arendtian tendency that looks towards the conceptual partitioning of modes of human activity into closed and self-contained spheres that preclude interpenetration’ (Holman 2011: 333)

Thus whilst Patricia Owens is right to assert that Arendt cannot be understood outside of her interaction with Marxist theory (Owens 2007, 2011), the very structure of Arendt’s theory is, in these divisions and distinctions, a repudiation of Marxist theory. The nature of this interaction is however also deeply problematic as ‘Arendt’s interpretation of Marx can only be described as highly tendentious’, if not ‘blatantly’ mistaken, and she thus ‘does not provide a critique of those aspects of Marx’s thought that would seem to invalidate her theoretical structure, but rather a critique of an imagined content within Marx, which, in fact, produces the initial need for this theoretical structure’ (Holman 2011: 334-5).

The Marxian concept of labour at once cuts across all three of the dimensions of her vita activa – of labour, work and action – there is no separating out of the specifically political sphere of action as it is embedded within labour as a whole. In seeking to reject this holistic embedding of the political we see then the deep structural idealism within her theory. Politics, or action, as contained in a separate realm is therefore false, in an ideological way, historically constructed and ‘lacking relevance outside of the context of the social formation which [Marx] will identify as capitalism’ (Holman 2011: 337). Arendt then fails to recognize within Marx his ‘desire to promote the very possibilities for free action that so much concern her’, to which his theoretical development of the concept of labour is central (Hansen 1993: 37–38; Holman 2011: 351).

As noted, this becomes clearest through concept of the citizen as politically active individual in society. Jan Rehm ann notes the difficulties introduced to Marx’s thinking by the German term Bürger referring simultaneously citizen and bourgeois. He notes that Marx’s contribution ‘reveals a ‘fundamental division’ between the two. He separates the different features, pits them against each other, and finally demonstrates that the citoyen is treated as the ‘servant’
of the egoistic bourgeois’, meanwhile the ‘sphere in which man acts as a communal being is degraded to the sphere in which he acts as a partial being’ (Rehmann 1999: 4). What is significant, and it prefigures Bourdieu’s criticism of the ‘invisible property qualification’ underlying the Habermasian public sphere also, is the formal separation of these realms. This, as noted throughout Marxist theory, gives the illusion of political freedom under capitalism, and it is this that Arendt reifies. Despite then focusing on the alienation inhering in the modern and the danger capital presents to the public sphere she misses that this is made possible, and the subordination of the citizen to the bourgeois to which she and Habermas object, is enabled precisely through these divisions and this conception of the political.

This then does not overcome the problematic normative social structuring effects of liberal cosmopolitanism as the fundamental political ontologies are shared. Cosmopolitanism, especially through its normative global civil society aspect, is notably often constructed against tendentious misreadings of Gramscian Marxism. Similar to Arendt’s reading of Marx, there is a consistent reading into Gramsci of their own theoretical divisions, with the function of discrediting what is in fact a holistic approach, towards which they would otherwise be almost ineluctably drawn by their normative drive and moral opposition to the effects of capital’s global predations.

Joseph Buttigieg exposes this tendency in the work of the LSE’s Centre for Civil Society (including work by Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier, and Marlies Glasius), citing numerous examples throughout their corpus of work. In particular he cites John Keane’s contribution to their Global Civil Society 2001 volume, repeated verbatim in Keane’s 2003 Global Civil Society, where he refers to the ‘Gramscian bias which draws a thick line between (bad) business backed by government and (good) voluntary associations’, such a ‘one-sided emphasis on the free civic choices of men and women has the effect of obscuring other planetary forces that currently constrain and enable their actions’ (Keane 2003: 63). As Buttigieg notes ‘Gramsci’s rejection of economism (i.e., the economic determinism inherent in simplistic or vulgar versions of the base-superstructure model) is taken for a separation tout court between the economic sphere and civil society’ (Buttigieg 2005: 42).

---

99 How else to explain the consistency of this misrepresentation and use as a strawman? Indeed as we see in considering Mary Kaldor below these ‘global civil society’ works are rooted in the attempt to think beyond democratic socialism.
This normative division within civil society, between its NGOs and its less palatable private operators is in fact characteristic of liberal cosmopolitanism and global civil society work more generally, as Barry Buzan notes in preferring his own international society approach as it avoids this analytic/normative conflation (Buzan 2004a: 80-82). John Keane’s highlighting of it here is to enable the reintegration of business into the ‘good’ category of ‘global civil society’ arguing ‘turbocapitalist firms, aided by the local and regional networks of smaller firms with which they do business, have definite civilising effects on the global civil society in which they are embedded’(Keane 2003: 82). This is pure cosmopolitanism, in the class sense I introduced of the worldview of the business traveller, as ‘[t]heir corporate negotiations are an obvious case in point. If they are serious about establishing business links, say, with South Korean firms, then they know that there are certain social rules that have to be followed’ (ibid: 82).

Gramsci’s approach in fact operates as a ‘critical counterpart to current liberal tendencies of embellishing and harmonizing civil society, because it lays bare the ideological structures of civil society and allows us to understand its social contradictions: on the one hand the material organization of the hegemonic (e.g. neoliberal) ideology, its apparatuses, hierarchies, gender-relations; on the other, elements of resistance, counter-cultures, the development of mass movements, their fragmentation and dispersion etc.’ (Buttigieg 2005: 44). Civil society here is not then a normative concept in the same sense, but an analytical heuristic serving to explicate the resilience of Western bourgeois society and the need for a different revolutionary strategy in relation to it. But then these are arguments that have been made before. What should be taken from this is the task given by Jan Rehmann of bringing ‘home’ the critical content of the ‘citizen’ and civil society. The task of retrieving the critical vision that wants to find and give ‘voice’ to those affected by old, new, and emerging inequities in the broadest sense, and providing a political and social platform for such voices to be heard.’ (Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius: 2003: 3–4.). More theoretically, to enable ‘meaningful engagement between the

---

100 It is worth noting here that Keane intuitively moves to productive capital in his examples – where at least at manager/cadre level there is some awareness of the need for socialisation and sustainability. By contrast, he rejects an analysis of global trends from within the dominant fully disembedded realm of financial capital seen in George Soros’s account of ‘the intensification of the profit motive and its penetration into areas that were previously governed by other considerations’ meaning ‘[i]t is no exaggeration to say that money rules people’s lives to a greater extent than ever before’ (Soros 1998:102, cited in Keane 2003: 81-2), as this exaggerates the exploitative role, and underplays the nourishing role, he seeks to create for capital in civil society.
Arendtian and Marxian political-theoretical traditions’ drawing in ‘politics as action, as spontaneous collective activity oriented towards the production of radically new beginnings’ to the benefit of Marxist approaches (Holman 2011: 349-350).

This then is the crux of the matter, the critical intent being expressed within the field. Chris Brown captures this succinctly: ‘Before the rise of academic cosmopolitanism, [‘engaged, non-banal’] internationalism was how those with a left/progressive sensibility approached international relations – a good question would be how and why th[e] notion of practical solidarity came to be displaced by th[is] kind of pointless abstract theorising’ (Brown 2012: 115).

Without (thankfully) needing to arrive at any definitive answer on the correct interpretation of Arendt, we can see from all this the great hope for cosmopolitanism as an academic expression of normative/politico-ethical drives, alongside strongly contested debate over its limits and possibilities. In this it ties in with the argument overall, of European difference as a genuine expressive drive giving it true emancipatory potential, but limited by a lack of self-reflexivity both on its class origins and the relations of its own production, and a determined blindness to the continuing central importance of class relations to the political. As Chris Brown suggests, this is not something that can be nailed down at the theoretical level: cosmopolitanism can mean a great many things. To understand it we must get beyond the idea of concepts and paradigms as the limits of political expression, to the actual political expressions they are intended to contain, those expressing themselves in this way, and the field they are expressing them within.

‘European IR’ as context for development of cosmopolitan Europe

Before I outline the contours of the context from which this cosmopolitan vision has developed, a few comments on what I mean by ‘European IR’. Although where scholars are trained and pursue their careers is of great significance, here in setting the contextual field for the trajectories I explore in the next chapter I delimit ‘Europe’ not in a simple - though far from clear-cut - geographical sense, but primarily through its political component, bringing back into play the argument that politically significant thought is organically connected to the conditions of its production. In all this I am focusing upon the West, so during the Cold War the focus is Western Europe, though the Cold War Central and Eastern European experience is seen in the negation of Marxist-Leninism post-Cold War.
This organic link is already present in accounts of ‘Western IR’ given in the introductory chapter. Here, whilst the focus is often on epistemology or conceptual imperialism, the link to contemporary Western (neo-)imperialism, and preceding European colonialism, is always at least implicit. As indicated, I am focusing on intra-Western dynamics, so the key shifts in the field are between the Cold War US hegemony to a post-Cold War bi-polar West.

Within this contemporarily it is within security studies, broadly defined, that European approaches are most discernible. That is, it is within security studies especially that we find approaches that are not ‘sectorial’ (that is security studies) manifestations of the main theories as defined by the ‘grand debates’ of the discipline at large, nor ‘copied form the United States’ (Wæver 2012: 48), but theorising grounded and developed from specifically European experience and debates that nonetheless reverberate through and influence the broader discipline (Wæver and Buzan 2013: 405). In security studies’ merging of the Cold War experiences of IR and peace research it is not surprising that this should be so, and accordingly it is here that cosmopolitan Europe is most politically meaningfully applied and operationalised. The contest over Europe’s role in a bi-polar West this contains, alongside this being the primary site where the first order shift to bi-polar theoretical production has taken place, in reaction to and contesting the second order US hegemony, has turned security studies from a rather staid sub-discipline to the most ‘fruitful’, ‘most dynamic and contested areas in International Relations’ (Williams 2003: 511).

In setting the context then I build a justification for considering a bi-polar Western IR as an emerging reality as well as offering some summary contentions focused on the ongoing salience of the Cold War field of IR and peace research, which underpin any explanation of why ‘one part of the West suddenly deviated so radically from its dominant counterpart on the other side of the Atlantic’ (Wæver 2012: 49) and which inform the cosmopolitanism discussed above. The two trajectories in the following chapter bring these relationships together in their applied cosmopolitanism.

**An American Social Science – Cold War IR and second order hegemony**

Whilst debate over the ultimate origins of the discipline continues, the central question on the nature of the discipline from the second world war onwards is not whether, but to what

---

101 In this context it is notable in itself, and indicative of my difference with these ‘post-Western IR’ approaches and the US/West conflation, that Wæver’s thoughts on contemporary European IR is included within the project of geo-cultural epistemologies and ‘Thinking International Relations Differently’.
degree IR was, or later remains, an American social science (Hoffmann 1977; Holsti 1985; Wæver 1998, Smith 2000; Walt 2011; Kristensen 2013). Current research points to an increasing ‘Europeanisation’ of the discipline, with publication now dominated by ‘Northeast American and West European elites’ (Kristensen 2013), however this dominant US founding meant that for the Cold War period European IR was almost by definition a terrain of ‘clones, copies and franchises’ (Jorgensen 2000).

The central element of this is the constitutive role of an artificially transplanted field of scholarship on the theorising taking place within it. As Jorg Friedrichs notes, the rubric of the ‘Great Debates’ structured European IR without relating to European academic contexts; for example the behaviourist turn was within the US academy (Friedrichs 2004; cf. Jorgensen 2000). This extends also to the social taxonomy the discipline interrelates with – nowhere else outside the US was thought on the international organically developed as a sub-field of a political science; with political science itself an approach to politics contemporaneously specific to the US. It was this grafted, non-organic nature that gave a lifeless feel to European IR that the caricature captures.

This makes sense of the focus on ‘strategies’ identified earlier in the literature considering European IR (Friedrichs 2004; Friedrichs and Wæver 2009). US hegemony was totalised with the boundaries and structure of the field set by the US discipline. Developing an organically (Western) European or national IR within such an accepted disciplinary context is accordingly difficult and requires strategies for engaging or disengaging with this field’s very structure. This then is also the limitation of such approaches focusing on strategy, they deal with the potential within the field, divorced from sociological extra-disciplinary factors (as opposed

---

102 In claiming there is more to the history of ‘continental’ IR theory than this, Jorgensen points to three areas that I cover as lying outside of IR theory: namely European Peace Research, Marxist approaches and their marginalisation, and the development of EU studies. Whilst this alerts us to the danger of circularity – looking for and defining IR as practiced by the mainstream means you will find only copies in Europe – in fact Jorgensen points to both the drawing on of very different resources outside of IR by these three European approaches in defining themselves against IR, and concomitantly their de facto, and usually institutional, position outside of the IR discipline. In this he supports my argument on the meaningful distinction between European and US IR and that on the sources of contemporary European IR, albeit casting a broader IR rubric backwards into the past than I do as he divorces the discipline from its organic relation to US foreign policy production, setting his argument explicitly against Hoffmann. In fact, he describes quite neatly precisely what I argue in this section, that European IR scholars have largely only a single reading of the field, taking it as constituted by its theoretical expressions only not its political drivers and effects.
merely to external ‘events’, which as Ole Wæver points out is a central failing of IR’s thinking about itself (Wæver 1998, cf. Holden 2002)).

However, as Hoffman asserted with his seminal characterisation, extra-disciplinary factors were central to the (re-)birth of the discipline as such a US social science. In its simplest relation to Western hegemony, if, in Stephen Walt’s take on the US social science, ‘major powers inevitably spend a lot of time thinking about global affairs and the rest of the world pays a lot of attention to what thinkers in the major powers are saying’, then European IR becomes more central as a bi-polar West forms, though working within both a field structured by this preceding hegemony and by the ‘second image’ hegemony of the continuing structuring of images of the discipline around US hegemony (Walt 2011: u.n.).

The various accounts over the years of IR as an American social science have focused on differing forms of hegemony from journal publication patterns and gatekeeping, and disciplining utterances from prominent figures within the discipline, to the way the discipline is taught, with textbook or curricula analysis. Considering the diverse ‘manner in which this widespread claim has been put forth’ Helen Turton finds assertions of US dominance ‘largely speculative’ and too ‘generic and ambiguous’ and so the ‘central issue is not whether the United States dominates the discipline but the degree and manner in which it does’. What is required is a disaggregating of the concept of US dominance as the US may dominate in some ways and not others (Turton 2013: 10). Thus while the ‘American IR community is intellectually hegemonic institutionally and theoretically’ in empirically investigating the contours of this dominance within IR Turton finds it unquestionably dominant in only one of five areas, in its institutional preponderance, whilst in IR theory the American academy is dominant in volume of production but within a theoretically pluralist discipline - evidence is lacking of US dominance in agenda-setting, methodology and gatekeeping (ibid: 227).

Recently too there is the growing idea that IR theory as a coherent ‘thing’ has come to an end (cf. EJIR special issue September 2013). Christine Sylvester sees IR now as consisting of a

---

103 This is Helen Turton’s PhD thesis, offering much needed detailed empirical analysis of various forms of US dominance in the field, uncovering the ‘reality of this diverse academic environment’, which should result at the least in reconsideration of the use of IR’s self-image as an American Social Science. The thesis is currently under embargo as due out in monograph form as part of the Worlding Beyond The West series, so I would like here to thank Helen for providing me with a copy of the thesis. I look forward to the debate upon its publication!
variety of camps - whether of feminist IR, or postmodern IR or realist IR - and laments their insularity and the lack of communication between them. All the while however, ‘IR’ itself continues along through holding conferences and especially through teaching something called IR in universities. Despite, for Sylvester, scholars actually operating and producing work within ‘camps’ and associated camp journals and panels, clearly there is still a field that can be taught in comprehensible way (Sylvester 2007, 2013).

This relates to first and second orders of hegemony. The former is the make-up of the contemporary work in the discipline and the disciplining thereof – what scholars actually do – and publication gatekeeping job prospects etc. The second is the self-image of the discipline that scholars work with, how they relate their work to the field and conceive of its oppositions and cleavages. This second order is reflected starkly in textbook introductions to the discipline and teaching, where the coordinates of the IR map are given; whilst scholars work itself is produced within this map but often across what are taught as its boundaries or cleavages.

What the ‘end of IR’ means therefore is the end of the first order US hegemony globally, as the work scholars produce outside of the US is an increasingly poor fit with US hegemony of the second order.

As early as 1998 Ole Weaver, examining journal publication as a ‘direct indicator of the discipline’ (Wæver 1998a: 697), saw US first order hegemony remained in an insular US field, but within European journals there was a mix of US and European work, both in terms of the nationality of scholars and adherence to his understanding of the US mainstream paradigmatically. Peter Kristensen’s recent work confirms this. His 2012 study of citations in papers published in 59 IR journals 2005–2009 (some 20,000 articles), produced a network image of journals and their relative prominence and proximity to one another (Kristensen 2012). Within this US publications remained dominant, but it also revealed an increasingly coherent and weighty European cluster of journals.

Kristensen’s 2013 work, analysing journals from 2010, confirms this, and gives a more variegated and detailed picture. He seeks to go beyond (whilst including in his analysis) the traditional focus on US dominance and its extension into Anglosphere, or US-UK condominium dominance, to the city and institutional level. Again, the US is found to be dominant but not disproportionately so, given the size of the community – and less so than in other social sciences. Overall whilst noting the ‘decreasing US influence and concentration, it should be
emphasized that IR as it is found in the journals studied here remains dominated by a few
countries in the Anglosphere and Western Europe’ (Kristensen 2013: 20).

In seeking to go beyond citations in network analysis, Kristensen also looks at patterns of co-
authorship, which reveals ‘[t]he production of knowledge in top IR journals is not dominated
by ‘America’ but is clustered in elite networks centered around certain nodes in Northeast
America, Western Europe, and Israel. These elite networks are neither confined to nation-state
spaces nor completely deterritorialized and globalized’ (Kristensen 2013: 3). These also
however represent two different networks, one between the US and Western Europe, and one
between the US and Israel. Implicitly recognising the first and second order split and its
salience he also adds the caveat that ‘it is worth questioning what difference it makes to
subject the self-images of the “American social science” to empirical scrutiny if it is a social
construct. If its practitioners continue to behave as American social scientists, it will be an
American social science’ (ibid: 20).

Within Europe then a first order US hegemony can no longer be said to exist. However it is
also clear that the prior existence of such hegemony remains of significance in the second
order hegemony that is still existent – US hegemony remains a truism, with effects on IR
production in Europe (Friedrichs 2004; Kristensen 2013).

What then are the implications for, and effects on the contemporary European field. Firstly,
we can note the derivative, dead nature of works produced within a field separated from the
organic source for the field. This is something grappled with extensively within the ‘post-
Western IR’ literature with meditations on the nature of meaningful difference from the US
hegemonised ‘global’ IR discipline seen as containing colonial narratives. Within Europe this
takes a different form, as after all the overall theoretical matrix of inter-state anarchy is
derived from a reading of European history. Here the salience is of the realist-liberal poles and
the great debates being understood literally, in field terms – rather than, as in the US
discipline, tending to be admixed in practice and used as needed. That is, for US scholars the
(conscious or unconscious) practice of a dual reading of the field – of its theoretical and socio-

104 Indeed it never did within thought on international relations, just within IR – the change then is
within IR itself, and its organic relation as a discipline to class power and Western hegemony is what
makes this shift within the discipline so important.
political nature – is natural, for European scholars such a dual reading generates dissonance; working within IR divorces expression form its socio-political drives, whilst the expression of organic political interests sets one against the IR field. Cold War European IR by definition falls into the former category, whilst European peace research tends towards the latter.

The two principal longer term effects on European and critical work we have already seen in the defining focus of cosmopolitanism in transcending an outmoded neo-realism and methodological nationalism, a variant of the more general critical diversion of setting oneself against state-centrism and positivism, and defining oneself in relation to the field in this way. By focusing on its manifestation in the field neither grasps what it is, in its explicit normative commitments, actually against. Cosmopolitanism sets itself against both neoliberalism and US unilateralism (Bush Jr merely the most recent example of this), but targets neo-realist understandings of the international resulting in the diffuse idea of globalising civil society as oppositional to globalising capitalism. Further in conceding that the realist international was once an accurate frame, rather than an ideological construction deriving from the taxonimising of the social into domestic and international, and economic and political used against theories of imperialism, the history and changing coordinates of class formation of this global capitalism are obscured leaving only facile globalisation theories (cf. Rosenberg 2002).

Similarly, thus answering the ‘question of the historical context and emergence of ‘critical IR’ more generally in Europe, especially thereby in refusing it as a ‘privileged vantage point’ outside of intellectual history, explains the ‘the abstract and theory-driven nature of critical theory and its lack of realistic understanding as to how to challenge the dominance of hegemonic ideas in today’s foreign policy practice’ (Holden 2002: 260, 255; cf. Cammack 2007; Kurki 2011: 130). It is the focus on the artificial field divorced from its organic relation and understanding that leads to the situation of ‘critical theory as increasingly lacking in relevance in contributing to the revitalisation of policy practice or perceptive critiques of it’ (Kurki 2011: 130).

Cosmopolitanism overcomes this to a degree by its grounding in the post-Cold War European experience, albeit idealised (in both senses). The two figures I focus on in my trajectories show the power of this organic link as both derive their theorising from the European context primarily before then taking up and opposing their theory to this second order hegemony. For Kaldor, as we will see, this relation requires teasing out somewhat – shrouded by references to ‘Clausewitzian’ and ‘old’ models which in fact contain the realist schema. For Ole Wæver the
relation is direct, as in theorising from the European security context but through ‘dissident’ Anglo-American IR he is explicitly trying to overcome the limitation of a critical theory that develops from its relation to existent realist theory and not the concrete political.

**European Peace Research and the International Security Studies ‘Conversation’**

The Cold War European peace research field, as notably distinct from the US field, can be divided into two phases, marked by what Håkan Wiberg refers to as crises – the first in the 1970s, the second the 1980s. In the earlier phase, whilst methodologically similar to the US field the European field was normatively more radical. In the later phase, developing during the ‘second Cold War’ of the 1980s European peace research become both ‘pro-European’ – as against a preceding concern with north-south imperialism – and ‘pro-security’ – prefiguring the post-Cold War shift to security studies proper. Our focus here is on the second phase, as the most significant, whilst I briefly outline the first as it set up the European field as a distinct entity.

