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Nationalism, Militarism and Masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus

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For Andreas and Angelos Toumazou
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Summary

This thesis addresses the relationship between Greek Cypriot nationalism, militarism and masculinity following the opening of the borders in Cyprus between North and South in 2003. Drawing upon empirical research conducted in Cyprus in 2011, the thesis argues that there is an integral relation between nationalism, militarism and masculinity and that since the opening of the borders, there has been a re-constitution of this relationship. In the re-constitution of this relationship what appears as the weakening of each component is illustrated to be an adapted reiteration of its co-constitution under new social and political parameters. This adapted reiteration is a continuation of the Greek Cypriot perceived nationalist militarist masculinist stance of power in the conflict situation against 'occupation' and explains, amongst other post – 2003 nationalist, militarist and masculinist reiterations, as to why the opening of the borders has not helped in the bringing together of the two communities. On the contrary, in fact, in some cases the adapted reiterations have helped new divisions to emerge.

The research reveals that the inextricability of masculinity in this three-fold co-constitutive relationship is significant in the adapted reiteration of an identity, which exists beneath the politically symbolic or institutional level – and is hindering the process of reconciliation. It is argued that despite there being a shifting away of the hegemonic masculinity of men from the national struggle, and thus also the conscription service, towards a transnational entrepreneurial masculinity, there remains a broader masculinist discourse in this co-constitutive relationship, which I name in this thesis as nationalist militarised masculinity. This is significant because it is a discourse that is integral to this Greek Cypriot nationalist militarist masculinist stance, with its adapted reiterations, that creates obstacles for reconciliation. The results of this thesis highlight the necessity of addressing the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in Cyprus and likewise in other post-armed conflict societies.
# Table of Contents

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**  
I

**SUMMARY**  
II

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**  
III

**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**  
VI

1. **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**  
   1.1. OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE RELATED TO THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS  
   1.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES  
   1.3. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
   7

2. **CHAPTER TWO: A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT**  
   2.2 THE BI-COMMUNAL CLASHES OF 1955-59  
   2.3 THE WAR OF 1974  
   2.4 THE OPENING OF THE NORTH-SOUTH BORDER IN 2003, EU accession and Annan Plan  
   23

3. **CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW**  
   3.1 INTRODUCTION  
   3.2 NATIONALISM  
   3.3 MILITARISM  
   3.4 GENDER, NATIONALISM AND MILITARISM  
   3.4 NATIONALISM, MILITARISM AND MASCULINITY  
   3.5 NATIONALISM, MILITARISM AND MASCULINITY IN CYPRUS  
   32

4. **CHAPTER FOUR: METHODS**  
   4.1 QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY  
   4.2 INTERVIEWS  
   4.6 REFLECTING ON ISSUES THAT EMERGED WITH EACH DISTINCT GROUP OF INTERVIEWEES  
   69

5. **CHAPTER FIVE: NATIONALISM IN POST-2003 CYPRUS**  
   5.1 INTRODUCTION  
   107
5.2. Looking back through post-war Cyprus: discourses of ‘I do not forget’ - ‘I struggle’ and the ‘borders’  
5.4. The relationship between a victimised Cyprus and the mothers of the missing persons  
5.5. Enacting national memory and deliberation; crossings and ‘occupation’  
5.6. Demanding closure of the borders: the appearance of ultra-nationalist political formations and ‘occupation’  
5.6. Conclusion  

6. Chapter Six: Militarism in Post-2003 Cyprus  
6.1. Introduction  
6.2. Looking back: the development of the ideology of defence  
6.3. The social forgetting of ‘defence’  
6.4. The role of the EU accession for the changing ideology of defence  
6.5. The role of the EU in the defence policy  
6.6. Mourning and melancholia about the undermining defence and ideology  
6.7. Changing civil-military relations and the governmental pressure to respond to the declining ‘defence’  
6.9. Conclusion  

7. Chapter Seven: Masculinity in Cyprus following the opening of the borders  
7.1. Introduction  
7.2. Looking back: the Cyprus problem, the post-war national struggle and G.C. masculinity  
7.3. The transition of a state towards a European masculinity  
7.4. Destabilisation of a militaristically built hegemonic masculinity  
7.4.1 Western influences on military masculinity in Cyprus  
7.4.2 From within the barracks towards a soldier’s individual goals for prosperity  
7.5. Social acceptance of the changing goals and desires of a soldier  
7.6. Criticism invoking anxiety of the community’s own loss of fighting spirit and commitment to struggle  
7.6.1 The re-adaptation of nationalist militarised masculinity under new social and political parameters  
7.7. Ultra-nationalist groups and masculinity  
7.8. Conclusion  

8. Conclusion: Assimilating nationalism, militarism and masculinity with ‘normality’  
8.1. Research objectives revisited  
8.2. Limitations of the study  
8.3. The co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity  
8.4. Key findings  
8.5. Changing identities: in-between ‘I do not forget’ and a new ‘I struggle’
8.6. Future Research  294
8.7. Concluding Thoughts  297

APPENDIXES:  299

APPENDIX 1: ACCESS LETTER TO THE NATIONAL GUARD  299
APPENDIX 2: CONSENT FORM FOR SOLDIERS OR OFFICERS  299
APPENDIX 3: THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE OF POST-WAR CYPRUS  300
APPENDIX 4: PHOTOS OF THE MOTHERS OF THE MISSING PERSONS  300
APPENDIX 5: MATERNAL POST-WAR CYPRUS EXPRESSED THROUGH LITERATURE AND POETRY  301
APPENDIX 6: FINANCIAL RESOURCES INVESTED IN 'DEFENCE'  302
APPENDIX 7: DEFENCE TAX  302
APPENDIX 8: SINGLE AREA DEFENCE DOCTRINE  302
APPENDIX 9: PICTURE OF 'ATtila’s Boot'  303
APPENDIX 12: SONGS DEDICATED TO TASSOS ISAAK AND SOLOMOS SOLOMOU  305
APPENDIX 13 CONSENT FORM  305
APPENDIX 14 SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW AGENDA  306
APPENDIX 15 SAMPLE OF NVivo CODE  309

REFERENCES:  1
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

DHSY Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός (Democratic Rally of Cyprus)
EDEK Κίνημα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών (The Movement for Social Democracy)
EDHK Εθνικιστικό Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα (Nationalist Democratic Party)
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
ELAM Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο (National Popular Front)
EOKA Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)
EU European Union
FRONT Μέτωπο (Front)
G.C. Greek Cypriot
ROE Representative of ELAM
SADD Ενιαίο Αμυντικό Δόγμα Ελλάδας-Κύπρου (Single Area defence Doctrine with Greece)
T.C. Turkish Cypriot
1. Chapter One: Introduction

This thesis examines the relationship of Greek Cypriot (G.C) nationalism, militarism and masculinity in Cyprus following the opening of the border\(^1\) (2003) and argues that there is a co-constitutive relationship between them. The historical context of the so-called ‘Cyprus Problem’ has changed significantly since the opening of the borders between North and South Cyprus, the accession of the Republic of Cyprus (South Cyprus) to the European Union (EU), the Annan Plan referendum for reconciliation (2004) as well as wider societal developments. Yet, the Republic of Cyprus remains globally one of the countries that have not abolished its conscription service.

The historical frame of the research coincides with the time of my own personal experience of serving in the Cyprus National Guard (NG) as a soldier (2003-4), shortly after the opening of the borders in 2003, while the Annan Plan referendum was in process and when Cyprus was on the threshold of European Union (EU) accession (admitted in 2004).

Coming from a family with strong pro-reunification views and having Turkish Cypriot (T.C.) friends since early childhood, the institutionalised expectation of the country and society where I grew up to serve two years of military service was incomprehensible to me. Having been compulsorily enlisted in the NG eleven days after I graduated from

\(^1\) The ‘border’ as mentioned here also known as the ‘Green Line’ in Cyprus is a line that splits the island in two, separating the North and the South, and is about 112 miles long. This line has had many names dependent on one’s political positioning. Here, I will use the term ‘border’. By referring to the ‘border’ I am not taking a political position. Rather, this is understood to resemble more the militarist aspect of it, which is a major focus in this work. In some instances the term ‘Green Line’ is used interchangeably with ‘border’. These cases mostly relate to a broader context or understanding of the conflict.

In more detail, the choice of the term ‘border’ or ‘barricade’ to refer to the commonly known ‘Green Line’ or ‘Buffer Zone’ in Cyprus is an issue treated with paramount importance. This is an issue that is repeatedly addressed in this thesis. Traditionally, the right-wing scene in Cyprus has referred to them as ‘barricades’; a term that is used in illustrating the temporality of them. It also highlights the official pronunciation of the Cyprus conflict as a problem of invasion and occupation, whilst the word ‘border’ most often reveals a liberal positioning towards the conflict.

This line was first referred to as the ‘Green Line’ in 1963 after the first interethnic violence. Other names since then have included the ‘Dead Zone’, and the ‘Partitioning Line’. After the 1974 events, it has also been referred to as the ‘Attila Line’ and the ‘No-man’s Land’, see Cockburn (2004).
high school, I began my journey into the micro-cosmos of the army where I was called to protect my country from the 'threatening Turk' by, first of all, being a 'proper G.C. man'. A personal anecdote that took place during this experience aroused my curiosity about possible links between nationalism, militarism and masculinity. One day, I suggested the following to my Captain: “Is it not realistically useless that a Greek Cypriot army even exists? In the case of war we will be fighting Turkey; one of the strongest military powers in the world! Also, it is even worse if we try to resist and not surrender as people will die and we are going to lose regardless.” His answer was revealing: “Stratis, if you are walking with your girlfriend in the street and another man bigger than you comes and disturbs your girlfriend, are you not going to do anything because he is bigger than you? Or are you going to stand on your feet as a man and protect your girlfriend?”

In this anecdote that my Captain used to justify the existence of the military in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), the aggressor, the physically strong man who is bigger than the boyfriend, represents Turkey, and the weaker man, who is the protector, represents the G.C. army. The latter will, even if much weaker than the Turkish army, protect the powerless girlfriend, who is here used as a voiceless symbol of post-war Cyprus, which is itself conceived as feminine and in need of protection.

My service was an important period through which there were new political and social developments for Cyprus, which brought hopes for the reconciliation between the two Cypriot communities, namely Greek and Turkish Cypriot. For me, these developments sparked my curiosity for reflection and research. During this time, I observed that the aforementioned political events began to challenge some of my fellow soldiers’ and my own commitment to military service. It was this observation that encouraged me to explore the extent to which our response was perhaps reflective of broader social and political changes, processes and events like the opening of the borders and, the (then) imminent accession of Cyprus to the EU. Furthermore, after I was discharged from the

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2 Post-war Cyprus in this thesis refers to post-1974 Cyprus. Even though the bio-communal clashes of 1963-64 had significantly contributed to the polarisation of the communities as well as to the creation of the NG in 1964 and the introduction of conscription under the National Guard Law of 1964 (Article C, subsection 1), see National Guard law 2011. This thesis is concerned with examining the post-opening of the borders Cypriot society. In placing analytical significance on the opening of the border, the partition of the island (1974), which led to the immediate creation of the border, also gains analytical significance.
army I observed that the centrality of the defence sector in the G.C. political discourse of the national struggle\(^3\) was becoming undermined and the phenomenon of draft dodging was becoming exponential, which was of great concern for the wider society and political leadership. This observation made me curious to understand how it was possible to simultaneously have the masculinist discourse of my Captain with a declining political discourse on militarism. These observations further fuelled my curiosity as to why, in this context, the desire to protect ‘powerless Cyprus’ from the perceived Turkish threat was decreasing amongst political leadership and ‘proper’ G.C. men.

1.1. Overview of the literature related to the scope of the thesis

Beyond my initial curiosity there are several other factors that contributed to the rationale for this thesis. Firstly, there appeared to be increasing academic recognition of the significance of gender to the investigation, construction and mobilisation of nationalism, militarism or both. Secondly, it was recognised from the outset that there was a gap in the literature addressing the relationship between nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-armed conflict societies\(^4\). Thirdly, I wanted to illustrate the significance of studying masculinity in nationalism and militarism through empirical research on Cyprus; an issue for research enquiry that has been largely ignored in writings about militarism and nationalism in Cyprus.

Nationalism (for example Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983) and militarism (for example Huntington, 1957; Moskos, 1976) have been approached by mainstream scholarship independently and, most often, when they are brought together the issue of gender has been neglected. However, in recent years, scholars who have studied nationalism, militarism or both in post-armed conflict societies have begun, in some cases, to adopt

\(^3\) This thesis is concerned with the significance the G.C. understanding of the national struggle as shaped following the opening of the borders has for the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. For this reason hereinafter when referring to the national struggle I will be referring to the post-opening of the borders national struggle. When referring to the post-war national struggle I will be referring to the national struggle that has taken place in the period of 1974 to 2003, which is when the borders opened.

\(^4\) In this thesis I use the term post-armed conflict societies to refer to societies that are coming out of armed conflict. In the literature, the term post-conflict societies has been previously used to refer to societies such as South Africa, (see Cock, 2004), and to refer to Cypriot society, (see Yakinthou, 2008). However, here I use the term post-armed conflict societies to highlight the culture of conflict that exists specifically following the end of armed conflict.
a gender lens when looking at these societies. This work tends to focus primarily on the role of and impact on women and femininity (for example Evangelista, 2010; Banerjee, 2003).

This focus is not surprising, as the predominance of these studies were conducted in the developing scope of feminism, first introducing gender as a key analytic category and transforming women’s lives on many levels during the past two centuries (Tinker, 1990; Freedman, 2002). Yet, this focus on women’s experiences of nationalism and militarism has not only made women visible, it also made it possible for researchers to see men (Enloe, 2004). Therefore, extending feminism to men, the investigation of masculinity needs to be embraced as an issue of research enquiry in itself and as an issue for investigation in research on nationalism and militarism.

What is increasingly recognised is that, in the context of post-armed conflict societies, research on masculinity has a vital role to play in understanding these societies, and that masculinity needs to be included in the gender lens adopted in researching such contexts (Kwon, 2000; McKeown and Sharoni, 2002). As McKeown and Sharoni (2002: 2) aptly comment:

“It is impossible to understand, let alone transform, the relationship between gender, conflict, and peace building without a serious examination of men and various conceptions of masculinity in different socio-political contexts.”

The link between nationalism, militarism and masculinity clearly cannot be ignored. As Cynthia Enloe finds (1990: 45) in her reminiscent book, Bananas, Beaches and Bases:

“Nationalism has typically sprung from masculinised memory, masculinised humiliation and masculinised hope … [as in nationalism] … the real actors are men, men who are defending their freedom, their honor, their homeland and their women”.

Meanwhile, elaborating on this perspective that ties nationalism and its militaristic side to masculinity, Nagel contends that “the ‘micro-culture’ of masculinity in everyday life articulates very well with the demands of nationalism particularly its militaristic side”, (1998: 252).
Increasingly, researchers have directed their attention to how masculinity has a stake in nationalism and militarism in post-armed conflict societies. Yet, the masculinist discourses of nationalism and militarism continue, in most cases, to be analysed exclusively in terms of the ‘role-proper’ of, and impact on, women and femininity in such processes (examples include Enloe, 2010, 2007, 2004; Sjoberg and Sandra Via, 2010; Sjoberg, 2007). One way in which masculinity has informed discussion on the adoption of a gender lens when looking at post-armed conflict societies is through the ‘essentialisation’ of masculinity (McKeown and Sharoni, 2002). With masculinity being typically treated as a monolithic entity in explorations of such contexts, such research is often focused on an explanation of masculinity as inextricable from the persistence of a patriarchal culture in nationalism and militarism that is continuing the oppression of women (Kwon, 2000).

There are also significant concerns about masculinity’s invisibility in the context of post-armed conflict societies, as it often appears irrelevant to processes of conflict transformation (Ashe, 2012). McKeown and Sharoni (2002: 1), amongst others (e.g. Kwon, 2000), argue that:

“[W]hile it is understandable that men had to be pushed aside to create space for women, it would be impossible to understand the interplay between gender and conflict if the diverse experiences of men remain unexamined. Moreover, the lack of attention to masculinity is likely to backfire as the conflation of ‘gender’ with ‘women’, leaves masculinity, unproblematised and thus treated as the norm.”

At the same time, and pulling in another direction, there is a line of research on post-armed conflict societies that takes a similar approach to this thesis. This body of literature suggests the significance of the study of masculinity in such contexts as an issue of inquiry itself and the impact that political and ideological changes can have on masculinities. Examples that have taken this approach include Kwon’s (2000) and Kim’s (1993) analysis of South Korea and Ashe’s (2012) analysis of Northern Ireland. Yet, this body of literature focuses exclusively on the masculinity of men; omitting the broader masculinity discourse that operates at a societal level, the analytical significance of which my own thesis develops.
The approach that I take in looking at nationalism and militarism in post-armed conflict societies could help in further exploring, deconstructing and maybe even challenging mainstream gender approaches of these societies in relation to masculinity. Just as nationalism and militarism have been linked to the shaping of femininity (Peterson, 1999; Sylvester, 1989; Cock, 1989), masculinity is likewise linked; shaping and being shaped by nationalism and militarism (Ashe, 2011).

A key contribution to the literature on masculinity in post-armed conflict societies is Fidelma Ashe’s (2012) work that, whilst focusing on Northern Ireland, notes some similar themes to this thesis. In looking at the transformation of ethno-nationalist conflict and militarisation in Northern Ireland, she approached masculinity through ‘a framework of engaging with masculinities during times of political transition’ and explored how traditional forms of masculinities were undergoing processes of change after the signing of the ‘Good Friday Agreement’. Similarly, this work focuses on the changing G.C. traditional hegemonic militarised masculinity in the scope of repeated negotiations for the reunification of Cyprus and other political events that are directly related to developments in the politics of the conflict.

In the scope of the political and social developments this work embraces the global perspectives that highlight the impact of globalisation on local definitions of masculinity (for example Connell, 1998, 2005; Altman, 2001), which cannot be neglected when examining these issues in post-armed conflict societies. What is most significant about this literature is that it has pointed out the more egocentric masculinity of the capitalist entrepreneur who is gaining hegemony at the global level, (Connell, 1998: 17), whilst the rigid ventures of the military masculinity are now globally a fading threat (ibid) to this change.

The academic research on nationalism and gender in Cyprus has followed similar thematic lines to international mainstream scholarship. Whereas, research on Cyprus has been prolific in studying and analysing G.C. nationalism extensively (for example Papadakis et al, 2006; Kizilyurek, 1993; Mavratsas, 1996; Bryant, 2004), both militarism and masculinity remain, to the present day, seriously understudied. The scholars who have addressed the relationship of gender and nationalism in Cyprus, and even very briefly of gender and nationalism in relation to militarism, have commented only on the
stakes of the conflict being constituted in masculine terms. They have placed their focus on the constructed role for women and on the co-constitution of femininity to masculinity in such processes (for example Hadjipavlou, 2010, 2006; Cockburn, 2004). Most importantly, this literature has neglected the co-contingency of nationalism, militarism and masculinity.

1.1. Research questions and objectives

In adopting a gendered perspective I aim to propose that, when looking at nationalism, militarism or masculinity in a post-armed conflict society, we need to address the way in which there is a three-fold co-constitutive relationship, by illustrating this through the case of post-armed conflict Cypriot society following the opening of the borders.

As I suggested above, there is already a body of literature examining post-armed conflict societies, and Cyprus in particular, but there is still a significant gap. As it became clear to me that solely looking at G.C. nationalism could not capture the posture of the larger social fabric in the conflict situation, I propose the concept of a co-constitutive relationship between nationalism, militarism and masculinity to explain the situation in the post-opening of the borders Cyprus. Further, I aim to address social questions, which have not been discussed in relation to the post-war composition in Cyprus, that assist us in understanding the post-opening of the borders situation and thus could then carry the potential for assisting reconciliation.

The opening of the borders in 2003, which was perceived by many as the beginning of the solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’, turned out not to carry reconciliatory potential. Most G.C. to present day refuse to cross the borders (see for example Hadjipavlou, 2007b) or to form relationships to the perceived ‘other’.

There was a failure of three events which held the potential of reunification, namely the G.C. defeat of the Annan reunification plan, the pressure brought by the accession of Cyprus to the EU to bring an end to the conflict, and more than ten years of open borders and crossings. In this setting of G.C. nationalist imagination (Anderson, 1983) the division with the ‘other’ remains deeply entrenched. This symbolic division is clearly illustrated by the creation of the ideological border, which is refused to be crossed.
In contrast, or indeed in addition, from the military perspective that I observed whilst conscripted, the successive governments that followed the opening of the borders were undermining the military framework of the post-war national struggle, pointing to a relative demilitarisation of the ‘Cyprus Problem’. Moreover, draft-dodging was a new and exponential phenomenon that expressed the lack of motivation of men to serve the army and, thus, a declining military masculinity. Yet, even though the borders were open and these military and masculinity developments were taking place, there was an unrelenting resistance from the general public to cross the border and to accept the weakened National Guard with a decline in motivation to serve. I witnessed the apparent contradiction between the declining militarised masculinity and militarism, and nationalism, as the former continued to be feeding into the nationalist assertion against ‘occupation’ (In Greek: Κατοχή)\(^5\).

The findings that emerged out of the 57 fieldwork interviews, (conducted in summer 2011) with Cypriots from a range of social and political backgrounds (including soldiers, officers, politicians and policy makers), provided an insight into the workings of the co-constitutive relationship between nationalism, militarism and masculinity. I began my fieldwork with the aim of providing an analysis of the social and political, ideological and discursive mechanisms for the reproduction of the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity and their patterns of practice in society, following these political events. This preconception was formed whilst writing up my PhD research proposal and then research outline, when witnessing that, even though the borders were opened and the new phenomenon of draft dodging was increasingly growing, there was an unrelenting resistance from the general public to cross the border and to accept the decline in motivation to serve. Early on in my time in the field, certain accounts of my interviewees illustrated that the events after 2003 challenge certain traditional military views of masculinity (equated to ‘everyday men with guns’), militarism

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5 The broader yet also official G.C. understanding of the conflict situation is that this is a problem of invasion and occupation, which opposes its alternative (and internationally prominent) that it is a ‘bi-communal conflict amongst two ethnic communities; G.C.s and T.C.s’. What is understood by ‘G.C.s’ as an ‘invasion’, for the ‘T.C.’ community is largely understood as ‘intervention’.

In this analysis while ‘invasion’ or ‘intervention’ is understood as a contested historical event, ‘occupation’ is seen as a G.C. discourse, which becomes central in the analysis that follows. Hereinafter, I will be referring to the understanding of the conflict situation as an ‘occupation’ by bearing in mind that this is part of the broader conceptualisation of ‘invasion and occupation’.
(equated to a mass army) and nationalism (contained within the closed borders between North and South Cyprus) and thus all three are shaped and constituted in terms of the new socio-political conditions that Cyprus was entering. Following these early findings, I became eager to understand the factors that underpin the weakening of the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity and the adapted reiteration of this co-constitutive relationship in the new social and political milieu following the opening of the borders. In this context, it needs to be clarified that when I talk about this adapted reiteration, I am referring to the discourse and, thus, I am not necessarily saying that individuals are themselves becoming adapted or reiterated.

This project was guided by three objectives: (1) to illustrate the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in Cyprus through the empirical data featured in this thesis. (2) to explore whether they are co-constituted in such a way that social and political developments and events can contribute to the re-imagination and, thus, re-adaptation of this relationship under the new social and political parameters. (3) to contribute to broader contemporary debates on Cyprus, by providing a masculinity lens of analysis for a better understanding of G.C. nationalism and militarism following the opening of the borders.

Given these objectives, the general research question became: How does G.C. nationalism operate through the broader national level of military ideology and particular understandings of masculinity following the opening of the borders? In considering this primary question, a number of sub-questions arise:

- What changes have the opening of the border, the accession of Cyprus to the EU, and the process of the Annan Plan brought about in attitudes towards G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity?
- What is the role of masculinity under the changed nationalism and militarism following the opening of the borders?
- Do these shifting forms of nationalism and militarism inform, to a significant extent, the hegemonic masculinity shaped thereafter?
- Are G.C. national awareness, national definition and national protectionism following the opening of the borders expressed through masculinised notions and ideals?
• Finally, how does an analysis of the co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity contribute to a better understanding of post-2003 Cyprus?

In exploring these questions, I illustrate that there is a co-constitutive relationship between nationalism, militarism and masculinity in the post-armed conflict, modern, European Cyprus with opened borders. This co-constitution can, under certain social and political conditions, contribute to the weakening of each one of its components. Yet, the weakening of this co-constitutive relationship can, specifically, generate its adapted reiteration under new social and political parameters. The adapted reiterations of this relationship are integral to the sustenance of a G.C. position of power in the conflict situation, even in the increasingly globalised and Europeanised modern Cyprus.

I will argue that in these adapted reiterations we need to not only focus on the changing hegemonic masculinity of men, but we should also address the concept I have named in this thesis as nationalist militarised masculinity. This is a broader masculinist discourse that has been a linchpin in specific nationalist, militarist re-adaptations and reiterations. Yet, returning, to the hegemonic masculinity of men, it will be illustrated that, in the scope of the intense cultural westernisation and Europeanisation of the G.C. society, the opening of the borders and accession of Cyprus to the EU have affected the roles of men in the national struggle, whilst further instigating the shift of G.C. hegemonic masculinity towards a transnational, entrepreneurial masculinity.

The time period in which the fieldwork was conducted (11th of May to 11th of September 2011) and the focus of this research project on nationalism, militarism and masculinity have naturally limited the light shone on other important issues of research that could have been included as key analytic categories in the scope of these thematic research areas. The fieldwork was conducted when the financial crisis in Cyprus was only beginning and had not yet become the issue that it is now, and before the finding of gas in Cyprus territorial waters was verified. Furthermore, for the purposes of this study the empirical data was drawn from G.C. opinion of armed militarism, given that my focus was on the masculinised militarism, which spoke of the national struggle and armed defence (In Greek: Άμυνα). Therefore, the civil defence in Cyprus, which predominantly conscripts women, is not considered in this study. Similarly, the issue of social class is not addressed specifically. **There is a clear importance at examining the intersection of**
social class to nationalism. Different social classes imagine the ‘national community’ in different ways. This research focused on nationalism, militarism and masculinity as it considered these thematic categories to be most significant in the changing socio-political context that followed the opening of the borders. Moreover, in examining the co-constitution of the three, this theoretical framework opens up the space for social class to be included as a key analytical category when examining such inter-sections in the context of Cyprus. Moreover, in this context, I wish to note that for the purposes of this thesis I am not defining interviewees by their profession. However, in attempting to provide the reader with a broad background of the interviewees, I have included some details about their professions. Furthermore, the cultural impact that the accession of Cyprus to the EU has had on G.C. society has been addressed throughout the thesis informing the discussion on the re-adaptation of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. Moreover, this opens up the space for further examination of the contextual impact of these cultural developments on notions of nationalism, militarism and masculinity to be addressed in future research.

Also the research was conducted during the period in which AKEL the Communist Party of Cyprus, was in power. Within this context AKEL’s, agenda should be acknowledged. For AKEL, which is a Cypriot major party, rapprochement has been a key policy since 1974 onwards. The party struggles for peaceful coexistence with Turkish Cypriots in a common homeland. Several interviewees did support AKEL or the party’s positions (whose accounts become mostly prominent in the discussion on crossings and their view on ideals of heroism). However, while members were approached, attempts to interview AKEL’s political leadership were unsuccessful.

Finally, the aim of this study was to draw links between nationalism, militarism and masculinity and not to provide an account of reconciliation. Although it is clear that reconciliation cannot be side-lined completely (see chapter on nationalism) the findings will have implications for the future development of such approaches (see conclusions).

1.3. Chapter outline

In terms of how the thesis is structured, the first three chapters that follow the introduction provide a short account of the history of the Cyprus conflict and an account of the contextual history of the opening of the borders, the Annan Plan referendum and
the accession of Cyprus to the EU; a literature review and a discussion of methods and research design.

In Chapter 2 (A Short History of the Cyprus Conflict) I present an account of the history of the strife between the G.C. and T.C. communities starting from the beginning of the second millennium to the present day. In this chapter I provide a historical account of the perpetuation of the divide between the two communities.

In Chapter 3 (Literature Review) I provide a review of the academic literature on nationalism, militarism and masculinity, illustrate the gaps in the literature this project aims to address and explain the way in which I adopt certain theorisations in studying nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus. After explaining some of the main approaches to nationalism and studies focusing on G.C. nationalism as negotiated and constructed at the everyday level in particular, I explain the way in which I employ Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ to understand G.C. nationalism, but also in specific ways the ‘other’ and the masculinist and militarist discourses co-constituting G.C. nationalism. I then engage with different theorisations of militarism and, whilst pointing to the lack of literature on militarism in Cyprus, I discuss my choice of approaching the relationship between the military and society as reciprocal and bidirectional in looking at the case of post-armed conflict Cyprus. I later draw on contributions from feminist scholarship to highlight the gender construction of nationalism and militarism, illustrating that there is an emerging body of literature that has begun to specifically examine masculinity in nationalism or militarism in post-conflict societies. Whilst this review reveals that there has been no literature that has provided an analysis of how these three are co-constituted, including in regards to the case of Cyprus, it further points to the lack of literature on Cyprus that has addressed masculinity as an issue of research enquiry in itself. ‘Nationalist militarised masculinity’ is the last issue discussed in this chapter. This is a concept I have put forward in proposing that there is a broader discourse of masculinity that does not exclusively relate to the masculinity of men, and which needs to be addressed when looking at nationalism, militarism or the co-constitution of the three.

Chapter 4 (Methods) first presents the rational for qualitative methodology in these environments of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. Secondly, my choice of semi-
structured interviews as the research tool to gain empirical understanding of the issues of enquiry is discussed. Then, after laying out some issues of consideration in the interviewer – interviewee relationship, which are inherent in conducting empirical research with human subjects, I describe my sample in relation to each group of interviewees (namely: public, politicians and policy makers, representatives of youth sections of political parties and independent political youth groups, soldiers and military officers). A discussion on how I devised my ‘general interview guide’ follows for each one of these groups, as well as my strategies for finding interviewees from each group. I then move on to describe data analysis and finally I provide my reflection on issues that emerged with each distinct group of interviewees.

Chapter 5 (Nationalism in the post-opening of the Cypriot borders) is the first of three discussion chapters based on research data gathered during fieldwork. In this chapter I focus on how participants in post-2003 Cyprus understand formative discourses of post-war nationalism, such as the idea of the national struggle. I focus first on the impact that the opening of the borders and the accession of Cyprus to the EU have had on the G.C. idea of the national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’ and the preservation of a potent ‘fighting spirit’ in the struggle; an issue which I then discuss in the following chapter in relation to the weakening of the militarist frame of the struggle. Then I discuss how the fact that the ‘mothers, wives and sisters of the missing persons’ (In Greek: Οι μάνες των αγνοουμένων) continue to symbolise a specific construction of post-war Cyprus as a feminised victim of ‘occupation’ following the opening of the borders precisely illustrates the persistence of this self-understanding of the G.C. community in this new situation as a ‘victim’ of ‘occupation’. I move on to put forward the argument that the failure of the opportunity created by the opening of the borders to bring together the two communities and the broad G.C. resistance in crossing the border, are conditioned by the discourse of ‘occupation’. The final section of this chapter discusses the appearance of ultra-nationalist political formations following the opening of the borders. This the first part of a three-fold discussion presented in each of the empirical chapters that investigates what has made these parties and groups possible from within

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6 Hereinafter I will be using the term ‘mothers of the missing persons’ to refer to the mothers, wives and sisters of the missing persons. In popular G.C. discourse the term ‘mothers of the missing persons’ (In Greek: οι μάνες των αγνοουμένων) is used to refer to the category of mothers, sisters and wives of the missing persons.
the post-opening of the borders co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. In this context, I wish to note that I do not draw any differentiations between the ultra-nationalist political formations discussed. The differences between them are not understood to be significant in the scope of this thesis, where it is their common positions on the issues of enquiry that are used in the analysis that follows.

In Chapter 6 (Militarism in the post-opening of the borders Cyprus) I address G.C. militarism following the opening of the borders and argue that the ideology of defence (In Greek: Άμυνα), the version of militarism (Huntington, 1957; Enloe, 2004) that appeared in post-war Cyprus, has been undermined since this event. In the first section, I discuss the creation of the ideology of defence in post-war Cyprus illustrating that it has been a central expression of the ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle against the ‘occupation’ forces.

In the next section, building on the findings from the previous chapter, I focus on how the opening of the previously un-crossable internal border has counter-posed and undermined the ideology of defence and its underside: the commitment of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’7. In the next section I discuss how the accession of Cyprus to the EU has marked a turning point in the ‘struggle’ for Greek Cypriots and illustrate how successive governments have undermined the militarist framing of the national struggle, thus the ideology of defence.

In the subsequent section, I discuss how the governmental and public disinvestment in the army has found itself in opposition to the post-war societal structures and that, in this context, a number of public reactions have been expressed. In the section that follows I discuss the changing civil-military relations. I illustrate that individualism transverses civil-military relations, undermining in this way the ‘nation-in-arms’. And in the final section, I argue that the ultra-nationalist parties are also a response to the undermining of ‘defence’; rendering ‘defence’ now an extreme discourse placed in their hands.

Chapter 7, the final chapter based on empirical data and entitled ‘Masculinity in Cyprus following the opening of the borders’, investigates the relationship of G.C. hegemonic

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7 Nation-in-arms is portrayed as a model of relations in which the boundaries between the civil and military sectors are fragmented, (see Rapoport, 1962).
masculinity (Connell, 1995; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) and nationalist militarised masculinity with the changing understanding of the national struggle and the undermining of the ideology of defence following the opening of the borders. The first section of this chapter provides an account of G.C. masculinity in Cyprus in relation to the island’s turbulent modern history. Later on in the chapter, I address the emerging G.C. transnational entrepreneurial hegemonic masculinity. In the sections that follow, I discuss the relationship between G.C. hegemonic masculinity and the conscription service, illustrating that the opening of the borders has further instigated the changing G.C. hegemonic masculinity, in which military service is not viewed to the same extent as a rite-of-passage in becoming a G.C. man.

In the penultimate section, I address a certain paradox that emerges from the data through the theorisation of nationalist militarised masculinity. I present this as a case through two examples: the resistance to cross the borders and the continuous support for the existence of a potent army and its call for change into a semi or fully professional force in the context of the weakened ideology of defence.

In the last section, I discuss that the hyper-militarist masculinised character in which the newly formed ultra-nationalist political parties have risen in the last few years contains elements of the state post-war masculinisation and militarisation of the national struggle. And there is a certain reiteration of these elements in the face of their undermining, but with these now being fused with neo-Nazi and junta-phile ideological elements.

Finally, in Chapter eight, I conclude that there is an adapted reiteration of the co-constitutive relationship of nationalism, militarism and masculinity against ‘occupation’ that has been formed following the opening of the borders and that, through the adapted reiteration of this co-constitution, the broader G.C. stance in the post-opening of the borders conflict situation can be explained. This re-constitution is illustrated to construct new ideological borders that have now replaced the previously closed un-crossable ones and scaffolds the resistance to cross and the continuous support for the existence of a potent army and its change into a semi or fully professional force.

I also conclude that although the three elements characterising the readapted post-war Cypriot society are co-constitutive, they are very much weakened independently. I argue that the newly created ultra-nationalist political formations should be understood
as a discursive response to the process of the weakening post-war co-constitution of this three-fold relationship.

The concluding remarks highlight the importance of addressing the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in coming closer to the obstacles retaining the conduction of meaningful negotiations for reconciliation and to overcome the conflict culture by building bridges to understand the traumas and fears of both communities.
2. Chapter two: A short account of the Cyprus conflict

This chapter presents a short account of the Cyprus conflict and three important political events, the opening of the borders in 2003 between North and South Cyprus, the Annan Plan referendum and the accession of Cyprus to the EU, all of which occurred before the fieldwork took place. These events have been approached in this thesis as formative in the relationship of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity.

Short account of the history of Cyprus

Cyprus is located in the eastern Mediterranean, in a geo-strategic position between Europe, Asia and Africa. Its position is often presented in popular narratives as the main reason that it has been conquered and colonised many times during its history (Hitchens, 1997).

More recently difficulties between two populations, the Greek Cypriots on the one hand, the Turkish Cypriots on the other, have led to excessive conflict. The politics of nationhood and identity played a central role in the rise of inter-communal tension and the creation of the so-called ‘Cyprus problem’, (Kızılyürek, 2002). Making claims to a Hellenic past and lineage, G.C.s, especially the nationalists, often emphasise the arrival and settlement of the Mycenaean/Achaeans from mainland Greece in the second millennium BC as the first colonisers of the island. They had formed city-kingsdoms on the Minoan model and introduced the Greek language, religion and culture to the island. Thus, it is often asserted by the G.C.s that this period determined the predominant character of the island, (Hadjipavlou, 2006: 331). Many T.C.s on the other hand, see 1571 as an historical starting point, since this was the year that the island was conquered by the Ottoman Turks, after being occupied by Venetians between 1489 and 1571 and the French Lusignan dynasty of Jerusalem between 1191 and 1489 (Calotychos, 1998: 5). During the almost four centuries before independence, Muslim Turks lived dispersed throughout the island, both in separate villages and mixed villages with the Christian Greeks. With the exception of some occasional violent events, social
relationships between the two groups were relatively harmonious (Loizos, 1981:40).

The rendering of Cyprus by the Ottomans to the British in 1878 became formative to the development of the inter-communal conflict. In 1914, the island was officially annexed to the British Empire as a colony. At that time the island consisted of 73.9% Orthodox Greeks and 24.4% Muslim Turks (Calotychos, 1998: 5).

The situation created between the two communities during the British rule had set the basis for a consolidation of their differences. Greek and Turkish nationalisms developed during the colonial period in Cyprus (1878-1960) (Attalides, 1979) and became a tool for forming an ethnicised sense of person-hood in the masses through separate educational systems (Bryant, 2004). During that period, as Bryant (2004: 2) argues, identity became singular and ethnic, the outcome of which she describes as the process by which people one knows may nevertheless ‘appear to be or to become strangers’.

2.2 The bi-communal clashes of 1955-59

The British politicised intra-communal differences as a tool to serve their colonial interests in the Middle East (Pollis, 1998). They reinforced the two emerging antagonistic nationalisms and competing visions based on each group’s ‘primordial attachments’ to their respective ‘motherlands’. During the British rule, the idea of union (in Greek: ένωση) with Greece started to become popular amongst G.C.s; however, any moves to create alignment with Greece during that period were quashed (Fisher, 2001: 309).

The 1950s was a period of growing inter-ethnic mistrust, fear and violence. 1955 was the year that marked the start of serious bi-communal clashes, (Kızılyürek, 2012). Divides between Greeks and Turks crystallised during the anti-colonial struggle from 1955–59 in the context of which the G.C.s fought the British for ‘union’ with ‘motherland’ Greece and the T.C.s fought the British for Taksim, that is for union of part of the island with ‘motherland’ Turkey (ibid).

In 1955, the quest for union with Greece was intensified and the National Organisation
of Cypriot Struggle (EOKA) was formed as a self-proclaimed liberating movement against British colonialism and its close at the time ally, the overwhelmingly T.C. police force. The group engaged in guerrilla warfare and operated under the leadership of General Georgios Grivas (Markides, 1997). The reaction to the guerrilla movement resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives, and alienated the T.C population who responded to enosis with a call for the partition of the island into two separate communities (Loizos, 1981). This situation led to interethnic killings and in consequence, in 1958, riots and armed interethnic confrontations broke out (Pollis, 1979).

According to T.C. writers (Salih, 1968; Nedjatigil, 1997; Kizilyurek, 2002), the T.C. leadership expected that eventually the EOKA would terrorise the T.C. community. By 1957, the T.C.s aligned themselves with the British and established the TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization), (Papadakis, 1998:149), with the goal of counteracting the Greek-based EOKA. TMT engaged in limited inter-communal fighting with the G.C.s, until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958 (Fisher, 2001:310).

Yet, it was not only the T.C.s, who were excluded from the liberation and nationalism of EOKA, but also leftists and communists, as separation existed also between right and left G.C. factions. EOKA ’s leadership saw the communists as outside the national community and as a threat to their struggle, whilst it formed allies with the Church of Cyprus and other conservative agents (Loizides, 2007: 176).

In 1960, G.C.s and T.C.s accepted a compromise settlement that led to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus (Xydis, 1973). The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) marks an important development in the history of Cyprus, as the island became an independent republic for the first time since antiquity, albeit in a limited way (Attalides, 1979; Faustmann, 1999). This settlement was agreed by outside stakeholders, Greece, Turkey and Britain, who were to act as guarantors to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new state (Papadakis, 1998: 152).

The 1960 constitution was a “complex power-sharing arrangement with both a national legislature and two communal chambers, and a cabinet, public service, police force and army” (Fisher, 2001: 310). In the newly formed state, Archbishop Makarios became the first President of the RoC and Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, was appointed as the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President.
However, soon after independence, power-sharing arrangements broke down and violence erupted again between the two communities. In the years 1963-1964 and 1967, the T.C.s suffered the greater losses and many of them moved to areas that gradually became their armed enclaves (Loizos, 1981; Papadakis, 1998; Fisher, 2001). As the interethnic fighting of 1963-67 subsided, G.C.s became deeply divided between those arguing for enosis now, and others favouring enosis if possible in the future (Loizos, 1974: 125).

In this context, the National Guard (NG) has been an integral part and a clear manifestation of the developing deep-routed dichotomy created between the two communities during the bi-communal clashes of 1963-4. Following the end of British rule, as part of the formation of Cyprus as an independent state, the Cyprus army was created, composing both G.C. and T.C.s. However, the purpose of the army in Cyprus changed and became re-imagined following the bi-communal clashes of 1963-4. As a result of these clashes that marked the beginning of the separation of the two communities, the Cyprus army was dissolved and the NG was created in its place consisting only of G.C.s, whilst in 1964 conscription was introduced, (see: National Guard law (2011). The NG was involved in two minor military clashes with Turkey and T.C.s in 1964 and 1967 and fought in the war with Turkey in 1974.

The continuing violent inter-communal strife led to concerns in NATO and eventually to the involvement of the United Nations (UN). The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in March 1964 and remains on the island to this day. Shortly after, a UN monitored buffer zone, usually referred to as the ‘Green Line’ was established in Nicosia.

Hostility and inter-communal violence continued for the remainder of the 1960s, and the early 1970s were “punctuated by intermittent crises sparking Turkish involvement and repeated calls for ‘enosis’ by nationalist elements in the G.C. community” (Fisher, 2001:310). The differences between the two communities were never resolved. On the contrary, the T.C.s lived in enclaves intermittently until 1974.
2.3 The war of 1974

In 1967 the rise of a military junta in Greece had significant repercussions in Cyprus. With the support of the junta, EOKA B, a paramilitary pro-enosis organisation, was formed, again under the leadership of General Georgios Grivas, and started a series of attacks, killings and violent episodes against the government and members of the left-wing party (Hitchens, 1997:71).

In July 1974, the military junta in Greece encouraged a coup d’état that deposed the president, Archbishop Makarios. In response to this, Turkey, as a guarantor power of the constitution, legally intervened by launching a military offensive to protect T.C.s and to supposedly restore constitutional order, which had been suspended since 1964, (Papadakis, 1998:152). However, Turkish forces moved to illegally occupy 37% of the island.

During the short (20th July- 16th August 1974) and bloody conflict created by the Turkish invasion around 3,500 people were killed and 2,000 were reported as missing. In the empirical chapters, the issue of G.C. missing persons is shown to take an indispensable part in the gendering of G.C. nationalism. This is through the use of the mothers, wives and sisters of the missing persons to project the image of post-war Cyprus as a victim awaiting liberation. Out of the total G.C. community of 574,000 some 180,000 became refugees (Kyle, 1997) fleeing to the south of the island and creating a complicated refugee problem (see Zetter, 1998). Later, the voluntary regrouping of populations resulted in approximately 40,000 T.C.s moving to the North. Thus, the events of 1974 had the effect of creating two separate ethnic zones on the island (Calotychos, 1998: 8).

In 1975, the T.C. community declared itself the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, with Rauf Denktaş as its first leader. In 1983, it declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The state of northern Cyprus is only recognised by Turkey and it is treated internationally as an illegal non-state (Calotychos, 1998: 9). The south part of the island that has since then essentially been the G.C. administration, gained international recognition and legitimacy as the official Republic of Cyprus.

Following the events outlined above, constitutional power was never restored. Instead
the island was divided and remains divided to the present day. Therefore, in this thesis when I will refer to the state, the state refers to the Republic of Cyprus which is a post-colonial state. But which, since 1963, no longer represents the T.C.s and, since 1974, represents only the southern part of Cyprus.

The dividing line, known as the ‘Green line’ that had been drawn in Nicosia by the UN forces to deal with inter-communal violence, was rearranged into the ‘Attila Line’ (112 miles long) in August 1974 now extended to separate the island into two parts. In the empirical chapters the border separating the two communities is illustrated to have become a G.C. symbol of the polarisation of the two communities and opposition to the ‘occupation’ of North Cyprus yet also of the need to ‘I struggle’. It will also be discussed how the national struggle for the G.C. community following the opening of these borders becomes conflicting and contradictory to the reality of opened borders and their crossing-taking place from both sides of the divide.

2. 4 The opening of the North-South border in 2003, EU accession and Annan Plan

The opening of crossing points on the borders (2003) took place in the context of Cyprus being on the threshold of its accession to the EU and increased negotiations for reunification (UN Annan Plan). Since 1975, a long series of inter-communal high-level negotiations had been conducted every so often under UN auspices, but to this day no mutually acceptable agreement has been reached.

The concept of the EU and the perceived benefits of membership were primary motivators for positive political change towards peace in both North and South Cyprus, (Yakinthou, 2009). Both populations were called to vote in the most recent resolution initiative: the Annan Plan referendum put together by the UN Secretary General in 2004 after the two sides had negotiated (Trimikliotis & Demetriou, 2011: 17; Palley 2006).

The decision in 1997 by the EU to open up accession negotiations with the RoC, following the Republic’s initiation of a unilateral application to join the EU in 1990, created a new catalyst for settlement. In December 1999, talks also began between

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8 The term 'Attila' is used in Cyprus to refer to the Turkish conqueror of North Cyprus. This name seems to have been adopted from 'Operation Attila', which was the Turkish Armed Forces’ code name of the invasion of Cyprus.
Turkey and the EU in regards to Turkey becoming a candidate for EU membership. However, the talks quickly broke down with the confrontation between Turkey and the EU becoming visible over Cyprus’ accession. Turkey’s candidacy was clearly tied to Cyprus’ EU membership.

Cyprus’ EU accession and Turkey’s candidacy became a catalyst for solution. Perhaps in realising the gravity of the situation, Rauf Denktas, at the time T.C. President, in November 2001, initiated a new peace process with Glafcos Clerides, at the time G.C. President. However, the talks soon reached a deadlock. In an attempt to help this situation a new round of negotiations was opened between the G.C.s and T.C.s under UN auspices, (Sözen & Özersay, 2007). The Security Council agreed that the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, should present the two sides with a blueprint settlement, which would have formed the basis for further negotiations.

At the time it was hoped that the urgency of resolving the Cyprus conflict prior to Cyprus’ accession to the EU may have brought the two sides finally to the bargaining table and that they would have agreed to the Annan plan. At each stage of the negotiations “official EU statements underlined again and again the Union’s aspirations for a final solution to the problem to be found and for the whole island to eventually become a member” (Demetriou, 2005: 9).

The RoC signed the Accession Treaty on 16th of April 2003. A week later, in an unprecedented move, the T.C. leadership decided to open up the crossing points on the Green Line. Up to that point, from 1974 to 2003, communication between the two sides of the border was virtually impossible and the two communities lived completely separate from the other. “No direct phone line connection existed, postal services were not available and physical crossing of the line was prohibited.” (Demetriou, 2005: 11).

Opening of the borders

The decision of the at the time T.C. President, Rauf Denktas, to partially lift the ban on freedom of movement in April 2003 and to open up a number of checkpoints around the island came as a surprise to G.C.s. After the long term division and isolation of the two communities, the possibility to cross opened new debates about the meanings of the
opening and its possible significance for the future of Cyprus (Cockburn, 2004: 7). To the present day, it is not completely clear what the reasons were for the opening of the borders. Nonetheless, the G.C. side did not have a role to play in this decision. For them the legality of the existence of the border was, from the outset, not accepted.

In this manner, the crossings, which were opened on the border, where treated with suspicion and uncertainty from the G.C. public and political powers (Dikomitis, 2005, 2004; Demetriou, 2007). The G.C. leadership discouraged the public from crossing the border (Demetriou, 2007). A significant number of G.C.s have provided clear resistance in crossing (Webster & Timothy 2006; Boedeltje & Houtum, 2007), while the crossings that have taken place have not resulted in significant interaction between the two communities (Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Webster & Timothy, 2006). This resistance to cross will be shown in the empirical chapters to be an expression of the adapted reiteration of the relationship of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity following this event.

It is difficult to present an accurate number of the crossings that have taken place since then, as it appears that often these numbers are filtered through political agendas. Yet, the following statistics provide some indications. On the 23rd April 2013 the left-wing newspaper ‘Alitheia’ (in Greek: αλήθεια) commented that since 2003, thus within about 10 years, there have been 22 million crossings, (see Alitheia – Αλήθεια, 2013). Out of the total number, it commented that 8 million G.C.s and 14 million T.C.s (ibid) have crossed. Specifically, the UN office in Cyprus estimates that a total of 9 million people have crossed in the three years between 2003 and 2006 (see Hadjipavlou, 2007b).

These numbers illustrate that some people have been crossing the border repeatedly. If we were to base our analysis merely on statistics, then one could conclude that reconciliation has taken place. However, as this qualitative driven thesis reveals this is certainly not the case.

Annan Plan failure and accession to the EU

The ‘Annan plan’ (officially Annan III), which was the initiative that followed the submission and presentation of a version and modified version of two UN plans for
settlement (named Annan I and II), was defeated in a referendum on 24th April 2004 by the G.C.s. The majority of G.C.s - 76% - voted ‘no’ to the plan, while the majority of T.C.s - 65% - voted ‘yes’, supporting reunification and the entry to the EU of the whole Island, (for a more detailed discussion of the plan see Palley, 2006 and Russell & Cohn, 2012). Shortly after, on 1st May 2004, the RoC became a member of the EU.

The defeat of the referendum created an atypical type of EU membership; Cyprus now exists as an EU member state, but it remains divided. Whereas officially the whole island acceded to the EU, EU legislation only applies in the recognised RoC. The *acquis communautaire* is suspended in the north part until a solution of the ‘Cyprus problem’ is achieved, in accordance with protocol 10 of Cyprus’ EU accession treaty (Yakinthou, 2009; 309).

However, whilst only the South of Cyprus directly receives the benefits (and meets the obligations) of EU membership (Yakinthou, 2009: 307), after the rejection of the reunification plan in the south, special measures were adopted by the EU, which has been regulating its relations with the north, starting with the policing of the Green Line and extending to trade, funding, and official representation (Demetriou, 2005: 9). Noteworthy is that the EU has provided €259,000,000 in funds to help the T.C.s upgrade their infrastructure (Yakinthou, 2009: 317).

The defeat of the Annan Plan in the above-described context marked a new turning point in the recent history of the conflict, demonstrating that the accession of the island to the EU was not powerful enough to facilitate both sides to overcome past divisions and reservations to imagine a shared future. Political intercessions, such as the opening of the borders, the Annan Plan referendum process, and the accession to the EU could have contributed to a collective paradigm shift of peace aspiration and reconciliation, but have not. Yet, as this thesis illustrates, these three events have become formative in the politics of the conflict.

This project questions the persistence of a particular G.C. nationalist identity in Cyprus despite the opening of the borders in 2003 and the accession to the EU. It explores, in particular, the relationship between G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity, claiming that there continues to exist a ‘post-opening of the borders conflict culture’, in which militarism (in a defensive posture) and masculinity serve an important function.
This thesis argues that such an analysis can contribute towards a better explanation as to why the opening of the borders, the interaction between the two communities and the EU accession have not resulted in furthering substantial attempts towards a resolution.

In the context of the recent discovery of gas in the Cyprus exclusive economic zone (EEZ), there has been a further UN initiative to begin talks for new rounds of negotiations. The RoC was delaying the start of talks by setting a precondition that before starting the talks both parties need to agree on a joint communiqué that will clearly define the framework within which a solution to the Cyprus Problem will be sought (see Psylides, 2014). Yet, both parties have since early 2014 entered an intense process of negotiations.

3. Chapter three: Literature review

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the literature relating to the key issues of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, both as separate areas of research in their own right as well as relating to their inter-connection.

This review illustrates that there is a lack of literature that has addressed the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity and discusses the literature used
in this thesis to demonstrate that these three are co-constituted in Cyprus. The conclusion raises the contention of this thesis, that it is the interrelationship of ideas associated with nationalism, militarism and masculinity that is we need to address when looking at post-armed conflict societies. Therefore, while these three theoretical areas for the purposes of this chapter will be treated in most cases as distinct. I will bring them together at the end of the chapter in highlighting that they are co-contingent, while also pointing to the ability of this three-fold relationship to be reiterated or re-adapted under new social and political parameters. In this relationship masculinity is not only seen to be an issue relating to the identity of men rather to the broader masculinist discourse co-constituting nationalism and militarism in such societies. For the purpose of illustrating this, I employ the term ‘nationalist militarised masculinity’. The ‘nationalist militarised masculinity’ underpinning G.C. nationalism and militarism, as it will be introduced in this chapter and illustrated in the empirical ones, is a linchpin to the obstacles created for reconciliation.

3.2 Nationalism

Although there are many definitions of ‘nation’, it is not my intention to review them here. Rather, I want to shortly point to some central areas of debate and then put forward the argument that a modernist-constructivist approach to nationalism will be the analytic tool I will be using to understand G.C. nationalism and the origins of the “Greek” nation. Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ will be applied to this discussion.

Nationalism is still an ambiguous concept. There is no general consensus amongst scholars on the nature and definition of the concept (Ozkirimli, 2005; Brown, 2004; Harris, 2009). That is because there is fundamental disagreement about the nature of nationalism and nation among scholars (Brown, 2004; Harris, 2009). Different understandings of the development of nations and nationalism rest on and form the different definitions of how and when they arose and what they are. For example, Gellner, (1983), Anderson, (1983) and Smith, (1998) provide very different answers to these questions. Yet, the fact remains as Ozkirimli (2005: 7) informs us that, “definitions abound, and the most fundamental conceptual divide in the literature concerns the relative weight to be attached to objective and subjective elements in the definition of nations.”
A lecture given by Ernest Renan at the Sorbonne, Paris, in 1882, was one of the early investigations into the meaning of nationalism. In this lecture entitled “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (What is a nation?) he proposed that a nation is a matter of the will of people to be a nation; it is based on their common ancestry and their desire to live together. Therefore, under this framework “nationalism’ is what ‘nations’ do”, (Hearn, 2006).

Central to the debate on nationalism and nations is the relationship between ethnicity and nation. For example, primordialists tend to place ethnicity at the centre of their understanding of nationalism, and so in this vein nationalism is understood rather as a late development of much older processes of ethnicity (see: Hearn, 2006). An example of this is G.C. nationalist ideology that, through a primordial attachment, “views Cyprus as an extension of Greece”, see Mavratsas (1996: 89). However, this theory is sharply criticised by modernist theorists of nations and nationalism (such as Breuilly, 1985; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Kedourie, 1985 and Anderson, 1983) for giving nations biological and/or racial attributes.

Modernist scholars (for example Breuilly, 1985; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983 and Anderson, 1983) view nations as being born out of the conditions of modernity and have the idea that the nation is constructed through internal processes within the nation. According to modernists, nations are the result of social, political and economic changes, which occurred since the 19th century and are related to the rise of industrial capitalism, the expansion of imperialism, the French and American Revolutions, and the modern bureaucratic state, urbanisation and secularism (Puri, 2004). Max Weber defines a nation as a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state and which holds notions of common descent, though not necessarily common blood (Gerth and Mills, 1948). Kedourie is one of the most-cited modernist scholars on nationalism. In his book ‘Nationalism’, published in 1960, he developed the approach that nationalism is an ideology developed in Europe as a response to the predicament of Modernity.

Modernist approaches emphasise the ‘creation’ of nations. A central argument in modernist accounts is that the presence or absence of an ethnic link does not in itself bestow any particular characteristics (Gellner, 1996). Nations are not unchangeable
entities. In short, ‘nationalism comes before nations. ‘Nations do not make states and nationalism, but the other way round’ (Hobsbawm, 1990: 10).

Hobsbawm (1990) finds mutual ground with modernist thought on seeing state control as a central point of nationalism, and he places emphasis on the importance of the nation state as the political outcome of nationalism. Hobsbawm, unlike the primordialists, emphasises the discontinuities of modern nationalisms with the past. By the use of the term ‘invented traditions’ Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) argue that nations, nationalism, the nation-state, and national symbols are types of recently invented traditions and that any seeming continuity with the past is mostly fictitious. As Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983, 1992: 2) put it:

“I would stress the element of artefact, invention and social engineering which enters into the making of nations.”

It is important to point out that Hobsbawm, as Puri (1994:) clarifies, does not suggest that “invented traditions such as nationalism are fictions and therefore meaningless; rather, he shows how ‘traditions’ such as nationalism, which seem or claim to be old, are recent in origin and actively created.”

Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) have shown us how memory in nationalism can serve as a function of resistance, since the creation of the nation-state rests on the construction of a single historical narrative, which recalls the glorious periods of the nation and its struggles. ‘The invention of tradition’, as conceived by them, refers to rethinking, and redefining certain practices, symbols, and spaces of a community. This can involve the attribution of novel symbolism and significance to historical monuments or the manipulation of historical figures, by reinventing them as great heroic ancestors. By instilling this façade of the nation’s immortality and its extension to immemorial periods of its history this constructs a unitary national past and present. This aspect is discussed in the analysis of my empirical research in the chapters in relation to the G.C. national slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ (In Greek: Δεν Ξεχνω και Αγωνίζομαι).

In this thesis, I approach G.C. nationalism through Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ and Ozkirimli’s understanding of nationalism as ‘a discourse’. Anderson
characterises nations as ‘imagined communities’ and argues that these communities are to be distinguished from one another ‘not by their authenticity but by the way in which they are imagined’ (1983: 15). The concept of ‘imagined community’ does not imply that nations are not real; thus that the ‘imagined’ nation is an ‘imaginary’ nation. Rather it guides us in understanding that nations are imagined:

“Because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them; yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (ibid)

The emphasis on the nation as a construct rests on the nationalist assumption that authentic or true communities do exist. However, in fact, apart from the face-to-face everyday interactions in primordial villages, all modern communities are imagined in one way or another.

Furthermore, Ozkirimli (2005:29) takes a discursive approach to nationalism, arguing that we should understand nationalism as a particular form of discourse. Following Stuart Hall’s definition, he understands discourse as; “sets of ready-made and reconstituted ‘experiencings’ displayed and arranged through language” (Hall, 1977: 322). It should be noted that this is the definition of discourse adopted in this thesis. This suggests that people live and experience through discourse in the sense that discourses impose frameworks that limit what can be experienced or the meaning that experience can assume, thereby influencing what can be said or done, Ozkirimli argues (2005:29-30). Hence nationalism in this vein “is a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps us make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds us.” (Ozkirimli, 2005: 30).

Both the emphasis on the nation as an ‘imagined community’ and as a ‘discursive formation’ point us to the constructiveness of the nation as well as to nationalism as a way of interpreting and understanding the world that is continuously reproduced by the ‘members’ of a nation. Thus, the national imaginary allows the ideological reproduction of ‘imagined communities’ that are experienced as both limited and sovereign (Anderson, 1983). Then, given that “the nationalist way of thinking and speaking helps to make nation,” (Calhoun, 1997: 99); “nationalism is not just a political doctrine, but a more basic way of talking, thinking and acting” (Ozkirimli, 2005:31).
Furthermore, the national ‘other’ is inextricable to the ‘imagination’ and ‘discursive construction’ but also to the continuous reproduction of the idea of the national community as authentic and sovereign. The role of the ‘other’ in the construction and maintenance, but also ‘imagination’, of identity has prevailed in the theory of identity across social sciences in recent years, stretching, for example, from Said (1978) to Billing (1995) and Smith (1991). While the role of the ‘other’ in the general theorisation of identity appears primarily in the formation of any type of identity which is said to act as a catalyst in the differentiation and realisation of that identity in relevance to the ‘other’, here I wish to stress the significance of processes of ‘othering’ in nationalism.

In the same way that nationalism imagines nations (Anderson, 1983) it also imagines its ‘others’ or namely ‘enemies’, through which interiorised feelings of group belonging and cohesion are established and secured. As Hall writes, “identity is partly the relationship between you and the other. Only when there is another can you know who you are” (Hall, 1992: 344). This consistency of identities and national coherence is made through a reverse orientation. Thus, by sketching out what the ‘other’ is for ‘us’, the ‘us’ becomes clear and strongly defined in the face of the ‘other’. As Kennedy and Danks (2001:3) point out, all identity construction requires the summoning of difference; thus the relativisation of the self against the ‘other’. Then, through the projection of a shared ‘other’ collective, solidarity is established amongst the ‘we’ and through the consolidation of an ‘other’ the collectively understood self becomes consolidated as well. The collective acceptance of shared national ‘others’ provides interiorised feelings of group belonging, which facilitates and guides collective action.

The above discussion has reviewed some of the main definitions of nationalism. Moreover, as it will be later explored in detail, traditional frameworks employed by mainstream analyses of deeply divided ethno-nationalist societies have tended to ignore the gendered dimensions of ethno-nationalisms. The next section will review the literature on G.C. nationalism, where again the limited gendered analysis and, more specifically, the lack of analysis of masculinity in the relevant literature will be pointed out. The contention of this thesis is that masculinity underpins and provides a rationale for understanding nationalism and militarism, particularly in post-armed conflict situations such as in Cyprus by having a constituent role in the ‘imagination’ (Anderson,
1983) of the ‘other’ and the nationalist militarist ‘self’ necessitated in opposition to this ‘other’.

**Literature on Greek Cypriot nationalism**

Nationalism has been often treated by scholars as a process mainly articulated from above (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1983). Earlier research on nationalism in Cyprus had mostly adopted a macro-analytical approach and focused on the dividing aspects of the conflict, in order to unveil the processes and operations of nationalism, and the obstacles to reconciliation (Attalides, 1979; Bryant, 2004; Papadakis et al, 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Anastasiou, 2008; Papadakis & Bryant, 2012; Mavratsas, 1996; Brown and Theodossopoulos, 2004). For the social scientist of the conflict, understanding and deconstructing nationalism especially after the events of 1974 became a major quest in explaining how violence and division comes about, and also how it becomes consolidated and reproduced through both popular discourses and state institutions. For instance, Bryant (2004) has examined the historical production and lineages of what she calls ‘two conflicting styles of nationalist imagination’ that were (re)produced by respective elites in both communities and then gained particular appeal amongst the masses.

Yet, in recent years there has been a growing body of qualitative interviewing and ethnographic research on G.C. nationalism as constructed and negotiated at the local or everyday level leading to an increasing focus at the individual level (for example Hadjipavlou, 2007; Dikomitis, 2005; Christou, 2006; Spyrou, 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2006; Dikomitis, 2004; Webster & Timothy, 2006). By stressing the need to specify, rather than assume, how individuals position themselves in relation to nationalism, these studies have made a significant contribution to the knowledge on G.C. nationalism, by shifting the level of analysis from the macro to the micro. The findings of my empirical study further illustrate the significance of understanding how nationalism is constructed and negotiated at the micro level, but also the need to understand the inter-relationship of nationalism to militarism and masculinity.
There have been many studies on the creation of social memory and the reproduction and perpetuation of nationalist ideology in Cyprus. These studies have focused on education (Bryant, 1998, 1998b; Spyrou, 2000, 2002), political rituals and commemorative events (Papadakis, 2003) and ethnic stereotypes (Brown and Theodossopoulos, 2004; Papadakis, 2004) in the construction of ‘otherness’ and creation of an ‘imagined community’ in the G.C. educational system (Philippou, 2004; Spyrou, 2000) and specifically as generated by the slogan “I don’t forget and I struggle” in the G.C. educational system (Christou, 2006). What is key is that these studies move beyond the identification and description of the totalising effect of G.C. nationalism by examining the meaning that individuals make of national ideologies in their everyday lives. Papadakis (1998), for example, became concerned about the link between ‘the national’ and ‘the personal’. The personal biographies he examines would often turn into political commentaries on local or national history interwoven with personal experiences (ibid:160).

It is then possible to examine how individuals have the potential to strategically deal with nationalist ideology, engage in self-reflection and articulate counter-nationalist discourses, whilst also reiterating and re-modelling nationalist discourses under new political and social parameters.

Research on political developments in Cyprus; conflict transformation and nationalism

In recent years mainstream scholarship has encompassed the actual processes of conflict transformation. The opening of the Green Line in 2003 and the Annan reunification plan with the possibility of a solution raised in 2004, has led to a general academic turn of focus: from studying the conflict identities and the separation of the two communities, to investigating the new opportunities created by these political events for contact between the two communities. A qualitative body of work has been produced to investigate border crossings as a ‘new opportunity for contact’ and the potential for reconciliation (Dikomitis, 2005, 2009; Hadjipavlou, 2007b, 2009; Bryant, 2010). This body of research has unveiled the new opportunities for contact between the two communities, and also revealed the new, ideological borders and the utilization of the opening of the borders in reiterating divisions (Hadjipavlou, 2006, 2007a; Dikomitis,
In her recent book ‘The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus’, Bryant (2010) demonstrates that the opening of the borders, while it has significantly challenged long-standing imaginings and myths on both sides of the divide, it has also in some respects widened the distance between the two communities. The analysis of nationalism following the opening of the border, in terms of ‘new opportunities for contact’ and ‘ideological borders’ replacing the ‘un-crossable borders’, is employed in the thesis, in investigating the adapted reiteration of the relationship between nationalism, militarism and masculinity following the opening of the borders.

