Why is there no queer international theory?

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Why is there no Queer International Theory?

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Forthcoming in European Journal of International Relations, 21(1), March 2015

This paper was presented at the 2nd annual International Feminist Journal of Politics conference on ‘(Im)possibly Queer International Feminisms’, University of Sussex, Brighton, May 17-19, 2013. Thanks to audience members for their comments and to Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Angela Chnapko, Lisa Duggan, Anne-Marie Fortier, Lene Hansen, Rachel O’Connell, Louiza Odysseos, Laura Sjoberg, the anonymous referees, and the editors of EJIR for their close readings of and astute engagements with my argument. Thanks to Aristea Fotopoulou for her research assistance and Joanna Wood for her editing assistance.

Abstract:

Over the last decade, Queer Studies have become Global Queer Studies, generating significant insights into key international political processes. Yet the transformation from Queer to Global Queer has left the discipline of International Relations largely unaffected, which begs the question: If Queer Studies have gone global, why hasn’t the discipline of International Relations gone somewhat queer? Or, to put it in Martin Wight’s provocative terms, why is there no queer international theory? This article claims that the presumed non-existence of queer international theory is an effect of how the discipline of IR combines homologization, figuration and gentrification to code various types of theory as failures in order to manage the conduct of international theorizing in all its forms. This means there are generalizable lessons to be drawn from how the discipline categorizes queer international theory out of existence to bring a specific understanding of IR into existence.
Why is there no Queer International Theory?
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Since its formation as an academic field, Queer Studies has questioned “the uniformity of sexual identities,” tracing how sexual and gender variance undo fixed identity categories like gay, lesbian, and straight. This led to theorizations of sexuality and gender as flexible, often anti-normative, and increasingly politicized (Duggan, 2003). Most of this work involved thinking sex, sexuality and their performances on a personal, institutional or national scale (Rubin, 1984; Butler, 1990; Berlant and Freeman, 1992). In response to contemporary global incidents ranging from “the triumph of neoliberalism” to the “infinite ‘war on terrorism’” to “the pathologizing of immigrant communities as ‘terrorists’” (Eng et al, 2005:1), Queer Studies has largely transformed itself into Global Queer Studies (GQS). In this guise, it produces significant insights on the global workings of “race, on the problems of transnationalism, on conflicts between global capital and labor, on issues of diaspora and immigration, and on questions of citizenship, national belonging, and necropolitics” (Eng et al, 2005:20; also see Povinelli and Chauncey, 1999). GQS contributions to what are arguably the three core areas of International Relations (IR) research – war and peace, state and nation formation, and international political economy – are regularly featured in top-ranked journals and in top-ranked book series (e.g., Puar, 2007; Puar and Rai, 2002; Hoad, 2000; Binnie, 2004; Briggs, 2003; Luibhied and Cantu, 2005; Luibhied, 2002, 2007; Kuntsman, 2009; Spurlin, 2013;
Cruz-Malave and Manalansan, 2002; Eng et al, 2005, Khanna, 2007). But not in the field of IR.

Strikingly, this resurgence of activity in and attention to GQS and to the scholarship it is producing has largely bypassed IR. Since Queer Studies made the turn to Global Queer Studies over the last decade, only six journal articles and no special issues on GQS-themes have been published in the top 20 impact-rated IR journals, and only one GQS-themed book has been published or commissioned by a top IR book series.¹

All of this begs the question - If Queer Studies has enhanced understandings of international politics by going global, why hasn’t IR gone somewhat queer? Or, to paraphrase Martin Wight, why is there no queer international theory? Three likely answers spring to mind.

Answer 1: “IR scholars are not interested in queer-themed work.” This may be the case for many, yet it does not account for the fact that membership in the International Studies Association (ISA) LGBTQA Caucus which (among other things) sponsors ISA panels is steadily growing. Nor does it explain why the first interdisciplinary conference to focus on Queer IR² received over 100 submissions and

¹ This data was generated from a Web of Knowledge search of the twenty IR journals with the highest impact ratings using the keywords “homosexuality,” “queer,” “homonationalism,” “pinkwashing,” “transsexual,” and “transgender” between 2003 and April 2013. Searches yielded the following results: “homosexuality” – one article (Altman, 2007); “queer” – one article (Jauhola, 2010); “homonationalism” – no articles; “pinkwashing” – no articles; “transgender” or “transsexual” – three articles (RKM Smith, 2003; Kollman, 2007; Sjoberg, 2012). Expanding the search to include “gay” and “lesbian” (which are terms queer theorists usually critique rather than embrace) yields just two additional results, neither of which discussed queer international theoretical issues. Including ‘sexuality’ yields five additional result, only one of which discussed queer international theoretical issues (Pratt, 2007).

² “Queer IR” denotes GQS-themed scholarship by scholars in the discipline of IR. “Queer International Theory” in the singular designates the only kind of GQS-themed work acceptable to Disciplinary IR. Lower-cased and pluralized “queer international theories” denotes GQS-themed work that exceeds the limits of Disciplinary IR and eschews Disciplinary IR’s ideal of Queer International Theory as a unified, singular metadiscourse (see Berlant and Warner, 1995).
drew 200 participants.³

Answer 2: “This interest in GQS has not (yet) led IR scholars to produce any queer international theory.” This answer ignores an expanding body of queer-themed work authored by IR scholars that dates back some 20 years (e.g., Weber, 1994a, 1994b, 1998, 1999, 2002, forthcoming; Peterson, 1999, 2013; RKM Smith, 2003; Altman, 2006; Kelly, 2007; Pratt, 2007; Rao, 2010; Agathangelou, 2013; Marjaana, 2010; Owens, 2010; Sjoberg, 2012; Sjoberg and Shepherd, 2013; Sabsay, 2013). Yet because most of this work is not published in IR outlets, this does contribute to the impression that there is no queer international theory.

Answer 3: “All of the GQS-themed work produced by IR scholars is so interdisciplinary that it lacks a primary focus on core IR concerns, which is why IR scholars are not interested in it and why it is not published in IR outlets.” Yet the primary foci of most queer-themed work published by IR scholars are classic IR themes such as war, security, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, nationalism, empire, colonialism, and the general practice of foreign policy. Of particular relevance to IR scholars are investigations that explore how failing hegemonic states perform queerness through their conduct of interventions and wars to solidify their hegemonic status (Weber, 1999), how states produce themselves and their citizens as pro-LGBT subjects in part to constitute other states, ‘civilizations’ or peoples as national and global threats (Puar, 2003), how the articulation and circulation of global (economic) value through queer and racialized bodies supports the practices of empires (Agathangelou, 2013; Scott, 2013), and more generally how ‘queer’ is mobilized to designate some state practices as progressive and others as non-progressive as a mechanism to divide the world into orderly vs. disorderly (anarchic)


This suggests that multiple queer international theories do exist, which means we need to ask a different question: Why does there appear to be no Queer International Theory?

My claim is that the presumed non-existence of Queer International Theory cannot be explained merely by its absence from prestigious IR journals and book series because this absence is the (un)conscious effect of how so-called Disciplinary IR codes various types of theory as failures. “Disciplinary IR” – which aspires to be but is not equivalent to the discipline of IR as a whole – is, of course, as imagined as it is enacted, and it changes as social, cultural, economic, and political forces change. Yet at any particular historical moment, IR scholars have a working knowledge of Disciplinary IR because it embodies the general commitments and standards that regulate, manage, and normalize “the conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 1994:237) regarding IR publishing, funding, hiring, promotion and tenure decisions. While there are certainly institutional and national variations in how these standards are enacted (Hoffmann, 1977; Waever, 1998), most IR academics are required to justify their work with regard to these standards at some point in their careers.