The end of the Cold War presented a further crisis for peace research, and whilst peace research continues, albeit in a poor condition perhaps even requiring ‘resuscitation’ (Patomäki 2001; Jutila, Pehkonen, and Väyrynen 2008), its significance for my argument is as part of the security conversation that has led to a flourishing European International Relations which, in a reversal of the locus of innovation as a field, now overshadows this antecedent tradition. Indeed, as Heikki Patomäki notes, ‘[s]ince [Johan] Galtung, few have developed the critical ideals and methodology of peace research’, Patomäki’s notable exceptions of Ole Wæver’s and Hayward Alker’s academic careers more ‘closely linked with the side of International Relations’ than peace research (Patomäki 2001: 734).

The first ‘crisis’ of peace research around 1970, was the crystallisation of the general ‘broadening and deepening of the Peace Research agenda in the late 1960s and 1970s’ (Wiberg 2005; Buzan and Hansen 2009). This crisis ‘pitted the protagonists of the ‘old agenda’ (studying causes of war, armament dynamics, integration, peaceful systems etc.) against those of the ‘new agenda’ who wanted to focus on exploitation, dominance and dependence, imperialism etc.’ (Wiberg 2005: u.n.), a development contemporary to and intertwined with

---

105 In the critical ‘new agenda’ sense - as distinct from ‘conflict resolution’, ‘a more recent concept’ developing within peace research that since the ‘1990s […] has taken on a new, more significant and central meaning’ (Wallensteen 2011: 7).
dependency theory’s heydays. The debate was fierce and polarising in its language - Lars Dencik, one of the radical new school of militant peace researchers characterising existent peace research as a technology of control and ‘pacification’, whilst such militancy and its propinquity to positions condoning revolutionary violence was seen as heresy by their opponents - but the end result was to create a broadened peace research agenda, shorn of the extremes of both sides (Lawler 1995: 77).

Much has been made of the Marxist influence in European peace research (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 124-127, 146). Nonetheless where not deracinated such Marxist theory always held a very marginal and contested position as the idea of ‘peace through revolution’ runs counter to the central pacifist ethos of peace research. Kenneth Boulding notes usefully that ‘[i]t is hard to find dialectical thinkers who have a taboo on violence, as struggle is so important to them. To those who think that the dynamics of the world consists of winning struggles, a taboo on violence may seem very confining. However, I have put Herman Schmid, the Swedish Communist peace researcher in this category, with the understanding that the taboo may not be absolute’ (Boulding 1977: 77). Schmid for his part argued ‘that a violent revolution of the oppressed may be justified in the name of true peace’ whilst aware that ‘it would not be very meaningful to keep the label ‘peace research’ given the usual connotations of the term’ if his approach were to prevail (Schmid cited in Lawler 2005: 82; cf. Neufeld 1993).

Whilst the US largely remained ‘old agenda’, Europe embraced the more ‘radical’ ‘new agenda’ but minus its ‘extremes’ and with the field however sharing at least a common understanding of ‘negative peace’ (i.e. absence of direct violence) and ‘positive peace’ (absence of structural violence too) as roughly coterminous demarcations, the situation could be one of ‘friendly quarrels’ (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 129-134; Boulding 1977). In analysis that speaks to today’s characterisations of transatlantic divides in political thought Western Europeans had retreated from reality into ‘fantasies of justice’, whereas Americans had succumbed to a ‘niggling scientism, with sophisticated methodologies and not very many new ideas’ (Boulding 1978: 347).

It is this ‘fantasy of justice’ and its construction that we should take from this period. Johan Galtung is certainly the dominant European figure here. His conception of positive peace, bridging liberal and Marxist approaches, constitutes the strongest vision of the distinctiveness of the European new agenda field (Lawler 1995; Buzan and Hansen 2009: 123-129). Herman
Schmid’s critique of Galtungian peace research provides a neat summary noting that at core it was problematically ‘anticipating the continuing evolution of a global social system that transcended relations between states’, with the problem lying in the ‘presumption of an identity of interest among its [international system] elements in order to facilitate the application of [his] functionalist sociology’ Schmid in Lawler 1995: 74). In common with such functionalist sociology generally this is depoliticising (see for example Ralf Dahrendorf’s development of ‘conflict theory’ against structural functionalism). Peter Wallensteen, grasping the general applicability of this critique, notes: ‘Peace research serves the whole of humanity without excluding anyone, at least intentionally or in advance. This [...] is problematic because it pushes the subjects of politics into the background. The construction of political agents must be brought to the fore. What is the role envisaged for peace research in relation to construction of agency and agents?’ (Wallensteen 2011: 41).

Galtung’s conception of Europe is the final significant element here. The understanding builds upon his ‘structural theory of imperialism’ a theory that clearly owes much to dependency theory and contains the foci of the radical challenge within peace research, yet nevertheless is explicitly abstracted away against Marxist historical approaches into an ahistorical ‘scientific’ model (Galtung 1971). This ahistorical model of imperialism can then be applied to both Soviet and Western imperialism as both supposedly contain the same structural relations between core and periphery. From this, the European Community is seen as a developing neo-imperialist power from its structural position and power - centrally the European Community would continue vertical divisions of labour central to this structural understanding, and therefore not contribute to development (Galtung 1973). Nonetheless, this was separated from the internal character of a ‘Europe [...] not inclined to either reward or punish (classic attributes of power) but to influence the world with its ideas. Europe would thus constitute a third way between the United States and the USSR’ (Laidi 2008: 37).106

It is this separation, and the idea that Europe should be ‘a non-military superpower’ in this ‘ideological’ way (Pace 2007: 1042) that means his work, despite a seemingly useful focus on Pax Bruxellana as an attempt to (re-)create a truly Eurocentric world, is formative in the construction of the ‘normative power Europe’ discourse, alongside François Duchêne

106 One can also note here that Galtung similarly distinguishes between American Empire (bad) and American Republic (good) throughout his work.
(Manners 2002). Indeed that his vision excludes interest and violence from true politics, and that change to a universal transcendent positive peace consisting of an unstated European social model can be achieved ‘rationally’ can be seen from his views on the desirable contemporary role for the EU, which ‘will have an enormous status and influence as the model region, having achieved so much inner positive peace; directly, structurally and culturally’ (Galtung 2010).

The events of the 1980s, combined with both the ongoing, and increasingly methodologically sophisticated critique of the European field’s characteristic (soft) positivism as inherently conservative, and the influence of especially Dieter Senghaas’ ‘Feindbild’ or ‘enemy image’ literature brought a significant shift in European peace research. The ending of détente, second Cold War and siting of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe brought to the fore the difference in Western European and US interests. The concept of deterrence through the threat of limited nuclear war in Europe made superpower rivalry (and/or more abstractly bipolarity), rather than simply the Soviet Union the gravest threat, as ‘the means and doctrines of defence appear[ed] more threatening to the wellbeing and existence of Western Europe than anything the Soviet Union seem[ed] likely to do’ (Buzan 1989: 30). Not only was the prospect of conflict in which Europe would be devastated overwhelming, it also seemed needless as Western Europeans also largely did not share the ‘new’ ramped up US image of the Soviet threat (Buzan 1989). The inability to express this difference within the IR field proper within Western Europe at the time led to a vibrant and necessarily different European peace studies expressing this difference.

The popular social base of this position is seen in the growth of a new peace activism opposed to the siting of cruise and Pershing missiles, most notably the formation of European Nuclear Disarmament (END), with peace research becoming part of this complex, with many peace researchers both advising the movement and activists (Wiberg 2005). The heightened conflict also meant the ‘relative balance between military and development issues shifted back again in the direction of the former’ (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 127). Western Europeans also began to see themselves as ‘outside’ of the Cold War conflict, with Europe the victim of it. From here the Cold War seemed increasingly irrational, down – developing the earlier positivist peace research view of rationalism and the medical metaphor for the role of the peace researcher as physician – to pathology of one kind or another. Altogether peace research notably became ‘pro-security’, but outside of a nuclear deterrence frame and developed to enable its
transcendence through, for example, common security concepts and non-offensive defence, and ‘pro—Europe’ as the previous image of Europe’s role within Western core imperialism faded with the shift in focus (Wæver and Buzan 2013).

The work of the ‘West German school’, in particular the *Feindbild* literature, became increasingly important linked to Germany’s specific experience with the division of Europe, with the divide along US-Soviet lines within one country making clear the external nature of such bifurcation (Guzzini 2004: 43). Dieter Senghaas’ characterisation of an autistic deterrence culture - that is a closed system with an inbuilt logic - reliant on ‘enemy images’ for its legitimating logic, expressed the overall shift towards seeing equivalence between the blocs and matching obsessions of the nuclear superpowers. With this the picture of Germans on both sides of the Wall connected in a community of victimhood was broadened to Europe as a whole. Similarly the concomitant promotion of German national self-interest as ‘non-ideological’ against this ideological division extended to this idea of a whole Europe caught between ideologically motivated powers - leaving a non-ideological (Western) European soft social democracy, the later much touted ‘European model’ or ‘European Way’. Against this the US and Soviet elites were seen to be using the Cold War to control their populace and vassal empires (Guzzini 2004: 43), with ‘enemy images’ fulfilling ‘functional needs to rally domestic support and national/group identity’ (Guzzini 2013a: 240-242).

I will show the concrete effects of this Cold War European peace research on post-Cold War European International relations in the two trajectories below, including Heikki Patomäki’s notable figure of Ole Wæver. However I draw out three features here which combine in a way that can be seen in the underlying political ontologies of the European international relations approaches I examine.

Firstly, as Stefano Guzzini argues in broad terms, this later European peace research was a ‘forerunner of present constructivism-inspired scholarship in IR’ as well as post-structuralist approaches focusing on self/other politics (Guzzini 2013a: 242, 2004: 43). More significantly though is the specifically European nature of this constructivism as seen in its development in critical security studies. Classing critical security studies as a primarily European development, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver distinguish between constructivist approaches in US security studies which they attribute to US IR scholars involved in ‘theory wars’ on the constructivist side, moving into security studies ‘to prove constructivism on the home ground of materialist
approaches: security’, and that of the European ‘schools’ (Aberystwyth, Copenhagen, Paris) which did not develop deductively but emerged ‘as part of the engagements on a distinct security scene’ and their theoretical innovations ‘have become’ rather than being derived from part of IR theory (Waever and Buzan 2013: 405). As well as making these schools difficult to pin down in theoretical terms, in a way that has fruitfully generated both debate and attempts at application across a diversity of contexts, this derivation from the European scene made debate between and about these European schools the field for other more general debates on, for example, the role of discourse, the ethical position of the researcher, or of Critical Theory’s relevance (ibid: 405-6).

Secondly, the central significance of the ‘pro-Europe’ shift, away from the dependencia focus on Western imperialism during détente to a focus on bipolarity and nuclear deterrence in the 1980s with Europe as the victim ‘caught in the middle’ between the superpowers. This gives an essentially Europe-centric view of the Cold War. This is not so much of a break as a shift within overall continuity: equivalence between the blocs was already there in Galtung’s work, as was the idea of a ‘non-ideological’ rational European model. However the East-West focus now came at the expense of North-South considerations, and so the Cold War took on a Eurocentric understanding in Rick Saull’s definition – that is as Eurocentric as opposed to West-centric - where viewing it as ‘a conflict between Moscow and Washington’ comes at the expense of the longer and broader understanding of it ‘as a global conflict waged by the United States as the leading imperial power against social revolution’ (Saull 2011: 1127). This global understanding makes clear the Eurocentrism of the concept of the ‘second Cold War’ as, even excluding early intervention against the Bolsheviks, the Cold War continued throughout through ‘successive waves of revolutionary struggle that originated at the micro-level within particular societal contexts and spread across the world unevenly—in Cuba in the early 1930s and then the mid-1950s, China in the early 1920s through to the late 1940s, Vietnam in the 1930s and then from the mid-1940s up to the 1970s, Egypt in the early 1950s through to the 1970s’ (ibid: 1137)107. The war was only ever really cold in Europe.

Thirdly it is this understanding of the Cold War that allows the shift to being ‘pro-security’ within a peace research merging into a broadened security studies. Tarak Barkawi picks up the

---

107 Though the European experience of US imperialism, in the US dismantling of European empires post World War II is reflected in this Europeanist division within the West.
politics of the shift from war and peace to security – arguing for a critical war studies – noting that the ‘discourse of national security [...] transforms the relationship of force and politics into one of protection from threat, proliferating means to security in the relative absence of debate over ultimate ends or purposes, and security studies [...] participates in this process’ (Barkawi 2012: 3).

As a whole ‘[t]hese [security] discourses came to revolve around the notion of defence from aggression, articulated initially with the identity politics of the Cold War, even as Western power was used ‘offensively’, to forge a world order conducive to Western interests. Force was regularly used to see off alternatives to this order, principally in the Third World, but was referred to in languages of police actions and assisting allies (Barkawi 2012: 3). We can see exactly this happening in Barry Buzan’s assessment published in 1989 (written pre- the fall of the Berlin Wall) where a more robust Western Europe self-defence would free up US resources for ‘use elsewhere’ producing ‘a much more comfortable division of labour in relation to the overall security of the West’ (Buzan 1989: 42).

A Western Social Science – Post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe

The contemporary European IR field is structured by these two legacies, of US hegemony and the expression of divergent Western European interest within the Western Alliance in European peace research. As argued above, the broader Western field is now increasingly a bipolar Western field. Examination of the development of the field in European IR’s ‘barbaricum’, the area ‘simultaneously lying inside and outside IR ‘civilisation’108, of Central and Eastern European (CEE) IR brings out these elements of the legacies and Western bipolarity, as well as the field’s ongoing political role.

The post-Cold War creation of disciplinary IR was an integral aspect of the creation of Western academic fields to replace a previously Marxist-Leninist academy. This work was simultaneously presented in terms of the universal validity of these disciplines, and in their role in underpinning societal reshaping along Western liberal capitalist lines. As captured in

108 ‘Barbaricum is Jozef Bátora and Nik Hynek’s characterisation of Slovakian IR, here expanded to the region, which gives a less passive understanding than ‘periphery’ or ‘semi-periphery’. As they note of the regional institutional layer upon which I focus: ‘The majority of Slovak IR institutions and staff have been members of the Central and Eastern European International Studies Association (CEEISA) and the indirect influence of the most influential regional site — the Central European University (CEU) is beyond any doubt’ (Bátora and Hynek 2009: 188).
the overarching ‘End of History’ thesis the two are seen as internally related – Western liberal capitalism being the end of the line in human development, and thus universally valid.

In its broad structure then, the IR transplanted was that of the Cold War ‘Anglo-American discipline’ with syllabi recognisable to those trained in IR in the West, in line with the continuing second order US hegemony of the discipline in its foundational structuring and delimiting, and disciplinary self-reflection and self-perpetuation (Moody 2010; Hagmann and Biersteker 2012; van der Pijl 2014).

The political element of this transfer of Western disciplines is brought out by George Soros’ role here. Interwoven with his role in supporting civil society organisations and think tanks in the region, George Soros was central to this establishment of IR, alongside economics, political science, public policy and associated disciplines in the region.109 The centrepiece is his Central European University which is intimately bound up with his broader Open Society political philanthropy in the region—a instance of ‘philanthropic management of the social sciences’ in the interests of ‘reforming the world’ and institutionalizing his vision of a world safe for continued capitalist exploitation (Guilhot 2007; cf. Stone 2010).

The CEU is very much a centrepiece, serving as a unifying and professionalising hub for more widespread activities supporting the establishment of Western social science in virtually every CEE and FSU state—a ‘cutting edge’ in Soros terms for establishing Western academic disciplines in CEE.110 Overall Soros was an ‘extraordinarily important and influential catalyst to the development of political science in the region’ without whom, and the ‘hundreds of millions of dollars spent in this effort over twenty years’ truly heterodox thought could have taken hold as these disciplines ‘would have spun out into their own widely distant orbits, or

---

109 I do not cover his role in the Westernisation of the natural sciences across the region and Russia. Nonetheless, he was similarly able to leverage his funding, most notably though far from exclusively through his International Science Foundation (ISF), into wholesale academic restructuring in this area too, with more direct benefits to Western capital and the US military in the exploitation of former Eastern bloc natural scientific resources (Leiter 1996; Levitin 1995; Markusova et al. 1999). Again there are antecedents in the role of the US in the Cold War restructuring of Western European natural sciences (Krige 2006).

110 It is worth noting here also the important role played by the conservative US Pew Foundation in supporting the International Affairs Network (IAN) which sought to create a network of institutions in Central and Eastern Europe with a focus on the study of International Relations (IR). This was the antecedent organisation to the Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA) mentioned in n.108.
conceivably even imploded, becoming black holes in a galaxy of separately burning stars’ (Eisfeld and Pal 2010a).

The need for such an imposition of Western social science if the region was to be reshaped successfully along capitalist lines is acknowledged by those participating in it, and reflected upon by those engaged in the disciplines in the region themselves. Diane Stone, whose work on think tanks and her embeddedness in Soros’ network we saw earlier, founded the Masters level course in Public Policy (MPP) at the Central European University. Reflecting upon this activity she notes that by its very existence as a field of study its political implications are made evident. Its embeddedness within a Lockean cultural context reflected linguistically with ‘public policy’ often ‘translated directly as ‘politics’ or given the meaning ‘training to do politicking’ in the local languages, further noting that ‘public policy degree programs inherently diffuse values and practices through their design and content’ (Stone 2007: 547). This role complements the broader Western (she cites institutions such as the Open Society Network, the European Commission, World Bank and UNDP) ‘mission to replace the Marxist economic paradigm and the way economics had been taught under the communist regime with a new one of modern, Western economics’ (ibid: 545). Initially ‘little credence was given to the socio-political aspects of transition and market reform’, an oversight that programs such as the MPP have been designed to rectify (ibid; cf. Soros 2011a; Eisfeld and Pal 2010b).

This ties George Soros work, and the Open Society Foundations, into the longer Cold War strategies and networks ensuring a capitalist friendly Western Europe, through the Congress for Cultural Freedom and its affiliates, and programmes of cross-cultural exchange across the Iron Curtain seeking to work ‘against Communism, to cultivate intellectuals who later came to prominence after the fall of the Berlin Wall’ (Guilhot 2006: 380; van der Pijl 2014: 214-215). Indeed the Fondation pour une Entraide Intellectuelle Européenne (Foundation for European Intellectual Solidarity, FEIE) the central conduit for such Cold War exchanges in 1990 ‘literally merged into Soros’ network of foundations as its last director, Annette Laborey, went to head the Paris office of the Open Society Institute’ (Guilhot 2006: 456). In the post-Cold War world, whilst ‘some [of these] programmes eventually disappeared, their protagonists did not, and many went on to reformulate goals, to create new institutions, and to occupy new positions in the reshaping of ‘civil society’ in Europe’, a process in which Soros has remained central (Guilhot 2006: 380).
This brings out both the European and the cohesive Western elements to the development of this transposition of IR – Soros’ concept of the Open Society is modelled at least as much on European as US societal models, and against the free-market fundamentalism of the US that he sees endangering liberal capitalism. Indeed his philanthropy overall reflects a specifically European political habitus (cf. Guilhot 2007), and this is embedded in the university’s mission statement: ‘CEU is based on the premise that human fallibility can be counterbalanced by the critical discussion of ideas and that this critical spirit can be sustained best in societies where citizens have the freedom to scrutinize competing theories and openly evaluate and change government policies’. Thus we see a shift through its ongoing development of the CEU moving from a centre of technical training for ‘democratising’ and privatising elites in the region, to embodying a more sophisticated locus of societal authority through development to a ‘real’ university, a ‘Cosmopolitan University in the Social Sciences’ (ibid).

Applying this more nuanced role for the social sciences and breaking down Western hegemony in the discipline beyond the simple continuation of US hegemony as I have done allows a richer and more revealing picture in syllabus analysis also, whilst not contradicting either the politics of its establishment or the ongoing significance of the ‘American Social Science’ given in the existing accounts referenced above. To do so, and reflect the ongoing development of the discipline in the region, I contrast two earlier studies of the CEU’s Masters level IR theory syllabus with an analysis of the 2012-2013 iteration. 111

The earlier analyses are that of Thomas Biersteker and Jonas Hagmann covering the academic year 2007-2008, and my own covering the academic year 2009-2010 (Hagmann and Biersteker 2012; Moody 2010). The latter is from a study focusing on the ‘Dissemination of Anglo-American Approaches to IR in Central and Eastern Europe’, the former covers ‘23 American and European International Relations graduate programs’ (including, and reflecting the US bias, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, see n.112 below) to give a survey ‘[b]eyond the published discipline’.

Table 5.1 contains the results of these analyses. As is clear the coding is not directly comparable, but with a common focus on the proportion of US scholars allocated as core

111 Reflections in the editorials of the Journal of International Relations and Development (JIRD), the journal of the Central and East European International Studies Association, at times of transfer to a new editorial team give a good overall snapshot: a picture of an increasingly self-confident IR community (Guzzini, Šabić, and Jackson 2008; Bátor et al. 2012). See also the JIRD special issue on IR in the region (JIRD, 12:2, 20009).
readings can, alongside my current analysis, give a snapshot of change. In both my studies the method of geographical coding of scholars is compatible with that of Biersteker and Hagmann, focusing on where the scholar spent the ‘bulk of their professional career’ rather than country of birth. The paradigmatic distribution I come to momentarily I include a cumulative percentage column, and order the geographical blocks as given to allow comparison also of the US-UK ‘condominium’, and the ‘Anglosphere’, though my argument above suggests their decreasing utility post-Cold War especially in light of the undiminished and almost total parochialism of the US discipline (this last reflected also in Biersteker and Hagmann 2012). This, alongside my earlier coding and Biersteker and Hagmann’s distinctions in their text (not coding) between ‘European’ and ‘British’ work has also necessitated separating out UK and continental European work.

Table 5.1 – Geographical distribution of authors in CEU IR Theory course core readings (% )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007-2008112</th>
<th>2009-2010113</th>
<th>2012-2013114</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>32 [0]</td>
<td>27 [77]</td>
<td>21 [51]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ‘Anglosphere’7115</td>
<td>8 [85]</td>
<td>16 [67]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (CEE)</td>
<td>15 (5116)</td>
<td>34 [100]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0 [100]</td>
<td>0 [100]</td>
<td>0 [100]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Western hegemony is clear – there are no readings assigned from outside the West, a finding replicated across all of the 23 programmes Biersteker and Hagmann analysed (Hagmann and Biersteker 2012: 13). Work from CEE has also yet to make it consistently into the core readings. In 2009-2010 all of the CEE readings were authored by the course convener, Michael Merlingen. Merlingen undertook his postgraduate education in the US and Canada (Bowling Green State University, USA and University of British Columbia, Canada) but has been at CEU since 1998. The current convener Xymena Kurowska was trained at European University...

