A University of Sussex DPhil thesis

Available online via Sussex Research Online:

http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/

This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details
Generative Knowledge:
a pragmatist logic of inquiry articulated by
the classical Indian philosopher Bhaṭṭa Kumārila

Jaspal Peter Sahota

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy
University of Sussex
January 2015
Declaration

I hereby declare that:

• this thesis has not been and will not be submitted, in whole or in part, to any other University for a degree

• where I have drawn on the research of others, this has always been clearly indicated

Signature:

Date:
This thesis investigates the svātāḥ-prāmāṇyam doctrine of the 7th century Indian philosopher Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, based on an analysis of this doctrine as presented in the Brhaṭṭjīkā and in the Śloka-vārttika. The original contribution of this thesis consists in a novel interpretation of Kumārila's claim which diverges from the interpretations of the classical Indian commentators as well as those of recent scholarship by John Taber and Dan Arnold.

Rather than a phenomenological or Reidean epistemology, this research argues that Kumārila provides a normative epistemology. In contrast to the interpretation of Dan Arnold, which roots justification and truth in the phenomenological fact of mere awareness which is undefeated, it is argued here that Kumārila articulates a normative process which mandates the believer to strengthen her beliefs through a purposive and goal-oriented process.

The thesis begins with a consideration of the notion of svabhāva, to which Kumārila appeals, making a dispositional essentialist reading of this term, as a real causal power or disposition which is the essence of an entity conditional on
its existence. It is then argued that Kumārila's claim concerns the manifestation of a competence. The operational dichotomy between pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa is compared to that between Good and Bad Cases in epistemological disjunctivism.

It is shown that Kumārila articulates a belief protocol by analogy with normative processes in generative grammar and in legal and ritual interpretation. An anti-foundationalist defence of this protocol and its applicability to the case of beliefs formed from Vedic testimony is provided. It is suggested that Kumārila's claim engages more closely with Sosa's notion of aptness than with any notion of justification.
Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction.................................................................................................1
  Section 1: Acknowledgements and sources..............................................................1
  Section 2: Introducing the research topic..............................................................3
  Section 3: Intellectual and social context..............................................................5
  Section 4: Situating the research.........................................................................10
  Section 5: Methodological approach.................................................................13
  Section 6: Use of terminology.............................................................................18
  Section 7: Thesis Summary..................................................................................21

Chapter 2: Kumārila's dispositional essentialism......................................................29
  Section 1: Introduction...........................................................................................29
  Section 2: Powers and properties in the classical Indian context.......................31
    Subsection 1: Svabhāva as a property.................................................................32
    Subsection 2: Svabhāva as a power.................................................................36
    Subsection 3: Summary.................................................................................38
  Section 3: Powers and properties in the contemporary context.........................40
  Section 4: A debate about natural necessity.......................................................46
  Section 5: Reductionism about properties..........................................................55
    Subsection 1: Reductionism and anti-realism..................................................56
Chapter 3: Kumārila's disjunctive epistemology

Section 1: Introduction

Section 2: Knowledge and its value

Section 3: Terminological issues in the existing literature

Subsection 1: Pramāṇa as instrument or outcome

Subsection 2: Prāmāṇyam as instrumentality or as outcome

Subsection 3: Svataḥ as intrinsic

Section 4: Kumārila's disjunction between pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa

Subsection 1: Good and Bad Cases

Subsection 2: Reflective indiscriminability

Section 5: Kumārila's notion of 'from itself'

Subsection 1: Kumārila's four possible views

Subsection 2: Deliverances must possess a svabhāva

Subsection 3: An epistemic capacity must be restricted to deliverances

Subsection 4: Obstruction of capacity

Section 6: Kumārila as Virtue Epistemologist

Chapter 4: Kumārila's belief protocol

Section 1: Introduction

Section 2: Apparent truth or ascribed truth?

Subsection 1: The Pārthasārathi-Arnold line of interpretation
Subsection 2: Drawbacks of the Pārthasārathi-Arnold interpretation…148

Subsection 3: Towards a re-evaluation of the Pārthasārathi-Arnold interpretation.................................................................153

Section 3: The grammatical and ritual origins of Kumārila’s terminology…156

Subsection 1: 'General operation' and 'replacement operation'...........159

Subsection 2: More on exceptions..................................................................................164

Subsection 3: 'Exhortation'.........................................................................................165

Subsection 4: 'Conflict'..............................................................................................166

Section 4: Kumārila’s logic of inquiry........................................................171

Section 5: The instigating of inquiry........................................................................173

Section 6: The prolonging of inquiry.................................................................179

Section 7: Metarules for prolonging inquiry..................................................198

Section 8: The terminating of inquiry............................................................203

Chapter 5: Kumārila's anti-foundationalism.................................................209

Section 1: Introduction.......................................................................................209

Section 2: Existing literature on Kumārila's anti-foundationalism...............210

Section 3: Kumārila's argument against organon justification.................215

Section 4: Kumārila's opposition to Buddhist foundationalism.................226

Section 5: Kumārila’s anti-foundationalist defence of the Veda.................237

Chapter 6: Conclusion.....................................................................................242

Section 1: Summary of findings.......................................................................242

Section 2: Suggestions for future research.....................................................246

Abbreviations.................................................................................................247
Bibliography........................................................................................................249
Appendix 1: Transliterated Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā text extract............................................267
Appendix 2: Translated Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā text extract (with transliteration in
brackets)........................................................................................................273
Glossary of key terms........................................................................................284
Index versorum..................................................................................................287
Chapter 1: Introduction

Section 1: Acknowledgements and sources

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Jonardon Ganeri for his skilful guidance through the course of writing this thesis and for his thoughtful advice as to the most effective ways to develop the themes and lines of inquiry for each chapter. I am deeply grateful to Prof. Kei Kataoka, who guided me through a very detailed study of the whole of Jayanta's discussion of the topic of prāmāṇyam, thereby introducing me to the conventions of philosophical Sanskrit and to the guiding themes of the debate about prāmāṇyam. I thank Mr. Suguru Ishimura, who worked closely with me on translating Jayanta's discussion, and who encouraged me to think about the relative significance of the terms pramāṇatvam and prāmāṇyam. I thank Prof. Piyushkant Dixit for reading through Jayanta's discussion of the topic of khyāti-vāda with me. I thank my Sanskrit teacher, Ms. Usha Mehta, for teaching me Sanskrit language and passing on her wide-ranging knowledge of Sanskrit literature, and for her encouragement to take my studies further.

The dependence of this research on existing scholarship will be evident from a reading of the thesis. The work of John Taber and Dan Arnold constitutes a sort of pūrvapakṣa which was helpful as a point of reference against which the distinctive features of this interpretation could be contrasted. This interpretation builds on the research of Kataoka (2011), and in particular picks up on the attention to philological details found in that work. Kataoka's translation of Kumārila's Śloka-vārttika presentation provided there was an indispensable foundation for this research. Further, the findings of Dunne
(2004) have been helpful as a basis for identifying some important philosophical suppositions and strategies shared by Kumārila, and Dunne's translations of passages from Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi were used as a very helpful guide for examination of the Tibetan texts. Details of editions of other texts referenced can be found in the abbreviations and bibliography sections.

The textual basis of the research is two similar presentations by Kumārila of the doctrine of svataḥ-prāmāṇyam in the Brhaṭ-tīkā and in the Śloka-vārttika. The Brhaṭ-tīkā presentation is preserved within the larger Tattva-saṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita. The 1968 edition of the Sanskrit text by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri has been used as a basis for translation and analysis of this presentation. That utilises photostat copies kept in the Nalanda Library, but also records variant readings elsewhere. The 1926 Embar Krishnamacharya edition, which is based on a single manuscript preserved in the Wādi Pārśvanātha Bhāṇḍār in the ancient city of Pattan, was also consulted. Analysis of the Śloka-vārttika presentation is based on the 2011 critical edition of that presentation by Kei Kataoka, in preparing which Kataoka “consulted five manuscripts and seven published editions.” Additionally, Kataoka has provided a felicitous translation, and it has not been possible to improve on this translation in any way in terms of cogency and accuracy. Accordingly, the translation provided here represents a derivative work, where modifications reflect the attempt at a greater degree of engagement with the technical vocabulary of contemporary philosophy.

---

1 See Shastri (1968) 8
2 See Krishnamacharya (1926) Vol.1 ix
3 Kataoka (2011) Part I, vii
Section 2: Introducing the research topic

Kahrs explains that a “model of substitution is certainly a well-developed methodological procedure in Pāñinian grammar and in the ritual Sūtras”⁴. This thesis seeks firstly to extend Kahrs' finding by showing that Kumārila employs such a substitutional model in his epistemology. This will be done through a study of Kumārila's choice of terminology, and in particular, the terms 'utsarga', 'apavāda', and 'prāptā'. It will be shown that such terminology appeals to a substitutional model, and relevant precursors in grammatical and ritual interpretation literatures will be considered. Secondly, by employing this model, Kumārila's epistemology will be shown to constitute a pragmatist logic of inquiry with affinities to that of Peirce. A pragmatics of inquiry will be identified in Kumārila's presentation, involving the stages of instigating, prolonging and terminating inquiry. This reading of Kumārila is an anti-foundationalist reading, on which inquiry is driven by pragmatic considerations and knowledge-claims do not rest on some secure foundation.

However, Kumārila also separately characterizes deliverances from epistemic sources by reference to a paradigm of a Good Case deliverance, in which appropriately normal epistemic conditions ensure the truth of a belief. This element of Kumārila's doctrine distinguishes his view from a more thorough or Rortian anti-foundationalism which would deny a metaphysical foundation for truth. Rather, Kumārila's epistemological anti-foundationalism constitutes only a denial of the idea that any or all beliefs can be properly foundational in terms of justification, combined with a pragmatics of inquiry that involves attaining a sufficient threshold level of confidence in beliefs.

The case of beliefs formed via Vedic testimony is considered by Kumārila to involve a special application of the general process of inquiry. Vedic injunctions are held to comprise an exclusive domain of judgments in the same way as

⁴ Kahrs (1998) 176
flavours do. As such, defeat based on non-Vedic epistemic sources is not possible.

Renou describes how "[l]a pensee indienne a pour substructure des raisonnements d'ordre grammatical. La Mīmāṃsā ... implique une masse de données philologique qui remontent en fin de compte à la grammaire". However, contemporary scholarship on Indian philosophy has only partially been guided by this insight. In particular, little research has been done into the use of grammatical forms of reasoning among philosophers of the Mīmāṃsā school in their purely philosophical work. Kumārila was one of these philosophers and a grammatical form of reasoning can be found throughout his own work.

Diverse practices of reasoning exist within contemporary society, covered by broad categorical terms such as legal reasoning, scientific reasoning, and informal reasoning. In the context of classical Indian intellectual traditions, we may expect to discover new forms of reasoning or applications of alternative forms of reasoning within otherwise familiar intellectual disciplines. Such discoveries may constitute conceptual resources which can be applied in the context of our own intellectual practices. This thesis builds on Renou's insight by identifying a grammatical model of reasoning which motivates Kumārila's model of an epistemic process and goal. Such a form of reasoning constitutes a defeasible, case-based reasoning or informal logic, and thus has an affinity with legal reasoning.

---

5 Renou (1941) 164
6 K. Bhattacharya’s work on Nāgārjuna is an instance of following up on Renou’s general insight. The discussion of the Indian epistemological framework as a relational model based on a grammatical case relations (strictly, kāraka-relations) has been discussed in Matilal (1986) and Taber (2005): these presentations will be drawn on in the next two chapters. By contrast, the distinctiveness of the grammatical terminology used by Kumārila in the doctrine currently under examination has not been examined.
7 Freschi (2012) discusses grammatical forms of reasoning in Mīmāṃsā in a more general context.
Section 3: Intellectual and social context

Kumārila has been described as “the most important representative of classical Mīmāṃsā thought and apologetics”\(^8\). As Halbfass explains, “[a]ccording to Kumārila, the Mīmāṃsā is a “constellation of rules and arguments” (yuktikalāpa) that has been produced by a long tradition of human thought and teaching”\(^9\). Taber similarly explains that “Mīmāṃsā consists in a system of establishing rules and procedures, as objective as those of logic, for interpreting scriptural passages.”\(^10\) Taber also describes Mīmāṃsā in terms of a “science of exegesis”\(^11\) and suggests that its methods “were not altogether unlike the “objective” methods employed by modern philologists today in interpreting Vedic texts.”\(^12\) Verpoorten explains that the Mīmāṃsā school “is also called … Karma-mīmāṃsā “Action-enquiry” or Karma-kāṇḍa “Action-chapter,” because it explores the way of (ritual) action (as distinct from the way of knowledge) towards “Liberation” (mokṣa).”\(^13\) The focus on rules and arguments will become manifest in the presentation of Kumārila's doctrine in terms of reasoning strategies in this thesis.

Kumārila's primary intellectual opponents are held to be Buddhist philosophers such as Dignāga and Dharma-kīrti. Although fanciful stories about Kumārila and related authors are preserved in early works as well as in oral traditions\(^14\), fairly

---

\(^{8}\) Halbfass (1992) 32  
\(^{9}\) Halbfass (1992) 30  
\(^{10}\) Taber (2012) 146  
\(^{11}\) Taber (2012) 128  
\(^{12}\) Taber (2012) 146  
\(^{13}\) Verpoorten (1987) 1  
\(^{14}\) See the introduction to Sharma (1980) for a survey of some stories about the life of Kumārila and speculative remarks about the identity of Umveka. Early quasi-historical sources include for example the Śaṅkara-digvijaya by the 14th century author Vidyāraṇya (Mādhava) for Kumārila, and the Tibetan historians
little is known with certainty about their lives. As Taber explains:

“We know virtually nothing about Kumārila's precise historical situation. We can guess, by the usual method of cross-referencing, that he lived in the seventh century. He seems to belong to the same period as Dharmakīrti, Maṇḍana, Śaṅkara, and Prabhākara. His familiarity with South Indian forms and customs suggests but does not prove that he lived in the South.”

The Tibetan historian Tāranātha holds that the name 'Kumārila' is a corruption of the name 'Kumāra-līla'. According to Sharma's survey of textual evidence, Kumārila has been variously assigned to North India, South India and Bihar. According to Bu-ston, Kumārila was in fact the uncle of Dharmakīrti, and other evidence also suggests South Indian origins. On the other hand, as Jha suggests, the uncertain reading 'procyāḥ' for the upholders of the doctrine of svataḥ-prāmāṇyam in Śāntarakṣita's text could be a corruption of 'prācyāḥ' or 'easterners', which would locate Kumārila's intellectual community to the east of Nālandā. Also we read about how the 7th Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva "departed to the east, where he took part in a great dispute. By the force of his miraculous powers, he reconciled (those who were quarrelling) and gave pleasure to all."

---

15 Taber (1997) 390
16 See Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya (1970) 230
17 Sharma (1980) 11: “[The Tibetan historian] Tāranātha says that [Kumārila] was a native of Southern India. But it is also believed that he was a Brahman of Bihar who abjured Buddhism for Hinduism. The tradition associating Kumārila with Northern India receives some support from the statement of Ānandagiri in his Śaṅkara Vijaya (Calcutta Edition, p.235) that Kumārila came from the North (udagdeśāt) and persecuted the Buddhists and Jains in the South.”
18 See Arnold (2014): “It is sometimes surmised from his evident knowledge of Dravidian languages (his Tantravārttika includes some discussion of Tamil word forms) that Kumārila may have been south Indian”
19 Jha (1939) 775
20 Obermiller (1932) 163
Kataoka tells us:

"it is not yet clear what kind of relationship Kumārila had with Dharmakīrti ... who severely criticizes Mīmāṃsā directly ... Kumārila and Dharmakīrti do not explicitly refer to one another in their works ... Nevertheless, one finds theoretical parallels and allusions between the two ... it is likely that Mīmāṃsā, or a particular Mīmāṃsaka, played an important role ... at the time the young Dharmakīrti was developing his doctrines. And the most probable candidate is the Mīmāṃsaka Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, as Frauwallner [1962] suggested."

Kataoka surveys textual evidence related to the question of the relationship between Kumārila and his Buddhist opponent Dharmakīrti, who seem to have been close contemporaries. Eltschinger, Krasser and Taber similarly state that "Dharmakīrti's main opponent was Mīmāṃsā, quite probably in the person of its main brilliant classical exponent, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (Dharmakīrti's senior contemporary)."

Dharmakīrti "seems to have been born in South India and then to have moved to the great monastic university of Nālandā. The account of the 14th century Tibetan writer Bu-ston discusses the activities of various Buddhist philosophers from India in Tibet, including those discussed here. According to this account, as Obermiller explains:

"[t]he pupil of Īçvarasena was Dharmakīrti. The latter was born in the southern kingdom of Cūḍāmaṇi in a heretical [i.e. non-Buddhist] Brāhmanic family ... Once, as he took from his uncle, the heretical

---

21 Kataoka (2011) 25-26
22 See Kataoka (2011) 47-59
23 Eltschinger, Krasser and Taber (2011) 7
24 Tillemans (2013)
teacher Kumārila the garments of a Brāhmaṇic heretical ascetic, the uncle spoke abusively to him and drove him away. The teacher then made his resolve to vanquish all the heretics. Accordingly, he took orders in the Buddhist church ...”  

Taber mentions that "the only item of significance [as to Kumārila's dating is] his assignment to the reign of Srong-tsan-gam-po, 627-650, by the Tibetan historian Tāranātha." Taber also considers that "[m]ost scholars have tended to consider [Kumārila] an older contemporary of the great Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, but recent evidence that the latter lived as early as 530-600 CE ... makes this approach problematic." Thus, in recent research, Helmut Krasser explains:

“Dharmakīrti's dates as proposed in FRAUWALLNER's famous "Landmarks in the history of Indian Logic" are 600-660. These dates have been more or less accepted by the scholarly community, with the exception of Christian Lindtner and Toshihiko Kimura, who have proposed 530-600 and c. 550-620, respectively.” 

Krasser himself reconsiders the evidence and comes to a conclusion in which he "propose[s], as a working hypothesis, the time of activity of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti to be the middle of the sixth century." However, Frauwallner's dates seem to remain the scholarly consensus.

During the 7th and 8th centuries, the Buddhist institution of learning at Nālandā, in the Magadha region, was at the height of its fame and intellectual influence. Most of the prominent Buddhist philosophers of the times were based there.
According to one apocryphal story, Kumārila disguised himself as a Buddhist in order to learn the doctrines of the Buddhists at first hand at Nālandā.\textsuperscript{30} The Magadha region covered part of present-day Bihar and present-day Nepal.

As for the eight century Buddhist philosophers Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, according to Das, “[i]n the first quarter of the seventh century A.D., Buddhism was introduced into Tibet from Nepal …”\textsuperscript{31} and subsequently both these philosophers, along with many of the prominent Buddhist philosophers of their times, visited Tibet and ultimately relocated there, and were “engaged in translating Sanskrit works into Tibetan”\textsuperscript{32}. Śāntarakṣita was apparently “a native of Gaur [Bengal], who was the High Priest of the monastery of Nālandā”\textsuperscript{33} and Kamalaśīla was a “great Buddhist philosopher of Magadha”\textsuperscript{34}.

The debate about the epistemic good that is the aim of inquiry takes place within a wider context of debate about the source of the authority of the Vedic textual corpus. Kumārila intended that his doctrine support the idea that the authority of Vedic texts is independent of any human author. This idea and its motivating theory were vehemently denied by Kumārila's Buddhist contemporaries and successors, who by contrast took the words of the Buddha as a source of authoritative testimony. As Kataoka explains:

"Xuanzang's travel accounts further depict the situation of intellectuals in those days. One took part in public debates in order to defeat representatives of other schools and sects, thereby gaining rewards and patronage from kings and ministers. Kumārila's criticism of omniscience

\textsuperscript{30} See Aum Namah Shivaay (2011) for a popular dramatisation of this and one other episode from Kumārila's life
\textsuperscript{31} Das (1893) 49
\textsuperscript{32} Das (1893) 49. See also Blumenthal (2014): “He made two trips to Tibet and ultimately spent the last fifteen years of his life there. Śāntarakṣita was one of the most influential figures in the early dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet …”
\textsuperscript{33} Das (1893) 49
\textsuperscript{34} Das (1893) 49
[of the Buddha] and his defense of the Veda and Vedic animal sacrifices can be regarded as a result of lively arguments with his opponents.\(^{35}\)

At the same time, the significance of philosophical interaction and polemical activity between different groups in driving forward philosophical research programmes should not be overstated. One aim of this research is to show how Kumārila's epistemology can be read as a natural extension of his prior concerns with ritual interpretation and Vedic exegesis. In this way, the philosophical development of Mīmāṃsā was driven at least in part by an endogenous process.

Section 4: Situating the research

Kumārila's theory has been discussed by classical Indian commentators including Uṃveka (also called Bhaṭṭomveka and Umbeka) and Pārthasārathi Miśra, and in recent work published by John Taber, Dan Arnold, and Kei Kataoka.\(^{36}\) Arnold alludes to the importance of this topic by commenting that the "inattention to the epistemology of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is regrettable".\(^{37}\)

Kataoka presents a translation of Kumārila's discussion in the Śloka-vārttika and a comprehensive analysis of this, which represents a significant advance in understanding Kumārila's view but does not provide a critical evaluation of the doctrine or site it in the landscape of contemporary philosophy. Taber and Arnold both examine two contrasting interpretations of Kumārila's doctrine presented by the 8th century philosopher Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa and by the 11th century

\(^{35}\) Kataoka (2011) 24
\(^{36}\) See Taber (1992), Arnold (2001), Arnold (2005), Kataoka (2011); cf. also Arnold (2014)
\(^{37}\) Arnold (2001) 591
philosopher Pārthasārathi Miśra, and both favour the interpretation of the latter.

A study by Taber “attempts to explain what ... Kumārilabhaṭṭa meant by svataḥ prāmāṇya, by discussing and evaluating the distinct interpretations of Kumārila's statements by his commentators Umbekabhaṭṭa and Pārthasārathimiśra.” Arnold seeks to advance the work of Taber in two very similar publications, focusing on the interpretative differences between these two commentators. These two presentations will be assumed here to present a single view. Both Taber and Arnold focus almost exclusively on Kumārila's exposition in the Śloka-vārttika, on which the commentaries of Uṃveka and Pārthasārathi are based, and do not engage substantively with the separate presentation in the Brhaṭ-ṭīkā, as this thesis will do. In doing so, they follow the lead of the classical Indian commentators, whose exclusive focus on the Śloka-vārttika is not easy to explain, except perhaps if this were a later text that were considered to supersede the earlier Brhaṭ-ṭīkā. Thus, there are no extant commentaries on the Brhaṭ-ṭīkā apart from the antagonistic discussion by Śāntarakītī and Kamalaśīla, and the text itself only survives in part, with the only substantive preservation in the larger Tattva-saṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita. Given that the Brhaṭ-ṭīkā constitutes a "more refined and sophisticated" discussion than that in the Śloka-vārttika, with "more detailed explanations", one might expect that a confident understanding of the doctrine would require a close study of this text.

Taber and Arnold not only explain the interpretative differences, but also express a firm preference for Pārthasārathi's interpretation. Taber believes that "Pārthasārathi offers a much more coherent reading of Kumārila's text than

---

38 Taber (1992b) 204
40 Cf. Arnold (2005) viii: “Chapters 3 and 4 represent revisions of my article ...”
41 Kataoka (2011) 46
42 Kataoka (2011) 42
Umbeka"\textsuperscript{43} and that Pārthasārathi’s interpretation “represents a viable position in an important philosophical debate”\textsuperscript{44}, albeit “on no interpretation, neither Umbeka’s nor Pārthasārathi’s, can the notion of svataḥ prāmāṇya serve specifically as a basis for the defense of the authority of the Veda.”\textsuperscript{45} Arnold writes that “I hope to have shown that [Pārthasārathi’s] interpretation represents not only the best exegesis of the tradition … but also that it is a philosophically cogent account”\textsuperscript{46} whereas “Uṃveka’s interpretation compromises the major insight of Kumārila’s doctrine of svataḥ prāmāṇya.”\textsuperscript{47}

Although the scope of this study is restricted to understanding Kumārila’s doctrine in its own right, and does not discuss the later commentarial developments of his doctrine, nevertheless some engagement with the discussions of Taber and Arnold is necessary, insofar as these concern the question of the proper interpretation of Kumārila's claim. The interpretation of Kumārila's doctrine presented here builds on the insights into the analytic nuances of Kumārila's terminology provided by Kataoka. However, it differs significantly from the interpretations of Arnold and Taber on a number of grounds. Firstly, Kumārila's doctrine is characterized as a Peircean form of anti-foundationalism rather than a Reidean form. Secondly, Kumārila's doctrine is characterized in terms of a culminating epistemic process constrained by a normative goal rather than by sole reference to the phenomenology of awareness. Thirdly, an ontological aspect of Kumārila's understanding of how deliverances function is distinguished from Kumārila's analysis of inquiry, thereby clarifying the sense in which Kumārila endorses a metaphysical foundation for the truth of beliefs. It is argued that the views of the two classical commentators correctly capture different aspects of Kumārila's claim.

\textsuperscript{43} Taber (1992b) 211
\textsuperscript{44} Taber (1992b) 218
\textsuperscript{45} Taber (1992b) 217
\textsuperscript{46} Arnold (2001) 642
\textsuperscript{47} Arnold (2001) 593
Umveka's view has been characterized by Arnold as a causal account. It will be suggested that Umveka's account is adequate to capture the nature of the Good Case deliverances which form the paradigm case and which constitute the goal of inquiry. Pārthasārathi's view will not be considered separately, but only within the context of a general 'Pārthasārathi-Arnold' reading. The Pārthasārathi-Arnold reading of Kumārila's doctrine is non-normative and appeals instead to phenomenological content as the sole basis for justification and a robust conception of truth. It is suggested that such an account captures a regulative notion of justification present in Kumārila's doctrine. However, the reading developed here identifies a dynamic element to Kumārila's doctrine whereby it constitutes a normative and purposive protocol that reflects the logic of inquiry of a rational agent.

Section 5: Methodological approach

Classical Indian epistemological texts constitute a major intellectual resource and there is significant potential for bringing this resource into engagement with contemporary epistemology. Kumārila's presentation of the doctrine to be discussed is the earliest extant sophisticated discussion of an abstract epistemic goal, termed 'prāmāṇya', common to all beliefs, rather than the description of particular information channels for forming beliefs. For him, this goal is 'from itself' ('svata'), rather than 'from something else' ('parata').

Prominent features of the terrain of contemporary epistemology have developed in response to the Gettier counter-examples to the justified true belief analysis.  

---

48 Uddyotakara discusses the topic of prāmāṇya before Kumārila, but in a more rudimentary way and not in the context of an established debate: see Shida (2004) for details. Śabara uses the terms prāmāṇya and non-prāmāṇya before Kumārila. Dharmakīrti provides his views at the same time as Kumārila, but does not situate them in a wider polemical context.
of knowledge, including the purported need for modal conditions such as safety in an account of knowledge, and the distinction between internalist and externalist terminologies and positions. The historical evolution of classical Indian epistemology obviously does not parallel that of contemporary epistemology, and thus any claim of equivalence of analytic concepts between the two traditions must be treated with extreme caution. Nevertheless, in this thesis it is argued that, despite ostensibly different concerns, some notions in the classical Indian debate are allied to concepts in contemporary philosophy, and some of the same theoretical themes emerge in both contexts.

In describing his own methodological approach to classical Indian Buddhist epistemological texts, Christian Coseru explains his goal of “engaging the arguments of the Buddhist epistemologists in ways that make their thought relevant to contemporary debates”. Accordingly, Coseru advises that “one engages Buddhist thinkers *philosophically*, that is, in the same way one reads Descartes or Kant as informers of contemporary philosophical debates.” Although this approach may seem to raise interpretive concerns, Coseru quotes Gadamer in order to make the point that “the texts of the Buddhist epistemological tradition do not wish to draw attention to them as textual materials fit for exegesis but rather to mediate our understanding of various logical and epistemological arguments in relation to a specific topic.” The aim of this thesis is to engage with Kumārla in such a manner. In particular, a reading of Kumārla’s doctrine that is philosophically coherent as well as appealing should be seen to speak in favour of the interpretative success of that reading. The thesis thus constitutes a reading of Kumārla which draws on the language and debates of contemporary philosophy as a tool or resource for transposing Kumārla’s ideas into the space of contemporary philosophical concerns. Thus what Wiggins says about Peirce, that if his “ideas are to reach

---

49 Coseru (2012) 22
50 Coseru (2012) 35
51 Coseru (2012) 36 fn.62
again into the bloodstream of philosophy, then we need not only fresh studies of his texts but speculative transpositions of these ideas\textsuperscript{52} may also be said in regard to Kumārila.

This thesis provides a reconstruction of Kumārila's doctrine based on a close reading of the Sanskrit texts of both the Brha-ṭṭikā and the Śloka-vārttika. Kumārila's sets out his doctrine on two separate occasions in these two different texts. Their relative chronology and Kumārila's reasons for authoring two distinct works covering substantially the same ground are issues that are not fully settled among contemporary scholars.\textsuperscript{53} Both presentations are in verse and are terse and succinct, presenting difficulties of interpretation which led to interpretative divergences arising during the following century. Thus Umveka considers four alternative interpretations of Kumārila's doctrine at some length before giving his own interpretation. Likewise Śāntarakṣita considers three and Kamalaśīla a further five versions of Kumārila's doctrine, one of which is Umveka's. This profusion of possible interpretations rather suggests that subsequent thinkers were in fact bewildered as to the actual significance of Kumārila's doctrine.

The presentation in the Śloka-vārttika involves a strategy of setting up a schema of four possible positions, and then fairly rapidly rejecting the three alternative views before advocating Kumārila's own view at greater length. The presentation in the Brha-ṭṭikā does not involve this strategy and argues in favour of Kumārila's own view in greater detail. This thesis freely draws from

\textsuperscript{52} Wiggins (2004) 89

\textsuperscript{53} See Kataoka (2011) 27-47 for a survey of the history of modern scholarship on these two questions. See in particular p.47, where Kataoka concludes in accordance with Frauwallner that “the Brhaṭṭikā is a later, revised version of the Śloka-vārttika.” Similarly, Verpoorten (1987) 30 states that “[t]he Brhaṭṭikā handles the same problems as the ŚV ... we feel K's thought in this work to be more synthetic and riper.” By contrast, Taber (1992a) 179 argues against Frauwallner and in favour of “the traditional opinion [of K.S. Ramaswami Sastri] that the ŚV represents Kumārila's mature philosophy.”
both texts in order to present a coherent and philosophically appealing view, without attempting to find any difference in the two presentations that may indicate a development in Kumārila's own thinking.

The approach of this thesis aims to compensate for the terseness of Kumārila's presentation by examining how Kumārila selects technical terms with a pre-existing history of usage in theoretical contexts. This is not to claim that Kumārila did not adapt the precise meaning of the terms to suit his own dialectic purpose, but rather that an understanding of the pre-existing roles of technical terms can provide a sound basis for understanding Kumārila's own use of these terms.

This thesis seeks to reconstruct Kumārila's own doctrine as far as possible independently of the concerns of later Indian philosophers who may have had varied motivations for discussing Kumārila's work, and who were writing at a later time when the driving concerns of Indian epistemology would have changed to some extent. Given the terseness of Kumārila's presentation, it has though been necessary to consult later authors who commented on or responded to these texts in more or less depth to strengthen the understanding of Kumārila's epistemology. Later discussions of Kumārila's work have therefore been drawn on to throw light on the technical terminology used by Kumārila, but as far as possible without introducing any novel elements into the interpretation. However, given the controversy which arose over the proper interpretation of Kumārila's doctrine among later authors, which seems to reflect an inherent ambiguity in Kumārila's own presentations, it may not be possible fully to realize this ideal.

The main later sources drawn on in this thesis date from the seventh and eighth century, and are the earliest commentaries on this doctrine. As such,
they may be closer in spirit to Kumārila's own way of thinking. The Tātparya-Ṭīkā is a commentary on the Śloka-vārttika by Umveka Bhaṭṭa, who was also affiliated to the Mīmāṁsā school and as such defended (his own reading of) Kumārila's doctrine. The Tattva-saṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita and its own commentary Pañjikā by Kamalaśīla excerpt Kumārila's presentation from the Brhat-ṭīkā and provide discussion of it. As Buddhist philosophers, these two authors disagree with Kumārila's view, provide their own criticisms, and explain their own alternative view. These two philosophers are discussed briefly, and are treated here as speaking in a single voice against Kumārila. As close contemporaries to Kumārila, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi have been drawn on to a limited extent, but a more detailed study of these two important Buddhist philosophers would be helpful in providing more insight into their contributions to the debate.

Unless otherwise stated, quotes from the Śloka-vārttika represent a modification of the translation in Kataoka (2011), and quotes from the Brhaṭṭīkā and all other sources are translations made directly from published versions of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts referenced in the abbreviations and bibliography sections. Appendices are also provided with transliterated Sanskrit text and translations corresponding to extracts of the substantive part of

54 Kataoka (2011) 21 gives the dates of Umveka as 730-790 AD. Mirashi (1966) 91 says that "Umbekā flourished in circa A.D. 775-800". Kane (1928) 292-3 says that "the literary activity ... of Umbeka [must be placed] between 700 and 730 AD". However, Mirashi (1966) 93 fn.209 argues forcefully that Dr Kane's reasons for this dating "are absolutely baseless". Taber (1992b) 209 says that "It indeed appears that the first Mīmāṁsā theory of svataḥ prāmaṇya discussed by Śāntarakṣita in his TS (2812-45) is Umbeka's interpretation of Kumārila". Although this is not entirely implausible, the fact Kamalaśīla appends to this chapter a separate discussion of Umveka's views would suggest that the view discussed by Śāntarakṣita is not Umbeka's interpretation of Kumārila, and that Umbeka wrote soon after Śāntarakṣita.

55 Kataoka (2011) 21 follows Frauwallner in giving 725-788 AD as Śāntarakṣita's dates.

56 Kataoka (2011) 21 follows Frauwallner in giving 740-795 AD as Kamalaśīla's dates.
Kumārila's discussion of this topic in the Brhat-ṭīkā. These appendices cover all the verses quoted from those two texts in this thesis, and are intended as a reference guide for the reader. No credit is taken for original research in respect of editing the Sanskrit text. Further, it has not been possible to make any significant improvement on the translation of the Śloka-vārttika made in Kataoka (2011), so the translation provided here represents a mere modification of that in line with the interpretation developed in this thesis. Accordingly, no credit is claimed in respect of translation of the Śloka-vārttika text extract either. The reader is directed to Kataoka (2011) for a full translation of the Śloka-vārttika text extract.

Section 6: Use of terminology

Terminology used in a philosophical discussion is of a technical character. The range of terms available and the semantic range of these terms reflects the contingent historical development of the subject. This is true for both contemporary Western philosophy and the classical Indian debate. Key terms of the vocabulary of contemporary epistemology, such as the framing of a debate between internalist and externalist positions, has been developed in the literature attempting to respond to the Gettier problem, and the meanings of pre-existing terms such as justification has also been made more complex and also problematic through this literature. Accordingly, this thesis will attempt to introduce whatever contemporary terminology is needed with a degree of self-awareness about the contingent historical character of contemporary terminology. The examination of wider usage of the Indian terminology in theoretical contexts mentioned above will also serve to introduce a degree of self-awareness about the contingent historical character of the terminology available to Kumārila. At the same time, terminology is wielded in distinctive
ways by individual philosophers, and the examination of general use of terminology constitutes only a preliminary exercise for understanding Kumārila's use of these terms.

Accordingly, this thesis will proceed to recover an understanding of Kumārila's doctrine through an examination of his use of a number of key theoretical terms. The question of how these terms should be rendered into the vocabulary of contemporary epistemology will be under examination throughout much of this thesis. As such, it will not be possible to begin this examination with a translation of these terms into English without presupposing what is ultimately to be discovered. In particular, the technical terms 'pramāṇa', 'non-pramāṇa', 'prāmāṇya', 'non-prāmāṇya', 'svabhāva', 'virodha', 'utsarga', 'apavāda' and 'prāptā' will be originally encountered in Sanskrit in this thesis. As well as developing novel formulations for translating these terms, existing translations such as 'validity' etc. will be used when engaging with the existing scholarship. A glossary of key technical terms is provided at the end.

Part of the argument of this thesis is that Kumārila does not make his terminology any more exact than it needs to be in order to do the philosophical work he requires of it. Thus there can be a variety of ways of filling out the details of Kumārila's position, but no such additional detail should be necessary in order to understand the structure of Kumārila's argument and its philosophical coherence. Thus Kumārila did not see the attainment of maximum granularity in analysis as the aim of philosophical endeavour, but instead chose to use philosophical terminology that is determined with a level of granularity appropriate to his specific philosophical goals. This can be compared to the way a tool is chosen that is appropriately coarse or fine to suit the purpose. A similar phenomenon can be seen in contemporary legal reasoning, where a good legal principle involves the idea that cases should be decided on narrower rather than broader grounds.
Kumārila's approach contrasts with an analytic reductionist approach which is a prominent theme in at least some Buddhist philosophy. In particular, it will be seen how Kumārila transfers paradigms of methodology and reasoning well-established in grammatical and ritual and legal interpretation literatures to this new context. It could also be that Kumārila sought to make a philosophical intervention in support of his extra-philosophical beliefs, and thus was not concerned to engage with details that were not material to his strategic aims. A wide variety of interpretations of Kumārila's doctrine formulated by later interpreters are preserved in the works of Uṃveka and Kamalaśīla. It will be suggested that these later interpretations reflect a failure to understand this strategic dimension to Kumārila's use of terminology.

Given this approach, the challenge will be to find contemporary philosophical vocabulary which is sufficiently broad in its semantic range to convey the non-specific import of Kumārila's use of the Sanskrit terms listed above. Thus it will be necessary to directly address the question of how key terms from contemporary philosophical vocabulary are being used at various stages in this thesis. The goal is to find a translation of each Sanskrit term which reflects the philosophical work being done by the term without introducing additional substantive claims which Kumārila would not be concerned to defend.

Italics have been used for passages translated as block quotes from Sanskrit or Tibetan. Italics have not been used for transliterated Sanskrit terms, unless as part of a quotation, where the convention of the quoted author has been followed. Bold font has sometimes been used to emphasize a term within a translated quotation that is of particular relevance to the larger discussion. All page references to Kataoka (2011) are to Part II unless otherwise stated.
Section 7: Thesis Summary

A connection between Kumārila's doctrine of svataḥprāmāṇyam and the ideas of fallibility and infallibility has been suggested by B.K. Matilal. This thesis will clarify how notions of fallibilism and infallibilism are involved in Kumārila's doctrine, and find an affinity with Peirce's rejection of skepticism and the Cartesian method of doubt in favour of a pragmatist method of inquiry.

Hookway distinguishes between two ways of characterizing fallibilism. A first way is as a "distinctive 'attitude of mind'" whereby "our acceptance of propositions should always have a detached or tentative character: the possibility of error must be real." Hookway's interest however lies in a second characterization which he attributes to Peirce. Here, "lack of 'absolute certainty' is compatible with the sort of ordinary certainty that arises when the possibility of error cannot really be entertained or taken seriously." This second characterization involves "defining infallibility, and then characteriz[ing] fallibilism as the view that there are no propositions that are 'infallible' so understood." Hookway thus explains:

"When we describe a judgement or belief as 'infallible', we identify it as belonging to an epistemic kind of which, of necessity, all members are true ... This assignment to a kind identifies a metaphysical feature of the judgement or belief that guarantees its truth."

---

57 See Matilal (1986) 32
58 In Hookway (2007); the same material is also presented in Hookway (2008)
59 Hookway (2007) 10
60 Hookway (2007) 10
61 Hookway (2007) 10
62 Hookway (2007) 11
63 Hookway (2007) 11
Kumārila's use of the notion of svabhāva will be investigated in order to show that Kumārila conceives of pramāṇas as epistemic kinds which have an essential disposition to correctly apprehend some object or rational truth under appropriately normal conditions. Kumārila is shown to endorse a disjunctive account of deliverances from epistemic sources, whereby deliverances based on pramāṇas are of necessity true, and deliverances not based on pramāṇas are characterized partly in terms of reflective indiscriminability from the first class of deliverances.

However, as Hookway goes on to explain, in such a case, "we may be unconfident of our judgement because we are unsure whether it is a judgement of perception or, perhaps, a member of a different epistemic kind, a report of illusion or hallucination, for example." Kumārila's response to a first possible view raised in the Śloka-vārttika presentation makes this same point. Hookway suggests that a first possible solution is to "revise the characterization of infallibility to require that the belief detectably belongs to a kind which guarantees its truth." Kumārila's discussion and a discussion by Uṃveka which rejects the notion of a distinguishing feature of correct awareness argue that no beliefs can meet such a characterization, and thus all beliefs are fallible in this sense.

However, Hookway alternately suggest that "we might accept that fallibilism does not extend to all our judgements, recognizing the infallibility of perceptual ones, while also insisting that our beliefs about whether a given judgement is a perceptual judgement are fallible." Similarly, Kumārila asserts that, whereas perceptual and other judgments based on pramāṇas are infallible in the sense that

---

64 Hookway (2007) 11
65 Hookway (2007) 11
66 Hookway (2007) 11
that they belong to an epistemic kind that necessitates their truth, beliefs about whether a judgment is based on a pramāṇa are fallible. Accordingly, Kumārila's fallibilism concerns beliefs about whether a deliverance is of the right epistemic kind or not, and thus concerns something like the contemporary philosophical notion of judgments. Thus for Kumārila, just as much as for Peirce, "a commitment to fallibilism is compatible with great confidence and certainty in the adequacy of most of our opinions and methods."  

Kumārila's fallibilism about judgments leads to his presentation of a method of inquiry which involves the transference of a pre-existing theoretical model rooted in ritual interpretation and already informing other disciplines such as legal interpretation and generative grammar. This is a model of general operation and replacement operation. Kumārila's model of inquiry is found to have an affinity with Peirce's understanding of abduction as a defeasible reasoning strategy that reflects the fallibility of human inquiry.

Kumārila's main claim is that "the prāmāṇyam of all pramāṇas is 'from itself'". A full understanding of his claim will accordingly require a separate understanding of Kumārila's use of the three technical terms 'prāmāṇyam', 'pramāṇa' and 'svataḥ' ('from itself'). Chapter Two argues for an understanding of the term 'from itself' as a form of nomic necessitation and Chapter Three argues for a rendering of the term 'pramāṇa' as a deliverance which obtains in a 'Good Case', where the notion of 'Good Case' is borrowed from contemporary disjunctivism. A reading of the term 'prāmāṇyam' as a capacity for epistemic success and as a manifestation of that competence in the form of accurate determination of an object or fact is also argued for in Chapter Three. As such, Kumārila's claim is that a capacity for epistemic success is nomically necessitated in Good Cases. One way to read this idea is provided by Sosa's 

---

67 Hookway (2007) 13
68 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively. The language is almost identical in both texts.
idea that the disposition to trust our deliverances represents the manifestation of a competence where it is exercised in appropriate conditions. This means that epistemic success can be ascertained by the subject by ascertaining that conditions are appropriate, i.e. that a Good Case obtains. Kumārila's notion of 'non-pramāṇa' corresponds to the notion of a Bad Case as understood in disjunctivism.

Although Good Case deliverances represent the manifestation of a competence which is an essential disposition, nevertheless, as Hookway notes, the agent may be unsure whether any given deliverance belong to this epistemic kind. Accordingly, a method of inquiry is needed, and Chapter Four examines Kumārila's presentation of just such a method. Peirce is drawn on as an interlocutor for the understanding of Kumārila's protocol of inquiry, which is also rooted in the methodologies of ritual interpretation and generative grammar. Kumārila's method is set out in terms of three phases, which are labelled instigating, prolonging and terminating inquiry.

Chapter Five considers Kumārila's anti-foundationalism, which is based on a regress argument against a certain conception of justification. This regress argument targets inter alia the Buddhist position. Kumārila's opposition to the requirement for subsequent justification supports his own claim that the agent satisfies a normative burden by following a protocol for inquiry. That this protocol results in true belief is argued for via an explanatory induction.

The above discussion of Kumārila's doctrine has focused on the case of judgments that are not based on testimony from Vedic scripture, i.e. judgments derived from epistemic sources including perception, reasoning and ordinary testimony. In the case of Vedic judgments, Kumārila holds that the scope for error is eliminated because there is no other possible epistemic kind which
could give rise to a reflectively indiscriminable judgment.

In more detail, the chapter structure is as follows. Chapter Two begins with Kumārila's gloss of 'from itself' as 'due to svabhāva' and argues that Kumārila's use of the term 'svabhāva' captures a notion of nomic necessity. Primary and secondary literature on the term 'svabhāva' is surveyed to obtain a preliminary understanding of the term. However, previous research relating to this term outside of a Buddhist context is limited, so the research in this chapter contributes to a fuller understanding of the meaning of the term 'svabhāva'. The term 'svabhāva' is found to equate to some form of essential disposition, following the contemporary literature on dispositional essentialism. By endorsing the notion of a bare disposition, the chapter diverges from Arnold's rejection of virtus dormativa arguments such as Umveka's ontological reading of 'svatah' ('from itself').

The Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti rebut the interpretations of svabhāva as a permanent existent and as an invariably associated feature. This notion relates a property to an entity, and it is found to cover the semantic field of the terms 'nature' and 'essence', where these are understood as a real component explaining necessity and as a basis for the individuation of an entity.

The findings of Ramkrishna Bhattacharya that the notion of svabhāva among the svabhāva-advocates is ambiguous between a notion involving a minimal form of causality and a notion denying causality are then presented. The same ambiguity is shown to be inherent in Kumārila's conception of an invariably associated feature. Umveka's interpretation disambiguates the meaning in favour of minimal causality. Kumārila's use of the term 'svabhāva' is seen to capture a notion of nomic or natural necessity, congruent with the modality
implicit in Hookway's idea of “an epistemic kind of which, of necessity, all members are true.”

Chapter Three begins by explicating Kumārila's use of the term 'prāmāṇyam' as a capacity for epistemic success. As per its characterization by reference to svabhāva, this is nomically necessitated in the case of a pramāṇa. A pramāṇa is shown to be a deliverance which obtains in appropriately normal conditions, and thus represents the manifestation of a competence which determines the accuracy of the belief.

Through a careful reading of passages from Kumārila's text, the dichotomy between pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa is shown to correspond to the dichotomy between a Good Case and a Bad Case advocated by epistemological disjunctivists. Further analysis of Kumārila's terminology shows that Kumārila's doctrine closely involves the disjunctivist idea that “Bad Cases [are] reflectively indiscriminable from Good ones”.

Chapter Four presents Kumārila's claim as a belief protocol that captures the logic of inquiry of a rational agent. The normative reading of Kumārila's doctrine developed here is contrasted with a phenomenological reading developed by Pārthasārathi and by Dan Arnold. The terms 'utsarga' and 'apavāda' are used by Kumārila to capture the idea of hypothesis adoption and hypothesis replacement. The roots of this terminology in the grammatical and ritual literatures are described in order to show how Kumārila models the process of generating true beliefs by analogy with how linguistic units are correctly formed through a generative grammar. Such a model constitutes a directive to the epistemic agent who aims at getting beliefs that are not merely

---

69 Hookway (2007) 11
70 Sturgeon (2006) 188
justified but are in fact true. The instigating, prolonging and terminating of inquiry are all separately investigated. Kumārila's discussion of alternatives to his own view is seen to support the logic of inquiry he provides.

Chapter Five examines Kumārila's anti-foundationalism. Kumārila's presentation of an argument from infinite regress attacks forms of foundationalism including that of his Buddhist adversaries, which is accordingly described. Kumārila is interpreted as an anti-foundationalist who rejects the idea that a secure foundation for judgments can be obtained. However, whereas the reading of Kumārila's anti-foundationalism by Taber and Arnold means that all beliefs are equally justified or equally valid, the interpretation presented here is that a process of inquiry is necessary to strengthen the epistemic status of beliefs. Finally, the case of the Veda as an infallible epistemic source is considered.

Ultimately it is found that the term 'prāmāṇyam' constitutes the notion of a capacity for epistemic success, the term 'pramāṇa' constitutes a Good Case deliverance, which involves both possession and exercise of such a capacity, and 'svataḥ', or 'from itself', provides the idea that the exercise of such a capacity is in virtue of the intrinsic nature of the deliverance conditional on its identity as a Good Case deliverance, and hence not reliant on anything else. The notion of being 'in virtue of' represents an idea of metaphysical grounding. Thus Kumārila's claim is that Good Case deliverances exercise a capacity for epistemic success which they possess as an intrinsic disposition.

By contrast, 'non-pramāṇa' constitutes a Bad Case deliverance. Such a deliverance is 'from something else' in the sense that its apprehension as of an object is due to sub-optimal epistemic conditions which are characterized as flaws of the belief process. Because Bad Case deliverances are so reliant, they
are vulnerable to defeat, unlike Good Case deliverances.
Chapter 2: Kumārila's dispositional essentialism

Section 1: Introduction

This chapter provides an examination of rival notions of svabhāva in circulation at the time of Kumārila, and defends the attribution to Kumārila of a form of dispositional essentialism involving the notion of a real causal power of an entity which constitutes its essence conditional on the existence of that entity. Kumārila's notion of svabhāva is shown to have a greater affinity with a notion promulgated by earlier groups of svabhāva-advocates that with the notion criticized by Mādhyamika Buddhists. In the existing secondary literature, 'svabhāva' has been translated by terms such as 'nature' and 'essence' which hint at a constraint on metaphysical possibility.

John Carroll remarks that “[t]he most interesting and perhaps the most perplexing feature of laws is their modal character.”\(^1\) In contemporary philosophy, Humean or Regularity theories and natural or nomic necessitation theories form two competing strategies to account for this modal character. As Alexander Bird explains, “[t]he prevailing debates surrounding the nature of laws of nature have focused on the rivalry between the regularity conception of laws and recent nomic necessitation accounts.”\(^2\) Classical Indian discussions of the lawlike behaviour of the natural world also exist, and this chapter will provide a survey of some of these discussions.

The term 'svabhāva' is employed by groups known as svabhāva-advocates (svabhāva-vādins), and this notion is understood by one of these groups as either an essential property or an intrinsic nature of a substance which determines its behavioural manifestations. This view has much in common with the thesis of dispositional essentialism in contemporary philosophy. Kumārila appears to draw on just this idea of nomic necessitation in his epistemological

\(^{1}\) Carroll (1990) 185  
\(^{2}\) Bird (2005) 353
claim, which is that beliefs have a real and irreducible disposition or causal power to provide epistemic success. A second group of svabhāva-advocates uphold a thesis of lawlessness which focuses on the denial of the essentialist thesis. Dharmakīrti is one of Kumārila's Buddhist contemporaries who formulates a broadly similar notion of svabhāva as an explanatory principle, but within an ultimately reductionist and anti-realist framework. Arguments against a realist conception of svabhāva are provided by the Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti.

This chapter reviews these various conceptions of svabhāva as an explanatory posit for the lawlike behaviour of objects. Firstly, a quick overview of dispositional essentialism is provided as a contemporary theoretical framework for the presentation of the Indian material. Kumārila's own claim is then presented in order to motivate the discussion of powers and properties in general. The views of the svabhāva-advocates are then considered by drawing on the work of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Ramkrishna Bhattacharya. The view of Dharmakīrti is considered by reference to the work of John Dunne. The arguments against a realist notion are then considered with reference to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as well as relevant secondary literature. On the basis of this discussion, the notion of essential property is refined to provide a viable conception which evades the force of these arguments. The discussion then turns to Kumārila's own notion of svabhāva. After briefly indicating the importance of this notion in his epistemological claim, an illustration involving a pot is examined. On this basis, it is argued that Kumārila's notion of svabhāva amounts to that of an essential property.

This thesis as a whole provides a detailed examination of nomic necessitation as it figures in Kumārila's doctrine and as such provides an additional textual resource on which to assess the viability of the concept of svabhāva. It can be seen as building on the research of Chattopadhyaya and Bhattacharya into the svabhāva-advocates, but with a focus on the outlying case of Kumārila, who was affiliated to the Mīmāṃsā school rather than being a self-declared svabhāva-advocate. The purpose of this chapter is to use the existing primary
and secondary literature on svabhāva as a resource to flesh out the notion of svabhāva as it figures in Kumārila's claim.

Section 2: Powers and properties in the classical Indian context

Kumārila begins the presentation of his own view in both the Brhaṭ-ṭīkā and the Śloka-vārttika with the claim that "the prāmāṇyam of all pramāṇas is 'from itself'". In order to understand this claim, the terms 'prāmāṇyam', 'pramāṇa' and 'from itself' will need to be separately understood. However, this opening statement already informs us that some kind of relation obtains between pramāṇas and prāmāṇyam.

Kumārila next explains that this means that "a capacity for accurate determination of an object belongs to them [scil. pramāṇas] due to their svabhāva". According to this clarification, prāmāṇyam is a capacity for accurate determination, and its relation to pramāṇas is 'due to svabhāva'. The term 'prāmāṇyam' and Kumārila's notion of a capacity will be explored in more depth later, as well as the idea of a capacity for epistemic success. The central term in Kumārila's claim, 'from itself', has been immediately glossed as 'due to its svabhāva'. The investigation into Kumārila's claim will begin with an investigation of this expression 'due to svabhāva'. In order to understand this term, it will be helpful to examine the wider usage of the theoretical term 'svabhāva' in the classical Indian context. This task will be undertaken in this chapter, before turning to the specific application to prāmāṇyam as a capacity for accurate determination of an object.

The meaning of the term 'svabhāva' has been investigated in much recent

---

3 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
4 TS 2812ab
scholarship. This section will provide a high-level survey of how the notion of svabhāva has been treated in recent literature. Later sections of this chapter will provide a deeper engagement with selected pieces of primary and secondary literature. By comparison of the textual evidence with the relevant contemporary literature, it will be argued in this section that the term svabhāva incorporates two dimensions, firstly as a default nature, in a sense to be explicated, and secondly as a real dispositional property or causal power.

Subsection 1: Svabhāva as a property

The denial of the existence of svabhāva in entities is a key Mādhyamika Buddhist tenet, and arguments provided against svabhāva by the Mādhyamika philosophers Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti will be examined below. In the context of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Buddhism, Collett Cox explains:

“Each such primary factor, or dharma, is determined or distinguished by an intrinsic nature (svabhāva), or distinctive characteristic, that can be applied to that factor alone and to no other ... The term 'intrinsic nature' ... refers to its atemporal underlying and defining nature ...”

In the context of Buddhist Reductionism generally, Mark Siderits focuses his discussion on 'intrinsic nature' and 'genuine intrinsic property' in order to capture the ontological dimension of the term 'svabhāva' as what is fundamentally real. Jan Westerhoff notes that the term is “often translated as “inherent existence” or “own-being”. Westerhoff himself draws a distinction

---

5 See for example Siderits (2003), Dunne (2004), Ronkin (2005) and Westerhoff (2011)
6 Cox (1995) 139
7 See Siderits (2003) 117
8 See Westerhoff (2011) 19
between this ontological dimension to the notion as what “exist[s] in a primary manner, unconstructed and independent of anything else”\(^9\) and a notion of essence as “something that an object cannot lose without ceasing to be that very object.”\(^10\) (A cognitive dimension and a notion of absolute-svabhāva are also discussed by Westerhoff, but will not be relevant to this study.) In the context of Abhidharma Buddhism, Ronkin notes that sabhāva (the Pāli equivalent of svabhāva in the Abhidharma texts) has been rendered in various ways, “the most paramount of which are ‘particular nature’, ‘own-nature’, ‘self-existence’ and ‘individual essence’.”\(^11\) Ronkin makes a distinction between senses of nature and essence similar to that of Westerhoff.

In the context of the affirmation of svabhāva by the non-Mādhyamika Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, John Dunne carefully distinguishes between svabhāva as property and svabhāva as nature.\(^12\) Dunne further explains although “Dharmakīrti’s system does not allow de re predication”\(^13\), his notion of svabhāva does involve some notion of necessity, although this is not quite a notion of de dicto necessity either.\(^14\) Dunne further explains that the accidental/essential distinction “remains vague and undeveloped”\(^15\) in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy.