Disciplinary IR’s commitments and standards are as much the performative result of so-called “mainstream” agendas of learned societies, universities, independent funding agencies and governments that support socially, culturally, economically, or politically “policy-relevance”, “usefulness” or “impactful” research as they are the performative outcome of so-called “dissident” practices (Ashley and Walker, 1990; also see Soreanu, 2010) that seek to rewrite, resist or rebel against so-called mainstream agendas, be they “scientific”, “positivist”, or “neoliberal”, for example. Together, these intricately intertwined positions produce a Disciplinary IR that claims to speak for the whole of the discipline of IR because it wields sufficient
power to (de)legitimate IR scholars and their work for many user communities. Because of its power, Disciplinary IR is as often contested as it is assimilated to by IR scholars of virtually all intellectual dispositions.4

A central tenant of what I am calling Disciplinary IR is embedded in the work of Martin Wight. Wight claimed that for international theorizing to succeed, it must accumulate knowledge about interstate relations (Wight, 1966; Smith, 2000). My claim is that from a Disciplinary IR perspective, theories – including queer international theories – fail because they are judged not to be making progress toward this goal. This is what explains the subsequent absence of queer international theories from prestigious IR journals and book series and the presumed non-existence of Queer International Theory.

To substantiate this claim, I investigate how Disciplinary IR employs three strategies - homologization, figuration, and gentrification - to make it appear as if there is no Queer International Theory. Homologization describes the act of using a homology to describe relationships, relative positions and structures in a set of elements in order to prescribe how relationships ought to be ordered and how elements and their aims ought to be valued (e.g., Wight, 1966).5 Figuration describes the act of employing semiotic tropes that combine knowledges, practices, and power to shape how we map our worlds and understand actual things in those worlds (Haraway, 1997). Gentrification describes the replacement of mix with homogeneity while pretending difference and privilege do not exist (Schulman, 2012).

My analysis is grounded in Martin Wight’s famous homology “Politics is to International Politics as Political Theory is to Historical Interpretation.” This is not only because Wight’s homology illustrates and/or authorizes homologization,
figuration, and gentrification. It is also because Wight’s homology elegantly encapsulates how Disciplinary IR has traditionally thought of itself since its formation in the wake of World War I – as separate but parallel to the discipline of politics and as capable of achieving its aim to produce unique cumulative knowledge about international politics only if it models itself on how political theory is practiced. In the 1960s, Wight mobilized this generalized view to make his case for an historical approach to the study of IR – both as a participant in the first “great debate” over method and methodology between traditionalists and behavioralists and as an historian who founded an International Relations department. This in part accounts for Wight’s contentious claim that international theory can only succeed if it transforms itself into historical interpretation and his contentious placement of the term “Historical Interpretation” in the place one would expect to find the term “International Theory” in his homology. IR debates about methodology and history have certainly moved on since Wight’s time (e.g., Lapid, 1989; Rosenberg, 2006). Even so, the values and relationships expressed in Wight’s homology are still widely accepted in Disciplinary IR, to the point that Wight’s homology remains a generalizable guide to regulating how international theorizing ought to be conducted.

Beginning with Martin Wight’s homology, I trace how Wight’s strategy of homologization equates international theory and the discipline of International Relations with failure, authorizes the figuration of specific types of international theory and specific ways of producing international theory as failures, and embraces a gentrified strategy of substitution as a legitimate response to these failures. Applying these logics to queer international theories, I suggest that homologization, figuration and gentrification combine to make it appear as if there is no Queer International Theory. In so doing, they authorize the discipline of IR (on Disciplinary IR’s behalf) to dismiss queer international theories as International Theory, resulting in negative consequences not only for the scholars who produce this type of work but for the
discipline of IR as a whole.

I conclude by reflecting on the costs of using Wight’s homology to regulate, manage and normalize the scholarly conduct of international theorizing – for queer international theories and for the discipline of IR as a whole. I argue that while most scholars in the discipline (un)consciously embraces Wight’s homology as their guide to disciplinary success, my analysis of Queer International Theory reveals that Wight’s homology has three detrimental effects on the discipline: it limits how international politics is enriched by critical inquiry, it cedes consideration of key international phenomena to other disciplines, and it paradoxically leads to disciplinary failure on the discipline’s own terms.

Because the case of Queer International Theory illustrates how Disciplinary IR manages not just queer international theories but all theories that profess to be International Theory, generalizable lessons can be drawn from this case for the discipline as a whole. Primary among these is that IR’s disciplinary attachment to Wight’s homology compromises possibilities for doing international theorizing and thinking international politics not only on terms the discipline rejects but on terms the discipline embraces.

**Homologizing Failure**

Politics:International Politics = Political Theory:Historical Interpretation

- Martin Wight (1966:33)

This is the first and most famous example of a homology in IR. The origin of
his homology is Martin Wight’s essay “Why there is no international theory?,” where his homology serves as his summary statement on the discipline of IR and its relationships to the fields of political theory and history. What Wight’s essay offers IR is a cautionary tale about how not to produce failing international theory and a curative tale about how to successfully revive a discipline whose theoretical endeavors have led it astray. The power and influence of Wight’s essay and the homology at its core are undeniable. Whether to embrace, debate, or refine it, Wight’s argument is so rehearsed in IR through teaching and research (e.g., Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1990; Smith, 1995; Weber, 1998a; Rosenberg, 2006; Snidal and Wendt, 2009, Amitav and Buzan, 2010) that his essay “has almost iconic status in IR so that in reading it one is reading the discipline itself” (Epp, 1996).

My aim in this section is to explain how Wight’s essay homologizes failure and charts the acceptable pathway to overcoming failure by using a homology to describe relationships, relative positions and structures in a set of elements in order to prescribe how relationships ought to be ordered and how elements and their aims ought to be valued. My analysis unfolds in three moves. First, I analyze how Wight’s homology allows him to argue that there is no International Theory. Second, I discuss how Wight’s homology regulates, manages, and normalizes scholarly conduct within the discipline and why this matters for international theorizing. Finally, I draw upon both of these arguments to explain how Wight’s homology sets up Queer International Theory as failure.

The key to understanding Wight’s homology lies in grasping the function of its third term, Political Theory. Political Theory is the foundational or ‘master’ term against which all other terms in the homology are evaluated. As such, its own meaning is self-evident and beyond question, and the meaning and value of every other term in Wight’s homology flow from Wight’s understanding of Political Theory.
Wight opens his essay by defining Political Theory as “a phrase that in general requires no explanation…[that] denotes speculation about the state” (1966:17) and International Theory as “a tradition of speculation about relations between states” (1966:17). Wight then offers us a logical argument that appears to be logically impossible. As “a tradition imagined as the twin of speculation about the state to which the name ‘political theory’ is appropriated” (1966:17), Wight suggests that International Theory fails to exist because it fails to measure up to its twin Political Theory. For Wight, this is why there is no International Theory. Wight’s essay elaborates on this unusual formulation of theoretical failure and seeks to discover if there is an alternative tradition of speculation about relations between states that succeeds where International Theory fails.