The accession of Cyprus to the European Union has also been a political development that has led to the production of a body of literature examining the impact of the EU accession on the politics of the conflict (for example see: Diez et al., 2008; Demetriou, 2005, 2008). This has mostly shown how the accession has marked a new turning point in the ‘struggle’ for the G.C.s by the accession becoming an instrument of the struggle to use against Turkey. This new body of work has also pointed to the feeling of security of G.C.s that the possibility of a second invasion by Turkey is simply non-existent (Demetriou, 2005; Lordos and Kaymak, 2007). Some research has also drawn links between the modern national identity of Cyprus and sexuality, pointing to the persistence of ‘hetero-normativity’ and ‘hetero-centricity’ in Cypriot society following the accession to the EU (Kamenou, 2011). The analysis of this political development in Cyprus in terms of the ‘changing understanding of struggle’ and ‘security vis-à-vis Turkey’ in this thesis is employed in investigating the process undermining the ideology of ‘defence’ (in Greek: ἀμυνα) resulting from the Europeanisation of the politics of the conflict and the appeal to a ‘Euro-Cypriot’ identity. Moreover, the thesis examines how a ‘Euro-Cypriot’ identity relates to the changing G.C. hegemonic masculinity.

Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’ in the examination of Nationalism, Militarism and Masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus

In this thesis I employ Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ to understand G.C. nationalism. I also take Anderson’s theorisation a step further to understand the
‘other’ and the masculinist and militarist discourses co-constituting G.C. nationalism. Anderson has been repeatedly used to understand G.C. nationalism (Bryant, 2002; Mavratsas, 1996) and also more specifically in empirical studies on G.C. nationalism (Christou, 2006, 2007; Spyrou, 2006).

Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ is helpful in understanding the construction and the ‘imagination’ of G.C. nationalism and the idea of the G.C. community. As Mavratsas argues in his article: ‘Approaches to Nationalism: Basic Theoretical Considerations in the Study of the G.C. Case and a Historical Overview’, that there is “enough evidence to support the claim that the modern concept of the Greek nation only began to appear gradually and to be ‘imagined’, around the turn of the nineteenth century.” (1996: 83). The ideological origins of Greek nationalism in Cyprus can be traced to when the Greeks began to develop a specific identity in the period of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, which differentiated them from the other Christians of the Ottoman Empire (Kitromilides, 1983, 1989, 1994). An awareness of ethnic distinction had begun to arise in the early years of the 19th century, yet only within a small segment of the G.C. population, due to influences from both Greece and centres of Hellenism in Asia Minor (Attalides, 1979; Kitromilides, 1979; Loizos, 1974). The main mechanisms of ‘nation-building’ were the educational system, which at the time was in the hand of the Orthodox Church, and the Greek consulate (Attalides, 1979; Kitromilides, 1979).

G.C. national identity has had to reconcile two separate nation states: “Greece and Cyprus, a sometime uneasy relationship inextricably bound up with debates over Cypriot independence and union with Greece, and ultimately brought into sharp focus by the Turkish invasion” (Burrell, 2006: 91). Thus the main internal opposition against G.C. nationalism as Mavratsas (1996; 88) informs us “has come from what may be broadly called ‘Cypriotism’, a political ideology and cultural discourse which, by placing the centre of attention on Cyprus, rather than the Greek nation, functions as a territorial nationalism with strong civic elements.” (see also Attalides, 1979).

The diverse perspectives and the complexity on what constitutes G.C. national identity have been convoluted and long drawn out, and as Papadakis (1998: 162) has noted “if anything unites Greek Cypriots in a community, it is their participation in a debate about
what constitutes the nation, not some shared conception of the nation.” Broadly speaking, “it may be argued that the contrast between Greek nationalism and Cypriotism corresponds to the political opposition between right and left.” (Mavratsas, 1996: 93).

What has also been particularly useful in employing Anderson’s theory was thinking beyond his application of the concept to understand how the ‘other’ is framed in the G.C. community. Part of the ‘imagined community’ is imagining the ‘other’. Therefore, the concept ‘imagined communities’ works well in the case of Cyprus, as imagination, and as it will be argued, also memory, were so to speak ‘sterilised’ and ‘decontextualised’ in time from 1974 to 2003, due to the partition of the island. Any contact between the two communities during this period was impossible due to the existence of closed, heavily militarised borders that physically separated them.

G.C. post-war nationalism has rested on the imagination of the threatening national generalised and undifferentiated ‘other’; the ‘Turks’, who existed across the border, (see Spyrou, 2006: 97-99). This has been an indispensable part of the imagination of the G.C. community and to the preservation of both national sentiment and unity, yet also to a feeling of superiority. The primary ‘other’ (the Turks for G.C.s) provides a “convenient point of reference for any kind of comparison, whether in relation to war, or civilisation, or any aspect of daily life where ‘being a Greek’ always implies a sense of superiority.” (Spyrou, 2006: 98). This process is a familiar one to nationalist constructions of identity, where the Self is understood as superior to the ‘other’. In the broader G.C. nationalist imagination of the ‘enemy’, T.C.s do not seem to be differentiated from ‘Turks’, and the generalised term ‘Turk’ swallows up any diversity in the Other and, by eliminating its diversity, national identity is fully essentialised, (see Spyrou, 2006: 99). Thus the ‘imagination’ of the undifferentiated and unifying enemy becomes the unifying force for the collective solidarity and Self.

While, for the G.C.s the ‘other’ living across the border was imagined, the ‘other side’ was part of the ‘imagination’ of what Cyprus became for the G.C. community following the partition. What was perceived to have been lost, existing across the border was either imagined or remembered. Therefore, memory, which in this instance takes the form of the official pronouncement of ‘I do not forget’ (Christou, 2006), has been a
function of resistance (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) in maintaining in the G.C. nationalist imagination the territory of Cyprus that G.C.s no longer controlled, and were also unable to visit. The resistance to forgetting maintained an ‘imagination’ that was ideologically turned into the need to ‘I struggle’ to ‘return’; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ for the G.C. community.

The concept of ‘imagined communities’ can also be extended in assisting us to understand the masculinist and militarist discourses co-constituting G.C. nationalism. Anderson (1983) has argued that nations also inspire profound love that can lead to self-sacrifice for this “imagined community”. “Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.” Anderson (1983, 2006: 7). However, he does not further extend his analysis in providing an understanding of the significance of gender and militarism to nationalism. As Mavratsas (1996) argues; “it is of crucial significance for the researcher to understand that, notwithstanding its often irrational, or even catastrophic, implications, Greek Cypriots nationalism has historically produced martyrdom, as well as other incidents of genuine national heroism.”

As will be discussed in the empirical chapters on G.C. nationalism these specific constructions of ‘heroism’ and ‘defence’ have been constituent parts of the way in which the post-war G.C. community has been ‘imagined’. ‘Defence’, with its specific discourses of heroism, was a ‘sacred’ element integrative of the ‘imagination’ of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ that will protect the victimised Cyprus. Thus, ‘defence’ has been an internal indispensable component of the collective consciousness and ‘imagination’ of the community that has rested on the dynamic of being ‘threatened’ and needing to be ‘protected’, while fighting for the legal rights and freedom for the community. Moreover, the National Guard occupies a central axis and has been the institutional facet in the ‘imagination’ of ‘defence’. As Whitworth (2004: 27) argues Anderson’s insight can be applied not only to nations but also to any large contemporary institutions, including national militaries and multilateral institutions. ‘They are constituted in part through shared ideas that give them meaning.’ The next section explores the broader literature on militarism, illustrating the lack of literature on militarism in Cyprus.
3. 3. Militarism

Militarism itself is a difficult field of study because of its wide diversity in forms and processes as well as socio-cultural contexts. Militarism has been a contested concept (Cock, 1989, 2004). Theorisations of militarisation, as Cock (1989: 51) argues, most often hinge on distinction being drawn between three social phenomena: 1) the military as a social institution: a set of social relationships organised around war, taking the shape of an armed force; 2) militarism as an ideology which values war and legitimates state violence as the solution to conflict; 3) militarism as a social process that involves mobilisation for war through the penetration of the military, its power and influence, into more and more social arenas, until the military have a primacy in state and society. However, in the literature on militarism, often there is a good deal of slippage between these three phenomena. In this thesis the term ‘militarism’ is used to refer:

1. To the military as a formal state institution
2. To the militarisation of the state
3. To the militarisation of the society
4. To the reciprocal process of militarisation between military barracks, state and society

Therefore, I employ ‘militarisation’ to refer to the militarisation of the military state institution, the state and society through a reciprocal relationship between them. This relationship, through culture and ideology, is constructing, reproducing and re-adapting G.C. post-armed conflict militarized, nationalist, and masculinist discourses.

The systematic examination of the military in social sciences was launched by scholars (for example Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Moskos, 1976; Burk, 1993) who focused on the military as a social institution and the military leadership as a professional yet social elite. In sociology, the military has been understood classically as one of the many, and basic, institutions of the state. For Max Weber (1978) the analysis of the military is central to the definition of the modern bureaucratic state. He defines the
modern state as the community, which successfully believes it holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of force of a certain territory. Since the state monopolisation of violence in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, armed forces have always been central to the state, (Weber, 1978; Tilly, 1975; Anderson, 1993; Scott, 2000).

The military is frequently conceptualised as a discrete institutional entity. While Enloe refers to ‘the military institution’, others have expanded the notion to depict a 'military-industrial complex' or even 'the military-industrial-technological-bureaucratic complex' (Eide and Thee, 1980). This is sometimes identified with the state (see for example Williams, 1985:224).

It is often observed that the military has an 'institutional' character because of its connection with the means of legitimate violence and the unlimited liability of their contract of employment (Moskos and Wood, 1988). In this understanding the emphasis is often placed on the sub-culture of the military as a state-institution. This being “alien to civilian life in terms of dealing with fear of physical danger and acceptance of hardship, the importance of leadership, and so on.” (Kuhlmann and Callaghan, 2011: 36). The main features of the military are seen as a distinct set of behaviours, rules, norms, and values coordinated around a defensive or offensive goal (ibid). However, this understanding has been sharply criticised for attempting to demarcate the problem. For example Thompson (1982:21) argues that:

“We speak of "the military-industrial complex" or of "the military sector" or "interest" of the arms lobby. This suggests that the evil is confined in a known and limited place: it may threaten to push forward, but it can be restrained.”

In the same vein Sjoberg and Sandra Via (2010: 7) argue “though war is an essential condition of militarism- the apex, the climax, the peak experience, the point of all the investment, training, and preparation – militarism - is much, much broader than war, comprising an underlying system of institutions, practices, values, and cultures.” This later conceptualisation of militarism, by providing an understanding of it as a synergy between multiple institutions and culture, points us to the reciprocal relationship between the military, state and society. Whereas, by pointing to the culture and ideology of militarism we can shed light onto understanding the way militarism is co-constituted
with nationalism and masculinity, not only during armed conflicts, but also in post-armed conflict societies.

Clearly different societies have experienced different levels of militarisation. The way militarisation is to be conceptualised and measured, however, remains an on-going question. The RoC, as a result of the Turkish occupation on the island controls only its southern part, but is typically ranked by quantitative militarisation indexes in the top ten per capita militarised countries globally, for example see the Global Militarisation Index. Yet, whether one measures the level of militarisation through qualitative or quantitative indicators, taking into account military expenditure, the number and sophistication of the weapons systems, the number of heavy weapons in relation to the population, the political influence of the military, the power and influence of the military over the society, the involvement of the larger society into the ‘military project’, Cyprus is a highly militarised society. The high levels of militarisation of Cyprus, as the next section illustrates, rely on the strong reciprocal relationship between military and society.

The military and society as reciprocal and bidirectional

In this thesis I have approached the relationship between the military and society as reciprocal and bidirectional. It is often observed that militaries are dependent upon “the host societies from which they recruit, which they serve and from which they derive financial and moral support.” (Kuhlmann and Callaghan, 2011: 35). Chamallas (1998: 307) has argued that the military is a microcosm of society. Conceptualising the military in this way helps us to understand how the military reflects and represents a larger society at a given historical, political and cultural juncture. Moreover, Lômsqî-Feder & Ben-Ari (1999: 1) argue that “both warfare and armed service represent intensive meeting points between the individual and the collective.” In investigating militarism, therefore, we need to direct our attention both to the military as a micro-society conditioned by the broader national society and also to the modalities and perceptions shaped within the military that then penetrate the larger society. We could then say that, "some variables pertain to the society, in the sense that society is the place where their modalities are shaped, and some others pertain to the military, in the sense that the military is the place where their modalities are shaped." Nuciari (2006: 83). Under this framework of thinking, ‘militarisation is a social process’ that involves the
mobilisation of resources for war at political, economic and ideological levels, (see Cock and Nathan, 1989: 2).

Andreski (1968) importantly argues, that militarism can also mean subservience of the whole society to the needs of the army, which may involve a recasting of social life in accordance with the pattern of military organisation, while also referring to an ideology which promotes military ideas. Enloe takes the ideological dimension of militarisation one step further and argues that it implies the extent to which military encroachments are acceptable to the population and become seen as ‘common sense’ solutions to civil problems. (Enloe, 1983: 9). The strong relationship between the NG and society is discussed in detail in the chapter on militarism, where the argument is put forward that ‘defence’ is an ideology of militarism developed in post-war Cyprus, which involved and appealed to the whole of society. However, certain political developments in Cyprus and certain global military trends and cultural developments, which are introduced in the section that follows, have begun to undermine the ideology of ‘defence’ in Cyprus.

The shift from mass-conscription to professional, all volunteer armies and the abolition of conscription

Military establishments in industrial democracies face serious challenges in the 21st century, see for example Kuhlmann and Callaghan (2011). These challenges have become a central theme in the recent studies of militarism that have discussed the replacement of the mass conscription army by a smaller professional one, as a result of technological and economic developments (Burk, 1992; Haltiner, 1998; Cohen, 1995; Shaw, 1991; Van Doom, 1975; Janowitz, 1960; Moon, 2005a). Whilst the EU accession has also been repeatedly identified as an impactful factor on the professionalisation and modernisation of member state armies, (see Lutterbeck 2005; King, 2011, 2005). Literature has also discussed how mass conscription armies had to be reconsidered due to the decline in the motivation to serve (see Haltiner, 1998). Moskos et al. (2000) in the scope of these developments draw a distinction between the modern, late modern and postmodern armies and claims that war and armed forces in the West have become post-modern.

From the 1990s, professional, smaller and more cost-effective forces have gradually replaced mass conscript armies. Many European countries as well as most members of NATO have abolished obligatory military service. Today, out of the 28 NATO countries
only 5 have some form of military service. Out of the 28 European Union member-states only 6 do\(^9\), and this includes Cyprus, which today has the longest conscription service in the EU.

The abandonment of military conscription in European militaries has been discussed repeatedly (Joenniemi, 2006; Belfer, 2013), while also pointing to European armed forces becoming concentrated and ‘transnational’, see King (2005). Elaborating on his theory in light of empirical cases in Western Europe, Haltiner (1998) contended that "geostrategic factors" are more important than economic and technological factors in determining the decline of the mass conscription army. Military conscription is today in Europe mostly an anachronism antithetical to the appeal of a European identity. In the scope of the exchange of conscript armies for professional ones in Europe, the European cultural dimension of this shift has also been raised (see for example example Belfer, 2013: 27).

Changes in the military reflect broader social changes and vice-versa (Janowitz, 1960, 1957, 1984). Social scientists became interested in how this change affected society and the representativeness of the military in society. The wider cultural background in western societies moving away from traditional values poses a serious challenge to state-militaries in terms of the micro-culture of the institution. In this scope of cultural developments in the West, debates on gender and sexuality and military service, have become crucial (Dandeker and Segal 1996; Segal 1995; Winslow, 2010).

**Militarism in Cyprus**

Despite its political and cultural saliences, militarism in Cyprus as an issue of inquiry itself has attracted surprisingly little social research. Military vehicles, outposts and soldiers colour the natural sceneries of the island, while Nicosia, the capital, remains divided in two with the heavy military presence, namely G.C. and Turkish armies, on both sides of the buffer zone and the UN peace keeping forces located in the middle. In

\(^9\) In 2013 the EU country members sustaining conscription are Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland and Greece.
academic literature the NG only appears in historical discussions regarding the appeal for union with Greece and the coup d’état of 1974 (for example see Bruce, 1985; Byrne, 2000), in discussions about defence spending (Kollias, Naxakis & Zarangas, 2004; Kollias, 2001), and defence acquisition (Demetriou, 1998; Tank, 2002). Militarism, as it will be discussed in the section on masculinity, has been very briefly touched on in discussions on gender.

This absence is surprising given the high levels of militarisation that Cyprus has experienced following the war of 1974. Moreover, the absence of studies of the NG in the literature is surprising given the extensive literature on G.C. nationalism. The NG was created out of and had a significant role in the spark of the bi-communal clashes of 1963-4 and was involved in the war of 1974 against the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. Thereafter it has been ascribed with political and security importance. It has become a huge economic investment and has maintained up to the present day a long conscription service (since the enactment of the 1964 National Guard law), which is currently the longest period of conscription service in the EU. RoC presents a particular case of European integration that has become entangled with the on-going national conflict. Understanding the relationship between the army and society as bi-directional, helps us to investigate both the high levels of militarisation which Cyprus has been experiencing as well as this particular dynamic between the state, armed forces and society in the scope of the Europeanisation of Cyprus.

Bi-directional relationship of National Guard to society

In this thesis I have approached the NG of Cyprus as an institution of the state that has direct contingent and conditional links to society. As such the NG is being shaped and constructed by the larger society and the larger society is shaped and constructed by the ideological mobilisation of the NG. I therefore avoided approaching it as a discrete state institutional entity and thus as a micro-society distinct from G.C. society.

Cyprus presents a case of what we can call ‘nation-in-arms’ (Rapoport, 1962; BenEliezer, 1995). In Cyprus the fully conscript NG entirely depends on recruiting soldiers from society, for a military service that in the form of conscription, reserve and militia today includes males from the ages of 18 – 55, (see: National Guard law (2011).
Militarism in Cyprus, operating through a ‘nation-in-arms’ model, further consolidates and strengthens the links between the army and society. In Cyprus the military touches every G.C. family, with almost every family having a son as a soldier or reserve and a husband as a reserve or militia, almost every family has a ‘militarised wing’.

This thesis draws on specific political, cultural and social discourses that are part of relationships binding Cyprus society to the NG. These are argued to be:

- The perceived threat by Turkey, mostly in relation to a second military offensive that has largely characterised post-war politics, has acquired existential significance for the G.C. community following the war in 1974.

- The perceived threat by Turkey being responded to by the development of the ideology of ‘defence’ (in Greek: ἀμύνα) and the attendant ‘nation-in-arms’ that includes an extensive conscription service and diversion of financial resources to military uses such as upgrading Cyprus’ military capabilities as counter-posed to the small population and size of Cyprus in relation to Turkey.

- The political orientation of public opinion towards the significance of the NG through political discourse and media.

- The production and reproduction of collective representations of the notions of ‘citizen-soldier’ and ‘everyday ordinary heroes’ through political, popular and state discourse.

Furthermore, in this thesis, in theorising and understanding militarism in Cyprus through the bi-directional relationship between NG and society, I have drawn extensively from literature on Northern Ireland, Israel and South Korea. As militarism in all of these contexts is argued to have similarities with the case of Cyprus in the way it has been constructed and mobilised as bi-directional and manifested outside the confines of the army barracks. The relation of army and society has been mobilised in all of these three countries through certain notions of nation-in-arms in response to the perceived necessity for defence of the community from the threat of being swept away by the
'enemy' (Ben-Eliezer, 1995; 1998; Mamān et al, 2001; Lômsqî-Feder & Ben-Ari, 1999; Moon, 2005b; Kwon, 2000; Sheffer & Barak, 2010; Banerjee, 2012; Ashe, 2012). Also, specific militarised understandings of masculinity, and co-constitutive femininity, had a pivotal role to play both in the construction and reproduction of militarism and defence of the community from 'existential-threat' (Kimmerling, 1983; Banerjee, 2012; Robbins & Ben-Eliezer, 2000; Sheffer & Barak, 2010; Sasson-Levy, 2003; Kwon, 2000; Moon, 2005a; Ashe, 2012). Given these strong supportive links between the NG and society in Cyprus, as it is discussed in the empirical chapters, the weakening and declining legitimacy of the NG in wider society can prove to be particularly detrimental for militarism and these developments in militarism are key in investigating its interrelationship to nationalism and masculinity.

In the empirical chapters I am concerned with explaining the tensions created between this conflicting trajectory: the broader European shift in professional armies and European Cyprus falling back from this shift, with open borders and in the context of certain cultural developments (facing a particular political and military situation). This particular situation is analysed in exposing the impact it has on militarism, and also on the bi-directional relationship of the NG with society. In doing so the empirical chapters investigate:

- The commitment of the community to the idea of a ‘nation-in-arms’.
- The personal importance social actors ascribe to the armed struggle for defence.
- Their understanding of security and the place of the military within it.
- The personal importance they ascribe to military service.
- Their view of the diversion and management of resources towards military uses.
- The relationship of gender to military roles.

The role of gender in nationalism and militarism is the focus of the next section that will reveal a significant gap in the literature in relation to masculinity, which this thesis aims to redress.
3.4. Gender, Nationalism and Militarism

In this section I start by discussing the initiation of the study of gender by feminism and then move into the emergence of the study of men and masculinity and conclude by illustrating the significance of addressing masculinity in post-armed conflict societies.

Feminism

During the past two centuries, feminism as an ideology and as a social movement has transformed women’s lives, especially in the West, on many levels (Tinker, 1990; Freedman 2002). Unlike other revolutions like “national revolutions, this social upheaval crosses continents, decades, and ideologies” (Freedman, 2002: 31). Feminists “believe that women have been subordinated through men’s power, variously expressed in different arenas. They value women’s concerns, and work to improve women’s status.” DeVault (1996: 31)

As part of the feminist movement, varied theories developed to explain the causes of male domination (DeVault, 1996). These theories, “charged that cultural ideologies favoured men, that social institutions reflected these ideologies, and that men as a group benefited from the subordination of women as a group”, Gardiner (2005: 35).

Feminism invites us to deal with different perspectives and theorisations about women’s oppressions and subordinate roles (Littlewood, 2004). At different times in the development of feminism, a strand, an approach, or issue become more dominant such as civil rights for women, race and identity. These changes that occurred in the development of the feminist movement are called waves, (see: Aikau et al., 2007).

Feminist approaches to sociological inquiry have developed in the past four decades alongside feminist political movements, (see: Stanley, 2013 for overview). This challenging of sociology by feminists relates to the inadequacy of sociology in documenting and explaining the social world and the structures that might oppress and discriminate against women. The feminist critique was therefore a reaction against existing sexist bias, with the emphasis on exposing male dominated disciplines and research behaviours (Spender, 1981; Stanley and Wise, 2013). This has significantly contributed also to both epistemological and methodological academic discussions,
(see for example Littlewood, 2004 and DeVault, 1996 which offer a comprehensive discussion of these).

Gender in studies of nationalism and militarism

Feminists have repeatedly and continually highlighted that nationalisms are highly gendered ideologies and need to be examined in relation to gender (see for example Peterson, 1999; Sylvester, 1989; Enloe, 1989, 2000; Cockburn, 1998, 2004; Maynard & Winn, 1997; Golan, 1997; Sharoni, 1995; Abu-Laban, 2009; Rodenas, 1998; Hadjipavlou, 2010; Evangelista, 2011; Ueno & Yamamoto, 2004; Sjoberg & Via, 2010; Banerjee, 2003). Despite the nationalists’ investment in the idea of unity, ‘nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalisation of gender difference’ (McClintock, 1996: 260).

Many feminist studies of gender in nationalism and militarism, have pointed out that “the militarisation of any nationalist movement occurs through the gendered workings of power”, as the militarism that pervades global politics is not gender neutral, “natural or automatic” (Enloe, 1993). Yet, such studies have most often tended to focus on the implications of the gendered dimension of nationalism and militarism for women. By extension, the masculinist discourses of nationalism and militarism have been often analysed in the relevant literature in terms of the ‘role-proper’ of and impact for women in such process (examples include Enloe, 2010, 2000, 2004, 2007; Sjoberg and Sandra Via, 2010; Sjoberg, 2007). Thus, such literature has tended to ignore the significance of addressing the role of men and masculinity as an issue of inquiry itself and has often taken for granted the role men and masculinity play in nationalism and militarism. For example, Sjoberg and Sandra Via (2010) offer a comprehensive edited volume on Gender, War and Militarism that predominantly focuses on investigating and assessing the impacts of war and militarism on women. They argue in their introduction to this volume:

“Always masculinist endeavours, war and militarism have significant, distinctive, and heart-wrenching effects on women.” (ibid: 10).

More specifically, the impact of militarisation and its attendant masculinity on women’s lives has been repeatedly discussed and demonstrated in specific contexts. Examples
include Evangelista’s (2010) analysis of gender, nationalism, and war in Algeria, Yugoslavia, Chechnya and Quebec (Canada), Banerjee’s (2003) analysis of gender and nationalism in contemporary India and Albanese’s (2001) analysis of nationalism, war, and gender relations in the Balkans. Also, an emerging body of literature has explored the admission and increasing number of women in Western armies, focusing mostly on the discrimination and occupational restriction of women, (Carreiras, 2013; Miller, 1998; Rogan, 1981).

Gender in studies of nationalism and militarism in post-conflict societies

In the scope of the analysis of nationalism and militarism in post-conflict societies through the lens of gender, unfortunately ‘gender’ has again mostly been understood as synonymous to women (McKeown and Sharoni, 2002; Kwon, 2000; Ashe, 2012). By prioritising a set of issues relating to women in such examinations of post-conflict societies the role of women has largely outweighed the one of men. Examples, include Aretxaga’s (1997) and Dowler’s (1998) analyses of the effects of ethnic conflict on women in Northern Ireland, and Cock’s (1989) examination of women’s roles in nationalism and militarism in South Africa. For example Jacklyn Cock (1989) in her article titled: ‘Keeping the Fires Burning: Militarisation and the Politics of Gender in South Africa’ examines how war is a male affair and the military a patriarchal institution from which women are excluded and by whom they are often victimised.

The focus on women in examinations of gender in nationalism and militarism in post-conflict societies has tended to ignore masculinity as an issue of inquiry itself, the experiences and voices of men, the impact that political and ideological changes can have on masculinities and the role of masculinity in processes of conflict transformation (see McKeown and Sharoni, 2002 who make these points about N. Ireland and Palestine, Kwon, 2000 about South Korea and Ashe, 2012 about N. Ireland). It is the case that gender analyses of post-armed conflict societies have often understood masculinities in conflict as somehow unchangeable, thus essentialised. By extension, when men are addressed in the scope of post-conflict societies they are treated as a monolithic entity (McKeown and Sharoni, 2002: 1). Moreover, in studies of gender in post-conflict societies the inspection of masculinity has often been limited to the
explanation that the persistence of patriarchal culture in nationalism and militarism is continuing the oppression of women. As Insook Kwon comments:

“For both South Korean feminists and many of the country’s women in general, the persistence of a Confucian patriarchal culture into Korea’s present industrialized era is assumed to be a sufficient explanation for the continuation of gendered oppression in South Korea: blocking attempts for other explanations.” (Kwon, 2000: 27).

Scholars have tended to conduct limited investigations of masculinity in the examinations of the masculinist dimensions of nationalism and militarism in post-conflict societies. As, by doing so, they have unwittingly preserved the naturalised dimensions of masculinity (McKeown and Sharoni, 2002: 2). It is the contention of this thesis that, to put masculinity aside in our examination of nationalism and militarism in a post-armed conflict society, like Cyprus, is to underestimate the array of masculinist stakes that construct a nationalist militarist society. Moreover, this thesis takes the perspective that ignoring masculinity underestimates the workings of masculinity in the ability of this three-fold relationship to continuously reproduce the co-constitution of these three discourses and to readapt and reiterate its interdependency in post-armed conflict societies: a) in the picking up of the pieces of armed ethnic nationalist militarist conflict in such a way that leaves the nationalist masculinist, militaristic culture undisturbed b) in the aftermath of political events that demolish central constructions on which this relationship has been co-constituted against.

Nationalism and gender in Cyprus

The dominance of specific matters pertaining to analysing and solving the ‘Cyprus Problem’ in academic literature on Cyprus has not been conducive to explorations of other forms of identity (Chatzipanagiotidou, 2012: 5), pushing gender research even further than it is usually on to the margins of mainstream social science. Concurrently, this academic focus has not been conducive to explorations of how nationalism is co-constituted with other identities, discourses and ideologies.

Gender has been previously raised in the context of the Cyprus conflict pointing to the different experience and impact of it on men and women (Hadjipavlou, 2010). Such scholarship, however, mainly addressed the role of women and femininity and has been
concerned with the condition of womanhood in the conflict situation (see Hadjipavlou, 2009 and 1996; Anthias, 1992 and 1989; Cockburn, 2004 and 2006). Also, the opening and crossing of the borders has been previously addressed through qualitative research, in relation to gender, although again focusing mainly on women (Hadjipavlou, 2006). This justifiable concern for women in research on gender, has masked not only the role of men but also the significance of masculinity in the post-armed conflict situation, attributing little attention to men and masculinity that remains to the present day seriously understudied (exceptions include Kamenou, 2011; Koureas, 2012; Philaretou et al., 2006; Philaretou et al., 2005; Scott, 2003).

The broader body of work on gender in Cyprus has mostly focused on the lack of feminist analysis of gender power relations and the lack of analysis of the different experiences of women’s lives from those of men (Anthias, 1989, 1992; Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2009). The instrumentalisation of women’s pain and suffering is part of the exploitation by the State to promote the nationalist project and its own form of masculinity and femininity (Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2006; Yakinthou, 2008; Sant Cassia, 2005). So is the reluctance of the State in appointing women in important public positions (Iacovou-Kapsali et al., 2008). The shared view of T.C. and G.C. women is that women’s issues have been undermined in the political agenda because of the predominance of the ‘national political problem’ (Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2010). The exploration of women’s exceptional gender status is through their own narratives (Hadjipavlou, 2009). Women’s gender consciousness is rising due to their level of education and increasing awareness of male dominance in society (Hadjipavlou, 2004, 2010; Cockburn, 2004; Mertan, 2000). Therefore, the body of work on gender in Cyprus is limited, mainly addressing the role of men and masculinity in the post-armed conflict situation only in so far as it co-constitutes femininity and the role of women. This has had clear implications to the study of men and masculinity with the role of men and masculinity remaining unproblematised and obscured through the understanding of patriarchy that reproduces gender inequality and oppression for women, most often framing masculinities as naturalised and as somehow unchanged, thus essentialised.

The absence of studies on masculinity and the role of men in the post-armed conflict situation in Cyprus as an issue of inquiry by itself, is surprising, since the centrality of masculinity, even if very briefly touched on, has been previously raised in co-
constituting femininity in patriarchal society (Hadjipavlou, 2010: 93), military masculinity and the NG as the primary institutional site of hegemonic masculinity (Philaretou, Phellas and Karayianni, 2006: 76), the military service for males as the primary form of gender discrimination (Joannidis, 2012) as well as homosexuality and gender subjectivities (Kamenou, 2011; Onoufriou, 2010). Also, research that has addressed gender and nationalism in Cyprus has, in some cases, commented on the stakes of the conflict being constituted in masculine terms such as honour, revenge and heroism (for example Cockburn, 2004; Hadjipavlou, 2010). This has opened up the discussion on the centrality of the G.C. masculine discourse in the formation of nationalism and militarism, yet does not proceed further in analysing this.

Therefore, research on gender in Cyprus has been important in opening up the discussion on the significance and implication for and of gender in Cypriot nationalist, masculinist, militarist culture.

Maria Hadjipavlou is the main scholar that became concerned about the link between nationalism and gender in Cyprus and has extensively illustrated through her work the relevance and significance of studying gender in understanding the conflict, and creating prospects for reconciliation. Yet, with her focus been to provide an analysis of the role of and implications for women in nationalist and militarist ideological and discursive processes in Cyprus, she has only touched on the role of men and masculinity in G.C. nationalism and militarism by illustrating the co-constitutive role of women and femininity in such conflict processes. However, this focus on gender has provided us with important insights about the role of gender in the conflict, whilst opening up the discussion to now explore the role of men and masculinity in G.C. nationalism and militarism. For example she argues that:

“In the Greek Cypriot community many posters used in public spaces after the 1974 Turkish invasion depicted Greek Cypriot women weeping and holding terrified babies or photographs of missing loved ones, all embodiments of the collective pain and suffering of Greek Cypriot refugees.” (2010: 37).

Furthermore, she comments that “as war is deemed part of the ‘male domain’, female interpretations, reactions, desires and opinions are excluded as extraneous, secondary and ultimately immaterial.” (2010: 43).
Hadjipavlou offers a key point here, that war and conflict are seen as masculine as they are tightly linked to the 'male domain'. A masculinist discourse represents this domain in the conflict, which as Hadjipavlou observes above, places the female interpretations as secondary. In this thesis I am examining how this masculinist discourse on war is played out by being co-constituted to nationalism and militarism.

Furthermore, as Hadjipavlou argues, “not only men but women too reproduce the narrative and norms; they participate in the militarisation of the state and Greek Cypriot mothers are proud that their sons do their military service for 26 months.”\(^{10}\) (2010: 42).

The point she makes here is key, as both women and men take part in the militarisation of the state and their society’s sense of pride is a product of the masculinist co-constitution of nationalism and militarism that relates to the broader masculinist nationalist militarist G.C. posture in the conflict situation. This thesis therefore puts forward the argument that there is a broader masculinist discourse that engages both men and women to take part in and reproduce not only the nationalist militarisation of the state but also of society. It is this nationalist militarised masculinity that today provides the rationale for the continuous public support of a potent army following the opening of the borders in 2003 and the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004.

Studies of gender in Cyprus have ignored in their analysis, on the one hand, that masculinity is a broader discourse in its inter-relationship to nationalism and militarism, on the other hand, such studies have not allowed the space for male experiences and the voices of men to be enunciated. By not engaging with the broader masculinist discourse and the experience of men through the intersection and antagonism of masculine ideals in competing political and social discourses, these studies have also failed to embrace the role of masculinity at times of political development and social transition.

To challenge this naturalised set of assumptions of masculinity and, thus, to encourage research and attention towards masculinity in the European post-armed conflict Cyprus with open borders requires a scholar to demonstrate that masculinity concerns a wider and deeper range of societal, political and national issues than simply the discourse of patriarchy and young men’s experience of compulsory military service.

\(^{10}\) The military service today is 24 months but the duration of it has been reduced several times over the years (see: Ministry of Defence -Υπουργείο Άμυνας - Στρατολογία 2013).
The following section will start by discussing the emergence of the study of men and masculinity and will then move forward in illustrating the importance of addressing masculinity in post-armed conflict societies.

### 3.4. Nationalism, Militarism and Masculinity

The emergence of the study of men and masculinity

The study of men and masculinity emerged following the initiation of the broader discussion on gender by feminism, see Kimmel et al. (2005: 1), Gardiner (2005: 35) and Hearn and Kimmel (2006: 53). Early feminist research on gender concentrated on the relationship of women to particular formations of society, in which women’s oppression was manifested. Once those studies became more accepted, the space was generated to also explore the relationship of men to particular formations of society, see Kimmel et al. (2005: 1) and Gardiner (2005: 35). Feminist thinking has therefore been fundamental to the development of men and masculinity studies. By revealing the dynamics of gender, masculinity also becomes visible and then leads to the problematisation of men’s position in society, (Gardiner, 2005: 35; Kimmel et al. 2005: 1).

The study of men and masculinity shifted the exclusive focus in researching gender away from women. For example Hearn and Kimmel (2006), in ‘Changing Studies on Men and Masculinities’, comment that:

“Men’s outlooks and culturally defined characteristics were formally generally the unexamined norm for religion, science, citizenship, law and authority, the new scholarship recognizes their genealogies, structures, and dynamics.”(ibid: 53).

Thus, this emerging body of research on gender focuses on an analysis that argues that masculinity, as well as femininity, are socially constructed and can be oppressive for men. As Kaufman (1999: 59) in his article entitled ‘Men, Feminism, and Men’s Contradictory Experiences of Power’ argues:

“In a world dominated by men, the world of men is, by definition, a world of power… But men’s lives speak of a different reality. Though men hold power and reap the privileges that come with our sex, that power is tainted. There is, in the lives of men, a strange
combination of power and privilege, pain and powerlessness... This combination of power and pain is the hidden story in the lives of men. It is men’s contradictory experiences of power.”

Kaufman (1999: 60) importantly goes on to clarify that the existence of men’s pain is not an excuse for acts of violence or oppression at the hands of men. But rather this pain “allows us to better grasp what we might think of as the gender work of a society” (ibid). In the case of Cyprus ‘men’s pain’ particularly relates to the institutionalised burden of men by state and society to be the ‘saviours’ by becoming ‘conscript soldiers, reserves and militia’ and to be willing if need-be, through the organised ‘nation-in-arms’, to ‘sacrifice’ themselves for the community.

To the present day there is some debate about what to call this field of research. Hearn and Kimmel (2006: 56) comment that to describe the field some scholars have used the terms ‘masculinity studies’ or ‘male dominance studies’ or ‘critical studies on men’, while others called this area of inquiry ‘men’s studies’.

The inquiry into the study of men and masculinity has generated considerable controversy in the social sciences. The concept of a male sex role has been largely critiqued (see for example Brittan, 1989; Kimmel, 1987) and in its place, social construction perspectives have emerged highlighting issues of social power (Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, 1985; Kaufman, 1987), along with critiques of the dominance of heterosexuality and heterosexism (Frank, 1987; Herek, 1986). As Hearn and Kimmel (2006: 56) succinctly summarise the above, two major sets of power relations have been addressed: the power of men over women, and the power of some men over other men. “These twin themes inform contemporary enquiries into the construction of masculinities.” (ibid).

The concept ‘masculinities’ has, over time, replaced that of the ‘male sex role’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 830-1; Demetriou, 2001: 337-41). The concept ‘masculinities’ in the plural rather than ‘masculinity’ in the singular, has broadened the analysis of men within the gender order (for example Carrigan et al, 1985; Brod, 1987; Connell, 1995). These prevailing theorisations of masculinity emphasised social structure as the context for the formation of particular masculinities (for example Connell, 1987; Hearn, 1987).
Within the scope of the critique of the ‘male sex role’, the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ has been developed, (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 830). The concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ proposes a model of multiple masculinities and power relations and refers to the gender practice (i.e. things done, not just a set of role expectations or an identity) that allows the dominant social position of men, and the subordinate social position of women (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). The theorisation of masculinity adopted in this thesis, in the last two decades has influenced extensively the thinking about men and masculinity (Connell 2005). While, it has also been debated and critiqued, (for example see Donaldson, 1993; Hearn, 1996; Whitehead, 2002; Demetriou, 2001; Wetherell and Edley, 1999).

Furthermore, global perspectives on local masculinities have become increasingly significant in recent years (Cleaver, 2002; Pease and Pringle, 2002; Connell, 1998; 2005; Hearn and Kimmel, 2006: 56). An emerging issue in the literature on masculinity is the impact of globalisation on local gender patterns such as definitions of masculinity and men’s sexuality (Altman, 2001). As it will be later discussed in relation to the case of Cyprus, Connell’s (1998, 2005) analysis of the ways in which certain versions of hegemonic masculinity are reshaped at the global level, as part of globalisation is a valuable interpretive tool in understanding a shifting hegemonic masculinity towards the entrepreneurial male ideal. The next section reviews literature that has brought together masculinity and nationalism or militarism.

**Masculinity in nationalism and militarism**

Men and women are constructed and imagined differently through the nationalist discourse and consequently they are incorporated differently into nationalist projects. While there is no universal gendered division of labour in conflict and post-conflict situations, they are highly gendered. Men and masculinity have been traditionally associated with public arenas, politics, conflict and military organisations (Enloe, 2000; Kaplan, 2006; Mosse, 1996,1990). The theatre of military combat is not viewed as an arena for the achievement of normative femininity (see Higate, 2003a) as opposed to masculinity (see Kovitz, 2003).
Some writers such as Nagel (1998: 252) have argued that militarised models of masculinities draw from a more general stock of ideas about what constitutes “manly” traits, aspirations, and behaviours and connects them to nationalism and struggles for national liberation, (see also Mosse 1996). Cynthia Enloe in her seminal book, ‘Bananas, Beaches and Bases’ notes that “nationalism has typically sprung from masculinised memory, masculinised humiliation and masculinised hope”, (1990: 45). Moreover, some theorists have argued that ‘militarised masculinities’ become dominant or hegemonic models of masculinity in nationalist cultures and act as arenas for “achieving” masculinities (see Higate, 2003a for overview). Theorists have employed the term ‘militarised masculinities’ to refer to the types of identities that militarised societies and organisations constitute for men (see Higate, 2000a, 2000b).

In this thesis I employ the term ‘nationalist militarised masculinity’ to refer to the broader discourse of masculinity co-constituting nationalism and militarism in such societies. Likewise, nationalist militarised masculinity informs the hegemonic masculinity of men in nationalist militarist cultures and is an integral part of the reproduction and perpetuation of divides in post-armed conflict societies.

The army and conscription have been classically linked to the formation of masculinities (for example Arkin and Dobrofsky, 1978; Cameron 1994), and the nationalisation of masculinity in a given context (for example Kaplan, 2006: 135). Studies on male conscription have focused on the specific masculinities conscription produces (for example Rosen, Knudson, and Fancher, 2003; Karner, 1998; Arkin and Dobrofsky, 1978), the individual and collective experiences of actual military life and combat (Rosen, Knudson, and Fancher, 2003; Ben-Ari, 1998; Cameron, 1994) and the way such militarised masculinities are represented in the broader society, such as through cultural texts like films, novels, memoirs, and public rituals (for example Dawson, 1991, 1994; Donald, 1992; Mosse, 1990). However, such studies have failed to address that there is a broader masculinist discourse made up of nationalism and militarism in post-conflict societies, of which the male military service is merely a part. By extension, these studies have failed to address how the militarisation of masculinist discourses is the militarisation of the masculinist discourses co-constituting nationalism and militarism.

In order to challenge this rather obscured role of masculinity in nationalism and
militarism it is necessary for a scholar to demonstrate that masculinity in nationalist militarist societies is a broader discourse that does not only relate to the actual role of men in such settings.

Chamallas (1998; 307) has argued that the military is a microcosm of society. Conceptualising the military in this way provides a point of departure in understanding that military masculinities do not only relate to the “the types of identities that militarised societies and organizations constitute for men” (see Higate 2000a, 2000b), but to the militarised masculinisation of the society as a national body.

The reciprocal relationship between militarism and masculinity functions at the level of identity as well as the state (Higate, 2003b). “The state has a vested interest in maintaining strong ideological links between militarism and masculinity.” (Higate and Hopton 2005: 435). The political representatives of the state have historically mobilised ideologies of idealised masculinity that give value to a nation of strong active males, collectively willing to risk their personal safety for the good of the country (Barnett, 1982; Segal, 1990). Yet, militarism also feeds into ideologies of masculinity through the eroticisation of risk-taking and even lethal violence (Goldstein, 2001). However, the link between militarism and masculinity extends beyond the eroticisation of certain notions of masculinity, through the glamorisation of a collective military culture and the participation of a unified social body for the military goal. Military organisations, military successes, military pageantry, and rituals represent the public endorsement of such values and their institutionalisation in national culture (Dawson, 1994; Hockey, 2003). Military masculinities are embedded into discourses of nationalism (Bickford, 2003; Caplan, 2003; Dawson, 1994). Nationalism is refracted through military masculinity.

The links between hegemonic masculinity and the military are surprisingly tenacious (Higate, 2003a, 2000a, 2000b). Yet, in tracing many practices to the level of the state and culture, it becomes clear that nationalist militarist values have an inextricable influence on the ways in which hegemonic masculinity is created, and how it feeds into the reproduction of a nationalist militarist masculinist society. In the antagonistic ethno-nationalist, post-armed conflict culture of Cyprus duty, commitment, violence and national struggle have become fused and constitute the elements of nationalist militarised forms of masculinity. Yet, the significance of nationalist militarised forms of
Masculinity extends beyond the hegemonic model of masculinity for G.C. men and the military to the nationalist militarised masculinist appeal of the broader social body that is committed in an assemblage of ways to the defence and struggle for justice of its own community.

**Masculinity in nationalism and militarism at times of political and social change**

It has been repeatedly argued that it is important to engage in the study of masculinities during times of political transition (Hearn and Morgan, 1990; Hearn, 1997), as current and on-going political changes at global, inter-state and “national levels are likely to have significant impacts on the gendered characteristics of military cultures” (Dandeker, 1999: 64). Indeed, gendered transitions in countries such as Russia have emerged through a set of political forces. Men’s identities in that context moved from the bureaucratic masculinities of the Communist regime towards new entrepreneurial masculinities and it is suggested that this shift preserved men’s dominance in private and public spheres (Meshcherkina, 2000).

I wish to take this a step further and argue that it is central in post-armed conflict societies to engage with the role of nationalist militarised masculinity at times of global, inter-state and national political changes and social transitions. This is because masculinity can play a pivotal role in perpetuating the interrelationship of nationalism, militarism and masculinity even when the perceived threat has been undermined, by becoming readapted under new political and social parameters. This adapted co-constitution can greatly assist in the reiteration and revision of older nationalist and militarist discourses. Specific studies have illustrated how transitions in masculinities during times of social change have operated to re-anchor men’s power in shifting and changing social contexts (see: Kimmel, 1996), while other studies have indicated how masculinity changes under such processes. In the context of post-armed conflict Northern Ireland, Ashe (2012: 5) argues that the dynamics of the peace process briefly opened a space for exploring men’s traditional identities and power. Yet the actual implementation of the Agreement eventually narrowed the space for exploring gender issues, including the issue of how traditional forms of masculinities were undergoing processes of change (ibid). The next section discusses my employment of ‘hegemonic
masculinity’ in this thesis and its significance in studying masculinity at a time of political and cultural developments.

**Hegemonic masculinity in the examination of Nationalism, Militarism and Masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus**

In this thesis I have used the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (Connell 1995; Connell & Messerschmidt 2005) to illustrate the mutually constitutive G.C. masculinist discourse to nationalism and militarism and the hegemonic model of masculinity this co-constitution has been creating for men. I will now proceed to discuss my decision in adopting this concept in this investigation.

The concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ works particularly well in this investigation that has been concerned with the prevailing ideal of masculinity mobilised at the ideological, national collective and state level. Thus, the ideals of masculinity that are supported by the state and its institutions, especially the military and schools, and wider society have taken part in the construction of the post-war culture that supported the national struggle for liberation and return. In approaching masculinity through the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’, the latter (hegemonic masculinity) demands to be distinguished from other co-existing masculinities that are seen as being ‘subordinated’ from hegemonic masculinity, (Connell, 1987: 186). Therefore, ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is not assumed to be ‘normal’ in the statistical sense as “only a minority of men might enact it… [but also] hegemonic masculinities can be constructed that do not correspond closely to the lives of any actual men”, (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). In this way, “there is a distance, and a tension, between collective ideals and actual lives… yet very large numbers of men are complicit in sustaining the hegemonic model.” (Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, 1985: 112-3). Connell and Messerschmidt offer a key point here, that what most men support is not necessarily what they are. In extension, what has been central to the examination of G.C. ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is not what most men are, rather the masculinity men and wider society “position themselves in relation to” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). Furthermore, in Connell’s argument there is some correspondence between the cultural ideal and institutional power, in the form of state, business and corporate power. In this way hegemony “mean[s] ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832).
Then, this guides us in studying the complex and intersecting ways in which G.C. hegemonic masculinity is constructed into the specific understanding of the national struggle for liberation and return that is supported and reproduced by state and society.

Another central aspect of hegemonic masculinity, of important assistance in this examination, is that it well captures the struggle of men in attaining or failing to attain that hegemonic model. In approaching masculinity through the concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’, the latter demands to be distinguished from ‘subordinated’ forms of masculinity, (Connell, 1987). The way in which nationalism, militarism and masculinity are inter-related in Cyprus illustrates that there is a social cost out there for G.C.s who interact with the ‘other’, cross the border and generally for individuals that appeal to a more bi-communal approach to the solution of the conflict as they risk failing the hegemonic model. Thus, it is the identifiable ‘normative’ or ‘hegemonic’ masculinity that sets the standards for male thinking and action, (Connell, 1995).

Furthermore, the concept of hegemonic masculinity works particularly well in understanding the role and/or transformation of masculinity in post-armed conflict Cyprus at a time of central developments in the politics of the conflict and cultural transitions. The importance of masculinity in this thesis, as discussed above, extends beyond the identity of men to the masculinist discourse of nationalism and militarism. Rather, masculinity and its possible transformation or reiteration inhabits a crucial role at particular periods of political, social or ideological change in the construction and negotiation of nationalist and militarist ideas and processes.

‘Hegemonic masculinity’ is particularly helpful in understanding the shift away of G.C. masculinity from military and heroic masculinity to financial, professional and modern image oriented ideals of masculinity, as it points us to certain versions of masculinity that are being reshaped at the global level, (Connell, 1998, 2005). Therefore, these changes of masculinity are not understood as a crisis of masculinity, as described by the relevant literature (Segal, 2007; Beynon, 2002; MacInnes, 1998), but as the hegemony of masculinity, which is changing. As Connell (1998) and Donaldson (1993) suggest, hegemonic masculinity is ‘elastic’ and able to change. Thus, I adopt Connell’s (1998, 2005) argument that certain versions of hegemonic masculinity are reshaped at the global level, with the more egocentric masculinity of the capitalist entrepreneur
holding sway the world stage today, (Connell, 1998: 17), whilst the rigid masculinity of the military is now globally a fading threat (ibid) to this change. This is extensively discussed in the empirical chapters in relation to certain political events further instigating the move towards an entrepreneurial model of masculinity.

3.5. Nationalism, militarism and masculinity in Cyprus

I have presented the literature that is significant to this thesis because it relates to the issues that have emerged through the empirical data. In contrast, I am going to show in the empirical chapters how these discourses work together to produce a particular type of masculinist, militarist, nationalist discourse, which inhibits the understandings that might encourage processes of reconciliation between the two Cypriot communities, namely Greek and Turkish Cypriot.

Nationalism has been an extensively researched area, and a lot of the academic attention on nationalism has concentrated on the ambiguity of what nationalism is and how it should be approached. This focus has undermined the significance of addressing the co-constitution of nationalism with other social identities and issues. Likewise, academic research on militarism has offered polyphony of rather distinct definitions. This has focused extensively on whether militarism should refer to the institution of the military exclusively, or also to the host society and the multiple dynamics created between them. Yet, it has been less concerned with understanding the inter-relation of militarism with other social identities, inequalities and issues. The study of masculinity emerged following the developing investigation of gender by feminism. Yet, to the present day studies of gender, and its co-constitution to other forms of social identities, inequalities and issues tend to focus mostly on the impact of these for women and thus aimed to surface their role in these processes. Likewise, while research that has brought together nationalism, militarism and gender in its analysis is limited, it has also concentrated on women and femininity, rendering monolithic and uncritical accounts of masculinity.

This thesis takes the perspective that such phenomena as nationalism, militarism and masculinity cannot be understood without examining how these are co-constitutively constructed and it argues that in studying any one we need to look at its relationship to
the other two. Cyprus presents a case of post-armed conflict society where nationalism and militarism and their underlying masculinity were constructed against the outcomes of the armed conflict, resulting in the division of the country into two artificially homogenous, ethnically separate geographical spaces. A manifestation of this three-fold relationship will be illustrated to be the construction of post-war Cyprus as a ‘nation-in-arms’. By concentrating on certain catalytic events in the conflict situation following the opening of the borders in April 2003, this thesis aims to illustrate not only the co-constitution of the three but also the ability of this relationship to readapt itself to new social and political parameters.

Without understanding the subtle gendering of masculinist discourse, our analysis of nationalism and militarism, especially in post-armed conflict situations such as in Cyprus, will always be limited. For example, we will not be able to adequately understand the centrality that certain ideals of masculinity, inherent to the post-war national struggle for liberation and the politics of defence, as well as the role of masculinity in the ‘changing understanding of struggle’ in recent years, have sought to undermine the militarist frame of the struggle. However, demonstrating this significance of masculinity in post-armed conflict societies requires a questioning of the following understandings:

a) that masculinity and militarism in nationalism, at the level of identity relate predominantly to the construction of ‘militarised masculinities’ for men

b) that masculinity is an issue that relates predominantly to male conscription and to conflict and armed defence being an exclusive calling for men

Thus, the thesis contends that masculinity is a wider discourse, which mobilises the military institution as a platform for the exemplification of certain constructions of masculinity to the larger society. This discourse is embodied in the state and also creates the position of the given post-armed conflict society as a perceived unified nationalist, militarist masculinist body that resists feminisation from certain ‘positions of power’. We can call this ‘nationalist militarised masculinity’.

Nationalism, militarism and masculinity are not distinct; they are inter-linked, co-constituent, and supportive of each other. The significance of addressing the
relationship between these is discussed in detail in the analysis of my empirical data in chapters that will follow.

4. Chapter four: Methods

4.1. Qualitative methodology

Qualitative research is an umbrella term for an array of attitudes towards, and strategies for, conducting inquiries that study social phenomena in their natural setting, aiming at discovering how human beings understand, experience, interpret, and produce the social world (Sandelowski 2004: 893). Then, qualitative research is distinguished from other forms of research as it is a situated activity that, by locating the observer in the
world, aims to understand the meanings that participants give to the issues of research enquiry (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 4).

The justification for qualitative methodology is long established (Becker, 1963; Silverman 1993; Atkinson and Silverman 1997). Qualitative research allows for multiple perspectives and stories to be embraced; to accumulate understandings of the complex world in which we live and thus to reflect on the many different and changing social and organisational cultures, histories and contexts, (Flick, 2002). Therefore, by allowing a window into the variations and often-contradictory social behaviours, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals in context, qualitative research provides the opportunity to obtain complex and multiple descriptions of how people experience specific issues of research enquiry. As such, qualitative methodology allows researchers to study subject areas in their entirety and to represent their complexity, ambiguity and variability and, in this way, diversity can be found, valued and interpreted.

Qualitative research methods have been a pillar of sociological methodological literature since the first half of the twentieth century (Becker; 1970; Denzin, 1978; Filstead, 1970; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Webb, 1966; Silverman, 2013; Lewis-Beck et al. 2004). In sociology, the work of the ‘Chicago School’ during the 1920s and 1930s founded the importance of qualitative inquiry for the study of social life (Dewey, 1930; Mead, 1934; Thomas and Swaine, 1928). With the ground-breaking work of the Chicago Department of Sociology in the 1930s came a substantial sociological way of looking at the world (Berg, 2009:12; Herman, 1995; Becker, 1963; Blumer, 1969).

The appropriateness of qualitative methodologies in the research environments of nationalism, militarism and masculinity is long established. Harris (2002) has conducted qualitative empirical research to study nationalism in Slovakia and Slovenia and, more specifically, Yoshino (2013) used face-to-face interviews to study nationalism in Japan. Furthermore, Vuga and Juva (2012), based on their experience of researching the Slovenian Armed Forces for the last two decades, have illustrated the suitability of qualitative empirical research methods for the study of the army and militarism. Likewise, Castro (2013) has illustrated the appropriateness of qualitative empirical research for the study of the army and militarism, by discussing the experience of ten researchers that have conducted empirical research on the Brazilian army. Also, Pini (2005)
conducted interviews to examine the masculinities engaged by male leaders of an Australian agricultural organisation. Furthermore, qualitative empirical research has been previously used in researching ultra-nationalist and guerrilla groups. Sluka (2007) has conducted participant observation and interviews with ultra-nationalist groups in Northern Ireland. While Kruijt (2012) has discussed more specifically how his development of a specific style of interviewing was necessary in researching Latin American military and guerrilla leadership.

Moreover, qualitative empirical research has also been previously used in researching nationalism and masculinity or the army and masculinity. Kwon (2000) has conducted qualitative empirical research on nationalism and male military conscription in South Korea. Also, Kim (1993) has conducted qualitative empirical research on the South Korean military and masculinity. More specifically, Barrett (1996) used life history interviews with male military officers to examine the construction of hegemonic masculinity within the US Navy.

In relation to the case of Cyprus, in recent years there has been a growing body of qualitative empirical research on G.C. nationalism, which has focused on how it is constructed but also negotiated at the everyday level (for example Hadjipavlou, 2007; Dikomitis, 2005; Christou, 2006; Spyrou, 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2006; Dikomitis, 2004; Webster & Timothy, 2006). This qualitative body of scholarship has made a significant contribution to the knowledge on G.C. nationalism by reconsidering the level of analysis from the macro to the micro, given that earlier research on nationalism in Cyprus had mostly adopted a macro-analytical approach on the dividing aspects of the conflict (Attalides, 1979; Bryant, 2004; Papadakis et al., 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Anastasiou, 2008; Papadakis & Bryant, 2012; Mavratsas, 1996; Brown and Theodossopoulos, 2004). Qualitative empirical research has also been previously used to investigate gender in the context of the Cyprus conflict (for example, see Hadjipavlou, 2010) and, more specifically, to study nationalism and gender in the context of women crossing the borders (Hadjipavlou, 2006).

This research project examining the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus was designed, from the beginning, as qualitative. As the literature review has revealed there is a need for this kind of research and analysis,
as it addresses distinct unexplored areas of empirical research and the co-contingency of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in Cyprus.

Qualitative methods are most appropriate for this project because they are suitable for getting at how the co-construction of nationalism, militarism and masculinity creates obstacles for reconciliation in the post-armed conflict society Cyprus. That is, qualitative researchers attempt “to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 5). Therefore, the appropriateness of qualitative empirical research for this project relates to the aim of the research to analyse the ways in which both ordinary people, the presumed recipients of these ideologies, and politicians and policy makers, the presumed producers of these ideologies, construct nationalism, militarism and masculinity through discourse and social interaction, and the meanings they make out of these discursive and ideological practices. The next section will discuss the appropriateness of the choice of using interviews as the research tool in this project.

4.2. Interviews
Interviewing is currently the central resource through which social science engages with issues that concern it (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997). The use of interviews in research suggests that the views and interpretations of certain social actors, and the certain meanings that participants come to attach to phenomena or events (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998: 98) are important to the research questions. Interviews allow the use of open-ended questions that give participants the opportunity to respond in their own words, rather than forcing them to choose from fixed responses. Open-ended questions have the ability to evoke responses that are meaningful and culturally silent to the participant, unanticipated by the researcher and rich and explanatory in nature. Also, the face-to-face interaction of the interview enables a ‘special insight’ into subjectivity, voice and lived experience (Atkinson and Silverman; 1997). However, the choice of using interviews as a research tool has also attracted criticism, with a recurring one being that of the time and cost factor, (Gillham, 2000: 9).

The focus of this research project has been to elicit the views and interpretations of G.C. men and women living in Cyprus about certain events, ideologies and discourses. Partly the research aimed to investigate the meanings that people participating in institutions
associate with them. Therefore, interviewing provides a necessary, if not always completely sufficient, avenue of inquiry, (Seidman, 1991: 4). Moreover, it needs to be noted that public discourses (including media, policy documents) were included in the analysis. Whilst these were not included as part of the data analysis, they had been implicitly drawn upon in understanding the socio-political context the research was focusing on. The research was investigating the way in which social actors of a broad spectrum of social and political backgrounds take up discourses associated with nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus and the meaning they make out of them, thus also how they change and re-mobilise them. In effect, a systematic examination of public discourses fell out of the investigating focus of the research.

Semi-structured interviews

Research based primarily on semi-structured interviewing has become a very popular and important form of qualitative research across the social sciences, especially in sociology and anthropology (Edgerton, 1993; Spradley, 1979). In the context of this research, the choice of face-to-face, semi-structured interviews served a number of main objectives. Semi-structured interviews can be a most productive way of conducting interviews in studies like this, where the goals of the investigation are exploration and discovery of both the collective and diverse interpretations and meanings that interviewees make out of specific complex social events and political processes (Robnett, 1996; Ray, 1999). This is because semi-structured interviews have set objectives and structures, but at the same time allow room for the subject’s individual concerns and needs to be articulated and addressed (Flick, 2002; Bryman, 2004).

The structure of this research tool provides an efficient means of obtaining rich, detailed and in-depth data by allowing space for objectives to be met with each interviewee. More specifically, interviewing afforded me the opportunity to obtain accounts on specific issues generated from the responses of the participants of a variety of institutions, in diverse sectors and spectrums of G.C. social life.

Moreover, the negotiable structures of this research tool are equally valuable in studies like this. These endorse an increased scope of flexibility for insightful avenues of inquiry
to emerge outside of objectives, in contrast to structured interviews or other research methods, which usually generate single-statement answers. This flexibility is a gate into “breadth and depth of information”, (Blee and Taylor, 2002: 92) that might have only arisen spontaneously during the research (Hammersley 2000; Bryman 1984, 2004; Okeley 2007). Thus, they provide the opportunity to the researcher to discover the respondent’s experience and interpretation of reality and to access people’s ideas, thoughts, and memories in their own words, (Blee and Taylor, 2002: 92). As the researcher is able to reflect back on the interviewees’ answers, rather than relying on discrete statements, he/she can further access the context of the respondent’s answers. Moreover, semi-structured interviews are an efficient means of obtaining rich, detailed and in-depth data, without committing the investigator to prolonged involvement in the lives and activities of the respondents (Blee, 2001), which is usually the case in life interviews.

Furthermore, the structure and the flexibility of this type of interview have also been valuable in interviewing ‘powerful’ people, (Fitz and Halpin, 1994). The structure has been useful in accommodating these interviews in the short time offered by the elite interviewees, by allowing them to focus their responses on the specific topics under investigation, whilst the flexibility allowed space in the interview with the ‘powerful’ for new topics to emerge, (Hertz and Imber, 1995; Fitz and Halpin, 1994). The next section will explore the careful reflection the conducting of the interviews invites in terms of the relationship of interviewer – interviewee; given that the main instrument of qualitative research is the researcher him/herself.

4.3. The relationship of interviewer – interviewee: bias, reflexivity and research identity

The crucial importance of the relationship between the interviewer and interviewee has been long addressed (Benney and Hughes 1956: 142; Oakley 1981; Dexter 1970; Fontana and Frey 1998). The recurrent concern with bias in the social sciences (Becker, 1967: 245; Gouldner, 1971; Hammersley, 2000) has often signalled the crucial importance of efforts to sustain a separation of the researcher and the researched. Yet, the claim for neutrality of the researcher in the research process positivism has strived for (Dunne, Pryor, and Yates, 2006: 31), has long been critiqued by feminist
researchers (see for example, Oakley, 1981). Therefore, it is argued that “research cannot provide the mirror reflection of the social world that positivists strive for, but it may provide access to the meanings people attribute to their experiences and social worlds,” (Silverman, 2006: 126). Interviews create “situated understandings grounded in specific interactional episodes”, (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 36), as the interview is “a reflection of the personalities of the participant and the interviewer and the ways they interact”, (Seidman, I. E., 1991: 72), and “both are assumed to be individuals who reflect upon their experience”, (Acker, Barry, and Esseveld, 1991: 140).

Reflexivity is a longstanding hallmark of feminist methodologies (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). Reflexivity, “urges us to explore the ways in which a researcher’s involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs such research”, (Nightingale and Cromby, 1999: 228). Therefore, the role of the researcher is subject to the same critical analysis and scrutiny as the research itself, (Carolan, M, 2003: 6). Moreover, building rapport is also a key ingredient in successful qualitative interviewing as it enables the participant to feel comfortable in opening up to the interviewer, (King and Horrocks, 2010: 48).

Respect towards each other and trust are some important elements of building rapport, see Miller (2001) and Glassner and Loughlin (1987). Trust is a key element in the relationship between researcher and the researched. There is a symbiosis in the trust relationship, which, if undermined, can destroy the validity of the research, and perhaps more importantly undermine the interviewees’ trust in the research.

For me as a researcher, reflexivity has meant that the understanding of myself through the research process and of my interviewees cannot be taken for granted and that we can both influence each other. Thus, I maintained the understanding that we were both in ‘a process of becoming’, ‘rather than being’ (Hall, 1996b: 2) and that ‘our identities’ through the interview process are an issue that invites careful reflection.

The need to adopt reflexivity was further instigated by the fact that I interviewed interviewees from a diversity of social and political backgrounds as well as conducting interviews within the army. This created an interesting combination of varying and complex power relationship dynamics, both in and out of the interviews, which I needed to reflect on and manage.
The relationship of interviewer – interviewee when researching the ‘powerful’, whether this is politicians or military officers, is an issue that invites its own reflection. Researching the ‘powerful’ has often been raised as an example of ‘researching up’ rather than the more conventional ‘researching down’, (Cohen, Manion and Morrison 2007: 127; Odendahl and Shaw 2002; Fitz and Halpin 1994: 42). Yet, the feminist thought has taken the examination of power in the research process one step further, illustrating that the power dynamic between the researcher and elite informant not only shapes the interview process but also defines how knowledge is created, (Conti and O’Neil, 2007: 67). Therefore, the play of power in these settings is of the utmost importance as knowledge is produced through the relationship.

The ‘researching up’ conceptualisation, while it implies a conceptualisation of “power as ‘possessed’ by an individual” (Conti and O’Neil, 2007: 80), it also obscures the on-going dynamics within the creation and operation of power relationships. Therefore, while it undermines the status the ‘powerful’ can ascribe to academia, it also undermines the ability of the researcher to analyse the micro-politics of the situations shaped between interviewer and interviewee around the research. Moreover, also it undermines his/her ability to develop a strategy of how a careful presentation of the research project and researcher identity performativity (Butler, 1990) can empower the position of the interviewer, who can then negotiate the play of power.

The next part of the chapter presents the research design I developed in conducting this research, whilst the subsequent one discusses the implications of interviewing each group of interviewees, including the different form of trust and reflectivity these different sets of relationships necessitated.

4.4. Research Design

The fieldwork was carried out in one phase in which I conducted all interviews and one informal discussion with refugees. The interviewees fall under three main groups: public, soldiers and military officers, and politicians (this group also includes youth sections of political parties and independent political youth groups and policy related military personnel of the Ministry of Defence). My aim has been to interview some people from
all the main strata of Cypriot society, in order to understand how both ordinary people of a fair range of social and political backgrounds, soldiers and military officers, and politicians and policy makers construct nationalism, militarism and masculinity and what meanings they created of these discursive and ideological practices.