The existence of svabhāva has also been affirmed by various non-Buddhist groups. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Ramkrishna Bhattacharya are two scholars who have examined the views of groups called svabhāva-advocates. In the context of one group of svabhāva-advocates, Bhattacharya quotes a view of Joseph Needham that svabhāva “could be translated “inherent nature”, “innate thus-ness”, or “the essential nature of things”.\(^16\) Bhattacharya himself

---

\(^9\) Westerhoff (2011) 24
\(^10\) Westerhoff (2009) 22
\(^11\) See Ronkin (2005) 86
\(^12\) See Dunne (2004) 155-202
\(^13\) Dunne (2004) 187
\(^14\) See Dunne (2004) 187-190
\(^15\) Dunne (2004) 190
\(^16\) Bhattacharya (2012) 603
distinguishes between two types of svabhāva-advocacy. The first type is the idea that svabhāva is the cause of everything, which he labels svabhāva-as-causality, rigid causality, embodied cause and unchanging nature. The second type is the denial of causality and of svabhāva-as-causality, which he labels svabhāva-as-accident or chance.

The Mādhyamika Buddhist critique focuses on a dimension of the notion of svabhāva which connects with the notion of essence or nature, as indicated by some of the common translations within this context. By contrast, the context of the svabhāva-advocates focuses a dimension which connects with some notion of disposition or causal power, as indicated by Bhattacharya's translations and discussion to be considered below. A preliminary understanding of this notion can be had from a quick look at some examples of it. Candrakīrti mentions the examples of heat in fire and the property that makes a ruby a ruby. Here, svabhāva refers to a property possessed by an entity. Nāgārjuna explains that "a svabhāva cannot be removed/ abandoned/ caused to cease, such as the heat of fire, fluidity in [liquid] water [and] extendedness of space." These brief remarks, which can be taken as relatively neutral and unbiased, indicate a property that is possessed with some form of necessity.

In the Nyāya Kośa, a Sanskrit reference work for philosophical terms, svabhāva is defined as "a particular property of an entity which is not dependent on another cause" and is said to be "difficult to overcome". Examples given are

---

17 See Bhattacharya (2012) 599, 608 and passim. The term "embodied cause" is taken from a quote from Needham
18 See Bhattacharya (2012) 599, 608 and passim
19 PP 260: "agnier aṣṭyam jñātānām padmarāgādīnaṁ padmarāgādī-svabhāvaś ca"
20 Vigrahavyāvartani Svarūti 82: 14-15, also quoted in Westerhoff (2009) 22: "na hi svabhāvah śakyo vinivartayituṣ yathāgner uṣṇatvam apāṁ dravatvam ākāśasya nirāvaranatvam!"
21 The svabhāva-advocates also provide the examples of heat in fire and coolness in water, as described later
23 Jhalakīkar (1996) 971: durakramaḥ
heat in fire, coolness in water, and cool sensation in breeze, and a late statement of the views of the Cārvākas is referred to, which Bhattacharya shows the views of the svabhāva-advocates to have been conflated with. The use of this expression 'difficult to overcome' to describe svabhāva is quite astute in that it can be construed to cover a range of cases, from the conceptual and metaphysical impossibility of unextended space (at least in a pre-modern paradigm) to the slight effort required to heat water.

By contrast, all of Nāgārjuna's three examples provide cases of determinable properties which are inalienable from their determinate entities and serve in part to individuate those entities. Kit Fine explains that the concept of essence "plays not only an external role, in helping to characterize the subject, but also an internal role, in helping to constitute it" and characterizes the latter as a consequence of the former. As such, the concept is of use "in the formulation of metaphysical claims [and] in the definition of metaphysical concepts", including the concept of ontological dependence. As Fine explains, a modal account of essence posits that "an object [has] a property essentially just in case it is necessary that the object has the property." The fact that Fine's two roles are being played by the properties with respect to their entities would seem to motivate a loose translation of svabhāva as essence.

There are also important differences in how the properties figure in their determinate entities in the examples given, and the resulting ambiguity will be exploited in the arguments provided by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti against svabhāva, which will be discussed later. In the example of space and extendedness, extendedness constitutes space as a permanent given for experience (at least in a premodern paradigm). In contrast, heat may be lost when fire is extinguished, but not without the loss of fire also. And in the case of fluidity, water can lose this while continuing to exist, by turning to ice or to

24 Fine (1994) 1
25 See Fine (1994) 1
26 Fine (1994) 2
27 Fine (1994) 3
steam, but thereby loses its identity as water. Coolness in water represents a fourth case, where water may lose the coolness it possesses at normal environmental temperature without losing its identity, by heating up, but only dependent on external conditions to provide heat. The first three of these cases are reflected in a three-way distinction made by Fine concerning essence. Having characterized essence by the statement that “an object [has] a property essentially just in case it is necessary that the object has the property”\(^{28}\), Fine labels this a categorical form and provides two variants on this categorical form – conditional on existence, i.e. if the object exists, and conditional upon identity, i.e. if the object is identical to that very object.\(^{29}\) It can be seen that the case of extendedness in space satisfies the categorical form, the case of heat in fire satisfies the form conditional on existence, and the case of fluidity in water satisfies the form conditional on identity.

The fourth case, that of coolness in water, can be said to satisfy a third conditional form, conditional on the absence of extrinsic factors. As such, this fourth case of water temperature provides a notion of an intrinsic feature rather than that of an essence, where an intrinsic feature is “a feature of the thing itself”\(^{30}\). Heat in water is an accidental property rather than an essential property, and one which is dependent on extrinsic conditions, where these are understood as “the stimuli to which it may be subject or the conditions which it finds itself in”\(^{31}\).

### Subsection 2: Svabhāva as a power

The svabhāva-advocates provide a wide variety of examples of svabhāva, many of which have been collated by Bhattacharya, including the following verses:

---

\(^{28}\) Fine (1994) 3  
\(^{29}\) See Fine (1994) 4  
\(^{30}\) Harré and Madden (1975) 87  
\(^{31}\) Harré and Madden (1975) 87
"Heat in fire, coolness in water, the sweetness of tone in a cuckoo – these and other things of the same kind are [due to] svabhāva and not something else." \(^{32}\)

[One] thorn of a jujube tree is sharp, [one is] straight, and one is curved, and the fruit is spherical. Say, by what was this produced? \(^{33}\)

"What makes the sharpness of thorns, the various forms of birds and animals, the sweetness of sugarcane and the bitterness of lime? All this happens due to svabhāva." \(^{34}\)

Whereas the examples of heat and coolness are familiar from the above discussion, the other examples are more whimsical in character and suggest a slightly different conception of svabhāva to the four cases described above. Although all the examples can be construed as dispositional ascriptions, the example of the sweetness of a cuckoo's song stands out as a more paradigmatic example of a dispositional ascription, because it specifies a behaviour that the cuckoo is disposed to engage in. That is, on a dispositionalist reading the cuckoo's song is easily construed as a display of a real causal power in the cuckoo, whereas the idea of heat as a dispositional property needs to be filled out by saying the burning, cooking, warming, scalding etc. constitute its displays.

The examples considered so far involve dispositions of kinds, and arguably, of

\(^{32}\) SSS 2.2 quoted in Bhattacharya (2012) 602: agnair auṣṇyam apāṁ śaītyam kokile madhurasvarāḥ | ityādyekapraśāh syāt svabhāvo nāparaḥ kvacit || The translation provided here follows Bhattacharya in supplying 'due to', which is syntactically necessary. Note also that the dropping of the ablative termination, which is probably done for metrical reasons, can easily mislead the interpreter into reading of the svabhāva doctrine in Mādhyamika fashion, which is precisely the danger highlighted in this chapter.

\(^{33}\) Quoted in Bhattacharya (2012) 602 (my translation): badaryāḥ kaṅṭakastikṣṇa rjurekaśca kumcitah | phaḷam ca vartula tasyā vada kena vinirmitam ||

\(^{34}\) Quoted in Bhattacharya (2012) 602 (my translation): kah kaṅṭakānāṁ prakarotī taṅkṣṇyām vicitrabhāvaṁ mrṛa-paścinām ca | mādhuryaṁ ikṣoḥ katūṁ ca nimbe svabhāvataṁ sarvamidāṁ pravṛttām || (Strictly, the fruit mentioned is Nimb, or Azadirachta Indica, which is similar to lime.)
natural kinds or kinds that resemble natural kinds. That dispositions should be properties of natural kinds rather than of kinds generally or particulars is important to establishing the essentialist thesis. This is because the exercise of the causal power is explained by reference to the fact that it is the essence of a natural kind. A kind determined by social conventions would have no unified metaphysical essence and thus the notion of a dispositional property could do no explanatory work in relation to it.

By contrast, the examples of different types of thorns attribute dispositions to particulars. In Ellis’s terminology, the degree of sharpness of a thorn cannot constitute a kind essence but only a particular essence. That is, the explanatory demand is for an explanation of intrinsic properties of thorns not constituted by their essential properties as a kind.

In this section it has been suggested that the properties seen in these examples can be construed as kind dispositions which are real causal powers. In section four below, it will be argued that such a construal is maintained by one of two groups of svabhāva-advocates.

Subsection 3: Summary

To summarize, the examples of svabhāva have been analysed in respect of essentialist and dispositionalist dimensions in turn. As a property, the notion of svabhāva has been shown to subsume a categorical notion of an essence which is an individuating principle and source of modal constraint, a notion of essence conditional on existence, a notion of essence conditional on identity, and a notion of intrinsic property conditional on normal extrinsic conditions. The notion of a nature as an ontologically real feature overlaps with at least the categorical form of the notion of essence, and provides a real basis for the lawlike behaviour of a determinate entity. This notion of a nature also forms one limb of a dichotomy between what is ontologically real and what is
conceptually constructed. The existence of such variety helps to explain the variety of translations in recent literature that were surveyed above.

What is common to all the senses of svabhāva as essence is the idea of a property of an entity which, in the words of the Nyāya Kośa quoted above, is 'difficult to overcome', where the difficulty ranges from the need for an intervening factor up to a conceptual and metaphysical impossibility. A notion which is loose enough to allow for such a range of possibilities is the notion of a default intrinsic property. This would be a property that is a feature of the thing itself, and a default in the sense that it is conditional on the absence of external factors which would interfere. The presence of coolness in water can be taken as an illustrative example of a default intrinsic nature which is not an essential property. Water is cool under what can be considered normal atmospheric conditions, but such coolness can be removed in the presence of an external source of heat. Such a notion subsumes the cases of an essential property discussed above as well as the case of an intrinsic property that is contingent on normal extrinsic conditions or the absence of an extrinsic stimulus.

As well as this essentialist dimension, a dispositionalist dimension to svabhāva was also identified in this section. Examples given by the svabhāva-advocates were used to flag the notion of a dispositional ascription and to distinguish a notion of kind essence in contrast to particular essence to which this may apply. The ability of cuckoos to sing can be taken as an illustrative example of a dispositional property which is the real essence of a natural kind, which may or may not manifest depending on circumstances that are extrinsic to the cuckoo. Although strictly speaking, cuckoo song does not individuate cuckoos as a natural kind, nevertheless this illustration has sufficient resemblance to a scientifically respectable natural kind to be illuminating. The idea that dispositional ascriptions could present svabhāva as a causal power, which is more prominent in the presentation by one group of svabhāva-advocates, was also noted, and this will be examined in more detail in section four below.
Section 3: Powers and properties in the contemporary context

Dispositional essentialism is a thesis in contemporary philosophy which is a conjunction of two separate claims, realism about dispositional properties and essentialism.\(^{35}\) In the contemporary context, realism about dispositions arises through opposition to a Humean metaphysic\(^{36}\) which holds that things in the world are passive entities which “behave as they are required to by the laws of nature”\(^{37}\), these laws being “universal regularities imposed on things whose identities are independent of the laws”\(^{38}\) and which “are contingent, not necessary”\(^{39}\). According to a strong Humean view, such as that of David Lewis, laws supervene on particular matters of fact in some way. A weaker Humean view, such as that of David Armstrong, would be that laws are imposed on passive entities from without. Characterizing the Humean position as passivism, dispositionalists advocate an anti-passivism which holds that lawlike behaviour stems from the real causal powers or dispositional properties possessed by objects in the world.

The distinguishing feature of dispositionalism is the idea that “[p]roperties are powerful”\(^{40}\) and that their powers “supply the world’s necessity and possibility through being intrinsically modal: affording, grounding or instigating change”\(^{41}\). In a version of the doctrine first canvassed by Shoemaker and favoured by Mumford, properties of objects “are natural clusters of, and exhausted by, powers”\(^{42}\), so that “the powers fix the identity of the property.”\(^{43}\) These causal powers are irreducible to analysis in terms of non-causal behaviour, that is,

---

35 See Groff (2013) 211-217 for a discussion of these two elements within the context of Ellis's scientific essentialism.
36 Whether the position commonly described in the literature as Humean does in fact reflect Hume's own view is a question which will not be discussed here.
37 Ellis (2008) 76
38 Ellis (2008) 77
39 Ellis (2008) 77
40 Mumford (2004) 170
41 Mumford (2004) 168
42 Mumford (2004) 170
43 Mumford (2004) 171
they do not supervene on so-called categorical properties. The view that entities possess such causal powers can be traced back to Leibniz’s notion of *vis viva* as a force that animates objects of nature from within. This provides the first element of dispositional essentialism, which is metaphysical realism about dispositional properties or causal powers.

Essentialism is the view that some properties of objects or natural kinds are metaphysically essential to it. Locke describes the real essence of a thing as “the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is”[^44] and distinguishes it from nominal essence, which is a function of how we choose to categorize things. The Lockean real essence roughly corresponds to an Aristotelian notion of essence and is roughly the sense in play in contemporary essentialism[^45]. Dispositional essentialism typically involves the idea that some or all properties of natural kinds are dispositional properties and are essential to their kinds[^46]. Essentialism also provides an anti-Humean line of reasoning, in that it denies that lawlike behaviour is merely contingent. As Brian Ellis explains, essentialism is one form of what is called a natural necessitation theory, which asserts that laws are necessary in some sense[^47]. Specifically, for essentialists, there is a real relation between natural kinds and essential properties which exerts a modal constraint on behaviour. This modal constraint is variously termed natural necessity, nomic necessity, *de re* necessity, or metaphysical necessity[^48]. After briefly reviewing some of these terms, Ellis explains that he prefers the expression ‘*de re* necessity’ “which might reasonably be translated as “real necessity”, for this indicates the kind of grounding that essentialists

[^44]: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 3.3.15. See Jones (2013)
[^45]: See Ellis (2001) 55: “The scientific task is to discover what makes a thing the kind of thing it is and hence to explain why it behaves or has the properties it has. The scientific version of essentialism is therefore less concerned with questions of identity, and more with questions of explanation, than is the classical essentialism of Aristotle or the new essentialism of Kripke. Its closest historical predecessor is the kind of essentialism described by Locke.” However, see Leary (2009) for an alternative reading of Locke involving a trichotomy.
[^47]: See Ellis (2002) 97
[^48]: See Ellis (2002) 110 and Ellis (2001) 43 for a brief explanation of how these terms target the same idea
believe natural necessities to have, namely, a grounding in reality."\(^{49}\) Here, Ellis appeals to a notion of metaphysical grounding. Similarly, Mumford explains that "[d]e re necessity means necessity in nature: in things rather than in words or logical form."\(^{50}\) Other similar terminology is used in a similar way by essentialist authors. Ellis suggests that "[t]he distinctions between causal powers, capacities, propensities, liabilities and so on, which appear to name different species of dispositions, are difficult to make, and of doubtful philosophical significance."\(^{51}\)

Harré and Madden present an early theory that combines a doctrine of causal powers with the idea of natural necessity, wherein "natures of the operative powerful particulars, the constraining or stimulating effects of conditions and so on are offered as the grounds for judgement that a certain effect cannot but happen, or cannot but fail to happen"\(^{52}\). As such, there is a match between this natural necessity, which holds between dispositions and manifested properties, and a conceptual necessity, which holds between predicates descriptive of causes and predicates descriptive of effects.\(^{53}\) Harré and Madden explain that "[t]he elements in a case of natural necessity, however, are independently describable even though conceptually related. It is perfectly possible to identify the weight and pressure of the atmosphere without reference to water rising in a pump ..."\(^{54}\)

Harré and Madden prefer the term 'power' or 'causal power' over other the alternative terminologies, explaining that "'[p]ower' is a notion particularly associated with agency, with the initiation of trains of events, with activity."\(^{55}\) The proper analysis of a power ascription is that "'X has the power to A' means 'X (will/ can) do A, in the appropriate conditions, in virtue of its intrinsic

---

\(^{49}\) Ellis (2002) 110
\(^{50}\) Mumford (2004) 166
\(^{51}\) Ellis (2002) 65
\(^{52}\) Harré and Madden (1975) 20
\(^{53}\) See Harré and Madden (1975) 8
\(^{54}\) Harré and Madden (1975) 134
\(^{55}\) Harré and Madden (1975) 88
Harré and Madden criticise earlier literature for an emphasis on liabilities, that is, the disposition to be causally affected, at the expense of powers, or the disposition to actively cause something. Thus "old favourites like 'solubility', 'inflammability', 'brittleness', etc. ... were the only dispositional properties that were ever mentioned. But these only have a role where the world is also full of things and materials with active powers. Nothing could be brittle in a world where nothing could smash, nothing could be inflammable in a world where nothing had the power to ignite and there could be no solutes where there were no solvents." At the same time, "[t]he concepts of power and liability ... are the poles of a spectrum of concepts, distinguished by the degree to which we assign responsibility for particular behavioural manifestations between intrinsic conditions and extrinsic circumstances." Thus "[t]he chain saw cuts the tree and the tree dulls, to some extent, the teeth of the saw."

Harré and Madden explain that the notions of 'power', 'ability', 'nature' are explanatorily ineliminable and provide the most fundamental level of explanation and that "power statements ... refer to genuine agencies which are explained but not eliminated by adverting to the general 'natures of things' form of explanation." Thus in an example of the power and nature of a car, "explanations in terms of the nature of the car do not lead to the elimination of the notion of 'power' in the description of the car as a potent thing, since that power is specified in terms of an effect which is not part of the description of the nature in virtue of which the power is possessed."

Thus "what the thing or material does ... is to be understood as brought about not just by the stimuli to which it may be subject or the conditions which it finds itself in, i.e. by extrinsic conditions, but in some measure by the nature or

---

56 Harré and Madden (1975) 86
57 Harré and Madden (1975) 89
58 Harré and Madden (1975) 114
59 Harré and Madden (1975) 11
60 Harré and Madden (1975) 112-113
61 Harré and Madden (1975) 11
constitution of that thing or material, i.e. by intrinsic conditions.\textsuperscript{62} Intrinsic conditions are "a feature of the thing itself\textsuperscript{63} whereas extrinsic conditions are such that "changes in [conditions] are not properly to be considered to be changes in the thing or material itself\textsuperscript{64}. This contrasts with the notions of internal and external, which concerns whether they "lie within the spatial envelope of the thing\textsuperscript{65}. Thus a magnetic field is intrinsic to a magnet without being internal to it. Molnar's similar idea is that a power $P$ is intrinsic to a bearer $x$ "iff $x$'s having $P$, and $x$'s lacking $P$, are independent of the existence, and the non-existence, of any contingent object wholly distinct from $x."\textsuperscript{66}

Harré and Madden set out four features of natural necessity which distinguish it from logical entailment. Firstly, "nature is explanatory of outcome whereas entailment \textit{per se} is not"\textsuperscript{67}. Secondly, natural necessity involves conceptual separability of the causal power and the causal process which is related to it. They explain that "[t]he elements in a case of natural necessity, however, are independently describable even though conceptually related. It is perfectly possible to identify the weight and pressure of the atmosphere without reference to water rising in a pump ..."\textsuperscript{68} Thirdly, natural necessity holds exclusively between natural kinds, constituted by "the concept of generative mechanisms and powerful particulars\textsuperscript{69}. Fourthly, "[n]atural necessity involves causal directionality as an essential element, whereas entailment as a purely logical relation does not."\textsuperscript{70}

Ellis's scientific essentialism represents a robust form of dispositional essentialism in which anti-passivism and essentialism are intimately related. As Groff explains, for Ellis, anti-passivism performs three roles. Anti-passivism "motivates the claim that there are two different species of property kind, one

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Harré and Madden (1975) 87
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Harré and Madden (1975) 87
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Harré and Madden (1975) 87
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Harré and Madden (1975) 87
  \item \textsuperscript{66} Molnar (2003) 102
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Harré and Madden (1975) 133
  \item \textsuperscript{68} Harré and Madden (1975) 134
  \item \textsuperscript{69} Harré and Madden (1975) 134
  \item \textsuperscript{70} Harré and Madden (1975) 134
\end{itemize}
Ellis explains that "a causal power is a disposition to engage in a certain kind of process: a causal process." Ellis explains that this causal process relates causal events to effectual events. Both causal events and effectual events must belong to natural kinds so that their definition is independent of how we choose to classify things. The causal relationship between these two is explained by the exercise of causal power by the particular, rather than as mere regularity, as per the regularist account, or as due to subordination to external agency, as per the Categorical Realist account. In this way, for the essentialist, "inanimate objects of nature are genuine causal agents." As such, the essentialist account of the modal constraint on the relation between cause and effect differs from any conditional account, such as Ryle's dispositionalist account.

Other authors have affirmed causal realism while rejecting the essentialism that would necessitate that causal powers be displayed by entities in given situations. As Mumford explains, the Humean argument against causal powers is that a causal process could fail to be followed by its characteristic effect in a given situation, thus refuting the necessary connection and supposedly the presence of the causal power too. However, if the causal power is understood as a probabilistic tendency, the Humean argument can be dismissed.

---

71 Groff (2013)213  
72 Groff (2013)213  
73 Groff (2013)214  
74 Ellis (2002) 48  
75 Ellis (2002) 3  
76 See Mumford (2005), Chakravartty (2008) and Mumford (2013) for arguments for an anti-Humean position that involves realism about causal powers while rejecting essentialism.  
77 See Mumford (2013) 17-19
Section 4: A debate about natural necessity

The previous section has provided an account of dispositional essentialism as the conjunction of two claims, that dispositional ascriptions reflect real dispositional properties and that such dispositional properties are essential features of their objects which thus determine their lawlike behaviour with nomic necessity. The present section returns to the topic of svabhāva-advocacy, summarizing recent scholarship about two different types of svabhāva-advocacy. On this basis, the views of these two groups are characterized as dispositional essentialism and dispositional inessentialism respectively. This characterization entails two separate claims, about dispositions and essences. Firstly, the claim that svabhāvas are real dispositional properties rather than mere dispositional ascriptions is argued for. Secondly, it is argued that the debate between these two groups concerns whether such properties are essentially distributed over entities or inessentially distributed.

To recap, Kumārila's claim is that "it is understood that the prāmāṇyam of all pramāṇas is 'from itself'"78, and this is glossed as meaning that "a capacity for accurate determination of an object belongs to them [scil. pramāṇas] due to their svabhāva"79. These formulations involve an ablative locution and an adverbial locution respectively. The ablative locution is also found in the presentation of the term 'svabhāva' by the groups known as svabhāva-advocates, who affirmed some concept of svabhāva. In the Śloka-vārttika presentation, Kumārila presents a first view which Sucarita describes as being "svabhāva-advocacy about both [prāmāṇyam and its opposite]"80, and which is very similar to his own view81. This would suggest that Kumārila may have an affinity with svabhāva-advocacy. Chattopadhyaya explains that "early Sāmkhya

---

78 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
79 TS 2812ab
80 Sucarita refers to the advocates of this view as svābhāvikōbhayavādinaḥ at K84 under ŚV 2.36
81 At ŚV 2.34ab; This point is made in Kataoka (2011) 233-4 fn170 commenting on ŚV 2.34ab: “This view of svatahprāmāṇya is the same as Kumārila’s own siddhānta in that it takes validity to be ontologically innate to itself.”
was really maintaining the doctrine of natural law (svabhāva vāda)" and Bhattacharya notes that although "svabhāva turned out to be, so to say, a lance free and readily available for use by anyone and everyone", at the same time, "svabhāva has its own place in the Sāṃkhya tradition".

By drawing on the scholarship of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, the notion of svabhāva held by its advocates will be investigated in this section. Correspondence will be found between the conception of one group of svabhāva-advocates and the contemporary theses of causal realism and essentialism presented in the discussion above. This reading will be motivated on textual grounds, but the appeal of this reading in relation to Kumārila's epistemological claim will only be made evident in the next chapter.

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya discusses the notion of svabhāva among those who advocate this notion, with a focus on its use in the ancient medical literature. Chattopadhyaya characterizes svabhāva in opposition to the idea of supernatural causation:

"the emphatic claim of the ancient doctors that the action of a substance is determined by the substance itself leaves no scope for any supernatural view of the efficacy of a substance being influenced in any way by adṛṣṭa [scil. a supernatural force] or god or any other factor like that ... the svabhāva or the inherent nature of a substance produces its specific result. In Indian terminology, this is known as svabhāva-vāda, literally "the doctrine of nature", or according to the modern way of putting it, "the doctrine of the laws of nature"."

Chattopadhyaya explains that this doctrine involves a rejection of both accidentalism, the view that events happen at random without cause, as well as
supernaturalism, especially the idea “that health and disease are determined ultimately by the actions performed by the patient in his past life.”\textsuperscript{86} Thus the svabhāva principle is opposed to the law of karma as well as theistic causation. As Chattopadhyaya explains, the doctrine of svabhāva and the rejection of both supernatural action and lack of causal explanation which the doctrine entails “cannot but be a fundamental proposition for defending the intrinsic efficacy of medicine.”\textsuperscript{87}

In addition to this “medical view of svabhāva as “embodied cause” or unchanging nature”\textsuperscript{88}, Bhattacharya identifies a second meaning of svabhāva as accident or chance, which is precisely one of the views denied by the medical usage. Bhattacharya explains, “[d]enial of causality and free will then is the mark of one group of svabhāvavādins [in the 'ethical' domain] … while acceptance of svabhāva as the cause of everything is the mark of the other [in the 'cosmological' domain]”\textsuperscript{89} Bhattacharya explains that the group using svabhāva in the ethical domain advocated fatalism rather than free will. The 'cosmological' group use the notion of svabhāva in a similar way to its medical usage, as a dual rejection of both accidentalism and supernaturalism, but in regard to natural phenomena. This dual use of svabhāva led to confusion or conflation of the two ideas in some texts “from the fourth century CE to the fifteenth century”\textsuperscript{90} and in subsequent scholarship. Indeed, Bhattacharya notes a similar ambiguity in the English word “nature” which “could mean both regularity and irregularity”\textsuperscript{91}. For example, 'natural law' indicates regularity whereas 'natural' in other contexts could mean 'spontaneous' in the sense of being beyond the reach of lawlike explanation.

Bhattacharya has collated various examples of svabhāva from the svabhāva-advocates, including the following verse, which was also quoted above:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{86} Chattopadhyaya (1977) 186
\item \textsuperscript{87} Chattopadhyaya (1977) 155
\item \textsuperscript{88} Bhattacharya (2012) 608
\item \textsuperscript{89} Bhattacharya (2012) 602
\item \textsuperscript{90} Bhattacharya (2012) 610
\item \textsuperscript{91} Bhattacharya (2012) 598
\end{itemize}
"What makes the sharpness of thorns, the varied nature of birds and animals, the sweetness of sugarcane and the bitterness of lime? All this happens due to svabhāva."

Bhattacharya contrasts this verse with a variant version:

"What produces the sharpness of thorns [and] the varied nature of birds and animals? All this happens due to svabhāva. It is not through desire [of an agent]. What is the point of effort?"

Whereas this second formulation advocates fatalism, and presents the idea of svabhāva as accident, or lack of causal explanation, the first formulation above "stops at asserting the role of svabhāva, not of any other agency or creator as the cause of all varieties" and thus presents svabhāva as causal explanation.

In sum, there are two contrasting conceptions of svabhāva, the neo-medical conception which Chattopadhyaya focuses on, and a second conception carefully distinguished from it by Bhattacharya. In both formulations, 'due to svabhāva' takes an ablative construction because it is the response to a question. As in other languages, the ablative construction includes not only the idea of 'from' but idea of 'due to' as per the translation used here. In response to a 'Why?' question, it is the idea of 'due to' which is the material sense of the construction.

This ablative notion of 'because', 'due to' or 'in virtue of' is also part of the vocabulary of metaphysical grounding. This metaphysical reading of the ablative formulation coheres with the neo-medical conception of svabhāva as

---

92 Quoted in Bhattacharya (2012) 602 (my translation): kaḥ kaṇṭakāṇāṁ prakaroti taiksṇyaṁ vicitrabhāvaṁ mrgā-paśīṇām ca I mādhuryam īkṣoḥ katutāṁ ca nimbe svabhāvataḥ sarvamidaṁ pravṛttam II (Strictly, the fruit mentioned is Nimb, or Azadirachta Indica, which is similar to lime.)

93 Quoted in Bhattacharya (2012) 602 (my translation): kaḥ kaṇṭakāṇāṁ prakaroti taiksṇyaṁ vicitrabhāvaṁ mrgā-paśīṇām ca I svabhāvataḥ sarvamidaṁ pravṛttam na kāmakāra 'sti kutāḥ prayatnaḥ II

94 Bhattacharya (2012) 602
real essence or nature rather than the conception of svabhāva as chance. Metaphysical grounding appears in various philosophical theses, but the basic idea is to provide some metaphysically significant explanation. Thus Ellis explicates dispositional essentialism by appeal to this relation as per some quotes above. Specifically, for Ellis, “the natural dispositions [are] simply the real essences of the natural kinds of processes they ground”\(^\text{95}\) and “[a] natural kind of process ... is a display of a dispositional property”\(^\text{96}\).

The nature of metaphysical grounding is a topic of significant debate in the literature, but the dominant view is that the concept of grounding is primitive and not susceptible to analysis.\(^\text{97}\) Fine considers that metaphysical grounding provides a distinct kind of explanation, “in which explanans and explanandum are connected, not through some sort of causal mechanism, but through some constitutive form of determination.”\(^\text{98}\) Audi holds that grounding is a relation of noncausal explanation, involving a relation of essential connectedness between the natures of two properties, such that each instance of one property grounds an instance of the other.\(^\text{99}\) Audi takes metaphysical grounding to be irreflexive, such that one distinct property grounds another distinct property.\(^\text{100}\) So for Ellis, a real causal power which is the real essence of a natural kind of process grounds an instantiation of that process.

The neo-medical conception presents svabhāva as cause of its effect and as explanation of its effect, both in the context of drugs and their power to cure, as well as in the general context of objects and their power to behave in lawlike ways. Chattopadhyaya provides a quote from the medical text Caraka-samhitā, which he translates as “these laws are but the laws of nature (svābhāvika) – just like the laws because of which fire is hot and water liquid.”\(^\text{101}\) This translation of the notion of svabhāva as 'laws of nature' for this group of

\(^{95}\) Ellis (2001) 125
\(^{96}\) Ellis (2001) 124
\(^{97}\) See Bliss and Trogdon (2014)
\(^{98}\) Fine, K. (2012) 37
\(^{99}\) See Audi (2012) 693-695
\(^{100}\) See Audi (2012) 691-692
\(^{101}\) Chattopadhyaya (1977) 182
svabhāva-advocates seems to capture the notion of natural or nomic necessity which determines a constraint on behaviour. Indeed, the question of how the answer ‘due to svabhāva’ explains phenomena corresponds to the question of what kind of explanation is provided by laws of nature for the phenomena they purport to explain.

However, it fails to capture the characterization of svabhāva as a property of its entity which is metaphysically grounded in that entity. A better correspondence for the neo-medical view of svabhāva is with the idea of a real and metaphysically necessary causal power or essential dispositional property as per the dispositionalist literature surveyed above, which locates the source of natural necessity in the entity itself.\textsuperscript{102} Chattopadhyaya's own explanation that svabhāva is “the inherent nature of a substance [that] produces its specific result”\textsuperscript{103} and that “the action of a substance is determined by the substance itself”\textsuperscript{104} was quoted above. These two ideas correspond with the ideas that “the actions of things depend on their causal powers and other dispositional properties”\textsuperscript{105} and that “dispositional properties are genuine properties, and intrinsic to the things that have them”\textsuperscript{106}, which constitute two planks of Ellis's scientific essentialism, involving realism and essentialism about causal powers.

This motivates a reading of this view as not only dispositionalist but also essentialist. That is, the essential natures of things determine the lawlike behaviour of those things due to a relation of natural or nomic necessity. The explanatory demand being made in the verses quoted is a demand to account for the lawlike behaviour of entities in nature, and the answer that is given is that such behaviour is necessarily the display of a real dispositional property. On this essentialist reading of svabhāva, the behaviour would be determined by a necessary connection between the existence of the property in the entity and its display under the right type of circumstances, corresponding to Ellis's

\textsuperscript{102} Cf. Ellis (2002) 97-102
\textsuperscript{103} Chattopadhyaya (1977) 155
\textsuperscript{104} Chattopadhyaya (1977) 155
\textsuperscript{105} Ellis (2008) 76
\textsuperscript{106} Ellis (2008) 76
statements that “the natural dispositions [are] simply the real essences of the natural kinds of processes they ground”\textsuperscript{107} and that “[a] natural kind of process ... is a display of a dispositional property”\textsuperscript{108} This idea of a display of an essential dispositional property would be consistent with the reading of svabhāva as kind essence described above but not with the notion of svabhāva as intrinsic nature.

Bhattacharya further explains that this group of svabhāva-advocates “believed in activism”\textsuperscript{109} and that such “activism, or faith in human endeavour or resoluteness”\textsuperscript{110} could be seen as a logical corollary of this notion of svabhāva-as-causality.\textsuperscript{111} This would make sense if it is understood that the participants in this debate see a robust connection between the causal power of entities and human agency. Interestingly, a connection between these two concepts is mooted by Ellis, who proposes that “human agency [may be] the exercising of our meta-powers to alter our own dispositions to act in one way rather than another”.\textsuperscript{112} However, an even stronger connection may be needed for the claim of the svabhāva-advocates, and it may be that they in fact made a conceptual equation of human agency and the causal power of entities.

The affiliation between this group of svabhāva-advocates and contemporary dispositionalism is also evidenced by a shared commitment to the inherent dynamism of the natural world and an shared opposition to the 'dead world of mechanism'.\textsuperscript{113} Thus Harré and Madden explain that “[w]hen we think of causality and action we look to such images as a springtime plant forcing its way upwards towards the light, as the pulsing, surging movement of the protoplasm within an amoeba, of a flash of radiation as a positron and an electron meet, of the enormous flux of electromagnetic radiation from a star, of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Ellis (2001) 125
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Ellis (2001) 124
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Bhattacharya (2012) 603
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Bhattacharya (2012) 599
  \item \textsuperscript{111} See Bhattacharya (2012) 599
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Ellis (2002) 144; see also O'Connor (2009), Bird (2013), Ellis (2013) and Groff (2013) for more discussion of causal power and agency
  \item \textsuperscript{113} 'The dead world of mechanism' is a phrase used by Ellis as a subheading in Ellis (2002) 60 and also referenced in Groff (2013) 210
\end{itemize}
the mobility and imaginative control of his own actions exercised by a human being, of the potent configuration of a magnetic field."\footnote{Harré and Madden (1975) 7. A longer version of this quote is also given in Groff (2013) 210} Likewise for this group of svabhāva-advocates, there is a connection with human freedom as described above. A principle of natural dynamism also seems to inform the examples of the svabhāva-advocates above, but is even more vivid in examples attributed by Śaṁkara to the allied Sāṁkhyya philosophers\footnote{The evidence for the affiliation between the Sāṁkhyya philosophers and the svabhāva-advocates will be set out later in this chapter.}, which include the images of milk flowing 'due to its svabhāva' from a mother to nourish her child, of water flowing 'due to its svabhāva' for the benefit of mankind, and of grass, herbs and water transforming themselves into milk.\footnote{See Chattopadhyaya (1969) 67-68 and Chattopadhyaya (2012) 393-394; the examples are taken from Śaṁkara’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya 2.2.3 and 2.2.5} This last example seems to involve being digested by a cow, although it is argued that there is no instrumental cause, on the basis that we can neither perceive nor replicate this process.\footnote{See Chattopadhyaya (1969) 68 and Chattopadhyaya (2012) 395} In fact, there is also a notion of teleological cause present in these last examples, which is not evident in the examples of the svabhāva-advocates given above and which is avoided in the contemporary discussion.\footnote{Cf. Ellis (2002) 13: “Aristotle’s concept of final cause – that is, that for the sake of which a thing exists – has no role in the new essentialism.”}

That this group of svabhāva-advocates understand svabhāvas as properties which are no more than causal powers\footnote{The view that properties just are powers or clusters of causal powers was proposed by Shoemaker: see Mumford (2004) 150 and Mumford (2011) 3} is suggested by a quote from Śaṁkarānanda translated as follows by Chattopadhyaya: “By svabhāva is meant the inherent nature of the respective material objects, i.e. their unique causal efficacy. For instance, burning in the case of fire and flowing downwards in the case of water.”\footnote{Chattopadhyaya (1969) 59}

The conception of the second group of svabhāva-advocates is that of svabhāva as accident or chance. This conception seems to be focused on a rejection of the essentialist thesis rather than on the rejection of real dispositional
properties. Perhaps the rejection of the essentialist thesis was thought sufficient to motivate the fatalism that they also advocated. Fatalism would then obtain regardless of whether there are real causal powers in the world, because there would be no necessity as to whether any causal power should manifest itself in any given situation.

Whereas the view of the first group was identified with dispositional essentialism, the view of this group of svabhāva can thus be tentatively labelled dispositional inessentialism. In the contemporary literature, this resonates with an aspect of a position set out by Anjan Chakravartty, that “causal powers are inessentially distributed”\textsuperscript{121} and that “[t]he behaviours of members of kinds may be a function of their causal powers, but only sometimes do powers constitute “essences”.”\textsuperscript{122} That is, Anjan Chakravartty maintains a position that falls short of full dispositional essentialism just as the first group maintain a position that similarly falls short of full dispositional essentialism.

The denial of natural necessity by this group is rhetorically strengthened by the focus on the variety of dispositional properties in nature, such as the example of different shapes of individual thorns, which are not easily susceptible to explanation in terms that reference kinds, given that every thorn is slightly differently constituted. In the examples given, the demand for an explanation of kind essence, such as heat in fire, which necessitarian theories purport to provide, is blurred together with the demand for an explanation of particular essence, such as the shapes of individual thorns, which necessitarian theories do not presume to address.\textsuperscript{123} This sleight of hand lends a spurious credibility to the svabhāva-as-chance position. Bhattacharya also explains that 'inactivism' is a logical corollary of 'accidentalism'.\textsuperscript{124} This again suggests that a robust connection between causal power and agency is being assumed in this debate.

\textsuperscript{121} Chakravartty (2008) 160
\textsuperscript{122} Chakravartty (2008) 161
\textsuperscript{123} Cf. Ellis (2001) 239: “The identity of something as an individual seems to depend primarily on its temporal and causal history, and therefore on its extrinsic, not its intrinsic, properties.”
\textsuperscript{124} See Bhattacharya (2012) 599
In summary, it has been argued that the two types of svabhāva-advocacy correspond to positions that can be located with respect to the contemporary debate. The neo-medical conception of svabhāva presents svabhāva as a causal power or real disposition which grounds a notion of natural necessity. Although the textual evidence is not sufficient to fill out the full details of this grounding, it is due to a feature of the entity and thus coheres with the essentialist thesis within dispositional essentialism. The chance conception of svabhāva denies natural necessity but seemingly without denying causal powers.

Section 5: Reductionism about properties

The Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti argue against the notion of svabhāva in what constitutes one of the most extended discussions of this notion in the primary literature. The notion that they argue against is that of the Buddhist Reductionists, whereby “ultimately intrinsic properties are essential to their bearers [and] all qualitative change is of extrinsic properties.” Their discussion appears to form part of an intra-Buddhist debate, rather than a direct challenge to the views of the svabhāva-advocates discussed above. Further, the notion of svabhāva as a fundamental substance is more important in their debate than the notion of svabhāva as essence that is the focus here. Thus a full exegesis of any Buddhist notion of svabhāva is outside the scope of this research. The purpose of considering some Buddhist discussions is only to note some helpful affinities and contrasts with Kumārila’s notion.

In a first subsection, the Buddhist principle of reductionism, whereby svabhāvas are properties possessed by the most elementary constituent particles of the most complete scientific theory, is contrasted with the attribution of svabhāvas

125 Siderits (2003) 119
by the svabhāva-advocates to kinds of everyday middle-sized objects. In a second subsection, a model of svabhāva and parabhāva affirmed by the Abhidharma Reductionist Buddhists and discussed by Candrakīrti is presented. Some examples are discussed in order to understand the notion of svabhāva involved. It is found that this model presents the notion of a real disposition which is an intrinsic nature in the presence of normal extrinsic conditions.

Subsection 1: Reductionism and anti-realism

Jan Westerhoff distinguishes between two conceptions of svabhāva in Nāgārjuna's work, substance-svabhāva and essence-svabhāva. Essence-svabhāva is a primarily epistemological notion, ranging from an earlier idea of a “specific characterizing property of an object” which distinguish them from other objects to Candrakīrti’s idea of an essential property which is “something that an object cannot lose without ceasing to be that very object.” This latter formulation, which coheres with Nāgārjuna's own view, conveys an idea of modal necessity, as Westerhoff also indicates. By contrast, what Westerhoff terms substance-svabhāva is “a primarily ontological notion. Rather than svabhāva's being seen as the opposite of shared qualities (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), it is contrasted with conceptually constructed or secondary (prajñaptisat) existents and equated with the mark of the primary ones (dravyasat).” Substance-svabhāva is thus a primary existent which is an irreducible constituent of the empirical world, as opposed to a secondary existent, which would be a linguistic and mental construction, and this notion ”is most prominent in Nāgārjuna's arguments.” Westerhoff explains that substance-svabhāva refers to putative “[p]rimary existents [which] constitute the irreducible constituents of the empirical world [and do not] depend on linguistic

126 Westerhoff (2009) 21
127 Westerhoff (2009) 22
128 See Westerhoff (2009) 22
129 See Westerhoff (2009) 22
130 Westerhoff (2009) 23
131 Westerhoff (2009) 24
and mental construction for their existence.\textsuperscript{132}

The relevant notion in Kumārila's discussion will be svabhāva as essence. By contrast, as Jan Westerhoff notes, the notion of substance-svabhāva "is of much greater importance in the Madhyamaka debate"\textsuperscript{133}, and Westerhoff's discussion correspondingly treats this aspect in greater depth. Siderits's discussion is likewise focused on the ontological dimension of svabhāva as 'substance-svabhāva' or 'intrinsic nature'.

As Jan Westerhoff notes, Candrakīrti highlights Nāgārjuna's statement "A svabhāva is not causally produced and is not dependent on something else" as a defining statement of svabhāva.\textsuperscript{134} This dual negation suggests that svabhāva can be characterized within the framework of either of two dualities, contrasted with what is causally produced and with what is dependent. This dual framework also appears to be affirmed by the Abhidharma Buddhists discussed by Ronkin, who uphold the existence of svabhāva as nature and essence which they believe satisfies the conditions implied by both dichotomies.\textsuperscript{135}

In what appears to address the first dichotomy, between svabhāva and causal production, Candrakīrti's method is to start with a putative distinction between examples of svabhāva and examples which are not svabhāva. Candrakīrti explains that the heat artificially produced in water or quartz appearing as ruby are not generally taken to be svabhāvas.\textsuperscript{136} The first example is in fact an intrinsic nature in the sense of Harré and Madden, and an accidental property. The second example involves an erroneous judgment, so can be characterized as a feature of extrinsic conditions. Candrakīrti explains that these cases are commonly acknowledged not to be svabhāvas because they are produced by

\textsuperscript{132} Westerhoff (2009) 24
\textsuperscript{133} Westerhoff (2009) 23
\textsuperscript{134} Westerhoff (2009) 24-25. The statement is "akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca"
\textsuperscript{135} See Ronkin (2005) 99-100, 223
\textsuperscript{136} PP 260: yaḥ kṛtakaḥ padārthaḥ sa loke naiva svabhāva iti vyapadiśyate tad yathā apām ausṣṭyaṃ dhātu-piśāca-prayatna-nispaṭitaḥ karketanādīnāṃ padmarāgādi-bhāvaś ca|
causes. We can understand that both examples are explained by reference to extrinsic conditions, although they differ in whether those extrinsic conditions result in a change in the intrinsic nature of the entity.

By contrast, Candrakīrti tells us, the heat of fire and the property of being a ruby in a ruby which is (correctly) known are commonly taken to be svabhāvas. These are two clear instances of essential properties, not so dependent on extrinsic conditions. Candrakīrti explains the reasoning for attributing the svabhāva of heat to fire as follows:

*Heat is said to be the svabhāva of fire as it is invariably associated with that in everyday experience ... then there is lack of change due to this invariable association, as fire is not [ever] cold.*

The key feature here seems to be inalienability or invariable association so the characterization of svabhāva is as essence conditional on existence. By contrast, as Candrakīrti explains:

*That same heat is not the svabhāva in water when it is found [there] because it is causally produced [and] because it arises from external conditions.*

This setup involves a dichotomy between an intrinsic nature in the presence of normal extrinsic conditions and an intrinsic nature in the presence of abnormal extrinsic conditions, as mentioned above.

Candrakīrti then notes that heat is causally dependent on the causes of fire

---

137 PP 260: tad evam akṛtakaḥ svabhāva iti lokavyavahāre vyavasthite
138 PP 260: yas tv akṛtakaḥ sa svabhāvas tad yathā agner aṣṭyaṁ jñātānāṁ padmarāgadīnāṁ padmarāgādi-svabhāvaś ca
139 PP 241: agner aṣṭyaṁ hi loke tad-avyabhicāritvāt svabhāva iti ucyate ... tadāśyāvyabhicāritvād anyathābhāvaḥ syād abhāvaḥ| na hy agneḥ śāityaṁ pratipadyate|
140 PP 241: tad evaṣṭyaṁ aṣṭupalabhyamānaṁ para-pratyaya-sambhūtatvāt kṛtrimatvān na svabhāva iti|
also:

Not even the heat of fire is a svabhāva, because it is causally produced ... the dependence of fire on causes and conditions is found [to be] due to the conjunction of a jewel [acting as a lens], fuel and the sun, or due to rubbing sticks together, and so on. Heat does not arise without fire. So heat is also produced by causes and conditions. And so [heat] is causally produced. And because it is causally produced, it is not a svabhāva, like the heat of water ...

This contrast with causal dependence is based on the idea that to be fundamentally real, an entity or property would have to be permanent and hence not causally produced, and hence reflects a notion of substance-svabhāva. Thus Candrakīrti says that causal production would be redundant if there were svabhāvas, as they would already exist.

Garfield explains similarly that Nāgārjuna “argues against the existence of causes and for the existence of a variety of kinds of conditions ... [which] must be thought of as empty of inherent existence ...” Aside from the idea of emptiness of inherent existence, which appeals to a notion of svabhāva opposed to conceptual construction, there is also the idea that there can be no real dispositional property which is not reducible to a set of causal conditions.

---

141 PP 260: vayam idānīṃ brūmo yad etad auṣṇyaṃ tad apy agneḥ svabhāvo na bhavatīti gṛhyatāṁ kṛtakavat| iha maṇiṇḍhānāditya-samāgamād aranī-nirghaṣaṇādeś cāgner hetu-pratyaya-sāpekṣaṭaivopalabhaye| na cāgni-vyatiriktam auṣṇyaṃ sambhavati| tasmād auṣṇyaṃ api hetu-pratyaya-janitam| tataśca kṛtakam| kṛtakvāc cāpām auṣṇyavat svabhāvo na bhavatīti sphutam avasīyate|

142 In chapter 15 (see Sprung 152); see also chapter 1, where the same argument is adduced against independence: Sprung 36-37

143 Garfield (1995) 104-105

144 For this dichotomy see e.g. MMK 502-503 verses 24.16-24.18, where it is also suggested that only conventional designation can preserve our commonsense understanding of causality

145 Cf Lusthaus (2002) 170: Buddhists “do not accept the notion of ‘cause’, especially if by this one means a ‘sufficient cause.’ Buddhists instead propose a theory of conditionality, the precise definition of which varied from school to
The argument of Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna thus amounts to the idea that a real dispositional property cannot be an essence conditional on existence and identity. By contrast, maintaining such a distinction between a disposition and a causal condition is central to contemporary dispositionalism. As Harré and Madden explain, in the claim that an entity has the power to do something in virtue of its intrinsic nature, the expression 'in virtue of' does not constitute an additional condition.146 Rather, the potentiality or potency of an object is about “what would happen, as a matter of course, if interfering conditions were absent or taken away.”147

Why should a property that is produced by causes not be a svabhāva? Siderits attributes to the Buddhist Reductionist doctrine of intrinsic natures the claims that “all and ultimately real entities have intrinsic natures”148 and that “every property that is intrinsic to an ultimately real entity is an essential property of that entity.”149 This entails a denial that ultimately real entities can have accidental properties. Thus Siderits explains:

“there is something deeply problematic about the idea that something might undergo change in any of its intrinsic properties ... For to call a property intrinsic is to say that it is part of its bearer's nature. And it sounds distinctly odd to say that a certain thing both has and lacks a certain nature.”150

Siderits goes on to explain that this rules out the idea that an entity can change its nature151, and reinforces this with a Humean suggestion that “'potentiality' looks like little more than a projection of our expectations given past

146 See Harré and Madden (1975) 86-87
147 Harré and Madden (1975) 12
148 Siderits (2003) 117
149 Siderits (2003) 117
150 Siderits (2003) 119
151 See Siderits (2003) 119
experience\textsuperscript{152}.

That a thing may have different intrinsic properties at different times appears odd only given the reductionist principle, that is, 'findability under analysis', shared by the Abhidharma Buddhists and the Mādhyamika Buddhists. The resulting conception of svabhāva excludes by definition the possibility that dispositional properties could be intrinsic to things. The real world of the Abhidharma Buddhist Reductionists is one which resembles the 'dead world of mechanism', described by Ellis as one which is "hard, cold, colourless, silent, and dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable motions in mechanical regularity\textsuperscript{153}. By contrast, in the paradigm of dispositional essentialism, Ellis characterizes dispositional properties as dynamic universals possessed by objects which necessitate the display of the causal processes that they define.\textsuperscript{154} In short, "the world must have a dynamic as well as a substantive structure."\textsuperscript{155}

Siderits explains that the contrast with causal dependence is based on an argument that all varieties of causal relationship are "thoroughly intentional or conceptually constructed in nature\textsuperscript{156}. Siderits considers and rejects various attempts to locate causal efficacy in an entity as a capacity or power\textsuperscript{157}, and concludes that "it appears impossible for the realist to give a satisfactory account of a causal relation that might be said to obtain among ultimately real entities."\textsuperscript{158} So "if the fire atom is to count as ultimately real, then it cannot originate in dependence on causes and conditions. Thus ultimately real entities cannot come into existence; they must be eternal ... [which] will be taken as evidence that the notion of an ultimately real entity is incoherent."\textsuperscript{159} However, a natural necessitation approach such as dispositional essentialism is able to

\textsuperscript{152} Siderits (2003) 119-120
\textsuperscript{153} Ellis (2008) 77: the quote is taken from E.A.Burtt (1932) The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science
\textsuperscript{154} See Ellis (2002) 67-68 and 78
\textsuperscript{155} Ellis (2002) 32
\textsuperscript{156} Siderits (2003) 126
\textsuperscript{157} See Siderits (2003) 126-131
\textsuperscript{158} Siderits (2003) 131
\textsuperscript{159} Siderits (2003) 125
provide a more satisfying account of how there can be real change in the world that involves change in the observable properties of an entity than the counterfactual conditional account that Siderits focuses on.

This Buddhist demand that svabhāva, as what is ontologically fundamental, that is, Westerhoff's substance-svabhāva, be innately static is thus in striking contrast with the idea of an innately dynamic natural world advocated by contemporary essentialists and by the Indian svabhāva-advocates. The quotation from Harré and Madden given earlier involved such images as "a springtime plant forcing its way upwards towards the light, as the pulsing, surging movement of the protoplasm within an amoeba". Likewise the view of the Sāmkhya philosophers quoted above involved images of milk flowing 'due to its svabhāva' from a mother to nourish her child, of water flowing 'due to its svabhāva' for the benefit of mankind, and of grass, herbs and water transforming themselves into milk.

Subsection 2: Disposition as default nature

The second part of the definition above contrasts svabhāva with dependence. This contrast forms a dichotomy of svabhāva (or 'own-nature') and parabhāva (or 'other-nature'), and is illustrated by Candrakīrti with the example of one's own money and money that is borrowed. This conception is treated only briefly by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, who argue that, because svabhāva as causelessness has already been refuted, parabhāva also stands refuted, "because parabhāva is the svabhāva of another thing".

Noa Ronkin provides a discussion of this distinction between svabhāva and parabhāva as was current among the Buddhist Abhidharma schools. As Ronkin

---

160 Harré and Madden (1975) 7
161 See Chattopadhyaya (1969) 67-68
162 MMK 265-266 verse 15.3 kutāḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati
svabhāvah parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate||
explains:

"The own-nature is further explained as internal (ajjhātiko) to a stream of dharmas, as unshared or not held in common by them, and is likened to a producer (nibbatiko) and to a resident (nevāsiko). By contrast, the other-nature is said to be external (bāhiro) to a stream of consciousness, held in common (sādhāraṇo) by its constitutive dharmas, and is likened to a receiver (paṭiggāhako) and to a visitor (āgantuko) respectively."\(^{163}\)

Ronkin also explains that the own-nature is equated with the notion of specific cause (hetu) and the other-nature with the notion of general causal condition (paccaya/pratyaya) in the Buddhist text Petakopadesa.\(^{164}\) Likewise Siderits describes this as a "contrast between the concepts of 'one's own' and 'borrowed from another'\(^{165}\) and attributes this model to the Buddhist Reductionists, or Abhidharma schools, where it was used to determine the ultimately real components of experience.\(^{166}\)

Candrakīrti’s example of heat in water as representing its transfer from fire when it is heated up on the fire\(^ {167}\) and Candrakīrti’s example of monies owned and borrowed both suggest a reading in terms of a real causal power that may be transferred from one entity to another. Mumford and Anjum similarly raise the idea that powers can be passed around, and they illustrate this with a similar example:

"You come in from the cold and sit by the fire. You sit by the fire because it is hot ... The fire being hot would mean nothing to you if it didn't mean that it had the power to heat. Causation occurs when powers exercise themselves ... Your body was cold and now it is hot. And, being hot, it now also has the power to warm some other thing,

\(^{163}\) Ronkin (2005) 99

\(^{164}\) However, note that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti consider svabhāva to be opposed to both hetu and pratyaya. See e.g. MMK 502 verse 24.16

\(^{165}\) Siderits (2003) 118

\(^{166}\) See Siderits (2003) 118 and Siderits (2003) 14 note (a)

\(^{167}\) See PP 260: “apām auṣṭyaṃ dhātu-piśāca-prayatna-niśpāditaḥ”
such as the body of anyone who wants to come and cuddle. And, if they do, the power to warm something else will be passed on to their body, and so on.”

In Candrākīrti’s discussion, there is a dichotomy whereby svabhāva is an entity’s own power and parabhāva is a power which is foreign to an entity in some way. Candrākīrti’s examples illustrate forms of asymmetry in the possession of powers which is the basis for this dichotomy. By contrast with what is owned, Candrākīrti explains that what is borrowed are temporarily available. The implicit contrast is with the permanent possession of one's own money. Presumably the availability of the monies are also contingent on the loan policy of the bank and on the credit-worthiness of the borrower.

The example of heat in water also works well as an illustration of borrowed nature, where again heat in water is contingent on being exposed to a power to heat, such as fire, and temporary, as water will gradually revert to cool temperature when the source of heat is removed. The analogy of resident and visitor is presumably intended to capture the contrast between permanent and temporary, on the basis that visitors may not overstay their welcome. Further, a visit is contingent on an explicit or implicit invitation by the homeowner, whereas staying at home is not contingent.

The analogy of producer and receiver also fits the examples of heat and of money, as fires and commercial banks are sources of heat and of money in a more robust sense than are heated water and indebted borrowers respectively. Specifically, the svabhāva is a potentiality or potency of an object in the strong sense of Harré and Madden, which concerns “what would happen, as a matter of course, if interfering conditions were absent or taken away.” Similarly, in the absence of any invitations, the default situation would involve everyone staying at home, and thus all individuals possess resident status as essence conditional on default location.

168 Mumford and Anjum (2011) 5-6
169 PP 262: “tad yathā tāvat-kālikā-yācitakam asvatantram”
170 Harré and Madden (1975) 12
The examples of water temperature and creditor-debtor relation are formulated within the framework of own-nature and other-nature, and as such they provide a conception of svabhāva as default nature, conditional on the presence of normal external conditions and the absence of extrinsic interfering factors. Mirroring this conception of svabhāva as default nature, parabhāva is a borrowed power which is possessed not by default but contingently on extrinsic conditions and temporarily. Parabhāva may constitute either an intrinsic accidental feature, such as heat in water, or a feature of extrinsic conditions, such as being a visitor in one's location.