112 Adapted from Hagmann and Biersteker 2012. Their geographic coding reduces the utility of the survey. It consists of ‘US’, ‘national’ (of respective institution, here Hungary), and ‘other’, though the commentary reveals this last category to always consist of Western work, and in the case of CEU ‘draws strongly on European scholarship’ (Hagmann and Biersteker 2012: 13).
113 Adapted from Moody 2010
115 Being Canada and Australia (all Canadian work surveyed published in English). 2009-10 all of this work was Canadian, for 2013-14 it was 50/50, each contributing 8% of works cited.
116 Attributable to course convener setting his own work as core texts in this year. In 2013-14 course convener’s work was all in the additional readings.
Institute, Florence, but cites other authors from her own edited volume in the core readings, not her own chapters (Kurowska and Breuer 2012).

Within this however there is a clear decline in the weight of US readings assigned, and from 2009-10 to 2012-13 an increase in European work cited – Biersteker and Hagmann’s US focus leaves them noting only that the 2007-8 CEU syllabus (alongside those of EUI Florence and Bologna) ‘draws strongly on European scholarship’ (Hagmann and Biersteker 2012: 13). The course now is true to its self-description in its treatment of international relations theory, covering the ‘strong tradition of international relations scholarship in North America, the UK, and Western Europe’ (http://ires.ceu.hu/).

There is also another temporal layer to this, relating to the publication dates of the works assigned. In 2007-8 the average date of publication of the works assigned was 1988, with only 42% of the work published post-Cold War (they code post-1990) (Hagmann and Biersteker 2012: 14). CEU was teaching the Cold War discipline of IR at that time. For the 2012-13 syllabus 96% of the works assigned were published after 1990, 73% in or after 2000, and a full 25% were published in or after 2010. The syllabus now more closely reflects the current discipline.

This suggests a further revealing way to look at the syllabus in relation to the distinction between first and second order hegemony. The most recent syllabus is explicitly split into three consecutive sections, starting with a mapping of the theoretical field of IR, before progressing to ‘concepts’ in IR (anarchy, sovereignty, norms, etc.), and finally ‘logics of action’ in IR. The geographical base of scholars assigned across these three sections is given below in table 5.2.

| Table 5.2: Geographical distribution of authors in CEU IR Theory course sections 2012-13 (%) |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
|                                 | Theories | Concepts | Logics |
| UK                              | 35 [66]  | 13 [59]  | 0 [8]   |
| Other ‘Anglosphere’             | 19 [85]  | 0 [59]   | 25 [33] |
| Europe                          | 15 [100] | 41 [100] | 67 [100]|

The three sections are not of equal size, ‘Theories’ comprising 49% of total readings, ‘Concepts’ 28% and ‘Logics of Action’ 23%. The first section gives the images, or ‘frameworks’ of the discipline, and here the Cold War US-UK condominium appears significant, though the
work is of recent vintage, whilst non-UK European work is weakest. Paradigmatically this remains, as is true for the preceding two earlier analyses also\(^{117}\), a standard mainstream mapping of the field passing through realism (classical, neo), liberalism (classical, neo), Marxism and critical theory, constructivism, the English School, post-structuralism and feminist theory. The latter two categories, ‘Concepts’ and ‘Logics’, especially ‘Logics’ which is focused on the ‘newest discussions’, reflect more the contemporary debates within the discipline, and here the average across the two is for just over half the work to be authored by European based scholars (52%).

The other compulsory course for ‘IR track’ students is International Security Studies. Lacking historical comparators I have not analysed this curricula in the same way but note it has a focus on ‘in particular the contributions of what has been labelled as the Welsh, Copenhagen, and Paris schools of security studies’. Accordingly a third of the course covers strategic studies (and peace research), with the remaining two thirds covering ‘c(C)ritical approaches’, with the Copenhagen School taking up twice as much time within the course as any other ‘critical’ approach.\(^{118}\)

Without wishing to overstretch such an illustrative overview, this indicates that the findings of ‘Europeanization’, that is a Western European and US combined hegemony, of citations within the discipline may well be starting to be reflected in a shift in the second-order hegemony of teaching the accepted parameters and content of the discipline too. This suggests at the least that future curricula analyses should code for these considerations of Western bi-polarity and levels of hegemony in line with the indicative support this analysis gives to their existence.

What these consideration together – of change in the IR discipline in Central and Eastern Europe, and of the political founding and continued support for IR there - bring out is that when those in such a periphery talk of ‘Western IR’ it is increasingly of a truly Western, not just US, hegemony whereof they speak.

\(^{117}\) Hagmann and Biersteker code with subdivisions of rationalist and reflectivist approaches following Ole Wæver’s mapping of the field (in Wæver 1998). CEU however does not stand out from the broader European-US divide in which ‘European schools tend to complement rational choice perspectives with reflexive and historical works, as opposed to the US schools, which complement those with formal theory and quantitative works’ (Hagmann and Biersteker 2012: 12), beyond a greater than usual assignment of ‘non-postmodern constructivism’ (ibid: 11).

\(^{118}\) Syllabus: \url{http://ires.ceu.hu/courses/20122013/international-security}
Conclusion
The first half of this chapter interrogated the conception of cosmopolitan Europe underlying much of the policy debate that was covered in the part one of the thesis, tracing the rise of a recent Arendtian turn in this discourse. The crux of the change was found to lie in the conception of the role of force in the establishment of cosmopolitan political orders. Through this is then revealed the homology to the normative power – global power debate seen in chapter three. Thus far this remains at a high level of abstraction; the next chapter again shows the critical issue to be the founding of political orders – the kind of power to use in creating a cosmopolitan global order – in the application of this cosmopolitanism. It also shows the subterranean existence of this cosmopolitan Europe conception within non-explicitly cosmopolitan theory, supporting the idea of this as a core element of a European IR.

I then gave an account of the European context for the development of this cosmopolitan discourse via a conceptualisation of the IR discipline as (still residually) structured by preceding first and second order hegemonies of US IR. This gave an image of a Cold War field of IR proper in Europe as both a first and second order US hegemony, whilst European peace research contained first order (Western) European theoretical production in reaction to this hegemony, with the understanding of realism as constituting this hegemony having significant political consequences. That is, the self-understanding of their work was against the Cold War global order, but understood principally as refracted through realist IR, seen in its theoretical image, not as an ideological tool. Post-Cold War Western IR is moving to a bi-polar US-Western European hegemony, and some of the implications of this were explored through an illustrative longitudinal comparison of graduate IR course syllabi at the Central European University. Again this remains relatively abstract; as the methodology outlined earlier indicates it is the negotiation of this terrain in the two examples of applied cosmopolitanism given in the next chapter – that is how the field is significant through these actors strategic navigating of it – that ultimately gives political significance to both of these constructions of a European IR.
6. Applied Cosmopolitanism: Two Trajectories

Introduction

As the earlier methodological section argued, a good way of understanding the relative autonomy of the academic field, of offering a dual reading, is through the trajectories of individual scholars. Here I offer two trajectories in support of the argument: one ‘easy’ case of explicit cosmopolitanism; one harder case of theory not usually thought of in such terms, certainly not self-defined as such, but that nonetheless operates within the same conception of politics and thereby relation to cosmopolitan Europe. The two trajectories are those of Mary Kaldor and of the Copenhagen School, focusing primarily on its founding partnership of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. The selection criteria develop from my argument so far. Both, in their prominence and distinctiveness of their theorising, are seen as emblematic of the success of European IR by other scholars engaged in surveys of the IR discipline in Europe: Mary Kaldor the primary ‘exemplar’ of European thought as contained in ‘new wars’, self-consciously set against US ‘old wars’ thinking (Sylvester 2012: 485-6); the Copenhagen School seen as the ‘flagship of Scandinavian IR on the continent’, within an assessment that sees Scandinavian IR as containing the desirable strategy for developing further the ‘embryonic ‘Euro-discipline’’ of IR (Friedrichs 2004: 74-5). As prominent figures in critical security studies, this reflects that such ‘critical security studies’ itself is seen, through being ‘surprisingly productive’ and generating ‘theory of broader relevance and inspiration to the field of IR in general’, as forming a central plank of European contributions to the discipline as a whole (Buzan and Wæver 2013: 405).

More though, both represent ‘applied cosmopolitanism’, containing a deliberate relation to the policy world and not simply being what Chris Brown saw as ‘pointless abstract theorising’ (Brown 2012: 115; cf. Kurki 2011). Whilst they also contain and derive from a ‘notion of practical solidarity’ it is a cosmopolitan solidarity. They are therefore good candidates to represent the most politically significant and strongest examples of European progressive difference contributing to the renovation of Western hegemony. Mary Kaldor has the most direct relation to the policy world as I will outline below, but also as we saw is a founding member of the ECFR with a strong relationship with George Soros. The Copenhagen School, incubated in the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) has the characteristic peace research tradition relationship of critically engaging with whilst not necessarily being part of policy debate. As we will see Ole Wæver also takes part in more direct on the ground
facilitation work, aimed at desecuritising issues with various stakeholders through his Centre for Advanced Security Theory (CAST) at the University of Copenhagen.

As I have argued, whilst a field may contain and generate a great diversity of thought, that which is politically significant is organically related to the social conditions in which it is produced and this thought should therefore form the focus of a political assessment of the field. Divining which these ‘organic’ approaches are is more difficult, but I have argued for European cosmopolitanism to be understood as such. Thus whilst far from capturing the full diversity of IR in Europe, a focus on applied cosmopolitanism is a productive focus for understanding a specifically European IR, as it relates and is defined by this relation to its conditions of production. One immediate and beneficial effect of such an ‘applied cosmopolitanism’ focus is that it also cuts through the frequent differentiation between ‘critical security studies’ proper, and human security as a critical approach to security, with the former often characterising the latter as ‘problem-solving’ theory or a ‘hegemonic discourse co-opted by the state’ (Newman 2010: 77). As we will see Wæver suggests, and as I argue above, it is better to proceed without such a priori signposting of just what is ‘critical’.

As we saw, during the Cold War peace research gave an outlet for Western European concerns outside of the stranglehold of US hegemony in IR, and here ‘critical approaches to security in Europe’ provide the same opening, lying ‘at the centre of specifically European theorising’ with ‘distinctive European research agenda(s) in the traditionally US-dominated field of ‘security studies’, whether these be of the ‘Aberystwyth’ ‘Copenhagen’ or ‘Paris’ schools’ (C.A.S.E. 2006: 444). The form of such theorising is clearly integrated with and developed from continuing engagement and conversation with ‘dissident’ IR in North America (C.A.S.E. 2006: 447). In content though, in continuation of the argument of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver that European security ‘schools’ developed from a particular European ‘security scene’ and innovations therein and that their constructivism is therefore of a different nature to mainstream IR constructivism and not derived from US IR theory, they contain an organic expression of European cosmopolitanism derived from European experiences.

Both Kaldor and the Copenhagen School bring these organic academic contexts together with their academic work bridging the end of the Cold War, covering the shift from peace research to security studies, and remaining highly productive throughout. Seeing European security studies in this way, as the continuation of a fruitful site for negotiating a relationship with second order US hegemony in IR, rather than as merely a sub-discipline, also makes sense of
the breaking down of the supposed sub-disciplinary academic structure (of a core of IR theory and sub-disciplines of ISS and IPE) found in contemporary security studies. Such security studies contains the ‘post-Cold War security–development nexus’, with far broader than merely security concerns as ‘[t]he merging of development and security has given global liberal governance an expansive and inclusive political logic’ (Duffield 2001: 259). This makes comprehensible why it has been debate within this European subfield that has contained many of the most dynamic and fruitful discussions in contemporary IR. Whilst interesting disciplinarily the primary political significance here is not necessarily this nexus itself – peace research as we saw already integrating the issues of security and development - but the cosmopolitanism within it; that is the organic European contribution to it.

They also fulfil three of the main selection criteria used by Ole Wæver and Ivor Neumann in selecting scholars to cover in Masters in the Making - those of ‘noise’, of presenting a ‘puzzle’ of some kind, and that study of them would tell us something worthwhile about the discipline of IR more generally\(^{119}\). ‘Noise’ is a measure of importance in the discipline measured simply by ‘being talked about’ and there is no doubt that both Mary Kaldor in both her new wars and human security works, and the Copenhagen School, especially with securitisation theory, have provoked widespread ongoing debate and secondary literatures.

The ‘puzzle’ with Mary Kaldor is the divergence between her own and others views of her work. She is often seen as having ‘shifted’ from a ‘quasi-Marxist’ to a global civil society/cosmopolitan framework, whereas she sees her position as evolutionary and coherent. This relates also to her now being characterised in more radical quarters as one of those providing the ‘normative sources of the new world order’, yet her own view remains of herself as a critical scholar (Douzinas 2007: 162).

For the Copenhagen school there are similarly two related ‘puzzles’. The first is the theoretical coherence of the School, most emblematically in its ‘post-structuralist realism’. The second is the inability somehow of critics to get a firm grasp on the politics of the school and Ole

\(^{119}\) For discussion of the value of this volume for my method see the discussion in chapter 4. ‘Masters’ are defined as those whose work is still in print decades after their death, so a primary criteria for Wæver and Neumann was being a strong contender for this. Whilst the long-term endurance of works is not of such significance to me here, I suspect given the seminal works produced by Mary Kaldor and within the Copenhagen School they have a strong case here too (New Wars third edition was published in 2013, and People States and Fear’s second edition was reprinted in 2007 for example).
Waver’s insistence that the politics of his work has been consistently misunderstood – most commonly in accusations of ‘Eurocentrism’. Thus we see the Copenhagen School simultaneously decried for eschewing emancipation yet also the dominant approach within critical approaches to security.

The ‘solution’ here to both is tied up in the nature of European cosmopolitanism, the basis for its presentation as critical, progressive and emancipatory, and the distinction between ‘critical’ work and that built on class analysis. I am not though simply arguing such theoretical work can be exploited by hegemonic interests, or expounding on the ‘enduring problem of idealism’, this having been well covered before. Reflecting on such existing radical critiques Tara McCormack notes that they ‘do not develop an argument about why critical and emancipatory approaches are doomed to appear as little more than the theoretical wing of contemporary liberal interventionism’ (McCormack 2009: 18). Her own explanation ‘why’ focuses on internal theoretical critique and analysis of the continuities between the discourses of state and international organisations and those of critical theorists – focusing on their common attempt to ‘transcend’ realism/sovereignty/state-centrism. This, and the argument that this is an idealism in which the ‘critique of critical theorists is little more than a statement of their own moral values’ I have already covered, with the addition of the relation of class and scholastic occupation to such moral values (ibid: 137). So what I aim to do through approaching the field through these trajectories is to move beyond such a critique, valuable as it is, to uncover the relation of European cosmopolitanism to the conditions of its production.

The ‘puzzles’ shape the differing structures of the two trajectories, but ultimately my defence of this selection, and of this approach itself, rests on the last of Wæver and Neumann’s criteria – that the two trajectories tell us something worthwhile not just about the discipline of IR, but about European IR and its relation to the renovation of Western hegemony.
Trajectory 1: Mary Kaldor and the Field of Power

So in the end the most important ingredients for the dish that I became would have been family experience; some very important people such as Edward Thomson; and the experience of being a peace and human rights activist.

(Kaldor 2009)

At first blush it may seem a long way to go from being a radical peace activist, founding European Nuclear Disarmament (END) with E.P Thompson (1982) and publishing in Marxism Today (Kaldor and Holden 1986; Kaldor 1990b; Kaldor 1991a), to accepting the (delightfully oxymoronic) rank of Commander of the British Empire for services to democracy and global governance (in 2003) and sitting on one of the World Economic Forum’s policy panels (on Energy Security, WEF 2009). This movement seems to embody a similar theoretical shift ‘from a quasi-Marxian analysis of militarism and ‘modes of warfare’, in her work in the 1980s, to becoming one of the most prominent scholars of ‘new wars’ and ‘global civil society’ (Stavrianakis and Selby 2012: 11), these latter areas ones that more radical scholars see as constituting the theoretical wing of liberal interventionism (Douzinas 2007).

Mary Kaldor however sees a clear continuity and development in her work from the 1980s to today (Kaldor 2013b). I argue here that she is right to do so, and that both the continuities, and shifts others identify in her work demonstrate clearly the main contours of my argument in this chapter – firstly identifying her cosmopolitanism as having antecedents in the form of the peace movement leftism she espoused in the 1980s, and secondly the validity of the move beyond internal critique of theory to the central role of habitus and the field in shaping the form of emancipatory expressive drives. In doing so it sharpens the argument made so far by showing Kaldor’s thought as politically significant in its organic relation to the shifts underlying the conditions of its production. More than this, her development of human security as part of corporate social responsibility for BP and as a security doctrine for the EU for Javier Solana

120 I feel I should note here that graduating from Martin Shaw’s excellent MA course in Contemporary War and Peace Studies has provided an invaluable background for my understanding within this section, especially relating to Clausewitz and Mary Kaldor. Shaw’s own trajectory from socialist Labourism (including standing as a Labour candidate in 1987) and revolutionary socialism and back, via END, to a global society position not antithetical to Kaldor’s own is fascinating in itself, and also in placing Kaldor as representative of strategic action in a changing field, rather than intellectual maverick.
demonstrates the intersections of such work with the field of power. In both cases reports for sponsoring bodies accompanied further abstraction into academic work – for the former the ‘Bellagio’ report to oil executives (2007: x) for the latter the Barcelona and Madrid Reports to Javier Solana (2004, 2007).

I trace her trajectory through three periods: her Cold War ‘quasi-Marxist’ period working in a ‘leftist’ peace research activist-research nexus, through to the explicit abandonment of socialism (1990); the post-Cold War development of the new wars thesis as a new model for legitimating cosmopolitan intervention; and her development of this theory in a human security direction in the interests of the oil industry and then the EU. The Cold War period establishes the political parameters of her thought from which the later work develops so will be given more treatment here than the latter two. Throughout there are two dominant threads of an autonomous military logic, separable from the socio-political, as the central problem, and of a developing idealist cosmopolitan politics, alongside a consistent vision of Europe as offering an ‘alternative politics’ to the prevailing militarised milieu. It is this which makes sense particularly of the self-understood progressive nature of her later work with the military, for example sitting on the UK governments Defence Advisory Forum (2009-2010), as through it she is struggling to shift the internal logic she sees within the military establishment (cf. Beebe 2012).

What her trajectory overall demonstrates then is how academic production ‘may serve politico-normative agendas independent of [the scholar’s] personal value commitments’ (Neufeld 2001: 133), and thus despite being driven by a clear emancipatory drive,¹²¹ the interaction of habitus and the field means one can still act as an organic intellectual for capital. After all, what more perfect image can there be of the academic as ‘dominated dominator’ - structurally subordinate but with the symbolic power to legitimate or discredit the dominant group’ (Speller 2011: 47) - than Kaldor lending her academic weight to the pseudo-intellectualising of academic-manqué George Soros by chairing Q&A sessions with him?¹²²

---

¹²¹ For all its expression in bourgeois adventurism, it is hard to doubt the sincerity driving Kaldor’s activism and academic work.

¹²² Soros is a major donor to the Global Governance Centre at LSE of which Kaldor is co-director with David Held. Examples of lending this academic credibility, both individually and through the LSE more generally include approving citations of Soros’ books (see esp. Kaldor 2003), as well as chairing and moderating talks and seminars he gives both at LSE and through his Open Society Foundations (most recently (see LSE Events 2014).
Cold War development

Mary Kaldor’s early career and her intellectual origins lie in the late-Cold War peace activism-research complex, with her work an academic expression of this activism – in turn derived from a personal familial background combining peace activism and Eastern European political dissidence (she notes her mother and uncle in this context respectively). Her concern from this combination being that peace activists ‘weren’t really concerned about issues like human rights and the problem of communism in Eastern Europe. So somehow I wanted to bring those two things together’ (Kaldor 2009: u.n.).

Her first job, from 1967 – 1969, was at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, where she compiled the first statistics on the arms trade. From there she went to the University of Sussex until 1999, working within the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), the Sussex European Institute (SEI) and most significantly at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), where her work focused on the political economy of arms and the arms race.

Her most significant activism during this period was as a founding member of European Nuclear Disarmament (END), also editing its European Nuclear Disarmament Journal (1983–88). END issued its founding statement in April 1980 in response to NATO’s decision in December 1979 to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles across Western Europe. Notable from this founding statement is the equivalence drawn between the US and USSR, refusing to ‘apportion guilt between the military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties’ (END 1980). Though focused on nuclear disarmament, more significant – particularly given many of its members later transition to the Helsinki Citizens Assembly – was its work with dissidents in Central and Eastern Europe, attempting ‘détente from below’.

Her scholarly work was an academic expression of this activism. The field at the time was, if one identified as being of the ‘left’ – even socialist as Kaldor did123 – quasi-Marxist, and she was also deeply influenced by her interactions with E.P. Thompson. Her Cold War work, whilst avowedly not Marxist, is therefore replete with Marxist terminology, especially in Warfare and Capitalism (Kaldor 1982a), and The Baroque Arsenal (Kaldor 1982b). Regardless of the accuracy of these works, there are two central threads to her work at the time: the separating

123 For the nature of this essentially Labourist socialism see for an early example ‘Democratic Socialism and the Cost of Defence: The Report and Papers of the Labour Party Defence Study Group’, which she edited alongside, Dan Smith, and Steve Vines (Kaldor, Smith, and Vines 1979).
out of a military logic from political logic (cf. Kaldor 1986); and the identification of peace as anti-ideology (Kaldor 1983; Kaldor 1985; Kaldor and Holden 1986).