Wight elaborates on how International Theory fails to measure up to Political Theory in both function and content. Political Theory exists primarily because it fulfills its function to accurately reflect the content of politics. It does this by telling the story of how state’s strive through their domestic political process to achieve ‘the good life’ (Wight, 1966:33). Political Theory exists secondarily because it has a succession of classic texts that document its story. Put in terms of Wight’s homology, Politics equals Political Theory. International Theory, in contrast, does not exist because it does not fulfill its function to reflect the content of international political processes. It does not tell the story of how states’ diplomats grapple with the ‘recurrence and repetition’ of interstate conflicts (Wight, 1966:33) in order to ensure the survival of their states. This explains why International Theory is “scattered, unsystematic, and mostly inaccessible to the layman” (1966:20) and why “there is no succession of first-rank books about the states-system and diplomacy like the succession of political classics from Bodin to Mill” (1966:18).

Because for Wight International Theory does not equal International Politics, Wight excludes the term International Theory from his homology altogether. But
Wight’s homology is not incomplete. It is not Politics:International Politics = Political Theory:Nothing Whatsoever. Rather, in the place where we would expect to find the term International Theory, Wight’s homology uses the term ‘Historical Interpretation’. Politics:International Politics = Political Theory:Historical Interpretation. For Wight, this substitution of Historical Interpretation for International Theory is valid because the only type of theory that describes things as they are in international politics is Historical Interpretation. This is because, for Wight, it is only Historical Interpretation that makes it its “business to study the states-system, the diplomatic community itself” (1966:22). International Politics equals Historical Interpretation.

This is a forceful set of propositions, which Wight appears to submit to his reader with caution. He writes, “[I]f one came to the point of offering the equation Politics:International Politics = Political Theory:Historical Investigation it would be tentatively, aware of a problem posed and a challenge delivered” (Wight, 1960:48). Yet apart from this one qualifying sentence, there is nothing cautious or tentative about Wight’s homologization. It is definitive in how it defines the relationships, relative positions and structures of Politics, Political Theory, International Politics, International Theory, and Historical Interpretation and in how it orders and values these elements and their relationships. As a result, it is definitive in posing the non-existence of International Theory as a problem to be solved. And it is definitive in suggesting that solving this problem lies in the challenge of reforming what Wight views as inadequate international theories into or reforming them with Historical Interpretation, which just happens to be how Wight (an international historian) studies international politics. Or, again, to put it in Wight’s terms, International Politics

6 Here I am citing from Wight’s originally published 1960 article because in this version of the piece Wight more hesitantly offers his homology. In the revised 1966 version, Wight writes, “So one might venture tentatively to put forward the equation: Politics:International Politics = Political Theory:Historical Interpretation” (1966:32-33).
equals Historical Interpretation, therefore International Theory must equal Historical Interpretation if International Theory is to exist.

The effects of Wight’s homologization are significant. By homologizing his argument, Wight elevates a series of biases and assumptions into apparent mathematical facts – that there is only one correct way to conceive of Political Theory and International Theory, that Political Theory as Wight defines it should be the starting point for thinking about the definition and role of International Theory, that Politics and International Politics are singular, separate realms of conduct that must be accounted for by separate bodies of theory, that these bodies of theory either do represent or should represent things as they really are in a neutral and unbiased way, that these neutral, unbiased accounts of the world can and should result in a sustained progression of cumulative knowledge about their field of inquiry, and that if they fail to do this then they do not properly exist as bodies of theory. The overall effect of how Wight employs his homology is to naturalize some very problematic ideas about the existence of Political Theory and International Theory in the singular, about the existence of a rigid domestic/international boundary, about the nature of language and aims of theory and knowledge, and about what kinds of theory and knowledge are valuable.

Wight’s homologization has further effects because of the way it has been taken up by Disciplinary IR. Because reading Wight’s essay is akin to “reading the discipline itself” (Epp, 1996), Wight’s homology performs the same task in Disciplinary IR that the term Political Theory performs in Wight’s homology; it is a foundational point of reference that gives meaning, value, and proper positioning to other terms/theories/disciplines that come into contact with it. In this way, Wight’s homology orients IR theorists toward what Disciplinary IR claims the discipline of IR is, ought to be, and could be if its members were to follow Wight’s advice. This is what allows Wight’s homology to perform as a normalizing technology in the
Foucauldian sense, in that it regulates, manages, and normalizes the scholarly conduct of international theorizing within the discipline of IR (Foucault, 1994:237) in the sense that it guides the behavior of IR theorists down specific approved routes for creating International Theory and for marking those who stray off these approved paths as failures.

This does not mean that all IR theorists agree with Wight that every kind of international theory apart from Historical Interpretation is a failure. Rather, it means that it is to Wight’s homology that a surprising array of IR scholars turn when they attempt to systematically differentiate amongst various types of theory and to consider how to correct those strains of theory that they believe fail the discipline because they stray down the wrong paths to theory-making. Just as Wight wielded his homology to figure International Theory as a failure and to legitimate the substitution of Historical Interpretation for International Theory, so too have recent scholars employed Wight’s homology to figure contemporary expressions of international theories as failures and to substitute the pathway to their favored theory as the legitimate road to theoretical success (e.g., Buzan and Little, 2001; Rosenberg, 2006; Snidal and Wendt, 2009; Amitav and Buzan, 2010).

Even those scholars who do not overtly employ Wight’s homology often unconsciously abide by its recommendations. If they do not, they risk not being recognized as proper international relations theorists. In this way, then, Wight’s homology normalizes the conduct of international theorizing rather broadly in the discipline of IR because it governs how a critical mass of IR scholars (un)consciously think about international theories in general and about their own practices as international theorists specifically.

This is what makes Wight’s homology so dangerous and so powerful. It is dangerous because it is a highly biased expression of what politics, theory and knowledge ought to look like in Disciplinary IR’s view of the discipline of IR, that is
applied to the discipline as if it were objective. It is powerful because it functions as a technology of differentiation to designate failure and pathways to success for international theories that can be applied to normalize (by validating, dismissing or correcting) *any type of theory and theorist* that/who would dare to make a claim to be (doing) International Theory.

This is why Wight’s homologization of international theories matters for queer international theories. For when Wight’s observations about International Theory are applied to Queer International Theory, queer international theories are homologized out of existence.

Like International Theory, Queer International Theory “does not, at first sight, exist” (Wight, 1966:17) because it fails to measure up to its “twin” Queer Political Theory in content and in function. This is for three reasons. First, queer international theories lack a substantial, significant body of classical texts (Wight, 1966:17) that Queer Political Theory provides (from Foucault, [1976/1979] to Butler [1990] to De Laruetis [1991] to Segwick [1991] for example), offering in its place scattered, unsystematic texts published almost exclusively in non-IR outlets.