During an intensive four-month period of fieldwork (11th May- 11th September 2011) I conducted 57 semi-structured interviews with Cypriot men and women living in Cyprus, aged between 18-83 years old, with representatives of youth sections of political parties and independent political youth groups, soldiers and military officers, some politicians that were central to the topics under investigation and one informal discussion with refugees. Throughout this time, I was conducting an internship with PRIO Cyprus Centre. Out of the abovementioned 57 interviews, 15 were conducted with soldiers and officers in a camp of the National Guard of Cyprus, while more soldiers and officers were interviewed outside the army, usually on their day off. Interviewees from all groups were contacted to arrange interviews throughout my time in Cyprus. The period in which I conducted the fieldwork became significant for the research project and the design of it in a number of ways. I will first discuss this to contextualise the research project and design and I will then proceed to discuss my strategy of recruiting from each group of interviewees.

The period in which the interviews were conducted

In my endeavour to arrest a ‘complicated-ever-changing-reality’ in the course of the fieldwork, I had to accept the transverse section of social time as an important element in developing and understanding the intersection of the ‘social’ and the ‘political’ and the possibility of the innovating dynamics between them. The strategy of not interviewing each group of interviewees during different time periods of fieldwork coincided well with the collapse of my hypothesis, however it posed both advantages and limitations. The original hypothesis I had entertained before heading into the field, namely that the co-constitution of certain nationalist, militarist and masculinist ideologies persisted following the opening of the borders, fell flat. My interview with Kyriacos Mauronicolas -Minister of Defence when the borders opened- and a few members of the public and reserves in the first few weeks, shaped an overall shift in my interest. This shift in interest was from providing an analysis of the social and political ideological and discursive mechanisms
for the reproduction of certain ideologies and their patterns of practice in society, to understanding the factors that underpin and brought about their weakening.

Moreover, time did not elapse within the duration of the fieldwork, as the occurrence of a certain event (the explosion of the naval base in Mari on the 11th of July 2011), became central to the research process and interviews. This had created a series of political and military implications and reactions from the public, including major demonstrations, which repeatedly reminded me of the ‘research present’. As it will be discussed later on, the explosion of the naval base had worked in my favour in terms of getting access to the army. Moreover, it had also brought to the surface certain issues about defence policy, the military and the political reasonability and responsibility over the National Guard (NG), generating much political and public discussion alike. My strategy was not to add any questions about these issues that followed the event in order to allow the interviewees to raise them if it was important to them. Indeed, the interviewees brought up the event extensively and all the issues this reflected for them.

Therefore, this fieldwork was conducted during a time where certain issues of inquiry were in a process of change and transformation, such as the rising phenomenon of draft-dodging, the general undermining of militarism as well as the event of the naval base in Mari surfacing certain political and social defence issues and firing up the rising public criticism of the undermined Defence sector. This aspect of the fieldwork significantly added to my predicament of repeatedly coming up against one of perhaps the most frustrating and insightful limitations of fieldwork: data gaps and incongruities in the data. In confronting the cultural level of practice, usually this results from the fact that what is taken for granted escapes explication. Here my strategy of not interviewing each group of interviewees during different time periods of fieldwork helped me in many cases to fill in lacunae and silences in the data.

Dealing with such issues whilst conducting the interviews with the general public was significant in providing me with an array of opinions, interpretations and feelings about such policy changes and emerging phenomena. However, these accounts from the general public were most often unable to explain the factors underlying these broader changes. Whereas politicians and military officers repeatedly provided insightful accounts that helped me fill in these lacunae in the data. Clearly, needless to say, this
relationship also worked in the opposite direction. Politicians I talked to often pointed me to political actions, which have significantly shaped public perception, opening new avenues for discovery in my interviews with the public.

However, conducting interviews with politicians at various points of the fieldwork also posed limitations. Throughout the fieldwork, accounts offered by the members of the public pointed me to political actions that have influenced their perceptions. However, as I had interviewed some politicians, who were particularly important to the research, at the very beginning of the fieldwork, I had foreclosed the opportunity of addressing these issues in my interviews with them.

Furthermore, certain ‘buzz-words’ quickly began to acquire importance in the interview process with all groups of interviewees; my understanding of the interviewees and their understanding of me and were crucial in building or undermining trust. The political events central to this research have deposited layers of meaning to certain ‘buzz-words’ that signify and reveal one’s positioning towards certain issues. As Dunne, Pryor and Yates (2005: 32) argue: the researcher and respondent are caught in contemporaneous social dynamics that invade the social space of the interview. The case that acquired the most significance was the phrasing used to describe the ‘borders’. Since the opening of the borders in 2003 there has been further significance ascribed to this. The word ‘border’ most often reveals a liberal positioning towards the conflict. While the word ‘barricades’, that is used in illustrating the temporality of them, reveals a right wing and conservative positioning. A use of an oppositional reference to the ‘border’ from the interviewees’ political beliefs could significantly challenge their trust towards me as a researcher and by extension their trust towards the interview overall. Coming from a liberal family I have always referred to them as ‘borders’, however in my interviews with the public, I adopted a diplomatic phrasing naming the ‘border’ as ‘Green Line’, which does not indicate any political beliefs. However, in my interviews with politicians, military policy makers, military officers and ultra-nationalist the same technique would have not been successful. These were settings that did not allow any space for lenience for an alternative phrasing from the state and most dominant rhetoric that insists on the naming of ‘barricades’. Below I discuss my strategy of recruiting from each group of interviewees, then the development of my interview agendas and the way in which I analysed the interviews.
Sample and Strategies of finding interviewees

Sub-set one: Public

Table of interviewees from the public (25 out of 57)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic information about interviewees from the public sphere of Cyprus</th>
<th>Total number</th>
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<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities of Origin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limassol</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larnaca</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paphos</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famagusta</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University educated out of the total number</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees out of the total number</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewees with missing persons in their family out of the total number</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported to be heterosexual</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported to be homosexual</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of my interviewees there was a higher representation of men and women who, at the time of interviewing, were between the ages of 20 and 60. Whilst this age selection of participants did mean they were aware of military matters, the men of the group were not old enough to have been 18 years old in 1964, when the conscription law was enforced. Thus, almost all of my male interviewees (excluding a few cases that were exempt for health reasons and one who was 83 years old) were conscripted in the army as soldiers, and subsequently reserves and militia. A few of my interviewees had, following their conscription, draft-dodged their service. Also, more than half of them are refugees and a few of them had missing persons in their family. Furthermore, the
informal discussion with refugees was of a representative sample of age groups, including first and second-generation refugees.

The five largest cities in Cyprus (by size of population) were, on the whole, fairly represented in the selection of interviewees. Thus, most of the interviewees were from Nicosia, followed by Limassol, then Larnaca, Paphos, Kyrenia and Famagusta in decreasing numbers.

There was a higher representation of interviewees who lived in cities in contrast to villages. A lot of them did originally come from villages but now lived in the city. This higher representation can be explained by the extensive urbanisation that has taken place in Cyprus following the war in 1974. However, it also occurred due to solidly practical reasons. Being the only researcher in this research project it would have required a much longer period of time and substantial costs to find interviewees from all of the largest villages around Cyprus and travel there. Indeed, choosing to use interviews as a research tool over other research methods poses the ‘time-cost’ factor (Gillham, 2000: 9). These implications, however, are factored into the overall research framework.

Social class, even if this has no clear form in Cyprus, was represented fairly in the collection of participants. With the major population of Cyprus being middle-class, most participants were middle class, with fewer working-class, a few upper-middle class and substantially fewer upper class. This was clearly matched by my interviewees’ level of education. More than half of them were educated to degree level and very few were not educated to school level.

*Strategies of finding interviewees from the public*

My attempt to find interviews from the Cypriot public in the first several weeks of the fieldwork was an on-going process of developing relevant strategies. My first strategy was to ask members of my family and acquaintances to ask people they knew if they would be willing to take part in the research. Then I asked these interviewees if they could ask people they knew who would also be willing to take part. However, this strategy was short-lived as I came to realise that between these interviewees there was
a reproduction of similar social backgrounds, levels of education and age, which posed issues of representativeness.

As a result of the inadequacy of this first strategy, I realised the need to give up the insistence on well-organised fieldwork and instead to provide space for more innovative ways of entering the Cypriot public sphere. I decided to take up any opportunity in finding interviewees, yet to also create these opportunities for myself. I drove in different and diverse part of cities and stopped at shops, coffee shops and such like and took every opportunity possible to ask people if they would be interested in taking part in the research. I then asked these interviewees if they could put me in contact with others who would be willing to take part in the research. The Cypriot culture is welcoming, so people were most often helpful. As it turned out, within a very short time, I had created a strong network of interviewees that kept expanding.

**Sub-set two: politicians and other ‘elite’ informants**

Table of politicians and other ‘elite’ informants (8 out of 57)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role under which interviewed</th>
<th>Political party (if relevant)</th>
<th>Surname &amp; name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former Minister of Defence (2003-2006)</td>
<td>EDEK</td>
<td>Mavronicolas Kyriacos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador of Sweden</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ingerman Lindahl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counsellor of Germany</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ralf Teepe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Lawyer on the case of Missing Persons in European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Courts</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Achilleas Dimitriadis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the above table illustrates all of the politicians I interviewed were G.C. males. This fairly represents the political sphere of Cyprus being extremely male dominated, but it also reflects the reluctance of the state in appointing women to important public positions, (Lacovou-Kapsali et al., 2008).

**Arranging to interview politicians**

I chose the politicians that were most relevant to the issues under investigation and then devised a number of strategies in arranging an interview with them. Getting each politician that I interviewed to accept to be interviewed required its own strategy each time. Gatekeeping has been repeatedly highlighted in researching the 'powerful', (Gewirtz and Ozga, 1994: 192-193; Fitz and Halpin 1994). I come from a G.C. family, which belongs to the so-called political class of Cyprus. In effect, my family’s position in G.C. society allowed access into interviewing certain politicians, which otherwise it would have been difficult to do so. Thus, the research stages assisted by personal contacts were the interviewing of some of the politicians and the access into the army. Moreover, having granted a certain status to the research through these stages,
significantly assisted me in conducting more interviews with politicians, which I had no association to, and also more generally succeeding research goals.

Some of the politicians I interviewed were family friends that I grew up with. In these cases, I asked a member of my family or theirs to let him know of my intention to conduct an interview with him. The individual would then confirm that they accepted the next time they saw me. I then arranged the details of the interview with a family member of his or secretary.

In getting to interview politicians that I am not linked to I always contacted them personally. In these cases, I utilised the fact that I had interviewed two important politicians in the context of Cypriot politics at the very beginning of my fieldwork as a means of presenting the project as significant, and a way of also exerting pressure on them to accept. This strategy proved to be most successful, with them often proposing without prompting other politicians who would be useful to interview and seemed to be happy to arrange these for me.

Furthermore, getting the leaders or representatives of ultra-nationalist parties to be interviewed was a tricky task. Interestingly, the issues I faced in arranging these interviews were unrelated to the ones faced with politicians of mainstream political parties. Distrust about my own person and the intention of the interview were perhaps the biggest obstacles I faced. Every single attempt to ask other nationalist politicians to arrange these interviews for me failed flat, as they refused to take the responsibility. But, most importantly, these parties do not respect other political powers. As, characteristically, one of their main slogans says: ‘against everyone’. As such, I decided to attempt using a completely different strategy. I carefully selected the person used as the contact, placing paramount importance on how both my person and project would be presented. Crucial to this presentation of the project and me, as it will be discussed in the reflection section, was that I had not revealed any specific political outlook.

The issue of how to present oneself is an important and continuous question, (Becker,1956; Fontana and Frey, 1998). The specific projection of my research identity in the interviews with the ‘powerful’ was as a distinct expert, which most often instigated their interest in hearing my views on the issues discussed, as they had not often had encounters with social scientists working in their terrain.
Dress code, presentation of ‘self’ and behaviour in these situations is fundamental in ensuring the success of purpose. Dress code in these situations needs to be conceptualised as a configuration of identity and not as a set identity to be met. In all of my interviews with the ‘powerful’ I dressed like I dress in my everyday life, smart-casual. Politicians in their everyday encounters with other politicians are not that formal to each other; it is everyone else that is formal with them. Therefore, dressing too formally creates an unbalanced relationship of power, favoured on the side of the politician as it indicates the absence of the required cultural capital, (Bourdieu, 1986).

Sub-set three: representatives of youth sections of political parties and independent political youth groups

Table of interviewees: representatives of youth sections of political parties and independent political youth groups (4 out of 57)
I arranged the interviews with politicians of the youth section of political parties through personal contacts. Here, the similarity in age and the fact that in almost all the cases they were also students made the process of arranging these interviews much easier, greatly assisting in developing an empathetic understanding of the significance of interviewing them for my project.

**Sub-set four: soldiers and military officers**

Table of interviewees: soldiers and Military Officers (20 out of 57)
I conducted 20 interviews with military officers and soldiers. Out of this number, 15 interviews were conducted in the National Guard (NG) with military officers and soldiers. I cannot reveal detailed demographic information about this group or the military units they came from, as this was part of my agreement with the NG. However, I have interviewed both non-commissioned and commissioned officers of a good representation of different military units and age, and both first and second year soldiers. Also, the city of origin of soldiers, the percentage who were refugees as well as the number of them who had missing persons in the family was roughly similar to the public group of interviewees.

**Arranging access to the National Guard**

Obtaining permission to conduct interviews with soldiers and military officers in the National Guard (NG) was, unsurprisingly, a difficult undertaking. This had to be given by the Minister of Defence himself (see appendix 1 for access letter), because no one inferior to him was allowed to make the decision. I was aware beforehand that when others, in the past, had asked for permission to conduct social research within the army they had been denied it. Therefore, it was clear to me that simply requesting access on the basis of necessary research material was not a sufficient avenue.

Together with a politician who was also a family friend and a former high-ranking officer of the NG I developed a strategy. We agreed that I would send a letter to the Minister of Defence, requesting access and that they would then call him and support my claim. They had also brought me into contact with the personal secretary of the Minister, who proved to be of great assistance in my quest. I faxed the letter to the Ministers’ secretary, called her to inform her that I had and very soon after I received a call from the Ministry letting me know that my request had been approved and that this would now be sent to the headquarters of the army.
After waiting for several weeks, I had to return back to the U.K. and, therefore, I contacted the relevant office to check on the progress of granting the access. The army had already received the order, but had not taken action in arranging the research. The tragic explosion of the naval base that had taken place in the time in-between acted in my favour. The army was extremely weary of being portrayed as unorganised and ineffective once more, given also the political influence that was already tied to the project. After explaining that everything had to now be arranged and completed within a few days, from that point onwards the headquarters of the army treated the situation with a lot of gravity and urgency, being extremely helpful and effective in arranging everything for the research.

All of my research requests were fully heard. A mixed unit military base was assigned for the research and the exact number of soldiers and officers were provided for interview. Now I will proceed to discuss the interview schedules I developed in interviewing each one of these groups of interviewees.

**Interview schedules**

I devised a general interview guide, which was the one used with the public, and then I used these thematic areas in designing a separate interview schedule for soldiers, officers and politicians. For each politician I designed an individual one; tailored to their role and my research interest in it.

I had run a pilot study using the ‘general interview guide’ prior to beginning the fieldwork with three G.C.s living in Brighton and then revised the questions. These pilot interviews were not included in the final analysis. The pilot interviews led into a lot of questions becoming merged. Then, I revised my ‘public agenda’ for the first few weeks of the fieldwork after each interview, subsequently leading to only having an informal ‘checklist’. This provided great assistance in ensuring that, by the end of the interview, all major themes were, to some extent, investigated, but at the same time not overly formalising questions and responses (Flick, 2002; Bryman, 2004) and allowing space for the interview to be shaped and directed by both parties. As Douglas (1985) suggests,
'forgetting the rules' and the 'how-to' ways in conversations can lead to unknown roles and areas where a synergy between the researcher and the researched develops.

Once a meeting had been arranged with the participants, I opened the interview with introductions: I presented an overview of the research project and I gave an explanation of the nature of semi-structured interviews. I elucidated that I would want them to talk most of the time and that I would not ask specific questions expecting specific answers, as I was interested in their opinions regarding certain issues, and that, in this way, it would not be like an everyday discussion.

The general interview guide used with the public is composed of five sections and a total of sixty-eight questions. No single participant was asked all sixty-eight questions; some questions were included in the interview guide merely as prompts to solicit more details in the event that a general question did not evoke a full response. The sections were organised to move from socio-demographic questions about themselves and their families, to specific questions designed to draw out the respondent's personal understandings, opinions and experiences. The interview guide included the following sections: Socio-demographical; Nationalism/National Identity; Militarism/Defence issues; Masculinity; Future.

The socio-demographic questions were situated at the beginning of the interview for mainly one reason: to create a more familiar and comfortable environment and a bridge to the more personal questions that would have followed. Interviewees most often felt slightly uncomfortable at the beginning of the interview, as they had not been interviewed before. Therefore, these socio-demographic questions, which were quite straightforward, and most often were questions that the interviewees had been asked before many times, where a way of guiding the interviewee more comfortably into the later questions which were quite personal and, for the interviewees, often significant or even traumatic issues and events.

The main body of the interview agenda covered themes directly or indirectly relating to social, military, institutional and political events and processes that have been formed, became formative and have been contested during and following certain political events that had taken place since 2003. These mainly include the opening of the borders (2003), the Annan Plan referendum (2004) and the accession of Cyprus to the
European Union (2004). All interviewees were aware of these events and knew a substantial amount of information about them.

The penultimate section of the interview guide related to the interviewees’ hopes and expectations for the future of Cyprus. This included three main questions: the first asking about how they evaluate the present G.C. politics in relation to the conflict, whether there are lessons we should collectively learn from the history of the conflict situation and whether they would like Cyprus to be heading towards reunification. The second asked whether they feel that the current G.C. masculinity is one necessitated for their own vision/expectations of the future developments in the conflict situation. The last related to where they locate T.C.s in their imagination of the future Cyprus.

The last section of the interview guide included two questions: one asking if there was anything that the participant wanted to add to what had been discussed. The second was asking whether there were any issues related to the research topics that the participant felt they had not had the opportunity to discuss.

In my interviews with soldiers, reserves and militia that were held outside of the military barracks, I used the same interview guide as with the public adding one more section. This was a set of specific questions about their experience of serving their military service, reserve and militia forces respectively and some information about their division, role and rank. My decision to construct their interview schedule in this way related to the fact that they were being interviewed whilst off duty. Therefore, I approached them both as citizens and soldiers. This view has been an important part of the research that has inspected certain issues through the concepts of ‘citizen-soldier’ and ‘nation-in-arms’.

In my interviews with men who had draft-dodged their military service, another section was added that replaced that of the soldier’s. This related to their social experience of being someone who had not completed his military service, as well as their experience of the processes of getting out of the army, as one first needs to be conscripted to then be exempted from military duties.

The interview schedules with soldiers and military officers were again a revised version of the general interview guide used for the public, but were shorter, focusing more on their experience and the meaning they attribute to the military service. The sections
were again organised to move from socio-demographic questions about themselves and their families, to specific questions designed to draw out the soldiers’ and officers’ personal understandings, opinions of and experiences in the NG. Both schedules with soldiers and officers ended with the same question: ‘How do you envision the Cypriot army in the future and how would you like it to be? Shall we continue with conscription or have a professional force?’

The agreements made between the head of the force and myself meant limited space for follow-up questions. As it will be discussed below, the interview agendas I used in my interviews in the NG, had to be approved by the head of the force. Clearly, in this case, interviews were more structured. Yet, these cannot be classified completely as structured as, following several issues I had to manage during my time in the army, discussed later on, there was enough scope for flexibility to ask follow-up questions within the pre-agreed areas of interest.

I gave an information sheet explaining what the research is about and how the information would be used to all soldiers and officers. The NG had also prepared a consent form that soldiers and officers had to sign before the interview (see appendix 2). This explained that they were voluntarily taking part in the research.

Lastly, interview agendas for politicians and representatives of youth sections of political parties and independent political youth groups were devised according to their role and its relevance to the research questions, still in line with the thematic sections of the ‘general interview guide’. The reason I devised the initial schedule differently for each politician is because I was interviewing them under their current or former political role and not as a member of the public. Therefore, in devising the schedule accordingly, I researched about the political career of the respective politician for specific information that related his political roles and goals to the issues of my research enquiry.

The time before turning on the Dictaphone was most central in establishing trust with politicians. There is not much doubt whether a politician would have said something that he would not have been comfortable for me to use. Yet, a clear explanation of how the interview would be used seemed to always lay a good foundation of trust. Thorough preparation and careful selection of the questions to be asked were proven, from my first interview with a politician, to be fundamental in the conduct of this type of interview.
Well-considered and concise questions draw the picture of a professional researcher and shows respect towards the position or ‘power’ of the politician, as the researcher in this way shows they value the politician’s time.

Interviews with all participants were conducted face-to-face. Interviews with the public lasted between fifty minutes to a little over one hour. With politicians they lasted between one to one and a half hours, and with soldiers and military officers from thirty minutes to an hour. The interviews were conducted in a variety of places (including the interviewee’s house and mine, and quiet coffee shops). In all of these places, I ensured the environment was private and comfortable. In the next section I discuss some of the strategies I developed to deal with the relative need of interviewees to offer accounts that would please me.

**Strategy on follow-up questions and taking notes**

In the first few interviews I conducted I noticed that by taking notes whilst interviewees were responding, they often felt that what they were saying was important or it was the “right” answer and motivated them to expand on the response given. It is indeed the case that the interviewee most often feels a certain need to satisfy the interviewer. In addition, it started to become evident that the invitation to expand on an opinion offered is often interpreted by the interviewee as your agreement to their response. Thus encouragement to say more is interpreted as encouragement of their position. In this way a ‘double hermeneutic’ is in operation, (Miller, 2000: 130-131).

The strategy I developed to deal with this issue was to stop taking notes, as everything was recorded. Furthermore, when I asked an interviewee to elaborate, I would always also reveal to him/her the reason I was interested in exploring this further with them. This created further reciprocity between us, as the interviewee in this way was not assuming the importance ascribed to certain accounts.
4.5. Analysis of interviews

I completed the analysis myself. By reading the transcribed interviews several times I identified certain recurring themes and sub-themes across interviewees accounts. I selected the themes that appeared more often in these accounts as well as the ones which showed opposition or differentiation to the most dominant themes. Then, by using Nvivo software I organised all of the data under these themes, so I could subsequently choose which themes should be included in each chapter. The main themes related to ‘the impact of the opening of the borders’, ‘the weakening of the fighting spirit’, ‘the weakening of the National Guard’ and ‘the westernization and europeanisation of the society.

One of the most important parts of transforming embodied interviews into usable data is transcription (Tracy 2012). A professional translator had conducted the translation from Cypriot or Greek to English and full transcription of all interviews and the focus group. There were advantages and disadvantages in my decision to give the role of transcription to a professional translator. Apart from freeing up more time for me to write up the findings, the translator is a native Cypriot and given that Cypriot is a dialect she was able to translate all of the particularities and euphemisms of the language that I would have not been able to. However, as Wengraf (2001: 209) suggests, the slow work of transcription forces “the delivery to your conscious mind of as many thoughts and memories as you can.” My strategy to overcome the fact I hadn’t done the transcription myself was to listen to the recording while conducting the first reading of each transcript.

Furthermore, at different points of the analysis when I felt that I had become comfortable with the themes and narratives constructed I went back and read the data outside of the thematic parameters. Also, given that writing is an active form of thinking, during the writing up phase I frequently went back to the data to look at it in news ways, as the analysis pointed me both to the lack or overuse of certain accounts, often at the expense of others. Still, one of the main difficulties I faced in the analysis and writing-up process was the limitation posed by the method I employed of constructing narratives.

In my endeavour to find some form of structure through which to make sense of the different accounts and give meaning to them, I constructed a number of narratives that represent the most recurring accounts on a given issue. However, telling a narrative is
only a practical solution to the problem of legitimising diverse and distinct accounts. In writing our own narratives and identities, we are seeking what Ricoeur (1984) calls ‘narrative hospitality’ in the reader. Yet, the nature of representations and their relation to the reality they point to is always problematic, because in the categorical unfitness the complex diversity of accounts might, to some extent, be lost. Also, the reader cannot know how I have decided to construct these categories and not others.

I have employed a number of techniques to minimise my impact on constructing these narratives. In my effort to embrace diversity to the widest extent possible I have constructed as many narratives as possible. Additionally, I included as many interviewee accounts as possible in each narrative, in order for the reader to have the widest range of data to make his/her own interpretation of the data and the narratives constructed. Moreover, I have tried to give a voice to the interviewees through the text by either including interview extracts or using their own words to present the given argument. In an attempt to allow complexity to be voiced through the narrative, I included accounts that illustrate diversity and often conflict within the narrative. Also, I included as much information as possible about each interviewee, for example, apart from age and gender in many cases I also exposed the political beliefs of the interviewee and occupation in my effort to provide the reader with adequate information about interviewees. Moreover, in this study I have consistently used the first person to present arguments and to articulate experiences, feelings and perceptions in order to convey the sense of not only the research process, but also to remind the reader how my arguments are solidly my own interpretations. I am aware that these data can then be interpreted by an alien logic (Rapport and Overing, 2000) to mine. The next part of the chapter will explore issues that emerged with each distinct group of interviewees in arranging and conducting the interviews.

4.6 Reflecting on issues that emerged with each distinct group of interviewees

This part of the method chapter is going to explain the distinction between the sets of people I interviewed and some of the issues I faced with that particular group.

Interviews with the Public

In my interviews with the public, I took a great deal of care to create an equal power relationship with my interviewees. Rapport and reciprocity were central values in
conducting the interviews. In these interviews trust was mostly established by ensuring confidentiality and anonymity and creating a safe and comfortable environment for the interview. Also, the academic profile of the research seemed, in the interviewees’ perception, to be trustworthy.

It is indeed the case that by treating the other person as an equal person and asking the questions person-to-person it becomes more likely that the questions will be answered fully. In most cases I did not avoid getting involved in ‘real conversations’ and offered responses to the interviewees answers or to their questions, and thus became involved in an interactive process whereby the interview becomes a joint exploration of the issues of inquiry and where both the interviewee and interviewer together take part in the knowledge that is produced.

However, being an insider posed both advantages and limitations, which had to be overcome. While reflexivity became more complicated by the fact that I was interviewing people from diverse and distinct social and political backgrounds, often oppositional to my background, coming from the same society I was able to relate to people’s experiences in concrete ways and show familiarity and empathy towards certain issues. A certain introduction at the beginning of the interview assisted me in adopting the role of alien/foreigner, when I needed the interviewee to explain something from scratch or to elaborate extensively on widely known realities in Cyprus. Thus, I always made it clear that ‘given that I am also Cypriot I will ask questions that might sound odd as I also know the ‘answer’; however, what I am interested in is your interpretation, opinion and understanding of certain social and political issues.’ Moreover, as it will be later discussed, in my interview encounters with ultra-nationalists I was actually interviewing people whose social and political beliefs I have always been strongly opposed to in the context of Cyprus.

Lastly, I always took care at the end of the interview to invite the interviewee to come back to the present, as the research topics often instigated traumatic or difficult experiences, for example, some interviewees talked about their missing relatives or about their experiences of the war.
Interviews with politicians

In previous sections I have discussed ‘gate-keeping’ and ‘access’, here I will focus on the actual interview encounter with the ‘powerful’ interviewees. I will argue that carefully creating and upholding a balanced power relationship in these interviews, to whatever extent possible, is of the utmost importance, as lowering one’s position in the power relationship can potentially foreclose access to the desired information and potentially have an impact on the knowledge being produced throughout the interview.

To my surprise, the interview process with politicians who were also family friends was not much different from the ones I didn’t have any prior connection with. From my first interview with a family friend it straightaway became apparent to me that the family relationship got me the interview but was not at all part of the interview process. In these interviews a very clear renegotiation of the relationship took place immediately upon my arrival. However, in all interviews with the ‘powerful’ the fact that they did not know what to expect from the interview or from me as an interviewer, given that they are not used to conducting non-journalist interviews, opened up the power relationship for negotiation. By carefully presenting the project and myself I was able to gain their respect but also encouraged a sense of curiosity about the project.

One also needs to accept that it is unavoidable that the politician has better political skills than the researcher. In most of these interviews, there were moments where certain interview goals were defeated by the experience of the politician; the most common case being the interviewee thinking he understood what I was getting at before I finished my question, interrupting me, not letting me complete the question and providing an answer that did not fully answer the intended question. In such situations, one needs to show sensitivity to the micro-politics of the given situation. Insisting on getting an answer to a question can seriously undermine rapport. One needs to respect that it is part of the role of the politician to reveal some bits of information and not others. This became particularly evident in my interview with the former President of Cyprus, where I rephrased and asked a specific question three times, to only get a diplomatic answer in which he did not touch on my question. At that point, I realised that I should not insist further. Reflecting on this later, I realised that it was the question that was
wrong. I was actually asking something that he could not admit to in regards to a policy that perhaps he also felt uncomfortable about enforcing.

**Interviews in the National Guard**

On the day that the research would have commenced I was stunned by how well everything had been arranged by the National Guard (NG). Yet, a major difficulty was just about to emerge. I was asked to provide the headquarters with the interview questions beforehand. While I had sent this in time, the officer in charge of the research had informed me that the research could not commence until they received the approval of the Head of the NG, they were still waiting for this.

To my disappointment, the Head of the NG decided that since I was asking questions regarding the ‘enemy’ and generally what he called ‘political questions’, the Minister of Defence had to also approve the questions. I was asked to leave the camp and that they would contact me about the Minister’s decision. However, I had to return to the U.K. within days and I knew that the process of re-arranging access would not be quick or simple. Thus, the situation called for drastic solutions.

I contacted the Minister of Defence’s secretary, who would have been able to speed up the process, to ask whether the questions had been received for approval from the Minister. Then, I contacted one of the highest-ranking officers of the headquarters of the army who spoke with the head of the military, who informed me that he was concerned about confidentiality of such military information and by whom my writings would be read. This discrepancy in the way my research was perceived at the Ministry of Defence and headquarters of the army is interesting in itself; illustrating much of the suspicion of the 'military mind', (Huntington, 1957).

After discussing this with the aforementioned officer, we decided to avoid a long process of sending the questions back and forth between the Minister and head of the army. We proposed removing some of them with the agreement that I would return back to the camp promptly. Removing certain questions did not pose a problem for the research as by that time I had acquired these types of accounts already, especially from reserves, officers and soldiers I had interviewed whilst off duty. However, the situation had becoming very charged. The above-mentioned officer had made it clear that since
he called for a meeting with the head of the military in which he represented me; the responsibility was now on him. Thus, if I deviated from what was agreed I would be betraying him. The next working day, I was again at the gate of the camp. During the whole of my time in the army, the military was extremely helpful in every way, making sure that I had everything I needed and, as they said repeatedly from the headquarters, they wanted to ‘deliver a good service’.

Power relationships within the army

The army is a system of hierarchy, oppression and, most of all, power relationships. Therefore conducting research within the army could not escape from that system of power relationships. The fact that my research was approved by the Minister of Defence and the head of the army, within the army barracks it seemed to translate as being directly linked to them. This acted in my favour, as in all of my communications and relations with and within the military I enjoyed a great deal of respect. Also, my clothing being non-military within a military environment had ascribed my identity with a certain level of power. I had been understood as a high level academic conducting important research. Moreover, given that the research is something very different from the everyday routine in the army, this was treated as a positive event and officers showed much enthusiasm and curiosity about it. However, my age (26 at the time) posed the issue of having to renegotiate power relations at certain points of the research within the army barracks.

Going to the military camp; take one!

My relationship with the military officer in charge of the research was of utmost importance in successfully conducting the research in the army. In this case, I had dressed formally given the particularity of the setting. Yet, my only concern was that given the profile they had constructed about me; my age could have reconfigured the power relationship, where I could have ended up being in the position of the ‘soldier’ if I was to be perceived as a student doing some study and nothing more. This scenario
ran the risk of creating several obstacles to my research process and collection of data, including negotiations on how the research was to take place within the camp.

My fear was proven to be true within the first 10 seconds of my arrival to the military camp. Immediately, the officer in charge told me ‘I was expecting to see someone much older’. With my age revealed a space was open for renegotiating the relationship of power. The issue of the disclosure of identities in researching the powerful has been raised by Fitz and Halpin, (1994: 35-36), whilst Conti and O’Neil (2007: 73) note how they devised a set of strategies for dealing with the dismissiveness of their respondents and altering the authority relationship in the interview. I was aware that I had to find a way to gain back my power in the relationship. My strategy was to draw on my academic background and, it worked! From that point onwards, he started several discussions on current national and international politics, occasionally trying to impress me with his opinions. He then introduced me to other officers as ‘Professor’.

*Going to the military camp; take two!*

Following the events and repeated negotiations over my re-entrance to the army, the situation became much more tense and liable to becoming interjected again. I knew that in the interviews I had to strictly stick to the questions agreed with the head of military if the research wasn’t to be interrupted again, and to also not betray the high ranking officers who become involved in convincing the head of the military to agree to my re-entrance. Yet, this generated another set of issues that I had to manage.

It was clear to me before entering the army barracks for the second time that the relationship that I would developed with the officer in charge of my research could have impeded the accomplishment of all of my research goals in the army. However, my task was a complicated one; I had to gain his trust that I would follow what had already been agreed, without becoming obedient to him. Therefore, establishing respect towards my person was key in balancing the relationship of power. I knew that by not deviating from the questions agreed and being careful in my approach to the soldiers and officers would establish a certain level of trusting rapport. Yet this role construct of a lawful
researcher obeying the pre-agreed terms gave almost the feeling of a soldier acting under an officer’s commands. This was undesirable and I had to regain my power!

In doing this, I developed a strategy based on a few steps. I will elaborate on the first step, by way of example. Based on my belief that the time between being picked up from the gate to getting to the office where I would conduct the interviews was critical in setting the dynamic of the relationship I aspired to between the officer and myself, I had already planned that I would create a discussion where I would state two points. ‘You see that I arranged everything in a way so that we could meet again very soon’ I said. This was a claim of political power on my behalf. Indeed, he asked: ‘How did you manage to arrange it so soon?’ I replied, ‘I proposed to the head of the military to take these measures, deleting the questions that he did not agree with’ he appeared impressed and he asked me, ‘did you speak with the head of military himself?’ I had already planned my answer, which is what actually happened, ‘I had someone representing me to him,’ I said; knowing that, at that point, the power relationship was, to an important extent, restored.

Relationship to soldiers

The relationship between the soldiers and I, in the way the setting was arranged by the army, could not escape a certain relationship of power, as my academic status became interwoven with the military hierarchical power structures. The description of my research proclaimed in the camp morning report had already painted a professional academic profile of me to the soldiers. Also, my arrival to the grounds where the interviews were conducted with the officer in charge of the research had somehow linked me, in the soldiers’ perception, to the army itself. Of noteworthy mention is that the soldiers would stand up every time the officer and I entered the establishment.

The setting and set-up of the interviews in the camp clearly showed its military character and created an influence, to some extent, over the interview process. The soldiers were waiting to be interviewed in the reception room and an officer was with them calling the next interviewee to come to the room. In our very first communications soldiers treated me as someone hierarchically superior to them. I took certain measures to minimise the
power relationship, and, therefore, its impact on the production of knowledge throughout the interview. When soldiers entered through the door I immediately said that I was not related to the army in any way. I also made it very clear that they were allowed to express anything they wanted and that their accounts would be anonymised. This technique proved to be successful as soldiers did generally become much more relaxed following my introduction. The fact that soldiers most often took the opportunity to express difficulties they were facing in the camp also illustrates that the power dynamic that the pre-set situation had created was, to some extent, overcome. Nonetheless, I struggled to escape the formality the military environment created and my relationship with the soldiers, even if much less so than at the beginning, was quite formal.

Interviews with Ultra-nationalist Politicians

In this section I will reflect on my interview encounter with ultra-nationalist politicians. Before proceeding to discuss this, I will first elaborate further on some of the remarks made earlier in the research design section about arranging these interviews, as certain issues faced call for further attention.

Arranging to interview ultra-nationalist and issues of trust in these interviews

As it was discussed above in arranging to interview ELAM, which is perhaps the most extreme ultra-nationalist party, I very soon realised that a ‘top-down’ approach would not be effective. I carefully selected an acquaintance who is a friend with one of their leading figures. The selection of him was particularly strategic as he is not politicised and therefore would not have revealed any political outlook on my part. We had had a very thorough discussion in advance about how he would portray me. He presented me as a student doing research in which their views would have been very valuable to my project. As it turned out, the respective politician accepted my request following a phone conversation between the two of us and him being granted permission from the board of the party to represent the party.
On another occasion, I used a completely different strategy in my attempt to get an interview with EDHK, a smaller ultra-nationalist party. I wrote a letter in purist Greek language (which is hardly used any more) to the president of the party, hoping that he would be more inclined to accept my request, given that nationalists in Cyprus and Greece are continuing the use of purist Greek language. Indeed, he called me and warmly accepted to be interviewed.

Furthermore, trust with representatives of ultra-nationalist parties was a complicated issue and often posed a significant barrier that needed to be overcome. This level of distrust towards the interview was clearly illustrated by the fact that in two cases the respective representative turned up to the interview with other party members. There was also a certain form of anxiety regarding what we would be discussing. In some cases, I had to send the interview questions in advance. In my effort to overcome the trust issues, I adopted a certain level of diplomacy, describing the topic of the research as national identity and male identity in Cyprus. It would have been rather tragicomic to ask to interview an ultra-nationalist politician by telling him that I was conducting research on ultra-nationalism. Also of great assistance was proven to be a clarification on my part that I am an academic researcher and thus not a journalist. My efforts to build trust and some rapport became successful, as, after a certain point in these interviews, informants came to view it in positive terms. Mainly understanding it as an opportunity to share their views with the world.

Now I will proceed to discuss the interview encounters I had with the two major ultra-nationalist parties of Cyprus, ELAM and EDHK (thus excluding two ultra-nationalist youths, namely Metwp and Drasis-Kes), as these posed more significant issues in terms of the interview process and the overall situation created.

Finding the President of EDHK

I had left Nicosia early in the morning as I had to drive for a few hours to get to where Loucas Stavrou, the president of EDHK, insisted on meeting. I had sent him a letter to which he responded with a phone call clarifying that if I was to interview him ‘I had to go
and find him where he lives’. To my surprise, he lived in one of the most remote villages, on the slope of Troodos (the highest mountain of Cyprus: 60,404 ft.).

I was excited to be facing a potential new world of unexplored data on the issues of inquiry, however I was not quite sure what to expect from the imminent encounter with an outspoken advocate of ultra-nationalism. The media presented these parties, mostly through some violent incidents, as some sort of street-gang with strong ideological dogmas.

I arrived at the village and called him; he then gave me some directions and told me to wait in the grounds of a church. These few minutes of waiting seemed to last forever, and it became clear that the stakes change when one decides to look into the face of extremism. As he entered the grounds of the church, I identified him not by his face but from his walk, which resembled the steadiness and assurance of a military walk.

As we walked along the strand, we exchanged pleasantries. Here I was in the company of an ultra-nationalist, in a village in the middle of the mountains. He suggested that we conduct the interview in a nearby restaurant. The staff at the restaurant clearly knew him, but were somehow distant in their communication with him, which was clearly identifiable in their body language. During the course of the interview, the tone of the conversation ranged from convivial discourse of ‘educated men’, to moments when our political incommensurability was laid bare. I had prepared all questions with great care and had thought selectively of the phrasing that I would use; to not reveal strong antithetical political beliefs to him yet also to not use phrasing that would upset him and, thus, undermine his trust in the interview. However, I soon realised that what I considered to be a rational statement or question was very different to his understanding and in such ways my value-free performativity was repeatedly undermined. For example, I had phrased this specific question very carefully, however he shocked me with is reply:

**Interviewer:** Exactly what type of solution would you like for our national issue and which solution do you believe is possible today?

**Loucas Stavrou:** The solution is beyond possible! The solution that we ought to propose is a solution acceptable by the terms and values of Europe. This of course
might not be possible under the current circumstances, but what it is, is that it will constitute the basis of the armed claim of liberation, because I believe that the only possible solution is an armed claim.

Interviewer: You do?

Loucas Stavrou: Yes, but we must prepare this first diplomatically and then [...] What are you asking for? We are asking for democracy! We refuse to sell our land, not even a handful of it!

Interviewer: Do you believe that we have the capability of an armed claim?

Loucas Stavrou: Of course there are the capabilities today especially if we consider that Turkey is a giant with bronze legs. Let’s not believe in the propaganda that Turkey is a massive force.

Meeting a representative of ELAM

Driving to meet the representative of ELAM at a coffee shop that I had proposed, I was thrilled by the opportunity to interview him, so thrilled in fact that I forgot to arrange how we would identify each other. Walking into the coffee shop, I immediately realised that identification would have never posed a problem; a well-built young man with a huge moustache and a motorcycle helmet waved at me.

His appearance portrayed his political beliefs. This created an interesting yet heavily charged environment, as the people sitting at tables around us kept staring at him. I did not predict the anxiety he felt. As we were getting ready to begin the interview his anxiety clearly showed by his hands slightly shaking. Also, there was a certain effort by him to satisfy me, which underpinned the interview process. We might have been speaking two very different political languages, but this encounter was also about uncomfortable resemblances. We were of a similar age, graduates, came from the same city and have a friend in common. Even though we approached the same issues from a very different angle, we were interested in the same common issues and had shared concerns. For example, the breakdown of Cypriot community and the directionless defence policy, which we admittedly had different approaches to but we were equally engaged in an exploration of these issues in the context of Cyprus. He
was as willing to hear my opinions, which he appeared to value, as much as I was interested in hearing his.

Moreover, by allowing me to enter his world; I began to understand the emotional depth in which such nationalist and militarist beliefs, that I have always been opposed to yet have chosen to concentrate on in my research, were interwoven with his way of looking at world issues. These feelings of deep emotional attachment to national sentiments can be interpreted through the primordial understanding of nations that often characterises the nationalist thought and provides an understanding of national kinship that extends beyond clear-cut kin connections (Puri 2004: 44; Smith 1986: 12; Hearn 2006: 20; Horowitz 1985: 57-64; specifically on Cypriot nationalism see Papadakis, 2008: 5).

The developing rapport between us became even more present and yet further complicated, when, half an hour after the interview began, two other party members appeared and sat with us. The relationship between the interviewee and me had already been established as warm with sympathy being openly revealed from both sides, as such the other members accepted me and we ended up spending the whole evening together as a group. Moreover, it was very interesting that they had done their homework about me. This became particularly apparent when, while discussing draft-dodging, the fact that I had also draft-dodged slipped through the lips of the interviewee; revealing that they had looked at my military record. However, in all cases they treated such instances with a great deal of care and sensitivity so that rapport would not be broken.

After I had turned off the Dictaphone, the most interesting political and military conversations were sparked. Clearly, when working with extremist organisations of any sort one has to, as Sluka (2007: 267) points out, “learn how to walk softly. Be sensitive to what sorts of questions may be asked and what sort of questions are taboo.” Having established rapport I was able to disregard these taboo areas and ask questions that I had never assumed would have been received as appropriate.

In my endeavour to deepen my understanding of them, they also increasingly shared with me some of the difficulties they were facing in Cypriot society and political circles due to their extreme political beliefs. In these cases, I had showed sympathy to the
difficulties they were facing. However, are the commitments of polyphony that postmodern theory proposes the same if one is sharing interview authority with outspoken advocates of fascism?

Taylor’s notion of *perspicuous contrast* is useful here. As he writes: “It will almost always be the case that the adequate language in which we can understand another society is not our language of understanding, or theirs, but rather what one could call a language of perspicuous contrast.” (1985: 125).

However, it is possible that in the effort to give voice to what appears alien to us we can push the ethics of understanding to its limits. These uncomfortable congruencies, including the fact that I had, to some degree, related to him as another human being who ascribes emotional importance to what he perceives as significant, undercut any simple separation between researcher and research subject, or between the liberal and fascist. In this sense, there is no neutral place for Weber’s value-free social scientist to stand. As it has been already discussed, there has been much debate in sociology about the issue of bias. Becker summed up this problem in his well-known essay ‘Whose side are we on?’ He notes: whatever side we are on, we must use our techniques impartially enough that a belief to which we are especially sympathetic could be proved untrue.’ (1967: 246).

I will take a moment to explore the two main questions that have troubled me following the interview: How are the ethics of investigating ultra-nationalist power implicated in these strange acquaintances – necessitated by the research itself – and the desire to understand the advocates of nationalism and intolerance towards anything perceived as an ‘other’? What does this extreme case, where I was almost researching a political and ideological opponent, raise in relation to the place from which I make interpretations and strive to understand this interviewee?

When I left this interview I spent a long time alone contemplating the rapport that had built up between us during the several hours we had spent together and what that meant about me as a researcher. Perhaps what had shocked me the most is that, by allowing me to access their own world, I had come to understand that, contrary to my previous thoughts, the arguments and statements advocated by them, which I have always been opposed to, were in their own world engaged with a rational reasoned set
of debates. Also, these involved deep emotional attachments to ideas, which appears to me as alien and irrational. Besides, apart from the differences between us there were also similarities.

During and after the interview, I was trying to understand if a combination of dialogue and critical judgment could be possible in my effort to find a place in which I could stand to interpret this somehow unique and new-fangled research encounter. However, dialogue and critique do not necessarily need to be different. It is possible for both sides to be destabilised whilst critically evaluating the naturalised predispositions of the interviewee.

What I have come to understand is that contrary to my previous belief, ultra-nationalists are also humans with concerns, feelings and rationality and I have thereafter ceased to ‘caricature’ ultra-nationalists as violent, irrational monsters. This has allowed me to understand them as fellow-human beings and, therefore, to further interpret the way in which they construct different beliefs and ideologies through the importance they ascribe to certain ideas in the realm of rationality and emotion. I also came to realise that in my endeavour to understand the ‘other’, I need to ‘use’ the ‘other’, as a reflective mirror for looking back at myself in order to keep reminding myself that the differences that make us different are much finer than we always assume, as there is a great deal of congruence. Thus, it is within the fine intersections and apartness of similarity and difference that we can best interpret what, at first sight, appears to us as alien. As Crapanzano (1980) has argued, in learning about the ‘other’ we learn about the ‘self’.

5. Chapter five: Nationalism in post-2003 Cyprus

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter I seek to understand post-2003 Greek Cypriot (G.C.) nationalism through examining the constellation of social, political and state-institutional processes and discourses that followed the opening of the borders between North and South Cyprus in 2003. In doing so I wish to understand post-2003 G.C. nationalism, as a discourse
formulated, on what I understand as its formative, post-war elemental components. These are, ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ (In Greek: Δεν Ξεχνώ και Αγωνίζομαι), ‘defence’ (In Greek: Άμυνα), ‘occupation’ (In Greek: Κατοχή), and the issue of the ‘mothers, wives and sisters of the missing persons’ (In Greek: Οι μάνες των αγνοουμένων).

I am not seeking to describe an escalation or a downfall of G.C. nationalism but rather to map and identify the intersection of discourses created during and following the period of 2003-2004 in Cyprus. Thus, I am seeking to identify certain changes, reactions and reiterations within the discourse of G.C. nationalism created as a response to the following events: the opening of the borders, the Annan Plan referendum, and the accession of Cyprus to the European Union (EU). I will do this by studying the G.C. community’s perception of the national struggle in this new space and the crossings from the one side of the island to the other that occurred following the opening of the borders, from and towards the ‘green line’ and the choice of not crossing.

The purpose that this inquiry would serve is to contribute to the overall argument of this thesis that, in post-conflict European Cyprus with open borders, masculinist endeavours of nationalism and militarism are continuing under certain new social and political parameters and in a setting where the perceived threat has been undermined to perpetuate a co-constitutive relationship of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. The concept of nationalist militarised masculinity, introduced in the first chapter, is used in the chapter on masculinity to illustrate how the resistance to cross and the significance of the discourse of ‘occupation’ for G.C. nationalism that this chapter reveals are an expression of a broader discourse of masculinity co-constituted to nationalism and militarism that appeals to the whole social body and is integral to the viewpoint the community adopts in the conflict situation.

The overarching argument of the chapter is that following the opening of the borders whilst there has been a perceived weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’ (I struggle) for liberation from ‘occupation’, there is an enduring invocation of victimcy (I do not forget) in relation to ‘occupation’, which is symbolically illustrated through the significance the community continues to ascribe to the mothers of the missing persons. This becomes particularly clear in the most prominent narrative of my interviewees on their perception
of the effect of the opening of the borders and crossings as undermining the status of the conflict as ‘occupation’. Therefore, the analytical centrality that is given to the opening of the borders relies on the understanding of this event creating a new discursive space of dynamics for defining and interpreting an on-going and unresolved problem. Yet, in the post-opening of the borders, the discourse of ‘occupation’, formative of post-war G.C. nationalism, will be illustrated to condition the ‘right’ to cross (I do not forget). Whereas, a prominent G.C. reality is the perceived weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’ (I struggle) tightly linked to the opening of the borders. This will guides us in understanding further the centrality the borders were given in the overall conceptualisation of the conflict as an ‘occupation’.

The accession of Cyprus to the European Union is also perceived as undermining the ‘fighting spirit’ of the struggle in the G.C. community. This is mostly linked to the accession providing relative public security in relation to the fear of a second invasion by Turkey. Conversely, the diminution of the fear of war also ensues the presence of the perceived ‘other’ on the South part of the border, which, following the war in 1974, is controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. This has helped many G.C.s to ease numerous preoccupations about the previously ‘imagined’ (Anderson, 1983) threatening ‘enemy’ yet the limited interaction illustrates how this is also delimitated through the ‘occupation’.

The ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle I found as being affected by the cultural impact of Western individualist and consumerist values and ideals on the G.C. community since this is understood as weakening the unified community predicated on the common national struggle for ‘defence’ and liberation from ‘occupation’.

In this manner, as it will be discussed in the following chapter on militarism, the opening of the borders, the accession to the EU and certain cultural developments are also undermining the militarist framing of the struggle and the role of men within it as ‘defenders’. Furthermore, the chapter on masculinity will illustrate these weakened masculinist discourses to be now taking place in specific nationalist and militarist adapted iterations.

Moreover, I will argue that the emergence of organised ultra-nationalist parties and political youth groups only following the opening of the borders are a discursive response to this opening, the perception of the weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’ in the
G.C. community, the undermined ‘defence’ and the weakening of masculinist militarist discourses of the national struggle. Whereas the financial crisis and the migration challenges faced by many EU states has been tightly linked to the rise of ultra-right wing parties across Europe, my concern here is what made these political parties possible from within the post-opening of the borders in Cyprus. Therefore, the analysis that follows seeks to understand the intersection of discourses within the post-opening of the borders co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity that made them possible.

This chapter begin by looking back at the creation of the discourse of the national struggle in post-1974 Cyprus. Then it places the importance on the failure of political events (the opening of the borders, the accession of Cyprus to the EU, the Annan Referendum) that held the potential of reunifying Cyprus and their role in re-formation of the national struggle. Within this new setting then there is a reiteration of the invocation of victimcy expressed through G.C. resistances to crossing the ‘occupation’ and not interacting with the T.C. in the South. This so created space of victimcy is what ultra-nationalist fractions have been preying upon.

5.2. Looking back through post-war Cyprus: discourses of ‘I do not forget’ - ‘I struggle’ and the ‘borders’

Following the war of 1974 the broader yet also official state conceptualisation of the conflict as an invasion and a continuous ‘occupation’ by Turkey was inextricable from the construction of the idea of the national struggle. This framing of the conflict opposes its alternative (and internationally prominent) that is a ‘bi-communal conflict amongst two ethnic communities; G.C.s and T.C.s’. This section will discuss the idea of the post-war national struggle and its relevance to the aforementioned conceptualisation of the conflict.

In this analysis the use of the term ‘occupation’ is argued to be a certain discursive practice of the conflict situation, supported by the state and mobilised through its institutions, tied to the national struggle for liberation and the ideology of defence. As Foucault (1977: 200) argues, a discursive practice is “embodied in technical processes,
in institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms of transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them.” This discourse crystallised the position that the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus means that Cyprus has been a victim of the “enemy” (I do not forget). Consequently, ‘returning’ meant liberation of the ‘occupied’ land whilst ‘defending’ the community and ‘free areas’ of Cyprus, and ‘protesting’ against ‘occupation’ (I struggle). Therefore, in the G.C. community ‘occupation’ is understood to be what Bourdieu (1991: 107) terms as ‘authorised language’. This is understood to provide resistance to new patterns of thinking or action that lay outside of it (ibid). ‘Occupation’ meant ‘borders’; ‘remembering’, ‘struggling’ and ‘defence’.

The official state rhetoric following the war and partition of the island in 1974 has rested on cultivating the struggle for a unified country, largely predicated on keeping the memory alive of the ‘occupied’ part of the island (I do not forget) and fighting for liberation from ‘occupation’ (I struggle). The relevance of the national struggle to nationalism in Cyprus lies in the analysis of the nation as a discursive formation (Calhoun, 1997) as well as an ‘imagined political community’ (Anderson, 1983). This allows its members to envision a deep affinity with each other by creating their history, which is largely a shared narrative of the common struggle for survival (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Renan, 1990; Kedourie, 1994; Smith, 1998) of the G.C. community through time. Following the war in 1974, and the resulting partition of the island, state-funded schools, as Christou (2006: 286) reminds us, have sought to educate a new generation of G.C.s by helping them to remember the ‘occupied’ part of the island and to maintain the struggle for a unified country.

Then the state mobilised slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ was constructed of two ideological instructive components. The former (I do not forget) embodied the promise of the G.C. political leadership and people that the territory that was lost due to the war would not be forgotten. Nationalist memory that hereinafter will be addressed through

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11 It needs to be noted that the slogan first appears in Cyprus following the events of 1974 as ‘I don’t forget’ and promptly becomes a permanent feature of G.C. school life (see: Christou, 2006). Then the slogan was modified to ‘I don’t forget and I struggle’. In 2001 the slogan was modified again to ‘I know, I don’t forget and I struggle’,(see: ibid). In this thesis I refer to ‘I don’t forget and I struggle’ except if specified otherwise. This is as the importance ascribed to this slogan in post-war Cyprus was ascribed to ‘I don’t forget and I struggle’.
the policy instruction of ‘I do not forget’ has assisted in maintaining the territory of the ROC that G.C.s no longer control, and were also unable to visit in the G.C. nationalist imagination (Anderson, 1983). Therefore, memory, which in this instance takes the form of the official pronouncement of ‘I do not forget’, has been a function of resistance (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). The later (I struggle) ideological instructive component means that by using any means possible and available, what was lost will be regained through struggle, which will finally lead to the ‘liberation from the Turkish conqueror’. This statement, which is also a popular slogan (In Greek: απελευθέρωση της Κύπρου από τον Τούρκο κατακτητή), is inextricable from the state mobilised historical narratives of the “Greek nation”. This discourse of nationhood comprises both Greek and Cyprus states under a “Greek nation” that liberated itself from the Ottoman conqueror in 1821, maintaining the “Greek” ‘fighting spirit’ that will again liberate its “Ottoman re-enslavement in 1974”.

‘I do not forget and I struggle’ became the symbol of the post-war G.C. identity. This slogan was visually presented in state institutional settings, such as schools and the army; non-governmental organisations, associations, groups and individuals themselves also used it. In Cyprus, it is not uncommon at all that someone has a sticker proclaiming ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ on their car window or on their house door.

Hence, resisting the forgetting of lost homelands maintained a romanticised ‘image’ of the ‘occupied’ land, which the G.C. community ideologically turned into the need to ‘struggle’ and to ‘return’. In this discursive space, the existence of the un-crossable so-called ‘Green-Line’ in Cyprus had become a symbol of the polarisation and opposition of the two communities on the island yet also of the need to ‘struggle’. Consequently, the opening of the borders, in the analysis that follows, is seen as of paramount importance to the continuation of the G.C. national struggle.

The closed and heavily militarised border that divided Cyprus between the ‘free’ and ‘occupied’ parts has stood as the most major symbol of the ‘occupation’ of Northern

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12 When I use the term ‘nation’ I refer to the nationalist construction that Cyprus is part of the “Greek nation”. This becomes particularly significant when discussing the ideology of defence. The constructed ideology of defence referred to the defence of the whole “Greek nation” from the expansion tendencies of Turkey, which is further illustrated by the establishment of the Single Area Defence Doctrine Cyprus-Greece.
Cyprus. It has fuelled the need for ‘defence’ from the ‘occupation’ forces and the need to protest against the existence of the border, therefore the need for liberation from ‘occupation’. The importance of military guarded borders in relation to nationalism in a divided country like Cyprus is of the utmost importance and a cause for much public, political and academic discussion (Demetriou, 2007; Çaykent, 2010; Diez et al., 2008; Hadjipavlou, 2006 & 2007a). Greek and Turkish nationalisms took place during the colonial period in Cyprus (1878-1960) (Attalides, 1979) and became a tool for forming an ethnicised sense of personhood into the masses through separate educational systems (Bryant, 2004). The inter-ethnic violence that broke out in December 1963 (Kyriakides, 1968) resulted in the creation of the ‘Green Line’, a dividing line in the capital of Nicosia, to keep the two ethnic communities apart. The Turkish invasion (1974) and ‘occupation’ of the northern third of the island led to the present division into two artificially homogeneous ethnic spaces by the rearrangement of the ‘Green Line’ into the ‘Attila Line’ (112 miles long) in August 1974. G.C. nationalism thereafter has been predicated on the memory of the war of 1974 and the continuing ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus (Papadakis et al., 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Anastasiou, 2008; Papadakis & Bryant, 2012). Characteristically one of the most prominent official and public G.C. slogans in relation to the conflict situation is that ‘Our borders are in Kerynia’ (in Greek: “Τα σύνορα μας είναι στη Κερύνεια”). This means that these post-1974 inland borders are not our genuine borders; our borders are from the one side of the island to the other.

Furthermore, the existence of closed un-crossable borders has been fundamental in the construction and specific ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 1983) of the threatening, generalised, and undifferentiated national ‘other’: the ‘Turks’, (Spyrou, 2006: 97-99), as the ‘enemy within’ (Kanaaneh, 2013), namely the ‘occupation’ forces.

G.C. post-war nationalism has rested on this specific rhetorical plan of ‘othering’ the ‘Turk’ that existed across the border. Through the discourse of the ‘existential threat’ from the ‘enemy within’, the notion of a unified community predicated on the need for ‘defence’ and ‘liberation’ was constructed and sustained. The notion of ‘existential threat’ in post-war Cyprus was presented by the state as a dominant discourse as not only a threat for the G.C. community by a second invasion from Turkey, but also for the whole of the “Greek nation”.
The national goal, as also clearly evoked and manifested through the official and unofficial discourses of the national struggle, was that these borders would one day be overthrown and the ‘enemy within’ will be thrown out of Cyprus. As one of the most popular G.C. post-war slogans says: ‘All Turks out of Cyprus’ (In Greek: ‘Έξω οι Τούρκοι από την Κύπρο’): by achieving their expulsion G.C.s will, in some way, re-gain what was lost. Characteristically, as another very prominent G.C. post-war slogan states: ‘May all the refugees return to their homes’ (In Greek: ‘Όλοι οι πρόσφυγες στα σπίτια τους’).

Most centrally, the idea of the G.C. national struggle did not merely involved the political struggle to bring the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus to an end, but required the commitment of the complete social body. For example, anti-occupation marches and protests, which have been extremely frequent following the division of the island, were organised from a widest spectrum of political and social fractions of Cypriot society. Noteworthy is that the first anti-occupation march was organised by a small number of women on 20th April 1975 (Xamatsou, 2011). Another significant commitment by civil society has been the annual student anti-occupation over-night protest on the borders, which involved all schools across the country, and the annual Cyprus Federation of Motorcyclists march. Moreover, the strongest commitment of the community to the national struggle is illustrated by the “letting” one’s son and/or husband (if between the ages of 18 and 55) be conscripted in the NG under the role of soldier, reserve or militia (see National Guard Law, 2011). Even women are conscripted in civil defence when they turn eighteen and men following their discharge from the militia service at the age of fifty-five are supporting the civil defence (see Civil Defence Law 1998).

The NG and the ideology of defence, which as the next chapter will illustrate is the version of militarism that appeared in post-war Cyprus, was perhaps the most central manifestation on the part of the nationalist militarist ‘struggle’. Whilst ‘I do not forget’ was an active policy with great appeal and adherence amongst the public, it also provided the platform for the existence and purpose of the army; i.e. you are not going to ‘forget’ because you are going to ‘defend’; one justified the other. The role of men in post-war Cyprus was ideologically fused into the national struggle. This ideological script provided that the NG manifests the will of the G.C. men involved as soldiers, reserves and militia in defence of the G.C. community. The NG maintains a high
‘fighting spirit’ with the goal of liberation of the ‘occupied’ North part of Cyprus to enable the refugees to return back to their homes.

In this section, I have argued that, following the war in 1974 and the partition of the island, the specific conceptualisation of the conflict by G.C.s as an invasion and continuous ‘occupation’, as well as the existence of an ideate threatening ‘other’ across the border conveyed by a considerable military was discursively responded to with the need to ‘not forget’ the ‘occupied’ territory across the border. As well as responses with the ‘struggle’ to push back the border and liberate the ‘occupied’ land in addition to ‘defence’ of the border from the ‘occupying’ forces. Theorising the borders that exist in Cyprus in this way leads one to notice not only the significance the borders were given by G.C.s to the integrity and continuation of G.C. existence, but also the discursive centrality they were given to the overall conceptualisation of the ‘Cyprus problem’ as a continuous ‘occupation’. Therefore, because of the central role of the borders to the conflict’s conceptualisation, changes made on those borders have the potential to reshape the G.C. interpretation of the conflict itself and consequently the understanding of the national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’.

5.3. The ‘struggle’ following the opening of the borders

Following the opening of the borders, the collectivity of the national body rests on a new dynamic situated within the ‘I do not forget’ and ‘I struggle’ narratives. In this dynamic the public national imaginary maintains conflicting longings. Declaring both a wish for the sustenance of a collective memory of the war events (1974) and places (I do not forget), and also acknowledging that the ‘fighting spirit’, thus the morale and wish for ‘I struggle’ to recover what was lost, is becoming weaker. Since the opening of the borders the public understanding of ‘struggle’ contains conflicting desires, which generate a range of often contradictory responses such as: 1) an apparent continued adherence to the collective ‘I struggle’ 2) the criticism of the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ in the community and 3) the personal unwillingness to ‘I struggle’ in the defence and liberation of Cyprus. The discursive synergy of the opening of the borders, the Annan Plan and the accession of Cyprus to the EU, which took place within a period of 2 years (2003 and 2004), apart from being, at the outset, clearly political events, have been formative of the re-adapted iterations of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in G.C.
society. I argue that the synergy between these three socio-political conditions is creating a new discursive space of dynamics for defining, interpreting and visualising the future of the G.C. national struggle for an on-going and unresolved conflict ‘problem’.

This section addresses the weakening ‘fighting spirit’ (I struggle) within this new discursive space to ‘remember’ and ‘liberate’ Cyprus from ‘occupation’. Whilst, later on in this chapter it will be illustrated that the multiple public and state resistances that have been put in place regarding not crossing the border are a manifestation of the reiteration of G.C. nationalism. So, it appears that following the opening of the borders, there is a reiteration of a certain nationalist stance of victimcy in relation to ‘occupation’ (I do not forget), whilst the ‘fighting spirit’ (I struggle) is perceived as undermined.

The opening of the borders has resulted in a destabilisation of the national ideological discourses that were conceptually anchored on the borders, and this has impacted on the ideological reproduction of the nationalist militarist ‘struggle’. The national struggle, for the larger G.C. community, in a divided country like Cyprus, which used to be predicated on the idea of ‘opening’ the closed borders in terms of recovering the ‘occupied’ land, became conflicting and contradictory in a new unforeseen reality of opened borders whilst the ‘occupation’ continues. Importantly, the opening of the borders was a decision of T.C. leadership and did not come about as a result of G.C. struggle. For the small segment of the Cyprus community that sees the ‘struggle’ as reunification the opening of the borders did not undermine their struggle, on the contrary this group viewed the opening as a significant opportunity for reconciliation. However, the crossings that have taken place from both sites of the divide have not resulted in any further substantial interaction between the two communities (Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Dikomitis, 2005; Demetriou, 2007; Sahin, 2011; Christiansen, 2005; Webster & Timothy, 2006). Most G.C.s had limited or no interaction with T.C.s (Sites, Latin & Lazio, 2007 and Webster & Timothy, 2006) because coming closer to the ‘other’ (as revealed through the data) is understood as undermining the ‘occupation’.

The Annan Plan referendum (2004), was defeated by the G.C.s (75.8% voted ‘no’), illustrating that they did not wish to live with T.C.s (see Bordignon, 2008), under a
collectively formed community and shared state authority \(^{13}\) (see Russell & Cohn, 2012), at least not under the specific arrangements of the plan. Yet, this socio-political process had created in the public perception a tangible possibility of an end to this long-lasting conflict, while such a possibility has been further sustained in the public perception, by the repeated negotiations thereafter (Spilling et al. 2010: 41). Moreover, today, the understanding of 'I struggle', changes towards a 'European solution to the Cyprus Problem'. The accession of Cyprus to the EU, as it will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, marked a particular turning point in the G.C. 'struggle'. The EU for G.C. become an instrument for the struggle through EU political pressures on Turkey (Demetriou, 2008; Bryant, 2004; Joseph, 1997; Yakinthou, 2009), contributing to a disengagement of the community from an 'I struggle' position, whilst also, as the next chapter will discuss, reducing the defence budget. I discuss that 'I do not forget and I struggle' is a discourse which requires and facilitates a nationalist, militarist masculinist culture. When that culture begins to weaken, due to unforeseen events, the discourses which sustain that culture also begin to unravel.

Polemical discourses and nationalistic imaginaries such as the 'struggle' to push the borders back whilst 'defending' the borders from the 'enemy within' to prevent further 'Turkish aggression' (I struggle) and the maintenance of the memory of what is now 'occupied' by Turkey (I do not forget) become bleary and antithetical when the partition of the two communities is no longer conceptually predicated on the existence of un-crossable military guarded borders.

