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Can there be epistemic reasons for action?
In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may support moral realism.
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Publication status
- Published
Journal
Grazer Philosophische Studien - Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische PhilosophieISSN
0165-9227Publisher
RodopiIssue
1Volume
73Page range
133-144Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
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- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2015-03-08Usage metrics
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