Nāgārjuna denies that the properties of an entity are caused either 'from itself' or 'from something else'. The first of these options appears to be that advocated by the Sākhya philosophers. Nāgārjuna equates these options with causation by own-nature (svabhāva), that is, the nature of the entity itself, and causation by borrowed nature (parabhāva), which Nāgārjuna explains would be the own-nature of some other entity. The dichotomy of 'due to own-nature' and 'due to other-nature' thus has an affinity to Kumārila's own dichotomy of 'from itself' and 'from something else', which will be set out later.

The examples considered in this section suggest that, for Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, svabhāva corresponds to the idea of an intrinsic nature in the presence of normal extrinsic conditions, and the contrasting notion of borrowed nature corresponds to the idea of a temporary and contingent change in intrinsic nature under abnormal extrinsic conditions, where these are defined with respect to "the stimuli to which it may be subject or the conditions which it finds itself in".

---

171 See MMK 12 verse 1.1a: "na svato nāpi parato" Nāgārjuna also denies causation due to both and due to neither.
172 Cf. Garfield (1995) 105: "The first view – held prominently by Samkhya philosophers – is that all causation is really self-causation." Garfield adds in a footnote that this is "[at] least according to Tsong Khapa's commentary on this verse."
173 See MMK 78 verse 1.3cd: avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate
174 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
Section 6: Dharmakīrti and bare dispositions

The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, who appears to have been a contemporary of Kumārila, also uses the term 'svabhāva' to describe characteristics of an entity in virtue of which it exhibits law-like behaviour. Dharmakīrti’s conception of svabhāva attempts to reconcile the ultimately reductionist analysis of other Buddhist groups with the dynamism seen in the examples of the svabhāva-advocates. John Dunne has provided a detailed analysis of Dharmakīrti’s notion of svabhāva, and the presentation in this section will be based on Dunne's reading of Dharmakīrti rather than on a study of primary texts.

Drawing on the work of Ernst Steinkellner, John Dunne distinguishes between two related notions both subsumed by Dharmakīrti under the polysemous term svabhāva: nature-svabhāva as the single total nature of an entity and property-svabhāva as one of many properties that an entity could have. For Dharmakīrti, nature-svabhāva is “a predicate that refers to the totality of the causal characteristics of the subject to which that predicate is applied.”

These causal characteristics include “the causes and conditions from which it must have arisen, and the corresponding effects that it is capable of producing.” However, these latter consist merely in potentials to engage in various causal complexes to produce various effects, such as the potential of a sesame seed to produce oil if crushed or to sprout if given appropriate nourishment, and not in actually being causes of products such as oil or a sprout. Strictly speaking, although “some passages in Dharmakīrti’s work suggest a relationship between an entity's nature-svabhāva and its participation in a present causal complex or its arisal from a past causal complex,” nevertheless “an entity's nature-svabhāva should not be equated with a causal

---

175 Dunne (2004) 198
176 Dunne (2004) 161
177 See Dunne (2004) 168
178 Dunne (2004) 163
complex, whether it be a present causal complex in which it participates or the past causal complex from which it arose.\textsuperscript{179}

A similar contrast to that between nature-\textit{svabhāva} and property-\textit{svabhāva} is found in the notion of a causal power developed by O'Connor and Churchill. They explain that “a single property may contribute to a very wide array of effects, depending on the context in which it is instanced ... But in ordinary speech, again, there is a tendency to talk of a corresponding array of powers being exercised, 'each' of which is identified through the effect actually manifested ... [Instead] a basic power or disposition [should be understood] not in terms of this or that salient manifestation, but rather in terms of a unitary causal influence, something that is constant across circumstances while its manifestations will vary.\textsuperscript{180}

As Dunne explains, nature-\textit{svabhāva} provides an explanatory basis for the causal powers of entities: “Veiled within Dharmakīrti’s notion of \textit{svabhāva} as nature is a strong rejection of random (\textit{ākasmika}) causality and thus a strong commitment to the regularity of causality ... [Dharmakīrti] claims that an entity's causal potentials are restricted precisely because they have arisen from certain causes: it is impossible for an apple seed to produce certain types of effects because it is impossible for it to arise from certain types of causes. While these notions of restriction are negative in character, they amount to positive claims: an entity has the potentials to produce certain types of effects because it has arisen from certain types of causes.”\textsuperscript{181}

Dunne also explains that “the causal functionality implicit in both senses of \textit{svabhāva} is actually reducible to the causal functionality of particulars.”\textsuperscript{182}

Dharmakīrti’s idea seems to be that causal powers of entities supervene on causal powers of their constituent elementary particles, rather than on non-

\textsuperscript{179} Dunne (2004) 164
\textsuperscript{180} O'Connor and Churchill (2010) 45; see also Corry (2009) 173 for discussion of Cartwright’s similar distinctions between a capacity and a disposition and of Ellis and Lierse’s notion of a multi-track disposition
\textsuperscript{181} Dunne (2004) 162
\textsuperscript{182} Dunne (2004) 155
causal categorical properties. Accordingly, it would not be correct to attribute to Dharmakīrti an affirmation of categorical properties. Rather, this claim appears to be Dharmakīrti's way of acknowledging the reductionist principle advocated by other Buddhist groups, whilst allowing for a dynamism to characterize reality at the microscopic and macroscopic levels.

Dunne describes another “principle of ontological reduction that appears to underlie Dharmakīrti’s system. Properties can be reduced to the nature-svabhāva of the subject (dharmin) that they qualify. This amounts to a reduction of the properties to the subject itself, since its nature-svabhāva is a marker for the totality of the causal characteristics that is that subject.”\textsuperscript{183} The idea that only causal properties are ultimately real is also reflected in Dharmakīrti’s use of the notion of arthakriyākāritvam, or perceptible causal efficiency, as a criterion of what is real. As Dunne explains, for Dharmakīrti, “things that produce effects are particulars (or they are reducible to particulars), and since only particulars are ultimately real, anything that fails to produce an effect is not ultimately real.”\textsuperscript{184}

With regard to the translation of the term svabhāva, Dunne cautions that “the notion of an “essential property” must not be allowed to introduce an unwarranted form of essentialism – and its attendant problems – into Dharmakīrti’s system”\textsuperscript{185} and that “Dharmakīrti’s theory … belies any such de re essentialism”\textsuperscript{186}. Specifically, “in a correct judgment immediately subsequent to a perception, the predications one makes of an individual are markedly conditioned by mind-dependent factors such as expectation, need, context, perceptual acuity, habituation and so on. Thus, when a child who studies under his father sees him coming from afar, he will first conceive of that person as “father” rather than “teacher.””\textsuperscript{187} This explanation makes it seem that Dharmakīrti’s notion of svabhāva corresponds to Locke’s notion of a nominal

\textsuperscript{183} Dunne (2004) 199
\textsuperscript{184} Dunne (2004) 83-84
\textsuperscript{185} Dunne (2004) 182-183
\textsuperscript{186} Dunne (2004) 184
\textsuperscript{187} Dunne (2004) 184
essence, and, as such, Dharmakīrti would be labelled a conventionalist. As Ellis explains, conventionalists "do not think there are any real (that is, de re or metaphysical) necessities in the world. All necessities, they suppose, are de dicto, and hence derive from the conventions of language."\(^{188}\)

In fact, however, no secure attribution of conventionalism can be made to Dharmakīrti. This is because, as Dunne explains, Dharmakīrti's notion of svabhāva cannot be easily equated with a notion of de dicto necessity either, because of a "relationship between psychologism and ontology in his system"\(^{189}\) and because of "his failure to formulate and provide adequate terminology for a distinction between necessary and accidental properties"\(^{190}\) The accidental/essential distinction "remains vague and undeveloped"\(^{191}\) in Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

The key feature of Dharmakīrti's notion of svabhāva is that it supervenes in some sense on the causal history and possible causal future of the entity. In this way Dharmakīrti provides a causal basis for dispositional properties. In the contemporary literature, dispositions that supervene on causal bases are contrasted with bare dispositions. Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter and Frank Jackson define the causal basis of a disposition by means of an example of the fragility of a glass. They explain:

"[the] reason why a glass is fragile ... involves a causally relevant property (or property complex) of the glass, which we will call the causal basis of the disposition."\(^{192}\)

Prior et al. go on to argue it is a necessary truth that dispositions have a causal basis, and that this be distinct from the disposition itself, and that it is the causal basis of the disposition rather than the disposition itself which is the

\(^{188}\) Ellis (2001) 43  
\(^{189}\) Dunne (2004) 188  
\(^{190}\) Dunne (2004) 188  
\(^{191}\) Dunne (2004) 190  
\(^{192}\) Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982) 251
cause of the display of the disposition. That is, in the case of a glass, whatever causes the display of fragility in the glass is fixed by reference to the facts about the glass that constitute its fragility rather than being fixed by reference to the fact that those facts constitute fragility.

One objection to the notion of a bare disposition that is commonly canvassed is the *virtus dormitiva* objection. This objection is named from the example of providing 'dormative power' as an explanation of why opium causes sleep, which fails to provide an independent non-circular explanation of the power of opium to cause sleep. As Harré explains this objection:

"If the identifying criterion for a power of a certain kind is uniquely tied to the effect that it has when the corresponding disposition is activated, then there is a vicious circularity between powers and their manifestations. There would be a power for every disposition."\(^{193}\)

That this objection does not have force against the notion of a disposition that is not a bare disposition is made clear by Mumford as follows. Although the explanation of 'dormative power' is trivial in answer to the question 'why does opium cause sleep?', it is not trivial in answer to the question, 'why does sleep follow whenever opium is taken?' This is because the former question does and the latter question does not presuppose a causal relation between opium and sleep. As such, to respond to the latter question with the answer 'dormative power' serves to rule out alternative possibilities, such as correlation without causation. 'Dormative power' thus functions as a placeholder for a fuller or more scientific explanation rather than as an alternative to it. Harré and Madden similarly explain:

"The emptiness of the general regularity statement contrasts unfavourably with the promise of the power statement, which implies that the sleepiness is not fully explained by the fact of the ingestion of opium, but is to be looked for in the nature of opium. An attribution of a
power opens up a certain direction of empirical investigation. It is not an attribution of an occult quality, because it is not a quality-attribution at all.”

The view that there could be bare dispositions and that a disposition may have no distinct causal basis has been advocated by Jennifer McKitrick. The notion of a bare disposition also gains support from the essentialist thesis in Ellis's dispositional essentialism, whereby the disposition constitutes the real essence of a natural kind and is a modal property defined by a way of acting. Crucially, Ellis holds that the causal process which serves to define the dispositional property is not itself defined by reference to that process, but is defined in terms of the causal kind and effectual kind events it involves. Timothy O'Connor and John Ross Churchill similarly understand a causal power as “a power to produce or bring about some event, where this is assumed to be a real relation irreducible to more basic features of the world. Our favoured technical terms for this is 'causal oomph'. So understood, causation is not amenable to analysis in non-causal terms, but instead involves the exercise of ontologically primitive causal powers or capacities of particulars.” In sum, it can be said that there is no settled position in the literature about what dispositions consist in, and, specifically, it is not fully settled whether they are or are not reducible to causes or to other dispositional or categorical properties.

Based on the limited textual evidence available, it is not clear whether the neo-medical group of svabhāva-advocates also affirm bare dispositions or consider that dispositions supervene on other properties or facts. However, the lack of any available statement of how dispositions supervene on other factors make it plausible that they advocated bare dispositions. Also, as we shall see below, a form of supervenience concerning dispositions was advocated by the Buddhist

---

194 Harré and Madden (1975) 85
195 See McKitrick (2003) and McKitrick (2009)
196 See Ellis (2002) 47-50
197 O'Connor and Churchill (2010) 44
198 See also the various papers in Kistler and Gnassounou (2007)
Dharmakīrti, so the opposition between Sāṃkhya philosophers aligned with this group and Buddhists may also suggest that this group advocated bare dispositions. If this were the case, it would also explain the confusion between this group and the second group of svabhāva-advocates, whose anti-necessitarian view would entail lack of such supervenience.

By contrast, the intellectual pessimism of one group of svabhāva-advocates in appealing to chance seems to entail the denial of distinct causal bases for distinct dispositions. The other group who affirmed a neo-medical conception of svabhāva also failed to specify any causal basis for dispositions, although their view is not technically inconsistent with the idea that dispositions should have a causal basis, based on the limited textual evidence available.

**Section 7: Kumārila's notion of svabhāva**

The foregoing discussion has identified dispositionalist and essentialist dimensions to the notion of svabhāva. Dispositionally, svabhāva constitutes a real causal power which is an embodied cause. In terms of essence, three conceptions of particular interest have been identified. These include Fine's two notions of essence conditional on existence and essence conditional on identity. The third is the notion of a default intrinsic nature conditional on the absence of extrinsic factors. The notion of intrinsicality is that of Harré and Madden, which is that it is "a feature of the thing itself"\(^{199}\), and the notion of a default refers to the presence of normal conditions and the absence of extrinsic factors. As such, an intrinsic feature is capable of metaphysically grounding some explanandum. In the next chapter, Kumārila's claim that "it is understood that the prāmāṇyam of all pramāṇas is 'from itself'\(^{200}\) will be investigated with respect to these conceptions. This section will provide a preliminary analysis of dispositionalism and essentialism in Kumārila's notion of svabhāva by

\(^{199}\) Harré and Madden (1975) 87
\(^{200}\) TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
considering Kumārila's analogy with the case of water being carried in a pot.

Kumārila provides an example of his notion of svabhāva using the illustration of a disposition of a pot to carry water:

*TS 2850: In being produced, a pot depends on a lump of clay, a [potter's] stick, a [potter's] wheel etc., ...*

*... but [the pot's] dependency on those things is not present in the extraction of water.*

The translation of the term 'āharaṇa' as 'extraction' diverges from previous translations of this verse. Thus Jha provides the translation 'the action of containing water'. Taber, Arnold and Kataoka similarly translates this term as 'carrying water' or 'to carry water'. However, 'containing' water does not really fit with the meaning of 'āharaṇa', and, although 'carrying' picks up on one set of meanings provided by Monier-Williams as “taking, seizing, bringing, fetching” , nevertheless it is the carrier and not the pot which plays the significant instrumental role when water is transferred from one place from another. Further, on this reading, it is not clear why the dynamic functioning of delivered content in bringing about beliefs that are true should be like the static functioning of a pot in holding water while it is carried.

Monier-Williams provides the following additional meanings for this term: “taking away, robbing ... extracting, removing...”. The notion of extracting water seems to better capture the idea of a dynamic process. Specifically, in setting processes, such as when milk is set to make yoghurt, or hot liquidy ghee is set to make solid ghee, there is a dynamic process, where the porosity

---

202 Monier-Williams (1956) 162
203 Jayanta also expresses some misgivings about this analogy: see NM 424
204 Monier-Williams (1956) 162
of an earthenware pot may be thought to play some role in this extraction process. Although this revision of previous translations brings the analogy to life in a way that previous translations do not, the discussion below could alternatively be read in terms of a pot containing water or somehow being involved when water is carried.

The behaviour of the pot in facilitating the extraction of water constitutes the display of a capacity which is a real dispositional property or causal power. Similarly, Kataoka explains that "Kumārila has his own well-defined notion of capacity and uses the term consistently." Kataoka observes:

"Ontologically, a capacity belongs to an entity ... It is ... "hypothetically" postulated from a seen result ... it exists objectively as a real entity."

Kataoka's explanation highlights the affinity between Kumārila's notion of capacity and the notion of disposition discussed above. Specifically, the capacity is real and belongs to an entity, so corresponds to the general idea of a real property. The idea that a capacity is postulated from a seen result corresponds to Ellis's idea that a dispositional property which is the real essence of a natural kind is defined in terms of its display or manifestation.

The capacity to facilitate extraction plays a real causal role which explains its manner of display in terms of the extraction of water. Thus the capacity is a real property of its entity which has a causal role in determining the behaviour of that entity. Kataoka similarly notes that 'due to svabhāva' is a paraphrase of 'from itself' with a specifically ontological connotation. This is also evident from the medical analogy, where the svabhāva of a drug was said to be responsible for its curative effect.

---

205 Kataoka (2011) 247
206 Kataoka (2011) 247-248
208 See Kataoka (2011) 84, 86
Kumārila also claims that the capacity does not supervene on the causal conditions that are responsible for the particular essence of the pot. This contrasts with Dharmakīrti's understanding of svabhāva described above. Kumārila's capacity is a property which is a kind essence rather than a particular essence. It is a dispositional property which does not supervene on any causal basis. The verse makes explicit that a capacity does not supervene on the causal history or material cause of its entity. Thus, although the conception of a bare disposition and debates about it in contemporary philosophy are in flux, Kumārila's notion of a capacity can be tentatively equated with the notion of a bare disposition. The notion of a bare disposition was also tentatively equated with the neo-medical use of svabhāva above.

In addition to this dispositionalist dimension to Kumārila's notion of svabhāva, there is also an essentialist dimension. It was described above how Dunne cautions that “Dharmakīrti’s theory ... belies any such de re essentialism”\(^\text{209}\) and asserts that the accidental/essential distinction “remains vague and undeveloped”\(^\text{210}\) in Dharmakīrti's philosophy. Dunne's call for caution would prima facie apply in the case of Kumārila also. However, whereas Dharmakīrti emphasizes how correct judgments are “conditioned by mind-dependent factors such as expectation, need, context, perceptual acuity, habituation and so on”\(^\text{211}\), Kumārila's analogy with the case of a pot emphasizes rather the independence of the correct judgment from its causal factors, as bare disposition. As such, Fine's two conditional notions of essence, as conditional on existence and as conditional on identity, provide a sufficiently sophisticated notion of essence, which when properly applied does not “introduce an unwarranted form of essentialism”\(^\text{212}\) into Kumārila's doctrine. The notion of an intrinsic feature conditional on normal extrinsic conditions, i.e. the absence of external interference, is also relevant. The idea of disappearing together with its entity

\(^{209}\) Dunne (2004) 184
\(^{210}\) Dunne (2004) 190
\(^{211}\) Dunne (2004) 184
\(^{212}\) Dunne (2004) 182-183
corresponds to Fine's idea of an essence conditional on existence. Kataoka similarly observes that a capacity "disappears if its locus is destroyed"\textsuperscript{213}

Relating this essentialist strand to the pot analogy, pots in general would be capable of facilitating extraction. However, this is conditional on normal conditions and the absence of extrinsic factors. For example, a person could smash or crack the pot, causing it to leak. As such, the ability to facilitate extraction is an intrinsic nature of the pot conditional on absence of interference.

There is now a disjunction between the case of an undamaged and a damaged pot. If something constitutes an undamaged pot, it will necessarily be able to facilitate extraction. As such, the ability to facilitate extraction is an essence conditional on identity as an undamaged pot, and is essentially distributed over undamaged pots. Specifically, it would be a kind essence, or essential property of a kind. That is, a pot is the type of thing that by its essential kind nature holds water. It would be possible for an individual pot to be destroyed along with its disposition to hold water, and also for a pot to be damaged, retaining its individual identity whilst losing its disposition to facilitate extraction. The lack of the ability to facilitate extraction in a pot is due to external interference. As some damaged pots may yet possess such ability, this ability is inessentially distributed over damaged pots. The significance of these observations will become clearer in the next chapter, where the notion of svabhāva is applied to the case of the relation between 'pramāṇa' and 'prāmāṇya'm.

\textsuperscript{213} Kataoka (2011) 248
Chapter 3: Kumārila's disjunctive epistemology

Section 1: Introduction

The claim under examination in this thesis is that "the prāmāṇyam of all pramāṇas is 'from itself'"\(^1\). In the previous chapter, Kumārila's terms 'from itself' and 'due to svabhāva' were explicated in terms of a metaphysic of causal powers, and the ramifications of such a metaphysic will be developed in this chapter. This requires an investigation of Kumārila's use of the terms 'pramāṇa' and 'prāmāṇyam' in establishing his epistemological claim. Kumārila's use of these two related terms is indebted to a general understanding of them common to a diverse selection of different Indian philosophers. As such, a certain amount of general discussion of these terms will be necessary. However, a comprehensive investigation of these two terms would require an examination of other thinkers in their own right, which is outside the scope of this thesis.

Sosa's virtue epistemology (VE) approach has itself been presented as a dispositional thesis consistent with a general metaphysics of causal powers. Sosa considers that human faculties such as eyesight are the intellectual virtues which are powers that bring about one's believing the truth under normal circumstances. It is suggested that Kumārila's approach contributes to VE by demonstrating how Sosa's claim harmonizes with the metaphysical picture of dispositional essentialism.

This chapter begins with an examination of the key terms in Kumārila's epistemic vocabulary, which are 'pramāṇa' and 'prāmāṇyam', based on existing secondary literature. The work of Dan Arnold and John Taber on the meaning of the claim "the prāmāṇyam of all pramāṇas is 'from itself'"\(^2\) is then examined.

---

\(^1\) TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.

\(^2\) TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
Following this, the thesis argues for a reading of Kumārila's claim as a metaphysical claim that deliverances have an essential disposition to make an accurate determination. Such a reading constitutes an ontological interpretation falling into a general type which is rejected by Arnold, and as such, the objections of Arnold to this type of reading are addressed.

This metaphysical interpretation is supported firstly by arguing for an initial understanding of Kumārila's term 'pramāṇa' as a deliverance from an epistemic source. Such deliverances manifest their causal power when conditions are appropriately normal, and fail to do so when conditions are abnormal. As such, Kumārila's distinction between pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa represents a distinction between a Good Case deliverance and a Bad Case deliverance respectively, where the Good Case deliverance is considered a paradigm case.

Section 2: Knowledge and its value

No single term in Kumārila's discussion clearly corresponds to the term 'knowledge'. Kumārila's expression meya-bodha more closely equates to the idea of veridical awareness, accurate determination, or true belief. The synonymous terms pramāṇa and pramiti in classical Indian philosophy are terms with debated epistemic status, but are frequently used in the sense of true belief. Although they do not occur in this discussion, these terms would arguably denote some conception of knowledge for Kumārila. This is because Kumārila's notion of prāmāṇyam, which is etymologically related to these terms, involves the idea of a causal power and thereby does concern an epistemic performance and an epistemic achievement. It will be argued in this chapter that prāmāṇyam involves the idea of accuracy and the exercise of a competence, thereby establishing a clear contrast with accidentally true belief, which is not an epistemic achievement in a robust sense. In this way,

3 See for example MK Part 5 2772: pramātvaṃ ca yathārthānubhavatvatvaṃ| See also Potter (1977) 155: “Pramāṇa is a term designating a true judgment”
Kumārila's doctrine comes to engage with some conception of knowledge. More widely, the classical Indian debate recognizes an epistemic status which is more valuable than mere true belief because it invests the agent with confidence in that true belief. As such, there is a strong connection with discussions of knowledge and of the value of knowledge in Western philosophy generally.

Duncan Pritchard explains that recent work in epistemology has focused on questions about the value of knowledge. Pritchard describes the precedent for this discussion set by Plato's discussion in the Meno as to why knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Here, Plato suggests that knowledge is ""tied down" to the truth, like the mythical tethered statues of Daedalus which were so lifelike that they were tied to the ground to ensure that they did not run away." Pritchard suggests that this amounts to the idea that "knowledge, unlike mere true belief, gives one a confidence that is not easily lost." Pritchard suggests that mere true belief about the way to Larissa may be lost if the road seems to be going in the wrong direction, because one may lose confidence, whereas a person with knowledge "will in all likelihood press on regardless (and thereby have one's confidence rewarded by getting where one needs to go)."

It is interesting to note that Plato's example of the traveller to Larissa focuses on the predicament of the individual knower, and specifically that the need for confidence suggests conditions that must be satisfied by the epistemic agent for herself. Such conditions would then themselves have to be accessible to the epistemic agent in some sense. Contemporary accounts in the analysis of knowledge seem to focus on a more abstract higher-level perspective from which a determination about the agent's epistemic status should be made according to a normative threshold for knowledge. Although subtle, this shift in perspective means that the confidence of the epistemic agent in acting on her beliefs is no longer centre stage, but is replaced with the confidence of the

---

4 Pritchard (2007)
5 Pritchard (2007) 86
6 Pritchard (2007) 86
7 Pritchard (2007) 86
philosopher in making a determination as to whether the traveller should be said to possess knowledge.

The motivation for considering the value of knowledge in the classical Indian context is illustrated by Jayanta in his discussion of this topic. Jayanta explains that Vedic rituals involve “labours including the giving of countless amounts of wealth”\(^8\). A prudent person would not take such action were the unseen benefits of such actions not ascertained.\(^9\) By contrast, Jayanta suggests, everyday actions can be motivated by empirical beliefs even if their truth has not been fully ascertained.\(^10\)

Jayanta himself follows the lead of Buddhists such as Śāntarakṣita\(^11\) in suggesting that the need for ascertainment represents a further separable condition for knowledge beyond the need for true belief.\(^12\) By contrast, Kumārila denies that the need for ascertainment represents a separable condition. However, there is a general consensus that something beyond true belief is needed in order to give the agent confidence to act on her beliefs.

There is thus a parallel with the idea that knowledge gives one the confidence to press on even in the face of initially unpromising results. The classical Indian debate thus shares with Plato’s discussion a focus on the perspective of the knower, who is to gain sufficient confidence in the truth of her belief in order to act with conviction, thereby raising the epistemic status of the belief to a level that can aptly be termed knowledge. It could thus be said that knowledge requires true belief plus confidence, where this means that the epistemic agent must satisfy for herself certain conditions that would provide a type of confidence that is adequate in degree and in kind.

The alternative idea proposed by Kumārila is that the epistemic agent can gain

---

\(^8\) NM 436: “agañita-draviṇa-vitaranāṇḍi-kleśa-sādhyesu”

\(^9\) See NM 436: “prekṣāvatām pravartanaṁ anucitaṁ”

\(^10\) See NM 436: “pratyakṣādiṣu dṛṣṭārtheṣu pramāṇaṁ prāmāṇya-niścayam antareṇaṁva vyavahāra-siddhiḥ ... tatra śreyāṁ anirṇaya eva”

\(^11\) See esp. TS 2974-2978

\(^12\) See NM 436: “na tāvat svayam eva prāmāṇya-grahaṇaṁ upapannam aprāmāṇikaṭvāt”
the needed confidence in her beliefs without such definitive ascertainment. His approach contrasts with the idea of a normative threshold or criterion to be met by a belief which is present among other classical Indian thinkers. Kumārila provides an alternative means for the epistemic agent to gain the required confidence in her beliefs. Kumārila provides a belief protocol for the agent to obtain beliefs in which she may justly place her confidence.

Accordingly, rather than a factorizable analysis of knowledge, Kumārila provides a modal metaphysics of beliefs together with a belief protocol addressed to the individual knower. The present chapter examines Kumārila's metaphysics of beliefs, whilst the next chapter examines Kumārila's belief protocol.

Section 3: Terminological issues in the existing literature

B.K. Matilal explains:

“In the Western tradition, epistemology is the name given to that branch of philosophy which concerns itself with the theory of knowledge ... The function of what is called the pramāṇa-śāstra in Indian philosophic tradition coincides to a great extent with this activity.”

The terms pramāṇa and prāmāṇyam thus form part of a range of etymologically connected epistemic vocabulary. These two terms are central in Kumārila's main claim that “the prāmāṇyam of all pramāṇas is 'from itself'”.

The term 'pramāṇa' refers to a type of 'jñāna'. In the similar context of Nyāya, J.N.Mohanty writes:

“Jñāna is not an activity but a product ... each person's ... jñāna is

\[\text{Matilal (1986) 22}\]
\[\text{TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.}\]
directly perceivable by himself and by none else ... it is an occurrent, i.e.
to say, arises in time and is replaced by others ... epistemologically it
refers beyond itself to its object ... if I am conscious of anything in
whatsoever mode it may be, in the Nyāya terminology I may be said to
have a *ṣaṅkṣipta* of it”\(^\text{15}\).

The term 'thought' is sometimes used in the contemporary context to capture
the similar notion of a propositional mental event.\(^\text{16}\)

Kataoka explains that "in the Mīmāṃsā tradition, it is also well established that
*jñāna* can be interpreted in two ways: cognition and a means of cognition
(*jñāyate 'nena*).”\(^\text{17}\) The notion of a cognition in turn subsumes notions of an
occurrent judgment and an occurrent awareness. A full analysis of this
dimension of the term's meaning is outside the scope of this thesis, and the
terms 'cognition', 'judgment', '(epistemic) deliverance', 'belief' and 'awareness'
will alternately feature as translations depending on context. In particular,
whilst being entirely consistent in his thinking, Kumārila's perspective often
shift between that of means and that of product, and the translation of the term
*jñāna* as 'deliverance' and as 'judgment' will be used to capture these two
perspectives.

The term 'deliverance' is used in Sosa's sense. Sosa explains:

“Traditionally our knowledge is said to have “sources” such as
perception, memory, and inference. Epistemic sources issue

\(^{15}\) Mohanty (1989) 23-26

\(^{16}\) See Sawyer (1998) 523 fn.2: “The term 'thought' as I use it should not be
understood as a Fregean thought. Rather, 'thought' should be understood as a
synonym for 'propositional mental event'. Hence, two subjects cannot have the
same thought, but can have thoughts with the same content. Similarly, a
subject cannot be said to have the same thought at different times, but can have
two thoughts with the same content at different times.”

\(^{17}\) Kataoka (2011) 204 fn.113
“deliverances” that we may or may not accept ... Deliverances thus conceived make up a realm of the ostensible: ostensible perceptions, ostensible memories, ostensible intuitions, and the like ... Examples of deliverances are test results, indicator readings, eyewitness reports, media reports, perceptual reports, perceptual appearances, and even rational intuitions and ostensible conclusions. Contents are delivered by each such source.\(^{18}\)

The focus of Kumārila's discussion will be on the potential of an accurate judgment to accurately determine an object as a result, and accordingly Kumārila's use of the term 'jñāna' will be found to have an affinity with Sosa's notion of a deliverance. Interestingly, Sosa chooses to use a single term, deliverance, to refer to both the act of delivering by the epistemic source and the content that is delivered.\(^{19}\) These two senses of the term 'jñāna', act of delivering and delivered content, also correspond to the means and product perspectives.

The term 'jñāna' additionally subsumes both 'pramāṇa' and 'non-pramāṇa'. Accordingly, the same ambiguity is found at this sub-level. Thus Dan Arnold explains that pramāṇa “alternately refer[s] to a reliable means of knowing, and to an episode of veridical awareness such as results from the exercise thereof.”\(^{20}\) It will be argued that the term 'pramāṇa' denotes an epistemic performance which achieves a particular outcome, which is accurate determination, and thus constitutes a successful deliverance. As an abstract property of such successful deliverances, the term 'prāmāṇyam' reflects a notion of epistemic success. These senses can be grammatically parsed as follows –

\(^{18}\) Sosa (2007) 101-103
\(^{19}\) See Sosa (2007) 103 fn.5
\(^{20}\) Arnold (2001) 590
• pramāṇa = pramā-karaṇa\textsuperscript{21} = a successful act of deliverance
• pramāṇa = pramā = successfully delivered content

Corresponding to these are also two senses of prāmāṇyam.\textsuperscript{22} In some presentations, ambiguity is only attributed to this term, as the second sense of pramāṇa can be disambiguated by the term 'pramā'.\textsuperscript{23} Based on the capacity reading of prāmāṇyam developed in the previous chapter, these will be understood as follows:

• prāmāṇyam = pramā-karaṇa-tvam = a capacity for epistemic success
• prāmāṇyam = pramā-tvam = epistemic success

Kumārila’s notion of prāmāṇyam will be equated with the notion of pramā-karaṇa, or a capacity for epistemic success. However, it will also be found that most of Kumārila’s claims can be formulated with respect to the epistemic success which results from the exercise of such a capacity. As such, the two notions of a capacity for epistemic success and epistemic success itself represent the two perspectives of means and product.

Ryle explains how success verbs, which signify achievements\textsuperscript{24}, are frequently used to refer to processes properly denoted by hunt verbs. Ryle writes, “we very often borrow achievement verbs to signify the performance of the corresponding task activities, where the hope of success is good. A runner may be described as winning his race from the start, despite the fact that he may

\textsuperscript{21} Cf. MK Part 5 2773: pramāṇatvam pramākaraṇatvam|

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. Arnold (2001) 590: “Pṛmāṇya then refers to that abstract quality in virtue of which a pramāṇa has whatever status it has.”

\textsuperscript{23} See Mohanty (1989) 2 quoted below; see also Potter (1977) 155: “Pramā is a term designating a true judgment; pramātva is the universal property shared by all true judgments. Frequently this property is referred to by another word, prāmāṇya, which is, however, ambiguous, as Mohanty demonstrates. The truth of a judgment is grounded in what is called a pramāṇa, an instrument of (true) knowledge ... The property which all such instruments have in common is also called prāmāṇya – thus providing a source of confusion.”

\textsuperscript{24} See Ryle (1976) 125-126
not win it in the end; and a doctor may boast that he is curing his patient's pneumonia, when his treatment does not in fact result in the anticipated recovery.\footnote{Ryle (1976) 143} A similar ambiguity sometimes obtains in the case of the Indian terminology. Thus Jayanta for example at one point uses the expression ‘yathārthētara-pramiti' to denote correct or incorrect judgments.\footnote{See NM 431}

Subsection 1: Pramāṇa as instrument or outcome

Regarding the former sense, Potter calls pramāṇa “an instrument of (true) knowledge”\footnote{Potter (1977) 155}. Jha explains that it is a 'Means of Cognition', seemingly bracketing the question of epistemic status.\footnote{See Jha (1939) 1271 unnumbered footnote: "The dual sense of the form 'Pramāṇa' as Cognition and Means of Cognition is brought out clearly in the Commentary on Text 2813 ..."}

Matilal explains that pramāṇa "means simply various instrumental causes leading to true cognition."\footnote{Matilal (1985) 203} and also writes, "What is a pramāṇa? Roughly the answer is: A pramāṇa is the means leading to a knowledge-episode (pramāṇa) as its end."\footnote{Matilal (1986) 22} Surendranath Dasgupta explains that pramāṇa "signifies the means and the movement by which knowledge is acquired"\footnote{Dasgupta (1969) 406} and, in the context of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy, writes that "[t]hat collocation (sāmagrī) which produced knowledge involved certain non-intelligent as well as intelligent elements ... this collocation is thus called pramāṇa or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge"\footnote{Dasgupta (1969) 330}. Arnold quotes a definition from the Nyāyabhāṣya that "[a] pramāṇa is that by means of which one knows an object"\footnote{Arnold (2001) 650-651; the quoted definition is "sa yenārtham pramiṇoti tat pramāṇam"} and states that "I prefer to render pramāṇa in this sense as “reliable warrant”, though William Alston’s term doxastic practice ... would also do nicely."\footnote{Arnold (2001) 651; cf. Arnold (2005) 60}
a reliabilist aspect to Kumārila's doctrine.

Kumārila discusses the term 'pramāṇa' in the 'determination of perception' chapter of the Śloka-vārttika. John Taber has provided a translation of this chapter together with a detailed analytic commentary.\(^{35}\) In his introduction to the text, Taber explains that pramāṇa has a general meaning of "that which functions as the means or instrument in an act of cognition ... To ask, What is the pramāṇa perception? then, is to ask, What is the thing that functions instrumentally in the act of perception?"\(^{36}\) In this discussion, then, Kumārila is considering the 'hunt' aspect of pramāṇa as act of delivering, without regard for the fact that that deliverance has positive epistemic status.

Taber explains that a variety of theories were discussed by Kumārila's contemporaries. The following table quotes some options from Taber's enumeration\(^{37}\) of interpretations of the idea that the pramāṇa is "the means of knowledge perception"\(^{38}\) and its result is "the cognition of an object"\(^{39}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Pramāṇa (means of knowing)</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>the sense faculty</td>
<td>cognition of the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>the connection of sense faculty and object</td>
<td>cognition of the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3</td>
<td>the connection between sense faculty and mind</td>
<td>cognition of the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4</td>
<td>all of these connections taken together</td>
<td>cognition of the object</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{35}\) Taber (2005)  
\(^{36}\) Taber (2005) 18-19  
\(^{37}\) See Taber (2005) 19; T for Taber has been added to the option labels  
\(^{38}\) Taber (2005) 19  
\(^{39}\) Taber (2005) 19  
\(^{40}\) Cf. Taber (2006) 6: “Now the word pramāṇa ... literally means ... 'a means of knowing'.”
The following table of options presents some options from Taber's enumeration\(^{41}\) of interpretations of the idea that the pramāṇa is "the cognition of the object"\(^{42}\) and its result is "some other kind of cognition"\(^{43}\) –

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Pramāṇa</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T5</td>
<td>a cognition of a qualifying feature of an object, such as the colour blue</td>
<td>an awareness of that same object as qualified by that feature, for example, “The pot is blue”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T6</td>
<td>a nonconceptualized perception of the qualifying feature</td>
<td>a conceptualized awareness of it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T7</td>
<td>an awareness of the qualified object</td>
<td>an awareness of it as desirable, undesirable, or neither</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These two broad styles of approach are also distinguished by Kamalaśīla\(^{44}\) and by Jayanta.\(^{45}\) Taber notes\(^{46}\) that in the chapter on perception, Kumārila shows a preference for the latter family of views, whereby the pramāṇa is an awareness, yet is amenable to any view that characterizes the pramāṇa as something that makes contact with an external object, i.e. any view other than the view espoused by Buddhists like Dharmakīrti. Taber explains that "Kumārila, interestingly, proceeds [in the chapter on perception] to defend all of the theories that accept some kind of interaction between sense faculty and object as viable options – against the various criticisms raised by Diṁnāga ... Even theories that hold the cognition of the object to be the means of knowledge,

\(^{41}\) See Taber (2005) 20; T for Taber has been added to the option labels
\(^{42}\) Taber (2005) 19
\(^{43}\) Taber (2005) 19
\(^{44}\) P on TS 2812
\(^{45}\) Jayanta also discusses and rejects a third interpretation, that pramāṇa refers to one element in the causal aggregate which produces the cognition.
\(^{46}\) See above footnote. See also ŚV 2.80, which provides a kind of definition of a pramāṇa, and which characterizes it as a type of cognition.
with which Kumārila's own is to be grouped, can be shown to be coherent.\footnote{Taber (2005) 19-20}

As Taber explains, although Kumārila runs through all the possible views considering their various merits, the crucial point for Kumārila is simply that a distinction is made between pramāṇa and its effect. Whatever definition is chosen, "perception will still be something that occurs only when there is an existing connection of sense-faculty and object."\footnote{Taber (2005) 70} Kumārila's opposition to the Buddhist idea that pramāṇa and its effect are identical seems to be that to accept it would vitiate the explanatory model in which pramāṇa is on the side of the explanans and its effect is something with positive epistemic status which is the explanandum. As Taber explains, "It is a basic tenet of Mīmāṃsā (and all other realist schools of Indian philosophy) that means and end must always be distinct – an axe used to fell a tree is one thing, the felling of the tree another..."\footnote{Taber (2005) 79}

Taber also considers that "it appears that Kumārila favors the view that the cognition itself is the pramāṇa\footnote{Taber (2005) 71}. As for the effect of the pramāṇa, Taber notes:

"Kumārila's own view is that the result of knowing is, not another cognition, but the knownness (jñātatā) or manifestation (prākatya) of the object."\footnote{Taber (2005) 169 fn.67}

This supposition is reinforced by Kumārila's presentation under discussion here,
as the argument that a pramāṇa is a type of deliverance corresponds to Taber's equation of pramāṇa with the cognition itself. Further, Kumārila's idea that "a capacity for accurate determination of an object belongs to them [scil. pramāṇas] due to their svabhāva"\textsuperscript{52} indicates that accurate determination, i.e. knownness or manifestation of a fact or object, is the effect of the exercise of a capacity. Also, in TS 2910, Kumārila likens the way in which the eye can cognize to the way in which a pramāṇa can cognize, suggesting that the two are not equivalent.

The term 'pramāṇa' can also refer to this effect or outcome of the deliverance. Arnold explains:

"In the present context [viz. Kumārila's discussion] ... the word [scil. pramāṇa] very often has the latter sense, and thus I will generally translate it as veridical awareness."\textsuperscript{53}

Potter provides 'true judgement' for this latter 'pramā' sense\textsuperscript{54} and also notes that "[t]he Buddhists define truth as \textit{avisamvāditva} – nondeviance ..."\textsuperscript{55}

Dasgupta explains that pramā is "the result of pramāṇa – right knowledge"\textsuperscript{56}.

The Mimāṃsā-kośa similarly provides the expression 'correct experience' as the meaning of 'pramā'.\textsuperscript{57}

Subsection 2: Prāmāṇyam as instrumentality or as outcome

As abstract properties derived from the two senses of pramāṇa above, Mohanty explains that 'prāmāṇyam' "may mean either the property of being instrumental in bringing about true knowledge (\textit{pramākaraṇatva}), or simply the truth of a

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{}TS 2812ab
\bibitem{}Arnold (2001) 590
\bibitem{}Potter (1977) 155: "Pramā is a term designating a true judgment"
\bibitem{}Potter (1977) 156
\bibitem{}Dasgupta (1969) 406
\bibitem{}MK Part 5 2772: “pramātvaṃ ca yathārthānubhavatvam”
\end{thebibliography}
knowledge (*pramātva*). In the former sense, *prāmāṇya* belongs to the various instrumental causes of true knowledge. In the latter sense, it characterizes a knowledge [i.e. a veridical awareness] itself.\(^{58}\)

Mohanty translates *prāmāṇya* as truth, explaining that "[t]he theories of *prāmāṇya* ... are concerned with *prāmāṇya* in the second sense, i.e. with the truth of a knowledge."\(^{59}\) Similarly, Matilal writes that "I shall often use 'truth' to translate the Sanskrit *pramātva*, which is one of the two senses of *prāmāṇya* and in this I shall follow J.N. Mohanty."\(^{60}\)

A translation as 'validity' for this latter sense is also frequently used, both in the context of Kumārila's doctrine and in general.\(^{61}\) It is difficult to find any positive argument for such a translation which references the meaning of this term, based either on a dictionary definition or on its use in any specialized philosophical context. Dan Arnold favours this term for what it does not imply, explaining that it is "important to render the word in such a way as to avoid prejudging the question of truth"\(^{62}\). However, John Dunne argues against a translation as validity, on the grounds that it wrongly "equates veridicality with *prāmāṇya*"\(^{63}\) and that it creates confusion with the notion of validity as preservation of truth in argument structure.\(^{64}\)

Jha interestingly uses the terms 'authoritativeness', 'authority' and 'validity'\(^{65}\), the first two of which seem to convey the idea of a normative claim being made on the agent. Dasgupta states that "[v]alidity (*prāmāṇya*) with Mīmāṃsā meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to practical action in

---

\(^{58}\) Mohanty (1989) 2

\(^{59}\) Mohanty (1989) 2

\(^{60}\) Matilal (1985) 203

\(^{61}\) See Jha (1939), Taber (1992b), Arnold (2001), Arnold (2005) and Kataoka (2011) Part 2 for the translation as validity in the specific context of Kumārila's discussion; see for example Dasgupta (1969) for the translation as validity in a general context

\(^{62}\) Arnold (2005) 62; Arnold (2001) 592

\(^{63}\) Dunne (2004) 227

\(^{64}\) See Dunne (2004) 227

\(^{65}\) See Jha (1907) 26 ff. and Jha (1939) 1270 ff.
accordance with it, but with Vedānta it meant correctness to facts and want of contradiction.\textsuperscript{66} The second alternative captures a notion of accuracy, but Dasgupta's first option would introduce a novel element.

John Dunne provides a perspicacious discussion of the significance of the term 'prāmāṇyam', in which he coins the expression 'instrumentality' as his preferred translation, corresponding to the notion of a pramāṇa as "instrumental cognition."\textsuperscript{67} Dunne argues that this would appropriately stress the connection with the grammatical instrumentality\textsuperscript{68} and that the unfamiliarity of this term as compared with 'truth' or 'validity' allows "new possibilities for working through old problems"\textsuperscript{69}. Dunne also construes instrumentality in terms of purpose, writing that "part of what one means by instrumentality is that an instrument of knowledge must be “good for something”\textsuperscript{70}, and thus this notion of instrumentality is a feature of pramāṇas, here, deliverances, relative to some goal to be specified.

Given the current state of research, translation for the terms 'pramāṇa', 'prāmāṇatā' and 'prāmāṇyam' in this thesis will have a necessarily provisional status, both in general and in relation to Kumārila's conception. The term 'pramāṇa' will be understood as a successful deliverance in relation to a disjunction with the term 'non-pramāṇa' or unsuccessful deliverance. Kumārila's explication of the term 'prāmāṇyam' has already been shown to involve the notion of a capacity for accurate determination actually exercised under appropriately normal conditions which is also an essential disposition of those beliefs which are pramāṇas or successful deliverances.

Like Dharmakīrti, and perhaps in contrast with the later commentators, Kumārila's concern seems to be with prāmāṇyam as a feature of deliverances which Dunne conveys by the term 'instrumentality', rather than the feature of

\textsuperscript{66} Dasgupta (1969) 485  
\textsuperscript{67} Dunne (2004) 255  
\textsuperscript{68} See Dunne (2004) 223-225  
\textsuperscript{69} Dunne (2004) 225  
\textsuperscript{70} Dunne (2004) 229-230
accuracy pertaining to the delivered content. The notion of instrumentality towards some epistemically successful end is substantially equivalent to the attainment of such an end. However, Dunne's term 'instrumentality' seems to place the leading emphasis on process, by constituting a 'hunt' term rather than a 'success' term. Thus, even if it were to be understood as instrumentality towards some epistemically successful end, the fact that an instrumentally successful outcome is not merely targeted but must in fact be achieved for the use of the term to be apt is obscured. An optimal expression would emphasize the requirement for success, without being too specific about the nature of the successful outcome. Accordingly, a notion of epistemic success will be employed. The advantage of this expression is that the notion of success conveys not merely a final state but that state construed in relation to a process of which it is an outcome. Further, as a means to such an outcome, prāmāṇyam will be understood as the exercise of a capacity for epistemic success. At the same time, Dunne's locution whereby a deliverance is said to be instrumental to an outcome will also be helpful in representing Kumārila's views.

Kumārila's main claim is that all pramāṇas have prāmāṇyam 'from itself'. Kumārila glosses this main claim with the statement that a pramāṇa has a capacity for accurate determination of an object. This capacity is likewise glossed by Kamalaśīla as a capacity to accurately determine an object and as a capacity to produce a correct awareness. Śāntarakṣita likewise understands that prāmāṇyam "has the defining characteristic of [involving] a capacity" in his discussion of Kumārila's verses. Kamalaśīla similarly provides his own separate explanation of prāmāṇyam as a capacity of an initial awareness to give rise to a later awareness of a further result in his commentary on Śāntarakṣita's accuracy-based definition above. Accordingly, we must understand that the

71 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab
72 See TS 2812ab
73 Kamalaśīla's gloss is as 'prameya-paricchede śaktiḥ' and as "yathārtha-jñāna-janane śaktiḥ", both at P 746 under TS 2812
74 TS 2838: "śakti-lakṣaṇam ... idaṃ prāmāṇyam"
75 P 771 under TS 2958-2961: "tasya tat-prāpaṇa-śaktiḥ." Kamalaśīla rather defines pramāṇa as correct awareness (see P 778: avisaṃvādi-jñānam)
term 'prāmāṇyam' also refers either directly to a capacity for accurate
determination or something which is characterized by such a capacity.  

Subsection 3: Svataḥ as intrinsic

Kumārila's claim that "the prāmāṇyam of all pramāṇas is 'from itself'" states
the doctrine of 'svataḥ-prāmāṇyam' or 'prāmāṇyam from itself'. The Sanskrit
term 'svataḥ', which is here being translated literally as 'from itself', is also
frequently translated as 'intrinsic' in the secondary literature. Dasgupta
however talks of "'[t]he doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge
(svataḥprāmāṇy) ... Validity means the certitude of truth." Monier Monier-
Williams provides various meanings for 'svataḥ' including "'from one's own
share' ... 'of one's own self', 'of one's own accord ... by nature ...". Jha mainly
uses the expression 'due to the conception itself' when translating the Śloka-
värttika and uses the terms 'inherent' and 'self-sufficient' when translating the
Tattva-saṅgraha. It is not clear whether Jha has a positive consideration in
mind when choosing these terms.

Taber provides a purely negative consideration:

"I prefer to translate svataḥ ambiguously as 'intrinsic' or 'intrinsically'
instead of literally as 'of itself', in order to allow for the possibility that it
means something other than, strictly, 'of/from [the cognition] itself' ...

---

76 Śāntaraksitā's term 'lakṣaṇam' at TS 2838 especially indicates the idea of an
essential characteristic
77 TS 2811ab and SV 2.47ab
78 This is following the lead of Kataoka (2011); see also Taber (1992b) 207:
"svataḥ literally means 'of itself' or 'from itself'."
79 See for example Potter (1977) 156-160, Taber (1992b) 211 and passim, Arnold
(2001) 597 and passim
80 Dasgupta (1969) 372
81 Monier-Williams (1956) 1275
82 See Jha (1907) 26 ff.
83 See Jha (1939) 1270 ff.
Dan Arnold similarly writes: “I will render [svataḥ-prāmāṇyam as] “intrinsic validity.” Kataoka (2011) alternately uses both ‘from itself’ and ‘intrinsic’. This thesis will use the literal translation ‘from itself’ and also argue that this engages with ideas of essence and intrinsic nature in ways to be specified.

What is the philosophical significance of the term 'svataḥ'? Taber and Arnold both approach this question through a consideration of the two competing interpretations by Uṃveka and Pārthasārathi about what 'sva-' (itself) refer to. The views of Arnold and Taber will be considered in turn. As previously noted, however, discussion of the views of Uṃveka and Pārthasārathi are not within the scope of this research. On the basis of a cursory survey of the original works, the accuracy of Taber and Arnold in representing their views is accepted, and in particular, the position advocated by Arnold is taken to represent a homogenous Pārthasārathi-Arnold view.

Arnold explains that “the word svataḥ ... is often rendered adverbially (“intrinsically”), in which case, its reflexive sense is obscured.” Arnold focuses on Pārthasārathi’s work Nyāya-ratna-mālā, where Pārthasārathi considers whether “sva- is reflexive only to all veridical awarenesses (i.e., only to pramāṇas)” before arguing instead that “we must take the reflexive sva- ... as reflexive to all awarenesses – i.e., even those that turn out not to be veridical.” Strongly endorsing Pārthasārathi’s interpretation, Arnold explains that we should “understand the pramāṇya debate to concern nothing more than prima facie justification.” Thus “what is intrinsic is simply the fact that awareness confers prima facie justification.”

---

84 Taber (1992b) 207 fn.21; square brackets are in the original
86 See Kataoka (2011) Part 2 63, 64 and passim
88 Arnold (2001) 628
90 Arnold (2001) 641
91 Arnold (2001) 592
Arnold also argues forcefully against the contrary idea that ‘from itself’ is reflexive to veridical awarenesses only and the allied reading of prāmāṇya as truth. Kumārila’s claim would then be read as the claim that only veridical awareness possess truth. Arnold writes that “in this case, we would seem to be faced with a truism; for “validity” intrinsically obtains with respect to all “valid awarenesses” simply by definition. On this account, then, the “intrinsic-ness” of validity obtains, as it were, simply de dicto.” This rejected reading involves the idea that “the “capacity” for producing validity (the capacity which, if not already existent, can’t be brought about by anything else) is something like an occult “power” or metaphysical property that is intrinsically possessed by pramāṇas, which therefore intrinsically and objectively “bear” the means of producing the state of affairs which makes them valid ... svataḥ prāmāṇya [is] something like the intrinsic truth of pramāṇas.” Arnold claims that this type of occult power would function like a virtus dormitiva, as it “is not an explanation, it is simply a restatement of what requires explanation.” Thus Arnold argues that ““truth” is a tendentious and misleading rendering of pramāṇya which I think is much more appropriately rendered as validity.”

Like Arnold, Taber also seems to endorse Pārthasārathi’s reading, telling us that “Pārthasārathi appears to interpret the ŚV correctly,” that “the second theory, that championed by Pārthasārathi, affords a better interpretation [than Umveka's],” and that “Pārthasārathi offers a much more coherent reading of Kumārila's text than Umbeka.” Taber explains that Pārthasārathi holds that:

“whenever a cognition occurs it presents itself as true ... This does not mean that it is known definitively to be true, but only that it ”is manifest” as such. Even false cognitions manifest themselves as true. All

---

92 Arnold (2001) 604
93 Arnold (2001) 605
94 Arnold (2001) 605
95 Arnold (2001) 591
96 Taber (1992b) 212
97 Taber (1992b) 208
98 Taber (1992b) 211
cognitions, not just true cognitions, have intrinsic validity, according to Parthasarathi ... every cognition has a certain inherent force of conviction."^99

Thus "Kumārila never claims that intrinsic validity entails validity ... Pārthasārathi in particular stresses that intrinsic validity is common to true and false cognitions alike."^100 However, Taber's endorsement of Pārthasārathi's interpretation seems more nuanced than that of Arnold. Taber asks if Kumārila's position is "that since we can never establish the validity of cognition extrinsically, we must rest content with intrinsic validity, even though it is only subjective and may ultimately mislead us? that intrinsic validity, though not the same as real validity, is the best we can do?"^101 Contrary to Arnold (and seemingly Pārthasārathi), Taber answers in the negative. Specifically, what Taber highlights is a process aspect to Kumārila's epistemology, the epistemological significance of which is downplayed in Arnold's exposition, as will be discussed later. Thus Taber writes:

"one becomes aware of the falsehood of a particular cognition only by ascertaining some other fact ... if no evidence of the falsehood of a cognition emerges ... we may suppose that the situation that would give rise to such evidence – an actual state of affairs that conflicts with its truth – does not exist, hence that the cognition really is true"^102

In this way, Taber finds in Kumārila's account the resources for something like a conventional analysis of knowledge. Specifically, the concern shown by Uṃveka that the subject be able to distinguish true beliefs from false beliefs is addressed in Taber's exposition. Taber writes:

"The difference between true and false cognitions is that the latter are always eventually overturned by other cognitions, whereas the former

---

^99 Taber (1992b) 210
^100 Taber (1992b) 214
^101 Taber (1992b) 215
^102 Taber (1992b) 215
retain their intrinsic validity indefinitely. In short, every cognition has a certain inherent force of conviction. We are inclined to believe that it represents matters as they really are, as soon as it occurs. True cognitions retain this force of conviction, but false ones eventually lose it.¹⁰³

In this way, one is justified in believing that one's cognitions are not just seemingly true, but actually true, and “[a]lthough that is not as good as knowing it is true extrinsically, via a pramāṇa – which however would be futile, since that would lead to a regress – it is almost as good.”¹⁰⁴ Both Taber¹⁰⁵ and Arnold¹⁰⁶ also find evidence for a Pārhasārati-type interpretation in Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.53. This verse and its proper interpretation will be discussed in the next chapter.

Kataoka systematically analyses how Kumārila uses verbs with three different viewpoints to talk about pramāṇa and prāmāṇyam, which Kataoka labels the ontological, epistemological and operational viewpoints.¹⁰⁷ The terminological distinction of ontological, operational and epistemological viewpoints employed in contemporary scholarship on Kumārila's doctrine seems to hark back to the description of four levels of structure presented by Gillon and Love as “underlying the subject-matter of the Nyāyapraveśa”¹⁰⁸ and maintained to be the structure “which underlies Indian logic, at least as it is expounded in the texts of Buddhism and Nyāyavaiśeṣika.”¹⁰⁹ These four levels of structure are an ontic level, an epistemic level, a dialectic level and a forensic level. In a more recent article, Gillon distinguishes between four perspectives on reasoning, where “seek[ing] to distinguish good reasoning from bad” involves “seek[ing] to identify the general conditions under which what one concludes is true,

¹⁰³ Taber (1992b) 210
¹⁰⁴ Taber (1992b) 216
¹⁰⁵ See Taber (1992b) 212
¹⁰⁷ Kataoka (2011) Part 2 64-76
¹⁰⁸ Gillon and Love (1980) 351
¹⁰⁹ Gillon and Love (1980) 351
having taken other things to be true.” These four perspectives are an ontic perspective, an epistemic perspective, a dialectic perspective and a forensic perspective.