Understandably, the perceived undermined 'fighting spirit' generated multiple and intense reactions amongst my interviewees. However, there was a general feeling of unease and desolation about this. Crossings are seen as undermining the understanding of the conflict as 'occupation' because they are translated as accepting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as legitimate. This was clearly depicted in an interview I conducted with the Minister of Defence when the border opened, Kyriacos Mavronicolas, who commented that soldiers began to question whether it was really that necessary to serve their military service, i.e. actively take part in the 'struggle', when seeing the movement of people from one side of the border to the

\(^{13}\) The Annan Plan was rejected by 75.8% of G.C.s. While 64.8% of the T.C. population voted in favor of the plan. (see Russell, J. & Cohn, R., 2012 and Bordignon, 2008 for an analysis of the results).
other. Indeed another contingent underside of the weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’, the next chapter will reveal, is that within the aforementioned space the need for ‘defence’ has been challenged, contributing to the weakening self-understanding of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, and of men in the military national struggle.

In such ways, the people I talked to expressed their desolation that both the G.C. community and political leadership have allowed the conflict to reach the current disappointing point where the ‘fighting spirit’ of the community is significantly weakened. In this context, interviewees also linked the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ to the accession of Cyprus to the EU due to an emerging notion of security. The lessening of the fear of war with Turkey linked to the EU as a protective power was an issue raised by most people I talked to and was treated with a lot of gravity. As Xristos (man, 27, unemployed) explains:

“The fact that there might be a war or that Turkey could attack us, doesn’t even cross my mind. However, I think that if anything happened, many countries would help us, mostly because of the EU”.

The opening of the borders, with the resulting crossings, the T.C. existence in the South, and the accession of Cyprus to the EU have resulted in a general public feeling of safety that a war between the RoC and Turkey is now unlikely (Demetriou, 2005; Vassiliou, 2004: 12; Lordos and Kaymak, 2007: 16). This created a feeling of relative ontological security (Giddens, 1990: 92) in the G.C. community in relation to the previously felt ‘existential threat’ with the possibility of a second invasion by Turkey and a ‘full occupation’ of the island.

Such changes in the public perception of G.C.s have contributed to destabilising the image of the ‘other’. This image was constructed as an ‘enemy within’ against whom there was a national ‘fighting spirit’, both of which were challenged by a Europeanisation of the conflict situation and a relative assimilation of the ‘otherness’ with the ‘normality’. This weakened image of the national struggle and an “enemy” thus ousted the feeling of fear of that “enemy”. A non-Commissioned Officer (35, interviewed whilst off duty) of the NG provides an understanding as to how the opening of the borders has resulted in an undermining of the fear of war but also a challenge to the idea of the Turks as the ‘other’:
"When I joined the army, I heard the word “war” maybe even twice a week; we feared that a war could break out at any time. When I was a kid, if I ever saw a Turkish man I thought that he would kill me. Nowadays, soldiers don’t experience this … There is the possibility for a rapprochement and, for example, in 2003 when the borders were opened, people who are soldiers today were 9-10 years old at the time. They have grown up differently…"

Cleary the above account enunciates that these generations have grown up differently as they have been able to cross and experience T.C.s in the South with whom they can interact. The diminution of the fear of war in a divided and highly militarised country like Cyprus, is both of political and social importance as it signals the creation of, what Foucault terms, counter-discourse (for example see, Terdiman, 1989). The counter discourse was built against the most prominent G.C. discourse of ‘occupation’ which was underlined by the feeling of fear of another military conflict with Turkey. In post-war Cyprus, ‘defence’, as the next chapter will discuss, was framed by both the state and the public as of existential importance. G.C. militarism involved the commitment of the whole social body that was mobilised by the state as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Then the relative, yet significant, decrease in the fear of war in the public perception holds the potential to reconfigure the perception of need for defence.

In the transition period, from having to ‘struggle’ to defend the borders to having the possibility to cross, two narratives emerged: there was a shared perception of the communal need to care and ‘struggle’ for the community but also a diminishing need to deploy a militaristic protectionism. In the fieldwork research I conducted it was systematically clear that interviewees felt a responsibility to ‘struggle’. This was evident in that interviewees often and systematically reproduced the G.C. state official discourse of nationalism to ‘remember’ the ‘occupied’ part and ‘struggle’ for liberation from ‘occupation’, whilst reproducing aspects of nationalistic state institutional constructions of identity in their agendas. Yet, in most cases, they personally maintained a passive stance towards the conflict and the national struggle, while condemning this public process of letting these ideals fade away and felt defeated about it. In this transit socio-political situation, my interviewees found themselves in a somewhat problematic situation. This paradox emerged in most interviewees’ accounts and perhaps it can be theorised as a gap between the idea of enacting memory and deliberation. Xristo’s (man,
27, unemployed) account summarises some of the main arguments and feelings evoked in relation to the public’s association with the conflict situation:

“Xristos: Psychologically...I don’t have the Cyprus Problem in mind all the time. Of course everyone is concerned about the Cyprus problem. But, in our everyday life, at my age, I am personally not preoccupied with the question as someone older would. You can say I grew up with this, but I don’t stress about it all the time. I am not constantly worried. However, it is wrong that people are settled, and they have reassured themselves that everything is fine. It’s wrong that they don’t have that desire that older people have to return and take back our homes.

Interviewer: So do you believe in this...?

Xristos: I mean, if someone told me now that the borders would be closed, and we had to stay here and they had to stay there, I might not react, do you understand? I don’t say that I want to stay like this and forget about the rest (translators note: meaning the ‘occupied’ land). But, it is not something that bothers me constantly and concerns me that much in my everyday life.”

The paradox becomes immediately apparent as, while the man above confirms that he is not preoccupied about the Cyprus Problem, he acknowledges that he has been brought up to be concerned about it and he then criticises the reality he has just portrayed and everyone who is taking part in it. In this context, it is interesting to note that the ‘I’ is used to evoke one’s personal journey through the inactiveness towards the ‘Cyprus problem’. Yet, when that is placed in the context of the broader reality of the conflict the ‘I’ becomes “they” and converts into a criticism of the reality the observer is now confronted with.

It should also be noted that when I asked him to clarify if he meant that he believes in the national struggle, he uses the borders as the main way of illustrating if one cares or not, and he goes on to evidence his inactiveness with how he would have responded to changes made on the borders; “if someone told me now that the borders would be closed I might not react, do you understand?”. Interestingly, by placing the borders in the centre of his description he then reproduces the same paradox as above. What comes out of the nexus he reproduces is a divergence, of which importance is further
analysed throughout the empirical chapters, between the preservation of ‘national memory’ and engagement in the ‘national struggle’: “I don’t say that I want to stay like this and forget about the rest. But it is not something that bothers me constantly and concerns me that much in my everyday life.”

Indeed most interviewees referred to national commemorative events, anti-occupational marches and protests, strongly advocating national heroes and defence issues, which in the post-war G.C. nationalist discourse inhabited a sacred place representing the ‘fighting spirit’, as something of the past or school, and commented on such values and ideals fading away in expressing and portraying the broader undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’. These masculinist discourses of nationalism and militarism that today are weakening, as the next chapters will further illustrate, have been a central part of the ideological basis for the culture of the ‘national struggle’. Maria’s (woman, 27, translator) response was a rather typical one of people of that age; when I asked her to comment on how she feels about national commemoration events, she notes that:

“When I hear the national anthem for example, I am moved but these are things of school mostly and thus, in general, I don’t feel that I have to do something for my country in terms of national conscience.”

The above quotation immediately presents us with an interesting reality. When I asked her to elaborate on how she feels about national commemorations she did so through drawing a clear correlation with how much she is willing to do for her country. Thus, she examined her feelings in relation to national commemorative events as compared with how much she is willing to ‘struggle’, in metaphorical terms.

The dichotomy that both the interviewees above, Xristos’ and Maria, drew between an individual’s preservation of the ‘memory of the war events and lost lands’ and the extent to which one is concerned and ‘proactive about the conflict situation’, represents larger social and institutional structures and processes of the prominent campaign of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. Nationalism is often reproduced and materialised through its own populist slogans.
Changes observed by my interviewees in the national ideals and values of the national struggle at the collective level were often expressed in a negative relation to some of the most popular G.C. slogans about the conflict. The two main ones discussed were ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ and ‘our borders are in Kerynia’. These two slogans have acquired much importance in G.C. society; being deeply socially and culturally reproduced and strongly projected through political and institutional discourse. In presenting my arguments regarding the national struggle following the opening of the borders, I will tie the following analysis further to the use of these slogans by my participants. What I wish to highlight here is the manner in which national slogans, which in the past expressed the position of the G.C. community at large in relation to the conflict and more specifically the ‘occupation’, were now most often sharply criticised by my interviewees, or treated with irony when placed in the context of the current G.C. situation.

The persistent use of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ by my interviewees to verbalise their observations reminded me of how individuals and groups of any form in the G.C. community refer to this slogan not only as a generalised slogan, but also as a collectively understood reality; expressing and embodying widespread concerns and the national goal of the G.C. political leadership and people: ‘to not forget the lands lost and the war events’ and to ‘struggle for liberation’. The importance of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ to G.C. nationalism, specifically to the creation of consciousness of victimhood against the Turkish aggressor, has been long addressed (Bryant, 2005; Yakinthou, 2008; Hadjipavlou, 2006; Efthymiou, 2011). “I don’t forget and I struggle” has been a function of G.C. nationalism, in symbolically constructing (Cohen, 1985), the post-war G.C. community yet also ‘imagining’ (Anderson, 1983) its future, (see Christou, 2006: 299). The account of Andros (42, company director) who is a refugee and a reserve illustrates this clearly:

“I try not to forget ‘I do not forget’ and I try to teach my children in this way. If we stop thinking like this, it’s like admitting that we have lost everything for good.”

Interviewees most often referred to and discussed the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ predominantly denoting the national struggle for liberation and the national promise underlying the fight that what was lost will not be forgotten, will not be forgiven,
in their effort to verbalise the relative yet evident (for them) loss of the ‘fighting spirit’ in ‘I struggle’.

Many people talked about such slogans with disappointment and anger, as they felt let down by the political direction the conflict situation has followed. They talked about the G.C. community ‘forgetting’ and not ‘struggling’, explaining that the open borders and crossings undermine the understanding of ‘occupation’ and, in synergy with the perceived security provided by the EU, the community does not feel the need to struggle. As Louca (man, 63, civil servant) a refugee from Kerynia comments:

“‘I do not forget and I struggle’ was just in the beginning; we thought that by saying all these slogans, we were achieving something. ‘Our borders are in Kerynia’. Where is Kerynia now? We will never get our cities and our villages back.”

Similarly, Xristalla (woman, 51, owner of a small convenience store) notes:

“Xristalla: ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ was very good but it couldn’t last forever.

Interviewer: But it continues to exist.

Xristalla: Yes but my daughters who have an age difference of 15 years, the younger one couldn’t understand ‘I do not forget’. The older one knows a few things at least. If the slogan was used correctly, it could have had a duration of 50-60 years but then we said the same about Constantinople: ‘As time and years go by, once more, it shall be ours’, is this valid today?”

In the above accounts, the ‘pushing’ and ‘pulling’ that occurs within the discourse of G.C. nationalism is reflected. This is understood as discursive tensions created between aspects of institutional nationalism and popular current nationalism. It is evident from the accounts presented above that these people used to believe and support the existence of these nationalistic slogans, yet in their present accounts there was anger, frustration and criticism about such slogans not representing the way in which the national struggle has developed. While these accounts are apparent of a perceived weakened ‘fighting spirit’, at the same time they are strongly expressing dejection and
grief for what is, to some extent, lost from G.C. society. Even though Front (In Greek: Μέτωπο), one of the most right-wing political parties for youths, represents a small part of the population as it takes a particular political view, the account of the press officer of Front below clearly depicts the weakening ‘fighting spirit’ in the community through the understanding of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’:

“People unfortunately have forgotten ...In the past, you could see Greek flags everywhere but now people will call “fascist” or “extreme nationalist” a person who is holding a Greek flag.... If a father is forgetting about our history how will his son care? .... we forget about ‘I do not forget’.

Front was created a few years ago with its main aim to awaken the national morale of G.C. youth and has as its motto: ‘Do not forget the I do not forget’. The creation of ultra-nationalist political formations in the space created following the opening of the borders is specifically addressed in the last section of this chapter.

Specifically, the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ was often used as a reflective mirror of both personal and community national sentiment. One of the two main narratives commented that both strands of ‘I do not forget’ and ‘I struggle’, are weakening in contemporary Cypriot society. As Xristos (man, 27, unemployed) comments:

“I believe that people at my age are not so much connected to ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. We may have learned it at school but people are forgetting and I don’t see anyone taking action.”

However, the most prominent narrative expressed that it is only the latter that is lost, thus the ‘I struggle’. Elina’s (woman, 33, teacher) account represents this narrative clearly:

‘Elina: ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ in my opinion means that in the past these places were ours and the ‘fight’ part is lost but the ‘I do not forget’ part, we need to keep it in our hearts and we need to convey it to the next generations.

Interviewer: Why do you say that the ‘fight’ part is lost?
Elina: Because, I don’t see anyone fighting, I don’t see anything happening. If not forgetting means fighting then ok it still exists. As long as I live I will try to talk about this at school and I hope that this won’t fade away through the years.”

Usually, this observation, which is used later on to explain the resistance of crossing the borders, was narrated by noting that general G.C. society does not choose to fight for the conflict further, but that national memory (I do not forget) is broadly sustained and that this is a form of struggle. This could be theorised in the sense of moralising the loss of struggle and grieving for its loss. Thus, the struggle is maintained since memory is sustained. Discursively, national memory presented in the form of struggle seemed too often to provide, at least, a temporary solution to the tension expressed between the loss of the broader sense of struggle in society, not desiring to let go of the national memory and of the war events and territories lost. For example, Xristina (woman, 35, civil servant) formed her position similarly to Elina:

“These places were ours and the “fight” part is lost but the ‘I do not forget’ part, we need to keep in our hearts and minds. We might never get them back but we shouldn’t erase them from our memory.”

Interviewees, stating their observations towards ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ more often than not expressed their thoughts with disappointment, regarding both the Cypriot political leadership and community repudiating the goal of liberating the ‘occupied’ areas of Cyprus. In the chapter on masculinity, through the theorisation of nationalist militarised masculinity, it is illustrated that this disenchantment relates to the fear of a G.C. devaluing of a masculinist defensive and assertive position of power in the national struggle for ‘defence’ and liberation from ‘occupation’.

The notion of the community not ‘struggling’ was often tied to the understanding that the political leadership had lost its sense of struggle, while not managing to bring the conflict to an end after such a long time. This disappointment towards the political and state level struggle seemed to significantly contribute to the broader loss of the sense of struggle by the G.C. community. The G.C. public collectively understood the national struggle for liberation following the war of 1974 through a concept of an assemblage of forms of struggles: political, military and public. A clear intersection of the public and political struggle, which as it will be illustrated in the next chapter is today also
weakening, has been the militarist frame of the struggle that was constructed through the idea of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Often, the people I talked to talked about feeling deceived by political leadership that had called the community to commit to the struggle, but now they felt that leadership itself is not struggling as it should. As Spiros (man, 27, accountant) commented:

“They do it for their own benefit and I am sorry to say this but they refer to the Cypriot problem at their own convenience in an attempt to assist their political campaigns.”

These accounts were often narrated by also noting that any form of public struggle would now be ineffectual; as they felt that the power was not anymore in people’s hands. As Evroula (woman, 30, teacher) says:

“I do not think that we are fighting. We are not fighting because even if we decide to continue the struggles that our ancestors had started, they will not bring any results, simply because it’s not the people’s decision.”

The above account guides us in understanding the disengagement of the social body from its involvement in the national struggle, a point which is further illustrated in the next chapter specifically in relation to the weakening understanding of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’.

While this disappointment was a generally accepted reality across age groups, people often emphasised that it is the youth that is the most indifferent segment of the population in relation to the so-called ‘Cyprus problem’. This was most often supported in two ways. The first was by explaining that the youth has been most disappointed by the political leadership that has not resolved the ‘Cyprus problem’. The second was that the cultural shift towards a new privileging understanding of society, consisting of entrepreneurial, rights-bearing individuals associated most often with ‘being European’, has mostly affected the youth segment of the population and this posed an obstacle in the struggle.

It was indeed often the case that younger interviewees talked about how their disappointment towards politics has made them less engaged in the national struggle. These accounts were often narrated by noting that they do not trust the politicians, but
also that they feel that they have no political or national leader to look up to. As Anna (woman, 32, teacher) further notes:

“I think that it’s hard because we don’t have modern standards, we don’t have politicians that we can look up to, they don’t give us motives, they don’t deserve our trust.”

The absence of motivating political leadership and the distrust towards the political leaders that they would be able to bring the conflict to an end was broadly understood as counteracting the sustenance of the national goal for liberating Cyprus from the ‘occupation’ forces. This was a rather commonly understood reality expressed in some way by most people I talked to, but understandably this created multiple reactions.

Furthermore, as indicated above, interviewees often saw the economic prosperity, that is often linked to the ‘economic miracle’ Cyprus (see appendix 3) experienced following the partition of 1974 (Gergakopoulos, 1999; Kammas, 1992), and the impact of Western capitalist ideals and values of individualism and consumerism on G.C. society, at the expense of the ‘fighting spirit’. This prominent narrative in my interviewees’ accounts was most often expressed with the explanation that this is the case especially since the problem has been so complicated and on-going, while in contemporary Cyprus there are no everyday reminders of any threat to this new comfortable situation.

In Cyprus, a greater acceptance of cultural pluralism and individualism and strengthening of both consumerist and material values has contributed to the formation of a G.C. culture that challenges the subordination of individual considerations to collective goals of the community, thus most centrally the national struggle. Neoliberalism, globalisation and migration are generating changes in Cypriot society, which is becoming more open, individualistic, and materialistic rather than tradition orientated, and significantly more liberated from the shackles of the nation-state, as it existed in the post-independence era. The accession of Cyprus into the EU has meant further liberalisation of the Cypriot economy, yet also greater cultural liberation of Cypriot society from the confines of the nation-state. The process of globalisation undermining the seclusion of state boundaries (Martell, 2010) has exposed Cypriot society in recent years to increasing cultural flows of Western notions of multiculturalism, individualism and understandings of success. Cypriot society was really quick in picking up Western
cultural ideals such as extensive acquisition of material wealth and financial and professional success.

Interviewees explained that Cypriot society is now focusing on one’s ‘image’, explaining that G.C.s today mostly care about their own rights, success and public projection of material wealth. Maria’s (woman, 27, translator) understanding was a very typical one:

‘All that Cypriots care about is having a financially rewarding and stable career and to buy expensive things, the times of heroism have died’

This cultural shift was generally seen as mutually exclusive to the ‘fighting spirit’. Many pointed out that Cypriot society is an individualistic, settled and comfortable one. And that, in conjunction with general society not feeling any immediate threat, new generations have been brought up with values aspiring for material wealth and socio-professional hypostasis, at the expense of national conscience, but above all at the expense of the ‘national struggle’. As Stiliani (woman, 30, teacher) typically told me:

“Because of the advancement of society, modernisation, settling down and the comfortable lives we live, young people don’t care about history or politics, they just care about easy money. Their goal is to have fun, to live their lives without worrying too much and then comes the rest (economic crisis, the Cypriot problem etc.).”

Generally, my interviewees highly doubted that the young generations would wish to jeopardise their personal goals and comforts in order to ‘fight’ for what was lost due to the war of 1974, especially since there are no everyday reminders of threat to the community. Indeed, as it will be discussed in the next chapters, draft-dodging conscription and the weakening value of heroism have been often linked to the individuals’ priorities and goals being placed above those of the community.

Besides a certain modification by the state of the ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ slogan, supports the above argument. A directive that has been sent to all elementary schools by the Ministry of Education and Culture in recent years, Christou (2006: 291-2) informs us, is entitled “Upgrading the goal of ‘I know, I don’t forget and I struggle.’” The upgrade of adding the instruction to ‘know’ illustrates the argument of the weakening ‘fighting
spirit’ of the younger community in the national struggle. Indeed, the memo noted that several inquiries had shown a decline in student interest and knowledge about the ‘occupied’ part; therefore it requested teachers to dedicate some teaching periods to this goal (Ibid). However, the upgrade also illustrates the instructiveness of the discourse of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ in constructing the G.C. community through mirroring a specific post-war identity; ‘to not forget’ the ‘occupation’ and ‘struggle’ to liberate the ‘occupied’ land. Indeed, following up with suggestions to incorporate this theme in particular classes, “the memo remarked that, in addition to knowledge and information, it is important that students (a) maintain their unwavering morale to struggle and (b) understand, without prejudice or intolerance, their rights and responsibilities in a semi-occupied” country (ibid: 292).

The observation of the Ministry of Education and Culture was repeatedly illustrated through my interviewees’ accounts to be a general agreement that the youth today is less preoccupied about the conflict and not as proactive in the national struggle as young generations used to be. Clearly such a reality, even if broadly shared, generated multiple and diverse reactions. While some interviewees such as Xristalla (woman, 51, owner of convenience store) commented: “It will pass, everyone will forget.” Others such as Stiliani’s (woman, 30, teacher) expressed resistance to the aforementioned process:

“Look, I think that ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ is a national idea, history is engraved in our memory, it’s something very important so we cannot just forget it, we cannot just erase “I do not forget and I struggle”, it’s like renouncing our identity.”

Moreover, a small group of interviewees, who most often held left-wing and/or bi-communal views, expressed their disagreement and anger regarding the mobilisation of this slogan and the meaning it acquired in state-institutional settings, especially schools, and commented to have moved completely away from such understandings of the conflict. For example, Pavlos (man, 23, student) said that:

“I remember ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ everywhere, that’s wrong! I think that they filled our minds with ideas but they didn’t give us the choice if we wanted to support those ideas or not. We have to learn to move forwards and to open our
minds and our eyes. This slogan means I won’t go on with my life until the Turks leave from Cyprus.”

Lastly, it was interesting that a small number of interviewees provided an account intersecting the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ that is clearly a discourse for the preservation of memory which projects its own vision of the future by balancing their positioning between ‘memory’, ‘progress’ and the ‘future’. As Stelios (man, 37, airport worker) comments:

“I don’t think we will ever forget and we shouldn’t forget, but we have to get on with our lives. It’s good to progress and to remember at the same time.”

Others provided this type of account while at the same time highlighting their difficulty in moving on. For example, Dimitris (man, 44, entrepreneur) comments that:

“No, I wouldn’t forget but as time goes by I will try to compromise even though it’s a lot harder for me to forget because I am a refugee.”

These accounts above illustrate a strong sense of ‘agency’ in relation to their identities, (for example see Hall, 1996a, Giddens, 1991 and Butler, 1990, 1993). My interviewees’ strong sense of agency, in the two accounts above (needing to move on with their lives) is, for them, directly interrelated with their own identity that they present as rather ductile. These accounts express a partial or almost complete transgression to the limits imposed upon their thought and identity by the discourse of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’, in which they both reported to previously being coerced in.

The accounts of my interviewees, broadly, brought about discussions about the institutional structures of nationalism, the shaking of these structures and the space opened for the ‘self’, the ‘I’ as distinct from the nationalist ‘struggle’. Besides being a socio-political process of transitions through several events, the years between 2003 and 2004 opened the possibility for inspecting the construction of the ‘self’ and thus restructuring as well. There was a relative self-detachment from the ‘nation-in-arms’ discourse which had constructed –and limited- G.C. identity. Foucault’s term “limit-attitude” is useful here. As Kiziltan et al. (1990: 365) note the “limit-attitude can be fully realised only in the form of historical investigations into our understanding of ourselves and our representations of the world around us”. The end of this “historico-practical”
investigation, according to Foucault, is to separate out “from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.” (in Rabinow, 1984: 38).

The “limit-attitude”, therefore, in the positioning of the two above interviewees towards ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ can be conceived as a unique combination of a discerning interest in what political historic, cultural, “natural” and inner “reality” is for them, with a personal “imagination which transgresses the limits imposed upon [their] thought and identity” (Kiziltan, Bain and Anita, 1990: 365). Examining and remembering where the national, and personal, identity of a continuous threat of war had come from provides a reflective framework that can be transgressed. In the words of Marios: ‘It’s good to progress and to remember at the same time.’

This section has illustrated that, following the opening of the borders, the national struggle rests on a new dynamic between a dispirited ‘I struggle’ and the need to maintain the ‘remembrance’ of ‘occupation’. The next section will illustrate that the tenacious ‘I do not forget’ is part of the construction of post-war Cyprus as a feminised victim of ‘occupation’. This theorisation of the data is used later on in this chapter to explain the resistance of crossing the border.

5.4. The relationship between a victimised Cyprus and the mothers of the missing persons

Following the opening of the borders and the accession of Cyprus to the EU, Cyprus continues to be depicted as a victim of ‘occupation’. In this section, I focus on the persistent nationalism of victimcy following the opening of the borders that is illustrated through a certain enduring, symbolic position of the mothers of the missing persons in society by first providing an account of this discourse in post-war Cyprus. I will argue that this collective G.C. position of victimcy in relation to the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus positions the crossings as a feminisation of the national struggle. Crossing as an act is translated as acceptance of the ‘occupation’ and thus forgetting that Cyprus has been the victim of the war in 1974 - the very memory that people should ‘not forget’.

The post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity has been cantered on a dynamic between a ‘victim’ and a ‘protector’. Militarism and nationalism
invoke the dichotomy of the male protector and the protected female, which coincides with a broader binary of active male protector versus passive female victim. Cyprus post-war nationalism has been one of victimhood (Constantinou, 2008). Militarism and masculinity on the other hand, as also the personal anecdote discussed in the introduction with my captain in the NG revealed, have played the role of the protector with masculinist discourses of virile militarisation, preparedness and defence. The role of men in the national struggle, as defenders of the community, have thus discursively internally responded to the victimized depiction of Cyprus. This type of relationship between the three was mobilised and supported by the state.

The post-war discourse of ‘victimcy’ and the mothers of the missing persons

The accounts of interviewees across the spectrum of political and social beliefs and readings of the conflict revealed that the mothers, wives and sisters of the missing G.C.s undoubtedly today still occupy and maintain a sacred place in the encapsulation of the national struggle for the G.C. community. In post-war Cyprus, the idea of national struggle was interwoven into the mobilisation of the broader ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 1983) of post-war Cyprus as a victim (Constantinou, 2008) in which the mothers of the missing persons symbolised the maternal long-suffering bond awaiting liberation, (see Yakinthou, 2008). This symbolism of post-war Cyprus through these mothers was constructed at the political-state level and transmuted to the community through the adoption of a collective position of feminised victimcy in relation to ‘occupation’, which was predicated on the idea of Turkey as a barbarian invader. This is the understanding that in the way in which Turkey ‘barbarically’ invaded Cyprus and illegally ‘occupied’ its Northern part, it also killed or captured G.C. soldiers and deprived the right to the truth of their women. Therefore, in this post-war discourse of victimcy the pain experienced by these women has become an inextricable representation of the pain experienced by the G.C. community caused by the invader and ‘occupying’ force Turkey. Then the mothers of the missing persons, by becoming constructed *through* and becoming *the* most clear and iconic manifestation of this discourse of national victimcy (see appendix4), adopted an indispensable part in the post-war construction of the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. This nationalism of
victimcy, as the next chapter discusses, was internally responded to by the muscular assertion of the rescuer state with its attentive masculinist discourses of virile militarisation, and the role of men in the national struggle as defenders of the community.

Feminist literature has repeatedly guided us in understanding that, in some nations, there is a use of a woman’s reproductive role to articulate policies of national survival (see Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1998). In the context of post-war Cyprus, the centrality of femininity in the projection of the need of national survival by the use of these women was naturalised by using the mothers, wives, and sisters and by these means they were politically effaced from the institutional and public structures they are integral to. The mothers of the missing persons became an integral part of the relationship the state of post-war Cyprus has mobilised between its international and internal agendas (discussed in the next chapter in relation to ‘defence’). They were used by the state to project the specific conceptualisation of post-war Cyprus to the international community as a victim, while they became an integral part of the internal politics of national resistance and ‘defence’; depicted in the official pronunciation of the trauma and need for liberation from ‘occupation’; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. The mothers of the missing persons were centrally mobilised through official and unofficial discourses of post-war national identity, appearing on brochures and posters published by the state. As Achilleas Dimitiradis, the lawyer who defended cases of the families of missing persons against the Republic of Cyprus before the Domestic Courts, notes:

“Mrs Palma [One of the wives of the missing persons] was instrumental in the campaigns that the missing did, she appears on a number of brochures used by the government, with children, she was in all demonstrations, she was essentially the face of the missing persons”.

The mothers of the missing persons have been deeply interwoven into the post-war conflict structures (Yakinthou, 2008) and the use of these women in representative terms is part of the broader conceptualisation of post-war Cyprus as relentlessly suffering and in need of deliverance. Therefore, whilst these women were not an official part of the struggle, the state mobilised this specific symbolic femininity of victimcy, which it constructed through this symbolism of the mothers of the missing persons, to
represent post-war Cyprus. This specific symbolism of the mothers of the missing persons through imagery published by the state and other institutional organisations related to the war, “lies in the silent image of their tragic figures that speaks for itself, without words, and especially without calling attention to itself.” (Christou, 2006; 295). As Yakinthou (2008: 16) argues “the symbol of the tormented woman (mother or wife) dressed in black and holding a photo of her missing loved one to a silent sky is the most powerful symbol of G.C. suffering.”

Furthermore, the major people displacement tragedy in 1974 that led to the Cyprus refugee issue ‘has been usually portrayed through the images of weeping women refugees … holding pictures of sons and family members … killed during the invasion.’ (Christou, 2006: 295). Therefore, this conceptualisation of post-war Cyprus was manifestly engendered through the iconic image of the mothers of the missing persons, whose compulsive expression of pain has constituted the image of them as an embodied constant reminder of the pain and sorrow of the G.C. community caused by the events of 1974. A poster that appeared in Cyprus after 1974 presented such a picture under the title “Our Martyred Cyprus” (Anthias, 1989: 155).

Yet this specific presentation of the mothers of the missing persons respectively also portrayed them as a symbol of national resistance and struggle for liberation from the ‘occupation’ forces. This interlinks with the broader discursive formation of nationalism (Calhoun, 1997) in post-war Cyprus that portrayed Cyprus through the tragic figure of a mother who is painfully waiting for liberation. Thus, the specific depiction of femininity through the enduring pain and hope of these mothers to find their children symbolises a unified national body of resistance and struggle. For example, a motto that often appeared above images of the mothers and wives of the missing persons is: ‘A mother who is waiting, a loving mother, a son, a daughter. Me and you. We still wait …. (in Greek: Μια μάνα που περιμένει. μια αγαπημένη. Ένας γιος,μια κόρη. Εσύ ,Εγώ. Θα περιμένουμε σκόμα ....). This specific conceptualisation of maternal post-war Cyprus that awaits for liberation was also expressed through literature and poetry (see appendix 5).

Nations often rely on maternal or paternal archetypes to invoke national unity. The mothers of the missing persons, whilst been used as a symbolic representation of post-
war Cyprus at the political and state level, this position of national victimcy that acquires its power by remembering the ‘occupation’ (i.e. I do not forget) becomes transmuted at a discursive level to a community position of feminised victimcy, which needs rescuing by this muscular militarised state. Thus, the construction of post-war Cyprus through this discourse of feminised victimcy symbolised through the mothers of the missing persons is constitutive of the ‘nation-in-arms’ that was previously manifested on the un-crossable borders. Characteristically in a speech by the Minister of Defence in an anti-occupation event dedicated to the mothers of missing persons, on the anniversary of the Turkish invasion (20th of July 2013), he notes:

‘You were crucified by them mother,
they stabbed you in the heart with a knife,
they took your child away from you,
but you still endure.
You are our Cyprus;
our Mother, our Wife, our Sister.
I kneel before you and kowtow to you.’

Militaries, as Enloe (2000) argues, have existed on the contradiction of appearing completely male, but being dependent on a cooperative long-suffering and self-sacrificing female presence. Therefore, in the G.C. community while women are excluded from the archaic yet continuously reproduced male notion of the protector, they occupy an important symbolic place in the national struggle as the caring mother of the nation; a mother who is suffering and who waits for liberation. Thus these ideals of femininity used to construct the idea of post-war Cyprus as a victim of ‘occupation’ came “to actually enforce the militarisation of masculinity.”(Enloe, 2004: 103).

This discursive symbolic conduction between ‘feminised victimcy’ and ‘rescuer state’ was chiefly manifested on the borders. The mothers of the missing persons have been presented through images in agony on the borders and they have frequently protested on the borders themselves. In symbolic terms, this has been the most prominent reminder of the need for national struggle and liberation of the victim post-war Cyprus;
the purest form of resistance, which was co-constitutively materialised by the masculinist G.C. military guarding the borders.

The post-war discourse of victimcy in the post-opening of the borders

Today in the post-opening of the borders European Cyprus in the minds of G.C.s the mothers of the missing persons are still the heart and the purest form of the ‘fighting spirit’ of the G.C. national struggle to remember ‘occupation’ and ‘liberate’ Cyprus from it. This enduring attachment of the community to this position of victimcy through the symbolism of these women becomes further revealed when taking into account that, in recent years, the construction of the case of the mothers of the missing persons by the post-war political leadership has been, to some extent, revealed. Recent court cases won at the District court of Cyprus (namely Pashas and Palmas vs Republic of Cyprus), on behalf of the families of missing persons, have begun to reveal that the case of the missing persons has, to an extent, been a political expediency of the Cypriot state and no more than a construct. As Achilleas Dimitriadis, the lawyer who defended these case, noted:

“For me it’s now obvious that for reasons yet unverified the government of the Republic of Cyprus saw fit to be ‘economical’, to say the least, with the truth. And by not telling the truth to these women, and by creating doubts in their minds, they actually made them think that there was a chance for their loved ones to return, when in fact on a number of occasions they knew, or should have known, that these people were dead and buried on our side.”

Moreover, the following quotation captures the three most prominent narratives about the mothers of the missing persons articulated by my interviewees and reveals that the primordial nationalist attachment to the symbolism of post-war Cyprus as a feminised victim that demands justice and thus liberation from ‘occupation’ encapsulated through the iconic image of these mothers persists. Dimitri’s (man, 27, travel agent) account provides a point of departure:

“I think that most of them know that the missing persons are dead but I also think that they have the right to be asking for justice. There is no one who doesn’t want
Almost all of my interviewees stated that they understand that these people are no longer missing, but are dead; most often stating awareness of the political exploitation of the case of the missing persons. Yet all of the people I talked to across the full spectrum of political and social ideologies, and regardless of their view on the conflict and willingness to participate in the national struggle, expressed deep sadness and sympathy for the pain experienced by the mothers of the missing persons and most of them expressed how for them this pain is the purest form of resistance. Thus, the enduring pain experienced by these mothers and wives and their resilient hope that they might find their children for G.C. continues today to be intuited as national strength in the milieu of the national struggle. For example, Lampros (man, 34, teacher) who had not expressed any strong nationalist beliefs and in many cases condemned nationalist views still reproduces a similar narrative to the above:

“A few people are experiencing all this pain, the indignation, and the yearning to go back and find those missing persons. Ok, we have reached a point where the hope of finding them is starting to fade away but they still believe that they might find their children one day. They will never stop hoping.”

Stelios (man, 37, airport worker) account also clearly illustrates this:

“I mean that the mother of a missing person won’t ever forget about the invasion, she won’t stop caring. To me, this is very important.”

What is most central here is that the case of the mothers of the missing persons that was constructed into a discourse presenting them as the clearest symbolism of the post-war Cyprus as a victim of ‘occupation’ is, in this new setting, sustained. This illustrates the continuing position of victimcy of the community in relation to the ‘occupation’ that appears to have become an inextricable component of the post-war national identity centred on remembering that the community is a victim as the land across the border is ‘occupied’; an understanding of oneself that was articulated by interviewees across the spectrum of political and social beliefs. This is interesting for G.C. nationalism as it means that its main internal opposition; the identity of ‘Cypriotism’,
as discussed in the literature review, which is clearly associated with the liberal fraction of Cyprus (Mavratsas, 1996; 88) also reproduces the discourse of ‘occupation’.

My argument is that the mothers of the missing persons are an integral function of the reproduction of the discourse of ‘occupation’, since their suffering and perseverance are directly linked to ‘occupation’. ‘Occupation’ is a discourse that, as this thesis argues, is sustained in the post-opening of the borders. The case of the missing persons, presented through their mothers, in G.C. nationalism is inextricable from ‘occupation’ since they are understood to be an outcome of the invasion and the continuous ‘occupation’. Therefore, whilst the interviewees are aware that these soldiers are dead and not missing they still feel empathy towards the pain felt by these women, as for them they symbolise the pain the community has been going through because of ‘occupation’. Concurrently, these women that refuse to accept the faits accomplis of the Turkish ‘occupation’ that has resulted in the death of their loved ones but still relentlessly hope that they will find them; symbolise for the community that the yearning to liberate the ‘occupied’ land is alive. The depiction of women as bodies of national resistance is part of a larger discourse on the nation as a body (Haraway, 1991). Dimitri (man, 27, travel agent) characteristically comments:

“They are the tragic figures of the invasion. They are the people who have been suffering since and they will never stop suffering. They will never forget and they are a part of our society who will always be in pain, who will always think about this, who will always wait and fight.”

It is argued therefore that in the post-opening of the borders nationalist structures, where there has been a perceived weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’, the specific conceptualisation of post-war Cyprus as a woman in need of deliverance (symbolised through the mothers of the missing persons) has become a central function of the moralisation of the sense of struggle (I struggle) through the sustenance of memory (I do not forget). As Christou has argued: ‘for these young people, the intensity of the women’s protest and the persistence of their presence at the Green Line […]borders…]—especially in contrast with the perceived lack of ‘action’ by anyone else—constitute the highest form of struggle’ (2006: 295).
The specific femininity embodied in the idea of these women as bearers of the ‘fighting spirit’ represents a G.C. ‘soul’ (in Greek: ψυχή), that remains ‘free’ and Greek; “something internal, pure, and natural (as opposed to imposed)”, whilst the body (Cyprus) is enslaved and forced into allegiance to foreign rulers (Bryant, 2002: 511-513) and thus ‘occupied’.

These women, in the post-opening of the borders nationalist discourse in representative terms, as articulated in the accounts of my interviews, act as a function of resistance; the enslaved ‘soul’ that will not be surrendered by the community that continues to remember that it is only temporarily enslaved, thus ‘occupied’, but remains ‘free’ (I do not forget). Whilst most often my interviewees accounts, in regards to their position towards the issue of the conflict, were differentiated by the type of solution supported and the acceptance or not of the T.C.s, they all in some way articulated the discourse of ‘occupation’ and the relentless need for remembrance of the land that is ‘occupied’.

Today the remembrance (I do not forget), thus the sustenance of the discourse of ‘occupation’, the next section will discuss, is mainly expressed through the resistance to cross the border. Most characteristically, today photos of the mothers of the missing persons, but also of the missing soldiers, have been placed on the crossing checkpoints on the borders on the South site of the divide. Therefore, this instruction of memory through the nationalist discourse of victimcy (I do not forget) in relation to ‘occupation’ that has been depicted through the mothers of the missing persons is today printed on the checkpoints. This function of memory in relation to a now open and thus crossable border reflects the adapted reiteration of the G.C. nationalism of victimcy that poses crossing as ‘forgetting’ the ‘occupation’ and, therefore, the feminisation of the ‘I struggle’ to liberate the North side of the border – hence accepting that the land that is considered to be ‘occupied’ is lost.

5.5. Enacting national memory and deliberation; crossings and ‘occupation’

‘I do not forget’, as the previous section has illustrated, is a persistent discourse in this new setting to not forget that the G.C. community has been the victim of the invasion of Turkey in 1974 and continues to be a victim through the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus by Turkey. Then, as this section will illustrate, in the post-opening of the borders to not
cross, cross again, or to not come close and interact with the ‘other’ is to maintain oneself within the discourse of ‘occupation’ (I do not forget).

Statistics inform us, as already discussed in the historical chapter, that in the first year of opened borders (from April 2003 to the end of 2004) a total of 2,347,792 G.C. s and 3,595, 979 T.C.s had crossed the checkpoints, (Hazou, 2005). In 2013, newspaper ‘Alitheia’ (in Greek: αλήθεια) commented that since 2003, thus within about 10 years, there have been 22 million crossings, (see Alitheia – Άληθεια, (2013). However, studying the border crossing figures in Cyprus one also observes that many G.C.s did not cross the ‘Green Line’ at all (Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Dikomitis, 2005; Webster & Timothy, 2006).

In the scene of a peaceful and seemingly rather comfortable existence of the T.C. presence in the South and the many positive stories of G.C.s visiting the North, this section will illustrate that the most prominent narrative perceives the “unjustified” G.C. crossings to be further weakening the ‘fighting spirit’ (I struggle) from the G.C. community’s perspective, as crossing is to accept ‘occupation’. In this context, a strong agenda of ‘who’ and ‘why’ one should cross determines G.C.s choice of crossing. This discourse on the crossings will be illustrated to be an adapted, reiterated invocation of G.C. nationalism within this new space created following the opening of the borders of remembering ‘occupation’ (I do not forget). Thus the resistance of crossing is an adapted discursive mechanism of reproducing the discourse of ‘occupation’. For the purposes of this section I separate and address consecutively the crossings of T.C.s to the South from the crossings of G.C.s to the North illustrating that for G.C.s both are framed through the discourse of ‘occupation’.

The ‘other’ on ‘our side’

A crossing of G.C.s to the North needs to be conceptualised as a separate type of interaction with T.C.s crossing to the South, yet both are deliberated through the discourse of ‘occupation’. The quantitative significant crossing of T.C. s to the South provides a qualitative opportunity for G.C. s to become engaged with their ‘ethnically

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14 The overall population of the whole of Cyprus in 2003 was 817,095 (see World Bank, World Development Indicators). Therefore, the statistics mentioned include G.C.s and T.C.s, who live abroad. At the time it was a historical moment and G.C.s and T.C.s from all over the world visited Cyprus to cross the border.
divided other’. However, this opportunity has been conditioned through an adaptive reiteration of the discourse of ‘occupation’ following the opening of the borders that keeps both ‘self’ and ‘other’ separate.

The flow of people between the borders, as also discussed above, is an unequal one, as a significant number of T.C.s cross to the South daily. Crossing to visit one’s house in the North side of the divide and perhaps for chiefly sentimental reasons presupposes a very different social and psychological setting than the G.C. community accepting the existence of T.C.s in everyday life in the South\textsuperscript{15}. The embargo placed on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by the international community due to the ‘occupation’, and the larger economy of the RoC, drives a lot of T.C.s to cross the border on a daily basis for work, study, shopping and so forth.

The daily flow of T.C.s to the European South was clear in the accounts of many of the people I talked with to have resulted in challenging former preoccupations in relation to the T.C.s as the ‘other’ and understanding the similarities T.C.s have with G.C.s, especially in terms of culture and outward appearances. The threatening and unknown ‘enemy within’ that for 37 years lived across the border now became a human entity in the everyday life of G.C. society. For example Pavlos (man, 23, student) typically comments:

“I met one because he is a friend of my family and I also met two guys with whom we were working together for some time. They are people, just like us. I don’t hate them.

I don’t think that I have a problem living with them. They are not so different than us, on the outside as well as culture-wise and mentality-wise.”

Interestingly, a group of the people I talked to, who worked in the fields of business and industry, emphasised how the opening of the borders had an immediate effect on the collaboration of business and industries across the border and that it is through this opportunity that they themselves came to meet and cooperate with T.C.s. As Marios (man, 40, entrepreneur) who is a refugee notes:

\textsuperscript{15}In this context, it should be noted that T.C. are eligible for Cypriot citizenship and other democratic and legal rights in the RoC.
“Yes, when I was in some companies, right after the opening of the borders, we had some contacts with T.C. businessmen because we had the same distributors. There are a lot of open-minded businessmen and they have good dealerships and there are some of them who speak Greek. We cooperated very well.”

Indeed, research has stressed the effective business collaborations between the two sides, (Yorucu et al., 2010; Webster et al., 2009), and the effect of this on facilitating peace-making (Gokcekus et al., 2012; Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri, 2008). However, in the most prominent narrative, whilst there was relative humanisation of the ‘other’ in the G.C. nationalist imagination, interviewees reported to have had very limited or no interaction with T.C.s, and accounts where any form of relationship or deeper interaction had taken place were somehow limited. In this narrative people took a clear political stance regarding interaction with T.C.s asserting in many cases the discourse of ‘occupation’ in which they clearly articulated the notion of a need to maintain a distance. Xristos’ (man, 27, unemployed) account was a very typical one:

“I am not against a friendship with them but while the situation remains the same (translators note: referring specifically to ‘occupation’) I will not go after one.”

Clearly for Andreas the distance he feels that he needs to keep from the ‘other’ is delimited by the discourse of ‘occupation’, where coming closer undermines the ‘occupation’. Other interviewees went further to analyse the distance they feel they need to keep due to the difficulty they would have found in conducting some type of interaction with T.C.s. For example Stiliani (woman, 30) a teacher who was given a class were a number of students were T.C.s explained her difficulty of overcoming past prejudices:

“10 years ago a friend of mine was dating a Turk and I remember telling her ‘why would you date him, aren’t there any other men in the world?’ Now I have changed a bit, because of the fact that I had T.C. students, but it’s very hard.”

Crossings have not resulted in an integration of the two communities and nor in a substantial interaction between them. Even though, as noted above, many of the people I talked to reported to have become rather comfortable with the T.C. existence on the Southern part of the island and some have formed bi-communal relationships and
collaborations, the accounts of my interviewees on the whole point to interaction between the two communities in the South as been limited and, in many cases, absent. The fear that sustains the need for a distance from the ‘other’ and therefore the fear that penetrates coming closer to the ‘other’ appears to be created by the discourse of ‘occupation’, where coming closer undermines ‘occupation’. I will now proceed to illustrate that the strongly expressed G.C. agenda of ‘who’ is and ‘how’ one is allowed to cross is also conditioned by the discourse of ‘occupation’, where crossing “unjustifiably” undermines the discourse of ‘occupation’.

To not cross and the discourse of ‘occupation’

Drawing from the fieldwork research I conducted in Cyprus in 2011, many had never crossed out of protest for the need to show their passports and thus, in their view, acknowledging the ‘pseudo-state’ of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, whereas others did not cross because of their unwillingness to forgive; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. Many others who had crossed to the North, only did so once or twice. While a much smaller number of interviewees had crossed repeatedly or on a number of occasions.

The many G.C. resistances that have been put in place defining ‘who’ and ‘why’ one should cross are delimited by the understanding of the conflict as an ‘occupation’. This provides us with certain insights into post-opening of the border G.C. nationalism and, as the next chapters will illustrate, its inter-relationship with militarism and masculinity. Today, the remembrance (I do not forget), thus the sustenance of the discourse of ‘occupation’ is mainly expressed through the resistance to cross or re-cross the border. ‘I do not forget’, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is in certain ways now moralising the loss of ‘I struggle’ in the community as the resistance to cross is sustaining in the G.C. nationalist imagination (Anderson, 1983) the discourse of ‘occupation’ that embodies the post-war victim notion that the land is theirs and only temporarily ‘occupied’. Aggelos’ (42, vice-director of a company, refugee) account, which was very typical of the people that had crossed, provides a point of departure:
“I have crossed three to four times. The first time, we went to see our house. It wasn’t a very good experience. It’s horrible to see your mother touch the house and cry. It was just me and my mother, my father couldn’t go then, it was too hard for him. They were both very sad. The rest of the times we went to Apostle Andreas and Kerynia. It’s not a great experience though. I felt like a tourist in my own country and I didn’t like that. Signs are in Turkish, the place is not developed. I don’t want to cross again because I feel that I am not doing any good by going, it is not ethical. Only the fact that I show my identity card and give them money to as an insurance, that’s horrible. I would like to go, just to visit all the beautiful places of my country, but I went a few times and it still doesn’t feel right given that Turkish occupation continues.”

In the above account it is clear that the discourse of ‘occupation’ conditions the choice of whether Aggelos should cross again. The crossings and perception of the weakened ‘fighting spirit’ in the most prominent narrative of my interviewee accounts fires up the discourse of ‘occupation’ in the face of the fear of it being undermined. ‘Occupation’ is an instructive discourse that is the internal integral facet of ‘I do not forget’. ‘I do not forget’ meant to not forget the war events and their outcomes, which in this discourse are defined as ‘occupation’. Then ‘occupation’ is a discourse, thus ‘ready-made and reconstituted ‘experiencing’s’ displayed and arranged through language’ (Hall, 1977: 322) that provide resistance to new patterns of thinking or action that lay outside of it (Bourdieu 1991: 107). The accounts presented in this section, I argue, reveal that crossings can potentially lead to new spaces of contact and new experiences that will transform nationalist preconceptions towards forming new experiences and constructing new histories between the two communities that will be based on those shared experiences. I argue that it is this possibility my interviewees compulsively foreclose through the discourse of ‘occupation’.

The opening of the borders and the crossings are understood as threatening the discourse of ‘occupation’. The opening of the borders after 30 years, in April 2003, during Rauf Denktas’ time as president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as it was discussed in the historical chapter, came as a surprise to G.C. s. Yet, this surprise and the subsequent crossings of G.C.s to the North, for the G.C. community at a national ideological level, were perceived as what Foucault names as a counter-discourse (for example see, Terdiman 1989) to the ‘occupation’. The account of General
Pandreou (pseudonym), who was a Major General of the NG when the borders opened, further provides a point of departure:

“In my opinion we were caught by surprise. We hadn’t studied the situation thoroughly and we hadn’t informed the people properly. If we had the time to do it, we could have informed everyone and the opening of the borders wouldn’t have affected us this much. It affected us negatively because only by passing through the borders it was like recognising the existence of a fictitious state and also the military structures were shaky. The fact that people could pass through the borders, certainly changed everything …”

The above quotation guides us in further understanding the centrality in which the borders have been placed in the overall conceptualisation of the conflict situation and the attendant ideology of defence. Yet, it also illustrates the urgency with which the state and its institutions framed the occurring crossings as threatening the definition of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’. The borders on the part of G.C.s were the very manifestation of the ‘occupation’, as the utility of their existence was to protect the respective population and territory while the state was ‘defending’ the community and ‘fighting’ for the liberation of Cyprus from the ‘occupation’ army, namely Turkey.

The reasoning articulated by the most prominent narrative of my interviewees as to ‘why’ and ‘who’ has the right to cross; reflects the governmental statements that began to be made shortly after the opening of the borders. Within days of opened borders, Demetriou (2007: 998) informs us, “government statements appeared that distinguished between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for crossing … the epitome of this process was the self-enacted practice by individuals of imposing prohibitions that did not officially exist… a code of conduct between the state and its subjects was created that was beyond law”. These statements illustrate that the state has a vested interest in maintaining the discourse of ‘occupation’.

The qualitative research conducted by Boedeltje & Houtum (2007) supports the above argument. As they point out “the terminology used by the Greek Cypriot officials to

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16 General Pandreou has held various roles in the period that this thesis is concerned with. From 2003 to 2005 he was an Adjutant to the Minister of Defense. In 2005, he was promoted as the Manager of the Military Office of the Minister of Defense. I will refer the role he held when discussing a specific period, otherwise I will be referring to him as General Pandreou.
describe border movement illustrates vividly current attitudes: the Turkish Cypriots do not cross the Green Line, but ‘enter’ the ‘free areas’ … The Greek Cypriots on the other hand ‘travel’ to the ‘occupied’ areas and ‘cross’ the Green Line.” (ibid: 18). Similarly, Webster & Timothy (2006: 176) comment drawing on their quantitative research on the crossings that most of those who have not crossed “resist because it offends their sense of ethics – travelling to the other side of the island would demonstrate tacit recognition of the existence of the other political entity on the island”.

These observations direct us to the ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ campaign, discussed above, a state mobilised binary position between ‘remembering’ and ‘fighting’ that came to symbolise the national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’. Thus, crossing is to forget the ‘I do not forget’ and to abandon the ‘I struggle’ as crossing is translated as accepting that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (an illegal ‘occupation’) is legitimate.

It appears, therefore, that through the co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity these symbolic representations of post-war Cyprus as a feminised victim of ‘occupation’ operating at a national level, as discussed in the previous section, become transmuted to this idea of a feminised population in the face of ‘occupation’ that denies and resists crossing which would mean accepting ‘occupation’. Thus, the co-constitution of this three-fold relationship interprets the crossings as emasculating the G.C. masculinist position of power in the conflict ‘to not forget’ that the community is a ‘victim’ of ‘occupation’ that needs to be rescued by the muscular state through ‘struggle’ for liberation of the entire ‘occupied’ land that would allow all G.C. refugees to return to their houses and land.

Let us now take a moment to examine in more detail how crossings have been linked to the discourse of ‘occupation’ through further diversity in the data.

Whilst many of the people I talked to have never crossed to the North; clearly articulating the discourse of ‘occupation’ in their reasoning, the ones that had crossed at least once or twice had sentimental, but most often, positive experiences to report regarding their experience in the North and their interaction with the new inhabitants of their house, (see also Hadjipavlou, 2007b: 54 for similar observations). These accounts
repeatedly illustrated a humanisation of the ‘other’. Giorgos (male, 26, accountant) who is a second generation refugee typically describes his experience:

“We had also met the people who were living in her [his grandmothers’] house and even though they were settlers and they are of ill fame, they were very nice people. They had kept my grandmother’s photos, they gave them to us, they gave us oranges from the garden and they told us they wished we could go back and be able to live in peace.”

Still, out of all the people I talked to who had crossed, most of them illustrated some humanisation of the ‘other’ in their accounts and explained that they crossed once or twice to visit their house or their parents’ or grandparents’ house, clarifying that they would have preferred not to cross again as there would be no reason to do so under the given circumstances of ‘occupation’ (most prominent narrative). Kostas’ (28, man, banker) account was most typical of this narrative:

“Kostas: When I crossed I felt really strange, I felt like I was in a foreign country, but it is our country! I had a strange feeling and a sense of injustice because even though I am not a refugee, it’s our land which is being trespassed (translators note: meaning occupied) and which was invaded. My mother started crying when she saw the house; she had a lot of memories coming back. In moments like this, we realise that it is not the people’s fault and that it’s the government’s fault and the fact that Turkey has an expansive policy. However so long as the occupation continues there is no reason for me to go there again.

Interviewer: Have you ever met any Turkish-Cypriots?

Kostas: Yes. In the place where I work we have Turkish clients because it is a Federal Bank of the Middle East. In my job I collaborate a lot with Turkish people and there are also two Turkish-Cypriot women who work in the Customer Service Department to enable this communication and they are very nice.”

Kostas’ account above articulates the most prominent narrative on the crossings whilst his liberal beliefs are revealed by his acceptance of T.C.s and Turks. This rather typical account on the crossings further illustrates that this form of civic nationalism supported by the identity of ‘Cypriotism’, as discussed in the theoretical chapter, is the main
internal opposition to G.C. nationalism, which is by definition more accepting of and engaging with the T.C. community and is clearly associated with the liberal fraction of Cyprus (Mavratsas, 1996; 88) still opposes as it understands the conflict as 'occupation'. Thus this G.C. civic nationalism appears to also reproduce the discourse of 'occupation'. Whilst this argument explains the resistance of crossing expressed by participants who had liberal beliefs it also illustrates how the reproduction of nationalism itself is not an exclusive endorsement of the nationalist or right wing fractions of society.

Having said that, however, a very limited number of interviewees had crossed repeatedly (second most prominent narrative), expressing the curiosity to explore the Northern part of the island further. The accounts of these interviewees, who most often had strong bi-communal and liberal political beliefs and/or had been to private schools and/or had often lived for a long period abroad, illustrated a “stepping out” from the discourse of ‘occupation’. For example, Stalo (35, camera woman) commented that:

“Personally, ok I was always curious, I wanted to see the ‘occupied’ part. I have seen some places, I went a few times ... In the beginning it was weird for me to spend the night there but when I did, then I felt a lot better.”

Another group of interviewees, young enough in age to not have lived before the partition of the island, interestingly noted that they have no attachments with the other side therefore nothing is driving them to cross or cross again (third most prominent narrative). As Pavlos, (man, 23, student) comments:

‘Pavlos: I went once or twice. But then I never went back ... I was very young to think about certain things, I didn’t think about anything in specific. It was just an unknown place to me that I was visiting for the first time.

Interviewer: But you never went back there after that?

Pavlos: No, I didn’t bother. I didn’t even think about it. I don’t know if I would go in the future however.”

Interestingly, these accounts illustrate a “stepping out” from the discourse of ‘occupation’ in a reserve manner to above. Thus the weak construction of these
interviewees through ‘occupation’ due to their age allows them to cross without facing the ethical barrier, which other interviewees expressed, however it also undermines their motivation to cross due to the lack of memories, even if constructed, which connect them to the ‘occupied’ part. This perhaps illustrates what was argued earlier on in this chapter that the ‘fighting spirit’ to regain what was lost has faded most in the younger generations. These findings explain the modification of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ to ‘I know, do not forget and I struggle’ discussed above.

Still, the most prominent narrative evoked a strong sense of right and responsibility as to ‘why’ and ‘who’ should cross. Indeed, as Webster & Timothy (2006: 176) argue “there appears to be a moral or ethical barrier against crossing”.

The ‘ethical barrier’ against crossing is the discourse of ‘occupation’. It is argued, therefore, that in the nationalist discourse of ‘I do not forget’ when the border opened; a shift of focus occurred, from being against the existence of the border to what crossing the border ‘means’, which again translates to the same; ‘occupation’. Clearly, the resistances for crossing expressed by my interviewees where delimited by ‘occupation’.

Perhaps the most conspicuous G.C. resistance my interviewees expressed in crossing is the issue of showing one’s I.D. This is perceived as an acknowledgment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a legitimate state, which therefore contests the status of the conflict situation as an ‘occupation’. The reality of the bureaucratic process of crossing the checkpoints to the North, which involves filling out some paperwork and showing one’s passport or European I.D., was mentioned by most of my interviewees as the main reason preventing them from crossing the borders or ever crossing again. Angeliki’s account, (woman, 25, translator) was a most typical one:

“What bothers me is the fact that I need to show my passport to go through the borders. It’s Cyprus; it’s my own country so why should I have to show my passport to go there?”

Showing one’s passport to cross the borders is an issue that has concerned and has been discussed extensively by the G.C. community, state, political powers and media. A
common G.C. expression that my interviewees repeatedly used as a statement for not crossing and having to show a passport was ‘I am not going to be a tourist in my own country’. Dikomitis (2005) has also noted that in her fieldwork research G.C.s asserted the same statement, (see also Dikomitis, 2004). These nationalistic arguments soon after the opening become visible in slogans appearing near the checkpoints, Demetriou (2007: 999-1000) comments, “declaring, in the first-person singular, that one should ‘not need a visa to visit one’s own house’ (dhen thelo víza na báo spídi mou). The order of the verb here is significant, because it harks back to the older rhetoric of the 1980s campaign against losing the memory of ‘our lands’, entitled ‘I don’t forget’”.

Clearly, in these accounts a fear penetrates the possibility of crossing where the discourse of ‘occupation’ provides the understanding that crossing translates into accepting the ‘loss’ of the G.C. community. Thus, crossing here means relinquishing the fight of liberating Cyprus from ‘occupation’ and accepting that the territory understood to be temporarily occupied is forever lost and thus no longer occupied. This construal of crossings appeared as a banner hanging in checkpoints saying ‘This is not the [correct] way to return’ (In Greek: Αυτος δεν ειναι ο δρομος της επιστροφης), see (Dikomitis, 2005).

Spending money in the Turkish Republic Northern Cyprus was another reason preventing many of the people I talked to crossing the border or crossing again, which was again framed through the discourse of ‘occupation’. Spending money in the North was broadly understood as enhancing the development of the “pseudo-state” of North Cyprus and thus fuelling the ‘occupation’, (see Webster & Timothy, 2006: 173 for similar observations). Kostas’ account (man, 28, banker) represents the most typical narrative:

“I don’t want to spend more money there. We had spent very little and it was for the insurance of the car. I wouldn’t want to go back as a tourist and have fun there or anything like this. I don’t want to visit different cities, go for coffee etc. I went once, and it was only because I wanted to see my grandmother’s house and that’s it.”

The openings that occurred on the borders practically allow free flow of people from both sides. Yet, the narratives of resistance presented above, which reflect the official and unofficial G.C. rhetoric that has emerged, direct us in understanding the
seriousness with which many G.C.s approach the crossings in relation to the discourse of ‘not forgetting’ that the G.C. community is a victim of ‘occupation’.

Being a refugee or owning a property in the Northern part of Cyprus to visit was the main criterion that most interviewees used in deciding whether or not they should cross or cross again. For example Xristos’ account (man, 27, unemployed) commented to not ‘have a valid reason’ to cross since he is not a refugee and that for this reason he does not want to spend any money there. As Webster & Timothy (2006: 172) have argued “the choice of crossing into the ‘occupied’ zone was largely a function of having a previous personal family connection with the north”. Sitas, Latif & Loizou (2007: 14) also comment that “with very few exceptions, most refugees have crossed to revisit their houses or property.” ‘Refugees’ do not threaten the discourse of ‘occupation’. On the contrary these are refugees of the ‘occupation’ who, at a discursive level, reproduce the idea that the G.C. community is a victim of ‘occupation’; ‘I do not forget’.

Whilst most interviewees’ accounts on crossing or not are centred on their refugee status, this was a generally agreed judgement of the G.C.s who cross without a substantiated reason. Stiliani (woman, 30, teacher) who reported she held strong nationalist political beliefs rather assertively yet quite typically stated:

“It is justifiable only in the case of refugees who need to go in order to see their homes and in the case of the people who are not refugees they just want to go to find out what happened to these places. These are the only attenuating circumstances”

The above account describing the reasons for which one could cross closely draws the discourse of ‘occupation’. As Stiliani above explains, only two categories can cross ‘justifiably’ a) ‘refugees who need to go in order to see their homes’ who are held hostage by the ‘occupation’ and b) the non-refugees who ‘want to go to find out what happened to these places’ who are held hostage by the ‘occupation’. This most typical discourse of reasoning reflects the governmental statements that began to be made shortly after the opening of the borders (see Demetriou, 2007).

The refusal to cross the border is a function of resistance against ‘forgetting’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), the ‘occupation’ and relinquishing the ‘struggle’, hence
accepting that what was temporarily ‘occupied’ is lost. Consequently, those who cross without the ‘right’ to are ‘forgetting’ that Cyprus has been a victim of the ‘occupation’ and thus are ‘surrendering’. This reveals the importance of the borders to the G.C. conceptualisation of the conflict as ‘occupation’. The definition of the conflict as ‘occupation’ however is an integral part of the post-war G.C. identity of victimcy discussed above. Therefore, ‘occupation’ relates not only to the definition of the conflict but to the G.C. ‘self’ that is constituted vis-à-vis ‘occupation’. This nationalist post-war ‘self’ understanding of the community, as the previous section illustrated, presents post-war Cyprus as a victim of ‘occupation’ through certain constructions of femininity centrally manifested through the iconic symbolism of the mothers of the missing persons. As such, I argue that for those that resist crossing, the discourse of ‘occupation’ “provides resistance to new patterns of thinking or action that lay outside”, Bourdieu (1991: 107), ‘occupation’ vis-à-vis the G.C. ‘self’ of victimcy. Thus, the ‘occupied’ part of Cyprus for those that choose to not cross, remains ‘imagined’ (Anderson, 1983) through constructed memories of the ‘authorised language’ of ‘occupation’ mobilised by the state.

These findings lead us in understanding that following the opening of the borders there has been an adapted nationalist invocation in maintaining the nationalist imagination (Anderson 1983) and thus ‘not forgetting’ the ‘occupation’ by not crossing the now crossable border. However, the ‘imagination’ of the ‘occupation’ that is maintained by ‘not forgetting’, in some cases, illustrated a certain difference between interviewees who had right wing or liberal political beliefs. Repeatedly, the former group of accounts illustrated that ‘occupation’ was reproduced by keeping ‘self’ separate from the ‘other’ and ‘other side’. Whilst, the later group illustrated a much more reconciliatory approach to the ‘other’ yet reproduced ‘occupation’ as the ‘other side’.

Therefore, to ‘not forget’ by not crossing is an adaptation of G.C. nationalism in this new space of open borders that reproduces the discourse of ‘occupation’ vis-à-vis the above-outlined G.C. post-war identity of victimcy, by keeping ‘occupation’ as ‘imagined’ (Anderson 1983). However, for liberal interviewees often the imagination of the ‘occupation’ did not necessitate, and thus did not include the T.C. as the ‘other’.
5.6. Demanding closure of the borders: the appearance of ultra-nationalist political formations and ‘occupation’

The appearance of ultra-right wing parties and political youth groups, new and old (I have studied ELAM, EDHK, DRASIS-KES and METWPO), only following the opening of the borders (apart from Drasis-Kes) raises certain questions about the dynamics created, following this event, within the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, that made them possible. The political agenda of these parties is for the most part a continuation of ultra-nationalist politics that appeared shortly after the independence of Cyprus against independence\textsuperscript{17}. However, their more recent views appear to be also fused, to one extent or another according to the party or group, with neo-Nazi ideologies mostly of pure race, ethnic origins and junta-phile para-military views. Even though their political agenda is primarily a continuation of ultra-nationalist politics that had appeared following the independence, these parties and groups have only been formed, and have gained some political power following the opening of the borders. Therefore, the main question that arises is: what has made these parties possible from within the post-opening of the borders co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity?