‘Warfare and Capitalism’, in E.P. Thompson’s *Exterminism and Cold War*, introduced the concept of the ‘mode of warfare’, developed through analogy with the mode of production. This was not a Marxist project relating these modes internally; in fact Kaldor was seeking to break conceptual links between warfare and capitalism and develop the ‘mode of warfare’ as possessing an autonomous logic. It was this that was developed within *The Baroque Arsenal* (1982b). The ‘mode of warfare’, having fed off the ‘mode of production’, came in turn to dominate and shape it, in military industrial complexes understood as creating statist war economies in both East and West.\(^{124}\) We can see in this the influence of E.P. Thompson’s argument in the same volume that industrial societies, East and West, are best understood through their containing a thoroughgoing gearing towards the logic of mass extermination. Whilst not the empirical focus of such works, set against these is an idealised civil society, understood as outside of the state.

The first strand then constructs the Cold War in the Eurocentric manner seen in the previous chapter’s consideration of European peace research, and also brings out the overdetermining role of a separable military logic in such conceptions.\(^{125}\) From this the difference for Kaldor between East and West is that whilst the West contains a MIC, the East is a MIC. The West is therefore preferable as this autonomous military armaments logic can be overcome, through civil society in alliance with ‘progressive capitalists’. The second strand that I come to now is dependent on this first move, and the outcome of both an idealist politics and conception of Europe as essentially passive in the Cold War: ‘the people of Europe do not want to be drawn into a war between the superpowers for which they have no reason and over which they have no control’, which is true ‘from Poland to Portugal’ (Kaldor 1981: 45).

---

\(^{124}\) The ‘baroque’ element derives from the idea that the interaction between conservative military establishments and a dynamic arms industry leads to the development not of new approaches to defence but of ever more sophisticated versions of the same Fordist weaponry of the Second World War.

\(^{125}\) In more recent work Kaldor notes the shift in the composition of her assumed military-industrial-complex, from arms manufacturers supposedly ‘interested in producing useless weapons systems but not in war’ to ‘the newly emerging network that also consists of private security service providers, who benefit from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Kaldor 2009: u.n.), without reflecting on the implications of acknowledging this transition for the significance she gives to their asserted motives. Such a shift and change in composition of membership cannot be adequately conceptualised within a theory that sees a ‘military-industrial-complex’ as overdetermining to class strategy, rather than subordinate to it.
As we saw this fits the general milieu of contemporaneous European peace research, a focus on war and nuclear weapons as the problem, generating a nominal equivalence between elites in the East and West. This then opens the space for an equivalence or commonality between the ‘politics from below’ on both sides – E.P. Thompson’s great influence here, as he ‘taught [her] that we were against the cold war, not just nuclear weapons’ (Kaldor 2007d: 15) - between the new peace movements opposing nuclear weapons in the West and dissidents seeking to create ‘civil society’ in the East in the name of human rights, which were already secure in the West; though for Kaldor ‘[a]s a reasonably paid intellectual [...] I personally prefer the Western Alliance’ (Kaldor 1981: 45).

Indeed contact with these social movements in Central Europe was profoundly formative as ‘they were articulating ideas that expressed what we were trying to do in the peace movement but which we hadn’t got the language for – they gave us ‘anti-politics’,\(^{126}\) ‘civil society’, and even ‘globalisation’ [...] It was a terrific education for me’ (Kaldor 2007d: 15).

The influence of the political theory of the Central and Eastern European dissidents on political theory in Europe as a whole is under-recognised, submerged under both the political actions of many of the dissidents once in power and the flattening effect of the ‘end of history’ argument - their thought often conceived of as merely derivation from and application of Western liberalism (Isaac 1995; Falk 2003: 313-354; Kaldor 1990b; Barnett et al. 1991). Nonetheless, as Kaldor indicates, this is a significant root of the global civil society literature, with the 1980s ‘cult of civil society’ work of theorists such as John Keane, Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, as well as Kaldor, forming its conceptual base (Wood 1990, cf. Buttigieg 2005 and discussion in preceding chapter). In the 1980s in particular the attempt for many on the left investigating these ideas as articulated in central Europe was to overcome the problems they saw in socialism in Western Europe, ‘re-democratising’ socialism and escaping (the) Marx (of their tendentious readings) – though this reconstruction of an essentially liberal conception of civil society was called out even then, as was the effect of obscuring of exploitation. Ellen Meiksins Wood’s characterisation of them as ‘an army of ‘post-Marxists’ one of whose principal

---

\(^{126}\) Kaldor notes, ‘anti-politics’ was not against politics but about ‘doing politics differently’, and folded thereby into the conception of the political associated with the conceptualisation of civil society.
functions is apparently to conceptualize away the problem of capitalism’ remains applicable to global civil society work today (Wood 1990: 60).

The specific context in which the common European political theoretical history of conceptualising civil society is developed then becomes very significant. Kaldor is correct, in her way, when she says ‘the words have quite different meanings because of different experiences and cultures. Words like Europe, socialism, privatisation, markets, feminism, have quite different significance in East and West’ (Kaldor 1990a: 43). However, whereas for Kaldor this differing conceptualisation formed the base for an ‘alternative politics’ dedicated to ‘changing the very nature of power relations’, the development of these concepts outside of capitalism is what allowed their use in the manoeuvres of these ‘post-Marxists’ that Wood sees as a ‘full retreat’ from socialism (ibid; Wood 1990: 60). The concept of civil society thinkers such as Vaclav Havel and Adam Michnik – to take two of the lodestones for Kaldor - were working with was the ‘Western’ conception as developed through Locke and Hegel. In doing so in part they were asserting a common European history and culture of cosmopolitanism. However, whereas the concept had developed in tandem with the development of capitalism, in the East the concept was developed outside of it, in opposition to ‘totalitarianism’. As a result there is no way to grasp the tension between the citizen and bourgeois in their thought and as a result civil society becomes an end in and of itself, unproblematic to a degree impossible even within the thought of Habermas or Arendt.

In line with the argument above on the political ontologies of Arendtian cosmopolitanism, overall their thought contains a Lockean state-society structure, but with the political conceptualised through a primary focus on action in society – on the social before the political or economic individual with a concomitant stress on morality or individual virtue and responsibility. This is a development of political thought in a way particularly suitable for a social democratic Europe seeking to avoid the ‘problem of capitalism’. This vision developed in a situation in which ‘dissidents were relatively free to resuscitate the concept of civil society and conveniently side step the issues of the implications of a privately-controlled capitalist market economy’ (Falk 2003: 327) and has had profound effects, lying at the base of Kaldor’s ‘alternative politics’. Civil society – in a situation where its creation was an end in itself – continues in this vision to be an end in itself, counterposed to ‘global capitalism’ with its intertwining and co-constitution with ‘global civil society’ ignored from this theoretical base.
Thus whilst the majority of analysts within political science see either a rehashed liberalism or at most ‘liberalism plus’ – the plus a focus on morality in politics – in political thought in the region from this period, it makes more sense to see them as reviving and developing the classical and republican focus on civic virtue and the citizen in Arendtian fashion (Falk 2003; Isaac 1995). This is true both in their construction of Central and Eastern European states as ‘totalitarian’ as well as the concept of politics developed against this construct, and indeed both Vaclav Havel and Adam Michnik explicitly took Arendt’s work as one of their primary points of departure. Accordingly civil society is conceived as inherently non-violent – a politics threatened by primarily state violence - with concomitant dissident commitment to this ethic in creating the new politics (Keane 1996: 80; cf. Keane 2003: 202 for continued expression of this explicitly Arendtian ethic within global civil society work).

All of this becomes clearer still with the end of the Cold War, as seen from her ‘European perspective’. Kaldor characterises the Cold War period as an ‘imaginary war’ which she sees as a ‘joint venture’ between Western ‘Atlanticism’ and Eastern ‘Stalinism/post-Stalinism’ in which an initially political and economic confrontation became ‘militarised’ into an ‘imaginary war’ in which the leaders of both East and West created the enemy as a means of managing internal conflict (Kaldor 1990c). This serves to repress the conflict as a truly political one, with a focus upon how it became ‘militarised’ and the effects thereof.

With such a characterisation of militarised ‘enemy images’, rather than fundamental socio-political conflict, the end of the Cold War cannot be seen as the West’s victory and an end to history, rather, with the removal of these stasis inducing overdetermining blocs, history for Europe ‘has just resumed’ (ibid). Against ‘mainstream commentators’ that see the end as ‘the decisive defeat of socialism and the triumph of liberal (actually neo-liberal) values and policies’, she questions whether the West can even be called capitalist, as this was part of the ‘imagining’ of the war: ‘The Cold War has always been a discourse, a conflict of words, ‘capitalism’ versus ‘socialism’” (Kaldor 1990a: 25). It is this rejection of the material that also allows the valorisation of her own role as the conflict was won by the ‘undermin[ing of] the words and the language of the Cold War’ a process carried out by ‘the new social movements, and especially the peace movements’ (ibid: 33). With the conflict understood as such a militarised joint venture, history and politics (potentially) resumes if the peripheralisation of military authority that the end of the Cold war brought continues, offering hope for the future as it may allow the creation of a genuine ‘international civil society’ (ibid: 36).
This marks the shift away from even nominal socialism, seen as irretrievably tarnished, creating the need for a new as yet unspecified, inchoate ‘third way’ the nature of which is to be developed through dialogue with Central and Eastern Europeans (cf. Kaldor 1991b), and the content of which is then developed in her later theorising on (global) civil society as we saw above. This task was framed by a series of questions, the answers to which her focus on unifying civil society across Europe render pre-ordained: ‘Is social justice an adequate substitute for the term ‘socialist’? Do we have to begin the painful and isolating task of redefining and resuscitating socialism? Or should we attempt to develop a new term that encompasses new concerns about democracy, the environment, gender and race, as well as traditional concerns?’ (Kaldor 1990a: 38).

Pursuing this analysis in activism Kaldor founded and co-chaired the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, dedicated to ‘peace, democracy and human rights in Europe’ aiming to translate ‘détente from below’ into ‘the post-Cold War from below’ maintaining a focus on civil society. Accordingly, as my argument so far should lead us to expect, ‘every American foundation wanted to support us’, though she ‘never actually had money from the Open Society’, George Soros seemingly feeling her approach lacked his cutting edge (Kaldor 2009). Through the ‘Helsinki Citizens Assembly (hCa) the idea of which was to help civil society in difficult places and to work together across the East-West divide. I [Kaldor] got tremendously involved in Yugoslavia and Bosnia, because branches of the hCa were started, and being there led to all my work on new wars’ (Kaldor 2009: u.n.).

‘New’ Wars
The new wars thesis posits that there has been a qualitative change to a new form of warfare occurring roughly at the end of the Cold War; Kaldor is the seminal and dominant figure within the development of this thesis. The wars of Yugoslav dissolution were central to this development, spurring Kaldor’s ‘new thinking’ on war. Within this ‘ethnic cleansing’, as a term not the practice with its long history, is central, coined at the time and a ‘literal translation of the Serbo/Croatian/Bosnian’ (Belloni 2008: 125). The ‘new wars’ of the post-Cold War era are accordingly different as driven by identity politics, waged mostly against civilians and are financed through networks, criminal and other, that take advantage of the globalised war economy. Bosnia is thus used as the prototype of a ‘new war’ where the distinction between war, organised crime, and large-scale violations of human rights blur, and where civilians bear most of the costs of political instability.
Many have argued against the novelty of these features arguing that it is only their specific concatenation, in the Bosnian war particularly, that can be argued to be novel – especially when this conflict is stripped of a broader context. For example, seeing a lack of evidence for the novelty of these characteristics Stathis Kalyvas concludes the ‘distinction drawn between post-cold war conflicts and their predecessors may be attributable more to the demise of readily available conceptual categories then to the existence of profound differences’ (Kalyvas 2001: 105), whilst Martin Shaw notes ‘the loss of Cold War narratives, particularly war as revolution’ as creating a ‘vacuum’ (Shaw 2000: 178). This idea of Kaldor’s theory being constructed in the vacuum of the loss of Cold War narratives gets to the heart of what Kaldor believes is ‘new’ about her theory, both in theoretical and political terms.127

She casts her ‘new wars’ concept against both the preceding Cold War (and before) reality of ‘old wars’ and ongoing ‘old wars thinking’ amongst policy intellectuals and politicians. This ‘old war’ concept she refers to as ‘Clausewitzian’ – however many have found her initial summary of his view of war as ‘the use of military means to defeat another state’ inaccurate and tendentious, designed to create novelty for her own thesis. Two in particular that she has since responded to, largely conceding their points (Kaldor 2013a), are Andreas Herberg-Rothe’s response where he notes that Clausewitz ‘devoted a chapter in On War to warfare waged by non-state actors’ and therefore ‘Clausewitz’s concept of state must be understood as any kind of community’ (Herberg-Rothe 2007), and Bart Schuurman’s consideration where in summarising his own and others problems with the novelty and ‘post-Clausewitzian’ conception of her thesis he notes that ‘ultimately rather than supplant the Clausewitzian concept of war, new wars theory reinforces it’ (Schuurman 2010: 97). In fact when one considers the two most notable elements of novelty underpinning her conception of new wars – that war is no longer inter-state, and is now driven by identity politics and criminality not political calculation – one can see that what she is casting herself against is the neo-realist definition of warfare, the Cold War European image of the IR discipline, not Clausewitz.128

The dissolution of the Cold War political narrative underpins the normative dimension of the thesis also, giving the political conceptualisation within which new wars, and the politics of intervention they legitimise is set. Rather than East-West conflict, ‘globalisation’ becomes the key driver of identity formation in ‘the aftermath of the events of 1989’ (Kaldor 1996: 43). This

127 It can at times seem that for Kaldor the most significant element of the whole enterprise is that ‘I have therefore reformulated the definition of war’ (Kaldor 2013a: 13).
128 Or perhaps more accurately, against Clausewitz read through neo-realism.
shift demonstrates the problem with her earlier conception of the Cold War, not as imperialism and contender state reaction, but as an isolated bipolar struggle. With the Cold War’s end ‘globalisation’ appears as an abstract concept disembedded from territory or class, not as the concrete expression of the abstract tendency of capital towards globalisation realised to varying but always limited degrees through political projects and therefore tied to both territory and class, expanding in the wake of defeat of the latest contender state. This then underlies the ‘neglect [of] the socio-spatial source of the project of cosmopolitan democracy under a transnational substitute for the state, in the professional and informational service class of global capital’ (Drake 1999: 4.4).

With ‘globalisation’ the defining classifications of people become ‘non-territorial’: the ‘new divide’ is therefore based not on East – West or even inter-state divisions, but lies between ‘cosmopolitans’ and various forms of ‘particularisms’ – a ‘new nationalism’, novel in that it ‘is much more particularistic and fragmenting than earlier nationalism. It is about labels much more than substance; national identity is no more than a label, not a prerequisite for democratic participation or cultural regeneration’ (Kaldor 1996a: 53). Politically the division is between the pacific universalist values of the cosmopolitans emerging from transnational institutions from above and civil society from below, and particularistic identity politics antithetical to these values. The conception of the truly political then becomes central, as in opposing such cosmopolitanism any such particularism becomes not political but anti-political and essentially criminal.

The first half of the title of Mary Kaldor’s 1996 article ‘Cosmopolitan Responses to New Wars’ is therefore the more significant half, and also represents the real novelty within the thesis129 – its uptake related to the need for a new post-cold war legitimating rubric for intervention by the ‘international community’. This is brought out most clearly in the move to designate such wars as criminal, rather than political, and the redefining of action by the international community away from intervention to a policing response (Kaldor 1996b). This too has roots in the hCa work in the former Yugoslavia where her work was with what she saw as civilised cosmopolitan pockets, ‘islands of civility’, set against the ‘new nationalisms’ driving the conflicts - this cosmopolitanism linking them to, and requiring support from the West. It is thus this ‘new’ division that allows the shift to conceptualising interventions as ‘policing’

129 In Kaldor’s subsequent defence of the novelty of her concept she concedes a great deal of the argument, pointing precisely to the change in ‘logic’, to criminality, as the novelty of new wars - in the process dropping the bulk of the rest of what she claimed made ‘new wars’ new (Kaldor 2013a).
actions. Indeed, she sees her own contribution, as this ‘reframing’ of violences, as ‘different ways of framing different types of violence imply different solutions or different ways of addressing the problem’ with the aim all along ‘to reconceptualise political violence as ‘new war’ or crime and the use of force as cosmopolitan law enforcement rather than war-fighting’ (Kaldor 2009; Kaldor 2013a: 14).\footnote{I note in passing the support this gives for the contention that the constructivism found in European approaches is derived inductively, not deductively, as per Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s argument above.}

This then changes the way Western intervention is conceptualised: global cosmopolitanism makes the ‘Western’ tag politically irrelevant and the logic of making wars a question of cosmopolitan law-enforcement transcends the internal/external and thus renders debates of intervention or non-intervention meaningless. The struggle derived from this is to reformat Western militaries and the logic of their use accordingly, as support forces that are essentially ‘glorified policemen’ (Shaw 2000).

**Human Security**

Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh traces the human security concept back to the early 1980s transition from an academic focus on ‘peace’ to ‘security’ and the broadening of the security agenda, relating it clearly to critical approaches to security more generally and with which it shares the starting point of a challenge to neorealist security ‘orthodoxy’. In contrast to other critical approaches however, human security has been predominantly developed within, or in close contact with, policy and political institutional settings (Tadjbakhsh 2007: 9; Newman 2010).

As a critically applied concept human security began and (perhaps) ended its career at the UN (Tadjbakhsh 2007: 9). The most important articulation at the beginning of this institutional journey was that of Mahbub Ul Haq in the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*, setting out an ‘ethical, comprehensive and universal vision of security’. The hope was for this to form a coherent post-cold war narrative for the UN, centring on global justice and equity, but as a civilian conception, without any military component. The concept was further developed through other UN agencies, governments\footnote{Initially the Canadian, Japanese and Norwegian governments took on its development, adopting it for their foreign policy. From this developed the Human Security Network, a ‘loose grouping of thirteen governments committed – at least in a declaratory sense’ to people centred development (Newman 2010: 81),}, and government sponsored organisations such as the Commission on Human Security and the Human Security Trust Fund. The 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), initiated by the
Canadian Government and made up of UN General Assembly members, marked its development to the titular project of *The Responsibility to Protect*. The concept of broadening security to individuals is here hardened up to create a duty to intervene for their protection – and implied ‘duty to prevent, to react and to rebuild’ (Matlary 2008: 137) - through this responsibility, which also reverses the burden of justification, previously on the intervening powers, by talking of a state having to justify its ‘moral claim to be treated as legitimate’ (ICISS 2001: 136; Chandler 2004: 64-5). This is a major change of principle in the intervention norm in international politics: sovereignty becomes conditional, with the conditions set by the ‘international community’, to whom sovereignty for the area passes if the conditions are not met. Further development of this concept through a 2004 UN High-Level Panel on Security report, and subsequent general endorsement of this report at the UN General Assembly in 2005 marks the demise of the ‘first generation’ of human security as a critical concept, seen as suffocated through co-option (Martin and Owen 2010).

Such context in part explains the development of human security as a ‘problem solving’ concept, developed in relation to policy, not through methodological debate (Newman 2010: 77-80). This method of development was in part used to overcome the problem common to broadened security agendas of vagueness from potential all-inclusiveness, as Lakhdar Brahimi, chair of the UN Panel on Peace-keeping puts it: ‘I don’t use the term human security because I don’t know exactly what I mean, and I worry that someone will come up and contradict me’ (Brahimi in Martin and Owen 2010: 215).

However, this mode of development was also strategic. Theoretical development was avoided precisely because the Western norms for intervention it implied would be resisted and thus development of the concept proceeded through ‘concrete projects that had some relation to physical security, such as child soldiers or the trade in small arms, without focusing on the intervention norm directly’ (Matlary 2008: 136). Janne Haaland Matlary, who was deputy foreign minister of Norway at this time and in charge of human security policy, notes ‘[e]ach time I mentioned the concept of human security to non-Western states during this work, the reaction was wary. Was this a new way for the West to secure a right of intervention under the pretext of human rights?’ (Matlary 2008: 136).

---

**132** The baton for a second generation of human security then passes to the EU, where if the lessons from the UN experience are learnt, the as yet unsuccessful project to have human security adopted as the security doctrine for Europe can still prevail (Martin and Owen 2010).
I will look at two projects where Mary Kaldor has developed her thinking on human security in just such a ‘problem-solving’ way: developing human security as part of ‘corporate social responsibility’ for BP, with for her an aim to ‘work out what it might mean to be genuinely a ‘human rights company’’ (Kaldor, Karl, and Said 2007: ix); developing human security for the EU as a security doctrine, which argued that ‘in order to implement the European Security Strategy, Europe needs military forces to be configured and used in new ways’ (Albrecht et al. 2004: 5).

‘Human securing oil’

Kaldor’s work in the edited volume ‘Oil Wars’ covers the ‘unipolar moment’, being begun in 1998 at the behest of BP - then facing up to the problems of ‘exploring oilfields in unstable parts of the world’, the ‘social equivalent of deep sea drilling’ – the work covered the period until publication in 2007. In particular the work covers the Iraq War and its aftermath, used as the prime case to examine the relationship between oil and war. Beside BP’s problem of stabilising potentially oil-rich regions, she is also concerned with the broader problem of the fact that the US ‘old wars’ approach means they misunderstood the situation in Iraq, which could have been grasped with ‘new wars thinking’, and are therefore unable to secure energy supplies. Alongside BP’s initial impetus, this work was funded, ‘independently’, by the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation, with conclusions and recommendations deriving from discussions with oil executives in a ‘meeting at Bellagio, the Italian villa owned by the [Rockefeller] Foundation’ from which her report of this work to them gains its name (Kaldor 2007a: ix: ix).

The concept of new wars is directly operationalised in both the private interests of oil companies and those of the energy security of the West more generally through developing the idea of ‘new oil wars’, in which the interventionary logic of new wars is amplified as ‘the risk of war in oil-exporting countries is greater than in other countries and the need to address this danger is more urgent’. As for human security generally, preventive action is implied, as the aim is to produce recommendations for ‘measures all stakeholders can take to prevent bloodshed’, whilst understanding that the stakeholders she acknowledges are primarily

133 The nature of the work is set out clearly in the introduction with the motivating question ‘could it be that the nature of this relationship [between oil revenues and forms of state] rather than geopolitical competition explains Iraq’s conflict prone modern history?’ The answer, unsurprising if you consider her co-editor Terry Lynn Karl’s comparative political work on the internal causes of instability in ‘petro-states’, is yes (Karl 1997).
interested in maintaining the minimal functioning state and sufficient rule of law to keep oil flowing (Kaldor, Karl, and Said 2007: 4, 2).