Prāmāṇyam is said to arise, to exist, and to be cognized. It seems clear that the dominant aspect of prāmāṇyam in these roles is that of accurate determination, although it is consistent with the idea that such accurate determination has arisen etc. as a result of a disposition. This is particularly clear in the quasi-definitional statement that “an awareness which has arisen … should be considered a pramāṇa”, albeit that refers to pramāṇa and not prāmāṇyam.

Section 4: Kumārila’s disjunction between pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa

Kumārila provides what Kataoka describes as an operational aspect in verses 2.48 to 2.51. In verse 2.48, Kumārila writes:

ŚV 2.48: To explain, entities would depend on causes in order to obtain their existence. But the functioning in performing their own activities of [entities which] have obtained their existence [is] just independent.

In verse 2.48 “Kumārila presupposes [that] “a valid cognition operates of itself” (pramāṇam svataḥ pravartate)” and in verses 2.49-2.51, which will be discussed below, “Kumārila denies the opposite view, “a valid cognition operates through something else” (pramāṇam svataḥ pravartate), because it

---

110 Gillon (2011)
111 ŚV 2.80
112 See Kataoka (2011) Part 2 70
would lead to the fault of infinite regress (anavasthā)." This operational aspect seems to capture what Ellis refers to as a natural kind of process. Pots engage in a natural kind of process to facilitate extraction on the basis of a real causal power to engage in such a process, which is the real essence of that process. Similarly, pramāṇas, as Good Case deliverances, engage in a natural kind of process to accurately judge, based on a real causal power to engage in such a process, which is the real essence of that process. Kataoka observes that this operational aspect features again in verse 2.83, which will also be examined below.\(^{114}\)

Subsection 1: Good and Bad Cases

The theory of disjunctivism has been developed primarily in relation to perceptual awareness. As M.G.F. Martin explains:

"Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naive realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination."\(^{115}\)

In particular, no conception of hallucination as relations to non-physical objects of awareness or as seeming relations to objects "challenges our conception of veridical perceptions as relations to mind-independent objects."\(^{116}\) The view is disjunctive in the sense that it denies that veridical perceptions and hallucinations have some common property. As J.M. Hinton explains:

"the illusion of seeing a flash of light is the disjunction of Cases that are not, but to the subject are like, seeing a flash of light ... The reality of

\(^{113}\) See Kataoka (2011) Part 2 70-71  
\(^{114}\) See Kataoka (2011) Part 2 71  
\(^{115}\) Martin (2006) 354  
\(^{116}\) Martin (2006) 354
seeing a flash of light is the disjunction of Cases of seeing a flash of light.\textsuperscript{117}

Based on this general idea, a distinction between Good Cases and Bad Cases is standardly drawn in the literature. The terminology of Good and Bad Cases was developed by Timothy Williamson. Williamson writes, "A case is a possible total state of a system, the system consisting of an agent at a time paired with an external environment ..."\textsuperscript{118} Williamson further explains:

"In the good case, things appear generally as they ordinarily do, and are that way; one believes some proposition p (for example, that one has hands), and p is true ... In the bad case, things still appear generally as they ordinarily do, but are some other way; one still believes p, but p is false ..."\textsuperscript{119}

Sturgeon explains:

"There are three types of visual experience: veridical perception, illusion and hallucination. They have portrayal and perceptual sides; and the former can be grounded in the latter to various degrees ... We shall simply speak—to simplify things—of Good and Bad experiences, Good and Bad episodes, Good and Bad cases."\textsuperscript{120}

The disjunctivist goes further by making the claim that the character of the experience is different in each of the two cases. As such, what justifies the experience is different in each case. As Hinton explains, in a case where you appear to see a flash, you do not know a proposition from which you infer that either a flash took place or you experienced the illusion of a flash. Rather, Hinton explains:

\textsuperscript{117} Hinton (1967) 218-219
\textsuperscript{118} Williamson (2000) 52
\textsuperscript{119} Williamson (2000) 165
\textsuperscript{120} Sturgeon (2006) 186-187
“When what happens is that you see a photic flash, you are justified by this, irrespective of whether you know that this is what is happening; and when what happens is that you have an illusion of one, you are justified by this, irrespective of whether you know that this is what is happening.”

In this way, the criterion of justification is pulled apart from the criterion of distinguishability or discrimination. This approach marks a radical break with the traditional internalist conception of justification, which holds that justification is solely a function of what is introspectively discriminable by the agent. The helpfulness of the disjunctive framework stems not from this particular claim that is being made being made but rather from the setup of a disjunction of awareness states through which this claim is motivated.

This general framework of disjunctivism has an affinity with the contrast set up by Kumārila between the terms prāmāṇya and pramāṇa and their opposite terms non-prāmāṇya and non-pramāṇa. In a defining statement in the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila tells us:

ŚV 2.54: Non-prāmāṇya is divided into three types according to [the three cases, i.e.] erroneous beliefs, non-awareness and doubt. Of these [three], [only] two [i.e. erroneous beliefs and doubts] are able [to arise] from a flawed cause, because they are real [whereas a non-awareness is not]

This statement constitutes an indirect response to a suggestion mooted earlier that non-prāmāṇya is not a real entity. The suggestion there is that the

---

121 Hinton (1967) 223
122 See Goldman (1976) 772: “a person is said to know that p just in case he distinguishes or discriminates the truth of p from relevant alternatives.”
123 ŚV 2.39a
prefix 'non-' would denote a mere lack, so that non-prāmāṇyam would denote a simple lack of capacity. Instead, Kumārila wishes to assert here that non-prāmāṇyam involves some real basis, or at least, in two of the three cases it does, viz. doubt and error. Accordingly, we must understand that non-prāmāṇyam denotes some kind of real analogue of the capacity, which results in doubt or error.

The verse explains that non-prāmāṇyam results when the constitution of the deliverance is somehow defective. At another point, Kumārila likewise tells us that “being a non-pramāṇa [i.e. non-prāmāṇyam] is due to a flaw.” This verse seems to be a direct answer to an opposed view canvassed earlier that “non-prāmāṇyam could not be due to a flaw in the cause.” Kumārila provides the example of a visual perceptual belief formed in a dark environment as a case where doubt may occur. Similarly, Umveka supplies the example “defective sense-faculties e.g. due to cataracts” as a flaw. Jayanta also gives the example of cataracts as a flaw in regard to vision and the example of clarity of vision as a putative good feature.

These putative good and bad features are properties of the causes of the deliverance, which correspond to the first set of items labelled T1 to T4 in the above table. Thus, rather than affecting the pramāṇa directly, i.e. the delivered content or the cognition, Kumārila's view is that bad features vitiate the cause to prevent the proper formation of a pramāṇa. What is formed instead is a non-pramāṇa. Kumārila himself uses such terms as "cause" and "cause of

---

124 ŚV 2.56ab; pramāṇatvam and non-pramāṇatvam can have the sense of prāmāṇyam and non-prāmāṇyam respectively
125 ŚV 2.39ab
126 See TS 2878a
127 Umveka presents this in his discussion of the third view: see TāT 46 under ŚV 2.42bcd ("dusṭatvād indriyādīnām timirādi-dośaiḥ") and TāT 47 under ŚV 2.43cd ("yadā timirādi-doṣa-duṣṭāni kāraṇāni bhavanti ...”). This example is also given by later authors including Jayanta: see NM 423 and NM 448, where it is given as part of a list of various sub-optimal epistemic conditions
128 In presenting the Kumārila-type view: NM 423: “timirādeḥ”
129 In presenting the Kumārila-type view: NM 423: “locanādeḥ nairmalya-vyapadesaiḥ”
130 ŚV 2.39b: “kāraṇa” etc.
the capacity for epistemic success of a deliverance". Putative good or bad features are features not of the pramāṇa but of these causal factors. Such causes correspond to Sosa's idea of the human faculties which constitute sources for deliverances.

This can be understood in terms of the pot analogy, whereby flaws can affect the making of a pot, thereby preventing the production of a well-formed pot. Once a pot has been well-formed, however, its facilitating extraction is a natural kind of process which is metaphysically grounded in a real causal power or disposition to facilitate extraction. Similarly, epistemic success is an outcome of a natural kind of process to accurately determine a fact or object which is metaphysically grounded in a real causal power. As such, pramāṇa is constituted by an awareness conditional on the lack of bad features.

The above verse also explains that the relevant cases of non-pramāṇa include not all false propositions, subsumed in cases of non-awareness, but only false beliefs which have actually arisen for some subject. This coheres with the disjunctivist idea of Bad Cases, which include perceptions and hallucinations rather than all false propositions, even though the cases of doubt and error provide a rather different emphasis.

Thus the earlier quote explains that doubt and error are forms of non-veridical awareness which are explained by a flaw, presumably because this flaw vitiates the operation of the capacity. Continuing the medical analogy of the last chapter, this can be compared to the situation where the capacity of a drug to heal is neutralized by some extraneous factor.

Pritchard draws a distinction between Good and Bad Cases as follows:

“`A ‘good’ case ... is a case in which the agent’s veridical perception takes place in epistemically advantageous conditions, and consequently results

131 ŚV 2.44b: “jñāna-prāmāṇya-kāraṇam”
The notion of non-pramāṇa presented by Kumārila appears to cohere with conditions (ii) and (iii). The reflective indiscriminability of Good and Bad Cases that satisfies condition (i) will be discussed below. Satisfaction of condition (ii) is due to the specification of doubt and error. Satisfaction of condition (iii) is suggested by Kumārila's example of darkness causing doubt in a visual perceptual case, and by the example of cataracts.

Kumārila's notion of non-pramāṇa corresponds to the Bad Case, with two caveats. Firstly, it includes all cases of erroneous and doubtful perception, rather than only hallucinations, or only hallucinations and illusions, as is the case in much literature on disjunctivism. Secondly, the dichotomy of pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa is meant to apply to all belief processes and not merely perception. However, as with disjunctivism, which has also been extended beyond application to perception, the theory is easiest to grasp in relation to perceptual beliefs.¹³³

In the same way, pramāṇa represents the typical case of an epistemic performance that does result in a successful outcome consisting in an accurate determination, whereas non-pramāṇa represents the deviant case that will not. Whereas Ryle believes that achievement verbs are used to “describe people and, sometimes with qualms, animals”,¹³⁴ Sosa extends such vocabulary to a wider sphere, explaining that “[a] heartbeat succeeds if it helps pump blood,

¹³² Pritchard (2011) 243. In Pritchard (2012), this is characterized as the distinction between an objectively epistemically Good Case and an objectively epistemically Bad Case.

¹³³ Cf. Taber (2006) 165 fn.27: “The question of what is the means of knowledge [i.e. the pramāṇa] becomes even more complicated in the case of inference.”

¹³⁴ Ryle (1976) 125
even absent any intentional aim"\textsuperscript{135} and also suggests that "[m]aybe all performances have an aim, even those superficially aimless, such as ostensibly aimless rambling."\textsuperscript{136} Ryle explains that success verbs have corresponding verbs of failure. Ryle provides examples of such pairs including spell/ misspell and calculate/ miscalculate.\textsuperscript{137} Ryle explains that the sense of 'can' in 'can spell' and 'can calculate' is quite different from its sense in 'can misspell' and 'can miscalculate'. The one is a competence, the other is not another competence but a liability.\textsuperscript{138}

Kumārila's claims that "the prāmāṇyam of all pramāṇas is 'from itself'"\textsuperscript{139} and that "a capacity for accurate determination of an object belongs to them [scil. pramāṇas] due to their svabhāva"\textsuperscript{140} both involve ablative formulations which the previous chapter linked with metaphysical explanation and metaphysical grounding. The epistemic success of a judgment which consists in accurate determination of an object or fact is metaphysically grounded in the judgment itself.

Accordingly, the term 'pramāṇa' is used to denote a deliverance which would typically be a Good Case deliverance. Conversely, non-pramāṇyam can be understood as a liability for an awareness to be either erroneous or doubtful, that is, non-veridical. Such liability terminology conveys the implication of a failure of an epistemic performance implied by Kumārila's success vocabulary and his presentation of non-pramāṇa as doubt and error owing to a flaw affecting the performance. The deliverance which suffers such a flaw would constitute a non-pramāṇa.

Similarly, Sosa presents a disjunctive account of reliably operating faculties and their erring equivalents. Sosa provides the example of memory and perception

\textsuperscript{135} Sosa (2007) 23
\textsuperscript{136} Sosa (2007) 23
\textsuperscript{137} See Ryle (1976) 125
\textsuperscript{138} Ryle (1976) 125-126
\textsuperscript{139} TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
\textsuperscript{140} TS 2812ab
as follows:

"Possession of an excellent transmissive memory is yet compatible with frequent error in one's ostensible memories. Someone might have an excellent ability to retain beliefs once acquired, and yet suffer from a terrible propensity to believe new things out of the blue which come as apparent memories, as beliefs from the past."\textsuperscript{141}

"[Consider] someone with excellent sight subject besides to frequent hallucinations. His ostensible visual perceptions are thus highly error-prone but that should not cancel the virtue of his faculty of sight so long as both erring intuition and erring memory retain their status."\textsuperscript{142}

As such, for both Kumārila and Sosa, the existence of real dispositions in the sources of deliverances such as perception etc. to make accurate determination is consistent with the fact of erroneous judgment.

Subsection 2: Reflective indiscriminability

One aspect of disjunctivism involves the idea that Bad Cases are reflectively indiscriminable from Good ones.\textsuperscript{143} Kumārila's statement that "a non-pramāṇa also [is established] in its own form, just like a pramāṇa"\textsuperscript{144} suggests that the agent would not be able to subjectively discriminate between Good and Bad Cases. Similarly, Uṃveka explains that awareness as such is common to both veridical and non-veridical awarenesses, so something further is needed in the

\textsuperscript{141} Sosa (1991) 226
\textsuperscript{142} Sosa (1991) 226-227
\textsuperscript{143} See Sturgeon (2006) 188, where this is discussed within the context of reflective disjunctivism.
\textsuperscript{144} TS 2911ab; cf. ŚV 2.85 which is discussed below
case of veridical awarenesses.\textsuperscript{145}

Does this indicate that Bad character is characterized by reflective indiscriminability from Good character? Kumārila's setup of the disjunction between an epistemic status and an opposed epistemic status which has a negative particle attached would suggest so. Thus Kumārila specifically considers whether negation implies absence or difference by contrasting his own understanding of non-pramāṇa with an alternative view. According to the alternative, non-pramāṇya is not a real entity\textsuperscript{146}, so epistemic failure is the mere absence of success. Kumārila's rejection of this idea involves arguing that negation of success would be mere lack of belief, whereas erroneous and doubtful beliefs are a negation which are not a mere lack in this way, but have some positive status.\textsuperscript{147} Thus a positive account of these two types of non-pramāṇya is needed. That is, the opposition between pramāṇya and these types of non-pramāṇya follows a model of conflict between two incompatible properties such as blue and yellow. Thus, according to Kumārila's view, pramāṇya is a real entity, or 'vastu'.\textsuperscript{148}

These two possibilities cover some of the options discussed by the grammarian Koḍa-bhaṭṭa, who provides six meanings of negation in total: similarity (sādṛśya), absence (abhāva), being different/ mutual absence (tadanyatvam), smallness (tadalpatā), impropriety or unfitness (aprāśastya), and contrariety (virdha).\textsuperscript{149} Kumārila's own view opposes the notion of negation as absence, and instead posits a model of difference and contrariety. Kumārila's argument here complements his general understanding of negation. Kumārila thus states, following Jha's translation, that "[t]he negative particle, occurring in conjunction with a noun or a verbal root, does not possess the actual negativing faculty. For the words "non-Brāhmaṇa" and "non-Virtue" only signify such other other positive entities as are contrary to those ... all negations

\textsuperscript{145} See TṬ 45: “pramāṇyaṁ tu svālambanāvyaḥbibhārivatvam; na bodhakatvam, tasya pramāṇetara-sādhāraṇatvāt”
\textsuperscript{146} See ŚV 2.39a
\textsuperscript{147} See ŚV 2.54
\textsuperscript{148} See ŚV 2.54c
\textsuperscript{149} See Joshi (1990) 288
(Apoha) would rest in positive entities." Here Kumārila denies outright something like Koṇḍa-bhaṭṭa's conception of negation as absence. As Taber similarly explains, Kumārila "held non-being (abhāva) to be a real thing (vastu), i.e., a real aspect (aṃśa) of that which is present."

In the apohavāda chapter of the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila considers how addition of a negative particle serves to modify the meaning of a term, taking up the example of the term 'Brahmin' and its negation 'non-Brahmin'. Indeed, this pair may have constituted something of a paradigm example in such discussions in early India, as it also appears in an interesting discussion of negation in the Nyāyānusāra, as well as in the discussions by Patañjali and Bhartṛhari discussed below, and in grammarians such as Kaiyāta and Koṇḍa-bhaṭṭa. Kumārila denies that any negative term refers by reference to any extensional or intensional definition of that negative term. Thus Kumārila rejects the idea that the term 'non-jar' refers to all things that are not jars, on the basis that we are not familiar with all the items included in that class.

Further, Kumārila also rejects the idea that the term 'non-Brahmin' refers to some common feature of all such individuals. Rather, the negative term gains its reference as a function of its connection with the non-negated equivalent. Following Jha's translation, in a first reading, "the Class ‘Manhood’ common to all the four castes, is precluded by means of the negative particle (in the word ‘non-Brāhmaṇa’), from all non-Brāhmaṇas, - and as such, the class ‘non-Brāhmanahood (signifying manhood precluded from Brāhmanas) is cognized as a positive entity."

In a second alternative accepted by Kumārila, following Jha's translation, "we may accept similarity alone as being the object of denotation. And this is based upon a similarity of parts. In fact, it is also in the absence of any such (similarity of parts) that the similarity is perceived."

---

150 Jha (1907) 301
151 Taber (2001) 72
152 See Cox (1988) 56
153 See Joshi (1990) 288-289
154 See Jha (1907) 298
155 See Jha (1907) 298
156 Jha (1907) 298
157 Jha (1907) 300-301
Whereas the first suggestion is of negation as difference, Kumārila's second alternative ties in with Koṇḍa-bhaṭṭa's notion of negation as similarity. Similar usage of the negative particle can be observed in contemporary English, for example, in the advertising by various companies which offer non-paper destruction. It is understood by the client that the advertising company will destroy not any item whatsoever which is not comprised of paper, but only items that have a resemblance to paper in some respect or another, e.g. electronic media which contain information which would otherwise be kept on paper, office equipment such as printers which would typically be used alongside paper, etc. Returning to the Indian context, only the primary sense is strictly correct, and the secondary sense is explained with reference to the functioning of doubt or misinformation. However, that is not to say that the term non-Brahmin is used when the agent is in doubt or error, but rather that the term non-Brahmin gets its reference by appeal to those situations where an agent is in doubt based on similarity or error based on misinformation.

Kumārila's understanding of negation as similarity seems to hark back to the linguistic investigations made by Patañjali in his commentary on Pāṇini's single-word aphorism 'negation'. Patañjali's view is that the term Brahmin has two ranges of possible application, firstly on the basis of caste, and secondly to one who may superficially resemble a Brahmin in appearance, habits etc. or who one wrongly surmises to be a Brahmin based on what one has been informed. However, the second range of application is said to be based on doubt or misinformation. The later commentator Kaiyaṭa terms these the primary and secondary senses respectively of the term 'Brahmin'. This secondary sense is based on similarity to the primary sense of Brahmin. The function of the negative particle according to Patañjali is not to positively identify the range subsuming every item which falls outside the class 'Brahmin'. Rather, it functions as an indicator that the secondary sense of the term

158 2.2.6: nañ. See Joshi and Roodbergen (1973) 70-117 for a translation and commentary on Patañjali's discussion.
159 In fact, Patañjali also discusses a second model of negation, for situations such as where one who is quite clearly a non-Brahmin is being described. That model is not relevant to this discussion.
'Brahmin' is in play, which is similarity to an actual Brahmin.

Patañjali expresses the two possible views, that negation functions to identify a range and that negation functions merely as an indicator, as 'language-dependent' (vācanakī) and 'natural' (svābhāvika) respectively. This terminological dichotomy is also seen elsewhere, such as in Patañjali's discussion of whether grammatical number and grammatical gender are 'language-dependent' or 'innate'.

Bhartṛhari's development of this 'non-Brahmin' model of negation is discussed by Radhika Herzberger in her book, 'Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists'. For Bhartṛhari, the term 'non-Brahmin' contains its reference via analytic content from the term 'Brahmin', which analytically contains the notion of a learned person, and antonymic content from the term 'non-' which contains the notion of some other branch within the category 'learned person'. As Bhartṛhari explains, the term is thus appropriately applied not to anything that is not a Brahmin, such as a clod of earth, but rather to a learned person who happens not to be a Brahmin. As Herzberger explains, whereas earlier thinkers had explained how terms gained their reference from qualities, such as learnedness etc. in the case of 'non-Brahmin', “the analytic content of names was organized by Bhartṛhari into a hierarchical structure”.

As a result, Bhartṛhari's account involves appeal to the analytic and antonymic content of names. As Herzberger explains, “The content defined by compatible co-inherence is the analytic content of a word; the content defined by incompatible co-inherence is the antonymic content. The former is given by the elements which lie along its ancestral lines; the latter is given by an element's siblings.”

---

160 MB on P2.2.6: “yadā punaḥ asya padārthaḥ nivartate kim svābhāvikī nivṛttīḥ āhosvit vācanikī”
161 See Joshi and Roodbergen (1973) 84
162 Herzberger (1986)
163 See Herzberger (1986) 39
164 Herzberger (1986) 14
165 Herzberger (1986) 36
contain the term 'tree' and antonymically contain the terms 'pine', 'birch' etc.\textsuperscript{166}

It is possible that Kumārila sets up the problem of epistemic status in terms of success and its antonym in order to be able to similarly appeal to the analytic and antonymic content of the capacity for epistemic success. Just as the concept 'oak' analytically contains the concept 'tree' and antonymically contains the concepts 'pine' etc., or the concept 'Brahmin' analytically contains the concept 'learned person' and antonymically contains the concept 'other learned person' (at least in the presentation of writers like Bhartṛhari), similarly the concept of a Good Case deliverance analytically contains the concept of a deliverance and antonymically contains the concept of a Bad Case deliverance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Analytic content</th>
<th>Antonymic content</th>
<th>Absence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oak</td>
<td>Tree</td>
<td>Pine, birch etc.</td>
<td>Non-tree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmīn</td>
<td>Learned person</td>
<td>Other learned person</td>
<td>Unlearned person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accurate</td>
<td>Determination</td>
<td>Doubtful and erroneous determinations</td>
<td>Lack of determination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>determination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, it seems that the example 'Brahmin' is a better fit than the example of oak, because it seems to take 'Brahmin' as a paradigm case of a learned person, which sets a normative standard which certain others are able to apparently meet dependent on their educational attainment. In the same way, an accurate determination constitutes a paradigm case of a determination and an inaccurate or doubtful determination can perhaps arise. In this way, Kumārila's setup in terms of prāmāṇya/ pramāṇa and non-prāmāṇya/ non-pramāṇa seems to gain leverage from this pre-existing debate about negation.

\textsuperscript{166} However, for reasons Herzberger discusses, Bhartṛhari himself avoids addressing this example, and illustrates his theory using other examples, including the term 'non-Brahmin', which Herzberger focuses on.
Section 5: Kumārila's notion of 'from itself'

The above section has argued that pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa form a metaphysical disjunction between Good Case deliverances, involving the manifestation of a disposition, and Bad Case deliverances, where the disposition is corrupted by a flaw, respectively. This section argues that the disjunction is also in part a modal disjunction. The Good Case deliverance not only has positive epistemic status but also accurately determines an object with necessity. Conversely, the Bad Case deliverance has a form of contingency, whereby it determines an object in a manner that is fortuitous or haphazard.

The above literature review indicated a common translation of 'svataḥ' as 'intrinsic' and a more literal translation as 'from itself', meaning 'from the judgment itself'. Kataoka similarly explains that 'from itself' refers either to the cognition or to pramāṇa. However, in this section, it will be argued that the idea of intrinsicality as reflexivity captures a peculiarly Buddhist understanding of this term, but is misleading as far as Kumārila's use of this term is concerned.

Thus Taber is led to the view that “if a cognition were unable to determine its object itself, it could not receive such a capacity from something else ... [so] every cognition must involve an awareness of its own truth.” Similarly, Arnold urges that, following Pārthasārathi, we “understand svataḥ as reflexive to any awareness whose status as a pramāṇa is in question.” Kumārila's own verses will be examined in order to argue that, rather than a notion of reflexive awareness, Kumārila's own conception of 'from itself' involves in part the notion

---

167 See Kataoka (2011) 63-64: “It is also not clear what [Kumārila] really means by “itself” (sva) and “something else” (para) ... Whether it is cognition (jñāna) or validity (pramāṇatva) that is considered “itself” ... All of the above seem possible in certain contexts.”

168 Taber (1992b) 211
of embodied cause. At an ontological level, 'from itself' indicates that epistemic success results from the exercise of a capacity for epistemic success which is an essential disposition and epistemic kind, thus 'due to svabhāva'. For the individual believer, 'from itself' indicates that epistemic success arises 'as a result of the process of inquiry'.

The previous chapter provided three essentialist notions that were relevant to a general understanding of svabhāva, and applied these to Kumārila's example of a pot with a capacity to facilitate extraction of water in a setting process involving yoghurt, ghee etc. These were Fine's conceptions of essence conditional on existence and essence conditional on identity, and the notion of an intrinsic feature conditional on absence of extrinsic factors. Through a close reading of Kumārila's canvassing of four possible views in the Śloka-vārttika presentation, it will now be argued that Kumārila's understanding of 'from itself' appeals to these notions, and explained exactly how these notions feature in his discussion.

Subsection 1: Kumārila's four possible views

Whereas the Bṛhaṭ-tīkā is focused on articulating and defending Kumārila's own view, Kumārila pursues a very different argumentative approach in the Śloka-vārttika presentation. Here, Kumārila presents his own view as one of four possible views, and successively eliminates three of these before elaborating on and defending his own view in what amounts to either a concise or an underdeveloped version of the Bṛhaṭ-tīkā presentation. In the Śloka-vārttika presentation, the terms 'from itself' and its antonym 'from something else' are mapped onto a dichotomy of prāmāṇya and non-prāmāṇya, or pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa. Kumārila thus introduces the topic by writing:

ŚV 2.33: First of all, with regard to the content of all judgments, this should be investigated: are the fact of being a pramāṇa and the fact of
being a non-pramāṇa 'from itself' or 'from something else'?

Understanding the fact of being a pramāṇa and the fact of being a non-pramāṇa in terms of Goodness of Case and Badness of Case, as per the above discussion of disjunctivism, this results in four combinations which can be presented as follows:

- view one: Goodness of Case is from itself and Badness of Case is from itself
- view two: Goodness of Case is from something else and Badness of Case is from something else
- view three: Goodness of Case is from something else and Badness of Case is from itself
- view four: Goodness of Case is from itself and Badness of Case is from something else

Later authors also list out these four possible views, but by glossing Kumārila's expressions 'the fact of being a pramāṇa' ('pramāṇatvam') and 'the fact of being a non-pramāṇa' ('apramāṇatvam') as 'prāmāṇyam' and 'non-prāmāṇyam'. Kumārila himself also sometimes uses the expression 'svataḥ-prāmāṇyam' or 'epistemic success from itself'.

Kataoka explains that Kumārila's presentation displays "a hierarchic sequence among the four views: the first and second views ... are refuted by the third view ... [which] is refuted by the final, fourth view". Each of these four views agrees in part with two other views, so we may expect to find some common

---

169 Kamalaśīla and Jayanta both set out this schema at P 745 under TS 2810 and at NM 420 respectively. Kumārila himself discussed the first three of these possibilities before setting out his own view, which equates to the fourth view here.

170 Kataoka (2011) 122
ground or argumentative overlap in the discussions. Schematically, the third and fourth views are fashioned by recombining the two halves of the first and second views, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goodness of Case from itself</th>
<th>Goodness of Case from something else</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First view</td>
<td>Fourth view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third view</td>
<td>Second view</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 14th century text sarva-darśana-saṅgraha attributes the four views to different groups of philosophers – the first to the Sāmkhyas, the second to the Naiyāyikas, the third to the Buddhists and the fourth to the Mīmāṃsakas. Later texts including the 17th century text Mānameyodaya and the 20th century Mīmāṃsā-kośa repeat this classification. However, Kumārila himself does not specify the names of any groups who held these views, and there is little contemporaneous evidence for these attributions. Thus Kataoka instead suggests that “Kumārila’s classification is quite mechanical and looks highly hypothetical. It is unlikely that Kumārila has a particular opponent in mind ...” Building on Kataoka’s suggestion, consideration of the four views will be treated as an integral part of Kumārila’s methodology. In this chapter and again in the next chapter, the three alternative views will be discussed in terms of what they contribute to an understanding of Kumārila’s own doctrine, which features as the fourth view, and, as such, they will be introduced in an order relevant to the discussion here.

---

171 See Hattori (1997)
172 See Hattori (1997)
173 Part 5 2856
174 Kataoka (2011) 233 fn 169
Subsection 2: Deliverances must possess a svabhāva

The second view considered by Kumārila is one in which neither prāmāṇya nor non-prāmāṇya is 'from itself'. Kumārila presents the view as follows:

ŚV 2.34cd: Others [say that both Goodness of Case and Badness of Case are] dependent on the determination of good and bad features produced in the causes [of the deliverance].

According to the second view, deliverances would constitute Good or Bad Cases in virtue of real positive features which are separable from the belief itself. Good Cases would be due to the nature of the good feature and Bad Cases would be due to the nature of the bad feature. That Goodness and Badness of Case are due to these features and not the deliverance itself is indicated by Kumārila's argument against the second view. Kumārila writes:

ŚV 2.35cd: In that way, the deliverance per se would be without a svabhāva.

ŚV 2.36cd: And of what nature would that [deliverance] be without either svabhāva?

Although the second view does not deny that every deliverance does in fact possess either good or bad features, and thus is in fact successful or unsuccessful in correctly apprehending an object, nevertheless Kumārila objects on grounds of lack of svabhāva. Kumārila indicates again the connection of the expression 'from itself' with the idea of 'due to svabhāva'. This contrasts with a reflexive understanding of 'from itself' attributed above to Buddhist philosophers such as Śākyabuddhi.

Kumārila's idea is that svabhāva must comprise a feature which is not merely accidental or contingent. As mentioned in the previous chapter, such putative
good and bad features would be things like clarity of vision and cataracts respectively in regard to visual perceptual beliefs. Kumārila characterizes the contingency and separability of these features by the expression 'from something else'. As Kataoka notes, there is an ambiguity in this expression, such that it may refer to "good qualities (guṇa) and bad qualities (doṣa) of the causes of the cognition ... [or] their cognition ... [or] (a cognition of) agreement (saṃgati) or an invalidating cognition (bādhaka)."\(^{175}\)

Rather, epistemic acts of deliverance must play a role of metaphysically grounding either positive or negative epistemic status through an essential connectedness with that epistemic nature. Consideration of the first view will indicate that all deliverances must possess one or other epistemic status as a default intrinsic nature, in a sense to be explicated.

**Subsection 3: An epistemic capacity must be restricted to deliverances**

Kumārila's first canvassed view is one in which both prāmāṇya and non-prāmāṇya are 'from itself'. As noted above, the first half of this claim is the same as the first half of Kumārila's own claim. Kumārila presents the first view as follows:

\[ŚV\ 2.34\text{ab}:\text{ Some say both [Goodness and Badness of Case] are 'from itself', because what is not 'from itself' cannot be established [by separable means].}\]

This presentation involves a general form of argument applied to the specific case of Good and Bad Cases, which are concluded to be "both 'from itself'". Sucarita labels this first view as belonging to the svabhāva-advocates about both epistemic success and failure\(^{176}\) and also attributes this view to the

\(^{175}\) Kataoka (2011) 63  
\(^{176}\) Sucaari on ŚV 2.36: K 84
The most prominent advocates of the satkāryavāda doctrine during this period appear to have been the Sāmkhya philosophers. Although the development of Sāmkhya philosophy during this period is not well-understood, we know that its ideas were taken seriously and vigorously debated by the thinkers of this period. Sucarita's equation of 'due to svabhāva' and 'from itself' reinforces the reading of Kumārila's notion of 'from itself' in terms of 'due to svabhāva'. The first view, agreeing with Kumārila's objection to the second view, and, as will be seen, like Kumārila's own view, thus endorses the idea that epistemic status should be possessed as a svabhāva.

In his discussion of this first view, Sucarita explains that svabhāva is posited to explain the restriction on production by external causes in regard to properties of an entity: if what does not have existence could be produced, then anything, including fictional entities, could be produced from anything. Were production of a given nature such as fragrance in flowers by external causes possible, then those same external causes should be capable of producing such a nature in any context, such as producing fragrance in fire or oil in sand. Instead, “there is a restriction” of entities to their own material causes, such that “a pot is only made of clay, a grass mat is made only from vetiver grass”. The core elements of this reasoning already appear in the early Sāmkhya literature, which demonstrates that this notion of a restrictive

---

177 See Kāśikā on ŚV 2.34 and on ŚV 2.35 passim, and in particular: “satkāryavādino hi sarvam eva kārya-jātaṁ sad utpadyata iti manyamānāṁ prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyātmakam api dvayaṁ svata evāsthiṣṭaṁ” (K 80); “iti satkāryavādināṁ siddhānta” (K 82).

178 See the extensive discussion of their satkāryavāda views in Ch 1 of TS

179 See Larson and Bhattacharya (1987) 22-23: “it can be reasonably asserted that the commentorial tradition on the [Sāmkhya] Kārikā extends from about the beginning of the sixth century ... through the ninth or tenth century ... We know that other systems of Indian philosophy ... were undergoing vigorous development, and one part of that development in each case involved polemical encounter with Sāmkhya philosophy ...”. The authors tentatively ascribe the Yuktidīpikā and Jayamangalā to the seventh and eighth centuries respectively.

180 K80: “asattvāviśeṣena hi sarvam sarvasmāt utpadyeta”

181 K80: “niyamo drśyate”

182 K80: “mrdr eva ghatāsya kaṁsya vīraṁ iti”

183 See Sāmkhya-kārikā verse 9: “because not everything can be produced (sarva-sambhavābhāvāt)”. See also the SS commentary on that: “If (yadi) the effect
capacity long precedes its appearance in Kumārila's debate.

Uṃveka similarly explains that “there is a restriction on which products can be produced”. Uṃveka provides the following illustrative examples: “For it is not possible to bring about [qualities like] fragrance etc. in fire or oil etc. in sand.” Uṃveka's second example is part of a stock example from the discussion of cause and effect. The full example contrasts sesame with sand: only the former can yield oil. Uṃveka's choice of examples remind us of the discussions of svabhāva seen in the svabhāva advocates' doctrine, where it could mean explanation by reference to the nature of the entity, either as causal basis, e.g. a fire's heat is caused by the fire, or locational basis, e.g. oil's production from sesame is causally explained by its location in sesame.

The notion of svabhāva has been equated to a real causal power which is the real essence of a natural kind that metaphysically grounds a process or outcome. The physical examples provided by Sucarita and Uṃveka support this equation. Thus Audi explains that grounding is a form of determination, which, among other things, means for one thing “to bring about or be responsible for” another thing. Further, grounding is closely related to explanation. Further, “[d]etermination is a worldly, as opposed to conceptual, affair. Whether two things stand in a relation of determination does not depend on how we conceive them.” Taber likewise notes that “[w]hat is meant by
'potency', śakti, it seems, is a dynamic property that is characteristic of a thing and makes it what it is, like that of burning in the case of fire.”

The examples above such as the ability of sesame but not sand to yield oil are similarly worldly rather than conceptual affairs. The nature of sesame is responsible for the fact that oil is produced through a grinding process. Audi provides the similar example that “the fact that my shirt is maroon grounds the fact that it is red.” Another example provided by Audi is “[i]n virtue of being spherical, this ball is disposed to roll down inclined planes.” Audi holds that grounding is a relation of noncausal explanation, involving a relation of essential connectedness between the natures of two properties, such that each instance of one property grounds an instance of the other. Audi writes:

“some pairs of properties fail to be essentially connected in the required way … It is metaphysically impossible that something be red in virtue of being loud, or morally wrong in virtue of being pointy, or prime in virtue of having a mass of 10kg. The properties in these pairs are simply too disparate.”

Similarly, pairs such as (fire, fragrance) and (sand, oil) are too disparate for there to be a grounding relation between terms. This would indicate that the grounding for the restriction in the epistemic status of deliverances is also a worldly affair and a real feature of the deliverance. In the discussion of the pot analogy above, it was suggested that Kumārila's understands prāmāṇya as a bare disposition of the deliverance. As such, there is a modal feature of Kumārila's claim, whereby it involves a de re rather than de dicto necessity. Specifically, it will be argued, it is a restrictive necessity, whereby certain features are restricted to certain entities. Such metaphysical necessity is a
feature of grounding. Thus Uṃveka's claim is not that fragrance is necessarily produced in flowers or oil necessarily in sesame. This is because the production of these things could be somehow obstructed or prevented, e.g. if the flower or sesame seed is flawed in some way. Thus the necessity must be formulated negatively, whereby fragrance must not occur in entities such as fire or oil in substances such as sand. Similarly, the idea shared by Kumārila's view and the first view is that the capacity for epistemic success is restricted to appear in deliverances. It may not appear outside deliverances.

By positing that both Good and Bad Cases are 'from itself', the first view can thus be understood as the view that both accurate and inaccurate determinations are due to capacities which are restricted to deliverances. However, this raises the question of how such capacities are distributed across deliverances. If all deliverances simultaneously possess both capacities, there would be conflict. Kumārila expresses his objection to the first view with the following very terse formulations:

ŚV 2.35ab: Firstly, both [Goodness and Badness of Case] are not 'from itself', due to conflict ...

ŚV 2.36ab: To explain, how can [a deliverance] which does not depend on something else have conflicting natures?

The objection centres on the single term 'virodhāt', which has been translated as 'due to conflict'. Bandyopadhyay explains that "[t]he Sanskrit term 'virodha' covers the two types of opposition, namely, contradiction and contrariety as they are defined and differentiated in Western logic ... What is common between contradiction and contrariety is that p and q cannot both be true at the same time and place ... in contradiction both p and q can neither be

195 See ŚV 2.35b: virodhāt. Although Kumārila sums up this criticism in this single word, Umveka explains that it refers to conflict in the case of a single cognition: "... ekasyām tāvat nāsti, iti virodhād ity āha." Sucarita glosses this term as svabhāva-virodhāt, i.e. conflict in the svabhāvas of epistemic success and failure.
simultaneously true nor be false, while in contrariety, though both cannot be true, both can be false." 

Kumārila's criticism appeals to Audi's notion of essential connectedness between natures. Specifically, an act of deliverance is a process which must have a nature which is essentially connected with some epistemic nature, and which metaphysically grounds that epistemic nature.

Specifically, conflict is an opposition between ontologically incompatible natures, and Kumārila thus seems to appeal to Fine's notion of essence conditional on the existence of a deliverance. The idea is that deliverances cannot have two conflicting essences conditional only on their existence. So the first view would construe 'from itself' as 'based on being the essence of deliverances as an epistemic kind'. This is the conception of svabhāva that is being rejected by Kumārila's criticism. This argument also supports the construal of good and bad features in terms of separability, despite their engagement with the cause of the deliverance.

According to Umveka, Kumārila's next remarks are directed against an alternative reading of the first view which may initially seem more attractive. Umveka explains that the above statement can be understood in either or two ways:

*Goodness of Case and Badness of Case would either be in each token judgment or due to the difference between token judgments.*

Thus a situation of conflict would only arise if both prāmāṇyam and its conflicting opposite were ascribed to every awareness. In what can be taken as a canvassing of Umveka's latter reading, and a rebuttal of that, Kumārila

---

196 Bandyopadhyay (1988) 241-243 note 1
197 Ṭ 43 under ŚV 2.35ab: “tarhy ekasyām vā vijnāna-vyaktau syāt vijnāna-vyakti-bhedena vā?”
introduces the alternative reading as follows:

ŚV 2.37ab: "If it is said that there is no conflict because the token judgments are different, ..."

As support for the idea of both being 'from itself', this indicates that certain token deliverances have Goodness of Case 'from itself' and certain token deliverances have Badness of Case 'from itself'. There are thus two epistemic categories of deliverance with two opposed epistemic statuses. As such, this strategy appeals to a notion of essence conditional on the identity of a deliverance as a Good Case or a Bad Case deliverance. So 'from itself' alternately indicates 'based on being the essence of Good Cases as an epistemic kind' and 'based on being the essence of Bad Cases as an epistemic kind'.

Kumārila’s rebuttal of the modification is as follows:

ŚV 2.37cd: "... [then] even so, it cannot be determined which [of Goodness of Case and Badness of Case] is where [i.e. in which deliverance], because they do not depend on any other thing."

Kumārila's criticism parallels the remarks of Hookway above, that even given that Good Case deliverances do constitute an epistemic kind, "we may be unconfident of our judgement because we are unsure whether it is a judgement of perception or, perhaps, a member of a different epistemic kind, a report of illusion or hallucination, for example." Thus it is of no help to be informed merely that Good and Bad Cases do constitute epistemic kinds. The problematic is that, as described above, Bad Case deliverances are reflectively indiscriminable from Good Case deliverances. This reflective indiscriminability presents the epistemic agent with a problem of belief formation. What is additionally required is an independent definition of epistemic success against which Cases can be assessed as Good or Bad.

198 Hookway (2007) 11
The upshot of this discussion is that svabhāva cannot be located in deliverances at the level of Good Case or Bad Case deliverances, owing to the 'which is where?' critique of the revised first view. Yet, as indicated by the critique of the second view, svabhāva must be possessed by deliverances in general. However, the 'conflict' critique indicates that capacities cannot be possessed by deliverances as an inalienable essence. Capacities must be restricted to deliverances, yet their manifestation in deliverances is not guaranteed. Kumārila also holds that although there are two epistemic outcomes, only one epistemic capacity may be posited of all deliverances. As such, the other epistemic outcome must be construed as a failure of exercise of the epistemic capacity.

This reasoning leads to the formulation of the third and fourth views. According to Kumārila's own view, which comprises the fourth view in this schema, all deliverances constitute Good Cases as a default nature, yet this nature is vitiated by the aforementioned bad features. The term 'vitiating' is chosen to indicate an erosion of an ordinarily functional state. Alternatively, according to the third view canvassed, all deliverances constitute Bad Cases as a default nature, and this nature is revamped by the aforementioned good features. The term 'revamping' is chosen to indicate the overcoming of an ordinarily impotent state. The dichotomy between the exercise of the deliverance as default outcome and the vitiation or revamping as extrinsically caused outcome taps into the Abhidharma conception of own nature and other nature discussed in the previous chapter, where the examples of credit and debit, and of cool and hot water were described.

Thus in explaining the rejection of these first two views, Sucarita brings up the example of coolness in water which was discussed above in the context of Abhidharma Buddhism. Sucarita writes, "one svabhāva is overcome due to the juxtaposed presence of a different superimposed form, like coldness in water [is overcome] in contact with fire [i.e. when heated] ...". This analogy seems to

199 See K84 on ŚV 2.36ab: "ekas tu svabhāva upādhy-antara-sannidhānād
confirm the understanding of svabhāva as a default state which may be overcome by external factors. Sucarita likens erroneous perceptions in Kumārila's own view to hot water, in that they occur due to vitiation by extrinsic factors. Just as water has a default state of coolness, so deliverances yield accurate determination as a default outcome. Just as heat in water is due to the effect of fire, which has an intrinsic nature of heat, so Badness in deliverances is due to bad features, which has an innate nature of Badness. The third view would be the reverse of this as regards the role of the effect of fire.

These views can be presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sucarita's analogy</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Fire</th>
<th>Heat</th>
<th>Coolness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third view</td>
<td>Deliverance</td>
<td>Goodness</td>
<td>Goodness</td>
<td>Badness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumārila's (fourth) view</td>
<td>Deliverance</td>
<td>Badness</td>
<td>Badness</td>
<td>Goodness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subsection 4: Obstruction of capacity

Kumārila's discussion of the pot example involved the idea that the disposition to facilitate extraction is a bare disposition in the sense that it does not causally supervene on the causes of the pot, but functions independently once the pot comes into being. Similarly, the capacity for epistemic success requires no positive feature over and above the properly formed deliverance. The pot analogy thus supports Kumārila's claim:

abhībhūto bhavāti, apsv ivāgni-saṃyoge śaityam”

See K84 under ŚV 2.36ab: “tad-apekṣaṣa ca tāsv auṣṇya-bhramah”
ŚV 2.48ab: [Entities which] have obtained their existence function in their own activities just independently\textsuperscript{201}.

In this way, though constituting a real causal power, the capacity for epistemic success is not due to any separable feature of the deliverance.

As such, all deliverances possess the capacity for epistemic success by default, in the sense that this occurs by virtue of the fact of judgment absent any bad feature. However, Kumārila indicates that a Bad Case deliverance is due to “the judgment that there is a bad feature in the cause.”\textsuperscript{202} As such, the capacity may be vitiated by a bad feature, such as cataracts, insufficient light etc. in the case of visual perceptual beliefs. Absent such bad features, the deliverance constitutes a Good Case deliverance. Sosa similarly holds that intellectual virtues are powers or abilities which “make one such that, normally at least, in one's ordinary habitat, or at least in one's ordinary circumstances when making judgments, one would believe what is true and not believe what is false, concerning matters in that field.”\textsuperscript{203} Sosa explains that “[t]he perceptual faculty of sight, for example, generates beliefs about the colours and shapes of surfaces seen fully, within a range, and in adequate light.”\textsuperscript{204}

Accordingly, Kumārila’s own view is one in which deliverances have a capacity to make nothing other than an accurate determination when not obstructed, i.e. under appropriately normal epistemic conditions. By analytically categorizing those deliverances which are not obstructed as pramāṇas, or Good Case deliveries, this class of deliveries involves the necessity that they do in fact make an accurate determination. However, this is not an analytic

\textsuperscript{201} TS 2847cd and ŚV 2.48
\textsuperscript{202} ŚV 2.53cd; cf. similar statements at 2.43 and 2.45 (against this view), 2.52, 2.55, 2.56, 2.59, 2.60, 2.62, 2.63
\textsuperscript{203} Sosa (1991) 274
\textsuperscript{204} Sosa (1991) 227
necessity, as it is based on the fact that they possess an epistemic capacity as a real causal power, which is not obstructed. As such, an independent ground is provided for identifying deliverances as Good Cases.

Accordingly, Kumārila's argument is read as one in which the capacity for epistemic success is a restrictive capacity which precludes the failure of Good Case deliverances. As such, the capacity for epistemic success is a real causal power which is a kind essence of a Good Case deliverance conditional on its identity as a Good Case deliverance. Such identity is contingent on non-vitiation in the process of judgment formation. This is analogous to the way in which a pot in good nick has a real causal power to facilitate extraction conditional on good nick. By contrast, by lacking any equivalent capacity, Bad Case deliverance are not precluded from being epistemically successful. Further, such lack is due to a positive act of vitiation by a bad feature. Based on the example of cataracts etc. provided by Kumārila, such bad feature consists in some sub-optimal feature of the situation of judgment formation. This parallels the way in which a pot in bad nick may yet facilitate extraction.

This reading is supported by consideration of the remarkable parallel between Kumārila's notion of prāmāṇya and that developed by the Buddhist philosophers Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi, who would have been working at around the same time as Kumārila. Dunne explains that Dharmakīrti’s "Brahminical counterparts [including Kumārila] consider [a successful deliverance] to be instrumental relative primarily to the act of knowing"\textsuperscript{205}. By contrast, Dharmakīrti himself considers a successful deliverance instrumental to “another resulting action, namely, the perceiver's activity”\textsuperscript{206}. However, within two differing frameworks, both Kumārila and the Buddhist authors make a strikingly similar appeal to the notion of a capacity. By drawing on recent scholarship by John Dunne, some details of the Buddhist theoretical work will now be investigated in order to support the above reading of Kumārila's view.

\textsuperscript{205} Dunne (2004) 262-263
\textsuperscript{206} Dunne (2004) 263
Dunne explains that Devendrabuddhi “find[s] himself in such a muddle”\textsuperscript{207} by articulating two different conceptions of the ‘trustworthiness’ of an awareness. Initially, Devendrabuddhi adheres closely to Dharmakirti’s text in presenting a confirmation-model, as described above, whereby “the trustworthiness of [an] instrumental cognition consists of the fact that it leads to another instrumental cognition whose content is the desired telic function, i.e., the achievement of one’s goal.”\textsuperscript{208}

Later, however, Devendrabuddhi goes on to redefine an instrumental cognition “in terms just of the capacity to result in the achievement of one’s goal”\textsuperscript{209}. This redefinition occurs in response to an objection based on obstructed action. Specifically, a correct judgment may not lead to successful activity if subsequent action is obstructed. Thus, Dunne provides an example where “if I have correctly identified fresh water from a distance and yet my attempt to reach it fails”\textsuperscript{210}. Devendrabuddhi accordingly makes “a tactical retreat”\textsuperscript{211} from the position that a correct judgment necessarily leads to successful result to the position that a correct judgment cannot lead to an unsuccessful result.

As Dunne explains, “Devendrabuddhi's above-cited answer is to place the restriction not upon the obtainment, but upon the object.”\textsuperscript{212} This strategy involves a modal idea, whereby an instrumental cognition necessarily leads to no other result. This can be expressed in terms of the idea that there cannot be a false positive. By contrast, both true positive and false positive are possible in the case of doubt. As Dunne explains, “a doubtful perception might lead me to water, but in other cases I will find only the hot sand of a mirage.”\textsuperscript{213} Devendrabuddhi utilises the notion of a capacity to convey the idea of necessity of restriction rather than necessity of result, whereby “what distinguishes an instrumental cognition is not that it necessarily leads one to the result, but

\begin{footnotes}
\item[207] Dunne (2004) 287
\item[208] Dunne (2004) 287
\item[209] Dunne (2004) 286
\item[210] Dunne (2004) 287
\item[211] Dunne (2004) 287
\item[212] Dunne (2004) 286
\item[213] Dunne (2004) 286-287
\end{footnotes}
rather that it has the capacity to lead one to that result if all other conditions are in place.”

In Dunne's example of perceiving water at a distance, what distinguishes a successful deliverance from an unsuccessful one is thus that the former will lead to “attain[ing] an object with the desired or expected telic function” if one has the chance to move towards the perceived water without hindrance.

Similarly, as the examples of Sucarita and Uṃveka indicate, Kumārila's capacity is restricted to deliverances and this capacity is necessarily exercised in cases where it is not obstructed. Dharmakīrti's notion of a goal-oriented activity such as heading for water corresponds to Kumārila's notion of epistemic deliverances as a goal-oriented process. Dharmakīrti's conception of an awareness of telic function as goal corresponds to Kumārila's conception of accurate determination as result. Further, Dharmakīrti's notion of hindrance corresponds to Kumārila's notion of a bad feature. Extending the analogy to consider how the views canvassed by Kumārila correspond to the process of seeking water can yield some insight into the nature of Kumārila's reasoning. There must be some fact of the matter as to whether a given route does or does not lead to water. As such, the route itself is ascribed some capacity as an intrinsic feature. Kumārila's own supposition is that this is a capacity to lead to water. However, individual deliverances correspond in this analogy to attempts to pursue this path and ultimately reach water. Certain attempts succeed and others fail.

The second view is equivalent to the idea that whether or not an attempt succeeds or fails is entirely due to assistance or obstruction. However, this overlooks the role of the route itself in leading to water. The first view denies the roles of both assistance and obstruction. However, without either such notion, there is no account of why some attempts are successful in reaching water and other are unsuccessful. As such, Kumārila's position is equivalent to maintaining that the route itself is responsible for successful outcomes, whereas obstruction of the route is responsible for unsuccessful outcomes. As

---

215 Dunne (2004) 289
such, it is necessary that attempts to follow the route lead to water when not obstructed. This has been expressed technically as the idea that the capacity for success is both the intrinsic nature of attempts to follow the route, as well as the essence of unobstructed attempts to follow the route conditional on their identity as unobstructed attempts to follow the route.

Kumārila distinguishes between Good Case deliverances and Bad Case deliverances as follows:\textsuperscript{216}

\textbf{ŚV 2.83:} A pramāṇa which is independent in its functioning, enduring only (eva) by its own nature before being apprehended [as being a pramāṇa rather than a non-pramāṇa], is apprehended by means of another awareness.

\textbf{ŚV 2.85:} However, it could be (syāt) that a non-pramāṇa apprehends its own object due to its own nature. It would not cease until falsity is apprehended by a further [awareness].

A pramāṇa is a natural kind of process which results in accurate determination, and metaphysically grounds this outcome. By contrast, a non-pramāṇa is dependent on bad features in functioning to apprehend its object, and thus it would cease operating when the bad features on which it depends are removed, in a sense that will be explicated in the next chapter. This provides a metaphysically disjunctive conception of pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa. Pramāṇa is a process which is metaphysically grounded in a real causal power which is a real disposition and real nature of the kind of process of forming an accurate judgment. By contrast, non-pramāṇa is a process of erring in judgment which is metaphysically grounded in a bad feature of the cause.

Kumārila's idea was clarified by Uḥveka. As Kataoka explains:

\textsuperscript{216} In the Śloka-vārttika; see TS 2909 and TS 2912 for the equivalent verses in the Brhaṭ-ṭīkā.
"Umbeka ... clarifies Kumārila's intention that even an erroneous cognition seems to have correctly grasped its own object, just as a valid cognition does. An invalid cognition, though it is erroneous, is nonetheless "the agent of grasping" with regard to its object, just as a valid one is ... "

This explanation captures the way in which non-pramāṇas are reflectively indiscriminable from pramāṇas. Successful deliverances must not accurately determine something other than their object, whereas doubts, classified as unsuccessful deliverances, may or may not yield an accurate determination. This is equivalent to the idea that only successful deliverances produce no false positives. However, in order to constitute a successful deliverance, thus being guaranteed to produce a true positive, other conditions must be satisfied, which in Devendrabuddhi's case consists in a 'no obstruction' condition and in Kumārila's case requires appropriately normal epistemic conditions, as described above. By contrast, unsuccessful deliverances may produce a false positive. This corresponds to the idea that an unsuccessful attempt to reach water may at first seem as though it will be successful.

Both Devendrabuddhi and Kumārila utilise the notion of capacity to convey these ideas. Kataoka explains that for Kumārila a capacity "is made manifest by a vyañjaka and enables its substratum-entity to bring about a particular result (kārya)." However, does this mean that the capacity exists in all deliverances and is only exercised in Good Case deliverances? It is true that all deliverances are in principle capable of succeeding if not vitiated by bad features. However, such bad features, consisting in cataracts etc., affect the constitution of the cause itself. As such, only Good Case deliverances possess the capacity in fact. The possession of the capacity by a deliverance entails its exercise, and no separate stimulus is required.

Kataoka (2011) Part 2 295-296 fn.293
Kataoka (2011) 248
This is consistent with the notion of a bare disposition discussed above, where the possession of a disposition to facilitate extraction automatically results in the process of extraction, and a severely damaged pot possesses no such disposition. In the contemporary dispositionalist literature, Mumford and Anjum similarly reject the idea that a separate stimulus is needed for the manifestation of a power, instead allowing that powers necessitate their own manifestation. No ontological distinction can be made between powers and stimuli.\textsuperscript{219} They provide the example of radioactive decay as a 'lonely' power which manifests itself spontaneously.\textsuperscript{220} Cases where powers fail to manifest are analysed as cases where there is “an unknown, hidden, or just taken-for-granted countervailing power”\textsuperscript{221} or “an obstacle in the way of the manifestation”\textsuperscript{222} of the power. Mumford and Anjum explain that a power that needs a mutual manifestation partner “needs its partner in order to operate. It is not exercising otherwise.”\textsuperscript{223} Kumārila’s notion of independence seems to liken the case of epistemic deliverances to the case of radioactive decay, where no mutual manifestation partner is required. Although possession of the deliverance by an agent is necessary for the exercise of the capacity, the pot analogy suggests that this is a background fact about the deliverance rather than a stimulus for its exercise.