Second, while queer international theories contribute to scholarly discussions about war, security and terrorism (Weber, 2002; Owens, 2010), states and nationalism (Weber, 1998b; Peterson, 1999, 2013), sovereignty, intervention, hegemony (Weber, 1994a, 1994b, 1999; Pratt, 2007), empire (Agathangelou, 2013) and other international forms of violence, they do not restrict themselves to focusing on “high politics” or “the states-system, the diplomatic community itself“ (Wight, 1966:22). Instead, they often twin the *content* of Queer Political Theory by using an array of interdisciplinary high and low theories, epistemologies, and methods (see Sedgwick, 1991) that defy Wight’s tidy boundaries between Politics and International Politics, between Political Theory and International Theory, and between successful and unsuccessful knowledge accumulation to describe Queer International Politics “as they really are.”
This is widely seen as acceptable practice in queer political theorizing in general because queer political practices are themselves so mixed that they can only accurately be described with a mix of theories, epistemologies, methodologies and foci. But it is infrequently viewed as acceptable practice in Disciplinary IR theorizing. This is because Disciplinary IR rarely recognizes boundary-breaking theoretical, epistemological, and methodological approaches to international theorizing as being productive of valuable knowledge about international politics (Weber, 2013). What this means in Wight’s terms, then, is that queer international theories stray too far from telling the one true story that all International Theory must tell – the story about the survival of states in the states-system. And they stray too far from deploying acceptable approaches in telling the stories they do tell about international politics – approaches that use positivist methods to accumulate knowledge.

Finally, because much of the “low,” boundary-breaking content of queer international political processes is classified out of existence by Wight, Wight’s homology places queer international theories at a fork in the road where both paths lead to failure. If queer international theories explore a mix of high and low, domestic and international queer international political processes using appropriate epistemologies and methodologies, they are faulted by Wight’s homology for twinning the content but not the function of its twin Queer Political Theory. Yet if they neglect to explore this mix of queer international political processes, they are faulted for not reflecting international political processes “as they really are.”

What this means is that while it might be possible to claim that Queer Politics equals Queer Political Theory, Wight’s homology offers no successful route to a

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7 The exception is when low/popular/cultural insights are formulated as “soft power” in the service of state power by mobilizing epistemologies and methodologies that do not threaten positivist knowledge accumulation. See Nye, 2004.
claim that Queer International Politics equals Queer International Theory. This is how queer international theories are homologized as failures.

Because queer international theories are (un)consciously homologized as failing the discipline of IR, Queer International Theory is, following Wight’s contestable logic, deemed to be non-existent. And Disciplinary IR’s next logical step is to again follow in Wight’s footsteps, by substituting a “successful” type of International Theory in its place. Wight’s homologization of theory, then, first authorizes the figuring of various types of theory as failures and then authorizes their substitution with successful theory. Explaining how these processes work in relation to queer international theories is the task of the next two sections.

**Figuring Failure**

“Failure is the map of political paths not taken, though it does not chart a completely separate land; failure’s by-ways are all the spaces in between the superhighways of capital.”

-Judith Jack Halberstam (2011:19)

My argument so far has focused on how Martin Wight’s famous essay renders international theories – and particularly queer international theories – non-existent by homologizing them as failures. In this section, I will extend this discussion to the figuration of failure by pursuing two aims. The first is to examine how Wight’s homologization of international theories (including queer international theories) illustrates and authorizes the figuration of failure. I do this by applying a simplified
version of Donna Haraway’s theorization of figuration to Wight’s homology. The second is to analyze how Wight’s homology thwarts attempts to celebrate queer international theories as what Judith Jack Halberstam calls “successful failure”, a concept that has recently gained traction amongst some queer IR scholars. To do this, I read Wight’s figuration of theoretical failure in tandem with Halberstam’s work on queer (as) failure.

Haraway describes figuration as the act of employing semiotic tropes that combine knowledges, practices, and power to shape how we map our worlds and understand actual things in those worlds (1997). Haraway argues that figurations take specific form through their reliance on tropes, temporalities, performances, and worldings (1997:11).

Tropes are material and semiotic references to actual things that express how we understand actual things. Tropes are not “literal or self-identical” to the things they describe (Haraway, 1997:11). Rather, tropes are figures of speech. Haraway argues that “[a]ll language, including mathematics, is figurative, that is, made of tropes, constituted by bumps that make us swerve from literal-mindedness” (Haraway, 1997:11). This is because all language – textual, visual, artistic – involves “at least some kind of displacement that can trouble identifications and certainties” (Haraway, 1997:11) between a figure and an actual thing.

Wight’s homology is a figuration that deploys a mathematical trope. Describing his homology as an equation (1960:22 and 1966:32), Wight invites a mathematical engagement with his homology, one that makes us “swerve from literal-mindedness” (Haraway, 1997:11), away from the fact that (in this case) queer international theories exist to make us consider their non-existence. It does this by

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8 Haraway employs figuration to capture ideas about embodiment and materiality, which is not how Wight uses it. Yet applying her categorization of the key elements of figuration to Wight’s homologization illuminates how Wight figures failure.
figuring relationships among actual bodies of theory and how we ought to understand them. Wight’s homology is also figurative because it is temporal, performative, and worlding.

Haraway notes that figurations are historically rooted in “the semiotics of Western Christian realism”, which is embedded with a progressive, eschatological temporality. Western Christian figures embody this progressive temporality because they hold the promise of salvation in the afterlife (Haraway, 1997:9). This medieval notion of developmental temporality remains a vital aspect of contemporary figurations, even when figures take secular forms (e.g., when science promises to deliver us from evil with a new technological innovation; see Haraway, 1997:10).

Developmental progress as the route to secular salvation is equally present in Wight’s homology. With the achievements of Queer Political Theory as its developmental goal, would-be Queer International Theory is advised by Wight to journey down the same path as its righteous twin by replicating Queer Political Theory’s project of accumulating knowledge to accurately reflect the realm of politics it should describe. For Queer International Theory, this means making it its “business to study the states-system, the diplomatic community itself” (Wight, 1966:22).

Queer International Theory only comes into existence by performing the same function as Queer Political Theory. This illustrates the performative aspect of figuration. Performativity expresses how repeated iterations of acts constitute the subjects who are said to be performing them (Butler, 1999:xv). Haraway argues that “[f]igurations are performative images that can be inhabited” (Haraway, 1997:11). Applying this to Wight’s homology, Queer Political Theory is the performative image – the body of knowledge that is the effect of ritualistically repeated practices of specific forms of knowledge collection - that Queer International Theory must inhabit through its disciplinary performances in order to exist.

What we have with Wight’s homology, then, is a figuration taking the form of
a mathematical equation that posits the pathway to success charted by Queer Political Theory as the developmental and performative goal of Queer International Theory. Wight’s homology shows queer international theories/theorists the one true path to theoretical success, and, in so doing, it delivers them from failure. As the logical formula for disciplinary success, Wight’s homology maps the superhighway to the accumulation of intellectual capital and the disciplinary power that comes with it that queer international theories so far lack.

By charting this and only this course to theoretical and disciplinary success, Wight’s homology provides queer IR theorists with the final aspect that Haraway argues all figurations possess, worlding. Like figurations in general, Wight’s homology “map[s] universes of knowledge, practice, and power” (Haraway, 1997:11). Successful practice is “studying the states-system, the diplomatic community itself” (Wight, 1966:22). Successful knowledge is the developmental, cumulative, and representational result of this practice. And power is the disciplinary capital one acquires by being practically and knowledgably successful.

Wight’s figurations of theoretical success and failure are remarkably similar to Halberstam’s figurations of success and failure in queer theory. But these figurations are valued and mobilized in significantly different ways. While Wight’s aim is to identify failure so international theories (like queer international theories) can overcome it, Halberstam’s aim is to identify failure so queer theories and queer people can revel in it as a way of undoing disciplines and disciplinization. This is strategically possible because Halberstam understands queer failure (a term he borrows from Jose Munoz, 2010 and refines through the work of Lee Edleman, 2005) – as a productive negativity that can be deployed to “dismantle the logics of success and failure with which we currently live” (2011:2).