Each one of the empirical chapters will address this question by accordingly discussing the specific expression of nationalism, militarism or masculinity by these parties and groups. These expressions will be also sketched out by comparing them with the most prominent narratives expressed by the public. In this chapter, the first issue to be discussed is their view on the opening of the borders. This event and the crossings have been illustrated throughout this chapter to be largely understood by the public as undermining the discourse of ‘occupation’ and the ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle. However, these parties and political youth groups have a more extreme view on this

\textsuperscript{17} These ultra-nationalist political sectors are tied to the ultra-nationalist politics that appeared shortly after the independence; against independence. At that time the ultra-right-wing nationalistic ideology was mobilised by EOKA-B. This was a G.C. paramilitary organisation formed in 1971 by General Georgios Grivas-Digenis. This organisation had the ultimate goal of achieving union (in Greek: ένωσης) of Cyprus with Greece. These political sectors during the formative years of the post-war national struggle, even if usually embedded within wider activities and campaigns of the official state authorities, were relatively politically peripheral and had not formed an autonomous political force. These ultra-nationalist, neo-fascist and junta-phile elements were dispersed across other right-wing parties, which, is perhaps also today one of the reasons for their small size. Yet, following the opening of the borders they became organised, formed ultra-nationalist parties.
issue and have made the closure of the borders as one of their main objectives. The below account of the President of Drasis-Kes tells its own story:

“I remember in particular a woman around 50 years old who told us [translator’s note: referring to Drasis-Kes who was protesting on the borders demanding their closure...] ... it was just as the borders closed for the day and she wanted to cross over to go to the casino: “you don’t know who you are talking to”, “who are you...?“ we replied “My brother is one of the missing persons”, and one of our members there told her “by going there and by spending your money there it will be like you are paying for the bullets that killed your brother” and the woman burst into tears and left. So, unless one speaks directly to people’s hearts, unless the issue affects their immediate families or their wallets they are not as bothered about their country as they are about their comfort. That’s why we are trying to open their eyes, because by having a country you will also have an economy, a home, a family, a job and everything else. If you don’t have a country you have nothing ... We are the first and only ones who carry on the struggle to close the borders”

ELAM, a newly formed political party (founded in 2006), which is the fraternal party of Golden Dawn of Greece, also states on their website that ‘as part of our political positions we require: “The immediate closure of the checkpoints that are the gate which maintains the occupation army and the “pseudo-state”’ (see ELAM, 2014). As a representative of ELAM (ROE) noted in an interview I conducted with him:

“The barricades should be closed immediately! We are subsidising the conqueror financially”

These parties and groups, share their interpretation with the most prominent narrative in the accounts of the public presented above, that the opening of the borders and the subsequent crossings is recognition of the “pseudo-state”. This directly opposes the status of ‘occupation’ and is detrimental for the negotiating tools of the G.C.s for the G.C.s, which significantly undermines the ‘fighting spirit’ and is inextricable from ‘forgetting’. However, in the accounts provided by these four political parties and youths it was clear that for them this effect of the opening of the borders had further significance. They expressed a strong and assertive understanding that the closure of
the borders is a clear step in restoring and strengthening the ‘fighting spirit’, as this translates into returning to the state of ‘occupation’ and war. Therefore it appears that for them the opening of the borders is undermining a specific type of national struggle, which they support. As Loucas Stavrou, President of EDHK, comments:

“The borders should close for many reasons; because we have to return to a state of war and because we shouldn’t support the occupation and because we have to free our land… The opening of the borders is an act of negation as well as this back and forth and the collaboration with the invasion forces … The borders should close, end of! Sirs, you are occupying our country, end of!”

As the ROE also comments:

“We organise protests at the borders regarding the closing of the borders… we try to promote this as much as we can in order to make people understand all the negative aspects that brought the opening of the borders”

This view is further supported by the president of Drasis-Kes who states:

“I believe that the borders should close; we will be holding an event next week in favour of the symbolic closing of the borders in order to promote and project some messages, we have done this 3-4 times in the past.”

These parties and groups have made, as a pivotal axis of their political positions and objectives, the interrelated, in their perspective, objective of closing the borders and strengthening the ‘fighting spirit’. This is inextricable from their grand objective to reinstall awareness of the national struggle in the G.C. community as a way of combatting ‘forgetting’ and thus firing up the ‘fighting spirit’. As ELAM notes on their website, part of their main political objectives is: ‘The immediate growing of fighting spirit in people and combating the climate of defeatism.’ (see ELAM, 2014). Moreover, in my interviews with these parties and groups, the way in which they had used 'I do not forget and I struggle' as a way of illustrating the weakened ‘fighting spirit’ and the ways in which they have modified this slogan, illustrate a central part of the struggle they aspire. Characteristically the ROE commented: “Now it’s an empty phrase and nothing more”. While the Press Officer of Front has come to acknowledge that: “Unfortunately as the years go by, we forget about the important things, we forget about ‘I do not forget’. In
this context, he explained the meaning of the slogan that the community should have sustained. The opinion that is representative of all of these parties is that:

“If Turks give us 10% out of the 37% of our land, I do not forget that all of it is mine. And if they tell us but it’s been 36 years that the settlers live here, I do not forget that before that, there were no settlers.”

For these parties and groups forgetting has clear implications on the type of national struggle they support. This is further illustrated by the way in which they have modified the slogan of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ to fit the perceived ‘forgetting’ and weakened ‘struggle’, intensely projecting it mainly through the media to the community. For example, ELAM has come to assert ‘Never Forget’. While Drasis-Kes has created this slogan as their key pronouncement: ‘You have forgotten’. For these political parties that support union of Cyprus with Greece (Cyprus is viewed as an extension of Greece), the ‘forgetting’ is the deterioration and self-destructive process of the, for them, ‘Greek Cyprus’. As the Press Officer of Front comments:

“‘I don’t forget and I struggle’ means that I am not talking about the situation today, I am talking about what I had and what you stole from me.”

Therefore, under this framework forgetting manifests the national destruction of the understanding of the conflict as an ‘occupation’ and, therefore, forgetting means relinquishing the heroic and military national struggle, as the next two chapters will reveal, for liberation of Cyprus from the ‘occupation’ forces. Without ‘I do not forget’, thus active national memory of the war events and lost lands their interpretation of the ‘I struggle’ part, of ‘I do not forget and I struggle’, becomes dispirited. As the Press Officer of Front continues:

“As I already said, people forget, and that’s how the slogan ‘I don’t forget the I don’t forget’ emerged, which we have been using for about 5 years now, it acts as a reminder…”

Clearly, for Front the “I don’t forget the I don’t forget” slogan is part of their own ‘I struggle’ to reinstall the ‘fighting spirit’. Yet, it is important to clarify: who forgets for them, and who is perceived as the accused? The President of Drasis-Kes comments:
“I don’t consider them to be my enemies [the G.C. s who cross the border], they are victims of this situation ‘we’ve forgotten, let’s have a good time, it’s over’.”

What is most central here is that these parties and groups see the weakening of the community, cultural shifts towards individualism and focussing on one’s image as significantly leading to the breakdown of the unified mono-ethnic community of ‘Greece of Greek Christians’ (In Greek: Ελλάς Ελλήνων Χριστιανών) 18 predicated on the collective national struggle. The reference to the community as, “let’s have a good time, it’s over” relates exactly to this criticism of the adoption of an individualist self-interested attitude of the general community at the expense of the unified national struggle. However, these parties mainly direct their disapproval of the current situation towards the government. Besides, ELAM posted recently on their website (see ELAM, 2012) that:

“In recent years the current political leaders follow a methodical policy leading mathematically from the ‘I don’t forget and I struggle’ to ‘delete memories and compromise’”.

The disappointment of these political parties and youths with the political direction the Cyprus conflict is heading towards following the opening of the borders and the community’s acceptance of this, has meant that they felt that political parties or political youth groups need to be formed that will restore their version of the post-war national struggle. Part of this objective is to awaken the ‘fighting spirit’ in the G.C. community by pointing to the need to ‘Never Forget’, as ELAM’s slogan goes. This is also evident in that they are aiming to demonstrate that there are G.C.s who don’t forget: ‘Nobody Forgets Nothing is Forgotten’ (In Greek: Κανενάς Δεν Ξεχνά Τιποτά Δεν Ξεχνιεται), this being a widespread and prevalent slogan used in the rather newly formed ultra-right wing area of the political scene of Cyprus.

18 The phrase of ‘Greece of Greek Christians’ was one of the political strongest slogans uttered by the dictator of Greece, Georgios Papadopoulos (1967-1974).
5.6. Conclusion

The discourse of ‘occupation’ is the ideological platform in the milieu of the national struggle for liberation of the Northern part of Cyprus from ‘occupation’, which, as discussed in the next chapter, has been inseparable from the development of the ideology of defence and the construction of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’.

The general fading of the ‘fighting spirit’ has been rigorously tied to the opening of the borders by the interviewees. The opening of the borders has challenged formative components of post-war G.C. nationalism as these were predicated on the closed borders; which were the central manifestation of the discourse of ‘occupation’ and, therefore, in the milieu of the national struggle the borders represented the protest and need of liberation from ‘occupation’.

The national struggle might have shifted towards the aspiration of an EU solution to the conflict, yet, in the G.C. community, the struggle is a weak discourse today. The crossings of G.C.s to the North have been broadly understood through the discourse of ‘occupation’ as follows: crossing means ‘forgetting’, thus returning back as ‘a tourist’ rather as liberators of the ‘occupied’ land is an acceptance that the land across the border is not ‘occupied’ but that the island is divided, which defeats the national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’. In this manner, the opening of the borders, in the next chapters, is also discussed as feminising the masculinist militarist framing of the struggle.

The memory of the war events and lost places (I do not forget) is understood in post-opening of the borders G.C. nationalist discourse to be acting as a function of resistance (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), that seems in many cases to be moralising the loss of struggle; the enslaved ‘soul’ that will not be surrendered by the community that continues to remember.

The crossings menace the definition of the conflict as an ‘occupation’ in the public understanding that now asserts as resistance the discourse of ‘occupation’. The specific conceptualisation of post-war Cyprus as a woman in need of deliverance (symbolised through the mothers of the missing persons) that is embodied in the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ is a central function of the moralisation of the sense of struggle through the sustenance of memory. Building on these observations the chapter on
masculinity will reveal that the strong position put forward by the majority of informants that crossing undermines the 'occupation' illustrates the contingency of this discourse to a certain perceived masculinitist collective position of power of the community in the conflict situation that has now become reiterated under these new social and political parameters.

The new ultra-nationalist parties and political youth groups believe the borders should close. They strongly assert the need for their immediate closure as they expect this to restore the 'fighting spirit'. For them, the closure of the borders translates to returning to a state of 'occupation' and war and the expectation that this will fortify anew the national struggle for liberation.

The next chapter builds on the observations on the opening of the borders and the undermined 'fighting spirit' discussed in this chapter, and examines the weakening militarist framing of the struggle; the ideology of defence.
6. Chapter six: Militarism in post-2003 Cyprus

6.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the decline of the G.C. ideology of defence (in Greek: Άμυνα) in Cyprus since the opening of the borders between North and South in 2003 and illustrates its co-constitutive relationship to nationalism and masculinity. ‘Defence’, as discussed in the first section, is the specific version of militarism (Huntington, 1957; Enloe, 2004) that appeared in post-war Cyprus. ‘Defence’ has been a co-constitutive part of post-war G.C. nationalism and masculinity, as it has been a central expression of the ‘fighting spirit’ and served as an integral function of ‘I struggle’ manifested in Cyprus following the invasion of the island (1974). ‘Defence’ was a type of militarism constituted by its elemental discourses of: ‘nation-in-arms’, ‘high military investment’ in the face of ‘existential threat’ and the ‘enemy within’. This specific ideology of militarism materialised through state policies of successive governments, receiving great public adherence and becoming a vast social and economic investment.

The overarching argument of this chapter is that the ideology of defence is weakening in both state and public domains following: the opening of the borders, the process of the Annan Plan referendum and the accession of Cyprus to the European Union, which all took place in the early 21st century. Therefore, while the previous chapter has illustrated the changing relation of ‘I do not forget’ and ‘I struggle’, this chapter addresses the weakening militarist frame of the struggle. Here it will illustrate that the declining ideology of defence has meant the relative disengagement of both the political leadership and community from the idea of Cyprus as a technologically advanced potent ‘nation-in-arms’ against the ‘occupation’. The analysis that will follow seeks to contribute to the overall argument of the thesis by providing the understanding that the
fading idea of post-war Cyprus as a ‘nation-in-arms’ encapsulates the changing components of the relationship of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. Whilst, the weakening nationalist militarist idea of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ illustrates the disengagement of the community from its previously strong commitment to the ‘defence’ of post-war Cyprus presented as a feminised victim of ‘occupation’, which points us to the weakening masculinist discourses of the struggle, examined in the next chapter. Through discussion of the factors that have undermined ‘defence’ and the reactions to this reality, I will not only illustrate the ‘Europeanisation’ of ‘defence’, but also the contradictory directions for militarism’s present and future. The weakening militarism has impacted civil-military relations; strengthening the boundaries between the civil and military sectors, on which fragmented boundaries the ‘nation-in-arms’ model operated (Rapoport 1962).

The decline of the ideology of defence is illustrated in this chapter to be a broadly understood reality yet one treated with criticism and creating public and political reactions. It will be argued that these reactions are a product of ‘defence’ being deeply embedded into the post-armed conflict structures through its inter-dependency on nationalism and masculinity. My effort here, therefore, is to investigate the social and cultural arenas within which the centrality of defence military matters have been produced and reproduced by the state in post-war Cyprus. My goal is to illustrate that the changing understanding of the national struggle for liberation under the auspices of the EU and the opening of the borders, which has undermined the ideology of ‘defence’, has found itself in opposition to the post-war conflict structures that have been largely constructed on the discourse of ‘occupation’. With the wider public acceptance of the decline of militarism, in the public sphere the discourse of ‘occupation’ generates public anxiety by a feeling of defencelessness, asserting the nationalist masculinist need for ‘defence’ from the ‘occupation’ forces. Hence, in this chapter the previous arguments made in relation to the discourse of ‘occupation’ are substantiated by illustrating the inextricability of the understanding of ‘occupation’ from ‘defence’.

After discussing the formation and significance of ‘defence’ in post-war Cyprus I use the qualitative data I collected in 2011 to argue that certain factors reflecting the contiguous parts of ‘defence’: ‘investing’, ‘trusting’ and ‘serving’ in the mass-conscript-
army, have contributed to its weakening and seek to provide an understanding of the militarism situation in this new setting through its co-constitution to nationalism and masculinity. On examining the weakening of the militarist framing of the national struggle following the opening of the borders, we come to understand the social and cultural concerns related to (and derived from) the armed forces, war and provisions for ‘national security’ in the European Cypriot society with open borders.

6.2. Looking back: the development of the ideology of defence

The scenery of Cyprus is coloured by the heavy military presence on insland with military vehicles, outposts and soldiers of six armies: the Greek Cypriot National Guard (NG), the Hellenic force of Cyprus (ELDYK), the Turkish Cypriot Security Force (TCSF), the Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Cyprus (KTBK, which are considered by the G.C. as the ‘occupation’ army), the British Forces of Cyprus (BFC) and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Nicosia, the capital, remains divided into two zones of Cypriot and Turkish armies buffered by the UN forces located in the middle.

‘Defence’, the version of militarism that developed in Cyprus following the events of 1974, can be seen in the discourses and policies mobilised and implemented by successive governments and the deeply entrenched commitment of the population to its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Following the invasion of Cyprus, and the ‘occupation’ of the Northern part of the island by Turkey, ‘defence’ for Cyprus has not only been a militaristic issue, but also a central expression of the ‘fighting spirit’ to push back the ‘occupation’ forces. However, ‘defence’ has been the internal front of the Janus-faced international and internal agenda the state of RoC mobilised for itself. Following the invasion and division of the island, the state has been portraying itself internationally as a victim that is in ‘existential need’ of the international community, and internally as the ‘defensive’ potent saviour of that victim.

The state of the Republic of Cyprus and the post-war development of the ideology of defence

The ideology of defence is a focal mechanism of the relationship the state of post-war Cyprus has mobilised between its international and internal agenda. This relationship is
fundamental in the co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity. One of the most significant features of the conflict in Cyprus since its inception has been “the concentration of political discourse on appeals to the international community.” (Demetriou, 2007: 991). As it was discussed in the historical chapter, the bi-communal clashes of 1963-64 led to the state of the RoC being controlled only by G.C.s, as, since 1964, the T.C. seats have remained vacant. This has given “G.C.s complete control over the governance of the country, not just in domestic terms, but in the eyes of the world” (Ker Lindsay, 2008: 109).

G.C. post-war nationalism, as discussed in the previous chapter, has been centred on explicit gendered notions of victimcy (Yakinthou, 2008; Christou, 2006; Hadjipavlou, 2006), mobilised by the state through the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. The iconic image of mothers of the missing persons has a symbolic function for G.C.s to remember a certain image of the state as a victim. Ultimately, in this particular discursive space of victimised, national, self-understanding anchored around ‘I do not forget and I struggle’, the discourse of ‘defence’ has operated as a predominant form, existing through ‘struggling’.

The projection of post-war Cyprus by successive governments to the international community as a victim was internally constitutive of the masculinist post-war internal politics of ‘We have been victims but we can still win; we will defend ourselves’. In the most dominant nationalist discourses following the division of the island, Cyprus was presented to the international community “as small and unprotected, a ‘little Cyprus’ (i mikri Kipros) suffering from the unjust bullying of a Turkey with a large, strong and vicious army at its disposal” (Demetriou, 2005: 16). Certain results of the war, including the population displacement and the case of the missing persons (symbolised through the mothers of the missing persons), were part of the nationalist gendering of post-war Cyprus that was strongly projected to the international community to venture the image of Cyprus as a victim suffering from the violation of human rights and injustice at the hands of Turkey. This projection has been internally constitutive of self- ‘defence’.

The official state political rhetoric called for the international political powers to understand the need for justice of two legally equal communities, the majority G.C.s and
the minority T.C.s. Within this rhetoric, ‘justice’ meant achieving a solution that was based on international law (Demetriou, 2005: 11; Bryant, 2001). However, at the same time, the projection of the conflict by G.C. political leadership to the international community sought to create an image that specifically connected the ‘division’ with ‘injustice’ for the G.C.s. This, in turn, meant a solution based on the recognition of the G.C. leadership as the only legitimate government on the island (Demetriou, 2005: 11). This G.C. discourse appealed to international bodies such as the United Nations and, later on, to the EU for foreign support and political intervention.

These points were reiterated in an interview I conducted with Glafcos Clerides, who was the President of the Parliament of the ROC when the invasion took place, and President of the RoC for most of the period (1993-2003) when the NG was chiefly upgraded and modernised. While discussing his efforts to advance the NG when he was the President of the Parliament he commented that the purpose of the force should be to delay the Turkish military forces and not allow them to occupy the whole of the island until the UN could interfere and oblige them to start the negotiations. The G.C. political leadership and community, as discussed in detail further on in this chapter, have perceived the accession of Cyprus to the EU as the principal instrument for a G.C. solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ and this has informed all of the components of the discourse of the national struggle.

The Cypriot state asserted itself through the ideology of ‘defence’ as a masculine militarist entity against the ‘existential threat’ by the ‘occupation’ forces and mobilised the population for collective aims with the construction of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Therefore, the armed forces were presented as a way in which the state had established and reproduced its legitimacy (Tilly, 1975; Giddens, 1985). The extensive mobilisation of human and financial resources, which the ‘defence’ entailed (see appendix 6), figured strongly in the consolidation and strengthening of the state in relation to the dangers to national security (Huntington, 1957: 67). The ideology of defence was reflected, reinforced and refracted against the 112 mile long border that

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19 See Bryant (2001) for a historical perspective on G.C. understandings of ‘justice’ in political terms.
20 This particular relationship between society, state and armed forces that asserts the state as a masculine militarist entity has been repeatedly also identified in other post-armed conflict divided societies, (for example, regarding Israel see Ben Eliezer, 1997 and 1998, and Ehrich, 1987).
divides the island and was heavily guarded by both armies. Constructed on the G.C. collectives’ need for survival, ‘defence’ inextricably gave rise to the notion of preparedness for another military offensive on the part of Turkey; the ‘enemy within’ already occupying about one third of Cyprus’ territory.

The border in Cyprus presents an uncommon situation as it signified the need for ‘defence’ from its creators but also the protest against its existence (I struggle). The ideology of ‘defence’ made the border the NG’s first priority; ensuring that the ‘enemy within’ would not overthrow it and occupy the rest of the island, whilst fighting for liberation of the ‘occupied’ part of Cyprus. In this ideological setting, the idea of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and thus the state-led militarisation of the whole society is integrally related to the notion of Cyprus being a distinctively small country needing to be militarised throughout because it is threatened by the ‘enormous enemy within’.

The sense of ‘existential threat’ in Cyprus, just like in Israel, (see Ehrlich, 1987), has been, in certain ways, systematically repeated and used by the state and its representatives to gain and maintain legitimacy, to define standards for the distribution of resources, to shape the post-war public culture and the lives of individuals. Therefore, the protection of the population was built into the ‘existential threat’ within the discursive system the state created and mobilised through patterns of embedding militarism in society.

The state led a nationalist politicisation of the mass army within society through solidification of the idea of the G.C ‘ethnic community’ that still needs to defend its existence. Therefore, the embedded nature of the ‘existential threat’ within society was an effort by the state to culturally homogenise an ‘ethnic community’ as a ‘nation-in-arms’. A clear example is the amount and specificity of NG broadcasts on state television. A TV programme (‘Defend your Country’, in Greek: αμύνεσθαι περί πάτρης) focuses exclusively on Cyprus’ defence issues and news from within the force; it runs to the present day on the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (RIK) channel. Also, the NG and defence issues still appear on mainstream media almost on a daily basis.

The ‘nation-in-arms’ is a focal point of the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in terms of the vast investment in ‘defence’ and the extensive
length of the conscription and reserve service. This nationalist and masculinist militarist expression became the main institutional arena, as well as the socio-political mechanism for the construction of ‘defence’ and protest against the ‘occupation’ (I struggle).

The construction of post-war Cyprus as a ‘nation-in-arms’ has been instrumental in the pursuit of the establishment of the ideology of defence by the state. The state, as part of the effort to reproduce its legitimacy against the ‘occupation’, marshalled financial and human resources to create a ‘nation-in-arms’ that would have defended the community from the ‘existential threat’ from ‘occupation’. In other words, the construction of the ‘nation-in-arms’ represented a state-led integrative response against the ‘occupation’ forces where a state and society had lost the 1974 war and their territory was now ‘occupied’ from the ‘enemy within’. This point was reiterated in the interview I conducted with General Pandreou who commented that the G.C. community needed to create the NG in order to face the Turkish expansion policy and the fact that Turkey wanted to occupy the entire island of Cyprus.

In this ever-present possibility of danger, the ideology of ‘defence’ was the nationalist masculinist resistance to the emasculating tendencies of circumstance. This existence of danger framed a realist thinking about the ‘other’; (see Odysseos, 2002: 417). For G.C.s, ‘defence’ was a national promise that the collective ‘fighting spirit’ for the liberation of Cyprus would be sustained against overwhelming odds and that, if political negotiations failed, the well-equipped and technologically advanced NG (with the will of the soldiers, reserves and militia to sacrifice their lives) would hold back the ‘enemy’.

The state projected its military prowess through the extensive procurement of arms and the technological modernisation of the armed forces. The post-war political era was characterised by major defence procurements, especially in the 1990s, with the most prominent and popular example being the purchase of the surface-to-air defensive S300s missiles from Russia in 1998. The ‘economic miracle’ Cyprus experienced in the post-war years (Gergakopoulos, 1999; Kammas, 1992), made possible the diversion of extensive resources for military uses. Defence spending is an everyday reality for G.C.s living in Cyprus who pay ‘defence tax’ almost in all of their financial transactions (see appendix 7). The extensive financial investment in defence has been comparable to the
investment of human capital from the community in military service. The NG is an army of nearly 100,000 soldiers (conscripts, reserves and militia) and officers, (see European Defence Agency (EDA) and European Defence Information (EDI). Therefore, at any time the NG involves 12% of the total population of the RoC in its operations. In more detail, the NG is estimated to consist of 10,000 conscripts, 70,000 reserves and militia (50,000 of whom are readily available) and 12,500 military personnel, (see European Defence Agency). A clear illustration of the ‘nation-in-arms’ model mobilised in Cyprus is that, to the present day, most reserves and militia maintain a military gun, usually a G3 military rifle, and ammunition in their house. This translates into almost every house in Cyprus having guns of the NG. As a prominent slogan mobilised by Vassos Lyssarides, a central figure in Cyprus politics in the post-war years, goes ‘every home a castle, every patriot a soldier’ (in Greek: κάθε σπίτι και κάστρο, κάθε πατριώτης και στρατιώτης).

Furthermore, an important event in the development of the ideology of defence was the creation of the Single Area Defence Doctrine with Greece (In Greek: Ενιαίο Αμυντικό Δόγμα Ελλάδας-Κύπρου, hereinafter SADD) in the 1990s. This sought to expand the G.C. defence and military capabilities in relation to Turkey, (see appendix 8). In the nationalist popular discourse this was perceived as strengthening Cyprus’ defence with a joint military defence agreement and cooperation between Cyprus and Greece. SADD created the enlargement of military borders and the area covered by both the Cypriot and Greek states was considered, for ‘defence purposes’, unified. In the wider public understanding at the time, this was perceived as a defence shield for Cyprus who would no longer have to present a defence force alone against Turkey. Under the SADD defence spending increased significantly (see UN military expenditure data). This change in defence policy is also reflected by the sharp rise of arms imports during the 1987-1997 period, which, as a share of total imports, rose by more than 300% (3.35% of the GDP), when compared to the previous ten year period (1977-1987), (ibid). This change in arms procurements as part of the SADD signified the new defence policy aiming for the further advancement of the military capabilities of the NG in cooperation with the Greek military forces against Turkey. As a popular saying that appeared at the

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21 In 2011, the population of Cyprus was slightly more than 800,000 (exactly 838,897), (see Statistical Service Republic of Cyprus).
time, in the national media of both countries, goes: ‘Every gun that strengthens the
defence of Greece strengthens the defence of Cyprus also’ (In Greek: Κάθε όπλο που
ενισχύει την άμυνα της Ελλάδας ενισχύει και την άμυνα της Κύπρου).

Post-war Cypriot society and the ideology of ‘defence’

Collective memories of the war, division of the island and the territories lost reproduced
through popular discourse connected the ideology of defence with the cultural means by
which it was constructed. ‘Defence’, the ‘army’ and notions of ‘returning back’, were
part of cultural militarism (as Ben-Eliezer, 1995a, 1997 and Kimmerling, 1993 argue in
relation to Israel) and became central organising principles in post-war G.C. society.
Therefore, while ‘defence’ was an ideology centrally mobilised by the state and
exemplified through the NG of Cyprus, it “become a part of the way people live both
inside and outside military barracks (Enloe, 2000: 3-4), as it involved and appealed to
the entire social body that framed national survival as an urgent priority, committed to
defending the threatened and vulnerable homeland; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’.

In the G.C. community, the legitimacy of the national struggle and ontological security
was dependant on the association with military goals, (Enloe, 2004: 145), with the
obligatory involvement of the male community, an issue that will be specifically
addressed in the next chapter on masculinity. The centrality of the demand for ‘justice’,
the end to the violations of ‘human rights’ in relation to the war events and ‘occupation’
in public and political discourse, (see: Demetriou, 2005), created a naturalisation of the
need for defence. Militarisation is both a social and discursive process, “involving a shift
in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimise … the
organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tributes
used to pay for them” (Lutz, 2002: 723).

‘Defence’ has been embedded into the public understanding of the national struggle and
ontological security following the invasion and subsequent ‘occupation’ of Cyprus by
Turkey. In such ways, in the G.C. community, the culture of militarism and the broader
commitment of the community in ‘defence’, just like in India and Ireland (Banerjee, 2012:
45), underscored the effeminate tendencies of circumstance. These are the small size
of Cyprus, with its army defeated in the war by Turkey and its inability to repel the Attila invading forces, which has thereafter been the ‘enemy within’. This was part of the post-war nationalist discourse that justified the continuation of the masculinist discourse of vast investment in military terms, touching upon the ‘existential threat’ for the continuation of the G.C community.

The state calling for the need to defend was illustrated and highlighted to the community through specific gender symbolisms, which were centrally mobilised through state institutions. A key example of this is the portrayal of the mothers, wives and sisters of missing persons as a discursive symbolic means to project and sustain the notion of Cyprus as a victim of the ‘enemy’ (Yakinthou, 2008). Such feminine articulations of powerlessness and victimcy of Cyprus appeared, as they were co-constituted with a gender angle alongside the iconography of this ‘enemy’ in dangerous hyper-masculine terms. An example of this is the picture (see appendix 9) named ‘Attila’s boot’, which, in addition to other places, was present in public school classrooms. This illustrated a Turkish soldier mercilessly attacking the whole of Cyprus whilst stepping with vigour on a G.C. soldier. What is perhaps most crucial here is that this Turk is pictured as being able to invade the whole island with brutality.

These gender discourses were part of the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. Mobilised by the state, these discourses, portraying post-war Cyprus as a feminised victim in need of protection and deliverance, were internally responded to with the masculinist ideology of ‘defence’ and, therefore, the need for the community to invest and stay committed to ‘defence’.

In this section, I have illustrated that the post-war state of Cyprus has used various channels to formulate a response to the tragedy of the 1974 war both internally and internationally. Internally, it created a masculinised ‘nation-in-arms’ through the means of cultural intervention, such as extensive presentation of defence issues in national media, through the conscription of men from almost every family and through legal enforcement, such as defence tax. Internationally, the geographical size of ‘free’ Cyprus was transformed into a gendered, victimised state that sought the intervention of bigger
political entities. In the next section I illustrate the weakening of this internal response of ‘defence’ following the opening of the borders.

6.3. The social forgetting of ‘defence’

In this section I will illustrate that the opening of the previously un-crossable internal border has undermined the ideology of defence and, its underside, the commitment of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ that were, along with nationalism and masculinity, predicated on guarding that border. This is clearly reflected in the increased unpopularity the NG is facing with the mass public and the declining legitimacy of the armed forces in the G.C. community.

The previous chapter illustrated that the weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’ in the ‘I struggle’ was tightly linked to the opening of the borders. Here my aim is to understand the militarist frame of ‘I struggle’, the wearying ‘defence’, predicated on the borders, as a specific expression of the weakening of the ‘fighting spirit’. The next chapter advances this argument by addressing the weakening and adapted reiteration of the discourses of masculinity inter-dependent to nationalism and militarism.

My argument in this section is that the G.C. community became deeply ambivalent about the state-mobilised masculinist idea of ‘defence’ (co-constituting nationalist, militarist and masculinist ideals, predicated on the closed border) when faced with opened borders and the ‘enemy within’ crossing them. Since coming into existence the border has stood for the separation of the two communities (Demetriou, 2005). This protectionist militarism was supported by its cooperative side- the conceptualization and projection of Cyprus as a victim of ‘occupation’- and was scaffolding the normativisation of a specific masculinity. The active meaning of military service as a male defence duty against and for the border becomes defeated against the opened borders. Demetriou’s (2007: 999-1000) observation provides a point of departure:

“In Cyprus, although the decision was a governmental one, the opening of the border and the crossings that followed were definitively outside institutionalized practice … The Greek Cypriot society that one knew and lived in had been reconstituted, ‘at random’, in a place that, however one chose to define it, was out of the state’s control. This was a moment when the interpellatory capacity of
the state, the epitome of the success of its ideological apparatus (Althusser, 1971: 170-177), was removed.”

In the accounts of members of the public, politicians and military officers I spoke to, the openings that occurred on the border and the subsequent crossings were repeatedly commented on. These opening, in which the absence of ethnic violence has been noteworthy (Papadakis et al., 2006), is seen as defeating the purpose of the NG and, more specifically, the guarding of the border. The role of the NG since the events of 1974 has been to hold the South part of the border ensuring that the ‘occupation’ army will not ‘occupy’ the whole of the island. The role of the ‘occupation’ army on the other hand is to protect the land on the North part of the border that it has already ‘occupied’. Therefore the role of the ‘occupation’ army in this setting has remained potent and has not been overthrown by the openings.

The effect the opening of the borders has had on the disorientation of the force became particularly clear in the interview I conducted with Kyriacos Mavronicolas, Minister of Defence when the borders opened, who emphasised that due to the age of conscript soldiers the Ministry had to re-mobilise the idea of an able National Guard whilst also: “A new concept of the way of controlling the dividing line had to be developed”.

General Pandreou, who at the time was a Major General of the NG, further exemplified this in his account by commenting that following this event the mission that is ‘to react in order to prevent any offensive action taken by Turkey’ has not changed but the mentality of the force has, emphasising that: “We should have kept the morale of our soldiers a bit higher.”

These two accounts at a political level illustrate that the undermining of the ideology of defence is part of the weakening ‘fighting spirit’ discussed in the previous chapter and that the masculinist military ‘fighting spirit’ weakened also at the political level following the opening of the borders. However, as the previous chapter also illustrated this observation is most often commented with criticism both at the political and public level. The account of Giannos’ (man, 58, owner of local dry-cleaning shop), who is a reserve refugee now living in Nicosia, is clear of the link between the demoralisation of the role
of the NG by the opening of the borders and the crossings and the criticism of this reality. He notes with disappointment:

“Now, they have opened the borders, the occupation forces give us electricity, G.C.s pass to the other side to go to casinos... What does the army stand for in the end? The value and the role of the army are degraded by this ‘movement towards the occupied part.’”

Furthermore, it was repeatedly evident in the accounts of both politicians and members of the public, that the period of the Annan Plan has further contributed to the weakening of the ideology of defence. It is argued that the border on which the ideology of defence was predicated and manifested in the period of the Annan Plan becomes a platform for expressing hope for the reunification of Cyprus; yet also fear for the future and uncertainty of the need for defence. General Pandreou who, at the time was an Adjutant of the Minister of Defence, commented that this was a shortcoming of theirs at the Ministry as there was a “slackening”: “[...and it was because of the little time given between the Annan Plan and the opening of the borders and because people weren’t properly informed.”

It is the case that in this period, the continuation of the NG was highly politically and publicly questioned, as the reunification plan provided the dissolution of the NG (one state, one army), (see Palley, 2006: 223), and as the above account reveals the uncertainty about the need for defence penetrates into both the forces and Cypriot society. It is argued that this is because both the public and all men related to the NG had come to understand and live under the uncertainty that there was a serious possibility that the NG would be dissolved and hence the RoC would cease to have its own army.

I was a soldier in the NG at the time; we were all waiting for the results of the Annan Plan to see if we were going to be dismissed from the army, feeling that, in due course, the purpose of the force and us within it could have simply been non-existent and the force dissolved. It is argued that in this conflicting ideological nexus in which the NG is caught the possibility of reunification with the perceived ‘enemy within’ completely
defeats the purpose of guarding the border from this 'enemy within'. The possibility of reunification, therefore, is also contradictory to the ideologically constructed necessity of the 'nation-in-arms' and thus, as the next chapter will reveal, of men in the national struggle as 'defenders'.

The opening of the borders and the decline in motivation to serve in the NG

The decline in motivation to serve in the NG and the creation of the recent phenomenon of draft dodging represent the disengagement of the community from its idea as a 'nation-in-arms' which is a clear illustration of the weakening post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity following the opening of the borders. These two phenomena are argued to be a clear manifestation of the weakening militarist 'fighting spirit', which is part of the broader weakening of the 'fighting spirit' discussed in the previous chapter.

The guarding of the borders has been the first priority of the NG since its establishment and the meaning of military service has been a male defence duty to push back the border. Yet, being conscripted in an army predicated on guarding a border (now open along with a humanisation of the 'other' in the G.C. community), has become problematic for men expected to serve their duty towards the 'nation-in-arms'. The extensive media coverage and certain parliamentary statements on the issue of inquiry provide a point of departure. The appearance of draft-dodging in political, and media discussions\(^ {22} \), only after the opening of the borders, further supports the argument of the weakening ideology of defence following the opening of the borders. This phenomenon grew exponentially in the 3 year period following the first press reference to it, and, in 2009, became a front line issue for both the government and the Ministry of Defence. On 20\(^ {\text{th}} \) July, that is the anniversary of the invasion of Cyprus, Andri Thrasivoulou (In Greek: Άντρη θρασυβούλου) writes in the right-wing newspaper Simerini (in Greek: Σημερινή):

\[^{22}\text{The first reference of draft-dodging in the Cyprus press was in 2006 by Simerini newspaper (see: Χατζήστυλιανού (2006).}\]
“In the year of 2009 … most young people are not only unwilling to sacrifice their lives but not even to "lose" 24 months from ... their comfortable lives!”

Previously, on 9th June, the Cyprus Parliament met to discuss draft-dodging, where Kostas Kostantinou (In Greek: Κώστας Κωνσταντίνου), MP of DHSY, notes in his parliamentary statement:

“This phenomenon is increasingly expanding; deferments due to mental disorders exhibit sustained growth over the last decade.”

The subversion of the ideological conscription of men into the military created in the scope of these two events (opening of the borders and the referendum) has a clear institutional facet. The two institutional structures: ‘The Ministry and the National Guard’, understood to be the most central manifestations of the ‘fighting spirit’ of the national struggle in divided Cyprus, bearers of the social and political promise that the community would remain defended from the face of the ‘enemy within’, are ideologically shaken during the period of these events taking place.. Kyriacos Mavronicolas, who was the Minister of Defence during this period, commented on young men having an ‘ethical problem’ with the army following these events, particularly whilst experiencing the movement over the border. General Pandreou further makes these observations clear:

“Imagine being at the buffer zone [translator’s note: referring to the referendum period] and seeing T.C.s coming and going, people whose identity you don’t know. It takes a lot of mental strength in order to face this situation and to continue your mission there … The guards have a different role now, they are not there in order to guard the “Green line”, they are just watching the Turkish forces and the Turkish soldiers… [and] … watching towards our side worrying that someone might steal something from them, or take their gun etc. We have reached a point where Turkish Cypriot builders work in Greek Cypriot military camps.”

The above accounts are indicative of the problems the Ministry of Defence has thereafter been facing in maintaining the sense of identity and thus the purpose of
remaining committed to the ‘nation-in-arms’ by serving one’s military service. The example given by a non-commissioned officer (38, interviewed whilst off duty), regarding his own soldiers further portrays the role of the ‘nation-in-arms’ becoming undermined due to the opening of the borders. Speaking with disappointment in the state of the army he comments that:

“There are outposts on the borders in Nicosia, where, if you go and ask a soldier why he left his guard, he will reply, ‘Why should I stay? Turkish Cypriots pass lawfully to this side so there is no reason for me to be here. Who am I protecting and from whom?’”

As another military officer (37, interviewed whilst off duty) characteristically commented:

“What can I tell him? ‘Stay here and keep guard because the Turks might arrive?’ He knows that it’s not true!”

The above accounts summarise what has been argued until this point; that the opening of the borders has been inextricable from ideological obscuring the role of the ‘nation-in-arms’ in ‘defence’ and by extension, as the next chapter will specifically address, the role of men in ‘defence’. Yet, these accounts further direct us back to the nationalism chapter, where it was discussed that the most prominent narrative expressed a significant humanisation of the previously threatening ‘other’ - the ‘enemy within’ - and that this has contributed to an underlying feeling of public security given that there haven’t been any ethnic clashes. Clearly, this has deep implications on guarding the border and more generally militarism, which I will now proceed to discuss.

Guarding the border as well as having a nation armed and ready for war have become paradoxical when the ‘other’ is a ‘safe’ everyday presence and, to some extent, a humanised existence South of the border. The ‘distance’ between ‘self’ and ‘other’ the closed borders provided was vital to the ideology of defence and the construction of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. This distance is central to the “summoning of difference, thus the relativisation of the self against the ‘other’”, (Kennedy and Danks, 2001: 3). As, in order for the ‘fixed truths’ the ideology of defence provided “to remain intact, self and other must remain both distinct and separate.” (Whitworth, 2004: 155). It
was in the space of this physical distance to the imaginary threatening ‘enemy within’
existing across the border, that the ‘existential threat’ from ‘Turks’ was ceaselessly
reproduced both in and out of the military barracks. In this ideological script, ‘defence’
was providing the notion of preparedness that the NG with the ‘nation-in-arms’, would
provide the deterrent force against this ‘enemy’. The account of a non-commissioned
officer (38, interviewed whilst off duty), supports this argument about the broader
disengagement of the social body from the idea of itself as ‘nation-in-arms’ due to the
necessity of creating distance from the ‘other’:

“That certain soldiers are not enlisted for various reasons. This also has something to
do with the opening of the borders. If someone lives in a building where there is a
Turkish Cypriot family living also, why would he send his son to the army? He will
think ‘they live with us, why would I make my son waste two years of his life in
the military?’”

The story presented by Giannos (man, 58, owner of local dry-cleaning shop) who is a
refugee and a reservist, whilst commenting on the impact of the opening of the borders,
clearly depicts this picture:

“I once went to an outpost one night I was on watch. I went, there were 3 soldiers
there, so we were 4 in total. I took my gun and the munitions, I learned the code-
words and I asked the other guys what did I need to be aware of and where the
Turks were. They said, “we don’t now … there are no Turks here”. “So what are
we guarding here?’ I asked and then I left the outpost.”

The declining motivation to serve that has also affected the reserve forces illustrates the
broader disengagement of the community from its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Reserves
are regularly called-up for training and scheduled annual exercises; a “Durkheimian
ritual in which the group is periodically re-created … [in continuing to be] … oriented to
shared goals and to the communal means of achieving them.” (King, 2006: 1). Yet,
almost every reservist I talked to commented that they did not see the purpose in
continuing to serve under the current conditions, whilst condemning the current state of
the force and the futile time needed to be spent in the army each year. A conversation with a couple of refugees, who are also reserves, in Larnaca clearly draws this picture:

“**Stephanos** (man, 48, airport officer): *Last time I went to the army in June, we went for three days and we did absolutely nothing.*

**Dimitri** (man, 27, travel agent): *So did you stay in the military camp for three whole days?*

**Stephanos:** *Of course not.*

**Dimitris:** *Ok, because I would be surprised if you did!*

**Panikos** (man, 38, travel agent): *The reservists go to the army just to see their friends, they don’t go to serve the cause or learn something.*"

The decline in motivation to serve and the very existence of a significant proportion of draft-dodgers in Cypriot society contests the previously deeply entrenched notions of ‘defence’. This is argued to be a result of a set of contiguous elements of the ideology of defence becoming undermined, which will be illustrated throughout this chapter. Almost all of my interviewees were very aware of the recent phenomenon of draft-dodging, repeatedly linking this to the opening of the borders and the crossings of T.C.s to the Southern part of Cyprus. Miranda (woman, 60, cleaner), a refugee, whose brother is a missing person, commented that:

“*Some people claim to have a problem so that they won’t go. However, when my children went to the army, things were different, people didn’t want to avoid it. This started happening in the past few years.*”

Also Gianna (woman, 55, owner of a convenience store), who is a refugee, noted that:

“*We had 5 boys in the neighbourhood and in the end, no one served in the army. They think why should I go when you don’t?*”

The above account points to another contingent part of the ideology of defence becoming undermined by revealing how the breakdown of the unified understanding of society, discussed in the previous chapter, has contributed to the phenomenon of draft-dodging. As argued already, the ideology of defence was one of the common goals of ‘defence’ and ‘liberation’, based on the idea of a unified community.
Moreover, the above expressions of popular resentment reveal that some Cypriots continue today, more than 10 years after the opening of the borders, to hold high expectations when they assess any young man’s willingness to take a personal responsibility for Cyprus’ national defence. This said, however, as discussed in the next chapter, not every young man in practice has continued to internalise these masculine conscription expectations. On the contrary, a central assumption now being questioned in G.C. community is that of the centrality of the military service to society and to definitions of G.C. manhood.

6.4. The role of the EU accession for the changing ideology of defence

In this section I will argue that another political event; the accession of Cyprus to the EU, has formative implications on the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. The significant shift in the understanding that the solution of the conflict is to be pursued (‘struggle’) through EU pressures on Turkey, the sense of ontological security the accession has generated in the community and the intense cultural Europeanisation and Westernisation of the community, have all had clear implications for the ideology of defence and the commitment of the community to its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’, which was predicated on the unified defence of the vulnerable victim post-war Cyprus from Turkey.

By illustrating the weakening of the militarist ‘fighting spirit’ under the auspices of the EU I will further substantiate the argument put forward in the previous chapter that the accession has undermined the ‘fighting spirit’. Here, in supporting my argument that the accession has been having these implications at a number of levels; I will first address the cultural level of aspiring to become ‘Euro-Cypriot’, then, the public sense of ontological security and then, in the next section, the changing political understanding of ‘I struggle’ under the auspices of the EU and certain changes in defence policy that have taken place under these new social and political parameters.

The ideology of defence under the aspiration of becoming ‘Euro-Cypriot’
The strong appeal of a ‘Euro-Cypriot’ identity and the intense cultural westernisation of Cypriot society, as discussed in detail in the previous chapter, had repercussions on the co-constitution of post-war nationalism, militarism and masculinity. The ideology of defence found itself at odds with the idea of a European Cyprus. In Cyprus, the EU as a concept became more and more identical to the concept of Europe, (Demetriou, 2005) and for G.C.s has created a deep yearning and a shift from the identification with the middle-eastern culture to becoming a ‘Euro-Cypriot society’ and adopting a Western-like lifestyle. The on-going Europeanisation of the island however points to a particular process of European integration, with issues arising out of an unresolved conflict within the EU, (Shaelou, 2010; Stefanou, 2005).

The particular conjunction of nationalist, militarist and patriarchal values on the one hand and a very welcomed process (by G.C.s) of becoming European and belonging to a greater whole, as well as the intense adoption of capitalist, individualistic values on the other hand, resulted in an arena of cultural contestation that has been inextricable from a crisis of national cultural values. In this space, the strongly emerging culture of individualism had formative implications on the understanding of the G.C. community as a unified ‘nation-in-arms’ predicated on the national struggle. Cyprus, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, quick at adopting cultural ideals of Western individualist success was said by my interviewees to have contributed to the undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’, a part of which is here revealed to be the weakening ‘nation-in-arms’. This cultural undermine of the ‘fighting spirit’ will be in the next chapter further illustrated through the hegemonic masculinity shifting away from it’s identification with the national struggle.

Cyprus today is characterised by a certain decline in the acceptance of G.C. defence ideology, especially amongst the younger generations. The broader social adoption of a more European, Westernised individualist male identity signalled a shift away from collectivist patriarchal and nationalist military values of the ‘nation-in-arms’. Young men in Cyprus are aware of the fact that most other European citizens do not serve military service and also that they would need to compete in the European labour market with them. Whilst experiencing a society that no longer feels constantly threatened by the ‘occupation’ forces and experiencing the ‘other’ in their everyday lives in the southern
part of the divide, many began to question whether it was so necessary to serve their military duty.

Individualism has come to challenge the very understanding of the G.C. community in which G.C.s were committed to the struggle. As the notion of a unified G.C. community weakens, the idea of forced conscription, an extensive reserve service, and the strong intersection of armed militarism in and out of the military barracks, which previously constituted the cultural basis for the ‘nation-in-arms’, have become culturally undermined.

The undermining of the post-war entrenchment of the culture of militarism is evident today in Cypriot society. The phenomenon of draft-dodgers is a clear reflection of the shift from the collective project of solidarity of the national struggle to the individuals’ personal goals and understanding of success. My interviewees very often commented on the decline in motivation or refusal to serve in terms of the individualist and materialistic modern G.C. culture. Andros’ (man, 41, director of a company) account was a typical one:

“It’s because everyone cares for themselves, it’s a social matter. People are settled as we said before. Everyone wants to live a comfortable life, and this includes the matter of the army.”

These trends can be understood, as Maman et al. (2001: 4) have argued in relation to Israel, as the transformation of G.C. society from a ‘mobilised society’ into a ‘normal’ Western society and have resulted in a strongly emerging culture of individualism and in attenuation of the state’s capacity to mobilize those groups who were the carriers of the national struggle project. The account of General Pandreou who, at the time of the accession, was the Manager of the Military Office for the Minister of Defence, clearly illustrates the weakening post-war ideology of defence, co-constitutive with nationalism and masculinity, in the context of these cultural developments:

“Today young men ‘think that there is no point in serving in the army and that they will lose 2 years of their life instead of going to university’… People cannot
understand why they should serve in the army ... If you don’t explain to them that they have to do it for their country’s sake and for their family’s security firstly, they will never understand. In the past, they were aware of this, that’s why they didn’t want to get a deferment.”

In more general terms, the widespread assumption that military service for G.C. men is a natural, taken-for-granted matter (Sasson-Levy, 2003) has undergone serious decline. Military service is counter-posed now to the individuals needs and goals; young men’s own career plans and aspirations, rather than the necessity of service to the community, which will be further addressed in the next chapter in relation to masculinity.

Ontological security under the auspices of the EU

Here I will argue that the accession of Cyprus to the EU, even if the EU is not a defence union per se, has, as discussed in the previous chapter, created in the Cypriot community a new notion of security. And, as I will then discuss, it has also brought an alternative rhetoric about a ‘European solution to the problem’ which has contributed to the disengagement of the community from its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’.

The EU has experienced some demilitarisation and disarmament, see (Jauhiainen, 1997), whereas the idea of a unified European military co-operation is still being developed. (Lutterbeck, 2005; Eide & Thee, 1980). Yet, the EU today provides a political deterrent force for countries outside of the union wanting attack an EU country member.

The ontological security, felt in the G.C. community whilst sheltering under the EU in relation to the ‘existential threat’ of another military offensive by Turkey, is argued to have contributed to the social disinvestment in ‘defence’ (previously a vast investment in post-war Cyprus to ‘defend’ against the ‘existential threat’ by Turkey).

The reference to the ‘large European family’ became ever common in the community. This “reflected the G.C. expectation that what they would join was an organisation that was able to act as ‘protector’ of their ‘rights’ and their concept of ‘justice’” and this was therefore “an answer to this large militant bully that spelled the end of ‘injustice’ against Greek Cypriots.” (Demetriou, 2005: 16). For the G.C.s, therefore, the accession was, as
George Vassiliou (2004: 12), who was the former President of the RoC (1988–93), and chief negotiator for Cyprus’ accession to the EU (1998–2003), argues, “undoubtedly the most important event since the establishment of the Republic … [as] their feeling of safety and security would be dramatically improved … knowing that the danger of a second invasion by Turkey is simply non-existent”. Supportive to this argument are also the figures available by a quantitative survey conducted by Lordos and Kaymak, (2007: 16) in May 2005. In this study, EU Security for G.C.s overruled (54.7 %) the security offered under the Annan Plan (32.9 %). This change in the public understanding of ‘struggle’, and ‘security’ significantly undermined the public belief in the ideology of defence contributing to the disengagement of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, as these were clearly providing the understanding of ‘little Cyprus’ needing to defend itself from the ‘large militant bully’, Turkey, (Demetriou, 2005). This shift in the understanding of security is clear in the words of Kyriacos Mavronicolas who was the Minister of Defence when Cyprus became an EU member:

“Firstly, I need to point out that the accession of Cyprus to the EU has created a stronger sense of safety than before. So, the possibility of a military clash or even a military incident is very small, keeping in mind the fact that Cyprus is a member of the EU. Secondly and most importantly, Turkey is in a pre-accession course, which means that the possibility for a military incident to happen is very low, according to the current situation.”

The accounts of foreign diplomats of EU countries on the island further identified but also substantiated this feeling of security in relation to Turkey under the auspices of the EU. The Chancellor of Germany asserts that:

“Although the EU is not strictly a defence project, in reality it’s a political union, of course there are indications for security and I would suspect that an attack on one of its members would solicit a strong reaction … being a member of the EU has its defence implications … I think Cypriots would worry a bit less now, but I can’t see that Turkey would do that.”

The accounts of the Ambassador of Sweden, at the time, further supported this view:
“Well, I should say that it’s very unlikely that Turkey would do anything. But, of course, if there was a massive thrust to sort of take over the South then of course it would have a lot of repercussions on the EU politically”.

The above accounts of politicians illustrate that the notion of EU as a protective power undermines the sense of ‘existential threat’ at the political level. This was also repeatedly evident in the accounts of my interviewees from the public. Dimitri’s account (man, 27, travel agent) was most typical:

“The fact that there might be a war, or that Turkey could attack us, doesn’t even cross my mind. However I think that if anything happened, many countries would help us, mostly because of the EU.”

The most prominent narrative at political and public levels commented that, due to the political implications of the EU, a military offensive on the part of Turkey was unlikely, as an attack on a member State would have meant an attack on the entire EU (most often also noting that Turkey was set on a EU pre-accession course). This new form of the EU as a protective power underscores the weakening post-war three-fold relationship previously constructed on the conceptualisation of the small and unprotected Cyprus needing to defend itself from Turkey.

6.5 The role of the EU in the defence policy

In this section I will argue that the accession of Cyprus to the EU has resulted in a ‘Europeanisation’ of the Cypriot defence policy that has formative implications for the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. The successive Cypriot governments that followed the opening of the borders and the accession to the EU, as well as the general public, came to understand the EU as an instrument of the ‘struggle’ itself, perhaps the most influential (Demetriou, 2008). Formerly, the ideology of defence that prioritised the nations’ military security over other social and economic issues was continually reproduced in relation to the ‘occupation’ and the fear of ‘existential threat’ in the face of another military offensive by the ‘enemy within’.
However, in the scope of ‘Europeanisation of the conflict’, the successive governments adopted a policy of disinvestment in the NG, changed some of the mobilisations and manifestations of ‘defence’ and in such ways undermined the ‘nation-in-arms’ and therefore the high militarist ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle.

I will illustrate the changing governmental policies of defence by discussing the dramatic decrease of the defence budget, the non-investment in arms procurement and the ambivalent policy in relation to the Single Area Defence Doctrine. Then I will proceed to further illustrate this by discussing the systematic cancellations of annual military parades and exercises and changes in the mobilisation of ideology in the training of conscripts.

The EU has, from the outset, marked a new turning point in the G.C. ‘struggle’ by becoming an instrument of the struggle for justice against Turkey. The EU has been broadly represented as an external actor who could influence the conflict in comparative relation to other external actors, (see Demetriou, 2005: 6). The EU has always supported the UN’s efforts for a lasting settlement, which would guarantee the basic needs, civil, political and cultural rights of all Cypriot citizens (Bryant, 2004; Tocci, 2004; Joseph, 1997). This view, in line with the post-war political discourse that represented the G.C.s as victims, has linked the EU accession of Cyprus to the conflict by resting on the idea that the EU would seek a solution “on the basis of ‘justice’ and ‘human rights’ that the EU was founded upon” (Demetriou, 2005: 16). It has been repeatedly argued that the accession created the belief that the G.C. side would now have more bargaining power, (for example see Demetriou, 2008).

In post-war Cyprus, as already discussed, the governments mobilised an unequal relationship between the post-war external and internal political agendas, by appealing to the international community to support the G.C. position and internally mobilising the ideology of defence. In the European Cyprus it appears that there has been a shift away from this unequal relationship. This is to appeal to the EU that has concurrently undermined the internal mobilisation of the ideology of defence, which is now, as discussed in the previous section, also mobilised against the opened border.
However, the impact of these two events together (the opening of the border and the accession of Cyprus to the EU) on the national struggle, appears in my interviewees accounts to have created another unequal relationship in the understanding of the G.C. position in the conflict situation. The opening of the borders, as discussed in the previous chapter, has been often seen as significantly weakening the negotiation tools of G.C.s, as it is undermining the definition of ‘occupation’, whereas the accession of Cyprus to the EU has been broadly seen as strengthening the negotiation tools.

In the context of the new understanding of ‘I struggle’ where the “I” became “we” as it included the EU as an instrument of the ‘struggle’, the successive governments shifted the ‘struggle’ away from military antagonisms by undermining the militarist framing of the national struggle that has been co-constitutive to post-war nationalism and masculinity. Therefore, the ‘Europeanisation’ of the external affairs of the conflict was inextricable from the governmental attempt to ‘Europeanise’ and thus to ‘normalise’ certain internal politics of masculinist nationalism and ‘defence’. Yet the issue here is that this is ideologically and discursively conflicting to the continuation of the ‘nation-in-arms’ predicated on the defence from the ‘enemy within’.

Perhaps the first sign of this ‘normalisation’ is the governmental acceptance of the opening of the borders, as the government could not have asserted such a strong nationalistic claim when on the threshold, only a year prior, to the Cyprus EU accession. This decision, which has been sharply criticised by certain segments of both the public and political leadership; undermines this post-war co-constitution projected on the un-crossable border. Also, this ideological fit between EU accession and internal public nationalist, militarist sentiment has thereafter placed the Cypriot state, which has been the scaffold of the national struggle, in a precarious position. Perhaps this explains Demetriou’s (2007) observation that the state was absent in the first days of opened borders, to then re-appear with political statements that sought to create a nationalist moralising discourse of ‘who’ and ‘why’ one should cross.

The major change in defence policy is, therefore, argued to be part of the new understanding of the ‘Europeanisation’ of the ‘I struggle’ and thus the effort to adopt a more EU integrative policy (Lutterbeck, 2005; Eide & Thee, 1980) and reconciliatory
face of Cyprus’, in recognition, also, that the ideology of defence is not conducive to negotiating with T.C.s. The implications of this on state defence and ideology is ‘normalisation’ of the G.C. defence politics, thus the extensive attempt of the Cypriot defence sector at mobilising both externally and internally a more European and reconciliatory face of ‘defence’. These changes have formative implications for the co-constitution of this three-fold relationship, subverting the ideology of defence and thus the high militarist ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle.

In terms of external defence affairs, this change can be clearly illustrated in the extensive involvement in EU defence programs and missions\textsuperscript{23}. Yet, internally, this change becomes formative for the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, which was predicated on struggling for liberation and ‘defence’ from ‘occupation’. The NG, and the ‘nation-in-arms’ in post-war Cyprus directly portrayed the ideology of defence in regards to the ‘existential threat’ that existed across the uncrossable border. However, I argue that the above changes created an ideological conflicting trajectory and public puzzlement of the role of the NG under these new parameters, which have been thereafter undermining the ‘nation-in-arms’. The ‘normalisation’ of the internal defence affairs has been conducive to the changing of some of the militarist masculinist ideological mobilisations and projections of military prowess the state has asserted as part of the ideology of defence.

Whilst the armed forces remain operationally and structurally organised in the same way these changes in defence policy have a major impact on the operational abilities of the army and the motivation to serve. General Pandreou, Adjutant to the Minister of Defence when these changes began to take place, emphasised that, since the Annan Plan called for the demise of the NG and they thought that there would have been a solution to the conflict from that time onwards, the budget of the NG was reduced every year and they stopped buying new equipment and doing so many exercises:

\textsuperscript{23} Such examples are the collaboration of Cyprus with the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in European Union) and ESDC (European Union Security and Defence College) as well as the engagement with the Finabel committee (since 2006 under the status of the observer and since 2008 a full Member State).
“this is why the NG does not currently have the consistency, the uniformity and the obedience it had in the past.”

If we are to first look at numbers, see table below, the notable decrease of the defence budget since the early 2000s provides a clear illustration of the change in defence policy. The proportion of GDP spent on defence between 2002 and 2011 averaged 2.08% in contrast to the defence spending of the 1990s period, which averaged 3.9%\(^{24}\) between 1987 and 1999.

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\(^{24}\) The statistics of the above table were taken from the SIPRI military expenditure database (see also World Bank Military Expenditures).
It is argued that this change in defence policy with the associated defence spending reflects a clear change in the state objective to mobilise military prowess, as this meant major cuts in the ‘defence arms procurement fund’ leading to no further major modernisation and procurement programs. Heavy weapons are not separate from the broader culture of militarisation. In post-war Cyprus these procurements were a projection of military prowess, publicly demonstrated in the regular military parades, and were an indispensable manifestation of the ideology of defence and a high militarist ‘fighting spirit’ that received great public support.

The defence sector thereafter prioritises the maintenance of major weapon systems, (see Phileletheros, 2011). The NG continues as a mass-conscription army with only the necessary resources for its overall sustenance. Media sources support this observation, as Philelepheros (in Greek: Φιλελεύθερος), (2010), one of the most widespread newspapers in Cyprus, notes on Friday 12th November 2010:

“The defence budget for 2011 is reduced, and does not contain military armaments and procurement programs, with the exception of ammunition and some accessories for existing defence armaments which were purchased years ago.”

Following the defence policy of the late 1980s and 1990s with its associated tax spending and extensive procurement programs, discussed in the first section of this chapter, the major change in defence policy (that did not also translate into the abolition of the special levy for defence) generated intense public, media and political discussions, which will be presented and discussed throughout this chapter. What is most significant about this change of defence policy is that it is clearly undermining the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity.

The account of Kyriacos Mavronicolas who was the Minister of Defence when Cyprus became a member of the EU, in response to a question I posed to him in relation to where the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ is located in the understanding of

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25 As it is stated in the Global Militarisation Index report 2011: “to determine the level of militarization of a country, specific types of heavy weapons have to be taken into account” (see GMI 2011).
patriotism supported by the political party he represents (EDEK), provides a point of departure into understanding the subversion of the ideology of defence by the state:

“Basically, we need to fight for a united Cyprus, for a modern European army of a European member-state without the presence of the Turkish occupying army. Certainly, times have changed and we cannot talk about a military solution. We are trying through peace talks with the thought that, at some point, Turkey will understand the needs and the international developments well enough in order to face its neighbouring countries in a more consensual way.”

The above account is illustrative of the political unwillingness to carry through the post-war assertive militarism of the ‘nation-in-arms’ that is undermining the assertive masculinist militarist frame of the post-war national struggle. General Pandreou further made this clear by explaining that in this situation there was a certain inactivity from the part of the Ministry of Defence and the government:

“[…] because the defensive armouring of Cyprus should continue to exist as it was and every officer of the NG should be informed in order to continue their tasks as before.”

What is most central here is that, whilst under these new attended features of the governmental politics, the defence policy and the NG are put under pressure to become European both structurally and culturally. However, the mission of the NG has not been transformed. Rather the state that has evidently undermined the defence sector, and has not made its defence plans clear, has sustained the existing military order within a defence policy of ‘normalisation’ and ‘non-investment’. The force falls behind in the European shift of armed forces to smaller professional militaries (Burk, 1992; King, 2005; Haltiner, 1998). Professionalisation and modernisation do not take place but are periodically discussed in political and military circles and media. Whilst at the end of 2013 the government began to discuss a potential plan for semi-professionalisation of the force (see ANT1), Cyprus is today one of 6 out of the 27 EU members that have not abolished conscription, and is also the EU member-state with the longest conscription service.
Therefore, I argue that whilst the NG is frozen as a mass-conscription army of the same size, which continues to require the commitment of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ by sustaining a two-year military conscription and extensive reserve service, it continues a military mission that today, to some extent, is ideologically empty. However, in this socio-political discursive space, as I will now proceed to illustrate, the NG as a state institution loses its legitimacy, in continuing to ‘normalise’ its post-war ideological representations of defence.

A policy change that is argued to illustrate the relinquishment of the state’s ideological conscription of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and its insistence on the preparedness and readiness of the ‘nation-in-arms’, is the consecutive cancellation of military parades and exercises since the Annan Plan period, in the light of the on-going and intensified negotiations for the reunification of Cyprus, as well as the financial crisis. These central state manifestations of defence prowess in post-war Cyprus, have been repeatedly identified in divided societies to be an evocation of the idea of defence of the community as well as resistance and self-reliance (see Ross, 2009; Bryan, 2000; Jarman, & Bryan 1998, on the role of parades in Northern Ireland) and therefore of a high militaristic ‘fighting spirit’.

Military parades have, since the opening of the borders, been restricted to one per year on the 1st October, which is the independence day of the RoC, with limited major weapons displayed. However, it is argued that the ideological statement this parade symbolises, because of the specific celebration, is de-anchored from the military dispute with Turkey. Whereas, the military parades related to the ‘occupation’, which were a way of projecting nationalist military pride, uniformity and strength against the ‘enemy within’ were cancelled, which is a clear illustration of a weakening militarist ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle.

Furthermore, the military exercise ‘Nikihforos’ (In Greek: ‘Νικηφόρος’), which was one of the two annual military exercises that included the whole force (the other, which is still continuing, is 'Dimitra', in Greek: ‘Δήμητρα’), and received significant public adherence and media coverage, was cancelled when the Annan Plan was in process (with the
exception that it took place in 2006 and not again thereafter). This was cancelled as a sign of good will for the negotiations, in conjunction with the cancellation of the exercise of Turkeys' force in Cyprus named 'Bull' (In Greek: Ταύρος). The cancellation of 'Nikiiforos' was followed by the abolition of the joint Cypriot and Greek exercises, "Nikiforos" and "Toxitis" (in Greek: Τοξότης), since the two were held together. The cancelation of "Nikiforos" and "Toxitis" bears a special symbolism in the weakening ideology of defence, as the combining of these two exercises took place under the Single Area Defence Doctrine, which, as discussed above, sought to enlarge the idea of the Defence of Cyprus, by creating this defence union with Greece.

A change in defence policy that illustrates the ‘stepping back’ of the masculinist assertion of defence, in the scope of the pressure the Cypriot state underwent in customising its defence policy under the EU, is argued to be a policy that created ambivalence as to whether the Single Area Defence Doctrine is politically and structurally still in place. In the 1990s the SADD with Greece had become an integral part of the ideology of defence, co-constituting nationalism and masculinity, providing the aggregation of defence policy between these two states as a matter of “national existential threat”. It is clear that such territorial military coalitions and antagonisms are oppositional to the idea of the EU.

Even though the abandonment of SADD has never been made official, infrequent references to it in the press have repeatedly suggested that it is deactivated. In 2014, the term ‘Single Area Defence Doctrine’ does not appear anywhere on the Cyprus Ministry of Defence and the NG websites, when it previously did. At the same time, as discussed above, the conduct of joined military exercises with Greece that took place under the SADD have been repeatedly cancelled. The Ministers of Defence of both countries following the early 2000 period adopted a policy of stressing the defence ties between the collaboration of two historically linked EU Members; but avoid referring to the doctrine directly. Evidence of this, is the reference to the SADD by Cyprus Defence Minister, Kostas Papakostas, on 2nd October 2008 on the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, as "fireworks that faded", (see Defence News Greece,2008). While he also noted that what is in force between Cyprus and Greece is ‘defence cooperation’, (ibid).
Similarly, when Greek Minister of Defence, Evangelos Venizelos on the 4th April 2011 (see Press and Information Office Cyprus Republic, 2011), is asked about it directly by a journalist he replies:

"We have said repeatedly that what is in force is the permanent structured cooperation between two member states of the EU, related with national and historical ties ... So what we are saying is what meets the needs of the time."

This reference translates into a very different defence partnership between the two states from the 1990s masculinist “self” assertion of SADD.