Epistemic reflexivity to the individual judgment better reflects the Buddhist doctrine than Kumārila’s view. As Kataoka explains:

“the lack of ... [the formulation] “validity is cognized through itself” ... cannot be explained without assuming that Kumārila does not favour the idea. And in fact Kumārila confirms this assumption ... from the epistemological viewpoint it is supposed that a capacity is grasped from

\textsuperscript{219} See Mumford (2013) 16
\textsuperscript{220} See Mumford and Anjum (2011) 34-38
\textsuperscript{221} Mumford and Anjum (2011) 36
\textsuperscript{222} Mumford and Anjum (2011) 37
\textsuperscript{223} Mumford and Anjum (2011) 38
its result ... Therefore it is theoretically consistent for Kumārila to say that validity is cognized "by something else" and not "through itself".\(^{224}\)

By contrast, Śākyabuddhi endorses just such an epistemological conception of 'from itself' as reflexive awareness for a certain class of perceptions which are those involving telic function, which will be discussed in more detail below. Śākyabuddhi writes:

"Therefore, because a perception whose content has the capacity for telic function is without the causes of error, it is determined by reflexive awareness as being nothing other than a pramāṇa just due to svabhāva."\(^{225}\)

The notion of reflexive awareness ('rang rig' or 'svasamvedana') is a distinctly Buddhistic notion\(^{226}\), and by adopting Śākyabuddhi’s conception, Pārthasārathi is forced into the unenviable situation of having to explain that awareness provides reflexive awareness of its own epistemic goodness but not of itself\(^{227}\). It thus seems that Pārthasārathi may have adopted a reflexive conception of 'from itself' from Śākyabuddhi.

Section 6: Kumārila as Virtue Epistemologist

The term 'virtue epistemology' (VE) is used to label a diverse range of different approaches in a fast-developing field of epistemology, including so-called reliabilist and responsibilist approaches. Linda Zagzebski and Abrol Fairweather explain that, in the aftermath of the Gettier literature, Sosa "introduced the

\(^{224}\) Kataoka (2011) 72-73
\(^{225}\) PVṬ nye 75A: "de'i phyir don byed par nus pa'i yul can gyi mongon sum ni 'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan med pa'i phyir tshad ma nyid kyi bdag nyid du gyur pas rang rig pas yongs su bcad pa yin no!"; cf. Dunne (2004) 292-293
\(^{227}\) See Taber (1992b) 213-214
term "intellectual virtue" into the contemporary epistemological literature. What Sosa meant by an intellectual virtue was a reliable belief-forming faculty, and so virtue epistemology (VE) began as a species of reliabilism.\textsuperscript{228} By contrast, responsibilist approaches model virtue as conscientiousness or responsibility as a parallel to virtue ethics.\textsuperscript{229} Greco contrasts the Aristotelian, responsibilist form of VE with the reliabilist approach as follows:

"If we do not make Aristotle's account of moral virtue definitional of the concept of virtue in general, then we can see that Sosa, Goldman and Zagzebski are members of an important camp; one appropriately labeled "virtue epistemology." The defining characteristic of virtue epistemology, in this sense, is that it makes the normative properties of persons conceptually prior to the normative properties of beliefs.\textsuperscript{230}

Fairweather similarly explains:

"The Aristotelian conception of virtue as an excellence of character has dominated work in virtue ethics ... There are other plausible accounts available; virtue can be defined as a skill or a mere power ..."\textsuperscript{231}

Ernest Sosa's VE presents a dispositional understanding of epistemic virtues, as causal powers of agents. Sosa writes:

"Epistemic virtues or competences are abilities. These are a special sort of dispositions, familiar examples of which are fragility and solubility."\textsuperscript{232}

As Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard explain, Sosa's virtue epistemology:

"explicitly understands epistemic virtue in terms of the manifestation of a
cognitive disposition, or power, where these cognitive dispositions have a physical basis resident in [the] cognitive subject … Sosa’s virtue epistemology thus trades on a broader metaphysical picture of dispositions and powers, where the manifestation of a cognitive power mirrors the manifestation of dispositions and powers more generally."\(^{233}\)

John Greco similarly states that “[a]ccording to Sosa, an intellectual virtue is a reliable cognitive ability or power.”\(^{234}\) For Sosa, virtues are “powers or abilities [which] enable a subject to achieve knowledge or at least epistemic justification”\(^{235}\). It is this notion of virtue as skill or power which has an affinity with Kumārila’s notion of prāmāṇya as a capacity or real causal power. Kallestrup and Pritchard explain that Sosa’s account contrasts with Greco’s presentation of an otherwise similar form of VE, which involves “think[ing] of the “because of” relation in play here precisely in terms of the kind of causal explanatory lines that Sosa rejects.”\(^{236}\) In light of the discussion of dispositions in the previous chapter, we may liken Sosa’s position to the idea of a bare disposition which is causally irreducible, in contrast to Greco’s causally reducible position. Sosa’s VE thus represents one way in which the causal power metaphysic can be transferred into the domain of epistemology, whereby “the accuracy [of a belief] manifests a cognitive power on the part of the subject.”\(^{237}\)

Sosa holds in particular that human faculties are themselves intellectual virtues. Sosa writes:

“it may be one's faculty of sight operating in good light that generates one's belief in the whiteness and roundness of a facing snowball. Is possession of such a faculty a “virtue”? Not in the narrow Aristotelian sense, of course, since it is no disposition to make deliberate choices. But there is a broader sense of “virtue,” still Greek, in which anything

\(^{233}\) Kallestrup and Pritchard (2013) 250
\(^{234}\) Greco (2002) 293
\(^{235}\) Sosa (1991) 274
\(^{236}\) Kallestrup and Pritchard (2013) 265 fn.4
\(^{237}\) Kallestrup and Pritchard (2013) 250
with a function – natural or artificial – does have virtues. The eye does, after all, have its virtues, and so does a knife. And if we include grasping the truth about one's environment among the proper ends of a human being, then the faculty of sight would seem in a broad sense a virtue in human beings …”

Sosa's claim that faculties such as reason, memory and perception are themselves the intellectual virtues which “enable a subject to achieve knowledge or at least epistemic justification” has an affinity with Kumārila's claim that prāmāṇyaṃ is ‘from itself’. The review of Kumārila's canvassed alternative views indicated that this claim amounted to the rejection of the idea that accurate determination is due to separable good features. Rather, the unflawed causes of the deliverance, which are the pure faculties, is responsible for accurate determination, and thus these unflawed causes constitute intellectual virtues in Sosa's sense.

Sosa's characterisation of human faculties as intellectual virtues has been disputed by Zagzebski, and defended by Greco. Zagzebski writes that "it is quite obvious that sight, hearing, and memory are faculties ... the Greeks identified virtues, not with faculties themselves, but with the excellence of faculties." This disagreement concerns the question of whether virtues are eyesight etc. or separable good features of deliverances. As such, Kumārila is allied with Sosa, because of their common rejection of good features over and above the normal exercise of the sense-faculties etc. By contrast, Zagzebski's understanding of excellences as faculties is allied with the third view canvassed by Kumārila, according to which the capacity for accurate determination is due to contingent good features of the cause, such as clarity of vision, which is a property of sight.

Sosa separately considers both generative faculties, such as external perception and intuitive reason, and transmissive faculties, such as memory and deductive

---

238 Sosa (1991) 274  
239 See Greco (2000)  
240 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: 10, quoted in Greco (2000) 180
reason. Considering an example of the latter, Sosa writes:

“The perceptual faculty of sight, for example, generates beliefs about the colours and shapes of surfaces seen fully, within a range, and in adequate light. Such beliefs issue from visual impressions derived in turn from the seen objects.”

Sosa considers that the case of a subject whose “ostensible visual perceptions are ... highly error-prone”\textsuperscript{241}, holding that “that should not cancel the virtue of his faculty of sight so long as both erring intuition and erring memory retain their status.”\textsuperscript{242} This presents a disjunctive analysis of types of perception, contrasting with the idea that “what makes a belief perceptual is its basis in experience as if P, leaving it open whether or not the belief derives from a perceptual process originating in a fact corresponding to the object of the belief, namely, P.”\textsuperscript{243}

In the case of external perception, because this is understood in terms of an experience-belief mechanism, fallibility is due to “the occasional failure of an experience to reflect what experience of that sort normally reflects.” In the case of faculties such as introspection, memory, intuition and deduction, it is not clear what can play an analogous role to experience, as a “belief-guiding pre-belief appearance in [their] operation.”\textsuperscript{244} In the case of memory, “how then do we understand the lineage required for legitimacy as memory while still allowing for the possibility of error due to the misoperation of memory (and not to flaws in the original inputs)?” As such, Sosa suggests, “[w]hy not conceive of such faculties as infallible?”\textsuperscript{245} Although it outside the scope of this thesis to defend this claim, similar reasoning seems to be behind the claim of the Buddhist philosophers that inferential reasoning is always ‘from itself’.

\textsuperscript{241} Sosa (1991) 227
\textsuperscript{242} Sosa (1991) 227
\textsuperscript{243} Sosa (1991) 227
\textsuperscript{244} Sosa (1991) 230
\textsuperscript{245} Sosa (1991) 231
A metaphysical claim seems to be suggested by Sosa's VE. Kallestrup and Pritchard explain:

"Sosa's virtue epistemology thus trades on a broader metaphysical picture of dispositions and powers, where the manifestation of a cognitive power mirrors the manifestation of dispositions and powers more generally."\textsuperscript{246}

Kumārila's characterisation of prāmāṇyam as a real causal power or disposition seems to contribute to filling out this idea of VE as a metaphysical thesis. Kumārila's use of the expression 'from itself' (svataḥ) seems to cohere with a notion of 'due to svabhāva' (svabhāvataḥ) that is of more general applicability in metaphysical speculation.

\textsuperscript{246} Kallestrup and Pritchard (2013) 250
Chapter 4: Kumārila's belief protocol

Section 1: Introduction

This chapter presents Kumārila's claim as a protocol for belief adoption and revision with normative force for the epistemic agent. The chapter begins by surveying some existing secondary literature, and in particular the reading of Dan Arnold, based on the commentary by Pārthasārathi. The chapter then develops an alternative reading of Kumārila's doctrine as a normative protocol which captures the logic of inquiry of the rational agent. This reading is motivated by examining the origins of some of Kumārila's terminology in the existing grammatical and ritual material. Kumārila's epistemology is presented as generative in the sense in which Pāṇini's grammar is generative: it provides a procedure which can be followed to generate true beliefs about the world. Kumārila's belief protocol is then presented in some detail, considering the beginning, middle and end of the process of inquiry. The ramifications of three alternative views in the Śloka-vārttika for a viable logic of inquiry are considered.

Kumārila writes that "a capacity to cognize something etc. belongs to them as a svabhāva."\(^1\) On the basis of a consideration of the meaning of the term svabhāva and Kumārila's use of it, the argument of the previous chapters is that the claim that epistemic success is 'from itself' amounts to the idea that deliverances under appropriately normal conditions constitute Good Case deliverances, and they are true because they are the manifestation of an essential disposition.

The chapter begins by considering the arguments by Taber and Arnold in favour

\(^1\) TS 2812ab
of a reading of prāmāṇyam in terms of 'prima facie justification'\textsuperscript{2} or 'force of conviction'\textsuperscript{2}, which build on the interpretation of the philosopher Pārthasārathī, as well as the findings of Kataoka in regard to this. It is argued that what is missing from the Pārthasārathī-Arnold interpretation is the idea that Kumārila considers the attribution of prāmāṇyam as a stage in a normative process.

Kumārila's own thinking thus involves the notion of a hypothesis. That the logic of inquiry is distinct from the psychology of belief formation is a point emphasized by Charles Peirce, and Peirce will accordingly be treated as an interlocutor for understanding Kumārila's claim. Whereas Arnold's account allows no scope for an understanding of Kumārila's doctrine as a normative account, it will be argued that normativity plays a key role in Kumārila's account. Some points of agreement between this interpretation and that of Arnold will be noted.

This chapter will accordingly provide an interpretation of Kumārila's doctrine as goal-oriented and purposive. On this basis, the more straightforward reading of Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.47, whereby only pramāṇas have the feature of 'intrinsic validity', is supported. In order to substantiate this claim about Kumārila's normative thinking, the origins of some of the vocabulary used by Kumārila in the grammatical and ritual literatures will be examined. The purposive and goal-orientated theoretical framework of the original context of these terms will be highlighted in order to motivate the claim that Kumārila deployed just such a purposive and goal-orientated model in the new context of epistemology. After that, a reading of Kumārila's verses TS 2861 and ŚV 2.53 as providing a protocol for belief formation and revision will be set out. It is argued that this protocol is rooted in the ritual interpretation literature and in the Indian grammatical literature. Specifically, it will be argued that Kumārila's epistemology involves a rule or procedure analogous to these rules of ritual interpretation and the rules of Pāṇini's generative grammar. Such an approach contrasts with the specification of necessary and sufficient conditions in some post-Gettier epistemology, in that it is process-orientated. This idea will be

\textsuperscript{2} See e.g. Arnold (2001) 641; Arnold (2005) 61

\textsuperscript{3} See e.g. Taber (1992b) 210
further developed by characterizing Kumārila's description of an epistemic process as a logic of inquiry. The beginning, middle and end of inquiry will be considered in turn. Inquiry is begun through instigation by means of adoption of a working hypothesis. Inquiry is prolonged through search for defeaters, motivated by a genuine doubt. Inquiry is terminated when defeaters fail to appear, on partly epistemic grounds and partly pragmatic grounds. These stages of inquiry will be investigated in successive sections.

Section 2: Apparent truth or ascribed truth?

Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.53 has been taken by John Taber and Dan Arnold as definitive support for Pārthasārathi's interpretation of Kumārila's doctrine, whereby prāmāṇyaṃ “concern[s] nothing more than prima facie justification” and “is common to true and false cognitions alike.” This section presents an alternative reading of Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.53 and its analogue TS 2861 in the Bṛhaṭ-ṭikā in order to argue that prāmāṇyaṃ constitutes a notion of truth. Specifically, it is argued that the verse specifies a two-part procedure, of truth-ascription and 'erasing the excess'. This procedure is executed by the agent through the single operational instruction to exercise repeatedly his default competence to host and accept dispositions.

Subsection 1: The Pārthasārathi-Arnold line of interpretation

Taber identifies a distinction between two competing interpretations of Kumārila's claim, 'svataḥ sarva-pramāṇānaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ', which emerges to full clarity in later literature. These two interpretations are 'from utpatti' and 'from jñāapti'. Taber explains that "[t]he positions of Umbeka and Pārthasārathi
came to be known in subsequent literature as *svataḥ prāmāṇyam utpattitah* and *svataḥ prāmāṇyam jñaptitah*, respectively … They themselves do not use these expressions.”

However, the beginnings of such a distinction between utpatti-prāmāṇyam and niścaya-prāmāṇyam seems to be present already in the work of Buddhist philosophers working around the time of Kumārila. Indeed, this distinction is particularly relevant to the Buddhist position, which provides accounts of the two which diverge in respect of unfamiliar awarenesses, though not of other types of awareness. Thus expressions such as ‘tshad ma ‘jug pa’ and ‘tshad ma nges pa’ are found in the Tibetan translations of the discussion of this topic by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi. Further research would be needed to trace the evolution of this distinction in detail.

Translating the above claim as “[t]he validity of all pramāṇas should be accepted as intrinsic”\(^7\), Arnold finds that “there are some interpretative difficulties in [this passage]”. These difficulties are resolved by Pārthasārathi by reinterpreting this statement to be reflexive to all awarenesses, so that it is read as the claim that “whenever a cognition occurs it presents itself as true.”\(^8\) Taber and Arnold both prefer this revised interpretation, where all true or false awarenesses are ‘intrinsically valid’.

Taber claims that “[i]f intrinsic validity were an actual correspondence between cognition and object that arose in a cognition from its causes, then it certainly would not belong to false cognitions; yet Kumārila clearly says that it does.”\(^9\) Taber seems to base this on Kumārila’s half-verse ŚV 2.53ab, which Taber translates:

ŚV 2.53ab: Thus, the validity of a cognition, due to its having the nature of knowledge, …\(^10\).

---

\(^6\) Taber (1992b) 208 fn.24  
\(^7\) Arnold (2005) 70  
\(^8\) Taber (1992b) 210  
\(^9\) Taber (1992b) 214  
\(^10\) Taber (1992b) 212
Taber states that this "says that a cognition is intrinsically valid by virtue of being a bodha, that is, a knowledge of its object ... [which] is to say that it is intrinsically valid insofar as it presents itself as true." Taber bases his endorsement of Pārthasārathi on this point, and also on the next half-verse ŚV 2.53cd, which "says that the intrinsic validity of false cognitions is annulled upon disconfirming the cognition." If 'intrinsic validity' amounted to truth, Taber explains, it could not "initially belong to a cognition and then be removed."

Arnold likewise bases his support for Pārthasārathi largely on a reading of Kumārila's half-verse ŚV 2.53ab. Arnold translates the same line as:

ŚV 2.53ab: the validity of awareness obtains simply by virtue of the fact that it is awareness (bodhātmakatvena)

Arnold suggests that this verse provides "something like a definitive statement regarding prāmāṇya." Arnold also sets out and endorses Pārthasārathi's own argument in the Nyāya-ratna-mālā against an Uṇveka-type approach. There, Pārthasārathi explains that the view would be that "the prāmāṇyam of a cognition produced from itself is later exceptionally cancelled" and argues that "that is not right, because it is already a non-pramāṇa when it arises." That is, if prāmāṇyam is truth, then belief revision cannot alter the truth-status of a belief. As Arnold paraphrases this, for the Uṇveka-type approach, belief revision would have to "consist in the actual transformation of the initial cognitive event ... the subsequent, overriding awareness actually renders untrue what had (really, ontologically) been true."
Taber concludes rather pessimistically that, despite offering "a much more coherent reading of Kumārila's text than Umbeka"\(^{19}\), nevertheless Pārthasārathi's interpretation "appears to provide no better defense of the authority of the Veda than Umbeka's ... svataḥ prāmāṇya is something essentially subjective for Pārthasārathi; it is a cognition's initial appearance or manifestation of validity."\(^{20}\) By contrast, Arnold finds Pārthasārathi's interpretation more philosophically appealing. Finding an affinity with "the argument that William Alston develops in Perceiving God"\(^{21}\), Arnold develops an understanding of Kumārila's epistemology as having a largely phenomenological significance. Thus "Alston's procedure is to show that the subjects of religious experience are prima facie justified in thinking that their experience is the experience it seems, phenomenologically, to be; and, if one is thus justified, then the experience can, ipso facto, be taken as genuinely an experience of what seems to be experienced."\(^{22}\)

It is not really clear that the notion of justification can be used in a way which divorces it from meta-level concerns about the correctness of one's beliefs. As Velleman explains:

> "Something is subject to justification only if it is subject to a jus, or norm of correctness ... a belief can be justified only because it can be correct or incorrect by virtue of being true or false."\(^{23}\)

Similarly, Sosa writes:

> "According to my dictionary, to justify is "to prove or show to be just, right, or reasonable," in a way that implies "appeal to a standard or precedent.""\(^{24}\)
However, Arnold introduces an epistemic notion of truth, whereby “truth consists in the means of justification”\textsuperscript{25}. Thus, quoting Alston, Arnold explains:

“the truth of a truth bearer consists not in its relation to some 'transcendent' state of affairs, but in the epistemic virtues the former displays within our thought, experience, and discourse. Truth value is a matter of whether, or the extent to which, a belief is justified, warranted, rational, well-grounded, or the like ...”\textsuperscript{26}

This contrasts with a realist notion of truth, which is “a conception of “truth” as obtaining independently of what any knowing subjects believe to be the case.”\textsuperscript{27} Arnold contrasts the interpretations of Umveka and Pārthasārathi in terms of their notion of truth. Whereas Pārthasārathi’s account “involves a realist conception of truth”\textsuperscript{28}, “Umveka ends up supporting an ultimately epistemic notion of truth”\textsuperscript{29}. Specifically, Pārthasārathi "thinks of the justification defended by his account as conducive to the realization of truth, understood in realist terms – here, in terms of something like correspondence ... The point is simply that we are justified in finding such correspondence to obtain whenever “the validity of cognition that obtains simply by virtue of the fact that it is cognition” is not falsified by any subsequent overriding cognition.”\textsuperscript{30}

Arnold notes that Buddhist philosophers including Dignāga and Dharmakīrti “espoused a fundamentally causal epistemology”\textsuperscript{31} whereby “a subject’s awarenesses are simply among the effects produced by that object (together, of course, with the proper conditions in the subject)”\textsuperscript{32}. Arnold argues that it is precisely this causal epistemology which is disputed by Pārthasārathi, who

\textsuperscript{25} Arnold (2005) 50
\textsuperscript{26} Arnold (2005) 51
\textsuperscript{27} Arnold (2005) 78
\textsuperscript{28} Arnold (2005) 94
\textsuperscript{29} Arnold (2005) 81
\textsuperscript{30} Arnold (2005) 95
\textsuperscript{32} Arnold (2001) 633
instead formulates a doxastic epistemology, which "starts from the presumption of justification, takes us as entitled to consider ourselves justified in thinking ourselves to experience, in fact, what we seem to ourselves to experience. Such justification is, on this view, all that is required for us to be justified in claiming to hold true beliefs." Nevertheless, it is "not incompatible with strong truth-claims." Arnold characterizes Uṃveka's reading of Kumārila as a causal account whereby:

"validity, on this causal account, is the resultant effect of the causes that are veridical awarenesses, and the real task is simply to determine, by appeal to causes, which are and which are not veridical awarenesses. This is why Uṃveka can take it as an unwanted consequence of Kumārila's interpretation that validity ends up being predicated of awarenesses that are not pramāṇas ... "truth" turns out, in fact, to be a plausible rendering of prāmāṇya – and it would indeed sound absurd to speak of something's being prima facie true." Arnold contrasts two different understandings of how prāmāṇya figures in the epistemic process: "Pārthasārathi disagrees with Uṃveka regarding whether validity is found at the outcome of the epistemic process, or at the beginning. Umveka construes prāmāṇya as the outcome of the epistemic process, so that "truth" turns out ... to be a plausible rendering of prāmāṇya" By contrast, the Pārthasārathi-Arnold view renders prāmāṇya in terms of subjective justification, prima facie justification, prima facie validity etc. and refers to "awarenesses that are prima facie credited with validity". This "prima facie judgment of validity merely begins the process, which is subject to revision

---

34 Arnold (2001) 644
35 See Arnold (2001) 607-612
36 Arnold (2001) 612
37 Arnold (2001) 625
38 See Arnold (2001) 612
39 See Arnold (2001) 608
40 See Arnold (2001) 619
41 See Arnold (2001) 619
42 See Arnold (2001) 619
43 Arnold (2001) 625
(subject, that is, to falsification) in light of subsequent, overriding awarenesses.\textsuperscript{44} In this way, Arnold is able to find an affinity with William Alston's discussion in \textit{Perceiving God}, which "defend[s] the claim that putative experiences of God are significantly akin to perceptual experiences ... Alston here eschews a normative-explanatory approach in favor of a strictly phenomenological characterization."\textsuperscript{45} Arnold thus construes prāmāṇyaam “not as \textit{truth} (not as the \textit{outcome} of the epistemic process), but as \textit{prima facie justification} (hence, as the \textit{basis} for the epistemic process)"\textsuperscript{46}.

Arnold goes on to assimilate the accounts of Kumārila’s doctrine given by both B.K. Matilal and J.N. Mohanty to the same type of causal epistemology he attributes to Umveka. Arnold writes:

“Matilal’s presupposition of a causal epistemology has led him to see prāmāṇya precisely as this kind of “effect,” such that its resulting from causes can be likened to a mango’s resulting from conditions of growth. It is, I suggest, fundamentally this notion of prāmāṇya as the culmination of the epistemic process that has Matilal render it as “truth.””\textsuperscript{47}

Likewise, Arnold writes:

"Mohanty, in thinking that the \textit{svataḥ prāmāṇya} of \textit{all} awarenesses absurdly entails the “truth” of erroneous awarenesses, assumes that prāmāṇya must be the end result of the epistemic process, the “effect” that is caused by pramāṇas."\textsuperscript{48}

In sum, for Arnold, “Matilal and Mohanty are guilty of misrepresenting the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[44] Arnold (2001) 625
\item[45] Arnold (2001) 612-613
\item[46] Arnold (2001) 626
\item[47] See Arnold (2001) 641
\item[48] See Arnold (2001) 642
\end{footnotes}
position”⁴⁹ and “are on shaky philosophical ground”⁵⁰ because “the target of the whole Mīmāṃsāka project ... [is] the idea that some particular pramāṇas (some special kinds of awareness) have privileged access to the world.”⁵¹

Subsection 2: Drawbacks of the Pārthasārathi-Arnold interpretation

Taber considers that Pārthasārathi’s interpretation appears theoretically unsatisfying. Taber writes:

“Clearly, the appearance or idea of truth is not the same as truth. Pārthasārathi himself admits, even emphasizes, that cognitions that are in fact false have intrinsic validity, that is, they initially manifest themselves as true. This ... is the problem that most of those outside Mīmāṃsā have seen in the doctrine of svataḥ prāmāṇya.”⁵²

By contrast, Arnold’s adducing of Alston is intended to demonstrate that Pārthasārathi’s notion of subjective justification or prima facie validity is in fact compatible with a robust or realist conception of truth.⁵³

In either case, it seems that no scope is allowed for Kumārila’s account of the epistemic process to be purposive or goal-orientated in any sense. This characterization of prāmāṇyam leads to its disconnection from the process of inquiry. What is missing is the idea that our beliefs are susceptible to normative assessment. Arnold in fact considers it a virtue that Alston “eschews a normative-explanatory approach in favor of a strictly phenomenological

---

⁴⁹ See Arnold (2001) 642
⁵⁰ See Arnold (2001) 642
⁵¹ See Arnold (2001) 643
⁵² Taber (1992b) 212
characterization"\(^{54}\). However, this way the process of belief revision amounts to simply one disconnected belief after another, rather than constituting any kind of epistemic ascent. By denying that one can entertain doubts about what is phenomenologically secure, the agent seems to be denied any motivation to undertake inquiry starting from a position of settled belief. Further, even if external forces compel belief revision, such belief revision would not constitute an epistemic advantage. Rather, change in belief would be no more epistemically noteworthy than the entertaining of one thought followed by a different one. Indeed, the endorsement by Arnold of an epistemic process without epistemic culmination seems rather to acquiesce in a Buddhist notion of process devoid of normativity.

This interpretation seems particularly odd given that the intensity of inquiry of Mimāṃsā authors including Kumārila in their interpretative enterprise seems to be the diametric opposite of the type of intellectual apathy that would follow from the view that finds no intrinsic epistemic value in inquiry. Further, as Lingat explains, “[t]he Mimāṃsā has as its primary object the study of the injunction. It determined and examined the different forms under which it could present itself in the Vedic texts and undertook to define their respective scope of application.”\(^{55}\) Specifically, Lingat explains that “[t]he Mīmāṃsā ("investigation") is a method of exegesis which was originally confined to the Vedic texts.”\(^{56}\) However, “one of the essential tasks of interpretation distinguishes it completely from literary exegesis. It is the search from amongst the rules of smṛti, for that which ought to be held for an obligatory rule of conduct.”\(^{57}\) Thus “the Mīmāṃsā propounds rules which enable the scholar to recognise a true injunction and to determine its sense and significance.”\(^{58}\)

---

\(^{54}\) Arnold (2005) 82

\(^{55}\) Lingat (1973) 153; cf. also Verpoorten (1987) 37, where 'vidhi' or 'injunction' is described as “the chief mīmāṃsaka concept”

\(^{56}\) Lingat (1973) 148-149

\(^{57}\) Lingat (1973) 148

\(^{58}\) Lingat (1973) 149
That the Mīmāṃsā approach to philosophy emerged from this tradition of exegesis of normative statements is a point made by Halbfass, who describes how "[a] genuinely and originally exegetic and text-oriented tradition [i.e. Mīmāṃsā] opens itself increasingly to epistemology and logic"\(^{59}\) leading to a "concurrent amalgamation of philosophy and exegesis."\(^{60}\) Thus "[s]uch concepts as bhāvanā, vidhi, and niyoga all deal primarily with the causal and motivating power of the Vedic word ... but they also refer to problems concerning ethics, the causality of human actions, and the motivating power of language in a far more general sense."\(^{61}\) Ganeri likewise tells us that "[a]lthough it has its origins in a particular context, the Mīmāṃsā theory is clearly a theory of practical reason, a method for deciding what properly is to be done."\(^{62}\) Such a notion of what is to be done can be adapted from the ritual domain not only to the ethical domain but also to the epistemological domain. If in the context of ritual, action leads to liberation, then in the epistemic context, Mīmāṃsā thinkers might be expected to specify actions leading to some ultimate epistemic good such as knowledge or true belief. That this is in fact precisely Kumārila's strategy will be argued in this chapter.

As Francavilla explains, "[t]he Mīmāṃsā's peculiarity may be found in the context of Vedic ritualism and in the capacity of diffusion of ritual thought."\(^{63}\) Thus a robust notion of justification as conforming to an external standard of correctness may be expected in the context of Mīmāṃsā. McClymond explains that "[t]he ability to identify ritual errors assumes that general standards for correct and incorrect ritual action exist, grounded in some authority beyond the realm of the ritual arena itself."\(^{64}\) McClymond discusses the large body of prāyaścitta material in the Vedic corpus, which describes expiatory rites which are to be performed as corrective activity for mistakes made in the performance of rituals.\(^{65}\) Such material may have formed the background for

59 Halbfass (1992) 29  
60 Halbfass (1992) 30  
61 Halbfass (1992) 32  
62 Ganeri (2004) 211  
63 Francavilla (2006) 13  
64 McClymond (2012) 203  
65 McClymond (2012)
Kumārila’s epistemological theorizing, whereby belief correction is a process aiming at a standard of correctness external to the belief formation process itself. Indeed, the idea of an external norm would be expected in other intellectual disciplines involving a rule-governed system, such as generative grammar and legal hermeneutics. Thus Francavilla describes how “the Mīmāṃsā ... has many connections with the grammarians' schools ... it is remarkable that key Mīmāṃsā terms are key terms in grammatical science also.”

Further, Mīmāṃsā is connected with Dharmaśāstra, which Francavilla describes as “a kind of jurisprudential system” the texts of which have “an interpretative character”. Francavilla further explains:

“[t]he Mīmāṃsā is strictly linked to the dharmaśāstra and their origins should be searched for in the same context of learning ... while dharmaśāstra is meant to teach about dharma, the Mīmāṃsā, as a more theoretical science, is concerned with the epistemological investigation into the nature of dharma and the ways to know it.”

Such normative concerns were seemingly not shared by contemporaneous and subsequent Buddhist philosophers, who were not rooted in the traditions of Vedic exegesis. As such, it may be that the contextual framework of Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics from within which Kumārila’s thinking arose would over time have become obscured by the more analytic-reductionist framework within which Buddhist philosophers formulated their own views. Thus later commentators on Kumārila may also have read Kumārila without sufficient attention to Kumārila’s own notion of process, but in a context shaped by the need to respond to Buddhism. Thus, discussing the same stretch of history, Herzberger explains:

“Texts fell into obscurity rapidly. When Vācaspati Miśra, who wrote not much more than two hundred years after Uddyotakara, compared his
work of commenting on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyāvārttika* to the efforts involved in rescuing an old cow deeply sunk in mire, what he was expressing was a lack of communication.\(^70\)

Arnold has reduced the interpretative question to the question of whether the right interpretation is that of Umveka or that of Pārthasārathī, and thus moves too quickly in assimilating the views of Matilal and Mohanty to that of Umveka. The notion of an epistemic process that culminates in an epistemically advantageous situation certainly does involve an analogy with causal process such as a mango ripening, in the sense that prāmāṇya is an outcome, but it need not be a causal epistemology in any sense that requires the agent to determine the sufficiency of the causal conditions from which the awareness has arisen. Indeed, it will be argued that Kumārila considers and rejects just such a possibility.

Rather, the epistemic process may be a purposive and goal-orientated process in the same way as is a mango's ripening. This is not to deny that awareness "becomes true or false depending upon the causal conditions from which it arises"\(^71\), if this is understood as a statement relating to the goal at which the process aims. The reading developed here allows for a provisional attribution of prāmāṇya to a belief that serves as "the basis for the epistemic process"\(^72\) and also the idea that this epistemic process is a culminating process which ends in one's beliefs coinciding with the truth, as per its translation by Matilal and by Mohanty. That there is an idea of directive action or goal-orientation, so that the actions of the agent constitute a process that moves towards and ultimately results in believing propositions that are in fact objectively true, is argued here.

Thus Kumārila's epistemology is seen to involve also a normative directive to the epistemic agent. Without such normativity, it would be difficult to articulate any systematic logic of inquiry, that is, to explain what drives the process of

---

\(^{70}\) Herzberger (1986) 4  
\(^{71}\) Arnold (2001) 642 quoting Matilal  
\(^{72}\) Arnold (2001) 626
inquiry forward not merely from a psychological perspective but from a rational perspective. Key terms used by Kumārila to convey this sense of directionality are prāptā, utsarga and apavāda, which will be discussed in the next section.

Subsection 3: Towards a re-evaluation of the Pārthasārathi-Arnold interpretation

The reading of Kataoka differs somewhat from Arnold in that the term 'prāptā' is understood as 'ascribed' or 'presupposed', rather than as 'obtained'. Contrasting an 'ontological' reading with an 'epistemological' reading, Kataoka explains:

“prāptā must be understood in an epistemological sense … it should mean “be wrongly ascribed” so that the validity of an erroneous cognition will be epistemologically cancelled. And prāptā is often used in the sense “has resulted”, “is [tentatively and often wrongly] concluded”.”

Kataoka contrasts this term 'prāptā' with another of Kumārila's terms, 'āttaḥ', as "was unconsciously presupposed wrongly" and "was unconsciously presupposed correctly" respectively. Kataoka considers that "Pārthasārathi does not fail to incorporate his own view into this passage … which, with a subtle, clever modification, then supports his view" and that “Pārthasārathi's interpretation is not acceptable in taking ... prāptā as avagatā”.

Kataoka translates the Śloka-vārttika verse discussed above as follows:

---

73 Kataoka (2011) 75
74 Kataoka (2011) 76
75 Kataoka (2011) 76
76 Kataoka (2011) 257 fn217
77 Kataoka (2011) 257 fn217
ŚV 2.53: Therefore the validity of a cognition which has resulted from its being a cognition is exceptionally cancelled [only] when [one] finds that the object [of the cognition] is otherwise [than the way it was cognized] or that there are bad qualities in [its] cause.\(^{78}\) (bold font not in original)

The interpretation of Kataoka differs from that of Arnold in that, whereas Arnold reads the claim that 'prāmāṇyam' is 'prāptā' as 'justification obtains', Kataoka understands that an 'ontological' feature of the belief which Kataoka terms 'validity' is '[wrongly] ascribed' or '[wrongly] presupposed'. Thus what is at issue is not an ontological transformation but rather a revision of attributed ontological status. The contrast between these two readings lies in the fact that the Kataoka-type ascription reading allows that the agent's propositional attitude can be assessed as 'right' or 'wrong', and thus that Kumārila's epistemology involves a normative dimension. However, Kataoka does not build on this by finding in Kumārila's discussion any account of normativity or normative process. Kataoka only observes that "Kumārila's use of the word bodhātmakatvena as if he refers to a condition or reason of validity (pramāṇatā) is problematic. However, he probably intends neither a causal nor a logical relationship in a rigid sense ..."\(^{79}\)

The criticism made by Pārthasārathi and Arnold was that Uṃveka's ontological understanding of prāmāṇyam as truth would lead to belief revision being characterized as an ontological transformation. This was premised on the idea that prāmāṇyam is obtained in the case of every awareness, whether true or false. On the revised understanding that prāptā denotes ascription, it can be comprehended how the ascription of a real ontological feature such as truth to a belief ascribed by an agent can be revised without any transformation in the ontology of the belief.

Although this then allows that ascription can be normatively assessed, and that

\(^{78}\) See Kataoka (2011) 257-259; bold font not in original

\(^{79}\) Kataoka (2011) 259
inquiry can aim at the normative goal of true belief, Uṃveka himself does not go on to give any account of this, leaving a rather impoverished account of Kumārila's doctrine. Thus while identifying a real weakness in Uṃveka's analysis, the Pārthasārathī-Arnold interpretation goes too far in reducing the basis of prāmāṇya to a phenomenological claim. Arnold tells us that "on Pārthasārathī's account ... we are justified in forming beliefs about whatever appears in that cognition ... this epistemological claim thus turns on a basically phenomenological point about how cognitions appear". At the same time, Arnold holds that this "is nevertheless compatible with a realist conception of truth". Arnold's characterization of prāmāṇya as prima facie justification is thus intended to support a doxastic account of justification.

The 'ascription' reading of verse ŚV 2.53 allows the possibility of the more natural construal of ŚV 2.47, according to which prāmāṇya is a feature of all pramāṇas, i.e. that only accurate determinations are in fact predicated with a feature which necessitates their being true, although at intermediate stages of inquiry, the epistemic agent may falsely ascribe such a feature to determinations which are not in fact accurate. As such, what is ascribed constitutes a hypothesis.

Previous chapters have examined aspects of the ontology of beliefs as true or false, by discussing the idea of a capacity for accurate determination which features as an essential disposition in the case of pramāṇas, and setting out an ontological disjunction between pramāṇas and non-pramāṇas. It may be surmised that Uṃveka would be in agreement with much of this discussion. However, in this chapter and the next, it is argued that Kumārila's primary concern in setting out this topic is not to provide a 'comprehensive epistemology', as Arnold suggests, but rather to uncover a normative logic of inquiry of the individual epistemic agent. Thus a procedural aspect to the belief

---

\[80\] See Arnold (2001) 620; Arnold (2005) 94-97
\[81\] See Arnold (2001) 620; Arnold (2005) 94-97
\[82\] See Arnold (2005) 66: "It is therefore to be expected that Kumārila found in Śabara's discussion of codanā the need for better elaborating and defending a comprehensive epistemological doctrine."
Section 3: The grammatical and ritual origins of Kumārila’s terminology

The previous section discussed existing scholarship on a key verse in the Śloka-vārttika, which can now be translated as follows:

ŚV 2.53: Therefore [the hypothesis] that a judgment [is based on] a Good Case deliverance, which has been ascribed (prāptā) from the fact of its being a judgment, is replaced (apodyate) [only] by a deliverance that the object [of the judgment] is otherwise [than the way it was originally judged] or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was formed.

The equivalent verse in the Bṛhaṭṭīkā is as follows:

TS 2861: So Goodness of Case [being] the essence of an epistemic kind remains the general operation (autsargikam) in all cases, [and] it is replaced (apodyate) either by a defeating deliverance or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was formed.83

Before making a full examination of what the substance of this verse amounts to, it will be helpful to examine the sources of the technical terminology used by Kumārila in the grammatical and ritual literatures, and thereby to understand the explanatory models that he draws on. Louis Renou was perhaps the first modern scholar to describe how “Indian philosophy follows the grammatical method and makes a massive use of grammatical concepts”84. More specifically, Elisa Freschi writes that “[l]inguistic analysis and

83 TS 2861; the reading of Kataoka (2011) 259 as 'apodyate' has been followed
84 K.Bhattacharya (1985) 7
epistemology are always closely linked in Mīmāṃsā.\textsuperscript{85}

Doniger explains:

“Concepts that seem at first to be mutually contradictory often turn out, on closer examination, merely to constitute a general principle and a series of exceptions to it. This is ... a method whose most extreme form was already achieved in the grammatical treatise of Pāṇini, which set the paradigm for all kinds of scientific inquiry in India: state one general rule, to which the whole of the subsequent treatise constitutes nothing but a series of increasingly specific exceptions. Ritual texts have archetypes and ectypes, rules and exceptions, just like Pāṇini.”\textsuperscript{86}

Doniger here presents a model of general principle and exceptions as an organizational methodology present in Pāṇini’s grammar and also used in ritual interpretation and legal codification. This thesis will find that this methodology was also used by Kumārila in the specification of a protocol for belief. Doniger also presents this methodology as a solution to a problem of apparent contradiction. It will be found that Kumārila makes the same move in motivating his model of inquiry by a problem of apparent conflict.

Through a consideration of Kumārila's use of technical vocabulary, it will be argued that Kumārila's strategy involves an appeal to a generative paradigm that was developed in the earlier grammatical and linguistics literature. This paradigm involves firstly the identification of a natural relation, which is natural in the sense allied to the notion of natural necessity, and secondly, a stage of 'erasing the excess', whereby an initial over-extension of the relation of natural necessity is reversed. This results in a normative protocol for believing constituted by the instruction to host and accept deliverances as per the agent's default competence.

\textsuperscript{85} Freschi (2012) 60
\textsuperscript{86} Doniger (1991) liv-lv; also quoted in part in Francavilla (2006) 187
The Śloka-vārttika verse provides a pairing of the terms 'ascribed' (prāptā) and 'replaced' (apodyate), which Kataoka translates as 'ascribed' and 'exceptionally cancelled' respectively, and which are flagged in bold font above. The Brhaṭṭīkā verse provides a similar pairing of 'general operation' (utsarga)\(^87\) and 'replaced' (apodyate)\(^88\), also flagged in bold font. Similarly, at ŚV 2.65, Kumārila talks about a 'general operation' (utsarga) which is not subsequently replaced (anapodita). All of these terms are technical terms borrowed from the grammatical literature to describe the operation of a grammatical rule. Kumārila's use of these terms indicate that he is seeking to understand the nature of epistemic success in part through the interpretative framework of general and specific rules. In particular, this suggests that his account of epistemic status involves in part a protocol for belief adoption analogous to Pāṇini's protocol for word formation. An investigation of the origins of the terms 'defeat' (bādha), 'ascribed' (prāptā), 'general operation' (utsarga) and 'replacement operation' (apavāda), from which 'replaced' (apodyate) is derived, in the grammatical and ritual interpretation literatures will thus illuminate Kumārila's intention in the present epistemological context.

\(^87\) See also TS 2861, Kamalaśīla's commentary below TS 2862, TS 2865 and TS 2869 where a similar term 'apoh-' is used. This term may be a wrong reading for 'apod-'.

\(^88\) There is some confusion between the terms 'replaced' (apodyate) and 'excluded' (apohyate). In devanāgarī script, it would be difficult to see the difference so there is potential for scribal error. Both editions of TS uses the terminology of apoh- ('exclusion') at TS 2861 and throughout the texts of Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalaśīla. By contrast, Kataoka (2011) 259 quotes 'apodyate' for TS 2862. Accordingly, 'replacement' rather than 'exclusion' has been assumed throughout, as this also makes more sense. A wrong reading as 'apohyate' could have been introduced by later copyists, who were conflating Kumārila's ideas with the Buddhist apoha-theory. The substantive issue addressed here is strengthened by the 'replacement' reading but does not absolutely depend on it. In any case, the terminology of defeat and exclusion is used rather loosely, at least in the edited texts. Kamalaśīla glosses 'dependence on a replacement operation' as 'dependence on a defeater' at TS 2866.
Subsection 1: ‘General operation’ and ‘replacement operation’

Referring to a rule given in Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 6.5.54, Renou explains, “il s’agit de l’application d’un principe grammatical bien connu, aux termes duquel la règle générale (utsarga, nyāya, sāmānya) cède le pas à la règle particulière (apavāda, višeṣa).” Kahrs similarly describes a substitution model which is “a well-developed methodological procedure in Pāṇinian grammar and in the ritual Sūtras.” In the grammatical context, “the linguistic derivational process are accounted for by saying ‘Y occurs in the place of X’ as opposed to ‘X becomes Y’. Kahrs explains that the substitution model was extended from its use in ritual interpretation to the new use in grammar. Kahrs writes:

“In other words, something automatically applies (prāpnoti) unless there is some specific instruction, ādeśa, to overrule it. In practice this comes down to ‘substitute’, and the usage of the term ādeśa in grammar is accordingly nothing more than a special application of its liturgical use.”

In the above Śloka-vārttika verse, Kumārila’s uses the term ‘prāptā’ to signify that a truth-ascription is automatic, and uses the term apodyate instead of ādeśa to indicate a special instruction. Likewise in the Brhat-ṭīkā verse, utsarga has the sense of a general operation which automatically applies.

Herzberger also discusses the transference of a ritual model into grammatical analysis. In the original ritual context, Herzberger surmises that its motivation may have been as follows:

“The problem of finding substitutes for materials prescribed in the context of certain rituals must have become acute as the Indo-European tribes migrated east. The problem was two-fold: to find substitutes and to justify their substitution, ensuring that the Vedic injunction prescribing

89 Renou (1941) 118
90 Kahrs (1998) 176
91 Kahrs (1998) 176
92 Kahrs (1998) 182
Herzberger notes the teleological nature of this model, such that “rituals were conceived of teleologically; they were performed in order to bring about certain ends ... Grammarians found an analogy between this description of ritual and, within the context of sentences, the roles of nouns and the principal verb.” Kumārila's further transference of this model into epistemology suggests that he conceived of the process of inquiry as normatively constrained by the pursuit of an externally defined goal, constituted by some positive epistemic status.

In the context of grammar, the linguist Pāṇini provides a system of rules which constitute a generative grammar of the Sanskrit language. Correctly forming a word from its verbal root and obtaining the correct inflection requires performing a sequence of grammatical operations on the verbal root in the stipulated order. Thus generative grammar involves a normative aspect in that it specifies the rules to be followed in order to achieve a correct description of language.\(^{94}\) In this context, too, Renou explains:

> On sait que Pāṇini a disséminé dans l’Aṣṭādhyāyī, et surtout dans le premier pāda, des sūtra qui constituent des axiomes à valeur générale, “illuminant comme une lampe la grammaire entière” (Pradīpa ad M. I 49 vt. 4) et que la tradition appelle des paribhāṣāsūtra.\(^{95}\)

Cardona describes a particular linguistic debate about how negative particles function within Pāṇini's rules, which are understood as grammatical operations.\(^{96}\) In order to simplify the presentation, instead of taking an example from Pāṇini's rules, the example 'i before e but not after c' can be used. This is a rule that concerns the spelling of words. The first part of this rule stipulates the operation of placing the letter i before the letter e. The

---

\(^{93}\) Herzberger (1986) 18-19

\(^{94}\) cf. Staal (1962) 70 fn.1: “Though modern linguistics aims at being descriptive and not prescriptive, it is possible to formulate general rules prescribing how to arrive at a set of rules which together constitute a description of a language.”

\(^{95}\) Renou (1941) 116

\(^{96}\) See Cardona (1967)
second part tells us that in restricted cases 'i before e' is not done. The two possible interpretations of the negative injunction in this second rule involve interpreting the negative particle in either of two ways, which Cardona terms 'limitation(al negation)' and 'negation (subsequent to tentatively applying)'.

On the first interpretation, the formulation 'not after c' restricts the scope of the 'i before e' to the remaining 25 letters. The whole rule is thus a more economical way of saying 'i before e after a, after b, after d, after e, etc.' Specifying what falls outside the scope of the rule serves to indicate what falls within its scope. On the second interpretation, the formulation 'not after c' constitutes a second operation to be performed subsequent to the first part, which backs out the effect of the first part, so that i is moved before e to yield a tentative result then moved back to its previous place after e to yield the final result. The grammatical end result is the same in either case, so it is a theoretical debate between rival linguistic models. On the first interpretation, negation serves to exclude a positive operation from acting in a domain, whereas on the second interpretation, negation fails to restrict the positive operation but involves subsequent cancellation of that positive operation and replacement by a different operation within a more limited domain.

If we look at the operation element of each part of the rule in isolation from context, there is an apparent conflict between 'place i before e' and 'place e before i'. This conflict is merely apparent, however, either because the rules are restricted to mutually exclusive domains on the first interpretation, or because they are to be considered serially on the second interpretation. In either case, the restriction in scope involves distinguishing between generally applicable and specifically applicable rules. As Cardona tells us, "[a] rule providing a general operation is called an utsarga(vākya), one which provides a

---

97 See Cardona (1967) 34
98 The analogy is slightly imperfect at this point, because the example rule is not part of a larger system of operations in the way that Pāṇini's rules are, so the notion of a previous place is rather shaky.
99 See Joshi and Roodbergen (1981) 44-45 for a discussion of this debate
100 Strictly speaking, it involves cancellation and replacement by a different positive operation. Mere cancellation is modelled by a similar dichotomy between vidhi and pratiśedha.
specific operation is called an *apavāda*(vākya)*"*101 A very similar dichotomy is between vidhi, or positive operation, which operates in an unrestricted domain, and pratiṣedha, or cancellation, which operates in a restricted domain. As Cardona explains, “The essential difference between pratiṣedha and apavāda is that while the latter counters an utsarga by providing another positive operation ... a pratiṣedha counters a vidhi by providing its absence.”102 It is on this basis that the term 'replacement operation' has been chosen here.

These same considerations about the distinction between negation as exclusion from a domain and as replacement are also found in the literature on ritual interpretation, which is developed by a series of thinkers which includes Kumārila. This is a specifically normative context, so the interpretation of the negation becomes a normative question. Staal discusses the differing analyses of negation of both verbs and nouns as either a positive injunction through exclusion (paryudāsa) or a negative injunction through prohibition (pratiṣedha).103 Staal contrasts the ritual injunctions 'he shall not look' and 'he shall not eat'. As instructions within the contexts of particular rituals, the former “positively enjoins something opposed to looking”104, thus involves exclusion, whereas the latter “does not enjoin ... any definite action different from eating, but it prohibits eating”105, thus involves prohibition. A similar distinction obtains in the case of nouns also. Staal provides the single example of the instruction 'not at the after-sacrifices does he say ye-yajamahe', where "the context shows that ... it means ... 'at sacrifices other than the after-sacrifices he shall say ye-yajamahe'."106 Here, negation applies to the term 'after-sacrifices', and the type of negation is exclusion, as it results in a positive injunction.

The notion of 'apoha' or 'exclusion' may also be related to the notion of 'apavāda' or replacement operation. Thus variant readings as 'apohyate' and

---

101 Cardona (1967) 35
102 Cardona (1967) 40
103 See Staal (1962)
104 Staal (1962) 59
105 Staal (1962) 57
106 Staal (1962) 59
'apodyate' are seen in different edited texts. In any case, there is an affinity between the way these two terms denote very similar ideas of an operation that negates and replaces a procedure. In her discussion of the debate between the philosophers Bhartṛhari and Dignāga, Herzberger explains that Dignāga “was forced to concede the consequences that Bhartṛhari had drawn from this view: that the occasioning ground for names is in excess of the spatio-temporal bearers.” However, Dignāga provided an account of apoha as an operation “to erase this excess ... and to restitute the rights of Kātyāyana’s aphorism on names.” Although there are various negational aspects to Dignāga’s apoha operation, the key feature is that “[t]he apoha-operation is restricted to that part of the name-giving sentence which designates its object indirectly through universals ... those elements ... alone are subject to the apoha-operation which are in excess of their spatio-temporal bearers.”

In Chapter Two above, it was seen how Bhattacharya explains that “svabhāva turned out to be, so to say, a lance free and readily available for use by anyone and everyone.” The use of the terms apoha and apavāda by different writers for different purposes suggests that they similarly constitute another terminological resource which could be flexibly employed. Indeed, just as this research notes the parallels in the grammatical literature in regard to the notion of apavāda, Herzberger also suggests, “[m]odels for Dignāga’s apoha operation, I think, are to be found in the deleting procedures used by grammarians, in Bhartṛhari’s view that universals abandon their number when they become associated with individuals ... and in Bhartṛhari’s idea of apoha.”

---

107 Both editions of TS use the terminology of apoh- ('exclusion') at TS 2862 and throughout the texts of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. By contrast, Kataoka (2011) 259 quotes ‘apodyate’ for TS 2862.
108 Herzberger (1986) 124
109 Herzberger (1986) 125
110 Herzberger (1986) 124-125
111 Bhattacharya (2012) 610
112 Herzberger (1986) 125
Subsection 2: More on exceptions

Tantra-yuktis are interpretative devices employed in various Indian intellectual disciplines. As Helmut Scharfe explains in relation to the early political text Artha-śāstra, "Among the tantra-yukti-s listed in XV 1,3 there are logical (upamāna, arthāpatti, samśaya, vikalpa, ūhya) and interpretative (uddeśa, nirdeśa, upadeśa, apadeśa, atideśa, etc.) terms that are also known from the Mahābhāṣya …"¹¹³ Such devices can be seen to constitute a meta-level set of terminology in which the logic of the underlying arguments can be classified or analysed.

Scharfe tells us that "[t]he elaboration of the thirty-two tantra-yukti-s “text-fittings” is the only topic in the last book of the Arthaśāstra (book XV) … the relation of this book with the text is found only in the illustrations; the list of terms and their definitions are absolutely neutral and might as well be taken from another source, e.g. a philosophical text. There are, in fact, indications that the tantra-yukti-s have an extraneous source."¹¹⁴ Scharfe goes on to discuss the presence of similar final tantra-yukti sections in the medical texts Caraka-samhitā and Suśruta-samhitā, and similar tantra-yukti listings or discussions in the Tamil grammar Tolkāppiyam, the Tamil grammar Nānṉūl and in the Śāmkhya text Yuktidīpikā.¹¹⁵ Scharfe suggests that several of these texts "can be dated in the first few centuries A.D."¹¹⁶ As a "system of establishing rules and procedures"¹¹⁷, it might be expected that Mīmāmsā would contain just such tantra-yuktis, even if not explicitly documented.

One of the technical devices listed in the Artha-śāstra is apavarga, which is substantially equivalent to the notion of an exception also captured by the term 'apavāda'. As Scharfe explains, "[t]he interplay of the general rule and its exception is an essential feature of Pāṇini’s grammar; the Mahābhāṣya uses the

---
¹¹³ Scharfe (1993) 265-266
¹¹⁴ Scharfe (1993) 265-266
¹¹⁵ See Scharfe (1993) 268-270
¹¹⁶ Scharfe (1993) 271
¹¹⁷ Taber (2012) 146
terms *utsarga* and *apavāda* for these two classes of rules. In the Arthaśāstra the relation of general rule and exception turns up frequently in the presentation of legal facts." Scharfe refers to a rule providing for divorce, where this is possible under given circumstances, but then a final caveat 'But not when they have begotten children' constitutes "a clearly marked exception to the general rule." Scharfe's second example involves a fine on a breadwinner who refuses to provide for his familial dependents. In this example, "we find not only an exception to the rule, but also an exception to the exception." That those familial dependents who have been cast out of society due to wrongdoing need not be provided for constitutes a first exception; that one must provide for one's own mother constitutes an exception to that exception.

**Subsection 3: 'Exhortation'**

The term 'vidhi' is translated as 'injunction' or as 'prescription'. As Freschi explains, “*vidhi* denotes both a prescriptive sentence and its exhortative core ... I distinguish the two aspects by calling the former "prescription" and the latter "prescriptive force"." Above the notion of vidhi was compared to the notion of utsarga or general operation. Freschi also explains that prescriptive force is connected with use of the optative grammatical ending by the Mīmāṃsā theorists.

Although Kumārila does not use the term 'vidhi' in this discussion, the general notion of exhortation to inquiry appears to be in the background of his discussion. Thus Kumārila's discussion of this topic is provided as part of a

---

118 Scharfe (1993) 271
119 Scharfe (1993) 272
120 See Scharfe (1993) 272
121 Scharfe (1993) 272
122 See Scharfe (1993) 272
123 Freschi (2012) 19
124 Freschi (2012) 20
commentary on a Mīmāṃsā Sūtra that concerns codanā or Vedic injunction. Lingat describes a range of injunctions defined in the Mīmāṃsā literature, including “the primary injunction pure and simple (upatti-vidhi) ... the injunction of employment (prayoga-vidhi) which fixes the order in which the different parts of the rite should be performed ... and the injunction of exclusive specification (parisaṃkhyā-vidhi, which operates as a prohibition) ...”

Similarly, Francavilla explains that "[g]enerally, the term "vidhi" denotes a positive prescription, while the terms niṣedha and pratiṣedha make reference to a prescription having a negative content ... The terms codanā and vidhi are equivalent in many contexts."