To make this case, Halberstam begins much like Wight does – by defining

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9 Halberstam prefers to be referred to by masculine pronouns.
success and figuring failure in its wake. Couching his discussion of success and failure in the context of “a heternormative, capitalist society,” Halberstam argues that such societies equate success with “specific forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth accumulation” (Halberstam, 2011:2). Halberstam’s aim is to deploy queer failure to interrupt and disrupt hetero-maturity and wealth accumulation (2011:92). To do this, Halberstam makes two important moves.

First, he claims failure as something intrinsic to queers. Halberstam writes of failure as “something queers do and have always done exceptionally well” (2011:3). Not only do queers fail, they fail with flair. “[F]or queers, failure can be a style, to cite Quentin Crisp, or a way of life, to cite Foucault” (2011:3). Given this, Halberstam suggests that queers are the prototypes of failure (2011:3).

Second, Halberstam specifically figures queer failure by using all the elements Haraway associates with figuration. Queer failure is worlding because if success is the heterosexual matrix that establishes “the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods” (2011:3), then queer failure (like failure itself) is “the map of political paths not taken” (2011:19). Still on the map but perversely off course, Halberstam claims queer failure challenges heterosexual orthodoxies and how they model queer lives and queer futures.

Queer failure is temporal because it rejects developmental temporalities (to normatively grow up, reproduce, and accumulate capital) that lead to theoretical and personal maturity in the terms successful theorizing and living demand (2011:3). As such, queer failure repudiates the salvation narrative found in classical Christian and

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10 In The Queer Art of Failure, Halberstam gestures at what the terms “queer” and “queers” mean but does not offer definitive definitions. “Queers” appear to be those who fail by not achieving “specific [heternormative] forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth accumulation” (Halberstam, 2011:92), while “queer” seems to denote the positive embracing of this form of heteronormative failure. There are innumerable other ways to define queer and queers. See e.g. Jagose (1997) or Halperin (2003).
contemporary secular figurations. The temporality of queer failure is instead a counter-temporality – a refusal to mature in heteronormative terms – that is situated more broadly in Halberstam’s Gramscian-inspired counter-hegemonic queer politics.

Queer failure’s reliance upon tropes is evidenced by its figurative rather than literal strategies to interrupt and disrupt success. For example, queer failure might strategically inhabit stupidity – not literally by lacking knowledge but figuratively by miming “unteachablity” in the modes of conduct prescribed by the dominant heterosexist matrix. By displacing ‘real stupidity’ for “figural stupidity”, queer failure exposes “the limits of certain forms of knowing and certain ways of inhabiting structures of knowing” (Halberstam, 2011:11-12; Ranciere, 1991). In this way, queer failure becomes a refusal to be read, which becomes a refusal to be normatively streamed down the pathways of success.

Finally, queer failure is performative because – as the ritualistic repetition of undiscipinable performances by queer bodies that are incongruous with the dominant heterosexist matrix – queer failure interrupts and disrupts success and produces alternative images of (un)being and (un)knowing that failing queer bodies might inhabit (Halberstam, 2011:23).

Not all failure is queer failure. For example, Halberstam argues that the film *Trainspotting* illustrates “unqueer failure”. For even though the characters in this film reject productive love and wealth accumulation, their drug-fueled lifestyle becomes “the rage of the excluded white male, a rage that promises and delivers punishments for women and people of color” (2011:92). In contrast, Halberstam argues that queer failure is a negativity that interrupts and disrupts heteromaturity and wealth accumulation – and is “productively linked to racial awareness, anticolonial struggle, gender variance, and different formulations of the temporality of success” (2011:92).

Collectively, these points allow Halberstam to tell the story of failure differently, as “a tale of anticapitalist, queer struggle” set within a narrative about
“anticolonial struggle, the refusal of legibility, and an art of unbecoming” (2011:88). In that story, queer failure is “a way of refusing to acquiesce to dominant logics of power and discipline and [is] a form of critique” (2011:88; my brackets).

Were Halberstam’s figuration of queer failure to live up to its promise and were it to be embraced by international theorists and applied to international theories, it might well achieve for international theories what Halberstam argues it achieves for queer theory. It might elevate the detours of international theories off the disciplinary pathways of success into valued philosophical insights. This could bring Queer International Theory “into existence”. For if, as Halberstam suggests, “queer is the art of elevating perversion to philosophy” (Halberstam, quoted in Ristic, 2013), then Queer International Theory might be accepted as an (artful) instance of elevating “queer perversions” of IR’s disciplinary pathways to knowledges, practices, and power into valuable queer philosophical insights about Queer International Politics.

This might be an attractive option for IR scholars doing queer international theorizing. Yet it would require several leaps of faith on their part to move from Halberstam’s celebration of queer failure to a Queer International Theory that is not so hampered by disciplinary knowledges, practices and power that they would be left with anything to celebrate. This is not only because many of the positions Halberstam attributes to queer failure are worthy political aims he attaches to queer failure rather than generates from it (e.g., that queer failure is necessarily anticolonial, illegible, counter hetero-/homo-normative and counter-hegemonic), making his claims more idealistic than realistic. It is also because, as Halberstam figures it, queer failure does not ultimately “dismantle the logics of success and failure with which we currently live” (Halberstam, 2011:1). Rather, Halberstam performs a radical reversal – not a dismantling - of success and failure with his notion of queer failure, marking success as something that fails queer bodies and failure as something that successfully liberates queer bodies from the burdens of conventionally-understood success and
failure (2011:3-4).

From the standpoint of a Disciplinary IR (un)consciously governed by Wight’s homologizing technology of the conduct of international theorizing, nothing could be more alarming. For the point of Wight’s homologization and its figuration of failure is to move IR scholars from the “perversion” of misapplying themselves to their studies of international politics to correcting how and what they study. This spirit is encapsulated in the title of Barry Buzan and Richard Little’s Wight-inspired essay, “Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do About it” (2001). If this analysis of Wight’s figuration of failure tells us anything, it is that charting the course toward international theories’ salvation was always Wight’s motivation for naming their sins.

Halberstam’s figuration of queer failure ultimately proves unhelpful for escaping Wight’s homologization not primarily because it departs from Wight by celebrating “the sin” of failure. Rather, Halberstam’s figuration of queer failure is at its weakest where it charts the very same course as does Wight’s homology. That course is to take the worlds and the mappings of success and failure (but not, in Halberstam’s case, their values) as given. In so doing, both Wight and Halberstam overlook how “figurations are condensed maps of contestable worlds” (Haraway, 1997:11, my emphasis). To call these contestable worlds into question requires not just revaluing their terms but challenging how they are mapped.

It comes as no surprise that Wight performs this neglect in how he maps success and failure. For he attempts to place any contestability of his worlding practices beyond discussion through his recourse to ‘mathematics’. Not only does Wight definitively figure international theories as failures by excluding them from his equation. Wight figures success as something that can only be achieved by following Wight’s dubious calculations.