Moreover, the state further loses legitimacy, in continuing to ‘normalise’ its post-war ideological conscription of defence as it is forced to abolish the draconian legal sanctions that existed for those who did not complete their military service, previously assisting the sustenance of the ‘nation-in-arms’. These could no longer be enforced under the relevant European Directives and, more broadly, were contradictory to European culture. Kyriacos Mauvronicolas, former Minister of Defence, made it clear in the interview I conducted with him that, as European citizens, young men are allowed to refuse to serve military service.

It is argued that the apparent ideology of defence among G.C.s began to unravel in the context of the political changes discussed above alongside the cultural impact of Western and European, individualist and materialist values and ideals on the broader community and more specifically, as it will be discussed in the next chapter, on masculinity and its post-war links to conscription. Until the recent political and cultural transitions and changes, the deep-rooted social values of defence and conscription had not posed a problem of political legitimacy. The successive governments that followed the division of the island used the ideology of defence in producing consent to prioritise Cyprus’ military defence over other social and economic issues. However, in this process of Europeanisation the Cyprus NG is caught up between the old ‘defence’ rhetoric and the effort for Europeanisation, where, the aforementioned changes, today, are constitutive of the ideological conflicting trajectory of ‘defence’ in and out of the military barracks and this underscores the weakening of this three-fold relationship.
The position of the National Guard in a conflicting ideological trajectory

In this section I will argue that the NG, with its concomitant ‘nation-in-arms’ under the above-discussed nexus of new social and political parameters and defence policies, has thereafter entered into an ideological conflicting situation. In this situation the NG struggles as an institution to maintain its sense of purpose and this situation has contributed in challenging the commitment of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. This is a clear illustration of the weakening militarist frame of the national struggle that has formative implications for the post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity.

Key parts and evidence of the ideological undermining of the ‘nation-in-arms’ is the weakening morale in the force, emergence of draft-dodging and loosening discipline and sense of purpose in the reserve forces. Moreover, the governmental disinvestment in defence, the end to masculinist displays of military prowess and the policies of prohibiting the reconstruction of specific ‘otherings’ in the force, which will be discussed in this section, were a ‘stepping-back’ from ideological manifestations of ‘defence’ in the state apparatus. The ‘stepping-back’ from these state ideological manifestations which previously assisted the commitment of the community to the ‘nation-in-arms’ (with its purpose to protect the ‘free areas’ of Cyprus by the ‘Turk’), have contributed in ideologically disorientating the purpose of the force.

Following these developments, as I will now proceed to further illustrate, the technologically advanced, organised 'nation-in-arms', which is one of the most prominent contingent materialisations of the 'fighting spirit', is becoming ideologically undermined and its purpose obscured. Yet, the government still requires the commitment of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ given that it sustains the conscription system. However, in this new setting the state has not instructed the NG with a new ideology and operational purpose that could have revived the motivation of the community to remain committed to its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’. This relationship between the decaying ideology of defence, the state and the community as ‘nation-in-arms’ further ideologically undermines the role of the ‘nation-in-arms’.
Those “making changes in an institution’s value system […] referring specifically to the army […]” at times have a clear idea of the results they seek, in most cases they do not, and in any case cannot be assured of achieving the desired results” (Murray, 1999: 135). Indeed, General Pandreou, who was an adjutant to the Minister of Defence when these polices of disinvestment began to be applied, made it clear that all of these factors have affected the morale and the spirit of the soldiers, emphasising that it is expected that soldiers will start questioning the purpose of serving when the government and the NG shows to the public that they are not interested in maintaining a well-trained and potent force.

In the setting of these political and social developments, it was repeatedly clear in the accounts of members of the military leadership, military officers and soldiers I spoke to that they have become disoriented in regards to the role they are called to play, an issue that is explored in the next chapter in relation to masculinity and the declining motivation to serve conscription. In military culture “it is likely that unintended effects of reforms on the cultural patterns of an organization may be more significant than intended effects” (Murray, 1999: 135). As General Pandreou went on to explain, now there is a compliancy in the force but the NG used to be different

“[…]it was a uniform system which was functioning with certain rules, with obedience etc. because of the dangerous situation we were facing…Now our soldiers don’t even have a basic level of morale, I don’t know if they will be able to react in case of an incident, they are in hibernation mode! ”

This ideologically conflicting process of the purpose of the force in conjunction with the impact of the political events and certain social transformations in subverting the ideology of defence, all discussed above, are argued to have had an impact on civil-military relations, the value of the conscription and reserve service; substantially contributing to the exponential phenomenon of draft-dodging and a weakened reserve force. This ideological conflicting situation between political leadership, public and armed forces is clearly manifested in the declining public support of the idea of ‘nation-in-arms’ and was widely acknowledged by the military officers I spoke to. The ideological disorientation of the mission of the ‘nation-in-arms’ is clearly illustrated by the prohibition of a specific slogan in the NG.
Prohibition of ‘othering’ the ‘Turk’ in the National Guard

One of the most significant developments that represents and is represented by the ideological disorientation of the mission of the ‘nation-in-arms’ in relation to the ‘other’ is the prohibition of the use of the ever-common post-war slogan ‘A Good Turk is a Dead Turk’ (in Greek: Τούρκος καλός μονάχα ο νεκρός). It is argued that this comes to further disorient the post-war purpose of the force and undermine its ‘fighting spirit’. As discussed previously, the opening of the borders resulted in partly diminishing the former distance with the ‘Turks’ as the ‘other’, and the accession of Cyprus to the EU resulted in a relative ontological security in relation to the ‘existential threat’ from the ‘other’. Thus, the state institution of the NG, which ceaselessly reconstructed the ‘Turk’ as the dangerous ‘enemy within’ and existed under the ascribed purpose of keeping ready and trained the ‘nation-in-arms’ that would provide the deterrent force against this ‘enemy’, is argued to lose significant ideological ground when it is prohibited, under certain policies of the Ministry of Defence, from continuing to project the ‘Turk’ as the dangerous ‘enemy’.

The Ministry of Defence has, in recent years, been committed to ‘a series of measures to identify officers with extreme nationalist attitudes’, (see for example SigmaLive, 2013). Such policy cases began to attract political, media and public criticism and discussion, following the 25th July 2009, when the Ministry of Defence launched disciplinary action against training officers at the military training boot camps (in Greek: ΚΕΝ, κέντρο εκπαίδευσης νεοσιλεκτών) of Larnaca and Paphos, for forcing new conscripts into chanting, what was named at the time as, ‘unacceptable slogans’, (see Cyprus Mail, 2009). In this incident the, at the time, Minister of Defence Costas Papacostas said that slogans such as “‘A good Turk is a dead Turk’ could only create more problems for the NG”. Adding that: “We want fighters who can deal at any given moment with a hostile attack; we don’t want blood-thirsty people, or people who breed hate and passion”, (see Maxh, 2011). He called for new conscripts not to shout slogans that the Head of the NG did not give his permission for. General Pandreou, who at the time was the former Manager of the Military Office of the Minister of Defence, offers an account about the impact of these policies on the force by explaining that:
“Certain battles cries have stopped appearing during the training. I guess that it’s the mentality of the new government. It bothers me enormously when I hear some people saying that Turkish-Cypriots are our brothers. They are not our brothers. If we continue with this mentality, this will certainly be the end of the NG.”

The above account is illustrative of the significance the specific ‘othering’ of the ‘Turks’ has for the force. Furthermore, a few more events come to further verify and contribute to this change of policy. In October 2011, an order was given by the 2nd Division of the NG to erase certain slogans appearing on the walls of some camps and outposts on the border that referred to notions of returning back to the ‘occupied’ part of the island, (see Maxh, 2011). Maxh (In Greek: Μάχη, that translates into Battle), a widespread Cyprus newspaper with right wing affiliations, on the 30th October 2011, (ibid), comments on this situation with criticism and irony as follows:

“According to the order…[these]… must be erased because they … refer to the past … and promote hatred and fanaticism (apparently against the Turkish occupation army)!”. 

Moreover, some officers I spoke to (whilst off duty) commented on the fact that nationalist history in regards to the construction of the ‘other’ is generally not strongly practiced anymore in the NG. Thus, a non-commissioned officer, (37) explains that:

“In the past, when you joined the army they would tell you ‘In 1974, the Turks came, they invaded our homes, they raped our women etc. etc.’ and so the soldiers were fanaticised. You create images in your head even though you haven’t experienced the war”.

Today, officers commented it is up to the conscience and willingness of the respective Captain to teach this version of history to his soldiers. Such policies are argued to undermine contingent parts of the ideology of defence; notably the ‘existential threat’ from the ‘enemy within’ and the masculinist, military ‘fighting spirit’ of the national struggle for liberation from the feminised tendencies of circumstance i.e. ‘occupation’. These policies are understood. as discussed above, to be part of the general effort to ‘normalise’ politics under the EU accession and in recognition that the ideology of
defence, that portrays ‘Turks’ as an ‘enemy within’ threatening the survival of the G.C. population, is not conducive to negotiating with T.C.s for reunification. In fact, they are oppositional to the very discursive structures of the force that ceaselessly re-constructed the ‘Turk’ as the arch ‘enemy’. The force has not been given another purpose and operationally it is maintained with its original ‘primary necessary purpose’, which is to defend and guard the border from the ‘enemy within’. The ideology of defence of the ‘nation-in-arms’, which has already been debilitated under the new parameters discussed throughout this chapter, cannot be mobilised without its dialectical opposite; the ‘Turk’, as the existentially threatening ‘other’, a process of identity maintenance that has been prohibited through the polices discussed above. Thus, the ‘Turk’, is argued, at the level of ideology to be a necessary ‘enemy’ for the ‘nation-in-arms’ of the NG.

The NG has been created and ideologically constructed through the nationalist discursive construction of identity that drew on a relation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, where the ‘Turk’ took the form of the generalised and undifferentiated ‘other’, (Said, 1978); the ‘enemy’ par excellence of the “Greek nation”, (see Spyrou, 2006: 97-99). Therefore, the masculine representational practices, which construct the G.C. soldier in the NG were played in negative opposition to the ‘other’, and thus constructed “the ‘self’ vis-a-vis this other” (Doty, 1996: 10).

One needs to consider that the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ highly displayed in the NG was part of the post-war nationalist construction of the memory of the war events that pointed to the ‘existential threat’ from the ‘enemy within’, which was turned into the need for struggle for liberation (this is also clearly laid out in the revised National Guard law that provides the sustenance of conscription, see National Guard law, 2011). In the identity construction of the ‘nation-in-arms’, ‘I do not forget’ meant that I will not forget what the Turks did to Cyprus and that it is ‘our’ masculine duty to ‘I struggle’ with military force for ‘defence’ and for liberation of the vulnerable homeland Cyprus from the ‘occupation’ forces. This was further symbolically illustrated in the force by the ever-present slogan: ‘A Good Turk is a Dead Turk’.

The impact of the prohibition of the projection of the ‘Turk’ as the ‘enemy’ on the sense of ‘I struggle’ for the ‘nation-in-arms’ is argued to reflect the changing relationship
between ‘I do not forget’ and ‘I struggle’, discussed in the previous chapter. The impact of these policies on the changing relationship between ‘I do not forget’ and ‘I struggle’ was characteristically depicted in the following discussion I had with an officer (39, interviewed whilst off duty):

“Interviewer: When we were children, we grew up with the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’.

Officer: It applied back then. It was really important for all of us.

Interviewer: Can you hear it in the army today?

Officer: No, soldiers come into the army and they don’t even know anything. For example, you can ask them where the Turks are and they might say that they are on this side of the island.

Interviewer: Can you find ‘I do not forget’, as a symbol, or relevant images in the military camps today?

Officer: Yes, but that’s it. There are just some photos. Because of our foreign policy, these ideologies do not exist anymore. At the time of the referendum when everyone thought that we would find a solution to the Cypriot problem, it was unacceptable for the NG to fanaticise its soldiers. However, they had still some slogans like “a good Turk is a dead Turk.”

The type of slogans that were provided in exchange for the previous ones further support this argument. These were also discussed in the press (see for example Adonis Palikaridis, 2010), and were clearly laid out in a discussion I had with two non-commissioned officers (37 and 38, interviewed whilst off duty) who specified the slogans they were allowed to use:

“Officer A: For example “Go, go, green berets” … We are only allowed to say things about our unit that have nothing to do with external matters.

Interviewer: What else is forbidden now?

Officer A: Just this basically. Whatever has to do with the Turks.
**Officer B:** They just use the ‘harmless’ slogans.”

The sense of identity of the soldiers, thus ‘us’, these new policies seek to cultivate do not include a threatening ‘other’ and therefore neither the notion of defence of ‘us’ from Cyprus’ arch ‘enemy’, the ‘Turk’. The way in which the discussion with the two non-commissioned officers developed, supports this argument:

“**Officer A:** Now it is forbidden to shout these kinds of slogans against the Turks.

**Officer B:** Yes it’s true. There is no more hatred, in fact they are trying to erase this hatred but without it, you cannot cultivate the rest. If you don’t show them that the men on the other side are dangerous and we need to fight them before they fight us, they will just shake hands with them. There is no other way! How will you convince them that they are dangerous? We can do this only through the army. We should convince them that we should keep our distance.

**Interviewer:** What did you mean when you said ‘cultivate the rest’?

**Officer A:** How will I train them to fight against the Turks when they don’t hate them? How will they kill the Turks since they don’t feel that they have anything against them? And regarding the slogans we were shouting, these slogans brainwash them and they see things differently.”

Thus, the prohibition of officers from drawing the differentiation of ‘us’ versus the distant existentially threatening ‘them’ is an insurmountable obstacle in reiterating the ideology of defence, as both ‘self and other’ need to be kept separate for the protraction of the identity the ideology of defence is mobilising. These policies further illustrate the contradictory trajectory the ideology of defence is travelling on, leading to a very convoluting and uncertain understanding of the role of the ‘nation-in-arms’ today.

In this overall context, it is argued that the identity mobilised through the force, which is centred solidly on the part of ‘us’ that feels a relative security and encounters the ‘other’ in everyday life, struggles to find purpose or, perhaps more succinctly, a sense of self in serving his military duty and to guard the border from the ‘Turk’. Therefore, it is argued
that the invigorating commitment of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and the ideological and actual conscription of men in the army in Cyprus can only be unremitting so long as the state and the NG continues to construct and project the ‘enemy’ as being dangerous to the very existence of the “nation” and effectively mobilise this throughout society. In relation to these polices there is a vast array of right wing press accounts from that time, which were especially preoccupied with these issues, making the point that these polices lead to the declining motivation to serve and to the issue of draft-dodging (see H Shmerinh, 2010 and Maxh, 2011).

The men who were to be conscripted into the NG in the coming years were faced with this particular conflicting ideological trajectory; ‘occupation’, needing to defend the border and open-borders, the ‘enemy within’ crossing them, the possibility of reunification sustained by the intensified negotiations, a society that feels relatively safe under the protection of the EU and an ideologically disoriented and undermined force. Following this period, draft dodging rapidly became an exponential phenomenon and the discipline in the reserve forces became weakened.

In this section, I have argued that these polices create a disorientation of the ideology of defence. This ideological disorientation comes to challenge the social body as a ‘nation-in-arms’ predicated on the ‘existential threat’ from the ‘enemy within’ by undermining this type of culture that was mobilising the masculinist nationalist and militarist ideological assertions of post-war Cyprus against ‘occupation’ and constituting the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’.

6.6. Mourning and melancholia about the undermining defence and ideology

In this section, I will argue that the governmental and public disinvestment in ‘defence’ has found itself oppositional to the post-war societal structures that were constructed on defence and the need for liberation from the ‘occupation’ forces. The most prominent narrative in my interviewees’ accounts articulated this contradiction: a continued upholding of defence as a mobilising frame of protection and liberation, but at the same time these defence frames are precisely the issues from which they had disengaged in their accounts. In this context, new questions have arisen in and around a variety of
topics such as military service, the responsibility of the government over the army (especially the use of resources diverted towards military purposes) and the moral and legal responsibility of commanders for military issues and accidents.

This puzzling contradiction in my interviewees’ accounts between a continued support of defence, and both the feeling of substantial security under the auspices of the EU and the personal unwillingness to ‘I struggle’ in defence of the community, generate one main question: If the general public feels security under the EU and so many young G.C. men are trying to avoid military service, what is the basis for the public’s recently mobilised deep resentment of the governmental disinvestment in defence and the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of young soldiers?

My argument is that the deep public subversion of the ideology of defence resulted in the public feeling defenceless and that the ‘fighting spirit’ of the national struggle has further weakened. This ideology had, since the division of the island, inculcated into Cyprus society the defence of the community as a value of existential urgency and centrality and had placed the NG at the heart of the encapsulation of the national struggle. Hence, while the most prominent narrative on defence illustrated the ‘social forgetting’ of defence and clearly articulated a sense of security due to the EU membership, it did express insecurity and disenchantment that the ‘fighting spirit’ has weakened when faced with an undermined NG. In this new situation the army is being sustained as an essential part of the publics’ ontological security and understanding of the national struggle, embedded through the post-war nationalist discourse of ‘occupation’. It appears to me that my interviewees typically articulated in their accounts that the new form of security offered by sheltering under the EU contributes to, but does not substitute, the old military ontological security and that the potency of this new form of EU struggle continues to be linked to the ‘fighting spirit’ of the army. This is expressed clearly in Maria’s (woman, 27, translator) account:

“We are not alone. We have the EU first of all … Turkey will have to think twice before going into a war against us because we are a member of the EU. We are not just a small island that they can invade without much effort, the situation is not the same as it was in 1974 …. we need to spend a big percentage of this
money because of our situation, since half of the island is under Turkish occupation, the army should be our first concern.”

The account of Dimitri’s (man, 27, travel agent) who is a young reservist, further illustrates this contradiction of feeling ontological security under the auspices of the EU but, at the same time, expressing the need for military defence:

“The army needs money, certainly. In the end, Cyprus’ biggest problem is the Cypriot Problem! Since we can see that we don’t have a modernised army, we don’t buy new weaponry systems … then it’s rational to wonder where all this money is spent … Even though we are under occupation, we would never imagine waking up to a war tomorrow. Anyway, after our accession to the EU, I don’t think that there is any way that we won’t have the EU’s support if Turkey decides to attack us… the fact that there might be a war or that Turkey could attack us, doesn’t even cross my mind.”

In the post-opening of the borders European Cyprus, the decline in motivation to serve, the public support for the decrease of the length of the military service and relative support for the exchange of the force to a professional one, discussed below, represent the disengagement of the community from its commitment to the ‘nation-in-arms’. Whereas, the exponential penetrating phenomenon of draft-dodging is the clearest manifestation of this disengagement, pointing us also to the changing hegemonic masculinity discussed in the following chapter. However, the disengagement of the community from the idea of the ‘nation-in-arms’ does not translate into negation of the public support for a strong army in the national struggle. As Kuhlman (2003) observes, public support for the armed forces does not mean that the ‘count me out’ inclination among civilians has been overcome, quite the opposite is true.

The undermined ‘defence’ generated intense and multiple reactions amongst my interviewees. However, the question of whether the RoC should continue to have its own army did not. Only a small minority of my interviewees did not support the existence of the army institution. The vast majority of them took a strong position on the necessity of a potent army in the national struggle against ‘occupation’. In this context,
interviewees most often took a strong critical position towards the respective governments and policies that led to the neglect of the NG. Therefore, at the public level the NG, under the auspices of the EU and the opened borders, continues to be framed as inextricable from the sense of ontological security and understanding of national struggle. For example, Giannos’ (man, 58, owner of local dry-cleaning shop) narrative illustrates that the accession to the EU, open borders and the humanisation of the ‘other’ does not defeat the role of the army against ‘occupation’:

“When I went to the occupied side I didn’t have any problems with the people there. They are nice. But imagine if I told them to leave from my house? Even if they are nice. Would they give me my home back? So why would I say that they are nice? They aren’t! I should just go and reclaim what belonged to me. Since I am not doing this, the army should be maintained and continue with its role.”

Interviewees from diverse political and socio-economic groups expressed the insecurity felt in relation to the condition of the army and the unclear ideology of defence mobilised by the state, and, while challenging the army’s potency in the national struggle; asserted the discourse of ‘occupation’. My argument is that the ontological security and idea of the national struggle as integrally tied to the army is a direct product of the remnants of the post-war nationalist militarist structures, that today acts as an entrenchment of the public need for a potent army against the ‘occupation’.

Almost all of my interviewees commented that the NG is no longer in a condition expected to defend the community from the ‘occupation’ forces and most often supported that the army needs to regroup and raise its morale and operational abilities. Panico’s (man, 27, unemployed) account was a most typical one:

“In terms of human resources I think our army is enough. However, I don’t think that we are properly equipped and ready to fight the occupation forces.”

Nonetheless, while under the above-outlined new parameters the G.C. community began to question the level of operative and operational abilities of the NG as well as the appropriate use of diverted resources to military uses, and it increasingly felt a large
measure of dissatisfaction over the system of conscription, especially the length of service. The continuation of the conscription system was not defended independently, but rather, most often, only if necessary in order to have a potent army. This further illustrates the disengagement of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, yet also the sustenance of the ontological importance of the army in the public’s perception and it’s inextricable role in the national struggle.

In relation to what exactly should be done with the conscription system, interviewees revealed multiple opinions: most often there was relative support for a decrease in the length of military service and thus the semi-professionalisation of the force, if this is possible whilst having a strong army (most prominent narrative). In this narrative, the length of the conscription service was almost always counter-posed to the loss of time from men’s careers. Elpiniki’s (woman, 33,) account, a private school teacher with liberal views, was a most typical one:

“I think that if they ever decide to do this [translators note: meaning abolish the army], I will be terrified, even though I don’t really agree with this institution, but if they decide to reduce the military service to a few months then I would agree with them.”

Another group of interviewees expressed the wish for turning the NG into a professional force, in order to have a potent army (second most prominent narrative). In this view, the poor condition of the force and the decline in motivation to serve and the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of young soldiers, was most often counter-posed to the need for potent military defence against ‘occupation’. Most often, interviewees who supported this narrative argued that under these conditions young men waste two years serving their military service and reserves waste their time when called for training without this serving the purpose. Therefore, they commented that they did not see any reason as to why men should continue to complete their service. Nico’s (man, 42, entrepreneur) account, who is a refugee, was very typical of this narrative:

“It would be better to have a professional army. Do you think that the people who served or who are serving in the army now will be able to save us? What can the youth do today? It’s a shame to waste so much of their time in the army.”
Also Marios (man, 29, engineer) who had ultra-nationalist, political views and was particularly fond of the army and very interested in military matters still, in his own way, articulates this view:

“Our ‘enemy’ is the Turkish army and we have the obligation to protect our mothers, our brothers and sisters. If anything happens, if you don’t go, the person next to you doesn’t go etc., then who will go to serve our country? … Concerning the army, they should either constitute a professional army or they should keep it the way it is and just change the military service duration from 2 years to 1 year instead.”

Other interviewees like Stephanos (man, 34, accountant) who also held strong nationalist views, went further to describe the professionalisation of the army they support:

“We could easily create the alternative; a very strong army with 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 thousand people in a professional army whose job would be to protect our country! These could be Cypriots or foreigners. Whatever, I don’t care! And we could have equipment worth 1 billion Euros on the borders so we wouldn’t need to have the outposts etc. (translators note: referring to the outposts on the border)”

Moreover, Kyriacos Mauvronicolas, former Minister of Defence, showed clear awareness of the public support for a strong army without the involvement of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ counter-posing this against a long conscription that detains young men from their career plans. He made clear the intention of the Ministry to reduce the length of service yet commented on the costly necessary rearrangements that will have to be made in the force.

The two most prominent narratives presented above, illustrate that the weakening of the ideology of defence has affected the continuous support for the existence of a potent army and calls for its change into a semi or fully professional force. Indeed, it was only a limited number of interviewees, who had most often expressed strong nationalist, right-wing beliefs, which explicitly supported a potent conscript army (third most prominent narrative). Interestingly, in this narrative the decline in motivation or refusal to serve was most often understood in terms of the poor condition of the force that, as they
commented, defeats any sense of purpose for the young conscripts. As Marios (man, 40, entrepreneur) clearly laid out in his account:

“The army should remain as it is. Yet, the reality is that someone who would have served in the army, if things were different, decides that it is not necessary to do it because the situation is the way it is or because it’s not worth it anymore.”

And a very limited number of interviewees supported de-militarisation and the abolition of the NG (fourth most prominent narrative). As Louca (man, 63, civil servant) proposed:

“I think we should dismiss our army, compensate the officers and go to the UN and declare Cyprus as an “open city” so that no one will be able to invade us.”

It appears that one of the important consequences of these developments of the ideology of defence in G.C. society is that among the majority of the G.C. population there has been a significant erosion in the almost sacred status once enjoyed by the NG as a mass-conscript army; one of the most central pillars of the national struggle. These changes contributed not only to a crack in the popular acceptance of the military service as men’s duty, but also to a growing intolerance towards the defence sector. For example, Dimitris (man, 44, entrepreneur) commented that there should be an army because of ‘occupation’ but that in recent years the NG has become very weak and that this makes him feel unsafe. Also, Dimitris (man, 44, entrepreneur) characteristically commented that:

“You are supposed to be a soldier in order to serve a cause because of the situation we are in, but in reality the Cyprus army is nothing like this. The situation in my opinion is tragic.”

In a discussion that I had with a number of refugees in Larnaca, these remarks were clearly laid out. Dimitri’s (man, 27, travel agent) that he is in favour of the army but that with the current situation they will not be able to defend themselves, highlighting that: “Imagine (that) the reservists will have no idea where to go.” When Myranda (woman, 39, airport worker): replied that the NG would not be able to react in the case of a war, but what would happen: “Is that they will send the poor soldiers to war and practically
kill them.” Stelios (man, 37, airport worker) with irony replied that: “I think that they might even shoot some G.C.s accidentally.”

It seems that many groups in contemporary G.C. society are no longer willing to grant the NG its previous status of unquestioned potency, and that the status and trust of the army in society has been deeply eroded. The reasons revealed in my interviewees’ accounts as to why the NG has been undermined all seemed to significantly contribute to their distrust towards the government’s policies over the role of the army in the national struggle. In general terms, the government is denunciated largely in Cypriot society for having deserted the NG; deeply undermining Cyprus’ defence without making the plan for defence ever clear to the public. The vast majority of my interviewees that commented on this said they understood the undermined state of the army as a matter of governmental negligence of the defence sector, absence of interest from the staff of the NG to maintain a strong force and bad internal organisation within the force and corruption. In this context, the cancellation of military parades and exercises was broadly seen as an evident sign of the negligence of the army on the part of the government and as a general sign of the deterioration of Cyprus’ military defence.

Moreover, the extensive favouritism and nepotism taking place within the force in recent years (see: Transparency International, 2013), which is a widely known phenomenon in Cyprus, was evident in a lot of my interviewees’ accounts and has contributed to a decline in the status of the army in society and the public distrust of the defence sector. In Cyprus, the political power over the military makes it easier for those with political influence to avoid conscription or for soldiers and officers to be given a comfortable post within the army. This phenomenon, which is also periodically discussed in the media (see Simerini, 2011), was noted systematically by a lot of my interviewees as they expressed their distrust towards the army with a strong sense of frustration.

Today, the main purpose of the NG is to ensure the safety and protect the ‘free areas’ of the RoC from the ‘occupation’ forces, and has been, to a large extent, defeated by the opening of the borders and the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Yet, under these new parameters, the discourse of ‘occupation’ on which the ideology of defence was constituted on, which in post-war Cyprus called the social body to take part in the
defence of the vulnerable homeland through its construction as a ‘nation-in-arms’, is now acting as a ‘reflecting mirror’. This is creating public uncertainty and anxiety when faced with an undermined NG and directionless defence policy of Cyprus. G.C. militarism has been deeply co-constituted with post-war nationalism and any shift away from the post-war nationalist discourse of ‘I do not forget’ and the militarist ‘I struggle’ for ‘defence’ of the community is understood as devaluation of the national struggle and an undermining of the ontological security, which fires up the discourse of ‘occupation’.

The deep public anxiety and distrust felt in relation to the unclear defence policy and the bad condition of the army was collectively expressed, as it will be discussed in the next section, through the opportunity created by Cyprus’ worst military accident in 2011.

Explosion of the naval base in Mari

It is argued that the explosion of the naval base in Mari26, created a platform for collectively expressing the public insecurity of a long-lived absence of political and military sovereignty and transparent military responsibility in the national struggle. The explosion has been covered in depth by the national media, and has become of paramount importance for political powers and the public, leading to a number of political trials, including the at the time President of the Republic Of Cyprus, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence and the Head of the National Guard, (see Cyprus News Report, 2012). The explosion has been Cyprus’ worst peacetime military accident, and has been argued to currently hold the record as the biggest conventional (non-nuclear) explosion ever recorded in the world during a time of peace, (see Cyprus Updates, 2011).

The issue of the G.C. public living for the last few decades in a highly militarised ‘nation-in-arms’ committed to defending the G.C. community, investing money, time and trust in the army, was a boiling cauldron which imploded when the naval base in Mari, built as

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26 The Evangelos Florakis Naval Base explosion on the 11th July 2011, was Cyprus’ worst peacetime military accident, (see BBC, 2011). The incident occurred when 98 containers of explosives that had been stored for some time in the sun on the naval base self-detonated. As a result of the explosion, 12 Cypriot soldiers, officers and civilians were killed and sixty-two people were wounded. The blast killed, amongst others, the Head of the Cypriot navy, a navy base commander, 2 soldiers and six fire fighters, also knocking out the island’s biggest power station. The shockwave destroyed buildings on the base and fuel tanks at the nearby Vassilikos power plant, as well as destroying several houses and displacing a significant number of people. Debris was blown for kilometres around the base (see Cyprus Updates, 2011).
part of the SADD, exploded on the 11th July 2011. The state and political leadership, which had already been blamed for the condition of the army, were called to face the thousands of Cypriots protesting and asking for the President’s resignation. Pantelides (in Greek: Παντελίδης) (2011), writes in an article in the Cyprus Mail:

“The public, which has been able to forget numerous scandals in the past, has been demanding justice ever since the blast. It would appear that the Mari tragedy has exposed a deeply flawed system where we place people in power only to have them deny that their position comes with responsibility.”

I argue that the explosion in Mari created a platform for collectively expressing the deep public and political problematisation of state leadership, namely responsibility and sovereignty in the national struggle for the liberation of Cyprus from the ‘occupation’ forces. The governmental lack of responsibility over the army was understood to be largely linked to the weakening of the national struggle itself. Such a fatal explosion for the NG provided a space for vocalising the public anxiety deriving from the undermined defence in the name of reunification and Europeanisation; leading to the NG malfunctioning with clear consequences such as the incident in Mari. Angered by the government's failure to dispose of the ammunition, which had been seized by the United States Navy in 2009 after it intercepted a Cypriot-flagged, Russian-owned vessel, travelling from Iran to Syria in the Red Sea, several thousand G.C.s staged demonstrations outside the Presidential Palace where the demand for political and military responsibility predominated the scene. As BBC news had noted on the 12th July of 2011, (see BBC, 2011):

“Thousands of Greek Cypriots have marched on the presidential palace in Nicosia in protest over the deaths of 12 people in a blast at a navy base …. As public anger at the incident swelled, police said a crowd of up to 5,000 converged on the palace compound and hung a banner on the gate saying ‘(President Demetris) Christofias is a murderer and must go to jail’.”

Most of the people I talked to after the incident utilised this event to express their deep concern for the absence of military responsibility and the condition of the army. And
often, in this context, expressed their distrust of force in a potential war. In a discussion I had with some refugees in Larnaca shortly after the incident in Mari, these fears become clear:

**Myranda** (woman, 39, airport worker): “*Imagine, concerning the incident in Mari, there were mothers who went to the naval base just to pick up their children who were serving as soldiers there.*

When **Stephanos** (man, 48, airport officer) replied: “*We could say that in Cyprus we don’t have an army, it’s like we are under occupation.* (translator’s note: meaning that the whole island is under occupation)

This was also clearly evoked in the narrative of a soldier (aged 18) I interviewed within the NG shortly after the incident, who, while discussing his own role in the NG, commented:

"*I think that it’s a waste of time. I have never been in an emergency situation, in order to understand, in order to see that the Cyprus army is really able to perform; I wasn't even alive in 1974 … I see guns and tanks everywhere but there were also things like these in Mari and that exploded.*"

The explosion of the naval base in Mari was used by the public as a platform for expressing its insecurity of a long-lived absence of political military responsibility in the national struggle. The next section will expose that the government has thereafter placed much effort in illustrating that it continues to struggle militarily.

**6.7. Changing civil-military relations and the Governmental pressure to respond to the declining ‘defence’**

The above findings have clearly illustrated a changing dynamic between G.C. society, the state and army. The accounts of the public’s view of ‘defence’, provided by the two most prominent narratives, illustrate that the weakening of the ideology of defence has affected the continuous support for the existence of a potent army and calls for its
change into a semi or fully professional force. Also, the public anger that the incident in Mari unleashed illustrates the extensive criticism for the subversion of defence and directionless defence policy, directed against the government and the public demand for the state to become more responsible over the NG in the national struggle. Moreover, certain global cultural flows were illustrated to be catalytic in the disengagement of the community from the idea of its self as a ‘nation-in-arms’.

It appears that one of the most important consequences of the weakening of the ideology of defence is that it has allowed space for the pressure exerted by global developments on the NG to turn into a professional force to emerge as an issue for the public. Changes in the military reflect broader social changes and vice-versa (Janowitz, 1960, 1957, 1984). As discussed in the literature review, from the 1990s professional, smaller and more cost-effective forces have gradually replaced mass conscript armies. Most countries of NATO and the EU have today abolished conscription. This change relates mostly to global political, technological and economic developments (Burk, 1992; Haltiner, 1998; Cohen, 1995; Shaw, 1991; Van Doom, 1975; Janowitz, 1960; Moon, 2005a), whilst the EU accession has also been repeatedly identified as a catalyst for the professionalisation and modernisation of member state armies, (see: Lutterbeck, 2005; King, 2011, 2005). Yet, clearly in the context of divided Cyprus, the global pressure for professionalisation and modernisation of the NG unfolds as it enters the dynamics of the conflict itself. What is most significant here is the discourse of ‘occupation’.

The on-going so-called ‘Cyprus Problem’ has led to a post-armed conflict situation, which perpetuates a military mission on both sides of the divide. However, following the opening of the borders between the North and South of Cyprus in 2003, the Cyprus NG is sustaining a, by definition, mass conscript army trapped both structurally and culturally in the nexus between the continuous dispute with the ‘occupation’ force Turkey, European integration, army modernisation, opened borders, and intensified reunification talks. Therefore, since 2003 the Cyprus defence sector, I argue, has needed to reconcile two poles of reference. On the one hand, the political, military and technological developments at both global and European levels, which have been exerting pressure on the state to professionalise and modernise the force (which is today in an ‘anachronistic’ form) in order to gain competitive combat effectiveness. Also,
the accession to the EU and the intensified process of reunification talks have been exerting pressure on the state to create a more European and reconciliatory defence ideology. On the other hand, the state had to reconcile the 'occupation', thus, Turkey 'occupying' the Northern part of the border with a significant number of troops, which directly translates into the ever-present need of guarding a 112 mile border. However, the position of the Cyprus defence sector becomes more complicated yet as, since the opening of the borders, the following elements have also gradually entered this dynamic: ‘undermined and dispirited National Guard’ and ‘a public that feels defenceless’. This overall set of dynamics resulted in a multilateral nexus of pressures exerted between the state of the RoC, the G.C. public and the NG.

In this situation, I argue that, whilst the state is under the pressure of the global and European developments to professionalise and modernise the NG, it doesn’t. Yet, the state exerts pressure on the NG to continue its post-war mission (I struggle) against ‘occupation’, as a mass-conscript-army. However, in this setting, the state undermines the significance of the NG in the struggle by cutting its funds almost in half and, in the name of ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘reunification’, prohibits a large and indispensable part of the reproduction of its ideology (‘defence’). Yet, as the following discussion will illustrate, in the face of the undermined defence and the public’s strongly expressed condemnation of it, the state attempts, but is unable to, effectively reiterate the discourse of the ‘nation-in-arms’ in and out of the military barracks and thus fails to coerce the public into continuing to take up military responsibility, as its own (Enloe, 2007: 4). However, what becomes most significant in this situation is that the public exerts great pressure on the state to take up complete responsibility of the military frame of the national struggle.

The broader global change to professional and modernised armies, which is also supported by the G.C. public, reflects not only the need of the armed forces to adjust to “a new strategic environment of international relations” (Kuhlmann & Callaghan, 2011: 4), but also reflects broader cultural developments at the global level that provide technical rather than nationalist emotional solutions to perceived military threats. What is most central here is that whilst globalisation undermines the state-led national, cultural homogenisation that produces these nationalist and militarist social values, it is
individualism that consolidates the boundaries between the civil-military domains. The strongly emerging culture of individualism in Cyprus and the strong endorsement for a ‘Euro-Cypriot’ identity, contests the state-institutionalised subordination of individual considerations of the collective armed national struggle for ‘defence’.

The relationship between cultural homogenisation, nationalism and militarisation has historically been a state-led process (Conversi, 2007). Both within and outside the army, state-led cultural homogenisation consisted of the top-down imposition of a single, distilled, purified culture, ushered in by technological advances (ibid: 382). Therefore, universal male conscription in Cyprus was not only an effort to mobilise a mass army “but, behind it, a whole politicised population” (Best, 1982: 86). Then the nationalist politicisation of the mass army was achieved through the solidification of G.C. nationalist militarism throughout the ‘ethnic community’. Most importantly, however, the consolidation of G.C. cultural nationalist militarism, of which the manifestation is the ‘nation-in-arms’, requires that civil and military domains are kept fragmented, so that the state can strive in this civil-military space to instil the nationalist militarism and ensure its central appropriation into cultural homogenisation.

However, the wider cultural background in Western societies moving away from traditional cultural values, poses a serious challenge to state militaries, as they need to adjust to a rapidly changing society. Today’s society is more positively disposed to global cultural flows and the “free market, compared with the central state, as a basis for economic life” (Kuhlmann & Callaghan 2011: 4) and cultural homogenisation. The globalisation of finance, trade, communication, and other vital human activities steadily erodes much of the traditional basis (Moskos et al., 2000) of the ‘nation-in-arms’ model across the globe and removes the interpellatory capacity of the state, the epitome of the success of its ideological apparatus (Althusser, 1971: 170-177), to keep civil and military domains as fragmented whilst ensuring cultural homogenisation.

In Cyprus, the strongly emerging G.C. culture of individualism contests the subordination of individual considerations to the collective armed struggle of ‘defence’ against ‘occupation’. The decline of social cohesion has also meant a decline in social trust (Putnam, 2002) of the heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’ that has meant a stronger reliance of individuals on the state to execute the collective national project of
‘defence’. The professional force, that the G.C. public supports, whilst not necessitating strong community ties and emotional attachments to nationalist militarist ideals, it still solidly relies on the state for resources and support. Therefore, individualism in this case transverses the civil-military relations, where the civil domain that clearly still supports the need for a potent army is exerting pressure on the state to assume a greater role in sustaining the militarist frame of the national struggle. This change is especially important in countries like Cyprus where the army was completely reliant on the construction of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. The discussion of two officers (37 and 38, interviewed whilst off duty) depicts vividly how the consolidation of civil and military boundaries and changing civil-military relations undermines the ‘nation-in-arms’:

**Officer A:** Imagine that including the reservists we have around 120-130 thousand soldiers and everyone has guns in their homes so we are talking about 130 thousand guns in case of a war. It’s a real army!

*If a British soldier hears that Cyprus has an army of 130 thousand soldiers, he will think that we are undefeatable. But it’s not true. Basically we are 130 thousand useless soldiers.*

**Officer B:** The issue here is that society intervenes in every aspect of the military. For example, in Turkey unlike Cyprus, if a reserve loses his gun from his house, they won’t go and take everyone’s guns from everyone’s house with the thought that it’s dangerous since the illegal factions will used them. So what if a faction steals a gun and kills someone? However, in Cyprus, they make us hide the guns. If a gun gets stolen so what? This is how society intervenes in the affairs of the army. And this way the army is becoming more and more weakened. Army and modern society cannot coexist in Cyprus!

**Officer A:** The society has changed as well. Our society nowadays is very different, you cannot make soldiers do something. It’s hard to discipline them.

**Officer B:** No, it’s the parents who create problems and they bother the captain and the commander all the time by calling them and complaining. For example they might say ‘My son told me that he wants to be granted a day off on Sunday, why won’t you let him come home?’
Officer A: *For example, if you hung up on them, which in my opinion it is the right thing to do and which the commander has the power to do, they will call to the Ministry of Defense to complain. And then the people from the ministry will call the commander and tell him that he shouldn’t have hung up on them and that he should have listened to their problem. Is this a problem? The fact that the soldier can’t take a day off on Sunday to go to a family dinner? They don’t care about the units’ problems.”*

The military officers above are enunciating how individualism is traversing civil-military relations. One reserve with the accidental event of his lost gun has the power to bring down the pre-institutionalised, structured masculinist collective militarism of the ‘nation-in-arms’. This illustrates precisely the reciprocal undermining of trust between the military and civil domains in the scope of the changing civil-military relations. The apparent anger of Officer B is directed towards the degrading impact of modern society on the army, as he characteristically claims: “Army and modern society cannot coexist in Cyprus”.

In this way, Officer B is reacting against the emerging cultural stance that focuses on individuals’ rights: in the case of someone being killed due to a stolen gun. This is perceived as a distinct and alien posture for a ‘real soldier’, protector of the whole community from a much bigger threat; the ‘occupation’ army that is also not undergoing these social changes. Officer A congruently confirms that an ‘individual’s rights’ undermine a 130 thousand soldier army and they both conclude by presenting how the G.C. family’s ascription of value based on the culture of individualism is traversing the importance of the military community.

Moreover, the effect of individualism on the G.C. ‘nation-in-arms’, I argue, is illustrated not only in the public disengagement from its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’, but also in the attenuation of the state’s capacity to respond to the declining militarism by re-mobilising the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’.

The Ministry of Defence has, since 2011, placed much effort in creating a resistance to the declining motivation to serve; optimising the use of the reserve forces, and raising the morale of the NG as well as its status in Cypriot society (see Ministry of Defence, 2012). It is argued that the political issue was how to manage the ‘nation-in-arms’ well enough so that it would not provoke the public further in the face of the weakened NG
and thus illustrate to the public that the state has not ‘forgotten’ but ‘struggles’ for defence; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’.

This argument is supported by the statement of the, at the time, Defence Minister, Demetris Eliades, on 3rd November 2011 (see Ministry of Defence, 2012), who expressed the need for ”a joint effort by all to regroup the forces and to raise the morale so that the National Guard can play the role for which it has been assigned by the state.” New legislations for draft-dodging are designed, (see National Guard Law, 2011), and promptly implemented, these provide stricter measures for those who choose to not enlist or evade the service and the introduction of a longer period of community or civil service as an alternative for draft-dodgers and for conscientious objectors (see appendix 10).

The ‘Commission for the Prevention and Treatment of Draft-Dodging’ was established under the National Guard Law (2011). In the face of growing distaste for military service among the new generation of recruits, political leaders stressed the pride of serving in the force and denounced draft-dodging27 (see Ministry of Defence 2012). A meeting held in September 2012 by the Commission (see SigmaLive, 2012) chaired by Defence Minister Demetris Eliades had, as part of the agenda, the development of further programs for students such as visits to military camps but also programs where officers visit schools in order to, as the Defence Minister noted:

“properly inform the students and cultivate the spirit necessary to then pass the message that to serve the NG is an honor and offer to their country.”

From 2012 onwards, the Ministry of Defence was, for a certain period, announcing improvements made in the force due to the new policies (enacted in 2011, see for

27 An example of this is the speech given by George Barnabas, Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee, after visiting one of the main training camps of the force (KEN, Larnaca) in July of 2012: ”we want to send the message to the recruit soldiers who been conscripted in the National Guard, as has already been said by the Minister of Defence, is intrepidity ... “. To avoid one’s conscription, he noted, claiming some special reasons, it is considered weakness and cowardliness. (Extracts of the speech taken from an article published by Sigma Live, 2012B).

Also see Moon (2005a, 78) who describes a similar change in the ideological language mobilized by the state to deal with a similar phenomenon in South Korea.
example: Politis, 2012). However, both the Ministry and political leadership have thereafter mostly remained silent about the issues of inquiry and have ceased discussing ‘draft-dodging’. Yet, media sources have repeatedly indicated that draft-dodging is continuing without ever commenting on a verified decrease in the number of draft-dodgers (see for example: SigmaLive, 2013). Moreover, this chapter has illustrated a strongly expressed larger public support for the abandonment of conscription and the professionalisation and modernisation of the National Guard.

I argue, therefore, that what we are observing here, like in other post-armed conflict societies that have abolished or are considering abolishing conscription and abandoning the ‘nation-in-arms’ model, is an attenuation of the state capacity to maintain the civil-military boundaries as fragmented. We are also observing an emerging culture of individuals focused on their own personal goals and rights, which is now exerting pressure on the state to take complete control and responsibility of the defence of the country. This dynamic between the civil and military domains is underscored by the globally strongly emerging culture of individualism that is strengthening the dividing boundaries between the civil and military domains. Similar changes studied in Israeli militarism have led to the emergence of new theoretical orientations that now emphasise the effort the state has invested in order to constantly keep producing and reproducing its legitimacy (Kimmerling 1992; Lustick 1998; Rosenhek 1998).

Indeed, it is the case that while writing this thesis (early 2014) the Cyprus government is discussing a plan for radical changes in the NG, which includes a significant reduction of the military service with parallel recruitment of professional staff and the procurement of special military equipment, such as sensors and cameras, that will replace the guards on the borders, (see ANT1, 2013). It has been repeatedly raised by the Minister of Defence, Fotis Fotiou, that these will be changes without an iota of reduction in security (ibid). Therefore, in this setting, whilst the strongly emerging individualism has consolidated the civil-military boundaries, the state has now started to become more reliant on military technological developments and the specialisation of labour to exchange the previous commitment of the community to ‘defend’ itself. They will do so with further procurement programs, which will provide better equipment and the professional operation of it; constituting a more potent, combatable and effective force.
As the Minister of Defence stated himself a few days before the New Year of 2014, in the context of putting forward the agenda for the professionalisation and modernisation of the force: “this modernisation is a must if we want to have strong, well-trained armed forces that can respond to the national mission.” (see Shmerinh, 2013). As such civil and military domains diverge creating an empty discursive space. This space, as the next section will reveal, gives rise to the formation of ultra-nationalist parties.

6.8. Repudiating the declining ‘defence’: The rise of ultra-nationalist political parties

New for the political scene of Cyprus are the organised, ultra-nationalist political parties, namely ELAM and EDHK, which have emerged following the opening of the borders. In the previous chapter I have illustrated that these parties are a discursive response to the opening of the borders, which they perceive as having undermined the ‘fighting spirit’ and a version of the post-war national struggle that is supported by them. Here, my aim is to illustrate that they are also a response to the undermining of ‘defence’, rendering ‘defence’ now an extreme discourse placed in the hands of these parties.

These social sectors that, during the formative years of the armed national struggle, were relatively peripheral and had not formed a political scene became organised, formed ultra-nationalist parties, and gained some political power, which is directed against the aforementioned changes by the state. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, these discursive expressions of masculinist militarism re-enacted by the ultra-nationalist parties are partly constitutive of the ideology of ‘defence’ previously enacted by the state, which had become an indispensable mainstream expression of the national struggle in the G.C. community taught in state institutions: mainly schools and the army.

These parties, whilst criticising the government for neglecting the militarist frame of the post-war national struggle, have reproduced discourses of defence formative of the post-war national struggle, which in their hands have become more extreme. The point here is that the effort of the state to ‘normalise’ the ‘defence’ politics in negotiating with the ‘other’ and the change of the ‘struggle’ taking place under the auspices of the EU
has structured the very formation of opposition parties, which are now mobilised for collective action against the role of the state in ‘defence’ and call the community to join them. Therefore, the strong critical attitudes, discussed above, towards the state for the condition of the NG are not only appearing among the groups representing a strong shift from traditional social and military-defence values to the European and Western-like individualist attitudes and aspirations. Rather they have also appeared—albeit articulated in inverse terms—among some of the most vocal newly formed ultra-nationalist political parties.

What is perhaps most central here is that these parties’ main objectives are directly opposed to and vigorously criticise the governmental acceptance of having open borders, the ‘stepping back’ from militarism, the repeated and intensified negotiations for reunification as well as the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ in the community. For them, all of these translate as returning to the condition of ‘ragiadismos’ (in Greek: Ραγιαδισμός).

This is a concern of re-enslavement that invokes the shameful ottoman past when Greece and Cyprus (for these parties both are constitutive of the “Greek nation”) were enslaved to the Ottoman rule. Therefore, they understand the undermining of militarism as the danger of forgetting the moments of revolution in which the Greek and G.C. masculinist military endeavours assured the national “self”-assertion. Specifically this refers to 1821, the Greek war of independence against the Ottoman rule (commonly known as the Greek Revolution, in Greek: Ελληνική Επανάσταση), and 1955, the beginning of the Cypriot military campaign of EOKA\(^\text{28}\) against the British rule. Thus ‘ragiadismos’ for them is the danger of Cyprus becoming a peon again to powers far greater than it. The account of the President of EDHK, on the declining militarism, clearly draws this picture:

“*This is betrayal, it is the demolition of the army; in essence this comes to support a policy of retreat, submissiveness and ‘ragiadisμou’. That’s why they want to demolish the army, because they clearly state that our aim is to have a demilitarized Cyprus, so that we have no army.*”

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\(^{28}\) EOKA was a nationalist organisation with the ultimate goal of the liberation of Cyprus from the British yoke.
Also, the ROE said that the crossings on the borders:

“To be the definition of immorality, the epitome of immorality […] towards…] a nation which when it came to protecting its national interest in 1955-59 it was making miracles … as a nation we had always supported our national fights from 1821…”

The ideology of defence continues to be carried by groups that stress that only the continuation of the affinity between the fortification of armed forces, militarism, armed liberation, preparedness of the ‘nation-in-arms’ (I struggle) and constancy of memory of the national trauma (I do not forget) and the Greek national struggle through history can assure the saving of ‘semi-occupied’ Cyprus from such a shameful self-enslavement. For these parties, militarisation and war is seen as an integral part of the national struggle, for which Cyprus needs to prepare by fortifying the armed forces, regenerating militarism in society and first of all by closing the borders. As the President of EDHK comments:

“The borders should close; because we have to return to a state of war … because I believe that the only possible solution is an armed claim.”

This becomes clearer in the account of ROE who comments that:

“We must never forget that we are under occupation, with a well-equipped ‘enemy’, therefore we have to do our very best so that we are powerful, so that the National Guard have the capability to liberate at some point these lands even by the use of force.”

These parties see themselves as the only ones who continue the “true” national struggle for liberation. Trimikliniotis (2011: 3) comments that ELAM is “claiming that it is the only party that speaks for the ‘liberation of our enslaved lands’”. In this rather anachronistic yet also modified discourse of the ‘I struggle’, the ‘existential threat’, of which the opening of the borders and the accession to the EU has eased in the general community, continues to be mobilised by these groups. In the face of the ‘existential threat’ felt by these ultra-nationalist groups they keep re-asserting the need for defence. As the ROE comments:
“By opening the borders we endangered our national sovereignty…they should be closed immediately! … [it is] the moral duty that we have towards the dead and the ones that are not yet born”.

For ultra-nationalist groups the policy against ‘ragiadismos’ is integrally related to the uprising of a unified military “self-assertion” with Greece through the revival of the Single Area Defence Doctrine for Cyprus-Greece, with the armed liberation of Northern Cyprus as the only solution to the conflict. In this context, it needs to be highlighted again that these parties support the political union of Cyprus with Greece. The president of EDHK explains that the ‘rulers have abandoned this assertive policy as it is pointless having two “Greek states” members of the EU. Rather EDHK supports that “the strengthening of our defence and the promotion of a new policy focused on liberation are interrelated” and fights for the strengthening of the SADD:

“That would revive the hope of liberation and would constitute the basis of a new political strategy; if we had the Greek army here, we would be able, for example, to extract our gas without becoming vassals to the British and the Jews…we would not have retreated on the Cyprus Problem; we would have had a different strategy, which could have led to the goal; an armed claim of our ‘occupied’ lands and the liberation of Cyprus.”

Similarly ROE comments that: ‘the situation of the army is disrespectful towards the state, we want whatever a state that respects itself wants’. He emphasised that since Turks are the enemy, Cyprus should compose an army that has the capability to play not only a defensive but also offensive role so as to liberate the ‘occupied’ lands even by the use of force:

“From there on we expect a lot from Greece, because there is no Greece without Cyprus and Cyprus cannot exist without Greece… We want a marine presence, Greek ships in Cyprus’ territorial waters…”

The above accounts explain why these parties are against the defence policy of the state and the state of RoC itself, and are said to have their own militant groups. However, it should also be noted that the alliances the government created with stronger military powers to provide an armed deterrent force against Turkey (who had
been threatening the sovereignty of Cyprus over the gas, see Αντωνιου, 2012) following the discovery of gas in the territorial waters of Cyprus, is further interpreted by these parties as ‘ragiadismos’. For them, as the above accounts reveal, these threats by Turkey are a provocation of war and Cyprus should not rely on foreign military powers in this situation. Rather, this should be dealt with by regenerating SADD with Greece, (see also Golden Dawn, ELAM (2013).

Since these parties clearly do not trust the state in doing the “necessary” in the national struggle, it appears that they see it as their responsibility to become mobilised for action. This perhaps illustrates the junta-phile, neo-Nazi element of their ideology. This was made especially clear in a political discussion between members of Golden Dawn and its fraternal party ELAM, about the conflict situation in Cyprus, on Golden Dawn’s TV Channel, (see The Political Programme of Golden Dawn, 2013). In this discussion it was supported that the state exists only to assist the nation and that if the state is not serving the nation, then the state should cease to exist and a new one should be created. In this discussion the slogan ‘Hurray the Nation, Down the state’ (in Greek: Ζήτω το Έθνος Κάτω το Κράτος) was also used.

These groups are ideologically against the state and their militant groups are constitutive of this ultra-nationalist neo-Nazi ideology. Both parties reportedly have their own militant groups. In the case of ELAM, they refer to the militants of ELAM, whereas in the organisational and administrative structure of EDHK on their website, (see EDHK, 2009-2013), they include a section about their militant group, which they describe as the ‘iron fist’ of the movement with the role to:

“Organize the members of militant action and prepare them for rapid and disciplined action in peace or war.”

In the increasing political investigations into the paramilitary actions of these ultra-nationalist parties following the murder of Pavlos Fissas (in Greek: Παύλου Φύσσα) by a member of Golden Dawn, which is the fraternal party of ELAM, the issue of the militant groups of these parties has been intensely on the political agenda in Cyprus and Greece. In the scope of these political developments the Cyprus Ministry of Justice has begun to investigate these groups under the charge that they organise paramilitary
trainings in abandoned camps of the NG. On 24th September 2013, Phileleptheros newspaper (see Phileleptheros, 2013a) writes:

“In the abandoned camp of LOK (translators note: LOK are a division of the special forces of the NG), … seems that trainings were taking place with weapons or replicas of weapons”

In the scope of the weakening ideology of defence these parties and groups have been formed who do not trust the destiny of the “Greek nation” to the state whose role in the national struggle and especially in armed defence today is perceived by them as submissive. The next chapter will take this argument a step further to illustrate that while they perceive the role of the state in the national struggle as submissive, they have embodied masculinist militarist discourses in the performativity (Butler, 1990) of their own masculinity, which is mobilised against the ‘occupation’ and the intensified negotiations for reunification.

6.9. Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the weakening of the ideology of defence following the opening of the borders, mapped the governmental and public understandings of the contradictory directions in terms of defence’s present and future, and showed how these developments have been a part of the weakening post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity.

The argument was put forward that whilst the broader governmental disinvestment in ‘defence’ has been part of the changing understanding of the ‘struggle’ under the auspices of the EU, the process undermining the ideology of defence has been further underscored by certain cultural developments, the public-felt security and the weakening ‘fighting spirit’ in the community, which has in this overall setting become significantly less committed to the idea of a ‘nation-in-arms’. The increasing public distrust and anger towards the undermined potency of the NG, the directionless defence policy and the relative disengagement of the community from the idea of the ‘nation-in-arms’ represent the conflicting trajectory of the continued public support of defence and social disinvestment in defence that illustrates the changing civil-military relations, which
call for the change of the NG into a semi or fully professional force. This conflicting trajectory is further addressed in the next chapter, which further illustrates this public position to be constitutive of an adapted reiterated G.C. position of power in the conflict situation.

The militarisation of G.C. society in the post-war years has been inextricable from the creation of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’: where ‘militaristic values and priorities were set as one’s own’, (Enloe, 2007: 4). ‘Defence’ has been the most important organising principle in G.C. society following the war and division of the island in 1974. However, today there is a contradictory gap between acknowledging the need for refortifying a strong army in the national struggle, in light of the current condition of the army, and experiencing security under the auspices of the EU in comparison with the need for men to serve a long conscription. The common attitudes of my interviewees toward conscription were that it is a necessity for defence but an unnecessary male sacrifice. This ideological disagreement, which was evoked in the most prominent narrative of my interviewees’ accounts, represents the turning point for and the yet uncertain trajectory the ideology of defence has entered since the opening of the borders. In this nexus, there has been a disengagement of the community from the idea of itself as a ‘nation-in-arms’ and the phenomenon of draft-dodging and loosening discipline in the reserve forces have emerged, issues that will be further explored in the next chapter in relation to the hegemonic masculinity moving towards the individualist entrepreneur.

Today, the strong widespread support of the army amongst my interviewees presents us with a different type of militarisation than the post-war ‘nation-in-arms’. It appears that in the scope of the political events and social processes that took place on the island following the opening of the borders, a growing antithetical relationship has been created in the continuing public support of the army. This is a major public paradigm shift of the willingness for the community to offer itself unswervingly to the ‘security’ of Cyprus, thus the disengagement of the community as the ‘nation-in-arms’ and the continuing support of the army vis-à-vis ‘occupation’. The accounts of my interviewees, which have on the whole clearly evoked a strongly emerging culture of individualism, mostly point to supporting the existence of the army merely as a requisite for the
‘security’ of Cyprus, but not the involvement of the community in this understanding of ‘security’. The accounts also point to the call for the state to take up complete responsibility of ‘defence’ by professionalising the force. Thus, in the discourse of ‘occupation’ the NG provides an ontological security, which has only been partly substituted by the accession of Cyprus to the EU. As the next chapter will further illustrate, the ‘fighting spirit’ of the force and the men it involves is contingent to the understanding of the potency of the national struggle even under its new EU form.

In European Cypriot society with open borders ‘defence’ the militarist frame of the national struggle, even if weakened, is sustained through the post-war inter-dependency of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, as a distinctly and explicitly masculinist discourse that fights feminisation in the national struggle. ‘Defence’, as the following chapter will further illustrate, opposes retreat and submissiveness of the G.C. ‘defensive’ and ‘assertive’ stance in the conflict. Therefore, it is argued that the post-war predication of both state and social body on the assertive armed defence of the community from the ‘occupation’ forces today is a discursive structure in response to the very reverberation of defence. This is contributing to the public feeling of defencelessness, as it perceives the undermining of the militarist frame of the national struggle through the discourse of ‘occupation’ to be an explicit and intrinsic illustration of a potent ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle for ‘defence’ and ‘liberation’ from ‘occupation’. These remarks on the weakening co-constitution of this post-war three-fold relationship and the public criticism of these realities will be illustrated in the next chapter to be constitutive of the re-adaptation of this relationship under new political and social parameters.

The ultra-nationalist parties that have emerged following the opening of the borders are a discursive response to the recent developments of militarism at both governmental and social levels. These parties do not trust the destiny of the “Greek nation” in the hands of the state of RoC whose role in the national struggle and especially in armed defence today is perceived by them as submissive. In some ways, these parties are a reincarnation of the masculinist militarist national struggle, previously strongly mobilised by the state, which they re-mobilise against ‘occupation’.
7. Chapter seven: Masculinity in Cyprus following the opening of the borders

7.1. Introduction

This chapter investigates the relationship of Greek Cypriot hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1995; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) as well as nationalist militarised masculinity with the declining ideology of defence and the changing understanding of the national struggle following the opening of the borders between North and South Cyprus in April 2003. The openings that have occurred along this border place these masculinity discourses mobilised against the idea of closed borders at stake. The changing understanding of how the national struggle is to be pursued, by the thought that this is to come through European Union pressures and politics rather than ‘struggle’ understood as military ‘defence’ and ‘kinetic’ force, further puts into question the masculinist and militarist discourses of the national struggle.

The overarching argument of this chapter is that, whilst the G.C. post-war hegemonic masculinity is in a process of moving away from the military and heroic male ideals constitutive of the post-war national struggle, the discourse of nationalist militarised masculinity appears to be adaptively reiterated in its inter-dependency to nationalism and militarism. This is illustrated by a certain nationalist militarist masculinist stance of the community in relation to crossing the border and the continuing public support of a potent army that now calls for its change into a semi or fully professional modernised army to act as a deterrent force against the ‘occupation’ forces. This re-adapted stance is argued to sustain the G.C. discourse of ‘occupation’, which forms the key political discourse for the appeal to the international community for support for liberation from ‘occupation’. Therefore, the sustenance of the ‘occupation’ in the G.C. community, illustrated in the nationalism chapter, and the continuing public support of a potent army illustrated in the militarism chapter, are here shown to be focal discursive mechanisms
of the re-adapted G.C. stance in this new setting that maintains the discourse of ‘occupation’, specifically in relation to a masculinist discourse.

I will argue that masculinity is the silent partner of nationalism and militarism, since the ways in which it manifests itself in such discursive processes is greatly naturalised. Ideals and notions of male identity and worth are co-constitutive of both nationalism and militarism (Massad, 1995; Ashe, 2012). In exposing the changing G.C. hegemonic masculinity I seek to situate the role of masculinity within the changing the national struggle. In the same way that masculinity is a central part in the making of nations and nationalism (Nagel, 1998; Sjoberg et al., 2010; Enloe, 1990), the changing hegemonic masculinity of men in the context of post-armed conflict societies, such as Cyprus, can point us to the changing understanding of the national struggle. Yet, my research suggests that masculinity in nationalist, militarist post-armed conflict societies is a broader discourse that, under new social and political parameters, forms the underside of the adapted reiteration of nationalism and militarism. It is this mutually constitutive relationship between hegemonic masculinity, nationalist militarised masculinity, nationalism and militarism I wish to examine in this chapter.

For the purposes of this chapter, I use the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ to refer exclusively to the hegemonic masculinity of men in the G.C. community. I use the term ‘nationalist militarised masculinity’ to refer to the broader G.C. masculine discourse co-constituting nationalism and militarism. Thus, arguing that there is a broader discourse of masculinity in post-armed conflict, nationalist and militarist societies which does not only relate to the identity of men and armed conflict as an exclusive calling for men. Without addressing this broader G.C. masculinist discourse we would not be able to understand the centrality of masculinity in the ability of this three-fold relationship to readapt and reiterate its interdependency in the aftermath of political events that are providing new parameters for nationalism, militarism and masculinity. We would also not be able to understand that the re-adaptations and reiterations of the masculinist discourse contingent part of this relationship appeal to the larger social body and are integral to the stance the community adopts in the conflict situation. I directly relate these two concepts and indicate that they are both discourses of masculinity
constructed through the European post-opening of the borders Cypriot post-armed conflict culture.

This chapter will begin by looking back at the role of masculinity in the formation of the post-war national struggle and then proceeds to unravel masculinity from the findings on G.C. nationalism and militarism illustrated in previous chapters and will then illustrate the role of masculinity in this re-adapted G.C. stance. Finally, this chapter seeks to understand the rise of ultra-nationalist political parties amongst the above-outlined setting. Here, I propose the argument that the state disinvestment from its own masculinist discourses, which sustained the militarist face of nationalism and the broader social undermining of these discourses, has given space to the reiteration of masculinist militarist discourses by ultra-nationalist movements; a discursive response to the perceived notion of feminisation of the national struggle.

7.2. Looking back: the Cyprus Problem, the post-war national struggle and G.C. masculinity

The post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity underpinned the national struggle against ‘occupation’. This section will provide an account of the role of masculinity in post-war Cyprus because, in attempting to give any account of G.C. masculinity, we are immediately directed to the deep-rooted link with the turbulent histories that have marked this island and the post-war nationalist and militarist discourses, inextricably tied to the army and conscription.

The continuing presence of ‘enemy’ troops on Cypriot soil in Cyprus’ modern history (both the British colonisation of Cyprus and Turkish ‘occupation’) has endowed masculinity with armed patriotic quality. Specifically, in post-war Cyprus masculinity has been entangled with the national problem of the upkeep of a certain identity, and has been used both culturally and structurally by the power system, which has, in certain ways, relied on it for its operation. Popular and hegemonic notions of masculinity have unquestionably been shaped by these histories.

In fact, in the collective G.C. nationalist imagination (Anderson, 1983) the perceptions, every-day behaviours, and the discourses that shape and articulate the daily politics of
Masculinity have been directly connected with major historical events. These have deposited various layers of meaning to masculine acts, masculine behaviour, and, more generally, gender performance (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 1976). Indeed, Kovitz (2003) has observed that war and conflict are highly gendered and military roles tend to be constituted as normative for men as opposed to women. Militarised models of masculinities draw from a more general stock of ideas about what constitute “manly” traits, aspirations, and behaviours (Nagel, 1998). In the context of post-war Cyprus, these traits were connected to the struggle for national liberation.

The hegemonic masculinity observed in Cyprus in the post-war years can be understood better as a militarised masculinity. Theorists have employed the term ‘militarised masculinities’ to refer to the types of identities that militarised societies and organisations constitute for men (see e.g., Higate 2003a, 2003b). For example, Ashe (2012: 7) argues that in Northern Ireland after partition, the struggles around the constitutional status generated a range of militarised roles for men.