Subsection 4: 'Conflict'

Conflict (virodha) is also one of various forms of negation that have been identified in the grammatical literature and it constitutes a technical term in that literature. Patañjali explains that a 'general operation' is 'defeated' by a 'replacement operation'. However, the later linguist Kaiyāta describes an interesting divergence of opinion between Kātyāyana and Patañjali on the circumstances under which this happens. Kātyāyana holds that defeat can only happen when there is conflict between the operations, whereas Patañjali holds that defeat can occur even when there is no such conflict. As Joshi and Roodbergen explain, for the grammarians, the term 'defeat' is used as

---

125 Cf. Kataoka (2011) 160-161
126 See Kataoka (2011) 159-160
127 Lingat (1973) 153
128 Francavilla (2006) 101
129 See for example the discussion by Koṇḍa-bhaṭṭa at Joshi (1990) 288 and referenced below
130 See e.g. MB 2.1.24: “apavādai utsargāḥ bādhyante”. See also Joshi (1969) 158
131 See Joshi and Roodbergen (1973) 18-19 and Joshi and Roodbergen (1976) 15
something that holds between two grammatical operations, whereas conflict (virodha) and sameness of result (ekaphalatva) are terms applied to the outcomes of applying the rules.\textsuperscript{132} Joshi and Roodbergen also explain that defeat cannot hold between two general operations, but only between a general operation and a replacement operation and that conflict (vipratiśedha) "is assumed to occur between two rules, if both are of equal force; if both are applicable to the same example, and if they cannot be applied together."\textsuperscript{133} 

Renou explains:

"Le terme vipratiśedha apparaît aussi dans le rituel en concurrence avec virodha (qui le glose chez M.) et, isolement, avec vibādhamāna ... qui montre un cas ... de la racine bādh- dite de regles qui s'entravent."\textsuperscript{134} 

Renou describes the rule 'in case of conflict, the later [operation] ought to be performed'\textsuperscript{135} as one of the most significant general operations of Pāṇini's grammar. Renou also explains:

"Les philosophes du rituel ont emprunté cette paribhāṣā ; les Mī. XII 4 37 donnent la formule vipratiśedhe param, infléchie d'ailleurs vers une valeur différente "lorsqu'il y a prohibition mutuelle (entre ce qui est en vue du rite et ce qui est en vue de l'homme), c'est l'autre (i.e. ce qui est en vue du rite) qui est à effectuer."\textsuperscript{136} 

If the Mīmāṃsā philosophers were able to adapt the meaning of this rule in the context of ritual, one may expect also a further adaptation to the context of epistemology.

A key discussion in the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra involves various aspects of meaning

\textsuperscript{132} Joshi and Roodbergen (1973) 19 fn.68
\textsuperscript{133} Joshi and Roodbergen (1969) 159
\textsuperscript{134} Renou (1941) 117 fn.1
\textsuperscript{135} Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.4.2: 'vipratiśedhe param kāryam'
\textsuperscript{136} Renou (1941) 117
roughly corresponding to the ideas of denotation, connotation, contextual meaning etc. The discussion of this by Śabara and Kumārila begins by considering whether a statement should be taken according to its denotation or its connotation. In the chosen example, "The Gārhapatya [fire] should be worshipped with the [verse] to Indra"\textsuperscript{137}, the denotation is that the fire is to be worshipped whereas the connotation is that Indra is to be worshipped. There are in fact four possible meanings of the verse, because it is additionally possible to suppose that both should be jointly worshipped or that either one could be freely selected for worship. Here denotation is the general rule (utsarga) and connotation is the exception (apavāda).\textsuperscript{138}

A later sūtra presents six aspects of meaning in order from strongest to weakest. The structure of the discussion by both Śabara and Kumārila is then to examine each of the five adjacent pairs to confirm that they do indeed stand in the relation of stronger to weaker. As such, the structure of this discussion very closely resembles that used by Kauṭilya in the Arthaśāstra to assess the relative gravity of various different types of political crisis that can occur.

In their discussions of how the various elements of meaning play a role, both Śabara and Kumārila himself begin by confirming that there is indeed conflict (virodha) between such elements, which means that there are numerous possible interpretations of any one statement.\textsuperscript{139}

Interestingly, the literature on conflict was still in continuing development by Buddhist philosophers of Kumārila's time and later. Dharmakīrti distinguishes between two varieties of conflict, which I shall translate as 'mutually scope-restricting' and 'mutually displacing'.\textsuperscript{140} This distinction has been discussed in recent scholarship, sometimes using the translations 'conceptual

\textsuperscript{137} Aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhate
\textsuperscript{138} cf. Tantra Vārttika 755 ad 3.2.5: ataḥ param etad vicāryate ka utsargasya visayah ko 'pavādasyēti
\textsuperscript{139} See their commentaries ad Mīmāṁsā Śūtra 3.2.3, 3.2.5 and 3.3.14
\textsuperscript{140} That is, these terms can be used to translate Dharmakīrti's terms sahānavasthāna-virodha and paraspara-sthiti-lakṣāṇa-virodha/ paraspara-parihāra-sthita-lakṣāṇa-virodha respectively
incompatibility’ and ‘factual incompatibility’\textsuperscript{141}.

Dharmakīrti’s former case, ‘mutually scope-restricting’, holds between a property and its negation, as illustrated by the conflict between blue and not-blue. As Kyuma discusses\textsuperscript{142}, the later Buddhist philosopher Jñānaśrīmitra explains that blue and not-blue are a case of mere difference when in separate loci, but become a case of conflict when ascribed to the same locus. It is on this basis that they are termed ‘mutually scope-restricting’. Further, Dharmottara argues that cases such as blue and yellow, which do not feature excluded middle, are a variant of this general case of ‘mutually scope-restricting’. As Woo explains, “parasparasthitilaksānavirodha ['mutually scope-restricting'] … can be understood as a kind of identical relation between properties in the logical world.”\textsuperscript{143} The absence of one property is invariably associated with the presence of the other. Whether this invariable association is founded in either logical or metaphysical necessity, or is merely an empirical correlation is a question which I will not address.

Mutually scope-restricting properties are thus those such as colour that are inalienable from their loci, as they are held to be partly constitutive of their loci, and, due to the concomitant causal restriction, serve to define their entities. We should perhaps imagine different types of flowers such as bluebells and buttercups, or different types of minerals, such as lapis lazuli and gold, whose colour may be taken as innate to their classification as such. This type of conflict is between properties which are in part constitutive of the entity.

By contrast, Dharmakīrti’s latter case, ‘mutually displacing’ “occurs between two opposed facts (vastu, dīos pa), such as light and darkness (ālokāndhakāra) or the sensation of heat and that of coldness (sīto asparśa).” These are states of affairs which can exist in a single locus at different times, because they are not constitutive properties of their loci.\textsuperscript{144} These examples are presumably

\textsuperscript{141} See Bandyopadhyay (1988), Kyuma (1997), Woo (2001)
\textsuperscript{142} Kyuma (1997) 26
\textsuperscript{143} Woo (2001) 424
\textsuperscript{144} Woo (2001) 423
chosen because changes of a single entity or location in temperature and brightness are commonplace phenomena. This model allows properties to be alienable from their substratum, so that a single locus can non-concurrently possess two contradictory properties such as light and dark or heat and cold. Similarly, a thought can non-concurrently possess both prāmāṇya and non-prāmāṇya. As Woo explains:

"When two facts in sahānavasthānānāvirodha ['mutually displacing'] contact each other in a place, the following three progressions occur: 1) They are ready to impede each other’s existence in that place; 2) The one with strong causal effectiveness (arthakriyākārita) nullifies the other with less effectiveness; and 3) Only the former can exist while the latter ceases to exist in that place. So, the two facts described in this ‘incompatibility’ are in a relationship of the impeded and the impeder (nivartyanivartakabhāva)."\(^{145}\)

Specifically, two mutually exclusive or opposite properties are merely different when in different loci but in conflict when in the same locus.\(^{146}\) As Sucarita elaborates, “So, just as a single fire cannot be both cold and hot, in the same way a single thought cannot be both pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa.”\(^{147}\) Kyuma’s explanation, “While S [mutual displacement] occurs between two opposed facts, e.g., the sensation of heat and that of coldness, P [mutual scope-restriction] stands between a property and its negation, e.g. ‘blue’ and ‘non-blue’"\(^{148}\) seems to resonate with Sucarita’s example.

\(^{145}\) Woo (2001) 424
\(^{146}\) See Kyuma (1997) 26
\(^{147}\) atah yathā naikasyāgneḥ na śītōṣṇatvam evam jñānasya na pramāṇāpramāṇam iti
\(^{148}\) Kyuma (1997) 1019
Section 4: Kumārila's logic of inquiry

The above section has provided some resources that can usefully be employed in understanding Kumārila's doctrine. A large part of Kumārila's discussion in both the Brhaṭṭikā and the Śloka-vārttika concerns the case of beliefs formed via non-Vedic sources, including beliefs formed on the basis of perception, reasoning and non-Vedic testimony. The following sections will identify a normative protocol for belief adoption and revision that captures the logic of inquiry, initially through a careful examination of Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.53 in the Śloka-vārttika. This protocol is especially relevant in the case of non-Vedic beliefs.

Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.53 has now been translated as follows:

ŚV 2.53: Therefore [the hypothesis] that a judgment [is based on] a Good Case deliverance, which has been ascribed (prāptā) from the fact of its being a judgment, ...

... is replaced (apodyate) [only] by a deliverance that the object [of the judgment] is otherwise [than the way it was originally judged] or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was formed.

The equivalent verse in the Brhaṭṭikā has been translated as follows:

TS 2861: So Goodness of Case [being] the essence of an epistemic kind remains the general operation (autsargikam) in all cases, [and] it is replaced (apodyate) either by a defeating deliverance or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was formed.

Each of these two verses presents a two-step procedure, explained either in terms of 'being ascribed' and 'being replaced' or in terms of 'general operation' and 'replacement'. The terminology used in these statements is the normative
terminology associated with generative grammar or exegesis of ritual instructions described above. The ascription is of a capacity for accurate determination which is the essential disposition of an epistemic kind, as discussed in previous chapters.

Kumārila's logic of inquiry will accordingly now be examined in terms of stages of a normative protocol followed by a rational epistemic agent. These stages are the instigating of inquiry, the prolonging of inquiry, and the termination of inquiry.

Kumārila's protocol can be likened, first of all, to Goldman's notion of a doxastic decision principle, or DDP. Goldman explains, "We may represent a DDP as a function whose inputs are certain conditions of a cognizer -e.g., his beliefs, perceptual field, and ostensible memories-and whose outputs are prescriptions to adopt (or retain) this or that doxastic attitude-e.g., believing p, suspending judgment with respect to p, or having a particular subjective probability vis-à-vis p." Goldman notes that whether a subject is justified in believing depends partly on some unique DDP being correct, but assuming that this is the case, "Then S is justified in believing p at t if and only if the right DDP, when applied to the relevant conditions that characterize S at t, yields as output the prescription "believe p"." This notion of a DDP captures a regulative function of justification principles, which Goldman distinguishes from theoretical functions of justification principles. Goldman writes, “It may well be suggested that a cognizer is justified in believing something just in case the rules of proper epistemic procedure prescribe that belief. Principles that make such doxastic prescriptions might thereby “double as principles of justification.” This would perform a regulative function. By contrast, a theoretical function is served by a theory which “considers an already formed belief of a cognizer and says what features are necessary and sufficient for that

149 Goldman (1980) 29
150 Goldman (1980) 30
151 Goldman (1980)
152 Goldman (1980) 27
belief to count as justified.”

A pragmatics of inquiry involving three conceptual stages in the process of inquiry will now be identified in Kumārila's discussion. This stagewise process constitutes a pragmatics of inquiry in the Peircean sense of a belief-habit. As Burks explains, “As a pragmatist Peirce held that a belief is a conscious habit of action ... Peirce calls the activity of resolving genuine doubt and arriving at stable belief-habits inquiry ... Peirce conceived of the three kinds of reasoning (abduction, deduction, and induction) as three stages of inquiry.” Kumārila's belief protocol can similarly be understood in terms of a belief-habit of the agent who seeks to arrive at stable beliefs. Like that of Peirce, Kumārila's protocol would "lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be disappointed".

Kumārila's canvassing of three alternatives to his own view was discussed above. It will be suggested that Kumārila's critique of the second view serves to buttress his conception of how inquiry is instigated, Kumārila's critique of the first view serves to buttress his conception of how inquiry is prolonged, and Kumārila's critique of the third view serves to buttress Kumārila's conception of how inquiry is terminated.

**Section 5: The instigating of inquiry**

By rebutting the second view, discussed above, according to which neither epistemic success nor epistemic failure constitute the default intrinsic nature of deliverances, Kumārila is able to set up a presumption that one or the other is in fact the default intrinsic nature of deliverances. As such, the epistemic agent must also default to accepting one or other status for his judgments. Kumārila's own view was that epistemic success must be ascribed to judgments

---

153 Goldman (1980) 29
154 Burks (1946) 303
155 CP 5.197 quoted in Burks (1946) 303
by default. As a result, the agent must affirm or deny the propositional content of an awareness, but may not suspend belief as to the truth of a judgment in the way that Śāntarakṣita will advocate. Thus Kumārila's universe of propositional attitudes for inquiry includes belief, denial, and, as we shall see, genuine doubt, but not suspension of belief. Kumārila's claim is that the process of inquiry begins with acceptance of propositional content as true, mirroring the psychological fact that we are willing to believe on first impressions.

This claim is supported by employing terminology from the normative disciplines as described above. The notion of a general operation involves the idea of an initial prescription which is rationally justified by its role in instigating a normative process, here the process of inquiry. Similarly, the notion of 'ascription' indicates a first stage in the process of inquiry, subject to later revision.

The first part of the verses under examination, as set out above, run as follows, in the Brhaṭṭikā and the Śloka-vārttika respectively:

TS 2861ab: So Goodness of Case [being] the essence of an epistemic kind remains the general operation (autsargikam) in all cases, ...

ŚV 2.53ab: Therefore [the hypothesis] that a judgment [is based on] a Good Case deliverance, which has been ascribed (prāptā) from the fact of its being a judgment, ...

In the Brhaṭṭikā presentation, Kumārila clarifies the procedure of a defeasible general operation potentially followed by replacement operation. Kumārila's use of the term 'ascribed' in the Śloka-vārttika presentation similarly serves to introduce the feature of prāmāṇya into the epistemic process through an initial operation. As per the discussion of the previous chapter, what is ascribed is a capacity for epistemic success which is a real dispositional property, and by extension epistemic success itself. This attribution involves a transition from
the fact that an awareness has been produced to the fact that this awareness is veridical, i.e. that a belief has been formed which accurately determines its object. Thus the term 'ascribed' introduces a truth-claim which is provisionally attributed on the basis that it would account for the awareness that has arisen.

Such a notion accords well with Charles Peirce's notion of a hypothesis and its role in abductive inference. Peirce tells us:

"By a hypothesis, I mean ... any ... supposed truth from which would result such facts as have been observed"\textsuperscript{156}

Kumārila's term 'prāptā' or 'ascribed' can thus be seen as a way of introducing a claim that functions in the same way as a hypothesis functions for Peirce. Specifically, the fact that p constitutes a hypothesis that would account for the awareness as of p. In the terms of Kumārila's gloss, the fact that a capacity to accurately determine an object has operated constitutes a hypothesis that would account for the awareness as of an accurately determined object.

Further, the structure of Kumārila's argument in the first half of each of the above verses parallels the structure of Peirce's abductive inference. There are numerous interpretative difficulties concerning Peirce's views on abduction, but affinities can be found at a high level. As Fann explains, already in his earlier papers, Peirce considers abduction as an evidencing process, whereby:

"we pass from the observation of certain facts to the supposition of a general principle to account for the facts ... abduction is an inference from a body of data to an explaining hypothesis, or from effect to cause ..."\textsuperscript{157}

In Kumārila's argument, the idea that an accurate determination has been made and the awareness as of an accurately determined object likewise stand

\textsuperscript{156} CP 6.525 quoted in Frankfurt (1958) 596
\textsuperscript{157} Fann (1970) 10
in the relation of explaining hypothesis to data and in the relation of effect to cause.

Like Peirce, Kumārila's use of inference is to move from the explanatory value of the proposition to attributing truth to the proposition. However, Peirce treats abductive inference within the context of scientific discovery, with its multiplicity of observation about each of which many hypotheses can be made. By contrast, Kumārila applies a similar form of reasoning to the single question of the epistemic status of an occurrent judgment, where only two possible hypotheses are available, that it is accurate or erroneous. In this way, the question of hypothesis construction does not feature. Only the question of hypothesis selection is a live question. At this stage, Kumārila's discussion is focused on the case on ordinary beliefs rather than beliefs formed on the basis of Vedic scripture.

Frankfurt contrasts the way in which “abduction leads us to adopt hypotheses as working hypotheses, as worthy of investigation and verification” with induction, which “leads us to adopt hypotheses as true or as verified.” Abduction thus leads us to hypotheses which, in the expression used by Fann, are adopted ‘on probation’. Similarly, Kumārila's presentation involves assuming the accuracy of any given perceptual, rational or testimonial awareness as a working hypothesis or hypothesis on probation.

Fann adds that abduction is an ampliative form of inference, where the conclusion amplifies rather than explicates what is stated in the premises, and so does not follow from the premises with necessity. As such, it is “the only kind of reasoning that introduces new ideas into our store of reasoning.” There is an affinity with the way in which “being a source of new information is an important characteristic of pramāṇa ... for Kumārila.”

---

158 Frankfurt (1958) 595
159 Frankfurt (1958) 595
160 See Fann (1970) 7-8
161 Fann (1970) 7-8
162 Kataoka (2003) 89
Kumārila's idea is thus that the application of the general operation results in rational belief in its propositional content rather than just suspension of belief in that propositional content pending some further determination. As Kataoka notes, such dependence on some further determination is one reading of the 'from something else' position opposed to Kumārila's own 'from itself' position.\textsuperscript{163}

In the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila begins to set out his own view as follows –

ŚV 2.47: It should be understood that the validity of all pramāṇas is independent, for a capacity not existing by itself cannot be produced by something else.

Kumārila's argument for independent validity appears \textit{prima facie} to be the same as the argument of the 'both independent' advocate for the first view of independent validity discussed above\textsuperscript{164}. That is, both Kumārila's own view and the first view reason from the fact of awareness (bodhakatvam) to prāmāṇyaḥ. However, as described above, the advocate of the first view engaged in forward reasoning from the fact of awareness to a deductively valid conclusion. By contrast, Kumārila's 'ascription' terminology suggests that Kumārila engages in backward reasoning from the fact of awareness to a hypothetical explanation which locates prāmāṇyaḥ as a feature in the awareness, i.e. posits that an accurate determination has been made.

In order to get the process of inquiry started, then, a general rule must be applied, which is to attribute truth to a belief on a basis that purports to be modally necessary due to the metaphysical nature of beliefs. That is, the belief is individuated as a true belief on the assumption that all relevant facts that could compromise the truth of the belief are known. This step can be

\textsuperscript{163} See Kataoka (2011) 63
\textsuperscript{164} This point is made in Kataoka (2011) 233-4 fn170 commenting on ŚV 2.34ab: “This view of svatahprāmāṇyaḥ is the same as Kumārila's own siddhānta in that it takes validity to be ontologically innate to itself.”
considered quasi-analytic in nature because truth is analytically entailed when conditions are appropriately normal, i.e. by Good Case deliverances. That is, when the subject’s cognitive faculties and the environmental conditions are sufficiently good, then the belief that is formed is guaranteed to be true due to the possession of a causal power which manifests itself under such circumstances. Similarly, Fann explains that abduction “is the only logical operation which introduces any new ideas; for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis”\textsuperscript{165}.

This step yields an intermediate result. The terms 'utsarga' and 'prāptā' in the above verses thus build on their significance in the earlier contexts by suggesting that an apparent awareness should be treated as a working hypothesis. Prakken similarly explains that “a general rational principle people employ is: assume as much as possible that things are normal; under this assumption conclusions can be drawn which have to be retracted only in unusual circumstances.”\textsuperscript{166}

It can now be seen that the strength of Pārthasārathi's interpretation is that it captures how the process of inquiry gets going. We must act as though validity is in fact produced in the case of all awarenesses, whether true or false. As Arnold explains, Pārthasārathi's interpretation is based on “what Umveka saw as an unwanted consequence: that all cognitions must be assumed intrinsically to confer prima facie justification.”\textsuperscript{167} However, whereas for the Pārthasārathi-Arnold reading, this idea is "the whole doctrine of intrinsic validity”\textsuperscript{168}, in the present interpretation this is considered merely an instigating stage within a larger normative process of inquiry, with further stages to be described next.

\textsuperscript{165} CP 5.171, quoted in Fann (1970) 10
\textsuperscript{166} Prakken (1997) 67
\textsuperscript{167} Arnold (2005) 92
\textsuperscript{168} Arnold (2005) 92
Section 6: The prolonging of inquiry

It has been argued in the previous section that Kumārila’s line ŚV 2.53ab involves a Peircean abductive inference to the truth of the belief, that is, to the hypothesis that the occurrent awareness has made an accurate determination. It will now be argued that the second half of the above verse, line ŚV 2.53cd, presents a subsequent stage of inquiry whereby the hypotheses can be replaced by a contrary hypothesis under certain circumstances. Together, the two parts of the verse constitute the protocol for the epistemic agent which capture the logic of belief adoption and revision.

The second part of the verses under examination, as set out above, run as follows, in the Śloka-vārttika and the Brhaṭ-ṭīkā respectively:

ŚV 2.53cd: [the hypothesis] ... is replaced (apodyate) [only] by a deliverance that the object [of the judgment] is otherwise [than the way it was originally judged] or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was formed.

TS 2861cd: [the hypothesis] ... is replaced (apodyate) either by a defeating deliverance or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was formed.

The Śloka-vārttika verse above explains that replacement is based on (an awareness of) either the object being other than what was originally believed, or the belief forming process having gone wrong in some way. The second possibility is expressed in terms of the causal factors of awareness being defective. The Brhaṭ-ṭīkā verse similarly explains that replacement is based on a defeater or on the belief forming process having gone wrong in some way. The Brhaṭ-ṭīkā verse appears to draw a distinction between a defeater and a faulty belief-forming process. However, the Śloka-varttika clarifies that both are cases involving defeat, as the latter case is one where ‘defeat has been
indirectly ascribed\textsuperscript{169}, and Kamalaśīla also makes the same point.\textsuperscript{170}

In these verses, Kumārila presents a process of defeat as causing belief revision, thereby moving forward the process of inquiry. By focusing on the role of the defeating awareness, Kumārila's protocol involves a notion of mental state defeater. Indeed, Kumārila provides no independent discussion of propositional defeaters, indicating that his sole concern is to provide a protocol executable from the perspective of the individual knower. Goldman likewise explains that the inputs to a DDP should be current cognitive states rather than states of the world such as truth and falsity. This is because:

"If a DDP is to be actually usable for making deliberate decisions, the conditions that serve as inputs must be accessible or available to the decision-maker at the time of decision."\textsuperscript{171}

The notion of 'bādha' or 'defeat' is also seen in the ritual interpretation literature. Francavilla explains:

"in case of conflict [between various types of sources] ... the preceding source prevails on the following. This is seen as a case of bādha, that is to say, exclusion, which is a general way to organise normative complexity that applies also, for instance, to methods of interpretation."\textsuperscript{172}

Kahrs' identification of a model of substitution as "a well-developed methodological procedure in Pāṇinian grammar and in the ritual Sūtras"\textsuperscript{173} was discussed above. In her discussion of Kahrs' findings, Candotti tentatively concludes that "a substitution model was, by the time of Pāṇini, at the disposal

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{169} See ŚV 2.58
\item \textsuperscript{170} See P under TS 2862: “bādhaḥ – arthānyathātvāvadhāraṇaṁ kāraṇa-duṣṭa-jñānam ca”
\item \textsuperscript{171} Goldman (1980) 30
\item \textsuperscript{172} Francavilla (2006) 189
\item \textsuperscript{173} Kahrs (1998) 176
\end{itemize}
of all schools with an hermeneutic background and aim.” Kumārila’s notion of defeat likewise seems to tie into this idea of substitution derived from the ritual context. Thus Kumārila writes:

ŚV 2.58: On the other hand, in the case of an awareness that the cause is defective, although a different object is established, defeat is ascribed indirectly, having the same object, like the milk-pail etc.

Jayanta explains this example more fully, as follows:

'[Water] should be carried [towards the east] using a milk-pail [for the sake] of one who desires cattle’ - here, because of the reference to cattle as the desired object, the milk-pail is for the sake of humans, so, even though [they] thus deal with different [things] due to [their being used] for the sake of ritual and for the sake of humans, there is a single effect of the wooden bowl and milk-pail called 'carrying', so when that [carrying water] by the milk-pail is being accomplished, the wooden bowl ceases [to be applicable].

The example concerns a situation where the general form of the ritual is modified by substituting a milk-pail for a wooden bowl. This modification is made to reflect the fact that the patron of the ritual acts from a desire for cattle, i.e. a human purpose, rather than out of a duty to maintain the performance of the ritual, i.e. a ritual purpose. By raising this example, Kumārila is suggesting that a defeater acts to replace a belief. That an overriding defeater conforms to such a model, by pushing out the old belief, might be evident, but Kumārila here emphasizes that an undercutting defeater acts in this way, because the original belief is replaced by a belief in the opposite proposition.

Candotti (2012) 35

NM 432: “godohanena paśu-kāmasya pranayet iti kāmyamāṇa-paśu-nirdeśat puruṣārtham godohanam ity evam krtvartha-puruṣārthatayā bhinna-visayatve 'pi camasa-godohanayoḥ pranayanākyaṁ kāryam ekam iti godohanena nirvṛtte tasmiṁś camaso nivartate|”
As Kahrs explains, one mode of substitution is 'ceasing', as for example, "when one says 'Bitter herb medicine in the case of phlegm', one means that the phlegm is removed when the medicine is taken." In a similar way, for Kumārila, defeat of a belief involves ceasing to ascribe a positive epistemic status to a belief not through mere cancellation of that status, but by substituting an opposed status. In terms of the feature-placing model discussed above, whereby conflicting features may alternately be posited of a single substratum, Kumārila’s conception seems to be that defeat can only occur when one feature is substituted for another at a later point in time. Kumārila's term 'defeat' (bādh-) thus constitutes something like an antonym for his term 'ascribe' (prāp-). In Kahrs' description of the substitution model in grammar, “stages in the linguistic derivational process are accounted for by saying ‘Y occurs in the place of X’ as opposed to ‘X becomes Y’.” Similarly, in Kumārila's epistemology, an ascription of positive epistemic status can be overturned not by mere cancellation but only by a positive act of substitution for an alternative epistemic status. This again connects with Kumārila's endorsement of negation as difference and conflict rather than absence.

In the modern context, Claudia Blöser traces the notion of defeasibility back to an article, 'The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights' by H.L.A Hart. There Hart notes that “it is usually not possible to define a legal concept such as "trespass" or “contract” by specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for its application.” For such legal concepts, the word 'unless' is indispensable, as it indicates how a contract, for example, can be defeated, even when the ordinarily sufficient conditions have been satisfied. Hart explains that he will "borrow and extend" the word 'defeasible', which was previously being "used of a legal interest in property which is subject to termination or 'defeat' in a number of different contingencies but remains intact if no such contingencies

---

176 Kahrs (1998) 249
177 Kahrs (1998) 176
178 Hart (1949) 174
179 See Hart (1949) 174-175
180 Hart (1949) 175
Hart thus identifies such concepts as both ascriptive, such that they "ascribe responsibility for actions" and defeasible. Fascinatingly, as Blöser explains, Hart "identifies a defeasible structure ... also for concepts traditionally designated as “mental elements” in criminal law, such as mens rea, intentionality or voluntariness." Hart explains that, although jurists have striven to identify some positive definition of such concepts, nevertheless, their content is in fact given by the absence of any defeater. Hart writes:

"the word “voluntary” in fact serves to exclude a heterogeneous range of cases such as physical compulsion, coercion by threats, accidents, mistakes, etc., and not to designate a mental element or state; nor does “involuntary” signify the absence of this mental element or state."  

Hart's notion of ascription seems to parallel that of Kumārila, in as much as to ascribe prāmāṇya is to make a normative judgment that appropriately normal causal conditions are responsible for the arising of a belief. Further, Hart's defeasible structure parallels that of Kumārila, inasmuch as Kumārila's stipulation involves the idea that the end of inquiry results in prāmāṇya being ascribed not on the basis of some positive definition. Rather, what Hart says about certain legal concepts, that "in order to determine ... how their presence and absence are established it is necessary to refer back to the various defences [i.e. possible defeaters]" can also be said about Kumārila's notion of prāmāṇya.

This also ties in with a pattern of ritual structure where an action is to be performed in cases where no stated exception holds. Kahrs analyses passage 24.8 from the paribhāṣā section of the pre-common era text the Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra as an example of general case and exceptions and summarizes its structure and purport as follows:

181 Hart (1949) 175, also quoted in Blöser (2013) 131
182 Hart (1949) 171
183 Blöser (2013) 132
184 Hart (1949) 180, also quoted in Blöser (2013) 132
185 Hart (1949) 181
“the default case is that one sacrifices on the Āhavanīya fire; unless there is a specific instruction, the sacrifice must be made by the Adhvaryu priest; unless there is a specific instruction, the sacrifice must be made by means of a Sruc ladle; unless there is a specific instruction, the sacrifice must be made only after the fire has received the kindling. Otherwise a specific instruction (ādeśa) would tell you to substitute that for the general instruction.”

In this passage, there is no positive specification of sufficient conditions for sacrificing on the Āhavanīya fire. Rather, such an instruction obtains in the absence of a specific exclusion. Similarly mens rea in Hart's analysis, and prāmāṇya in Kumārila’s analysis, are both ascribed, to the defendant and to the judgment respectively, in the absence of a contrary instruction.

From this beginning, defeasibility has come to feature in epistemology and other areas of philosophy. Similarly in the Indian context, it appears that Kumārila makes a parallel move by transferring a notion from the context of legal and ritual interpretation and generative grammar into epistemology. Indeed, this should be unsurprising given the position of Mīmāṃsā as a theoretical resource for legal reasoning in classical India.187 Thus both Mīmāṃsā reasoning functioning in the context of legal and ritual interpretation in classical India, as well as contemporary legal reasoning, involve forms of defeasible, case-based reasoning or informal logic. As such, it should not be a surprise that Kumārila here presents a reasoning strategy which does not conform to a deductively valid schema but rather to a defeasible, informal logic which has much in common with contemporary legal reasoning.

In contemporary epistemology, the notion of a defeater seems to have been

186 Kahrs (1998) 183; the quoted sentence has been broken out onto separate lines for clarity
developed in the context of literature on “defeasibility conditions”, which represented one response to the Gettier problem, according to which knowledge was analysed as undefeated justified true belief. As Shope explains, “Certain modifications of a standard analysis of knowing involve what are commonly called "defeasibility conditions," but there is no agreement about the definition of that technical label.” In the literature, defeat is considered to apply to the justification for a belief or to the reason for holding the belief, rather than to the belief itself. Michael Bergmann distinguishes between "'propositional' defeaters (which are propositions) and 'mental state' defeaters (which are either propositional attitudes or experiences or combinations thereof)." According to Bergmann, in a defeasibility account of knowledge, “the mere truth of [a defeater for a belief] prevents [that belief] from counting as knowledge.” By contrast, a mental state defeater is internal to the believer and is constituted by whatever would cause a belief to be justified. Moving between the two notions of defeat corresponding to these two types of defeater, Goldman explains that “an indefeasibility theory would say that S's justification j for believing that p is defeated if and only if there is some true proposition q such that the conjunction of q and j does not justify S in believing that p. In slightly different terms, S's justification j is defeated just in case p would no longer be evident for S if q were evident for S.”

Arnold importantly observes that defeat is just by another cognition and not by some special falsifying cognition. The conclusion drawn from this by Arnold is that there is no more to the process of one cognition overriding another than what is phenomenologically given. Characterizing defeat in terms of overriding rather than undercutting, Arnold writes: "a cognition can present itself as falsifying a previous one just insofar as it is the subsequent one that seems more credible. And if that is not how it seems, then it will not appear,

---

188 See Shope (1983) 45-74 for a survey of the literature on defeasibility in the context of additions to the JTB analysis of knowledge.
189 Shope (1983) 45
190 Bergmann (2005) 422; see also Bergmann (2006) 154-159
191 Bergmann (2005) 422
192 See Bergmann (2005) 422
193 Goldman (1976) 774
194 See Arnold (2005) 73
phenomenologically, as an overriding cognition!\textsuperscript{195}

The above verse links the objective fact that the belief formation process was flawed with the psychological fact that the belief is destabilized. Kumārila's notion of flaw again suggests that the belief process and thus the epistemic status of the belief produced can be normatively evaluated. Further, this normatively evaluable status is linked with the psychological process of destabilization of beliefs in a way that allows the subject to move away from a normatively sub-optimal situation. Specifically, Kumārila's account involves two bases for belief revision. Firstly, further inspection may show the nature of a distal object to be something other than what was initially believed. Here, Kumārila recognizes the Peircean point that beliefs can be revised based on a "return to the object of their disquiet, namely the particular thing not known."\textsuperscript{196}

Secondly, Kumārila provides an alternative non-Peircean method of belief revision, whereby instead of returning to the distal object, one re-considers the circumstances of belief formation. If these are sub-optimal, this fact will destabilize the settled belief which was formed under such circumstances.

This distinction between two types of defeaters roughly corresponds to the distinction between overriding and undercutting defeaters in contemporary epistemology. As Janvid explains, "[a]n overriding defeater to a knowledge-claim P provides justification for non-P, while an undermining defeater to P defeats the justification provided for P. In the latter case, no justification has thereby been provided for non-P."\textsuperscript{197} Janvid provides the example of a printed flight itinerary, where an overriding defeater may be contrary information on the airport departure board, and an undermining defeater might be the discovery of a misprint in the itinerary.\textsuperscript{198} However, whereas Janvid clarifies that defeat occurs only when "the evidence for non-P is stronger than the evidence for P"\textsuperscript{199}, so, in the airport example, presumably the departure board

\textsuperscript{195} Arnold (2005) 73
\textsuperscript{196} Wiggins (2004) 94
\textsuperscript{197} Janvid (2008) 47
\textsuperscript{198} See Janvid (2008) 47
\textsuperscript{199} See Janvid (2008) 47
information is presumed to have greater authority than a printed itinerary, Kumārila does not make this feature of defeat explicit.

The previous chapter presented an operational disjunction between pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa, whereby the former functions independently whereas the latter functions dependently and thereby ceases. It can now be seen that non-pramāṇa ceases when undercutting and overriding defeaters effect the removal of bad features. The undercutting defeater removes the bad feature by identifying its presence in the process of belief formation, whereas the overriding defeater removes the bad feature despite not specifically identifying it in the cause. In one case, the vitiation is apprehended, and in the other case, the vitiation is supplanted. By contrast, the functioning of a pramāṇa in apprehending a distal object does not depend on any separable feature, but is simply due to the nature of awareness itself. As such, nothing can cause the apprehension of a distal object by a pramāṇa to cease.

In order to understand better the significance of the defeat process, Kumārila's discussion in the Brhat-tikā will now be examined. This constitutes a “more refined and sophisticated” discussion than that in the Śloka-vārttika, and a close reading of a core section of this text will illuminate the role of defeat in this belief protocol. Kumārila starts by linking replacement with the arising of a mental state defeater in the ordinary process of belief formation as indicated. Kumārila writes:

TS 2865: The mental state defeater is just the determination that the object is different [from how it was originally cognized]. It excludes the earlier deliverance because it has a success of deliverances that is independent.

Kumārila next considers the status of the revised belief that has replaced an original belief:

200 Kataoka (2011) 46
TS 2866: Although in respect of those [defeaters] there may again be dependence on replacement operation, in some cases, nevertheless, for a person who has developed a genuine doubt due to the earlier awareness, that [dependence] however will easily come to an end.

The first part of this verse characterizes the possibility of repeated defeat in terms of dependence on replacement operation.

The second part of this verse allows for the entertainment of doubt, so that the universe of propositional attitudes includes scope for doubting one's occurrent awarenesses and determinations. Kumārila is here considering the case of an either/or situation, where defeat of one possibility has nevertheless caused some element of residual doubt, as clarified in the next verse. Kumārila recognizes that a believer may entertain a legitimate doubt even when her current phenomenological awareness is unproblematic, as in this case when she wonders if she was right to revise her belief. The acknowledgement that the believer can exercise such doubt, so that the possibility of defeat can be entertained in respect of an awareness that is as yet phenomenologically secure, seems to tell against Arnold's reading, whereby phenomenological security is the entire basis for epistemic justification and for Arnold's conception of truth. Rather, what is provided by the belief is not theoretical justification but Goldman's regulatory justification, merely justifying the holding of that belief at the relevant stage of inquiry.

Kumārila's paradigm inquirer in the above verse is the person who has a genuine doubt. By linking the process of inquiry with the possession of genuine doubt, Kumārila endorses a belief-doubt model of a general type found by Isaac Levi in the work of the great American pragmatists, Charles Peirce, John Dewey and William James. In his book, 'Pragmatism and Inquiry', Levi discusses how these thinkers characterized epistemology in terms of problem-solving inquiry. Levi explains:
“Inquiry according to Peirce is a struggle to replace doubt by true belief. As such, inquiry calls for a transformation of one state of belief (a state of suspense or doubt in some respect) to a state where the doubt is alleviated.”

A similar transformation is discernible in the above verse, where the doubter is able to allay her doubt. Kumārila also links such doubt with the idea that replacement is dependent, thereby accepting that the first stage of belief revision cannot be guaranteed to bring the process of inquiry to an end. Thus Kumārila next explains how a misleading defeater can in turn be defeated if and when the subject comes to form further beliefs, leaving her original belief intact:

*TS 2867*: *If another defeater of this [second belief], being further sought for, is produced, then by the defeat of the middle [second] belief, the first alone has prāmāṇya.*

Thus, as described above, the process of inquiry may continue to toggle between two opposed beliefs, each supplanting the other through replacement, acting as a mental state defeater of the other. We can again compare with the grammatical context, where some exceptions themselves have exceptions which restore the original rule. The case of a fine on a breadwinner in a legal context was also discussed above as involving an exception to an exception. Kumārila’s protocol for belief change can be depicted as follows, where token deliverances from epistemic sources are represented on the left hand side. In the case of an overriding defeater:

\[
\begin{align*}
p \rightarrow B(p) \\
\neg p \rightarrow B(\neg p) \\
p \rightarrow B(p) \\
\neg p \rightarrow B(\neg p) \text{ etc.}
\end{align*}
\]

---

201 Levi (2012) 1
202 See ŚV 2.59 for the equivalent verse in the Śloka-vārttika
203 See Joshi and Roodbergen (1969) 26-27
This schema is based on a toggle model, as per verse TS 2867 above, in which the difference between not believing p and believing that not-p is disregarded. Successive lines show temporally successive changes in belief in response to successive changes in deliverances. In the case of an undercutting defeater, the dependence on appropriately normal epistemic conditions, which can be represented as p|q, becomes explicit, as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
p|q \rightarrow B(p) \\
\neg q \rightarrow \neg B(p)
\end{align*}
\]

However, in the continued absence of a defeater, we have no motive to disbelieve the proposition. Kumārila writes:

**TS 2868:** And if, when it has been correctly sought by appropriate effort, a defeater of the defeater would not be known as it has no basis, ...

**TS 2869:** ... then due to [the defeater's] greater strength (bāliyasā), because it has not been cancelled, the first [belief] will be blocked by [the defeater], [and] the prāmāṇyam of that [first belief] will be cancelled.

Kumārila here clarifies that seeking for a potential defeater plays a role in allaying doubt, and mandates the agent to seek out a defeater, in this case one that might defeat the first defeater. This notion of defeat has roots in the interpretative techniques of Mīmāṃsā\(^{204}\), and it was discussed in great detail by Jayanta.\(^{205}\) As Sarkar explains, in one type of defeat, “where two contradictory texts or contradictory matters are both of equal force, there only is contradiction proper (Virodha). But if one of them possesses greater force than the other, then the former supersedes the latter, and this is called Bādha.”\(^{206}\)

\(^{204}\) See Sarkar (1909) 213-220 for details
\(^{205}\) See NM 452 ff.
\(^{206}\) Sarkar (1909) 219
Arnold's description of *prima facie* justification presented the mere fact of awareness as sufficient for a robust truth-claim. Arnold rightly observes that “justification regarding the truth of beliefs is all that we get here in this sublunary world”\(^{207}\) and goes on to say that “[i]t is precisely the point of Pārthasārathi’s interpretation ... that one cannot know anything more about the truth of one's belief than one already knows in being justified.”\(^{208}\) Whilst the Pārthasārathi-Arnold reading eloquently acknowledges that justification is the only means to approach truth, by holding that Kumārila’s "epistemological claim thus turns on a basically phenomenological point about how cognitions appear."\(^{209}\), it fails to capitalize on the additional resources in Kumārila’s presentation, which demonstrate that justification is not an all-or-nothing matter. Rather, justification can be strengthened over time, and indeed Kumārila advises that appropriate effort must be made in order to achieve such strengthening. Thus acquiring sufficient justification is a purposive and goal-oriented activity by the agent.

Further, Kumārila here also claims that defeat is due to the greater strength of the defeater. The notion of relative strength is again one with roots in ritual and grammar, where the rule 'the replacement operation is stronger than the default case'\(^{210}\) occurs in the Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra. Discussing this, Renou writes that "la maxime ... reparaît dans la grammaire et indirectement dans les Mī. Sū."\(^{211}\)

This terminology implies that the agent moves from a weaker epistemic position to a stronger one. Kumārila presents us with a hierarchy of justification, whereby stronger awarenesses replaces weaker ones. Kumārila also allies the sensation of doubt with the idea that one's level of justification can be appraised as strong or weak, and the idea that this can provide a motive to continue with inquiry. This indicates that mere phenomenal appearance is

---

\(^{207}\) Arnold (2005) 97
\(^{208}\) Arnold (2005) 107
\(^{209}\) Arnold (2005) 96
\(^{210}\) ‘prasaṅgād apavādo baliyan’
\(^{211}\) Renou (1941) 121
not sufficient for the removal of genuine doubt. Rather, Kumārila's process of inquiry is a hysteresis process, whereby the present epistemic state of the agent is a function of his past history of inquiry. Thus, the fact that it appears to the agent as if x is the case does not by itself indicate whether or not the agent is justified in that judgment. Rather, this turns on whether this judgment does or does not represent the (pragmatically determined) end of inquiry.

Kumārila's notion of strengthening justification has an affinity with a discussion about strengthening justification in contemporary epistemology. Janvid describes how epistemic contextualism is associated with a "rising standards of justification model" which involves the idea "that challenging a knowledge-claim always raises the original standards of justification". Janvid makes a similar point about how the notion of strengthening involves an external standard, writing that "the metric of strength itself, where the marks of correctness are placed, constitutes an invariant feature of the dialectic of justification. (The standards could not be classified as higher or lower otherwise)."

As we have seen, even a belief that has been revised may be susceptible to future revision. Thus Kumārila seeks to bring the process of doubting and also the possibility of defeat to an end by distinguishing between genuine doubt and spurious conjecture. Kumārila writes:

*TS 2870: Thus the inquirer does not go beyond the third judgment, and so a further defeater is not suspected as no defeater has arisen.*

Kumārila here affirms a link between the psychological sensation of 'suspecting a defeater', i.e. having doubt about one's current beliefs, and the process of inquiry which involves the search for a defeater. By telling us that at a certain stage of inquiry, a defeater is no longer suspected, Kumārila again implies that one may entertain doubts about one's currently phenomenologically secure
beliefs up to a point.

Kumārila here articulates another element of what was characterized above as a belief-doubt model, whereby one only needs to change one’s belief if there are grounds for suspicion of a possible defeater. Thus Levi explains, “Peirce, as I understand and admire him, was a fan of the principle of doxastic inertia according to which there is no need to justify current beliefs (i.e. doxastic commitments) but only changes in belief (doxastic commitments)”215

Kumārila next writes:

*TS 2871:* For he who, having a doubting nature in all his everyday activities, conjectures [a defeater] through delusion even when no defeater has arisen will perish.

*TS 2872:* And so being a compulsive doubter is censured by Vāsudeva – “O, Kaunteya, neither this world nor the next is for a compulsive doubter.”216

In contrast to the paradigm inquirer discussed above, the person who has developed a genuine doubt (‘jātāśaṇka’), Kumārila now depicts the case of a compulsive doubter (‘saṃsayaṭmā’) whose doubt amounts to mere conjecture (‘utprekṣā’). This contrast also has an equivalent in the pragmatist literature. As Levi explains, for the American pragmatists, “justification for changes in belief ought to be grounded in the methods and information currently free of living doubt.”217 Burks explains that Peirce:

“held that genuine doubt comes about when an actually functioning habit is interrupted ... Once a belief-habit is interrupted the aim is to arrive at a new belief-habit which will prove to be stable, that is, one that would lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the establishment of a habit

---

215 Levi (2012) 32  
216 Here Kumārila quotes a variant on line 4.40cd from the Bhagavad Gītā  
217 Levi (2012) 5
of positive expectation that shall not be disappointed" (5.197). Peirce calls the activity of resolving genuine doubt and arriving at stable belief-habits inquiry.⁴¹²

Kumārila expresses a similar thought in the Śloka-vārttika as follows:

ŚV 2.60cd: But when awareness of a bad feature has not arisen, [there can be] no doubt which is not based on some successful deliverance.

Kumārila's distinction between doubt which is and is not based on a successful deliverance corresponds to the distinction between a living doubt and a mere paper doubt, and this distinction plays a similar role in determining the extent of legitimate inquiry.

A consideration of uberty is also discernible in these verses. As Fann explains, the term 'uberty' is used by Peirce to denote the 'value in productiveness' of adopting a hypothesis.⁴¹⁹ That is, uberty refers to something like fruitfulness in generating new ideas or new content. Uberty contrasts with security, which is the 'approach to certainty' made by the hypothesis. Fann explains that “from deduction to induction and to abduction the security decreases greatly, while the uberty increases greatly.”⁴²⁰ Kumārila's stark warnings against excessive doubt seem likewise to advert to the fact that failure to invest sufficient confidence in one's beliefs would not be a productive attitude.

Kumārila next presents a series of verses which, according to Kamalaśīla, answer the question 'how much replacement is possible and where?'.⁴²¹ Kamalaśīla's introduction indicates that a replacement operation can only occur in limited situations, conforming to the model of 'erasing the excess' described above. Kamalaśīla's use of such terminology also suggests that Kamalaśīla may

---

⁴¹² Burks (1946) 303
⁴¹⁹ See Fann (1970) 8; see CP 8.384 for Peirce's original presentation
⁴²⁰ Fann (1970) 8
⁴²¹ See P above TS 2875: “kutra kiyān apavādaḥ sambhāvyata ity etad darśayann āha”
be alive to the operational aspect of Kumārila’s epistemology in a way that much later thinkers such as Pārthasārathi may not be.

Kumārila begins by stating:

**TS 2875:** Due to meeting with variations in place, time, person, [and] state, the seeker of defeaters determines those [beliefs] which are dependent in whichever respect.

Kumārila here again acknowledges a requirement to seek for defeaters, but restricts this requirement by indexing it to these four parameters. The process of inquiry thus displays a tendency to return to a stable trajectory which is a feature of a homeorhetic mechanism. Specifically, the stable trajectory to which the agent aims as an ideal is the continual formation of correct judgments, and the agent veers away from this trajectory through the formation of erroneous judgments. However, by the very fact of forming erroneous judgments, the agent strengthens the tendency for those beliefs to be defeated by subsequent judgments, thus returing her to the stable trajectory of true judgments.

An example is now provided of something seen far away, which may be suspected to be something other than what it is, “just until one has come close.” It appears Kumārila intends this as a case of ‘time’, where error is resolved with passage of time. Kumārila here connects the disquiet produced by doubt with a perceived need to return to the distal object. Kumārila next states:

**TS 2877:** [Entertaining the possibility of] replacement operation (apavāda) terminates in respect of time, man and state, and the possibility [of replacement] is not entertained other than in regard to...
[those things], like an awareness of a mirage etc.

Kumārila here restates the three cases, time, man and state, but now adds that doubt terminates in each of the three cases. Kumārila goes on to illustrate each of these cases and its termination in the next three verses. In the first case:

TS 2878: Where there is error or ascertainment such as a doubt about being a cow or a horse at a time of great darkness, in that case, [inquiry] terminates when [the object] is manifested.

The idea seems to be that error is here caused by a lack of appropriately normal conditions for belief formation, such as insufficient light. This constitutes a case of time in that the error is 'terminated' when epistemic conditions revert to normal, e.g. more light is provided, the agent moves closer to the object etc. By indexing error to conditions which are transient, the scope for error is restricted in time, and the case is termed one of 'time'.

Secondly:

TS 2879: In cases of confusion about the moon [or about] direction, the letters and accents of the Vedas etc., [there is] a determination to the contrary due to asking another person.

Here, error is indexed to conditions which are localized to a single individual, and the case is termed one of 'person'. Error is here terminated by deferring to the testimony of another person. This example also seems to indicate that what is at stake is objective truth rather than subjective certitude. However, deferring to the judgment of another is preferred over a return to the object itself.

Finally, Kumārila writes:

223 The case of 'place' is perhaps unintentionally missed
Kumārila here recognizes that error can be indexed to features of the agent's internal state. Error terminates when such features are not present. However, it is not clear why termination of states such as hunger and thirst would not constitute a case of 'time', and it is also not clear that states such as madness need terminate at all. Kumārila's expression 'in the absence of those' may indicate that beliefs must be formed by an agent with an optimal state, and that we should simply give up on mad agents.

Sosa similarly considers the difference between Mr. Magoo, who is "extremely nearsighted but totally unaware of his condition"²²⁴ and an ordinary myopic, who is "well aware of his limits"²²⁵. Sosa writes:

"The big difference between Magoo and the ordinary myopic is a difference in self-knowledge with a corresponding difference in self-imposed limits for the use of one's eyes. The ordinary myopic and Magoo are equally deficient beyond arm's length, but the former knows his limits and proceeds accordingly."²²⁶

Kumārila's discussion suggests that error arises when the agent acts like Mr. Magoo, not imposing appropriate limits for making judgements. However, importantly, Kumārila's solution is not to hold the agent epistemically blameworthy for his beliefs. Rather, acting like Mr. Magoo can be consistent with Kumārila's protocol, as improperly formed beliefs will in due course be defeated. In this way, like Mr. Magoo, Kumārila's agent will find that every problematic situation ultimately rights itself.

²²⁴ Sosa (1991) 286  
²²⁵ Sosa (1991) 286  
²²⁶ Sosa (1991) 286
Section 7: Metarules for prolonging inquiry

Kumārila's doctrine has been characterized above as a logic of inquiry, based on a multi-stage process. This suggestion is supported by consideration of Kumārila's critique of the first view, discussed above. Kumārila's objection 'due to conflict' seems to understand the first view in terms of a dual exhortation addressed to the believer to ascribe both prāmāṇya and non-prāmāṇya to beliefs. The surface contradiction is analogous to that between conflicting Vedic normative statements, and Kumārila brings the pre-existing interpretative apparatus to bear on this problem. Francavilla describes a variety of interpretative techniques devised to resolve contradiction, including the following technique described by Kumārila in his Tantra-Vārttika:

"it is just possible that the suspected contradiction could be explained and set aside ... even when they do treat of the same subject, as there would be no contradiction, if one could be explained as a General Injunction, and the other as the prohibition of a particular phase of it."

Francavilla distinguishes between two well-known types of negation, paryudāsa, which is "a restricted or qualified prohibition that must be considered an exception" and pratiṣedha, which is "a general prohibition of what is first prescribed". These were also discussed above with reference to the ritual injunctions 'he shall not look' and 'he shall not eat'. Francavilla explains that the above type of resolution "occurs when there is a conflict between a positive injunction and a negative one ... interpreters could solve apparent conflict by showing that the negative injunction is a paryudāsa." Kumārila thus seems to set up the first view in order to present his own view as emerging from a

---

227 Tantra Vārttika 1.3.2, quoted in translation from Francavilla (2006) 185-186
228 Francavilla (2006) 186
229 Francavilla (2006) 186
230 Francavilla (2006) 186
resolution of the apparent conflict between exhortations concerning what to believe. This resolution is effected by organizing our belief process in terms of a general rule to form beliefs followed by specific exceptions constituted by cases of subsequent defeat.

Similarly, Francavilla explains that "[t]he Sanskrit term for conflict is virodha. This term has a wide semantic scope and is suitable to denote any kind of conflict ... the conflict between normative sentences is connected to the conflict between the actions they lay down as dutiful." Francavilla describes how the mass of apparent contradictions between different Vedic statements led the Mīmāṃsā thinkers to develop principles of interpretation to resolve such conflict. A similar motivation is evident in the contemporary development of similar legal principles. As Prakken explains:

"Regulations come into being and cease to exist in complex ways ... all this can easily give rise to inconsistencies, involving different authorities at different times in different places ... lawyers have developed ways of anticipating such conflicts based on the same structural features of legal systems by which the conflicts are caused."

The problem faced by both versions of the first view described above is that they provide no basis on which the agent can prolong inquiry. It is not coherent to entertain both belief and disbelief with respect to a single proposition, and it is not helpful to know that some propositions are true and others false if there is no further instruction as to which epistemic status is where. Consideration of this view helps to motivate Kumārila's idea that the logic of inquiry requires specification in terms of a multi-stage process rather than a single instruction. This is because no feature of the awareness itself which is accessible to the subject is sufficient to identify it as accurate.

Uभैव नुस्थाने makes this point very clear in a separate discussion of another

231 Francavilla (2006) 181
232 See Francavilla (2006) 177-204
233 Prakken (1997) 67
proposed view. Uṃveka describes this view as follows:

"Prāmāṇyam is not merely the nature of awareness; that deviates; rather, a pramāṇa has a cognitive distinguishing feature which [provides] the absence of doubt – 'this is a hand'."{234}

This view acknowledges the difficulty of forming accurate beliefs, but attempts to find some special accessible feature by which one would know it as accurate. However, Uṃveka considers and rejects various candidate features that would satisfy such a condition, viz. clarity, lacking shakiness, or lack of invalidating cognition.{235}

Kumārila's protocol also displays an affinity with the contemporary legal principle of 'Lex Specialis Derogat Legi Generali'. Prakken describes this as a type of legal collision rule, provided to deal with "conflicts between norms"{236}. Prakken explains that "[t]he general idea is, instead of introducing a new operator into the language of a logical system, to augment an existing logical system with a metaprinciple to restore consistency if a contradiction has been derived."{237} Kumārila's rule that a stronger belief defeats a weaker belief constitutes a collision rule which acts as a metarule to the rule to form beliefs.

Kumārila's protocol thus seems to constitute a metarule exhorting the agent to form beliefs, together with a metarule on that metarule to the effect that a replacement operation is stronger than the general operation. In this way, the problem of epistemic fallibility becomes a short-term problem. The individuating role of svabhāva is compromised by the existence of bad beliefs

---

{234} TṬ 50: “nanu na bodhâtmakatva-mātram prāmāṇyam; tad vyabhicarati; nirvicikitsas tu bodha-viśeṣaḥ pramāṇam – hasta 'yam iti'

{235} Jayanta also provides a discussion which is very similar to that of Umveka. However, note that Kumārila also claims that there is a distinguishing feature present in waking awarenesses that distinguishes them from dream-state awarenesses in Śloka-varttika 5.28ab: "jāgra-jñāne viśeśo 'yam supariniscahayah". This claim occurs in the Nirālambanavāda discussion and requires further investigation.

{236} Prakken (1997) 204

{237} Prakken (1997) 44
which are subjectively indiscriminable. However, this compromised status proves to be a temporary phenomenon, because further information is available at a later time which will defeat these beliefs. In this way, the postulated correct apprehension is able to play the role of individuating beliefs, and subsequent lack of defeat confirms the correctness of the apprehension.

Doniger similarly explains in the context of a general Indian theoretical model:

"A metarule on metarules states that the distinctiveness of the particular overrides the general application of the metarule. Thus, 'A specific injunction is stronger than a general one.' Manu, like the Vedic texts it so faithfully follows in this, posits a few general principles and then a host of exceptions."^238

Kumārila's protocol can be expressed in the single operational instruction "Believe beliefs!" although it falls into two theoretical stages. The first stage involves postulation of the capacity in a belief in virtue of which it would be a good belief.\(^\text{239}\) That is, when forming a belief, we should assume that the belief has apprehended its object. The second stage involves forming further beliefs. In cases where the belief was incorrectly postulated, the belief will be defeated.

There is again a parallel with the case of ritual, where as McClymond explains, "if certain life difficulties arise, a householder may suspect that his sacrificial fires have become ritually useless ... In response he can reestablish the ritual fires, starting afresh to correct the problem."^240 McClymond explains that problems can also occur when sacrificial utensils are manipulated improperly\(^\text{241}\), mirroring the case where the epistemic faculties are manipulated improperly in receiving a deliverance.