What is more surprising is that Halberstam performs this same neglect, by
never contesting how “the dominant system” maps success and failure. For while he revalues failure as success and argues that “[f]ailure is the map of political paths not taken,” he still insists that failure “does not chart a completely separate land; failure’s by-ways are all the spaces in between the superhighways of [intellectual] capital” (2011:19; my brackets). In charting these specific pathways to queer failure, Halberstam accepts a worlding of success and failure that is strikingly similar to Wight’s. This allows Wight’s chartings of successful international theoretical practice (“studying the states-system, the diplomatic community itself”; Wight, 1966:22), knowledge (the developmental, cumulative, and representational result of this practice) and power (the disciplinary capital one acquires by being practically and knowledgably successful) to remain intact. What this means is that “the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development” (Halberstam, 2011:3) – while disavowed by Halberstam – continue to be applied to any theory that would dare to call itself International Theory.

Halberstam’s neglect to query success is, I suspect, a result of his overinvestment in failure. For Halberstam imbues failure with an authentically queer essence. Were he to remap success - tear up its maps, dig up its roads, focus on how success employs its power to zigzag around and pave over its own innumerable failures in its attempt to make us think it never swerves from literal-mindedness – he would also be required to remap failure, rethink queer, and rethink his investment in queer failure. This may well explain why Halberstam, like Wight, places the pathways (but not the value) of success beyond contestability.

Were IR scholars doing queer international theorizing to embrace Halberstam’s celebration of queer failure, they would suffer from these same shortcomings. As a result, they would not disrupt Disciplinary IR’s ideal of disciplinary success anymore than Halberstam does, even as they repudiated disciplinary success in favor of a Queer International Theory revalued as successful
failure. Should they embrace this move, it could have three unwanted consequences. First, it could further exclude Queer IR scholars from participating in refiguring what success and failure mean for/in Disciplinary IR and how they are applied to international theorizing. Second, it could forfeit any demand that Disciplinary IR evaluate queer international theories as successful in terms that Discipline IR already regards as constituting success – contributing to understandings about interstate relations. Finally, it could unwittingly confirm what Disciplinary IR already believes – that Queer International Theory is not a figuration it wishes to inhabit.

As a field shamed by its failure and determined to achieve success in conventional terms, celebrations of queer failure may not only convince Disciplinary IR that Queer International Theory does not exist. They may convince the discipline more generally that Queer International Theory must not exist. For this reason celebrations of queer failure may unintentionally participate in authorizing the final step in Disciplinary IR’s disavowal of queer international theories. That step is gentrification.

**Gentrifying Failure**

“There is a gentrification that happens to buildings and neighborhoods and there is a gentrification that happens to ideas”.

-- Artist Penny Arcade, 1996 (quoted in Schulman, 2012:29)

In this section, I argue that Wight’s homology authorizes the substitution of ideas produced by “failing” queer international theories with ideas produced by a
“successful” type of International Theory of Disciplinary IR’s choosing. To make this argument, I apply Sarah Schulman’s analysis of what she calls “the gentrification of the mind” (2012) to a discussion of what I call ‘the neighborhood of IR’.

Conceptualizing IR as a neighborhood is gestured toward but not elaborated on in Anna Agathangelou and LHM Ling’s “The House of IR”, in which they map relations among IR traditions as those of a multi-generational family lead by “Grand Pater Imperialism” and “Grand Mater Capitalism” and their spawn including Realism and Liberalism living upstairs, with support from “Native-Informant Servants” like Area Studies living downstairs. While Agathangelou and Ling’s characterization of IR as a house offers useful insights into how IR is organized, it does not capture the movement amongst traditions within the discipline. We get no sense of the comings and goings of “family members,” of who gets booted out of a bedroom to accommodate a new arrival, of whose intellectual capital is rising or falling, and of which tradition has accepted a makeover to avoid being shunned. If we were to remap IR as a neighborhood, the dynamic nature of the discipline would be more apparent. We could take account of who is sitting on prime real estate, how urban/disciplinary blight and renewal shake things up, and how (re)zoning organizes IR’s complex living arrangements. Diagramed in this way, one specific force organizing the houses of IR would become apparent – gentrification.

The term gentrification was coined by the British sociologist Ruth Glass to describe “the influx of middle-class people to cities and neighborhoods, displacing the lower-class worker residents” (Schulman, 2012:24). But as the artist Penny Arcade notes, gentrification does not just happen to buildings and neighborhoods. It also happens to ideas. Sarah Schulman traces how the physical gentrification of “failing” urban neighborhoods leads to the gentrification of ideas, what she calls “the gentrification of the mind” (Schulman, 2012). For by moving diverse people out of buildings, one is also moving diverse ideas out of neighborhoods.
Schulman describes gentrification as the replacement of mix with homogeneity while pretending difference and privilege do not exist (Schulman, 2012). Among the key elements Schulman identifies as part of the gentrification process are substitution, homogenization, and assimilation.

Substitution refers to the physical replacement of mix with sameness. Thanks to zoning laws that refigure where prime real estate is located, formerly poor, mixed, “failing” neighborhoods are “regenerated” by moving in wealthy, predominantly white residents. As wealthy residents move in, high-class businesses appear, real estate and rental prices soar, and poor residents are priced out of their own neighborhoods.

This has the effect not only of driving out people marked by difference. It also re-categorizes these “different” residents as dangers to newly gentrified communities. “The relaxed nature of neighborhood living becomes threatening, something to be eradicated and controlled” (2012:28). This is because gentrifiers “brought the values of the gated community and a willingness to trade freedom for security” with them (2012:30) and therefore “sought a comfort in overpowering the natives, rather than becoming them” (2012:30).

As former residents disappear, so too do their ideas and ways of living. The lived realities, tastes, points of view and stories of the rich and powerful replace those of former inhabitants. Traces remain, but in the form of what Schulman calls “the ‘fusion’ phenomena.” Fusion is expressed by the kind of food one sees in gentrified neighborhoods – food with “toned-down flavors, made with higher quality ingredients and at significantly higher prices, usually owned by whites, usually serving whites.” More troublingly, it is equally present in the toned-down, ever-blandier, simplistic, and superficial ideas that replace the complexity of ideas and relationships that marked pre-gentrified mixed neighborhoods (2012:31). This intellectual homogenization is part of what Schulman means when she refers to the gentrification of the mind.
Because they control the story that is told about themselves, gentrifiers believe “that corporate support for and inflation of their story is in fact a neutral and accurate picture of the world” (2012:28). In this way, gentrification erases not only difference but the economic, political, social, and cultural privilege that makes it possible for gentrifiers to erase difference because “gentrification is a process that hides the apparatus of domination from the dominant themselves” (2012:27).

Not only is gentrification naturalized as a pure good, with the costs to replaced populations erased. Gentrification encourages all those living in gentrified neighborhoods to internalize gentrified values and assimilate to gentrified modes of conduct. As Schulman explains it, “There is a weird passivity that accompanies gentrification” (2012:33). “It’s like a hypnotic identification with authority” (2012:34) which brings with it “an acceptance of banality, a concept of self based falsely in passivity, an inability to realize one’s self as a powerful instigator and agent of profound social change” (2012:13-14). This is the final component of what Schulman calls the gentrification of the mind.

Schulman made her argument to explain the 1990s gentrification of her East Village New York City neighborhood and how this gentrification was enabled in part by the loss of a generation of edgy artists and queer activists to AIDS. What Schulman observed in her neighborhood parallels the theoretical gentrification of the neighborhood of IR, where substitution, homogenization, and assimilation have replaced the “wrong” kinds of theoretical, epistemological, and methodological mix with Disciplinary homogeneity while pretending difference and privilege do not exist (Schulman, 2012).