These recommendations then are aimed at overcoming the problem of old war thinking, as evidenced concretely in the inability of the US to secure energy supplies using military force, as ‘geopolitical competition, which is the key characteristic of ‘old oil wars’, is counterproductive if the aim is to secure the supply of oil’ (Kaldor and Said 2007: 275). ‘[N]ew war thinking allows a multilateral solution to the problem ‘in which ‘[c]ivil society strengthening is critical’. What is needed then is a ‘change of mindset: human security [is] the only way to ensure energy supplies in the future’ (Kaldor 2007b: 179).

This can be seen as a continuation and application of her Cold War concerns and experiences. In her conclusion written with Yahia Said134, the overarching aim is regime change within ‘petro-states’ to liberal democratic capitalist states, to resolve conflict, promote human rights and democracy135. The practical difficulty is that oil supply has previously been ensured by maintaining good relations with whatever type of compliant government was in power in oil-producing states. The solution is ‘a four way partnership involving civil society, companies, governments and international institutions [that] could offer a mechanism for strengthening civil society without jeopardising state relations’, applying to a new context the lessons that enabling civil society against totalitarian states during the Cold War provided (Kaldor and Said 2007: 276). Such an approach underlies her associated belief in there having been ‘an alternative to war in Iraq’ as ‘there was a real possibility of ‘opening up’ the regime rather in the way that happened in east-central Europe in the 1980s as a result of a combination of pressure both from outside based on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and from below’ (Kaldor 2005: u.n.).

‘A European Way of Security’

Central to the EU’s need to define Europe (in the body of the EU) is its conceptualisation as a different kind of power in international relations; a view often expressed in terms of ‘civilian

134 Yahia Said is Director of the Middle East and North Africa Region at the Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) and Research Fellow, London School of Economics. RWI began as a program of the Open Society Institute, and was spun off as an independent organisation in 2006. It is now principally funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the Open Society Institute.

135 ‘Substantive democracy’ must be ensured, involving interaction and monitoring between civil society, business and the state’ – Venezuela is thus held up as a poor model as its populism and social democracy ‘creates dependency’ (Kaldor and Said 2007: 278).
power’ or ‘normative power’ Europe. It is this need to demarcate difference that underlies Javier Solana’s commissioning of Mary Kaldor to lead a study group to redefine European security policy along human security lines whilst he was High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However, the actual implications of doing so, whilst showing the potential power of such an idealist project, led to its failure to be adopted.

Kaldor sees the concept of human security as offering both an alternative strategic narrative and operational doctrine. For the former it seems to provide a unifying rubric for the existing aims of common foreign and security policy ‘to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (article 11, Amsterdam Treaty; immanent from the expressed founding principles of the Union in article 6, Amsterdam Treaty), and thus secure the claim to be a different kind of international actor, expressing internationally the EU’s domestic values. Herein perhaps lies the problem underlying its non-adoption, as Kaldor saw her role as providing more than merely an ‘analytical label that categorises the EU’s international role in the way that concepts such as normative power or civilian power have done’ instead seeking to provide a ‘dynamic organising frame for security action’ and ‘pro-active strategic narrative’ to unify EU foreign policy (Martin and Kaldor 2010: 1) and thereby overstepping the bounds of what was required.

This drive influences the development of the broad concept human security concept contained in the Barcelona Report into the implementation focused Madrid Report. Recognising the contested nature of the human security concept, Kaldor redefines it for use by Europe in this latter report, which sought both to demonstrate that human security was ‘already implicit in much of what the EU does’ and to develop from this a refined set of principles for action (Kaldor 2010: 6). The core of the Madrid report then is a set of five case studies ‘of EU engagement in regions where it has intervened to help stabilise societies that have suffered violent conflict’, the lessons from which serve to both legitimise the six principles broadly defined in the Barcelona report and refine them for future action (Madrid report – annex in Martin and Kaldor 2010, case studies tabulated 178-180)136, in a tactic reminiscent of the UN’s development of the concept.

136 The six principles are: the primacy of human rights; legitimate political authority; a bottom-up approach; effective multilateralism; an integrated regional approach, and; clear and transparent strategic direction.
The practices of the EU from which Kaldor derives her recommendation are however of a ‘European alternative’ approach to global governance that is simply less belligerent than the US (van der Pijl 2006b: 15). In addition to the interventionary practice already discussed, and used as case studies by Kaldor, analysis of EU and US responses short of military intervention (from aid withdrawal and sanctions through to ‘democracy assistance’) to non-compliance with human rights and democracy norms in third countries, finds that both reacted based upon similar security or economic concerns, the difference lying in the US responding more often, and more forcefully than the EU (Warkotsch 2010). A human security ‘alternative’ developed from and adapted to such current practice will therefore be broadly compatible with liberal interventionism across a wide spectrum of global governance concerns.

This then makes clear the relation of the earlier work by Kaldor to work on human security as a security doctrine for Europe. Her 2003 article on ‘American power: from ‘compellance’ to cosmopolitanism?’ (coming before the Barcelona report), reproduced as chapter 2, ‘American Power’, of 2007’s ‘Human Security: reflections on globalisation and intervention’ (contemporaneous to the Madrid report) offers a prescription for effective US power – it must act in Kaldor’s cosmopolitan vein if it is to shape the world in its interests. She, of course, defines any thought of US interest being tied to material resources or domestic multinationals as ‘old-fashioned’: for her the US represents the Arendtian vision we have seen of the US republic as a model to the world of an ‘open, reasoning society’. Its interests then are, and should be, in spreading (American) democracy to the rest of the world (2003: 22). We thus see her take issue with an (unnamed) Asian human rights activist’s claim that America represses democracy when it is in its interests, accepting only that current (Bush era) unilateralism ‘may have the effect of repressing democracy’ (ibid).

The means, of unilateralism and the type of military force used, not the ends of the use of US power is therefore her target. She berates the US for viewing ‘sovereignty as conditional for other states, but unconditional for the United States because the United States represents ‘good’ (ibid: 12), insisting instead that sovereignty be conditional for all. Similarly it is the unilateralism of the ‘extraordinarily wide remit for military action’ the US has claimed for itself by lining up a ‘duty to protect freedom’ with ‘preventive self-defence’ against terrorism that she challenges. Nonetheless she agrees with George Soros’s comments on the internal condition of other states as ‘important for our internal security’ and thus subject to ‘military containment’, though naturally ‘conceived as international law enforcement, not war-fighting’
with this force to be applied by and subject to the conditions of the ‘international community’ (ibid: 19).

Trajectory 1 – Conclusion: Retrieving the critical intellectual

Through this trajectory we have seen a continuity of concerns with the role and nature of the military establishment and with the creation of an ‘alternative politics’ deriving from the Central and Eastern European development of Arendtian republicanism. Throughout too, we see her conception as violence as lying outside of politics and society – remove the military and this ‘alternative politics’ will flourish. This then has developed into her central concern of an ‘applied cosmopolitanism’ – precisely the issue of establishing such a politics that Patricia Owens sees as lying at the heart of Arendt’s contribution to cosmopolitanism. Seeing such a politics as immanent within society Kaldor does not however reject the use of force in establishing the conditions for it – though such a use of force is through this conceptualisation cast as defending society and politics from violence. Nonetheless ‘trying to create the conditions in which human beings can solve problems though debate and reason rather than through violence and struggle [...] is extremely difficult’ (Kaldor 2009: u.n.).

One can see how easily this slips into fellow-travelling with neoconservative foreign policy: ‘there is a link. I felt it in my own soul, as it were. All of us who started off as peace movement activists and became passionate about human rights found it hard not to flip over to the other side [to neo-conservatism].’ The difference is principally one of means, as ‘[t]he neocons on the one hand are passionate about human rights but on the other hand they think bombing is legitimate in support of human rights’, whereas the difficulty, and her task – all along – is ‘of holding peace and human rights together’ (Kaldor 2007d: 23-24).

That there is also more of a difference in political vision too comes out in her response to Mark Duffield’s argument that ‘‘human security’ linked to intervention is a new way of playing the governance game’ (Kaldor 2009: u.n.; Duffield 2007). Whilst his argument is ‘seductive’ it is, simply, ‘too negative’:

... what is the alternative, and I think the real problem is that for him there’s no middle position between imperial intervention and global revolution. When you look at his alternative, he talks vaguely about solidarity and I think there just has to be a middle position, or at least we have to believe in the existence of a middle position, which for me
is reflected in a human security agenda, which I would argue is not imperialist because it has to be executed within a multilateralist framework based on the equality of human beings. And we simply can’t use conventional warfare, our actions have to be different, and that’s how I understand the middle position. (Kaldor 2009: u.n.)

This is her vision of applied cosmopolitanism, returning to the question of the practice of solidarity identified as the serious issue within cosmopolitan approaches in the previous chapter. In doing so she draws out the power of critical thought in cosmopolitanism to legitimate the action of a bi-polar West, within which the preferred vehicle remains the EU. Most recently, characterising ‘[t]he EU as a New Form of Political Authority’ offering a ‘model for global governance’, Kaldor lauds the expeditionary nature of European power arguing the ‘Common Security and Defence Policy is designed to make a contribution to global security rather than to protect borders using military force, as in the case of classic nation-states’. To increase the legitimacy of this model, contained in both the EU and CSDP, ‘[t]he EU should explicitly adopt the concept of human security as a basis for external security policy’ (Kaldor 2012: 79-80). Here then we see all these concerns coming together in considering how to apply the power of cosmopolitan Europe externally.

**Trajectory 2: Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen School**

The Copenhagen School’s work represents the ‘most thorough and continuous exploration of the significance and implications of the widening security agenda for security studies’ developing from the post-Cold War problematizing of security (Husymans 2007: 480). The School itself is built around three main ideas: securitisation/desecuritisation, sectoral security, and regional security complexes (Wæver 2004; Huysmans 2007). Here I will focus on the first, as securitisation is what unifies and defines the school most distinctly and where the contestation over its normative / political content lies (Wæver 2012; Hansen 2012).

In the terms of the academic field – of scholarly impact, papers and books published, and grants awarded – the Copenhagen School has been the most enduringly successful of these

---

137 An earlier version of this section was presented to the Copenhagen Sussex postgraduate Network Workshop, held at the University of Copenhagen in December 2013. My thanks particularly to Lene Hansen, Lise Philipsen and Rebecca Adler-Nissen for helpful comments.
new post-Cold War approaches to security emerging in Europe (Friedrichs 2004; Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; Buzan and Hansen 2009; de Graaf and Zwierlein 2013; and see for example the Centre for Advanced Security Theory\(^\text{138}\)). As such it has inevitably been the focus of much questioning over whether it has been as successful theoretically and politically; from Bill McSweeney’s initial interrogation – from which the label Copenhagen School derives\(^\text{139}\) - onwards, with the School often standing in for Critical Security Studies as a whole in such analysis (McSweeney 1996; Hynek and Chandler 2013).

These two sets of questions asked of the Copenhagen School, the theoretical and political, are analytically separable but inter-related (Wæver 2011). The first set, of theoretical adequacy, has two elements; firstly the internal consistency of the theory and its claims, secondly its contribution to the theoretical field in general – here the broadening and deepening of thinking on security in terms of its referents, applicable sectors and nature of its constitution.

The second set questions the political implications of the school’s work; Nik Hynek and David Chandler put it strongly, attacking ‘the complete rejection of any emancipatory ambition by the Copenhagen School’, as well demonstrating the interrelation with theory through seeing this as the key to theoretical impact and overall success (Hynek and Chandler 2013: 52; cf. Browning and McDonald 2013)\(^\text{140}\).

Here I explore the inter-relation of these challenges, setting the school also in the context of the European field developed above. Overall, as the approach I have developed indicates, the focus will be on the political significance of the school (rather than significance within theory), and the relation of this significance to both the academic field and concrete social context. The focus is on the foundational figure for the school of Ole Wæver, as it was his work that developed into securitisation theory, although I also first outline the significance of co-founder Barry Buzan.

\(^{138}\) [http://cast.ku.dk/about/](http://cast.ku.dk/about/)

\(^{139}\) One of Ole Wæver’s earlier responses highlighted the potential disciplinary use of labelling a relatively cohesive theoretical challenge to the mainstream a ‘school’, a labelling that acts as a repressive tolerance that helps exclude the challenge from mainstream debate. It will be interesting to see how much longer the Copenhagen School rubric can last, given its increasing diversity and dominance within security studies.

\(^{140}\) Lene Hansen outlines the terrain clearly: within the Copenhagen School ‘[e]mancipation is refuted, but emancipation is not the only concept through which a normative claim can be made’ (2012: 527, n.6). For her, as espoused in developing a contrast with Claudia Aradau’s work, desecuritisation as a concept has to carry this weight – though whether a particular desecuritisation is responsible or normatively desirable is always political and only decidable in the concrete. It is the conception of the political that is in question here.
Barry Buzan – Security

‘We thought of realism as a great place to start but a really miserable place to finish. The core from which you work out.’
(Buzan 2012, interviewed by Dan Nexon, 39m)

The Copenhagen School’s prehistory lies in the uptake of the conceptions within the first edition of Barry Buzan’s book People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (PSF) (Buzan 1983), within Scandinavian IR, particularly within the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). The interest was mutual, as the second edition demonstrates, notably in its use of Ole Wæver’s work (Buzan 1991: passim), which is perhaps unsurprising given Buzan’s overall project: as seen in the second edition’s subtitle, to construct ‘an agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era’, incorporating, as we saw, the peace research work undertaken in Europe (ibid: 12-13). As Ole Wæver notes the contemporary division between US and European security studies (as well as within the ‘Anglosphere’) was ‘pre-visioned’ in the divergent reception to this work on either side of the Atlantic, with a ‘tepid’ reception in the US, whilst in ‘the United Kingdom [and] generally in Europe, Canada and Australia’ it became a ‘standard textbook’ (Wæver 2012: 66, n.4).

Ole Wæver approached Buzan to collaborate, and as a result from 1988 to 2002 141, Buzan was a project director at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), with a resultant seminal work for the Copenhagen School of Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1997), jointly written by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. Buzan is clear on the division of labour between the two main founding protagonists, with Regional Security Theory (RST) primarily his contribution, whilst securitisation theory was ‘something Ole Wæver had been working on for some time’, crystallising in the school’s work, and something Buzan happily ‘bought into’ (Buzan 2012, 33m.).

Nonetheless, whilst RST has obvious attractions for the ‘security community’ of Norden, the central political significance lies in the encapsulation of the shift in the peace movement in the 1980s identified in the previous chapter – to ‘pro-security’ ‘pro-Europe’ positions - as in Denmark too a ‘new peace movement had grown up’ containing a ‘redefinition of the security

141 In January 2003, COPRI was merged into the Danish Institute for International Studies (or in Buzan’s take ‘summarily closed by the Danish Government’ (Buzan 2004b: xii)).
agenda’ along these lines (Pederson 1989: 273). Buzan’s work concomitantly served to depoliticise the peace agenda in similar fashion within the academic sphere creating a ‘middle ground between power (IR, Strategic Studies) and peace’. This helped shift the previously bitter Scandinavian peace-security rift to what he sees as an superior, and apolitical, academic debate (Buzan 2012: 21m; cf. Wæver 2004).

It is worth noting Wæver’s take on the institutional context of the school’s development, that COPRI’s founding during this ‘neo-security wave within peace research’, alongside the proclivities of founding director Håkan Wiberg, made it ‘never very ‘peace research’-like’(Wæver 2004: 62-3). This is an environment temperamentally suited to Barry Buzan also, whose interest lies in analysis of structures and processes not normative debates. His PhD thesis, completed in 1973, was motivated by fascination with the contemporaneous peace movement, but from outside – developing into a historical thesis on ‘why peace movements don’t work’ (covering empirically the British peace movement 1919-1939) (Buzan 2012: 6 – 9m.).

For Ole Wæver the end of the Cold War reverses the positions of ‘peace’ and ‘security’ so that ‘security’ is now the critical position. He argues that liberalism’s rediscovery of its own ‘positive peace’ in the democratic peace thesis dramatically changes the context of debate on peace. However, as we saw ‘security’ is problematically ‘critical’ (at best). I examine Wæver’s work creating security as a critical concept below but here note that the problematic nature of assigning value to security was noted at the time also in response to PSF as, despite constituting a seminal moment in the broadening and deepening of security studies the focus remains on the state as referent object of security and the understanding of security remains as an absence of observable conflict. Both emancipation and the significance of ‘society’ had yet to be seriously considered – thus security is placed ‘at the top of the hierarchy of values [...] more important than justice or equality’ (Smith 1991: 338; cf. Booth 1991a, 1991b, introducing the individual and emancipation to security, Shaw 1993 on society).

Much more could be said about Buzan’s corpus of work and its political orientation,142 but the central point to take for us here is the foundational academic impetus for the Copenhagen

142 Steve Smith sees the opening of security within PSF as developing within liberal ideology, pointing to a liberal teleology (the development to a secure world of strong states and a mature anarchy), the contingent nature of conflict (that it is caused by misperception rather than essential and related to real interests), in turn stemming from the view of economics as a realm of cooperation – economic interdependence therefore lessening conflict (Smith 1991). His work continues within this ideology, his
School (and indeed much other critical security work) is found in a work oriented to the general European milieu identified in the preceding chapter, of the turn to security within the second Cold War, and in peace research meeting the image of realism.

**Wæver and securitization theory**

The need for the East is political changes that open up possibilities for politics in these societies. From there the other changes can be conquered by the people there.

(Wæver 1989a: 9)

Securitisation was coined by Ole Wæver in 1995 though its intellectual development stretches back to the 1980s, and was developed from John Austin’s speech act theory. Securitisation theory contrasts itself with traditional security studies, which as a Cold War artefact it sees as having a relatively unproblematised understanding of the nature of security, deriving from a focus on material, principally military, distributions within an assumed inter-state system (e.g. uni/bi/multi-polarity, balance of power etc.). In problematizing the concept of security, securitisation theory focuses on the process of the construction of security, on how within a political context issues are discursively constructed as security threats, and the political implications of doing so. From this it is often seen as offering normatively neutral analysis of securitising processes, and there is indeed ambivalence throughout the school’s work on the desirability of differing issues being securitised. In general though, securitization creates ‘the Schmittian realm of the political’ of existential enemies and decisionism lifting issues outside of debate and normal politics, ‘and for precisely this reason it is dangerous and by and large to be avoided’ (Williams 2003: 515). As far as is stated within the school, desecuritisation is the long term preference, though some securitisations are seen as responsible and necessary – the desirability of specific securitisations is something that can only be decided in the concrete context.

Both the political theoretical components and political commitments of securitisation theory are seen as problematically diverse and the under-specification of their implications seen to place its coherence in danger. Lene Hansen notes that ‘many have taken the view that the weaknesses – and strengths – of securitization theory ‘arise from unspecified yet deeply held

---

English School development of world society building on the more developed debate on the ‘analogous concept of global civil society’ (2004a: 84), and in analysing the post-Cold War world he sees the end of history as a beneficial thing as with no more battles over capitalism international society can flourish (Buzan 2013), and liberal democracies can work together with ‘joint gains in an open economy’ (Buzan 2004b: 22).
philosophical views’’ (Hansen 2011: 358, Balzacq cited in ibid), and that ‘insufficient attention to politics in the theory of securitization’ leave it ‘open to interpretation’ and readings through a wide range of political theorists – though principally Arendt, Derrida, Foucault, Habermas and Schmitt (Hansen 2012: 526-7). The potential for such multiple interpretations, and the opening for a variety of attempted applications in a diversity of contexts this offers, combined with the basic conceptual break contained in viewing security as a self-referential speech act, account for both some of the success in the academic field, as well as much of the criticism.

However, like Lene Hansen I believe there is a ‘normative-political’ core to the school, and that its understanding lies in a ‘reconstruction of desecuritisation’ both in terms of the theoretical field it engages with and the development of the theory in the context of Cold War détente (ibid). Though I add that its success lies not in the politics of its post-structuralism but in relation to the politics underpinning cosmopolitan power Europe.

Post-structuralist realism (PSR) is the core of Wæver’s securitisation theory, though neglected as significant theoretical background in much of the secondary literature; only Rita Floyd really gives it due significance (Floyd 2010: 23-31). Of even greater significance, though similarly neglected in the secondary literature, is the context in which securitisation was developed which gives meaning to the politics of securitisation theory – here only Lene Hansen sees it as truly significant (Hansen 2012). There are then three inter-related elements to cover, of which the last is the least well covered elsewhere and of most weight: PSR, which constitutes a political approach to theory – formulated as a critical international relations theory ‘beyond’ critical international relations theory; a theory of politics, inflected by other elements but principally Arendtian; and, engagement in the peace research/movement nexus in the ‘second Cold War’. From this last we can contextualise the preceding two, in the use of Arendtian

143 Post-structuralist realism (PSR) is almost entirely absent as a term – though several of its component parts are considered – in the secondary literature. Rita Floyd’s is a comprehensive reconstruction of the development of PSR through the use of early, largely unpublished papers by Wæver, alongside his PhD thesis and early lectures. Her purpose however is to revise securitisation theory for her own application, not to consider it politically as I am seeking to. Here I principally use a paper not utilised by Floyd, Beyond the Beyond of Critical International Theory, though published as a working paper by COPRI, as it deals directly with the relation of PSR to ‘critical international theory’. It is however consistent with, and indeed contains sections repeated verbatim in those Floyd covers. The utility of this is in its explicit engagement with theory, a contrast to the ‘theory in the background’ approach Wæver took in most of his other papers in the period, which Lene Hansen suggests ‘might have contributed to the controversy over the status of securitisation as political theory’ (Hansen 2012: 536, n. 60).

144 Hansen’s own survey of the literature on securitisation turns up only one other instance of its consideration, again from Rita Floyd, though Floyd focuses more on the significance of the end of the Cold War (Hansen 2012: 536, n59; Floyd 2010: 33-8).
concepts of politics, as in the discussion of Mary Kaldor above, and post-structuralist realism not only as developing within the broader incursion of post-structuralist ‘dissidents’ into IR theory, but also as a ‘realism’ counterposed to what Wæver saw as the idealism of both these ‘dissidents’ and the peace movement. Heuristically divided up these three elements relate to respectively, the field, Wæver’s ethico-political drive, and the more general social condition of its production.