After the partition in Cyprus, the broader and official understanding of the conflict as one of invasion and ‘occupation’ involved a discourse of national feminisation in which a particular version of femininity was used to symbolise the nation as a victim and in need of protection; depicted through the metaphor and image of a suffering woman awaiting liberation (Anthias, 1989: 155) and symbolised through the mothers of the missing persons (Yakinthou, 2008). This was discursively responded to with the militarist masculinisation (Brittain, 1989) of the national struggle for liberation, which generated a range of militarised roles for men. A central example of this is that the importance of men’s military conscription to G.C. masculinity (and femininity) was set against what is threatened and to be protected. As Cynthia Enloe (1993) discussed, the cultural politics of militarised masculinity involve selective deployment of femininity corresponding to militarised masculinity. Nationalism and militarism, as discussed in the chapter on nationalism, are discourses that often invoke the feminine victim and masculine protector, which coincide with broader patriarchal structures of active masculinity of the fighter versus the passive femininity of the victim (for example see Massad’s, 1995 discussion on Palestinian nationalism). This discrepancy is central to the masculine conceptualisation of the G.C. national struggle.
Memories of the war events and the invasion and ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus were entrenched in the nationalist discourse, articulated through victimcy, where femininity, was used explicitly in the first part of the most prominent post-war slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. This campaign constituted a symbolic means of sustaining the memory of the traumatic events using the iconic image of the mothers of the missing persons relentlessly suffering and in need of deliverance, (Yakinthou, 2008; Christou, 2006: 295; Anthias, 1989: 155). Here, I argue that similarly, the national struggle for liberation (thus ‘I struggle’) was a masculinist project, which included the masculinist militarist assertiveness of the Cypriot state and people over the ‘occupation’ forces and it was an issue ascribed only to men. Hadjipavlou (2006: 330) argues that, in Cyprus, issues such as victimhood, truth, human rights violations and justice acquire a mono-focal, masculinist meaning. Furthermore, Christou (2006: 289) argues that when the slogan was modified from ‘I do not forget’ to ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ this “new version, which includes a positive stance (I struggle) was perceived by teachers as a more affirmative and dynamic assertion of the goals of the educational system”.

It is central in the analysis that follows to highlight the interpretation of feminisation as devaluation of a certain understanding of the national struggle in the G.C. nationalist discourse. The broader ideology of defence, discussed in the previous chapter, that mobilised the construction of the ‘nation-in-arms’; was a defensive model of military readiness, assertion of military strength, protest of the ‘occupation’ and the promise that the lost territory would be regained; ‘not forgetting’ and ‘keep struggling’. More specifically, the post-war body politic focused on and demonstrated military virility and prowess in the national struggle through its construction as a ‘nation-in-arms’. This ‘defence’ stance was a joint effort by state and community to avoid being perceived as weak and feminine in comparison with the emasculating faits accomplis of ‘occupation’. These faits accomplis, as discussed earlier, are: being invaded by Turkey- a significant military power in the middle-east-; losing a significant part of territory with the NG defeated; living in fear of another military offensive by Turkey. Any attempt to negotiate or compromise was interpreted by all involved in this masculinist national struggle as a sign of weakness or retreat from a position of rightfulness and steadfastness, a stance that is later on in this chapter interpreted through the theorisation of nationalist militarised masculinity. This masculine construction of the national struggle was
opposed to an effeminacy marked by retreat, submissiveness and acceptance that the territory 'occupied' by Turkey was lost forever; thus no longer 'occupied'. Therefore, against this was set the slogan 'I do not forget and I struggle'. I argue that mobilising metaphors and slogans of nationalist movements reflect the fundamental assumptions of nationalist thought, which establishes the future gender constitution and gender roles of nationalist agents.

This muscular militarist nationalism, as I will now proceed to discuss, provided a version of the national struggle that was linked to heroic and military masculinities. These masculinities in the nationalist militarist post-war culture become the hegemonic model of masculinity and acted as an arena for "achieving" masculinities (see Higate 2003a and Collier 2002: 44).

The ideology of defence provided a clear separation of gender roles. The closed-border, which has been open since 2003, was the platform on which the co-constitution of masculinity and femininity of the post-war nationalist discourse was manifested and illustrates how both G.C. men and women were ideologically engaged in the symbolism and defence of the 'mother victim' Cyprus. The guarding of the border, as I also discussed in the previous chapters, was a promise of the heroic praxis of the 'nation-in-arms'; that the vulnerable and victimised G.C. community would remain intact in the face of the 'enemy-within' 'occupying' North Cyprus whilst fighting for liberation ('I struggle'). Therefore, while the mothers and wives of the missing persons on the border holding the photos of their loved ones served as an ideological mobilisation of sustaining the memory of the trauma suffered by Cyprus ('I do not forget') men had another role to undertake; that of defending and protecting the "nation" whilst fighting for liberation, ('I struggle').

**National heroes, masculinity and the national struggle**

Notions of defence, heroism and returning back to the 'occupied' territory were central discourses of the post-war G.C. hegemonic masculinity and national struggle. The continuing 'occupation' of Northern Cyprus by Turkey meant perpetuation of the divide that, within the nationalist discourse, was continuing to validate the masculinist national
struggle, which was directly linked to the hegemonic model of masculinity. This had the effect of fostering and sustaining a very specific nationalist version of heroic military masculinity of the ‘nation-in-arms’. I refer to military and heroic masculinity in this chapter as central components of the post-war G.C. hegemonic masculinity which has been an integral part of the construction of the ‘nation-in-arms’.

In post-war G.C. society the projection, exemplification and honouring of the acts of certain national heroes though part of the construction of the cultural ideological basis of the collective national struggle have been discourses of an assertive defensive militarism. Therefore these discourses of the ‘defence’ part of the ‘struggle’ were conductive to the heroic praxis of an everyday organised, mobilised and technologically advanced type of ‘nation-in-arms’.

Ideals of national heroes in the milieu of the national struggle framed certain forms of masculinity as signifiers of collective resistance and liberation. As Connell (1990: 94) argues “the pattern of masculinity must have exemplars who are celebrated as heroes” so that hegemonic masculinity is enacted and re-enacted through authoritative symbolic activity. In post-war Cyprus through political, public and state institutional mobilised discourses (specifically in schools and the army) heroic figures embodied and exemplified a narrative between a very central medium of the collective national struggle for liberation and the achievement of G.C. masculinity through the notion of ‘everyday ordinary heroes’. The successive governments of Cyprus following the events of 1974 sought to educate generations through an educational curriculum that relied heavily on nationalist constructions honouring national heroes (see Christou 2006: 294). The remembrance of heroic figures of previous national struggles (see Koureas, 2012 for discussion on heroism and the anti-colonial struggle) has been conducive to an everyday organised type of ‘nation-in-arms’.

At this level, ‘defence’ has been an everyday consumed ideology in which this particular type of heroism is a normative component of post-war G.C. hegemonic masculinity. This heroic masculinity exemplified in the national struggle has framed G.C. hegemonic masculinity through the understanding of ‘everyday ordinary heroes’ who do their military service, then become reserves and then militia (I struggle). Women, as
discussed above, acquired the role of memory keepers (I do not forget), supporters of the struggle and pain bearers. As Oberschall (2007: 23) writes, in relation to Israel, that in “ethnically divided societies, members of each ethnic group trust their separate authorities … look for guidance to their own community, and admire heroes who sacrificed themselves for their group”.

Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 832) argued that hegemonic masculinity “was not assumed to be normal in the statistical sense; only a minority of men might enact it, but, it was certainly normative. It embodied the currently most honoured way of being a man; it required all other men to position themselves in relation to it.” In this G.C. ideological script, heroic figures such as Auxentiou and Palikarides, who died at the hands of the British whilst fighting in the anti-colonial struggle against the British rule, signified the purest form of heroism. Further significant examples are the heroes of the 1821 Greek war of independence from Ottoman rule. Taken together, such heroes were portrayed as models of masculinity against the Turkish aggressor, and became discursive expressions of hegemonic masculinity rooted in narratives of successful liberation.

Yet, the narratives of the deaths of Tasos Isaak and Solomos Solomou on the border (1996), whilst they became a discursive continuation of the narratives of heroism presented above, bear a special symbolism in G.C. nationalist discourse. As Hadjipavlou (2006: 333) reminds us, the Line has acquired both a symbolic and a physical presence in daily life. These two men, who have been broadly considered to be the two most recent heroes of Cyprus, were killed on the border following the Motorcyclists’ March (see appendix 11), by the ‘occupation’ forces, whilst protesting against the Turkish ‘occupation’ of northern Cyprus and demanding liberation. Following these events, these two men were exemplified as heroic idols in political and public discourse. Their deaths on the border became a symbolic exemplification of the collective active struggle for protest and liberation from Turkey’s military ‘occupation’ of northern Cyprus, (see Christou 2006: 296).

More specifically, photos of Solomou climbing the Turkish flagpole and Isaak being beaten to death on the border today appear as large photographic displays attached to main crossing points on the border. They have been extensively used as a symbol of
protest against Turkey’s military ‘occupation’ of northern Cyprus and became a key symbol of struggle and resistance in political discourse. A speech given by the Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and the Environment, Fotis Fotiou (6th August 2006) who after became the Minister of Defence, at the memorial of the two men clearly illustrates the above point: “That afternoon that black Sunday of August, Tassos Isaak who was lying in blood beside the borders ... became a symbol of bravery and struggle ... With awe we remember today Solomos Solomou the hero-martyr climbing up the flagpole to remove the Turkish flag from its mast ... he overcame fear and refused forever the occupation.” Also, several prominent Greek composers and singers dedicated songs to them portraying them as symbols of struggle for liberation (for example see appendix 12).

Within the nationalist discourse, narratives about soldier heroes are both underpinned by and vigorously reproduce conceptions of gender and nation as unchanging essences, (Dawson, 1994: 1). As Onoufriou, (2009: 268) writes, heroic masculinities can take many forms in contemporary Cyprus and the young soldier in a land of conflict is unquestionably ‘a real man’ with courage and physical strength. In the milieu of the national struggle heroic masculinist values and ideals such as fearless determination for liberation and courage were projected against the ‘occupation’ to cultivate the organised governing marshalling of ideology for the production of a body politic that is militarised and protests, demands and is determined for defence and liberation from the ‘occupation’ forces.

**Military service and masculinity**

The military service has, in post-war Cyprus, been a focal axis; interconnecting nationalism, militarism and masculinity, since it bears the responsibility of socialising all G.C. men in the roles demanded of them by the political leadership, state and G.C. community since the division of the island (1974). The ‘nation-in-arms’ ideologically constructed through the notion of ‘everyday ordinary heroes’ was relying wholly on an extensive universal male military service. Men, who in post-war Cyprus were understood to hold in their hands the part of the ‘I struggle’ slogan, were directly involved in the project of the national struggle; conscripted to the army from the ages of
Military masculine identities are created and sustained in the armed forces and the societies in which they operate (Higate, 2003a).

The defence of the border was a masculinist project of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and part of the constant ‘gender practice’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). The ideology of defence with discourses of high investment in defence, military readiness and the commitment of the conscripts and reserves in ‘defence’ ensured that the border would not be overthrown by the perceived strength of the military ‘enemy’ understood to be threatening occupation of the whole of the island. A similar masculinisation of national struggle occurred in Palestine (see Massad, 1995: 473). The Zionist ‘enemy’ was masculinised and Palestinian nationalists were urged to equal the ‘enemy’ in martial prowess and muscular strength as they defended Palestine; a nation embodied as a woman, (see also Moon, 2005a: 79 who described a similar case in the context of South Korea).

Military service, and the training it entails, has been persistently identified in many countries as an effort of the state to instil the national ethos and civic consciousness (Enloe 1980; Segal 1989; Gill 1997), and aims to ‘teach’ the masculinity demanded by the national army, (see Baritz 1985: 171; Gill 1997; Kaplan 2006: 135). The Cyprus National Guard is a type of ‘total institution’ (Goffman 1961: xiii), which has, since 1964, conscripted and thus ‘cut off from the wider society’ all able-bodied G.C. men in military service for approximately two years. Therefore, its role in defining and reproducing G.C. masculinity is seen as paramount. The NG is “the primary institutional site of hegemonic masculinity where turning out ‘ideal’ G.C. males is the ultimate goal” (Philaretou, Phellas and Karayianni, 2006: 76). This is to train and socialise males that will ‘defend’ and ‘(I) struggle’ to liberate the ‘occupied’ part of Cyprus from the heavily armed ‘enemy within’ as part of on-going and unresolved national conflict ‘problem’.

The ideas of serving for one’s country, defence and liberation were specific masculinist, militarised notions of the ‘nation-in-arms’ that had a key role to play in constituting the hegemonic model of G.C. masculinity in post-war G.C. society. Within these ideological and discursive post-war structures the military service has been set as the main rite-of-passage (Goffman, 1963) of transforming ‘boys’ into ‘men’, (see Arkin & Dobrofsky, 1978; Kaplan, 2006: 135; Baritz, 1985:171). The common G.C. saying ‘he will go to the
army and become a proper man’ (in Greek: θα πάει στρατό να γίνει άντρας) clearly evokes this transformation of boys into men.

These associations between masculinity and the army in post-war Cyprus extended outside the military barracks into wider society where the army assumed a primary role in shaping images of masculinity in the larger society and thus mobilised the military service as an essential part of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and of becoming a G.C. man. Therefore, any changes in the hegemonic masculinity in Cyprus identified in and out of the military barracks are argued to illustrate a change in the ideals of masculinity and the understanding of the struggle.

The openings that have occurred along this border and the new EU understanding of the national struggle place these masculinist discourses, co-constitutive of post-war nationalism and militarism, at stake.

7.3. The transition of a state towards a European masculinity
The successive governments of the RoC, as discussed in the previous chapter, have, following the opening of the borders and the accession of Cyprus to the EU, changed some of the assertive masculinist ideological mobilisations and projections of military prowess. These have been asserted as part of the ideology of defence against the ‘occupation’ forces since the partition of the island. Here, I wish to advance the argument put forward in the previous chapter by illustrating that this ‘stepping back’ from ideological mobilisations and projections of ‘defence’ was also a ‘stepping back’ from a certain masculinist assertion of Cyprus entangled in this militarism.

The state is itself gendered in quite precise and specifiable ways (Connell, 1990). The specific hegemonic masculinity observed in post-war Cyprus has been attendant to this type of organisational power of the state (Rai, 2002 and Elias J., 2007), which sought to create a ‘nation-in-arms’. Therefore, it is argued that studying the changing masculinist mobilisations of militarism by the state assists us also in understanding the changing G.C. hegemonic masculinity, as the operation of localised gender regimes is something
that cannot be fully comprehended without also focusing on the mediating and supporting role of the state (Rai, 2002).

The masculine prowess of militarism is a dominant and common assertion of national character. State power, nationalism and militarism have been repeatedly argued to be best understood as masculinist projects, involving masculine institutions and activities (see Pateman, 1989; Connell, 1995 and 1990). Therefore, gender ideology at the heart of nationalist and militarist thought has been central to discussions on the impact of assertive nation building processes (Saigol, 1998). Assertive militarised states can be observed in many divided societies like Israel and formerly Apartheid South Africa, which, like Cyprus, have been accompanied by a ‘nation-in-arms’ model (see Uri Ben-Eliezer, 1995; Conway D., 2008).

In post-war Cyprus, successive governments asserted the state as a masculinist militarist entity with vast investment and devotion to the NG; constructing a highly militarist masculine struggle alongside the political, with both struggles set against the border and therefore the ‘occupation’. The virile ideology of ‘defence’ that, as discussed in the previous chapter, has been the internal mobilisation of the ‘Janus face’ that post-1974 governments mobilised, was supported and manifested through masculine discourses personified in the RoC. These masculine discourses were previously used to support the legitimacy of the state in the national struggle that called for the ‘nation-in-arms’ to identify with struggle by acting as the protector of the “free areas” of Cyprus and the community. This masculinist ideology of defence was materialised through the development and projection of a strong G.C. military presence vis-à-vis the occupying powers. Military identity is traditionally maintained by means of symbols, rituals, and ceremonies (Juznic, 1993). This masculinist military assertion of the state against the ‘occupation’ forces exhibited publicly, amongst other ways, through regular military parades and exercises, was symbolically clear through slogans used in the NG; predominantly ‘A Good Turk is a Dead Turk’.

The masculine state fell into crisis, in the nexus of the new dynamics in which it entered since the opening of the borders. The European Cypriot state with open borders, in light of the on-going negotiations for the reunification of the island and the changing
understanding of the ‘I struggle’, wished to show a less assertive nationalist militaristic face and a more reconciliatory and European face. This intrinsically involved ‘stepping back’ from certain assertive masculinist, militarist, ideological arguments manifested in the state apparatus, as it needed to appropriate a different ideological language.

The successive governments of Cyprus that, since 2003, have started to relinquish the construct of the state in arms have also relinquished, as discussed in the previous chapter, a lot of the public illustrations of military prowess, as they proceeded with systematic cancellations of military parades and exercises. Parades are understood to be ‘displays of collective strength, of communal unity and of political power’ (Jarman, 2003: 93). Furthermore, they relinquished the insistence of the state on the readiness of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and prohibited the army of ‘othering’ the ‘other’, in the way it did previously. This provides a contrast to other divided societies where the masculine state fell into crisis as a response to the destabilisation of gendered binaries on which nationalism rested. For example, Conway, D. (2008) provided an analysis of Apartheid South Africa where she argued that the state had constituted itself as a masculine entity in crisis and deployed a number of gendered discourses to negate objectors to the military service.

However, these policies, which have aimed to ‘step back’ from the post-war masculinist aggressive militarism, stand today in contradiction to the construction of the purpose of the force; to guard the border from the ‘enemy within’. This specific construction of the ‘enemy’ as discussed in previous chapters was presented by the state in the post-war years as the dangerous hyper masculine Turk. The words of General Pandreou are evocative of the impact that this ideological ‘stepping back’ has had on young men’s identification with the ‘nation-in-arms’:

“They don’t create the right conditions in order to be able to explain to the soldiers exactly why they have to serve in the military. That’s where the problem is and it doesn’t depend on the soldiers. It’s up to the government and the entire system, because it’s the system that needs to keep you on the alert and give you a reason to stay.”
Clearly the word ‘alert’ here is particularly illustrative of the specific masculinist militarism relying on the notion of the need for preparedness of the ‘nation-in-arms’ against the perceived threat. Some of my interviewees from the public also used the example of the cancellation of military parades and exercises to articulate that the government has ‘stepped back’ from its displays of military power in recent years. As Dimitris (man, 27, travel agent) comments in disappointment:

“I heard that they stopped organising the parades and exercises because they claim that the cost is high. Every country in the world has military parades because it’s a demonstration of power.”

In the accounts of some of my interviewees, who most often were particularly interested in military issues, the criticism of the undermining of this type of masculinist assertion of militarism under these changes was clear. For example, Giorgos’ (man, 48, entrepreneur) account clearly depicts this picture:

“If you have an ‘enemy’ and you don’t fanaticise your soldiers against this ‘enemy’, what do you expect that they will do? Play with their dolls?”

I argue that the softening of the post-war masculinist militarist assertive ideology of the state by successive governments has contributed to the weakening of post-war masculinist and militarist discourses of the national struggle in society discussed throughout this chapter.

The weakening ideology of ‘defence’ is now calling for the professionalisation of the force. The community is becoming disengaged from the idea of itself as a ‘nation-in-arms’ and is supporting this professionalisation. In this situation, even though a masculinist language was again asserted by the government when dealing with draft-dodging and thus in its attempt to re-mobilise the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, the masculinist militarist post-war evocation of the state was not reiterated and the state has not re-constituted itself as a masculine entity in the form that it previously did. Individualism, as this chapter will further illustrate, transverses civil-military relations. In this space the civil domain that clearly still supports the need for a potent army is
exerting pressure on the state to assume a greater role in sustaining the militarist frame of the national struggle. The government, as discussed in the previous chapter, is now preparing a policy for gradually professionalising the force. The state has, therefore, now started to become reliant on military technological developments and the specialisation of labour in order to replace the commitment of the community to 'defend' itself.

It appears that the state intends to take up the complete masculinist military role through an approach distinct from social and cultural mobilisation. Through rebuilding the army on its own with professional soldiers and technology it will embody the role of the modernised protector against 'occupation'. I suggest that in the scope of the above developments this process will assert less pressure on individuals to perform (Butler, 1990) militarised gender roles, which as this chapter will illustrate are already significantly weakening. The next section will discuss the moving away of G.C. hegemonic masculinity from its militarised side following certain political and cultural developments.

7.4. Destabilisation of a militaristically built hegemonic masculinity

In this section I will argue that G.C. hegemonic masculinity has been in an intensified process of changing since the opening of the borders; moving away from the traditional post-war heroic military masculinity that was part of the masculinist militarist national struggle for liberation. Masculinities created in specific historical circumstances are liable to reconstruction, and any pattern of hegemony is subject to contestation, in which a dominant masculinity may be displaced (Connell, 1998). The nationalism chapter illustrated a perceived undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle following the opening of the borders. The chapter on militarism addressed the militarist framing of the undermining of ‘fighting spirit’. Here, I discuss the issues of masculinity entangled in this process undermining the ‘fighting spirit’. Drawing on my fieldwork research, I will illustrate this as a case in post-2003 Cyprus in three main ways. I will first discuss the influence that western capitalist and neoliberal ideals of male identity and success have had on G.C. hegemonic masculinity in order to culturally contextualise the discussion that will follow. Then, I will argue that the value of male
military service has been not only been undermined in G.C. society, but also that what military service represents to those who serve in terms of masculinity has, to an extent, become an experience that has become disconnected from the national struggle. Lastly, I will illustrate the social acceptance of the changing masculinity through discussing the changing relationship between the Cypriot family and the idea of the ‘nation-in-arms’ as well as the discounted value of heroism in society.

7.4.1 Western influences on military masculinity in Cyprus

Here, I will argue that the weakening ideology of defence, discussed in the previous chapter, which is now calling for the change of the force into a semi or fully professional force, underpinned by a strongly emerging G.C. culture of individualism, has also been undermined by an emerging hegemonic masculinity that is indeed directly informed by individualism.

Today, the emergence of the new understanding of society as made up of rights-bearing individuals focused on their own personal goals arguably threatens the idea of a unified community committed, as a ‘nation-in-arms’, to the national struggle. In post-war Cyprus the specific militarist hegemonic masculinity has been part of the idea of the unified community predicated on the national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’. These ideas, as argued above, unfold against the broader G.C. nationalist construction in which certain heroic military traits of hegemonic masculinity were already shaping the cultural milieu since the action of EOKA against the British rule of the island.

The increasing influence of globalised capitalist neoliberal values on Cypriot society was repeatedly and strongly said by my interviewees to undermine the motivation of young men in the national struggle. In previous chapters it has been illustrated that the greater acceptance of cultural pluralism and individualism and strengthening of capitalist consumerist and materialist values has contributed to the increasing focus of G.C. society on the individual’s rights, goals and success. This social focus is part of the new privileging understanding of society, made up of such entrepreneurial, image-oriented individuals focused on their professional success and personal benefits, that is challenging the subordination of individual considerations to collective goals of the community, thus most centrally the national struggle.
Indeed, social scientific studies of globalisation have called for greater awareness of the way in which local hegemonic masculinities are shaped by the articulation of gender systems with global processes (Connell, 2005: 849; Connell, 1998; Elias & Beasley, 2009). I adopt Connell’s (1998: 16) perspective, which puts forward the argument that, in developing countries, the processes of globalisation have opened regional and local gender orders to new pressures for transformation. Therefore, to understand local masculinities, we must think in global terms. This was depicted particularly clearly in the account of the military officer (40) who was responsible for my fieldwork in the army, and whilst elaborating on draft-dodging commented that:

“Lately, this issue has been troubling Cyprus as well as many other counties. The society is changing, we are a European country, there are more individuals’ rights but young men don’t see it from the correct point of view. They think that by not serving in the army, they are gaining more rights and freedom. This issue is not just an issue of the military; it’s political as well.”

Kyriacos Mauronikolas, Minister of Defence when Cyprus entered the EU, commented with emphasis that soldiers feel injustice because in many other countries of the E.U. men don’t serve military service and made clear the Ministry’s wish to reduce it to:

“a period of time which will not be a drawback to the future plans of our young men.”

Post-1974 hegemonic masculinity has framed the national struggle and this current changing understanding of society has implications on the role of men in the struggle. The above accounts are evocative of the impact of the emerging Cypriot culture of individualism conditioned through the global capitalist neoliberal, materialist and consumerist culture focused on one’s rights and personal goals, which in turn decrease the value of serving military service as perceived by young men. Interviewees systematically commented on and criticised this cultural shift and the impact it has on men’s identity; directly deposing the ‘masculine-proper’ role of men in the national struggle and being counter-exclusive to the ‘fighting spirit’ of men, thus somewhat
preventing men from identifying with the ‘nation-in-arms’. Maria’s (woman, 27, translator) account presents this reality raised by most interviewees with a lot of clarity:

“Because of the modernisation of society, young men don’t have national values and ideals anymore so I think that the undermining of national conscience is a part of the modern progressive society”.

Miranda’s (woman, 37, actor) account makes this point regarding de-identification clearer:

“I don’t want to undermine the male identity of our generation in Cyprus but I think that they are growing up in a society that doesn’t offer enough concerning the cultivation of their national spirit and their personality. Most of them are losing this type of identity.”

The motivation of individuals from current personal benefits and their primary reliance on themselves is part of the changing military values, (Kotnik & Kopac, 2002). These are clearly contrary to the values of a military organisation, which is based on collectivism and camaraderie and commitment to the common good (Janowitz, 1960). Often interviewees’ accounts were specifically clear of the contrast between the individualistic identity of young men and the commitment of the community to the ‘nation-in-arms’. Giannos (man, 58, owner of local dry-cleaning shop) who is an older militia explains his experience:

"Young men are spoiled … When I went to the army as a reservist there were some young soldiers in the camp who I noticed were very self-centred and they only cared about their own interest."

This attitude of individualism was often linked to the phenomenon of draft-dodging which diverted young men away from the national struggle, which was understood as the ‘common good’. Therefore, individualism in this context was most often criticised. Maria (woman, 27, translator), further elaborates on this:

“Their goal is to have fun, make money, and to live their lives without worrying too much and then comes the rest (the Cypriot problem etc.).”
This impact of the broader Westernised capitalist culture on male identification with the military service, thus the ‘nation-in-arms’, is a reality that has been repeatedly raised by political leadership. As Giannakis Omhrou (Γιαννάκης Ομήρου), head of the Cypriot parliament at the time, states on 9th June 2009 when parliament met to discuss the issue of draft-dodging, (see Parliamentary minutes on Draft-Dodging 2009):

“In order to have an accurate interpretation of this phenomenon, which has developed into a plague for the Defence of Cyprus, we should identify the causes of this broader crisis of moral values within Cypriot society … the acclamation of easy money making and rampant consumerism as social values, as well as the attempt to deplore the patriotic morale and devaluate ‘defence’ as unnecessary and futile…”

Interviewees most often condemned this cultural shift and the impact this has had on the young men who choose professional and financial success and a comfortable life at the expense of the national struggle. Similarly, Christou (2006: 293 - 294) notes that the public school students she talked with “doubted that anyone would want to jeopardise these comforts in order to regain what was lost.” The adoption of Western male role models by the G.C. community was further strongly contrasted to the decline of national heroes as role models by the ultra-nationalist political formations I spoke to. The representative of ELAM comments with great disappointment that these role models, who favour individual success over the community, are ‘sick’ from Western values. These role models are part of the capitalist and consumerist society that prevails in Cypriot society because of the lack of a national education which turns private individuals into citizens who care for the community, for the nation and who would be willing to assert themselves for community and be sacrificed as heroes to protect it:

“In 1955 young people, 16-17 year olds [translators note: referring to the heroes of the anti-colonial struggle] would give up their lives, grab a gun and go to the mountains. They would put themselves in danger for their ideals. Nowadays, they are not role models, for many role models are imported; a well-paid football player”
Even though this Westernised type of individualist male ideal was generally treated with criticism from my interviewees, whether directly linking this to the national struggle or not, both men and women, in the vast majority of cases, used the same characteristics noted above to describe who they consider to be the ideal successful G.C. male. This is a point that illustrates that this type of masculinity was not ascribed to a subordinated form of masculinity (Connell, 1987: 186), but rather as directly informing the changing hegemonic model. Elina’s (woman, 33, teacher) ideal G.C. male was most typical: “Someone who has a job, who can support himself financially, who has a house, a car”. Giorogos (man, 48, entrepreneur) similarly and typically suggests: “Someone who has a good job, money, a wife, a Mercedes car.”

The above discussion points us to the changing G.C. hegemonic masculinity, which, while it is incorporating the Western globalised influences discussed above, is moving away from the traditional model of military masculinity. This discussion, has illustrated that Connell’s (1998: 17) argument that the more egocentric masculinity of the capitalist entrepreneur, which holds the world stage, in many ways holds true in the case of post-2003 Cyprus. The transnational business masculinity, as Connell (ibid) argues, has had, as its only major competitor for hegemony, in recent decades, the rigid masculinity of the military, whereas rigid military masculinity has now become a globally fading threat (ibid) to the emerging transnational individualist masculinity. The chapter will now proceed to illustrate that this process also holds true in post-2003 Cyprus resulting in military service not being placed as the chief rite-of-passage for young G.C. men.

7.4.2 From within the barracks towards a soldier’s individual goals for prosperity
This section will show that the phenomenon of draft-dodging and the undermining of the nationalist motivation of soldiers illustrates the changing G.C. hegemonic masculinity that is veering away from the normative identification with the ‘nation-in-arms’ that was interwoven with the post-war national struggle against the ‘occupation’ forces.

The role of men in the ‘nation-in-arms’ has become obscured under the changing understanding of ‘I struggle’, discussed in the militarism chapter, the European membership superseding the need for national defence and crossings taking place from and to the borders as discussed in the nationalism chapter. The decline in the
motivation to serve is particularly closely interconnected with the understanding of the EU as a protective power. It was repeatedly evident in my young male interviewees' accounts that the cultural reproduction of ideological legitimisations and militarist mobilisations of defence in the fear of another offensive by Turkey was undermined by the security brought by the EU accession and the humanisation of the ‘other’ in the broader G.C. perception. The changing hegemonic masculinity is also part of the broader weakening of the G.C. community, which is giving space to the staging of the new understanding of society as made up of goal orientated individuals, then strongly manifested in the masculinity of young men. While the ideology of ‘defence’ deteriorated and values of heroism, social militancy and the idea of the ‘existential need’ for ‘defence’ weakened, the G.C. community at large became significantly disengaged from the idea of itself as a ‘nation-in-arms’. In this context, the national struggle ceased to be, to the same extent, an issue centred on men, allowing discursive space for G.C. hegemonic masculinity to be detached from the conflict situation.

The hegemony of masculinity shaped in Cyprus under these new social and political parameters does not strictly pose the military service as a way of contributing to the national struggle, whereas the struggle is not understood to be a duty performed by men at any cost and thus as a perquisite to Cypriot manhood. Hence, it will be argued the military service today is not posed as the chief rite-of-passage (Goffman, 1963) for becoming a G.C. man in Cypriot society. Rather, it is the professional and financial success that defines a man’s place within the social network and constitutes the rite-of-passage to the ideal of a successful male. However, the following accounts will also expose how, even though there is a certain social compliance towards the changing masculinity of men, at the same time when this is placed in the context of the national struggle, most often a strong disenchantment is also expressed. This paradox will be addressed in the section on nationalist military masculinity.

Choosing not to serve in European Cyprus with open borders

The post-war hegemonic (Gramsci, 1971) idea of conscription, which was predicated on militarised notions of serving for one’s country and defence of the community, began to
unravel amongst G.C.s in the context of political, military and social developments in Cyprus since the opening of the borders. The growing phenomenon of draft-dodging conscription clearly illustrates that the military service is today not a desideratum rite-of-passage in becoming a G.C. man. Yet its intense emergence has further challenged the G.C. axiom that military service should be performed at any cost by men and that it is unconditionally a national and male virtue. The words of Nicos (man, 19, student) who has just evaded his service clearly illustrate that, for him, serving is not a signifier of his masculinity:

“You know, some people told me the classic ‘you should go to the army to become a man’ I think that I am more of a man now because I stayed faithful to my beliefs, I chose to study instead!”

And Giannis (man, 21, student) who has also draft-dodged, elaborates that:

“They say ‘a man should serve in the army to be a true man’. I think that this mentality does not fit in the 21st century.”

However, even though the above accounts reveal that the military service for these men is not an accreditation of their masculinity, there was a strong criticism by interviewees from across social and political groups about the phenomenon of draft-dodging. In discussing this phenomenon interviewees most often counter-posed the need to serve to the discourse of ‘occupation’. As Xristalla (woman, 51, owner of small convenience store) commented in criticism:

“They should not avoid their service since our country is divided, at any moment the occupation army can invade the entire country.”

Also, as a conscript soldier (interviewed within the army) comments:

“Half of Cyprus is occupied. If people stop serving in the army, they will invade us completely.”

The above accounts are clearly reproducing the ideology of defence in relation to the discourse of ‘occupation’. My fieldwork has shown that the majority of interviewees produced a certain paradox in their accounts between the broader acceptance of the
changing masculinity of men away from military types of masculinity but also a criticism when placed in the context of the national struggle, as addressed in the section on nationalist military masculinity.

Choosing to complete one’s military duties in European Cyprus

Military service for those that do choose to serve is clearly a signifier of masculinity, yet as it will be argued here for the most part it is not the traditional type of military masculinity previously deeply linked to the ‘nation-in-arms’. The value of serving one’s military service, drawing from the interviews I conducted with soldiers (of a number of different units) in a brigade of the National Guard in 2011, is chiefly either on the grounds of personal development, the legal obligation to serve, the pressure exerted on them by their fathers who have served, or due to the national need for defence in order to continue the national struggle. Consequently, in the dichotomy of individual and collective purpose, most of my participants’ accounts of the decision to serve were centred on the ways in which completing their service fitted into the life goals they had set as an individual rather than for the ‘common good’, represented by the national struggle. This directs us back to the discussion of the breakdown of the unitary G.C. community predicated as a ‘nation-in-arms’ and to the emergence of the new understanding of society made up of individuals centred on their own personal goals. The order in which the conscript soldier (19, interviewed within the army) below prioritises his reasons for serving, tells its own story and represents the most prominent narrative of the accounts of the soldiers I spoke to:

“It takes courage to manage to complete the military service and also in order to be able to work afterwards because, it’s difficult to find a job without the military discharge paper. And for my country as well.”

Almost all of the soldiers I spoke to in the NG commented on military service merely as another obligation one needs to complete after graduating from school; they highlighted this as a valued milestone for developing life-skills, acquiring experiences and maturing, and they raised the distancing from home as essential in this process. As a conscript soldier (18, interviewed within the army) typically notes:
“Basically the first reason is that you learn things that you can’t learn elsewhere and the second reason is that most people grow up here and they become more mature. That’s it.”

It is indeed often highlighted in studies of army and masculinity that the process of becoming a ‘man’ and a ‘soldier’ necessitates that recruits are separated from home. In this space of separation the military then strives to instil compliance to military values, see for example Gill (1997: 533) who describes this process in relation to the Bolivian army. Yet, the masculinity portrayed in these accounts of men personally developing through military service was rarely related to the national struggle and thus to ideals of heroism, defence and liberation. Furthermore, the ‘maturity’ described by young men was not concerned with virility, combativeness or a traditional type of military machismo, but with going through a difficult situation without giving up and gaining some life skills that will be helpful for them in their own lives. As a conscript soldier (19, interviewed within the army) explains:

“You learn to live somewhere alone, somewhere different than your home. You learn to live without family; you don’t have your mother to make your bed or to cook for you”.

However, a lot of the soldiers I spoke to in the army, whose fathers almost without exception had served their military service in post-war Cyprus, commented on the fact that they were serving in the NG because they felt direct pressure from their fathers or other male relatives to do so, or they felt pressured by the fact that their fathers had served their military service and/or fought in the war. They feared that they would have perhaps let them down or shamed them by not completing theirs, (the second most prominent narrative). For example, a conscript soldier (18, interviewed within the army) comments that:

“My father might think, ‘I served in the army for the sake of our country so why don’t you”.
Since the war in Cyprus is relatively recent (1974), most conscripts have relatives who have fought in the war or directly experienced it. As a conscript soldier (18, interviewed within the army) explains:

“So we talked about it and since my dad had experienced the war in 1974, he told me he wanted me to enlist.”

The understanding of some older men, which provided a clear articulation of the post-war role of men in the national struggle, was most often contrasted with a criticism of the younger generation of men. Arguably this difference in the wishes of men from different generations to be involved in the national struggle illustrates the changing hegemonic masculinity. Most conscripts felt pressured by the fact that it was important to their father that they do it, and almost all specified that for them it was just the pressure rather than heartfelt desire or conviction.

Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the fear of having to face legal sanctions if they had not enlisted was mentioned by most of the soldiers I spoke to as a key reason determining their decision to serve their military service (third most prominent narrative). For example conscript soldier (19, interviewed within the army) said:

“A legal obligation. I felt that I would have problems with the government if I didn’t do it.”

Clearly, some soldiers strongly asserted the need to serve in the army due to the national struggle, situating it within the discourse of threat and need for defence and liberation vis-à-vis the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus. Yet, such accounts were few, leaving this narrative as the fourth and least prominent. Typical of this narrative was the account offered by this conscript soldier (19, interviewed within the army):

“I did want to serve in the army for all the obvious reasons like the fact that we have the Turkish army on the opposite side and they are threatening us etc.”
In my research these accounts that represent the least prominent narrative as to why soldiers were serving clearly depicted the need for defence against the ‘other’. The narratives presented previously are missing this, perhaps, most central value of the ideology of defence: the articulation of the ‘threatening other’.

Most often, the accounts of this last narrative evoked the traditional post-war military masculinity tied to the national struggle. Thus, for them, serving one’s military duty and being militarily trained confirms their masculinity in relation to the national struggle for the defence and liberation of Cyprus from the ‘occupation’ forces. For example, as this conscript soldier (19, interviewed within the army) comments:

“I found the opportunity here in the army to learn some things so that I will be able to react and help my country if something happens in the future.”

While these accounts epitomise the post-war hegemonic meaning of military service, the accounts that clearly reproduced this rhetoric were not only few but also often showed ambivalence and doubt as to whether the struggle, which also includes them as soldiers, is being executed competently. The account of this conscript soldier (19, interviewed within the army) clearly depicts this:

“In order to protect the land we have left, and supposedly to protect Cyprus so that they won’t invade the other half as well.” [Soldier, 19].

As another conscript soldier (18, interviewed within the army) comments:

“Because I think that the Turks might do something at any moment and I think that I want to fight in order to protect Cyprus.”

The paradox that emerges from these accounts is that while these soldiers clearly reproduced the discourse of the masculinist nationalist military national struggle, at the same they doubted whether the struggle is really actually today in place, as they respectively noted: ‘supposedly to protect Cyprus’ and ‘I think that I want to fight’.
Furthermore, the accounts of military officers were often clear about the need for and their own struggle to reassert the masculinist military purpose to soldiers serving in the army through the discourse of national ‘threat’, ‘occupation’ and the ‘need’ for ‘defence’ from the ‘enemy within’. A military officer (33, interviewed within the army) rather typically elaborates on what he would tell a conscript considering evading his service:

“We are under the occupation of the Turks, the Turkish army is right next to us, they threaten us etc. and I think that he would see things differently then.”

Evidently, a significant number of soldiers in the last few years were not convinced of seeing this differently and went on to get a deferment, which illustrates that the discourse of ‘occupation’, ‘national existential threat’ and the ‘enemy within’ no longer present the post-war masculinist role of men in the national struggle to the same extent. This provides a contrast to my interviewees accounts presented in previous chapters, that when they were faced with an undermined army and ‘fighting spirit’, they asserted the discourse of ‘occupation’ and said to feel defenceless. Moreover, in the accounts of members of the public, draft-dodging was most often strongly condemned. At the same time, the understanding of the changing community and identity of men also most often accompanied this. Thus, the support of the army-institution did not necessary translate into ‘everyday men’ having a direct role in the national struggle. The disenchantment that was expressed in relation to the perceived undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of men and the acceptance of the changing masculinity, created a certain contradiction within these accounts that is addressed in the section on nationalist military masculinity.

What is emerging through the accounts presented in this section is that, when compared to the post-war hegemonic masculinity, the normative masculinity in Cyprus is changing in such ways that it is moving away from the national struggle and thus from identification of men with the idea of the ‘nation-in-arms’. As illustrated through the cases of draft-dodgers or enlisted soldiers, completing one’s military service is not posed vis-à-vis the discourse of ‘occupation’ and need for ‘defence’ and ‘liberation’. The findings drawn by these two sets of accounts illustrate that both serving and not serving is a choice taken chiefly on the grounds of personal development and goals, this exemplifies that G.C. hegemonic masculinity is becoming individualistic and further
substantiates the argument put forward in the previous chapter that individualism is traversing civil-military relations calling for the professionalisation of the force. Therefore, also since enlisted soldiers’ (and not only draft-dodgers’) values of conscription are chiefly on the grounds of personal development, the initial governmental idea that combating draft-dodging revives the national struggle is patently false. These findings will now be further illustrated through discussing the changing identification of family, which has been the cooperative side of ‘defence’, with the role of men in the national struggle.

7.5. Social acceptance of the changing goals and desires of a soldier

The Cypriot family, military barracks and masculinity

The analysis that will follow seeks to contribute to the overall argument of the chapter by linking the steering away of hegemonic masculinity from the identification with the ‘nation-in-arms’ to the family institution. My argument is that in the scope of the changing hegemonic masculinity and the societal cultural shift towards the privileging understanding of society as a community consistent of entrepreneurial, rights-bearing individuals, we can see a shift that challenges the understanding of a unified community committed as a ‘nation-in-arms’ in the national struggle. And, in synergy to the general public weakening fear of another military dispute with Turkey and public understanding of the undermined condition of the NG, the family institution does not identify to the same extent with the national struggle as a man’s duty served at any cost. The priorities that G.C. families ascribe for their sons override, to some extent, the collective purpose of the national struggle, which the army institution has traditionally mobilised. The family institution on the whole has undermined the importance it ascribes to military service. Given that the family institution has been central to the mobilisation of the ideology of ‘defence’ in post-war Cyprus, this change is argued to further undermine the ideology of
defence and military masculinity. In putting forward this argument, I will be drawing from accounts expressed at political, military and public spheres in order to show that this reality has been realised in all three.

General Pandreou enunciates the above arguments providing a point of departure. He comments that young men cannot understand now why they should serve their service; they consider it a chore that takes two years from their career path, especially since they see everyone else abandoning the army. For their fathers there is also a negative reaction, and that even though they have served in the army themselves it was under different circumstances, so they believe that it will be better for their children to go straight to university:

“Society has changed, the social institutions are looser. In the past, families were more composed, we were all united for our country, we talked about our ideals, our nation, family and religion were important, everything was within this strong link. Now everything is crumbling and that’s why we have these problems [translators’ note: referring specifically to draft-dodging].”

My interviewees generally saw the European integration for Cyprus and the impact of capitalist values discussed above as counter-posing the motivation of families to support their son’s conscription, as these matters such as serving in the army are based on an ideological ground of the national collective purpose. In the army, the officers I spoke to repeatedly noted this as well. As this officer (40, interviewed within the army) comments in criticism:

“After our accession to the EU, there have been a lot of changes in our society. People’s goals, values and principles start from their family. The financial interest has affected our society and our youth. Because of Europe, we are only thinking about our rights and we are forgetting about our responsibilities and our debt towards our country. People see things differently now.”

The above account is clear about the impact of individualism on the attribution of importance to military service given by the G.C. family. In my older interviewees’ accounts, military service was repeatedly counter-posed to the setback of two years
from young men’s career paths. It was not that long ago when families not only expected their son to serve, but draft-dodging brought shame and dishonour both to the young man and his family. The account of the director of the Health Department of the National Guard in an interview he gave to Simerini newspaper in 2012, (see antirrisies, 2012), supports the above argument:

“In the past, parents insisted on their children being conscripted. Today, things have changed … parents come to us and ask us to discharge their son from his military service… There is too much harm done, avoiding conscription is no longer considered a shame for society and cannot stigmatise the rest of a person’s life.”

Indeed, while most of my interviewees, as illustrated in the previous chapter, supported the existence of some type of army and some reported that they would have required their son to serve, there was a general acceptance of the changing G.C. male and the non-conformity of this ‘new man’ to an almost atavistic type of male activity. Public support for the army-institution does not mean inclination that the ‘count me out’ inclination among civilians has been overcome, (Kuhlman, 2003). This is supported by the account of Glafkos Clerides, Former President of Cyprus who observed:

“I think that most of the Cypriot people, except the people who live in the rural areas, would prefer it if there was no military service so that their children wouldn’t lose 2 years from their lives in order to serve in the military and so that they wouldn’t go through all the difficulties and dangers that people experience in a military force.”

Indeed parents emphasised the importance they ascribe to their children’s career path. A minority of interviewees also provided a clear account that they did not particularly see it as a requisite responsibility for their sons to serve his military service. Rather, they clearly stated that they would have not put up resistance if their son did not wish to serve his military duty or would have even assisted him in avoiding it. For example, as Marios (man, 40, graphic designer) comments:
“I don’t think that I would mind, I would support him in his decision! I might have told him you might have a problem finding a job in the future and things like this, but I don’t think that I would care in terms of ‘protecting our country’.”

Nonetheless, as the former President of Cyprus above observes, it should not be overlooked that in smaller rural communities the social pressure for serving in the army is more sustained than in cities. Many of the officers I spoke to drew associations between draft-dodging and one’s social background. While this should not be seen as a strong underlying link, associations between social class and draft dodging should still be drawn. Social class is a vague and undetermined concept in Cyprus but also a concept not often academically used in the context of Cyprus. Social background demarcation in Cyprus is predominantly based on simple distinction. Since the island has not gone through a significant industrial revolution but has been through a deep urbanisation, social class is predominantly defined by one’s origins from the city or village, which in conjunction with financial capital and social status define the individual’s social hypostasis. Consequently, in popular language, Cypriots use the word ‘villager’ as an equivalent to working class. Likewise, manners, social behaviours, values and preferences associated with socialisation in villages are understood as lower culture, whereas, an urban, wealthy and predominantly Western like lifestyle is understood as high culture.

Most often, the officers I spoke to commented on the relative social acceptance of the individual’s decision to draft-dodge in cities in contrast to villages. They also commented that young men coming from villages, who are used to a less comfortable lifestyle are more adaptable to life in the army and do not tend to draft-dodge. Whereas those who are more likely to consider not completing their military service mostly come from socioeconomic backgrounds that offer them enough financial and professional security, as these points affect their decision and influence their future prospects. As an officer (32, interviewed in the army) comments:

“Usually a percentage of maybe 70% of the men who draft-dodge, they are people who have a backup, people who know that they don’t have economic problems and that their family can support them. They know that if they leave the army, they will go abroad to study etc.”
Whilst in the past the Cypriot family was a strong link between the army-institution and the national struggle, with military service as the affirmation of the family’s social hypostasis interwoven with the national struggle, today family constitutes most of all a weakening link in this nexus. Characteristically, an officer (32, interviewed within the army) commented on the people who try to avoid their service;

“It’s the families they come from. Family is the weakest link.”

Accepting life without heroes

The post-opening of the borders situation in Cyprus illustrates the central undermining in the cultural reproduction of heroic ideals within the nationalist discourse, which further illustrates the social acceptance of the new goals, desires and objectives of young men. The ideal of the heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’ was constructed on defending the border to prevent further Turkish aggression and also desiring to push back the borders, constructed by the ‘invasion’ and maintained by the ‘occupation’ forces.

Discourses of heroism, whilst still mobilised by state institutions, have been significantly debilitated after the opening of the borders. This points us to the weakening ideology of defence that was constitutive of this type of organised collective heroic masculinity of the national struggle set against the border, and to the social acceptance of the changing hegemonic masculinity discussed throughout this chapter. It will be argued that in the shift towards a non-unified understanding of society, discussed above, the decline of social cohesion has been also a decline in social trust (Putnam, 2002) in the heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and the role of men within it. The changing hegemonic masculinity, therefore, has witnessed a shift also from the identification of men to heroic ideals of the unitary ‘nation-in-arms’ and a decline of the trust of the community that younger men will follow such ideals.

While these discourses of national heroes have remained intact, and the state mobilises and projects them in exactly the same way as before, the G.C. society is on the whole now supporting these ideals of heroism much less. This creates a discernible discrepancy between state institutionally mobilised discourses and the reproduction of these in the public domain. If one was to visit a state school or a military camp of the NG in Cyprus one would observe that such ideals are visually and theoretically present.
A discussion that I had with two military non-commissioned officers, (37 and 39, interviewed whilst off duty) depicts this situation well:

"**Interviewer:** When I was in the army, we could see photos of our national heroes everywhere in the camp.

**Officer A:** Yes, it’s very common to do that.

**Officer B:** Yes, no one can tell you not to have the photos of our heroes on the walls. Why not? The issue is that the soldiers see these photos and they don’t even know why these people are heroes."

Drawing from the accounts of the people I spoke to, both in and out of the military barracks, the ideals and values of heroism that were previously deeply entrenched in post-war Cypriot society were noted by most of them to have been undermined. Whilst the modern heroes of Cyprus were themselves, in some cases, questioned. Yet, most importantly perhaps, what was challenged most often was the possibility that young men today would act heroically in the name of liberation from ‘occupation’. The statement of the press officer of Front (In Greek: Μετωπο), one of the most right wing political youth groups in Cyprus, provides a point of departure:

“People unfortunately have forgotten… Nowadays, people are settled, they have a lot of money; they don’t really care about our national issue. If a father forgets our history how would his son care? I don’t think that if Isaak and Solomou died today, we would honour them as heroes. People would probably say that they were just two crazy extreme nationalists. I don’t believe that the youth cares, maybe it’s the money, the good life etc. they have lost their values.”

The above account illustrates multiple realities. The beginning of his statement refers to the weakening of ‘I do not forget’ and, thus, the memory of the lost territories. He then explains that the current society of Cyprus would have not considered the men (Issak and Solomou) who only died some years ago (1996) as heroes. Finally, he proceeds to argue that the youth of today no longer cares about the national struggle, because of the Western lifestyle and individualism they have lost their values.
G.C. hegemonic masculinity is steering away from heroic discourses of masculinity that vigorously reproduce the role of men as primordial protectors of the ‘nation-in-arms’ willing to sacrifice themselves for the community. This changing masculinity and the social consent towards it is the replacement of the idea of the unified heroic ‘nation-in-arms’, with the Western capitalist idea of a society made up of individuals and also one of ‘Europeanness’ (Leonard; 1998). This is the understanding of a ‘Euro-Cypriot’ society centred on an individual’s professional and financial success, which is relinquishing, to some extent, atavistic attachments (Habermas, 1994 and 1998). Most interviewees expressed the belief that today young men are too individualistic and therefore they do not trust that in a potential military conflict these young men would be willing to fight or sacrifice themselves for the community. This claim, a general and strong agreement between interviewees from diverse and distinct social and political sectors, was broadly associated with a significant feeling of disappointing defeatism, a reality within the data that is addressed in the section on nationalist military masculinity. Andros’ account (42, company director) was a typical one:

“No, I do not think that we have the young men we need as a nation today; most of them will back down in a potential war. When you see someone that doesn’t want to work and who still lives off his parents, do you think he will be willing to fight for his country? No!”

Interviewees most often articulated this narrative by commenting that young men would not jeopardise their comfortable life for the collective national struggle as their ideals and values have become much more individualistic and materialistic. The account of Evroula (woman, 30, teacher) clearly points to this reality as the result of a consumer society:

“I don’t think that young men would become heroes. Because of the modernisation of society, young people don’t care about the Cyprus Problem, they just care about themselves and easy money.”

The fading value of heroism from the G.C. community is a reality noted by almost all of the people I spoke to. This was treated by a lot of them with a relative disenchantment,
which is addressed later on in this chapter. In more detail, on the fading value of heroism, the most prominent narrative presented a personal change in the attitude towards heroes: from ascribing high emotional importance to indifference. As Miria (woman, 25, translator) typically commented:

‘I haven’t thought about heroes in years. When I was learning about our heroes at school, I was moved. I remember feeling proud. … As years go by I think that these people are forgotten little by little’.

The second most prominent narrative elaborated with criticism that the society is, on the whole, shifting away from ideals of heroism and the weakening of community while asserting the discourse of ‘occupation’. As Marios (man, 29, engineer) expressed in disappointment:

“I feel that it is an element which is missing from our generation. Nowadays it would be very difficult for someone to follow the path of our heroes. There are a lot of people today who don’t even know who our heroes are, about the Turkish invasion, who fought for us to be free today and even though we are still under occupation those people have fought for certain ideals in order for us to be able to live a better life. People don’t care that much anymore… as years go by, people tend to forget our problem.”

The third, less prominent, narrative, explicitly stated that the heroic ideals of self-sacrificing for the nation have no place in the current G.C. society. As Xristalla (woman, 51, owner of local convenience store) comments:

“It’s useless to create heroes. We can now do things otherwise. We have lost many young people; we have a lot of heroes, that’s enough. I don’t have a son but if I did I wouldn’t want him to sacrifice his life for our country.”

It would have been easy here to conclude that the people who expressed this narrative are left-wing or strongly support reunification; however this is not the case. Most often they explicated an account of almost completely moving away from such ideals after a
certain point in their life. Interviewees who seemed to hold left-wing or reconciliatory political beliefs were dispersed across the above narratives illustrating most often, on the one hand the ingrained nature of such discourses in the post-war culture and, on the other hand their intolerance of these in the present situation. Overall the above accounts have illustrated a weakening of the value of heroism in the G.C. community whilst the difference between the different narratives was how this reality is expressed.

For institutionally created discourses of heroism to sustainably protract the ascription of social and cultural value and thus perpetuate the discourse itself, they necessitate being continuously, culturally and socially supported. Thus, while heroism is most often an individual act, it is the given culture and time that make heroes possible. The changes observed in the public support of the idea of heroes and more broadly heroism, illustrate further the undermining of this type of heroic masculinist discourse cultivated in the idea of the G.C. community as a ‘nation-in-arms’ predicated on the national struggle and the social acceptance of the changing G.C. masculinity. Yet, the case of ‘Isaak and Solomou’, who have broadly been considered to be the two most recent heroes of Cyprus, is here seen as a platform for further examining the understandings of this discourse of heroism in the post-opening of the borders.

In the beginning of this section the accounts presented reveal the general public understanding that followed the death of these two men. This understanding at the collective level was short lived. The above accounts today represent one of the least prominent narratives presented by my interviewees as regards these two men. Christou (2006: 296) has argued in relation to a group discussion she had with students in a public school of Cyprus in 2000, thus 11 years before I conducted the qualitative research I will precede to draw on, that “these icons [referring to Isaak and Solomou] were sometimes questioned as far as their heroic dimension was concerned.” The use of the case of ‘Isaak and Solomou’ by a lot of my interviewees to illustrate the dying value of heroism was the most prominent narrative in the case of these two men. Whilst some of them commented that they personally still respect and feel proud of them, at the same time noted that this is not the case for the G.C. community in general. These accounts further substantiate the argument put forward here that heroism is a fading value in the milieu of the struggle for liberation and does not inhabit a central place in
the cultural reproduction of G.C. hegemonic masculinity. For example, Stella (woman, 25, computer scientist) said she felt proud and that their death was unfair:

“There aren’t many people nowadays who have this kind of drive. We honoured Isaak and Solomou in the beginning it’s true but then nothing. We have forgotten them. Now, certainly in Paralimni where they were born, they surely remember them and think about them a lot, but this is not the case for Cypriot society in general. As years go by I think that these people are forgotten little by little, and they are forgotten more easily than the heroes of 1955-1959 [EOKA].”

Heroism necessitates the act of sacrificing one’s life for the nation but also requires the respective national, cultural and social discourses to support that action as heroic, or more specifically; it necessitates the discourses that create and maintain the idea of a hero out of an individual’s act. The measure of comparison Stella is drawing above with EOKA fighters, like Afxentiou and Pallikarides, whose deaths signified the purest form of heroism, was systematically used by some of the people I talked to as a way of illustrating that these two recent heroes, directly related to the Turkish ‘occupation’ of the Northern part of Cyprus, are today the ones that are mostly fading away from the conscience of the national struggle. The argument put forward by the press officer of Front, quoted at the beginning of this section that if these two men died today “people would probably say that they were just two crazy extreme nationalists.”, was a reality indeed supported by the accounts of some of my interviewees who often commented that these men are young and driven by their adrenaline.

Heroism as a social discourse necessitates a certain form of social trust and cohesion. In post-war Cyprus, heroism directly related to the idea of a unified community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, which as a social discourse entailed the promise and public trust that men as soldiers, reserves or militia would choose to fight and risk dying for the community. However, my interviewees’ accounts most often illustrated a significant decline in social support of these ideals and this social trust of the heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’. This decline has been part of the broader undermining of unitary community masculinist assertion of the post-war national struggle.

In the milieu of the emerging individualist idea of G.C. society, the changing values of G.C. hegemonic masculinity are moving away from notions of heroism towards the ideal
of an entrepreneurial, ‘Euro-Cypriot’ image and wealth-oriented male. This further substantiates the argument put forward in the previous chapter of individualism traversing civil-military boundaries, disengaging the community from the idea of itself as a ‘nation-in-arms’ and calling for the semi or full professionalisation of the NG. Yet, as highlighted above, while this shift has been a widespread understood reality it was most often treated with disenchantment, which creates a certain paradox that I will now proceed to discuss.

7.6. Criticism invoking anxiety of the community’s own loss of fighting spirit and commitment to struggle
The puzzling contradiction in my interviewees’ accounts between the broader resignation at the decline in motivation to serve in the army and the weakening value of heroism, and the criticism of these realities provides a point of departure in raising certain questions that emerge from specific incongruities within the data. This paradox emerges through all of the empirical chapters that, whilst my interviewees’ accounts show a broad relative support of the changing national struggle resulting from EU pressures and acceptance of their personal disengagement and practices for avoidance of the national struggle, at the same time there is a strong discomfort and criticism about precisely this disengagement of the G.C. community and the collective practices of avoidance. Moreover, interviewees most often specifically criticised young men for their practices of avoiding the ‘national male role proper’ to defend the community and ‘I struggle’ for liberation of Northern Cyprus from ‘occupation’. What is central here is that, in the majority of these accounts, when people were faced with the reality that there has been a general shift in the community away from these nationalist militarist masculinist ideals constitutive of the national struggle illustrated through the weakened ‘fighting spirit’, they expressed strong disenchantment, felt defenceless, and asserted the discourse of ‘occupation’. As argued above, this discourse has been tightly linked to the understanding of the community needing to be predicated as a ‘nation-in-arms’ in the national struggle. However, in these aforementioned and subsequent accounts, the strong disenchantment was mostly specifically directed towards men, as in these accounts men are understood to hold in their hands the ‘defence’ of the community and the ‘I struggle’ for liberation. For example, a typical account illustrating the assertion of
the discourse of ‘occupation’ when faced with the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of men was of Marios (male, 40, entrepreneur) who commented in disappointment:

“No, I don’t think that young men are fighters, they don’t care about the national problem. You will meet people who are not refugees and they might tell you ‘I don’t care if you ever get your homes back’ [translators’ note: referring to the homes in the ‘occupied’ part of Cyprus]. I don’t feel that we are ready to fight.”

Similarly Siliani (woman, 30, teacher) commented that:

“I think that young men should be more assertive and they should care more about our country. They should know more things about our history of occupation”

Also as Dimitris (male, 44, entrepreneur) asserts:

“Do you think that the people who served or who are serving in the army now, will be able to save us from the ‘occupation’ forces? I don’t feel safe”

These expressions of popular resentment clearly articulate that most G.C.s continue today to hold high expectations when they assess young men’s commitment to ‘defence’ and the national struggle. Yet, this creates a paradox to what was illustrated earlier that the community has relatively disengaged from the masculinist nationalist military idea that in the national struggle it needs to be committed as a ‘nation-in-arms’.

As explained in the chapter on militarism it is the security felt under the auspices of the EU that has contributed to the undermining of the ideology of defence and its concomitant idea of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Also, in the chapter on nationalism, the opening of the borders was illustrated to have created a familiarisation with the ‘other’ contributing to this sense of security. Yet, this paradox becomes stronger within the data when observing that the idea of the ‘nation-in-arms’, and therefore the perceived necessity of ‘everyday men’ to remain strongly committed to the national struggle, has been undermined to the extent that most of my interviewees, of diverse political views and age groups, supported the semi or full professionalisation of the force and thus the abolition or decrease of military service. At the same time the government is designing a plan for a semi-professionalisation of the force and the procurement of military equipment that will replace the guards on the borders, (see ANΤ1,2013). These
changes supported by the public, as it was discussed in the militarism chapter, were proposed as a way of having a potent army and having a military defence from the ‘occupation’ forces. And, indeed, the government has repeatedly made it clear that these will be changes that will not affect security.

Moreover, the broader support of the changing ‘struggle’ towards an EU solution has been illustrated as an undermining of the public need for a strong commitment of men in the national struggle. Furthermore, the ontological security offered by the NG, as the above accounts also reveal, has been illustrated to not translate into public support for a conscript army and, hence, support for the involvement of ‘everyday men’ in the army. Therefore, it appears that this notion of security is not one that necessitates men to reproduce the post-war heroic and military types of masculinity. Yet, a certain paradox emerges from within the data as; firstly, the perceived undermined ‘fighting spirit’ of men seems to be translated as a dispirited national struggle; secondly, the perception of the weakened ‘fighting spirit’ of men fires-up the discourse of ‘occupation’, which in this context undermines the sense of ontological security. Then the puzzling gap between the apparent public anger against and discomfort towards the broader disengagement of the male community from the national struggle and the support for the new form of EU struggle that is accompanied by the accepting of personal relative disengagement and practices for avoidance from the national struggle, raises several questions: How does the perception of the weakened ‘fighting spirit’ of men fire-up the discourse of ‘occupation’, given that the new form of EU struggle undermines the significance of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and thus the role of ‘everyday men’ in the struggle and when there is a general understanding that masculinity has shifted increasingly towards one’s own ambitions and goals? Also, how have the popular ideological common-sense expectation and affirmation of male conscription values and the expectation for men to self-sacrifice been maintained, when many of them do not want to join the army, and parents or relatives help them to avoid conscription to the army whilst supporting the professionalization of the force? Besides, is it feasible for most G.C.s today to combine individualistic self-interested attitudes with the continued belief that, given the on-going ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus and the continuous threats of Turkey, which recently have been staged around the gas extraction in territorial waters of the RoC, men’s
sacrifices achieve or should be achieving the deterrent force against threat to the G.C. community?

In the above accounts, it appears that the 'fighting spirit' of 'everyday' men in the national struggle is understood as being entangled with the overall 'fighting spirit' of the national struggle. The perception of the weakened 'fighting spirit' of men in the national struggle is argued to represent the undermined discourses of military masculinity and undermined heroic male ideals which are part of the general undermined commitment of the community to the unified idea of itself as a 'nation-in-arms'. This illustrates the inability felt by male social actors to fully reproduce the post-war hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, it appears that this inability to reproduce a certain type of post-war masculinity, which in post-war Cyprus has been linked to the national struggle, is interpreted as undermining the national struggle even in its new EU form. And interpreted as also undermining the public sense of ontological security, as it is somehow representing the 'fighting spirit' of the national struggle itself. This nexus in which the paradox is contained precisely reveals the co-contingency of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, where when one of the components of this three-fold relationship weakens it undermines the relationship on which the national struggle is constructed.

The criticism that emerges from these accounts therefore is not of young men but of the wider communal disengagement of the national struggle. Thus, people understand the young men but lament the communal 'apathy' towards the 'struggle'. It is argued then that the issue of masculinity expressed in these accounts extends beyond the masculinity of actual men to a broader discourse of masculinity that is constitutive of the collective G.C. position in the national struggle. Therefore, the inability of these men to produce the military and heroic aspects of the post-war masculinity is interpreted by the wider public as a collective community devaluation from a certain position of power in the national struggle vis-à-vis the emasculating tendencies of 'occupation'. The masculinity discourse co-constituting this position is what I have named 'nationalist militarised masculinity', the significance of which I will now proceed to illustrate.
This thesis argues that nationalist militarised masculinity is a contingent discourse in post-armed conflict societies that co-constitutes nationalism and militarism. This inter-relation creates the ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 1983) of the community as an empowered masculine unified body that defends itself and fights for liberation. Then nationalist militarised masculinity is key in understanding how the inter-dependency of nationalism, militarism and masculinity at a given time creates the stance of ‘power’ adopted by the broader community against the ‘enemy’. Perhaps what is most significant about nationalist militarised masculinity is that it enables us to understand how any move away from this inter-related stance is perceived as a devaluation and thus a feminisation of a position of power in a conflict situation.

In the case of the European post-armed conflict Cypriot society with open borders, it is argued that the public disenchantment with the inability of young male social actors to reproduce certain post-war masculinities and the assertion of the discourse of ‘occupation’ in this context is an expression of nationalist militarised masculinity. Nationalist militarised masculinity in these accounts relates to the fear that this inability weakens the post-war nationalist militarist masculinist assertive stance of power of the larger G.C. community, which becomes devalued and feminised. This G.C. masculinist stance of ‘power’ in a conflict situation relates to maintaining the discourse of ‘righteousness’ through the understanding of said situation as ‘occupation’ (thus ‘I do not forget’). And also the maintenance of the ‘justice’ and ‘steadfastness’ discourses against Turkey which are projected to the international community for its support and adopted in negotiation talks for solutions, thus, ‘I struggle’ for liberation of the ‘occupied’ part of Cyprus and ‘return’ of refugees to their homes in the territory that is now ‘occupied’.

Therefore, the assertion of the discourse of ‘occupation’ in this context does not suggest that men remain committed to the national struggle and to the values of the ‘nation-in-arms’ that reproduce the post-war heroic military masculinity. Rather, it recalls that certain post-war military and heroic masculinities of the ‘nation-in-arms’ and the ‘struggle’ were an integral manifestation of the nationalist militarist masculinist co-constitutive stance of the community in the conflict situation. Therefore this fear is generated because G.C.s have learned to think of the ‘fighting spirit’ of ‘everyday’ men that serve their military service and are willing to sacrifice themselves for the collective
heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’ as a clear inseparable manifestation of the strong ‘fighting spirit’ of the community in the national struggle. Thus they have learned to think of military activity as the special calling of men, (Enloe, 2004), inextricably linked to the ‘fighting spirit’ of the struggle. This spirit is one that will always fight for liberation and will never accept the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus by Turkey as legitimate; a collective stance that has been embodied in the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. As Marios (also quoted above) characteristically commented in disappointment:

“No, I don’t think that young men are fighters, they don’t care about the national problem. You will meet people who are not refugees and they might tell you ‘I don’t care if you ever get your homes back’ [translators’ note: referring to the homes in the ‘occupied’ part of Cyprus]. I don’t feel that we are ready to fight.”