The poorest neighborhoods of IR have always been those populated by new intellectual immigrants to IR. These include Marxists, poststructuralists, feminists, critical race scholars, postcolonial scholars, critical studies scholars and queer studies scholars. These scholars are poor because they wield the least disciplinary capital in
IR. This is because their analyses deviate from an exclusive focus on “the state-system, the diplomatic community itself” (Wight, 1966:22) and because they refuse Disciplinary IR’s epistemological and methodological claims about knowledge collection and accumulation. Rather, these residents debate everything from post-positivism to gender and sexuality hierarchies to the global dominance of neoliberalism and empire as well as how and why these ideas, epistemologies, methodologies and phenomena shape international politics.

There have been numerous turf wars amongst these scholars over the years, yet for the most part this mix of relative newcomers to the discipline have peacefully lived together in their broadly-defined “critical theory” enclave (Cox, 1981), a kind of East Village of multiple, interdisciplinary-mixed IRs whose residents have relatives in a vast range of other disciplinary neighborhoods. From time to time, Disciplinary IR scholars have visited this enclave to sample its ideas. This happens most frequently when Disciplinary IR is in crisis, as it was, for example, when it failed to predict the end of the Cold War. During that period in the late 1980s/early 1990s, this East Village of IRs became a go-to location for new insights into the workings of international politics. This put critical IR on Disciplinary IR’s map as an up-and-coming area, thus raising the disciplinary capital of critical IR scholars, however temporarily.

But visits by Disciplinary IR scholars to this area could be dangerous. The ideas and approaches of Disciplinary IR scholars were not accorded the same respect here as they were elsewhere in the discipline (e.g., Ashley, 1984; Weber, 2010). What some Disciplinary IR scholars saw as their generous engagements with and support for emerging critical IR traditions were met with what they experienced as aggressive assaults on their core ideas and on the character of Disciplinary IR itself. In contrast, critical IR scholars saw themselves battling to save their neighborhood from IR’s disciplinary takeover (see Keohane, 1989; and in reply Weber, 1994).
These “non-productive” engagements added to the growing sense that critical IR was failing Disciplinary IR (Holsti, 1985). For, at least from Disciplinary IR’s perspective, these exchanges introduced dangerous mix into disciplinary homogeneity (Keohane, 1998) and detracted from rather than enhanced IR’s core goal – to progressively accumulate knowledge about interstate wars.

Once critical IR was marked as a failure, it could legitimately be “regenerated” by “overpowering the natives, rather than becoming them” (Schulman, 2012:30). Employing the gentrification toolkit, Disciplinary IR first re-zoned critical IR’s enclave and then subjected it to substitutions. Recognizing that this peripheral area producing marginalized intellectual ideas could potentially re-center and revive a discipline in crisis, some Disciplinary IR scholars took up residence in this edgy neighborhood. As their numbers reached a (non)critical mass, institutional authorities took notice and amended publishing and hiring strategies that effectively re-zoned this outlying turf as central to disciplinary regeneration. But making critical IR’s areas of investigation central to Disciplinary IR’s regeneration came with costs. Those costs were incurred through the gentrification strategies of substitution, homogenization, and assimilation.

The hard, troubling, political edges of critical IR were substituted with the softer, more soothing critiques of Disciplinary IR that left most critical politics behind. A generalized international political economy replaced Marxism (Strange, 1988), “the gender variable” replaced feminism (Jones, 1996; in reply see Carver, Cochran, and Squires, 1998), constructivism replaced poststructuralism (Wendt, 1992), “the clash of civilizations” replaced critical race and postcolonial studies (Huntington, 1993), and “soft power” in the service of state power replaced cultural critique (Nye, 2004). This is not to say that critical IR traditions disappeared. Rather, they were pushed off what was becoming some of the discipline’s prime real estate and beyond the barricades of Disciplinary IR’s newly-erected gated communities.
(e.g., most of IR’s top 20 journals). This made critical IR’s status in the discipline all the more precarious, which enabled the homogenization of critical IR’s ideas through “the fusion effect.” This created toned-down gentrified versions of critical IR’s ideas that were compatible with both what Disciplinary IR most valued (being “a realist and a statist”, e.g. Wendt, 1992) and what Disciplinary IR viewed as being critical enough.

With homogenization came assimilation. From the perspective of “old school” critical IR scholars, gentrified “critical” IR scholars exhibited “a weird passivity” (Schulman, 2012:33) about the political stakes of critical IR aims and “a hypnotic identification with authority” (Schulman, 2012:34) as they themselves became the new authorities within Disciplinary IR (Wendt, 1992). There seemed to be little if any critical self-reflection on how disciplinary privilege and power enabled and sustained this reorganizing of IR’s living arrangements. And there seemed to be no awareness within Disciplinary IR that its attempts to insulate itself from internal critique limited its ability to generate expert knowledge about international politics broadly and narrowly defined. Or, to put it in Schulman’s terms, Disciplinary IR did not grasp the relationship between the gentrification of a neighborhood and “the gentrification of the mind” (Schulman, 2012).

In fairness to Disciplinary IR scholars who were practicing at this time, how could they have grasped this connection? How could they have avoided doing precisely what they did? For the gentrification of critical IR had it roots not just in the failure of IR to predict the end of the Cold War. It had its roots in Martin Wight’s famous homology. This may well have had two (un)conscious consequences.

First, it may have stirred up Disciplinary IR’s nagging doubts about the discipline of IR. It may have led Disciplinary IR scholars to ask if Wight was right, if IR is a failing disciple because it produces no successful International Theory. Even though Wight’s test of success is not predicting future events but rather accumulating
knowledge about states and the states system, Disciplinary (and especially Realist) IR scholars at the time lamented the fact that the knowledge they had been accumulating about international politics left them blindsided by the end of the Cold War. As a result, securing the viability of the discipline urgently rose to the top of many Disciplinary IR scholars’ agendas.

Second, while Wight’s iconic reading of International Theory as failure may have stung at this time, it also provided the solution Disciplinary IR scholars needed. If Wight could rescue the discipline of IR by substituting Historical Interpretation for failing international theories, then Disciplinary IR could substitute all manner of discipline-supporting gentrified theories for discipline-challenging critical theories of these multiple IRs. (Un)consciously taking Wight’s homology as their licensing proof, Disciplinary IR scholars not only erased much of the critical difference within IR; they seemed to do so without any consideration of how this might impoverish IR intellectually. This is because – as Wight’s homology taught them – securing disciplinary success overrides insuring intellectual freedom.

Following in Wight’s footsteps, Disciplinary IR continues to make these moves. It substitutes “successful” (often gentrified) International Theory wherever and whenever “failed” international theories threaten it with good, but unpalatable, ideas and challenges.

Which brings us back to queer international theories. Queer international theories are ripe for gentrification by Disciplinary IR for three reasons. First, queer international theories are producing intellectual insights that could prove valuable to the discipline. By analyzing how sexual- and gender-variant identities, hierarchies, institutions, and systems function internationally, it investigates war, security, terrorism, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, nationalism, empire, and foreign policy more generally and contributes to understandings of interstate wars and international politics understood more broadly.
Second, queer international theories occupy just enough real estate for the discipline to take an interest in their (re)-generation. Thanks to support from the ISA via the LGBTQA Caucus and the Feminist and Gender Section, queer international theories are slowly but steadily being institutionalized into the neighborhood of IR.