**Post-Structuralist Realism**

The aim of Post-structuralist realism (PSR) is to ‘develop a theory that can be political’, ‘by being more post-structuralist than Richard Ashley and Robert Walker’. In this, and justifying my separation of a political approach to theory from a theory of politics in this case, ‘in relation to realism this post-structural realism is therefore less ‘critical’ in the traditional sense’ (Wæver 1989b: 1). The aim here is to destabilise realist concepts, and deconstruct them – the common post-structuralist strategy in which ‘Critical International Political Theory should be written in the margins of the realist text. Not as a new book’ (ibid: 89, his emphasis).

Nonetheless he realises the problem of relativism this generates, wary of the self-enclosed discursive logic of Richard Ashley, and negating the possibility of the ‘beyond’ in RBJ Walker (‘where should that be’). He therefore claims a Derridean approach in using the texts of realism as a foundation, reinserting the destabilised terms, and in effect forcing post-structuralism through realism: ‘the critical potential is the implosive energy, involved when you (with over-enthusiastic indifference ) return the message and thereby cause an overload: the Realpolitik becomes too Realpolitik for the real politician’ (ibid: 90).

It is therefore also ‘post’ structural realism in the second sense of coming after and building upon, rather than ‘against’, as the latter oppositional strategy leaves the field it is opposed to, here IR understood as contained by realism, untouched (ibid: 66-67). In this then he retains the basic realist core of the states system - it ‘is a continuation of realism (classical realism) – with the mark of a post-structuralist reading’ (ibid: 5, original emphasis) - albeit with states understood as socially constructed (ibid: 30-32, prefiguring in its ‘crystallisation’ the later Copenhagen School position of the states system as sufficiently ‘socially sedimented’ as to ‘become a possible referent object for security’ (Buzan and Wæver 1997: 242)).
We can see in all this the problem of the second order hegemony I have outlined. Whilst throughout he points to classical realists as very flexible thinkers, and seems to see their emphasis on the decision maker and the undecidability of political choices as proto-post-structuralist (even (half-?) jokingly placing Kissinger as a ‘critical theorist’ (ibid: 44 n.36, n.37)), realist theory is treated as theory qua theory, with Waltzian neorealism its ultimate theoretical realisation, shorn, for all Wæver’s references to Foucault, of a relation to any actual power. ‘Great powers’ appear in the text, with not even a ‘such as the US’. What is opposed is the manifestation of this power in the field, as understood shorn of its organic relation to power (a single reading of the field in Bourdieu’s terms), resulting in as futile, and as scholastic a strategy as that of the ‘dissidents’ he critiques on just these grounds.

This strategy leads to his version of critical ‘security’. R.B.J. Walker’s strategy is to ask ‘security for whom?’ and thereby draw out the implicit referent object of the state, and oppose it to human security. Being ‘more post-structuralist’ than Walker involves ‘rejecting the ‘whom’ - wherefrom he gets these ‘people’, as, Wæver argues, ‘humanity’ is an ‘empty reference’. The focus then is not on shifting the referent object – as in other ‘broadening’ approaches – but in destabilising ‘security’ itself. Rather than developing a theory of power he follows Foucault in developing an ‘analytics of power’, and from here we see the focus on the security speech act, inchoately introduced in these earlier works, which develops into securitisation theory (ibid: 74).

A common criticism of securitisation theory is of it as a neutral or technocratic ‘process tracing’ (Burke 2013: 79 for a ‘textbook’ presentation of this interpretation), but we can see here how this focus on the creation of security issues is, for Wæver, in and of itself political through its relationship to realism and strategic studies – though this is, in the classic critical failing, theory critique (mis-)understood as politics (cf. Jahn 1998; McCormack 2009). However, Wæver pushes his critique of post-structuralism further, agreeing with those who fault its lack of any ‘ethics’. In his ‘post structuralist’ international theory he wants to create ‘even an absolute commitment to some basic (political?) values’ (ibid: 54). Taking as the base the ‘absolute limit for human morality [as] total slavery, the Concentration Camps’, he opposes to a ‘human rights’ approach one that focuses on the ‘minimum’ – ‘those rights that facilitate political action’, noting the ‘affinity to Hannah Arendt’s concept of politics’ (ibid: 57-58).
An Arendtian concept of politics

His political theory he takes then from Arendt who ‘in my view captures uniquely well’ this ‘essential feature of politics - that irreducible, open element that is the in-betweenness of politics’ (Wæver 2007: 13). Development of his reading of Arendt need not overly detain us, her concept of politics is a common thread throughout his work, but it is worth situating it here as a post-structuralist reading focusing on the ‘undecidability’ of the consequences of actions. This openness is then read as post-structuralist in its stress on the performativity of politics and the undecidability of actions as good or ill, except once done – and then assessed in the stories told about it (Wæver 1989b: 50-51). Although securitisation theory has been read as containing a Habermasian theory of politics, Wæver is here clear on the difference between Habermas and his use of Arendt. What is important is the space for action; Habermas’ public sphere is too rationalist with too little scope for constitutive agonism and action, too little scope for creating identity and the self (cf. Hansen 2012: passim). Set against the Habermasian idea that ‘we (can) control language’ is the idea that we are ‘often controlled by language’ which makes clear that in Wæver’s hands securitisation is not about the creation of a public sphere based on Habermasian discourse ethics (Wæver 1989b: 50).

This gives an entry into the often misunderstood normative content of Wæver’s construction of securitisation/desecuritisation. The misunderstanding arises because there is a clear, long term, preference for issues to be desecuritised/returned to ‘normal politics’ and this is often seen to be the normative core. Certainly there is an idealised condition of asecurity – where, not feeling insecure people ‘work on other matters’ and ‘think in other categories: politics, economy, etc.’ (Wæver 1989b: 84). This is however something of a utopian vision – for Wæver entering politics as it is, ‘to move out into the political’, is a necessary task for critical theory to overcome the limitations of scholasticism: ‘out here directions are not marked with road-signs indicating what is ‘critical’ or ‘progressive’. In politics one cannot just be ‘against’: on the contrary one does something’ (ibid: 90). In doing so a responsible actor should attempt to securitise some things that can be best dealt with within emergency politics. Ultimately then this preference for securitisation/desecuritisation cannot be decidable outside of the concrete (cf. Floyd 2007, 2010).

145 Michael C. Williams a prominent example (Williams 2003).
Whilst this has led to debate on the ethics of securitising (specific) issues (notably *ibid*), what this means is that neither securitisation nor desecuritisation contain the normative content, which lies in the possibility of the process itself – the space for securitising action, as representative of this broader concept of politics. Once securitised of course, the space for this process relating to this issue is by definition shut down, and so desecuritisation will generally return to preference. This then makes sense of the position of Schmitt within securitisation, as theorising the state of emergency, but not in his unilateral decisionism of the ability to declare such a state. Normatively then security policy and its setting is viewed through this Arendtian concept of politics – ‘it should be stressed that since securitisation is never (in contrast to Schmitt) decided by one sovereign subject but in a constellation of decisions it is ultimately inter-subjective (and truly political in an Arendtian sense)’ (Wæver 2006: 286).

From this we can see the conceptualisation of politics is absolutely central normatively, but this does not resolve the difficulty of securitisation as a process as an expression of this politics, and securitisation in its effects as a negation of this process. For this we must understood it in its geopolitical context, in which the concept of desecuritisation was part of ‘theorising détente [and] thus part of a political project that strove to open up space for more political struggle’(Hansen 2012: 536-7).

**Cold War context**

Wæver’s own comments make clear what he sees as the political applications of securitisation theory seeing Cold War détente as ‘negotiated desecuritisation; negotiated limitation of the use of the security speech act’, which, so he argues, ‘contributed to the modification of the Eastern societies and systems that made possible the radical changes of 1989’ (Wæver 1997b: 227). Whilst his work of the time was not yet encapsulated in the rubric of desecuritisation, it prefigured it in advocating a shift from security to ‘politics’ as captured by ‘détente’, and in doing so it combined his political approach to theory with both peace activism and being ‘a kind of security expert in Denmark’ (cf. Hansen 2012: 536-8).

---

146 As the two scholars who consider the ethics of securitisation/desecuritisation within the context of the theory’s development, there are some parallels in my analysis with those of Lene Hansen and Rita Floyd (2012, 2010 respectively). However, their analysis is geared towards the ‘application’ of the theory whereas I am assessing the potential and problematic aspects of the theory politically and relation to cosmopolitan power Europe, within which context is critical.
His political analysis of Cold War détente, whilst more theoretical and less activist than Kaldor’s contains marked similarities. Firstly, the central significance of ‘enemy images’ of one another, and a European rejection of this seen in the central role this European ‘desecuritising’ of identities played in ending the Cold War. Secondly, in its construction of Europe against the elites of both East and West; processes of both ‘all-Europeanization and Western-Europeanization’ run the risk of accumulating ‘fears in limited but important groups - 'security elites’ in West and East. And one day this will cause a dramatic backlash’ (Wæver 1989a: 10).

Thirdly, the construction of civil society against totalitarian states of Central and Eastern Europe, and their protection: this last being the central question desecuritisation was designed to address - how to construct civil society activism as not a security issue for these state security classes. In this way it is posed as a European approach against a US human rights approach that in its absolutism and focus on individual rights, not civil society as a space, risked destabilising regimes and provoking a security response (Wæver 1989a: 11). As Wæver characterises it:

A rule-of-thumb can here be to turn 'threats' into 'challenges'; security problems into politics; make elites avoid the term 'security' and open up domestically room for more open political struggle - even if the rules are not yet 'fair' according to absolute standards. If first the room for politics is opened there are lots of brilliant people in the societies who will carry the cause further.

Wæver 1989a: 12

This is a political challenge for Eastern Europe as “civil society’ as an absolute claim is possible where there is no – or almost no- public realm; when the fight is for opening the space for politics’. Nonetheless he doesn’t fall into the trap of generalising this as Kaldor has; there can be no such absolute normative claims for civil society as representing ‘an ideal of unpolitical politics’ as he sees it used in contemporaneous peace movement circles.147 Therefore ‘[t]ransferring it into Western European politics is not necessarily that simple’ (1989b: 57).

That this is a theory not of, but for the creation of the ‘public sphere’ becomes evident in the difficulties of its application post-Cold War, once developed into securitisation theory proper.

147 Pinpointing the misunderstanding of ‘anti-politics’, as we have seen in our discussion of Kaldor above, which in fact relates more or less directly to the desecuritisation of issues; their removal from ‘totalitarian’ state politics.
A frequent charge against the Copenhagen School is of Eurocentrism, with securitisation theory’s theorising of the shift from ‘normal politics’ to securitised emergency politics seen as reflecting specifically Western liberal social structures (Greenwood and Wæver 2013: 485; cf. Bilgin 2011; Wilkinson 2007). Wæver’s response to this ‘most common’ ‘misreading of the theory’ is useful here: the ‘depoliticizing effect of securitization is understood in relative terms, and therefore can be observed in both democratic and undemocratic societies.’ (Greenwood and Wæver 2013: 485-6). In fact, despite applications outside of Europe being framed about how well the theory can ‘travel’ (ibid; Wilkinson 2007; cf. Bilgin 2011 for further examples), the most intensive development of the theory, into a ‘second generation’ Copenhagen School, has stemmed from difficulties applying the theory to liberal western politics, and especially the EU.\(^\text{148}\)

This ‘second generation’ contains a broad divergence into internal (post-structuralist/Derridean) and external (contextual/Bourdieusian) developments of the theory (Stritzel 2007: 359; Stritzel 2011).\(^\text{149}\) The central development of much of this second generation work, sharing a common external critique of the school, is against the claim that ‘security has an inherent, universal logic (associated with urgency and exceptionalism, for example)’ as this ‘lacks attention to the multiple ways in which security is understood and practised in world politics’, and so ‘greater attention is needed to the varied social, historical and political contexts in which security is constructed’(Browning and McDonald 2013: 237). Thus what gives this otherwise theoretically diverse second generation a ‘family resemblance’ is this focus on the nature and fluidity of the relationship between normal politics and the exceptional, and working to develop on the insight that ‘social construction of a security issue is a more dynamic, nuanced and complex process than the one described by the [original] Copenhagen School’ (Trombetta 2011: 135; Donnelly 2012: 49-64).

\(^{148}\) There is an interesting parallel with Wæver’s comment that ‘[a]lthough Deutsch’s concept of security community has been accused of being Euro-centric, it is actually difficult to apply to present-day Europe’, in that both develop from the European moment of creation that becomes embodied in the EU, but as idealised abstractions (of differing kinds) of the process are difficult to apply to the supposed subject (Wæver 1998: 104).

\(^{149}\) Stritzel’s 2007 division still widely cited and used (cf. Roe 2012 for inter-relation to the ‘ethics’ of securitisation) – in the more recent division he places as exemplars: Jef Huysmans, focusing on securitisation as Arendtian ‘political act’; Juha Vuori representing an internalist concern with the grammar of the securitization logic; and Thierry Balzacq and himself in a ‘contextual process/practice’ camp (2011: 348).
As an example of the difficulties in application to Western politics we can take the putatively
archetypal case of the George W. Bush administration’s construction of the War on Terror and
associated justifications for the war on Iraq. Whilst often seen as a pre-eminent example of
securitisation (Buzan 2006; Buzan and Wæver 2009), in using this discourse to develop
securitisation theory Faye Donnelly makes clear that its central failing is the fragility too rigid a
separation of normal politics and the exceptional gives to the theory (Donnelly 2012).

Couched in general terms by Donnelly, the question is posed as how one can distinguish
between a policy evolution and a securitisation, and the question of at what point enough
rules of a particular kind are broken to constitute a securitisation. Applied more specifically
Donnelly demonstrates the embeddedness of ‘securitising’ speech acts within wider political
discourses (or ‘overlapping language games’), characteristic of an administration determined
as much to change the rules of the game and create its own reality – and thus shift ‘normal
politics’ - as by explicit rule-breaking and decisionism, and the construction of emergency
politics. What is shown to be central is how the Iraq War was given meaning, how the Bush
administration’s use of language both enabled and constrained their action – within which
securitising logics (against the original securitising ‘blueprint’ she argues ‘there is always more
than one way to speak security’) formed part of the wider ‘language games’ constructing this
meaning (Donnelly 2012: 3-5, 88).

Where securitisation theory in its original formulation has been applied successfully is
precisely not in understanding Western security discourse, but in the shifting of ‘non-European’
political cultures towards the EU’s self-conceptualised norms. Not that it captures the reality of
such transitions151, but that it provides the political conceptions used within and enabling such
a shift.

150 Donnelly’s work is an application of Wittgensteinian ‘language games’ to securitisation theory, based
on her PhD which was supervised by Karin Fierke, whose own work lies in ‘post-Wittgensteinian’
development of constructivist approaches to IR (for critical security studies in particular see Fierke
2007). All of which bears out the academic fruitfulness of the conceptual break in seeing security as self-
referential practice crystallised by Wæver.

151 Claire Wilkinson’s 2007 development of securitisation theory demonstrating by its omissions the
weakness of the approach for this task. She seeks to overcome its ‘Eurocentrism’ - based on it
containing the assumption that the ‘Euro-American model of the state and the accompanying political
culture is valid globally’ (2007: 7) - through application to Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip Revolution’ of 2005, one of
the US backed Soros facilitated ‘Colour Revolutions’ in the FSU. This latter element is necessarily
unmentioned by Wilkinson, who must focus on the de/securitising acts of formal power holders and
Pinar Bilgin, consistently engaged in ‘Thinking past ‘Western’ IR’ (Bilgin 2008), demonstrates this usage in Turkish security literature, where beyond its use in process tracing ‘two interrelated processes of desecuritisation in Turkey: recent liberalization of domestic political processes, on the one hand, and improvements in relations with Syria and Iran, on the other’, securitisation theory has a direct normative power and impact (Bilgin 2011: 406). Locating this security literature in the context of EU accession debates she stresses ‘how securitization theory is utilized by Turkey’s scholars as a ‘Western European approach’ to security’, with the concomitant ‘[c]onflating [of] desecuritisation with Europeanization as such allow[ing] the[se] authors to portray Turkey as a Europeanizing (if not yet European) country whose civil society [...] and/or politicians [...] diagnose Turkey’s problems as securitization and seek to address them through desecuritisation as ‘proper’ European actors would’ (2011: 399, 406).

This is closely tied to Wæver’s iteration of the constructivist take on the end of the Cold War; Bilgin’s analysis worth citing at length as it gets to the core of the matter:

Through offering securitization theory’s reading of how the Cold War was brought to an end in Western Europe (securitization was the source of the ills of the European Union and desecuritisation was the method through which they were addressed), these texts assure readers as to the appropriateness of the solutions adopted by Turkey’s policymakers. Accordingly, controversial policies that (re)calibrate civil–military balances come across as entirely appropriate policies to be adopted by an EU candidate country. Second, viewed through the lens of securitization theory as such, Turkey comes across as being able to address its problems because it is following in the footsteps of EU actors. This second move locates Turkey in Europe by way of highlighting how it presently exhibits a ‘proper European way of behaviour’ at a time when sceptics at home and abroad question the likelihood of Turkey’s accession to the European Union. (ibid: 408)

Bilgin does also note that this should be unsurprising as despite laying a formulaic charge of ‘Eurocentric ethnocentrism’ against the theory, she highlights that Wæver has ‘argued that securitization theory might have a greater potential for adoption by non-core scholars than some other critical approaches to security’ precisely on the grounds of the potential similarity of situation and relation to non-liberal state formations of non-core scholars and ‘European

local political actors as they present themselves. Indeed she references the reports of the International Crisis Group without comment on the significance of the involvement of this organisation which was co-founded and financed by Soros, who still sits on the Executive Committee of its Board.
civil societal activists of the 1980s’ which gives a similar dynamic to the issue of desecuritisation and the creation of a public sphere (ibid: 403-4).152

This brings out the centrality of Cold War anti-totalitarianism and subsequent understanding of the construction of the EU, to the theory. My focus has been on the development of the theory in the Cold War, the shift to the theory’s relation to post-Cold War cosmopolitan Europe follows naturally as Pinar Bilgin’s analysis of its use reveals. The pacific image of (cosmopolitan)153 Europe is similarly created through a securitisation against Europe’s past. Europe is seen as a model of internal ‘asecurity’, the semi-utopian condition beyond desecuritisation where traditional military security issues cannot even be conceived within the ‘non-war’ or ‘security community’ (Wæver 1998). In his own take on the relation of geopolitical origins to the development of securitisation theory Wæver relates its development as a ‘meta-theorisation’ of the dilemmas of ‘widening’ security to non-traditional issues, which the asecuritised community of the EU brings to the fore (Wæver 2012, Wæver and Greenwood 2013, cf. n. 152 for the shift in Wæver’s understanding here between 2004 and 2012).

This brings us to a final acute point from Wæver on the nature of European power, and its distinction to US power. Much European discourse over George W Bush era US foreign policy criticised it as Manichean, creating a strict us and them binary, with many considerations bringing out the continuation of Cold War rhetoric within this. Against this, and ‘the wish of various poststructuralists and critical theorists to catch the EU and the West’s various neighbors – Islamic Middle East, Russia or the Balkans - the dominant trend in European security rhetoric is that the Other is Europe’s own past (fragmentation), and those

152 Turkey she speculates being therefore ‘one of those places where Wæver would expect securitization theory to do well by virtue of the ways in which the language of geopolitics and security has been utilized by elites to justify statist practices and limit civil society’s room for manoeuvre’ (ibid: 406). Bilgin doesn’t follow this argument through to question the actual nature of securitisation theory as ‘Eurocentric ethnocentrism’ in the way I have, and therefore supposes this applicability is not constitutive of the theory but would be a ‘matter of how it is utilized in a particular context’ (ibid: 404). The piece she cites is Wæver’s influential, ‘controversially’ unpublished, ISA paper on new ‘schools’ in security theory (Wæver 2004)(see Christine Sylvester’s response to the C.A.S.E. collective where the use of this unpublished paper is made a central issue (Sylvester 2007). Sylvester is correct insofar as assessing Wæver’s early work does require some effort as so much of it is unpublished or no longer readily available following COPRI’s merge into DIIS). In its later published iteration on ‘the Europeanness of new ‘schools’ the analysis shifts to suggest ‘other concepts [than security] may provide the headline for more productive and inspiring work on the same issues’ as security has done in different ways in the US and Europe (Wæver 2012: 66).

153 Wæver does not use the term, though as I show his analysis fits within this model.

154 Wæver’s failure here to differentiate within the ‘West’ reveals the pre-Bush era vintage, Clinton seeming to offer a change to Cold War US strategy (cf. Apeldoorn and Graaff 2012 on continuity and change in post-Cold War US grand strategy).
further away from the center are not defined as anti-Europe, only as less Europe' (Wæver 1998: 100); a succinct summary of the self-conceptualisation underlying cosmopolitan and normative power Europe.155

**Trajectory 2 – Conclusion: Political consistency**

Ole Wæver has been clear throughout his work on the centrality of an Arendtian concept of politics. His recent recapitulation of the ‘Politics of securitization (theory)’ states this once again, and relates it directly to the rest of the theory – that it is ‘the political moves invested in the theory, i.e. the political act involved in designing and/or employing securitization theory (how to theorize politically)’ that is ‘ultimately crucial – and, notably, more strategic’ (Wæver 2011: 466-7, original emphasis). Whilst his consideration of the burgeoning debate over the ‘politics of securitisation theory’ (cf. Gad and Petersen 2011) is done in a characteristically generous and thoughtful way this is directed against attempts to reconfigure securitisation theory along alternative ethical or normative lines, particularly the work seeking to bridge the division in critical security studies between Copenhagen and Aberystwyth (Ken Booth’s emancipatory critical security studies) and that arguing for a normative conceptualization of securitization/desecuritisation itself (he uses Booth and Claudia Aradau as illustrations).156

In doing so he offers an analysis of the politics of theorising which mirrors the political realist approach I argued for in chapter one. One approach ‘argues that a particular theory should take a stance on various issues or provide standards of judgement for specific cases’; this is not a sufficiently academic approach but ‘rather a political reflection that really belongs to another kind of actor, a political party – this approach does not assess what theory does as theory, but how it relates to a political position’. Its benefit is its ‘emphasis on real politics in society (not privileging academe), while its drawback is that it does not address intellectual academic work in a manner proper for this particular practice’. The common alternative to the ‘politics of theorizing sets out to demonstrate a given theory’s dependence on some philosophical premises, which are then shown as being inferior to other, more progressive philosophical

155 In contradiction with this, Uliana Hellberg uses the discourse of Blair and Habermas to construct the EU as engaging in identity construction through ‘securitising’ the other (Hellberg 2011). This highlights that the debate within Europe between muscular liberal interventionism and a more pacific normative power vision can be seen in conceptualising its identity construction through securitisation theory also.