Does the agent thus exercise his epistemic duty simply by continuing to form

\(^{238}\) Doniger (1991) lv; also quoted in part in Francavilla (2006) 187
\(^{239}\) See TS 2839
\(^{240}\) McClymond (2012) 197
\(^{241}\) See McClymond (2012) 197
beliefs, or is there any specific epistemic responsibility for the avoidance of error? Does the agent fall short in his duty given that in some cases the general operation will yield to a subsequent replacement operation, and thus some beliefs will turn out to be false? The semantic connection between the term apavāda and the term 'āpaddharma' may suggest so. In the Mahābhārata, the term apavāda is used in the context of describing āpaddharma or deviation from ethical norms in times of difficulty. In circumstances of distress, a suspension of ethical norms is mandated which is to be rectified at a later time when conditions become normal. In the story of Viśvamitra and the dog cooker, Viśvamitra chooses to steal and eat dog meat in order to avoid starvation, thereby transgressing ethical norms ordinarily applicable to him as a Brahmin.\textsuperscript{242} Similarly, forming incorrect judgments would constitute an āpaddharma, that is, a sanctioned activity in epistemically sub-optimal conditions.

Nevertheless, that the agent remains epistemically blameless is suggested by a Mīmāṃsā discussion which considers an individual who follows the general rule without specific regard to the problem of exceptions. As Sarkar explains, "is a violation of an exception also to be visited with a penance? Some [Mīmāṃsā writers] answer, no. Because to observe an exception is by itself no duty."\textsuperscript{243} Sarkar provides the example of a man who performs a mandated ritual, but during the night, contrary to a stipulated time restriction. "The effect is that he gets no benefit from the performance of the Srādh [ritual]. But he commits no positive sin."\textsuperscript{244} One can extrapolate from this the idea that to form an erroneous belief, by initially failing to observe the exception mandated by the replacement operation, involves neither epistemic praise nor blame.

\textsuperscript{242} See the āpaddharma-parvan in Mahābhārata Book 12 (Śānti-Parvan)
\textsuperscript{243} See Sarkar (1909) 333
\textsuperscript{244} See Sarkar (1909) 333-334 (page 334 is misnumbered as 234)
Section 8: The terminating of inquiry

In the Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā, Kumārila argues for a 'limit' or 'termination' (avadhi) to entertaining the possibility of defeat, i.e. to further inquiry concerning the truth of any existing belief. Kumārila indexes error to specific circumstances, so that entertaining this possibility comes to an end when the specified conditions are found not to obtain. Kumārila also places this limit within the context of the process of inquiry, where it constitutes an end of inquiry, or an end to the epistemic process. In the Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā, as described above, Kumārila writes:

TS 2870: Thus the inquirer does not go beyond the third judgment, and so a further defeater is not suspected as no defeater has arisen.

Similarly, in the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila tells us:

ŚV 2.61: "In this way, when three or four judgments have been produced, no more judgments are required. Just in this case one judgment enjoys prāmāṇyam from itself."

In the Śloka-vārttika verse, Kumārila asserts that a judgment which remains undefeated will enjoy prāmāṇyam. Whereas the initial judgment was ascribed with prāmāṇyam as a hypothesis, the belief held after a period of inquiry has gained in strength due either to defeating an earlier belief or itself becoming stronger by resisting defeat. That the belief held at this mature stage of inquiry accordingly enjoys greater security in its epistemic status seems to be the implication of Kumārila's notion of enjoying prāmāṇyam.

The specification of either three or 'three or four' judgments appears somewhat arbitrary, but the general idea is clear. Kumārila appears here to make broadly the same claim as Peirce, and accordingly to face broadly the same difficulty. Peirce holds that inquiry "is bound in the long run to iron out every error".

245 See TS 2877
246 Wiggins (2004) 89
Kumārila is rather more ambitious in allowing only three (or four) tokens of checking or revision, presumably intended to happen within a very limited timespan. Kumārila’s setting of such an arbitrary limit to inquiry appears questionable at first. However, Kumārila also makes an analogy with court proceedings, where judgment is given on the basis of a strictly limited number of statements taken, two from the plaintiff and one from the defendant. This analogy might suggest that termination of the epistemic process is a feature of the pragmatics of inquiry and not of the epistemology of inquiry.

Kumārila’s epistemological model of a process of individual acts of inquiry thus seems also to be rooted in a paradigm of ritual action, the analysis of which is focused on the combinatorics of individual ritual acts. Thus Kumārila seems to construe occurring judgments as acts of the agent. As Govardhan Bhatt explains, “all commentators and independent writers of [Kumārila’s] Bhāṭṭa school are unanimous in holding that cognition is an act,” although Kumārila’s own statements on this are somewhat ambiguous. Bhatt also criticizes Kumārila and his commentators for holding that “cognition … is essentially an activity of the subject in relation to some object.” Bhatt suggests that these thinkers “were misled by the word ‘activity’ which in common usage is predicated of ‘knowing’ as well as of such physical activities as ‘cooking’ etc.” However, an alternative understanding has been developed in this thesis, whereby an epistemology informed by the theory of ritual interpretation is able to illuminate the logic of inquiry in terms of purposive and normative acts by the epistemic agent.

By thinking again in terms of an informal logic of operations, Kumārila’s strategy here seems to owe something to the style of reasoning in the maxims (nyāyas) of Mīmāṃsā. Thus as Sarkar explains, “[b]y the Apaccheda (losing hold) maxim when two different effects are respectively attached to two events

---

247 TS 2881-2882
248 I would like to thank Dr Shalini Sinha for drawing my attention to this connection
249 Bhatt (1989) 17
250 Bhatt (1989) 65
251 Bhatt (1989) 66
alternately, if both happen simultaneously, either effect may be attached optionally; but, if one event follows the other, the result will be in accordance with the event that happens last.\textsuperscript{252} Sarkar illustrates this rule with an example commented on by Śabara, involving a potential mishap in a ritual when a priest holding the tail-end of the robe of the preceding happens to lose his grip.\textsuperscript{253} The compensatory burden on the sacrificer, i.e. the patron of the ritual, is different dependent on which type of priest loses his grip. Sarkar first asks: "If both the priests ... lose hold simultaneously, what is to be done?\textsuperscript{254} The answer is that "the case becomes one of direct conflict, and therefore, option results."\textsuperscript{255} But if one priest should lose hold successively, "the result will be in accordance with what happens last."\textsuperscript{256} Sarkar's quoting of Jimutvahana's example of Apaccheda is even more pertinent:

"in respect of the precepts enjoining the votary to bestow his wealth as a gratuity in one instance and no gratuity in the other ... [those instances being] if either the priest doing the functions of Udgatri or the one performing the office of Pratistotri, singly stumble ... but, if both these priests stumble at the same time, neither injunction would be applicable; for that would be a variableness in the precept."\textsuperscript{257}

From this angle, the first view appears to be such a case where conflict would result in neither the injunction to attribute prāmāṇyam nor the injunction to attribute non-prāmāṇyam being applicable. Kumārila's own view is one where the defeat functions as overrider or replacement operation due to its occurring later.

The use of terms from Pāṇini's generative grammar motivates the idea that a general operation yields a hypothesis which has provisional status at first, but

\textsuperscript{252} Sarkar (1909) 334 (the page is misnumbered as 234)
\textsuperscript{253} See Sarkar (1909) 334-335 (page 334 is misnumbered as 234)
\textsuperscript{254} Sarkar (1909) 334 (the page is misnumbered as 234)
\textsuperscript{255} Sarkar (1909) 335
\textsuperscript{256} Sarkar (1909) 335
\textsuperscript{257} Sarkar (1909) 402
the failure to be defeated leaves it with definitive status. However, in the Pāṇinian case, this is because the grammar has been explicitly constructed to include all necessary exceptions within the scope of a finite number of rules. Accordingly, it may be considered that the generative model of reasoning found in grammar is an inappropriate model to capture the logic of generating beliefs from a world of open-ended possibilities. Whilst it is outside the scope of this thesis to actually defend Kumārila's epistemology, it may be noted in his favour that both contexts share some noteworthy common features. Specifically, Pāṇini's generative grammar is intended to systematize the logic of word-formation rather than to reflect the psychology of language learning. Similarly, Kumārila aims to present the logical aspect of belief formation rather than its psychology. Further, whereas the extension of a language such as Sanskrit is potentially unlimited, Pāṇini's generative grammar indicates that its underlying logic can be captured in terms of a finite normative protocol. Similarly, the case of belief formation presents us with a situation where there is a potentially unlimited number of truths to be known, but the articulation of a logic of inquiry requires that there be a finite procedure in which this can be captured.

Hookway explains that the epistemology of Peirce and James:

"rejected the Cartesian focus upon the importance of defeating skepticism while endorsing the fallibilist view that any of our beliefs and methods could, in principle, turn out to be flawed. This was tied to the study of the normative standards we should adopt when carrying out inquiries, when trying to find things out."\(^{258}\)

The above presentation of Kumārila's three stages of inquiry displays these same elements of a pragmatist epistemology. Kumārila's admonishment of the compulsive doubter reflects a rejection of the Cartesian method of doubt, whereby existing beliefs need to be justified against skeptical challenges. Rather, as Levi explains, "the concern ought to be focused on justifying changes

\(^{258}\) Hookway (2013)
in belief”\textsuperscript{259} and “[t]he burden is on the skeptic to justify why one should cease being certain”\textsuperscript{260}. At the same time, Kumārila’s backing for the person with a genuine doubt indicates the recognition that the believer is situated at an intermediate stage in an epistemic process which may lead to defeat or to strengthening of her belief. Kumārila’s recommendation to end inquiry after three or four checks may at first be considered a somewhat dogmatic and anti-Peircean block to inquiry, but should ultimately be seen in terms of the pragmatics of inquiry, warning against excessive questioning rather than against maintaining openness to new evidence.

There is also some uncertainty about the nature of Peirce’s fallibilism. It was previously explained how Hookway understands Peirce's view in terms of the denial of an epistemic kind which necessitates truth, rather than the denial of everyday claims to certainty, thereby leaving such claims unaffected.

Levi similarly presents Peirce’s view in terms of preservation of everyday certainty, but by characterizing Peirce as a corrigibilist rather than a fallibilist. Levi explains that “[a] fallibilist denies that inquirers should be absolutely certain of any current extralogical beliefs.”\textsuperscript{261} By contrast, corrigibilism is a “vulnerability to being modified”\textsuperscript{262} which allows me to maintain absolute certainty in my beliefs due to the absence of any living doubt, whilst allowing me to acknowledge that in the future new considerations may cause such a doubt to arise or cause my belief to be defeated.\textsuperscript{263} Thus corrigibilists “can coherently acknowledge a distinction between conjectures or potential answers that might be true or false and settled assumptions, free from doubt.” Whereas “settled assumptions are ... all maximally certain”\textsuperscript{264}, “[o]ne may coherently distinguish between conjectures with respect to probability.”\textsuperscript{265} By contrast, fallibilists “must think of the distinction between conjectures and settled

\textsuperscript{259} Levi (2012) 5
\textsuperscript{260} Levi (2012) 31
\textsuperscript{261} Levi (2012) 4
\textsuperscript{262} Levi (2012) 184
\textsuperscript{263} See Levi (2012) 4
\textsuperscript{264} Levi (2012) 192
\textsuperscript{265} Levi (2012) 191
assumptions as matters of degree.” Levi considers that Peirce's belief-doubt model combines epistemological infallibilism with corrigibilism, indicating by this something like what Hookway means by his second characterization of fallibilism.

Kumārila acknowledges that the believer should exercise a degree of effort to question her beliefs, and that any genuine doubt that arises from a new deliverance should be treated with appropriate gravity as regards the resulting need for revision of existing beliefs. However, Kumārila's stipulation that “the self-concerned investigator should establish [his perception as accurate] by not continuing to conjecture” scenarios for defeat and that “one [judgment] enjoys epistemic success 'from itself'” indicate that the believer is right to invest those beliefs which have resisted a certain degree of challenge with certainty, and that this is the final meaning of prāmāṇyas 'from itself'. As such, Kumārila's protocol for inquiry similarly combines vulnerability to being modified with certainty in one's settled beliefs which is the mark of corrigibilism. As indicated above, the basis of Kumārila's corrigibilism is the fact that epistemic success in the form of accurate judgment is essentially distributed over the epistemic kind consisting in pramāṇas or successful deliverances.

---

266 Levi (2012) 192
267 TS 2874cd
268 ŚV 2.61cd
Chapter 5: Kumārila's anti-foundationalism

Section 1: Introduction

This chapter will present Kumārila's doctrine as a form of anti-foundationalism which has much in common with that of pragmatism. Levi explains that "[f]oundationalism in epistemology imposes two demands on the beliefs of intelligent inquirers: (1) that current beliefs be justified and (2) that there be foundational premises and principles of reasoning that are self-certifying on the basis of which the merits of other current beliefs and principles may be derived. Many antifoundationalists give up (2) but not (1) ... Pragmatists belong among those who give up both (2) and (1)." 1 In this chapter, it will be argued that Kumārila's presentation indicates the rejection of both the demands above. As such, Kumārila is an anti-foundationalism in the same vein as the pragmatists.

The chapter begins by reviewing existing literature which seems to suggest a Reidean form of anti-foundationalism. An argument from infinite regress which motivates Kumārila's anti-foundationalism is then examined. It is shown that this argument targets what Sosa terms an organon conception of justification, whereby one thing serves as rule or instrument for acquiring justification for another thing. Sosa accordingly suggests that aptness is a more promising notion than justification, and a loose affinity is found between Kumārila's doctrine and Sosa's Virtue Epistemology. As Arnold explains, Kumārila's consideration of the argument from infinite regress serves to reject the notion of foundational beliefs in Levi's first demand, such a view being explicitly set up as a third alternative view in the Śloka-vārttika. However, it will be argued here that Kumārila's doctrine involves a rejection of Levi's demand (1) in what amounts to a parallel move to Peirce.

1 Levi (2007) 30; a similar formulation can be found in Sosa (1991) 178
In the following section, a Buddhist epistemology is sketched out, and it is shown how the Buddhist position is under threat from this infinite regress argument. Finally, it is shown how Kumārila's anti-foundationalism comes to bear on the case of knowledge derived from the testimony of the Vedas. In this case, knowledge from other epistemic sources does not bear on the epistemic status of testimony from Vedic texts.

Section 2: Existing literature on Kumārila's anti-foundationalism

Taber explains that:

“Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā is not a form of epistemological foundationalism, which conceives of human knowledge as hierarchically structured, with the mass of what we know resting upon a few cognitions of special status.”

This statement attributes a rejection of Levi's second demand above to Kumārila. Taber also holds that Kumārila's doctrine is:

“closer to the common sense empiricism of the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, which stresses that almost all our perceptions have initial authority.”

Thus:

“we find at the basis of both the foundationalist and the Mīmāṃsā (Reidean) proposals the same insight: there must occur cognitions which present themselves as true ... The search for evidence must come to an end – either at the very start, or after a finite process – in a kind of

Taber (1992b) 217
knowledge for which the concern for evidence does not arise.”

Taber thus seems to commit Kumārila to Levi’s first demand above. Specifically, current beliefs are justified by their initial appearance of authority. Taber thus explains:

“Given that a cognition initially appears as true, one remains justified in believing that it is true until concrete evidence of its falsehood presents itself.”

Taber also tells us that:

“Opposed to this [foundationalist] answer would be any form of coherentism which says that truth is merely a matter of corroboration by further evidence that is not, in turn, ultimately anchored in some self-validating form of awareness. It is interesting that although such theories have been extensively developed in Western thought – e.g., in pragmatism – Indian philosophers have shied away from them.”

Taber’s statement above is somewhat ambiguous between a coherence theory of truth, which concerns the truth of propositions, and a coherence theory of justification, which concerns what it is for a belief to be justified, and is typically understood in terms of corroboration by further evidence.

Arnold similarly explains that “the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of svataḥ prāmāṇya represents a compelling critique of foundationalist epistemologies.” However, according to Arnold:

“many philosophers (both traditional and modern) persist in understanding the doctrine in terms of the foundationalist
presuppositions that are precisely what this doctrine means to call into question.”

Arnold includes B.K. Matilal among such philosophers and considers that only Pārthasārathi has correctly understood Kumārila’s anti-foundationalism. Arnold explains that foundationalist approaches are “intended … to indicate the uniquely indubitable sorts of knowledge that … are suitably regarded as foundational for the rest of our beliefs.” Thus Arnold similarly presents foundationalists as rejecting Levi’s demand (2) above.

Arnold’s preferred reading of Kumārila involves:

“a phenomenological sort of epistemology – where “phenomenological” here characterizes a basically descriptive approach, the “bracketing” of normative commitments … A project in phenomenological epistemology might thus aim to describe, for example, what must be the case … in order that there can develop such knowledge as we generally believe ourselves already to be justified in claiming.”

Arnold here presents Kumārila’s doctrine in terms of a bracketing of Levi’s demand (1). However, elsewhere Arnold renders Kumārila’s doctrine using the expression ‘prima facie justification’, which would seem to indicate an acceptance of Levi’s thesis (1). Further, it is not clear how, on Arnold’s construal, Kumārila’s doctrine could substantively engage with any research programme in philosophy.

Arnold contrasts Pārthasārathi’s approach with:

“a foundationalist approach, which would seek to ground justification in a causal story that takes the perceived object indubitably to have caused

---

7 Arnold (2001) 591
8 See Arnold (2001) 591
9 Arnold (2005) 123
10 Arnold (2005) 123-124
the perception – which, that is, withholds the judgment that one “knows” something until it has first been ascertained that the “something” in question is in fact present as the cause of the cognition under review. But the problem, of course, is that the latter can only be ascertained by adducing “other things one knows or justifiably believes,” which we can, in turn, only be justified in knowing based on the very same epistemic instruments now available to us as we seek to ascertain the presence of a cause.”

Arnold here sets out the foundationalist position and alludes to the argument from infinite regress which features in contemporary articulations of the foundationalist position. However, whereas the threat of such regress is often presented as an argument for some beliefs to be properly foundational, Arnold’s argument is that there is no properly basic class of beliefs which would not be vulnerable to further regress. Arnold's use of the regress argument here corresponds rather to the way it features in an argument presented by Kumārila both in the Brhaṭ-ṭikā, and in the Śloka-vārttika, where it functions as Kumārila's objection to a third canvassed view.

Arnold immediately goes on to assert:

“this is, finally, Uṇveka’s problem, too. For Uṇveka wants an account of svatāḥ prāmāṇya according to which we can be certain that, for example, we will only ever credit with prāmāṇya an awareness of silver that was really caused by silver.”

However, Uṇveka’s problem is only a problem of inquiry. As Arnold agrees, Umveka’s notion of prāmāṇya constitutes a notion of truth, which we can certainly “ground ... in a causal story that takes the perceived object indubitably
Indeed, such a story was developed in the earlier chapters of this thesis. Umveka’s problem thus concerns not acquiring true beliefs but rather acquiring justification for them, i.e. being able to credit them with truth. Arnold's hope is that Pārthasārathi's reading can provide a non-foundationalist theory of justification by rooting a robust conception of truth in the *prima facie* justification which is provided phenomenologically by the mere fact of awareness.

Arnold frequently uses the notion of 'crediting' an awareness with validity. Although such a notion seems at first similar to the notion of ascription driving the present interpretation, whereby a process of inquiry may be built on correcting an ascription, Arnold quickly shuts down this construal, by insisting that we are always 'justified' or 'entitled' to credit our initial awarenesses with such validity. Although, as mentioned above, there seems to be some tension between use of such notions as justification and entitlement and Arnold's claim that normative concerns have been bracketed, nevertheless Arnold ends up in a similar place to Taber, whereby all beliefs are justified by the phenomenological fact of mere awareness, thus answering to Levi's demand (1) above. So both Arnold and Taber read Kumārila as setting up the initial awareness as a complete phenomenological basis for some form of justification, and, in Arnold’s case, also for truth.

Notwithstanding this, Kumārila's view is well taken by both Arnold and Taber as what amounts to a rejection of Levi's demand (2). The idea seems to be that inquiry is needed to discriminate correct judgments from incorrect judgments, yet the process of inquiry must be one that can be brought to an end. One strategy would be to bring this to an end in some foundational class of beliefs. However, the privileging of any particular class of beliefs would be arbitrary, so the process of inquiry should be stopped through the ascription of epistemic success to the initial belief. As per the above discussion, this is a defeasible assumption made on pragmatic grounds.

14 Arnold (2001) 619
15 See e.g. Arnold (2001) 619, 625; Arnold (2005) 69, 101
Section 3: Kumārila's argument against organon justification

Kumārila presents an argument from infinite regress in favour of his own view, in both the Bṛhaṭ-ṭikā and the Śloka-vārttika. Whereas it is a free-standing argument in the Bṛhaṭ-ṭikā, in the Śloka-vārttika it targets a third view canvassed in opposition to Kumārila's own. It was described above how the third canvassed view is structurally the reverse of Kumārila's own view. Whereas Kumārila's claim is that pramāṇa is 'from itself' and non-pramāṇa is 'from something else', the third view holds that pramāṇa is 'from something else' and non-pramāṇa is 'from itself'. Kumārila's own claim has been construed as the claim that all deliverances constitute Good Cases as a default nature, yet this nature is vitiated by bad features. Conversely, according to the third view, all deliverances constitute Bad Cases as a default nature, and this nature is revamped by the aforementioned good features. Kumārila presents the third canvassed view as follows:

ŚV 2.38abc: Therefore the Badness of Case of those [Bad Case deliverances] (apramāṇatvam) should be accepted as being due to svabhāva (svābhāvikam), and the capacity for epistemic success [of Good Case deliverances] (pramāṇam) [as being] dependent on something else.

Whereas Bad Cases are 'due to svabhāva', epistemic success is 'dependent on something else'. Kumārila tells us that, in this view, this something else is a good feature. Kumārila writes:

ŚV 2.39cd: A capacity for epistemic success (pramāṇam) is produced by the good features of those [causal factors of the deliverance],
because it is a real entity.

By contrast:

ŚV 2.39ab: Epistemic failure (aprāmāṇyam) could not be due to a bad feature of the cause [of the deliverance], because it is not a real entity.

The role of the bad feature in this argument supports the reading of the second view discussed in Chapter Three above, whereby putative good and bad features would be responsible for deliverances constituting Good and Bad Cases respectively. In this argument, epistemic failure is characterised by a mere lack or absence of Goodness, and thus not due to a positive vitiating nature of a positive feature. The argument is that epistemic failure is a not a real property or nature of a process, so cannot be metaphysically grounded in a separable (bad) feature. By contrast, accurate judgment is real, so can be metaphysically grounded in a separable (good) feature, which revamps erroneous judgment. This argument thus supports the third view.

Kumārila later provides a rebuttal of that argument. Kumārila writes:

ŚV 2.54: "Epistemic failure (aprāmāṇyam) is divided into three types according to [the three cases, i.e.] erroneous judgment, lack of judgment and doubtful judgments. Of these [three], [only] two [i.e. erroneous judgments and doubtful judgments] are able [to arise] from a bad cause, because they are real [whereas lack of judgment is not].

Here, Kumārila observes that there are various types of Bad deliverances in order to assert that Bad Cases constitute some real nature which is metaphysically grounded in some separable feature of deliverances, which is a
positive vitiating feature. Kumārila however must clarify that this argument applies only to two of the three types of Bad Case. Kumārila writes:

ŚV 2.55: "As for lack of judgment, the operation of bad qualities [in that case] is not postulated. According to us, however, it [viz. lack of judgment] takes place only through the absence of causes as you have said yourself [in verse 2.41]."

In Kumārila's own view, epistemic failure is a real nature which arises from bad features of the cause, such as cataracts etc. and thus the agent is mandated to seek out an undercutting or rebutting defeater. Epistemic success is also a real nature, but one which is metaphysically grounded in the intrinsic nature of deliverances when unvitiated. This provides a point of asymmetry between Kumārila's own view and his third canvassed view.

In the third view, epistemic success arises from good features of the cause, seemingly such as clarity of vision etc. It is not clear if the agent would be required to ascertain the presence of such features in the belief formation process, in which case, justification would be dependent on such corroborating factors. Thus Kataoka notes that it is not clear whether 'something else' refers to "good qualities (guna) and bad qualities (doṣa) of the causes of the cognition ... [or] their cognition ... [or] (a cognition of) agreement (saṃgati) or an invalidating cognition (bādhaka)". As the third view amounts to a form of foundationalism, whereby justification is dependent on some externalist foundation, which constitute the good features, or some internalist foundation, comprising awareness of some factors. However, as noted in Chapter Four above, Uṃveka considers and rejects various candidate features that would provide such a foundation, such as clarity and lacking shakiness, on the basis that these are consistent with erroneous judgment.17

16 Kataoka (2011) 63
17 Jayanta also provides a discussion which is very similar to that of Uṃveka. However, note that Kumārila also claims that there is a distinguishing feature
Kumārila himself provides a regress argument against this third view. Kumārila writes:

ŚV 2.49: *If an object is not determined even when a judgment has been made, as long as purity of cause is not apprehended from a different successful deliverance, ...*

ŚV 2.50: *... then it would be necessary to make another judgment based on a different cause, because the purity [of the cause of the first judgment] is effectively non-existent as long as [that purity is] not correctly ascertained.*

ŚV 2.51: *When there is purity of the cause of that [second judgment] too, the judgment of that [first purity] would be a Good Case deliverance. And this would also be so of that [third judgment] also, so in this way, there is no foundation.*

Kumārila here appeals to an asymmetry between affirmation and denial in order to advantage his own view over the inverted alternative. In terms of the Peircean reading of the previous chapter, denial is capable of eliminating an abductive hypothesis that has been affirmed, whereas affirmation is not capable of introducing a hypothesis that has not first been introduced in some way.

Arnold characterizes this argument in terms of an infinite regress of justification, whereby “the subsequent, justifying cognition would, as itself a cognition, similarly require justification, and so on.”\(^\text{18}\) Thus on the Pārthasārathi-Arnold reading, the idea that no corroborating awareness is needed is because phenomenological content provides sufficient justification.

---

\(^{18}\) Arnold (2005) 69
Arnold thus considers that “it is an essentially phenomenological point being made ... that is, doesn't Kumārila effectively credit overriding cognitions with a capacity for stopping the epistemic process such as he does not allow for the initial cognitions thus overridden ...?”19 Arnold contrasts Kumārila's doctrine with Popper on the grounds that Kumārila allows for epistemic termination, which is provided for through the fact that an awareness phenomenologically appears to provide termination. By contrast, the argument of the above chapter was that such termination is made on pragmatic rather than epistemic grounds.

Sosa again provides an illuminating parallel to Kumārila's discussion. Sosa describes an organon account of justification leads to an infinite regress. Sosa describes an organon as a “manual of practical methodology”20 or “an instrument for acquiring knowledge”21. Sosa writes:

“According to methodism the only way one could acquire such justification is through a further appropriate application of an adequate organon. But that application in turn requires the appropriate following of rules, which in turn requires that one justifiably consider oneself to be in the conditions required for the application of these rules. And so on.”22

Sosa proposes that we abandon this organon conception of justification, and, with it, the term 'justification' itself. Sosa suggests we replace a requirement for justified belief with a requirement for apt belief, where justification may be one way to achieve aptness. In general, Sosa explains:

“The “aptness” of a belief B relative to an environment E requires that B derive from what relative to E is an intellectual virtue, i.e. a way of arriving at belief that yields an appropriate preponderance of truth over

19 Arnold (2005) 72
20 Sosa (1991) 245
21 Sosa (1991) 245
22 Sosa (1991) 249
In Chapter Three, Kumārila's claim that prāmāṇyam or epistemic success is due to the unflawed faculties themselves as causes of awareness was equated with Sosa's idea that the human faculties such as perception are themselves the intellectual virtues. As such, Sosa's conception of aptness as resulting from intellectual virtues would seem to have a close affinity with Kumārila's conception of epistemic success. Kumārila motivates the idea that epistemic success is 'from itself' by arguing that this avoids an infinite regress of justification. Sosa similarly motivates a notion of aptness as a criterion for knowledge by rejecting various conceptions of justification focused around the notion of an organon, and thus the term 'justification' itself. Thus part of Kumārila's main claim is to reject the notion of justification as the application of a methodological rule for determining true belief. However, whereas Sosa equates the organon conception of justification with the idea that epistemology is founded on a methodology, Kumārila distinguishes between these ideas, retaining some aspect of methodology for arriving at the truth. Specifically, Kumārila rejects the idea that the method of epistemology involves applying a rule for justifying beliefs, in favour of the idea of a culminating process, as described in Chapter Four.

Following Pārthasārathi, Arnold considers that this argument leads Kumārila to the idea, "why not simply allow this [viz. justification] with respect to the initial moment?" Arnold thus arrives at his notion of prima facie justification. However, as Sosa notes, “to justify is “to prove or show to be just, right, or reasonable,” in a way that implies “appeal to a standard or precedent.” As such, it is not clear that the term 'justification' can be retained by Arnold and Alston, whose usage he follows.

More generally, Arnold is correct to take Kumārila's discussion as a rejection of

---

23 Sosa (1991) 289
24 See Sosa (1991) 250
25 Arnold (2005) 70
26 Sosa (1991) 253
an organon conception of justification. The previous chapters have argued that Kumārila does nevertheless endorse the idea of an external standard or norm against which beliefs must be assessed. However, this argument from infinite regress stands opposed to what Sosa terms an organon conception of justification. As such, Kumārila has rejected the idea that beliefs can be justified by following a rule, on pain of infinite regress, without rejecting the idea that there is a normative burden on the agent to attain only true beliefs. The regress argument has established that the normative burden cannot be discharged by measuring the beliefs against some external standard in the manner of the third canvassed view. Rather, the protocol for inquiry set out in the previous chapter discharges the normative burden as it represents a culminating process resulting in true beliefs, despite not providing direct justification.

That protocol involved the strengthening of the epistemic status of beliefs through what was characterized as an appropriate level of investigation. It was claimed that the beliefs which are not defeated through a certain amount of checking activity will as a result provide the agent with a sufficient level of epistemic confidence. However, all beliefs are fallible in the sense that the evidence for them is consistent with their falsity, given the possibility of more or less radical sceptical scenarios. As such, why should Kumārila's protocol lead to actual true beliefs rather than merely beliefs held with a high degree of confidence?

Śāntarakṣita notes that Kumārila's view is that the existence of a capacity is established through arthāpatti, or postulation. Śāntarakṣita refers back to an earlier statement by Kumārila as follows:

"The capacities of all things are established through postulating [them] based on their effects."\(^{27}\)

\(^{27}\) TS 1588ab quoted again at TS 2839ab: “śaktayaḥ sarva-bhāvānāṁ kāryārthāpatti-sādhanāḥ”
Referring to the abductive logic of Charles Peirce, Shida makes a general observation that "in the Indian philosophical context, the valid means of cognition referred to as arthāpatti is similar to abduction." In abduction, Fann explains, "we pass from the observation of certain facts to the supposition of a general principle to account for the facts ... abduction is an inference from a body of data to an explaining hypothesis, or from effect to cause. This contrasts with induction, which is "an inference from a sample to a whole, or from particulars to a general law." Kumārila's explanation is thus that the existence of a capacity for accurate determination and its exercise constitutes an explaining hypothesis for the arising of undefeated awareness. This account of how beliefs are justified agrees with Sosa's idea of an explanatory inference. Sosa writes:

"the deeper, reflective justification of the beliefs ostensibly yielded by a certain faculty derives from an explanatory inference that attributes those beliefs to the faculties from which they ostensibly derive."

Considering the case of memory, where "sometimes the ostensible memory is merely ostensible," Sosa elaborates as follows:

"What justifies accepting one's ostensible memory m in such cases is, I suggest, a meta-belief in the virtue of one's memory which delivers m. One's justification hence derives from an explanatory induction applied to oneself and one's pertinent faculties."

---

28 Shida (2011) 514
29 Fann (1970) 10
30 Fann (1970) 10
31 Sosa (1991) 280
32 Sosa (1991) 280
33 Sosa (1991) 280
Sosa describes meta-epistemic foundationalism as follows:

"Meta-epistemic foundationalism is the view that there must be foundational epistemic beliefs: beliefs about epistemic justification that do not derive all of their justification from coherence or some other relation to other beliefs of the subject, but rather derive some of their justification from intrinsic plausibility or from factors external to the system of belief."\(^{34}\)

Kumārila's idea that the capacity is postulated thus seems to be equivalent to Sosa's idea of an explanatory inference that attributes the deliverance to faculties that operate correctly. This explanatory inference plays a meta-level role in justifying beliefs. As such, a meta-epistemic foundationalism in Sosa's sense can be attributed to Kumārila.

The previous chapter presented an operational disjunction between pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa, whereby the former functions independently whereas the latter functions dependently and thereby ceases. It can now be seen that non-pramāṇa ceases when undercutting and rebutting defeaters effect the removal of bad features. The undercutting defeater removes the bad feature by identifying its presence in the process of belief formation, whereas the rebutting defeater removes the bad feature despite not specifically identifying it in the cause. In one case, the vitiation is apprehended, and in the other case, the vitiation is supplanted.

By contrast, the functioning of a pramāṇa in apprehending a distal object does not depend on any separable feature, but is simply due to the nature of awareness itself. As such, nothing can cause the apprehension of a distal object by a pramāṇa to cease. This asymmetry between the way in which pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa function leads to an asymmetrical significance to

\(^{34}\) Sosa (1991) 157-158
the findings of subsequent investigation. In the case of non-pramāṇa, as

\[ \text{described above, subsequent disconfirmation has an instrumental role in regard}
\]

to the functioning of the non-pramāṇa, inasmuch as it terminates the

\[ \text{functioning by removing the enabling support. By contrast, the findings of}
\]

subsequent investigation do not play any instrumental role in respect of a

\[ \text{pramāṇa. Thus Kumārila explains:}
\]

\[ \text{ŚV 2.84: So the fact that \textit{[the pramāṇa itself] is known does not}
\]

\[ \text{contribute to [its] epistemic success. To explain, the experience of the}
\]

\[ \text{object is obtained only from the earlier [deliverance].}
\]

This feature of Kumārila's view, that subsequent investigation plays no role in

\[ \text{respect of the functioning of the pramāṇa in making an accurate determination,}
\]

is perhaps taken by Pārthasārathi and Arnold as support for the idea that

\[ \text{subsequent investigation plays no role in strengthening the justification of the}
\]

agent. On that reading, in every instance of crediting a belief with prāmāṇyam,

\[ \text{the agent is fully 'entitled' or 'justified', and thus that such prāmāṇyam}
\]

\[ \text{amounts to a notion of 'validity' or 'prima facie justification', which provides a}
\]

\[ \text{basis for an epistemic process involving possible belief revision. This would}
\]

\[ \text{suggest a Reidean interpretation of Kumārila of the type explicitly endorsed by}
\]

Taber. However, other remarks by Arnold about a bracketing of normative

\[ \text{commitments suggest this may not be the case.}
\]

The present discussion argues that this is not the case. Rather, following

\[ \text{Hookway, we can distinguish between the idea that a judgment "belong[s] to}
\]

\[ \text{an epistemic kind of which, of necessity, all members are true"}^{35} \text{ and the idea}
\]

\[ \text{that "we may be unconfident of our judgement because we are unsure whether}
\]

\[ \text{it is a judgement of perception or, perhaps, a member of a different epistemic}
\]

\[ \text{kind, a report of illusion or hallucination, for example."}^{36} \text{ Kumārila's discussion}
\]

\[ \text{of an operational aspect concerns the idea that the capacity of Good Case}
\]

\[ ^{35} \text{Hookway (2007) 11}
\]

\[ ^{36} \text{Hookway (2007) 11}
\]
deliverances to accurately determine objects is a real causal power which is not dependent on some extrinsic feature. It does not concern the ability of the agent to determine that a judgment constitutes a Good Case deliverance. In order to determine that, the agent must exercise appropriate doubt. Such a determination also rests on the meta-belief that one's undefeated judgments arise from the exercise of a real causal power of Good Case deliverances to make an accurate determination.

However, Kumārila allows that accuracy of judgment must be postulated at the outset of investigation. Kumārila writes:

*TS 2859:* So having considered for a long time, it certainly has to be postulated that the epistemic success of some [deliverance] is 'from itself'. This being the case it is best established in the first [cognition].

Here, Kumārila uses the term 'postulated'. This term has an affinity with the term 'prāptā' or 'ascribed' which was previously discussed, inasmuch as both terms allow that the question of whether prāmāṇya is present in the belief is separable from the question of whether it has been postulated or ascribed at a particular stage of inquiry, and thus allow for the possibility that the agent can normatively assess her own ascription or postulation through additional inquiry. What is postulated is that the deliverance has arisen from causes that are not flawed.

Accordingly, although the agent is justified in the sense of possessing regulatory justification, *viz.* a level of justification appropriate to the stage of inquiry, the agent is also allowed scope for genuine doubt about a phenomenologically secure belief, and mandated to exercise appropriate effort in corroborating the belief. Accordingly, the agent is able to strengthen her level of regulatory justification through inquiry by aiming at an ultimate goal of inquiry which is possessing beliefs that are objectively true. Kumārila rejects Levi's first demand in the same way that Peirce does, by focusing on
justification for belief change rather than on justification for belief per se.

Accuracy of judgment can only be postulated with a sufficient degree of epistemic confidence at the end of investigation. Kumārila thus provides the following statements:

*TS 2851ab: Epistemic success 'from itself' is like that [pot analogy], and it is certainly just in the final [judgment]*

Kamalaśīla clarifies that the word 'final' refers to 'the last judgment of all'.

Similarly in the Śloka-vārttika presentation, Kumārila writes:

*ŚV 2.61: In this way, when three or four deliverances have been produced, no more deliverances are required. Just in this case one [deliverance] enjoys epistemic success 'from itself'.*

Thus Kumārila's account involves an increase in epistemic confidence by the agent to a final outcome of inquiry involving a situation where the believer possesses only beliefs that are true in virtue of their arising from a successful deliverance.

### Section 4: Kumārila's opposition to Buddhist foundationalism

Kumārila's strategy is also opposed to the foundationalist strategy of the Buddhist thinkers referenced in Chapter Three above. Śākyabuddhi characterizes 'familiar' perceptual judgments, judgments of telic function, and inferential judgments as 'from itself' and 'unfamiliar' perceptual judgments as 'from something else'. Regarding perceptual judgments, Śākyabuddhi writes:

---

37 See P under TS 2852: anta iti sarva-paścime jñāna ity arthaḥ
38 Dunne (2004) translates this term as 'habituated'
"Activity based on perception is said to be of two types, viz. 'unfamiliar' and 'familiar'. Of those, because a very familiar and clear perception is produced as that which possesses familiarity, involving the elimination of cause of error, its production is accurately determined in accordance with the familiar type, and therefore an ascertainment is produced involving the later manifestation of what exists, so a person acts on the basis of that."

About judgments of telic function, Śākyabuddhi appeals to the notion of svabhāva as a guarantee of error-freedom. Śākyabuddhi writes:

"Therefore, because a perception whose content has the capacity for telic function is without the causes of error, it is determined by reflexive awareness as being nothing other than a pramāṇa just due to svabhāva."

According to this Buddhist picture, entities are defined in terms of their telic function, so that fire just is what has the effect of burning and cooking etc. As such, a familiar case is one where one accurately determines the object in the context of a familiar process. An unfamiliar case is one where one gains confidence in one's judgment only when the awareness of telic function is attained. Devendrabuddhi thus explains that the later awareness of telic function enables the agent to discriminate accurate judgments from their reflectively indiscriminable counterparts. Devendrabuddhi appeals to what Dunne terms a confirmation-model, in order to discriminate correct from incorrect judgments. Dunne explains:

---

39 PVT nye 72A: “brjod pa mngon sum gyi rten can gyi ’jug pa ni rnam pa gnyis te dang po nyid dang goms pa can no| de la goms pa dang ldan pa gang yin pa de la shin tu goms pa gsal ba can gyi mngon sum skyes pa na ji lta ba bzhin tu goms pa'i rnam par ’khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan spangs pa can nyid kyi yongs su bcad nas skye ba dang| de lta bur gyur pa'i phyis 'byung ba'i nges pa skyped par byed pa'i phyir de la skyes bu ’jug par byed do’”

40 PVT nye 75A: “de'i phyir don byed par nus pa'i yul can gyi mngon sum ni 'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan med pa'i phyir tshad ma nyid kyi bdag nyid du gyur pas rang rig pas yongs su bcad pa yi no|”; cf. Dunne (2004) 292-293
“On this model, the trustworthiness of that instrumental cognition consists of the fact that it leads to another instrumental cognition whose content is the desired telic function, i.e., the achievement of one’s goal.”

This research will adopt Dunne's translation of the term 'arthakriyā' or 'don byed pa' as 'telic function'. Interestingly, the notion of arthakriyā, which Dunne translates as 'telic function', also engages with a pragmatist maxim, that which holds that only what can make a practical difference can normatively regulate our beliefs. This seems to explain a common alternative translation of arthakriyā as 'pragmatic efficacy'. As Śākyabuddhi explains, “a perception whose content has the capacity for telic function is without the causes of error”. This represents a strategy of epistemological foundationalism, whereby certain classes of beliefs are foundational of the remainder. However, this foundationalist label should be caveated by the remark that it does not fully reflect the mind-dependent aspect of the Buddhist theory. As Dunne explains, Dharmakīrti’s “relentless pursuit of certainty (niścaya) suggests an intriguing form of foundationalism that is nevertheless relativist.” Thus, although Dharmakīrti’s “thought appears to rest on a kind of internalist foundationalism, where knowledge is ultimately rooted in the indubitability of habituated perceptions”, nevertheless “the “nature” of the object in question is in significant ways reflective of the mind in which that object is being perceived.” It may seem that “Dharmakīrti is resorting to an internalist foundationalism rooted in irrefragable and private sense data, but in fact, Dharmakīrti clearly rejects the ultimate reliability of such data.”

However, in terms of the everyday level of activity, a two-tier foundationalist model does reflect the Buddhist theory. For Śākyabuddhi, as for Kamalaśīla,

---

41 Dunne (2004) 287
43 PVṬ nye 75A: “don byed par nus pa’i yul can gyi mngon sum ni ’khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan med pa”; cf. Dunne (2004) 292-293
44 Dunne (2004) 3 fn.6
45 Dunne (2004) 323
46 Dunne (2004) 323-324
inferential judgments and habitual perceptual judgments are considered to be foundational, thus 'from itself', whereas novel perceptual judgments are not, and thus 'from something else', in the sense that their justification is based on subsequent confirmation. This Buddhist theory thus constitutes a confirmation model in which beliefs are justified either immediately because they are telic function judgments, or involve familiar processes leading to telic function judgments, or are justified at a later point when they involve unfamiliar processes when those processes do in fact yield successful outcomes. In this way, awareness of telic function is foundational for judgments involving previously unfamiliar processes.

This Buddhist epistemology has much in common with what Sosa terms super-radical skepticism. About this, Sosa writes:

“such skepticism does allow that one is reasonable in believing at least what is present to one's mind as intrinsically obvious per se … Justification in that case need not derive from any process of justifying that one or anyone need have carried out, but rather derives from one's satisfaction of certain conditions …”

For the Buddhist philosophers, judgments concerning familiar processes and telic function judgments represent awarenesses present to the agent's mind as intrinsically obvious, and on this basis are considered to be justified.

Due to the foundationalism of telic function and familiar judgments, the Buddhist theory answers to Levi's second demand above. Due to the need to justify unfamiliar perceptions, Levi's first demand above is acknowledged, though in a qualified way. Specifically, unfamiliar judgements need not be immediately justified, but can be acted on without justification, and justification will be achieved later through confirmation by a telic function judgement. This qualified acknowledgement of Levi's first demand leads to a delay model which

47 Sosa (1991) 248
was further developed by the later Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita.¹⁴⁸

Śāntarakṣita defends the Dhamakīrti-inspired model of epistemic success against that of Kumārila. Thus Śāntarakṣita begins by accepting Kumārila’s claim that the fact that the source is trustworthy guarantees the truth of a token belief. Śāntarakṣita writes:

"And as for [the reading of Kumārila’s proposal whereby] a capacity is produced from the pramāṇas’ own causes, rather than being added by other things after they [viz. the valid cognitions] have been produced from their own causes, then in this case we have no disagreement."¹⁴⁹

In this verse, Śāntarakṣita agrees that the capacity for accurate determination is not separable from the pramāṇas' own causes, i.e. from the appropriateness of the epistemic conditions of belief formation, and thus agrees that truth is achievable based on an essential disposition of beliefs. However, this does not mean that Śāntarakṣita is fully in agreement with Kumārila. In order to clarify their difference, Kamalaśīla asks:

"It could be [objected:] if you do not disagree, then why do you adopt [the view of] prāmāṇyam ‘from something else’?"⁵⁰

This question introduces Śāntarakṣita's statement:

"although this [capacity] is present in a belief, it cannot be ascertained independently in some cases."⁵¹

Śāntarakṣita here distinguishes between the fact that a belief is true and the

---

¹⁴⁸ See esp. TS & P 2836-2841 and TS & P 2958-2962
¹⁴⁹ TS 2826 – 2827a: “atha śaktiḥ svahetubhyāḥ pramāṇānāṁ prajāyate[jātānāṁ tu svahetubhyaḥ nānyair ādhīyate punah || tad atra na vivādo naḥ ko hy anamāsasya vastunāḥ]"
⁵⁰ P 750 immediately above TS 2832: “syād etat – yādi bhavatāṁ na vivādo kathām tarhi parataḥ-prāmāṇyam abhyupagatam iti”
⁵¹ TS 2832cd: “jāne kvacit sthitā ’py eṣā na bodhuma śakyate svataḥ||"
fact that the truth of the belief has been ascertained in some sense by the
agent. Śāntarakṣita alludes to Śākyabuddhi's distinction between unfamiliar
perceptual judgments and other kinds of judgments, as Kamalaśīla later
clarifies.Śāntarakṣita's critique challenges Kumārila's epistemology on the
grounds that it would account for mere true belief rather than some greater
epistemic good which allows the agent some degree of epistemic confidence
and which could appropriately be termed knowledge.

Śāntarakṣita thus agrees with Kumārila that, ontologically, successful
judgments determine their object, but argues that the agent is left with no
confidence as to whether any given token judgment has in fact been
successful. This also seems to be the understanding of Taber, who observes in
rejecting Uṃveka's view that "[v]alidity may always arise intrinsically, but it will
have to be determined extrinsically." This Buddhist position thus addresses
the challenge presented by Hookway, referred to above, such that we can
"recogniz[e] the infallibility of perceptual ones, while also insisting that our
beliefs about whether a given judgement is a perceptual judgement are
fallible." It does so by presenting a factorizable analysis of the epistemic goal.

The introduction of a further ascertainment requirement engages with the third
of the perspectives identified by Kataoka, the 'epistemological' or 'cognizing'
perspective. Indeed, Jayanta discusses this perspective specifically in terms of
'ascertainment' (niścaya). Reflecting the fact that Śāntarakṣita's critique of
Kumārila involves only a concern with the subject's ascertaining the truth and
not with the subject's possessing the truth, Shida explains that Śāntarakṣita's
"theory is argued mainly at the epistemological level" and that "Śāntarakṣita
mainly shows the third theory [i.e. endorses the idea that prāmāṇya is not
'from itself'] regarding the epistemological aspect."

---

52 See P 775 under TS 2844
53 See TS & P 2826-2827 and TS & P 2832-2835
54 Taber (1992b) 209
55 Hookway (2007) 11
56 Shida (2007) 1060
57 Shida (2007) 1059
Śāntarakṣita writes:

So [the capacity] depends on an awareness of telic function or other judgment just for [its] ascertainment, but does not [depend on those types of judgment] to separately provide this [i.e. the capacity in the awareness], like poison etc.\(^{58}\)

In this verse, Śāntarakṣita does several things. Firstly, he reaffirms that the truth of a belief is not dependent on any further judgment. Rather, the agent requires a further judgment in order to ascertain that truth. Secondly, Śāntarakṣita reiterates Devendrabuddhi's view that the ascertainment requirement is satisfied by an awareness of telic function. Similarly, Dunne explains:

"according to Devendrabuddhi ... when one acts ... and one then attains an object with the desired or expected telic function, that initial perception was instrumental; one was simply unable to determined the instrumentality of that perception at the time of the perception. Devendrabuddhi proposes that instrumentality in this context be confirmed by a subsequent instrumental cognition ... in which the desired telic function appears."\(^{59}\)

Thirdly, Śāntarakṣita's verse above makes a novel point about how ascertainment is achieved by the agent by analogy with poison and with wine. Śāntarakṣita goes on to explain the significance of this analogy as follows:

To explain, because poison, wine etc. are observed to be similar to other things [in having some effect] and [yet] because the results do not present themselves immediately, the ascertainment of the nature of these [viz. poison, wine etc. happens only] when there is ascertainment that the results of those things has been produced [such as] fainting,

\(^{58}\) TS 2835: tasmād arthakriyā-jñānam anyad vā samapekṣyate| niścayāyāiva na tv asyā ādhanāya viśādivat||

\(^{59}\) Dunne (2004) 289
sweating, slurring speech etc. In this same way too, it is ascertained that the deliverance does possess the capacity.60

This analogy with poison and wine presents a delay-model of confirmation, in which Levi's first demand must be ultimately satisfied. The lack of justification for one's beliefs regarding unfamiliar processes at the outset is no bar to being able to act on those beliefs. Thus a process of inquiry is established which involves a search for a judgment with epistemically foundational status. This contrasts with Kumārila's process of inquiry described in the previous chapter, which involves a search for a threshold level of epistemic confidence.

Śāntarakṣita replies to an objection that it would not be possible to act if one doubts one's judgment as follows:

The intelligent person acts on the basis of doubt alone, and by doing this, his intelligence is not diminished.61

Śākyabuddhi likewise explains:

"But regarding that cause [of awareness] which operates due to an initial perception, when there is no apprehension [of it] as accurate, one acts on the basis of nothing other than doubt."62

Similarly Jayanta writes:

"So we consider that prāmāṇya is not ascertained (na niścitam) at that time; we take action on the basis of nothing other than doubt."63

---

60 TS 2836-2837: “yathā hi viṣa-madyādes tad-anya-samatēkṣaṇāṁ phalānantarābhavāc caīṭād ātmā-viniścayāḥ mūrcchā-svedā-pralāpāti-tat-phalōtpatti-niścayāḥ tādātmyam gavyate 'py evam jñāne tac-chakti-niścayāḥ”
61 TS 2974: “ucyate saṃśāyaṁ naḥ varttate 'sau vicākṣaṇāḥ vaicākṣaṇya-kṣitis tasya na caīṭam anuṣajyate”
63 NM 439: tena manyāmahe na niścitam tadā prāmāṇyaṁ, saṃśayād eva
As such, whereas Kumārila's presentation concerns a regulative notion of degree of confidence, as per Goldman's characterisation above, the Buddhist discussions concern what Sosa terms an ideal level of confidence, i.e. the degree of confidence "given the subject's epistemic position, including his total relevant evidence." When an agent acts on the basis of a doubtful judgment, Kumārila's analysis is that she posits accuracy of judgment as a working hypothesis. By contrast, the Buddhist analysis is that a theoretically insufficient level of epistemic confidence can be sufficient to motivate action.

However, Kumārila alleges that the Buddhist confirmation model is vulnerable to the problem of infinite regress, which was examined earlier in this chapter. In the Bṛhaṭṭīkā presentation, Kumārila presents the argument from infinite regress as follows:

*TS 2852:* If you claim that the success of the deliverance in the case of the first [deliverance] is established by a different successful deliverance, [then] in that case, seeking in this way, we would not find a foundation.

*TS 2853:* Just as the first deliverance depends on a deliverance which agrees with it, in the same way, an agreeing deliverance should again be sought for that agreeing deliverance also.

*TS 2854:* But if you accept the success of deliverances of some [deliverance] to be just 'from itself', [then] for what reason is there aversion to [saying] the same thing [i.e. it is 'from itself'] about the first [deliverance]?

The argument of the last verse is that no subsequent judgment can play a foundational role for an earlier one, on pain of infinite regress. That this

---

vyavaharāma iti

64 Sosa (2011) 36
criticism is particularly aimed at the Buddhist confirmation model is suggested by the fact that Śākyabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita both explicitly address it. Śākyabuddhi directly quotes these verses TS 2853 and TS 2854 and considers how the Buddhist can respond. Devendrabuddhi has explained that the accuracy of judgments is confirmed by reference to the later awareness of telic function. However, Śākyabuddhi is forced to admit that even the awareness of telic function, which is supposed to play a foundational role, is subject to error, and thus stands in need of further justification. Devendrabuddhi has founded a disjunction between Good Case and Bad Case deliverances on the outcome in the form of an awareness involving telic function, so that they can be discriminated on this basis. Devendrabuddhi writes:

"Both would not occur when there is no real thing. When there is activity based on apprehending fire with respect to what is not fire, there is no arising of a later awareness having content involving the functions of burning and cooking etc., because that [later awareness] could only be based on a real thing."

However, Śākyabuddhi realizes that this does not correctly deal with the case of dreams. Śākyabuddhi considers the objection:

"According to [your] explanation, in a dream too, there would be non-deviation regarding the goal ... [so] the deliverances of dreams would have prāmāṇyam."

Śākyabuddhi replies:

---

65 Krasser (1992) 154 explains that "Kamalaśīla comments that this verse bhṛntihetor etc. [TS 2972] is a response to ... a verse from Kumārila's Brhatṭikā", viz. TS 2855 above.
67 PVṬ nye 75A: "gal te rmi lam la yang ji skad du bshad pa'i don la mi slu ba yod do zhe na| ... gal te rmi lam gyi shes pa tshad mar 'gyur ro zhe na ..."
68 PVṬ nye 75A: "gal te rmi lam la yang ji skad du bshad pa'i don la mi slu ba yod do zhe na| ... gal te rmi lam gyi shes pa tshad mar 'gyur ro zhe na ..."
"This is no fault because we accept this."  

Śākyabuddhi next considers:

"In that case, how do [you] explain the lack of prāmāṇyam [in dreams]?"

Śākyabuddhi's reply is:

"Because [one] thinks the thought 'it is an error"

Although Śākyabuddhi's way of dealing with the case of dreams is far from adequate, by admitting that there is no other basis for positing something as real than the phenomenology of awareness which is given equally in dreams and waking state, Śākyabuddhi seems to provide his support to a phenomenological interpretation of prāmāṇyam 'from itself' of just the type later advocated by Pārthasārathi and Arnold. Although Śākyabuddhi maintains that one can later correct one's beliefs, such correction consists in nothing over and above the fact of belief change, just as Arnold explains that "a cognition can present itself as falsifying a previous one just insofar as it is the subsequent one that seems more credible. And if that is not how it seems, then it will not appear, phenomenologically, as an overriding cognition!" This also reflects a more general Buddhist notion of process without culmination or normativity.

This problem of infinite regress should also be distinguished from its equivalent in the context of self-awareness. Whereas this argument involves an infinite regress of ascertaining prāmāṇyam, that context involves an infinite regress of being aware of awareness. As Zhihua Yao explains, the Sautrāntikas establish the reflexivity of awareness on the basis that "[i]f a consciousness is not known

---

69 PVṬ nye 75A: “’dod pa nyid kyi phyir skyon med do’
70 PVṬ nye 75A: “gal te ’o na ji ltar na tshad ma ma yin par bshad ce na’
71 PVṬ nye 75A: “’khrul pa yin no snyam pa’i bsam pas so’
72 Arnold (2005) 73
by itself, but by a separate consciousness, ... there will be a fault of infinite regress.\textsuperscript{73} Kumārila is aware of the threat of infinite regress to a non-reflexive philosophical position, but chooses to block it on pragmatic grounds rather than by admitting either of Levi's two foundationalist demands. Interestingly, the rendering of Kumārila's verse TS 2853ab by Śākyabuddhi or his translators, Subhutiśrī and Dge ba'i blo gros, discussed above, involves a subtle but significant change, so that it reads:

"Just as the cognizedness of the first [awareness] depends on [an awareness] which does not deceive ..."\textsuperscript{74}

By changing Kumārila's idea that the prāmāṇyam of the awareness depends on a subsequent awareness, the two infinite regress arguments seem to be either conflated or equated. Further, Śākyabuddhi's discussion seems to confirm that the earlier and later awarenesses specifically refer to the initial and telic function awarenesses of the Buddhist position. By construing 'not deviating from that' as 'not deceiving', this formulation also seems to sharpen the criticism of the idea of that privileged class of awarenesses, such as the awarenesses of telic function, can be identified as non-deceptive.

Section 5: Kumārila's anti-foundationalist defence of the Veda

The upshot of the above discussion is that deliverances have an intrinsic epistemic capacity to make an accurate determination under appropriately normal epistemic conditions. As such, in order to gain the requisite confidence in her beliefs, the agent is only required to ascertain the fact of appropriately normal epistemic conditions, which consists in the lack of separable bad features. In the case of testimony, bad features would consist in properties of the informant, such as ignorance, intention to deceive etc. As self-revealing

\textsuperscript{73} Yao (2005) 117
\textsuperscript{74} PVṬ nye 74B: “ji ltar dang po'i shes pa nyid| de mi slu la ltos 'gyur na|”
scripture, however, the Veda has no author as such. As Davis explains, "[t]he denial of any author for the Vedas liberates it from having to seek out the author's intentions. Like all texts subjected to hermeneutic practice, therefore, the Vedas possess a "semantic autonomy.""