Third, by breaking most of the rules about what successful International Theory is supposed to be (singular, focused exclusively on interstate wars, respectful of political theory/international theory and domestic/international boundaries, eschewing “low theory,” driven to accumulate disciplinary knowledge without questioning disciplinary knowledge in epistemologically and methodologically “unproductive ways”), queer international theories are figured as failures in Wight’s terms. Taken together, this means that queer international theories might be just enough of a success in their own terms and just enough of a failure in Disciplinary IR’s terms for the discipline more broadly to at some point in the not-to-distant future come to regard queer international theories as (another) dangerous difference that must be re-zoned.

How might queer international theories be gentrified? Or, to ask this question in Wight’s terms: If queer international theories were to be homologized as Queer Politics:Queer International Politics = Queer Theory:X, what might “X” out queer international theories?

Queer international theories would likely be “X” out by some form of gentrified “Critical” International Theory. If Disciplinary IR associated queer international theories with poststructuralism, then they would likely be substituted with constructivism. If they were associated with feminism, then queer international theories might be placed in a “sexuality variable” that strips them of all political critique (Weber, 1998c). If they were associated with cultural studies, then they might be mobilized for their soft power in the service of state power. And so on. In whatever way they might be substituted, homogenized, and assimilated, queer
international theories in anything resembling their current form would be gentrified out of existence. This would allow Disciplinary IR scholars and gentrified “critical” IR scholars alike to authoritatively declare about gentrified “Queer” International Theory, “There is Queer International Theory. It does exist. But only on our terms, which are Wight’s terms.”

Conclusion

Queer Politics:Queer International Politics = Queer Theory:X

Queer Politics is to Queer International Politics as Queer Theory is to X. Following Wight’s homologization of international theories, this is what a Disciplinary IR consideration of queer international theories looks like. As I have argued, thinking about queer international theories in this way is fatal to any genuine reflection on queer international theories in three ways. It homologizes queer international theories in their present form out of existence. It legitimates the figuration of queer international theories as failures. And it allows for the substitution of queer international theories with a gentrified “X” of Disciplinary IR’s choosing.

This approach to queer international theories is a non-approach because it concludes in advance that Queer International Theory does not and must not exist, at least in its present form. This is because queer international theories exceed the limits Wight’s homology sets for Disciplinary IR ontologically, epistemologically, methodologically, and politically. As my analysis demonstrates, this non-approach to queer international theories is an entrenched, if unconscious, mode of managing the
conduct of *all* international theories by regulating how IR scholars are expected to think about and produce International Theory.

This analysis makes evident the detrimental effects of this regulation on queer international theorists and critical international theorists more broadly (e.g., Duggan, 1995). Even so, it can be difficult for queer and critical scholars to give up on their attachments to Disciplinary IR, if doing so means relinquishing their demands for either disciplinary capital or disciplinary change. Yet as the case of Queer International Theory implies, the best Disciplinary IR can offer queer and critical IR scholars is “cruel optimism” (Berlant, 2006). In the context of IR, cruel optimism expresses a relation of attachment to Disciplinary IR that promises only compromised conditions of possibility for queer and critical IR’s existence and practice.11

This suggests a fourth potential answer to the question, “Why does there appear to be no Queer International Theory?” Answer 4: “IR scholars doing queer international theorizing might have given up on submitting their work for Disciplinary IR’s approval either because they have internalized Disciplinary IR’s judgment of themselves and their work as failures or because Disciplinary IR (with few exceptions) publishes a form of Queer International Theory that evacuates their queer international theorizing out of existence.” For Queer IR and other critical IR scholars who can afford to pursue it, this strategy of non-engagement with IR makes perfect intellectual sense.12 But it in no way holds Disciplinary IR accountable for the disciplinary capital it passes off as intellectual capital or for how this writes over alternative intellectual dispositions and writes out of the discipline many of the scholars who practice them. Instead, because it leave IR’s disciplinary maps of

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11 I am paraphrasing Berlant: “‘Cruel optimism’ names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility” (Berlant, 2006:21).
12 Non-engagement with one’s discipline is often the luxury of the tenured, the promoted, and the disciplinarily and geographically re-locatable. For scholars not in these positions, non-engagement with queer international theory is often the easier strategy than non-engagement with Disciplinary IR.
success and failure intact, this strategy licenses the continued concentration of disciplinary capital as if it were intellectual capital in the elites and elite institutions of the discipline that toe the Disciplinary IR line.

Queer and critical non-engagement on the one hand or their gentrification on the other may bring comfort to Disciplinary IR, as its power is further centralized, its ontology, epistemology, methodology, and their politics are spared critical “attacks,” its “pluralist” practices are evidenced by gentrified Queer International Theory, and its disciplinary status is secured. Yet the discipline more broadly has much to lose by allowing Disciplinary IR to regulate queer and other critical international theories to the point of non-engagement. Regulation not only limits how international politics is enriched by critical inquiry (Butler, 2009). It cedes considerations of key international phenomena – narrowly and broadly defined – to other academic disciplines. This is precisely what has been happening over the past decade with investigations of queer international politics. Global Queer Studies generates the principal research on how sexual and gender variance bear on core IR concerns like war and peace, state and nation formation, and international political economy. This makes Global Queer Studies – not Queer IR – the intellectual leader in this field.\(^\text{13}\)

Not only should it embarrass Disciplinary IR and the discipline as a whole that the best [recognized] queer international theories (and many of the best critical international theories; e.g., Butler, 2009) are being produced by scholars who make no claim to be IR scholars or to be generating International Theory. It should alert the discipline to the fact that by disciplining intellectual critique out of existence, Disciplinary IR makes the discipline ill-equipped to deliver on its claim to uniquely

\(^\text{13}\) I am not suggesting that Queer Global Studies should replace Queer IR. As with disciplinary IR, I also have concerns about how GQS – an interdisciplinary approach which is generally regulated by humanities-oriented disciplinary codes – often “X’s” out Queer IR. Instead, I am arguing for some configuration of Queer IR that might challenge if not escape disciplinary homologization, figuration, and gentrification altogether.
produce comprehensive, expert knowledge about international politics. It is this that makes the discipline of IR look like a failure on its own terms.

By closing itself off from or by correcting out of existence “different” international relations theories that trouble its conceptualization of the discipline, Disciplinary IR paradoxically makes trouble for the discipline. Yet it repeats these mistakes over and over because it has internalized Wight’s characterization of the discipline’s problems and how to solve them. But as the case of Queer International Theory demonstrates, Wight’s homology does not lead to disciplinary success. It keeps IR scholars from participating fully in conversations about international politics, like those taking place in Global Queer Studies. And it conditions IR scholars to be so preoccupied with how they might fail in the discipline by taking part in these conversations that they paradoxically fail the discipline on its own terms by declining to take part in them.

All this suggests that Wight’s homology is as cruelly optimistic – as enabling as it is disabling (Berlant, 2006:21) – for Disciplinary IR scholars as it is for “different” international theorists. This is because Wight’s homology enables the discipline to exist only by disabling the discipline’s ability to succeed. As a result, IR’s disciplinary attachment to Wight’s homology compromises possibilities for doing international theory and thinking international politics not only on the terms the discipline rejects (Shapiro, 2013) but on the terms the discipline embraces.

It is time to heed the warnings signs of this case and reconsider what successful international theories must be and must do. To achieve this, the discipline of IR must let go of Wight’s homology as its guide to disciplinary success and failure.

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