156 Others are not always so generous, Rita Taureck correctly, but more pugnaciously, arguing they are ‘based on a total misunderstanding of the premises of securitization theory’ (Taureck 2006: 54).
positions’ with the drawback that ‘[t]he most political thing one can do within such a perspective is to solve a philosophical problem in the politically correct way’. This second approach is then good at respecting the specificity of intellectual work, but errs in ‘placing politics in the sphere of philosophy’.

The trick is to ‘get both points right’: ‘The politics of philosophical debates does not have primacy, politics outside academia does’, but theory is ‘not to be assessed as though that theory were a political actor in the normal sense. It is not what the theory says, but what it does’ that is critical, and in this ‘how features of the theory systematically shape the political effects of using this theory’. He thus concludes that the Arendtian concept of politics ‘does not simply reflect a personal penchant on the part of the theory’s founder’ the very ‘definition of securitization shapes every usage of the theory and entails this Arendtian concept of politics’ (Wæver 2011: 467-8, his emphasis).

This is the approach I have taken in constructing this trajectory, with however the critical addition whose significance for his theory Wæver misses, that Arendt’s concept of politics was constructed against (her construction of) ‘totalitarianism’, and that this anti-totalitarianism is accordingly the central political effect available to his theory. As a concluding remark I will briefly draw out the ‘political effects of using this theory’ explicitly and contemporarily.

The concept of revolution, and revolutionary situations themselves cause great difficulties for realist IR theories – even post-structuralist realist ones. Reflecting, alongside Maja Touzari Greenwood, on his experiences as part of a CAST delegation to Egypt in 2010-11 to discuss widening conceptions of security, during the revolution there, Ole Wæver concludes the theory is ill-equipped for understanding political change. These events set securitisation theory the theoretical task of overcoming ‘reference to existing political structures’ – this task derived from a ‘theoretical challenge’ ‘not because the case is non-Western, but due to the revolutionary situation’ (Greenwood and Wæver 2013: 501). This however is to misrecognise the challenge presented by such a revolutionary situation, as revolutionary transformation of political structures in Central and Eastern Europe was constitutive rather than challenging to the theory. The difficulty lies instead where change cannot be grasped simply in terms of the construction of an idealised public sphere.

Martin Holbraad and Morten Axel Pedersen capture this through bringing securitisation theory into contact with the Cuban revolution. Within this meeting they find securitisation theory
cannot but ‘parse [the revolution] as a form of totalitarianism’ and is thus ‘conceptually confluent with the views expressed by the Cuban revolution’s liberal critics’ and in ‘profound contradiction with revolutionary discourse […] forms of political organization and action that lie at the heart of the experience of revolutionary politics in Cuba’ (Holbraad and Pedersen 2012: 169). Fundamentally it cannot grasp the revolutionary unity between the people and the state, an inability which for them reflects the liberal political ontology underlying the theory expressed in the form of the ‘distinction between the individual person and the state’ (ibid). With the reconstruction I have given above it becomes clear that to this we should add the flattening effect on the comprehension of politics that Arendt’s static conceptualisations create – the conflation of all non-liberal societies under ‘totalitarianism’ and related inability to grasp dynamics of geopolitical pressures and changes. Wæver brings this out himself in relation to Holbraad and Pederson’s argument, arguing that ‘revolutionary’ securitization often mythologizes the defence of ‘the people’ in a manner that comes close to classical ‘national security’ but even more so – ‘[a]s seen in the French and Russian revolutions, and perhaps most obviously in Cuba’s definition of threats against the ‘revolution’ decades after it took place (Holbraad and Petersen, 2012)’ (Greenwood and Wæver 2013: 494, 494 n.12).

Securitisation theory is not however an explicit theory of straightforward social restructuring, but a theorisation of practice(s) that nonetheless ‘systematically shape[s] the political effects of using this theory’ (ibid: 467). Wæver’s thoughts on the role of securitisation theory during the Egyptian revolution bear this out, simultaneously demonstrating the inability of such a theory to truly place such change in political context. For him securitisation theory’s role is to overcome a situation where political:

‘positions are abstracted into poles and each defended against their enemy […] a constellation [that] erases the possibility of politics, because no common ground exists’, so a concrete contribution ‘could be to calibrate an institutional minimum structure as a common security focal point in order to secure a form of stability that facilitates change. It is a classical paradox known from, for example, the politics of East–West détente, that change is only possible when there is enough stability for absolute change to be ruled out […] In Egypt, this pointed to security sector reform (police brutality as a procedural problem) and constitutional politics. The dominant securitizations became increasingly destructive
delegitimizations of political opponents, whereas any form of productive political co-production would demand at least an additional security discourse of shared defence of the framework itself. (ibid: 495)

Reasonable enough, if one sees revolutionary change as normatively undesirable and seeks to subvert it: ‘A central task discussed with our partners was to channel the young revolutionaries’ critique of the regime into concrete complaints over police violence and demands for reforms of the security sector’ (ibid: 495).

However the issue of a new constitution brings out the interests at play in a way that securitization theory, framing actors in terms of securitising discourses within Egypt cannot grasp. For Wæver NGOs and civil society groups are simply one of the four ‘revolutionary groupings’ at play, noting of them only that ‘civil society organizations, NGOs and human rights groups had grown massively in the previous two decades’ (ibid: 493). Typically though, as we saw in Central and Eastern Europe this has been a site for Western intervention, such growth relating to the fact that in the early 1990s ‘the United States began emphasizing civil society development in the Middle East’, stepped up considerably post 9/11 such that in 2009 the level of annual U.S. democracy aid in the Middle East was more than the total amount spent between 1991 to 2001’ (Hamid 2011: 19-20).

Such ‘aid’ formed a continuance of Western ‘Open Door imperialism’, opening societies to Western capital (van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2012), with a ‘focus on economic reform first and political change later’. U.S. and European policy communities ‘coalesced around the notion of ‘gradualism’’. Stability was key; ‘Revolution was impossible.’ (Hamid 2011: 19-20; cf. van der Pijl 2011).

Evidently control was lost to real democratising momentum. Nevertheless, during the crisis and the redrafting of the Egyptian constitution, pre-prepared draft constitutions were submitted for adoption from the civil society groups the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information and the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (Reuters 16 February, 2011), organisations funded in part by the Open Society Foundation and NED respectively. None of this, nor the provenance of Mohamed El Baradei the preferred presidential candidate of these

157 http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE71F0N620110216?sp=true
groups, who sat at the time on International Crisis Group Board alongside *inter alia* George Soros, can be fitted into Wæver’s securitisation theory approach to the situation. For him the revolutionary situation was down to ‘public pressure’, and as we saw ‘politics’ becomes restricted to limited disagreement within a space of ‘political co-production’ nationally (Greenwood and Wæver 2013: 496).

During the 2011 revolution George Soros (displaying his sense of humour) commented that ‘I am, as a general rule, wary of revolutions. But in the case of Egypt, I see a good chance of success. […] My foundations are prepared to contribute what they can. In practice, that means establishing resource centers for supporting the rule of law, constitutional reform, fighting corruption and strengthening democratic institutions in those countries that request help in establishing them, while staying out of those countries where such efforts are not welcome’ (Soros 2011b: u.n.). The ‘cutting edge’ had done its work, albeit creating a more revolutionary and fluid situation than desired, and the critical task of ensuring the right kind of expertise and knowledge underpinned the politics of the country was to begin.

To assess securitisation theory in Wæver’s own terms then, what it ‘says’ is a desirable creation and support of ‘co-produced’ politics. What it does is legitimise liberal capitalist openings of societies – against securitising totalitarian forces - in a process which it is incapable of theorising or grasping within its conceptualisation of politics.

**Conclusion**

The considerations of Mary Kaldor and Ole Wæver have reflected on their individual ‘puzzles’ in their respective conclusions. These considerations have also demonstrated the compatibility of their thought with liberal interventionism of differing kinds and thus the potential for co-option: Kaldor more akin to a modified global power Europe vision, Wæver to an assertive normative power conception of Europe.

In the introduction to his chapter, however I also set the two trajectories the task of telling us something worthwhile about European IR and its relation to the renovation of Western hegemony, beyond this simple relation of appropriation. What these trajectories tell us is about the nature of the construction of the new ‘great lie’ of international relations, of cosmopolitanism and the international community, and through this ‘why critical and emancipatory approaches are doomed to appear as little more than the theoretical wing of
contemporary liberal interventionism’ (McCormack 2009: 18). In demonstrating this In conclusion then I highlight how a political realist dual reading, as argued for in chapter four and developed in the trajectories, gives a more valuable understanding of their work than those that flatten it through this association with liberal imperialism. I take Nik Hynek and David Chandler’s work as primary exemplars of this flattening here, due to its otherwise great strength and insight.

Cosmopolitanism has been central to the shift in post-Cold War discourses, both academic and policy making, legitimising and shaping interventions by the West. Within this the putative cosmopolitan nature of the EU has been central, with the US either folded into this ‘post-modern’ camp (Cooper 2003), or seen as the primary obstacle to remaking the world in the European cosmopolitan image (Kaldor 2007c). Within accounts focusing on this relation however, the shift is understood instrumentally, with little consideration of the development of these discourses academically outside of their relation to policy making needs. A focus therefore is on the direct linkages between (critical) security theorists and policy making. Kaldor is the pre-eminent figure here, but there have been ‘very few successful critical security academics who did not participate in policy advocacy’ (Hynek and Chandler 2013: 52), with academic work understood as ‘parasitical on the shift in Western policy discourses’, or ‘derivative of existing policy rhetoric’ (ibid: 46; Hynek 2012: 4; Chandler and Hynek 2011).

Such an approach is only really able to grasp the most explicitly policy relevant academic discourses and lifts them out of their academic context, paradoxically also, through stressing the contemporary effects of the relation to policy, destroying the relationship of their development to the contemporaneous social conditions. This is most clear-cut in its contrast to my development above in the case of the Copenhagen School, for which I have demonstrated consanguinity between it and ‘emancipatory’ approaches, especially that of Kaldor.\(^\text{158}\) In seeking to remove the ‘critical’ descriptor from critical security studies (CSS) Nik Hynek and David Chandler take as their starting point Ken Booth’s post-Cold War work; this, constructed as the origin, being the ‘only basis’ upon which the field can be understood. From

---

\(^{158}\) Hynek and Chandler include Mary Kaldor in their grouping of ‘emancipatory’ critical security theorists alongside Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, grouped around the securitising of the individual and/or human security. They particularly highlight Nicholas Wheeler’s work on the British Labour Party’s ‘Ethical Foreign Policy’ and on R2P, alongside ‘[p]erhaps the most influential of these theorists Mary Kaldor’ (Hynek and Chandler 2013: 51).
here CSS is understood in its coeval development with greater freedom of intervention for the ‘West’ – ‘Western states, international institutions and ‘global civic culture’’. The Copenhagen School thereby becomes a ‘second generation’ of CSS becoming ‘critical’ only after Booth’s work and its relation to Western intervention made critique of such emancipatory critical security studies critical itself; thus as the ‘Copenhagen School of Security – otherwise existing since the late 1980s/early 1990s – became the Copenhagen School of Critical Security Studies (the ‘second generation’ of CSS), ‘its broadened scope and emphasis on studying processes of securitisation, which was framed as ‘non-traditional’ security, quickly became the byword for CSS’. For Hynek and Chandler the school’s rejecting of emancipatory approaches marks it as ‘impartial’ and devoid of political content, its significance lying in its theoretical critique of human security serving to open the security studies field further. This critique enabled the ‘incursion of post-structuralism into CSS’, thereby the snuffing of the critical from critical security studies, (Hynek and Chandler 2013: 53-54; Hynek 2012: 2), Critical security studies is thus understood only as a post-Cold War reaction to changed policy making needs.

Whilst this draws out the most significant impact of this work, the unidirectional focus leaves them unable to understand the shift underlying this shift in policy making itself as it is in turn linked directly to problems faced by policy makers. Consistent with my argument throughout they thus give a flattened image of the ‘West’ and ‘Western elites’ (Chandler 2006). This is problematic as the shift identified within this post-Cold war discourse over time points to the crisis of US hegemony and need for new legitimising rhetoric and practice – precisely as captured by Kaldor’s argument that her ‘new wars’ thinking is more effective than the old wars thinking persistent through the US’s unipolar moment. Chandler elaborates via the growth and increasing hold of human security discourses the shift away from an interventionary model of liberal state restructuring and laissez faire economic imposition to the more comprehensive societal restructuring and focus on stability which we saw Mark Leonard mark out as the European alternative to the preceding US model of intervention.

However, without consideration of the formation of the West, or its change in the post-Cold War world, these developments internal to post-Cold War legitimising discourse are understood primarily in relation to the external problems faced – as problem-solving solutions to the failure of preceding model (cf. Duffield 2007:11-12). David Chandler is left linking it to an existential crisis in the West, its elites incapable of strategic action as a result. This leaves the shift and the cosmopolitan and related human security discourses as ad hoc reaction to problems. (Chandler 2006).
Nik Hynek’s argument in this vein of distinctly different human security conceptions in Canada and Japan, related to the differing relations and ‘assemblages’ between state and private actors, highlights through its omission the central significance of the European discourse. Whilst I have not covered Canada or Japan’s development of the concept the centrality of Kaldor’s work to the overall development of the discourse is clear throughout both his and Chandler’s work but the central significance of her conception of human security suddenly disappears, and her central project of the EU as a human security actor is referenced only in a concluding comment as another suitable candidate for use of his approach (Hynek 2012: 197). Hynek is thus left with only the contrast between narrow and broad conceptions of human security (Japan and Canada respectively) understood instrumentally.

The two trajectories I have given focus in different ways on coherence over time and the organic link of this political coherence to European experience - the social conditions within which their conceptualisations were formed. The frequent references to the EU sharing the burden of ‘global governance’ within Chandler’s work should cause him to question whether this is linked to the shift in governance strategy and if so in what way. The trajectories suggest that there is underlying the shift a replacement of US exceptionalism with EU exceptionalism: Kaldor draws together the different strands of post-modern ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘multilateral’ Europe to counterpose it to the US, standing against the formation of a global cosmopolitan order not by virtue of its military power but through its use of that power unilaterally, as the ‘last nation-state’ (Kaldor 2003: 137; Kaldor 2007c: 150).

Uncovering the relation of European cosmopolitanism to the conditions of its production tell us much about the nature of the renovation of Western hegemony, through giving a different conception of ‘why critical and emancipatory approaches are doomed to appear as little more than the theoretical wing of contemporary liberal interventionism’ (McCormack 2009: 18). These theories and the European understanding of the experiences driving them are constitutive of the form the nature of this renovation takes.
Conclusion

Summary of the argument
I have argued that European discourses on international relations, within both the policy and academic fields, are central to the reworking of Western hegemony necessary in a ‘post-American’ world. Further, that this holds in most cases where the intent is consciously and nominally expressed as to provide an alternative to, or is even set explicitly against, the preceding US led Western hegemony.

I also argued that these policy and academic discourses are inter-related, pushing this argument further than the direct, surface inter-linking already established by others between the two fields (e.g. Diez and Manners 2007). Both reproduce the ‘illimitable narcissism’ underlying the universalisation of (idealised) European social structures, which underpins in turn interventions of various kinds to create and maintain these structures outside of the West (Anderson 2007). In this, European self-perceptions, euphemised to varying degrees, are a replacement for the tarnished, and no longer so easily conceived of as universally desirable, ‘American Way of Life’ (cf. Kagan 2012). European post-Cold War confidence and the sense of a continent’s civilised transcendence of the political mire the rest of the world inhabits and recreates, intertwines with a greater freedom of action and increasingly cohesive expeditionary EU forces, to re-establish a hegemonic interventionary project.

Within this frame, the US too is looked down upon where it diverges from European models, most explicitly in reaction to the Bush doctrine – though only actors such as George Soros, standing ‘above’ the state system have the power to intervene meaningfully within the US to ‘rectify’ these divergences, and accordingly he is most forthright on the US’s failing compared to Europe. In this we should take Soros as the leading global example of the combined ‘global’ capitalist and organic intellectual – capitalist in his position external to the states system and his use of this position directly to change the world in the interests of capital accumulation, both generally and specifically for his hedge fund ‘adventures’, and an organic intellectual in his universalising of the interests his interventions work to further.

Within this commonality, as I have shown, the policy and academic discourses differ, in line with the field theory model of Bourdieu: the former, policy discourse, more explicit in valorising the European model in support of European backed, Western actions globally; the
latter more euphemised and ambivalent, though the continuity and homology I demonstrated becomes very clear when academics venture onto policy making terrain.

Overall, European intellectual production on international relations has been at the forefront in establishing a new legitimate multilateralism to underpin Western hegemony, which US IR and policy is increasingly coming to recognise after the seductive febrile illusion of the ‘unipolar moment’.

**Development of the argument**

In constructing this argument I started from Raymond Geuss’s expansion of Lenin’s realist definition of politics: who does what to whom, for whose benefit? This powerful formulation naturally cleaves from any idealist understanding or vision of politics – whether consensual or agonist - and aligns, to varying degrees, with class-based approaches. Such a definition gives an approach focused on power, understood as a relation, and its use in the pursuit of interests. It also avoids the reification of the distinction between discourse and violence as things ‘done’ to people in pursuit of interests. This is particularly important in clarifying the concept of politics as inseparable from both consensual and coercive forms of power: War then is a form of politics, and we can benefit from the insights of both the Clausewitzian concept of war as the continuation of politics by other means, and its radical reversal to politics as the continuation of war by other means. This then inoculates against sloppy idealist conceptions of creating an ‘alternate’ politics, as well as removing this central reification underpinning the conception of Europe as a fundamentally different form of actor, engaged in ‘civilian’ or ‘policing’ interventions, potentially enabling of such an ‘alternate politics’ for example – rather than the imperialism of the US.

This Leninist definition, ‘who/whom?’ necessitates consideration of class, precisely because its focus on actors removes the abstract ethical from political questions, to be replaced by the concrete reality of class relations and struggle – it matters who carries out an action, and whom it affects, rather than simply what that action is. Its formulation of power as an active relation prevents reification of classes as acting as structural abstractions – the form of class formation is contingent upon these relational activities of both material and ideational kinds. Geuss’s expansion with the potential separation of actor and beneficiary further opens space for a host of intermediaries with various levels of consciousness of whose interests they are serving – whether characterised as a technocratic cadre, intellectuals as dominated
dominators, or organic intellectuals, this brings intellectual production squarely within the formulation.

The internal relation between class formation and the states system established by the Amsterdam School then provides the underlying dynamic behind the changing geopolitical formation of the West that interacts with the intellectual production of these cadre and intellectuals to create the conditions for the projects seeking to renovate Western hegemony that I studied.

To take this in stages, the creation of a Lockean transnational space across Britain and the US provided the conditions for the development of capitalism as we understand it – as an extra-territorial force – exerted through a transnational ruling class; this class itself formed through these developments, and shaped into a class for itself – of a particular historical kind – by the challenges it faced in the pursuit of its interests. This ruling class is a class in which capitalists and ‘state managers’ are not analytically separated a priori, but understood as forming as a (variegated) class for itself through this process.

This formation – the Lockean heartland and its interaction through struggles to overcome the challenges from a series of contender states, that is those most powerful states modernising through passive revolutions in response to pressure from the heartland – form the framework for understanding change in the global political economy from the point of the formation of the heartland onwards.

As the heartland overcame challenges from France and Germany, and as it faced that of the USSR, it incorporated Western Europe in the subordinate role so visible during the Cold War; whilst the USSR as primary contender during this period incorporated Central and Eastern Europe in a similar subordinate position, though one containing a radically different ‘contender’ state-society complex. Despite the initial appearance of, if not parity, then at least roughly matched superpower competition this division of Europe gave to those within Europe, the Cold War must be understood in the framework of this longer history – that is beyond the East–West perspective dominant in a divided Europe - to the dynamic of the Lockean heartland and contenders in the global political economy as a whole. Overcoming in this way the tendency to Western European parochialism in the region’s contemporaneous intellectual production allows both the study of such production as an object in itself as related to its
conditions of production, and concomitantly sets its concerns and the partiality of the concepts and definitions produced - for example of peace, democracy and state-civil society relations - in a wider global context.

Post-Cold War however, following the crisis of US hegemony crystallised in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, we find a ‘divided West’. By then the unipolar moment – which the crisis confirms never truly existed outside of febrile neo-con fantasy – had truly passed, seen through by all. This ‘divided West’, as even its coiner Jürgen Habermas makes clear, is in fact nothing of the kind on anything more than a superficial level. What it reflects is the need to reformulate the West’s mode of interaction with the rest of the world in line with the development of a bi-polar West – the poles being the EU and US - and need for them to act cohesively to maintain a hegemonic position. Habermas’ argument then, condensing and clarifying widespread but more inchoate reflections within Europe, comes down to the need for a Western European imprimatur for Western intervention.

Whilst not approaching US capabilities the EU can and does launch independent expeditionary interventions, and from a US perspective is increasingly seen as having a zone of responsibility within broader Western global management. Relatedly, the European ‘social model’- as I have developed as a more developed more sustainable and comprehensive model of neoliberalism - is needed in the wake of the rotted authority of the Washington consensus and de-legitimation of laissez faire in general, as a legitimate base of authority for all Western interventions. This European capability and its development is inter-related to the formation of a European capitalist class, separable but not separate from the Western transnational class as a whole. Indeed, within this broader Western formation this increasingly cohesive European element is increasingly central, increasingly core, as the gravity of capitalist networks and activity shits to Europe.

So far this is largely a retooling of the Amsterdam School for the post-Cold War, post-American world in order to set the context with which the European foreign policy and academic IR fields are imbricated: a retooling that I have shown has significant implications for the understanding of these fields and their developmental history. Whilst the two fields of academia and policy stand in different relation to the field of power, and contain their own logics and structures, politically effective expressions within them must not only reflect the logic of the field they are expressed within but also be organically related to the totality of contemporary social
conditions (politico-economic dominant amongst these). Thus ideas only ‘represent an independent force when maintained in dialectical connectivity, or internally related, with the social relations of production’ (Bieler and Morton 2008: 119).

The distinction here is between willed arbitrary expressions and those formulations ‘capable of moving a mass of men’ – that is politically significant expressions, significant due to their relation to political conditions. This then is not (simply) a conditioning of agency – after all there are innumerable arbitrary expressions in both the policy and academic fields – but a way of understanding politically significant agency, and in ‘reverse’ identifying it and its relation to political conditions through its effects. This then gives a powerful way to understand this relation for both the conscious ‘organic intellectual’ strategically playing their role, but also how this relation has been internalised, via the medium of the field, in other expressions – even where the ‘self-declared action’ stands in opposition to maintenance and development of the contextual political conditions.

This is also not a deterministic, or economistic unidirectional process, as, in addition to the field’s relative autonomy, the understanding, directing and forming of these conditions are dependent on the ways in which the concrete situation is captured by these expressions. That is, current conditions are formed through action based upon preceding understandings and expressions (with attendant errors, miscalculations and unintended effects), and whilst these conditions ‘delimit’ the significant organic expressions possible, they do not determine them. Rather than any conspiratorial or mechanistic relation between ruling class formation and their organic intellectuals then, such linkages and the ideas produced which take on independent force are formed by the powerful struggling with the tools available to tackle contemporary problems facing them, in addition to struggle in relation to one another in their respective fields and the field of power.

Whilst focusing on discourse this approach differs from constructivist accounts in tying intellectual production to extra-discursive material power. In doing so I do build on the opening the Amsterdam School have established in relating such intellectual production to the social conditions of production. Nevertheless, this angle is so far underdeveloped in their work, so whilst I based my work on the school’s many strengths and rely on developing their work in delineating the material bases of the development of the social conditions of intellectual production, I added an important missing element.
To do so the thesis developed the Amsterdam School concept of comprehensive concepts of control in a specific way. Comprehensive concepts of control are the ideological development of competing hegemonic projects, and their theorisation is a significant contribution from the school, underused in the discipline more widely. Through their use the ideational elements of hegemony are related to shifting material conditions - they express the ‘ideological and [...] hegemonic structure of particular historical configurations of capital’ (Overbeek and van der Pijl 2002: 3) – and through this the dialectic of structure and agency is captured. With this theorisation, studying the struggle between competing comprehensive concepts of control allows us to grasp the inter-relation between the grounding structural conditions for, and the strategic agency of, blocs within the bourgeoisie. It is this dialectic, with this struggle understood as the ongoing process of class formation and change, that makes a discourse analysis based upon comprehensive concepts of control distinct from constructivist accounts: the discourse is integral to processes of class formation related to shifts in the structural composition of capital.

Thus far within the school however, the ideational aspect of this has been developed principally in relation to capital structures. So, whilst the specificity of European and EU capitalism has been richly explored its understanding remains dominantly derived from how struggles within a European ruling class have developed a specific synthesis between the ideal-typical world-views of money capital and productive capital: the former containing a liberal internationalist concept of control privileging freedom of movement for capital and free trade, the latter being tied to real existing factors of production opposing the volatility of money capital. These ‘abstract categories have been manifested in the class fractions of industrial and financial capital’ and have been handled with considerable sophistication in the school’s work, always being ‘understood in their historically specific configuration’ within ‘concrete processes of class formation’ (Horn 2012: 52). Nonetheless, whilst this aspect of class formation – the relation of fragments of the ruling class to abstract categories of capital – certainly works to help set the parameters of organic, or politically efficacious, discourse, my aim has been to treat the members and intellectual affiliates of a ruling class as real agents, as more than actually existing carriers of structural agency.

To do this I added and took seriously the effects of existing ideational structures, and their interaction with political agency, with my focus throughout on class formation in relation to
these ideational structures. This brings to the fore the framing understanding of politics expressed in who/whom, of individuals exercising agency as whole individuals, and thereby operating not just within the worldview of structures of capital but the ideational structures of their societies as a whole also.

Here then I focused on such ideational structures as related to Europe as an international actor. Firstly, in the idea of Europe as an ‘alternative’ and the relation of this to its scope for legitimate action in the world. This is a self–conception of Europe that shapes the form of the money capital-productive capital synthesis of the EU’s competing comprehensive concepts of control in both foreign and domestic policies in non-trivial ways, and consideration of this factor should be developed further in Amsterdam School / critical IPE work.

Secondly, in studying the structures of the relevant academic field in Europe I moved beyond the direct linkages into policy making circuits and relations to corporate interests, to understand European IR through the specific European precursor structures of thought contained in peace research and security studies. Again these shape academic thought and input into policy-making discourse in non-trivial ways that should be considered seriously within European security studies and critical security studies more broadly – certainly it helps cut through the current ‘debate’ over what is or isn’t critical in critical security studies.

This approach also allowed me to develop the inter-relation between the policy and academic fields at a deeper level than study of their mechanistic linkages allows. Again, this moved this study of discourse beyond constructivist accounts to account for the specific social conditions of intellectual production shaping production in these two fields. Here the concepts of Europe, and its role as an international actor, are seen to develop from specific, and specifically European, liberal and social democratic understandings of the Cold War and its ending – as reflected in my development of the social fabric containing policy intellectuals, and the political sociology of academic IR in Europe.

All of this I have argued shapes the form of the development of an EU comprehensive concept of control. Whilst this concept must express a particular concrete money capital-productive capital synthesis, its development in Europe by Europeans means that its formation is affected in fundamental ways by European ideational structures too. Thus the distinctions between US and EU foreign policy discourses cannot just be understood as refractions of differing
syntheses between money and productive capital. For such discourses to be organic, that is politically effective expressions, they must also be generated from the existing resources of either US or EU exceptionalism. In this way my approach considerably develops existing considerations of discourse contained within the Amsterdam School, without drifting into constructivist waters.

Using this approach, and having established the class basis and ability to project power for the ‘Europe’ that is significant to us here, I turned first to study the inter-relation between capital and policy representations of Europe as an international actor and its related legitimacy. The overview of established work examining the developing conceptions from civilian power through to global power Europe - and of the relation between academic study of Europe and policy discourses – established the simple correlation between European freedom to act in an expeditionary fashion, and self-conceptions and models of legitimacy that enabled it to do so. In a sense this is a simple stating of the necessity of a coercive moment in hegemony; more then needed to be done to establish global power Europe discourses as part of a hegemonic project, and to understand this project’s form. I set to doing so through studying the relation between capital and such policy discourses through examining the field of EU foreign policy focused think tanks. The aim was to establish the organic relation between these expressions and their conditions of production, against the voluntarism underpinning the established accounts I already used in establishing this progression of self-conceptions.

My main contribution here was a comprehensive development of the sketches of the role of think tanks in this process that Ian Manners and James Rogers give, moving beyond their disembodied discourse approach. Seeing the think tank field as the primary engine of ideological production, for the formation of a class and construction of hegemonic projects through which such a class gains a sense of itself, means the contours of the think tank field in Europe, especially that concerned with defining Europe’s global role, becomes of great significance to the understanding of international relations. This reinforces the significance of the overall argument of the organic link of politically successful thought to contemporaneous power conditions, with the parameters, control and stakes of intellectual production much clearer in a field so deeply imbricated with the field of power.

Mapping this global power Europe think tank network reveals it to be relatively cohesive around a small core of think tanks, the most significant of which is George Soros’ European
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Further mapping the position of the ECFR within a putative hegemonic bloc confirmed the central location of think tanks and their governance and advisory boards within the transition from a corporate community to its forming as a class for itself and potential political action. This provided a novel and geographically located development of work within neo-Gramscian approaches examining the role of policy planning bodies in the establishment of Western hegemony; in doing so, against ‘global capital/ruling class models’, it established the relation between a post-Cold War, post-American world and the development of a bi-polar West and discourses of Europe as a different kind of international actor, here captured in the global power Europe discourse.

George Soros early diagnosed the crisis of hegemony in the US led West and set about doing his part to reconstruct Western hegemony around a bi-polar West; the establishment of the ECFR being his institutionalisation of the project. The positioning of ECFR shows his success in cohering discursive constructions of Europe’s role within the European think tank field around this vision. On the flip side of this, his success also demonstrates the organic link between contemporary conditions and such a vision – the wide compatibility of his vision with others contemporaneously developed making clear that Soros is not a perspicacious haruspex, but well positioned within and sensitive to the changing context.

Overall it is clear the power of the discourse coalition for a liberal interventionary global power Europe has grown considerably since first identified by Ian Manners in 2006. As December 2013’s European Council meeting, focusing on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), made clear we are studying an ongoing hegemonic project; this meeting, whilst lacklustre in developing EU competence overall, did however mark a ‘real step forward in building Defence Europe’ and perhaps signalled a reawakening of European appetite for interventions as unanimous support was given to French intervention in the Central African Republic, with options for European security and defence activities in support to be discussed at the next Foreign Affairs Council on 20 January 2014.159

Moving on to the broader ideational context with which the above project is inter-related we found that for academic IR in Europe, we have now moved on from a Cold War field that

159 http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Ministers-outline-results-of-EU
consisted of on one hand ‘clones, copies and franchises’ of the US discipline, reflecting Europe’s subordinate position, and on the other hand a European Peace Research tradition challenging the core of IR in realism and strategic studies from a specific Western European perspective and set of interests. However this history of an accepted US hegemony and a constructivist escape from the Western European role in both the Cold War and the construction of a neoliberal world during this struggle with the latest contender underlies the post-Cold War development of the IR field in Western Europe. What was initially an artificial and accordingly barren field in European academic life has developed organically from this, most significantly with the post-Cold War shift in Europe’s relation to the US and the world. Tracing developments in this manner then allows both an understanding of the enduring significance of the image of an American Social Science and an indication of where politically significant work within this field will be located; elements that cannot be deduced from the existing synchronic accounts of the current discipline that point to a developing bi-polar Western IR but not to the significance of this.

I argued that to understand the role of academics one must get beyond derivations from their structural position to consider agency. Not that the structural position or the structures of the disciplinary fields in which they work is insignificant, but that their significance lies in the strategic navigation of these by actors. This gives a methodology focusing on ‘persons not paradigms’ within IR, through which the inter-relation with both social conditions of production and the ethico-political drive of these individuals can be grasped. This restores humanity to academics otherwise seen as functionaries, and authenticity to protestations of ‘critical’ or progressive intent otherwise too easily dismissed as cant. Altogether this gives a far better grasp of Europe’s specific role and the development of conceptualisations of this role - founded as they are precisely on this conception of legitimacy stemming from a European self-conceptualisation of the EU as a normatively superior entity.

Pursuing this methodology I identified two academics whose trajectories covered the salient meeting point of Cold War peace research and activism, academic IR, and an intellectual focus on Cold War and post-Cold War development within Europe within a global frame: these being Mary Kaldor and Ole Wæver (and the Copenhagen School). These two were selected in part because of their presence within the discipline – the ‘noise’ generated by their own prolific output and reactions to it, and secondary literatures developing their work. More though for
their application of the content of the European pole of this bi-Western IR that is to be found within cosmopolitanism.

Mary Kaldor represented the ‘easy’ case of explicit cosmopolitanism and a direct concern for application of European force; focusing in on the question we saw lay at the core of the cosmopolitanism debate, of the role of force in establishing cosmopolitan political orders. Ole Wæver represented a ‘hard’ case, outside of the cosmopolitan discourse and seemingly engaged in discourse analysis. Tracing these two though revealed their relation to the social conditions of their intellectual production and from this cast them together within a coherently European IR, the affinity at a deeper level than surface theoretical opposition over the referent objects of security. Of main significance within this was their Arendtian politics built upon the figure of the citizen. As the discussion showed this leads to a more socially invasive and restructuring intervention – taking us back to the birth of biopolitics in response to the specifically European neoliberalism Foucault was concerned with. Through this a strong relation to the shifts in global governance is revealed (or confirmed and developed in Kaldor’s case) with the contribution here that through this method it is tied to the social conditions of production and thus organically European.

The two approaches used in the two parts of the thesis taken together make good on the promise of transnational historical materialism to treat the material and ideational dialectically and therefore offer just such a transnational historical materialist understanding of the renovation of Western hegemony through European alternatives as it relates to class formation.

**Significance**

The significance of this argument for IR is twofold. Firstly, it necessitates a fuller consideration of Europe’s contemporary role in Western hegemony. The West is still far, far, too often elided to the US, or at best, a US-led West. Such views give theorising on the post-American world a false post-Western content – this is only one possible outcome, occurring if the renovation of Western hegemony in line with the developing bi-polarity of the West fails and leaves a ‘divided West’. Similarly Europe is too easily seen as humanising, or even standing as an alternative to loosely conceptualised visions of US or neoliberal hegemony.
The conception of a bi-polar West and its implications is of central significance for those, like myself, who take the West (or ‘heartland’ or ‘core’) and its relations to the rest of the world as still the driving structure of the global political economy. Considering Europe’s role in this way, and the changing form of hegemony it creates, also forces deeper thought about what Western hegemony is based upon: the correctly noted difference in forms of European external action and neoliberal disciplines pointing to a deeper base for neoliberal hegemony, and the need for consideration of the implications of its adaptability, than the forms it took and reflections prompted during the (sui generis) US led period.

Secondly, despite ‘reflexivity’ being the ‘buzzword that is driving current debates within the field of International Relations’ this reflexivity has been only partial (Tickner 2013: 267). Taking seriously my argument would entail a more Bourdieusian reflection on our role as IR scholars and the way our intellectual production is structured by the field of IR, and the field of power it is produced within. Further, as Arlene Tickner notes (ibid), such a Bourdieusian reading requires the geopolitical element—so disciplinary self-reflection must reflect too on the discipline’s relation to a bi-polar West. This is especially so for those that take the West and its relations to the rest of the world as the driving structure of the international. Finally, understanding this relation and its relation in turn to the shift in forms of global governance is of central significance for ‘critical’ IR if it is indeed to be critical.
## Appendix A – Institutional development of independent European military capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Maastricht Treaty (TEU), establishes CFSP as second pillar of EU. Petersberg Tasks established for WEU.</td>
<td>Post-Cold War ‘breakthrough’ in co-ordinating foreign and security policies. Western European Union (WEU) given an operational role in humanitarian interventions, crisis management and peacekeeping. Territorial defence remains NATO prerogative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>EU’s Copenhagen Summit NATO defence ministers meeting in Travemünde, Germany</td>
<td>The first step towards Eastern enlargement: “The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union”. NATO Partnership for Peace program, a precursor to NATO expansion, presented as an American initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>NATO Summit meeting, Brussels</td>
<td>NATO Partnership for Peace agreement. Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept endorsed. CJTF marks a shift in purpose of NATO, as it allows subsets of NATO members to undertake military operations not involving the defence of the Alliance territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. ‘Separable but not separate’ European military capability established as a goal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, Berlin</td>
<td>CJTF agreement signed. The ‘Berlin Agreement’ allowed European countries, through the WEU, to use NATO asset: subject to unanimous agreement amongst the Alliance. Western European Union (WEU) to oversee the creation of a European Security and Defence Identity, as a European ‘pillar’ within NATO. Identification of ‘Separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets’ to allow WEU led operations. (WEU still dependent on such assets for operations.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Anglo-French St. Malo Summit</td>
<td>UK and France agree that the &quot;[European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to...&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

160 Final communique of Berlin Ministerial Meeting, 3 June 1996: [http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Nice Summit</td>
<td>Incorporation of WEU into EU, and establishment of the ESDP institutions: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Copenhagen European Council</td>
<td>Berlin Plus Agreements: establishing a direct relationship between EU and NATO (no WEU intermediation), the ‘pre-identification’ of assets and capabilities with a presumption of availability to the EU, and assured access to NATO planning assets. Use of alliance assets remains decided on a case-by-case basis. Political principles underlying the relationship between NATO and ESDP set out, including: partnership, effective mutual consultation and cooperation, equality and due regard for ‘the decision-making autonomy and interests’ of both EU and NATO, and ‘coherent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Anglo-French summit at Le Touquet</td>
<td>‘Declaration on Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defence’: ‘the potential scope of ESDP should match the worldwide ambition of the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy and should be able to support effectively the EU’s wider external policy objectives to promote democracy, human rights, good governance and reform’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin Plus finalised and in force</td>
<td>EU mission in Congo. First independent EU operation, conducted without any recourse to NATO assets, including strategic airlift (so not a Berlin Plus operation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation Artemis</td>
<td>Whilst commonly seen as short on strategy, sets out a political framework for ESDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B – Tabulation of Global Power Europe Think Tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core/convener</th>
<th>Notre Europe</th>
<th>EGS Project</th>
<th>James Rogers (2009a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notre Europe</td>
<td>Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)</td>
<td>Bertelsmann Foundation Centre for European Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)</td>
<td>Demos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Real Instituto Elcano (RIE)</td>
<td>Egmont Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI)</td>
<td>European Council on Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broader/affiliates</td>
<td>Carnegie Europe</td>
<td>Analytica</td>
<td>James Rogers (2009b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centre for European Policy Studies</td>
<td>Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy</td>
<td>Bertelsmann Foundation Centre for European Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centre for European Reform</td>
<td>Celare</td>
<td>Demos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus Centre for European and International Affairs</td>
<td>Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs</td>
<td>Egmont Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>demosEUROPA</td>
<td>Centre for European Policy Studies</td>
<td>European Council on Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egmont Institute</td>
<td>C.E.S. Centre for European Studies</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Council on Foreign Relations</td>
<td>Clingendael</td>
<td>European Policy Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Policy Centre</td>
<td>Egmont</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real Instituto Elcano</td>
<td>Estonian Foreign Policy Institute</td>
<td>Federal Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europeum - Institute for European Policy</td>
<td>Eurisc Foundation</td>
<td>Foundation Robert Schumann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRIDE</td>
<td>European Institute of Romania</td>
<td>Friends of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hellenic Foundation for European &amp; Foreign Policy</td>
<td>European Policy Centre</td>
<td>French Institute for International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Istituto Affari Internazionali</td>
<td>Group for Legal and Political Studies – Kosovo</td>
<td>German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notre Europe</td>
<td>The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies</td>
<td>Institute of International and European Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies</td>
<td>Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWP - German Institute for International and Security Affairs</td>
<td>HIIA – Hungarian Institute of International Affairs</td>
<td>Notre Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IMO - Institute for International Relations, Zagreb</td>
<td>Policy Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IERI – Institut Europeen Des Relations Internationales</td>
<td>Security and Defence Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Centre for Small State Studies (University of Iceland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institute of International Relations, Prague</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institute of International relations and Political Science, Vilnius University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International Union of Socialist Youth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Latvian Institute of International Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Norwegian Institute of International Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SWP - German Institute for International and Security Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ThinkTank (defunct)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Ian Manners (2006)*

New Defence Agenda (NDA)
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Appendix C – Numbered reference list of Global Power Europe ‘linkers’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Amato</td>
<td>Giuliano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Balcerowicz</td>
<td>Leszek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bonino</td>
<td>Emma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Brantner</td>
<td>Franziska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bruton</td>
<td>John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Buzek</td>
<td>Jerzy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cooper</td>
<td>Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dassù</td>
<td>Marta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Davignon</td>
<td>Etienne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>de Hoop Scheffer</td>
<td>Jaap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>de Schoutteete</td>
<td>Phillippe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dehaene</td>
<td>Jean-Luc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Dervis</td>
<td>Kemal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Duff</td>
<td>Andrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Fassino</td>
<td>Piero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Garton Ash</td>
<td>Timothy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Gastaldo</td>
<td>Piero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Goulard</td>
<td>Sylvie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Grabbe</td>
<td>Heather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Charles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Guigou</td>
<td>Elisabeth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Gyarmati</td>
<td>István</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Heisbourg</td>
<td>François</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Hübner</td>
<td>Danuta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ischinger</td>
<td>Wolfgang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Kerr</td>
<td>Lord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Knaus</td>
<td>Gerald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Koch-Weser</td>
<td>Caio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Kodmani</td>
<td>Bassma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Krastev</td>
<td>Ivan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Kuneva</td>
<td>Meglena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Lamy</td>
<td>Pascal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Maystadt</td>
<td>Philippe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Moïsi</td>
<td>Dominique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Monks</td>
<td>Lord John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>O’Ceallaigh</td>
<td>Daithi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Ockrent</td>
<td>Christine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Oosting</td>
<td>Dick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Perissich</td>
<td>Riccardo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Perthes</td>
<td>Volker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Pisani-Ferry</td>
<td>Jean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Powell</td>
<td>Charles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Robertson</td>
<td>George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Rodrigues</td>
<td>Maria Jaoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Salamé</td>
<td>Ghassan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Schüssel</td>
<td>Wolfgang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Scognamiglio</td>
<td>Giuseppe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Solana</td>
<td>Javier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Spaak</td>
<td>Antoinette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Sutherland</td>
<td>Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Świeboda</td>
<td>Pawel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Tocci</td>
<td>Nathalie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Tsoukalis</td>
<td>Loukas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Vitorino</td>
<td>Antonio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Wallace</td>
<td>Dame Helen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


———. 2013 (ed.). Bourdieu in International Relations, Routledge.


Ashman, Sam, and Alex Callinicos. 2006. "Capital accumulation and the state system: Assessing David Harvey’s the new imperialism." Historical Materialism 14.4.


223


Friedrichs, Jörg, and Ole Wæver. 2009. ‘Western Europe: structure and strategy at the national and regional levels’ in Tickner, Arlene B., and Ole Wæver, eds. International relations scholarship around the world. Routledge, 2009.


———. 1982b. The Baroque Arsenal. Andre Deutsch.
———. 1990c. The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict, Blackwell


International Affairs, 84(1), 131-143.
———. 2006. "Think again: Soft power." Foreign Policy


Shaw, Martin. 1993. ‘There is no such thing as society: Beyond individualism and statism in international security studies’. Review of International Studies, 19(02), 159-175.