Thus Kumārila writes:

\[ŚV \text{2.63cd: Bad features, lacking any basis, could not exist, because there is no author.}\]

The general protocol for belief formation described in the previous chapter involves a general operation of affirming one's judgments, followed by the search for a defeater which may result in a replacement operation. Regarding beliefs based on Vedic testimony, Kumārila writes:

\[ŚV \text{2.68: As concerns the [Veda], being free of replacement [of the general operation] is easier, because there is no author. Therefore, it does not even come to be suspected that the Veda is a non-pramāṇa.}\]

\[ŚV \text{2.65bcd: The absence of both kinds of epistemic failure is due to the lack of those [bad features]. So the general operation is not replaced.}\]

Here, Kumārila tells us that the tenet that the Veda has no author means that no prolonging of inquiry is needed, that the believer easily gains sufficient confidence in her beliefs. In this way, it would seem that the instigating and terminating of inquiry thus coincide. Whereas replacement is possible in the case of ordinary beliefs, in the case of beliefs derived from Vedic testimony, Kumārila tells us that the stage of replacement is not even possible.

Kumārila's strategy may appear \textit{prima facie} to be an odd and weak manner of defending the accuracy of Vedic testimony. Specifically, it may seem that Kumārila conflates absence of evidence for the falsity of Vedic injunctions with evidence of such absence. As such, the proposition that the Vedic statements

\[75\text{ Davis (2010) 48}\]

\[76ŚV \text{2.63cd: "vaktur abhāvena na syur doṣāḥ nirāśrayāḥ"}\]

\[77ŚV \text{2.65d: "tad-abhāvataḥ| aprāmāṇya-dvayaśattvam tenōtsargō 'napoditaḥ|"}\]
are true does not appear to meet the Peircean requirement that a hypothesis “must be capable of being subjected to experimental testing”\textsuperscript{78}. However, Kumārila clarifies his intention through an illuminating analogy with gustatory judgments. Kumārila writes:

\textit{ŚV 2.91: Nor, as in the case of flavour etc., would an object be absent if it is not apprehended by some other [sense]. For they [i.e. taste and so on] are indeed restricted to being grasped [only] by gustation etc.}\textsuperscript{79}

\textit{ŚV 2.92ab: If it is objected: [there is another] awareness of the object in the case of [taste], [Reply:] it will be likewise with respect to dharma.}\textsuperscript{80}

Judgments about the flavour of a food are obtained exclusively through the faculty of gustation. Indeed, following the ideas of Śākyabuddhi about telic function, sweetness can be defined as the power to affect the tastebuds in certain ways, and so on. As such, corroboration of a judgment of sweetness by audioperception and the other senses is neither possible nor necessary. However, Kumārila notes that a further awareness of the judgment of sweetness can be acquired, presumably in cases such as successive gustatory episodes involving a single bite of cake. Kumārila does not clarify how this second judgment would bear on the original judgment, but one construal is that corroboration is provided through further tasting. In this way, Kumārila would allow that corroboration is one way in which a judgment can gain positive epistemic status.

Alternatively, it could be understood that the judgment gains epistemic strength simply through not being defeated by subsequent judgments. Defeat could occur in cases such as illness. A second slice of cake eaten when one has recovered would also serve to rebut the initial judgment that the cake is sour. It could be objected that Kumārila overlooks the way in which gustatory

\textsuperscript{78} Fann (1970) 43
\textsuperscript{79} ŚV 2.91: “na cānyair agraha ’rthasya syād abhāvo rasādivat| teśāṃ jihvādibhir yasāṃ niyamo grahaṇe ’sti hi|l”
\textsuperscript{80} ŚV 2.92ab: “tad dhiyalvārthabodhaś cet tāḍṛg dharme bhaviṣyat|l”
judgments can be defeated by non-gustatory deliverances. Thus a doctor’s testimony that illness has affected one’s tastebuds constitutes an undercutting defeater for a previous judgment of flavour. However, in Kumārila’s defence, it can be said that this deliverance does not undercut the phenomenology of the awareness as of sourness.

Kumārila’s idea is that Vedic testimony provides awareness of phenomena within an exclusive domain in the same way as the sense of taste does. This exclusive domain concerns beliefs which broadly concern moral, legal and ritualistic affairs, thus normative rather than factual matters. As Halbfass explains, “[a]ll knowledge about dharma, the ritual norms and duties, is ultimately obtained from the Veda.”

As such, it seems that the lack of replacement operation and the lack of bad features described above refer to judgements based on non-Vedic sources. Just as a judgment of sourness can only be overturned by a later judgment of sweetness, so too a judgment based on a Vedic injunction can only be replaced by a contrary judgment based on a different Vedic injunction. The previous chapter provided examples of overturning such as the ritual injunctions ‘he shall not look’ and ‘he shall not eat’, carrying water in a milk-pail instead of a wooden bowl, and sacrificing on the Āhavanīya fire as a general case.

As such, within the sphere of Vedic judgments, it would seem that defeat of judgments formed on the basis of Vedic testimony is possible, and that the process of inquiry described in the previous chapter is applicable. This feature of Kumārila’s position has been recognized by Arnold, who explains that “Vedic practices (practices represented as executing what is enjoined by the Vedic texts) are subject to being overridden [but are] susceptible only to the outputs

---

81 Halbfass (1992) 30
82 It may be objected that these examples are not drawn from the core samhitā texts of the Vedas. However, this is typical of the type of injunctions of interest to the Mīmāṃsā philosophers. As Taber (1989) note 7 explains, “Śabara sometimes cites the Śrautasūtras as if they were śruti ... The paradigm of a Vedic injunction for Śabara, svargakāmo yajeta, is probably not a citation at all but a purely artificial model.”
of the Veda itself.” In this statement, Arnold comes close to acknowledging the procedural aspect of Kumārila’s thinking, albeit only in relation to the Vedas.

However, Arnold nevertheless maintains that the Mīmāṃsakas hold that “the Vedas are in principle unfalsifiable” and that “the Vedas cannot possibly be the source of any error.” Rather, falsification “takes the form of essentially hermeneutical debates about, what, precisely, is enjoined by the Vedas in any case.” As a result, “significant authority attaches to those charged with interpreting the Veda – that is, the Mīmāṃsakas.” Arnold’s analysis roots the process of falsification in the hermeneutical practices of the Mīmāṃsakas. By contrast, this research has argued that such hermeneutical practices reflect an underlying logic to the presentation of injunctions in the Veda, involving a model of general rule and exceptional cases. As such, the hermeneutic process reflects the general method of inquiry described in the previous chapter, whereby the agent is advised to begin inquiry by introducing a new idea, to continue inquiry by searching for a defeater, and to terminate inquiry when a sufficient level of confidence has been obtained. In the case of knowledge acquired from Vedic texts, the very fact of hearing the statements and of comprehending their exhortative significance is sufficient to introduce these statements as ideas and so begin the process of inquiry.

83 Arnold (2005) 113
84 Arnold (2005) 112
85 Arnold (2005) 112-113
86 Arnold (2005) 113
87 Arnold (2005) 113
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Section 1: Summary of findings

By drawing out the procedural aspect of Kumārila's doctrine, an interpretation has been developed which diverges from the interpretations by Kumārila's classical commentators as well as modern scholars, whilst acknowledging that those interpretations capture important features of Kumārila's doctrine. Specifically, whilst existing interpretations present notions of justification and truth relevant to the process of inquiry, what is lacking is attention to the dynamic aspect of Kumārila's epistemology, whereby the inquirer is mandated to engage in an epistemic process regulated by a notion of justification but culminating in a state where the inquirer can have sufficient confidence that her beliefs coincide with the truth. This epistemic process involves Peircean considerations about how to instigate, prolong and terminate inquiry, and as such has been characterized as a pragmatics of inquiry.

Kumārila's statement that the prāmāṇyam of all pramāṇas is 'from itself'\(^1\) was identified as his central claim. The term pramāṇa was shown to identify a deliverance from an epistemic source or human faculty such as perception, following Sosa's terminology. This is strictly the act of delivering, which is a natural kind of process to produce accurate determination, but can also be taken to refer to the accuracy of the delivered content.

A disjunction between pramāṇa and non-pramāṇa was characterized in terms of the disjunction between Good Case deliverances and Bad Case deliverances, on the grounds that they are reflectively indiscernible yet arise from different belief processes or sets of causal conditions. Specifically, a pramāṇa is a Good Case deliverance because it arises from epistemic sources not vitiated by flaws.

\(^1\) TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
Such flaws consist in features such as cataracts, which make epistemic conditions sub-optimal.

The notion of prāmāṇya was analyzed as a capacity for epistemic success, based on the idea of an epistemic goal implicit in this terminology. Based on Kumārila's expression 'meya-bodha-śakti', epistemic success consists in accurate determination of an object or fact.

The construction 'from itself' (svataḥ) was found to appeal to a dispositionalist essentialist notion of capacity as metaphysical ground for the process of accurate determination. A capacity is a real causal power which is a real essence and natural disposition of a natural kind of process. This capacity metaphysically grounds the process of accurate judgment, which results in an accurate judgment as an outcome. The contrast between 'from itself' and 'from something else' indicates a sense of non-reliance. A non-pramāṇa or Bad Case deliverance is reliant on some vitiating feature of the belief process to cause the apprehension as of a particular object. By contrast, a pramāṇa or Good Case deliverance is not reliant on anything external to itself.

Accordingly, Kumārila's claim above is that a Good Case deliverance, which arises from epistemic sources that are not vitiated by flaws, exercises a capacity to determine an object due to that capacity being a real causal power which is an essence conditional on its identity as a Good Case deliverance. All deliverances possess such a capacity as an intrinsic nature contingent on lack of vitiation, but the vitiation in the case of Bad Case deliveries means that their intrinsic nature is overpowered, in the same way that the intrinsic nature of water to be cool is held to be overpowered by the proximity of fire.

Thus a Good Case deliverance is one which arises from a human faculty which constitutes an intellectual virtue in the sense that it is "a way of arriving at belief that yields an appropriate preponderance of truth over error". This Good Case deliverance has positive epistemic status by virtue of being an apt belief,

---

2 Sosa (1991) 289
i.e. by virtue of deriving from that intellectual virtue. In this way, the reflexive sense of 'itself' is construed as reflexivity to the intellectual virtue that the deliverance amounts to. The interpretation of this thesis thus contrasts with that of Pārthasārathi, Arnold and Taber, whereby prāmāṇya is a property of both veridical and non-veridical awarenesses.

However, given the reflective indiscriminability of Bad Case deliverances, it still remains to be explained how the agent can have sufficient confidence that her beliefs arise from Good Case deliverances. This problem cannot be solved by appeal to some external standard of justification, on pain of infinite regress. Rather, Kumārila lays out a protocol for inquiry based on the asymmetry between Good Case and Bad Case deliverances. Bad Case deliverances rely on some vitiating feature whereby they are vulnerable to subsequent defeat, either by undercutting or overriding defeaters. By contrast, a Good Case delivery lacks any such reliance and so display no such vulnerability to defeat. As such, a process of checking one's beliefs will result in the defeat of Bad Case deliverances and the withstanding of defeat by Good Case deliverances.

Although such a checking process could potentially be continued indefinitely, it should be brought to an end on pragmatic grounds, just as a judge brings the potentially open-ended process of hearing evidence in a trial to an end. Although reflective indiscriminability means that judgments that withstand defeat are logically not incompatible with their falsity, nevertheless Kumārila considers that the agent attains not merely a high degree of epistemic confidence but actual possession of only true beliefs. This is based on an explanatory induction to the view that beliefs that withstand defeat do so because they are due to a real causal power which is a capacity to determine an object.

This dynamic conception contrasts with the static conception of Arnold, whereby the initial appearance provides a 'validity' which constitutes an epistemically complete outcome. This reading is defended through consideration of Kumārila's use of the notion of svabhāva, the negative particle, and ritual and
grammatical terminology. On this basis, affinities are found with Peirce's pragmatics of inquiry and with Sosa's Virtue Epistemology.

Kumārila's presentation of an argument from infinite regress is shown to target a conception of organon justification, whereby one belief is justified by some further instrument or rule. As such, Kumārila is an anti-foundationalist who rejects the idea that a secure foundation for judgments can be obtained. However, whereas the reading of Kumārila's anti-foundationalism by Taber and Arnold means that all beliefs are equally justified or equally valid, the interpretation presented here is that a process of inquiry is necessary to strengthen the epistemic status of beliefs. It is thus tentatively suggested that Kumārila's doctrine be understood with reference to Sosa's more general notion of aptness, rather than the narrower notion of justification.

The title of this thesis, 'Generative Knowledge', is intended to resonate with the idea of theory-generating methods in general, including Peirce's conception of abduction, but also has particular reference to the example of Pāṇini's generative grammar. A reading has been made in line with what Ganeri identifies as a Mīmāṃsā model of ritual reason involving processes of substitution and adaptation which is also a general model for practical deliberation. Kumārila's protocol has an affinity with legal reasoning, which is similarly adaptive. As Prakken explains, legal reasoning has a "rule-guided rather than rule-governed nature" whereby "legal rules are ... often subject to exceptions which are not explicitly stated in legislation, and this calls for ways of representing the provisional or 'defeasible' character of legal rules." Kumārila's doctrine of inquiry represents a similarly pragmatic response to "the open, unpredictable nature of the world" faced by jurists, ritualists and epistemologists.

---

3 See Ganeri (2004) 207
4 Prakken (1997) 33
5 Prakken (1997) 33
6 Prakken (1997) 33
Section 2: Suggestions for future research

This research has suggested connections with various themes in contemporary philosophy. These are the literature on metaphysical grounding, the thesis of dispositional essentialism, the pragmatism of Charles Peirce, and the Virtue Reliabilism of Ernest Sosa. However, the development of these connections has only been partial. Further research may strengthen the claim of Kumārila's affinity with these themes. In particular, it is likely that the general notion of pramāṇa can be helpfully illuminated with regard to aspects of Virtue Epistemology including anti-luck conditions for knowledge such as Sosa's modal notions of tracking and safety, as well as ability conditions for knowledge such as Sosa's notion of aptness, which Sosa has continued to develop in recent work. Further, the notion of a metaphysical ground is a topic of renewed philosophical interest, and research into the notion of svabhāva could contribute to the articulation of the concept of grounding.

This research has also set out Kumārila's own view with tangential reference to the rival accounts of Buddhist thinkers. However, given the substantial discursive engagement with Kumārila's view by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi very shortly after Kumārila's own activity, and by Dharmottara as well as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the following century, it would seem that research into the engagement with this topic by these thinkers would be very valuable in illuminating Kumārila's own understanding of his claim, as well as in indicating the immediate impact of Kumārila's work. As close contemporaries of Kumārila, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi may share Kumārila's own philosophical concerns more closely than Kumārila's own later commentators.

As discussed above, Mīmāṃsā authors have specialized in the analysis of normative statements, and as such, the methodologies they have developed can be brought into further engagement with similar normative concerns in contemporary thought, such as epistemological and ethical normativity.
Abbreviations

The abbreviations used in the thesis are explained here. A reference to the bibliography below is given in those cases where citations have been made with reference to page numbers.

BṬ = Brhaṭṭikā of Bhaṭṭa Kumārila – see Shastri (1968)

CP = Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce

K = Kāśikā of Sucarita Miśra – see Sāmbasiva Śāstrī (1926)

MB = Mahābhśya of Patañjali

MK = Mīmāṃsā Kośa – see Kevalānandasarasватī (1960)

MMK = Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā of Nāgārjuna – see Poussin (1903-1913)

NM = Nyāya-mañjarī of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta – the text reflects an unpublished critical edition of the text prepared by Prof. Kei Kataoka; see Varadācārya (1969) for page references

NRM = Nyāya-ratna-mālā of Pārthasārathi Miśra – see Shastri (1982)

P = Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā of Kamalaśīla – see Shastri (1926)

PP = Prasanna-padā of Candrakīrti – see Poussin (1903-1913)

PVP = Tshad ma rnam 'grel kyi 'grel pa (= Pramāṇa-vārttika-pañjikā) of Devendrabuddhi – see Devendrabuddhi (1991)

PVṬ = Tshad ma rnam 'grel kyi 'grel bshad (= Pramāṇa-vārttika-ṭīkā) of Śākyabuddhi – see Śākyabuddhi (1991)
ŚV = Śloka-vārttika of Bhaṭṭa Kumārila – see Kataoka (2011) Part 1

TS = Tattva-saṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita – see Shastri (1968)

ṬṬ = Tātparya-ṭīkā of Bhaṭṭomveka – see Ramanatha Sastri (1940)
Bibliography


Candotti, M. P. (2012) 'Naming-Procedure and Substitution in Early Sanskrit Grammarians', in Voegeli et al., *Devadattīyam: Johannes Bronkhorst*


Handbook of Epistemology, Oxford University Press: 287-315


Jha, G. (1907) *Çlokavārttika, translated from the original Sanskrit with extracts from the commentaries of Sucarita Miśra (the Kāśikā) and Pārtha Sārathi Miśra (the Nyāyaratnākara)*, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press


Joshi, S.D. (1968) *Patañjali’s Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Samarthāhnika*
(P.2.1.1): Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes, University of Poona, Poona


Joshi, S.D. and J.A.F. Roodbergen (1973) Patañjali’s Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Tatpurūṣāhnika (P.2.2.2-2.2.23): Edited with Translation and Explanatory Notes, University of Poona, Poona

Joshi, S.D. and J.A.F. Roodbergen (1975) Patañjali’s Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Kārakāhnika (P.1.4.23-1.4.55): Introduction, Translation and Notes, University of Poona, Poona

Joshi, S.D. and J.A.F. Roodbergen (1976) Patañjali’s Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Anabhihitāhnika (P.2.3.1-2.3.17): Introduction, Text, Translation and Notes, University of Poona, Poona


Kane, P.V. (1928) 'The chronological postion of Mandana, Umbeka, Bhavabhuti, Suresvara' in Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, New Series Vol.3 (1928)


Krasser, H. (2012b) 'Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti and Kumārila', in Voegeli et al., Devadattiyaṃ: Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume, Peter Lang

Krishnamacharya, E. (1926) Tattvasamgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the
commentary of Kamalaśīla, Vol.2, Baroda: Central Library (Gaekwad's Oriental Series)


Lusthaus, Dan (2002) Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih Lun, Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism Series


Mirashi, V.V. (1966) 'Dr Kane on Bhavabhuti and Umbeka', in Neog and Barpujari (eds.) *Professor Suryya Kumar Bhuyan Commemoration Volume*, Gauhati, Assam


Obermiller, E. (1932) (trans.) *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston, II. Part: The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet, Translated from Tibetan*, Heidelberg (O. Harrassowitz)


Poussin, Louis de la Vallée (1903-1913) *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, Imprimerie de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences, St. Pétersbourg

Defeasible Reasoning in Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers


Ramanatha Sastri, S.K. (1940) Śloka-vārttika-vyākhya (Tātparyaṭīkā) of Bhattombeka, University of Madras


Respect to the Origination of the Validity', *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Vol.55, No.3, March 2007


Appendix 1: Transliterated Bṛhat-ṭīkā text extract

This appendix contains a transliteration of the svataḥ-prāmāṇyam presentation in the Bṛhat-ṭīkā. That presentation is preserved as a long quotation within Śāntarakṣita's Tattva-saṅgraha. The transliteration below closely follows the Shastri (1968) (Bauddha Bharati) edition [BB], which does not constitute a genuinely critical edition. Accordingly, no credit is taken for original research in respect of the material in this appendix. Emendations were made based on the Krishnamacharya (1926) (Gaekwad's Oriental Series) edition [GOS]. The Tattva-saṅgraha verses quoting the Bṛhat-ṭīkā are 2811ab, 2812 to 2815 and 2846 to 2918. However, Kataoka notes that there is slight uncertainty as to whether verse 2846 is extracted from the Bṛhat-ṭīkā or is by Śāntarakṣita.¹ See Kataoka (2011) 283 footnote 274 for a comparison of Bṛhat-ṭīkā and Śloka-vārttika verses. This extract covers 2811 to 2815, 2846 to 2884, and 2908 to 2916, which concern the general case. Verses 2885 to 2907 and 2917 to 2918, concerning the application to the case of the Veda, are omitted.

2811ab: svataḥ sarva-pramāṇanāṁ prāmāṇyam iti gṛhyatām|
[2811cd: ity etasya ca vākyasya bhavadbhiḥ ko 'ṛtha iṣyate||]

2812ab: meya-bodhādike śaktis te ām svābhāvikī sthitā|
2812cd: na hi svato 'satī śaktih kartum anyena pāryate||²

2813ab: anapekṣatvam evaīkāṁ prāmāṇyasya nibandhanam|
2813cd: tad eva hi vināśyeta sāpekṣatve sāmāśrite||

2814ab: ko hi mūlaharam pakṣaṁ nyāyavādy adhyavasyati|
2814cd: yena tat-siddhy-upāyo 'pi svōktyaīvāsya vīṇāśyati||

¹ See Kataoka (2011) 251
² 2812cd pāryate] BB; śakyate GOS
2815ab: sāpekṣaṁ hi pramāṇatvam na vyavasthāpyate kvacit\(^3\)
2815cd: anavasthita-hetuṣ ca kah śādhyam śādhaiṣyati||

2846ab: svatas tv asya pramāṇanāṁ pramāṇyasyopaṇavaṇanat|
2846cd: svakārye vrṛttir jātāṇāṁ athāpy abhimatā svataḥ||

2847ab: ātmalābhe hi bhāvānāṁ kāraṇāpeksitēṣyate|
2847cd: labdhātmanaḥ svakāryeṣu vartante svayam eva tu||

2848ab: utpāda-mātra evāto vyapekṣāsti svahetuṣu|
2848cd: jñānānāṁ svaguṇeṣv eśā na tu niścaya-janmani||

2849ab: janane hi svatantrāṇāṁ pramāṇyārtha-viniściteḥ|
2849cd: svahetu-nirapekṣānāṁ teṣāṁ vrṛttir ghaṭādivat||

2850ab: mṛtpinda-daṇḍa-cakrādi ghaṭo janmany apekṣate|
2850cd: udakāharaṇe tv asya tad-apekṣā na vidyate||

2851ab: evaṁ svataḥ-pramāṇatvam ante cāvaṣyam eva tat|
2851cd: parādhīne pramāṇatve hy anavasthā prasajyate||

2852ab: maulike cet pramāṇatve pramāṇāntara-sādhyatā\(^4\)
2852cd: tava tatraiva icchanto na vyavasthāṁ labhemahi||

2853ab: yathaīva prathamaṁ jñānāṁ tat-sāmvādam apekṣate|
2853cd: sāmvādenāpi saṃvādaḥ punar mṛgyas tathaīva hi||

2854ab: kasyacit tu yadīṣyeta svata eva pramāṇatā|
2854cd: prathamasya tathābhāve pradveṣaḥ kena hetunā||

2855ab: evaṁ yadi guṇādhīnā pratyakṣādi-pramāṇatā|

\(^3\) 2815ab vyavasthāpyate] vyavasthāpyata GOS; vyasthāpyate BB
\(^4\) 2852ab cet] GOS; ca BB
269

2855cd: guṇāś ca na pramāṇena vinā santi kadācana||

2856ab: tato guṇa-paricchedi-pramāṇāntaram icchataḥ|
2856cd: tasyāpy anya-paricchinna-guṇāyattā pramāṇatā||

2857ab: yathādyeye ca tathā 'anyatṛety anavasthaiवa pūrvavat|⁵
2857cd: tatra tatraivam icchanto na vyavasthāṇi labhemahi|

2858ab: guṇa-jñānaṃ guṇa-yatta-pramāṇyam atha nēsyate|
2858cd: ādyam apy artha-vijñānaṃ nāpekṣeta guṇa-pramām||

2859ab: ato dúram api dhyātvā pramāṇyam yat svatāḥ kvacit|
2859cd: avaṣyābhypagantavyam tatraivādau varam sthitam||

2860ab: saṃvāda-guṇa-vijñāne kena vā 'bhyadhike mate|⁶
2860cd: ādyasya tad-adhīnatvam yad-balena bhaviṣyatį||

2861ab: tasmāt svatāḥ-pramāṇatvam sarvatrautsargikam sthitam|
2861cd: bādha-kāraṇa-duṣṭatva-jñānābhyām tad apodyate⁷||

2862ab: parāyatte 'pi caītasmin nānavasthā prasajyate|
2862cd: pramāṇādhīnam etad dhi svatas tac ca pratiṣṭhitam||

2863ab: pramāṇaṃ hi pramāṇena yathā nānyena sādhyate|
2863cd: na sidhyaty apramāṇatvam apramāṇāt tathaiva hi||

2864ab: tulya-jātāśrayatve hi pratiṣṭhā nōpapadyate|
2864cd: vijātes tv anya-hetutvād drṛṣha-mūla-pratiṣṭhitā||

2865ab: bādhaka-pratyayas tāvad arthānyatvāvadhāraṇam|

⁵ 2857ab yathādyeye ca tathā 'anyatṛety] GOS; yathaīvādyeye tataś caīvam BB
⁶ 'bhyadhike mate] GOS; printing is bad in BB
⁷ Kataoka reads this term as 'apodyate'
2865cd: so 'napekṣa-pramāṇatvāt pūrva-jñānam apohate

2866ab: tatrāpi tv apavādasya syād apekṣā punaḥ kvacit|
2866cd: jātāśaṅkasya pūrveṇa sā 'py alpena nivartate||

2867ab: bādhakāntaram utpannam yady asyānvīṣyato 'param|
2867cd: tato madhyama-bādhena pūrvasyaīva pramāṇatā||

2868ab: athānurūpa-yatnena samyag-anveṣane krte|
2868cd: mūlābhāvān na vijñānam bhavet bādhaka-bādhakam||

2869ab: tato nirapavādatvāt tenaīvādyam balīyasā|
2869cd: bādhyate tena tasyaīva pramāṇatvam apohyate||

2870ab: evaṃ parǐkṣaka-jñāna-tritayam nātvartate|
2870cd: tataś cājāta-bādhena nāsaṅkyam bādhakam punaḥ||

2871ab: utprekṣeta hi yo mohād ajātam api bādhakam||
2871cd: sa sarva-vyavahāreṣu saṁśayātmā kṣayaṁ vrajet||

2872ab: tathā ca vāsudevena ninditā saṁśayatmatā|
2872cd: nāyam loko 'sti kaunteya na paraḥ saṁśayatmanaḥ||

2873ab: yavān evāpavādo 'to yatra sambhāvyate matau|
2873cd: anviṣte 'nupajāte ca tāvaty eva tad-ātmanī||

2874ab: kadācit syād apiṣy evaḥ na bhūyas tatra vastunī|
2874cd: utprekṣamānaḥi sthātavyam atmakāmaiḥ pramāṭbhīḥ||

8 This term should perhaps be some form of 'apod-
9 2868cd vijñātām] GOS; vijñānam BB
10 This term should perhaps be 'apodyate'
11 2871ab utprekṣyate] GOS; utprekṣeta BB
12 2872cd loko] BB; loke GOS
13 2874cd atmakāmaiḥ] BB; nātmakāmaiḥ GOS
2875ab: deśa-kāla-narāvasthā-bhedāḥ saṃvyavahārataḥ|
2875cd: siddhā eva hi ye ṣaṃmīṁs te 'pekyā bādhakārthinā||

2876ab: dūra-deśa-vyavasthānād asamyag-darśane bhavet|
2876cd: anyāśaṅkā kvacit tatra samīpā-gati-mātrakām||

2877ab: apavādāvadhiḥ kāla-narāvasthāntare na tu|
2877cd: vyapeksā vidyate tasmin mrga-trṣṇādi-buddhivat||

2878ab: evaṁ santamase käle yo gavāsvādi-saṃśayaḥ|
2878cd: bhrānter vā nīryayas tatra prakāśi-bhavaṇāvadhit||

2879ab: tathā hi candra-dig-moha-veda-varṇa-svarādiṣu|
2879cd: puruṣāṇtara-sampaśnād anyāthātvaṇvadhaṇāṇam||

2880ab: rāga-dveṣa-madōnmaṇḍa-kṣut-trṣṇādi-kṣatendriyaiḥ|
2880cd: durjñāne jñāyamāne 'rthe tad-abhāvād viparyayah||

2881ab: ṇādi-vyavahāre 'pi dvayor vivadmaṇayoh|
2881cd: ekaṁ pratyarthino vākyam dve vākye pūrva-vādinaḥ||

2882ab: anavasthā-bhayād eva na vākyam dve likhyate 'dhikam|
2882cd: tatas tu nīnyayas bruṇuḥ svāmi-sākṣi-sahāsadaḥ||

2883ab: evaṁ jñāna-trayasaiṁa sarvatra vikriyāṣyate|^{15}
2883cd: trisatyata 'pi devānāṁ ata evābhidhiyate||

2884ab: tena svataḥ-pramāṇatve nānavaṇthōbhayor api|
2884cd: pramāṇatvāpāramāṇatve yathā-yogam ataḥ sthite||

2908ab: nanu pramāṇam ity evaṁ pratyakṣādi na gṛhyate|

---
^{14} 2879cd anyāthātvaṇvadhaṇāṇam] GOS; anyathātvevadhaṇāṇam BB
^{15} 2883ab sarvārthādhikriyāṣyate] BB; sarvatra vikriyāṣyate GOS
272

2908cd: na cēttham agraḥitena vyavahāro 'vakalpyate||

2909ab: pramāṇaṁ grahaṇat pūrvam svarūpeṇa pratiṣṭhitam|
2909cd: nirapekṣaṇa ca tat-svārthe pramāṇaṁ miyate paraiḥ||

2910ab: yathā cāviditair eva caksur-ādibhir indriyaiḥ|
2910cd: gṛhyante viṣayāḥ sarve pramāṇair api te tathā||

2911ab: tenātra jñāyamānatvam prāmāṇye nōpayujyate|
2911cd: viṣayānubhavo py asmād ajñātād eva labhyate||

2912ab: apramāṇaṁ punaḥ svārthe pramāṇam iva hi sthitam|
2912cd: mithyātvam tasya gṛhyeta na pramāṇāntarādṛte||

2913ab: na hy arthasyaṇyathābhāvaḥ pūrvenātta tathātvavat|
2913cd: tad atrāpy anyathābhāve dhīr yad vā duṣṭa-kāraṇe||

2914ab: tāvatā caiva mithyātvam gṛhyate nānya-hetukam|
2914cd: utpatty-avasthaṃ caivaṃ pramāṇam iti miyate||

2915ab: ato yatrāpi mithyātvam parebhyaḥ pratipādyate|
2915cd: tatrāpy etad dvayaṃ vācyam na tu sādharmya-mātrakam||

2916ab: tatrāpramāṇa-sādharmya-mātraṃ yat-kiṃcid āśritāḥ|
2916cd: sarvam pramāṇa-mithyātvam sādhayanty avipaścitaḥ||

\[16\] 2908cd 'vakalpyate] BB; 'vakalpate GOS
\[17\] 2914cd caivēdam] BB; evēdam GOS
Appendix 2: Translated Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā text extract (with transliteration in brackets)

This appendix contains a translation of the svataḥ-pramāṇyam presentation in the Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā in accordance with the final understanding developed in this thesis. That presentation is preserved as a long quotation within Śāntarakṣita's Tattva-saṅgraha. The transliterated text below is based on the Krishnamacharya (1926) and Shastri (1968) (Bauddha Bharati) editions, so no credit is taken for original research in respect of editing the Sanskrit text. Those editions do not constitute genuinely critical editions, and some errors in translation may arise from underlying errors in the text. The English translation Jha (1939) of that edition and parallel verses in Kataoka (2011) were consulted. The Tattva-saṅgraha verses quoting the Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā are 2811ab, 2812 to 2815 and 2846 to 2918. However, Kataoka notes that there is slight uncertainty as to whether verse 2846 is extracted from the Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā or is by Śāntarakṣita.¹ See Kataoka (2011) 283 footnote 274 for a comparison of Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā and Śloka-vārttika verses. This translation covers 2811 to 2815, 2846 to 2884, and 2908 to 2916, which concern the general case. Verses 2885 to 2907 and 2917 to 2918, concerning the application to the case of the Veda, are omitted. In some cases, verses are split to make clear the flow of the argument.

2811ab: The capacity for epistemic success (prāmāṇyam) of all Good Case deliverances (sarva-pramāṇānām) is apprehended (iti gṛhyatām) as being an intrinsic nature (svataḥ).

[2811cd: And (ca) what meaning (ko 'ṛthaḥ) of this statement (ity etasya ... vākyasya) is accepted (iṣyate) by you (bhavadbhiḥ)?]

2812: A capacity to cognize something etc. (meya-bodhādike śaktih) belongs to them [viz. Good Case deliverances] (teṣām ... sthitā) due to an intrinsic causal

¹ See Kataoka (2011) 251
power (svābhāvikī). To explain (hi), a capacity (śaktiḥ) which is not due to
being an intrinsic nature (svato 'sati) cannot be produced (na ... kartum ... 
pāryate) by something else (anyena).

2813: A capacity for epistemic success is solely due to non-dependence
(anapekṣatvam evākāṃ prāmāṇyasya nibandhanam). For (hi) just that [i.e.
the capacity for epistemic success] (tad eva) would be destroyed (vināśyeta) if
dependence were accepted (sāpekṣatve samāśrite).

2814: To explain (hi), what philosopher (kaḥ ... nyāyavādi) accepts
(adhyavasyati) a view that destroys the central topic (mūlaharam pakṣam), by
which (yena) even (api) the means of establishing that [view] (tat-siddhya-
upāyaḥ) is destroyed (vinaśyati) by his (asya) very words (svōktyaīva).

2815: To explain (hi), dependence (sāpekṣam) never (na ... kvacit) establishes
(vyavasthāpyate) the Goodness of Case (pramāṇatvam), and (ca) what (kaḥ)
reason which has no foundation (anavasthita-hetuh) will cause to be proved
(sādhayisyati) what is to be proved (sādhyam)?

2846ab: Rather (tu), due to the description (upavaranāt) of this capacity for
epistemic success (asya ... prāmāṇyasya) of the Good Case deliverances
(pramāṇānām) [as] being due to an intrinsic nature (svataḥ), ...

2846cd: ... therefore (athāpi) the activity (vr̥ttiḥ) in operating (svakārye) of [the
Good Case deliverances which] have arisen (jātānām) is considered (abhimatā)
[to be] due to an intrinsic nature (svataḥ).

2847: “To explain (hi), it is accepted that (iṣyate) entities (bhāvānām) depend
on causes (kāraṇāpekṣitā) in order to obtain their existence (ātmalābhe). But
(tu) [entities which] have obtained their existence (labdhātmanah) function
(vartante) in their own activities (svakāryeṣu) just independently (svayam eva).

2848: So (ataḥ) there is dependency (vyapekṣāsti) of deliverances (jñānānām)
on their own causes (svahetuṣu) simply in being produced (utpāda-mātṛ[e]) only (eva), but (tu) there is not (na) this [dependency] (eṣā) [of deliverances] in producing (-janmani) ascertainment (niścaya-) in respect of their good features (svaguṇeṣu).

2849: To explain (hi), when the ascertainment of the object [and] of the capacity for epistemic success (prāmāṇyārtha-viniściteḥ) is being produced (janane), the functioning (vṛttiḥ) of those [viz. Good Case deliverances] (teṣām) which are independent (svatantrāṃ) and not reliant on their own causes (svahetu-nirapekṣāṃ) is like [the functioning of] a pot etc. (ghaṭādīvat).

2850: In being produced (janmani), a pot (ghaṭaḥ) depends on (apekṣate) a lump of clay, a [potter's] stick, a [potter's] wheel etc. (mṛtpinda-daṇḍa-cakrādi), but (tu) its (āsya) [i.e. the pot's] dependency on those things (tad-apekṣā) is not present (na vidyate) when water is being extracted [in a setting process] (udakāharaṇe).

2851: Goodness of Case [being] due to an intrinsic nature (svataḥ-pramāṇatvam) is like that (evam), and (ca) that [Goodness] (tat) is certainly just (avaśyam eva) in the final [deliverance] (ante), for (hi) if Goodness of Case were dependent on something else (parādhīne pramāṇatve), there would be infinite regress (anavasthā prasajyate).

2852: If it is said (cet) by you (tava) that the Goodness of Case of the first [deliverance] (maulike ... pramāṇatve) is established (-sādhyatā) by a different Good Case deliverance (pramāṇāntara-), [then] in that case (tatra), seeking (icchantah) in this way (evam), we would not find a foundation (na vyavasthāṃ labhemahi).

2853: Just as (yathaîva) the first deliverance (prathamaḥ jñānam) depends on a deliverance which agrees with it (tat-sāṃvādam apekṣate), in the same way (tathaîva hi), an agreeing deliverance (sāṃvādaḥ) should again be sought (punar mrgyāḥ) for that agreeing deliverance (sāṃvādena) also (api).
2854: But (tu) if (yadi) you accept (iṣyeta) the Goodness of Case (pramāṇatā) of some [deliverance] (kasyacit) to be just due to an intrinsic nature (svata eva), [then] why (kena hetunā) are you averse (pradveśaḥ) to [admitting that] the actual presence (tathābhāve) [of Goodness] is in the first [deliverance] (prathamasya)?

2855: If (yadi) the Goodness of Case of perceptual deliverances etc. (pratyakṣādi-pramāṇatā) is dependent on good features (guṇādhīnā) in this way (evam), and (ca) good features (guṇāḥ) do not exist (na ... santi) other than in a Good Case deliverance (pramāṇena vinā) at any time (kadācana), ...

2856: ... then (tataḥ), when seeking (icchataḥ) another Good Case deliverance (-pramāṇāntaram) which manifests the good feature (guṇa-paricchedi-), the Goodness of Case (pramāṇatā) of that (tasya) too (api) would be dependent on a good feature manifested by another [valid cognition] (anya-paricchinna- guṇāyattā).

2857: And (ca) just as (yathā) in the case of the first (ādye), so (tathā) [in the case] of the next (anyatra), like before (pūrvavat) so (iti) [there would] just (eva) be infinite regress (anavasthā). In this way (evam), seeking (icchantaḥ) in the case of one and another (tatra tatra), we would not find a foundation (na vyavasthām labhemahi).

2858: And if (atha) it is not accepted (nēṣyate) that cognition of the good feature (guṇa-jñānam) has a capacity for epistemic success (-prāmāṇya- that is dependent on a [further] good feature (guṇayatta-), [then] the first [deliverance] (ādyam) too (api) would not depend (nāpekṣeta) on the deliverance of the object (artha-vijñānam) which is the knowledge of the good feature (guṇa-pramām).

2859: So (ataḥ) having considered (dhyātvā) for a long time (dūram api), it certainly has to be postulated (avaśyābhhyupagantavyam) that the capacity for
epistemic success (prāmāṇyam) of some [deliverance] (yat ... kvacit) is due to an intrinsic nature (svataḥ). This being the case (tatraîva) it is best (varam) established (sthitam) in the first [deliverance] (ādau).

2860: Or (vā) due to what (kena) are the deliverances of agreement and the deliverance of a good feature (saṃvāda-guṇa-vijñāne) considered (mate) superior (abhyadhike), due to the strength of which (yad-balena) the first [cognition] (ādyasya) will be (bhaviṣyati) dependent on that (tad-adhinatvam)?

2861: So (tasmāt) Goodness of Case [being] due to an intrinsic nature (svataḥ-pramāṇatvam) remains (sthitam) the general operation (autsargikam) in all cases (sarvatra), [and] it (tat) is replaced (apohyate) either by a defeating deliverance or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was formed (bādha-kāraṇa-duṣṭatva-jīānābhyām).

2862: And even though this [defeating deliverance or by the deliverance that there is a flaw] would be dependent on something else (parāyatte 'pi caītasmin), there would be no infinite regress (nānavasthā prasajyate), for (hi) that [Goodness] (etat) would be dependent on a Good Case deliverance (pramāṇādhiṇham), and that (tac ca) is established (pratiṣṭhitam) [as being] due to an intrinsic nature (svataḥ).

2863: To explain (hi), just as (yathā) a Good Case deliverance (pramāṇam) is not (na) established (sādhyate) by another (anyena) Good Case deliverance (pramāṇena), in the same way (tathaîva hi), Badness of deliverance (apramāṇatvam) is not (na) established (sidhyati) by [another] Bad Case deliverance (apramāṇat).  

2864: For (hi) when one thing is based on something else of the same kind (tulya-jātāśrayatve), a [final] foundation (pratiṣṭhā) is not possible (nōpapadyate), whereas (tu) [something] of a different kind (vijāteḥ) is securely established (drḍha-mūla-pratiṣṭhītā), because [in that Case] it has a

2 Kataoka reads this term as 'apodyate'
cause that is something else (anya-hetutvāt).

2865: The mental state defeater (bādhaka-pratyayaḥ) is just (tāvat) the determination (-avaḥdāraṇam) that the object is different [from how it was originally cognized] (arthānyatva-). It (sa) excludes (apohate³) the earlier deliverance (pūrva-jñānam) because it has Goodness of Case that is independent (anapekṣa-pramāṇatvāt).

2866: Although (api tu) in respect of those [defeaters] (tatra) there may be (syāt) dependence (apekṣā) on replacement operation (apavādasya) again (punah) in some cases (kvacit), nevertheless (api) for a person who has developed a genuine doubt (jātāśaṅkasya) due to the earlier [deliverance] (pūrveṇa), that [dependence] (sā) will easily (alpena) come to an end (nivartate).

2867: If (yadi) another actual defeater (bādhakântaram utpannam) of this [second deliverance] (asya) is additionally (aparam) sought (anviṣyataḥ), then (tataḥ) by the defeat of the middle [second] deliverance (madhyama-bādhena), just the first is a Good Case (pūrvasyaîva pramāṇatā).

2868: And if (atha), when it has been correctly sought (samyag-anveṣane kṛte) with appropriate effort (anurūpa-yatnena), a defeater of the defeater (bādhaka-bādhakam) should not be known (na vijñātaḥ bhavet) as it has no basis (mūlābhāvāt) ... 

2869: ... then (tataḥ) due to its greater strength (tenaîva ... balīyasā) [of the defeater] due to not being replaced (nirapavādatvāt), the first [deliverance] (ādyam) will be defeated (bādhyate tena), [and] the Goodness of Case (pramāṇatvam) of that [first deliverance] (tasyaîva) will be excluded (apohyate⁴).

³ Variant reading may be some form of ‘apod-’
⁴ Variant reading may be ‘apodyate’
2870: Thus (evam) the inquirer does not go beyond the third deliverance (parikṣaka-jñāna-tritayaṁ nātvartate), and so (tataś ca) a further defeater (bādhakāṁ punaḥ) is not suspected (nāśañkyam) as no defeater has arisen (ajāta-bādhena).

2871: To explain (hi), he (saḥ) who (yaḥ), having a doubting nature (saṃśayātmā) in all his everyday activities (sarva-vyavahāre u), conjectures (utprekṣyate) [a defeater] through delusion (mohāt) even when no defeater has arisen (ajātam api bādhakam) will perish (kṣayaṁ vrajet).

2872: And so (tathā ca) being a compulsive doubter (sa śayâtmatā) is censured (ninditā) by Vāsudeva (vāsudevena) – “O, Kaunteya (kaunteya), neither this world (nāyaṁ lokaḥ) nor the next (na paraḥ) is (asti) for a compulsive doubter (sa śayâtmanaḥ).”

2873: So (ataḥ) whenever (yavān eva) a replacement operation (apavāda[h]) is possible (sambhāvyate) for a deliverance (matau) and (ca) which (yatra) does not arise when sought (anvi e 'nupajāte), just in that Case (tāvaty eva) it has that nature (tad-ātmani).

2874: In regard to that object (tatra vastuni), the self-concerned (ātmakāmaiḥ) investigator (pramāt bhiḥ) should establish [its perception as correct] (sthātavyam), by not continuing (na bhūyaḥ) to conjecture (utprekṣamānaiḥ) that (ity evam) “[defeat] is possible at some [later] time” (kadācit syād api).

2875: To explain (hi), due to meeting with (saṃvyavahārataḥ) differences (-bhedāḥ) in place (deśa-), time (-kāla-), man (-nara-), circumstance (-avasthā-), for (hi) it is established that (siddhā) [error] only (eva) [is in those] which (ye) [are listed above, so it is] in regard to (apekṣyā) those (te) in which (yasmin) [error is sought] by the seeker of defeaters (bādhakārthinā).

2876: When something is wrongly seen (asamyag-darśane) due to being situated at a faraway place (dūra-deśa-vyavasthānāt), there would be (bhavet)
suspicion that it is something else (anyāśāṅkā) in some cases (kvacit) just until one has come close (tatra samīpa-gati-mātrakam).

2877: [Then there is] termination of [the possibility of] replacement operation (apavādāvadhiḥ) in respect of time (kāla-), man (-nara-) and circumstance (-avasthāntare), and there is no expectation (na tu vyapekṣā vidyate) in regard to that (tasmin), like the cognition of mirage etc. (mṛga-trṣṇādi-buddhivat).

2878: In this way (evam), when it is very dark (santamase kāle), a doubt such as about being a cow or a horse (gavāśvādi-saṃśayaḥ) which [takes the form] (yaḥ) 'is [the belief formed] through error or [is it] an accurate determination?' (bhrānter vā nirṇayaḥ); in those cases (tatra) termination [occurs] in [the object] being manifested (prakāśī-bhavanāvadhiḥ).

2879: In the same way (tathā hi), in the cases of [misperceiving] the moon (candra-), confusion about direction (-dig-moha-), the phonemes and accents of the Veda (-veda-varṇa-svarādi u), etc., a determination that [the true facts are] otherwise (anyathātvāvadhāraṇam) [occurs] by asking another person (puruṣāntara-saṃpraśnāt).

2880: In regard to the deliverance of objects which are being badly delivered (durjñāne jñāyamāne 'rthe), due to senses which have been imparied by (-kṣatēndriyaiḥ) passion (rāga-), anger (-dveṣa-), intoxication (-mada-), madness (-unmāda-), hunger (-kṣut-), thirst etc. (-trṣṇādi-), the opposite [i.e. good cognition] (viparyayaḥ) [occurs] when those things do not obtain (tad-abhāvād).

2881: Even (api) in lawsuits relating to debts etc. (mādi-vyavahāre), of the two litigants (dvayor vivadamānayoḥ), one statement [is taken] from the defendent (ekam pratyarthino vākyam) [and] two statements [are taken] from the claimant (dve vākye pūrva-vādinaḥ).

2882: Precisely (eva) because of the fear of infinite regress (anavasthā-
bhayāt), no further statements (na vākyam ... adhikam) are recorded (likhyate).
Rather (tu), the judge (svāmi-), witnesses (-sākṣi-) [and] assessors (-sabhāsadaḥ) should pronounce (brūyuḥ) a decision (nirṇayam) based on that [number of statements] (tataḥ).

2883: In this way (evam), in all cases (sarvatra), production (vikriyā) of only three judgments (jñāna-traya-saiva) is needed (iṣyate). For this reason (ata eva) the deities (devānām) too (api) are called (abhidhīyate) ‘triple-truth’ (trisatya-tā).

2884: So (tena) when Goodness of Case is due to an intrinsic nature (svata-ḥ-pramāṇatve), [there is] no infinite regress (nānavasthā) of either [Goodness or Badness of Case] (ubhayor api). So (ataḥ) Goodness and Badness of Case (pramāṇatvā-pramāṇatve) are established (sthite) as per usual practice (yathāyogam).

2908ab: Objection (nanu): Perceptual and other [cognitions] (pratyakṣādi) are not apprehended (na ghyate) in the manner (evam): '[this is] a Good Case deliverance' (pramāṇam ity).

2908cd: And (ca) human activity (vyavāhāraḥ) could not take place (na ... avakalpyate) while they are not grasped (aṅhītena) in this way (ittham)

2909: A Good Case deliverance (pramāṇam) is established (pratiṣṭhitam) due to its own nature (svarūpeṇa) even before being apprehended (grahaṇat pūrvam), independently (nirapekṣam) and (ca) in its own form (tat-svārthe); having apprehended [something] (pramite), it is [in turn] apprehended by another ['pramāṇa'] (mīyate paraī)

2910: And (ca) just as (yathā) objects (viṣayāḥ) are apprehended (grhyante) by the senses, vision etc. (cakṣur-ādibhir indriyaiḥ) which are themselves not cognized (aviditair eva), all those [things] (sarve ... te) are likewise (tathā) [cognized] due to Good Case deliverances (pramāṇaiḥ).
2911ab: So (tena) the fact that [the deliverance] is [itself] apprehended (asya jñāyamānatvam) does not contribute (nōpayujyate) to epistemic success (prāmāṇya).

2911cd: The experience of the object (viṣayānubhavaḥ) is obtained (labhyate) even (api) when there is no [separate] awareness of the deliverance [itself] (ajñātād eva).

2912ab: To explain (hi), by contrast (punaḥ), a Bad Case deliverance (apramāṇam) is established (sthitam) in its own object (svārthe) like a Good Case deliverance (pramāṇam iva)

2912cd: The falsity of that [deliverance] (mithyātvam tasya) is not apprehended without another Good Case deliverance (grhyeta na pramāṇāntarād ṛte).

2913ab: To explain (hi) that an object is different [from how it is apprehended] (arthasyaṅyathābhāvaḥ) is not discerned (na ... āttaḥ) from the earlier [deliverance] (pūrveṇa), [whereas] the fact that it is the same [does come from from the earlier deliverance] (tathātvavat).

2913cd: Here too (atrāpi), [there will be] an awareness (dhīḥ) that the object is different (arthānyathā-bhāve) from that (tat) or that the cause is faulty (yad vā duṣṭakāraṇe).

2914ab: And just in this way (tāvataīva ca) falsity (mithyātvam), which has no other cause (nānyahetukam) is apprehended (grhyate).

2914cd: And (ca) just (eva) in the state of being produced (utpatty-avastham), it is determined that “this is a Good Case deliverance” (idam pramāṇam iti miyate).
2915ab: Therefore (ataḥ) when (yatrāpi) [you opponents try to] inform others of (parebhyah pratipādyate) the falsity (mithyātvam) [of a cognition which arises from a Vedic injunction], ...

2915cd: ... in that case, too (tatrāpi), [one of] these two [conditions] (etad dvayaṃ) should be stated (vācyam), but [you should] not [appeal to] a mere similarity (na tu sādharmya-mātrakam) [to worldly statements, which might be true or false].

2916: Regarding that (tatra), undiscerning people (avipaścitaḥ) establish (sādhayanti) the falsity of all Good Case deliverances (sarva pramāṇa-mithyātvam) merely through [their] resemblance to Bad Case deliverances (apramāṇa-sādharmya-mātram) are inadequately supported (yat-kiñcid āśritāḥ).
Glossary of key terms

apavāda: Replacement operation; this is connected with the verbal form 'apodyate', which means 'is replaced'; cf. utsarga

bādhaka: Mental state defeater; this term is connected with the noun bādha, which means 'defeat'.

essence: the term is used in Fine's sense whereby "an object [has] a property essentially just in case it is necessary that the object has the property." Fine distinguishes this categorical form from two conditional forms, conditional on the existence of that object, and conditional on that object being identical with what it is.

intrinsic: the term is used in the sense of Harré and Madden, whereby an intrinsic feature is "a feature of the thing itself". Such an intrinsic feature may be overcome by external stimuli.

jñāna: Deliverance; this translation has been borrowed from Sosa, and displays a similar ambiguity to the original term, between act of delivering and delivered content. Depending on context, this term has also been translated as (occurrent) judgment. It also can correspond to the notions of (occurrent) belief and (occurrent) awareness. This term has been translated as 'cognition' and 'awareness' by some contemporary scholars.

non-pramāṇa: Bad Case deliverance; this is an incorrect awareness or judgment as of an object which arises from a vitiated use of human faculties such as perception; cf. pramāṇa

1 Fine (1994) 3
2 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
non-pramāṇatvam: The fact of being a Bad Case deliverance; cf. pramāṇatvam

non-pramāṇyam: Epistemic failure; cf. pramāṇyam

parataḥ: 'From something else'; This term has been translated as extrinsic by some contemporary scholars; cf. svataḥ

paryudāsa: A form of negation which positively excludes an injunction by prescribing an alternative injunction, rather than mere prohibition; cf. pratiṣedha

pramāṇa: Good Case deliverance; an awareness or judgment which arises from the unvitiated use of human faculties such as perception; cf. jñāna

pramāṇatvam: The fact of being a Good Case deliverance; cf. pramāṇa

pramāṇyam: A capacity for epistemic success; epistemic success consists in a capacity for veridical awareness, that is, a capacity for accurate determination of an object or fact. Depending on context, a statement about this capacity may be equivalent to a statement about epistemic success itself. This term has been translated as 'validity' by some contemporary scholars. John Dunne understands this term as 'instrumentality' towards some end such as a resultant act of knowing.

prāptā: 'Is ascribed'; this term describes the provisional attribution of a hypothesis.

pratiṣedha: A form of negation which merely prohibits rather than positively excludes by means of an alternative injunction; cf. paryudāsa

svabhāva: A causal power or disposition which is the essence of an entity conditional on its existence
svataḥ: 'From itself'; this term is used by Kumārila to convey the idea of a default intrinsic nature of deliverances per se as an epistemic kind conditional on normal conditions and the idea of a kind essence of Good Case deliverances conditional on their identity as Good case deliverances. This term has been translated as 'intrinsic' by some contemporary scholars; cf. parataḥ

utsarga: General operation; Kumārila transfers this term from ritual and grammatical theoretical contexts; cf. apavāda

virodha: Conflict; this term subsumes contradiction and contrariety; exegetical techniques were developed in the ritual interpretation literature to resolve such conflict; Kumārila discusses the ascription of two conflicting epistemic statuses to a single belief and resolution through a model of general operation and positive exclusion.
Index versorum

This index contains references to all significant quotations of verses in the 
Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā and in the Śloka-vārttika in the main body of the thesis.

**Bṛhaṭṭīkā.................................................................**

TS 2850.................................................................73
TS 2851ab..............................................................226
TS 2852.................................................................234
TS 2853.................................................................234
TS 2854.................................................................234
TS 2859.................................................................225
TS 2861.................................................................156, 171
TS 2861ab.............................................................174
TS 2861cd.............................................................179
TS 2865.................................................................187
TS 2866.................................................................188
TS 2867.................................................................189
TS 2868.................................................................190
TS 2869.................................................................190
TS 2870.................................................................192, 203
TS 2871.................................................................193
TS 2872.................................................................193
TS 2875.................................................................195
TS 2877.................................................................195
TS 2878.................................................................196
TS 2879.................................................................196
TS 2880.................................................................197
Śloka-vārttika

ŚV 2.33 ......................................................................................... 113
ŚV 2.34ab ...................................................................................... 117
ŚV 2.34cd ...................................................................................... 116
ŚV 2.35ab ...................................................................................... 121
ŚV 2.35cd ...................................................................................... 116
ŚV 2.36ab ...................................................................................... 121
ŚV 2.36cd ...................................................................................... 116
ŚV 2.37ab ...................................................................................... 123
ŚV 2.37cd ...................................................................................... 123
ŚV 2.38abc .................................................................................... 215
ŚV 2.39ab ...................................................................................... 216
ŚV 2.39cd ...................................................................................... 215
ŚV 2.47 .......................................................................................... 177
ŚV 2.48 .......................................................................................... 98
ŚV 2.48ab ...................................................................................... 126
ŚV 2.49 .......................................................................................... 218
ŚV 2.50 .......................................................................................... 218
ŚV 2.51 .......................................................................................... 218
ŚV 2.53 .......................................................................................... 154, 156, 171
ŚV 2.53ab ........................................................................................ 142, 143, 174
ŚV 2.53cd ........................................................................................ 179
ŚV 2.54 .......................................................................................... 101, 216
ŚV 2.55 .......................................................................................... 217
ŚV 2.58 .......................................................................................... 181
ŚV 2.60cd ........................................................................................ 194
ŚV 2.61 .......................................................................................... 203, 226
ŚV 2.63cd ........................................................................................ 238
ŚV 2.65bcd ...................................................................................... 238
ŚV 2.68 .......................................................................................... 238
ŚV 2.83 .......................................................................................... 130
ŚV 2.84 .......................................................................................... 224
ŚV 2.85 .......................................................................................... 130
ŚV 2.91..............................................................239
ŚV 2.92ab...........................................................239