Clearly ‘fight’ here does not refer to a military clash but to the ‘fighting spirit’ of the national struggle for liberation and return of the refugees to the now ‘occupied’ territory of Cyprus by Turkey. In the chapter on militarism, the same association as above was illustrated in the most prominent narrative of my interviewees, between the changing defence policy and changing face of the defence sector and a perceived undermined ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle. This again directs us back to the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and nationalist militarised masculinity that creates the undermining of masculinist militarist expressions in the national struggle and the devaluation of the assertive stance of power of the larger G.C. community in the conflict situation against ‘occupation’.

Through the theorisation of nationalist militarised masculinity, I argued that the fear in my interviewees’ accounts that the inability of men to reproduce certain post-war masculinities is related to a general undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’ and is the expression of the concern of devaluing an earlier assertive position adopted by the broader community in the national struggle. The following section seeks to extend this argument.
7.6.1 The re-adaptation of nationalist militarised masculinity under new social and political parameters

It is the argument of this thesis that ‘nationalist militarised masculinity’ and its possible transformation or reiteration in post-armed conflict societies plays a crucial role in particular periods of political, social or ideological change in the construction and negotiation and adapted reiterations of nationalist and militarist ideas and processes. Nationalist militarised masculinity is a linchpin in the co-constitution of a nationalist, militarist and masculinist culture which is embodied in the state and which also penetrates and represents the stance of the given post-conflict society as a masculinist unified body that resists feminization from a perceived position of power.

In the case of European post-armed conflict Cyprus with open borders, the re-adapted interdependency of the discourse of nationalist militarised masculinity to nationalism and militarism can be illustrated mainly in two ways. Firstly, by the strong and broader public resistance of crossing the borders; this is a masculinist nationalist militarist stance adopted against ‘occupation’ that largely poses the crossings as an undermining of the G.C. understanding of ‘occupation’ and therefore as feminisation of the G.C. position of power in the conflict situation. Secondly, it is illustrated by the continuing public support of a potent army in the context of the weakening ideology of defence that now calls for its change into a modernised semi or fully professional force, with a European persona. This public support of a potent army, accompanied by these changes and technological upgrades for defence from ‘occupation’, points to the re-adaptation of this three-fold relationship under the Europeanisation of the conflict, and other social, military and political developments discussed above, which are in turn influenced by broader cultural developments at Western and European levels. G.C. society, as already discussed, is one that is moving away from collective ideals to the emergence of the understanding of society as one made up of rights-bearing individuals focused on their personal goals. This has also implications on how the struggle is perceived by the public. The focus on an individual’s rights and personal goals has meant a relative acceptance of personal disengagement in the struggle, yet also a stronger reliance on the government to take up the role of the national struggle and fulfil the individual’s expectations of the struggle. This cultural shift is illustrated by the strong public reliance on the governmental appeals to the international community and international bodies (especially the EU) for support and intervention in the national
struggle, and the larger public support for the professionalism of the NG.

The above remarks guide us in understanding that, whilst the public still believes in ‘occupation’ and the need for ‘defence’, nationalist militarised masculinity has re-adapted its interdependency on nationalism and militarism; disengaging in this way the community from the idea of taking up responsibility of armed defence (‘nation-in-arms’) against ‘occupation’, and asserting the community’s responsibility to not cross the border, which action is perceived as undermining the discourse of ‘occupation’.

Before proceeding to further explain the re-adaptation of nationalist militarised masculinity in this context, it should be noted that there is a certain masculinist interdependency between the borders and the G.C. discourse of ‘occupation’ that is inextricable from the co-constitution and continuous re-adaptation of nationalism, militarism and nationalist militarised masculinity. In the European Cyprus with open borders, the borders continue to echo a masculinist sensibility in the G.C. nationalist ‘imagination’, (Anderson, 1983). Any changes made in relation to the borders are responded to by the G.C. community with a nationalist militarist masculinist assertion of the discourse of ‘occupation’. The community maintains a perceived position of power in relation to this discourse. As argued earlier, following the division of the island, the G.C. inter-relationship of nationalism, militarism and masculinity was manifested and projected in relation to the borders. This is because in the nationalist imagination, (Anderson, 1983) the borders are the material and symbolic clear illustration of the G.C. understanding that conflict is an issue of ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’. Thus, since the division of the island, the existence of the heavily guarded border meant that G.C.s couldn’t visit or live in the Northern part of Cyprus; this border was keeping the land that they consider theirs ‘occupied’. Therefore, the borders are, in ideological terms, the container of the understanding of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’. In other words, my argument here is that the definitional and discursive imperativeness the borders inhabited in the G.C. ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 1983) was responded to by a co-constitutive nationalist militarist masculinist community stance projected on the existence of the border.

Then, within the co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity there is an integral symbiotic discursive relationship between the existence of the border and
the discourse of ‘occupation’, where the co-constituted nationalist militarist masculinist stance of the community in relation to the existence of the borders unrelentingly protects the G.C. understanding of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’. For this reason, under social and political developments related to the conflict situation, the stance of the community in relation to the reality of open borders readapts in such ways as to sustain the discourse of ‘occupation’. This stance in relation to ‘occupation’ can be seen as symbolically represented and embodied in the slogan, ‘Our borders are in Kerynia’, which in popular discourse means that these are not our borders but the ones of ‘occupation’.

This is evident in that, whilst today G.C.s can cross the border, there is a largely shared resistance to doing so whilst the land across the border remains ‘occupied’. This choice to not cross is a clear expression of the re-adaptation of this collective stance of the larger community in relation to the border. Through this re-adapted stance the border is now being replaced by an ideological border where the choice to not cross sustains the discourse of ‘occupation’ in the nationalist imagination (Anderson, 1983) i.e. ‘I do not forget’. Thus, the use of the ‘Our borders are in Kerynia’ slogan today illustrates the imagination needed to sustain the idea of an ‘occupied’ city across a now crossable border. This open border has turned into an ideologically un-crossable border.

The sustenance of the discourse of ‘occupation’ is most significant for the G.C. community in the politics of the conflict, as this is the understanding that the RoC is the only legitimate and internationally recognised state on the island which translates into the idea that Turkey is illegally occupying Northern Cyprus beyond the border. This G.C. stance in the politics of the conflict has, since the events of 1974 to the present day, formed perhaps the strongest political tool for the appeals to the international community (Demetriou, 2007: 991). This is argued to be a feminised appeal of post-war Cyprus as a victim, symbolised, as argued in the nationalism chapter, through the mothers of the missing persons. In Demetriou’s (2005: 16) words the “small and unprotected … ‘little Cyprus’”, needs the support of the international community to liberate Northern Cyprus from the illegal ‘occupation’ by Turkey, which has “a large, strong and vicious army at its disposal.” (ibid). This directs us back to the chapter on militarism where it was argued that ‘defence’ has been the internal front of the Janus-faced international and internal agenda the G.C. state mobilised for itself.
Therefore, the re-adapted inter-relationship of nationalism, militarism and nationalist militarised masculinity, which today is refracted in relation to the open borders in such ways that sustain the discourse of ‘occupation’, relates to the agenda that the G.C. community projects to the international community. Hadjipavlou (2007: 71) aptly raises the point: one sometimes wonders if the ‘crossings’ have become, as has often been the case in Cyprus, part of the status quo. ‘Occupation’ is a discourse that sustains the position of power that the RoC is the only legitimate state on the island for the community in the politics of the conflict. As it was illustrated in the nationalism chapter, within the G.C. nationalist discourse today the memory of the war events and lost lands, thus the discourse of ‘occupation’ which is symbolised through the slogan ‘I do not forget’, is acting as a function of resistance that seems, in many cases, to be moralising the loss of ‘I struggle’ in the community. Then the moralisation of the loss of ‘I struggle’ through ‘I do not forget’ relates precisely to the sustenance of ‘I struggle’ through the discourse of ‘occupation’, which is projected to the international community for its support of ‘I struggle’. While the above theorisation explains my interviewees’ deep anxiety (presented in the nationalism chapter) that the crossing of the borders threatens the understanding of the conflict as ‘occupation’ and undermines the ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle, it also explains their largely shared continuous support for a potent army.

The continuous support for a potent army that is now calling for its change into a semi or fully professional force, which is a product of the re-adapted nationalist militarist masculinist posture of the larger G.C. community, is also integrally related to the internal front of the Janus-faced international and internal agenda of the G.C. community. The sense of the community’s ontological security of being protected by the military from the ‘existential threat’ by the ‘occupation’ forces is part of the internal front of the projection of Cyprus to the international community as a victim of ‘occupation’. As such, the military defence from the ‘occupation’ forces integrally relates to the sustenance of this double-faced discursive agenda of ‘we’ need to act as ‘our’ ‘protector’ to remain ‘victims’ who require the support of the international community to liberate ‘ourselves’ from ‘occupation’. Thus, how would the G.C. community be a victim of ‘occupation’ if it does not sustain a sense of threat by the ‘occupation’ forces and needs the military to protect the non-occupied territory from them? How would the definition of the conflict situation
be maintained as one of being a victim of military ‘occupation’ if G.C.s are unconcerned about crossing the border to the ‘occupied’ territory? And, therefore, how would the G.C. discourse of ‘occupation’ continue to be projected to the international community if G.C.s abandon the above-explained nationalist militarist masculinist stance that preserves the discourse of ‘occupation’?

In conclusion, whilst the hegemonic masculinity in the post-opening of the borders European Cyprus has moved away from the identification of men with the ‘defence’ of the community and the national struggle, nationalist militarised masculinity in the context of these social developments and developments in the politics of the conflict becomes re-adapted to its co-constitution to nationalism and militarism in sustaining the position of power of the broader community against ‘occupation’. This stance, as discussed above, preserves the discourse of ‘occupation’ and is projected to the international community in appealing for support for liberation from ‘occupation’.

7.7. Ultra-nationalist groups and masculinity
The hyper-militarist masculinised character in which the newly formed ultra-nationalist political parties, such as ELAM and EDHK have risen in the last few years (2008 and 2009 respectively) is argued to contain elements of the state post-war masculinisation and militarisation of the national struggle and neo-Nazi elements. Their emergence in an organised form is argued to be a discursive response to the government undermining of the armed part of the national struggle, the acceptance of having open borders, and the undermining of the masculinist militarist discourses of the struggle in both state and public domains. It is argued that these groups perceive this in ideological terms as a feminisation of the struggle, especially the role of the Cypriot government in the national struggle. As it will be illustrated, the masculinity of the parties discussed here, as Horschelmann (2013: 138) has argued in relation to Neo-fascist groups in Germany, challenges the assumption that non-hegemonic masculinities of these specific parties become subordinated forms of masculinity. These groups that personify a distinct masculinity from the dominant definitions of transnational entrepreneurial masculinity described above; assert their hegemony over others.
The aim of restoring the masculinisation and militarisation of the Cypriot national struggle is colouring the persona of these new parties in Cyprus. They see themselves as the only ones who continue the struggle, who officially request the closure of the borders, the fortification of armed forces and the revival of the Single Area Defence Doctrine with Greece. ‘The true nationalist do not forget’: one of the most projected slogans of ELAM, speaks for itself. They see the rest of the Cypriot public, and the state, as forgetting the national struggle, and ELAM is taking the role of re-establishing this struggle in Cypriot society. ‘Don’t forget’: another one of the most projected slogans of ELAM also speaks for itself.

These political parties aim to reinvigorate these masculine and military discourses of the post-war national struggle against the ‘occupation’ forces; aiming for the liberation of Cyprus. However, as it was illustrated in the previous chapter, since they do not trust the state to do the “necessary” in the national struggle, they take up an independent struggle from the government because they see this as their responsibility. Whilst ELAM’s and EDHK’s political influence in Cyprus is limited, they believe that a small group of people can drive the nation to liberation, and it is characteristic of them to have a strong devotion to their leader. A slogan used by ELAM is: "Standing in a world of ruins; the last faithful believers". My argument is that when the state in a post-armed conflict society moves away from the nationalist masculinist militaristic discourses it previously mobilised, this can contribute to the masculinist militarisation of ultra-nationalist groups. An article posted recently on the website of ELAM, (see ELAM. 2012), by a member clearly illustrates this:

“For the Nationalist People's Movement, the National Guard is the backbone of the existence of the morale and protection of our country… The anti-Hellenic state of Cyprus showed once again its intentions … its willingness to allow the weathering of the National Guard … hurting, to a criminal degree, its militancy with the most visible threat for Cyprus to become a state without defence. The National People’s Front undoubtedly today provides the only deterrent force that is at the forefront of the struggle”.

Both parties, as it was discussed in the previous chapter, reportedly have their own militant groups, though it is not clear, and also in the scope of this analysis not argued,
that they wish to use these for the purpose of war. This is here understood to be a
discursive response to the government undermining the masculinist militarism perceived
by them as necessary for the national struggle and their perceived inability to pursue a
revival of this through politics. Specifically, ELAM on their website discuss cases where
they had to act by themselves. Cases like this include confronting the police who denied
access to a fighter of EOKA to pay a tribute at the ‘Imprisoned Graves’\(^{29}\), (see ELAM,
20\(^{th}\) April 2011). Another example is the removal of street signs in Larnaca bearing
Turkish names requiring their replacement with Greek names, (see Sigma Live,
2013a).

Whilst the masculinist militarisation sets the basis for the character of the national
struggle that ELAM and EDHK strive for, the groups fight for concentration of the
masculinist and militarist discourses in the national struggle, but they do not trust the
government to do this. These groups have been clothed with a hyper-masculine
militaristic cloak in defiance and repugnance of the Cypriot government’s undermining
of the role of the armed forces in the national struggle. The hyper masculinity mobilised
by these movements is sure of its militaristic character, which is typical of neo-fascist
groups in Europe, (see Horschelmann, 2013: 129-131).

ELAM actions, such as a march, protest, or appearance in many ways are often
apparent of their militarist character. Though drawing the image of ELAM members’ is
not an easy task, the fashion in which they chant whilst marching, as well as the
slogans they have chanted in recent marches begins, perhaps, to help us form a picture.
ELAM, who has recently attracted much public and political attention, is generally
presented through a military hyper-masculine image and mien. ELAM marches, which
have been rather significant to the movement’s activity, are carried out in a rigorous
military fashion. Marching in military alignments and cadences they chant holding Greek
flags and often motorcycle helmets. In some cases, ELAM members have appeared in
settings such as marches and protests standing in units, aligned taking the commands
of a given leader who, even though he does not hold an official army rank, seems to
hold equivalent respect from ELAM members.

\(^{29}\) ‘Imprisoned Graves’ is a small cemetery located in the central jail of Nicosia, where 13 EOKA fighters
were interred during the 1955-1959 struggle for the liberation of Cyprus from British rule.
This masculine militarisation of ELAM is a reality given much importance and attention from ELAM’s leadership and members who are ‘fit and disciplined’, as ELAM announced following a training ‘Nationalist Camp’ which they organised in 2011 in the Troodos Mountains. It is interesting to observe some of the required items on the list published by ELAM for the members attending the camp (see ELAM, 26th July 2011):

1 pair of boots or something similar
1 pair of camouflage trousers or other similar military style
2 Tops Black
1 Survival Knife

It is important to shortly describe one of the many videos they have published, as these videos have been important in the identity and solidarity of the group. The youth division of ELAM organised an anti-occupation march through Nicosia (15th November 2010) and uploaded the video to their website with the title ‘Student march for the condemnation of the pseudo "state"’. The video is introduced by titles appearing on the screen:

“At the same time when some were in concerts with their “brothers” [translators note: meaning T.C.s] and they were singing about “a united country” as well as about Greek Turkish ‘friendships’.”

At the same time when some others were in coffee shops drinking their coffee, stress-free.

At the same time some others-the uncompromising ones-have come, disciplined, unrepentant and nationalist to agitate the calmness of the day.

The video begins with the youths of ELAM marching in military alignments and cadences chanting loudly and uniformly. The video of the march is interchanged with images and titles appearing on screen, as above, and a military rhythmic song playing in the background. The young men of ELAM chant:

“ELAM race, blood and honour
We will be back and the earth will tremble
Morality?? Blood!

Turks, Mongols, Murderers

The Turks of Cyprus are not our brethren

Listen to what the wolf said: one day we are going to return to take our land.

Solomou, Isaak the border is going to break!"

The titles appearing on the screen, mentioned above, refer mostly to Cypriot society, which they condemn for its passiveness in the national struggle, and a call to join them in an assertive struggle. Through their hyper-masculine militarist performativity (Butler, 1990) they come to claim and assert the masculinist heroic and militarist debilitated ideological link of the ‘I struggle’ of the Cypriot state and society, while they actively call the public to join them in the struggle.

Therefore, the effort of these parties to raise awareness of the need for a strong army and an armed liberation of Cyprus from occupation is embodied, retained and reiterated through expressions of masculinity, which have been historically central discourses of the ideology of defence and the idea of “Greek self” assertion, previously mobilised strongly by the state. They aim to bring awareness of the fading ideals of heroism to the G.C. community and in this way re-instil the necessary ideals in the national struggle, whilst they see themselves as the only ones who continue to substantially honour national heroes. As one of the most prominent slogans of ELAM states: ‘We honour, not forget’. They clearly state that for them national heroes are the role models we need to follow in liberating Cyprus. They organise anti-occupational marches, attend, but also organise ceremonials and informative events about national heroes. As the ROE comments:

“That's what we mean with ‘We honour, not forget’ because honour for a hero and a person is to find someone to carry on their purpose”

Passmore (2003: 171) makes a similar observation about men who subscribed to conservative ultra-nationalist ideas in France. She comments that these men embodied the notion of virile ‘true men’ who would restore the nation to glory and prominence through heroism and bravery. The president of EDHK, Loucas Stavrou, similarly
asserted that without heroes there is no society because it is the heroes who establish liberty and it is upon liberty that everything else is built:

“Now, as we’ve already mentioned with the phenomenon of draft-dodgers etc. youngsters have drifted away from these standards.”

The Representative of ELAM further asserted that we need to understand that heroes were people just like us and not demigods:

“They just had the right guidance, the right education … We need to learn from their character … to carry on their struggle.”

Thus, he enunciates the need for ‘active leading’ (Foucault, 2007, 1983) of the G.C. community in order to be shown onto the “right” path i.e. that of heroes of pervious struggles.

The masculinity embodied and performed by their groups of militias is used against ‘occupation’ yet also the perceived feminine role of the state in the national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’. The latest action of the militants of ELAM relates to the new rounds of negotiations for reunification in early 2014.

These parties denote negotiations as a form of solution to the so-called Cyprus problem, which they see as a feminized G.C. posture in relation to ‘occupation’. For them, ‘the only solution is liberation’ of the ‘enslaved lands’ (which is one of their most prominent slogans, in Greek: Απελευθέρωση η μόνη λύση). In this scenario the ‘occupation forces’ will be expelled from Cyprus (which is a post-war slogan that has become another of their most prominent slogans, ‘All Turks out of Cyprus’, In Greek: Έξω οι Τούρκοι από την Κύπρο). Loucas Stavrou, President of EDHK, revealingly says in his Presidential election manifesto (see Loucas Stavrou, 2013):

“Greeks of Cyprus those [translator’s note: referring to the government] who … have opened the borders, those who even though we have said ‘NO’ to the Annan reunification plan are supposedly seeking the right basis for the solution and are now preparing a new reunification plan! … young people of Cyprus the basis of the Cyprus Problem is none other than the imprisoned graves! From there we will start, from there will begin the struggle again, the path of liberation
and self-determination that would result, if necessary, in the prepared, armed conflict with the occupation forces”

In the scope of the intensified efforts by G.C. and T.C political leadership for reunification, the T.C. liberal political leader (and former President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) Mehmet Ali Talât gave a speech on 26th March 2014 in the RoC (at the Municipal Cultural Centre Panos Solomonides of Limmassol) encouraging reunification. Members of ELAM, who wore helmets, pushed aside the police and stormed into the Municipal Cultural Centre, breaking glass entrances, chanting slogans and insults and threw firecrackers and a lit torch towards the T.C. speaker. ELAM, announced both outside the building and on their website (see Cyprus News - ELAM) that:

“This is a provocation that could not have remained without a response by Greek nationalists ... The message is that as long as there is occupation in Cyprus, missing persons, refugees they will find us in their face”

A number of police interrogations of members of ELAM took place the next day. Following the imprisonment of the press officer of the party, ELAM’ press office announces (see ELAM, 2014):

“Unfortunately in a semi-occupied country those who oppose the Turkish occupation and Attila go to prison, yet this is an imprisonment of honour ... this political persecution is not going to quench our will for new consecutive struggles until we reach the final victory and the liberation of our country.”

With the efforts of the new Cypriot ultra-nationalist political parties to restore the masculinist militarisation of the Cypriot national struggle; they embody and reiterate integral parts of the post-war masculinist militarist nationalist discourse, previously strongly mobilised by the state, but with this now being fused with neo-Nazi and junta-phile ideological elements. The masculinity their groups of militants embody and perform is directed against the ‘occupation’ and the state of the RoC.
7.8. Conclusion
The opening of the borders and the accession of Cyprus to the EU created a new space of dynamics for negotiating an ongoing and unresolved conflict. But, it also shifted the politics of the conflict towards an EU solution, as opposed to military nationalist antagonisms; a transition that in synergy with the cultural influence from capitalist neoliberal ideals in the community had implications for men’s post-war traditional roles.

In post-war Cyprus the emphasis on ideals of manhood, in the assertion of masculinist martial prowess for the defence and liberation of Cyprus, was part of the ideological narratives that called on men to identify with the national struggle, and also the broader community to understand ‘defence’ as the role of men. It was against the background of these narratives and traditional militarised masculinities that new forms of masculinities emerged, which relate to the idea of a ‘Euro-Cypriot’ entrepreneurial wealth oriented male.

The increasing influence of Western capitalist and neoliberal individualist values and ideals on the island developed a cultural platform that has contributed to the undermining of the idea of the unitary G.C. community predicated as a ‘nation-in-arms’, and to the emergence of the new understanding of society as made up of rights-bearing individuals focused on their own personal goals. Therefore, this change of hegemonic masculinity, which is weakening its deep ties to the national struggle, was perhaps mostly instigated at a cultural level. Yet, with this broader cultural change, G.C. hegemonic masculinity had as its deterrent force the deeply ingrained military masculinity (Connell, 1998: 17). As the borders opened, against which the masculinist discourses of the national struggle were set, reunification negotiations intensified, and the politics of the conflict changed, moving towards the aspiration of an EU solution; post-war masculinities became arenas of contestation. In the space of this changing cultural milieu and national struggle, the image centred rights-bearing entrepreneurial ‘Euro-Cypriot’ masculinity has contested the strong identification of men with the collective goal of the national struggle.

However, the post-war social militancy and military masculinity, which was mobilised and sustained vis-à-vis the defence of the border, was part of the broader conceptualisation of the conflict as one of ‘invasion and occupation’. State militarism in post-war Cyprus was an internal assertion of nationalist masculinist military
prowess projected against the ‘occupation’ forces. The representation of militarised masculinities in state institutions as well as in the public domain as patriotic men serving their duty towards the country were naturalised and unchallenged notions, upholding the need for protection, protest and liberation from the ‘occupation’ forces. This identity of men had grown out of the general effort of the unitary community to resist against a potential and recurring (following 1974) feminisation of Cyprus’ defensive posture in the conflict. This muscular nationalism was structured on the creation of corresponding female images within the national struggle; the post-war Cypriot nation as a victim and in need of protection and deliverance that was projected to the international community for its support in liberating Cyprus from ‘occupation’. The masculinity component of this stance has been argued to be nationalist militarised masculinity.

Nationalist militarised masculinity has perhaps historically in Western societies been embedded in the identity of men. Yet, the broader shift of Western and European armies towards their professionalisation (Haltiner, 1998) illustrates how cultural and political developments undermine the current popular masculinity of men in the public and political perception of security and national struggle.

In the European Cyprus with opened borders, nationalist militarised masculinity has become re-adapted in its co-constitution to nationalism and militarism. In this context this inter-dependent three-fold relationship forms the stance of the larger community against ‘occupation’, without this relationship necessitating the previously strong identification of men with the national struggle. In this new social and political milieu while the ‘I struggle’ has shifted towards an EU solution to the so-called Cyprus Problem, the memory of lost lands as being ‘occupied’ by Turkey (I do not forget) operates in the community as the predominant form of ‘I struggle’. Thus, the discourse of ‘occupation’ constitutes the portrayal of victimcy through which Cyprus appeals for the support of the international community and a solution to the conflict that will be based on the principles and values of the EU and the UN. Therefore, my fieldwork clearly illustrates that post-war traditional nationalist militarised masculinity, such as state military virility projected through extensive defence acquisition, military parades and notions of heroic and military masculinity of the ‘nation-in-arms’, has been undermined. Certain notions of devalued femininity uphold the masculinist preservation of ‘occupation’ as a discursive structure of victimcy in the most dominant nationalist ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 1983),
symbolically embodied in the slogan ‘I do not forget’. Thus, certain discourses of femininity are maintained in the post opening of the borders European Cyprus as integral parts of the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and nationalist militarised masculinity. These integrally relate to this masculinised position of victimcy vis-à-vis ‘occupation’, which is projected to the international community to gain its support in the conflict situation.

Then, in symbolic terms, ‘I do not forget’ is a discourse that continues to feminise any potential compromises or shifts away of the nationalist militarist masculinist defensive position of power of the G.C. community in the post-opening of the borders European Cyprus, and rekindles the discourse of ‘occupation’. The G.C. idea of the borders as integrally related to the understanding of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’ is significant in this setting. In this setting the re-adapted posture of the community in the conflict situation, which rests on the re-constitution of nationalism, militarism and nationalist militarised masculinity, presents the choice of crossing the now ideological border and shows the undermined NG as directly devaluing the position of power and thus as feminising the national struggle. Therefore, the echo of the border, even with the openings, resonates a masculinist sensibility.

The possibility of crossing harks social actors back to the discourse of ‘occupation’. Since the crossings are understood as a form of forgetting the ‘occupation’ they are translated as further undermining the ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle. As discussed in the chapter on nationalism, they were portrayed by most of my interviewees as the humiliation of the national struggle and as accepting that the territory ‘occupied’ is lost forever. Thus they viewed opened borders as a defeat; asserting notions of national pride and liberation from ‘occupation’ in their reasoning not to cross.

The ultra-nationalist parties that appeared following the opening of the border demand the closure of them in order to return to a state of ‘occupation’, where war is rendered once again visible to the community’s eyes. They demand the regeneration of the post-war masculinist militarism in the national struggle, which they assert along with the need to follow once again the ideals of heroic figures as a way of successfully liberating
'occupied' Cyprus. Moreover, these groups’ ideals and assertions are fused with neo-Nazi ideological elements.

8. Conclusion: Assimilating nationalism, militarism and masculinity with 'normality'

The main aim of this thesis was to provide an analysis of the ways in which Greek Cypriot nationalism, militarism and masculinity have been co-constituted following the opening of the borders between North and South Cyprus in 2003. It was recognised from the outset that there was a gap in the literature addressing the significance of the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-armed conflict societies. The research was inspired by my own personal experience of serving as a soldier in the
National Guard from 2003 to 2004 straight after the borders opened, and while the Annan Plan referendum took place.

In the past, when scholars have studied nationalism and militarism, they have most often focused on studying these issues independently and, when they are brought together, the issue of gender has been neglected. In recent years, scholars who have studied nationalism, militarism or both in post-armed conflict societies have begun to adopt a gender lens when looking at these issues (for example see Dowler, 1998). However, in these cases, the study of gender has been most often understood as synonymous to the study of the role of, and impact on, women (for example see Aretxaga, 1997; Cock, 1989). This focus on women and femininity has sidelined masculinity as an issue of research enquiry itself and as an issue for research investigation in studies on nationalism and militarism (McKeown and Sharoni, 2002; Ashe 2012).

Most importantly, however, this literature has neglected the significance of addressing the co-constituency of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-armed conflict societies. It is this gap that this thesis was intended to address. The coconstitution of this three-fold relationship is significant in the perpetuation of an identity, which exists beneath the politically symbolic or institutional level and hinders the bringing together of the two Cypriot communities. As Kızılyürek, (2002) aptly points out: in Cyprus, the politics of identity played a central role in the rise of inter-communal tension and the creation of the Cyprus problem.

8.1. Research objectives revisited
As I began this research, I intended to show the significance of approaching G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity as a co-constitution by pointing to their inter-relating outcomes. By illustrating this through the case of post-armed conflict Cypriot society, my broader aim has been to illustrate that, when looking at nationalism, militarism or masculinity in a post-armed conflict society, we need to address the way in which there is a three-fold co-constitutive relationship.

This project was guided by four objectives. Firstly, when beginning this project, I sought an understanding that linked G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity. Secondly, as a result of the initial findings produced through the fieldwork research, it became clear,
and thus I began to want to demonstrate, that nationalism, militarism and masculinity are co-constituted in such a way that social and political developments and events can contribute to the re-imagination and, thus, re-adaptation of this relationship under new social and political parameters. Therefore, the initial findings guided me in understanding that, while this relationship is co-constitutive, it is made and remade through social, political and symbolic activity. Thirdly, by illustrating the adapted reiteration of this co-constitutive relationship I aimed to address both the first and second objectives.

Finally, my thesis is located within broader contemporary debates on Cyprus, providing a masculinity lens of analysis for a better understanding of G.C. nationalism and militarism following the opening of the borders, which was the fourth objective. I drew on empirical research conducted with different G.C. social and political groups to address these objectives. By analysing the interview transcripts I identified emerging themes. I then identified different narratives expressed within each theme and used these themes and narratives to construct broader arguments.

8.2. Limitations of the study
The interviews were conducted during a concentrated period of four months. Choosing to use interviews over other research methods presents the availability and the ‘time and cost’ factor (Gillham, 2000: 9). As repeat interviews were not possible, the opportunity to address issues raised by members of the public with those I had already interviewed and issues raised by members of the public with politicians and vice versa did not arise. I did not, therefore, have the opportunity to address contradictions in or new directions within the data with all of my interviewees. The implications of this were factored into my overall research design and the sequence of the interviews across the different groups. I developed the strategy of interviewing, within the allocated ‘time’, as many people as possible from each group of interviewees and, within the ‘availability’ and ‘cost’ confines, conducting interviews with each group and sub-group of interviewees. e.g. liberal and right-wing interviewees, throughout the fieldwork. For example, a number of my daily schedules involve interviews with a politician, a military officer or soldier and a member of the public all on the same day.
Addressing the same issues with members of the public as well as military officers and politicians is a strength of this project, as due to this I gained access to more varied accounts and information, especially on the perceived significance of political events from the perspective of the personal, the military and the political. The combination of these perspectives allowed a scope of different interpretations of the significance of these events, such as the opening of the borders, and other issues relevant to the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, which may not have become apparent through speaking only with members of the public, military officers or politicians. I also believe that by meeting face-to-face with each participant, and having the opportunity to explain all aspects of the research and build rapport (Miller, 2001), I was able to gain their confidence, to some extent, which allowed for them to be candid in the interviews (King and Horrocks, 2010: 48) and to become more engaged in the project itself.

8.3. The co-constitution of G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity
Early readings of the data led to the identification of a number of preliminary findings. For example, although nationalism and militarism, nationalism and masculinity or militarism and masculinity are often said to support the reproduction of their co-constitution through popular discourse and ideology, I have demonstrated that the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity can, under social and political developments, also contribute to the weakening of each one of its components. This was, for example, illustrated in the way that the opening of the borders and the accession to the EU have led to a perceived undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’, to a humanisation of the ‘other’ in the G.C. nationalist ‘imagination’ (Anderson, 1983) and an ontological security associated with the EU as a protective power. This context has contributed to the undermining of the ideology of defence, and the concomitant idea of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, which has been the concrete manifestation of post-war nationalism, militarism and masculinity. The undermining of the ideology of defence was illustrated to have further instigated the move of hegemonic masculinity away from its identification with the national struggle and towards a transnational entrepreneurial model (Connell, 1998, 2005). The changing hegemonic masculinity also undermines the ideology of defence and its attendant idea of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’, as well as the idea in the community that the ‘fighting spirit’ is sustained.
Later readings of the data led to the identification of more themes, as discussed further below. The most pivotal finding relates to the significance of studying the co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-armed conflict societies. This thesis, through the case-study of Cyprus, has demonstrated the integral relationship between nationalism, militarism and masculinity. Further, it has illustrated the case that social and political developments and events can have a formative effect to this co-constitutive relationship. Besides this, this thesis has also demonstrated that in the context of post-armed conflict societies the weakening of this co-constitutive relationship can precisely entail its adapted reiteration under new social and political parameters. This could be used to explain phenomena such as nationalist and militarist reiterations and the rise of neo-Nazism in situations where the political and military threat has been undermined.

8.4. Key findings
Five key themes were identified in this project: the centrality of the borders in the G.C. understanding of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’; the significance of the discourse of ‘occupation’ in the encapsulation of the national struggle; the impact of the accession of Cyprus to the EU on the understating of the national struggle and the ideology of defence; the role of masculinity in the perception of the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle and defence as well as in nationalist and militarist adapted reiterations; and the idea that the ultra-nationalist parties embody, evoke and mobilise the post-war pre-opening of the borders co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, in which they fuse with neo-Nazi and junta-phile ideological elements.

The opening of the borders and the crossings, addressed in the first and second themes, were illustrated in the nationalism chapter to have resulted in a familiarisation with the ‘other’ and a perceived weakened ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle. However, at the same time, as illustrated in the militarism and masculinity chapters, these developments are defeating the purpose of serving in the NG, in the face of which the discourse of ‘occupation’ has been most often asserted.

Through my interviewees’ accounts, it became clear that the borders took a central position in the G.C. nationalist ‘imagination’, (Anderson, 1983), defining the conflict situation as ‘occupation’ and that changes made in relation to the borders such as their opening and the crossings result in the fear of diminishing the understanding of Cyprus
being a victim of ‘occupation’. These observations confirm Webster and Timothy’s (2006) argument that most of those who have not crossed resist, because it offends their sense of ethics, and crossing is interpreted as recognition of the existence of the “pseudo state”.

The interviewees’ accounts further illustrated that the reluctance to cross the border is a form of resistance (‘I struggle’) to accepting the ‘occupation’. This is very well illustrated in the post war-slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. ‘I struggle’ and not crossing the borders is a way of not forgetting the ‘atrocities of the invasion’. ‘I do not forget’ is to continue maintaining the nationalist ‘fighting spirit’. These observations confirm Demetriou’s (2007) remark that the nationalistic slogans that appeared on the crossing points against crossing hark back to the older ‘I don’t forget’ campaign. In this manner, as argued in the masculinity chapter, crossings are interpreted as devaluing the G.C. masculinist position of power in the conflict to not forget and struggle for liberation of the entire occupied land so that refugees could return back. These observations support Hadjipavlou’s (2007b) argument that the ‘crossings’ have become, as often has been the case in Cyprus, part of the status quo.

The third theme, the impact of the accession of Cyprus to the EU on the understanding of the national struggle and the ideology of defence, was often apparent through contradictions in my interviewees’ accounts. Through the most prominent narrative of my interviewees’ accounts, in the nationalism and militarism chapter, it was illustrated that the ‘I struggle’ was broadly understood to have changed because of the accession of Cyprus to the EU, towards an ‘I struggle’ for an EU solution to the conflict. This new form of struggle was clearly understood as strengthening the G.C. position in the conflict and confirms Demetriou’s (2005) observation that the EU became an instrument in the struggle for justice against Turkey from the outset. However, at the same time it was also evident how, in this new context, the ‘fighting spirit’ of the community becomes undermined.

In these accounts there was a strongly shared feeling of substantial security under the auspices of the EU in relation to the ‘occupation’ force, Turkey. This confirms Demetriou’s (2005), Vassiliou’s (2004) and Lordos’s and Kaymak’s, (2007) observations that the accession created a general public feeling of safety that a war between the RoC
and Turkey is now an unlikely event. However, as illustrated in the militarism and masculinity chapters, there was also criticism that this security and the new understanding of struggle is further undermining the ‘fighting spirit’ and the motivation of men to commit to their military service, and more broadly, to fulfil their masculine duty in the national struggle.

Furthermore, it was illustrated in the empirical chapters that the Cypriot aspiration of becoming European as well as the cultural impact of Western individualist and consumerist values on the G.C. society was understood as weakening the idea of a unified community that was predicated on the common national struggle for liberation from ‘occupation’.

Taking these observations into account in the chapter on militarism, I developed the argument that the ideology of defence, which was constituted on the discourses of ‘nation-in-arms’, ‘existential threat’, ‘fighting spirit’ and ‘I struggle’ has weakened. The undermined ideology of defence has been demonstrated through the state disinvestment in defence, the relative but broader disengagement of the community from its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’, and the broader public support for the semi or full professionalisation of the force. Pivotal to this disengagement of the community and further instigated by it, has been illustrated, in the masculinity chapter, to be the undermining commitment of the family as the cooperative site of the armed struggle for the defence of the community. These observations confirm Haltiner’s (1998) perspective that in the short term, national sentiments can delay the decline of a mass conscription army but cannot prevent it.

The first strand of the fourth theme, the role of masculinity in the undermined ‘fighting spirit’ in the national struggle and defence, was identified through a conflict in my interviewees’ accounts. This conflict was between a broader understanding of the masculinity of men moving away from military and heroic male ideals towards becoming more Western and European-like and the criticism of this situation. The second strand of the fourth theme, the role of masculinity in nationalist and militarist adapted reiterations, was identified through strong nationalist assertions and criticism mostly in relation to the crossings, the perception of the undermined ‘fighting spirit’, and the need for a potent army.
In the chapter on masculinity, following the above readings of the data, I illustrated that masculinity has a role to play and is affected by the weakening ideology of defence and changing understanding of the national struggle. In this chapter, it has been established that in the scope of the intense cultural Westernization and Europeanisation of the G.C. society, these processes have affected the roles of men in the national struggle, whilst further instigating the shift of G.C. hegemonic masculinity towards a transnational entrepreneurial masculinity. In this now changing hegemonic masculinity, heroic and military aspects - that have been central to the ideology of defence - have been undermined. It was illustrated that in this context the military service - the clearest commitment of the community to its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’ - is not seen to the same extent as a rite-of-passage in becoming a man. These findings seem to validate Connell’s (1998, 2005) argument that certain versions of hegemonic masculinity are reshaped at the global level, with the more egocentric masculinity of the capitalist entrepreneur holding the world stage today, (Connell, 1998: 17), whereas the rigid masculinity of the military is now globally a fading threat (ibid) to this change. Moreover, in this chapter I argued that, in this space that has marked the reconstitution of hegemonic masculinity in the post-opening of the Cypriot borders, we need to not only focus on the changing hegemonic masculinity of men. In addition, we should also address the concept of what I have named in this thesis as nationalist militarised masculinity which has been a linchpin in specific nationalist militarist re-adaptations and reiterations.

Therefore, this thesis argues that we need to challenge the understanding that masculinity in nationalist militarist societies is an issue that exclusively relates to male conscription and armed conflict. Further, it argues that masculinity is a contingent part of a wider and deeper masculinist discourse, which includes the mobilisation of exclusive male callings, shaping certain roles for women as well. While this co-constituency could also be embodied by the state, it has been argued that it penetrates and represents the stance of the given post-armed conflict society as a masculinist uniform body that resists feminisation.
8.5. Changing identities: in-between ‘I do not forget’ and a new ‘I struggle’

The findings of the research clearly outlined a broad public criticism towards declining motivation to serve the army; a continuing public support for a potent army (semi or fully professional force), which would defend against ‘occupation’ and a public resistance towards crossing the border. Yet, these findings brought to the surface a certain paradox within the accounts of my interviewees’ as they were articulating two poles of reference: a) a broadly shared understanding, and in some cases personal compliance, of the weakening of post-war nationalist, militarist and masculinist ideals in the national struggle and b) the criticism of these broader shifts’ and continuing adherence to them.

This, in turn, formulates three main questions: firstly, how has the ideological ‘commonsense’ expectation of male military conscription been maintained given that the broader social acceptance of G.C. masculinity has shifted towards a transnational entrepreneurial masculinity? Secondly, how has the ontological security tied to the army as a defensive unit against ‘occupation’ been maintained when my interviewees’ accounts clearly illustrate that the accession of Cyprus to the EU has led to a new ontological security that a potential military offensive by Turkey is now impossible? Thirdly, in the new understanding of the national struggle through EU pressures on Turkey: a) how could the reluctance and resistance to cross the border have been understood as fighting the perceived undermining of the ‘fighting spirit’? b) how has the militarist form of the struggle continued to be supported as ‘necessary’?

Broadly speaking, the post-opening of the borders Cypriot situation creates a paradox of accepting, in the face of the EU, a new protective power that also acts as a form or path of ‘struggle’, still keeping the identity of a ‘struggling’ G.C. community. Indeed, the so created paradox has an important role to play in readapting notions of nationalism, militarism and masculinity against ‘occupation’. I illustrated that masculinity is readapted to incorporate the individualistic Western entrepreneur; nationalism is now providing space for EU interventions; militarism is now expressed through the support for the professionalisation of the force and military coalitions with foreign military powers. These three overlap and co-constitute themselves. They are conditional, contingent parts of an adapted reiteration of the co-constitutive relationship of nationalism, militarism and masculinity against ‘occupation’.
Therefore, I argue that, through the adapted reiteration of this co-constitution, the broader G.C. stance in the post-opening of the borders can be explained. Central to this argument has been the role of masculinity as a broader discourse in post-armed conflict societies. Nationalist military masculinity is an adaptive discourse. What is most central here is that nationalist military masculinity contributes to the sustenance of the unresolved conflict by constructing a masculinist post-armed conflict culture that fights and resists perceived feminisation of certain ‘positions of power’. The significance of it rests in that it re-adapts in fighting feminisation under new social and political parameters, even in times when there might not be an immediate security threat, or when the perceived threat has, for some reason, been undermined.

This thesis has examined the way in which this re-constitution constructs new ideological borders that have now replaced the previously closed un-crossable ones. These ideological borders result in crossings that have been viewed by the larger G.C. community as a defeat and, thus, feminisation of the national struggle, whereas not crossing is an expression of pride that the ‘fighting spirit’ is sustained. As such, to not cross is to maintain a perceived position of power in the conflict situation. These observations appear to confirm Cockburn’s (2004) and Hadjipavlou’s (2010) comment that the stakes of the conflict have been constituted in masculine terms.

Another case through which we can see the adaptive working of nationalist military masculinity is that the weakening of the ideology of defence has affected the continuous support for the existence of a potent army and calls for its change into a semi or fully professional force. This is a re-adaptation that directly relates to maintaining a perceived position of power against ‘occupation’. This is also evident in that in the face of the changing civil-military relations exerting public pressure on the state to professionalise the force, the state then proceeded to illustrate to the public that the military frame of the national struggle continues on, whilst also showing a clear intention to take up complete responsibility of ‘defence’.

What is most significant about the above outlined adaptive workings of this G.C. masculinist nationalist militarist stance is that it creates obstacles for reconciliation. The G.C. discursive understanding of the conflict situation as ‘occupation’, a discourse that continues to be discursively and symbolically anchored through the specific
representation of mothers and wives of the missing persons, is contingent to this G.C. nationalist, militarist masculinist stance with its re-adaptations. Thus, the relationship between them is manifested in the material and symbolic ideological existence of the border. As such, this relationship between them intrinsically projects the image of post-war Cyprus to the international community as a victim suffering from ‘occupation’, and therefore the appeal for support for liberation from it. This binary position of power, that is used to appeal for the support of the international community, inhibits the creation of mutual understanding of the traumas of both communities and restricts the creation of a vision of the future that extends outside of the discourse of ‘occupation’ to a solution that will serve the interest of both communities.

As mentioned above, although the three elements characterising the readapted post-war Cypriot society are co-constitutive, they are very much weakened independently. This is what the fifth theme addresses. This looks at the newly created ultra-nationalist political parties and political youth groups, which have been formed following the opening of the borders. I analyse these phenomena as a discursive response to the process of the weakening post-war co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity. As illustrated in the empirical chapters, the role of the government in the national struggle, particularly defence policy and negotiations, and the fading ‘fighting spirit’ in the community are perceived by these groups as submissive and effeminate postures. The argument that these parties continue to embody, evoke and thus reiterate this post-war pre-opening of the borders co-constitution was demonstrated clearly by comparing these accounts with the ones of the broader public. These parties and groups were created as a disagreement to the re-adaptation of this co-constitution.

The demand for the closure of the borders precisely and integrally relates to this non-re-adaptation of these groups’ position under the new parameters discussed in this thesis. The refusal to accept the open borders allows them to continue mobilizing their nationalist, militarist masculinist position against the existence of a ‘should-be’ uncrossable border. The re-production of this post-war stance allows them to continue mobilising the ‘existential threat’ and need for a ‘nation-in-arms’ contingent on a potent army, as well as discourses of heroism and collective virility as a defensive and offensive stance against the ‘occupation’ forces.
Moreover, their understanding of the armed part of the struggle extends beyond the mostly shared understanding of the public, to fortifying the NG, which should perform not only a defensive but also an offensive role. In this understanding, the revival of the Single Area Defence Doctrine was expressed by them to be integral to the reiteration of the post-war position assertion. In this understanding of the national struggle, they support the reconstruction of the unified mono-ethnic community of a 'Greece of Greek Christians' that will 'not forget', predicated on the collective national 'I struggle'. This understanding of the need for such community goes further than the public's criticism of the adoption of an individualist self-interested attitude, because it directly links to their support of a society that produces the militarist and heroic types of masculinity, and, by extension, men that will sacrifice themselves for the community's interest, namely, the national struggle.

While they perceive the role of the state of the ROC in the national struggle as submissive, they directly oppose its existence and appear to have formed their own groups of militants. Their opposition to the state, their groups of militants, and the embodiment and performativity of certain discourses of neo-Nazi masculinity show that their reversion back to the post-war stance towards the 'occupation' has been fused with neo-Nazi and junta-phile ideological elements. These remarks appear to confirm Passmore's (2003: 171) observation that men who subscribed to ultra-nationalist ideas in France embodied the notion of virile 'true men' who would restore the nation to glory and prominence through heroism and bravery, also applicable to the ultra-nationalist parties in Cyprus.

8.6. Future Research
The findings of this thesis provide a natural guide for further research. The masculinist discourses articulated by my participants in relation to the post-armed conflict situation did not relate exclusively to the actual role of men in the conflict and military conscription itself, but to a broader support of a masculinist, nationalist militarist posture of the community in the conflict situation. Nationalist military masculinity could also be applied to Northern Ireland, Israel, Palestine, South Korea or to post-armed conflict societies more generally. For example, Kwon (2010) provided an analysis of the persistence of a culture of militarism in South Korea through the gendering of
conscription. Extending that further, the role of masculinity here should be understood to go beyond the actual role of men as soldiers towards South Korean nationalist military masculinity co-constituting nationalism and militarism. This approach could lead to a finding that the mobilisation of South Korean masculinist nationalist militarism projected against North Korea is a discourse that fights feminisation from a South Korean position of power, in a post-armed conflict situation.

Furthermore, this thesis provides a strong foundation on which the implications of the finding of natural gas resources for the politics of the conflict and reconciliation and the developments in the role of the military that took place after the fieldwork was conducted (e.g.) could be explored in future research. The recent events that followed the finding of gas in the Cypriot territorial waters call the significance of continuing to address the re-adaptive workings of this co-constitutive relationship in relation to the imagination (Anderson, 1983) of the future of ‘occupation’. The territorial border in the sea between the ‘free’ and ‘occupied’ areas of Cyprus is another border created through the re-adaptation of this stance. Indeed, the role of political machismo in the dispute over the exercise of sovereignty of the gas findings has already begun to be recognized as an issue that needs to be addressed (see Constantinou, 2011). The thesis, therefore, provides a robust ground for understanding how the re-adaptation of this co-constitutive stance under political and social developments creates new borders against which it becomes further mobilised.

The discovery of gas in Cypriot territorial waters in a time of economic crisis is presented today as the primary avenue for the future economic resuscitation of Cyprus (see Xrisolora – Χρύσολωρά (2013). The drillings have already sparked military confrontations with Turkey around the gas extraction, which opposes any sole G.C. legitimacy over the gas. With Turkish military threats over Cyprus’ natural gas ventures, repeated announcements from Ankara that the search for gas in Cyprus EEZ will commence (see Antoniou, 2012), and some already taking place (see Proto Thema, 2013), Cyprus entered a process of upgrading its geostrategic power by creating alliances with stronger military powers to provide an armed deterrent force against Turkey and, thus, to secure sovereignty over the gas (see Bimbitisihs, 2013). These geopolitical and military tensions have promptly become formative in the adapted
reiteration of nationalism, militarism and masculinity discussed in this thesis that now extends as it manifests in the Cyprus territorial waters.

Crucially Cyprus is forming strategic military coalitions that currently show a strong military presence in the Cyprus EEZ (see Sigma Live, 2013b), and as projected by the Ministry of Defence, the NG begins again to acquire a central role in the politics of the conflict situation (see Phileleftheros, 2013b). Certain procurement programs have commenced that are aiming to provide a deterrent force against Turkish threats in the Cyprus EEZ (see H Kathmerini, 2013). What is important here is also that, through this re-adapted position, the ROC is again appealing to the international community for its support against Turkey, this time to report the invasion of the Cyprus EEZ.

There are various questions that further research should address in relation to the defence position over the new gas drillings on the foundation provided by this thesis. In this thesis, I argued of a re-adapted iteration of the nationalist, masculinist military stance in the public position of defence. Meanwhile questions about the public position on trading-off reconciliation and economic prosperity should also be looked at through a gender lens. A key question for such research would be: how a new defence policy, including new defence coalition agreements, informs the re-adapted co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity and what are the implications of this for the relationship between Turkey and Cyprus, the relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and prospects for reconciliation?

This thesis provides a solid basis for exploring the issues raised by the above question. It has illustrated that a re-adapted co-constitution of this relationship has led to the replacement of the previously un-crossable border with an ideological one that assists the sustenance of a G.C. position of power in the conflict situation. Following these developments, there seems to also be a new border that shifts the central border against which it predominantly manifests itself, from being staged on an open inland border to the sea territorial borders. These territorial borders in the sea did not previously acquire such national significance for G.Cs in the conflict situation.

A hypothesis is that the newly created significance of these borders in the re-adapted G.C. co-constitution of nationalism, militarism and masculinity contributes to further
consolidating the G.C. position of power and rightfulness in the conflict situation and thus creates further obstacles for reconciliation:

a) As they could lead to stronger assimilation policies from Turkey in the North of Cyprus

b) They could create further distrust between the two main communities and thus further separation between them.

This could be tested by doing further research. These findings motivate me, and hopefully others, to work within academic and policy institutions in Cyprus to raise awareness of what remains to be done.

8.7. Concluding thoughts
This thesis has provided an analysis of the ways in which G.C. nationalism, militarism and masculinity are co-constituted in the post-2003 armed conflict Cyprus situation, as well as of how this relationship can re-adapt under new social and political parameters in such ways that maintain the sense of the community’s masculinist, nationalist militarist position of power in the post-armed conflict situation. By deepening the understanding of the stakes of masculinity in, and implications for, nationalism and militarism in the post-opening of the borders Cypriot society we understand that what appears at first sight as a solidly nationalist or militarist expression, such as the resistance to cross the border and the continuous support for the existence of a potent army, does in fact specifically relate to the contingency of nationalist militarised masculinity in the co-constitution of this three-fold relationship that fights feminisation to withstand a perceived position of power in the conflict situation against ‘occupation’.

Therefore, by understanding the role of masculinity in the post-2003 situation we understand also its implications for the political developments of the conflict. Hence, we come to understand that the newly designed governmental policy of gradually abolishing conscription and the continuing public support for a potent army that calls for the professionalisation of the force reveal the contingency of masculinity in the perceived ‘position of power’ that conditions the political and public debates over the future of the NG.
Moreover, with the understanding that certain G.C. constructions of masculinity make-up the resistance of perceptually feminising the collective 'positions of power', we learn that the obstacles preventing the conduct of meaningful negotiations for reconciliation specifically relate to masculinist, nationalist and militarist adapted reiterations of assertions of ‘power’ and jurisdiction over the whole of Cyprus. We may also learn to design a solution plan that will serve the interest of both communities, to overcome the conflict culture to construct a new one that will be based on a shared vision of the future.
Appendixes:

Appendix 1: Access Letter to the National Guard
The National Guard provided a letter confirming that I had been granted access into the force for fieldwork research. However, this letter has been now removed from here due to confidentiality reasons.

Appendix 2: Consent Form for Soldiers or Officers
This consent form has been translated from Greek so that readers know what the consent form said.

Dear Officer/Soldier of the National Guard,

This research that you are willing to take part in, is for my Doctorate.

Any information and accounts you might offer will be used only for the purposes of the aforementioned purpose.

Your participation to this research is voluntary and you are allowed to bring the interview to an end at any point, if you may wish.

The interview is anonymous and any opinions offered will not be linked to your name.

In signing this document, you accept that you have been informed and agree with all the above.

Thank you for your participation to this research.

Stratis Efthymiou
Appendix 3: The Economic Miracle of post-war Cyprus

The consequences of the invasion were devastating for the economy of the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish invasion in 1974 resulted in around 37% of Cypriot territory under occupation thereafter which had an immediate effect on the GDP. The GDP received a dramatic shock and, as Kollias, Naxakis & Zarangas (2004: 301) inform us, fell in real terms by 16.9% in 1974 and 19% in 1975. However, the Cypriot economy shortly after the war events recovered with growth rates of 18% and 15.8% in 1976 and 1977 respectively and exhibited some comparatively high and steady growth rates that, in the 1976 to 2000, period averaged around 5.5% (Gergakopoulos, 1999; Kamma, 1992). Since 2012 Cyprus has entered a financial crisis.

Appendix 4: Photos of the Mothers of the Missing Persons
Appendix 5: Maternal post-war Cyprus expressed through literature and poetry

For example, the popular post-war Cyprus song ‘waiting day and night’ - 'Καρτερούμεν μέρα νύχτα':

“We are waiting days and nights
for a wind to blow
in this land that has been burnt
and it's never cool (δροσιά) (we never get relief)

We are waiting days and nights
for the light of that day
that will bring to everyone
coolness (relief) and an end (an end to the pain of the occupation)".
Appendix 6: Financial resources invested in ‘defence’

The Republic Of Cyprus has, since the partition of the island, spent a considerable proportion of its GDP on military expenditure with 1991 being the peak at 9.1%. Kollias, Naxakis & Zarangas (2004: 300) inform us in “the pre-1974 period, defense spending as a share of GDP averaged 1.7% during 1964–74, 1.8% during 1975–86 and 3.9% during 1987–99”. The 1990s overall was a decade where Cyprus had consistently spent a noteworthy percentage of its GDP on defence, (see: also World Bank Military Expenditures).

Appendix 7: Defence Tax

G.C.s living in Cyprus pay ‘defence tax’ in most of their financial transactions. In Cyprus there is a special defence levy called the ‘Special Contribution for defence tax’, based on the Special Contribution for defence law (Number 117(I)/2002). This law provides that any income is subject to a special contribution for defence (including dividends, interest and rents, where the entire taxable income is subject to a special levy), (see: Cyprus Inland Revenue Department).

Appendix 8: Single Area Defence Doctrine

The Single Area Defence Doctrine was a pivotal turn in the direction of Cyprus post-war defence ideology but also policy that constituted the idea of the defence of Cyprus in many ways as synonymous to it. A military attack by Turkey in the area of the Cyprus and Greek states would have solicited a cooperative joint reaction from both armies. The NG under the discussed defence union, during this period, is modernised, equipped and creates infrastructures to accommodate specific military forces of the Greek Armed Forces, including naval bases and it’s first and only military airport. Defence spending between 1987-99 rises significantly to 3.9% of GDP when compared to the previous period: 1.8% during 1975-86, with noteworthy amounts spent on defence especially between 1990-2 with an average of about 8% (exactly 7.93%) of GDP. This change in defence policy is also reflected by the sharp rise of arms imports during the 1987- 1997 period (see: UN military expenditure data).

In this period, the Global Militarisation Index (GMI) ranked Cyprus for most years as the 3rd most militarised country in the world.
Appendix 9: Picture of ‘Attila’s boot’

Appendix 10: 2011 Law on draft dodging and conscientious objectors

On the 1st of November 2011 the Cypriot Parliament voted a new legislative plan aiming at dealing with the phenomenon of draft dodging in the force. The National Guard Law (2011) provides stricter measures for those who choose not to enlist: detainment of the right to vote between other citizenship restrictions. The given law poses great difficulties if one is to attempt to evade his service, with strict laws on conscription and the introduction of community or civil service as an alternative to the military service. The introduction of alternative service was a key policy as in the past soldiers diagnosed as unable to perform their military duties due to health related issues were after a certain process usually exempt from their military service. Further, to those that due to health issues are granted temporary exception from service strict diagnostic processes and several restrictions are provided. Noteworthy is that the National Guard Law (2011) provides systematic and frequent check-ups of the given condition until the age of 30. Given that conscription is enforced between the ages of 18-20, the above-mentioned period is for 12 years.
Under the discussed Law conscientious objectors and reserve conscientious objectors who refuse to serve their military obligations to the NG serve alternative military service or alternative civilian service. Conscientious objectors have historically been an issue in Cyprus due to most conscientious objectors coming from religious segments and communities of the island, such as Jehovah’s Witness. Conscientious objectors under the 2011 Law on the National Guard serve either thirty-three months’ unarmed service in the army or thirty-eight months’ community work (when military service today is 24 months). In the same way, soldiers who have served alternative military or civil service have an obligation to serve alternative reserve service.

Interestingly, another new policy was to expand the concept of who is to serve in the NG. Previously, all males who have a father of Cypriot origin were called to conscript, now, after the implementation of the 2011 law, also those whose mothers are Cypriot but not their fathers qualify for conscription. From 2008 onwards, all men belonging to the religious groups of Armenians, Latins and Maronites, the main ethnic minorities of Cyprus who were in the past exempt and could serve voluntarily, have to serve.

Appendix 11: Motorcyclists’ March

The Motorcyclists’ March march was organized by the Motorcyclists’ Federation of Cyprus and was an effort to bring a cross party-line presence to the Green Line and to voice a patriotic statement from a group of men who are usually perceived as hooligans. The ultimate goal of the march that began on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of August in Berlin was to end in Kerynia (a city in northern Cyprus), and thus to cross the border using peaceful means. The motto of the march was "Liberation is the Only Solution".

Tasos Isaak, the first G.C. to die, was caught in the barbed wire in the UN-controlled buffer zone and was beaten to death by a group of Grey Wolves (Grey Wolves is a Turkish ultra-nationalist organization). The second Greek Cypriot, Solomos Solomou, was a cousin of Isaak who took part in a demonstration after Isaak’s funeral and entered the buffer zone. He was shot dead whilst climbing a Turkish flag-pole to remove the Turkish flag.
Appendix 12: Songs dedicated to Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou

Dionysis Savvopoulos dedicated Odi to Georgio Karaiskaki, Dimitris Mitropanos and Thanos Mikroutsikos dedicated Panta gelastoi and Stelios Rokkos dedicated Gia to Solomo Solomou.

The 2009 Notis Sfakianakis (In Greek: Νότης Σφακιανάκης), who is a popular Greek artist, song, Itan Trellos from the album Matomeno Dakry directly deals with Solomou's death and the on-going Turkish 'occupation' of Cyprus (see Sfakianakis, 2009). This is a clear representation of the interrelationship of the discourse of 'occupation' with certain ideals of heroism:

My brother, you became heartache,
how much courage can I put in just a song?
Be my flag and come with me,
help me draw away the ones who are a bother to me.
He danced as death’s bow strikes dressed in black,
he’s so tough that he didn’t even care leaving.

Appendix 13 Consent Form

Consent Form

The purpose of the study is to examine nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-2003 Cyprus. I am interested in understanding how G.C.’s understand notions associated to these three following the opening of the borders and the accession of the country to the EU. While there are no direct benefits to the participants, it is intended that the findings will contribute to knowledge production and policy design. There are no risks involved in participating in this study.

Participation consists of one interview, lasting approximately one-hour. This interview will be audio tabbed, unless otherwise requested by the participant. Privacy will be
ensured through confidentiality. Participation is voluntary and the interviewee has the right to terminate the interview at any time.

Signature of the Interviewee

Signature of the Interviewer

Appendix 14 Sample of Interview Agenda

Sample of Interview Agenda
- How old are you?
- Where are you from (city)?
- Tell me a bit about growing up in ...
- Who was in your family (brothers, sisters, grandparents)?
- What is your profession? / What is your parent's profession?
- Did you grow up with your grandparents? Are you close to them?
- Refugees? (parents/ grandparents)
- Have your parents had a personal experience of the war? Did your father fought in the war?
- Are they missing persons in your family?

Key words:
- What do you think makes a Greek-Cypriot?
  - Greek-Cypriot VS Cypriot VS Turks? Or Turkish Cypriot ....
- So who are the Turks for you? Who are Turkish Cypriots?
- Family, national identity--- ways celebrated (ways to open it importance of nationalistic history in the family, national celebrations) --- how were these things in the family? Discussed about heroes? The war? Liberation movement?
- Can you tell me ..... Family, national identity--- ways celebrated (ways to open it importance of nationalistic history in the family, national celebrations) --- how were these things in the family? Discussed about heroes? The war? Liberation movement?
- Were they any missing persons in your family? Who? How did they become missing? What were the situation/ story? How was growing up in a family with a missing person? Did you discuss it at home?
Where they any national holidays and national celebrations were this person was more remembered and grieved in the family?

Do your family belong to an organisation related to missing persons

- In what ways do you believe one should care and provide for his/ her nation?
- Have you ever crossed the border? Do you cross often?
- Have you/ do you cross with your family?
- Have you visited your house on the North (if parents refugees)?
- How did you feel?
- How did your parents feel?
- Have you met any Turkish Cypriots since the opening of the border? Were North/S

Soldiers

- How was the experience of serving your military service?
- What role (job) did you have in the military? Did you serve (guarded) on the Green Line?
- Was this an important experience for you?

- What made you serve your military service and not find a way to avoid it?
- How would your parents have felt if you were to not complete your national service?

- Important step in the life of a man- in your life? You know the common Cypriot saying ‘boys become men in the military’, how do you feel in relation to that now that you are serving/ have served the military?

- Military friendships ....

- Are soldiers treated well by the military?

Not serve as soldiers IMPORTANT say that I did not do it either:

- How did you feel about not completing your national service?
- What made you decide not to do/ complete your military service?
- Did your parents support your decision?
- How were you treated through the process of getting out of the army?
- Did military officers/ your captain tried to convince you to stay? In what ways?
- How did you feel about saying to people that you did not complete it?

Defence spending: Introduce by saying Economic crisis, influencing people, influencing Cyprus, especially in the last year.

- Tell me what you thing about the size of the army?
- Does the existence of the military make you feel safer as a Greek-Cypriot?
- Clearly we are spending an important proportion of our Gross National Income (GNI) on the military as well as an important proportion of human capital. How do you feel about this? Do you consider this necessary?
- Why would one spend so much money on an army that could not possibly defeat the enemy?
- We are not suffering! We do not live under the threat of violence or war- should we be cutting down on defence?
- On South site- great post-war economic propensity. Do you think that this economic privilege should be partially, yet at a very important proportion, spend on the military? Or use it to have better schools etc?

Masculinity

- How would you describe the successful Greek- Cypriot man? (money, nation- duty, family)
- How do you understand you father as man?
- Is he a man you look up to?
- What would make your father feel proud about you (check for economic success)?
• What about the national issue? Are the best men the ones which are currently devoted in serving their country?
• How are men who are active politically in relation to the Cyprus conflict perceived?
• What about politicians? Do you value them as men, since they work and provide towards justice to Greek-Cypriots? - None president or important political figure (which all have been men) has succeeded in solving the national problem. How are they to be perceived as men?
• How do you feel about Greek-Cypriot heroes? For example the heroes of liberation, heroes of the war in 1974? - What type of men were they? Makarios?
• Who is for you Issac and Solomou today?
• IS there the possibility of modern heroes today? - What exactly does it mean for you?
• Christofias also shed tears in his interview with Elita Michaelidou at SIGMAs television program: Με την Ελίτα. How do you understand that two Presidents of Cyprus cried on TV?
• Do you feel like forgetting? Would you like your children as well to grow up with ‘I do not forget’?
• How do understand that Papadopoulos cried in his speech on saying ‘No’ to the Annan Plan?
• How do you feel in relation the mothers of the missing persons?
• How felt in relation to ‘I do not forget’ past- military years- Now …. 
• What do you think ‘I do not forget’ really stand for?
  - How did you feel about them while serving the military?
• What type of men are Turks? What type of soldiers are Turks? T.C.? different G.C?

**Future (last questions)**
• Where do you think we should heading towards as a nation?
• Shall we learn from the past (i.e. past mistakes)?
  o What type of men do you think young Greek-Cypriots are today? How do you feel in relation to this?
• Is this the type of men we need? (i.e. as a society are we producing the type of men we need)?
• How do you feel about the future of Turkish Cypriots? Where are they located in your imagination of the future?
Appendix 15 Sample of Nvivo Code

Here is a sample of Nvivo code as shown in the image:

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Created On</th>
<th>Created By</th>
<th>Modified On</th>
<th>Modified By</th>
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<td>06/01/2012 16:56</td>
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<td>11/02/2012 14:40</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11/02/2012 18:57</td>
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<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The image shows a screenshot of Nvivo software with a table and a diagram.
References:


Antirrisies – αντιρρησίες., 2012. Χιλιάδες νέοι της Κύπρου "πουλούν ιστορίες τρέλας"


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ELAM. (2011-2014). *National People’s Front - Every People to its Land and Every*


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Renan, E., 1990 [1882]. What is a Nation?. In: H. K. Bhabha, (ed.) Nation and


- 2012. Η φυγοστρατία θα απασχολήσει τον Σεπτέμβριο την Επιτροπή Αμυνας
  - See more at:


