Making Sociology Public:
A critical analysis of an old idea
and a recent debate

By
Lambros Fatsis

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signed …………………………………………………………………………

Lambros Fatsis
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This thesis is dedicated to Dora Kalomoiri who passed away before I could say “goodbye”
University of Sussex

Lambros Fatsis

DPhil Sociology

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ABSTRACT

The current thesis attempts to discuss, critique, and repair the idea of public sociology as a public discourse and a professional practice. Emerging in the writings of C W. Mills and Alvin Gouldner in the late 1950s and 1970s, “public sociology” was given its name in 1988 by Herbert J. Gans, before it was popularised by Michael Burawoy in 2004, reflecting a recurring desire to debate the discipline’s public relevance, responsibility and accountability to its publics: academic and extra-academic alike.

Resisting a trend in the relevant literature to treat the term as new, it is argued that the notion of making sociology “public” is as old as the discipline itself, suggesting that the recent public sociology debate does not describe a modern predicament, but an enduring characteristic of sociology’s epistemic identity.

A detailed critical review of recent controversies on public sociology is offered as a compass with which to navigate the terms and conditions of the term, as it has been espoused, critiqued and re-modelled to fit divergent aspirations about sociology’s identity, status and function in academia and the public sphere.

An invitation to understand the discipline beyond a language of crisis concludes the thesis, offering eleven counter-theses to M. Burawoy’s approach that seek to reconstruct sociology’s self-perception, while also suggesting ways of making it public in the context of intellectual life at the 21st century.
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List of abbreviations

AHS: Association of Humanist Sociology
AJS: American Journal of Sociology
ASA: American Sociological Association
ASR: American Sociological Review
BSA: British Sociological Association
BJS: British Journal of Sociology
FEC: Full Economic Cost
ISA: International Sociological Association
LSE: London School of Economics and Political Science
MOOCs: Massive Open Online Courses
RAE: Research Assessment Exercise
REF: Research Excellence Framework
SPPS: Strong Programme in Professional Sociology
STEM: Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics
TRAC: Transparent Approach to Costing
Introduction

Intellectual rationale

Public sociology was thrust into the limelight, and received a fortunate stroke of serendipity under Michael Burawoy’s patronage, when he re-introduced the term in his 2004 presidential address to the American Sociological Association’s annual meeting in San Francisco.

This momentous event rightly signified a landmark in sociology’s long history of articulate and sagacious contemplation of its public “self”, but also gave the mistaken impression that the term emerged uniquely and unprecedentedly from the proceedings of the 2004 ASA meeting alone.

The term’s life-story however, both historically and empirically, is to be found in the origins of the discipline of sociology itself, although its christening ceremony had to wait until 1988 when Herbert J. Gans introduced the term by name in his own ASA presidential address. Setting scholarly considerations aside, what this clash of public sociology’s “origin myth” reveals, is neither a terrible lack of historical perspective, nor the urgency to search for, or agree on the term’s biological parents, but the need to treat public sociology as a healthy, enduring concern in and of sociology as an academic discipline.

This realisation matters, not only because it challenges us to make sense of public sociology as an immanent feature of, rather than an imminent threat to the entire sociological edifice, but also because it invites us to give up stories of sociology that liken it to a receptacle of respectable fears about its internal, disciplinary order and its wider public currency. In so doing, we come to recognise both sociology and public sociology as subjects that do not require rescuing in the face of impending crises, but as self-reflexive, active makers of their own history and fate.

Attempting such a leap of faith from understanding sociology pathologically as a discipline of ‘crisis and critique’ (Cordero, 2014) to a wholesome appreciation of it as an unproblematically self-reflexive endeavour with no repressive tendencies or
complexes, is to make sense of sociology as a fluid, open-ended, and revisable academic subject rather than a cloistered, fixed scholarly scripture that leads its life securely behind clearly defined boundaries and protective walls.

This critical overture to this current thesis is necessary given that it guides the reader through some of the main issues and debates that have routinely exercised sociologists of sociology and public sociology alike, while at the same time revealing the complexity of decisions that scholars make when they come face to face with the idea and the practice of public sociology, inspiring as it does a kind of publicly relevant, responsible and accountable scholarship that wards off accusations of ivory-tower isolation.

Despite its charm and promises for a more engaged sociology, public sociology nonetheless runs the risk of falling prey to a paradox, this being no other than the collision of a set of self-cancelling propositions.

On the one hand, public sociology is offered as a remedy for the perceived ills of academic insularity and irrelevance, while on the other hand it depicts sociology as mired in epistemological stagnation, inertia and passivity, thereby setting public sociology’s active progressive propensity against sociology’s ostensible lethargy and unresponsiveness. In the light of such a seemingly absurd observation, it still remains uncertain whether public sociology is offered as a plausible solution to academic enclosure, more than it is sacrificed on the altar of its disciplinary commitments in the new knowledge economy, thus oscillating between institutional legitimation and public legibility.

This inherent and hitherto unresolved contradiction makes the sociology of public sociology a fascinating topic for research, which reveals my interest in doing so in this doctoral thesis. Without wishing to radically “undo” such paradoxes and contradictions, preferring instead to disentangle the many threads that hold our fragile discipline together, my intent is to celebrate sociology as a volatile and indeterminate term with an ambivalent history, disputed origins, contested meaning, insecure disposition, that is often blighted by its waning appeal and internal crises as well as by invasive external demands, dictated by the knowledge market. Contrary to custom however, all these unflattering attributes of sociology are not seen through the prism of a lachrymose analysis that “pathologises” and “medicalises” the discipline, but by understanding ambiguity as a positive force and with an emphasis on “public” rather
than on “sociology” in the same way that Simmel (1910: 390) stressed the need to achieve not the ‘perfect society’ but the ‘perfect society’.

Research aims and objectives
Apart from a personal interest in offering a detailed critical analysis of an inward-looking, but not necessarily self-referential debate that has convulsed the discipline of sociology, what motivated the writing of this thesis was:
A deeply felt need to uncover additional, and often over-looked, layers in both the interpretation of and the discussions on public sociology by providing a critical inquiry into the meaning of public sociology as a piece of theoretical, conceptual research,

A sense of scepticism towards the answers that have already been provided in the existing literature, and

A modest belief that the contribution made by this research can be thought of as a potential corrective to previous approaches, given its focus in providing a formative and reconstructive, rather than a normative and de-constructive analysis of a “live” debate within the field of sociology.

The aims and objectives of this thesis therefore fit into a three-fold structure combining (a) scholarly/scholastic/historical, (b) critical/analytical, and (c) restorative/reconstructive elements.

The scholarly, scholastic and historical objectives of the thesis are represented by an interest in establishing the, hitherto unexplored, historiographical origins of public sociology avant le mot and before Burawoy, as well as by an interest in presenting public sociology as an idea with no single author.

The critical and analytical component of the thesis resides in its insistence in identifying important gaps, oversights and omissions in Burawoy’s conception and use of the term “public sociology” in his writings, while the restorative and reconstructive spirit of this research is demonstrated in the Conclusion where eleven original theses towards re-imagining the limits and possibilities of public sociology are being put forward.
These eleven theses are introduced as probes for re-conceptualising some “keywords” and some central issues in the debate, arguing that without thinking about them afresh, we might risk reproducing already existing tropes of discussing the matter that are often predictable, stagnating and regressive rather than positive, constructive and forward-looking.

These being the three main aims and objectives of this current thesis, its originality and contribution is thought to lie in its commitment to:

Analyse the public sociology debate from the perspective of public sociology itself, rather than from a(ny) “fixed” ideological or theoretical position

Attempt to offer a new vocabulary and propose new thinking habits with which to make sense of and discuss the term “public sociology”

Provide reflections on (a) recent changes in Higher Education and the multiple role(s) of the University, (b) the proliferation of Mode 2 knowledge and the co-production of scientific knowledge, and (c) the formation of potential alliances with life sciences and new technological innovations as part of a ‘new sociological imagination’ (Fuller, 2006) for the 21st century.

Withdraw support for “crisis-talk” in sociology’s self-presentation

Introduce the idea that intellectual life may be served better by replacing the popular, if not cliché, notion of the “public intellectual” with Jane Jacobs’ (1961) idea of the ‘public character’, proposing a shift from intellectual deliberation and the assertiveness of speaking to public participation and the attentiveness of listening allows a less exclusive and more open-ended re-invigoration of public life, colourfully described by Jacobs (1961) as a ‘street ballet’.

Suggest that civic intervention via intellectual activity can be served equally well by toning down the moral righteousness of ideological certitude and encouraging more scepticism, ambiguity and doubt, thereby arguing that less “self” and more
negotiation, co-operation and sociability are important in making meaning matter in the public sphere.

Interpret intellectual life as embodied, felt and lived viscerally by proposing what will be termed “physiology of knowledge”, as a probe to come to our senses when thinking and acting as citizens in our polity, therefore lending support to the notion of audience democracy mediated by a “parliament of sense” where our ocular (Green, 2010) and aural faculties (Back, 2007) can play a central role.

**Organisation of chapters**

Following a brief, critical commentary on the definitional variations and the historical origins of public sociology, to be found in the last section of the Introduction, Part One offers both a defence and a critique of public sociology as re-introduced by Michael Burawoy in his 2004 ASA presidential address and subsequent writings.

Chapter One focuses on the contemporary origins of public sociology outlining and celebrating Burawoy’s overall contribution to the debate by looking at how he has adopted, adapted and popularised public sociology in his work, while Chapter Two argues against Burawoy’s approach through a short but detailed critique which spells out some preliminary concerns and identifies some pitfalls in Burawoy’s analysis, before specifically challenging each of his eleven theses “for” public sociology as offered in his original ASA speech.

Part Two consists of three chapters which survey the relevant literature, in order to evaluate the way in which Burawoy’s approach towards public sociology has been received and challenged by contemporary scholars, during a period when sociologists demonstrated a keen interest in either supporting, or critiquing the term in question. The chapters in this section function as a critical literature review of the contributions that have made the most impact on the public sociology debate.

Chapter Three looks at special journal editions that captured the mood of the public sociology debate in the immediate aftermath of Burawoy’s speech, while Chapter Four reviews edited collections on public sociology bringing together the contributions of
esteemed sociologists from around the world. Chapter Five discusses the contribution of three books with separate, yet related, ambitions for the practice of public sociology as a companion to social change and activism. Given their focus on public sociology as a practical endeavour rather than a merely theoretical debate, they are grouped together because of their commitment to “using” public sociology as a metaphor for radicalising thought, research and action in sociology at broad.

Part Three is composed of Chapter Six and the thesis’ Conclusion, both of which aim at discussing public sociology in times of crisis. Chapter Six attempts an analysis and brief historiography of “crisis-talk” in sociology as a persistent trope in the discipline’s history and self-perception, and the thesis’ Conclusion adds its voice to the discussions on public sociology by outlining eleven original theses that aim at highlighting neglected aspects in the writings on public sociology, as well as offering a restorative vision for discussing and “doing” public sociology in the context of the 21st century.

**Historical origins and definitional variations of a troubled term**

In tracing the origins of the term “public sociology”, one is immediately confronted with a penumbra of problems; historical, epistemological, philosophical, ethical and political alike. Historical because there is no adequate historiography of the term, philosophical because it is an immensely difficult term to accurately pinpoint without the risk of sounding arbitrary or selective, ethical because the term’s parentage is uncertain, with Gans (1988), Seidman (1998), Agger (2000) and Burawoy (2004) all aspiring to the role of the putative father, and lastly, political because, as Becker (2003: 661) notes, ‘what things are called always reflects relations of power’\(^1\), with aspirations to legitimation, recognition, influence, and authority. This concatenation of dilemmas, leads to enormous challenges in trying to establish any authoritative definition of the term “public sociology”, or provide any accurate

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\(^1\) For an interesting discussion on the relationship between symbolic interactionism and “power”, see Dennis and Martin (2005).
depiction of where it resides, or how it manifests itself exactly in the relevant literature and public usage.

Instead of trying to resolve such uncertainty about the precise, or even “pure”, origins of the term however, the current thesis participates, situates and involves itself in such ambivalence about public sociology, by articulating a few more dilemmas, as they arise from critical reflections on current discussions of the term.

This approach towards a non-definition of the origins of public sociology was chosen not as a rhetorical sleight of hand, but rather as an attempt to hint at the importance of discussing, not so much the term’s heritage, but rather its potential uses. The remainder of this section then is not an attempt to describe “public sociology” as an ineluctable fact of historical sociology, but rather an understanding of it as an ongoing, and often confusing intellectual debate. Taking cues from R. Williams’ (1983) approach in *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, I have preferred to leave the interpretation of the term open to the reader by providing, not a dictionary definition of it, but rather a sociological inquiry into the meaning, significance and uses of public sociology as these may be encountered in the relevant literature.

To avoid accusations of fleeing from the responsibility of providing a sketch towards a map for reading public sociology in the discipline’s historical *longue durée* however, I shall endeavour to provide just that in turn, both by remaining faithful to my approach as well as attesting to the peculiarities of the term.

In the first instance of its use, in H. J. Gans’ 1988 presidential address to the American Sociological Association, public sociology was ambivalently referred to initially as ‘*lay sociology*’, later as an attribute of sociologists who engage in popularising the discipline for a broader public (*public sociologists*), and finally as ‘public sociology’ *per se* (Gans, 1989: 5, 7). What is remarkable and also quite puzzling about the birth of the term however, is that it came into being almost accidentally, given that in Gans’ speech and subsequent script as an article for the *American Sociological Review*, public sociology, unlike ‘*lay sociology*’ and ‘*public sociologists*’, is neither highlighted for emphasis, nor does it seem to feature as anything special, other than as a simple word used in passing; it is actually only mentioned once.

This denotes, not so much a lack of interest or care about the meaning, purpose and uses of the term, but rather a certain indifference about what this apparently novel
type of sociological endeavour may be called, hinting perhaps at the complexity of how to make sense of public sociology and whether it actually requires patronage, legitimation and/or institutionalisation by name when it can survive as a practice. Seidman’s (1998) use of the term is equally unepisodic although he does infuse it with a normative purpose, as does Agger (2000) who has grand aspirations for it as a successor script in sociology, pregnant with the possibility of re-orienting the discipline’s emphasis from ‘social facts’ to ‘literary acts’, thereby echoing Mills’ (1959: 8) hope and promise for sociology to translate ‘personal troubles’ into ‘public issues’. Michael Burawoy (2004) on the other hand, inherited both the term itself as well as its idealism from Agger, and partly from Seidman, and presented it as a neologism armed with a revolutionary aim to reconfigure the entire discipline, without acknowledging past uses of the term however either by Gans, Seidman or Agger, as academic etiquette and camaraderie would otherwise dictate.

The reality of public sociology as an existing professional practice without a name however, is hardly new and is encapsulated in what Seidman (1998: 171-214) calls ‘the moral canon of sociology’: justified both by virtue of the ontological orientation and epistemological ethos that Seidman’s phrase exudes, as well as by the indicative practice of such public sociology in the American context from the late 1950s to the 1970s as exemplified by the critical scholarship of C.W Mills, Alvin Gouldner and Daniel Bell.

To make matters worse, what may be described as public sociology is, of course, a contested and contestable matter, making the search for a blueprint of it increasingly difficult and problematic, if not futile, given that what public sociology may be, largely depends on competing definitions, conflicting loyalties and profound differences in how sociology and the public realm are made sense of.

This troubled, convoluted and hardly unitary or unified history of public sociology, from accident to annexation via scholarly discord, reveals a number of intellectual puzzles, not so much about the term’s own identity, but about the ways in which we

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2 This existence of public sociology despite its namelessness is best described by Patricia Hill Collins, in Clawson (2007: 101), where she admits to have been ‘doing a sociology that had no name’ prior to Burawoy’s popularisation of the term.

3 For a similar discussion on the innumerably many acceptable definitions that ideas and words may admit, written from the perspective of cognitive science, see Hofstadter (1997).
can identify the term sociologically by exploring what meaning, purpose and uses it can have in the current practice of both sociology and public life.

In the current thesis’ effort to offer a sociological inquiry into the possible meanings, uses and purposes of public sociology, both as a discourse and as a professional practice, a series of two broad cautionary remarks and five related questions are made in order to confront the term critically. Voicing these necessary doubts and reservations reveals a preference to err on the side of caution rather than to automatically accept and enshrine public sociology as an undisputable principle of and for sociological praxis, as Burawoy (2004) seems to suggest.

The first of these preliminary remarks relates to the very contestable nature of the term “public sociology”, appearing almost as an “empty” or a “floating” signifier since there is no agreed-upon meaning for it. Defining what public sociology is, can be, may be or must be, to follow Burawoy’s normative proposition, leads us headlong into hair-splitting disputes about the term’s meaning, orientation, and use, therefore inviting us to converse with what Derrida (in Cornell et al., 1992: 24-26) calls the ‘ghost of the undecidable’; inviting us to trouble the term by means of critiquing it, but also showing that it is a troubled term in its own right, much like the very idea of society itself.

To what extent can we unproblematically describe “society” as a body of interpersonal, collective institutions and relationships, more than we can understand it as the condition(s) in which these institutions and relationships are formed? To arrive at any definition all too easily, even at a provisional level, would be to do injustice both to our thought-process as well as to what we are struggling to describe and render intelligible, which brings us to a similar philosophical conundrum in any effort to fix the meaning of “public sociology” to an agreed-upon semantic field.

Secondly, attempting to define what public sociology is or what it may mean, involves making sense of the term relationally, that is in terms of how it relates to a series of other concepts it shores up and finally incorporates into its own meaning. In that sense, the meaning, the significance and the purpose of public sociology remains hostage to how we make sense of its constituent parts, therefore requiring an

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4 For a well-argued analysis of empty signifiers, see Laclau (1996: 36).
acknowledgement of what we understand the idea of “the public” to mean, both in its own right as well as in its attachment to “sociology”.

Such an acknowledgement raises a host of other questions explored below, primarily with reference to this uneasy fit between the words “public” and “sociology”, if they are sieved through in the critical manner suggested above.

I. The first of this set of questions seeks to problematize what is “public” about public sociology as well as wondering who may be responsible for deciding. Do we understand the idea of publicity in terms of its popular appeal or in terms of its relevance? Equally, does the sociologist decide what the appeal and the relevance of sociological work is, or is that the responsibility of “the public” itself? And, in doing so, what criteria determine the appeal or relevance of sociological endeavours, how are they selected and applied, with which and what public(s) in mind? By-passing the obvious problem that “the public” is also an empty signifier, it is also plausible to ask whether public sociology aspires to be a sociology of the public or for the public.

II. Taking up this last point leads us to the second set of questions about whether sociology needs to be public in order to study public social life. Recalling Bauman’s (1990: 11-15) understanding of sociology as the study of what is common-sense without being common-sense itself, might this also not be the case with sociology’s relationship with the publics it tries to give an account of? What makes Burawoy’s unashamedly normative blueprint for a public sociology more public or publicly relevant than Durkheim’s unashamedly positivist study of suicide? Do we therefore decide the public character of sociological contributions in terms of their attitude and intent or in terms or their impact and content?

III. Thinking of public sociology’s belonging as torn between the scholarly and the public realms, begs a third set of questions, starting with an aporia on whether public sociology is a distinctive feature of public social life or the name we give to a scholarly pursuit. If it is the former, does it make any sense to treat it as an academic endeavour? And if it is the latter, what critical contributions does such scholarship make to public social life? Would such an effort to publicise sociology or to sociologise public life not amount to a scholarly take-over of the public sphere? To make matters worse, if public sociology is already a characteristic of public life, or an idea which
belongs to the commons, can we not accuse the term public sociology, for trying to usurp and effectively copyright an essential ingredient of an open-source culture?

IV. Last but not least, does the naming of public sociology not devalue its public currency by virtue of authoritatively imposing an arbitrary, if not artificial, identity to itself and to the public world it seeks to describe? In doing so, does it not conspire to determine public sociology’s identity at birth rather than allow it to construct its own definitions of itself at a later stage in its life?

This introductory section has so far explored the multiple origins, the diverse meanings and the ‘impossibility’\(^5\) of defining public sociology in any satisfactory or uniform manner. To avoid wandering imprecisely around what the term, “public sociology” means or shrink the term in order to designate a clearly defined practice that it is not, I have chosen to embrace it in its complexity and contradictions, rather than pretend that it is an untroubled and unproblematic term with a smooth or linear history and development. The following chapter however, offers a less sceptical and infinitely more engaged view of the term and its potential uses in and out of the academy, by outlining, in relative detail, Burawoy’s vision and aspirations for his own version of and unique spin on the idea and practice of public sociology.

\(^5\) The term ‘impossibility’ is used here with reference to and in the context of Turner and Turner’s (1990) work.
Part One: A defence and a critique of public sociology
Chapter One: The contemporary origins, patronage and global spread of public sociology

Section I: For public sociology; Burawoy’s defense of public sociology

In 2004 the American Sociological Association’s erstwhile president, Michael Burawoy, endorsed “public sociology” as the theme of its prestigious annual meeting; a neologism that paved the way for a lively debate between sociologists over the discipline’s raison d’être. Although present, by allusion rather than by name, in the work of sociologists like C. Wright Mills, Alvin Gouldner, W.E.B. Du Bois and Jane Addams, the term “public sociology” was mobilised by Burawoy in his presidential address to describe and foster a sociological ethos of publicly relevant and engaging sociological practice; an initiative that according to Blau and Smith (2006: xvii) gave ‘a sense that the floodgates had at long last been opened and that they were liberated to profess a sociology that was relevant, critical and publicly responsible, if not in partnership with publics’.

The popular appeal of Burawoy’s speech, ‘For Public Sociology’, transcended the confines of the 2004 ASA meetings, resulting in publication at the American Sociological Review soon after the event, while the British Journal of Sociology republished the original paper, and dedicated its next volume to hosting replies to Michael Burawoy with contributions from a host of distinguished scholars, followed by Burawoy’s own response to his critics. ‘For Public Sociology’ soon appeared in

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6 For a more detailed intellectual biography of the term “public sociology”, as set out in the intro of this current chapter, see Smith (1994).

7 Many more could be added to this short, limited and perfunctory list but these are figures that stand out and stubbornly re-appear as exemplary public sociologists in Burawoy’s personal public sociological casting, primarily in his ASA address but also in subsequent writings. Other figures include, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Dewey, Du Bois, Lynd, Wilson, Bourdieu, Touraine, Habermas, Beauvoir, Freire, hooks and Fanon.


9 The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 56, No.2 (June 2005), pp.259-294

10 The British Journal of Sociology, 56(3), September 2005, pp. 335-432
multiple languages, sparking open and broad discussions between professional sociologists vis-à-vis their métier and a web-based database of books, papers, symposia and videos compiled by Burawoy at his Berkeley webpage. This animated discussion on the theme of public sociology constitutes the very core of the current thesis, and our personal foray into the matter starts with the way in which the term has been used by Michael Burawoy himself in the various platforms he has chosen to defend, popularise and even institutionalise public sociology as a viable and attractive endeavour for the discipline to take up in time to come.

**Eleven theses on public sociology**

Michael Burawoy’s name has become inextricably linked to the ‘public sociology wars’ since his 2004 presidential address at the ASA, and from a self-avowedly Marxist ethnographer whose research interests took him from South Chicago in the 1970s, to Hungary in the 1980s and then to Russia in the 1990s; earning him the colourful sobriquet ‘furnaceman’ due to his extended tenure as a participant observer in Hungary’s Lenin Steel Works, he turned the ethnographic eye inward on his own profession in order to see how knowledge can be turned outwards by doing public sociology, or as Jeff Bytes (2001: 2) and Burawoy (in Bytes 2001: 2) put it, ‘by shovelling grit into the works of so much armchair sociology and bring visions from the shopfloor to academia, to recover visions from below that might inform alternatives in

11 French, Spanish, Portuguese, Finnish, Farsi, Hungarian, Russian, Chinese, Italian, Arabic and Polish

12 In addition to Burawoy’s own web-based repository of public sociology, available at: [http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/PS.Webpage/ps.mainpage.htm](http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/PS.Webpage/ps.mainpage.htm), Albert Tzeng’s ‘working bibliography of public sociology’ is particularly useful to any researchers of the literature on public sociology. It can be accessed at: [http://sociologicalimagination.org/resources/public-sociology-bibliography](http://sociologicalimagination.org/resources/public-sociology-bibliography)

13 Burawoy (2009a)

14 Burawoy is particularly known for his commitment to ethnographic methods through his 1998 essay, now a book, on *The Extended Case Method*. His other major ethnographic works include: *Ethnography Unbound* (1992), and its follow-up *Global Ethnography* (2000).

15 Burawoy (1996)

16 For an amusing account of Burawoy’s nickname, see Bytes (2001).
the future’. Burawoy’s roving ethnographer’s view of sociology from the factory floor sought to leave its indelible mark on contemporary sociological discussion with his recent pilgrimage to public sociology overshadowing his previous ethnographic odyssey in post-Soviet steel mills, urging him to pronounce that ‘we have spent a century building professional knowledge, translating common sense into science, so that now, we are more than ready to embark on a systematic back-translation, taking knowledge back to those from whom it came, making public issues out of private troubles and thus regenerating sociology’s moral fiber’ (Burawoy 2005a: 5).

Sociology’s ‘moral fibre’ lies at the heart of Burawoy’s argument who extends Walter Benjamin’s (1968) messianic pronouncements about the ‘angel of history’s’ fight for progress, to sociology: ‘searching for order in the fragments of modernity’, seeking to salvage the promise of progress’ (Burawoy, 2005a: 2). Using Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Du Bois, and sociologist and community organiser Jane Addams as the illustrious *dramatis personae* of previous sociological work that espouses a morally informed sociological professional practice, Burawoy steers away from Benjamin’s ninth thesis on the philosophy of history and offers, through paraphrasing Marx and Engels’ (1938) *Eleven Theses on Feuerbach*, his own eleven theses on and for public sociology exclaiming ‘that if our predecessors set out to change the world we have too often ended up conserving it’ (Burawoy 2005a: 5).

**Thesis I**

The first of Burawoy’s theses revolves around what he calls ‘the scissors movement’ argument, according to which the world is moving *right* while sociology is moving *left*. In this first thesis, and borrowing from the scissors metaphor, Burawoy contends that it is this very leftward agenda of moral gravity that lured many of “us” into sociology.

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17 For an interesting theoretical salvage of such ‘fragments of modernity’ in the work of Benjamin, Simmel and Kracauer, see Frisby (1985).

18 Written by Marx in Brussels in the spring of 1845, under the title ‘1) *ad Feuerbach*’, the original text was first published in 1924, in German and in Russian translation, by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Marx-Engels Archives, Book I, Moscow. The English translation was first published in the Lawrence and Wishart edition of *The German Ideology* in 1938. The most widely known version of the “Theses” is that based on Engels’ edited version, published as an appendix to his *Ludwig Feuerbach* in 1888, where he gave it the title *Theses on Feuerbach*. 
which, in Burawoy’s thinking, also explains the popularity and appeal of the idea, discourse and practice of public sociology since its very inception.

To illustrate this clash in orientation between sociology and the world it studies, Burawoy compares and contrasts the ASA members’ reaction to the Vietnam War and the Iraq War respectively concluding that while in 1968 the two thirds of ASA members who voted on a member resolution against the Vietnam war opposed the ASA taking a position, in 2003 75% of those who voted were against the war and favoured an ASA resolution at the same time when the 75% of the general population supported the Iraq war (Burawoy 2005a: 6).

What these figures illustrate, in Burawoy’s logic, is the need for public sociologies that can address a wide variety of contexts, thus bringing an end to ‘the widening gap between the sociological ethos and the world we study; [which] inspires the demand and, simultaneously, creates the obstacles to public sociology’ (Burawoy, 2005a: 7).

Thesis II

This cri de coeur in favour of a multiplicity of public sociologies brings us to the second thesis promoted by Burawoy where he pleads for a public sociology that places itself and its practitioners in conversation with publics.

A distinction is being made between ‘traditional public sociology’ which addresses the publics, often from a pedestal, but does not actually engage them or involve the discipline in direct dialogue with them, and ‘organic public sociology’ to which we shall refer to in turn.

Borrowing from the Gramscian notion of the “organic intellectual” whose intervention is all-pervasive and ‘universal’20, Burawoy perceives organic public sociology as being in close connection with a visible, thick, active and local public, often a counter-public, as opposed to the more static interventions of traditional public sociology which, valuable though they are, hardly conceal their detachment from an engaged and on-going dialogic relationship with publics.

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19 Although the practice of public sociology is anything but new in the history of the discipline (despite not being specifically named “public sociology”), the term is treated as new; brought to widespread attention by Burawoy in his 2004 ASA presidential address.

20 We are inevitably reminded of Foucault’s (1984: 67-8) distinction between the ‘universal’ and the ‘specific’ intellectual in his major work, Truth and Power.
This is best illustrated by Burawoy’s reference to sociological classics that have been widely read by academic and extra-academic audiences alike, informing the collective socio-political conscience in the US, like W.E.B. Du Bois’ (1903) *The Souls of Black Folk*, Gunnar Myrdal’s (1944) *An American Dilemma*, David Riesman’s (1950) *The Lonely Crowd*, and Robert Bellah et al.’s (1985) *Habits of the Heart*. Burawoy cites these modern classics as examples of traditional (sedentary) public sociology which he compares and contrasts with the organic (active) public sociology of Berkeley graduate students Gretchen Pulser, Amy Schalet, and Ofer Sharone who wrote a courageous report in 2004 (appropriately entitled ‘Berkeley’s Betrayal’\(^\text{21}\)) studying ‘the plight of low-paid service workers on campus, bringing them out of the shadows and constituting them as a public to which the university should be accountable’ (Burawoy, 2005a: 8). By means of this comparison, Burawoy speaks for such an organic public sociology that not only disseminates sociological knowledge to a wide, non-academic audience but speaks directly to and for one or multiple publics.

This plight for commitment to publics is furthered with Burawoy resisting the temptation to lament on the ‘disappearance of publics’, as witnessed in the work of Wolfe (1989), Putnam (2001) and Skocpol (2003),\(^\text{22}\) and suggests instead that even if publics are indeed disappearing, sociologists need to either create them directly or constitute themselves as a *public*.

It is Burawoy’s conviction that the first public which we should be addressing is sociology students who can be turned into ambassadors of public sociology, not by means of despotic domination, coercion or control, but through discursive exchanges; thus making public sociology an integral part of the sociological discipline. The prospect of such an endeavour reminds Burawoy (2005a: 8) of Durkheim’s contention

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\(^{21}\) Pulser *et al.* (2006) It would be useful here to compare this initiative to the “People’s Park” protests of 1969, organised by Berkeley students who, in the words of Hannah Arendt (1970: 16), ‘struck successfully against campus authorities who were paying employees in the cafeteria and in buildings and grounds less that the legal minimum’.

\(^{22}\) Putnam (2001, 1994) in particular is famous for invoking the image of people ‘bowling alone’ in society, a characterisation that was taken a step further by Goldfarb (1991) who saw the emergence of a ‘cynical society’ whose denizens are ill-disposed to co-operate with public participation in mind.
that ‘professional associations should be an integral element of national political life and not just to defend their narrow professional interests’.

**Thesis III**

Burawoy’s insistence, via Durkheim, on the translatability of sociological labours by means of wedding ‘personal troubles’ to ‘public issues’, the ambition that made C. Wright Mills’ (1959: 8) *The Sociological Imagination* famous, continues in his third thesis where he attempts a division of sociological labour only to urge for a re-unification of each part to a much-desired and coherent whole, thus envisioning a sociology that is inherently public while at the same time assuming policy, professional and critical guises.

**The four types of sociology: Burawoy’s disciplinary matrix**

Invoking Mills’ (1959) *The Sociological Imagination* as an inspirational reference point, Burawoy stresses the importance of scholarly and moral endeavours as indistinguishable from each other and moves on to discuss his understanding of the discipline’s architecture as divided into four pillars or types of sociological practice; policy, public, professional and critical.

‘Policy sociology’ according to Burawoy (2005a: 9) is sociology in the service of a goal defined by a client and positions itself in defense of sociological research, human subjects, funding and congressional briefings. ‘Public sociology’ on the other hand, apart from being the ‘angel of history’ intent on turning ‘personal troubles’ into ‘public issues’, is the dialogic relation between sociology and public in which the agenda of each is brought to the table, and each adjusts to the other very much like Habermas’ (1984) ‘theory of communicative action’.

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23 This idea on the power of associations is reflected historically in the long-standing nineteenth-century movement of associationism. Richard Sennett (2012: 42-43) notes that ‘associationism did not at its beginnings belong to any political ideology’ but did contribute in forming ‘the origins of modern grass-roots organizing’ extending its reach from guilds and *confréries* to broader spaces and places for the organisation of political and social life such as the settlement houses: ‘a movement that gathered steam in the later decades of the nineteenth century, spreading in Europe from the East End of London to Moscow, where worker-houses were founded by Alexander Zelenco and reached across the Atlantic to shelters in New York and to the Hull House settlement founded by Jane Addams in Chicago’.
The concern here is with the discipline’s very own public image, presenting findings in an accessible manner, teaching basics of sociology and writing textbooks. The comparison and contrast with traditional and organic public sociology here appears to be rather timely as the modern sociological classics of Du Bois, Myrdal, Riesman, Bellah et al. are succeeded, in Burawoy’s argumentation, by Barbara Ehrenreich’s (2010) *Nickel and Dimed* and Diane Vaughan’s (1997) work on the Challenger and Columbia shuttle disasters, to mention but a few candidates in the emerging canon of organic public sociology, as shortlisted by Burawoy. Its public manifestations aside, sociology, in Burawoy’s mind, should remain professional above all, and a ‘professional sociology’ is a sociology which supplies true and tested methods, accumulated bodies of knowledge, with specifically oriented questions and conceptual frameworks. Research in professional sociology is conducted within research programs that define assumptions, theories, concepts, questions and puzzles and allows these to be openly contested by the fourth type of sociology offered by Burawoy, ‘critical sociology’.

Critical sociology examines the foundations, both the explicit and the implicit, both normative and descriptive, of the research programs of professional sociology and hosts critical debates of the discipline within and between research programs. Most importantly, critical sociology is credited by Burawoy for giving us the two fundamental ontological questions that place the four sociologies in relation to each other; ‘sociology for whom’ and ‘sociology for what’? Inspired by Alfred McClung Lee’s 1976 ASA presidential address, Burawoy revisits the ‘sociology for whom’ question wondering whether we are simply talking to ourselves (an academic audience) or we are also addressing others (an extra-academic audience), before returning to ask ‘sociology for what’ where the question mark this time examines the very substantive matter of sociology, that is the direction of the knowledge(s) produced within the discipline. To answer this question, Burawoy makes a distinction between ‘instrumental’ and ‘reflexive’ knowledge; the former referring to puzzle-solving professional sociology or the problem-solving of policy sociology, while the latter interrogates the value premises of our profession and society stressing the need for

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24 Lee, McClung (1976)

25 It should be noted that Burawoy’s ‘sociology for what’ question is an implicit reference to Lynd (1939)
dialogue between academics and various publics about the direction of research programs and society too (see diagram below\textsuperscript{26}).

**Diagram 1: Four types of sociological knowledge**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge for Whom?</th>
<th>Academic audience</th>
<th>Extra-academic audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge for What?</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(the trooper)</td>
<td>(the engineer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(the guardian)</td>
<td>(the moralist)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Thesis IV**

Burawoy’s division of sociological labour into four types (professional, policy, public, critical) powered by two driving questions (‘knowledge for whom’ and ‘knowledge for what’), continues in his fourth thesis which problematizes further the internal divisions of sociology.

Burawoy (2005a: 11-2) insists that the four types aided and abetted by the questions ‘knowledge for whom’ and ‘knowledge for what’ define ‘the fundamental character of our discipline. They not only divide sociology into four different types but allow us to understand how each type is internally constructed’, while at the same time recognising their antagonistic interdependence.

These four types of sociological knowledge present not only a functional differentiation of sociology spelling out who does what, but also four distinct perspectives on and of sociology, each trying to advance its own research initiative while recognising their cohabitation in the same grid. Each type on its own would have been useless, in Burawoy’s thinking, without its leaning to and borrowings from the others rivalling though they may appear.

\textsuperscript{26} This is a reproduction of Burawoy’s original diagram, while the characterisations ‘trooper’, ‘engineer’, ‘guardian’ and ‘moralist’ are mine. They are clarified further in the first paragraph of Thesis IV.
It could be useful here to allude to a metaphor to explain this antinomy of tension and synthesis within the discipline by imagining each type to be a soldier fighting a different battle for the same war, where professional sociology would provide the ammunition and would be the discipline’s *trooper*, policy sociology would assume the role of the *engineer* while critical and public sociologies would function as the *guardian* and the *moralist* respectively.

This internal epistemological divide in sociology is the very environment in which the sociologist is socialised, the contested space where she forms her *habitus* and defines her individual trajectories within, in between, around and against Burawoy’s figurative dissection of the sociological discipline into four types, bringing us to the fifth thesis of his ASA Presidential Address.

**Thesis V**

The inward eye of the ethnographer of sociology is mobilised here to locate the sociologist within Burawoy’s four sociologies grid, emphasizing the mismatch between the sociologist’s *habitus* and the structure of the disciplinary field as a whole. The antagonistic interdependence of the four sociologies is here extended to underline the fluidity in sociologists’ movement around these four types as informed by their individual trajectories, epistemological or otherwise, where one can inhabit multiple positions, often simultaneously, within Burawoy’s quadrant; starting from public only to move to critical sociology before committing to the professional canon and ending up defending policy sociology by means of disseminating academic knowledge, and suggesting schemes to implement change in various sectors of public and political life. Burawoy (2005a: 13) emphasizes this with reference to a number of sociologists from W.E.B. Du Bois and C. Wright Mills in the 20th century to James Coleman and Chris Jencks in the 21st century, to illustrate this inner-mobility *within* and *between* his devised quadrant where an unusual combination of public, critical, professional and policy moments in one’s sociological life-course can be noticed highlighting a tension between *institution* and *habitus*. 
Thesis VI

If Burawoy’s quadrant seems to illustrate a reciprocal interdependence of professional, policy, public and critical sociologies, in his sixth thesis he discusses the shared ethos underpinning our disciplinary environment while criticising and shedding positive, optimistic light on the normative lamenting stance of a “dying” sociology and the disappearance of public intellectuals by replacing it with a diametrically opposite stance which might spell good news for the sociological enterprise as a whole rather than just the sum total of its dispersed parts.

Much of public sociology, mostly what Burawoy calls traditional public sociology, has a pessimistic ring to it which undermines the importance of the two of its three other “colleagues”; namely professional and policy sociologies. Russell Jacoby (1987) mourned The Last Intellectuals, Orlando Patterson (2002) bade farewell to David Riesman as The Last Sociologist and Berger (2002) cried over Whatever Happened to Sociology, blaming sociology for seeking refuge to a cocoon of professionalization, surrendering to narrow specialisation and endorsing a certain methodological fetishism. This is what Burawoy (2005a: 15) calls the normative model, to which he responds with an argument for a public sociology that stresses mutual respect and synergy between what he sees, not as rival members but as Siamese twins in the same sociological family.

Burawoy’s (2005a: 15) own ‘normative vision’ of the discipline reinforces organic solidarity between the four types in which each sociological perspective derives energy, meaning and imagination from its connection to the others. Against a ‘pathological’ normative sociology, Burawoy (2005a: 16) extols the virtues of a scientific sociology promoting public engagement, noting the shift and transition within the sociological discipline where ‘what was professional sociology yesterday can be critical sociology today’ and where each of the four types has its own legitimation and accountability and thus each comes with its own pathology.

Professional sociology justifies itself on the basis of scientific norms and is subjected to peer review, policy sociology justifies itself on the basis of its effectiveness and reports to clients, public sociology advertises its relevance and is accountable to a designated public while critical sociology supplies moral visions and stands in front of a community
of critical intellectuals. Understanding this rudimentary sketch of sociology’s immune system à la Burawoy (2005a: 17) fosters a common ethos where ‘the flourishing of each sociology would enhance the flourishing of all’.

**Thesis VII**

The seventh thesis revisits this clash of ‘declinist’ warnings about the ill-health of the sociological discipline and Burawoy’s optimistic insistence that any intra-disciplinary division within sociology should be used to its advantage by promoting multiplicity of perspectives and incorporating them all into its disciplinary identity rather than enforce the gap they create because of differential interests.

Continuing from his sixth thesis, Burawoy (2005a: 18) defines sociology as a ‘field of power’, in a tone that is highly reminiscent of both Bourdieu’s notion of the field (*milieu*) and Foucault’s writings on power, describing it as ‘a more or less stable hierarchy of antagonistic knowledges’ which compete for advantage, and consequently power over one another.

To dramatise these intra-sociological animosities further, Burawoy refers to what he perceives as a pessimistic mood that ruled US sociology in the 1980s, problematizing if not demonising the politicisation of sociology which characterised the previous decade with its emphasis on providing critiques and analyses of systems of oppression along civil rights, race and gender lines.

The academic line-up of lament here includes Horowitz (1993) and Coleman (1991, 1992) who devoted their critiques to the dangers of the invasion of the academe by the dangers of politics and the social norm, while similar efforts of representing the sociological discipline from a bleak standpoint are attributed to Stephen Cole’s (2001) *What’s Wrong with Sociology* and Turner and Turner’s (1990) *The Impossible Science*.

While recognising some kernels of truth about sociology’s fragmentation and incoherence as signs of his ‘field of power’ argument, Burawoy (2005a: 19) argues that sociology has never been in a better shape ‘with the numbers of BAs in sociology increasing steadily since 1985, overtaking economics and history and nearly catching up with political science. The production of PhDs still lags behind these neighbouring disciplines but our numbers have been growing since 1989’. To this evidence Burawoy (2005a: 18) also adds increasing ASA membership figures which he sees as impressive
‘given a political climate hostile to sociology’, and levels yet another criticism to the
delinist writings about sociology, this time suggesting that it is the reflexive dimension in sociology that is in danger and not the instrumental. According to Burawoy (2005a: 18) ‘critical sociology’s supply of values and public sociology’s supply of influence do not match the power of careers and money’ of their instrumental siblings (professional and policy sociologies). Despite these asymmetries, antagonisms and contradictions between the reflexive and instrumental knowledges however, Burawoy (2005a: 19) still argues for acknowledging the gap that divides the two and encourages an understanding of their mutual interdependence, if not their inseparability, in the hope of developing ‘a variety of synergies and fruitful engagements’.

Thesis VIII

Having compared and contrasted the active intervention of sociology into the public and political realms as was manifested in civil rights movements in the 1970s with a period of scepticism and ominous predictions about sociology’s state of being in the 1980s, Burawoy extends his plaintive cry for unity within the sociological discipline in his four remaining theses which will be examined in turn.

Thesis Eight attempts a brief historical sketch of US professional sociology aimed at substantiating Burawoy’s characterisation of the discipline as a field of power where hierarchical tensions are at play, thus informing the very structure of the discipline by dividing it into warring camps where each idealises itself and pathologises the other. This might also be significant and useful in making sense of the professional sociological canon as a product of multiple transformations emerging through successive dialogues with public, policy and critical sociologies.

Burawoy’s periodization of US sociology is marked by three phases of development leading to a fourth which corresponds to the current state of affairs.

The first phase begins in the middle of 19th century where sociology is defined by a moral zeal and an ameliorative, philanthropic spirit which made it inherently public.

The second phase of sociology saw the shift of engagement from publics to foundations and governments beginning with the Rockefeller Foundation’s support for community research in the 1920s for the Universities of Chicago and South Carolina, sponsoring the Middletown studies carried out by the Institute for Social and Religious
Research, and promoting sociology actively until sociology attracted corporate financing of survey research epitomised by Lazarsfeld’s work at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University.

The third phase of US sociology is defined by critical engagement with professional sociology with scholars like Lynd, Mills and Gouldner calling for a liberal practicality and public relevance in sociology and providing initiatives and space for the development of feminist, Marxist and race theory perspectives within the existing sociological canon.

These being the three basic trends that Burawoy (2005a: 20) identified as the evolution of US sociology so far, he moved on to claim that are now witnessing the emergence of a fourth phase which is defined by the gap between the sociological ethos and the world propelling sociology into the public arena. Inspired by Kerry Strand et al’s (2003) report on community based research, Burawoy likens it to the public sociology initiative and welcomes Strand et al’s suggested set of principles, practices and examples of how to engage in such an endeavour, be it community-based research or public sociology (Burawoy considers these as synonyms), through the combination of research, teaching and service.

Thesis IX

Thesis nine retains its focus on US sociology, but this time not through a historical mapping of its various transformations, but by means of ‘provincialising’ it; showing its particularity on one hand, while discussing its universality, applicability and exportability in the international sociological context on the other. Burawoy’s ninth thesis thus adopts a self-critical look towards US sociology while at the same time hoping and wishing that the local sociological labours in the US will assist in catering for and strengthening the global sociological climate.

To account for this paradox of merging American sociology’s particularity with potential global influence, Burawoy (2005a: 20) states that public sociology can be thought of as an American invention, explaining that if ‘in other countries it is the essence of sociology, for us it is but a part of our discipline and a small one at that’.

With this in mind and aspiring to being an ethnographer of global sociology, Burawoy compares and contrasts the tone and character of other national sociologies, in search
of a way to connect them all together under the umbrella of a global public sociology. In the so-called “Global South”, sociology appears to assume an intensely public position and Burawoy (2005a: 20) mentions South Africa in particular as an indicative example of sociology’s involvement in the anti-apartheid struggles where sociologists were not simply theorising social movements but making social movements too.

In the Soviet Union, sociology was repressed under Stalin but resurfaced as a weapon of official and unofficial critique during perestroika, producing exemplary public sociology under the stalwart leadership of, M. Gorbachev’s one-time policy advisor, Tatyana Zaslavskaya\(^{27}\) who brought sociologists out to the force.

In Scandinavian countries, policy and public sociologies have been dominant, while in the rest of Europe the picture is slightly varied with France raising the bar of professional and public sociologies and providing us with public intellectuals who also were éminences grises in the professional realm with Raymond Aron, Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Touraine figuring as Burawoy’s prime examples.

In Britain, sociology has remained intensely professionalised, suffering a period of repression under Margaret Thatcher but was encouraged with the return of Labour government especially in the areas of policy research while also propelling Anthony Giddens as a public sociological voice into the House of Lords, and a figure that is routinely associated with the label of the public intellectual in Britain\(^{28}\).

Having taken a small detour to produce a small-scale portrait of sociology in the international arena, Burawoy (2005a: 21) returns to his aim to provincialise American sociology by means of globalising it, tirelessly restating that ‘in [such a] mapping [of] national sociologies one learns not only how particular is the sociology of the United States but also how powerful and influential it is’. Pointing at sociology’s strength in numbers and resources, Burawoy moves on to celebrate American sociology’s ‘world hegemonic’ status; a hegemony that is not oppressive, but rather suposedly welcome as it binds together different strands of national sociologies, making them mutually relevant in a global scale.

While an image of, or rather a hope for a globally unified yet locally relevant sociology predominates in his effort to provincialise US sociology by universalising it, Burawoy’s

\(^{27}\) For more insight into Zaslavskaya’s policy work for Gorbachev, see Lane (1996: 155).

\(^{28}\) For a somewhat different historical account of sociology in Britain, see Halsey (2004)
tenth thesis lends itself to a criticism of the multiple divisions of sociology per se and the general dispersal of perspectives in social and political sciences and argues for an interdisciplinary focus in current sociological practice.

Thesis X

Burawoy sees social sciences as distinguishing themselves from humanities and the natural sciences due to the social sciences’ unique combination of both instrumental and reflexive knowledge claims. Dividing the disciplines however, in Burawoy’s mind, amounts to little more than an anachronistic endeavour; an arbitrary product of 19th century European history which should be bypassed if not altogether ignored, replaced instead by working towards a unified social science.

This is a project that Burawoy welcomes on one hand but disagrees with on the other, as is noted in his scepticism towards Wallerstein et al’s (1996) Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of Social Sciences, appropriately entitled *Open the Social Sciences*.

Burawoy readily dismisses the report as a ‘positivist fantasy’ and charges it for not responding to the ‘knowledge for whom’ and ‘knowledge for what’ questions, deemed so necessary in Burawoy’s thinking when setting out to explain sociology’s orientation and knowledge claims (see Thesis IV).

Unifying the discipline, Burawoy stresses, is one thing but this unity may simply signify unity of the powerful in a world of domination rather than unity across the (power) spectrum.

Burawoy also appears quick to dismiss the charge of internal divisions in sociology as arbitrary, envisaging such changes as naturally involving an on-going process of changes in meaning and interests, and not simply as periods where one perspective dominates another. This much-critiqued disciplinary division, internally divided and externally confusing, is attributed instead to the multiple and overlapping research traditions in sociology which according to Burawoy is an advantage, as this constellation of outlooks makes sociology more *open* than its neighbouring disciplines and propels it advantageously in the public sphere influencing policy indirectly via public engagement. Instead of problematizing these disciplinary divides, Burawoy
treats them as empowering for sociology as it allows what he sees as a varying combination of instrumental and reflexive knowledges.

Thesis XI
This disciplinary dovetailing as imagined by Burawoy leads us to his last thesis which envisages the sociologist-as-partisan borrowing from Gouldner’s (1968) homonymous essay.

In his eleventh thesis, Burawoy (2005a: 24) depicts the sociologist as guardian of civil society assuming that the role of sociology is that of promoting civil society in and out of the academe by explicitly stating that ‘if the standpoint of economics is the market and its expansion and the standpoint of political science is the state and the guarantee of political stability then the standpoint of sociology is civil society and the defense of the social’.

Continuing from Thesis X where the social sciences are depicted as a melting pot of perspectives each defending different and opposed interests, Burawoy claims those interests to be the ground upon which the very knowledge claims of social sciences stand. Elaborating on the link between social sciences and civil society Burawoy (2005a: 24) argues that the interests on which sociology’s knowledge is grounded are to be found in civil society which he defines as the sum total of ‘congeries of associational life’. Civil society according to Burawoy (2005a: 24) is ‘a product of 19th century western capitalism that produced associations, movements and publics that were outside the state and economy- political parties, trade unions, communities of faith, print media and a variety of voluntary organisations’.29 It is those ‘congeries of associational life’ that sociology defends through its professional practice and its moral vision if we are to follow the ASA’s president reasoning and argumentation. By linking this brief definition and positioning of civil society in history and demonstrating its relation to the social sciences and sociology in particular, Burawoy comes to suggest, in very Gramscian tones, that when civil society disappears, sociology disappears too, as was witnessed in the repression of both civil society and sociology in the Soviet Union.

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29 In this passage Burawoy seems to be in agreement with and implicitly, if not intentionally, alludes to Wright’s (1995) Associations and Democracy, which forms Vol.1 of the ‘Real Utopias’ project, later to become his 2010 book, Envisioning Real Utopias.
under Stalin, Pinochet’s Chile and Hitler’s Germany unlike perestroika Russia and late apartheid South Africa where sociology flourished to a regenerative extent, at least in Burawoy’s reading of such disciplinary variations in history.

Reference to such historical examples where military coups d’état are contrasted with periods of civil renaissance, stamp Burawoy’s (2005a: 25) vision of civil society as ‘a terrain for the defense of humanity’ with sociology as its public speaker, agitator and actor. To substantiate sociology’s role as the ‘guardian angel’ of civil society Burawoy sets out to outline a few ways in which such an endeavour can be implemented beyond moral rhetoric and he suggests three possible thresholds with reference to the American Sociological Association of which he is president\(^\text{30}\).

The first of these ASA initiatives for the defense of civil society by means of sociology’s intervention has been the building of a taskforce\(^\text{31}\) for the institutionalisation of public sociology by means of recognising and validating existing public sociologies, endeavouring to make the invisible visible and the private public, inspired by C. Wright Mills’ idea of the sociological imagination which turns personal troubles into public issues. The second objective is to introduce incentives for public sociology and reward its pursuit, while the third aim is to develop criteria to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ public sociology as it is Burawoy’s (2004: 25) conviction that ‘public sociology cannot be second rate sociology’ although no specific criteria are offered for such a distinction.

This being his concluding thesis, Burawoy (2005a: 25) returns to Walter Benjamin’s (1968) image of the ‘angel of history’, which Burawoy likens to sociology’s moral vision, hoping that in the face of adversity sociology as ‘our angel of history will spread her wings and soar above the storm’.

Alongside this poetic imagery which endows the entire sociological enterprise with a moral scope and objective, Burawoy concludes his original speech with one last image, this time inspired by Henri Matisse’s ‘Dance’; a work of art that illustrates Burawoy’s

\(^{30}\) It should be noted that M. Burawoy’s suggestions towards initiatives to be taken up by the ASA bear a striking resemblance to Gans’ own in the latter’s 1988 ASA address.

\(^{31}\) This taskforce which was intended to invigorate public sociology built on its predecessor, namely the Task Force on Building Bridges to the Real World and was renamed Task Force on the Institutionalization of Public Sociology to focus more closely on the promotion of public sociology, following Burawoy’s address.
theory, where the five figures that are chain-dancing are taken to represent the four types of sociology offered by Burawoy with the addition of a fifth dancer, this being the public(s) which sociology or rather, public sociology addresses and is accountable to.
Section II: Introducing public sociology to the world

The emphasis of this chapter has so far been a close, in-depth, but by no means exhaustive, outline of Michael Burawoy’s 2004 ASA presidential address, and its subsequent reformulation into an immensely popular journal article in the Western hemisphere of sociology, and primarily in the Anglo-American scholarly world. Burawoy’s ethnographic excavation of the public sociological underground however, is by no means a singular event or a mere provocation that was to expire soon after the annual meetings of the ASA, but resembles instead an ongoing research interest which has led to a number of globally circulated journal articles and scholarly interventions by Burawoy himself on the public sociology debate as discussed in turn.

‘For Public Sociology’ may have begun its career as a presidential address at the American Sociological Association in 2004 but unlike other such keynote addresses, perhaps with the notable exception of other ASA addresses such as these by Ogburn (1929), Coser (1975), McLung Lee (1976), Gans (1988) and Feagin (2000), its momentum has been quite impressive in generating heated global debates around a, seemingly innocent, neologism in multiple fields, contexts and languages.

Burawoy’s input aside, which comprises of numerous interventions in conferences, symposia, journals, newspapers and lectures delivered around the globe, the “public sociology debate” has united and divided many sociological scholars to this day,

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32 The reader here is reminded of Burawoy’s equally noted faithfulness and insistence in defending the extended case method in his homonymous journal article published for Sociological Theory. Burawoy’s credentials of romantic idealism and belief in sociological endeavours he considers of vital importance are of course evident both in his campaigning for public sociology as well as in defence of ethnography. An excerpt from the latter demonstrates this rather vividly; ‘I have been writing this paper for twenty years. Earlier versions are barely recognisable due to dialogue, discussion in many venues’ writes Burawoy (1998: 4) whose words pay tribute to his active involvement in circulating and proposing public sociology as a powerful boost to existing social science in the same manner as he espoused the virtues of extended method six years earlier than his ASA address, advocating in both cases ‘a reflexive model of science that takes as its premise the intersubjectivity of scientist and subject of study. Reflexive science valorises intervention, process, structuration and theory reconstruction’.

33 Burawoy’s Berkley webpage, partly constructed as an online database for public sociology, features 20 such contributions, excluding translations of his original speech.
confirming and disputing Burawoy’s suggestions for epistemological reform in current sociological practice in and out of the academe, and continuing the internal critique within sociology, often declaring the “impossibility” of sociological knowledge as Turner and Turner (1990) would have it. The papers by Burawoy here discussed are selected with respect to the notable re-adjustment that they offer on his original “public sociology” idea. To facilitate discussion, Burawoy’s subsequent contributions are organised in two sections. The first looks at Burawoy’s hopes and aspirations for the popularisation of public sociology globally, while the second examines national variations of public sociologies, both guided by Burawoy’s own account of global trends and national differences in doing public sociology around the globe. Although Burawoy seems to don the mantle of a global ethnographer of public sociology, it must be noted at the outset that his reading of both global and national public sociologies is by no means encyclopaedic or exhaustive, but rather amounts to a personal and highly selective sketch of public sociological destinations, guided by his own research into different sociological traditions around the world prompted, almost exclusively, by invitations to lecture in the places whose sociologies he describes, more as a dizzied tourist in rather than an undisputable expert of “the field”, as the ethnographic bon mot has it.

Towards a global public sociology

Starting with Burawoy’s zeal to popularise and “globalise” public sociology, it must be noted that, although such a proposition is virtually omnipresent in his writing on and campaigning for public sociology, it appears in a more direct and specific way in the

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34 For a good discussion of this, see Holmwood (2007).

35 This becomes even more apparent in his attempt to institutionalise both ‘public sociology’ and ‘global (public) sociology’ by placing them side by side as complementary courses that are taught at Berkeley and transmitted worldwide under the auspices of the ISA, over which Burawoy current presides (2010-2014). More information on both courses can be found at the ISA website: http://www.isa-sociology.org/public-sociology-live/ http://www.isa-sociology.org/global-sociology-live/
See also: ‘Public Sociology on a Global Scale’: Keynote address delivered to the Hong Kong Sociological Association Annual Meeting and Conference, December 3rd 2005, ‘Public Sociologies in a Global Context’ Public Sociology Third Annual Workshop of the Polson Institute for Global Development Fall 2003 Cornell University, and ‘Challenges for a Global Sociology’, Contexts Fall 2009
publications selected and discussed below. With such an analytical attitude in mind, they are interpreted here as an attempt to rescue only some original insights that otherwise depart or creatively add to Burawoy’s familiar adage concerning the celebration and legitimation of his public sociology idea.

The first of these contributions towards a global public sociology à la Burawoy, comes from an international symposium on public sociology hosted by the *Current Sociology* journal, where Burawoy sought to critically revisit the theme of the XVI ISA World Congress of Sociology, namely ‘The Quality of Social Existence in a Globalising World’. Instead of tackling the issue as originally phrased however, Burawoy decided to offer his own ‘Theses on the Degradation of Social Existence in a Globalising World’, thus hinting at a certain pessimism on sociology’s current global role asking, by ventriloquizing Lenin, ‘What is to be Done?’.

Burawoy’s answer comes in eight theses that capitalise on the hope that sociology provides the ultimate solution to such alleged ‘degradation of social existence’ by acting as the privileged ‘legislator and interpreter’ of such a state of affairs.

Where Lenin spoke of ‘trade union consciousness’ requiring a disciplined ‘vanguard political party ‘to bring ‘revolutionary truth’ to the Russian proletariat, Burawoy (2008: 352) adapts this message to offer his very own sermon on public sociology where ‘common sense’, ‘political practice’ and ‘public discourse’ come to replace the communist leader’s original terms, thus describing the global public sociologist’s role in turning common sense into political practice, mediated by public discourse.

Having set the scene in such a way, Burawoy offers the first of his eight theses by replacing the term ‘globalising world’ with ‘third-wave marketisation’; inspired by and drawing on Karl Polanyi’s (1944) *The Great Transformation* which studied the origins, reproduction and consequences of market expansion from the late eighteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century.

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36 *Current Sociology* May 2008; 56 (3)

37 Burawoy here refers to Lenin’s famous 1902 revolutionary treatise, ‘What Is to Be Done?’.

38 See Bauman (1989)
According to Burawoy’s (2008: 356) Polanyi-inspired insight on the archaeology of market expansion, third wave marketization comes to refer to advanced capitalism and its privatisation of resources (commodification of nature), building on the first and second waves of marketization and their respective commodification of labour and money.

This being the first of the eight theses presented in this ISA address in order to appropriate the notion of a globalising world to his own interest in promoting public sociology, Burawoy moves on to his second thesis explaining what he sees as the special position of sociology in such a geopolitical climate. Third wave marketization, Burawoy (2008: 353) argues, is marked by the collusion of state and markets and is defended by economics and political science which have provided ideologies that justify it, while sociology’s interest is in promoting civil society. Advising against such legitimisation of dominant ideas by drawing on the examples of fascism and communism, Burawoy insists that sociology lives and dies with civil society instead, calling sociologists to become the guardians of humanity who will defend society against the tyranny of markets and the terrorism of states.

Burawoy’s (2008: 354) third thesis offers his four sociologies (professional, critical, policy, and public) as the four alternatives with which the sociologists can face the struggle of third world marketization in defence of their interest in society and civil society in particular.

The “traditional versus organic public sociologist” division comes to monopolise Burawoy’s (2008: 355) fourth thesis where he draws the distinction between the traditional public sociologist or Platonic ‘philosopher king’, who speaks from a pedestal dismissing publics as operating under false consciousness40, and the Gramscian organic public sociologist’s commitment to diagnose historical action, inform moral choices and advocate political projects by wedding the traditional public sociology of Lynd, Mills, Sorokin, Gouldner, Patricia Hill Collins and Dorothy Smith to the organic public sociologist’s aim to relate her scholarly interventions directly to a public, social

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39 The eight theses put forward by Burawoy are italicised for the reader’s convenience.

40 This indeed a common trope in the study of “publics” and is elegantly explored by Carey (1992)
movement or local organisation where publics serve as active, discursive communities with shared commitments.

In Burawoy’s (2008: 356) thinking, public sociology’s special place and role is to supply its organic intellectuals to address and engage publics that vary by their density of internal interaction (thick versus thin), by their level of mobilisation (active versus passive), by their geographical extension (local, regional, national, global) and by their politics (hegemonic, non-hegemonic) in order to combat, what his fifth thesis sees as the, third wave marketization’s commodification of nature (land, environment and body).

In his sixth thesis Burawoy envisages the political practice of public sociology as a global response to third wave marketization compared to the local and national responses that corresponded respectively to the first two waves of marketization. Here, Burawoy (2008: 357) argues, organic public sociologists find their niche as interpreters, communicators and intermediaries, tying together local movements across national boundaries; fostering what in his seventh thesis is referred to as the public discourse of human rights which succeed labour and social rights from the previous periods of marketization.

By embracing the discourse of human rights (seventh thesis) as a reactive response to global challenges, organic public sociology could signal what Burawoy (2008: 359) colourfully terms ‘the end of the ivory tower’ (eighth thesis) in sociological practice, thus aspiring to a political endeavour that joins disparate and desperate local defences in the creation of a global civil society, cemented in the struggle for human rights in the quite specific contexts of their violation’.

Amid such facile pronunciations of the “academic ivory tower” as dead, emerges the second of Burawoy’s attempts to globalise public sociology, which concentrates rather fittingly on the dilemma between retreating to or escaping from the much maligned ivory tower logic in academic practice. Offered as an opinion piece for The Chronicle of Higher Education, Burawoy (2004a) fixes his ethnographic gaze once more to the inner workings of the discipline by commenting on internal scholarly criticisms that turn sociologists into victims of parochialism, careerism and the professionalization of the
In the face of such perceived insularity, Burawoy diagnoses what he describes as a double exclusion for the sociologist-as-a-public-intellectual who finds herself attacked for either (a) blind commitment to academic specialisations or (b) dismissed for being partisan.

In such an unwelcome climate for publicly relevant contributions, of the type Burawoy imagines, public sociologists would appear threatened by academic isolation and institutional insularity rather than feel encouraged by an academic culture that would value, praise and reward public visibility instead of private research interests. Describing such a process as responsible for ‘commodifying’ learning by promoting the retreat from the public realm in favour of the immersion into the private institutional workplace, Burawoy (2004a, no pagination) argues for a ‘tough internal democracy’ within sociology, which will allow ‘critical deliberation’ instead of ‘the mundane politics of bureaucratic life’ which he interprets as symptomatic of the intervention of neoliberalism’s global spread in the form of ‘nosy states’ and ‘noisy markets’.

What would otherwise appear articulated, in the relevant literature, as a unique malaise of American or Anglo-American Western sociology (Bell, 1960, Gouldner 1970 and 1979, Mills 1959, and Jacoby 1987), assumes global guises in Burawoy’s text therefore justifying, in part, his suggestion that such threats to sociology’s “public self” now form a global trend rather than expressing a local particularity.

Such concerns with the management of knowledge production according to global market imperatives, at least in Burawoy’s analysis, justify his use of the term ‘third-wave marketization’ and provide Burawoy with the necessary critical ammunition to propose what we call ‘third-wave sociology’ as a necessary response to such perceived threats.

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42 Similar concerns about the swallowing up of the public world by the private world were made by Arendt (1998) and Putnam (1995), while similar debates about ‘The Fall of Public Man’, ‘The Corrosion of Character’ and the perceived decline in community feeling are to be found in the work of Richard Sennett (1977, 1998, and 1970). See also Wentraub and Kumar (1997), Marquand (2004) and Hind (2010).

43 For a similar, well-reasoned, book-length argument see, Evans (2004).
Burawoy’s third attempt to popularise public sociology, entitled ‘Third-Wave Sociology and the End of Pure Science’, offers what he sees as public sociology’s transgressive ethos, critical spirit and pluralist, cosmopolitan aspirations as a response to the certitude of sociological scientism, and ‘methodological nationalism’\textsuperscript{44}, which he sees represented by the advocates of the so-called Strong Programme in Professional Sociology (SPPS). Responding to Turner, Brint, and Boyns and Fletcher in The American Sociologist’s 2005 special issue on public sociology\textsuperscript{45}, Burawoy (2005b: 160) accuses the SPPS quartet’s ‘pure science’ alternative to public sociology as devoid of political purpose, therefore considering their proposition as inherently problematic, as it departs from the discipline’s foundational principles, preoccupations and concerns, while at the same time charging them for misinterpreting his pluralistic vision of and for public sociology as a political ruse for a Marxist takeover of sociology. Burawoy’s retaliation comes in the form of a counter-argument, accusing Turner, Brint, and Boyns and Fletcher for advocating an imperial ambition for a sociology with a singular, unified, homogeneous frame as opposed to his more synergistic interplay of four sociologies which, in Burawoy’s mind, appeals to the art of public sociology to build bridges and transcend differences between otherwise disconnected worlds, rather than impose further divisions within an already divided, if not chaotic and fragmentary, discipline\textsuperscript{46}.

This rivalry between scientific unity and public sociological pluralism as represented by above mentioned contenders, is nevertheless welcomed by Burawoy (2004c) who interprets such heated exchanges as manifestations of a global ‘critical turn to public sociology’ hoping that they will transform ‘methodological nationalism’ into ‘cosmopolitan vision’, to borrow Beck’s (2000, 2006) popular lexicon.

\textsuperscript{44} The term ‘methodological nationalism’ originated in the writings of Herminio Martins (1974), but was popularised by Beck (2000: 20, 2006) who aspired to replace such short-sightedness with ‘cosmopolitan vision’, in a manner similar to Burawoy’s aspirations for a global public sociology. For a historical analysis of the term see Chernilo (2006).

\textsuperscript{45} The American Sociologist. 2005, 36(3-4)

\textsuperscript{46} For an interesting reading of the fragmentation of social sciences see Abbott (2001).
Burawoy’s exploration of yet another historical “turn” in and of sociology, succeeding its ‘cultural’ and ‘linguistic’ ancestors, argues for a departure from radicalising professional sociology, and proposes instead the fostering of public sociology as a remedy for bolstering the organs of civil society by means of treating public sociology as a possible script for facilitating, promoting and protecting the conditions of participatory democracy.

Agitprop aside, Burawoy sees the merit of such an endeavour as an attempt to merge scholarly sociology with public life, while at the same time aspiring to promote public sociology as an endeavour that can offer ideas for empowered participatory democracy, in a way similar to Fung and Wright’s (2003) call for *Deepening Democracy* as a ‘real utopia’.

Drawing on sociology’s disciplinary resources and scientific merit, public sociology is offered here by Burawoy both as an ambition for epistemological reform, as well as a mode of political intervention with commitments to civil society and global governance; a vision that Burawoy (2009b) shared once more in calling for a ‘Public Sociology in the Age of Obama’, defending it thus in a research article for *Innovation - The European Journal of Social Science Research*.

Such a conceptualisation of public sociology as an ally of civil society also features prominently in Burawoy’s (2007) introduction to the publication of ‘For Public Sociology’ in Italian, entitled ‘Public Sociology: Mills vs Gramsci’, where Burawoy attempts an interesting comparison between the American intellectual gadfly C. Wright Mills, and the Italian Marxist pensatore Antonio Gramsci.

By placing the two in some fictional intellectual battle, Burawoy attempts to revisit the distinction between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘organic public sociologist’. Arguing that Mills belongs to the former category, while Gramsci to the latter, Burawoy

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48 Burawoy is referring to Fung and Wright’s (2003) joint contribution to Wright’s ‘Real Utopias Project’. The project begun in 1991 and as of 2010, six books have been published in the series. In his capacity as the 103rd president of the ASA, Wright made his ‘real utopias’ project into the ASA’s annual meetings’ theme and also took it abroad on a lecture tour visiting places as diverse as Winnipeg, Amsterdam, Berlin, Copenhagen and Bogotá.

49 See Thesis II of his original ASA address.
demonstrates a gulf that needs to be navigated between (traditional) public sociologists who act like Platonic philosopher kings or advisors to the prince, to borrow Mills’ (1959) own terminology, and (organic) public sociologists who would not simply promote, but struggle and lend themselves to the idea of a democratic republic as a response to mass society, thus aspiring to participation in civil society as active members of an autonomous debating society with a responsive government; a vision that Burawoy (2007: 11) attributes to America’s ‘Jeffersonian past’.

Invoking Mills and Gramsci then as his *dramatis personae*, Burawoy calls for the scholarly intervention of the organic public sociologist/intellectual who sets critical dialogue within the discipline in motion, while simultaneously engaging (with) multiple publics and ‘power elites’ (Mills, 1956) in defence of civil society.

Continuing the martial ethos of intellectual battles, Burawoy (in: Jeffries, 2009) reflects introspectively about the global critical reception of his idea of public sociology describing the process as ‘public sociology wars’, and wonders about whether such disputes, as hosted in Jeffries’ volume, derive from true commitment to the advancement of social science or from the contributors’ urge to legitimise their agenda of interests, advantage or supremacy even on a war whose aim is rule of a knowledge over another.

A more positive reading is also offered by Burawoy (2009: 452) however; hinting at the possibility of viewing such an intellectual warzone, with sociology as its trophy, as an encouraging sign that there is an active ‘[I]nternational’ of organic public ‘intellectuals’ who are ready to defend not just the discipline of sociology but humanity’s interests at broad. This very idea of an “International of organic public sociologists’ as well as the “martial art ethos”50 behind these ‘public sociology wars’, are of course indirect references to Pierre Bourdieu who is often enlisted by Burawoy as a public intellectual *par excellence*51.

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50 This idea of *doing* sociology as an armed struggle is to be found in the work of Pierre Bourdieu whose depiction of sociology as ‘a martial art’ inspired Sapiro’s (2010) *Sociology is a Martial Art*, and a documentary film with the same title from director Pierre Carles, released in 2001.

51 In fact, Burawoy (2012) has written an entire book placing Bourdieu in opposition to Mills, while also indulging in imaginary conversations with the French *penseur*
Taking Bourdieu’s intellectual legacy\textsuperscript{52} on board and considering Burawoy’s aspiration for similar figures to emerge out of his call for global public sociology, Bourdieu’s (2013: 294) own musings on global intellectualism via sociology, become extremely relevant in his description of the ‘ethno-sociologist’ as ‘a kind of organic intellectual of humanity, and as a collective agent’ who ‘can contribute to de-naturalizing and de-fatalizing human existence by placing his skill at the service of a universalism rooted in the comprehension of different particularisms’.

Fostering such a vision for sociology to act as a confident representative of civic culture and a translator of the local to the global, is an indispensable part of Burawoy’s (2010) rising hopes for ‘Forging Global Sociology from Below’ emphasising, in terms that are very similar to Bourdieu’s, the significance of a new global public sociology which would address questions of universal validity, but with geographically and culturally specific answers.

In viewing global public sociology as an ‘articulation of the local, of the specific and the global’ and wishing to cultivate the ‘conditions of enunciation which will enable us to speak’ as global public sociologists, Burawoy, echoing Hall (in: Morley and Chen, 1996: 407), draws his global ethnographic trail of global public sociology to a close, only to start an exploration of diverse, national sociological traditions which will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{52} For an interesting discussion of Bourdieu’s legacy, see Fournier (2011).
Section III: In praise of national public sociologies: A selection.

Having traversed the world in search of global possibilities for public sociology, Burawoy continues his pilgrimage, this time looking at national sociologies as examples of how and why public sociology may have purchase as an inspirational scholarly endeavour that contracts the world by virtue of its global outlook, while at the same time expanding localities by virtue of its respect for diverse national traditions of sociology.

With these thoughts in mind, Burawoy offers an exploration of three national sociologies as points of reference in the global conversation of public sociology, suspecting that even such a random, limited and fragmentary inquiry might offer sociologists valuable lessons about how to strengthen national sociological paradigms by capitalising on their virtues, while at the same time avoiding their inconsistencies and possible pitfalls.

This impulse to discover the global in the local and vice versa\(^5\) took Burawoy to Russia, Norway and Canada where he sought ethnographic variations of public sociology while discussing the fate of other national sociologies in passing\(^6\).

Commencing his “national sociologies” trail, Burawoy (2009c) examines Russian sociology as an interesting case study of how the development of a scientific discipline can be held hostage to political gerrymandering, thus choosing to interpret the evolution of Russian sociology according to each historical period’s political rule. Policy sociology was such a victim of political patronage, reaching its apotheosis as “the” sociology in the Soviet Union and effectively becoming the articulator, purveyor and handmaiden of party ideology.

Such mishandling, if not annexation, of sociology as a political resource by the Soviet party state, cast doubt about the very meaning, context and scholarly rigour of a discipline which studies public social life, distorting in turn the way in which the term “public” was to be understood and made sense of.

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\(^5\) See Thesis IX of his original ASA address.

\(^6\) His references revolve mostly around the examples of South Africa, Brazil, China, Britain, France and Italy, some of which are discussed here whenever necessary.
Burawoy (2009c: 23) was intrigued to witness such unease about the terms “public” and “sociology” and recounts how difficult it was to settle disputes in relation to how his idea of public sociology might be translated in Russian. The literal translation, *publichnaiasotsiologiia* (public sociology) has also appeared misleadingly as *obshchestvennaiasotsiologiia* (communal sociology)\(^{55}\), thus altering not just the meaning of the term but the very ambitions (epistemological and otherwise) that Burawoy has endowed it with since its inception, not to mention the obvious conflation of the public realm with the spirit and ethics of the commune.

Such strategic use of sociology for political gains, Burawoy (2009c: 199) shows, weakened not only the public and critical branches of the sociological family tree, but also restricted the growth of professional and policy sociologies too by treating them instrumentally as tools for the dissemination of the ruling ideology of the time, thus favouring opinion poll research over critical discourse in order to serve market and state imperatives directed at specific, and demanding, clients.

With the sole exception of the social, economic and policy reform which unfolded during Mikhail Gorbachev’s *perestroika* in the mid-1980s, where public sociological expression burst out of the confines of party rule and swam on the waves of a much more effervescent civil society than had been witnessed before, Russian sociology bore the imprint of political manipulation inviting Burawoy to muse on the cluster of circumstances; regional, cultural, political, that influence the development or the debasement of national sociologies around the world.

In doing so, he, somewhat flippantly and carelessly attempts to identify and map out patterns for the development of a “glocal”\(^{56}\) sociology that traverses multiple national sociological traditions and ties them to the global public sociological arena.

The hidden ambition of such a sweeping proposition is the attempt to imagine how we might think of regional sociologies that have not known or are relative newcomers to an autonomous professional sociology, in a world where academic resources are so heavily concentrated in and dominated by the United States and Europe.

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\(^{55}\) Both are Burawoy’s translations

\(^{56}\) The term “glocal” is used here to describe, in short, Burawoy’s conception of a public sociology that is both national and global almost by equal measure.
Pondering on the sovereignty of American and European paradigms of sociology, with reference to the development of French, British and American sociology, Burawoy proposes four models for countering the challenge of historicising sociology on a global scale. The first model is what Burawoy (2009c: 202) calls ‘the Chinese model’ owing its name to the way in which sociology ostensibly developed in China. Burawoy notes how sociology in China was modelled after US sociology, given the vast number of Chinese graduates from leading American university institutions; a trend which reached, in Burawoy’s testimony, a high point during the 1980s under the influence of US-based sociologist Nan Lin. Unlike its disciplinary putative father however, sociology in China shows certain particularities in its division of academic labour, divided as it is in two streams; a university stream and an Academy of Science stream permitting, in Burawoy’s (2009c: 202) reading, a certain autonomy for sociology in the universities allowing a limited space for critical and public sociologies, while policy sociology appears almost exclusively tied to the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

The second model is what Burawoy (2009c: 202) calls the ‘indigeneity model’, which refers to postcolonial challenges to Eurocentric knowledge production, as witnessed in the development of a rich counter-tradition in sociology which acknowledged and celebrated the uniqueness and rootedness of other non-European paradigms of culture, tradition and intellectual life. Burawoy singles out Raewyn Connell’s (2007) *Southern Theory* as an outstanding example towards creating a new “world social science”, which takes into account the social experience and the theories that have emerged from Australia, Indigenous peoples, Latin America, India, Africa, Islam and other post-colonial societies.

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57 Given Burawoy’s defective and highly contestable periodization, see Kemple (2006), for a good guide to and a succinct account of such developments. Prominent figures of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Hume, Ferguson, Smith and Miller could also be added to such lists, not to mention the inclusion of Spencer. For an interesting and less Eurocentric account on the historical evolution of sociology before Comte, see Abraham (1973), who considers Arab polymath, Ibn Khaldun as a much neglected and potential founding father of sociology. For an approach that combines the merits of both sources, see Patel (2010: 1-18)

58 For interesting discussions on postcolonial thought as a response to Eurocentrism, see Slemon and Tiffin (1992), Appiah (1993), Spivak (2007), Gilroy (1993), and Said (1978). See Cesaire (1972) and Fanon (1961) for two key texts that presaged the cultural, literary and scholarly ‘turn’ in postcolonial studies, and Brathwaite (1984) for a fascinating account of the hegemony of English in Anglo-phone Caribbean
A third model is the ‘Scandinavian model’, described by Burawoy (2009c: 202) as the proliferation of policy sociology for the legitimation and the upholding of the welfare state in a way that transcends narrow policy confines and engages instead virtually all of Burawoy’s four sociologies, by putting them to the service of the Nordic model of the developmental welfare state. Burawoy likens this model to the development of post World War II sociology in England with reference to the work of Richard Titmuss, Brian Abel-Smith, Peter Wilmott and Michael Young, interpreting such studies as indicative of the positive influence of the welfare state in defining the agenda of professional sociology through the channelling funds to research projects of policy relevance.

The fourth and final model is the most Burawoyian of all, outlined as drawing its energy from direct public engagement, owing its critical edge to, what Burawoy sees, as the emergence of a global civil society resulting in a mix of 19th century American sociology’s moral character, 1980s South African and Brazilian sociologies’ emphasis on social movements and Indian sociology’s critical discussion of experiences of the caste system, the forces of privatisation and struggles against environmental degradation. Burawoy’s contention is that this subaltern view of the world inevitably mapped out a publicly relevant and applied matrix of global public sociological participation, examples of which however are conspicuously absent in Burawoy’s text.

Continuing his national public sociologies trail, Burawoy’s next stop is Norway where he sought to explain how and why ‘the world needs public sociology’. To do so, Burawoy (2004b) chose to present his sociological quadrant by linking each of his four sociologies (professional, policy, critical, public) to four models of sociological practice namely the professional, policy, critical and public model as represented by the US, Russia, and South Africa respectively. According to Burawoy’s historicisation, the US

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59 For a sympathetic overview of the Nordic model, see Hilson (2008).

60 For a detailed, and infinitely more nuanced, history of British Sociology see Halsey (2004).

61 For an Indian-centred discussion of such themes see Patel’s (2005) sociological trilogy on Bombay. For more global discussions see Davis (2007) or Collier (2008).
has the monopoly over professional sociology displaying a (now) cemented identity and disciplinary status\textsuperscript{62}, Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia is charged with exerting state control over the discipline, as witnessed in the successive rule of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, with the exception of glasnost under Gorbachev, but always remaining faithful to policy sociology, while South African sociology is praised for organising resistance to the apartheid regime by fusing critical and public sociologies, inspired as it was by the 1970s Black Consciousness movement in the US and the Soweto uprisings. To these four models, Burawoy adds a fifth, the welfare model, characterised by its faithfulness to the Nordic welfare state and the defence of local communities against state interventions by means of a strong critical public social science, exemplified, in Burawoy’s mind, by Norway’s University of Tromsø which earned it the nickname “Red University” for pursuing this line of research.

Having presented these five models of sociological practice, Burawoy justifies his faith in the need for public sociology, not just in the specific lessons that can be drawn from these five models, but also in his aspiration to see a Rubik’s cube-style combination and fusion of these five sociological tropes in a global public sociology that is well-versed in the five variables of sociological practice as set by Burawoy, while aiming at making transnational connections, as can be seen, according to Burawoy, in the work of sociologists as diverse, in time and scholarly focus, as Wallerstein, Giddens, Sassen, Castells, Galtung, Meyer, Harvey, Appadurai, Polanyi and Gramsci.

This sociological palimpsest made from a variety of different sources, and inspired by a number of different models of and for public sociological praxis, lead Burawoy to the final destination of his public sociological journey, which explores Canadian sociology as a ‘disciplinary mosaic’\textsuperscript{63}.

Drawing on John Porter’s (1965) *The Vertical Mosaic*, Burawoy likens Porter’s much-praised analysis of social stratification in Canada\textsuperscript{64} with Canadian sociology’s own

\textsuperscript{62} For an objection to this claim see Turner and Turner (1990).

\textsuperscript{63} Burawoy’s paper has received some interesting critiques by Helmes-Hayes, Creese, McLaren and Pulkingham, and Brym and Reza-Nakahale in the same volume of the journal.

\textsuperscript{64} The book was fêted by Canadian sociologists as a classic ouvre in Canadian sociology and received an award from the American Sociological Association, giving Porter international recognition. For an overview of Porter’s sociological life see Helmes-Hayes (2010).
disciplinary fragmentation, due to the country’s ethno-linguistic division, not to pathologise it, but rather to rescue these fragments by incorporation into his four sociologies.

Taking cues from Helmes-Hayes and McLaughlin’s research on the historical context of public sociology in Canada, Burawoy (2009d: 872) describes Canadian sociology as the by-product of a long pedigree of mutations and dialogues with ‘19th century social gospel, 1930s-40s deepening professionalism dependent on state sponsorship, 1950s and 1960s era of New Liberal Sociology, and 1960s and 1970s Marxism and feminism’, in addition to a strand of national sociology that grew ‘against US sociology’s hegemony, leading to today’s climate of balance of professional sociology and the reassertion of policy sociology stimulated by state-funded research’.

Intrigued by such pluralism of perspectives, Burawoy (2009d: 876) refashions his sociological quadrant by splitting each of his four sociologies into two parts in order to emphasize the merits, rather than the confusion resulting from identifying sociology as an assemblage of different sources. In this light, policy sociology is divided by advocacy (springing from the initiative of researchers that seek to promote particular policies) and sponsorship (dictated by funding), professional sociology appears as formal (professionally regulated, insulated from the outside world) and substantive (developing elaborate scientific research programs), critical sociology seems torn between disciplinary and interdisciplinary commitments and roles, while public sociology explores the divide between traditional and organic.

Wedged between its traditional and organic roles, public sociology in this new configuration may seem ontologically in anguish, but Burawoy (2009d: 878) finds in the Canadian paradigm of sociology a new role for public sociology as ‘community-based research between academics and communities’ as fostered by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). This novel re-engineering of organic public sociology, Burawoy argues, offers ample opportunities for academics to forge durable bonds with communities and governmental departments in a way that requires the collaboration of all four sociologies (professional, policy, critical, public) under the firm tutelage of one (organic public sociology), therefore broadening the

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scope of the entire discipline as a mode of active participation and intervention in public and political life.

Such re-assembling of sociology’s identity, character and aspirations into a mosaic *ars sociologica*, constitutes the last sightseeing destination of Michael Burawoy’s international lecture tour, with public sociology as his inseparable one-item-of-luggage, thus drawing the current chapter to a close.

This chapter has so far provided an insight into the contents of Burawoy’s public sociological luggage as he dispatched it to the world; both at home and abroad, while the following chapter looks at my own critical objections to his well-travelled conceptual suitcase in attempt to identify possible shortcomings of this newly-born term. Both Burawoy’s own travels, like a contemporary version of St. Paul; preaching his idea to diverse, welcoming but always critical audiences, as well as the responses recorded in the relevant literature\(^66\) indicate that whatever the merits and shortcomings of public sociology, it hardly suffers from the nauseating ‘epistemic loneliness’ that Sartre (1976: 456) described, as the acute awareness of feeling lonely and occupying a limited space in the world. Rather, Burawoy’s version of public sociology has put a different and renewed spin to an idea that aspires to stay with us a little longer as an enlivened and enlivening dialogue, rather than a single-minded perspective. In that sense, it echoes Simmel’s essay (1971 [1908]: 184-9) *The Stranger*, who ‘comes today and stays tomorrow’; a wanderer that is granted a guarded welcome at first and held at bay, only until her experience becomes ‘a completely positive relation’ as ‘a specific form of interaction’ between scholars who are heatedly trying to decide what to make of and how to make this epistemological stranger’s stay more hospitable to the current sociological polity.

This ‘equilibrium’ of ‘healthy’ scholarly ‘antagonisms’, as Brazilian sociologist, Gilberto Freyre would have called them\(^67\), provides the core of the next chapters which, following my critique of Burawoy’s thesis, present a detailed account of the

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\(^66\) See chapters Three, Four and Five of this thesis.

\(^67\) See Burke and Pallares-Burke (2008: 64-5). Their comments on Freyre’s idea of antagonisms in equilibrium befit the point made here about public sociology as approached by Burawoy; ‘The idea of equilibrium of social as well as intellectual antagonisms’, Burke and Pallares-Burke (2008: 65) note, ‘is central to Freyre’s thought […] where the survival of antagonisms, and not their overcoming, is gradually emphasized’. For more sociological work on conflict, see Coser (1956).
divergences, antagonisms, clashes and agreements of prominent sociologists over the citizenship status of Michael Burawoy’s brainchild: public sociology.
Chapter Two: A critique of public sociology

Having taken a guided tour of public sociology’s ruptured history in Chapter One, while also pausing to consider Burawoy’s subsequent stewardship of the term at length, it seems necessary at present to take a critical detour, in order to explore the hidden backstreets of public sociology’s labyrinthine geography, by visiting areas that Burawoy may have overlooked in his personal pilgrimage to the term.

This current chapter is therefore devoted to critically re-assessing Burawoy’s reading of public sociology, by resisting his ownership of the term, and offering instead the possibility of its free reign over our sociological imaginations, without in any way committing to Burawoy’s personal interpretation of, or romantic vision for public sociology.

In endeavouring to ‘unbelieve’ Burawoy’s matrix of public sociology, to borrow from Atkinson and DePalma (2009) who used the verb playfully in their attempt to challenge the ‘heteronormative matrix’ in primary education⁶⁸, the current chapter attempts not to ‘queer’, but to estrange, disenchant and question Burawoy’s customised approach of public sociology, in order to make it safe for doubt.

The purpose of such critique is not to abandon the term altogether, but to suggest that it may need to be abandoned in its idealised and romanticised form. It is argued instead that granting public sociology the right to lead a more autonomous sociological life of its own, as a variable tool of and for sociology, can only strengthen the concept further, by means of critique and dialogic exchange. To discuss public sociology in such light, it needs to be treated as a relative rather than an absolute value in the sociological ethic and professional practice, therefore suspecting that any attempt to institutionalise public sociology, including Burawoy’s own, may run the risk of institutionalising our thinking about it as well.

This critical reading of Burawoy’s model for public sociology, in this chapter, is organised into two sections. The first looks at some broad, general, yet fairly important objections to Burawoy’s argument, while the second section makes a reconnaissance

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⁶⁸ See, Atkinson and DePalma (2009).
Section I: Preliminary objections to Burawoy’s version of public sociology

‘For Public Sociology’s’ appeal as a speech and as a subsequent journal article, owes much of its popularity to the zealous tone in which it was re-introduced in 2004 by Michael Burawoy. While Burawoy’s charisma as public speaker and his authorial ability to write passionate prose are undisputable virtues of his scholarship, they can also be read as problematic mannerisms, instead of coherent arguments that would seek to reform the sociological discipline epistemically, rather than merely articulate a vague revolutionary calling for change.

Burawoy’s text often reads more like an emotive manifesto or an urgent appeal to our sociological conscience, rather than a fully-fledged rational argument or account of the current climate in which sociology is practiced and made. Burawoy repeatedly describes what sociologists need to set themselves free from (the technobureaucratisation of sociology), but not what they may become free-er to do exactly. In doing so, he may be praised for planning an escape from the claustrophobic ‘iron cage’ of instrumental, scientistic rationality, to remember Weber (1946), but also accused of actually organising an en masse escape from the freedom to debate whether this predicament is correctly identified in the first place. Instead of readily and whole-heartedly admitting that ‘no summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness’ (Weber, 1946: 128), unless the practice of public sociology is embraced, it seems incumbent upon Burawoy’s reformative scope to describe precisely to what “iron cage” we are chained, how and why, in lieu of merely suggesting, as he does, to don the “light cloak” of public sociological practice as an alternative. Instead of specifically and analytically spelling out the conditions of our capture and the terms of our surrender, Burawoy hazards generalisations by loosely attributing sociology’s foibles and failings to neoliberalism and its politics, as if it were

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69 Indirect reference is here made to Fromm (1941).
a homogeneous rather than a contentious, contested, contestable and variable term; a
point to which we shall be returning in the course of this chapter.
In framing his invitation to public sociology in such a manner, Burawoy seems to be
summoning us to a prayer instead of presenting us with a concrete plan for sociological
deliberation and action in a way that leaves a lot to be desired, especially in terms of
discussing at length what and how higher education and the global sociological
curriculum could be reformed exactly to correspond to this public sociological matrix.
In not doing so, in the focus and detail that would otherwise be necessary, Burawoy
might be accused of conflating the idea of public sociology with a social movement
akin to socialism\textsuperscript{70}, as the advocates of the Strong Program for Professional Sociology
(SPPS) have done; namely Turner, Brint, Boyns and Fletcher, or as his term has been
misunderstood in its Russian translation; referred to as ‘communal sociology’\textsuperscript{71}.
Adopting such a position towards public sociology amounts to an almost populist or
demagogic stance, rather than attesting to a purely sociological reasoning and vision.
Both the language and the symbolism of Burawoy’s ASA address and ASR article seem
to be playing on his audience’s aspirations, prejudices and insecurities to safeguard his
endeavour’s prominence, popularity and appeal, rather than outlining the exact
epistemic challenges that sociologists may have to meet in an effort to render their
scholarship more applicable and accountable to a number of other, non-academic
publics. Such a choice is not only contentious on the basis of its personal ambitions,
but also on the basis of its analytical defects, descriptive and prescriptive alike. Uniting
“sociologists of the world” to change the scholarly environment they inhabit is not
simply a matter of creating an outlet for voicing discontents with the discipline, but
also an opportunity to offer some recommendations on how to implement such
desired changes personally, structurally and institutionally alike. Confusing epistemic
change with an act of agitprop however is (a) to resist treating sociologists as anything
other than a predictably homogeneous category, (b) to fail to recognise the
institutional environment in which sociologists work as diverse, variable and, often,
impenetrably unique, and (c) to identify both the problem, as well as its cure as one;
\textsuperscript{70} See Hartmann and Uggen (2009) for a similar discussion on sociology and socialism.
\textsuperscript{71} See Chapter One for a discussion of both Burawoy’s reaction to Turner, Brint, Boyns and Fletcher, as
well as of the specific reasons behind the misinterpretation of the term public sociology in Russian
language.
therefore disallowing or robbing autonomous individuals the possibility to define themselves, their practice and their surroundings as changeable in ways that may not necessarily fit Burawoy’s interpretive grid.

In simplifying epistemic change by evoking revolutionary language, Burawoy mistakes immensely complicated and diversified processes and circumstances for homogeneous traits, therefore anchoring an analysis, not in the positive principle of scientific doubt, but in the spiritual certitude and ontological security of one’s faith. To make matters worse, this is not merely a problematic reading of social, cultural and institutional change, but also the polar opposite of the ethnographer’s research ethos, which Burawoy claims to employ in his approach towards public sociology. In that respect, it is surprising to notice how there is more “sermon” than there is ethnographic investigation into where neoliberalism’s power or other causes of sociology’s current need for reform may inhere.

Both the aspiration to unite sociologists towards taking action, as well as homogenising the reasons why public sociology may be urgently needed in current academic practice, is to also simplify the various causes for the discipline’s alleged existential crisis at present. Apart from neglecting, or refusing to acknowledge scholars’ wilful embrace (Burrows, 2012) of many of the developments that Burawoy derides as alienating and destructive in current academic practice, he also strays away from actually describing these causes in some relative detail, thus limiting his approach instead to describing the symptoms of such perceived malaise.

The difference between symptoms and causes may be subtle but it is neither rhetorical, nor is it insubstantial and can be exemplified, as is the case in Burawoy’s diagnosis, by confusing accidents and misfortunes that befall a discipline (of which there are many), with objective factors that determine the current shape and state of a discipline, (of which there are none as they are open to interpretation).

The symptoms of sociology’s ill-health, in the current climate of Higher Education and in the academic production of knowledge, are experienced as a subjective melancholia about sociology’s uncertainty in a globalised knowledge economy; a (symptomatic)

72 A more detailed discussion of sociology’s crisis can be found in Chapter Six of the current thesis.
sentiment which cannot be conflated with the (causal), tidal shifts in the global knowledge economy, which of course exist but can be assessed, critically weighed and interpreted in a number of different ways.

A different outlook on these changes in Higher Education and knowledge production could be interpreted as positive outcomes that point towards scientific progress, rather than as evils that need to be eliminated for sociology to survive.

The qualitative difference between symptomatic difficulties and causal factors may be delicately nuanced, but it is nevertheless important in showing the dangers of substituting one for the other, in an effort to attribute blame for any discipline’s existential condition at the present juncture. Conflating the two, as Burawoy does, is to leave the disease that causes the symptoms largely unidentified and therefore untreated, with the exception of shooting arrows in a generalised way against the neoliberalisation of the academy and the commodification of learning, without explaining exactly how they relate to or are specifically responsible for sociology’s perceived predicament.

Expressing concern about such an impending crisis of sociology, entails not simply offering a critical reading of the current state of or in the sociology of knowledge, but also presenting a fully-fledged account of a model or a plan on how sociological scholarship may be(come) possible under such conditions, as well as carefully drawing a detailed map on how to navigate oneself within a discipline to avoid stepping into such a minefield. Instead of that, Burawoy risks generalisations about both neoliberalism and the destructive effects of globalisation-by-dispossesion, à la David Harvey (2005), without however explaining, as Harvey does, what these terms mean and what their specific impact on sociology are, beyond alluding to the privatisation of higher education, the commodification of learning and the forceful expulsion of critical, public sociology, in favour of its audit-bound, REFed, TRACed and FECed counterparts.73

Using both neoliberalism and globalisation as catch-all terms for the wider conditions that have come to impinge on the working practices of academics in general and

73 The reference here is to the UK examples of the Research Excellence Framework (REF), the Transparent Approach to Costing (TRAC), and the Full Economic Cost (FEC). For a critique of such auditing practices and their impact on sociology, see Holmwood (2011a), and Burrows (2012)
sociologists in particular, leads to a much-simplified and profoundly un-sociological
towards analysis and critical thinking.
In doing so, neoliberalism is erroneously described as a concrete and coherent
ideological project, rather than a slippery, contradictory and often personalized and
personalisable term that can be made to mean a number of different things. Described
by Brenner and Theodore (2002: 2) as ‘the belief that open, competitive, and
unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the
optimal mechanism for economic development’, neoliberal ideology is thought to have
materialised in Higher Education, in the form of research assessment exercises, league
tables, student fees, citation scores, impact factors, visual learning environments, time
allocation models and funding bids. Indeed, Dowling (2008: 2) shows how
neoliberalism is used as ‘the dominant trope […], with geographers, like other social
scientists, exploring the neoliberalization of the contemporary university’ by ascribing
to it characteristics that include ‘the infusion of market and competitive logics
throughout universities, the rise of audit processes and cultures of accountability, and
the replacement of public with private […] funding’. Dominant as those features may
be, and indeed they are, in current configurations of “the University”, it would perhaps
be a little facile, if not careless, to make all such newly-witnessed features of current
academic life reducible to a nebulous ideology without precisely articulating how these
scholarly traits may be overturned in favour of principles that are closer to sociology’s
message, ‘task’ and ‘promise’ (Mills, 1959: 6).
Although Burawoy generously offers his typology of four sociologies as inter-
comprehensible and interchangeable parts that can inform a new sociological whole,
that will challenge current neoliberalised paradigms of scholarly work, he does not go
into any detail in explaining exactly how we might bring ‘a bit of craftiness into the
craft’ of sociology (Back, 2012: 34), or how to re-invent it, theoretically and
methodologically, as ‘an attentive and sensuous craft, but also as a moral and political
project’ (Gane and Back, 2012: 404).
By contrast, Back (2012), Gane and Back (2012), as well as Lury and Wakeford (2012),
Burnett et al. (2010), Orton-Johnson and Prior (2013), Ruppert et al., Fraser (2009),
Puwar and Sharma (2012) among others, have all contributed detailed accounts of
what they envisage as inventive, imaginative and critical escape routes from
“neoliberalisation”, without making grand claims about their approaches, conclusive though they are, and without nurturing ambitions to act as ambassadors of change, as Burawoy has done both in his ASA address and his ASR article, without however furnishing an equally substantive counter-argument as his aforementioned colleagues have.

Moving on to Burawoy’s approach towards globalisation, it must be noted that although he understands the term as informed by multiple fusions of the local with the global, therefore acknowledging globalisation’s growing mobility across frontiers, when it comes to describing it as a new logic of economic and cultural development he remains silent about the complexities of the term, succumbing to what Ferguson (1992: 69) calls the ‘mythology of globalisation’, by not recognising that its ‘alleged benefits or negative costs are difficult to assess. The deeper questions are: ‘cui bono?’ and “who is being globalized (or de-globalized), to what extent and by whom?”

To by-pass such questions, in their full complexity, though Burawoy does mention the domination of the world’s scholarly peripheries by the West’s core, is to fail to recognise, as Touraine (1984: 40) does, that under such conditions “[t]he idea of society receives a new meaning: instead of being defined by institutions or a central power, and provided that it can certainly no longer be defined by common values or permanent rules of social organisation, society appears to be a field of debates and conflicts whose stake is the social use of the symbolic goods which are massively produced by our post-industrial society’. What this means is, in the context of public sociology’s potentiality in such a world, is that for sociology not to ‘wane’ or disappear, as Touraine (1984) fears, it requires a radical re-constitution of its identity, a reconstruction of its ego defences and its ability to negotiate its position within the dynamics of domination and submission.

Although Burawoy raises such points in his wholesale endorsement of public sociology, he does so in a fleeting and fragmentary manner, which does not match his aspirations of epistemic change within sociology and academia at large. Grounding such grand aspirations about the potential uses of public sociology in and out of the academe, would perhaps require articulating such an agenda in a book-length argument expressed in detail, with clarity and vividness, to avoid being misunderstood or
charged for offering an elusive, slippery account of the discipline’s existential condition or ‘identity crisis’ as Fuller (2006: 1) warns.

Having invested a decade on a concerted effort to legitimise his version of public sociological conduct, giving lectures, speaking at conferences, devising courses and writing numerous articles on public sociology, the absence of a cogent sociological vision presented in detail and in a relatively expansive manner is conspicuous as it is puzzling, as it could secure Burawoy’s argument as a potentially fully-fledged approach towards introducing a ‘new sociological imagination’, as Fuller (2006) has it, that goes beyond catchphrases and slogans, but develops into a coherent view of disciplinary, institutional, pedagogic and socio-political change, with public sociology as its point of orientation and centre of gravity.

Refraining from producing such a definitive critical companion to public sociology’s potentiality for change, runs the risk of reducing his thesis to an amendment or a mere addition to a plethora of existing clarion-calls to publicise and politicise sociology, rather than proposing a coherent theoretical, methodological, practical, institutional alternative, which would be more urgently needed in the light of his reformative purpose as a defender of public sociological conduct in and out of the academe.

To appropriate Rorty’s (1999: xviii–xix) words to our discussion, what seems to be lacking in Burawoy’s approach is the channelling of his ‘efforts at persuasion’ in ‘the form of gradual inculcation of new ways of speaking, rather than of straightforward argument within old ways of speaking’.

Much of Burawoy’s argument is anachronistic, reading like a revisiting of Gans’ 1988 ASA presidential address, and echoing Gouldner and Mills’ own grievances with the discipline, the University and the weakening of public life. Virtuous and inspiring though such a choice may be, it eschews the burdens of responsibility that such loud calls for change inevitably entail, thus offering an idea for and a view of sociology that looks more like what Raymond Williams (1989) would call a ‘resource of’ and for ‘hope’ than a robust and authoritative outline of a theory of professional sociological practice in the current cultural and socio-political climate.

As a concluding footnote to such a perfunctory critique of Burawoy’s version of public sociology, one last scepticism can be voiced about Burawoy’s systemic and structural reading of the current crisis of sociology. In identifying sociology’s malaise as structural
and inherently systemic, offering public sociology as the reformative cure, it seems worthwhile to ask whether a more institutionalist\textsuperscript{74} approach would be more suitable as an accurate reading of the institutional/cultural taken-for-granted features that influence the character and function of sociology at present: knowledge regimes, trust relationships, scholarly habits and disciplinary norms.

An ethnographic study of these variable aspects of sociology’s professional milieu would perhaps be better suited to Burawoy’s methodological sensibilities, than a structural Marxist interpretation of the discipline, which seems to have been preferred instead.

The casualty of such a choice is the possibility of gaining a fuller and clearer insight into the quotidian practices of sociologists that justify, reproduce and sanction the features that Burawoy finds so problematic, and hopes to replace with his matrix of public sociology. In limiting his analysis to a broad discussion of structural constraints, without exploring the institutional conduct that licenses them, Burawoy seems to fail where Burrows (2012) succeeds in his attempt to succinctly outline the implications of metric assemblages on contemporary sociological practice in academia. Burrows’ analysis points not to a structural but to an ‘affective’ and ‘somatic’ crisis in sociology, arguing that the influence of metrics, in the form of citations, workload models, transparent costing data, research assessments, teaching quality assessments, and commercial university league tables, needs to be recognised, studied and accounted for when interpreting the current climate in and conditions of academic work\textsuperscript{75}.

Having so far addressed some preliminary objections to Michael Burawoy’s overall defense of public sociology, by voicing certain doubts about his rationale, method, theoretical approach and overt ideological leanings, the next section offers a critical rejoinder to the eleven theses that Burawoy proposed as nodes towards the advancement of sociology, by questioning their validity, lucidity and purpose, as a prelude to the next chapter which surveys similar criticisms as recorded in the relevant literature on public sociology from 2004 to the present day.

\textsuperscript{74} The term is borrowed from economics as usually ascribed to North (1990) and Ostrom (2000)

\textsuperscript{75} For a similar accounts on the ‘agonies’ of excellence’ see Prichard and Thomas (2014), and Gill (2009).
Section II: Towards a critical reconnaissance with Burawoy’s eleven theses on public sociology

Having raised some preliminary objections to the manner in which Burawoy has broadly defended public sociology as a panacea for most of the discipline’s ills, this section aims at critically discussing his eleven theses for public sociology, in order to challenge the specific claims he makes in his enthusiastic endorsement of public sociology; suggesting that his prescription for sociology’s purported weaknesses may be equally as problematic as his diagnosis.

The remainder of this section will therefore examine, and critically respond to each of Burawoy’s original eleven theses, in an attempt to assess their currency and value as instructions for change, while also wondering whether such an exercise in persuasion amounts to anything more than a contemporary rhetorical equivalent to Marx’s own epigrammatic eleven Theses on Feuerbach.

I. The first of Burawoy’s theses in defence of public sociology, introduces what Burawoy (2005c: 261) calls ‘the scissors movement’ in sociology, according to which ‘sociology has moved left and the world has moved right’\(^\text{76}\). Arresting though the scissors metaphor may be, it can also be read like a misplaced hyperbole, as it does not come up to the expectations of Burawoy’s grand overture to his eleven theses, nor does it meet the requirements of his argument on at least two counts.

Firstly, the sole evidence that Burawoy (2005c: 262) offers for such an alleged tectonic shift in ideology across the globe, is a swift comparison of the reaction of the American Sociological Association’s members to the Vietnam War in 1968, and to the Iraq War in 2003, suggesting that while the majority of ASA members ‘opposed the ASA taking a position’ in 1968, the majority of ASA members ‘favored the resolution’ against the war in Iraq.

Followed by just a few examples of how the content of sociology has been radicalised following the plight of the soixante-huitards, despite the ASA members’ reluctance in

\(^{76}\) All excerpts from M.Burawoy’s original ASR article quoted here, are taken from its republication for the *British Journal of Sociology*, 56(2), June 2005.
responding as a professional association to the Vietnam War \(^{77}\) debate, Burawoy fails to support his already exaggerated claim with any amount of evidence that can justify such a statement as credible.

The problem with permitting such generalisations is not only a matter of academic scrupulousness, but also a moral concern given that any such claim would need substantive evidence of such a global shift in sociological work and would also require a thorough analysis of such a change, beyond merely referring to an ASA vote, or offering a general reading of the development of sociology since the late 1960s as acquiring a more critical and politicised stance. To make matters worse, it is highly contradictory, if not paradoxical, to claim that ‘the radicalism of the 1960s diffused through the profession’, while at the same time showing how at the height of a political impasse during that period, sociologists at large did not live up to such a reactionary attitude towards both politics and their discipline. It is also quite problematic to claim that ‘the ascent of the 1960s generation to leadership positions in departments and our association marked a critical drift that is echoed in the content of sociology’, given that the development of sociology in the wake of postmodernity has followed a less linear trajectory than Burawoy’s (2005c: 262) simplistic suggestion of a ‘leftward drift’ readily suggests.

Despite the influence of radical social movements, liberation movements, the rise of identity politics, and the embrace of transformative ideas from feminism and Afrocentric paradigms on the study and the doing of sociology, the discipline has not simply assumed a critical guise in the unproblematic way that Burawoy suggests given that from the late 1970s, sociology has witnessed a scientistic mainstream which licensed Gouldner’s (1970, 1973, 1979, 1985) fierce attacks on the bureaucratisation of the discipline and made Lyotard’s 1979 report on the state of knowledge, as submitted to the higher education council of Québec, synonymous with the ills of the ‘postmodern condition’\(^{78}\).

\(^{77}\) A similar complaint was made by Noam Chomsky (1967), echoing Dwight McDonald’s (1957, 1957) earlier condemnation of the silence and complicity of many intellectuals in the horrors of the 1930s in Ethiopia and Spain, as well as those a decade later, of the Nazis, of Hiroshima, of Dresden.  

\(^{78}\) The very term, ‘postmodernity’, as Readings (1996: 6) and Fuller (2009: 19) show, was coined by Lyotard in that report for the government of Québec’, although Harvey (1989: vii) sees the origins of such a ‘sea-change in cultural as well as in political-economic practices since around 1972’.
To interpret the historical development of sociology simply as an exponential rise of its critical faculties over its institutionalisation as a discipline, is to fail to account for the rivalry between those two aspects of sociology’s character, where the increasing insularity, specialisation and institutionalisation of sociological scholarship has signalled a relative decline in its political content, while simultaneously paving the way for morally and politically engaged social discourse à la Gouldner and Bell in America, Habermas and Marcuse in Germany during the second wave of the Frankfurt School, or Stuart Hall and other prominent exponents of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Thatcherite England, to mention just a few indicative examples and trends. Such attempts to recover a moral vision of sociology from the bureaucratised, scientised and mathematized mainstream, and to defend a critical social science instead, points not to a ‘scissors-movement’, as Burawoy contends, but to a double-edged sword where the proliferation of lesbian and gay theory, queer, postcolonial studies and post-structural (post-modern) sociological perspectives emerged as a response to the dominant paradigm of disciplinary knowledges, rather than as an unobstructed rise to meet the summit of moral sociological ambitions. To put it more realistically, as Seidman (1998: 299) does, the development of sociology post-1960s can be mapped as follows; ‘successful institutionalisation encouraged the professionalization of sociology. This included the standardisation of study areas (e.g. organisations, crime, demography, urban, political), the consolidation of a technical language, specialisation, the canonizing of a theory tradition, the mathematisation of research, and the belief that only science yields social knowledge’.

Rather than offering a more balanced and historically-grounded analysis of the changing faces of sociology from the turbulent 1960s to the present day, Burawoy limits himself in celebrating the purported triumph of sociology’s ‘leftward drift’, without acknowledging the tensions and conflicts that have punctuated sociology’s coming of age in postmodern times, and which remain enduring features of the discipline’s character at present, oscillating as it does between, what Brown et al. (2006) call, the ‘regulatory discourses’ in the current climate of higher education, and a critical and politicised arm that tries to oppose and dislodge them. Failing to account

79 Jacoby (1987: 147) put it similarly by arguing that ‘professionalization leads to privatization or depoliticization, a withdrawal of intellectual energy from a larger domain to a narrower discipline’. 
for such divergence in the discipline’s identity, culture and structure is failing to also make sense of the key stages in the historical development of knowledge, sociological and non-sociological alike, from ‘Alexandria to the Internet’ as McNeely and Wolverton (2008) playfully put it, in their own account of the re-invention of knowledge in six main stages; from the construction of the Library of Alexandria to the rise (and lasting success) of the laboratory, by way of the monastery, the university, the Republic of Letters and the disciplines, heralding the arrival of “inter-” and “trans-disciplinary Mode Two knowledge(s), and the flowering of a new phase in the development and democratization of knowledge, hailed by Dunleavy (2012) as the ‘Republic of Blogs’.

What such a brief allusion to the historical trajectory of the production of sociological knowledge shows, is that Burawoy’s oversimplified account papers over such delicate variations and complicated disagreements, in a manner that implies a uniform, one-ness of sociology rather than admit the multi-sided, diverse, untidy and ruptured historical development of the discipline which cannot be contained in the careless ‘scissors movement’ metaphor.

To put it simply, sociology’s inheritance from “the sixties” was not simply the countercultural relaxation of cultural taboos and social norms about clothing, music, drugs, dress, formalities, and schooling, but also the encounter of the corporatisation of academia with the challenges in the knowledge economy, under what Lyotard (1984 [1979]) and Marxist geographer David Harvey (1989) diagnosed respectively as the ‘postmodern condition’, or ‘condition of post-modernity’ as a newly-emerging contested cultural and socio-political terrain; a veritable ‘sea-change in cultural as well as in political-economic practices since around 1972’ in Harvey’s (1989: vii) words.

Before moving to the second critique of Burawoy’s ‘scissors movement’ thesis, it should also be noted that his depiction of the ASA as a more radicalised professional association is hardly unanimous and definitely not without its critics.

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80 Dunleavy’s article is available online only and can be accessed at the LSE’s ‘Impact of Social Sciences’ blog: [http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2012/06/12/the-republic-of-blogs/](http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2012/06/12/the-republic-of-blogs/). Similar concerns can be found in a book he has co-authored with Bastow and Tinkler (2014).

81 It is perhaps useful to remind ourselves of Wilner’s (1985) study of articles from the ASA’s flagship journal, the *American Sociological Review*. Analysing subjects covered by articles in the ASR from 1936 to 1982, Wilner found that, despite its pre-eminence, the ASR neglected key socio-political events and developments, with only a paucity of articles (around 1%) addressing the Cold War and the McCarthy witch-hunts.
Deflem (2004) wrote a polemical and quasi-satirical piece about the ASA’s merchandise, pointing to the ASA’s ‘commercialization’ and ‘managerialization’ as a ‘moral problem’, that may offer some hints about how professional associations such as the ASA are formed by and appeal to ‘consumers rather than intellectuals’. The underlying logic and the corresponding theory that Deflem capitalises on to critique the integrity of the ASA, revisits Durkheim’s (2005 [1897]: 346) comment, in Suicide, on how ‘identity of origin, culture and occupation makes occupational activity the richest sort of material for a common life’, which Deflem transforms into a question about the ASA’s character wondering whether it is ‘a moral force that can impress itself upon the economy rather than merely be its servant’, perhaps resembling a ‘guild’ instead.

Despite the exaggerated tone of the text as well as the slightly flimsy example that he uses, Deflem asks important questions about whether the ASA, or any professional association for that matter, can be seen as the bearer of ‘moral authority that is needed to curtail the normative problems characteristic of modern life’, rather than another casualty ‘of an unbridled market’, therefore lacking the inspirational and regulative force that Burawoy seems to imbue the ASA’s members with.

The second argument against Burawoy’s ‘scissors movement’ thesis concentrates on the equally contentious way in which Burawoy (2005c: 263) identifies the ‘sociological ethos’ with the political Left, considering public sociology to be the inevitable product of an ideology, rather than leading its life as an autonomous and independent entity. The problem with treating public sociology as synonymous to the Left is not so much an issue of political orientation or ideological preference, as much as it is a moral bias informed by a perspective that warps our image of the discipline’s history.

Not only are multiple ideological traditions represented within sociology that run the whole gamut of political convictions, rather than neatly fit Burawoy’s ‘scissors’ metaphor, but to articulate a vision for public sociology in such terms is to offer an

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83 For a similar argument, see Alexander (2011: 195-203).
84 Auguste Comte, Émile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons immediately come to mind, as well as Bell (1976: xi-xii) who, in the foreword of The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, described himself as a ‘socialist in economics, a liberal in politics, and a conservative in culture’, thereby making the neat alignment of
outline of propaganda rather than a programmatic statement for the future development of the discipline as a whole, therefore treating sociology as a privileged servant of the Left.

By praising sociology’s ‘leftward drift’, we are left to wonder whether Burawoy celebrates sociology’s alleged re-politicisation per se, or its inculcation with the moral values and the specific political lexicon of the Left, in a way that is reminiscent of Foucault (1984: 67), in Truth and Power, where he recounts how ‘for a long period, the “left” intellectual spoke and was acknowledged the right of speaking in the capacity of master of truth and justice. He was heard, or purported to make himself heard, as the spokesman of the universal. To be an intellectual meant something like being the consciousness/conscience of us all’.

Thus privileging the Left as having the monopoly over ‘consciousness/conscience’ and virtue, or acting as the undisputable ‘master of truth and justice’, is to confound sociological scholarship with what, Slovenian philosopher and cultural theorist, Slavoj Žižek (1989) colourfully termed, in Immanuel Kant’s intellectual shadow, ‘the sublime object of ideology’, therefore blurring the boundaries between ideology and objective intelligibility. Sociology does not need to reveal its party card to remain politicised and radical in its outlook, or be publicly accountable to its various publics, academic and civic alike, and such usurpation of the character of an entire discipline by just one political credo seems facile as it is morally dubious.

The main reservation, if not warning, about Burawoy’s ‘scissors movement’ is in fact that it is:

(a) Static and limited in its understanding of “the political” merely as “the ideological”,
(b) Biased in its privileging of the Left as an exclusive representative of political and moral virtue (areté) rather than the ideological militarism of virtù.

sociologists to specific ideologies problematic enough for Bell (1976: xi-xii) to also add that ‘assuming that if a person is radical in one realm, he is radical in all others; and, conversely, if he is a conservative in one realm, that he must be conservative in the others as well. Such an assumption misreads, both sociologically and morally, the nature of these different realms’.

For an interesting discussion on the identity of the intellectual Left in post-war France, see Khilnani (1993)

Arête here corresponds to Aristotle’s use of the word, especially in Nicomachean Ethics, to mean “moral virtue”, while virtù corresponds to “tactics”, as employed by Niccolò Machiavelli in The Prince.
(c) Facile in its diagnosis of the entire world’s political orientation, and
(d) Problematic in equating sociology as a discipline with a single ideological category.

In so doing, Burawoy does injustice to his use of the term “public sociology”, allowing,
to paraphrase Langford (1999), ‘revolutions of the heart’ to morph into ‘delusions of
[political] love’, thereby ignoring Cesaire’s humanist and ecumenical (1995 [1956]:
127) warning that ‘no race [or ideology] holds a monopoly of beauty, of intelligence
and strength’, and that ‘there is room for all at the rendez-vous of conquest’.

Colonising sociology by means of ideology is to undermine the discipline’s broader
pedagogic, epistemological, cultural and socio-political mission, therefore restricting it
to the production and reproduction of activists, committed to just one faith, by
dwelling on anachronistic political distinctions with no ‘axiomatic guarantee’87, or a
single, unitary monolithic theoretical identity outside of the particular history of
conjunctures and disjunctures in which they find themselves88.

The main charge against Burawoy in his assessment of the world’s propensity towards
the Right, and sociology’s leaning towards the political Left, is not only that it is
simplistic, and faulty on historical grounds, but also that it is irrelevant to sociology’s
purpose, influence and impact as a social science.

Sociology’s relevance and public character is not a matter of the discipline’s ideological
imprint but a matter of maximising its impact as a publicly-oriented social science.

To divide the discipline ideologically, is to fragment it further, therefore mistaking the
task, promise, calling and vocation of sociology, to remember Mills (1959) and Weber
(1904), with labouring under the alluring sounds of ideology’s lyre, therefore
contributing to its inward-looking and internally divided status rather than working
towards progressively eliminating a divide that is as incomprehensible and
unjustifiable as it is interminable.

II. The second of Burawoy’s (2005c: 263) eleven theses reflects on ‘the multiplicity of
public sociologies’, each addressing ‘different types of publics and multiple ways of
accessing them’.

87 See, Anderson (1998)

88 For similar discussions, see Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Bobbio (1996), and Fraser (1997).
In acknowledging the existence of such variety in the number of sociologies and publics that currently exist and can also be created, Burawoy (2005c: 264) draws a distinction between ‘traditional public sociology’ and ‘organic public sociology’, to distinguish between sociological work of academic import but of public relevance, and between the immersion of the sociologist in the public she wishes to engage, explore and help develop. Although Burawoy reserves much praise for traditional public sociology, he aspires to a profoundly Gramscian organic model, as best suited to his vision for public sociology, thus drawing on a time-old distinction between “arm-chair theory”, and more engaged types of sociological conduct; reminiscent of Chicago School’s pioneering ethnographer Robert Park’s (in Brewer, 2000: 13) own musings on the matter:

‘You have been told to go grubbing in the library thereby accumulating a mass of notes and a liberal coating of grime. You have been told to choose problems wherever you can find musty stacks of routine records. This is called ‘getting your hands dirty in real research’. Those who counsel you thus are wise and honourable men. But one thing more is needful: first hand observation. Go sit in the lounges of luxury hotels and on the doorsteps of the flop-houses; sit on the Gold Coast settees and in the slum shakedowns; sit in the orchestra hall and in the Star and Garter Burlesque. In short, gentlemen, go get the seat of your pants dirty in real research’.

Park’s advice to his students to explore the social world from the level of agency, and Burawoy’s call for sociologists to embrace their civic responsibilities tout court, correspond to an image of scholars and educators who are de facto unwilling to cloister themselves away from the activities and concerns of “the real world”, and are armed with a strong commitment to pedagogic imperatives, therefore aspiring to the expansion of the obligations of academics to the social world they study, and to the shrinking of the distance between students and the learning process in which they find themselves.

Such an idealised view of both educators and learners in tertiary education as representing a harmonious community of intellectual life, secure in the walled gardens of academia, is of course laudable but has also been substantially challenged by the transformation of the culture of academic life since the advent of the ‘marketisation of

In such a climate of ‘scholastic apartheid’ between ‘intellectual-based learning experience’ and ‘the marketization of higher education’, as Marinetto (2012) put it, Burawoy’s ambitions for the cultivation of organic intellectuals in the modern academe, would need to:

(a) Acknowledge such a state of affairs alongside its impact on the role of academics and students alike, and

(b) Take into account the complicity of faculty and students in processes and policies that sustain and encourage the commercialisation of education.

In addition to that, a few additional qualifying points must be raised in relation to Burawoy’s fervent support to wielding the influence of educational processes in order to foster new and dynamic publics in and out of the gilded halls of the academe.

First of all, Burawoy’s (2005c: 265) willingness to ‘create other publics’ and ‘constitute ourselves as a public that acts in the political arena’, lacks a specific programme that can show how to create such publics exactly, and fails to recognise that “our colleagues” and “our students” may not wish to become members of such a republic of organic public sociologists in the first place, especially in such an environment of intense institutionalisation of the educational experience on virtually all fronts.

Secondly, Burawoy’s (2005c: 263) steely determination to consider and address students as ‘our first and captive public’, may be met with increased scepticism or relative indifference given the possibility of students making sense of themselves and their learning experience as active consumers in search of job and career opportunities, rather than as enlightened scholars and politicised citizens.

The role of persuasion through the method of maieutics is of course vital to counter such an instrumental view of education and scholarly activity, but it may also be vehemently opposed by managers, fellow-academics and students in an environment that, according to some critics, favours ‘killing thinking’ and the bureaucratisation of education over intellectual creativity (Evans, 2004, Jacoby, 1991, Riessman, 1988, Bledstein, 1976).

Thirdly, it seems important to consider whether the student-as-consumer, who may voluntarily choose to participate in a “customer-service-provider model” of higher
education, should wish to be addressed as or be moulded into a public, as well as whether it is the role of sociology to create publics, or develop scholarship for the use of publics.

Virtuous, inspiring and brave though it may be to suggest that sociology has traditionally been of public descent and made with public intent, such a benevolent view of sociological labour as the courier of knowledge for the public sphere is also historically contestable, as well as an ideologically and scholarly contentious.

Last but not least, Burawoy’s suggestions on what and who a public may be, or how it may be made are virtually lacking, therefore making his agonistic stance towards revivifying the public orientation of scholarly work in sociology increasingly vulnerable to criticism, as it hardly provides a comprehensive road map of how to force our way through the fog of problems that such reformatory fervour will inevitably meet in the current climate of Higher Education.

Any such call to widen the dimensions of scholarship and open up students’ minds to the public benefits of their education would need to consider, or at least sketch a quick pen portrait of the manifold pressures that arise from the international and financial context of marketisation.

These include the gradual emergence of new roles and purposes of universities as institutions that cater for needs that go beyond scholarly and educational imperatives, the implications of university branding and promotion, the influence of league tables and student surveys as barometers of the quality of education (often explained in terms of efficiency), the global expansion of the higher education market and distance learning online, the role of students as consumers in the co-creation of value (educational and otherwise), and the changing student and faculty experiences, demands and focus towards goals that may not fit the Humboldtian educational ideal of freedom to teach (Lehrfreiheit), the freedom to learn (Lerhnfreiheit) and to conduct independent research (Freiheit der Wissenschaft).89

This need to account for the specific context in which publicly-minded scholars find themselves in, or excluded from, becomes even more urgent considering that it has been a historical concern which remains largely unresolved, therefore making any

89 A more detailed view of the “Humboldtian University” will follow in Part Three of this current thesis.
current plea for the democratisation of education questionable unless a clear, coherent and analytical vision is presented in lieu of celebratory tributes to public education and scathing critiques of the commodification of thinking and learning within the University and its institutional satellites.

Re-claiming the *jouissance* of intellectual (public) life or even the eroticisation of learning (Bell, 2014), is to step into a territory of intellectual battles with the intention to shorten their shelf-life as valid complaints, and to transform them into everyday scholarly routines and institutional practices, therefore making irrelevant a long pedigree of grievances about the commercialisation of education from Socrates’ concern with how the Sophists ‘peddl[ed] their wisdom’ for money (Furedi in Molesworth, 2011: 4), or J.S. Mill’s distaste of how teachers ‘attain their purposes’, not by ‘making people wiser or better, but by conforming to their opinions, pandering to their existing desires, and making them better pleased with themselves and with their errors and vices than they were before’ (Mill, 1978: 401). A similar claim was put more graphically by Frank Riessman (1988), who described how increased pressure for teachers to regard students as ‘consumers’ and to teach to their preferences, signalled ‘the next stage in student reform’.

Such views of ‘academic enterprise in an era of rising student consumerism’, as Riesman (1980) put it, echo Rich’s (1979: 231) disappointment with how such consumer mentality encourages students to expect an education, rather than to claim one; to be ‘acted upon’ than to ‘act’ in the pursuit of their educational goal.

Leaving the students’ responsibilities, or consumer preferences aside, similar ringing condemnations of the rise of consumerism in Higher Education are also raised in relation to academic administrators and academic staff alike who are depicted by Veblen (1918 in Bledstein, 1976: 287) as:

‘[b]usiness-minded predators who corrupted the scholarly mission of a real university by packaging education in salable units, weighing scholarship in bulk and market-value, promoting the growth of a corps of bureaucratic functionaries, treating faculty as hired hands, firing controversial teachers, raiding other institutions, measuring a university

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90 These scathing remarks on the apparently servile attitude of teachers towards students were written in 1866, in the form of a review of amateur classical historian George Grote’s essay *Plato and Other Companions of Socrates*. Mill’s essay-review, entitled ‘Grote’s Plato’, can be found in Robson (1978).
by the size of its bank statement, and selling higher learning to the public by paying obeisance to the rule that the consumer always knows best’.

Academic faculty are also hardly exempted from such accusations of complicity in adopting managerial fads, and Jacoby (1991: 286-7) went as far as to argue that academics have ‘become market enthusiasts’ who look like ‘loan officers’, offering course that resemble ‘managerial training programmes’, therefore emphasising education in skills rather than education itself; a trend that stands in contrast to the Socratic paradigm of paideia, which Burawoy implicitly evokes in his call for the cultivation of organic public intellectuals.

Unlike other proponents of a well-rounded paideia, such as Adler (1982), Burawoy does not present a public sociological manifesto for modern universities to accompany his idea of nurturing sociological education as a public good which encourages the cultivation of an appreciation for public participation, as befits learned citizens. Instead of that, Burawoy simply makes an, almost purely rhetorical, case for a reflexive form of critical education which leaves a lot of questions unanswered and a lot to be desired. Paradoxically enough, infinitely more convincing arguments on the issue have been put forward by management scholars such as Thompson and McGivern (1996) and Dunne et al. (2008), thus making Burawoy’s argument problematically weak in comparison.

An alternative proposition, which is entirely missing, could emphasize how amid the buzz and hum of marketisation processes in Higher Education, the rise of management practices might be an open invitation to the self-management of our discipline’s scholarly content, educational mission and public character. Such an argument however would require something closer to a detailed programme for change than a mere rallying cry which is what Burawoy seems to offer.

III. Having presented organic public sociology as the ‘reactionary tract for the times’, to recall the subtitle to W.H. Auden’s (2009 :182) poem Under Which Lyre?, Burawoy introduces his matrix of four sociologies, where he lists professional, policy, critical and public sociologies as the main nodes in the broad network of current sociological practice. In doing so, he is careful to point out that such a division of sociological labour should be likened more to a loose amalgam of sociological variations, rather than as an authoritative sociological equivalent to chemistry’s periodic table of the
elements, therefore never suggesting that his proposed grid is exhaustive or conclusive.

While acknowledging both the inherent limitations of his typology of and for sociological practice, as well as the manner in which all four types of sociology inevitably bleed into each other, Burawoy’s (2005c: 269) model willingly engages in ‘what Bourdieu (1986 [1979], 1988[1984]) would call a classification struggle’ which may displace or misplace the practice of many sociologists, thus raising a series of questions about:

(a) Whether such categorisation is desirable
(b) Whom it may represent
(c) How, and
(d) Why.

These four initial questions pose some additional challenges in justifying the factuality, functionality, directionality and alterability of Burawoy’s four-dimensional matrix leaving the reader to wonder:

(a) Whether such a division of labour corresponds to or adequately captures the dimensions and flow of current sociological practice (factuality),
(b) Whether Burawoy’s model helps or hinders our understanding, self-identification, orientation and function as sociologists (functionality),
(c) How such a typology may/can give us a sense of purpose and direction (directionality), and
(d) How such a proposition may guide us to make structural or institutional changes in order to better define or re-define the conditions of our everyday sociological practice (alterability).

Following such scepticism about the uses (utility) of Burawoy’s intra-disciplinary matrix, it seems important to also question the need (or desirability) for such an exercise in nomenclature given that, as Burawoy himself admits, by often occurring all at once, these four sociologies may also be performed by scholars who are busy acting all the parts simultaneously, thus making it increasingly difficult to decide when one is engaged in one type of sociology rather than the other.

Much like Marx and Engels’ (1845, in G.A. Cohen, 2000: 132) depiction of everyday life under communism, in The German Ideology, sociologists too have no ‘one exclusive
sphere of activity, but each can become accomplished in any branch’ they wish, therefore making it possible ‘to do one thing today and another tomorrow’; writing policy sociology in the morning, doing professional sociology in the afternoon, exercising critical sociology in the evening and indulging in public sociology after dinner, without ever strictly becoming professional, policy, critical or public sociologists.

Although, Burawoy (2005c: 269) recognises and celebrates the permeability of the four sociologies’ borders by noting that ‘any given piece of sociology can straddle these ideal types or move across them over time’, he refrains from explaining why such classification is necessary in the first place, since all four sociologies wrap themselves around another so intimately, but also airbrushes the question of how each of the four types may constitute its own genre historically, therefore leaving unexplored the question of whether and how they may compete with one another too; each defending its own vested interests for professional domination, legitimation and funding despite their propensity for cross-dressing and overlap.

IV, V and VI. In his effort to elaborate the internal complexity of his four-dimensional representation of sociological practice, Burawoy attempts to refine his exercise in the classification of the production of sociological knowledge and practice, by making a few qualifying points in theses IV, V and VI. Given their transmutability as explanatory statements in aid of Burawoy’s sociological matrix, they are grouped and discussed together to facilitate analytical coherence when critically discussing them.

Burawoy’s Thesis IV revisits two questions initially posed by McClung Lee (1976) and Lynd (1939), namely Sociology for Whom? and Knowledge for What? 91, and subsequently reworks and rewords them to fit his sociological matrix, maintaining that these two questions, ‘knowledge for whom’ and ‘knowledge for what?’, ‘define the fundamental character of our discipline’ by ‘allow[ing] us to understand how each type is internally constructed’ (Burawoy, 2005c: 269). As shown in Chapter One, Burawoy uses these two questions as analytical vectors in order to match the four sociologies with their potential audiences (academic and extra-academic), as well as to

91 The first question, ‘Sociology For Whom?’ specifically refers to McLung Lee’s 1976 ASA address, while the second question, ‘Knowledge For What?’, is taken from R.S.Lynd’s (1939) book, Knowledge For What? The Place of the Social Sciences in American Culture.
demonstrate what types of knowledge professional, policy, critical and public sociology are capable of producing.

While Burawoy supplies us with a useful compass with which to discuss what type of knowledge may be produced by what sociology and muse on who may be its potential target audience on what grounds, he fails to consider two important questions; sociology and knowledge “as what?” and “by whom?” These two questions are offered, not necessarily as correctives to Burawoy’s typology but as additional points of exploration with which to critically address Thesis V and VI. But first a certain clarification of the meaning of these two additional questions is urgently needed.

“Sociology as what?” invites us to re-think the discipline’s habitus, suggesting that we turn to exploring sociology’s alternative habitats instead in order to assess whether it can live, survive and indeed thrive outside the physical geography of the academe. In so doing, it raises further questions about whether sociology may be practiced solely as an academic discipline or as a broad and expansive public discourse that transcends academic confines and aspires to share its insights, content and critical attitude in a culture of commons, outside academia and inside the online world.

“Sociology by whom?” seeks to admit more members to sociology’s existing family structure, suspecting that a host of other knowledge-producers may both profit from sociology’s vast array of theories and methods of and for knowing the social world, as well as entertaining the possibility that non-academic knowledge workers may furnish the discipline with transformative ideas that could shape the discipline’s character further in a similar way to sociology’s earlier incorporation of radical ideas, taken from grassroots social movements.

Although Burawoy aspires to publicise sociology, he seems to lack an understanding of how to sociologise publics without treating them as peripheral to the conversation he wishes to see unfolding. Burawoy’s typology addresses the non-academic world merely as an audience, therefore disqualifying publics from acting as co-creators and disseminators of knowledge that can bring ideas, insights and critiques into academia. Conceiving of information flow as one-directional moving from the discipline’s institutional core to the outer public, without imagining or making space for the reverse movement of information from the public world to academic institutions, Burawoy seems to insulate the production of sociological knowledge further, rather
than strive to see it flow and change by crumbling its banks, or widening its channels, as if it were a flowing river than a static fish tank. Restricting any public’s input to academic resources also poses limits to the output of academic knowledge production, therefore:

(a) Empowering the siloing of disciplines and showing a neglect of the possibility for holistic or integrative knowledge production, dissemination and sharing
(b) Intensifying the esoterism of scientific knowledge production, therefore creating little room for knowledge translation to and back-translation from the public sphere
(c) Supporting the culture of credentialisation and the institutionalisation of knowledge, and
(d) Maintaining unequal patterns of information-sharing by operating within the confines of the academic market’s regulation by funding bodies, corporate penetration and government intervention through the bureaucratisation of research.

By contrast, resisting the predominance, or hegemony even, of passive, and one-directional modes of knowledge production by embracing an innovatory two-way knowledge pooling that the current flourishing of online commons offers would:

(a) Speed up the spread of ideas and socialise knowledge/education
(b) Allow academic expertise to become available directly, relevantly and usefully
(c) Communicate academic knowledge effectively to external audiences by treating them as interlocutors
(d) Engage greatly enlarged graduate and professional populations to become co-producers of debate, discursive analysis and knowledge, and
(e) Accelerate cross-disciplinary learning by minimising long-time lags in the production and diffusion of knowledge through adaptation to digital technologies.

Having replaced the institutionally situated ‘knowledge for whom’, and ‘knowledge for what’ questions that Burawoy asks in Thesis IV, with the online-friendly ‘knowledge as what’, and ‘knowledge by whom’ alternatives, it seems timely to tackle Thesis V, which charts the sociologist’s location largely within the academic context by referring to ‘the mismatch of her or his sociological habitus and the structure of the disciplinary field as a whole’ (Burawoy, 2005c: 272).

Countering Burawoy’s attempt to locate sociologists in the interstices of their field and the disciplinary structure at broad, it seems paradoxical for a call to make sociology
public to explore sociologists’ biographies within academia, rather than calling them to explore different trajectories that are available beyond the borders of such institutional ecologies.

In his search for the sociologist’s ‘location’, Burawoy (2005c: 274) does not seem to imagine any other viable place of belonging than the institutional settings where sociology dwells in, observing how ‘[t]he tension between institution and habitus drives sociologists restlessly from quadrant to quadrant, where they may settle for ritualistic accommodation before moving on or abandon the discipline altogether’.

While he recognises the possibility of migration from academia as a result of institutional claustrophobia, Burawoy (2005c: 274) moves on to argue rather contradictorily that such tension notwithstanding, ‘specialization is not inimical to public sociology’. The qualification for such an answer comes in Thesis VI, where Burawoy (2005c: 275) sees the balance between the obstacles and the freedoms of keeping sociology institutionalised, in what he envisages as a tempered version of ‘the normative model’ of and for doing public sociology.

In his reserved defence of such a stance towards public sociology, Burawoy (2005c: 275) explains how his ‘normative vision of the discipline of sociology is of reciprocal interdependence among our four types—an organic solidarity in which each type of sociology derives energy, meaning and imagination from its connection to the others’.

At the same time however, Burawoy (2005c: 275) is careful to note that his endorsement of such a normative vision excludes the overpowering of public sociology at the expense of its allies (professional, policy, critical), suggesting that ‘[i]n being over-responsive to their different audiences [...] each type of sociology can assume pathological forms, threatening the vitality of the whole’.

Such a synergistic approach towards all four sociologies is thought by Burawoy to make specialisation impossible, as no one type can exist without borrowings from and exchanges with the other three, as well as to ensuring that such co-operation guarantees that none of the four types normalises itself while pathologising the others.92

92 For a profound analytical account on such dialectics of ‘the pathology of normalcy’, see Fromm (2002: 12-20).
Laudable though this solidaristic and egalitarian approach towards the four sociologies may be, Burawoy’s analysis suffers from the paternalism and the short-sightedness of his own model mistaking it as the only way of organising or making sense of sociological conduct. Fleeing from the dangers of specialisation does not necessarily mean that the only destination available is within Burawoy’s quadrant, nor does interdependence between different types of sociology need to happen within the confines of Burawoy’s four-dimensional matrix. Uncharitable though such a reading of Burawoy may be, he offers no other escape route, nor does he consider any other plan that may circumvent or indeed by-pass his matrix. To make matters worse, Burawoy limits his road map to sociological freedom within the institutional confines of academia, without envisioning any other life or space for sociology to flourish elsewhere.

In so doing, Burawoy capitalises on and perhaps reinforces an artificial dilemma between inclusion and exclusion which may be largely unnecessary, given the possibility of an open dialogue between academic and non-academic worlds in the manner suggested in our critique of Thesis IV.

Such a choice has the advantage of making sense of the traffic between one’s *habitus* and the surrounding world as more pliable, flexible and amenable to variation and change than Burawoy allows us to think, therefore limiting the concept he borrows from Bourdieu (*habitus*) to the representation of a single location when it can be seen as a point of view that admits more interpretations. In a famous use of the term *habitus* by Bourdieu (1970) in *The Kabyle House, or the World Reversed*[^93], he shows how values, assumptions and ideas about location, identity and belonging may shift by means of adjusting one’s point of observation[^94].

[^93]: Although *The Kabyle House or The World Reversed* was written between 1963 and 1964 as an ethnographic exploration on Kabyles, a Berber ethnic group in N.Algeria, it was published later as part of a volume of tributes to C. Lévi-Strauss on his 60th birthday. Bourdieu ([1970] in Lane, 2000: 96) would later admit that *The Kabyle House* was: ‘The last work I wrote as a blissful structuralist’.

[^94]: Kabyles’ houses mirror their cultural and social universe which is constructed by a series of primary spatial oppositions (inside/outside, east/west). These oppositions are overlaid by a complex network of symbolic meanings (best seen in gender divisions). The interior (h’urma) is a dark, humid space which is thought to signify feminine attributes/values; birth, motherhood, nurture, domesticity, reserved respectability, while the exterior (nif) represents a space for assembly, assertion, male honour and action. Thus, leaving the house from the eastern door we see the sun rise; face the morning light signifying, the openness and honesty of the male world, leaving behind the dark, mystical and unknown
Depending on where one stands (inside or inside) in relation to “the Kabyle house”, both the world and the house looks differently, therefore justifying the subtitle of Bourdieu’s book; ‘the world reversed’. The moral of such a broader interpretation and use of the term *habitus* for the purposes of our discussion, is that it need not be used as a synonym for entrapment, but as a shifting and variable term that may lay down roots in more than one place, depending on outlook. Burawoy’s insistence that sociologies and sociologists move around, between or within his four-dimensional matrix is infinitely problematic and unimaginative as it disallows the power of agency in defining the threshold of our own belonging, identity, allegiance and location; all of which can be, as demonstrated above, multiple and varied rather than singular and fixed.

To draw our analysis of Burawoy’s theses IV, V and VI to a close before discussing the remaining five, it might be worth noting, by means of wrapping up, that Burawoy’s effort to show the internal complexity of sociology, to locate the sociologist and propose his own normative stance towards the practice of sociology, falls into the trap of conceiving of sociology in terms of a pre-designed matrix rather than accepting that the configuration, the space and the voice of sociologists’ work may rather be defined by the width of their research interests and respective sociological imaginations, in a way that may not fit a pre-determined formula or an arbitrary grid.

This seems like an important point to make, considering a sense of uncertainty and puzzlement over whether Burawoy is calling sociologists to align with his schema, rather than commit to the same public cause by choosing their own route as they go along; freely and without displaying subservience to his version of desirable ends, trajectory and destinations.

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domesticity of the female world. Seen from the outside, the house embodies female values, from the inside it embodies both. The western wall of the house is lit by the sun (male) while the eastern wall is in shade (female). More info on *The Kabyle House* and on Bourdieu’s ethnographic work in Algeria can be found in ‘Practical Logics’, which comprises the second part of Bourdieu’s (1992) *The Logic of Practice* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

95 In a characteristic passage from the book, Bourdieu ([1970] in Lane, 2000: 98) explains this perspectival shift in terms of gender identity; ‘One or other of the two systems of oppositions that define the house, either in internal organisation or in its relationship with the external world is brought to the fore depending on whether the house is considered from the male or the female point of view’.
VII. In Thesis VII, Burawoy (2005c: 278) seems to cast some doubt on his previous idealism regarding the interdependence of the four sociologies, and describes the discipline instead as a ‘field of power’, thus acknowledging the, hitherto suppressed, possibility of ‘reciprocal interdependence becoming asymmetrical and antagonistic’. While admitting such hidden injuries in his previous classificatory system, Burawoy (2005c: 278) illustrates such antagonisms by examining past fears and internal animosities within the discipline, and identifies a tension between the instrumental axis of sociology and its reflexive opponent, contending that previous concerns about sociology’s ‘politicianisation’, ‘decomposition’, ‘fragmentation’ and ‘non-cumulativeness’, as represented by Horowitz (1993), Turner and Turner (1990), and Cole (2001), have little relevance at present, arguing instead that the reverse is true in the current state and shape of the discipline; ‘it is the reflexive dimension of sociology that is in danger, not the instrumental dimension’ Burawoy (2005c: 279).

Having diagnosed instrumental sociology’s anthropophagic tendency to eliminate its reflexive adversary, Burawoy (2005c: 279) insists that ‘the balance of power may be weighted in favour of instrumental knowledge, but we can still make our discipline ourselves, creating the spaces to manufacture a bolder and more vital vision’.

Welcome though Burawoy’s recognition that disciplines resemble a battlefield rather than a harmonious commune may be, both his diagnosis as well as his proposed treatment seem to be slightly inaccurate in describing the discipline’s current condition.

Starting with his diagnosis to sociology’s ailment, Burawoy is surprisingly vague in his proposition to furnish a ‘bolder and more vital vision’ for sociology, as he fails to explain how sociologists will model themselves after such an ideal without considering the perennial issue of whether they would be interested in doing so in the first place.

Any such proposition to ‘make our discipline ourselves’ and ‘to create the spaces to manufacture a bolder and more vital vision’ for sociology begs at least two provisional questions; “how to do it” and “with whom”? Burawoy’s answer seem to presuppose a universal sociological “we”, when such unity has hardly been the characteristic of sociology as a discipline thus far, busy as it has been with, what Latour calls (2004: 227), the ‘maintenance of artificial controversies’ concerning its mission and core practices.
Nurturing the possibility of and hoping that such internal strife will come to an end is a valid aim, but it would require a detailed and precise plan of programmatic declarations rather than the mere consolations of a prayer. Envisioning such a plan for the unity of sociology as a discipline, also requires a clearly defined agenda for collective action that might allow sociologists to assemble around a common practice of sociology, provided that this is a desirable goal.

Leaving the question of whether such interminable disagreements may be the life-blood of the discipline, as it has historically been registered, future plans for the unification of the discipline’s various parts, would need to grapple with Burawoy’s “we” in its infinite complexity, and confront problems of collective action that Ostrom (1990 [2007]) summarised as; ‘the tragedy of the commons’, ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’ and ‘the logic of collective action’, as well as offering clear alternatives of self-organisation and self-governance to make collective-choice arrangements possible, viable and sustainable.

Drawing on Aristotle’s observation that ‘what is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it’, which laments how ‘[e]veryone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest”, and reflecting on Hobbes’ parable of man in a state of nature, in Leviathan, as prototypes of the tragedy of the commons; where ‘[m]en seek their own good and end up fighting one another’, Ostrom (2007 [1990]: 2-3) introduces the prisoner’s dilemma thesis by reference to Hardin’s (1968: 1,244) immensely popular article in Science, where he notes the ambivalence of collective actors, be it sociology professionals, farmers or castaways, given that:

‘[E]ach pursu[es] his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons’.

Such already bleak accounts on the organisation, or disorder, of public life, end here with a consideration of the logic of collective action as expressed in Magnus Olson’s (1965: 2) assertion that:

‘Unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests’.

What these three formulations on the organisation of public life as the battle between competing interests over common resources show, is that any such facile evocation of
“us” as a public, professional or otherwise, is to be met with scepticism and caution, unless the complexity and divergence of interests and positions is addressed.

One further conundrum, which Burawoy seems to ignore, points the multiplicity of roles that public actors can play depending on position, situation and circumstance, and Ostrom (2000) provisionally, and with great analytical care, offers at least three; ‘rational egoists’, ‘conditional co-operators’, and ‘willing punishers’. What these three categories show is that people do not act in one-directional or pre-determined ways, but are affected by rich repertoires of action and complex clusters of circumstance which need to be taken into account when thinking about collective action, the organisation of public life and the evolution of social norms.

Not only does Burawoy not offer such a rich account of the complexities involved when making a decision to act towards a desired goal, but he also comes short of spelling out that ‘bolder’ and ‘vital vision’ that may be required in re-defining ourselves, our discipline and our role(s) within it. There is no mention, in Burawoy’s *cri de coeur*, of what co-operative strategies may need to be put in place to achieve such consensus or, indeed, avoid the draining of our common institutional, organisational and disciplinary resources, while any sketch of working hypotheses on how to best devise, modify, monitor and enforce common rules to fit existing institutional arrangements or inspire new ones, is entirely lacking.

Having raised a number of necessary objections to the carelessness with which Burawoy approaches the collective “we” in sociologists’ identity as an institutionalised professional group at present, a critical discussion of his diagnosis of the demise of reflexive knowledge in favour of instrumental imperatives is offered in turn.

Despite definitional problems over what constitutes instrumental, and what reflexive knowledge in an era of academic practice where the proliferation of intra-disciplinarity is the norm, Burawoy’s melancholic disposition towards the alleged elimination of reflexive knowledge to the advantage of instrumentality is problematic on a number of counts.

Firstly, interpreting the discipline as a field of power seems like a fairly inaccurate representation of reality at a time when the academic production of knowledge

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96 A detailed analysis of these three roles can be found in Ostrom (2000).
resembles not a claustrophobic and self-referential milieu, but an open court that admits, attracts and hosts a number of scholars from diverse backgrounds and epistemic locations.

Secondly, contrary to the popular dictum, *diversity, not unity equals strength* in the current climate of scholarship, especially when considering the multiplicity, hybridity, multi-dimensionality, multi-directionality, diffuseness, and openness of intra-disciplinary knowledge production. As Gerring (2011: 4) put it; ‘[n]o escape is possible from broader inter-disciplinary standards if the enterprise of social science is to prove useful to humanity’, therefore calling for the “traditional social sciences” versus “physical science” divide to dissolve, in order to make both subjects relevant, applicable and accountable to the current demands of contemporary public social life.

Thirdly, this re-assemblage of the discipline’s content and structure can be interpreted as emancipatory rather than alienating, given that it provides the opportunity to liberate sociological insights from the discipline’s confines, by making them available and translatable to other domains of public social life and scholarship alike. Such re-orientation of disciplinary priorities is hardly exclusive to sociology after all, but a common trait in virtually all scientific disciplines at present, therefore spelling good news about the outward development of sociology itself, as such a climate of intense exchange encourages the strong convergence of sociology with STEM disciplines in the study of ‘human-dominated systems’ and ‘human-influenced systems’, as Bastow *et al.* (2014: 2) put it.

By establishing such a dialogue with the natural and the physical sciences for the study of humanity in the 21st century, sociology could gradually develop what Collins (1994) found so profoundly lacking; namely a ‘high consensus, rapid discovery’ model that, according to Collins, has been extremely beneficial to the physical sciences since the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, Collins described the pitfalls of the social sciences precisely in terms of the shortage of such a model contending that:

‘Their fundamental disability is not lack of empirical research, nor failure to adhere to a scientific epistemology, nor the greater ideological controversy that surrounds social topics. What is fundamentally lacking in the social sciences is a genealogy of research technology, whose manipulation reliably produces new phenomena and a rapidly
moving research front. Unless the social sciences invent new research hardware, they will likely never acquire much consensus or rapid discovery’.

Fourthly, what Burawoy (2005c: 280) describes as the hegemony, or in his own words ‘despotism’, of reflexive over instrumental scholarship, may well signal what Fuller (2006) called, and in fact celebrated, as ‘the new sociological imagination’ which strives to be applied to other disciplines and institutional settings to better resonate with business, government, civil society and the media, in producing knowledge and information that is ‘shorter, better, faster, free’, as Bastow et al. (2014: 2) put it, through the use of digital scholarship. Nowotny et al.’s (2001: 203) ground-breaking effort to ‘rethink’ science, points to a similar attempt in re-invigorating the sociological imagination, envisaging the space where academia meets society as a new ‘agora’, where the market and politics co-mingle in ‘a space that transcends the categorisations of modernity’.

Last but not least, such changes may be seen as a positive step towards putting an end to the endless reproduction of swathes of inward-looking analyses, commentaries and reflections, where each sets out radically different views about disciplinary futures; disputing fiercely over future directions, subject priorities and methods, and therefore undermining co-operation, dialogue and the possibility for consensus, by rigidly defending rival conceptions of the discipline instead of striving to make them irrelevant.

In the light of the above, it might be argued, as indeed Bastow et al. (2014: xii) repeatedly do, that the reasons for sociology’s depressive state may be interpreted by means of its reluctance to press ahead with such changes, hinting perhaps at ‘why social science research and insights have been scantly adopted in business, and have been less influential than one might expect in government and civil society; and why the public prestige and government funding of the social sciences lags so far behind that of the ‘physical’ sciences’. An essential part of bolstering the reflexivity of sociological knowledge could be to reconsider the dichotomy between instrumentality and reflexivity as artificial and arbitrary, if not entirely misleading and sclerotic, considering that the current climate of intellectual life makes high co-operative demands on any type of publicly-oriented scholarship, if it harbours ambitions to be directly involved as a worthy and authoritative interlocutor in a level playing field for
public influence. In their timely and painstakingly detailed assessment of the current impact of social sciences, Bastow et al (2014: xiii) conclude that:

‘For any societal research to be successfully applied in public or organisational decisions it must be timely, produced speedily, capturing the salient features of a situation and behaviours that may shift quickly in response to new factors, and interact with previously separate phenomena. All applied and impactful academic knowledge must also be “translated” from single-discipline silos; bridged and integrated with the insights of other disciplines in the social sciences or beyond in the applied and human-focused physical sciences; and assimilated into a joined-up picture so as to adequately encompass real world situations. Research advances and insights must also be communicated or transferred to non-academic people and organizations, and their lessons mediated, deliberated and drawn out in useable ways’.

VIII, IX, X and XI. The four remaining theses of Burawoy’s apostolic mission to convert sociologists to his sola fide conception of public sociology are grouped together, and will be discussed in relation to each other in the remainder of this chapter, given the similarity and the translatability between them.

Burawoy’s (2005c: 280) Thesis VIII attempts a top-bottom distinction between professional sociology’s concentration ‘in the research departments at the top of a highly stratified system of university education’, and between ‘the subaltern levels’, where public sociology ‘is more important if less visible’. Using that distinction as a starting point for considering ‘where the next impetus for sociology’ will come from, Burawoy (2005c: 281) suspects that the answer may lie in the combination of professional sociology’s rootedness in the academe and the bottom-up force of public sociology, but re-arranged and re-aligned in order to fit the global terms of sociological practice, predicting a ‘21st century public sociology of global dimensions’ (Burawoy, 2005c: 282). While this coalition of professional sociology with public sociology has to be treated as salutary, it points towards a combination across types of sociology, but not across diverse disciplines, therefore forging bonds that are less ambitious than advertised and with doubtful results given that such movement between types of sociological practice, signals improvement only within the space of Burawoy’s typology, rather than around or outside it, limiting any such coalition’s output at the outset, instead of widening the dimensions of such co-operation to include other
disciplinary influences that may be globally varied. To aspire to a global impetus for sociology, while offering a model of alternatives that is characterised by what Beck (2002a: 18) calls ‘methodological nationalism’, is as provincial as it is incongruous. Burawoy’s unification of professional and public sociologies with the intent of creating a globally relevant and applicable sociology for the 21st century, cannot simply stop at dissolving hierarchies and disciplinary structures in the American model of sociology, but may rather need to open itself up to other developments in and modes of global scholarship at broad, thus requiring a broader remit of and for social science that engages with developments in other disciplines and international traditions of scholarly practice that are currently emerging and may not be easy to pin down, but are open enough to admit participation of the sociology that Burawoy envisions in such close-knit terms.

Much like Beck’s understanding of methodological nationalism, Burawoy’s easy marriage of professional and public sociologies with a global twist, but only within his four-dimensional matrix, in the manner explained above, takes the following ideal premises, if not ideal types, for granted:

‘[I]t equates societies with nation-state societies, and sees states and their governments as the cornerstones of a social sciences analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which on the inside, organize themselves as nation-states and, on the outside, set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. It goes even further: this outer delimitation, as well as the competition between nation-states, represents the most fundamental category of political organization . . . Indeed, the social science stance is rooted in the concept of nation-state. It is a nation-state outlook on society and politics, law, justice and history, which governs the sociological imagination (Beck, 2002b: 51-52).

By replacing Beck’s reference to “nation-states” with “types of sociology”, one arrives at similar conclusions about Burawoy’s (2005c: 282) globally ambitious but locally gentrified model, which calls for a ‘21st century sociology of global dimensions’, but envisages movement only within a nationally focused disciplinary matrix, which elects just two types of narrowly-defined sociologies as its only delegates.
Paradoxical though this may sound, Burawoy (2005c: 282) follows a similar thought-process in Thesis IX, where he argues in favour of ‘provincializing American sociology’ to make it more globally relevant. Acknowledging the prevalence of the professional over the public dimension in the academic practice and institutional arrangements of American sociology, Burawoy claims that sociology in the US appears strikingly provincial in its public guise, in comparison with other countries, like South Africa, where the very term “public sociology” would sound like an oxymoron.

In recognising such a difference in the performance of these two types of sociology in the American context, Burawoy (2005c: 284) also interprets American sociology’s hegemonic status as a *lingua franca* that is endorsed world-wide, ‘not simply in terms of numbers and resources’ but also by ‘holding academics, sociologists included, accountable to ‘international’ standards, which means publishing in ‘Western’, journals, and in particular American journals’. Reading the global spread of American sociology in such terms, Burawoy proposes that American sociology would need to move from the vanguard to the rear-guard by taking a back-seat in the contagious spread of its professional sociology and offer the driver’s-seat to other national sociologies around the world so that their public sociologies can become audible globally. As Burawoy (2005c: 284) himself puts it ‘United States sociology becomes world-hegemonic. We, therefore, have a special responsibility to provincialize our own sociology, to bring it down from the pedestal of universality and recognise its distinctive character and national power’. While such a call for American sociology to lie fallow in order to encourage crop rotation worldwide invites a dialogue across borders between national sociologies, as well as stimulating the growth of American sociology’s public dimension, it opens up a series of uncomfortable questions about how Burawoy envisages the role of US sociology’s alleged hegemonic status.

Apart from perhaps confounding “American” with “Western sociology”, by reading the global spread on Anglophone sociological literature as an indication of a hegemonic take-over, rather than as a voluntary translation of disciplinary insights across cultures, albeit in a shared idiom, Burawoy seems not to provincialise American sociology but to ‘imperialise’ and ‘orientalise’ it, to paraphrase Said (1978).

Generous though Burawoy’s request for American sociology to step down may be, thus allowing other national delegates to be heard in the international academic
council of disciplines, it can also be read as a gratuitous extension of privilege from an imperial power to its colonies, couched in terms of a humanitarian aid package, thus disrespectfully elbowing the sovereignty of national sociologies out, also implying that perhaps they lack the power of autonomous self-rule and that this may be granted as a favour from the American sociological hegemon.

Such a “white-man’s-burden” approach to the democratisation of sociological practice world-wide, can sound patronising and demeaning rather than benevolent and cosmopolitan, running the risk of being weighed-down by the burden of its own prejudice instead of applying itself to an international context of global scholarship; thus risking identification with the ‘trap of methodological nationalism’ rather than the ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in sociology, to paraphrase Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2009)97.

Having, implicitly, divided sociology’s universe in terms of “core” and “periphery”, Burawoy (2005c: 285) attempts another exercise in carving up the disciplinary geography in Thesis X, where he ‘divid[es] the disciplines’ by defending his four-dimensional matrix against , what he calls, the ‘positivist fantasy’ of uniting them98.

In attacking Wallerstein’s (1996) call for a ‘unified social science’, in the Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences, Burawoy rejects such an initiative, arguing instead that maintaining such a divide in a disciplinary solar system, whose planets otherwise orbit each other, is necessary as it is vital for the benefit and strength of sociology’s sovereignty. While allowing much movement and

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98 It is perhaps useful here to puzzle over Burawoy’s dismissive tone towards positivism, considering that he has devised a four-dimensional typology of sociological knowledge, much in the same way that Durkheim drew a rather typology of suicide, also offering four types (egoistic, anomic, altruistic, and fatalistic). Both attempts are classificatory, and in that sense positivist, making Burawoy’s searing condemnation perhaps contradictory, especially as he, like Durkheim, remains faithful to his classificatory model, while of course acknowledging variations within it, but perhaps being less open than Durkheim (1951 [1897]: 297-298) in admitting that:

‘[T]he circumstances are almost infinite in number which are supposed to cause suicide because they rather frequently accompany it. One man kills himself in the midst of affluence, another in the lap of poverty; one was unhappy in his home, and another had just ended by divorce a marriage that was making him unhappy. In one case a soldier ends his life after having been punished for an offense he did not commit; in another, a criminal whose crime remained unpunished kills himself. The most varied and even the most contradictory events of life may equally serve as pretexts for suicide. This suggests that none of them is the specific cause. Could we perhaps at least causality to those qualities known to be common to all? But are there any such? At best, one might say that they usually consist of disappointments, of sorrows without any possibility of deciding how intense the grief must be to have such great significance’.
fluidity within sociology, Burawoy argues against openly sociable relations with related disciplines, but prefers negotiations with other disciplines on sociology’s strict terms and preferably tailored to his typology of four sociologies.

In that light, Burawoy (2005: 287) grants permission for sociology to relate to neighbouring disciplines, permitting exchange and collaboration exclusively by means of; ‘cross-disciplinary borrowing’ at ‘the interface of professional knowledge’, ‘trans-disciplinary infusion’ at ‘the interface of critical knowledge’, ‘multi-disciplinary collaboration’ for the ‘development of public knowledge’, and ‘joint-disciplinary coordination’ ‘in the policy world’.

Having recognised ‘the power of the disciplinary divide, captured in varying combinations of instrumental and reflexive knowledge’, Burawoy (2005c: 287) seems content with and confident about such an experiment, although he fails to explain in any desirable detail (a) how such links are to be forged exactly, (a) what they may mean, or (c) how they may be beneficial, both for his four types of sociology, as well as for the health, stability and sustainability of the overall exchange between disciplines.

What is puzzling throughout Thesis X is the contradiction between Burawoy’s willingness to communicate his model to other disciplines on the one hand, but not wishing to do away with the unnecessary divides between them on the other, which would facilitate the traffic of ideas even further as shown above with reference to the work of Collins (1994) Bastow et al. (2014), Gerring (2011), Fuller (2006) and Nowotny et al. (2001).

Such reluctance towards trans-disciplinary exchange on an equal footing, without fearing contamination, resembles an obsessive-compulsive stance towards disciplinary purity that brings to mind what Sennett ([1970] in DeFilippis and S. Saegert, 2008: 177) described as ‘this myth of dignity through communal solidarity’, or what Douglas (2002) meticulously explored as a conceptual taboo; both insisting that diversity, variety and intermingling are necessary, if not virtuous, features of community life, rather than dangers that need to be eliminated or fended off.

Burawoy’s proposition to foster links between sociology and its social scientific brethren by maintaining their disciplinary borders intact, amounts to an obsessive control over our disciplinary environment which sounds as irrelevant as it is compulsive.
To make matters worse, it mistakes the nature of disciplinary exchange across borders for a loss in the unity, strength and fidelity of his family of four sociologies, suspecting that any encounter across the fence might lead to the dissolution of the familial bonds as opposed to their loosening for every family member’s benefit. Managing common pool resources together as disciplinary neighbours, is hardly synonymous to adultery though it does mean allowing new couples to emerge out of old ones, thus pointing to new developments and trends in the structure of disciplinary families, which allow the democratisation of love for knowledge, and propose different interpretations of and new kinds of socialisation in an extended network of information-sharing and exchange, where we can learn to cope with the loss of our hitherto siloed existence, and celebrate our mutuality and common support in a co-operative, rather than a competitive manner.

This is a moral exercise as much as it is a scholarly one, echoing Foucault’s remarks on love, in *The History of Sexuality*, where he claimed that:

‘The idea of morals as something obeying a code of rules is already disappearing. And this lack of any moral code must and will be answered by the search for an aesthetic code of existence’ (Foucault, 1984 in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995: 183).

Such liberation from the obeisance to one single code of rules, or a regimented existence within artificial barriers that no longer apply or make sense, seems as relevant to sociology as it does to love, taking into account the prospect of finding new codes of existence, disciplinary, moral and even aesthetic, with other disciplines of which sociology is a part and can play an important role as a significant correspondent in a multi-authored republic of knowledge production.

Burawoy’s dismissal of such inter-penetration of disciplines as a ‘positivist fantasy’ could be read as a “copy-righted fantasy” on his part, refusing the derivative nature of knowledge production and culture, and wishing instead to impose distinctions on activities of the mind which, ‘like capitalism and Marxism’, are ideas, or ‘inventions, on which patents are impossible to preserve’ given that ‘they are there, so to speak, for the pirating’ (Anderson, 2006: 160).

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99 For ample evidence on the possibilities and the challenges of managing common pool resources at a communal level, see Ostrom (2007).
In discouraging such “making” and spreading of sociological knowledge as part of a wider network of social sciences, Burawoy seems to suggest a “regressive turn” within a pluralistic discipline that was ‘conceived in Liberty’ and now finds itself ‘engaged in a civil war’, that is as injurious to the discipline, as it is to the entire social sciences family, to paraphrase A. Lincoln’s (2009: 115) notorious 1863 Gettysburg address.

Reading Burawoy’s Thesis X as a struggle for the preservation of sociology’s internal unity, ‘a new birth of freedom’ (Lincoln, 2009: 115) soon emerges in the image and form of the ‘sociologist as partisan’ which Burawoy proposes and defends in his final thesis, which is explored in turn.

In claiming that there is something ‘distinctive about sociological knowledge and the interests it represents’, Burawoy (2005c: 287) nods his assent by arguing that what makes sociology unique is its unwavering commitment to civil society with which it is purportedly ‘connected […] by an umbilical cord’. While taking great care not to assert that ‘sociology only studies civil society’, Burawoy (2005c: 288) insists that ‘sociology depends on civil society’, which bestows on the discipline its own separate identity from the other social sciences, which may indeed study and belong to civil society, but presumably do not study the social world, ‘the state or the economy from the standpoint of civil society’. By making civil society the exclusive privilege and vantage point of sociology, Burawoy exposes his argument to potential criticisms of appropriating civil society for sociology’s benefit, supposing some unique affinity between civil society and sociology that remains largely unjustified, at least in such exclusionary terms. In lieu of substantiation, justification and evidence, Burawoy (2005c: 288) limits his analysis to the claim that:

‘[E]conomics and political science, between them, have manufactured the ideological time bombs that have justified the excesses of markets and states, excesses that are destroying the foundations of the public university, that is their own academic conditions of existence, as well as so much else’.

Treating economics and political science as handmaidens of neoliberal tactics, with no mention of psychology, anthropology or geography as possible contenders in the social sciences, is problematic enough, but to exclude sociology as the revolutionary outsider, or partisan, par excellence is fairly controversial if not inconsistent, given that
there is little evidence to support such a generalisation and oversimplification of the social sciences’ *modus operandi* in contemporary university life.

Balancing such an assertion against the paucity of literature that surrounds fierce analyses against the political and market forces that Burawoy describes, sociology probably fares rather poorly in comparison, especially with economics which has dominated both the academic and the public realms as “the” mercenary social science with a difference since the advent of the politics of austerity, crisis and recession in the post-2008 world\(^{100}\).

Leaving such privileging of sociology aside to examine Burawoy’s reading of the role of the sociologist as a ‘partisan’, it seems puzzling to note Burawoy’s grand aspirations for sociology as a bearer of change in and out of the academe, when his vision for the discipline shows little signs of community-inspired engagement with the broad church of the social sciences on whom sociology would otherwise depend to define and refine its public role, relevance, currency and voice. Although Burawoy (2005c: 289) purportedly envisions ‘myriads of nodes, each forging collaborations of sociologists with their publics, flowing together in a single current’, his eleven theses resemble a retreat to sociology’s subterranean disciplinary hide-outs, rather than a broadening of its horizons to carry such a goal forward ‘as a social movement beyond the academy’. In fact the very fault-lines of Burawoy’s approach, as discussed in detail in the space of the current chapter, are characterised by:

(a) An insistence to embrace and propose public sociology as a social movement, rather than as a fully-fledged programme of and for epistemic change

(b) An unwillingness to consider sociology as part of the umbrella body of the social sciences

(c) A fairly inaccurate diagnosis of and prescription for the discipline’s ill-health

(d) An undisciplined formulation of public sociology as an intra and extra-academic bearer of change

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\(^{100}\) An indicative list of best-selling and widely read titles from economics includes: Piketty (2014), Atkinson (2014), Milanovic (2012), Lapavitsas (2011), Varoufakis (2013), not to mention the regular contributions of Nobel-Prize winning economists such as Krugman and Stiglitz or other economists of repute such as Nouriel Roubini in the media. For a more detailed discussion on sociology’s relative unresponsiveness to current affairs, reflecting its own alleged disciplinary crisis, see Chapter Six.
(e) A careless reading and interpretation of complex processes, issues and debates that pertain to his eleven theses
(f) A lack of a systematic theory to support his approach, and
(g) A vague call to arms, loaded with hope but lacking a clear and convincing manifesto that could function as an accurate road map for his personal utopia.

Bearing in mind these seven main pitfalls of the eleven theses discussed throughout this chapter, Burawoy’s vision of public sociology as waging a partisan struggle that is likened to Walter Benjamin’s (1968) oft-quoted ‘angel of history’, seems bound to lead its life in a self-referential barricade rather than remaining conversant with other epistemic cultures, or translating insights between and across languages, thereby finding her wings clipped, and the reflection of her image distorted as a devil in disguise.

The end-product of such single-minded faithfulness of Burawoy to his four-dimensional matrix is a mix of admiration for its steady commitment, and disappointment with its strict alignment to a cause which, being thus defined, extends sociology’s propensity to remain fractured into a variety of competing visions, instead of establishing a broader and more open dialogue with neighbouring social sciences, as well as with hitherto “traditional enemies”, such as STEM subjects.

Closing up the public sociological mind in such a manner, to paraphrase Bloom (1987), Burawoy’s manifesto for public sociology runs the risk of disregarding Abraham Lincoln’s (2009: 59) important warning that ‘a house divided against itself cannot stand’ which may be as true for parliamentary democracy, as it is for sociology in the 21st century.

Given sociology’s status as just one of the many adopted children of the social sciences household, which relies on the broader scientific community for a chance to make itself heard publicly, Burawoy’s call to segment, provincialise and maintain the discipline’s alleged integrity against the perceived impurity, dissipation and degeneracy of cohabitation with unsightly epistemic fellow-citizens, may facilitate or accelerate its arrested development, if not its eventual demise as a potential voice in the public epistemic ecumene.

This chapter has attempted a critique of Burawoy’s version of public sociology, maintaining, not that it should be disregarded, but that it should be challenged in that
form, and reimagined in a way that would make 21st century public sociology more open to a variety of other perspectives that can be found in the discipline’s outer elliptical ring, rather than in its lunar surface.

The next chapter is a critical literature review of the nascent fascination with public sociology, following Burawoy’s immensely popular address to the American Sociological Association and his subsequent article for the American Sociological Review.
Part Two: Challenging the terms and conditions of and for public sociology

Michael Burawoy’s call for public sociology in what started as a presidential address at the ASA in 2004, has returned as a lingering echo against him, in the form of a debate that soon became a controversy, leaving professional sociologists ‘enthralled, embarrassed, redeemed, outraged, invigorated or discouraged’, to borrow from McCarthy and Hagan’s (in Jeffries, 2009: 319) summary of the prevailing sentiments that characterised the reaction of a number of professional sociologists in response to Burawoy’s flâneurian version of the discipline as the ‘angel of history’; intent on welcoming an equilibrium of conflicting positions and dissensual voices under its professional, policy, critical and public wings.

Having migrated away from the shores of the Atlantic, and spoken in many different tongues at international forums, Burawoy’s ‘angel of history’ has left an indelible mark on contemporary sociological literature on sociology, not simply as what Mills (1959) would call an ‘intellectual fad’ but rather as:

(a) A way of looking at sociology in an attempt to re-fashion its public-oriented character, and
(b) a form of “doing” sociology; namely public sociology.

Both the idea of making sociology “public”, as well as its institutionalisation, as a mode of professional practice, have been at the forefront of scholarly criticism, challenging Burawoy’s propositions in a series of journals, public sociology readers and textbooks which will be examined closely in the next three chapters.

The main bulk of responses to Burawoy’s plea for public sociology can be traced in the 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009 thematic editions of the American Sociologist, as well as in selected articles published in the Critical Sociologist and a special issue of the British
Journal of Sociology in 2005, offering an enviable variety of contributions to the critical discussion of the idea and the practice of public sociology.\(^{101}\)

Alongside this burgeoning amount of public sociology literature published in academic journals, Nichols (2007) has gathered the 2005 American Sociologist papers in one volume, while similar efforts took shape in the form of a handbook of public sociology, edited by Jeffries (2009), an official ASA publication on public sociology compiled by Clawson (2007), a ‘public sociologies’ reader introduced by Blau and Smith (2006) and a companion to public sociology by Nyden et al. (2012) offering a more “hands-on”, practical and research-oriented guide to public sociology through thirty-three case studies which aspire to connect ‘research, action and change’ to borrow the editor’s description of the volume’s content and purpose.

Special mention must be awarded to Agger’s (2000) Public Sociology, which precedes all the aforementioned volumes, including Burawoy’s very own ASA address, but did not have the impact of Burawoy’s popularisation of public sociology although it ‘got the dialogue started’, as Agger himself disclosed in response to an e-mail interview.\(^{102}\)

Traditional resources aside, the ‘public sociology wars’ as Michael Burawoy colourfully described them in Jeffries’ (2009) volume, have extended to the online world in the form of a public sociology page on Burawoy’s own Berkeley staff page, the official online ‘ASA Task Force on institutionalising public sociologies’ and Deflem’s ‘Save Sociology’ website which was set up as a spirited insurrection to the idea of public sociology and Burawoy’s cavalier endorsement of it, thus turning the melting pot of public sociology into a bubbling cauldron of scholarly responses and signalling an


\(^{102}\) In an attempt to update my understanding of the public sociology debate by talking to those who initiated it from 2000 onwards, I have informally interviewed Ben Agger and Michael Burawoy via e-mail, transcripts of which are available in my archive for reference purposes.
engagement with all four types of Burawoy’s schema of sociological labour in its professional, policy, critical and public guises.

Before delving into this veritable warfare of opposing scholarly views on public sociology, as an idea, a principle and a professional mode of “doing” sociology, a brief discussion on the selection of the literature appears necessary as a means of highlighting the reason why these articles and volumes were specifically singled out for consideration in this chapter, at the possible exception and omission of others.

As the current chapter avowedly dedicates itself to a detailed overview of the multitude of comments and responses to Burawoy’s mission to institutionalise and promote public sociology, particular effort has been invested in making sure that most, if not all, available sources of discussion on public sociology are addressed and covered, to the best possible level of analytical examination, given the limited space of a doctoral thesis. Particular emphasis has been placed on journal articles and publications that have stood out in their dialogue with Burawoy’s initiative by virtue of being:

(a) Published in major social sciences journals

(b) Cited often by respondents to the public sociology debate, or

(c) Hosted by broadly circulated anthologies on public sociology, which in turn have become landmarks of the current and growing scholarly participation and interest in the ‘public sociology wars’.

Special, thematic editions of journals that have invested several volumes to offer discussions on public sociology are accorded due mention as is the case with American Sociologist and the British Journal of Sociology, thus prioritising dedicated and systematic contributions to the public sociology endeavour regardless of their positioning in and stance towards the debate.

What unites the public sociology resources here discussed is their consistent and renewed commitment to, and impact on the public sociology debate, rendering any sporadic responses unfit for analysis in the course of this thesis, bearing in mind that the main weight of the discussion has already been unloaded in Chapter One, by

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103 Two online resources from the International Sociological Association (ISA) should be added, namely ‘Global Sociology, Live!’ and ‘Public Sociology, Live!’; but are discussed in more detail in the current thesis’ Conclusion.
means of outlining Burawoy’s original thesis and his responses to his critics, which continues in turn, by letting Burawoy’s critics speak, in the light of their critical involvement with public sociology by welcoming it or attacking it.
Chapter Three: A critical review of journal articles on public sociology

Section I: Public sociology as the sociology of public engagement and hope.

Following this preliminary outline of principles with regards to handling the critical literature on public sociology, it appears timely to stage the opposition to Burawoy’s plight for more public sociology on a hopeful note, starting with Nichols’ (2007: 221-222) memorable editorial for the American Sociologist, which introduces the stirring conversations about public sociology, as a welcome sign of ‘public engagement and hope’ in lieu of ‘anger and relentless critique’.

Ortiz (2007) recounts his ‘media Odyssey’ as a professional sociologist, intent on ‘breaking out of academic isolation’, and offers his insight on the problems that sociology confronts in its effort to reach out to a broader public through media involvement.

His paper addresses three questions deriving from his personal and professional confrontation with that sociological communicative deficit, these being:

(a) To what extent do we have a responsibility to the public to share sociological knowledge and research or address social issues

(b) How can we effectively work with the media without short-changing other professional responsibilities, and

(c) How can we effectively work with the media without compromising our scholarly integrity?

(Ortiz, 2007: 224)

To these critical questions—limits to the communicative competence of current sociological practice, the author offers four suggestions and guidelines, emerging from the metamorphosis of his ‘scholar self’ into a ‘media self’ due to unexpected media-interest in his work on sport marriages. These four principles for “mediating” sociological knowledge involve:

104 American Sociologist 38(3), 2007, 38:221–222
(1) Clarifying the part media participation plays in sociology and our careers,
(2) Recognising the need for professional media training for current and future sociologists,
(3) Establishing a code of ethics for media relations, and
(4) Actively promoting media relations through the ASA and regional associations.
(Ortiz, 2007: 243)

This impulse to propel sociological work into the limelight, as a means of publicising sociology to broaden its remit in extra-academic communities, is given additional support by Hu, who lends her argument a politicised edge, urging for a sociology of intervention. Her insight comes from her particular involvement in a self-declared ‘experimental public sociology project’, aiming at setting up a night school for the migrant workers at the bag-manufacturing Baigou township in China. The initiative aimed at providing the factory workers with basic training in English, IT skills and labour law as a way of evoking their ‘consciousnesses’ under such a ‘factory regime’ (Hu, 2007: 270)\(^\text{105}\), while harbouring aspirations to become, not a ‘charitable project’, but a public sociological endeavour with ‘multiple academic and practical considerations’ (Hu, 2007: 263). In acknowledging the Baigou project’s loyalty to community-based research and action, Hu (2007: 270) encourages such a direct conversation of sociological scholarship with publics and envisages links between public sociology and civil society in practice, by offering four principles of sociological intervention, borrowed from action sociologist Alain Touraine (1987) and reformulated as an invitation to:

(a) Enter into a relationship with the social movement itself,
(b) Go beyond ideological language and apprehend the group in its militant role,
(c) Set the social movement in context and perform two functions; as agitators and as secretaries to an ‘action sociology’ of intervention.

Hu (2007: 270)

This “opening up” of the sociological imagination to reach out to a wider public, is given a further boost of optimism by Wimberley and Morris, who chronicle their experiences from communicating research to policy-makers. The article’s focus is on

\(^{105}\) The term ‘factory regimes’ is borrowed from Burawoy (1985)
what the researchers expected to learn and on what they did not expect to learn from their interaction with policy-makers alongside a few positively alarming surprises. There were three main lessons to be learned ‘from the inside’, as Wimberley and Morris witnessed by working for the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, on leave from their university posts. The very first of these lessons was that ‘social interaction’ has practical implications in communicating research to Congress staffers. The second lesson was to ‘not do things that make it harder to win’, in other words not to obfuscate research findings with hidden antagonisms and tensions that can embarrass Congress members, and the third lesson involved learning how to ‘make the creative link’ by ‘plugging the findings of science and academics into the policy making process’ (Wimberley and Morris, 2007: 289-90).

In addition to these three lessons from the inside, “outside” discoveries included:
(a) Giving primacy to ‘issues first, then research’
(b) Attempting to be ‘colourful and visual’ in the presentation of research findings by ‘symbolising issues with memorable calling cards’, and
(c) Adopting an ‘indirect’ approach for convincing policymakers on issues of academic interest with the additional use of subtle diplomacy to achieve this goal.
(2007: 291)

In addition to such insights from the “inside” and “outside” experience of life in Congress, two surprises arose:
(a) Sociologists and other social scientists can make their research available to the Congress and it will be used; ‘if we first focus on the issues and then make the relevant research understandable and meaningful to congressional staffers and the elected members’.
(b) Sociologists and other social scientists do not have to promote their work to Congress on their own; ‘if our work is understandable and attractive to the public and to issue-interest groups, they will promote our ideas and recommendations for us’.
(Wimberley and Morris, 2007: 292)

Hadas (2007: 315-317) welcomes public sociology as a fertile discourse for the professional community of sociologists, but at the same time voices his reservations by claiming, in Shakespearean undertones, that Burawoy’s thesis amounts to ‘Much Ado about Nothing’. Hadas takes issue with Burawoy’s fourth-fold division of sociological
labour, and replaces it with his own ‘three-dimensional’ conceptual model; taking into account issues of ‘prestige’, ‘influence’, and what he calls the ‘action dimension’ as the main analytical aspects of the relationship between the social scientist and the public. He then moves on to divide sociological practice, not into types but into roles and positions; ‘researcher’, ‘university lecturer’, ‘expert’, ‘intellectual’, ‘public brain worker’ and ‘pop sociologist’.

From this view of sociological work as a thermostat responsible for regulating differing degrees of scientific production and public involvement, Lueck (2007) is in favour of a more positive outlook towards Burawoy’s proposition and, like Nichols’ editorial, also envisages the conduct of public sociology as an opportunity for mobilising hope, rather than pessimism, as an agent of social change. In a playful manipulation of the relationship between encouraging ‘hope for a cause’ to its translation as a ‘cause for hope’, she emphasizes the need for hope and hoping in her specialisation, namely environmental sociology, by stressing that the integration of hope is necessary for generating potential social environmental change contrary to the ‘undercurrent of pessimism’ which dominates her chosen field within sociology (Lueck, 2007: 253).

The papers of the volume close with Scheiring’s view of the public sociology discussion as an exercise in gate-keeping; fostering divisions among proponents of conflicting arguments where this need not be the case, as the gap between professional and public sociological practice may be much narrower than is normally assumed in the relevant literature.

This being Scheiring’s anchoring point in the debate, he groups participants of the discussion according to the position they defend. In Scheiring’s view the responses to Burawoy can be divided into ‘criticism in the name of pure science’, and ‘criticism in defense of critical sociology’, leaving a group of ‘followers’ who partly agree with Burawoy.

The first category is best exemplified by McLaughlin et al. (2005) and Mathieu Deflem (2006) who defend sociology as a science which should ‘detach itself from values and get on step by step by the objective exploration of the world based on a rigorous methodology’ (Scheiring, 2007: 297). Tittle (2004), Turner (2005), and Brint (2005) take
this point even further by attacking Burawoy’s public sociology for undermining sociology’s legitimacy, whose credibility rests ‘not in a prior moral commitment, but in a reliable body of knowledge which is produced in the course of systematic work’ (Scheiring, 2007: 297). According to these hard-liners of pro-scientific sociology, disciplinary change is not mediated by activism, but by epistemological commitment thus turning Burawoy’s humanistic/activist sociology into what Turner (2005) would call ‘social physics’.

The critical defenders of critical sociology, to whom Scheiring (2007) enlists Ghamari-Tabrizi (2005) and Braithwaite (2005), welcome the idea of critical sociology, but do not accept Burawoy’s depiction of it ‘playing second fiddle’ to professional sociology’s ‘beacon role’. In a similar vein, Scheiring orchestrates Beck (2005), Etzioni (2005), Lengyel (2006), McLaughlin (2005) and Némedi (2006) as the hesitant followers of Burawoy’s idea, who do not reject public sociology, but find unacceptable its thesis of normative commitment to civil society, viewing the latter not as homogeneous but divided, thus making it unclear for any kind of public sociology to decide which values to opt for in its defensive course of civil society, which is precisely the role Burawoy attributes to his project.

The contents of the 2007 American Sociologist appeared ambitiously under the umbrella of ‘Public Engagement and Hope’, and was composed of papers that upset and reset both the notion of public sociological practice, as well as its vision for public engagement and hope. The next issue of the American Sociologist returned to the theme of public sociology, this time focusing on the ‘Problematics, Publicity and Possibilities’ of the term, and the potential function of it in and out of the academe; thus contributing to an even more ample agenda which aims at understanding and critiquing public sociology further.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{106} American Sociologist 38(3), 2007 \textsuperscript{107} American Sociologist 40(4), 2009}
Section II: Problematics, publicity and possibilities of public sociology

Contrasting with the tone, mode, professional confidence, and self-assurance of most academic papers on public sociology, the *American Sociologist*’s 2009 issue opens with a view from a graduate sociology student at Berkeley, Darren Noy, aiming at revealing the contradictions of public sociology.

This provocative paper highlights a much evaded missing link between the public sociology rhetoric and the fundamental professional reality in the discipline, characterised by Noy (2009: 235) as ‘hyper-professionalised’ and deemed inaccessible because of that. Noy openly casts his doubts on whether public sociology should and/or could take a public position, favouring instead a greater effort in opening up professional sociology first.

To sharpen this point further, Noy (2009: 236) is quick to argue that ‘departments of sociology do not exist in a world of their own but in the organisational context of a university, in which struggles for resources and legitimacy are sometimes fierce’.

Building on his view of university culture as bound to organisational demands, requirements and pressures, Noy (2009: 237) critically re-interprets the recommendations of the ASA’s Task Force on the institutionalisation of public sociology to reward public sociology professionally by means of tenure and promotional guidelines, as clashing with the pressures of the academic market. To advance this point Noy (2009: 235) characteristically notes that ‘public sociology is something you do once you have made it to the top, and are looking for new ways to enhance your power and influence in the world-as a respected sociologist’ and moves on to mount an attack on the idea of public sociology as a ‘quest for relevance’ and a ‘quest for power’ serving the interests of (academic) prestige and privilege, attempting to exert ‘elite hegemony over the field and theory of sociology’ (Noy, 2009: 239).

In sharp contradiction with Burawoy’s vision of the organic public sociologist as the *voice of the voiceless* and the *spokesperson for civil society*, Noy’s (2009: 235) personal trajectory leads him to admit that ‘[...] the intellectual community I needed to support and mentor me as I sought to conduct publicly engaged research was not in the walls
of the academy at all. It was in the streets with organizers and homeless people; people with whom I could critically discuss strategies and tactics for developing publicly relevant, engaged and useful research'. Spelling out such personal involvement in working with grassroots homeless movements, a fundamental difference between ‘studying social change’ and ‘doing social change’ emerged in Noy’s outlook, separating academic sociological research from the research that social movements or community based organisations do and pointing to an ostensibly problematic reconciliation between the two.

This powerful combination of values, attributes or ambitions for a more active, responsive, public and thus less self-referential and insular sociology, are given an extra lease of confidence in Misztal’s paper, who makes the leap from a ‘sociology of professionals’ to the potential role of ‘sociologists as public intellectuals’. In order to justify this proposition, Misztal holds up Nobel Prize winning sociologists and public intellectuals Jane Addams, Emily Greene Balch and Alva Myrdal as inspirational role models for combining professional merit and public motive.

Starting with 1931 Nobel laureate Jane Addams, Misztal (2009: 335) highlights the value of combining scholarly credentials with public standing as vital resources for institutionalising social and cultural change; witnessed in Addams’ status as ‘one of the most important female sociologists who ever lived’ as well as in her dual role as a social reformer, social worker and founder of the Hull House settlement in Chicago. Such simultaneous participation in social science and in the public arena is further displayed by Misztal’s second contender, Emily Greene Balch who, succeeding Jane Addams as a sociological Nobel Prize winner in 1946, is praised for her teaching, research and social activism around issues of peace, and international co-operation in the aftermath of World War II. Balch’s blend of scholarly work on pacifism and civic radicalism, coupled with her role as elected honorary president of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, was particularly showcased in her address to the League of Nations for recognition of the need to reform and revise treaties in favour of international co-operation and peace-building, therefore giving remarkable impetus to public sociological endeavours, as Misztal set out to explain.

108 More on Jane Addams’ legacy as a community organiser can be found in Sennett (2012).
The last Nobel laureate to dominate Misztal’s discussion is Alva Myrdal, Gunnar Myrdal’s academic collaborator and spouse, who is credited by Ekerwald (2000, in Misztal 2009: 345) for ‘changing society for women and at the same time, making important contributions to the social science’, in her multiple contributions as social reformer, politician, social scientist, educator, and well known theorist of family and women-friendly welfare policies in Sweden, where she excelled in her role as a female minister, a member of the UN secretariat and a chairperson of Unesco’s social science section. Addams’, Balch’s and Myrdal’s credentials as respected scholars and admired public intellectuals are held by Mistzal to be exceptional virtues for aspiring public sociologists, suggesting that this mixture of academic and political allegiances may hint at links that need to be explored by sociologists who wish to don the mantle of the “public intellectual”.

In keeping with a celebration of the contribution of sociology and social sciences in general to the public realm, but also departing from established definitions of both academic disciplines and notions of “the public”, Gabriel et al. (2009) drift back into the gates of the academy in order to account for what they portray as a much neglected space in-between universities and public life. Drawing on three projects from the Department of Applied Social Sciences at London Metropolitan University, Gabriel et al. aim at exemplifying that “in-between space”, through the way in which they engage professional and public sensibilities and commitments. These three examples take the form of:

(a) The Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit (CWASU) researching violence against women and children,

(b) The community-based oral history project, and

(c) The health ethics teaching programme

Whilst divergent in terms of their content and emphasis, these three initiatives share a number of characteristics by means of their commitment to particular ‘hidden’, ‘tacit’ or ‘unspoken’ values, which extend beyond the university’s institutional and ontological stretch, and introduce concerns about social justice and improvement that
are deemed so vitally important by Gabriel et al., (2009: 310, 312) as a form of ‘dual intellectual citizenship’.

Departing from the academic ivory tower and its secret chambers of public activity, Siebel and Smith do not leave the building but rather attempt to hold the university gates open for a little longer, in order to shed light both to the institutional politics, as well as the sociological practices with respect to media coverage, by asking how “public” sociologists may be in their dual role as independent researchers and university workers.

To do so, Siebel and Smith (2009: 290) attune their paper to ‘the recent attention given to public sociology’, and explore the relationship of sociology with the media by treating the press as a potential and valuable outlet for public sociology, with the aim of educating sociologists in how to make sociology public by broadcasting its message on the news.

‘Despite the assertion that sociology should be made public, thus far there has been little research of how public we are, let alone how public we have been’, note Siebel and Smith (2009: 290), only to problematise the issue further by claiming that; ‘the literature shows that social science’s interest in empirically exploring news engagement with social scientific knowledge has been scattered, at best’ (Siebel & Smith: 2009:291).

Combatting what they perceive as a characteristic invisibility of sociology in the media, Siebel and Smith examine structural and cultural barriers in both sociology and journalism, in order to indicate where the pitfalls of such a communication breakdown may be found and concluding that any attempt at an answer includes considerations of:

(a) The sociologists’ message
(b) The sociologists’ engagement with the public
(c) The sociologists’ professional culture and
(d) The recognition of certain defects in the training of journalists.

In a similar reconciliatory if not unifying sentiment towards a public sociology that invests equally on its professional character and its public function, Sprague and Laube examine the institutional barriers to doing public sociology, as well as drawing on experiences of feminists in the academy.
The starting point to their discussion is that the public sociology debate so far, has been dominated by asking whether or not it is a good idea for sociologists to become more engaged with their various publics, while what motivates Sprague and Laube’s (2009: 250) research is the question of: ‘what are the institutional arrangements that make doing public sociology difficult and thus less likely?’.

To respond to such a research incentive, the paper’s authors conducted individual interviews with a sample of fifty academic feminists, identified as a group that has a theoretical motivation to be interested in public sociology, and group interviews, with an additional number of fifteen feminists engaged in some form of public sociology. Their findings resulted in an account of several obstacles to public sociology combined with first-hand accounts from their respondents.

The two main institutional fault-lines identified by Sprague and Laube (2009: 250) were the culture of professional sociology and the standards we use for evaluating scholarship, arguing that taking steps to break down these barriers ‘would ameliorate concerns some have raised about public sociology’. At the same time however, these two stubborn features of the institutionalisation of sociology return when asking:

(a) How amenable is the discipline to the actual work of doing public sociology? and,
(b) How do the focus and practices of contemporary sociology limit the degree to which sociologists are likely to create knowledge that informs public discourse?

Sprague and Laube (2009: 267) point to:

- The complexities of the academic culture,
- The evaluative practices,
- The variations in public engagement,
- The self-presentation of graduate departments and,
- The costs of maintaining the barriers,

as important variables that need to be borne in mind when attempting an answer to sociology’s readiness in actively contributing to the public realm, and their findings seem to suggest that ‘the hegemonic culture in our discipline makes it difficult for sociologists who have the most time to do research and bring the skills and perspective of sociology to the servicer of the broader public’.
Following Sprague and Laube’s suggestions towards the advancement of a strong public sociology, Revers endeavours to locate sociologists in the press, in an attempt to interrogate if not upset and challenge the link between professional sociological practice and its dissemination in the mediated public realm.

In a similar vein to Ortiz and Siebel whose articles have also examined the role of sociology in the media, Revers (2009: 272) seeks to study the contribution of sociologists in daily newspapers in Austria, puzzling over the paradoxical admission that; ‘although sociologists are rather present in the Austrian press [...] this remains without noticeable effects on public opinion formation’. In the course of his paper, Revers identifies five criteria that prevent and complicate the relationship between sociologists and the press, these being:

(a) The avoidance of publicity,
(b) The conflict of values and ideology,
(c) The incompatibility of language-games,
(d) The divergence of relevance criteria and,
(e) The deficient cultural empathy on the part of sociologists.

In addition to those five main factors that interrupt the flow of information between sociologists and the media, Revers (2009: 275) also identifies a lack of ‘impact’ and ‘discursive power’ from sociology’s part, suggesting instead that it should build ‘thematic monopolies’ in public discourse in order to gain privilege of interpretation of certain issues.

This combination of factors, Revers contends, is made worse by public sociology’s distaste for “going live”, in the fear that publicity is both alien, and irrelevant to the pursuit of an academic career. Amid such a climate of suspicion and enmity between sociology and the media, Revers (2009: 280-2) diagnoses four enduring sociological fears in relation to publicity which he deems problematic:

(a) The fear of embarrassment
(b) The fear of loss of reputation in front of peers
(c) The fear of political ascription and,
(d) The fear of rejection.
Section III: Interrogating the possibilities of public sociological knowledge.

In his introduction to the 2006 special issue of the *American Sociologist*, also devoted to the discussion of public sociology, Nichols dedicates the volume to exploring ‘the possibilities of sociological knowledge’ with an editorial which aims to assist the journal contributor’s efforts in providing a commentary on:

(a) The nature of knowledge in the field of sociology, and
(b) The possibility of sociological knowledge in the future.

Before delving into Nichols’ concise yet sharp remarks, it seems important to provide a further explanatory note on the contents of the 2006 issue of the *American Sociologist*, as it vividly captures the climate of buzzing scholarly exchange over Burawoy’s vote of confidence to public sociology in his 2004 ASA presidential address. This collection of papers materialised precisely in response to the ASA’s call for centennial plenary sessions in 2004, as it prepared for the 2005 annual meeting in Philadelphia. Three of the nearly twenty-four plenary sessions selected for the conference proceedings focused on the subject of sociological knowledge, thus attesting to another animated discussion in print, with public sociology and its knowledges placed under the sociology of knowledge lens.

Nichols takes the first step in this direction, as his editorial’s preamble openly claims, by offering his own ‘wide-ranging reflections’ and ‘empirical research’ on the value of knowledge in the field of sociology and on the possibility of such sociological knowledge in the future.

In his introductory note to this issue of the *American Sociologist*, Nichols (2006: 3-5) re-reads the journal contributions through Pitirim A. Sorokin’s lens, borrowing from Sorokin’s four-volume *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, published between 1937 and 1941. In this impressively detailed sociological oeuvre, Sorokin situated what he regarded as the crisis of sociology within the much broader sensate crisis of Western culture, in which modern science had served for several centuries as the ultimate standard of ‘knowledge’, displacing philosophy and religion. Sorokin’s position in the face of this gnosiological question is characteristically his own, maintaining that
'genuine knowledge was indeed possible by means of what he styled ‘internal cognition’ which combines intuition (truth or faith), rational knowledge and sensory knowledge in a dialectical synthesis' (Nichols, 2006: 4).

This more holistic conception of sociological knowledge emerges from Sorokin’s thinking described by Nichols (2006: 4) as ‘a formula for the revitalisation of sociology which he believed had become crudely sterile as a result of an over-emphasis on positivistic fact-finding, combined with a detachment from historical events’.

Departing from such a holistic approach to sociological knowledge in order to resume his nominal role as editor however, Nichols locates the discussions addressed in the journal into two distinct branches; one focusing on seeking valid, dispassionate, generalizable knowledge, while the other endeavours to launch sociological knowledge within a project of political reform.

Keith (2006: 7) attempts a similar exploration of ‘the nature of sociological knowledge’ with a visit to the American Sociological Association’s website, in search of clues for a generic description of the subject matter of sociology. Finding ‘the advancement of sociology as a scientific discipline’ an unsatisfactory description of sociology, he offers four additional questions/variables to any such attempt in defining sociology as the scientific study of society, these being:

(a) To what extent does sociological knowledge build upon its past?
(b) To what extent has the discipline advanced scientifically during the past century?
(c) What can we now explain that was not well established a century ago? and,
(d) Where have the greatest disciplinary advancements or achievements occurred?

Tempted as Keith (2006) appears to be to identify American sociology as a scientific field, he aims to problematise that very question, starting with Cole’s (1992 in Keith, 2006: 8) definition of science as ‘disciplinary knowledge for which there exists substantial consensus’, which in turn begs the question of what disciplinary consensus amounts to, so Keith (2006: 8) seeks to find an answer in Turner’s (1990) suggested outline of characteristics of what makes science, these being:

- Consensus over epistemology
- Agreed-upon research problems
- Demonstration of bodies of cumulative knowledge
- Certification
• Prestige and recognition and,
• Access to research funds

Following such properties of sociology’s scientific accreditation, Turner contends that sociology at large has failed to develop such organisational mechanisms, making its link to science increasingly problematic. Keith (2006: 8) however is less pessimistic, and much less critical of sociology’s scientific make-up and credentials, arguing that; ‘the nature of sociological knowledge does not lend itself to cumulation in the form of generalised laws across spatial and temporal boundaries; humans and their socially constructed orders do not appear to regulate their behaviour according to universal laws’, thus emphasising what he highlights as the ‘importance of context’ in such epistemological meditations, and stressing that social issues and sociological problems aren’t managed in patterned, generalizable ways but as events which are embedded in historical contexts.

To that “open” view of the sociological project as an endeavour that is quintessentially and by definition an inquiry into human affairs as organised in societies, J.H. Turner offers a more sceptical view of (American) sociology, portraying it as a chaotic discipline which is differentiated but not integrated, with disagreement reigning supreme over foundational issues that give disciplines coherence. In his view sociologists disagree on:

• The appropriateness of scientific orientation,
• The role of activism and ideology in inquiry,
• The best methodologies to employ,
• The primacy of micro versus macro levels of analysis
• The most important topics to study

To these inter-communicational failures of sociology, Turner (2006: 18) includes Burawoy’s call for public sociology which he interprets as ‘less of a remedy for what troubles sociology than an admission that we are a discipline divided’. With these critical remarks in mind and on the tip of his scholastic pen, Turner (2006: 18) offers an analysis of what would be required for turning sociology into an integrated discipline by defining first what makes a discipline coherent:
‘A discipline is integrated when there is centralised control over the material, organisational and symbolic resources necessary for intellectual work’.

These three elements, according to Turner, act as important integrating forces that help the advancement and growth of disciplines, and will dominate the remainder of his criticism.

By the term *material resources* Turner (2006: 15-6) refers to:

- Research grants
- Budgetary allocations,
- Student bodies seeking knowledge and paying fees or tuitions
- Clients looking for expertise to solve particular applied problems, and
- Physical facilities in which to conduct research.

In Turner’s (2006: 16) view, a high level of such material resources improves a discipline’s chances of becoming integrated, whereas ‘when material resources ebb and flow to very high degrees and fluctuating configurations, the lack of a stable material resources base leads scholars to pursue divergent resource seeking strategies and, hence intellectual topics and methodologies, in order to sustain themselves’.

Following from that, *organisational resources* prove to be ‘essential to the intellectual integration because ‘it is administrative control over the allocation of material and symbolic resources that enables a discipline [to] develop coherence’ as Turner (2006: 16) explains by additionally stressing the importance of organisational control in disciplinary decision-making in order to foster the ‘centralisation’ and ‘administrative structure’ of a discipline so that intellectual problems and methodologies are channelled by professional organisations that secure:

(a) reproduction of members of a professions,
(b) career tracks available to members, and
(c) the distribution of prestige in the form of awards, publications and grants.

‘Disciplines with weak organisational control’, Turner (2006: 16) insists, ‘are more likely to be incoherent in terms of consensus over problems, methodologies and activities of their members than those which evidence centralised administrative regulation of the distribution of material and symbolic resources’.
If organisational resources constitute, in Turner’s (2006: 16) view, the centralised, administrative headquarters from which sociologists speak and act out their professional role(s), *symbolic resources* refer to the shared cultural and intellectual home of sociologists organised in a scholarly community which is endowed with:

- Having common intellectual goals,
- Using common discursive forms,
- Focusing on common or at least agreed upon central problems,
- Utilizing accepted methods for solving these problems and,
- Agreeing upon standards for the evaluation of intellectual work.

The argument here is that agreement over what Turner (2006: 16) calls ‘cultural symbols’ brings epistemological integration, in a similar way to the way in which national flags can breed a sense of belonging, albeit as an ‘imagined community’, to recall Anderson’s (1996) classic thesis.

Against such a depiction of the trajectory of sociology as a downward spiral, Clemens’ (2006: 30-9) paper endeavours to treat the history of sociology as an ascending historical ladder consisting of two main sets of steps which in turn inform two imageries of time; one linear and the other cyclical. Borrowing from Stephen Jay Gould’s (1987) history of geology, entitled *Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle*, Clemens’ (2006: 30) exercise in historical sociology identifies the ‘time as an arrow’ dimension as one that furnishes grand historical narratives, while ‘the time as cycle’ dimension is linked to sociology’s quest for ‘generality’ and ‘regulation’. These two dimensions of sociology’s historicity are conceived as woven into each other through both ‘determinate relationships and contingent events’ in a dance of shifting tempos; one big, imposing and linear, and one small, every-day and cyclical.

Such ‘conjecture of diverse processes, Clemens (2006: 31) argues, not only describes ‘the tension between time’s arrow and time’s cycle within the history and philosophy of science’, but also reveals sociology’s fractured identity as oscillating between these two visions of temporal orientation and self-understanding. The lesson that can be drawn from examining that tension between history as *longue durée* and history as
histoire événementielle\textsuperscript{110}, according to Clemens (2006: 37), points to sociology’s liberation from studying ‘the traditional, pedantic, episodical, narrative synthesis of the spectacular and mainly military and political events of a people’, and to ‘an appreciation of the common things and common men, the inconspicuous and obscure, the regular and the uniform, the permanent and universal, the routine, everyday social life of peoples, as well as the unique and the spectacular’\textsuperscript{111}. This dialogic relationship between two aspects of historicising social life, Clemens (2006: 37) concludes, is vital for the improvement of historical sociology in a way that makes ‘history sociological’ and ‘sociology historical’ to the benefit of both, while also cultivating a historical sensibility and perspective in public sociological endeavours. With this view in mind, Clemens (2006: 37) pleads for a ‘more coherent engagement with questions of historical change, one fuelled by a double process of engagement first with the classic texts, particularly of Marx and Weber; secondly by events in the world that made the revolutions and economic transitions of the past seem newly relevant’.

This view of (public) sociology as quintessentially historical and historically grounded in Clemens’ argument for a more unitary and continuous sociological disciplinary identity, is countered by Cole’s contribution to the discussion which takes a self-avowedly critical stance towards sociology, depicting it as composed of a series of ideological biases, rather than built around principles of empirical evidence.

Drawing on a familiar theme from his 1992 monograph; \textit{Making Science: Between Nature and Society}, Cole (2006: 41) reverses the social constructivist discourse of science, and uses it to depict sociology as a socially constructed discipline, whereby ‘what sociologists believe to be true about human behaviour has very little to do with evidence from the empirical world; rather it is mostly a result of ideology, power, authority and other social processes’.


\textsuperscript{110} These two approaches towards the study of history are best exemplified in the legacy of the Annales School of historiography in France, best represented by Fevрre, Braudel and Duby

\textsuperscript{111} Such definitions of “the historical” bring to mind two of Raymond Williams’ essays; ‘Culture is Ordinary’, and ‘The Idea of a Common Culture’. Both essays can be found in Williams (1989)
theories, methods and exemplars’. In doing so, Cole argues, sociology degrades itself to ‘a kind of victimology in which poor people are seen as the victims of capitalism and the capitalist class, women are seen as the victims of men, Afro-Americans and other ethnic minorities are seen as the victims of whites, and homosexuals are seen as the victims of homophobes’ (Felson, 2001 cited by Cole 2006: 42). This alleged insistence of sociology to orient its disciplinary framework entirely in support of society’s most marginalised and disenfranchised populations, is interpreted by Cole (2006: 42) as ‘an ideologically-driven counter-essentialist essentialism’ which disregards ‘evidence which does not support the dominant victimology’ while in favour of ‘statements which support the dominant victimology are accepted without the benefit of empirical doubt’.

Complementing Cole’s critical attack on sociology’s biases of disciplinary faith over facts, Abbott dedicates his paper to the gathering of sociological data, not as a merely technical and scholastic matter, but rather as one which requires close attention to our effort of determining how we gather information to suit specific scholarly needs. Abbott (2006: 57) begins by identifying a paradox in the very process of collecting sociological data:

‘On the one hand, we have today descriptive data on social life at a level undreamed of a hundred years ago. [...] ‘On the other hand, it is equally clear that our foundational approaches to social life are little different from what they were a century ago’.

These foundational approaches are identified by Abbott as:

(a) The utilitarian individual framework,
(b) The dialectical and other conflict frameworks
(c) The process/ecologies framework, and
(d) The view that social life is basically about the working out of symbolic systems.

In an attempt to understand how sociologists collect data, Abbott divides the data-collection process into three sets of ways data-collection:

1. Empirical versions which involve questions about:
   (a) How the work of the past is used,
   (b) Knowledge and citation of past work
   (c) The fate of particular theories
2. Theoretical versions which require a turn towards the philosophy of science and enquiry by means of asking:
(a) What is real cumulativity as opposed to mere repetition?
(b) Is cumulativity a matter of piling up facts?
(c) Is cumulativity a matter of developing theories?
(d) Is cumulativity a matter of paradigm shifts?
(e) What are the alternatives to cumulativity as models of scientific life?’
(Abbott, 2006: 57)

3. Cultural versions which require understanding cumulation as ‘a particular cultural belief’ by investigating ‘its history and functions as we would those of egalitarianism as part of liberal policy or efficiency as part of bureaucratic ideology’ (Abbott 2006: 58).

Having outlined a number of ways in which cumulation can be understood, Abbott (2006: 65) introduces what he calls ‘an ideology of cumulation’ as a type of public sociology which involves ‘conmeasurability, a building directly on things before, which implies in turn the[ir] mutual translatability’ (Abbott, 2006: 62). In offering the, otherwise technical and mundane, task of data collection as a translation of scholarly data into public sociological practice, Abbott (2006: 65) calls us to explore the merits of ‘how we make sense of this to ourselves’, suggesting that ‘finding a level of the system with whose direction and pace we feel ourselves comfortable’, we can then ‘feel that at least for a while we are part of something that is going somewhere. Maybe that’s the best we can hope for’.

This co-existence with and development of a sociological art of living and thinking “with” our data, is revisited by Moody and Light in their attempt to show different ways in which sociology has evolved historically over the last 40 years. Having examined networks built on thousands of sociology-relevant papers in order to map sociology’s position in the wider social sciences family, and identify changes in research habits, Moody and Light (2006: 66) found that ‘sociology seems to have traded centrality in the field of social sciences for internal cohesion’.

Acknowledging that ‘scientific fields are typically defined by the topics that scientists study’, Moody and Light (2006: 67) ask whether it would be possible to ‘typify a science with weak substantive boundaries’ such as sociology. Without wishing to offer a doom-laden view of the discipline, Moody and Light “read” sociology as
characterised by a dialectic of openness and closure where ‘at the local level, sociology is a normal-science affair’, but ‘viewed globally, we see disconnection and chaos’. Having identified what they perceive as sociology’s position between locality on the one hand and global distance on the other, Moody and Light demonstrate sociology’s disciplinary void through a rather poetic, yet, arresting metaphor; ‘[m]uch like viewing mountain ranges from a single peak on a cold foggy morning, we can see the other peaks but not the valleys connecting them.’

Following such a mapping of sociological ebbs and flows and in-between developments in the discipline’s evolution, Massey explores sociology’s misfortunes during, what he perceives as, a socio-political climate that discourages its pursuit, not just epistemologically but socially and politically too, as his article’s title; “Doing Social Science in Anti-Scientific Times” openly states.

Massey (2006: 86) introduces his paper with the opening declaration that ‘we currently inhabit an era of remarkable hostility to scientific thought expressed at all levels of American society’. In the contemporary United States, Massey (2006: 86) continues, ‘scientific facts are routinely suppressed by those in power; public schools are forced to teach intelligent design as a valid scientific theory; individual scientists are singled out for harassment by members of congress; and government scientists are punished for doing their jobs’. Social sciences are hardly exempt from Massey’s bleak assessment and while he agrees with Burawoy’s appeal for a more public sociology, Massey (2006: 86) is ‘less enthusiastic about [a] call for a more partisan politics’. In fact his very essay attempts to demonstrate how public intervention may be possible by means of social scientific work alone, doing away with an openly militant and reactionary stance that might actually diminish sociology’s last modicum of prestige, especially during what Massey dubs ‘anti-scientific times’.

Against such systematic bias towards science and the social sciences which prioritises ‘religious dogma’ over ‘scientific knowledge’, evidenced by Massey’s personal experience as well as by what he perceives as the pernicious rise of the Discovery Institute112, Massey (2006: 91) calls, in Thomas Kuhn (1996) and Karl Popper’s (2002)

112 The Discovery Institute is a U.S. non-profit public policy think tank based in Seattle, Washington, best known for its advocacy of “intelligent design”. Its ’Teach the Controversy’ campaign aims to teach
footsteps, for a programmatic defence of science’s ‘evolving truth’ and ‘falsifiable propositions’ as important civic virtues. Unlike Burawoy however, Massey does not see this as a normative proposition to use sociology as a communicative medium for expressing discontent, but rather as an argument for using science, and social science, to influence political decision-making.

Drawing on a personal example to show how ‘a seemingly narrow-minded dedication to social science’ has influenced ‘concrete political outcomes’ that would not have occurred had he taken ‘a more "political" route from the start’, Massey (2006: 92) explains how he chose a social science path, and not an overtly political one to address and express disagreement over discrepancies of the Fair Housing Act of the 1980s, which was originally set up to prohibit racial discrimination in the rental and sale of housing in the US.

Massey’s (2006: 92) first step was to begin by ‘obtaining competitive support from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development to study the causes and consequences of segregation in U.S. cities’, and used that support as a foundation to do research. When the findings revealed that ‘blacks continued to be more segregated from non-Hispanic whites than other groups’, Massey (2006: 93) was surprised to realise that his research ‘proved to be big news around the country’ with Congress representatives approaching Massey to offer testimony on behalf of a bill that was debated and ultimately passed in August of 1988 as Fair Housing Amendments Act, lauded as "the most important development in housing discrimination law in twenty years" (Schwemm, 1990 cited by Massey 2006: 93). Since then, Massey (2006: 93) has been invited to address ‘numerous civic groups, fair housing organizations, congressional committees, governmental commissions, and academic audiences of all sorts’ while also delivering tutorials on segregation and fair housing enforcement to senior officials in Congress.

By adopting what he figuratively calls a ‘less is more’ approach; eliminating politics and giving priority to social science in his effort to address and achieve an inherently political goal, Massey (2006: 94) proposes, by means of conclusion, ‘contemplating creationist anti-evolution beliefs in United States public high school science courses alongside accepted scientific theories, positing a scientific controversy exists over these subjects.'
action on behalf of a cherished political cause’ through the route of social science, rather than politics, therefore offering a convincing alternative to Burawoy’s vision. Echoing Massey’s autobiographical experience of having made a considerable political impact by ‘committing’ social science\textsuperscript{113} with no recourse to political posturing, a collaborative paper by Schneider \textit{et al.} (2006), which focuses on ‘knowledge production and the public interest’, appears rather timely. Schneider \textit{et al.’s} article, despite its title, is not a commentary on the sociology of knowledge, but rather an account of how research collectives may challenge traditional models of knowledge production in social science, thus informally performing an active sociology of knowledge while advancing social science as a group endeavour. Schneider \textit{et al.} (2006: 96) note five main characteristics of distinction and difference in their defended mode of sociological knowledge production, compared to more traditional ways of doing research these being:

(a) Objectivity,

(b) Support and direction from sponsoring organisations,

(c) Methods of scholarship,

(d) Target audiences, and

(e) Incentives for participation.

This radical re-orientation of Burawoy’s sentiment into radical public sociology in action, evidenced in Britain with the emergence of the Women’s Workshop on Qualitative Family and Household Research in the late 1980’s, brings us to the final entry in the 2006 \textit{American Sociologist}’s special issue on public sociology which differs markedly from the previous essays of the volume both in its content as well as its length.

Whereas the articles hitherto examined were long contributions to a critique of public sociology, favourable and unfavourable alike, the concluding essay of the volume consists of remarks delivered at a special event honouring Irving Louis Horowitz as distinguished recipient of the lifetime service award in sociology, by the history of

\textsuperscript{113} The quote here is from W.H.Auden’s (1946) \textit{Under Which Lyre}. The full stanza reads as follows:

‘Thou shalt not sit
With statisticians nor commit
A social science’.
In his address, Horowitz (2006: 114) who is normally associated in the sociological imaginary with warning against the interference of politics with academia, seems to rather espouse Burawoy’s vision for public sociology by stressing that sociology ‘is a field in which the sense of the "public" serves the needs of democratic advancement, and no less, the aims of demented dictatorial regimes that capriciously determine who shall live and who shall die’, and begins his essay by arguing that the history of sociology traces the trials and tribulations of the tense rivalry between ‘truth’ and ‘error’.

This antagonism between truth and error and the sociologist’s calling to exert epistemological control over both, is best illustrated in his conception of the social scientist not as an ‘archivist’ but as an ‘activist’; ‘interested in the future condition of human affairs- in its intimacies and universalities alike’. If this sounds all too polemical for a proponent of what may be called “the conservative sociological canon”, the tone of Horowitz’s (2006: 113) writing assumes a more calming timbre, explaining that:

‘[O]ur activities are professional. They enlist us in the struggle for an honest social science, a sociology that is true to the calling of Max Weber, for a field in which evidence trumps ideology, reasonable discourse holds in check unbridled passion, and truth is respected without it becoming a source for punishing error. That is how we serve our professional calling’.

This ‘calling’ in Horowitz’s (2006: 113-4) speech is portrayed as an ambiguous and antinomical intellectual force that originated as a classical ethical theory exposing ‘abusive sentiments about measuring intelligence by cranial size and facial expression’, yet at the same time appeared in ‘defense of the slave system’. Horowitz (2006: 113) here reminds us that ‘the first American text that employed the word "sociology"’ was indeed racialist. Departing from our unruly disciplinary past however, Horowitz (2006: 114) finds ‘modesty’ to be ‘the order of the day’ in sociology’s entry to the 21st century with ‘people of talent [being] part of fields of research, life saving, policymaking’ alleviating ‘specific ailments and sufferings’; ‘Creative people still matter, but these people are part of collectivities of scholars and that is what we call associations, societies, and professional cohorts large and small’.

sociology section of the American Sociological Association at the 101st Annual Meeting of the ASA in Montreal, Canada.
Such interpretations of the current state of affairs, or perhaps even state of the art in sociology, may be a contestable one, yet perhaps justified as the epilogue and apotheosis of Horowitz’s (2006: 114) address wisely advises us that ‘as the imperfections of life draws closer to the perfection of death, we are compelled to define ourselves and our lives with an uncomfortable precision’ and, quoting and paraphrasing Pliny the Elder, Horowitz (2006: 114) decries; ‘Social scientist, stick to your people’.

Section IV: Public sociology under critical sociology’s lens.

Having so far examined the public sociology debate sociology mostly by looking at the special thematic editions of the American Sociologist from 2005 to 2009, the contents of Critical Sociology’s 2005 special edition on public sociology deserve special mention. Armed with a critical, inward look into public sociology, reflecting its authors’ allegiance with or departure from Burawoy’s endeavour, and often aided by personal exposés, stories and intimations of their sociological careers, the contributors to this volume place critical sociology in the service of their attempt to understand, embrace or attack the notion of public sociology in brief and direct articles intent on carrying their point across succinctly and critically, as the title of the journal suggests.

Acker opens up the issue with her comments on Burawoy making a stance in praise of feminist thought, envisaged here as a crucial component of and companion to a necessary restructuring of the sociological discipline, if it aspires to a more public role. Agreeing with Burawoy’s intentions to make sociology speak more publicly, Acker (2005: 327) thinks that ‘his analysis would be strengthened with more attention to the feminist critique and to the complex involvement of gender in the issues he discusses’. In addition to that, Acker (2005: 327) also raises some important criticisms of:

(a) The historical presentation of sociology ‘including the loss of much of the critical factor even as the old consensus was undermined’,
(b) The notion of civil society as sociology’s object and the distinctions between sociology, economics and political science and,
c) The relationship between public sociology, critical sociology and professional sociology, and Burawoy’s debating of ‘the prospects for a more ‘socialist’ sociology’.

In addition to these three cautionary comments on Burawoy’s ASA address, Acker (2005: 327) goes as far as to suggest that ‘critical sociology is not critical enough to support the kinds of social movements that may be necessary to protect our institutions against rampant neo liberalism and ambitions of empire’. The sole remedy for such discrepancies in historicising and critically commenting upon sociology, according to Acker (2005: 328), is the inclusion of feminist thought in order to achieve and strive for a less ‘gendered’ history of sociology if any ‘renewed’ model of it for public use is to be advocated.

In a similar critical vein, Aronowitz (2005: 333) describes his ‘tenuous’ relationship with sociology as his professional commitments over the years do not reflect the normal trajectory of a sociologist; working in the steel industry as a union activist, writing and teaching alongside responsibilities as Professional Congress staff at the City University of New York, addressing the media on issues of politics and the economy, talking to community and labour groups, being published in trade presses and member of the ASA. This whirlwind of activities compels Aronowitz (2005: 333) to pause momentarily and ask whether he feels comfortable with the title of the ‘professional sociologist in Burawoy’s sense of the phrase’. His answer is negative but not querulous, trying instead to identify points of intersection with and radical distance from such a job title and academic role.

Aronowitz (2005: 334) calls for ‘the revival of the public intellectual’ echoing, and discussing at relative length, the positions of Walter Lippmann, John Dewey, C. W. Mills and R. Jacoby as introductory nodes to raise the question that troubles him the most in relation to the role of intellectuals; ‘what and to whom is their thinking and research directed?’.

Burawoy, Aronowitz (2005: 335) argues, ‘wants to end radical sociology’s attack on the discipline, but also wants to reverse sociology’s inward direction’, by aspiring to ‘a program for “peaceful co-existence”’ which simultaneously introduces ‘a “positive” dimension to critical theory’s passion for debunking’. Commendable though such aspirations may be, Aronowitz, interprets them as an opposition of contrasting impulses that aspire to unison, and finds Burawoy’s thesis’ lacking in terms of its
'analysis of the context within which American sociology retreated both from social activism and from the obligation to direct its empirical researches to theory'.

Aronowitz (2005: 336) concludes by partially agreeing with what he sees as Burawoy’s genuine intentions for disciplinary focus on one hand, and enlargement to include the public on the other, but highlights his conviction that ‘the human sciences need desperately to blur, if not abandon their disciplinary boundaries’.

Sharing Aronowitz’s idea of the dissolution of boundaries in sociological discourse and professional practice, but aspiring to nurture a less fragmented and more politically sharp public sociological endeavour, Baiocchi set out to strengthen the link between critical and public sociology so that the two can be understood as indistinguishable from each other.

Baiocchi (2005: 339) begins by acknowledging a veritable gap in how public sociology as both an epistemological behaviour, and an academic endeavour is perceived in Brazil, and how starkly opposed such an understanding of it is in comparison with the American sociological mainstream. Drawing on insights gained from his ethnographic work in Brazil, Baiocchi (2005: 339) explains how common it is for Brazilian sociologists to be employed as advisors in NGOs, doing work on neighbourhoods since the 1980s and making a livelihood ‘out of this sort of community work through one of the many NGOs that were so important to Brazil’s transition to democracy’. By contrast, Baiocchi (2005: 339) notes, it is hard to imagine a more stark contrast to the way that sociology is practiced as a profession in the United States’, and suspects that the very notion of public sociology expressed aloud, would be a source of bemusement in Brazil where any such idea would elicit the question; ‘public sociology? As opposed to what?’.

With this relatively embarrassing thought in mind, Baiocchi aims to upset the way in which “we” conceive of sociology in general and public sociology in particular by offering comparisons with and possible lessons from Brazil.

The first of Baiocchi’s (2005: 340) observations stresses how Brazil, not only has ‘had a sociologist in its presidency’; Henrique Cardoso, but ‘it currently has a national party in power that, if nothing else, has for two decades defended civil society and today counts many sociologists among its theorists. ‘To be a sociologist in Brazil’, Baiocchi adds, implies taking a position vis-à-vis the transformative political project ‘in a way that would be essentially unthinkable in the USA today’. What is missing in comparison
is ‘a language or much experience with the critical connections with civil society that Burawoy calls for in his recent piece on the critical turn to public sociology’, and to close such a gap would require ‘calls for radicals to quit their navel-gazing and engage directly with and foster publics such “as the poor, the delinquent, the incarcerated, women with breast cancer, women with AIDS, single women, gays, and so on not to control them but to expand their powers of self-determination’ Baiocchi (2005: 341).

The second observation made by Baiocchi (2005: 344) calls for an understanding of public sociology in context, by acknowledging that it operates in an institutional climate where its practice is linked with ‘civic and non political motivations’ and is pressurised to ‘try to distance itself from critical sociology and jettison its critical-public connections’. In making the distinction between civil society and politics, Baiocchi (2005: 343) describes the former as ‘virtuous, consensual, and communally oriented’ and the latter as occupying ‘the realm of instrumental logic, conflict, ideology, and private interests’.

Reflecting on such observations, Baiocchi (2005: 346) returns to the Brazilian paradigm of sociology, as one that is inescapably public, and offers two lessons; the first being that ‘we ought to think about the institutional conditions for a critical public-sociology in today’s political context, perhaps being more creative about where this might take place’, while the second of Baiocchi’s (2005: 350-1) lessons assures sociologists that ‘engaging in work that is openly political does not mean compromising in terms of intellectual standards or somehow compromising “real” sociological work’.

Brewer proceeds to charge Burawoy for remembering half the story when he came to periodise the radical feminist thought of the 1970s in serving his public sociology rhetoric, and that such a link with history can only be useful if history is to be remembered correctly and used as a prime example for understanding the public and the social as raw materials for change from groups that dealt with such endeavours directly and not through the hegemonic academic route.

Such neglect, as Brewer (2005: 353) frames it in her analysis, can be seen as responsible for ‘haunt[ing] any attempt to make sociology public’ and moves on to advance four claims in the light of which we might “remember differently” and thus shape any attempts to doing public sociology accordingly.
The first point that Brewer (2005: 354) makes against Burawoy is that his ‘left history of sociology’ elides ‘the activist intellectual impact of Africana Studies, Ethnic Studies, Black studies in all the fields that emerged in struggle with the idea and practice that there is an inextricable link, an inseparable connection between community and academy’.

The second of Brewer’s (2005: 355) attacks on Burawoy concerns his omission that ‘the grand exception’ in the character of radical sociology of the 1970s ‘was feminism’; ‘it was the first theory to emerge from those whose interests it affirms’.

Brewer’s (2005: 356-7) third criticism of Burawoy asks ‘whose knowledge may inform a public sociology’, wondering whether indigenous knowledges of marginalised people, oppositional histories to disciplinary hegemony may count too as modes of public sociological reasoning.

In her fourth and final point, Brewer (2005: 357) urges Burawoy to re-conceptualise his history, and therefore his plan of action for public sociology in a way that would include not-so obvious exceptions and variations from his proposed thesis, therefore allowing his readers to imagine different and infinitely more varied ‘models of the interconnectionality of study and struggle, theory and practice’.

Sensing a certain note of uneasiness, discontent and caution in Brewer’s criticism of Burawoy, Ghamari-Tabrizi feels content enough to ask in turn: ‘Can Burawoy Make Everybody Happy?’.

Ghamari-Tabrizi (2005: 361), enlists himself as a supporter of Burawoy’s campaign for public sociology given that he ‘share[s] the belief that sociology means something more than a technocratic self-referential and instrumental discipline’, yet opens the issue up for further critical examination, not by means of polemics against Burawoy’s idea, but rather as an aide-de-camp advising how it could be performed more effectively. Contrary to the objections of the stern defenders of professional sociology (Nielsen 2004, Tittle 2004), Ghamari-Tabrizi’s (2005: 362) critique of Burawoy’s mission does not stem from ‘a scepticism about the merits and legitimacy of public sociology’, but from the desire to interrogate Burawoy’s ‘effort to construct a complementary model among the different types of sociology’, believing Burawoy’s taxonomy of the four types of sociological conduct to be problematic in its orientation and scope.
Burawoy, Ghamari-Tabrizi (2005: 363) argues, ‘falls into a positivist trap’ by arguing that ‘the praxis of public sociology cannot be based on concepts and classifications produced in professional sociology’, given that professional sociology ‘does not produce types of knowledge conducive and inviting to public sociology’.

By contrast, Ghamari-Tabrizi claims, for “public” and “sociology” to appear as mutually inclusive, “professional” and “sociology” may need to re-emerge as mutually exclusive elements in sociological practice, thereby envisaging a role for public sociologists as public intellectuals who are willing to disavow their role, position and identity as experts; ‘the expert often muffles the voice, obscures the integrity, and curtails the involvement of the subaltern’ while, ‘reflexive knowledge does not form communicatively outside of public engagement; rather it emerges as the result of it’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2005: 364).

Extending this argument further, Ghamari-Tabrizi (2005: 364), asks whether public sociology ‘need[s] to be sociological in any disciplinary sense’, suspecting that disciplinary boundaries are exclusive and therefore inimical to public orientation and usefulness and with such scepticism in mind concludes that ‘Burawoy might be mistaken that he can secure the institutional blessing of the ASA, but he is absolutely right in his mission to give voice and legitimacy to public sociology’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2005: 368-9).

Katz-Fishman and Scott continue Tabrizi’s aporetic relationship with sociology’s public performance in a praising manner towards Burawoy’s thesis, but not without suggesting some alternative trajectories on how to make it possible.

Given their long-standing involvement with Project South, Katz-Fishman and Scott (2005: 371) describe themselves as ‘organic public sociologists in the trenches and the academy for 35+ years’ and use such self-ascribed credentials to propose two paths to “doing” public sociology.

The first path, Katz-Fishman and Scott (2005: 373) argue, arises out of social struggle and the need to understand ‘root systemic causes of human degradation and destruction’, as ‘experienced by the women, men and youth of exploited and oppressed peoples, classes and communities’. Such recognition will help sociologists
‘articulate a vision of what a world of equality, justice, peace and popular democracy
would look like; and to develop a strategy to guide the process of change’.

The second path, is more modest in its goals and has its roots in ‘the academy’ and
‘the canons of sociology’, which, according to Katz-Fishman (2005: 374) and Scott,
need to be reconfigured to secure captive audiences in a process that will eventually
secure the relevance of scholarly pursuits, therefore urging fellow-sociologists to
‘[m]ake it happen!’.

Urry’s (2005: 375) contribution to the volume is more moderate, acknowledging that
‘there is much that is attractive’ about Burawoy’s examination of the critical turn to
public sociology on the one hand, while pinpointing that Burawoy’s text was written
within the limited and nation-specific focus and bias of American sociology.

‘Sociologists from nowhere else, Urry (2005: 375) argues, ‘could treat their sociology as
nationally bounded and unrelated to global processes that in all other fields are
transforming the social world’, and in doing so Burawoy is blamed for not respecting
that ‘the stories of other sociologies are necessarily different from that of the USA’, or
that ‘much about the story of any sociology cannot be understood without situating it
within wider globalizing processes that sociology everywhere struggles to engage
with’. This, in Urry’s (2005: 375-6) view, results in overlooking a process of
“McDonaldisation” of sociology across the globe; ‘a “small” absence [that] is not noted
in Burawoy’s paper’ and has significant implications in making sense of public sociology
as a global project, given that European sociology ‘was always much more intertwined
with politics, with the interests of various social movements that swept into the social
sciences and left little standing in their wake’, making it ‘less resolutely academic’ in
comparison.

Describing sociology, and especially British sociology, as ‘something of a “parasite”’114,
collecting and feeding off developments elsewhere including the “social” modes of
analysis that were being extruded from neighbouring social sciences’, Urry (2005: 376)
moves on to argue that ‘the world is already sociological in a broad sense. But as a
result the world may not know that it needs sociology as such since these modes of

114 See, Urry (1981)
thinking are present in very many spheres, many of which are better funded and more centred than even the ASA and American sociology’ (Urry, 2005: 377).

Such a recognition offers two important lessons for public sociology, presented by Urry (2005: 378) as good and bad news; the good news being ‘that there is a great deal of sociology present within all sorts of organisations and that an advocacy of a public sociology is progressive’, while ‘the bad news is that the entities that we now have to grapple in order to analyse global inequalities are hugely complex hybrids with awesome power and effects that cannot be shoehorned into even the boundaries of the American empire, let alone the categories of American sociology’.

This view of sociology as a parasite or scavenger living off crumbs left over from other disciplines, and an understanding of the global complexity and local particularities that inform any attempt to universalise public sociology, ends this special edition of the American Sociologist on public sociology but continues in the form of a recurrent debate in the space of similar journals which are examined in turn.

Section V: Public sociology: The contemporary debate continues

Such friendly fire from critical sociologists’ pens on the idea of public sociology ultimately encouraged even more conversation about the idea and the practice of public sociology and to this goal the 2005 edition of the American Sociologist proves to be a useful companion.

Edited by Nichols initially as a thematic issue on public sociology, it re-emerged in 2007 in book-form115, following Horowitz’s suggestion to Nichols (2007: 3) that ‘a book about public sociology based on our American Sociologist issue might reach a broader audience’. Nichols put this suggestion into practice, gathering all the original papers while also adding four new contributions to the volume; justifying in part Nichols’ (2007: 3) assertion that ‘the topic of public sociology is a current “hot button issue”.

115 All contributions to the journal in Section V are referenced from the book, rather than the original American Sociologist edition.
Following Nichols’ preamble, Lengermann and Brantley’s (2007: 7) paper lends itself to the consideration of settlement sociology; ‘the practice of sociology outside academia in the social settlements that grew up in America’s major cities’. Describing the settlements’ contribution to the discipline as ‘substantially significant’ and ‘methodologically pioneering’ in a way that embodies critical, reflexive and activist ways of doing sociology extra-academically, while also influencing the professional quarters of sociology.

Drawing on the examples of Toynbee Hall, The Neighbourhood Guild, Hull House, the College Settlements Association and Greenwich House, Lengerman and Brantley (2007: 10) identify six qualities that distinguish settlement from traditional academic institutions in a way that inspires public sociology in practice. These qualities are described as:

(a) Allowing movement across class lines
(b) Requiring that people from a relatively privileged class attempt to live with people who are from disempowered classes
(c) Organising living in a neighbourly relation
(d) Expecting that the privileged class residents will learn from their experiences thus encouraging
(e) Proposing a type of learning that can be both informal and systematic, and
(f) Instituting a more just distribution of socially produced goods.

Drawing on these qualities of acting upon ideas by “living” them, Lengermann and Brantley (2007: 10) turn to the crux of their paper which is to treat settlement work as sociological work, submitting that sociological work does not require academic tenure and an institutional home, but can exist and indeed flourish without these, showing that ‘credentialing through degree, employment as a professor, publication in disciplinary journals, and use of specialised vocabulary’ is ‘only one possibility among many’.

In a similar, though admittedly more rhetorical vein, than Lengermann and Brantley, McMahon draws inspiration from Edward A. Ross in his role as a gifted sociological public speaker, to consider public sociology as ‘platform work’. Noting the influence of ASA addresses on discussions about sociology, using Gans’ and Burawoy’s as good examples, McMahon (2007: 32-4) introduces E.A. Ross as an exemplary figure, capable
of fusing ‘personality with social discourse’ and acting, as a spokesperson, on behalf of sociology’s ‘ability to examine society critically and impartially’ in its effort to find ‘at just what places the shoe is pinching’ so that sociologists can then ‘freeze a moment in time and gauge the comparative strengths of crystallised or organised social forces’.

Evasive circumlocutions aside, McMahon, sees some merit in such an endeavour, believing that ‘sociologists have queer, original ways of their own for looking at things’ and ‘the only way of learning what they stand for is to listen to them’ in the hope that ‘sociology could fix one-fifth of the avoidable problems of society’, by recognising or foreseeing, almost prophetically that ‘[t]here may come a time in the career of every sociologist when it is his solemn duty to raise hell’.

In keeping with this line of politicised sociological scholarship, Ballard (2007) examines Burawoy’s public sociology through the work of Alfred McClung Lee in his role as the co-founder, with Elizabeth Briant Lee, of the Association for Humanist Sociology in 1976. Aiming at creating a ‘humanist movement in sociology’, the Lees committed to establishing not ‘a professional group or specific professional clique’ but a group of sociologists that shared a common ‘concern for humanity’ (Ballard, 2007: 44). Inspired by such a shift from what Latour (2004) calls ‘matters of fact’ to ‘matters of concern’, Ballard (2007: 51-2) summarises and offers the guiding ideals of the AHS as a strong movement in opposition to:

(a) The over-compartmentalisation of the discipline,
(b) Limitations of empirical approaches
(c) Determinism,
(d) Disciplinary chauvinism,
(e) Value-neutrality, and
(f) Opposition to orthodoxy by means of paradigmatic pluralism.

These four programmatic points towards a profoundly humanist sociological association are offered by Ballard (2007: 51-2) as possible ideals for the conduct of public sociology too, echoing AHS’s mission statement:

‘We are launching an Association of Humanist Sociology which will have some such idealism which will bring a lot of us together in non-competitive comradeship and which will help keep more sociological research and teaching on the great humanist high road’
This humanistic paradigm of *doing* public sociology occupies the nerve-centre of Bonacich’s (2007: 73) article where she recounts her experiences from working with the labour movement; an engagement she describes as ‘a personal journey in organic public sociology’.

Drawing on her experiences, as an “outsider within”, Bonacich (2007: 85) identifies four main challenges in doing public sociology, these relating to issues of:

(a) Access
(b) Betrayal
(c) Human subjects’ welfare, and
(d) Career issues

With respect to access, Bonacich (2007: 86) notes that in getting to work with labour unions, one swiftly realises that ‘some already have research teams and do not need outside assistance. Or if they do, they want to be able to specify exactly what it should be’. What unions want is ‘impeccable academic research to prove their point’, in order to provide ‘credibility for the union’s point of view’ rather than research that showcases findings irrespectively of their belonging to or distance from unions. The problem of betrayal comes next, posing an ‘ethical dilemma’ stemming from Bonacich’s (2007: 87) role in interviewing people ‘in positions of power’, mostly members of the managerial-professional stratum; ‘servants of the capitalist class’ working as its ‘functionaries’ as ‘firm believers in the system as it is’ and presumably hostile to how ‘radical’ Bonacich’s background is. ‘When I interview people like that’, Bonacich (2007: 87) admits, I hide my true intentions. I want to learn about their industry from them’. This ‘Robin hood researcher’ practice, as Bonacich (2007: 87) herself calls it, entails challenges in researching in such a manner without an inherent stigma of betrayal during the interviewing process. Bonacich (2007: 88) exemplifies this with reference to the third challenge, that of meeting *human subject* standards of ethical practice, these being respect for persons, beneficence and justice, which Bonacich admits to violating and circumventing, rather than ‘confront[ing] the IRB’s biases head on or disguise your political intentions under the language of scientific research’. An undercurrent of rebelliousness can be identified here in justifying such an unorthodox proposition of doing research, but Bonacich (2007: 88) maintains that ‘organic public sociology is not something that the establishment research universities
embrace. But in the name of academic freedom, I strongly believe that we have the right to do it’. Such a situated stance from the vantage point of academic freedom invites a discussion about career issues, the fourth of Bonacich’s (2007: 89) catalogue of challenges that researching labour movements entails when aligned to or pursued as organic public sociology, arguing that there need not be any ‘contradiction between being socially engaged and doing good sociology’, using her own career as proof that ‘political involvements’ can make one a ‘better sociologist’.

Putney et al.’s article retains much of the sentiment and conviction of Bonacich’s radicalism and seeks to introduce the field of social gerontology as public sociology, claiming that it is already “public” and “sociological” by virtue of its subject, theoretical orientation and working methods. Putney et al. (2007: 95) ‘argue that the relatively young field of social gerontology provides a useful model of successful public sociology in action’ given its intention of improving the lives of older people, and aiming at the amelioration of problems associated with age and aging. In the course of their defence for social gerontology, Putney et al. (2007: 109) offer four characteristics that they see as ultimate virtues for public sociology, these being:

(a) The multidisciplinarity of its working methods
(b) The ability to advocate professionally for its publics
(c) The unique affinity of its theories with its disciplinary values, and
(d) The constructive effects of its ongoing questioning of values and ethics

These attributes are seen by Putney et al. (2007: 110) as obvious starting points of how a social science can enact its public dimension and are treated as essential characteristics for the ‘development of knowledge […] through multidisciplinary collaboration, particularly “participatory action research”, that brings communities together with academics from complementary disciplines, where a community defines the issue’.

Steering away from a defence of public sociology, Boyns and Fletcher set themselves clearly against any such pursuit, deeming it problematic in its conception and proposed mode of practice, proposing instead what they call the Strong Program in Professional Sociology, henceforth SPPS, as a workable response to Burawoy’s model of sociological conduct.
Before articulating their vision for a strong, professional sociology however, Boyns and Fletcher (2007: 120) offer some reflections on public sociology in terms of public relations and disciplinary identity. ‘Sociology’, they argue, does not simply have a problem of public relations; sociology itself has an identity crisis’. To substantiate such an accusation, Boyns and Fletcher (2007: 120) offer anecdotes of common misconceptions of what sociologists do by the public, confusing and conflating sociology with ‘psychology, social philosophy, social work, criminology, social activism, urban studies, public administration, journalism, and perhaps, most disquieting of all, with socialism’. This in Boyns and Fletcher’s (2007: 120) view reveals a deeper problem than the autonomous recognition of sociologists as sociologists by the layperson, pointing in the suspicion that ‘as a discipline, we do not, ourselves, seem to know who we are’, resulting in a bricolage of frustrating terms; ‘are we scientists or activists, positivists or postmodernists, philosophers or theorists, teachers or researchers, qualitative or quantitative, micro or macro?’.

Amid such a climate of misrepresentation and confusion, Burawoy’s call for public sociology is seen as particularly unwelcome by Boyns and Fletcher (2007: 121) who argue that Burawoy’s neologism exacerbates such confusion and offers illusory propositions that are likely to establish already unfavourable traits firmly into the core of sociological practice, while at the same time harming its public image. Boyns and Fletcher’s disagreement is offered in the form of six criticisms which are examined in turn.

Firstly, they take aim at public sociology’s affiliation with Marxism, suggesting that Burawoy’s Marxist leanings not only influence his public sociology manifesto, rendering it a kind of sociological Marxism, but also fear a potential entrenchment of existing divisions within the discipline by means of such alignment to a particular, value-charged perspective.

Secondly, they raise the question of whether Burawoy is advocating a sociology “for” or “of” publics, and identify a paradoxical division between a sociology of publics which investigates the history and organisation of individuals in society, or a sociology for publics which aims at establishing forms of knowledge that can be utilised by individuals in society, and at times constituting those individuals as publics.
Thirdly, this uncertainty that Boyns and Fletcher (2007: 127) charge Burawoy with over the interaction of sociologists with publics, flows from what they perceive as a profound lack of a methodological agenda which could facilitate and represent such a sociology for publics.

Fourthly, any such attempt appears in Boyns and Fletcher’s (2007: 120) analysis as somewhat haunted by sociology’s disciplinary incoherence; ‘issues of disciplinary coherence […] not necessarily resolved by public sociology’ but rather ‘exacerbated by the invocation of public sociology as a new disciplinary identity’.

Fifthly, extending the charge that ‘the incoherence of professional sociology is obviated […] a misleading affiliation is made between scientific knowledge and the hegemonic structure of the profession’, and

Sixthly, Boyns and Fletcher (2007: 120) complete their list of critical reflections on Burawoy’s thinking about public sociology with a scepticism towards ‘the idealism of public sociology’s putative defense of civil society’ as a ‘utopian gesture akin to that of Habermas’ attempt to revive the public sphere’.

Boyns and Fletcher (2007: 133) suggested remedy for public sociology’s ills lies in their strong program for professional sociology (SPPS) which nurtures the ambition to unite what, with reference to C.P. Snow (1959), they claim to see as ‘two cultures in intellectual life’, with scientific inquiry on the one side and humanistic concerns on the other. ‘This is not to say that the homogenisation of sociology should be the goal’, Boyns and Fletcher (2007: 144) stress, ‘but some degree of uniformity and agreement within the discipline and about the discipline is long overdue’ attesting to a need for sociology to ‘develop a stronger and more coherent public presentation of self’.

Jeffries adds to the discussion of disciplinary unity, using Pitirim A. Sorokin’s notion of ‘integralism’ as a proposition for the advancement of sociological consensus. Jeffries’ objective is to demonstrate how Sorokin’s system and grand vision of and for sociology can make significant contributions in identifying standards of excellence for professional, critical, policy, and public sociology and for their interrelationships. In his

116 Bastow et al. (2014: 15), against both C.P. Snow’s original formulation and in updating the ambitions here espoused by Boyns and Fletcher, have noticed the emergence of the ‘three cultures’; ‘with social science in some sense bridging the previous divide, deploying mathematical and quantitative approaches in similar ways to STEM subjects, yet also in repeated dialogue with more foundational internal critics inside and across humanities disciplines’. A similar “triangular” division of epistemic cultures can be found in Lepenies (1988) and Halsey (2004: 24)
analysis Jeffries (2007: 151) isolates three major features of Sorokin’s writings on sociology, these being:

(a) A basic orientation to the nature and organisation of the discipline,
(b) A close correspondence of theoretical development and empirical research, and,
(c) The ontology and epistemology of ‘integralism’, both as a vision and an orientation for publicly relevant sociological work

Borrowing from Sorokin’s view of sociology as composed of personality, society and culture, Jeffries (2007: 151) proposes a ‘triadic manifold’ for producing ‘optimum knowledge and understanding’ that takes into account:

- How personality manifests itself in the thinking and acting of individuals
- How society can be seen as the totality of interacting individuals and social relationships, and
- How culture is composed of meanings, norms and values

In refashioning public sociology with this integralist perspective in mind, Jeffries (2007: 52) sees the emergence of a ‘total sociology’ which bonds ontology with epistemology by extending them to include ‘empirico-sensory’ and ‘super-sensory components’, as an attempt to ‘open the spiritual and transcendental realm to consideration and analysis’ (Jeffries, 2007: 152-3).¹¹⁷

Chase-Dunn (2007: 188) exhibits similar sensibilities to Sorokin in envisaging a broader public social science, and argues for a ‘global professional social science’ which takes ‘the emergent Earth-wide human system as an important unit of analysis’ to study ‘social realities (culture, institutions, politics, inequalities, transnational relations, globalisation processes, etc.) on a global scale using the methodological tools and theoretical perspectives of the social sciences’.

Drawing on Burawoy et al. (2000), Hardt and Negri (2004), and Starr (2000) as inspirational fore-runners of his ‘global professional social science’, Chase-Dunn (2007: 189) calls for globally public-minded sociologists to ‘use their research skills and analytic abilities to address global civil society’ and place themselves ‘in the service of transnational social movements’ in the manner of the Global Studies Association and

¹¹⁷ For similar defences of the sensory in sociology see Lury and Wakeford (2012), Back (2007), and Rhys-Taylor (2013)
the UCR Project on Transnational Social Movements, hosted by the University of California-Riverside (UCR).

Prus problematises the search for public sociologies by looking at the fundamental intellectual canons of a public sociology, aspiring to lay down the pragmatist foundations, the historical extensions and the humanly engaged realities of such an endeavour.

This task is inspired by Prus’ (2007: 195) unease with the term public sociology which he deems ‘notably ambiguous’, and sets out to render it less so by providing a set of reference points for defining a viable public sociology in order to make sociology ‘better known, more respected, more accessible, and of greater use to the public’ as well as ‘using sociology as a forum and resource for promoting various moral or ethical or reform standpoints and agendas’. The intellectual canons for a public sociology à la Prus (2007: 199) envisage a discipline where authenticity is emphasised by being:

- Empirically grounded
- Conceptually articulated
- Community-based and centrally attentive to human group life
- Intersubjectively accomplished
- Relationally engaged
- Activity minded
- Technologically enabled
- Memorably historical, and
- Enduringly humanist.

Sidestepping such parameters that focus on the public life of public sociology, Brint imitates Prus’ idea to present ten theses in articulation of his argument by offering eleven theses of his own, but departs from his fellow-contributor to the journal as his paper aims at militantly addressing major fault-lines in Burawoy’s argument.

For every suggestion made by Burawoy, Brint (2007: 239) counters a critique ‘to explain flaws in the program that he proposes’, starting with the recognition that the PhD is a research degree and not a labour of love towards disciplinary commitments:
‘The reason why students are admitted into a doctoral program is to learn theory and methods in sociology, to learn the literature of their fields of specialization, and to learn how to conduct research’.

What may appear an austere and perhaps restrictive definition of what a doctoral degree is or can be, is justified by Brint’s (2007: 240) second thesis which urges sociologists to grapple with ‘discomfiting truths’ of academic life rather than being in denial by leaving ‘moral passions’ and ‘good values’ at the expense of disciplinary maturity and inner growth.

Brint’s (2007: 241) third thesis argues that ‘the heart of sociology should not be faint’ and he fears that Burawoy’s treatment of professional sociology ‘supplies only a very faint heartbeat’, as it strays away from any discussion of ‘the theories, the methods, and findings that have “supplied” public sociology with the “legitimacy and expertise” that allow it to be strong and effective’.

In his fourth thesis against Burawoy, Brint (2007: 243) suspects that Burawoy’s impassioned plea for public sociology and reference to its moral foundations, amounts to ‘a political orientation in non-partisan clothing’ that ‘would be more accurately described as “left-liberal sociology”, while the fifth thesis, challenges Burawoy’s use of the term public, noting that ‘the realm of the public is the real of discussion and deliberation’, and cannot therefore be easily pinned down or spotted outright. Brint (2007: 244) attacks the argument that envisages the public as receding and hold Habermas, Skocpol and Burawoy equally guilty of asserting this so authoritatively, claiming instead that such concerns ‘merit further investigation’. Besides, Brint (2007: 244) adds, ‘money, technology, and power- and the networks that connect them are strong forces shaping public discourse in the United States’, suggesting that publics might be sought elsewhere, and not necessarily where Burawoy, Habermas and Skocpol are seeking them.

Brint’s (2007: 246-7) sixth thesis posits that ‘civil society is not the only arena’ of sociological intervention and that ‘social justice is not the only tool for the “defense of humanity”’. Brint (2007: 246) disagrees with Burawoy’s contention that sociology is the study of civil society, and instead proposes that ‘it is the study of all forms of social structure, cultural structure and social relations’. 
This coincides with a comment made in his seventh point, where Brint (2007: 249) claims that ‘the drive for social justice and the drive for social explanation are far from the same in principle’.

To make matters worse, Brint’s (2007: 251-2) eighth thesis intends to show how Burawoy’s intentions for disciplinary ‘peace, may encourage conflict rather than prevent it’, given ‘Burawoy’s identification with “critical sociology” and his emotional distance from “professional sociology”, which ‘tell us at least as much as the formal architecture of his system’.

The ninth point that Brint (2007: 252-3) raises sheds light on the subtleties of institutional shifts and changes in the postmodern University, where ‘new lines of division develop in Universities’ but ‘University administrators are not in a position to resolve [academic] disputes’.

Brint’s (2007: 254-5) tenth thesis is partly raised in agreement with Burawoy’s recognition of sociology’s power, but argues that the only way to make sure that its disciplinary strength endures is to ‘continue to tell us surprising things; things that we would not have known without it. If it becomes a partisan tool, it will no longer attract talented thinkers or train its new recruits competently’.

The eleventh and final thesis that Brint (2007: 256-7) advances urges a ‘more productive’ peace as a way to safeguard sociology’s longevity, to be achieved through ‘building a curriculum for the future and emphasizing the moral centrality of professional sociology’, by ‘focusing the largest part of the energies of all professors and graduate students on the teaching and further development of the discipline in a scholarly and scientific spirit’.

While Brint is in some agreement with Burawoy in developing a program of public sociology, J.H. Turner does not share any of the enthusiasm, wondering instead whether public sociology is ‘such a good idea’ after all.

Turner (2007: 263) treats Burawoy’s proposals with scepticism at the outset, arguing that Burawoy’s plan to create a public sociology which is disciplined by professional and policy sociologies on one hand, and driven by critical sociology on the other can be suspected to expose ‘the ideological biases of sociology to publics’, where it should strive to earn its respect as a social science ‘through a long evolutionary process of careful research and explanation without ideological fervor’.
In keeping with his consistently pro-scientific vision for sociology, best exemplified in *The Impossible Science* which he co-wrote with S.P. Turner in 1990, Turner (2007: 276) rejects Burawoy’s idealism by insisting that only ‘intellectually coherent disciplines can speak with a unity and power’, not ‘fragmented ones like sociology’.

In public sociology’s place Turner (2007: 280) proposes ‘social engineering’ instead, calling for sociologists to cease to be ‘ambulance chasers’, but rather upgrade to the status of status of ‘serious engineers’ who ‘have codes and standards of conduct’ instead of being ideologically ‘servile’.

Concluding his critique, Turner (2007: 282) defends his proposition further by explaining that ‘what I have in mind is an engineering that is more rigorous than most applied sociology; moreover it involves a systematic effort to use the theoretical principles and models of social processes to intervene in a problematic situation, to tear down a dysfunctional social structure or to build a new social structure’.

Caught in between the artillery of opposing sociological armies, McLaughlin *et al.* argue moderately that perhaps sociology ‘does not need to be saved’, and that saving sociology crusades may actually hinder the discipline’s evolution, development and growth. McLaughlin *et al.* introduce their analytic reflections on public sociology by arguing, both that sociology “need not” be saved by Burawoy, but also that it “cannot” be saved by venomous responses to his propositions, referring to Mathieu Deflem’s *Save Sociology* website, where he argues for saving sociology from Burawoy’s public sociological paradigm.

Instead of situating themselves in either extreme, McLaughlin *et al.* (2007: 291) aspire to sociology’s strength in building a ‘reputational autonomy that flows from technical language, clear boundaries between science and non-science and the restriction of audience to academic peers, not the general lay public’.

In the process of refining their vision for sociology however McLaughlin *et al.* (2007: 299-305) spot ambiguities in Burawoy’s usage of the terms “reflexive” and “critical”, claiming that ‘there is nothing in public sociology that is, *by definition*, reflexive’, seeing the latter as a process of ‘recursive turning back, but what does the turning, how it turns, and with what implications differs from category to category and even from one case to another within a given category?’ ask McLaughlin *et al.* (2007: 301).
Moving on to Burawoy’s use of the term “critical”, McLaughlin et al. (2007: 303-4) observe how ‘Burawoy uses critical to mean two different things’: on one hand critical sociology is linked in Burawoy’s work with a ‘reflexive and critical engagement with the core moral priorities of social science research’ and on the other hand, critical sociology is used to mean ‘political radical and left wing, a subset, it seems to us, of the critical sociologies that surely would include liberals and even conservatives’.

Amid such confusion about Burawoy’s usage of such terms, McLaughlin et al. (2007: 305) stress that what is sorely missing in Burawoy’s analysis is what they call a ‘comparative institutional analysis’ which would spell out how public sociology would interact with different institutions be it electronic media, newspapers, university sectors, governance structures, think tanks and their permutations in different national environments.
Section VI: Public sociology from the Atlantic to the English Channel

Nichols’ (2007) edited collection of the 2005 American Sociologist’s special edition on public sociology, coincided with a migration of the debate to Britain, where the September edition of the British Journal of Sociology hosted critical responses to Burawoy, capturing heated discussions of ‘a discipline born out of social change and upheaval’, as Bridget M. Hutter (2005: 333), in her capacity as the journal’s erstwhile editor, noted in her foreword.

Ulrich Beck introduces the proceedings by offering some advice for public sociology on ‘how not to become a museum piece’. In this effort to rescue sociology from the dismal possibility of becoming an epistemological fossil, Beck raises two questions: the first examining sociology’s public currency while the second suspects that mainstream sociology may not be prepared for such a venture.

In Beck’s view (2005: 335), ‘sociology not only needs a public voice, it also needs to be re-invented first in order to have a public voice at all’. Following such a bleak prediction, Beck (2005: 336) offers two points, one critical and one reconstructive.

The first of these points recognises that academic sociology and public discourse occupy two ‘different worlds’ with divergent rationality and codes of communication, where academic sociology is judged to have limited purchase in the ‘contexts of public, practical and political discourse and decision making’.

The second point diagnoses the discipline with a condition whose name Beck (2005: 338) himself coined, namely ‘methodological nationalism’, maintaining that sociology has historically defined its character ‘in nation-state terms’, when it should work towards cosmopolitanising itself through a process of ‘re-inventing’ itself in the 21st century by ‘de-constructing and then re-constructing’ its entire “being” ‘for the global age’. Failing to do that, Beck (2005: 338, 342) warns, would result in flirting with the risk of sociology becoming an ‘old, familiar museum piece’, requiring the emergence of what he calls a ‘New Critical Theory with cosmopolitan intent’, as a necessary tool for dismantling ‘the wall of methodological nationalism built into the category systems and research routines of the social sciences’.
Beck’s ambitions for a re-invention of sociology in the name of methodological pluralism infused with a cosmopolitan spirit, are followed by Braithwaite’s (2005: 345) ambivalence towards Burawoy’s blueprint for the social sciences, admitting that although he felt inspired by the former ASA president’s idea, he also believes that ‘universities would be better off if these disciplines disintegrated somewhat’. While not disregarding what ‘sociologists, economists and philosophers do in their teaching and research’, Brathwaite (2005: 346) also argues that the social sciences ‘might benefit from the kind of shift the biological sciences have seen, where organisation around categorical referents- like zoology (animals), botany (plants), entomology (insects), microbiology (microbes), anatomy (body parts)- has seen substantially supplanted by organisation of work around theoretical themes that cut across these categories’. Praising biology for ‘making more spectacular progress than both the social and physical sciences in recent decades because it disregarded clustering around categories or phenomena in favour of cross-category theoretical agendas’, Braithwaite (2005: 347) proposes that given the ‘heterodox’ character of sociology, made up of various fragments, angles and ways of studying social phenomena, it would be advisable to train ‘students to scan the social sciences for the best method for a particular problem’, rather than offer just one method plucked from ‘the standard suite of disciplinary methods’.

Armed with such a composite view of methodology, Braithwaite uses Burawoy’s matrix to suggest two alternative routes in sociologists’ trajectory between the four sociologies:

‘One is to shine the light of our scholarship from within a disciplinary four-box set in ways that illuminate more than one box at the time- critical sociology that is also public sociology, for example’, in the hope that ‘within the mutually illuminated four-box sociology, light then shines out from the discipline to linked publics’.

The other choice envisaged by Braithwaite (2005: 350) involves constructing ‘new nodes of light in a different place, above the surface’ where these nodes ‘cast light upon different boxes of different disciplines on the surface below, and also draws light from them’.

These illuminating metaphors that Braithwaite (2005: 350) enigmatically offers find their role models in ‘scholars like Keynes, who jump outside their disciplinary box in
conscious efforts to shine light upon other disciplines, other publics’, or Castells who is hailed by Braithwaite (2005: 353) as a model ‘trans-societal network sociologist beyond sociology’. Calhoun (2005: 356), who serves as the LSE’s current Director, endorses Burawoy’s ‘promise of public sociology’, using language that is reminiscent of Mills (1959), but also raises some important objections with respect to Burawoy’s formulation of his matrix, arguing that it:

(a) ‘It compartmentalises and to some extent essentialises four alleged ‘types’ of sociology’, and
(b) ‘It is not clear about the dimensions of axes of variation and contention that organise the field’

In an effort to rescue Burawoy’s model from what he sees as an uncanny resemblance to Parsons’ unified map of all action systems, in his AGIL paradigm, Calhoun (2005: 358) offers three qualifications:

Firstly, ‘it is important to remember that there is much work that defies the distinctions pure and applied’.

Secondly, ‘there is in much ‘professional sociology’ a fetishism of the original, based on a crude empiricism notion of the progress of science’, and

Thirdly, ‘one of the most basic conditions of a publicly valuable sociology is taking public significance into account in problem choice’.

In concluding his critique of Burawoy’s purportedly Parsonian formulation of public sociology, Calhoun (2005: 358) suggests that we should ‘worry not just about how well or poorly our scientific findings are communicated, but about what we should study’, bearing in mind that ‘sociology will [...] be very different if the ideal of the university as a public institution is not sustained’ in terms of ‘funding’, but also of ‘academic norms’, ‘state regulation’ or ‘the institutional forms private philanthropy takes on’.

Ericson focuses his article on sociology’s link to the public sphere by offering a few obstacles to what may look, in Burawoy’s analysis, like an easy or unproblematic task. Ericson (2005: 365) voices two disagreements with Burawoy’s proposal, the first being about his discomfort with Burawoy’s claim that there are four sociologies ‘each associated with a distinct type of knowledge’. Ericson argues that these four sociologies are ‘not discrete in the way [Burawoy] contends, and that all four are
embedded in any sociological analysis’. Ericson’s second criticism concerns ‘the institutionalisation of sociology and its communicative relations with other institutions’, believing that there are ‘discrepant criteria of relevance and communication logics’ in different institutions that have ‘implications for the sociological voice’.

Sociology, Ericson (2005: 365) suggests, ‘does not translate easily into the discourses and practices of other institutions, for example the mass media, government enquiries, or the requirements of evidence in law’, and despite declarations of goodwill from our part, access of sociology to those public arenas ‘may sometimes be impossible’ and ‘when it is possible, there is often loss of sociological autonomy and influence as the analysis translates into the criteria of relevance and communication logic of the institution concerned’.

Instead of hopelessly trying to act publicly in such a clumsy way, ‘sociology, Ericson (2005: 372) contends, ‘can best serve in this critical capacity and be a public good if the primary institution through which it operates, the university, affords its practitioners enabling conditions in which to advance knowledge’. It is only through the pursuit of ‘unfettered intellectual inquiry’, Ericson (2005: 372) affirms, that sociologists can yield knowledge ‘that is at once professional, critical, policy and public, and that improves the human condition’.

Etzioni adopts an arguably more normative stance on public sociology, gathering his observations around what he terms ‘bookmarks for public sociologists’, and offers these in the form of four propositions.

Etzioni’s (2005: 373) first argument is that ‘to be public is to be normative’, as ‘public matters are never merely technical, nor can they be treated strictly on the basis of empirical findings and observations’.

The second of Etzioni’s (2005: 374) propositions is that ‘to be a public sociologist, is to be in politics’, as ‘there is not a meaningful public voice that does not affect the mobilisation and coalition-building that is the essence of politics-the efforts to build support for new policies and regimes or to conserve existing ones’. Instead of ‘speaking truth to power’, as has been the dominant “call” for intellectual intervention from Benda (1928) to Jacoby (1987) and Said (1994), Etzioni, (2005: 374) advises
sociologists to ‘take into account the political lay of the land and consider where, when, and how they will join the fray’.

The final suggestion made by Etzioni (2005: 377) insists on the need for ‘the making of public sociologists’ by inculcating in more sociologists the ‘need to serve as public sociologists’. ‘Like specialists’, Etzioni (2005: 377) adds, ‘they must be cultivated’, but a prerequisite for the “making” of a public sociologist, is institutional reform in the universities; calling them to change their admission policies to ‘make it clear that those who have such an inclination or calling are welcome’, while pressurising faculties to include ‘some role models and a curriculum that shows a commitment to public sociology’, while encouraging major sociological journals to ‘set aside a section exclusively for public sociology essays’.

Hall salutes the nurturing of public sociology with a more ‘guarded welcome’ as the title of his article reveals. On the one hand Hall (2005: 379) argues that ‘sociologists can have an impact on public affairs’ and that ‘the sociological literature on intellectuals (and so on) shows that isolation from society is dangerous, the breeding ground not just for trivia but also for fantasies of place and power—which occasionally have led to dreadful historical actions’.

On the other hand, however Hall (2005: 379) is sceptical about Burawoy’s definition of the field of sociology, arguing that ‘sociology can be defined in various ways’ and that ‘Burawoy is almost Durkheimian in stressing the social, thereby leaving the political and economic to other disciplines’.

Instead of ‘leaving the political and economic to other disciplines’, Hall (2005: 379) argues for a disciplinary ‘imperialism’ of sorts, where sociology would parade as the ‘king or queen of social science, asking when and why a particular source of power has dominance in social relations’.

Having set out his ideal model for sociological intervention, Hall also proposes an alternative periodisation for the development of sociology, by lodging Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Émile Durkheim and Max Weber in the founding chambers of the discipline’s edifice due to ‘their greatness [...] in combining theory with empirical concerns’. This mix of Enlightenment and modernity is thought by Hall to represent the first stage of sociology’s historical development leading to the second stage which is represented by a trend in a sociology that is ‘far too professional, heavily concerned
with concepts rather than reality’, thus ushering a new period of ‘endless pseudo-philosophic debate, relativist in spirit and far removed from the structures of modernity’.

Living in this third period, sociologists, argues Hall (2005: 380), ‘do not have the capacity to undertake the tasks that Burawoy has in mind’ not simply because ‘a groundswell of support for his plea’ is missing but because ‘activism is less important, let it be stressed again, than reflection from the lessons to be drawn from historical comparative sociology’. What is favoured instead by Hall (2005: 281) is ‘the intellectual lessons to be absorbed’ in the light of his historical comparative sociology, but ‘[t]here is precious little sign of that in the early years of this new century’.

Inglis (2005: 383) is admittedly more accepting of Burawoy’s thesis seeing it as ‘an impressive example of the public sociology he advocates in action’. At the same time however, Inglis asks; ‘What then are the relevance and the implications of his speech for sociologies elsewhere?’, suspecting that ‘any consideration of this issue involves addressing the issue of the power [...] of American sociology to set the international sociological agenda’ by means of ‘its prominence in influencing international career structures’, as well as its influence in ‘setting the methodological and conceptual agendas of sociology internationally’.

Such prominence of US sociology is thought by Inglis (2005: 384) to be both good and bad; good because it aids in the ‘cumulation and development of sociological knowledge and theories’, and bad because it can be accused of ‘restricting and diminishing the breadth of sociological understanding by excluding alternative phenomena and perspectives which otherwise can lead to the development of important new approaches’.

Such approaches may escape the USA’s geographical and socio-cultural reach and may not be ‘necessarily relevant to it’, yet they constitute invaluable ‘sources of theoretical and empirical expansion’, broadening potential insights that ‘can contribute to the major issues confronting individual societies, including the USA’.

Instead of ‘provincialising’ American sociology, as Burawoy argues, Inglis (2005: 385) concludes that it may be better to recognise its ‘provincialism’, by pursuing strategies which ‘may open and expand it to other forms of sociological knowledge with mutual benefit to sociologists and their publics in the USA and elsewhere’.
Kalleberg (2005: 387) departs from Inglis’ preoccupation with (public) sociology’s sense of place in the modern international academe, and focuses on its own sense of disciplinary space by asking ‘what is public sociology’ and ‘why and how should it be made stronger?’. Kalleberg agrees with Burawoy on the importance of making public sociology stronger and developing it as an integrated part of the discipline, but remains unsure as to whether he shares the same understanding of public and other forms of sociological work.

Kalleberg (2005: 387) wonders if Burawoy’s public sociology is a euphemism for ‘popularisation’, ‘public discourse’ or ‘public enlightenment’, and finds it unusual in Burawoy’s analysis to ‘focus on disciplines as bundles of activities’. Kalleberg (2005: 388) moves on to remodel Burawoy’s paradigm by offering his own five-fold bundle of disciplinary activities as ‘constellations and combinations of five different institutional programmes’, composed of:

- Research programmes resulting in scientific publications
- Teaching and study programmes involving both the dissemination of ideas resulting in scientific and cultural literacy and contributions to democratic discourse
- Professional or expert programmes, resulting in advice or improvement for users (clients), and
- Self-governance programmes resulting in well-functioning institutions such as university departments, professional associations and academic journals

Viewing academic disciplines as five-fold bundles, Kalleberg recognises them as:
(a) Sciences
(b) Academic studies,
(c) Disseminators of ideas,
(d) Centres of expert activity, and
(e) Centres of institutional governance

These five functions correspond to five matching roles:
(a) The researcher
(b) The teacher
(c) The disseminator (and participant in public discourse),
(d) The expert, and
(e) The academic citizen

Following this original recombination of Burawoy’s quadrant into diverse activities spanning a broad spectrum of scholarly, institutional and public realms, Kalleberg concludes by asking ‘why and how’ should public sociology ‘be made stronger’. The “why” quietly resides in Kalleberg’s (2005: 393) conviction that participation of sociologists ‘as cultural and political citizens, members of publics, and not as clients and consumers in markets’ is granted, while the “how” is exemplified by working towards ‘institutionalising fora for public discourse’ that would, as Kalleberg (2005: 392) envisages, create ‘new publics within the university itself and in cooperation with mass media, schools and other institutions in civil society’.

Quah adds to Kalleberg’s concerns the issue of geographical breadth and the consequent remit of Burawoy’s four sociologies and examines their multiple roles by addressing the question of; ‘What has Michael Burawoy proposed that is most relevant to sociologists beyond the USA?’. Quah (2005: 396) implies that the answer to this question largely depends on who Burawoy’s audience is, and warns that there are’ two aspects of Burawoy’s arguments that would be inaccurate if they were directed to the international community of sociologists’ these being: ‘the division of sociological labour or ‘functional differentiation’ among the four sociologies, and the nature of the friction among them’.

Quah (2005: 397) is reassuring in her insistence that ‘all the four sociologies are alive and well in the international sphere’ but that ‘the distinct division of labour identified by Burawoy among professional, policy, public and critical sociologies, for most sociologists in the USA, does not necessarily occur in other countries’.

Offering insights from Asia, Africa and Latin America, Quah (2005: 397) shows how sociologists in these countries ‘tend to work on two, three or all four sociologies concurrently’ and that this state of affairs spells out ‘a typical situation rather than a unique feature of small elites within the discipline’, the reason being ‘the influence of the socio-economic context within which sociologists in those world regions perform their roles’. Calling this the ‘dual mandate’ of sociologists who ‘solve problems’ and ‘develop sociology as a discipline’ by simultaneously adopting the roles of ‘theorist, researcher, applier and critic’, and she concludes that ‘sociologists beyond North
America and Western Europe’ may ‘face the same pressures and conflicts but, as they typically perform multiple roles, the frictions take a different modality’.

Sassen (2005: 401) launches her comments on Burawoy in what she cryptically calls ‘the penumbra of master categories’, and makes a few comments ‘in the spirit of the collective work [that] Burawoy calls for’. In doing so, Sassen (2005: 401-2) spots a ‘built-in pluralism’ in Burawoy’s model, but she also wonders about whether such pluralism signifies a ‘stance of openness’ or whether it is ‘functioning as a master category’. Defining master categories as having ‘the power [to] illuminate’, but also to produce a ‘vast penumbra around that centre of light’, Sassen (2005: 402) throws some suspicion on Burawoy’s quadrant, puzzling over whether it should be ‘assumed to be good because it (supposedly) allows for all voices to speak’, or whether it should be ‘problematised for structuring a discursive space, with its own power and logics’.

Without reaching a definitive answer, Sassen (2005: 403) concludes that ‘we should not make a master category out of theory. Let’s bring it down, and consider that part of having a vigorous public sociology is that we can work at theorising with our publics, accepting that they also can theorise, can see, and may indeed see what we cannot see, because we are blinded by the enormous clarity of our theories’.

Scott (2005: 405) moves away from the shadows of Sassen’s doubts only to furnish his own comments on ‘who will speak’ and ‘who will listen’ to public sociologists in the aftermath of Burawoy’s institutionalisation of public sociology? Part of the answer, Scott (2005: 407) suspects, lies in the ‘willingness to engage with publics in ways that go beyond the conventional, professional criteria of science’. This engagement in turn requires ‘an obligation to ensure that publics listen to and pay attention to what is said’ or the promotion of public sociology would be ‘empty’ as an endeavour that is located in the interstices of science and publics. Scott (2005: 407) develops this observation further by arguing that ‘many of those who constitute the publics to which sociologists should speak have their own answers’ and ‘feel that sociologists should be attended to only on very limited terms’. Examples of such attitudes, Scott (2005: 407) continues can be found in ‘politicians, civil servants, business leaders, journalists’ who ‘assume that sociologists should be subservient providers of answers and solutions to practical problems related to externally-determined and given goals’. This external definition of sociology’s role in the public sphere is often accompanied by invocations
for sociologists to ‘communicate their work more effectively to policy makers: that they should not write only in professional journals’ or that ‘they should avoid professional ‘jargon’. Scott (2005: 407) agrees that although there is much merit in those suggestions, ‘none of this will ensure that sociology adequately informs public discussion in a way that reflects the subtlety and depth of sociological analysis’, urging instead for a more autonomous and sociology-friendly floating of our ideas in the public sphere. Scott (2005: 407) is surprised to find that ‘such comments are rarely made about natural scientists’: ‘We do not hear policy makers and politicians arguing that nuclear physicists must avoid technical terminology and make their work more comprehensible to non-scientists’. To make matters worse, Scott (2005: 407-8) recognises that natural science has been popularised, but at the same time reminds us that ‘many of the books and articles produced by sociologists are quite as accessible as the works in popular science. The problem is that publics do not want to read them’. A possible way out of this misunderstanding of sociology’s standing as a discipline and conveyor of valuable insights is, in Scott’s (2005: 408) mind, to ‘persuade publics that engagement with professional sociology is worth the effort’. This can be done by establishing ‘the means through which publics are motivated to take seriously and to engage with its academic products’: ‘a slow and incremental process in which people must be persuaded and enticed into reading sociology, and most importantly, to think sociologically’. Concluding his thoughts on a possible renaissance of interest in what sociologists do, Scott (2005: 408) ingeniously identifies that the debate on and the advocacy of public sociology is both ‘a claim for autonomy’ as well as ‘a claim for engagement’.

Vaughan (2005: 411) wraps up the BJS’ special issue on responses to Michael Burawoy, by discussing the ‘relevance of ethnography for the production of public sociology and policy’, in ways that critically complement Scott’s informed call for autonomy and engagement.

Vaughan’s insights on the discussion draw on her experience following the publication of her book about NASA’s organisational failings that led to the disastrous 1986 Challenger launch was used as a reference point when in 2003 NASA’s space shuttle Columbia which disintegrated upon re-entry to the Earth’s atmosphere. Reflecting on observations made during that time, Vaughan (2005: 411-1) admits to having
developed an unusual “feel” for being able to judge ‘the potential for public sociology’, which she renames ‘new policy science’, resting on the assumption that ‘a work of professional sociology becomes influential because of its relevance, the strength of its evidence, the architecture of its theory, and its ability to connect structure and agency’.

A combination of these characteristics, Vaughan (2005: 412) argues, can help re-launch public sociology as a ‘new policy science’ with augmented relevance, in a variety of (communicational) settings. Vaughan’s engagement with the press led to an understanding of the media’s use of key sociological concepts from her work: ‘[N]ormalisation of deviance, missed signals, institutional failure, organisational culture, structural secrecy- fit the data about Columbia and thus appeared repeatedly in the media to explain breaking developments’.

Using that as an example which ‘verifies the potential of ethnography to influence public debate, policy and make government accountable’ Vaughan (2005: 414) voices her aspiration ‘to convert the discipline into a ‘a new policy science’ of the Mertonian sort’, that will make use of its ‘rigorous methods, cumulative knowledge base, theories and concepts, insights and legitimacy’ upon entering the public realm.

This chapter has provided a critical literature review of special thematic editions of the American Sociologist, the British Journal of Sociology and Critical Sociologist from 2005 to 2009, given their role and significance in introducing, spreading and setting the scene for rigorous worldwide discussions of Michael Burawoy’s campaign for public sociology, following his ASA presidential address in 2004. The following chapter examines book contributions on the same theme, as seen in volumes such as Clawson’s (2007), Jeffries’ (2009) Nyden et al.’s (2012), and Blau and Smith’s (2006).
Chapter Four: A critical review of books on public sociology

Having so far traced the contemporary public sociology debate as it has unfolded in key sociology journals, this chapter focuses on published volumes on contemporary public sociology in book-form. Two of these follow the logic of journal contributions, namely Clawson et al.’s (2007) Public Sociology, and Jeffries’ (2009) Handbook of Public Sociology, and indeed gather essays by familiar discussants of public sociology in journal papers that preceded Clawson et al.’s and Jeffries’ anthologies. The other two set their own distinct agenda, with Nyden et al.’s (2012) Public Sociology. Research, Action, and Change offering a case-studies “take” on the public sociology debate, often resembling a practical, “hands-on” companion to the debate, while Blau and Smith’s (2006) Public Sociologies Reader invited debates over wide-ranging issues; the meaning of the local and the global, human rights, sustainability and peace, concluding with a critical discussion on liberalism, filtered through the idea of the practice of public sociology as a capable and worthy interlocutor to transformative ideas and social movements.

It should be noted that the discussion of these four volumes on public sociology appears relatively thinner and much more abbreviated in comparison to the review of journal editions, given that the journal contributions examined in Chapter Three captured the spirit of the public sociology debate live, as and when it happened, while their book-length counterparts offer authoritative, but much more sober after-thoughts which inevitably place them in the “reference-book” category. This is not to exaggerate the importance of journal articles over book chapters, but to explain why the former have been thus prioritised over the latter, offering my intellectual rationale for doing so; this being no other than a preference for urgency over calm recollection amid a live debate, such as the one unfurled on the highly charged issue of public sociology.
Section I: Public sociology: Fifteen eminent sociologists debate politics and the profession in the twenty-first century

Clawson et al.’s (2007) volume has its own proud public sociological heritage, resulting from Michael Burawoy’s proposition to the editors of the ASA’s Rose Monograph Series to edit a book on public sociology. Despite some initial cautionary disagreements by the editors, on the grounds that the Rose Series specialises in policy-oriented research monographs, they finally surrendered to Burawoy’s plea; this book being the product of such negotiations.

The contributions of the volume are organised in subsections that correspond to the themes and the structure of the volume itself, to facilitate links between the shape of Clawson et al.’s volume, and the critical review of it attempted in this section.

i. Institutionalising public sociology

The volume opens with French sociological éminence grise Alain Touraine, who offers a few considerations on public sociology and the ‘end of society’, in a manner that is reminiscent of but radically departs from Bell’s (1960) The End of Ideology, which is indirectly alluded to.

Touraine recognises that sociology no longer corresponds to its classical definition, due to the discipline’s departure from its classical roots, prompted by what Touraine (2007: 69) sees as two sets of attacks; the first being the advent of ‘triumphant capitalism’ which purportedly destroyed ‘social and political controls that regulate economic life’, while the second ‘comes from sociology itself’, which Touraine (2007: 69) sees as ‘de-socialised’ and ‘de-institutionalised’ due to pressures that have radically reconfigured the global social order (i.e. globalisation); leaving sociology ontologically and epistemologically de-regulated. Touraine’s (2007: 72) recommendation is that sociology would need to re-invent itself to fend off such attacks, and proposes the establishment of a ‘new professional’ or ‘neoprofessional sociology’ which would redefine itself in the mould of the new circumstances sociology finds itself in.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{118} For a similar argument, see Touraine (1984).
Contrary to Touraine, Hays suggests not a flight from sociology’s current position for pastures new, but an amplification of what sociologists are already doing, provided they pitch their message and their work to a more noticeable frequency that can make itself audible to themselves and their publics too. Her programme for disciplinary change involves resisting, what Mills (1959: 100-18) termed and Hays (2007: 80) observes as, ‘the bureaucratic ethos’ in current sociological practice, and recognising instead that ‘we’re in the business of building utopias’. In such utopian orientation of and for sociology, Hays proposes that ‘all sociologists [...] identify themselves as public sociologists’, and argues for ‘a more inclusive public sociology’ which will involve ‘nam[ing] ourselves as public sociologists’ by being more ‘explicit and reflexive about what we are already doing’. Active listening and dialogue, a sense of mutual obligation and accountability, the ability to engage in critical analysis and a commitment to relevant, accessible and socially significant knowledge stand out as the basic raw materials for Hay’s (2007: 87) sociological utopia, where teaching would have an especially honoured place, and direct engagement with multiple publics would be seen as something more than an “extra-curricular” activity.

Stacey responds to sociology’s institutional predicament with an imaginary conception, not of utopia, but of herself as if she were a ‘Goddess of Sociological Things’. This imaginary flight coincides with Stacey’s (2007: 93) dreams for globalising public sociology and re-kindling the sociological passions that Burawoy ostensibly set ablaze, by proposing (a) the establishment of ‘formal “sister” department relationships’ between sociology departments in the US and in other nations with the intent to ‘institutionalise diverse forms of transnational academic alliances and exchange’ and by (b) making ‘common cause with colleagues from related social science disciplines in ‘the interests of humanity’.

This ‘immodest’ proposal that Stacey (2007: 96) put forward consists of a set of six additional propositions:

(a) The declaration of a moratorium on academic publishing so that academic labourers can profit from a period of rest and calm reflection

(b) The abolition of the rank of associate professor which ‘misleadingly implies distinctions in occupational function where none exist’ apart from the allure of ‘a title’
(c) The expansion of the ASA task force for public sociology ‘to develop model disciplinary guidelines for promotion’, the central goals of which would be the ‘quality over the quantity of publications, to value contributions to public sociology in addition to academic achievements, and to foster greater intellectual breath and creativity’

(d) The allocation of ‘permanent faculty full-time equivalent positions in US sociology departments [...] for the regular appointment of public intellectuals’

(e) The institution of a ‘regular system for local, cross-disciplinary exchanges of faculty between departments and programs on the same campus’, and

(f) The revamping of ‘writing standards in the discipline to encourage scholars to compose more engaging, accessible prose’.

(Stacey, 2007: 96-9)

Notable American public intellectual and leading black feminist Patricia Hill Collins (2007: 101) takes a more critical view of Burawoy than her fellow-contributors to the volume so far, by recounting how ‘For years, I have been doing a kind of sociology that had no name’.

Drawing on this autobiographical opening statement Collins, mounts her criticism against Burawoy, not by rejecting it outright, but by cautioning against its christening, asking ‘what’s in a name’, and ‘what’s in this name’?

In confronting the first question, Collins (2007: 103) fears that ‘institutionalisation may not be good for everyone’, especially when there’s a name tag attached to it.

Collins likens such naming exercises to the discriminatory labelling and the subsequent stigmatisation of ‘mental patients, escaped slaves, runaway brides, and prisoners’, and also argues that a great deal of radical public sociology depends on being on the fringes of the discipline: ‘legitimating public sociology via naming it’, Collins (2007: 105) argues, ‘might not necessarily help its current practitioners: the act of naming might also shift the very mission of that sociology’. Collins fears that this may lead to taming the wayward, domesticating the rebellious and therefore “ghettoising” public sociology by institutionalising it, therefore limiting the critical edge of work done by what Collins described as the ‘outsiders within’ in her influential 1986 article119.

119 See Hill Collins (1986).
The second question, what’s in *this* name?, is treated with equal suspicion by Collins (2007: 106), wondering whether this is ‘a good time for the discipline of sociology to claim the term *public*, arguing that we currently live in an era which shows an ‘abandonment and derogation of anything public’, as ‘current efforts to privatise hospitals, sanitation services, schools and other public services’ show, therefore highlighting a ‘private-sector, entrepreneurial spirit’ in today’s political climate.

Concluding her article, Collins (2007: 108-9) raises one final point which perhaps binds the previous two together by asking ‘can we all get along?’, suspecting that we are ‘involved in a continually shifting mosaic of hierarchical relationships with one another- sometimes operat[ing] as friends, sometimes as enemies and often have very little knowledge of what the others are actually doing’.

**ii. Politics and the profession**

Wilson (2007: 117) shifts the attention from the virtues and vices of institutionalising public sociology to the politics in and of the profession, with particular focus on ‘speaking to publics’.

Departing from Burawoy’s intention to politicise sociology, Wilson (2007: 117) underlines the importance of professional sociology in offering an ‘unusual perspective on processes, entities, and events’ from which ‘participants in the public and policy arenas can benefit’ by gaining (a) a better ‘understanding of the forces and conditions that shape actions’, and (b) a clearer insight into ‘structures of meaning derived from sociological concepts, theories and research’.

While he is positive about sociology’s potential contributions, Wilson (2007: 118) also notes how ‘some of the best sociological insights never reach the general public because sociologists seldom take advantage of useful mechanisms to get their ideas out’.

To remedy such a gap between the sociologies we produce and the world we study, Wilson (2007: 119) urges sociologists to follow positive examples from the field of economics which ‘has certainly not suffered from all the media attention it has received over the years’, pointing to illustrious economists some of whom are also Nobel Prize winners such as Gary Becker, Robert Solow, Joseph Stiglitz and James Tobin.
Envisaging such participation as the key to getting our public message across, Wilson (2007: 120) also cautions against the use of ‘stilted, ponderous, jargon-laden language’ as this ‘will all but ensure that one’s writings will not penetrate beyond a narrow academic field or specialisation’.

Smith-Lovin accentuates Wilson’s proposition for professionalising the discipline further to make it serve its public role better, and registers her disappointment with Burawoy arguing that he ‘spent so little time dealing with the power dynamics in the discipline’, or with ‘the allocation of scarce resources to different lines of action’ institutionally speaking. In her effort to bridge that gap, Smith-Lovin (2007: 125) raises three disagreements with Burawoy, the first being that he ‘assumes that social change motivates most people to enter sociology and that academic motivation is difficult to sustain without civic involvement’. Smith-Lovin (2007: 126) finds this problematic, not only because she fears that ‘the discipline is in real trouble if students cannot be motivated to explore the sociological ideas without involvement in movements involving an outside public’, but also because she expresses her preference for boosting a ‘societal value of knowledge for knowledge’s sake’ rather offering ‘public support for a spawning ground of social movements’ (Smith-Lovin, 2007: 128).

The second objection that Smith-Lovin (2007: 129) raises with respect to Burawoy’s claims, favours the ‘cumulation of knowledge’ as catered for by professional sociology, and is quick to dismiss Burawoy’s depiction of a ‘despotic control of the discipline by professional sociology’ in a way that undermines critical, policy and public sociologies. By contrast, Smith-Lovin (2007: 129) argues that ‘critical, policy and public sociology must all be judged (at least within the context of the discipline) on what they contribute to the cumulation of knowledge.

In her third argument against Burawoy, Smith-Lovin (2007: 132), problematizes the way he ‘envisions a discipline energised by engagement with publics, suffused with moral fervor, motivated to do the science of sociology by a perceived social need and a hope of political impact’ and sees ‘that path leading to fracture, conflict and distraction’ fearing that ‘if we have more strong ties to those beyond the boundaries of our discipline, and fewer ties to those within, the center will not hold’.
Bringing her defence for the professionalization of the discipline to a close, Smith-Lovin (2007: 132) urges that ‘we need the core mission of cumulating knowledge’, implying that any departure from that, embattled or otherwise, might lead in losing ‘the institutions that allow us to promote academic freedom. And then individual civic action will be less possible, not more’.

Stinchcombe (2007: 135), who has also voiced his worries about the ‘disintegration’ of sociology in his previous work, urges sociologists to speak truth not just to power, but to the public too, arguing pessimistically that ‘we do not have enough truth to offer’ to shape public discourse ‘so that it will improve policy or the public’s understanding of their situation’, and argues that ‘we must tend to our job of getting enough truth of the kind that can bear on the future, which is what is relevant to public discourse’; thus devoting our scholarly travails in ‘figuring out what is true, rather than what will be heard’.

In noting such absence of ‘facts’ about and for ‘the future’, Stinchcombe (2007: 138) envisages sociology’s challenge in the development of a ‘sociology with theory that is empirically solid enough to deal with the future, a public sociology later with gentle peer pressure against saying things to the public that a provably false about the past or present, so that are unlikely guides to the future’.

Massey (2007: 145) shifts the discussion from “truth” and “publics” to a praise for the ‘strength of weak politics’, insisting that ‘sociologists are more likely to advance political causes they care about if they separate their collective dedication to social science from their individual commitments to political action’, and stresses that ‘[t]he only issue on which we have a legitimate right to speak about as a profession is the science and practice of sociology’.

Grounding his argument on these introductory declarations, Massey (2007:146) moves on to offer three main reasons for the ‘ASA to adhere to this seemingly narrow scientific mandate rather than taking broader political positions in public debates’:

The first reason rests on the recognition that ‘effective policy requires an accurate understanding of the social structures, group processes, and individual behaviours that
one seeks to modify through political action’; a process that Massey sees as synonymous to a politically-neutral but a professionally-charged position.

The second reason for keeping the ASA de-politicised, in Burawoy’s terms, is that ‘reputation for impartiality and objectivity greatly enhances the value of the statements that the association does choose to make on questions of public import’, while

The third advantage to maintaining the ASA as a scientific rather than a political organisation is that ‘by establishing best practices and standards, it provides sociologists with a means to build professional respect and scientific prestige and, hence, the legitimacy to weigh in on debates as individuals’.

Using his own personal experience as an example of, or case-study for what he proposes, Massey recalls how while researching the deficiencies of Fair Housing Act in the 1980s, he neither drafted a resolution condemning racial discrimination in housing, nor did he call on ASA to support these claims. Rather, Massey (2007: 151) notes, he decided to take a different route by taking such concerns ‘on Capitol Hill’; a decision that resulted in the publication of American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass which won the ASA’s Distinguished Publication Award, and the Population Section’s Otis Dudley Duncan Award.

Amid such self-congratulation, Massey concludes with a less for more approach towards sociology’s politicization, stressing that ‘for sociologists contemplating action on behalf of a cherished political cause, less can often be more’.

Frances Fox Piven, renowned for her left-leaning activist credentials, celebrates Burawoy’s campaign, and lends her support to making public sociology the inspirational shelter and the intellectual workplace for the ‘politicised sociologist’ (Piven, 2007: 158).

Piven starts with refining her understanding of public sociology as using ‘sociological knowledge to address public and, therefore, political problems’ to respond to ‘public problems’, as ‘the important part of our research agenda’ while at the same time striving to ‘communicate our findings to the political constituencies who are affected by those problems and can act on them in politics’. Having thus defined public sociology to fit her analytical purposes, Piven (2007: 163-4) argues that we should focus not on many publics but one, this being: ‘people at the lower end of the many
hierarchies that define our society’; ‘[t]heir felt problems should become our sociological problems. If we do this, then public sociology becomes a dissident and critical sociology’.

Recognising the study and the merits of public sociology as a quintessentially bottom-up endeavour, Piven (2007: 165) argues in defence of such a practice outside the space of the university contending that: ‘while the universities and colleges offer us some protection, they are far from a perfect environment for nurturing a dissident sociology. Like most institutions, they encourage conformity to whatever it is that went before, to whoever it is that is above the hierarchy’.

Piven’s (2007: 165) antidote to such an institutional status quo, with which she concludes her article, can be found in the self-constitution of public sociology’s outlets for self-expression, stressing that: ‘we have to try to create our own environment, an environment that encourages criticism and dissidence and allows us to devote our intelligence and our time to understanding the problems of the world’s majorities’.

Piven’s (2007: 165) proposition for advancing such an alternative institutionalisation of public sociology involves:

(a) Using ‘our conferences to honour the best dissident public sociology’,

(b) Creating ‘alternative journals to publish refereed articles’, and

(c) Making sure ‘we have comrades who support us when we need that support’, attesting to the belief that ‘the sociology of the great thinkers in our field, was, in fact, inspired by the moral and political concerns they confronted in their place and in their time’.

**iii. Conceptual reservations**

Wallerstein (2007: 171) inaugurates this critical reflection on the conceptual orientations of public sociology, by offering three linked and largely sequential functions for scholarly intervention in the public sphere, secure in his conviction that they ‘can never be evaded’.

The first of these inevitable functions of any public sociology, as envisaged by Wallerstein, is *intellectual* and refers to ‘seeking the most plausible analysis of the issues being investigated, both in detail and in their total context’.
The second function is *moral*, and involves ‘evaluating the moral implications of the realities being investigated and effectuating a substantively rational choice’.

The third function is *political* which seeks to ‘analyze the best way of effectuating a realization of the moral good as the intellectual has analyzed it’.

Instead of offering an authoritative prescription ‘for particular moral preferences, or particular political strategies or objectives, Wallerstein (2007: 174) argues that these three key functions of the public socialist as an intellectual ‘remain the role of the intellectual/scientist/scholar, no matter what views he or she holds’, concluding, in an arguably optimistic note, that ‘all sociologists-living, dead, or yet to be born- are, and cannot be other than, public sociologists’.

Harvard sociologist Orlando Patterson (2007: 176) also spots three points of omission in Burawoy’s discussion of sociology, and regrets how the latter’s approach ‘exhibits some of the virtues, and many of the worst intellectual vices of contemporary sociology’. On the virtues side of the spectrum, Patterson (2007: 177) notes, Burawoy’s proposition is ‘well informed, intellectually lively, dashed with a few useful insights’, while the vices are to be found in the ‘excessive overschematisation and overtheorising of subjects, the construction of falsely crisp sets and categories, and the failure to take seriously the role of agency in social outcomes’.

Against such shortcomings, Patterson (2007: 181) identifies ‘three broad sets of public sociologies: the professionally engaged; the discursively engaged and the actively or civicly engaged’ where the ‘sets overlap’, allowing for ‘a single sociologist [to] engage in all three, as I do’, admits Patterson, whose engagements with radical political change and social programs, aimed at the alleviation of poverty in post-colonial Caribbean, are well-known.

The first broad set of public sociology, namely *professionally engaged public sociology* is defined by Patterson (2007: 181) as ‘the kind of public sociology in which the scholar remains largely committed to the work but becomes involved with publics and important public issues as an expert’. This public involvement is mediated through ‘advice’ that the social scientist gives ‘rather than seeking out and engaging the public’, thus acting as a professionally-minded expert in any dealing with any given public.
The second broad set of public sociology, *discursive public sociology*, is described, in striking similarity with Habermas, as ‘a form of communicative action in which claims about an aspect of our social world, or about a given society, or about society in general, are validated by means of a public conversation between the sociologist, who initiates the discourse with his or her work, and the particular public the sociologist engages’ (Patterson, 2007: 183-4).

The third broad set of public sociology is what Patterson (2007: 187) calls *actively engaged public sociology* which is ‘marked primarily by the degree of active, civic, especially political engagement of the scholar’. Instead of presenting a set of characteristics for such an endeavour however, Patterson chooses instead to offer some role-models for this last set of public sociological endeavours.

Patterson (2007: 187) starts with Max Weber whom he identifies as a ‘prototype of the actively engaged public sociologist’ and showers with praise for being ‘adamant that political engagement should be strongly informed by ones’ values’, as well as for initiating a ‘tradition of political and civic engagement’.

Jürgen Habermas is then enlisted as a ‘revered national figure’ and is joined by Ralf Dahrendorf who is described as ‘[m]ore in keeping with the activism of Max Weber’, due to Dahrendorf’s multiple roles as ‘highly esteemed sociologist, politician and statesman’.

Migrating to France, Patterson (2007: 188) points to Alain Touraine, Pierre Rosanvallon, Raymond Boudon, Pierre Bourdieu and and sociology’s *grand-père*, Émile Durkheim as notable advocates of such discursive sociology, and his journey ends abruptly with F.H. Cardoso who is upheld as ‘the second-most-famous sociologist of the second-half of the twentieth century, and [...] the only member of the profession to ever lead a country’.

Having thus offered his ideal cast for the discursive set of the public sociologist’s mission, Patterson (2007: 192) concludes in a more pessimistic, if not fatalistic claim, arguing that ‘however much [Burawoy] may huff and puff to the contrary, the fact remains that there is no place in contemporary sociology for the modern equivalent of a Weber, or a Mills or a Riesman’ as prototypical public sociologists at large but
‘[t]here are still people who work in that great tradition, but they go by other professional names and earn their keep by other means’121.

Abbott (2007: 195), famous for his 2001 book, *Chaos of Disciplines*, praises Burawoy for his ‘open-mindedness and magnanimity’, but puzzles over ‘Burawoy’s implicit association between critique/reflexivity and left politics’. Nearly all the examples he invokes to illustrate critical and public sociology are on the left, and nearly all of what he deems professional and policy sociology is politically quietist or on the right’. ‘This assumption’, Abbott (2007: 196) remarks, ‘seems problematic on several counts’, given that ‘[n]ot only is it possible to envision societies in which critique is not on the left’, but ‘it is also clearly possible for sociology to be highly reflexive without being right or left at all, a possibility Burawoy’s four types do not admit’.

Having made his disappointment known, Abbott (2007: 197) notes that he also disagrees with Burawoy on his diagnosis of sociology’s ills, claiming that whereas Burawoy locates the problem in ‘the non-academic sphere’, Abbott thinks ‘it is in the academic one’.

Building on that observation, Abbott (2007: 198) finds Burawoy’s division between instrumental and reflexive work as ‘a cognitive mistake and a normative delict, because sociology is simultaneously a cognitive and a moral entreprise’.

Insisting upon this point, Abbott (2007: 203) argues for what he calls a ‘humanist position’ which envisages the social process as ‘made up of human beings’, urging our analysis of ourselves to be ‘humane’, through what Abbott terms the ‘project of humane translation’, avoiding ‘the Scylla of self-referential disengagement and the Charybdis of dogmatic politicisation’ by adopting ‘Terence’s rule that nothing human will be alien to me’.

Having set his agenda for a ‘humanist’ and implicitly cosmopolitan public sociological scholarship, Abbott (2007: 205) concludes by offering ‘some vague concerns, not so much disagreements as disquiets’.

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121 It should be noted that Patterson’s reference to Riesman is hardly symptomatic given his popular obituary of Riesman. See Patterson (2002).
The first is the realisation that ‘the temporal disjunctures between academic and political life will inevitably make the relation of public and professional sociology a complex and erratic one’.

The second of Abbott’s (2007: 205) ‘disquiets’ with Burawoy’s theses confesses that we find ourselves ‘in the middle of a large and largely imponderable change in the nature, distribution, ownership and structure of knowledge and expertise’ with the advent of the Internet, which brought a ‘transformation of our production processes—research, writing and even thinking’ which needs to be accounted for as both an obstacle and a possibility for public sociology.

**iii. Interdisciplinary preliminaries**

Nakano Glenn (2007: 213) shifts the attention of the discussion away from the centrality of sociology, steering it instead towards sociology’s interdisciplinary potential by retaining a relatively sceptical and mildly polemical stance towards Burawoy’s ‘big tent’ sociological reform.

Glenn (2007: 214) wonders at the outset, what is it that compels Burawoy, dubbed in her text as ‘the man who loved sociology’, to lay out such ‘a grand mapping of the field of sociology. Why does he feel qualified/entitled to define the boundaries of sociology and how it relates to the “neighbouring disciplines” of economics and political science and to expound upon the “divisions of labour” within the field?”. Glenn’s answer comes in the comment that Burawoy’s ‘privileged position, whether by reason of race, ethnicity, gender, institutional positioning or status in the academic prestige hierarchy’ allows him to meditate on the issue, and considers it unlikely for ‘a woman of colour or a community college teacher, for example’ to be ‘in a position of and having an interest in constructing a grand map’ of sociology.

122 Similar concerns led to the creation of “JENdA: A Journal of Culture and African Women Studies”, whose aims were described by its editor, Nkiru Nzegwu, as follows: ‘the first is to create a space from which to theorize our experiences, presently marginalized in today’s global context of unequal economic relations; and the second is to wrest ourselves from the mould of stereotypical assumptions in which this international economic order and its attendant culture of hierarchy have cast us. We chose to publish online because it offers an immediate and cost-effective way to reach a global audience’. More information about JENdA, including its mission statement can be found online at: [http://www.jendajournal.com/](http://www.jendajournal.com/)
In describing Burawoy’s sensitivities and concerns as symptomatic of his background, his professional standing and his habitus, Glenn (2007: 216) offers a portrait of herself as ‘the woman who went out into the cold’, as a starting point to raise six objections to Burawoy’s approach, recognising her exclusion from his model both by virtue of her identity as ‘an Asian American woman’ as well as because of her ‘location outside a sociology department’.

First, Glenn (2007: 217) sees ‘the process of defining and mapping a discipline’ as parallel to ‘the process of defining and mapping citizenship’, arguing that ‘[b]oth involve matters of recognition and membership, that is who belongs’.

Second, Glenn (2007: 220) notes, ‘race and gender (as well as other axes of power and difference) are central organising principles in the institutional structuring of sociology’, charging Burawoy for ‘conjur[ing] up images of inequality and exploitation’, given that ‘positions in the divisions of labour are not freely chosen (individual taste/preference) or randomly assigned (luck of the draw); nor are they always assigned according to capability or merit’, but rather, ‘occur systematically along lines of power and difference’.

Third, ‘[p]ower and hierarchy are embedded in the project of mapping sociology’, and Burawoy’s four sociologies are suspected of contributing to the ‘cementing of inequality within sociology’, even with the alleged inclusion of subaltern perspectives; their recognition ‘seen as a way of containing and controlling them’ (Glenn, 2007: 221).

Fourth, Glenn (2007: 223) likens Burawoy’s approach to a model of ‘internal colonialism’ of sorts which does not take into account how a ‘disproportionate share of university-based critical and organic public sociology’ is done ‘by sociologists who are located in interdisciplinary fields’.

Fifth, Glenn (2007: 226) charges professional sociology with ‘a colonial relationship with subaltern fields and with critical and public wings of sociology’, when it could ‘enjoy more fruitful (and egalitarian collaborative relations with organic public wings of
other disciplines such as history, economics, geography, and legal studies than with professional sociology’.

Sixth, Glenn (2007: 2226) explains how ‘contentious social issues are often most fruitfully addressed by research and activism that bring multidisciplinary perspectives into dialogue’.

Concluding her anti-theses to Burawoy, Glenn (2007: 228) draws her argument to a close by warning that making or accepting decisions ‘from the position of privilege and power (as seen from the vantage point of a top-rated PhD granting sociology department in a foremost research university)’, makes it ‘hard to be so sanguine about the future of our discipline and the role of organic public sociology within it’. Distinguished American journalist and author Barbara Ehrenreich concludes the volume by spreading the public wings of sociology in the direction of journalism, by attempting to forge a durable alliance with it. Ehrenreich (2007: 231) issues what she calls a ‘journalist’s plea’, defending both sociology and journalism as synonymous practices, and offers what she sees as three areas of possible translation of sociological knowledge to media discourse.

The first is what Ehrenreich (2007: 233) stages as a divide between ‘the warfare state versus the welfare state’, where the sociologist’s contribution would be welcome in sounding out the ‘historical anomaly’ of ‘rising militarism and an ever-shrinking welfare state, including veterans’ benefits.

The second concerns ‘the corporation as a site for internal predation’, where Ehrenreich (2007: 234) spots a gap in contemporary sociological literature on corporations, given that the laudable works of C.Wright Mills and William H. Whyte are seen by Ehrenreich as outdated due to radical changes in corporatism since Mills’ and Whyte’s time, but recognising Richard Sennett’s The Corrosion of Character (1998), and
business journalist Jill Andresky Fraser’s *White Collar Sweatshop* (2001) as encouraging, thoughtful nods in this direction\(^2\).

The third would account for ‘*religious substitutes for the welfare state*’, suspecting a ‘religious revival’ as ‘becoming an alternative welfare state, whose support rests not only on “faith” but also on the loyalty of the grateful recipients’ (Ehrenreich, 2007: 234).

In concluding her article and Clawson *et al.*’s ASA endorsed volume on public sociology, Ehrenreich (2007: 236) addresses sociologists by stating that ‘*[y]ou have the tools, you have “in society”, an endless supply of material. But *what is the question?*’, imagining that organising central question of sociology to be; ‘What is tearing us apart and how might we find ways to resist it and restore the cohesion, the *communitas* that makes us human?’.

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\(^2\) Ehrenreich’s, *Nickel and Dimed* (2010) and *Bait and Switch* (2006) could also feature on the list as good examples of sociologically-informed investigative journalism on work, organisations and inequality at the workplace.
Section II: Public sociology in a handbook

Ehrenreich’s (2007) closing statement exudes a humanistic sentiment, in its articulation of social change through the practice of sociology, especially if the sociologists would consider including her suggestions to their list of priorities towards their public role. This provides a rather sound introduction to the main theme of the *Handbook of Public Sociology*, edited by Jeffries in 2009 which is dedicated to attempting a translation of the ‘commitment to a common ethos’, and the’ reciprocity among forms of practice’ to a ‘holistic model of sociological practice’ (Jeffries, 2009: 1).

i. Towards a holistic sociology

Lawrence T. Nichols, editor of the *American Sociologist*, and a long-standing devotee of Pitirim Sorokin, opens the volume with a playful, imaginary conversation between Sorokin and Burawoy, believing that ‘their theoretical paradigms can be profitably considered together’ in fostering ‘a holistic approach that challenges scholars in the field to re-examine the very nature of the sociological project’.

Sorokin, fictionalised by Nichols (2009: 38-41), who acts all the parts in the dialogue, raises seven points of disagreement with Burawoy:

The first disagreement expresses Sorokin’s mistrust in Burawoy’s ‘vision of a dialectical matrix of sociological work’, arguing that ‘it requires further clarification’.

The second disagreement with Burawoy finds him ‘wrong about the nature of the crisis’ maintaining, as Sorokin would, that ‘[t]he contemporary crisis is not primarily economic in nature, nor is it even economic and political. Rather it is an extraordinary crisis of the type that occurs only once in many centuries, and it involves every fundamental compartment of the dominant sensate culture; its art, literature, law, system of truth and ethics, economics, politics, science, religion and system of social relationships’.

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124 Nichols is also the editor of *Public Sociology: The Contemporary Debate*, which gathered in 2007 the contributions to *American Sociologist’s A Conversation about “Public Sociology”* in 2005. See *American Sociologist* 36 (3-4), 2005.
The third disagreement charges Burawoy’s model as ‘grounded in the obsolescent assumptions of a dying sensate culture’; a seemingly incomplete perspective on human affairs as ‘there is also a super-sensory and super-rational dimension that has been recognised for countless centuries in the philosophies and religions of diverse civilizations’ (Nichols, 2009: 39).

The fourth disagreement suggests that Burawoy’s ‘emphasis on the values of freedom and liberation must be counter-balanced by an emphasis on self-control and responsibility’ and that ‘freedom and liberation must be matched by a search for responsibility and self-restraint’ (Nichols, 2009: 40).

The fifth disagreement opposes the belief that ‘sociology’s value depends upon an attitude of political and social liberalism among sociologists’, as ‘[n]o science should be defined in terms of the socio-political attitudes of its current practitioners’.

The sixth disagreement, in connection with the fifth, suspects that if sociology is defined in terms of these attitudes, Nichols (2009: 41) as Sorokin argues, ‘then it will be a will-o’-the wisp blown about by prevailing winds’.

The seventh disagreement warns that ‘[i]nsofar as sociologists cling to an obsolescent sensate ethics, they cannot be the moral vanguard of humanity as Burawoy seems to believe’. Rather, ‘the ethos of modern Western humanism, which has produced ethics of extreme relativism and self-centeredness, must be transformed and made more accurate through interaction with other great systems of ethics’.

By means of conclusion, Nichols (2009: 41-3) disguises himself as Burawoy, this time, to respond to Sorokin’s imaginary criticisms, offering three points of his own:

The first is that ‘Sorokin’s interpretation of historical change is not the only possible reading of events’, proposing instead that their ‘two readings should be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive possibilities’.
The second point stresses that ‘[s]ome of the differences and difficulties Sorokin cites in his critique are not as great as they may appear’, while

The third point asserts that ‘with regard to creating a public sociology, there is a need to be pragmatic. Perhaps the ultimate ethos is indeed one of unlimited love. In the meantime, however, the pursuit of justice will move sociology partway along this road’

Having thus staged an entirely fictional dispute between Sorokin and Burawoy, an exercise in which Burawoy (2012) has also tried his hand with his own imaginary conversations with Bourdieu, Nichols (2009: 43) concludes that had the two met they would have ‘regarded one another as kindred spirits seeking to reinvigorate their discipline within a context of perceived professional decline and historical crisis’ in the hope that ‘in the decades ahead, both will continue to reverberate together’.

Morrow (2009: 47) offers, what he calls, a ‘post-empiricist reconstruction of Burawoy’s model’, and seems primarily concerned with the way Burawoy’s manifesto has not ‘worked out in sufficient detail’ the terms and implications of what the four types of sociology, as divided by Burawoy, do or are able of doing.

Having defined his criticism in this way, Morrow (2009: 49), also perceives a tension between ‘interdisciplinarity’ and ‘sociological myopia’ which he seeks to remedy by arguing that he finds the idea of a broad-church of critical ‘social theory much wider than Burawoy’s model’, and sets out to describe his preferred ‘key forms of discourse associated with social theory’, these being: ‘the non-empirical discourses of normative theory (values) and scientific metatheory (ontology, epistemology), the quasi-empirical inquiries of historicist and constructionist studies of knowledge, and general socio-historic theories’, from which Morrow (2009: 58) build his, admittedly vague, ‘post-foundationalist critical theory’ alternative to Burawoy’s thesis.

Feagin et al. draw parallels and explore the paradoxes of Burawoy’s idea of ‘critical public sociology’, by comparing and contrasting it with Feagin’s notion of ‘social
justice’, as expounded in his 2000 presidential address. Feagin et al. (2009: 76) begin by identifying a certain naiveté in Burawoy’s assumption that ‘dominant knowledges of professional/policy sociology will or do concede “breathing space” for “subaltern knowledges” of critical/public sociology’. They insist that: ‘sociology as a discipline can do better than elevate from intellectual despotism to an intellectual hegemony of instrumental positivism, as Burawoy suggests’, finding recourse instead to the work of ‘countersystem sociologists working with and for socially oppressed groups, those scientists who are often marginalised by professional sociology’.

The argument here is that instead of trying to institutionalise public sociology within professional sociology as Burawoy proposes, any such critical/radical sociological endeavour might best survive by maintaining its subversive freedom in the reactionary margins of the discipline, concluding that this subaltern script for public sociology is specific in its orientation, goals and organisation in comparison to Burawoy’s vague call for public sociology which does not clarify ‘who organises, maintains, controls and “unifies” it’ (Feagin et al., 2009: 83).

Bell (2009: 89-90) invites us to take a detour from current musings on the present state of sociology, or even its past and imagine instead its future projections; offering a ‘future-oriented’ approach to public sociology which she conceives as composed by two parts, ‘the sociology of the future’, and ‘the sociology of the good’.

The sociology of the future involves two important recognitions, the first one being the recognition that:

(a) ‘Sociologists, of course, are familiar with the transformation of causal knowledge into contingent predictions’, in that ‘[i]f we know from past data that x causes y, we must make an inferential leap if we wish to say of some future case that x will cause y’ bearing in mind however that any ‘discourse concerning the future might, could, or will’.

125 American Sociological Review Vol 66 No 1, pp 1-20)
The second important recognition that Bell (2009: 94) offers is what she calls:

(b) ‘Self-altering prophecies’ as the sociological antidote to self-fulfilling prophecies acknowledging that ‘predictions or forecasts can be self-fulfilling or self-negating. There are cases where the act of making a prediction itself becomes a causal factor influencing the accuracy of the prediction’.

Building on these features of future sociology, Bell (2009: 95) describes a ‘sociology of the good’ as a process of evaluation of human values, recognising that ‘human values are neither arbitrary nor capricious’, and that ‘evolutionary processes of variation, selection, and retention are constantly at work shaping them’. Values according to Bell (2009: 95) are shaped by, through and from:

(a) ‘Interaction with other humans, such as emotional support, companionship, affection and sex’

(b) Morality as a way of ‘mak[ing] social life possible, to permit and encourage people to live and work together’, and

(c) The ‘nature of the physical environment in which humans live’.

In offering such a blueprint for a future-oriented ‘sociology of the good’, Bell, also influenced by Sorokin’s holistic approach, argues for a public sociology that transcends the limits of the present, unburdens itself from the weight of the past and envisions new modes of sociological conduct that accommodate sensual values to its theoretical and methodological repertoire.

Jeffries, who edited this handbook of public sociology, grounds his critical reflections on Burawoy with reference to Sorokin’s integralist paradigm of sociology, and influenced by his role-model’s view of sociology as ‘an interdependent system’ where ‘each part makes a unique contribution to the productivity and creativity of the whole’, offers four principles for the re-formulation of Burawoy’s quadrant.
Drawing on Sorokin’s *The Crisis of Our Age* (1941), *The Reconstruction of Humanity* (1948), and *Social and Cultural Mobility* (1959) Jeffries draws some ‘principles regarding the systemic nature of Burawoy’s four form model of sociology’ as can be witnessed in Sorokin’s system of sociology these being:

(a) The hypothesis that ‘the more comprehensive, empirically grounded, and theoretically advanced the professional sociology, the more adequate it is as a basis for the other three forms of practice’,

(b) The recognition that ‘critical sociology can be of great importance in directing professional activity to specific areas of practice

(c) The hope that ‘policy sociology can be given a powerful empirical basis by a body of theory and research and direction by an explicit and clearly articulated critical sociology’, and

(d) The reminder that ‘public sociology is dependent on each of the other forms for its full vitality’.

**ii. Establishing and perfecting the holistic model for public sociology**

ASA’s 78th president Herbert J. Gans, who is credited with being the first to deliver a presidential address explicitly on public sociology in 1988, challenges his 2004 successor to the chair by offering a ‘sociology’ of Burawoy’s ‘public sociology’. Gans (2009: 123) seems surprised to notice that ‘so far there seems to be more discourse about public sociology than activity to advance it’, and wonders whether such an outpouring of activity ‘requires some serious structural changes’ both in ‘the organisation of the discipline and in sociological graduate education’.

Having thus diagnosed the ills of current sociological practice in its structural and institutional settings, Gans (2009: 123-4) claims that public sociology is ‘facing formidable competition from other disciplines’ like economics, history, and cultural anthropology, and in his effort to identify what is unique about sociology, offers four distinctive features as a preamble to his plan on how to re-invigorate the discipline:

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(a) Much of its disciplinary data, quantitative and qualitative, comes from ordinary people, obtained by going into “the field” in various ways, but mainly through fieldwork, interviewing and survey research

(b) Sociology continues to venture into areas and subjects the other social sciences are reluctant or slow to study until we have been there first

(c) Sociology remains a skilled debunker of conventional wisdoms as well as an investigative reporter and analyst of social injustices. It also looks a little harder at what is taken for granted and unexamined in everyday life, by major institutions, and by the various sectors and strata of society

(d) Sociology remains philosophically more adventurous than most of the other social sciences.

(Gans, 2009: 125)

Following this outline on the arguably unique disciplinary traits of sociology, Gans (2009: 125 proposes that sociologists develop what he calls ‘eye opening’ sociology that is ‘original, insightful, and attention-attracting empirical and theoretical research on topics useful and relevant to all parts of the general public we can reach, written in English they can understand’.

Such eye-opening sociology, needs to combine a ‘topic-driven’ with a ‘theory-driven’ approach, focusing on topics that ‘concern or should concern the general public’ while endeavouring to ‘develop concepts and formulate or test theories’ related to those topics.

Gans (2009: 129-30) also envisages changes in the ‘graduate training’ of sociologists, proposing that ‘such changes could even come first’, by establishing ‘separate tracks in the curriculum for public sociology’ through ‘the development of a handful of separate courses’ on public sociology, in its topic-driven, theory-driven, and eye-opening guises and concludes, borrowing from Isaiah Berlin’s (1953 [2013]) parable of the ‘hedgehog and the fox’, by distinguishing between disciplines that attract ‘hedgehogs’ who ‘make their careers and typically conduct theory-driven research’, and ‘foxes’ who ‘are able and willing to study several objects and fields, and are therefore flexible enough also to orient themselves toward the topical’, suggesting of course that public sociologists of tomorrow would aspire to become wily foxes rather than dull-witted hedgehogs.
Glenn (2009: 135) introduces himself as a ‘cautionary’ supporter of Burawoy’s idea intending to contribute to the discussion by means of formulating ‘a set of suggested standards for distinguishing between bad and good sociology’. Throughout his paper Glenn identifies nine such principles for good sociological practice, which are listed below:

(a) A good public sociologist will support causes, social movements and public policies that comport with his/her ultimate values by helping devise effective means for attaining movement and policy goals and by helping assess the effectiveness of the means advocated by others who strive to attain those goals

(b) A good public sociologist will make only tentative commitments to specific means for attainment of goals, including those supported by a “preponderance of evidence”, and thus will refrain from dogmatic adherence to “derivative values”

(c) A good public sociologist will avoid formulating positions and arguments for the purpose of gaining the approval of (sometime) political and ideological allies and should, insofar as possible, avoid letting those persons become his/her main significant others

(d) A good public sociologist will oppose extreme, irresponsible, and unwarranted claims about empirical reality made in ideological debates by both opponents and sometime allies

(e) A good public sociologist will resist all influences, both internal and external, to make causal conclusions stronger than the evidence warrants

(f) A good public sociologist will recognise, and communicate to others, the limits of sociological knowledge, while at the same time believing in, but not exaggerating, the contribution sociology can make toward attainment of social ends

(g) A good public sociologist will be motivated primarily by the prospect of such psychic rewards as a feeling that he/she is making the world a better place rather than by anticipation of monetary rewards, career advancement, professional recognition, public acclaim, and other “extrinsic” rewards

(h) A good public sociologist will empathise with the persons he/she wishes to influence and thus will, among other things, communicate in clear, jargon-free language and avoid postures likely to be irritating to non-sociologists
(i) The good public sociologist will be mindful of how his/her participation in public debates, discussion, and activism will affect the reputation, public image, credibility, and respectability of sociology as a whole and will avoid statements and actions that will unnecessarily tarnish the image of the discipline (Glenn, 2009: 137-147)

Having listed his own rules of public sociological method, Glenn (2009: 148) concludes with a couple of caveats the first of which is the recognition that his suggested standards are ‘ideals’ and not ironclad rules for doing public sociology and that he ventures in suggesting those ‘ideals’ by means of initiating dialogue and not by ‘belief in their correctness’ as ‘absolute’ terms/conditions for public sociological conduct.

Mayrl and Westbrook (2009: 151) set themselves the ‘challenge to identify successful strategies for the public presentation of sociology’, endeavouring to explore ‘how to write public sociology’, proposing that sociologists ought to effectively engage with making their writing ‘not just accessible but accountable to publics’, and ‘responsible’ to them too.

A key component of such an effort to speak to and through publics, Mayrl and Westbrook (2009: 152) argue, is by encouraging ‘the public sociologist to suffuse his or her writing with both form and content that resonate with publics’, thus, not ‘simply yield the floor to publics by responding only to their interests’ but rather ‘reorient the public’s focus to issues that have been neglected’.

‘For the purposes of writing’, Mayrl and Westbrook (2009: 153) explain, ‘this means supplementing accessible language with accessible content, which in turn requires knowing what debates and points of reference are relevant for a chosen public’. In addition to this first pair of requirements, the marriage of language to content, Mayrl and Westbrook (2009: 155 and 160) emphasize the importance of ‘dialogue’ and ‘relevance’, defining dialogue as requiring ‘knowledge of a debate’s points of reference, as well as to the debate’s terms, issues and conventions’, while relevance refers to the ‘need to be enticed into reading sociology’.

Having offered two sets (or pairs) of requirements for writing sociology with “the public” in mind, Mayrl and Westbrook (2009: 163) conclude by offering two hints. These are the (a) adoption of ‘popular forms’ of writing style such as vignettes and (b) the subordination of ‘external references to allow the narrative flow unimpeded’, therefore working against what Agger (2000) calls ‘Sociology as Secret Writing’ or what
Dutton (1990: 38) dismisses as ‘hyperprose’ which ‘demands only that you grunt wide-eyed or bewildered assent’.

Sociologist, author and commentator Frank Furedi (2009: 173) contributes some observations for ‘recapturing the sociological imagination’, initially by offering some thoughts on how the notion of “the public” has been conceptualised by Burawoy, suggesting that any reference to it ought to be a cautious one as it is hardly ‘self-evident’ a term. Furedi (2009: 173) borrows from Habermas’ (1991) discussion of the transformation of the public sphere to show that there are ‘important differences in the way that the public is conceptualised and the manner in which it asserts itself’, being neither incapable of ‘grasping its own interest’, nor ‘easily swayed through the manipulation of its irrational emotions by the media or other cultural influences’.

Countering such ‘elite apprehensions toward populism’ by ‘recovering the sociological imagination’, in Mills’ footsteps, Furedi (2009: 180) laments this decline in the sociological imagination noticing instead ‘a growing tendency to redefine public issues as the private problem of the individual’, thus marginalising public explanations in favour of individualistic ones. Furedi (2009: 182) explains this as an unwelcome turn towards a ‘therapeutic culture’ in which ‘social problems are increasingly perceived in terms of psychological dispositions; as personal inadequacies, guilt feelings, anxieties, conflicts and neuroses’, arguing instead that public sociology can contribute vitally in curing such a misalignment by hijacking the “public and social” from the “personal and individualistic” by projecting ‘a sense of the world that can encourage purposeful public activity and the exercise of agency’.

iii. Teaching public sociology
DeCesare’s (2009: 187) starting point in his discussion of the fate of teaching of public sociology in secondary education is his uncomfortable realisation that the debate so far has ‘ignored a crucial way in which to take the discipline public; namely through

127 Three interesting “interlocutors” to such themes are Le Bon (1995) The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, Bernays’ (2005), and Laclau (2005). See also, Thesis V in the Conclusion of this thesis.
teaching’. Noting that the teaching of sociology ‘has been largely ignored by sociologists’ and ‘a relative rarity’ in high school education ‘over the past 95 years’, DeCesare (2009: 195) calls for a recognition of all four types of sociology as an imperative for the high-school sociological education and suggests ‘paths forward’ for the incorporation of all four.

Firstly, DeCesare (2009: 195-6) argues for a recognition of the primacy of the ASA ‘both in lobbying for legislation aimed at increasing the required coursework in sociology for high school teachers, and in working to professionalise high school sociology teachers into the discipline’. Thus far, DeCesare (2009: 196) argues, ‘the ASA has rested content with trying to reform the courses themselves, rather than with trying to improve teachers’ training’.

Secondly, ASA lobbying aside, ‘[a]n alternative avenue for increasing our various regional and state associations’ can be sought for making ‘a significant impact on legislators, boards of education, and school administrators’, thus enforcing educational policy at the state and local levels, while individual efforts to increase the presence, and prominence, of sociology in high-school courses, as well as offering an encouragement to sociology graduates for pursuing a teaching career in a secondary school, are deemed not only necessary but in line with similar initiatives from as early as the 1920s by prominent figures such as Park, Bogardus, and Cooley (DeCesare, 2009:199).

Persell (2009: 207), analyses the teaching of public sociology by looking at the way teaching is portrayed in ‘interviews with peer-recognised leaders in the field of sociology’, and tries to navigate the Burawoy’s quadrant in order to offer insights on how her respondents’ claims correspond to each of Burawoy’s four sociologies.

In the professional sociology wing of Burawoy’s model, Persell (2009: 208) unmask ‘a tension between what might be seen as a professional responsibility for teaching introductory sociology students something about the field of sociology, its history, major theories, and how it differs from other social and behavioural sciences, and, on the other hand, teaching students about society and/or social problems, which

128 Similar concerns, in a UK context, have been voiced by Snapper (2009).
students might find more immediately engaging and useful’. This dilemma in decision-making about “what to teach”, also has a bearing on “who to teach”, or rather who it is that one teaches; ’who is our public in teaching sociology? To whom are we accountable?’, asks Persell (2009: 209) only to add that ‘[o]ur answers shape the learning goals and content of courses and curricula’.

In the critical sociology aspect of Burawoy’s quadrant, Persell (2009: 209) sees teaching as facing ‘additional dilemmas, including concerns for sociology’s identity and public image, a tension between moral and scientific passions, and the possibility that exposing ideological biases will limit its influence on publics’. Although ‘leaders placed critical thinking very high on their agenda’, Persell (2009: 209) reports, ‘they also mention an unease in using ‘critical sociology to challenge the foundational basis of sociological knowledge’, as ‘students may not take sociology seriously or believe the empirical findings that are reasonably reliable and valid’.

Persell’s (2009: 212) exploration of leaders’ evaluation of policy sociology suggests that a striking emphasis was placed on “improving the world”, admitting that ‘[t]hey wanted their own sociological work to do this and they wanted to imbue students with the idea that sociology could and should be used to improve the world’ by teaching students how to ‘use empirical data to analyze possible costs and consequences of various social policies’ such as ‘death penalty or legal options for abortion or stem cell research’.

Such a discussion on how policy impacts social issues continues in the classroom under the guise of public sociology, as ‘all teaching is public sociology in that it is talking about sociology to non-sociologists’, but Hodges Persell (2009: 212, 214) also raises another question, this being; ‘[t]o what degree do they acquaint students with all four of the quadrants of sociology identified by Burawoy?’, suspecting that familiarity with all four might help students make imaginative connections between them in unpredictable ways that will enrich the educational experience as well as the professional practice of sociology in the classroom.
iv. The practice of organic public sociology

Leonard (2009: 225) exemplifies the fusion of the four sociologies into “one” organic public sociology by reflecting on her own research career, where her ‘exploration of the links between private troubles of women in prison for the death of their abusers and the public issues surrounding their lives and cases’, led her to a journey from one sociological form to another before ending up juggling all four in a research project which, ‘began in the world of professional sociology, evolved into organic public sociology as well as into a form of policy sociology, while critical sociology informed its evolution’.

This unusual inclusion of all of Burawoy’s four sociologies in one sociologist’s professional trajectory, took Leonard (2009: 227) to ‘a rare journey from data to drama’, and generated a play, Life without Parole, which then inspired ‘one filmmaker to begin production of a documentary about Convicted Women Against Abuse (CWAA), and another to begin filming on the research and its evolution into the play.

Having been immersed into a ‘new’ public, ‘a public outside academia’, Leonard (2009: 233 and 236) was impressed to see how this interrelationship of data and drama, or ‘sociology-as-drama’, engaged ‘publics beyond the academy’; addressing ‘the moral and political’ simultaneously, and revealing ‘the link between private troubles and public issues’, in a way that exemplified the requirements and virtues of organic public sociology.

Lina Hu describes a similar process of integrating the four sociologies with reference to her work on the ‘Baigou Project’ in China, described in detail at an earlier contribution of hers for American Sociologist\(^{129}\), as well as in Chapter Three of this thesis, thus yielding the floor to Stephen Cornell’s (2009) narrative on ‘becoming public sociology’. Cornell (2009: 263) remembers writing a book on contemporary American Indian political activism, before a phone call with a collaborative research intent from Harvard economist Joseph Kalt caught his interest in the midst of ‘pondering what to do next’ after the publication of his 1988 book, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence.

The pairing up with Kalt was to mark the beginning of Cornell’s (2009: 264) foray into ‘becoming public sociology’, having secured themselves a grant from the Ford

Foundation to establish the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, and not expecting that ‘twenty years later, we would still be working on topics traceable to that lunch in 1986, or that I would be doing what today we call public sociology’.

Reminiscing on the origins of how Cornell ‘became’ public sociology, he describes the benefits of such a transformation as a process of intense rethinking about ‘what it was’ that he and Kalt ‘were trying to understand’: a puzzlement which allowed for ‘a kind of cooperative and dialogic search for information and insights’, that Cornell (2009:274-5) sees as a defining characteristic of organic public sociology.

The main lessons Cornell drew from this process was the realisation of (a) ‘disappearing line between public and policy sociologies’, (b) the strengthening of the link ‘between policy and critical sociology’ and (c) ‘the merging of professional and public sociologies’ into a seamless organic public sociological whole, which he envisages as the ideal route to such scholarship and public participation.

Oliver (2009: 281) reflects on her multiple roles as a civilian, activist and researcher into issues surrounding ‘racial disparities in imprisonment’, in order to demonstrate how fluid the movement around Burawoy’s two-by-two typology of sociologies can be.

Using Burawoy’s formula as ‘a useful basis for organising [her] reflections’, Oliver (2009: 281) claims that ‘it elides many of the important lessons’ which arise ‘in the process of doing public sociology’, these revolving around the recognition of ‘the often-neglected skills that are important in communicating with the public’.

Drawing on such scepticism towards any wholesale acceptance of Burawoy’s model, Oliver (2009: 285) re-animates the idea of public sociology as a process of ‘taking professional research that already exists and moving it into the public forum’, using ‘the training and orientation’ of the professional sociologist, thus enabling ‘work that non-sociologists could not do’, while at the same time ‘learning how to do the work for a public purpose’ by translating or transferring ‘professional skills’ for ‘public purpose’.

Having presented an idea of organic public sociology as a translation process between different types of scholarly and public activities and endeavours, Oliver (2009: 291-2) cautions that these distinctions may be helpful analytically but they ‘are not so neat’ and depend on ‘whether the agenda is set by the sociologist or some outside group’,
as well as by ‘whether the sociologist works with grassroots organisations or elite institutional actors’.

Ruth Horowitz (2009: 300) revisits that link between civic responsibility and organic public sociology by sharing her experience as a medical board member, using both her skills ‘as a trained participant observer’ and her ‘sociological lens’, to tackle her double role as a public member on medical licensing boards; an opportunity that Horowitz (2009: 300) describes as ‘work from the inside to try to further the public interest by tackling regulatory issues’. This simultaneous involvement in two related, yet distinct, terrains is likened by Horowitz (2009: 301) to the ‘doing of organic public sociology; trying to “protect the public” and developing a public audience for board activities as a critical and professional sociologist’.

Reflecting on this double role of hers, as an ‘organic public sociologist’ and ‘a professional ethnographer’, Horowitz (2009: 304) lists some advantages of this dual citizenship of hers as an encouragement to developing organic public sociologists.

First, ‘doing a project is a long process’ which ‘facilitat[es] the change of emphasis and allow[es] more than one set of questions’ to be explored

Second, ‘whether starting a project as a concerned citizen or ethnographer, a reasonable sociologist uses sociological research tools to understand what is going on in any group’

Third, ‘organic public sociology provides opportunities for research that would often not be available otherwise, especially of powerful groups with gatekeepers’

Fourth, ‘research provides additional insights for change’

(Horowitz, 2009: 304-5)

Horowitz’s (2009: 305, 314) last consideration ponders; ‘[h]ow will both audiences accept’ a ‘multisided role’, and a ‘pragmatist vision of the social world that means writing to increase the dialogue among groups?’, answering, by means of conclusion, that ‘combining public and professional sociology provides a more multifaceted story’ and that ‘an ethnographic project provides one methodology for the four sociologies
to exist within one project’, disproving ‘[t]he perspective that one can have a view from nowhere or one has a view from everywhere’.130

Taking cues from Horowitz, McCarthy and Hagan offer a very specific view from somewhere in particular, namely Darfur, to look at public sociology’s mission to convince practitioners of sociology to engage in it. McCarthy and Hagan (2009: 321) discuss Burawoy’s propositions based on their collaborative research on the Darfur genocide in 2003, believing that their research on Darfur constitutes ‘a more visible and issue-oriented approach that answers Burawoy’s challenge to professional sociologists to ‘break out of the bubble and engage various publics’.

What McCarthy and Hagan (2009: 326) found out in their effort to ‘count the deaths in Darfur’ was that the process of sharing that information as their ‘truth’ was contested and problematic, much less informed by ‘an objective truth’, but often met with public constituencies that would ‘only accept sociological analysis that accords with its own criteria of what the world looks like’.

Given this mismatch between sociological expectations, or ‘truth procedures’ to borrow from Badiou (2009), and publics’ multiple and often unpredictable needs and wants, McCarthy and Hagan (2009: 33) stress the need for strengthening sociology’s professional clout, given that ‘several groups-the media, the government, scholars from other disciplines, and other publics- easily dismiss sociological contributions’, thus concluding that ‘[t]he pronouncements of public sociologists probably would be better received if sociology could improve its standing within the academy’, given that sociologists ‘rarely command high status in U.S. universities, and it is not clear that public sociology activities will provide the impetus for an increase in prestige’.

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130 This point has been mostly associated with Nagel (1986), while a more sociological argument in this direction can be found in Becker (1967).
v. Special fields and public sociology

Kleidman (2009: 341) writes admittedly inspired by the progressive social movements of the 1960s, and offers two comments towards the development of a ‘professional social movement scholarship, believing that a blending of the sensibility of social movements and the virtues of sociological study can coalesce and assemble around a common goal, seeing that relationship build and develop in two key ways:

First, Kleidman (2009: 346) argues, ‘scholarship can provide the material for engaged work’, as ‘policy and public sociology draw on professional sociology’s insights’ to advance their agendas.

Second, ‘for those who study contemporary social movements, research and scholarship can build relationships with activists, leading to policy and public sociology’.

The merits of such a union, Kleidman (2009: 346) contends, lie in the possibility to ‘distill framing theories for popular use’, addressing ‘felt needs and solve specific problems’, and create a ‘grassroots policy sociology’ that can facilitate that translation of insights and motives from one form of knowledge and action to the other. This can ultimately inspire what Kleidman (2009: 346) calls ‘grassroots public sociology’, defining it with reference to ‘ideology’ as ‘a vision of a future society shaped by core values’, offering ‘a penetrating analysis of the present that puts individual problems and specific social issues in a broader critique of systems and cultures’ and ‘a long-term comprehensive strategy for how to move from present systems to future visions’.

Howard-Hassmann (2009: 357) directly ‘take[s] issue with Burawoy’s idiosyncratic definition of human rights’, but also envisages parallels between the dovetailing of her research expertise into human rights and Burawoy’s public sociological intent, thus offering a pairing of her ideas on human rights with Burawoy’s four types of sociological practice.

Professional sociology, Howard-Hassmann (2009: 360) notes, can contribute to the study of human rights, arguing that professional sociology ‘has much to offer the academic study of human rights, presently dominated by the fields of law, philosophy and international relations. These fields do not possess the theoretical or methodological tools to explain the circumstances under which individuals will enjoy,
or not enjoy their human rights’. Furthermore, Howard-Hassmann sees much usefulness in the ‘classic Weberian themes of class, status and power’, lamenting that they ‘are still weakly integrated into the human rights literature’, suspecting that ‘without understanding the nature of status, we cannot analyze the situation of the Dalits in India, or of traditional slavery in African countries such as Mauritania’.

Moving on to critical sociology’s dovetailing with the study of human rights, Howard-Hassmann (2009: 361) is swift to notice ‘some confusion, in Burawoy’s writings, as to whether the function of critical sociology is merely to debate foundational principles within the discipline, or whether it is to provide a critical stance on the wider society’. This is a crucial distinction as Howard-Hassmann (2009: 362) conceives of an ideal synergy of critical sociology with the international law of human rights in providing ‘a common standard of achievement’ for being ‘critical of the societies in which’ we live, ‘whether local, national or global’.

As far as policy sociology is concerned, Howard-Hassmann (2009: 363) identifies an example of such a potential contribution in ‘human rights policy’, where sociologists are advised to ‘consider the relationship between minimum standards of well-being, as mandated by the international law of economic rights, and equality, both of opportunity and of outcomes’.

Last but not least, public sociology is recruited by Howard-Hassmann (2009: 368) to perform the role of providing information and ‘focus on the American public. Americans do not know their rights under international law: they are especially ignorant of the principle of economic rights. Yet indicators of economic rights in the United States are usually much worse than those of other Western European counterparts, for example with regard to public social expenditure’.

Oliner (2009: 377) raises the humanitarian aspiration of Burawoy’s four sociologies by linking them to notions of altruism, apology, forgiveness and reconciliation as examples of public sociology, arguing that ‘[a]t this point the public is not interested in subsidising the kinds of academic pursuits outlined by Burawoy because they perceive them as having little significance in their everyday lives’. Instead, Oliner (2009: 377) proposes ‘the inclusion of the process of apology and forgiveness within school curricula, the media, business training, public relations, and non-government
organisations’ in the hope that ‘the educational importance and emphasis of reconciliation may be reproduced for future generations including students, employees, clients, and the general public’.

This, according to Oliner (2009: 377), is ‘a marriage between the different sociological practices Burawoy bases his ideas upon’, re-interpreting the first of these, professional sociology as ‘concerned mainly with the quantitative and qualitative evidence gathered about apology and reconciliation’. Policy sociology, in Oliner’s (2009: 378) intellectual experimentation with Burawoy’s quadrant, ‘is the implementation of the professional findings’, critical sociology provides ‘the moral vision to demonstrate the usefulness of apology and forgiveness on a grand scale’, keeping a reflexive check on our ethical orientation, while public sociology is defined as a mode of thought that considers that ‘the problems societies face are complex and the consequences of not solving them are severe’ Oliner (2009: 385).

‘It is possible’, Oliner (2009: 385) adds, ‘to materially improve the world by inculcating and disseminating the practice of true apology and forgiveness and building processes that allow for reconciliation and restorative justice’. The question, as always, is ‘[h]ow do we disseminate the positive outcomes of forgiveness and reconciliation directly to the public?’

To answer that question Oliner finds ‘press release[s] and Op-Ed articles’, ‘talk shows, relevant bloggers, TV programs, and documentaries’ as useful mediators of such public sociology of reconciliation, and adds Ernest Stinger’s (1999) method of Participatory Action Research, as a viable academic component of such an endeavour, where: ‘sociology can become reflexive and the researcher can become a facilitator in the collaborative process for social change’.

Sassen (2009: 391) enlists public sociology for a better understanding ‘of a global age’, with the intent of ‘recovering the political’, and attaches particular importance in public sociology’s potential to ‘reject some of the most developed and strongest positions in the public imaginary if we intend to produce an alternative narrative-one that enables those who now seem utterly powerless confronted with the new global actors’.

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131 Similar arguments can be found in De Beauvoir (1948), Butler (2006), Shklar (1990), and Cose (2004).
Recognising such virtues in public sociology and in Burawoy’s campaign, which Sassen (2009: 391) describes as ‘intelligent and generous’, she argues for a public sociology that would advertise opportunities for understanding ‘states and citizens’, as ‘far better positioned to participate in governing and also shaping global institutions and processes, and to engage in global politics, than is commonly assumed’. ‘The importance of public sociology’, Sassen (2009: 405) notes, ‘is its potential to redraw the analysis of the current transformation, making visible what is now obscured and bringing in actors who are now excluded from the analysis’.

Tiryakian (2009: 411), like Bell, Nichols and Jeffries before him, considers Sorokin’s perspective on altruism as a possible ambition for public sociological endeavours, on the grounds that it offers conceptual alternatives that replace “negative critique” which ‘run[s] out of steam’ (Latour, 2004: 225) with “positive altruistic values” that hold the whole of humanity together. Tiryakian (2009: 411) praises Sorokin for going ‘beyond negativism to search for the reconstruction of society and social relationships in non-violent ways’, aiming especially at ‘a cognitive reorientation of the “other”, what he termed “amitology”- a perspective marked by goodwill, cooperation and love’.

Tiryakian (2009: 411) sees Sorokin’s ideas on amitology and altruism as ‘critical’ to a ‘transformation of the social, at the micro as well as at the macro level’, as they provide ‘a cognitive and behavioural reframing to the marked negativism of late modernity (which he termed “the declining sensate phase of Western culture”)’. This amitological stance as a transformative mode of sociological conduct inspires Tiryakian (2009: 411) to praise it as ‘enlarging’ the ‘sphere of attention’ of sociology by suggesting the ‘positive alternative of altruism’ as opposed to the ‘negativism undermining the civility of civil society’, concluding that ‘[i]t is not a need for benign charity that is required but rather a need to instill awareness from the top down and from the ground up that global altruism is not only the highest activity of globalisation but also that the “other” is an integral part of the global community’ (Tiryakian, 2009: 424).

132 This sentiment is echoed in Levinas’ “philosophy of the Other”, and in Nussbaum (2013). For a good overview of Levinas’ philosophy of ethics see Bernasconi and Wood (1988), or Cohen (1986). See also, Fromm (1956), Badiou and Truong (2009), Derrida (2005), and Agamben (2009).
Adam, (2009: 431) wraps up Jeffries’ volume with a reading of the practice and the challenge of public sociology as a process of ‘futures in the making’: a concern that Adam locates ‘at the very beginning of the social science enterprise and of sociology as an independent academic discipline’.

In her understanding of sociology as ‘furutological’, much like Bell in the same volume, Adam (2009: 436) interprets the function and the role of sociology as a process of ‘critical engagement with assumptions’; a battle with ideas that would aim ‘[t]o re-center the temporal and to make futurity explicit through critical analysis’, in a way that would ‘emphasize not merely the present domain’, but would also stress ‘the importance of an immanent process reality beyond empirical access’. Public sociology in particular, Adam (2009: 437) argues, is ‘charged to explain social processes and interdependencies, show historical differences and continuities, point to problems and inequalities, and, where possible, identify openings for social change’.

This chapter has provided a brief overview of the contents of Clawson et al.’s (2007) Public Sociology, and Jeffries’ (2009) Handbook of Public Sociology in order to reflect on the multiple voices and perspectives that the idea of public sociology can lend itself to. Clawson et al.’s volume has shown how prominent sociologists have responded to the idea of public sociology, as it was re-animated by Burawoy, while Jeffries’ volume has attempted to refashion the public sociology debate in the direction of a holistic sociology, largely inspired by the legacy of Sorokin’s oeuvre.
Chapter Five: Three ambitions for public sociology


What these three resources of and for public sociology have in common is their approach to discussing public sociology, not as an idea but as a practice, favouring research and action, and promoting social change rather than mere academic deliberation on the concept’s contents.

Nyden et al. (2012) and Blau and Smith (2006) offer their volumes as practical, “hands-on” companions to such change, with the mediation of sociology as a subversive, transgressive and potentially transformative public discourse, while Agger’s book aspires to re-introduce public sociology as a vocabulary for doing a different kind of sociology, imagining it as a new social script that writes itself into sociologists’ minds, thoughts and rhetorical habits as a literary act, echoing perhaps Bauman’s (2000: 89) view of ‘doing’ and ‘writing’ sociology as the process of:

‘[D]isclosing the possibility of living together differently, with less misery or no misery: the possibility daily withheld, overlooked, or unbelieved. Not-seeing, not-seeking, and therefore suppressing this possibility is itself part of the human misery and a major factor in its perpetuation’.

Having disclosed these three books’ humanist bias towards disclosing that possibility of living together differently, and working against such human misery, the remainder of this chapter will lend itself to an exploration of such a type of non-neutral or non-committal sociology, as expounded and acted upon by the contributors to these volumes.
Section I: Public sociology as a companion to research and action

Nyden et al. (2012: x) offer their companion to public sociology, not as an outline of a theory of practice of public sociology, to paraphrase Bourdieu (1977), but as an outline for the practice of a theory of public sociology in research and action, conceived as a process of ‘galvanizing the public will’, by fostering ‘a political imagination’ as it can be found in the practice of sociology.

The aim of such an unusually politicised volume at the outset, is defined by its editors as:

‘[B]ringing about social change in community settings, assisting nonprofit or social service organizations in their work, influencing local, regional, or national policy, informing the general public on key policy issues though media publications or visibility, and creating research centers that develop and carry out collaborative research involving both researchers and practitioners in all facets of the research process’.

Nyden et al. (2012: 1)

Armed with such a purpose for the practice of public sociology, Nyden et al. (2012: 8) are quick to admit that they part ways with other contributors to the debate, in that they do not pretend or aspire to be ‘eminent sociologists’, like the discussants in Clawson et al.’s (2007) volume, but represent the ‘rank and file of public sociology’, intent on emphasising the ‘active connections to publics and users of the research, not a passive research process’.

Enlisting themselves as troops of active, politicised, public sociological research in action, Nyden et al. (2012: 10) describe ‘[e]ven the decision to become a sociologist’ as ‘a political decision’, especially ‘[i]n a society where we look to individual explanations for human behaviour before we look to the role of social structures, social institutions, or social class’.

Having stated their value perspectives with respect to their approach to public sociology, in a manner reminiscent to McClung Lee’s request as editor of *Humanity and Society*, Nyden et al. situate themselves in the debate as honoured heirs of John

The moral centre of gravity in Nyden et al.’s (2012: 17) endeavour however resides in community-based participatory research organisation like the Highlander Center in Tennessee, The Institute for Community Economics (ICE), the National Trust and the Institute for Community Research (ICR), all of which embrace research done ‘by a combination of community activists and university-trained researchers’. In addition to such initiatives for such Freire-inspired ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’, Nyden et al. (2012: 18), also celebrate the emergence of ‘a “science shop” movement’ which ‘[s] tarted in the Netherlands in the 1970s’ and ‘has since spread throughout Europe and other countries around the world’. ‘Science shops’, Nyden et al. (2012: 18) explain:

‘[A] re typically formal units within universities that actively link the work of faculty and students to community and government needs, although a few have been established independently from universities. While many of the early science shops were in the natural sciences, during the past three decades they have expanded into the social sciences too’.

Organised through the international LivingKnowledge network, such initiatives cover a variety of issues and areas for research, ranging from water quality, flooding, and the impact of agricultural pesticides to affordable housing, domestic violence, and youth homelessness, all of which are of immense public significance and public sociological value.

In addition to this mushrooming of science shops in a burst of boundary-blurring creativity, Nyden et al. (2012: 19) introduce the Loyola University Chicago Center for

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133 John Dewey is praised for his philosophical contributions to education, Jane Addams for her work on Hull House, DuBois as a towering sociologist who practically institutionalised the sociology of race in the US, and Alinsky is revered for his role as community organiser as well as the author of *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals* (1971) and *Reveille for Radicals* (1969). Richard Sennett (2012: 50) describes Alinsky’s legacy as having ‘cast a spell over young followers, who have included Barack Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton, both of whom later strayed from the master’s path’.

134 See, Freire (2005)

135 More information on the LivingKnowledge network and conferences is available at [http://www.scienceshops.org/](http://www.scienceshops.org/)
Urban Research and Learning (CURL), as an institution that ‘consciously brought together university and community partners in tackling pressing policy issues’, thus recognising ‘knowledge in the university and in the community’ by ‘harnessing the creative tensions between researchers and community practitioners’. This synergistic ‘community and university input at all stages of research, from conceptualisation and designing the methodology to collecting and analyzing data’, Nyden et al. (2012: 21) observe, is by no means exclusive to CURL but rather, such collaborative research teams are given further support by kindred spirits as found in the Wilmington Housing Authority University of North Carolina Wilmington Community Campus (WHA-UNCW), where a public sociology program (the UNCW Public Sociology Program) has been established (and flourishes) since 2005 as a direct response to Burawoy’s call for institutionalising public sociology but in a bottom-up, Freirian manner. Both the CURL and WHA-UNCW initiatives integrate Burawoy’s ambitions and Nyden et al.’s (2012: 31) commitment into an ‘ongoing teaching and research mission’ that ‘has the potential to create a permanent home for public scholarship’.

Having provided some of the examples that run through Nyden et al.’s (2012: 53-6) “action-research” companion to public sociology, it seems necessary to introduce the book’s ‘Career Guide for Public Sociologists’ drafted by Roberta Spalter-Roth and Susan Ambler, perhaps as a direct response to a series of questions that Patricia Hill Collins admits to have been repeatedly asked by students about public sociology, these being; ‘Where do I go to study it? Do the top sociology programs offer a degree in it? Can I get a job doing it?’ (Collins, in Clawson et al., 2007: 111).

Spalter-Roth and Ambler (2012: 53) acknowledge the ASA as ‘an excellent resource for all sociologists, at whatever stage in their careers’, and analyse its contents for material that challenges the ‘underlying assumption that being a sociologist means being an academic’, finding numerous ‘master’s programs’ that, like the UNCW programme, have ‘added an applied, professional, or public track to their curriculum’.

In examining such ‘free-standing sociology masters’ programs’, Spalter-Roth and Ambler (2012: 55), found that apart from their orientation as open-ended alternatives, such programmes also reflect a greater mobility in their organisational structure,

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136 All such info can be accessed online at: [http://www.asanet.org/sections/SPPS.cfm](http://www.asanet.org/sections/SPPS.cfm)
staffing and occupational aspirations for their students being ‘more likely to require internship programs, to employ faculty members who have non-academic experience, to appoint an outside advisory board, and to offer online courses’. Celebrating such characteristics as ingredients of educational reform shyly in the making, Spalter-Roth and Ambler (2012: 55-6), show that the majority of students who enrolled in such programmes in 2008 were in full time employment in:

(a) Research occupations, ‘in which students apply methods including evaluation, survey, field, and policy research’

(b) Coordinating or managing programs, including those directed at families, college students, communities, consumers, and voters, and

(c) Case work and counselling

‘Nearly half of respondents’, Spalter-Roth and Ambler (2012: 56) assert, ‘reported that their jobs are closely related to their sociological studies’, with ‘[t]he most frequently reported job skill is “being with people” (71%), with grant-writing being ‘the skill that most respondents (57%) wished they had learned while ‘a third wished they had had better access to career counselling, and nearly 30% wished they had participated in an internship program’.

In Spalter-Roth and Ambler’s (2012: 56) mind, ‘[a]ll these findings suggest that there need to be more applied programs, and that most should follow the UNCW model’ preparing graduates ‘with a skill set that will enable them to work in sociologically informed ways in employment outside academia, with multiple publics, in collaboration with others from various disciplines’, as ‘[i]t is not uncommon in M.A. programs to hear students express their dislike for academia yet their love for the discipline’ (Spalter-Roth and Ambler, 2012: 56).

Meeting students’ expectations in a way that would reflect their concerns, hopes and aspirations could be a first step towards educating young public sociologists as public sociologists, armed with the belief and intention to foster links between community work and scholarship, as Spalter-Roth and Ambler’s (2012: 56) findings seem to suggest, an argument that is consistent with the principal aim of Nyden et al.’s (2012) volume which is no other than providing examples of what constitutes public sociology for them and how it can be carried out either through direct participation in sociological work with ‘the community’ or through educating young, aspiring
sociologists in the perspective of an active, situated, collaborative and translational sociological practice that speaks not just to but with publics.

Picking up from Spalter-Roth and Ambler’s research on alternative programmes, and career paths that would be attractive to public sociologists in the making, Nyden et al. dedicate the rest of the volume to case-studies/educational projects that exemplify the type of curricula/projects that correspond to such a view of public sociology education and practice as a collaborative, translational and community-based endeavour.

The projects anthologised by Nyden et al. (2012) as good starting points for public sociology include:

- Global environmental justice
- Developing sociology in public service
- Highlighting racial disparities in criminal justice
- Building non-profit University partnerships
- Doing research on the Internet and the World Wide Web as a leveller between advantaged and disadvantaged communities
- Stressing the power of community organising
- Developing feminist research in action
- Challenging discrimination against women, minorities and the sick in health insurance, and
- Advocating educational reform for cultivating public sociology for the classroom.

Nyden et al. (2012: 300) conclude their volume by stressing the importance of technology as an additional tool for introducing public sociology to the current disciplinary norms, arguing that ‘[t]he technology of the 21st century, with effective national and international communication systems (social networking sites, email, Internet, etc.)’, provide ‘a new potential to link multiple grassroots collaborative research projects directly with each other and improve local knowledge aimed at social change’.
Section II: Public sociology as a companion to social change

Nyden et al.’s activist conception of public sociology also lies at the heart of Blau and Smith’s (2006) *Public Sociologies Reader*, which is anchored to Burawoy’s hopes for a public sociology that combines research and (public) engagement, with the sub-textual focus of Blau and Smith’s volume being on the use of public sociology as an intellectual compass for activism, and the proliferation of social movements.

Revealing their sentiments outright, Blau and Smith (2006: xiii) acknowledge that ‘social scientists concretize how consciousness and ethics take shape—as new forms of social glue and social solidarities, activism and advocacy, participatory democracy, political movements, and new pedagogies’, and use that moral and conceptual orientation in order to offer an idea and practice of public sociology as ‘a community of sentiment’, to borrow from Weber (in Gerth and Mills 1991: 176), rather than as a strictly scholarly or epistemological realm.

i. From local to global public sociologies

Taking cues from Burawoy’s (2006: 16) introductory statement to the volume, claiming that ‘[p]ublic sociology may start at home but we cannot stay there—not in today’s world’, Robinson’s (2006: 21, 31) contribution to the volume traces the links between “the local” and “the global” by introducing what he and his colleague Richard Appelbaum call ‘critical globalization studies’; a perspective that defends ‘global social activism’, by ‘exposing the ideological content of theories and knowledge claims often put forward as social scientific discourse, the vested interests before the façade of neutral scholarship, and how powerful institutions really work’.

Delanty (2006: 37) goes a step further by interpreting public sociology not simply in global but in cosmopolitan terms, proposing that public sociology is understood as a form of ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’; ‘a conception of political community that avoids communitarianism and individualism and which can be termed cosmopolitan’. Cosmopolitanism, Delanty (2006: 38) argues, ‘is essential to public sociology, giving it a
perspective that goes beyond the limits of national perspectives and at the same time suggests a tension with globality’, as an in-between reflexive realm.

Smith (2006: 51) addresses the need to ‘redress rising global inequalities’, a project which she claims to be dependent on ‘three major areas’ of prospective sociological activity:

(a) Involvement in ‘resisting neoliberal economic policies on campuses’
(b) Opposition to ‘the enclosure of the knowledge commons by using direct action tactics and by promoting open source methodologies that encourage information sharing and,
(c) Work towards supporting ‘civil society through the teaching, research, and community activities’.

(Smith, 2006: 52).

These three methodologies of action are then complemented by two ‘sets of tasks’, one ‘intellectual’, and one ‘moral’; the first contributing to ‘people’s understandings of global interdependencies and the operations of global political and economic institutions’, while the second ‘focuses on helping groups develop lasting coalitions’ thus using sociologists’ ‘analytical skills and informational resources’ to aid ‘those working for social change better navigate the complex environment on which they must operate’ (Smith, 2006: 65).

Katz-Fishman and Scott (2006: 69) offer a case study to match such hopes for social change, concentrating on their insights from Project South; ‘the site for the first ever U.S. Social Forum (USSF) in the summer of 2007’ described as ‘the anchor Atlanta-based organization for a local coalition of over-twenty-five organizations that make up the host committee’, accompanied by a trio of slogans; ‘another world is possible’, ‘another United States is possible’ and ‘another U.S. South is possible’.137

Katz-Fishman and Scott’s (2006: 69, 71) understand Project South’s mission to be that of ‘a movement rising’ through ‘consciousness, vision and strategy from the bottom-up’, and offer ‘two main paths for public sociology-the path from the social struggle to the academy and the path from the academy to the larger social struggle’.

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137 More information about Project South and the U.S. Social Forum can be found on: www.projectsouth.org and www.us-socialforum.org
Gould depicts such struggles in a visual sociological project entitled ‘In Pursuit of Justice’, which displays photographs from demonstrations from the World Social Forum in Washington, D.C., and a mural painted by Turbado Marabou, bearing the evocative caption ‘Breaking Barriers’. In Blau and Smith’s (2006: xxi) view of Gould’s visual sociology, there are ‘abundant reasons why public sociologists might consider the arts as playing an important roles in community projects’ by making ‘synthetic connections involving experiences, ideas, aspirations, and emotions in a way that language cannot’, thus leaving the readers of the volume to construct their own interpretations of Gould’s imaginative contribution.\(^{138}\)

Rodney Coates (2006: 95) matches Gould’s imaginative contribution by offering what he called ‘poetical reflections of social reality’, in a series of themed verse that ‘poignantly discusses, interrogates and helps us clarify, not only what it, but what can be’ as an antidote to normal sociological prose.\(^{139}\)

### ii. Public sociology and human rights

Pollin (2006: 107) returns the volume to its scholarly concerns by using public sociology to understand and condemn ‘neoliberal globalisation and the question of sweatshop labour in developing countries’.

Pollin (2006: 108) critically examines ‘the global spread of sweatshop labor’ by celebrating the emergence of the anti-sweatshop movement, whose rise he situates ‘within the broader historical context of rising manufacturing capacity in less-developed countries’, as a response to ‘neoliberal globalisation[’s]’ foreclosure of alternatives to sweatshop labour. Pollin (2006: 108, 120) insists that ‘alternatives to sweatshop working conditions can be advanced’ through ‘the simple device of raising retail prices modestly to cover the incremental costs of providing decent employment conditions for production-level workers’, and sees public sociology’s role as

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\(^{138}\) Similar visual sociological projects have been carried out, albeit in a more ethnographic vein, by Bourdieu (2012, 1996). For a contemporary visual sociology initiative and methods course devised by Les Back, Caroline Knowles, Paul Halliday and Nina Wakeford see: [http://visualsociologygold.wordpress.com](http://visualsociologygold.wordpress.com)

\(^{139}\) Coates’ contribution is made up entirely by a series of eleven poems that can be found in the volume, but cannot be reproduced here.
responsible for spelling out and advertising such alternatives through its curriculum and public discourse.

Rohlinger and Quadagno (2006: 123) discuss human rights in relation to their novel re-definition of democracy which is understood as ‘a complex concept’ that involves three main types of rights:

(a) Civil rights, ‘which is the right to work without compulsion’
(b) Political rights, ‘which is the right to vote and participate in the political process’, and
(c) Social rights, ‘which is the right to protection against the exigencies of the capitalist marketplace’.

Having thus offered a typology of inalienable human rights that democracies need to protect, respect and promote, Rohlinger and Quadagno (2006: 133) show how these are dis-attended by proposals to privatise Social Security in the US, noting a ‘paradigm shift from recognition of shared risks and a commitment to social insurance to a focus on individual responsibility and ownership’.

Ugalde and Homedes (2006: 137) use the example of Latin America to discuss local governments’ and international organisations’ elusive negligence towards issues of health, claiming that they:

‘have failed to fulfil their constitutional mandates, and people are dying or suffering irreversible damage from a lack of access to potable water and waste disposal systems, detrimental environmental conditions, preventable infectious diseases, poor housing, and insufficient access to health services and treatments’.

Interpreting these conditions as political problems embedded in a widespread ‘culture of neoliberalism that permeates their staff and leadership’, Ugalde and Homedes’ fierce critique brings to mind what Uruguayan journalist, writer, poet and public intellectual par excellence, Galeano (1973) called The Open Veins of Latin America, to express what Wacquant (2008: 2) described as conditions of ‘advanced marginality’, brought forward by ‘planned shrinkage’ and ‘the collapse of public institutions’.

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140 This discussion of democracy and human rights brings to mind T.H. Marshall’s (1950) classic formulation of citizenship, accurately re-interpreted by Wacquant (2008: 38), as serving ‘to mitigate the class divisions generated by the marketplace’. This three-fold division of human rights may also be used as a good guide to read Agamben (1998).
Smith (2006: 157), who co-edited this volume, focuses on marginality, as experienced by indigenous populations, and on public sociology’s responsibility to accommodate their stories into its research. Offering an understanding of public sociology as participating in ‘a decolonized and indigenised academy’, Smith (2006: 157) illustrates the interactions between indigenous peoples and academia by highlighting the ‘usefulness of the discipline’s strengths’ in ‘advocating aggressively for freedoms and protections for indigenous people and nations’.

Defining “the indigenous” as a ‘political position, in relation to states’, thus departing from its facile conflation with ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion’, Smith (2006: 157-8, 170) treats indigenousness as a ‘relational concept’, breaking with the cast of essentialism and therefore making it relevant to public sociology if the latter is conceived as a ‘global [form of] sociology with local, national and transnational dialogues rooted in an emergent transnational civil society’.

Having thus defined indigenousness as an ally to public sociology’s civic concerns, Smith (2006: 169) shows how ‘sociological theory’s strengths’ in ‘framing puzzles, empirical grounding, and application of theoretical constructs, will be assets to the further study of indigenous people and the global context of this public’, making ‘[p]ublic sociology’s unique contribution to sociology’ its ‘reflexive relationship between publics and academia’.

This relationship between marginality, globalisation and public sociology’s potential role to translate if not integrate these processes into its disciplinary concerns, is accentuated further by Orum and Grabczynska’s (2006: 173-4) considerations on migration. Recognising ‘[t]he economy of global capitalism’ as ‘the driving force’ for changes in the politics and the reality of migration, Orum and Grabczynska ‘try to show how the concepts and imagination of sociologists can be better used to understand as well as to advance the cause of migrants’, therefore inviting public sociology to become an involved ally in articulating such concerns in its research priorities.
iii. Public sociology in the service of sustainability and peace

Rodriguez and Russell (2006: 193) draw on the impact and consequences of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras (1998) and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, to highlight ‘how variables such as development, poverty, inequality, gender, and race/ethnicity impact our vulnerability to disasters’, thus perceiving natural disasters as ‘intrinsically tied to social structures and social processes’.

In making sense of natural disasters as a quintessentially political problem, Rodriguez and Russell (2006: 193) perceive ‘inequality, stratification and poverty are key factors that increase a population’s vulnerability to disasters’, and propose ‘three factors or strategies’ that ‘are critical in order to promote and generate disaster-resilient communities and thus reduce disaster vulnerability’, envisaging public sociology’s role as the intellectual organiser of such suggestions by:

(a) Empowering communities through participatory processes

(b) Engaging communities in disaster planning and managements practices, and

(c) Developing self-help initiatives

Rodriguez and Russell (2006: 205)

Rodriguez and Russell (2006: 205), also recognise the need to ‘enhance the role of NGOs in the disaster recovery process and in promoting sustainable recovery’, and last but not least ‘encourage governments to take an active role in disaster mitigation and preparedness and in incorporating these initiatives into sustainable development programs thus building disaster-resilient communities’.

This resourceful use of public sociology as a language with which to articulate suggestions for promoting sustainability, is theorised further by Gould (2006) who, in this textual contribution to the volume, attempts to link democracy with sustainability as mutually constitutive ideas and social practices.

Gould (2006: 213) understands sustainable development as implying ‘global, national, regional and local development trajectories that meet basic social needs, while ensuring the integrity of ecosystems, and doing so in a manner that does not reduce the capacity of future generations to do the same’. ‘Attaining that seemingly reasonable goal’, Gould (2006: 213) adds, ‘requires calling into question all aspects of the existing relationships between human society and the natural world’, given that
‘[s]ocial system-ecosystem interactions are mediated through economic, political, cultural and technological systems, all of which are dominated by the narrow interests of economic elites, and all of which are contested by grassroots demands for radical democratisation’.

Having thus made links between democracy and sustainability, as well as between society and the environment, Gould (2006: 228) sees public sociology as ‘responsible’ for indicating how ‘humans act upon their environment through the technologies they produce and implement’, thus inspiring a ‘truly deep environmental justice paradigm’ which ‘must include the demand that citizens wrest control of scientific research and technological innovation agendas from elite-dominated institutions and market forces, and demand that the human technological capacity be harnessed to attain a socially just and ecologically sustainable trajectory’.

Pubantz and Moore Jr. (2006: 231) give the sustainability debate a theoretical spin, grounding it in the thought of Immanuel Kant and Jürgen Habermas. Acknowledging at the outset their argument for promoting peace through global governance, Pubantz and Moore Jr. (2006: 231) see global governance as ‘emerging from the shadows of long-established inter-governmental diplomacy’, brought forward by ‘a collective of transnational organizations, specialised agencies, institutional structures, forums, programs, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), social movements, and individuals’, with the UN situated at ‘the network’s nexus’.

Calling this global network the ‘new United nations’ Pubantz and Moore Jr. (2006: 231) interpret it as ‘the product of “Kantian” and “Habermasian” theoretical means’, to show how a preliminary public sociology of global governance may build on Kant’s and Habermas’ ideas on the defence of an international civil society to promote peace.

Starting with ‘[t]he Kantian forecast of increasing numbers of democratic states’, Pubantz and Moore Jr. (2006: 231) see ‘cooperation through international organizations, and enhanced global interdependence’, as opening avenues for ‘nonstate actors to play an enlarged role in an expanding republican federation at the global level’ which in turn fosters ‘democratization and cooperation within and among states’.

Habermas’ body of work becomes relevant and useful to Pubantz and Moore Jr’s. (2006: 232) rhetoric and public sociology, if it is mobilised to encourage ‘[p]articipatory
democracy by way of civil discourse about serious issues-now possible on an integrated global/local network’ thus securing policy formation without resort to interstate conflict’.

Having thus brought together the theoretical work of Kant and Habermas, Pubantz and Moore (2006: 232) see such inventive and imaginative links between theory and practice as the essential translational task of public sociology, which they rename ‘the new public sociology of peace through global governance’.

**iv. Rethinking liberalism with public sociology**

The volume’s co-editor Judith Blau, and Moncada (2006: 253) introduce the idea of ejidos (commons) as a ‘[u]topian project’ of direct public participation that ‘offer[s] lessons to Westerners who may now be concluding that neoliberalism is rapaciously devouring the planet’s resources and imperilling societies’ (Blau and Moncada, 2006: 261-2). The use of the term *ejidos* by Blau and Moncada (2006: 255) appropriates its original meaning which refers to collective agrarian practices in Latin America, to describe communities that are ‘self-governing, self-sufficient, and embrace egalitarian principles’, and draw a distinction between real and virtual self-governing communities, mediated by the use of the Internet.

Drawing on real self-governing communities, Blau and Moncada transpose *ejidosian* principles of communitarian action from the *situated* to the *mediated* online-world, where ‘[d]irect democracy is increasingly possible because of the Internet, and the main remaining challenges are, first ensuring that all have access to broadband and, second, creating online decision-making structures’. The Global Forum on Internet Governance, and the United Nations Working Group on Internet Governance are cited as initiatives that ‘have worked out some of the practical details that would make it possible to implement democratic participation locally, nationally, and internationally’, and are held up as a potential space for public sociology to flourish.

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141 An example of real self-governing communities that Blau and Moncada use, comes from the Kibera community, located within Nairobi.
Hattery and Smith (2006: 265) draw a different map for a sociology of the commons, starting from the campus as a prime location to discuss the teaching of public sociology as a way of ‘taking sociology beyond the university’.

Armed with the ambition to teach from ‘a “public sociology” perspective’, Hattery and Smith (2006: 266) highlight ‘the importance of involving students in the communities in which they are living and/or studying’, drawing on Stephen Pfohl’s (2004) assertion that ‘what is needed most is a quality of mind’ that will help students ‘use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and what may be happening within themselves’.

This process of intellectual discovery and community involvement guided the principles of Hattery and Smith’s (2006: 272) Social Stratification in American Deep South course at the Wake Forest University, which was ‘designed to teach sociology, as a method of inquiry and a theoretical framework, to examine contemporary issues of social stratification and civil rights in the Deep South; an area ‘frequently understood to be the deepest subsection of the [American] South’. This rather innovative course was taught in a bus, giving the students that enrolled the opportunity to travel by bus to cities, towns and rural areas in five southern states from Atlanta to the Mississippi Delta.

Using this mobile course as their roadmap for teaching public sociology, Hattery and Smith (2006: 279) were able to show students, via a lived experience, how stratification may unfold in the American South; allowing them to propose what they claim to be a ‘more honest, more inclusive, more in-depth manner’ of doing public sociology outside its traditional headquarters and pedagogical focus, thus almost reframing Burawoy’s paradigm into a sociology of action in motion, mediated by teaching en route to the very research areas and physical places Hattery and Smith (2006: 279) and their students sought to study.

This commitment to teaching public sociology as a form of scholarly activism is amplified in Risman’s (2006: 281) contribution to the volume, where she describes feminist sociologists as ‘public sociologists, whether they knew the term or not if by “public sociology” we mean sociology engaged with an audience outside the

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\(^{142}\) This quote is here attributed to Pfohl, but it can be found verbatim in Mills’ (1959: 5) definition of ‘the sociological imagination’.
academy¹⁴³, armed with the ambition to ‘create and to use knowledge for the public good’.

Feminist scholars, Risman (2006: 282-3) argues, appear to be natural fits for the role of public sociology, as they have at the outset defended ‘scholarship with a social justice mission’, articulated as ‘an antidote to sexism in intellectual and scientific endeavors’. In fact, Risman (2006: 283) elaborates, feminist scholarship is ‘by definition about providing the intellectual scaffolding for social change’:

(a) Through ‘teaching as activism’, by ‘developing a pedagogy that actively challenges students to use personal experience for insights, to think critically and to engage the world around them’, as well as

(b) To advance ‘careers as scholar-activists’, introducing to the public realm ‘data that indicates social inequality, and the idea that such inequality is historically contextual and socially produced’.

Having offered feminist sociologists as good role models for public sociological scholarship, Risman supports the continuation of such efforts to re-build connections with the public sphere and sees this as an important responsibility of current and future public sociology.

Gallagher (2006: 293) wraps up Blau and Smith’s volume by problematizing ‘[n]eoliberalism’s illusion of inclusion’, which he interprets as propagating the ‘widespread belief that individual agency and impersonal, nondiscriminatory, market forces rather than racial, gender, or class inequalities structure life chances’.

Gallagher (2006: 293) identifies public sociology’s admittedly Sisyphean task of forcing its way through the fog of such assumptions in order to ‘engage a public about growing social inequalities when most people now believe that such inequalities do not exist’.

Such individual explanations for socially created ills, are seen by Gallagher as a defining characteristic of neoliberalism, which he moves on to describe as both ‘a global economic system’ and as ‘an ideology’.

‘As global economic system’, Gallagher (2006: 293) notes, ‘neoliberalism calls for the privatisation of public space and resources, limited government, a dismantling of the social safety net, and unregulated markets’.

¹⁴³ This observation is also made by Patricia Hill Collins (in Clawson et al., 2007: 101) who admitted to having been ‘doing a kind of sociology that had no name’
‘As an ideology’, Gallagher (2006: 293) elaborates, ‘neoliberalism espouses a belief that the opportunity to be successful, rich, or both is available to all regardless of one’s particular social background (black, gay, poor, female...).’

Having thus identified two facets of neoliberalism which also explain its illusion of inclusion, Gallagher (2006: 294) locates at the very heart of public sociology’s function the ‘challenging [of] these distortions in any meaningful public way’. Any such ‘lack of engagement with the public concerning the social costs and implications of neoliberalism’, Gallagher (2006: 294) warns, ‘points to three troubling trends in our discipline’, these being:

(a) The ‘growing wall between the research we do and its connection to the general public’
(b) Sociologists’ ‘inability to provide empirically based competing narratives that challenge the neoliberal assertion that inequality is a perhaps unfortunate but necessary social outcome of postindustrialism’, and
(c) The ‘dilemma of disseminating research findings that challenge most individuals’ belief that the United States is a meritocracy’.

Having thus identified the challenges and the obstacles that public sociology encounters in its central role as an agent of social change, Gallagher concludes the volume with lots of pending promises for public sociological endeavours in the direction that he and his fellow-contributors to Blau and Smith’s volume have pushed for. The book closes optimistically, however, with a detailed annotated guide to online resources for public sociologists, designed to invite readers and practitioners of sociology to the disobedient family of public sociologies.
Section III: Public sociology as a literary act

In the previous section of this chapter, public sociology was interpreted as a pluralistic endeavour intending to bring together different strands of engaged scholarship, as a way of inciting the public sociological imagination of scholar-activists such as those contributing to Nyden’s (2012) and Blau and Smith’s (2006) anthologies.

The term “public sociology” however has its roots in the singular, despite its pluralistic orientation and objective, and makes its début in the contemporary literature in the work of Ben Agger who re-introduced the term in 2000. Although public sociology may be traced back to the writings of what Seidman (1998) calls ‘the moral sociological canon’ of sociology, casting Mills and Gouldner as key protagonists, the modern use of the term has been popularised by Agger writing four years before Burawoy thrust the term onto the public scene.

With this information in mind, the last section of this chapter will explore Agger’s version of public sociology as a singular term, but also one that has the collective imaginary in mind.

144 For a more detailed discussion of the term’s origins see the Introduction of this current thesis. It should also be noted that Agger argued, at a personal interview with this thesis’ author, that he ‘got the dialogue started’ with his 2000 book.
i. Sociology as secret writing

This idea of sociology as a literary act introduces Agger’s (2000: 1) ambition to write ‘a story about writing stories, which is the gist of sociology’, arguing that by ‘viewing sociology as storytelling, I do not rob it of rigor, method, high theory’, but rather offers an attempt to guard the discipline against what he conceives as the threat of ‘secret writing’.

Secret writing, in Agger’s (2000: 2) analytical lexicon, is what ‘method’ appears as. In such disguise method, according to Agger (200: 2), is to be mistrusted for (a) wilfully concealing its epistemological status as ‘a literary style’, and (b) masquerading instead as ‘a representation’ of social facts which are reported in a dispassionate manner, unblemished from literary properties or concerns. Method, according to Agger (2000: 2), is best understood as a ‘narrative’ and sociology as ‘a social text’, thus offering the possibility of ‘exploring the contemporary discipline of sociology from the perspective of its discourse’.

Sociology à la Agger (2000: 2) is best understood as ‘a social act that is above all literary’ but also ‘political’, admitting at the outset that his ‘project is unashamedly normative’.

Contending that ‘sociology should take a lead in building a democratic public sphere’, and being inspired by the social movements of the 1960s that ‘taught us that sociology is political’, Agger reconciles that emancipatory potential with ‘the postmodern turn in the social and cultural disciplines during the 1990s’, which instructed us that ‘sociology is discourse’.

This dualistic conception of sociology as “political” on the one hand and “discursive” on the other informs the core of Agger’s book which is structured around six main concepts acting as rhetorical handmaidens for Agger’s authorial and public sociological aspirations.

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145 For additional descriptions of sociology’s “literariness” see Halsey (2004: 15-28), whose A History of Sociology in Britain devotes its first chapter to “reading” sociology in the light of a “literature” or “science” dualism. For a similar discussion from a writer’s pen, see Wells (1914).

146 For a brief exploration of Agger’s theory on the discursive and disciplinary dimensions of sociology see Agger, (1989).
**ii. Six concepts for public sociology**

I. The first concept is *authoriality*, which is understood by Agger (2000: 3) as ‘the notion that writing in sociology requires deliberate authorial choices’.

II. *Iterability*, borrowed from Derrida, refers to ‘certain conventions that are learned in graduate school and reinforced throughout one’s academic career’.

III. *Undecidability*, also taken from Derrida, is employed to propose that ‘writing, no matter how science-like in its rhetorical conventions, does not solve intellectual problems with sheer technique, or method, because the sociological text does not perfectly mirror the world but rather is merely one version among possible versions’ (Agger, 2000: 3).

IV. *Narrativity* refers to ‘the way in which quantitative methodology is a rhetorical text that would convince readers of its peculiar, silent version of the social world’. ‘Method’, Agger (2000: 3) elaborates, ‘is rhetoric, argument, even polemic, in this view’.

V. The fifth concept of Agger’s (2000: 4) book is offered as an *ethnography and political economy of academic career writing*, to explore ‘how sociologists choose publication outlets in order to add value to their curriculum vitae and how they compose their articles and books in the light of the “language games” characteristic of their particular subfields in the discipline’.

Agger’s (2000: 2) foray into the how and why sociologists may write the way they do, returns to his twin criticism of:

(a) Sociology performed as ‘writing for publication that advances careers’, and

(b) The use of ‘methodology as a narrative’ for the purposes of ‘editorial gatekeeping’, and ‘the management of academic careers’.

VI. *Polyvocality* ushers in a view of sociology as ‘increasingly polyvocal, open to diverse voices, methods, theories [and] writing styles’, which ‘does not reduce sociology’s legitimacy, but opens it to cross-fertilization from cultural and humanistic disciplines’.

Agger’s (2000: 4) adaptation of Bakhtin’s (1981: 430) ideas of ‘polyvocality’ and

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*Agger refers here, and later in the text, to Wittgenstein’s (1974) concept of ‘language games’. Similar philosophical explorations on language can also be found in Wittgenstein (1977).*
'heteroglossia' as useful conceptual tools for a more dialogic public sociology, echo Burawoy’s (2005a: 11-2) own stress on the ‘antagonistic interdependence’ of his four types of sociology, thus making both scholars’ rousing calls for public sociology accountable to each other, inspired as they both are by a desire to ‘remake the discipline in fundamental ways’ (Agger, 2000: 4). This reformist spirit in Agger (2000: 4) features stubbornly throughout the book alongside the conviction that the way ‘disciplines write expresses their theoretical and normative frameworks. In their discourse, disciplines disclose themselves, the more so the more disciplines shun their narrativity- the fact that their busy professionals compose themselves and thus the world’. This statement guides most of Agger’s (2000: 16) narrative, coupled with a desire to develop a competence in ‘reading secret writing’ not just as a way of demystifying its allure and decoding its power (as previously suggested), but also in order to increase ‘the capacity of sociologists to view themselves sociologically’, thus making use of their powers and abilities of ‘reflexivity’ enlisted here by Agger, but proposed originally by Gouldner (1970) and O’ Neill (1972). This self-critique of sociology, akin to Friedrichs’ (1970) own sociology of sociology, is understood by Agger (2000: 18) as a form of ‘disciplinary reading’ itself, dubbed ‘socio(onto)logy’\textsuperscript{149}, with the intention of proposing the invigoration of a public sociology against the backdrop of the ‘disciplinary hegemony’ of method which makes itself felt as ‘a rhetorical practice that does not solve problems definitively but asks us to suspend our questioning about its deepest assumptions and to defer our scepticism about its absolute objectivity’.

\textsuperscript{149} See also Agger (1989)
iii. Learning the discipline discursively

Having outlined the six main areas of critical attention in Agger’s (2000) socio-literary aspirations for sociology, it appears timely to concentrate on some additional issues that Agger draws our attention to, in order to ground his assumptions while attempting to convince us to follow his suggested way out of what he seems to perceive as sociology’s disciplinary labyrinth: strewn with words, but confusing those who utter them.

The main strategy for disciplinary change according to Agger (2000: 23, 29), revolves around ‘learning the discipline discursively’ by confessing to ourselves and our public(s) that ‘sociology is discourse and, as such it must be learned’. This proposition has twofold implications; firstly offering itself as a reminder of Agger’s persistent conviction that sociology is écriture, and secondly as a self-portrait of sociology’s discourse, made up of technical norms, rules, conventions and canons that are “learned” through one’s scholarly career but need to be decoded as little more than ‘language games’ (Agger, 2000: 39). ‘Sense is made and reason advanced’, Agger notes, ‘within what [Wittgenstein] called language games, which litter the fields of scientific disciplines’, not excluding sociology if we are to follow Agger’s diagnosis. Likening this training in learning a discipline through its writing to an ‘acculturation process’, Agger (2000: 29) sets out to examine how these disciplinary roles are learned by looking at the technical minutiae of academic writing (in the social sciences), characterising the process as ‘an apprenticeship to scientism’ composed of authorial habits that are internalised when writing for journals and other academic publishing outlets.

These habits as laid out by Agger (2000: 29) involve a mastery of ‘citation’, ‘figuring’ (referring to the use of figures) and the processes of ‘revision’, and ‘re-submission’, as these largely shape the way in which sociology is written in journals. Agger’s emphasis on journals constitutes the core of his book’s methodology, tracing the history of the American Sociological Review (ASR) since 1938 in order to demonstrate the resemblance of contemporary journal sociology to the discourse of the ASR, while also comparing it to the forty articles he has surveyed between 1995 and the book’s
publication, coupled with 150 reviews and authors’ and editors’ letters that he has read in the course of his research for the book.\textsuperscript{150}

\textbf{iv. Method as a text}

The main findings from Agger’s (2000: 95) painstakingly detailed research into the very fabric of sociological authorship seem to coalesce into his argument against ‘method’, thus returning to his suspicion of it as ‘obstructed writing’ with a ‘science aura’ posing as ‘the main text’ which dominates not just the way sociology is written but also how its knowledge is produced, abstracted and “mathematized” (or ‘figured’ as is Agger’s, 2000: 53 preferred term). The dominance of numbers over words on the sociology journal page is evident, Agger (2000: 29) maintains, in the ‘discursive style of de-authorized quantitative empiricism’, a terms that resonates strongly with Mills’ (1959: 50-76) dismissal of ‘abstracted empiricism’.

Agger (2000: 30) is no less critical, though much more gentle in his critique of such versions of positivism describing it as ‘a discursive approach to writing science rather than as explicit doctrine’.

Agger and Mills’ disapproval of method’s disciplinary hegemony, Mills (1959: 59) refers to it grudgingly as ‘The Method’, fear the possibility of this ‘approach to writing’ sociology acting centre-stage, at the risk of converting the sociologist into a ‘Methodologist’ (Mills, 1959: 61), therefore marginalising the theoretical output of sociology scholars ‘who do cultural studies, feminist theory, post modernism, and critical theory’ as ‘weird and exotic species on display for the delectation of those temporarily wearied by positivist business as usual’ (Agger, 2000: 142).

What may be mistaken as a wholesale rejection of positivist(ic) social science in Agger’s (2000: 143) prose is to be best interpreted in the light of his warning against the tendency of ‘authors, reviewers, and editors [to] narrow arguments and militate against risk-taking’ although even that last statement, moderate though it may be, reminds us of Mills’ own lament of intellectual playfulness and eccentricity, enduringly etched in \textit{The Sociological Imagination}.

\textsuperscript{150} See Agger (2000: 237) for a more detailed account of his method.
Agger (2000: 143) appears rather concerned with the threat of ‘figure’ replacing ‘prose’ and their tense coexistence ‘with prose pushing outward on the technical constraints imposed by method, especially by the statistics used. Even prose of a highly technical kind, usually found in the methods sections, is reduced to figure, gesturing a methods-driven sociology’.

This highly normative stance towards what Agger (2000: 167) interprets as ‘methods-driven sociology’ is perhaps remedied when he accounts later for ‘theory’s science envy’ with theory becoming ‘obstructed writing, riddled with citations, and devoted to issues of exegesis and intellectual flirtation that bear scant resemblance to the grand theorising of Marx, Durkheim and Weber’.

**v. Was sociology always like this?**

Such critique may sound ruthless and even unforgiving for what simply constitutes different branches of not just sociology, but the very foundations of the philosophy of social science at broad, where positivism stands starkly opposed to the critical tradition of the Frankfurt School or the scholarship of Mills and Gouldner, whom Agger reveres as the illustrious forebears of the kind of sociological discipline that he is motivated by and aspires to. However, Agger’s (2000: 201) claims, purposely emotive and charged, do not go unsupported without a necessary historical journey into the question of whether sociology was ‘always like this’, with Agger’s (2000: 201) response supporting his epistemological worldview by examining the history of the *ASR* from the late 1930s until the present day to find that ‘early sociology, extending to the end of the 1960s and perhaps even somewhat beyond, was not methods driven’, suggesting that ‘[m]ethods have become the intellectual driving force only in the past twenty years, with rapid acceleration since about the mid-1980s, with the growing mathematization of journal discourse’.

Agger (2000: 205) found that ‘[a]lthough mainly positivist, sociology from 1938 to 1968 refused the hegemony of method. This began to change when sociology fell upon hard times during the 1970s, with cuts in funding and declining numbers of undergraduate majors, graduate students and tenure-track job opportunities’.
The ascent of method in the 1970s, according to Agger (2000: 205), is symptomatic of what he perceives as an ‘institutional crisis’ and even ‘decline’ of sociology as a result of which the discipline witnessed a period of ‘de-narrativization’ and imitation of the natural sciences’ practices of knowledge production, curation and dissemination, ‘with a fixation on methods’ with the aim of ‘hopefully imitating’ the ‘successes’ of natural sciences too. In this reading of sociology’s perceived downfall ‘[m]ethod, especially mathematics’, Agger (2000: 205) contends, ‘was conceived as a solution’, a narrative of disciplinary reform that ‘gathered momentum during the 1980s and 1990s, as journal sociology became even more mathematized, figural and gestural’, only to be challenged by developments in ‘interpretive, cultural and critical theory’, described by Agger (2000: 205) as ‘an intellectual revolution [that] swept the humanities’ and ‘politicized both graduate programs and publication outlets’.

It is to this transformation that Agger (2000: 205) pegs his hopes for the consolidation of a public sociology which draws on the legacy of such intellectual developments, while contemplating a triumphant return of sociological writing in the wake of postmodernism: ‘proven so scandalous to mainstream sociological empiricists, who breathed a sigh of relief as the conflict-oriented sixties were surpassed.’

vi. Sociological writing in the wake of post-modernism

This return to “author-reality”, to coin a new term, is imagined by Agger (2000: 237) to signify a revival of ‘sociology’s narrative period’ punctuated not by ‘a golden age, before methodology, when U.S. sociology belonged to the public sphere’, Agger (2000: 237) acknowledges that ‘[t]here was no such age’, but by a ‘narrative period during which method had not become gestural and the main text of writing was text, not figure’. The overall purpose of Agger’s (2000: 237) argument thus becomes much more restorative than merely critical, seeking to ‘explore alternative modes of sociological discourse that do not betray the empiricist project\(^{151}\)', but it is also a self-consciously ‘utopian’ one; ‘going beyond critique toward practical alternatives, where possible’. ‘In the first instance, Agger (2000: 238) notes, ‘I contend that we in sociology would be

\(^{151}\) For a more detailed and updated analysis on the politics of method in descriptive sociology see Savage and Burrows (2007)
better off if we practice and preach *author-present* writing’, which ‘allows us to read and write sociology as a “text” driven by certain political and social interests’.

This principled stance towards both the style and content of sociological writing reverberates strongly with Haraway’s (1988: 583-90) defence of a ‘situated and embodied knowledge’ in (feminist) sociology, ‘arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning and situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims’ (Haraway, 1988: 583-90).

Both Haraway and Agger seem to invest on the potential of sociology to write itself to a mode of critique that is mediated by moral concerns and discourse too. Agger (2000: 242-3) endorses such a sociology and places it historically in the emergence of critical theory as a ‘model of a public social science’, noting however that it ‘has lacked until recently’ [...] a foundation in discourse capable of translating sociology from ‘secret writing’, or what Wittgenstein (1953) calls *language games*, to ‘the practical discourses of everyday life’ (Agger: 2000: 240).

This ambitious overhaul of ‘disciplinary practices’ with a view of ‘academic writing as a social practice’ can be found in what Agger (2000: 242-3) calls ‘communicatively oriented critical theory’ represented by the work of Jürgen Habermas (1984, 1996), especially in books such as *Theory of Communicative Action*, and *Between Facts and Norms*, but also by contributors to the 1969 journal, *Telos*. Founded by Paul Piccone, *Telos* is celebrated by Agger (2000: 241) as ‘one of the bright spots in post-1970 American academic life’ and is credited with ‘signalling the emergence of a distinctively American voice in critical theory’ by blending ‘Frankfurt School themes’, with issues raised by the new social movements of the 1960s and the 1970s as well as the ‘nascent environmental movement and the New Left’.

**vii. Public sociology as dialogic scholarship**

If this dialogic and critical form of scholarship is the first stop *en route* to Agger’s disciplinary utopia for sociology, it is succeeded by his desire to wed what Jay (1973)

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152 See Brodkey (1987)

153 Agger has co-edited a tribute to *Telos*, with Timothy W. Luke in 2011. While hailed as a New Left publication, it came under attack for publishing articles by Alain de Benoist, the founder of the dissident New Right movement, Nouvelle Droite. For a criticism of Benoist, see Sheehan (1981)
termed ‘dialectical imagination’, in his homonymous book, essentially an intellectual history of the Frankfurt School from 1923 to 1950, with an ‘everyday sociology’ which will ‘connect people’s lives and the enveloping structures conditioning them’, drawing on the tradition of ‘both Marx and Mills, where they called for a sociological imagination linking public and private’ (Agger: 244-5). Re-claiming the space for such sociological imagination to narrow the gap between private and public realms and replacing it with a more associative spirit, would inevitably involve ‘ground[ing] sociological imagination in a historically based account of how people can view their biographies sociologically and thus, in effect, become amateur sociologists and hence better citizens’ (Agger, 2000: 245).

This semi-utopian vision of a potentially co-operative spirit in sociology is stressed even further by Agger (2000: 245), quoting Lemert, who saw ‘many different kinds of sociologies, some of them academic ones, but the most important ones are the sociologies whereby people make sense of their lives with others’, in a similar spirit to Garfinkel’s (1967: 11) vision for a conversational sociology where sociologists and citizens alike are seen as ‘cultural colleagues’. The debt to Garfinkel and ‘the spirit of ethnomethodologically oriented sociologies’ is duly noted by Agger (2000: 245), who praises him for removing ‘sociology’s prior privilege by suggesting that sociology, like all other everyday projects, is practical reasoning done in the natural attitude, as Husserl called it, enjoying no distance from the fray’.

This interweaving of lay and disciplinary versions of sociology is understood by Agger (2000: 245) as ‘emancipatory where it suggests the possibility of a democratic public sphere grounded in everyday settings, in which people not only make sense together, but make sense of society together reasoning about freedom and justice in sophisticated ways’. Agger’s revisiting of the ethnomethodological allure of studying common-sense practices (in the plural) as a valid sociological practice (in the singular) brings to mind Zimmerman and Pollner’s (1971: 80-1) distrust of ‘the perennial argument that sociology belabors the obvious’, proposing instead that sociology has yet to treat the obvious as a phenomenon’.

To further substantiate his ‘return to narrativity’ thesis Agger (2000: 246-7) picks up the work of Mills, O’Neill, and Lemert, ‘because they all address the narrativity of sociology, one from the late 1950s, one from the 1970s, and one from the 1990s’, and
in doing so he subtly brings together the two main strands of his own sociological vision; reflexive, critical, polemical and dialectically-written on the one hand, and every-day, emancipatory, and publicly-engaged on the other.

viii. Public sociology as story-telling

By means of concluding his argument, Agger (2000: 257) also admits that ‘it is not enough to quote Lemert, Mills and O’Neill as exemplars of good writing’, so Agger emphasizes a need for ‘narrating a public sociology’ by offering three observations and three ‘sociological desiderata’.

Starting with his three observations, Agger (2000: 257) states that:

(a) ‘There is plenty of good writing in sociology, but precious little of it in the empirical journals’

(b) ‘This fact alone makes the point that “discipline” is not seamless; editors as well as authors fall through the cracks and are allowed to go their own ways, relatively unencumbered by the strictures of normal science’s language game, which drives out thought and critique’, but favours a type of sociology that

(c) ‘admits that it tells a story, invites stories and addresses social problems accessibly’.

‘Good sociology’, Agger (2000: 257-8) adds, ‘is unashamed of its advocacy, grounding objectivity in choices clearly made about topic, method, theory discourse’ thus leading us to his three ‘sociological desiderata’ aspiring to sociological writing which must: (a) ‘reveal the author’, (b) ‘engage in self-translation’ and (c) ‘address major public issues’.

(a) ‘Revealing the author’, involves presenting sociological writing ‘as a literary act and outcome’ which would not ‘undermine its claim to be science but rather opens science to different versions grounded in different language games’.

(b) ‘Self translation’ is devised as a rhetorical mechanism for ‘disclosing its animating assumptions and confessing to its intellectual and social interests’, and

(c) Addressing ‘major public issues’ makes known the intention to ‘influence the public and policy’.

Such an idea of a sociology which does not withhold its commitments to the public sphere and is defined as a simultaneously social, scholarly and pedagogical enterprise

154 For a defence of such (dialectical) writing see, Jameson (2000)
that raises issues and debates as citizenship problems rather than epistemological abstractions, is defended further by Agger’s (2000: 260) concluding confession that ‘[m]y conception of public sociology resurrects the role of what Antonio Gramsci called the “organic intellectual”, an intellectual in dialogue with ongoing social movements’.

This chapter has examined the contribution of three separate ambitions for public sociology, as expressed by Nyden et al. (2012), Blau and Smith (2006), and Agger (2000). Each book has focused on different themes, the first two attempting to persuade public sociological endeavours to form coalitions with community work and social movements in inspiring impetus for change, while Agger’s seminal contribution to the contemporary use of the term “public sociology” has taken a more narrative route, offering public sociology as a critical discursive practice. The next two chapters lend themselves to an analysis of sociology “in crisis” and to an articulation of eleven counter-theses to Burawoy, which serve as this thesis’ original theoretical contribution to the public sociology debate.
Part Three: Discussing public sociology in times of crisis

Having so far explored public sociology’s status “under immanent criticism”, Part Three discusses sociology “in a state of imminent crisis” (Chapter Six), and offers eleven counter-theses (Conclusion), thus endowing the last part of this current thesis with descriptive and reconstructive ambitions. The descriptive element of Part Three corresponds to Chapter Six which sets out to debate sociology’s “crisis” as nothing new or pathological, while the re-constructive section emerges in the Conclusion which attempts to re-imagine the uses of public sociology in the current institutional climate of Higher Education and in the context of global intellectual, cultural and public life at broad.

This dovetailing of the descriptive and the reconstructive ambitions of Part Three corresponds to the central argument of the current thesis which serves firstly as a reminder of the long tradition in debating sociology’s public status, and secondly as an invitation to perceive and discuss the discipline differently in and for the future by asking:

(a) What it is
(b) How it should be done
(c) Where it may belong (epistemologically, ontologically and ideologically)
(d) How publicly relevant, available, and accountable it is, and
(e) Whether such introspection matters.

The implications, or mere results, of such stubborn questions are witnessed in recurring pronouncements of sociology’s ill-health or even “death” (Porter, 2008), which are often treated as new symptoms or breakthrough pains, rather than as long-acting grievances about sociology’s character, thereby mystifying and pathologising an otherwise ordinary characteristic of a dynamic and constantly changing discipline, in the light of the cluster of circumstances and conditions in which it finds itself. The remainder of this chapter concentrates on such an accumulating trail of complaints while the Conclusion looks at possible ways of making such displeasures irrelevant.
Chapter Six: Sociology in crisis?

Sociology’s discourse of and on itself narrates an auto-biography of the discipline as tempest-tossed; a craft in peril that is to be found in an in extremis crisis since its very inception and formal establishment as an academic discipline at the tail-end of the 19th century.

Sociology’s founding father, Émile Durkheim (1982 [1895]: 163), who is habitually credited with institutionalising the discipline of sociology, writes in his notorious conclusion to the Rules of Sociological Method that ‘the time has come for sociology to renounce worldly successes, so to speak, and take on the esoteric character which befits all science’; an unusually sceptical, insecure and introspective prelude to such a new discipline, finding sociology already ‘embroiled in partisan struggles’ which can threaten the new discipline’s ‘dignity’, ‘authority’ and ‘popularity’. Three decades later, sociology’s ‘dignity’, ‘authority’ and ‘popularity’ found itself being debated again, this time not in some ground-breaking, foundational work of sociology but in the mainstream press with an article by The Guardian’s economics leader writer, Aditya Chakrabortty (2012a), which provoked an animated discussion on the relevance and value of sociology at present.

Chakrabortty’s article argued that ‘[m]ainstream economic models have been discredited’ and, by implication, wondered ‘why aren’t political scientists and sociologists offering an alternative view?’ in the light of the current global financial meltdown; itself described as a major crisis. Sociologists were quick to respond, but

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155 Sociology was first used as a term by Auguste Comte in 1830, and first appeared in English in 1843 in the work of John Stuart Mill, On the Logic of Moral Sciences: Book VI. Spencer wrote Principles of Sociology in three volumes between 1876 and 1896, but, as Raymond Williams (1983 [1976]: 295) remarks, it was in the writings of Émile Durkheim, in French and Max Weber, in German that ‘the subject was remarkably expanded’ and founded as a disciplinary heir to the Enlightenment.

156 Similar arguments have been voiced by Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz (2009, 2014)

157 The Guardian Wednesday 18 April 2012. More sociological responses to Chakrabortty can be accessed online at: http://sociologicalimagination.org/archives/tag/aditya-chakrabortty. It should also be noted that the proceedings of the British Sociological Association’s Annual conference in 2013 were organised, perhaps defensively, around the theme of ‘Engaging Sociology’ with many comments on Chakrabortty’s article, while its 2014 proceedings, also included insistent references to that article suggesting perhaps that the attack left more than just a scar in the discipline’s consciousness.
Chakrabortty (2012b) returned with another inflammatory article insisting that ‘[t]he academics show their anger but they can't answer my criticism that there's too little analysis of our current crisis’.

Brewer (2012), in his capacity as the President of the British Sociological Association, stated defensively that ‘[S]ociologists don't debate quibbles’ but ‘are tackling the financial crisis head-on’ through the study of ‘how organisations work’\textsuperscript{158}.

A less reported “attack” on sociology came by Canada’s Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, who in the wake of a foiled terrorist attack (25 April 2013) argued that ‘this is not a time to commit sociology’\textsuperscript{159}. What these non-sociological examples show is a much broader and more diffuse scepticism about sociology’s ‘dignity’, ‘authority’ and ‘popularity’ echoing Durkheim’s very own concerns about the welcoming of the new discipline into the realm of sciences but also the world at large.

Agger’s (2000) and Burawoy’s (2004) preoccupation with the public standing of sociology differs little from the concerns alluded to above, and in fact then wrote their versions of public sociology as a way to remedy the discipline’s self-esteem and public face too\textsuperscript{160}. But as Hollands and Stanley (2009) note, ‘[p]roclamations of ‘current crisis’ in sociology are long-standing’ and their resurfacing inside and outside the sociological literature merits a more detailed account of how they have made their mark historically as an essential part of the discipline itself.

\textsuperscript{158} It must be noted that Brewer’s involvement in this discussion extended to writing a book interrogating the public value of the social sciences: John Brewer (2013) \textit{The Public Value of the Social Sciences: An Interpretive Essay} London: Bloomsbury Academic.

\textsuperscript{159} An excerpt from Stephen Harper’s statement can be accessed online at: \url{http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/04/25/string-of-terror-incidents-no-reason-to-commit-sociology-stephen-harper/}

\textsuperscript{160} This is also the central theme in Halliday and Janowitz (1992)
Section I: Once in crisis, always in crisis?

This ‘disenchantment’ with sociology as a ‘vocation’, a ‘profession’, a ‘science’ and even a ‘calling’ has not been absent in the writings of discipline’s other founding father, Max Weber, whose conceptual vocabulary has been emulated here to describe sociology’s state of the art.

In his 1904 essay on *Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy*, Weber (1994: 51) observed how the emerging discipline of sociology was characterised by dissension, rather than by agreement, decrying ‘the continuous changes and bitter conflict about the apparently most elementary problems of our discipline, its methods, the formulation and validity of its concepts’.

This lack of consensus about the discipline’s methodological and conceptual tools was picked up by Michels (1932: 123-4) who, writing on intellectuals for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, saw sociology as ‘largely demoralised’ and undergoing ‘an intense spiritual self-criticism’, a theme to which Robert Merton (1975: 22) returned to, commenting that ‘Sociology has typically been in an unstable state, alternating between planes of extravagant optimism and extravagant pessimism’ thus justifying in part Holton’s (1987: 503) observation that ‘[i]n the midst of these pervasive perceptions of crisis it is not surprising to find social thought to be diagnosed as crisis-ridden’; a diagnosis that inspired Raymond Boudon (1980 [1971]) to write a whole book on the matter, entitled *The Crisis in Sociology*.

This intimate relationship of sociology to crisis can then be seen both as an external reality of social life, affecting the discipline that studies it as well as an internal feature of sociology itself, of which Habermas (1984 [1981]: 4) writes that ‘it became the science of crisis par excellence; it concerned itself with the anomic aspects of the dissolution of traditional social systems and the development of modern ones’.

Habermas’ reading of crisis as both an intrinsic trait of sociology as well as a social reality surrounding it, deeply concerned Alvin Gouldner (1970, 1973, 1979, 1985) \footnote{For discussions of the legacy of Alvin Gouldner see Eldridge et al. (2000) which consists of papers from the 1999 BSA conference. For a similar attempt to discuss Gouldner ‘twenty years later’, see Johnson (1989) and Hammersley (1999)} who set himself the unenviable task of taking up the concerns about the state of the
discipline as a personal scholarly project, eventually making his name synonymous to debates on crisis of, in and for sociology and a protagonist of what Seidman (1998) describes as the moral canon of sociology: a title and a process that Seidman (1998: 171-214) interprets as the ‘dislodging’ of the ‘classical tradition’ (Comte, Durkheim, Marx, Weber) as well as the ‘theoretical canon’ of Parsons in order to replace both with ‘a moral vision’ of and for the social sciences, with Mills and Gouldner, lauded as key players in this process, inspiring ‘new social movements’, the ‘making of new social knowledges’ and ‘refashioning sociology for the 21st century’. Seidman’s (1998: 173-4) celebration of this ‘moral vision’ of and for sociology also finds in Gouldner and Mills\(^{162}\) the seeds of ‘a “public sociology” epitomising an ideal of ‘the sociologist as public intellectual’. This very statement constitutes Seidman’s analysis as a largely ignored contemporary fore-runner of Agger and Burawoy’s espousal of the terms “public sociology” and “public intellectual”, used by all three as prime ambitions for sociology at present. Yet, despite such grand visions for disciplinary renewal in this moral mode, sociology continued to find itself ‘on trial’ (Stein and Vidich 1963), described as an ‘impossible [and perhaps improbable] science’ (Turner and Turner 1990) and in a state of ‘decomposition’ (Horowitz 1993), thus leaving the 100th annual meeting of the ASA in need of ‘Accounting for the Rising and Declining Significance of Sociology\(^{163}\), with Cole (2001) and Berger (2002) respectively wondering ‘what’s wrong with sociology?’ and ‘whatever happened to sociology?’ while Porter (2008) derided it as ‘dead’. The chorus of voices lamenting sociology’s crisis has so far been articulated with reference to what Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) call ‘ontological gerrymandering’, with critics exposing its follies and lashing its vices on the one hand, and devotees extolling its virtues and moral mission on the other.

What is absent in this discussion however is a remark on the nature and potential causes of this crisis of sociology; an omission that will be dealt with in turn with reference to a useful observation by Hollands and Stanley (2008) regarding not just the manner in which sociology’s crisis has been debated by contemporary sociologists but rather the failure to identify such a crisis as different from the one Gouldner was

\(^{162}\) For a playful article on Mills and Gouldner, see Lemert (2007)

\(^{163}\) This was the 2005 sub-title of the convention theme for the American Sociological Association’s 100th Annual Meeting.
writing about. Hollands and Stanley (2008: 2) note that the ‘current crisis’ in sociology has been formulated as a problem of diversity and fragmentation’, while ‘Gouldner’s crisis was premised on the opposite view, that his discipline had become too monolithic, accompanied by a lack of reflexivity with respect to its theories, methods and the research relationship, and a failure to engage with the changing world around it: ‘Rather than a call for criticism, the watchword of professionalized sociology became: continuity codification, convergence and culmination (Gouldner, 1970: 17)’. What marks this shift according to Hollands and Stanley (2008: 1) is the ‘vastly increased regulation and bureaucratisation of the university system accompanying the expended remit of regulatory government, something we think underlines the discipline’s successive perceptions of crisis’.


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164 This is a theme that is explored in the aims of the Governing Academic Life conference and hosted by the LSE and The British Library on the 24th and the 25th of June 2014. An online version of the conference’s aims can be accessed online at: [http://www.governing-academic-life.org/aims/](http://www.governing-academic-life.org/aims/)

165 Gouldner’s (1979) ‘new class’ though largely absent from the current popular and sociological debate on the BBC’s Great British Class Survey (launched on Wednesday, 3rd April 2013), may prove useful as a point of reference for the seven new class groups introduced by the survey: elite, established middle class, technical middle class, new affluent workers, traditional working class, emergent service workers, precariat or precarious proletariat. For a different reading of the term ‘precariat’ see, Standing (2011).
Gouldner’s thesis sent ripples across the sociological establishment of the time and remained widely influential in shaping much of the ‘moral vision’ that Seidman (1998) attributed to the politically engaged sociology of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Giddens (1987: 987: 211) however, accused Gouldner of conflating ‘a technical intelligentsia and bureaucracy’, and dismissed Gouldner’s entire ‘account of the role of intellectuals in modern societies [as] embarrassingly weak’. Hollands and Stanley (2008: 11) address similar shortcomings of Gouldner’s ‘new class’ thesis charging him with failure in ‘anticipat[ing] ‘the massive extension of state regulation and the accompanying bureaucratisation of sociology’, themes that resonate only too strongly in Gouldner’s prose but not to the extent that Hollands and Stanley (2008) presumably would wish to see. They celebrate instead Posner’s (2011) account of the increased bureaucratisation of universities and the ‘deskilling’ and ‘disempowering’ of the intelligentsia, Jacoby’s (1987) critique of the modern university for turning intellectuals into ‘soulless academics with restrictive vision’, and Furedi’s (2004) argument that society now is less hospitable to complex challenging ideas, proposing that postmodernism, a new breed of ‘knowledge entrepreneur’ and ‘populist attacks on elitism’ are to blame for the decline of the intellectual(s) in modern life (Hollands and Stanley 2008: 11).
Section II: Whither crisis?

Discussing the crisis of and in sociology in the light of the wider socio-political environment which surrounds both intellectual life and higher education alike may appear valid and fair, but also runs the risk of conflating the ‘institutional’ and the ‘intellectual’ (and even ‘emotional’) level of analysis: a trend against which Collins (1986), counsels caution and proposes instead an emphasis on what is happening at the institutional level rather than making emotive assumptions about perceived consequences which find both the discipline and the University ‘in doldrums’.

Holmwood (2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c) has taken up those concerns by linking the future of sociology to the future of the University through a set of observations and suggestions that offer a good starting point for thinking about disciplinary crises in a broader context but without making them reducible to such a context, thus avoiding an analysis that makes folk devils and moral panics out of sociology’s boundary (and other) crises. Holmwood (2011c) reverses the optimistic accounts of Burawoy (2005) and Steinmetz (2005), both of whom hoped for a sociological renaissance born out of the rubble of the transformation of the knowledge economy from ‘Fordism’ to ‘post-Fordism’ (Jessop 1995, Jasanoff 2004, Holmwood 2011c), or from ‘Mode 1’ knowledge to ‘Mode 2’ knowledge (Gibbons et al. 1994, Nowotny et al. 2001) and sought to explain this shift (however defined) critically as consistent with the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005 [1999]) that ‘legitimates a new neo-liberal, market-oriented regime of governance’ (Holmwood, 2011c: 544). In this process of dissolving and destabilising disciplinary hierarchies: an essential characteristic of the transformation of the knowledge economy in the current

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166 John Holmwood will dominate the discussion for the remainder of this section given his energetic, and often decisive, participation in recent debates about sociology, both in his capacity as president of the British Sociological Association, as well as through campaign against the privatisation of Higher Education which resulted in the publication of his 2011 book, A Manifesto for the Public University.

167 Gibbons et al (1994: 3) distinguish knowledges as follows: ‘in Mode 1 problems are set and solved in a context governed by the, largely academic, interests of a specific community. By contrast, Mode 2 Knowledge is carried out in a context of application. Mode 1 is disciplinary while Mode 2 is transdisciplinary. Mode 1 is characterised by homogeneity, Mode 2 by heterogeneity. Organisationally, Mode 1 is hierarchical and tends to preserve its form, while Mode 2 is more heterarchical and transient. Each employs a different type of quality control. In comparison with Mode 1, Mode 2 is more socially accountable and reflexive’.

168 For similar critiques, see Couldry (2010), and Davies (2014)
state of ‘knowing capitalism’ (Thrift 2005), and a process that nourishes Burawoy’s and
Steinmetz’s optimism, Holmwood (2011c: 537) sees the emergence of a ‘new form of
instrumental knowledge’: that of ‘applied inter-disciplinary social studies’. The ‘rise of
interdisciplinary applied social science’, in Holmwood’s (2011c: 537-8) analysis, is
‘occasioned by a changed environment of higher education’ which in turn breeds a
number of ‘risks’:
(a) Making ‘the prognosis for sociology […] not good’,
(b) Transforming the ‘threats to sociology’ into ‘potentially damaging’ factors for ‘the
wider system of social science disciplines’ by socialising these threats, risks and losses,
and
(c) Recognising how ‘problems of disciplinary identity make it difficult for us both to
recognise and act upon the risks that we face’ (Holmwood, 2011c: 538).
Resisting a disciplinary self-image and self-presentation that stresses chaos and
disarray, Holmwood (2011c: 539) proposes instead that we creatively resolve such
tensions by recognising them as real, but not sensationalising them on some
mythological plane; ‘if we cannot persuade ourselves of the threats, how might we
persuade others?’, Holmwood (2011c: 539) asks only to instantly show ‘three ways in
which our perception of the threats is diminished’, these being:
I. The argument that ‘any claim that there is a crisis is a conservative response to a loss
of professional hegemony’.
II. The argument that ‘crisis claims are part of the normal language of sociological
argument and, therefore any claim that we have now entered a period of crisis is a
reassuring indication of the opposite, namely ‘business as usual’, and
III. The valorisation of interdisciplinarity and a preference for the transgression of
boundaries, rather than their maintenance’.
What Holmwood (2011c: 551) seems to suggest is that acknowledging the risk of
sociology morphing into the ‘mode two knowledge’ of ‘applied social studies’ as “real”
and “actually happening” is the inevitable and perhaps necessary by-product of the
‘post-Fordist knowledge regime’. This, Holmwood ruefully comments, is a danger that
cannot be resolved by cursing it away by mere critique, which is interpreted not
(merely) in terms of an ‘end of ideology’ thesis à la Daniel Bell (1960), but as a form of
‘mystification in what Horkheimer might have been motivated to describe as a new ‘double eclipse’ of reason’.

The first eclipse, Holmwood (2011c: 551) expands, is noted in the ‘promotion of instrumental knowledge against critical knowledges’ and the second eclipse occurs in the ‘way in which critique comes to serve the instrumentalization of knowledge’. In other words, the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism, the transformation of (sociological) knowledge from ‘Mode One’ to ‘Mode Two’ and the embracing of ‘knowing capitalism’ have not, in Holmwood’s (2011c: 547) analysis, occasioned a ‘democratisation of expertise’, but ‘an attempt to make it subject to market processes (or their audit proxies)’. This seismic shift, Holmwood (2011c: 546) insists, is what has made ‘[p]ublic bodies and universities alike become subject to the techniques of the new public management’ 169, confirming in part Gouldner’s (1973: 79) disappointment with the University’s ‘failure as a community in which rational discourse about social worlds is possible’. This three-tier analysis of Holmwood about sociology’s crisis is understood as composed by:

(a) Laments of the discipline’s ‘authority’ and ‘privilege’ as a social science when pushed to be allied with neighbouring disciplines in the context of an obligatory merging as dictated by the demands of the new knowledge economy; an enforced interdisciplinarity of sorts disregarding sociology’s alleged, imagined or real hegemony.

(b) Renewed scepticism about interdisciplinarity, derided by Holmwood (2011c: 537, 543) as a ‘new form of instrumental knowledge’, which does not respect sociology’s peculiar position in the social sciences matrix; on the one hand enjoying a ‘special relationship’ with the disciplines of politics and economics but on the other hand remaining ‘different from their relation to each other’ 170.

(c) A need to recognise that the ferment caused by disciplinary, epistemological, boundary crises is ‘old, and, in its own way, quite regular’ to borrow a quote from Abbott’s (2001: 121) Chaos of Disciplines.

169 See also: Bazerlay (2000), and Dunleavy, P. and Hood (1993)

170 This paradoxical claim reverberates Habermas’ (1984 [1981]: 4) claim that ‘sociology originated as the discipline responsible for the problems that politics and economics pushed to one side on their way to becoming specialized sciences’. 
In this climate of an uneasy fit between sociology’s substantive identity and the new rules of the academic game as imposed by the marketisation of the University and Higher Education (see McGettigan 2013), Holmwood seems to propose that sociology runs the risk of making a Faustian bargain with both internal and external forces that threaten to undermine its independent disciplinary standing in a not dissimilar way to how Antonio Gramsci (1971 [1929]: 238) envisages civil society at its weakest moments: ‘primordial’ and ‘gelatinous’, lacking a ‘sturdy structure’ to support and nourish it.

This battle between the ‘external factors of the wider socio-political environment of higher education in the UK, especially those associated with the audit culture and new systems of governance’, and the weak internal organisation of the discipline described by Holmwood (2010a: 650) as ‘in a state of internal interdisciplinarity’ are put forward by the same author as the main causes for ‘[s]ociology’s misfortune’. This internal fragility of sociology as a discipline and the impact of what Holmwood (2010a: 640) calls the ‘Anglo-American model of regulation’ in higher education which imposes ‘audit mechanisms, performance targets, outcomes and objectives’, best exhibit sociology’s legitimation crisis also studied and further exemplified by Lamont’s (2009) study of peer-review processes at grant bodies in order to offer an insight on ‘[h]ow professors think inside the curious world of academic judgement’.

The results of Lamont’s study seem to rehearse familiar arguments about sociology’s low self-esteem deriving from its poor internal regulation; a critique that has been famously preceded by Turner and Turner (1990) and Crane and Small (in Halliday and Janowitz 1992), but are updated in Lamont’s study in her effort to demonstrate how recent changes in the knowledge economy have added to the discipline’s problematic status.

While taking into account what Holmwood variously attacks as ‘audit culture’, Lamont’s research also looks at how such a change in the ‘[g]overnance of the public sciences’ (Whitley 2007) impacts on the academic self; the ‘hidden injuries’ on which have been witnessed and documented by Gill (2009) who blames ‘neo-liberal

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171 It is interesting to note at this point the continuity with Lamont’s (1994) earlier work on the culture of the French and the American upper-middle class. Similar and comparable ‘allusions’, ‘gaps’ and ‘glissandos’ of cultural capital that Lamont (1988) spotted are, to a certain extent, legible in her 2009 study of the academic world from the inside.
academia’ for the personal, physical, emotional and psychological stresses and pressures entailed in meeting the standards and demands of what Holmwood (2010b) has elsewhere dismissively called the ‘creaking piers of peer-review’.

Gill’s article has had an impressive appeal; in fact it went “viral”\(^{172}\) on-line, perhaps echoing the grievous torment of many academics and thus allowing room for similar observations on the state of the discipline by looking more closely at its habitat and \textit{habitus}, an idea that was put into practice by Platt (1993) in her effort to understand where sociology was at the time by researching researchers’ experiences in the academe by interviewing them directly rather than looking at the literature for signs of disciplinary decay\(^{173}\).

This transformation of the academy, critiqued by Holmwood (2010a: 641) as a move from the ‘old collegial system’ to a new ‘managerial hierarchy’, and its impact on both the sociological discipline and the sociological self of those who practice, do, or ‘commit’ sociology, can be read as a prolonged lament on the fall of the discipline; a sentiment that runs the risk of coming short of suggestions for the reconstitution of sociology’s ‘core’.

Holmwood (2010a: 649) locates sociology’s disciplinary core ‘not in concepts, categories or in methods (all of which are very significant products of practices of knowledge production) but in a \textit{sensibility}’ that he conceives of as a ‘significant part of ‘the sociological imagination’ in Mills’ (1959) sense of the word.

Scott (2005) proposes that ‘social theory’ especially that associated with historical sociology in the classical tradition, can form the core of the discipline; a position he has also advertised in his capacity as Chair of the Sociology Sub-Panel at RAE 2008. Savage and Burrows (2007: 13), in an influential paper that introduced “The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology”, by leaning on but re-adapting the title of Gouldner’s 1973 classic argue for ‘a politics of method’; which will ‘abandon a sole focus on causality and embrace instead an interest in \textit{description} and \textit{classification}’.

\(^{172}\) A popular neologism describing the spread and popularity of an activity in the online realm.

\(^{173}\) A similar research endeavour was pursued by Elisabeth Simbuerger (2008) whose PhD study on the self-understanding of sociologists in England was based on 30 qualitative interviews with sociologists from ten sociology departments in the winter and spring of 2007.
Drawing on the arguments of Bowker and Star (1999) for ‘sorting things out’, Pickstone’s (2002) exploration of ‘ways of knowing’ and Latour’s (2005) ‘re-assembling of the social’, Savage and Burrows (2007: 4) suggest that in an era of knowing capitalism where ‘circuits of information proliferate and are embedded in numerous kinds of information technologies’, reclaiming sociology’s potential for what Bauman (1988) calls ‘legislative’ knowledge may lie in a process in which ‘sociology seeks to define itself through a concern with research methods (interpreted very broadly), not simply as particular techniques, but as themselves an intrinsic feature of contemporary capitalist organisation’ (Savage and Burrows, 2007: 13). This ‘politics of method’ advocated by Savage and Burrows (2007: 13) further ‘involves sociologists renewing their interests in methodological innovation and reporting critically on new digitalisations’. Savage and Burrows’ (2007) emphasis on ‘the politics of method’ almost suggests a gentle nudge towards a slight paradigm shift, where sociology would commit itself to a form of what Mouzelis (1995: 9) calls ‘conceptual pragmatism’; a term fashioned to stress ‘criteria of utility rather than the truth’, thus prompting a renewed emphasis on conceptual tools that might be relevant for this or that problem, for this that context. Such a renewed vision of and for sociology brings to mind Fuller’s (2006: 212) adaptation of Comte’s definition of sociology as an; ‘empirically informed normative discipline designed to realize the project of humanity as the culminating stage in the history of science’. This type of ‘social epistemology’, to use Fuller’s (1988) own popular term, amounts to admitting a ‘new sociological imagination’ to our disciplinary lexicon conceived as a ‘normative version of the sociology of knowledge that aims to use what is empirically known about organised inquiry to enlighten our present and empower our future’ (Fuller, 2006: 2-3). These alternative sociological imaginations, brought forward here by Mouzelis and Fuller, are of course in no way identical but indeed synonymous in sentiment and orientation to Savage and Burrows’ (2007) own; also echoing perhaps Urry’s (2005) understanding of sociology ‘beyond the science of “society” but rather in need to re-constitute its disciplinary core around a non-fragmentary, strong and coherent self-identity that will bear only scant resemblance to a ‘lowest common denominator’ sociology. Burawoy (2004: 25) calls

174 For a slightly different and less normative variation of the term see Goldman (1999:4-5)
this ‘bad’ and ‘second rate’ sociology, and will shows the presence of a will to impose disciplinary standards, as is Holmwood’s (2010a: 645) hope.

**Section III: Sociology’s life after and beyond the crisis**

This brief exploration of sociology’s crisis as represented in the writings of sociology classics and their modern contenders, can be read either as a passionate expression of mournful loss and a space where intellectual rivalry is ‘consumed with that which it is nourished by’, as Shakespeare’s *Sonnet 73* playfully notes, or rather envisaged as a normal feature of a discipline living in a permanent state of what historian Philippe Ariès (1981) terms ‘tamed death’, thus constantly subjecting itself to a circular pattern of settlement, rupture, renewal and transition as ‘befits all science’, to return to Durkheim’s conclusion to the *Rules of Sociological Method* (1982 [1895]: 163).

To describe sociology as living a ‘tamed death’ is to suggest that pronouncements of the discipline’s final hour are misleading and unhelpful, while an understanding of sociology as naturally open to reflexive self-critique and internal modification imagines an afterlife for the discipline, not just ‘after the crisis’ (Lemert 2004), but beyond crisis and crisis-talk altogether.

Thus resisting the temptation to interpret sociology in a state of disarray, sociology and public sociology alike are liberated here from their death-penalty, and presented neither as mere constructions, nor as instrumental systems of knowledge, but as habits of thought that offer, what Bergson (in Donato 2009: 164), imagined as ‘the resolution made once to look naively at the world’. Lending itself to such a utopian sentiment, the remainder of the thesis treats sociological practice as an antidote to alarmist and hypochondriac conceptions of itself, and while not laying new foundations for scaffolding a normative project for sociology, it discusses sociology’s existential condition as inevitably married to public intent and value, rather than mired in internal divisions and disorganisation, by offering eleven counter-theses as recommendations for the flourishing of sociology’s public currency and might.
This chapter has offered an overview of discussions of sociology that describe it in a state of crisis, with the intention of showing that such crises are hardly episodic events but permanent features of the discipline itself, therefore urging sociologists not to abandon their hopes for the discipline, fearing its total decomposition, but taking up the challenge of working towards a re-invigorated conception of the discipline in the manner attempted in the next section.
Conclusion

Concluding the debate with eleven counter-theses on public sociology

Drawing on the descriptive analysis of public sociology offered thus far, the final chapter of this thesis attempts a re-constructive theoretical approach for re-imagining alternatives for public sociological scholarship in a way that neither bemoans the discipline’s past, present and future state, nor presents a reactionary sociological manifesto.

What is presented instead is a series of reflections and recommendations on how to adapt our thinking and our institutional settings to a process of progressively re-imagining and re-constituting sociology in a way that builds on its existing strengths and works towards eliminating some of its weaknesses.

This reconstructive spirit of the eleven counter-theses that follow aims at “restory-ing” the discipline through a narrative that resists premature obituaries and internal discord, and explores instead possible ways for restoring, remedying and reconfiguring the discipline by offering a more confident and optimistic account of sociology.

This restorative sentiment draws on Carolyn Cooper’s (1993) notion of ‘restory-ing’, plucked from her scholarship on the oral discourse in Jamaican popular culture, and on Richard Sennett’s (2012) ideas on repair, contending that sociology may become or be made public through a combination of narrating and making sense of itself differently, while opening it up to processes of repair, as a way of re-drafting its constitution as an academic discipline and a public discourse alike.

Sennett (2012: 212) identifies three ways to perform repair; ‘restoration’, ‘remediation’ and ‘reconfiguration’:

I. Restoration involves ‘making a damaged object seem just like new’ and is ‘governed by the object’s original state’

II. Remediation ‘improves’ that object’s ‘operation’ by ‘substitut[ing] better parts or materials while preserving an old form’, and
III. Reconfiguration ‘alter[s] it altogether’ by ‘re-imagin[ing] the form and use of the object in the course of fixing it’.

These three modes of repair rest on one basic principle, the admission that something is broken and can indeed be fixed, by contrast to ‘an object beyond recovery’ which is ‘deemed technically a ‘hermetic object’, admitting no further work’ (Sennett 2012: 212).

In addition to those three strategies of repair, Sennett (2012: 213-4) imagines three distinct types of “imaginations” and “repairers” that are required to perform the chosen tasks with restoration described as best suited to the unobtrusive humility of the craftsman as a ‘restorer’, remediation defined as admitting the repairer’s presence in the final work, upgrading him to the role of a ‘fixer’, while reconfiguration which is praised as the ‘most radical kind of repair’ requires the services of the ‘visionary’.

While not aspiring to don neither craftsmen’s tool apron, the eleven theses that follow retain much of the sensibility of repair by “restory-ing” sociology as an act of, what Mills (1959: 195-226) called, ‘intellectual craftsmanship’, in order to show not what sociology “is” or “should be”, but how it “is” and “can be” made possible, legible, audible and felt through the use of ‘the sociological imagination’.

Building on such ideas of repair and “restory-ing”, much of what follows offers a vocabulary for articulating sociology’s chronic insecurity with itself and its intellectual labour, by replacing sociology’s low disciplinary self-esteem with the confidence that sociology is relevant, necessary, applicable and useful in both its professional and public guises.

i. **Thesis I: Sociology as a craft of the mind**

Borrowing Bourdieu’s (1991) idea of sociology as a ‘craft’, Thesis I interprets sociology as an *aporia* on how it may be “done” or “made”, and how it might be understood as a craft, a *métier*, rather than setting out to determine what sociology is in an authoritative end-all, or be-all manner.

Sociology is therefore likened to the activities of a workshop community, an *artisanat* which combines the use of aesthetic, affective, discursive and intellectual qualities and resources. Such a conception of sociology lends itself to O’ Neill’s (1972: 6-7) idea of
sociology as a ‘skin trade’; a ‘symbiotic science’ which involves ‘working with people’ in and through a ‘bewildering variety of practices’, which O’Neil calls ‘skin trades’ in his effort to redefine sociology as a ‘human pastime’, rather than a purely scientific discipline (O’Neill, 1972: 3).

It is here argued that redefining the discipline as an *ars sociologica* which combines aesthetic and affective characteristics, does not reduce sociology to a ‘textual form of interior decoration’ (Slemon and Tiffin, 1989: x-xi), but rather elevates it to a ‘quality of mind’ that helps sociologists, as well as their audience, ‘to use information and develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within themselves’ (Mills, 1959: 5). Imagining sociology as such a ‘welfare state of mind’, to borrow from C.L.R. James (1963 [1969]: 207), makes sense of its role as a critical discursive practice which transcends ‘the power language has to make everything look the same’ (Wittgenstein, 1977 [1931]: 22e), and features instead as a ‘destroyer of myths’ (Elias, 1978 [1970]: 50-70), creating habits of the mind that ‘make the familiar strange, and interesting again’ (Erickson, 1986: 121).

In re-introducing sociology as a both a craft and a habit of the mind, it is here suspected that its practitioners can live up to such an ideal by using their role as flâneurs (Benjamin 1983, Simmel 1971, Frisby 1981, De Certeau 1984), bricoleurs (Lévi-Strauss 1966) and aesthetes of knowledge, to support and promote sociology through their teaching as, what Castoriadis (1986) called, an *hexis odopoietiki*; a routine mentality that paves the way for a different, if not radical, re-interpretation of our scholarly selves, our craft and our public mission alike.

Atkinson *et al.* (2003: 47) have insisted upon this point, arguing that this desire to defamiliarise the familiar is an integral part of teaching sociology by ‘mak[ing] strange the social context that we assume to understand by virtue of taken for granted cultural competence’, and have demonstrated this practically in the classroom by offering a range of strategies for countering familiarity in the classroom, including the adoption of “breaching experiments” à la Garfinkel. The merit of such an approach is that it presents sociology as something more ‘than a bundle of skills’, but rather as ‘a conception of how to live and a total praxis’, to quote Gouldner (1970: 504), by turning the discipline of sociology into a workshop-community of learning, indeed an atelier, that functions as a vital space for practicing the discipline as a professional technique.
and a participatory craft, by means of educational instruction and public expression; thereby transforming an otherwise scientific discipline to ‘an important institution of social life’, and a ‘founding text of social democracy’, through developing the sensibility and skills of an ‘artisan’s understanding of society as rooted in direct, concrete experience, of other people, rather than in rhetoric, floating abstractions, or temporary passions’ (Sennett, 2012: 57).

The proposed way of doing so is by understanding sociology as, and reforming it into a workshop-community, by espousing the principles and practices of workshop-communities. In doing so, sociology is reconfigured as a *wissenscraft*, a craft of and for thinking, knowing and practicing the discipline differently, by establishing and integrating aesthetic, affective, intellectual and discursive routines in the work of sociology, to make both itself and the social world it studies understood differently by virtue of “making” its ideas differently in a participatory, tactile and co-operative manner, like members of a workshop-community who are bound by the work they do in a direct, tactile way.

**ii. Thesis II: Education as a vocation**

Building on the idea of sociology as a community of and for learning, Thesis II conceives of education as a vocation, inspired by Max Weber’s (1946 [1919]: 77-128) essay on ‘Politics as a Vocation’. Understanding the notion of vocation as composed of commitment (*Beruf*), and animated by an ethic of conviction, or ‘calling’, Weber (1946 [1919]: 128) stressed the importance of integrating ‘*ira et studium*’, ‘passion and perspective’ to one’s calling, urging a ‘steadfastness of heart which can brave even the crumbling of all hopes’.

Weber’s faith and hope for a view of politics, and science, as a vocation is here extended to education, arguing that it can be embraced and practiced as an end in itself, a meeting of minds and an invitation to participate in what Michael Oakeshott (1962: 199) called, the ‘conversation of [hu]mankind’ conceived as:

‘[A]n initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation in which we learn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation. And it is this
conversation which, in the end, gives place and character to every human activity and utterance.\footnote{Oakeshott went as far as to suggest that what distinguishes human beings from other animals is our ability to participate in unending conversation. ‘As civilized human beings’, Oakeshott (1962: 199) writes, ‘we are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries. It is a conversation which goes on both in public and within each of ourselves’.}

Grand declarations aside, this view of education as a vocation is offered as an intellectual rationale on how to participate in education as a process that develops what Nussbaum (2010: 2) sees as ‘skills that are needed to keep democracies alive’,\footnote{Leaving the legacy of Socratic pedagogy aside, which attributed similar values to education to the ones defended here, Nussbaum’s vision also brings to mind the words of Renaissance humanist Guarino Guarini of Verona (1374-1460) who harboured ‘a vision of humanist education that combined civilized humane values with practical social skills crucial to social advancement’ (Brotton, 2002: 71-72). ‘What better goal can there be’, Guarino notes, ‘than the arts precepts and studies by which we come to guide, order and govern ourselves, our households and our political offices? ... Therefore continue as you have begun, excellent youths and gentlemen, and work at these Ciceronian studies which will fill our city with well-founded hope in you, and which bring honour and pleasure to you’ (Brotton, 2002: 72).} echoing Gouldner’s (1973: 25) warning that:

‘If we today concern ourselves exclusively with the technical proficiency of our students and reject all responsibility for their moral sense, or lack of it, the we may some day be compelled to accept responsibility for having trained a generation willing to serve in another Auschwitz’.\footnote{Grand declarations aside, this view of education as a vocation is offered as an intellectual rationale on how to participate in education as a process that develops what Nussbaum (2010: 2) sees as ‘skills that are needed to keep democracies alive’, echoing Gouldner’s (1973: 25) warning that: ‘If we today concern ourselves exclusively with the technical proficiency of our students and reject all responsibility for their moral sense, or lack of it, the we may some day be compelled to accept responsibility for having trained a generation willing to serve in another Auschwitz’.}

Arguing against a view of education as a set of ‘useless frills’, Nussbaum (2010: 2, 7) identifies three skills that correspond to the commitment, responsibility and conviction that inform the educational process, these being:

(a) ‘The ability to think critically’
(b) ‘The ability to transcend local loyalties and to approach world problems as a “citizen of the world”, and
(c) ‘The ability to imagine sympathetically the predicament of another person’

Drawing on those three functions of education, Nussbaum (2010: 3-4) identifies Massachusetts educator Bronson Alcott, Nobel laureate and all-round polymath Rabindranath Tagore and pragmatist philosopher John Dewey as visionaries who have set such skills in motion in their respective roles as educators, who have not simply defended education theoretically but have implemented such ideals practically by:
(a) Focusing on the ‘empowerment of the student through practices of Socratic argument, exposure to many world cultures’ (Tagore)
(b) Associating learning with ‘outward things’ by making students ‘conscious of their reality’ (Alcott), and
(c) Preparing learners for ‘democratic citizenship’ through the curriculum by stimulating students to ‘question, criticise, and imagine’ (Dewey)

This combination of critical thought, cosmopolitan outlook and expansive, imaginative thinking embodies the idea of education as a vocation which makes sense of the interrelation of teaching and learning as a process where knowledge appears as (a) a form of meeting, (b) a conversation on what, how and why to learn, and (c) a relationship we make with ourselves, our students and our colleagues by virtue of ‘rub[bing] and polish[ing] our brains’ through contact with others, as Montaigne (2003: 163) argued in his *Essays*.

In so doing education moves closer to its calling and its etymology too by performing its role through leading or drawing out, forth and away (*educere*), and conceiving the educational process as a passage towards the cultivation of ‘meaningful li[ves] based on reason and love’ (Fromm, 2002 [1955]: x, Darder, 2002).

**iii. Thesis III: The university as a site of disagreement**

Like sociology and education, visions of and for the university amount to a shattered view of it as a victim of and a witness to a vertiginously long and disputed history of disagreement about what it is, may or could be in terms of its identity, self-identity, function, role, depending on the ambitions of various interpretations of it.

These diverse views, definitions and understandings of “The University” are organised here into a series of questions that are drawn together in the form of a diagram (Fig. 1). Before delving into the contents of the diagram however, a brief historical exploration of the university’s evolution in the West seems necessary, if not obligatory, as a way of providing some context to an often labyrinthine discussion about that venerated and attacked institution of Higher Education.

Conceived as a heir to the Enlightenment, if not as its ultimate representation, the idea of the university has enduringly been imagined in romantic, idealised and idyllic terms
as a ‘quiet, scenic, space of disinterested thought- a territory strategically removed from everyday life’ (Baker Jr. 1993: 6). This imagery of a ‘pastoral garden’, an ‘escape’, or a ‘seminary in the wilderness’, as seventeenth-century Harvard was called, sprang from John Henry Newman’s (1925 [1853]) *The Idea of a University*, which started as a series of lectures given by Cardinal Newman in 1852 about establishing a Catholic University in Dublin, but came to dominate discussions on the university’s *raison d’être*\(^{177}\). Cardinal Newman’s “idea of a university”, Smith and Webster (1997: 2-3) note, corresponded to ‘an unashamedly élite institution’ intended to offer the ‘best that has been thought and known in the world’, as Matthew Arnold (1983 [1867]: 31) put it.

Treating ‘the business of a University’ as that of ‘mak[ing] culture its direct scope’ however was by no means the exclusive privilege of (Cardinal) Newman’s (1925 [1853]: 125) ambitions, but also informed (Minister) Wilhelm von Humboldt’s conception of the university as an *entrepôt* of ideas from the German idealists (Fichte, Schelling, Schiller, Schleiermacher), braiding together scientific and philosophical study (*Wissenschaft*) and a process of and for the cultivation of character (*Bildung*).

The combination of these two complementary visions of the university have served as the master image of the modern Western University\(^{178}\), until the emergence of what Clark Kerr (1963) called ‘the multiversity’\(^{179}\) in the tidal sweep of modernity and the wake of our postmodern times, thus heralding a shift from ‘The University of Culture’ to ‘The University of Excellence’ (Readings, 1996)\(^{180}\). The arrival of multiversities is charged from transforming the idea, the image, the purpose, the identity and the function of the university from ‘a garden of Western knowledge’, to a ‘factory’ into which ‘big business and big government poured billions of research dollars’ (Baker Jr.,

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\(^{177}\) For a critical re-examination of Newman’s idea of the university see Pelikan (1992)

\(^{178}\) Alternative examples can be sought in the founding of the medieval and Renaissance universities of Scotland (St. Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen, Edinburgh), London’s University College founded by Jeremy Bentham, and The Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg in Hanover.

\(^{179}\) Kerr’s book drew on his 1963 Godkin lectures at Harvard on the ‘Uses of the University’, and proved as popular as Newman’s own. The book was republished four times but each new edition shows Kerr ‘becoming progressively less sanguine and more concerned about the future’ (Holmwood 2011b: 17).

\(^{180}\) Readings would undoubtedly have found it disconcerting to know that in 2012, the Humboldt University of Berlin was one of eleven elite universities to win the German Universities Excellence Initiative, a national competition for universities organized by the German Federal Government
1993: 8); embodying ‘technobureaucratic’ principles and conducting itself as an ‘integrated industry’ which is ‘run as if it were a business’ (Readings 1996: 11, 14, 21). This perceived paradigm shift from culture to excellence, or from vocation to product\textsuperscript{181}, prompted another landmark in the historical evolution of the university, this being Lyotard’s (1984 [1979]) \textit{The Postmodern Condition}, written as a report on the University for the government of Québec, ‘at this very Postmodern moment that finds the University nearing what may be its end’ (Lyotard, 1984 [1979]: xxv)\textsuperscript{182}. Such Ovidian metamorphoses of the university from a product of the Enlightenment and a custodian of culture to what Readings (1996: 5) called the ‘post-historical’ university, indicates ‘different functions, or uses, of the modern university and how it had been transformed from a single community into a multiplicity of communities, each reflecting its different functions’ (Holmwood 2011b: 15), as well as changes brought forward by the ‘constrained welfare state’, the information technology revolution’, ‘postmodern thought’, the forces of widespread ‘commercialisation’, ‘globalisation’ (Fallis, 2007: 145-297), the ‘new academic capitalist order’ (Slaughter and Leslie 2001) and the rise of ‘entrepreneurial science’ (Etzkowitz 1998).

Having offered a perfunctory preamble to the historical development and some dominant visions of the Western university as ‘a paradigmatic institution of the public sphere and modernity more generally’ (Delanty, 2005: 530) , it seems necessary to outline a number of recurrent themes, issues and debates that routinely accompany sociological interpretations of the university and higher education, based on a diagram which has been devised specifically for the purposes of Thesis III (see Appendix I Diagram 2).

\textsuperscript{181} Max Weber, during his lecture on \textit{Science as a Vocation} at Munich University as early as 1918, puzzled over how bureaucratic the American universities of his time had become, describing the ‘American’s conception of the teacher who faces him’ as follows; ‘he sells me his knowledge and his methods for my father’s money, just as the greengrocer sells my mother cabbage. And that is all’ (Weber 1946 [1918]: 145).

\textsuperscript{182} Lyotard’s pessimism about the university appears even sharper, albeit in an anecdotal fashion, in Fuller’s (2009: 19) account of how ‘Lyotard dedicated his report to the ‘institute’ or department, where he held a chair in one of the new universities of Paris, wishing that it may flourish while the university itself withered away’
Sociological interpretations of the university, as summarised by Figure 1 (see Appendix I), tend to concentrate on questions regarding the nature (what is the university), the uses (what is university for), the identity (who is it), the ownership status (whose is it), and the overall importance (why it matters) of this complex institution of knowledge production and democratic citizenship, each of which however prompts further questions about the emphasis we give to the universities’ multiple functions, thereby making any conception of the university largely dependent on what we think it is, may be, can be, is capable of, responsible for and accountable to.

To make matters worse, these qualifying questions about how to make sense of and what characteristics to attribute to the university also rely on a host of additional considerations which involve a clear understanding and disclosure of (a) who we are, (b) what we want, (c) how honest, committed and engaged we are, (d) whether we care, and (e) what we are prepared to do to fulfil our ambitions for this major institutional site of cognitive, socio-cultural and political tensions.

This view of the university as a place where important scholarly, socio-cultural and political ideas are contested, as well as a place where its own institutional and public identity is also contested, invites us to understand the university as a unique self-reflexive institution of the contemporary knowledge society and public life, where ‘social interests engage with the specialized worlds of science’ (Delanty, 2005: 543), and where scholarly priorities and market demands meet. The remainder of Thesis III endeavours to concentrate on precisely those considerations, as an attempt to highlight the importance of such discussions, by guiding the reader through the schematic representation of such complex debates, as offered by Diagram 2 (Appendix I).

Amid such polyphony and disagreement about how to study or make sense of the university sociologically, defining what it is, can be likened to swimming against a powerful current of competing versions that accentuate ‘different principles and values’, which have ‘different historical origins and acutely different cultural meanings and purposes’ (Rothblatt, 1976: 205).

Having already introduced Cardinal Newman’s ivory tower conception of the university, and Minister Humboldt’s equally idealistic depiction of it as a hub of culture and academic freedom, Barnett’s (2013) anthology of epithets, each of which furnishes
a different vision of and for the university, is indicative of definitional pluralism as it is bewildering; there is the university as a feasible utopia, the entrepreneurial university, the commodified, the civic or public goods university, the accessible university, the university as a debating society, the anarchic, the borderless, the collaborative, congested, corporate, corrupt, creative, dialogic, digital, ecological, liquid, multi-nodal, performative, socialist, soulless, technologico-Benthamite, as well as the theatrical, translucent, imaginative, imagining, first class, edgeless, capitalist and even the university as fool (sic).


Following this multiplicity of interpretations of what the university is, can be, may be, should be, or no longer is, reflections on its uses (what is it for) are equally varied and perplexing, making Derrida’s (2002: 213-4) overly confident view of the university as ‘autonomous, unconditionally free in its institution, in its speech, in its writing, in its thinking’ difficult to sustain pragmatically.

Despite a diversity of roles that the university is being assigned by a retinue of eager scholars (see Diagram 2, Appendix I), the main activities that the university is being charged to perform are organised around the modern quadrivium of knowledge, education, research and teaching and culture, each of which are defined in multiple ways depending on the importance that sociologists of the university place on the instrumental uses of institutional outcomes, or on their public applicability. Researchers’ representations of what “the” university is for are therefore largely influenced by definitions of what “their” ideal university is for, thereby keeping interpretations of knowledge, education, research and teaching, and culture hostage
to personal ambitions of what the university ought to be, in order to accommodate the intent, vision and individual preferences of each participant in the debate. Questions regarding the university’s identity (who is it) and ownership status (whose is it) unsurprisingly fall prey to ontological orientation, but they also re-animate crucial debates about who may count as beneficiaries and benefactors of an ostensibly public institution. As illustrated by Diagram 2 (Appendix I), answers to such questions often give rise to raging disputes over who has the right and the responsibility to act in the name of the university; an issue that jostles with renewed possibilities in the wake of recent protests about rising tuition fees, not only in Britain but in Germany and Quebec too. What became to be known as “the maple spring” (printemps érable) in Quebec (2012), the anti-privatisation protests in Britain following the Browne Review in 2010 which announced the introduction of £9,000 fees per annum from 2012, and the total abolition of tuition fees in Germany (2014)\(^{183}\), gave new impetus to discussions about the governance of the universities, inspiring alternative ideas concerning the organisation, administration, and ownership of the university that re-animated “post-capitalist” visions of the university as a co-operative, a trust (Boden, Ciancanelli and Wright, 2011 and 2012), or a dynamic public agora which seeks to replace ‘transactional’ with ‘relational’ management, thereby also transforming stakeholders into share-holders (Nowotny et al., 2001)\(^{184}\).

\(^{183}\) A historical comparison with the counter-cultural impulse of the 1960s and the 1970s in Europe and the United States, could be useful here, on the grounds that much like “les événements” of May 1968 in Paris (Tourraine, 1971), the student protests against industrial-intellectual oligarchies in British universities (Thompson, 1970), or the 1969 “People’s Park” protests at Berkeley (Arendt, 1970), the student protests of the 21st century respond to a similar set of grievances, they are student-led and they too offer a view of culture ‘in the plural’; ‘no longer reserved for a given milieu’, no longer belonging to ‘certain professional specialities (teachers or liberal professions), and no longer defined as ‘a stable entity defined by universally received codes’ (de Certeau, 1997: 41).

\(^{184}\) Such transformative ideas for and visions of the University are of course not new, but creatively revisit a long-standing tradition of student protests and alternative social movements that have fashioned egalitarian and solidaristic versions of the university such as the London Free School and the Anti-University of the 1960s described by McKay (2005: 234) as a ‘movement broadly called deschooling- removing the institutional regulations and (it was argued) related authoritarian methodologies from education in practical radical critique of the system’. Such initiatives saw an increasingly important role in stressing the importance of ‘improvisatory educational developments’, making them worthy grassroots companions to Ivan Illich’s (1971) Deschooling Society and P.Freire’s (2005) Pedagogy of the Oppressed both of which adopted a critical stance towards the role and futures of education in modern capitalist economy. Similar movements today include the Campaign for the Public University, The Silent University, the Social Science Centre in
What such a chorus of voices on the meaning, orientation and uses of the university shows, is not only a pluralism of arguments for, against and beyond the university, but also an eagerness to demonstrate why and how the university matters, not merely as an institution of knowledge production and professional development, but also as a democratic institution of social life that often transcends national boundaries, and encourages cultural and political citizenship, ‘especially in countries such as China and Iran where civil society is weak’ (Delanty, 2005: 542).

Returning to the main argument of Thesis III however, which calls for an understanding of the university as a welcome site of disagreement and dialogic exchange, it should be stressed that universities matter because:

(a) They allow debates about its academic, institutional and social “self” to freely circulate,

(b) They challenge simplistic views of it as a simple unchanging and unchangeable institution, re-defining it instead as a “bundle institution” with multiple commitments, roles and functions, and

(c) They inspire debates on their ability to function as vital, innovative tools for what Castoriadis (1987) called an ‘imaginary institution of society’, by providing a space where the radical imagination can flourish, and where knowledge is transmitted and transformed, despite the often intrusive demands of professional scholarship, credentialisation and the market.

Having thus sketched the identity, functions, roles, alignments and implications of the university as a complex institution with competing beneficiaries, benefactors and trustees, the argument here espoused is that universities should primarily be fundamentally understood as vital civic institutions, and as sites of and for disagreement about knowledge, education, teaching and research, culture, politics and market forces.

Lincoln, the Free University Brighton, the Ragged University project in Edinburgh and Glasgow, as well as Cardiff and Liverpool’s Free Universities.
Endowed as the universities are with the function of anchoring social life by encouraging, not homogeneity and unproblematic consensus but diversity and dissensus, they can be thought of as a prime location where citizens question their beliefs, values, ideas, prejudices and preconceptions through creative disagreement, with a commonly nurtured dedication to the bolstering of civil society by making the ‘professional ethos’ of academia accountable to the ‘civic morals’ of our polis (Durkheim, 1992).

This process of disagreeing with each other is defended here as an essential function of active citizenship and participation within a polity which can be developed within the university as a unique opportunity for exploring knowledge, education, culture and politics as indeterminate, relative, contested, and dialogic, thus making ourselves beneficiaries of such ideas with the added responsibility of taking care of such ideas as relationships that require constant, ongoing deliberation about their meaning and purpose in civic life.

Such a view of the university as a site of disagreement and an anchor of civic life remakes university workers into custodians of a flourishing dialogic culture who engage in what Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, via Thomas Carlyle, praised as an ‘equilibrium of antagonisms’ to describe dialogic disagreement, not as a mere ‘tool of sociological analysis’, but as a ‘gift for political compromise’ which plays a ‘central role in [our] ideas about evolution, in the cosmos, in society and in mental life’ (Burke and Pallares-Burke (2008: 64-5)).
iv. Thesis IV: Public Intellectuals or public characters?

Having so far concentrated on the ‘stuff’ (sociology) and the ‘place’ (university) of intellectual life, following Fuller’s (2009) taxonomy of it, Thesis IV lends itself to a consideration of the ‘people’, or ambassadors of such activity; the intellectuals themselves. Drawing on a wide literature on and interminable discussions about intellectuals, Thesis IV endeavours to:

(a) Introduce the intellectual intent behind this thesis’ own theoretical approach towards the study of intellectuals,
(b) Provide an overview of some dominant tropes, or leitmotifs that have saturated the existing sociological literature on intellectuals, and
(c) Argue against current conceptualisations of intellectuals, by challenging the prominence of the “public intellectual” with the vernacular alternative of “the public character” as found in the work of the American urbanist, Jane Jacobs (1961).

Intellectual intent

Thesis IV’s aim, purpose, ambition and intent is fivefold, but it is firmly rooted in the desire to move away from commonplace depictions of “the intellectual” as an idealised, romanticised and heroised figure who ‘rhapsodis[es] the eternal’ (Foucault, 1980: 128) and challenges the status quo with bravado and flamboyance, drawing instead on more routine, every-day, but by no means banal, facets, features and practices of social life that serve equally well for the consolidation of civic morality, public participation and political action, without resorting to hero-worship of the kind that Max Weber and Friedrich Nietzsche imagined in their homage to the charismatic authority of the übermensch 185.

185 The reference here is to Weber’s (1948: 245-252) writings on “The Sociology of Charismatic Authority” in Economy and Society, and Nietzsche’s (1961) Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
I. The first principle that guides the current thesis’ understanding of the intellectuals rests on the proposition that a shift from *intellect* to *action* is necessary for both the conceptualisation and the performance of intellectual life, echoing Gramsci’s (1971 [1929]: 10) flat assertion that intellectual activity ‘can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical life’.

II. The second ambition of Thesis IV, is to de-personalise the intellectual in order to make that role available to everyone rather than to a crew of a select few, arguing that limiting public deliberation to intellectuals alone actually indicates, if not encourages, an anti-democratic animus towards the public sphere which intellectuals are purportedly charged to stimulate, promote, “serve”, and transform.

Drawing on Foucault’s (1980: 128) broad definition of the intellectual as ‘simply the person who uses his knowledge, his competence and his relation to truth in the field of political struggles’, intellectual activity is here understood not as exclusively limited to a specially designated troupe of thinkers or orators to whom we ought to entrust the cultivation of our political community, but as inclusively available to all citizens of a polity, as part of our commitment to citizenship.

Combining such a shift of emphasis from the figure of the intellectual to the responsibility of the public, it is deemed important to return to Gramsci’s (1971 [1929]: 5) conviction that intellectuals do not have to be ‘an autonomous and independent social group’, arguing instead that:

‘Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields’.

III. The third conceptual pillar on which Thesis IV rests is built around an exploration and re-interpretation of intellectual life as a collaborative project rather than the solo performance of a single actor, urging co-operation and amicable antagonism, instead of self-righteous confrontations in a battle of naked egos.
Considering critical reflection and public deliberation as the responsibility of all rather than the exclusive privilege of any specific group is empowering as it is necessary, and would be best exercised by resisting the allure of punditocracy, in favour of more open and direct democracy which largely depends on our contribution for its flourishing. Such a change of heart however involves not just a public ‘will to power’, but also a change of intellectual gear, combined with a willingness to abandon Nietzschean (1968) “one-man” fantasies and the fetishization of intellectual narcissism, in favour of collective effort towards sustaining and promoting intellectual life as public life, with no mediators between ourselves and our public, political conscience.

IV. The fourth precondition here offered for the rejuvenation of public-spirited citizenship, as opposed to self-interested demagoguery, rests on a fundamental change of approach in the way we understand public expression, suggesting that a shift from the acclamation and assertiveness of speaking to the compromise and attentiveness of listening is as vital, as it is systematically sidelined.186

Making our thoughts known and conveying them successfully in conversation so that they come to mean something to us depends not only on what and how something is being said, but also on what and how something is being heard, listened to and understood. Public expression therefore does not rely solely on speaking our minds, but also involves the manner in which information is taken in, and it is precisely the balance between those two communicative faculties that allows for dialogic negotiation as opposed to monologic recitation.

Granting the intellectuals powers that can, and often suggesting that they should, wield to shape “the people” as those who cannot sufficiently shape ourselves is to undermine the idea of politics as a cooperative relationship, as much as it is to disempower, desensitise and isolate us from shaping and making sense of the functions of deliberative democracy.

186 For a defence of the powers of collaboration, negotiation and compromise as important resources for making meaning, politics and culture see, Griefat and Katriel (1989), Casmir (1990), Cohen (1990) and Ellis and Maoz (2002).
Against such privileging of the intellectuals as the exclusive makers and speakers of meaning in politics and public life, and countering the monopoly of speaking as a one-directional communicative mode that turns free and equal citizens into a homogeneous and undifferentiated mob\(^{187}\), what is being rescued here is the capacity of the public to reason with the use of their attentive faculties (i.e. seeing and listening), contending that seeing clearly and listening carefully are important modes of democratic citizenship and public power.

It is therefore argued that challenging the role of intellectuals as privileged speakers of the human condition and replacing this idea with the notion of intellectual activity as an enterprise of and in listening, urges us to re-think public intervention as no longer represented by “intellectuals-as-speakers” (rhetores), but by “intellectuals-as-listeners” (akoustes).

This is deemed to be an important shift in making sense of politics, given that it challenges the idea of upholding intellectuals as an exclusive class of spokespersons who give voice to our grievances and concerns, arguing instead that by outsourcing the capacity of speaking for, about and in our polity as informed citizens we weaken our ability to exercise power over ourselves and the societies we wish to participate in. Replacing therefore, as Green (2010: 11) keenly suggests, the existing ‘vocal’ model of democracy with an ‘ocular’ and “aural” version of political life does not only empower us but also invites us to:

(a) Listen carefully to the dominant discourses that float around our political institutions, as well as how they are articulated and why they are presented to us by the commentariat the way they are

(b) Challenge the signal, the message, and the intent of what we see and hear, and

\(^{187}\text{For a good discussion of how “the people” are often conflated with “the mob”, see Arendt (1967: 106-117).}\)
(c) Acknowledge our shared responsibility as an audience in complying with or resisting the way in which political decisions are being made on our behalf, but not at our behest.

Drawing on Diodotus’ comments in Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*, who bitterly pointed out the asymmetry of holding speakers legally accountable ‘for the advice that they give’ in public, but not the listeners ‘for the decisions they make’ (i.e. in voting) (Lane, 2014: 104-105), the defence of aural deliberative democracy here espoused aspires to empower our sense of critical judgement and broaden our public participation by treating speaking and listening not as a mode of passive spectatorship, as Green (2010) does, but as an active, choice-making faculty in public affairs, arguing that neglecting the way we see, hear and interpret politics inevitably leads to our inability to control our fate and political purpose thereby making us dependent on and vulnerable to infantilising political rhetoric instead of mature political dialectic.

V. The fifth and final point which holds all previous four together is the suggestion that the much defended notion of “the public intellectual” embodies everything that is problematic and defective in our understanding of both intellectual life and public participation, arguing instead for its replacement with the idea of “the public character” as it emerged in Jane Jacobs’ (1961) *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*.

In attempting such a leap of imagination regarding the role of the intellect in public life, the processes of thinking, public intervention and political deliberation are all seen as every-day, routine features of cultural life, rather than exclusive, episodic moments, thereby urging us to re-interpret the social world as well as our stance towards it as what Jacobs described in terms of a creative, imaginative and playful ‘street ballet’, rather than a tedious boardroom meeting populated by earnest intellectuals who are allegedly equipped with unique talents and skills, and are armed with an unconditional willingness to liberate us all from ignorance and uninformed decision-making.

As it will be shown in the last section of Thesis IV, and to paraphrase Aimé Cesaire (1995: 127), there is no ‘monopoly of beauty, of intelligence, of strength, and, there is
room for all at the rendez-vous of conquest’, and the idea of “public character” is employed here to democratise and celebrate public life as something that is practiced by all, rather than best left to the various “public intellectuals” who we dream up as potential redeemers of our political sins and saviours of our public souls.

Overview of dominant themes in the sociology of intellectuals

Having presented a necessary theoretical overture to Thesis IV, this section offers a brief overview of some leitmotifs in the sociology of intellectuals, based on two detailed diagrams (see Appendix II), which have been designed as useful visual guides to the historiography, periodisation and representations of the intellectuals’ identity, function, and role as witnessed in the relevant literature.

This short outline is divided into two parts, the first of which looks at (a) recurrent themes in the study of intellectuals, (b) periods where the presence (or absence) of “the intellectual” has been most acutely noted as well as considering (c) popular candidates for the role of “the intellectual” in the existing literature on the subject (see Diagram 3, Appendix II).

The second part of this section looks at the identity, role, place, time, position, mode and content of the intellectuals’ intervention as can be found in the various sociological attempts to analyse the intellectuals’ performance and practice in public social life (see Diagram 4, Appendix II).

Themes

The study of intellectuals, not unlike the study of the university and of course sociology itself (see Thesis III and Chapter Six respectively), often reads like a recital of lamentations, jeremiads and dramatic tales that describe the fall, betrayal, disappearance, decline and absence of intellectuals (Benda 1928, Aron 1957, Molnar, 1961, Jacoby 1987, Posner, 2001, Lilla 2001, Furedi 2004, Collini, 2006, Sowell 2010), sometimes even treating them as an ‘endangered species’ (Etzioni, 2006). This melancholic vocabulary of loss is accentuated further by a danse macabre of autopsies and deaths (Jennings 2002a), only to be resurrected by clarion calls to ‘speak
truth to power’; a recurring trope in the literature on intellectuals, originated by Benda (1928), but popularised by Jacoby (1987) and Said (1994).

One last common refrain in the sociological discourse on intellectuals, belongs to Foucault’s (1980) distinction between the ‘specific’ and the ‘universal’ intellectual, the former understood as working within circumscribed domains of culture and politics, while the latter represents a spokesperson of all-encompassing human concerns.

As Foucault (1977: 207) himself put it, the specific intellectual can be understood as she who speaks ‘in the name of those who were forbidden to speak the truth’, while the universal intellectual ‘spoke the truth to those who had yet to see it’, not neglecting however that:

‘In the most recent upheaval\(^{188}\), the intellectual discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves’.

**Periods, trends, developments**

Following Baert and Isaac’s (2011) archaeology of historical and sociological perspectives on intellectuals, the early 20\(^{th}\) century appears divided into two main trends in the sociology of intellectuals.

The first of these trends defended the principles of objectivity, detachment and free-floating intellectual activity and was represented by Julien Benda, Alfred Weber and Karl Manheim who coined the term *freischbende intelligenz* to refer to the independent, non-aligned and unanchored intellectual, while the second trend reversed such priorities by emphasising class struggle and political change, as epitomised in the works of Marx and Gramsci who denounced intellectuals who acted as ‘waverers’ (Jacoby, 1987: 63), and urged intellectuals to aspire instead to the role of the ‘constructor’, ‘organizer’ and ‘permanent persuader’ (Gramsci, 1971 [1929]: 10).

The mid-20\(^{th}\) century, witnessed a relativist turn, influenced by the work of Thomas Kuhn (1996 [1962]), until the emergence of the “new class thesis”, mostly associated with Daniel Bell (1979) and Alvin Gouldner (1979), whose work predicted the coming of an arguably more technocratic, post-industrial cohort of “knowledge workers”.

\(^{188}\) Foucault is referring here to the events of May 1968.
In the late 20th century, this “new class thesis” lost much of its appeal giving rise to more empirical inquiries on knowledge chiefly represented by Bourdieu (1988) and Lamont (1987) in the 1980s, before arguments about the fall of the legislative power of intellectuals came to the fore in the writings of Bauman (1989) and Nisbet (1997) in the 1990s as a response to changes in the way universities were managed and the way knowledge was produced, disseminated and “used”.

Amid such a background of institutional transformation, fully fledged sociologies of intellectuals appeared in the work of Randall Collins (1998) and Camic and Gross (2001) which established the ferment out of which contemporary writings on public sociology emerged in the writings of Agger (2000) and Burawoy (2004), which have dominated most of the recent literature on engaged sociology and intellectual action.

**Protagonists**

Much like the conceptualization and the periodisation of the study of intellectuals, the enlisting of potential recruits for the role of “the intellectual” is varied as it is selective, thereby lacking a blueprint or a holotype upon which to base our choice for the most suitable candidate. There is however some relative consistency to be found in the idolization of certain characters who are routinely identified with the performance of the intellectual’s role (Zola, Sartre), as much as there is a conspicuous absence of women and black intellectuals (Lerner 1986, Mitchell 1984, hooks 1982, Jennings 2002b, Warmington, 2014).

The “Dreyfusards”\(^{189}\) monopolise that role (Said 1994, Rose 2010, Collins 2011), considered as they are to be the archetype for courageous public participation against all the odds, or at least against a backdrop of hesitation, silence and prejudice, speaking as they did in support of young Jewish artillery captain Alfred Dreyfus, who was unfairly accused with charges of espionage and treason in 1894, until he was fully exonerated in 1906, largely due to the intervention of politicians and high-profile intellectuals such as Georges and Albert Clemenceau, Jean Jaurès, Henri Poincaré,

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\(^{189}\) The term “Dreyfusards” was used to designate those in support of Dreyfus, but also used in a derogatory manner by their opponents, the “anti-Dreyfusards”, prominent among whom were Édouard Drumont, author of the 1885 anti-semitic diatribe *La France Juive* and editor of *La Libre Parole*, and Jules Guérin, founder of the *Ligue Antisémitique*.
Anatole France, and Émile Zola who exposed not only a fragrant miscarriage of justice, but also the outpouring of anti-semitic sentiment during the reign of the French Third Republic\(^{190}\).

Zola’s passionate letter in support of Dreyfus, written for the left-wing paper *L’Aurore* and known to us under the title ‘J’Accuse’, is seen as a highlight in the (Western) history of intellectuals, and Zola himself is celebrated “the” archetypal intellectual, until French existentialist philosopher and revolutionary thinker Jean-Paul Sartre donned the mantle of “the intellectual”, during another period of turmoil in French politics, this time dividing collaborationists of the Vichy regime of Phillipe Pétain during France’s occupation by Nazi Germany in World War II, such as Céline and Brasillach, and anti-collaborationists such as de Beauvoir, Gide, Fanon and Sartre himself.

Aptly described as the ‘the war of intellectuals’ by Gisèle Sapiro (1999), the period of “L’Occupation allemande” can be likened to a veritable cauldron of intellectual activity, during which the figure of Sarte, unfairly overshadowing Simone de Beauvoir, looms large, especially after the end of the War where formal and informal tribunals were set up to question the involvement of collaborationists who were called to testify for their wartime activity.

Divided as this process was into *épuration legale*, in the form of legal purges, and *épuration sauvage* which was marked by inofficial *ad hoc* purges, debates on the uses of violence and the justification of retribution as a form of justice\(^{191}\), became intense and were largely headed by Sartre whose radical stance towards the matter dominated much of the scene, urging Sapiro (1999) to name the period the ‘era of Sartre’.

Departing from nearly two centuries of animosities on French soil, but remaining within the country’s physical borders, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault rightly appear as successors to Sartre’s glory in Alexander’s (2011) casting of intellectual protagonists, who also includes fancifully, if not controversially perhaps, figures as diverse in time and opinion as Socrates, Marx, Trotsky, Bentham, J.S. Mill, the Fabians, Subcomandante Marcos, Osama Bin Laden, Ayn Rand, Michael Oakeshott, and Milton Friedman.

\(^{190}\) For an interesting overview of the case and a discussion on anti-semitism, see Arendt (1963: 89-120)

\(^{191}\) For an ambitious theoretical account of these events, see De Beauvoir (1948), while intriguing discussions on vengeance and violence can be found in Arendt (1998 and 1970).
Moving on to the second category of considerations regarding the study of intellectuals, as outlined in Diagram 4 (Appendix II), an analytical, conceptual typology is being offered attempting to describe the intellectuals’ identity (who is an intellectual), role (what do they do) and place (where are they), followed by questions regarding the content (what to say), time (when to act), position (where to stand) and mode (how to speak) of the intellectuals’ public performance and professional practice.

**Who is an intellectual?: The intellectuals’ identity**

Starting with the attempt to define who an intellectual is or may be, Bauman (1987: 2, 8) advises against such meaningless speculations suggesting instead that defining what and who an intellectual is, and perhaps who and what she is not, is in fact a self-definition that ‘makes no sense’, echoing perhaps Alexander’s (2011: 200) depiction of the intellectual as a ‘hero with a thousand faces’. Fuller (2009: 165) on the other hand appears more willing, albeit equally vague, in his definition of the intellectual as ‘someone who is clearly of academic descent but not necessarily of academic destiny’, perhaps leaving some room for making sense of intellectuals as a ‘new class’ of specialized knowledge-workers in the manner that Gouldner (1979) and Bell (1979) prophesised and that Weber (1992 [1904]: 124) feared in his rage against ‘specialist[s] without spirit and sensualist[s] with no heart’. Foucault (1980), as we saw in the introduction of Thesis IV, offers a broader scope for the definition of the intellectual maintaining that she can be anyone who uses her skills, talents and resources for the advancement of political struggles, while Valéry (1962 [1925]: 84) sought to describe intellectuals in the elitist image of men of letters (*belle-lettristes*), who have knowledge (*savants*) and ‘purpose’ as avant-garde artists (*artistes*). Collins (2011: 438) on the other hand suggests that revolutionaries, recipients of political patronage, and people who may work in and out of public office ought to be included, while he divides intellectuals into three categories; ‘major’, ‘secondary’ and ‘minor’. Jacoby (1987) places intellectuals in ‘institutionalised’ settings, considering them to be ‘tenured radicals’, Baert and Isaac (2011: 200) describe them as simultaneously respected and denounced as experts although they are often conspicuously absent, while Mills (1959: 179-181) urges intellectuals to
transcend their traditional role as either ‘philosopher kings’ or ‘advisors to the king’ and calls for an orientation of intellectuals’ work towards both ‘kings’ and ‘publics’.

**What do they do?: The intellectuals’ role**

If the identity of intellectuals is something that is “made”, to fit the scholar’s purposes and match her “gaze”, it seems important to note what roles the intellectuals “perform” in the existing literature, made up of functions and roles that support J.M. Keynes’ remark that:

‘[Intellectuals] have had to perform at one and the same time the tasks appropriate to the economist, to the financier, to the politician, to the journalist, to the propagandist, to the lawyer, to the statesman-even, I think, to the prophet and to the soothsayer’.\(^{192}\)

(Keynes, in: Varoufakis 2013: 59)

Keynes’, who is praised by Collins (2011: 439) as a distinguished public intellectual, in his comments on the Bretton Woods agreement almost outlines aspects of the role of intellectuals as can be found in the sociological literature on intellectuals where the latter are called to diagnose, pamphleteer, prophesize (Weber 1948 [1919])\(^{193}\) and also engage in ‘prophesying’; a role used by Sapiro (2003) to describe the delivery of prophesies as a specific mode of politicisation. Intellectuals are also conceived in the form of a *nom de guerre* for politically concerned intellectuals (*intellectuels engagés*), as carrier-groups (Eyerman 2011) who make claims and voice concerns for others extending their role as therapists of cultural or civic traumas, and as symbols or a spectacle in the form of celebrities (Debray 1981).

\(^{192}\) It is perhaps interesting to note that Keynes made this observation in the aftermath of the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 where, at the request of President Roosevelt, delegates converged to discuss the nature of and set up the institutions for the post-war global monetary order

\(^{193}\) Although Weber (1948 [1919]: 147) allows no space for the ‘prophet or the demagogue’ on the ‘academic platform’ he is suspected by Alexander (2011: 196) for considering ‘prophets’ as ‘the religious equivalents of intellectuals’.
Where are the intellectuals?: The intellectuals’ place and time

Understanding the intellectuals as figures that are “made” and charged with multiple roles to perform, individual as well as socio-cultural, leads to identifying them as a ‘space of opinion’ (Jacobs and Townsley 2010), located in the public sphere addressing, occupying and opening up to particular markets, media, ‘fields’ (Bourdieu 1992), institutions, contexts and, since the advent of the Internet, “modes”; online or offline. This hybridised position of the intellectual in between spaces is extended to time too, calling into question the conditions that persuade or dissuade the intellectuals’ intervention, involvement and co-operation and whether it is exclusive to crises (Charle 1990), political turmoil, disorder and unrest.

Having so far looked at the identity (who is an intellectual), role (what do they do), place (where are they), and time (when to act) as points of orientation for a sociological discussion on intellectuals, the position (where to stand), mode (how to speak) and content (what to say) are considered in turn.194

Where to stand: The intellectuals’ position

Locating the intellectual’s position can be likened to entertaining doubts similar to those expressed by Paul Valéry (1962 [1925]: 84) about the intellectuals’ purpose, given that ‘we find in the intellectual population these two categories: intellectuals who serve some purpose and intellectuals who serve none’. Despite what Bauman (1992: 77) sees as a ‘mixture of sham humility and unmistakable pride’, tracing the intellectuals’ stance remains an important issue and an unresolved controversy in the current literature.

There are those who argue for mounting a ‘war of position’ and ‘organising resistance’ in ‘journals, books, teaching, conferences and research for critical intellectuals’ in the academy (Lynch 2010: 575) or in civil society at broad (Gramsci 1971 [1929]) believing that there can be no ‘view from nowhere’ (Becker 1967, Nagel 1986) nor can there be a “being” devoid of ‘situation’ and ‘surroundings’ (de Beauvoir 1974: 275-6).

194 It should be noted that these questions are modelled after Howard Davis’ conclusion to Fleck et al.’s (2008) valuable publication on intellectuals and their publics.
But there are also those like Benda, Weber and Manheim who prefer a position of disinterest with no backing script or other ‘attachments of a particularistic sort—friendship, oikos, city, patriotism, passion’ (Alexander 2011: 196).

Such disparity of views on locating the intellectual, despite its artificial dualism between neutrality and situatedness, can be viewed as important if linked to questions of power hierarchy and social order, as intellectuals are not simply located somewhere arbitrarily in the broad social grid but they are also “made” there.

Understanding the intellectuals as ‘bound to their class origin’ (Kurzman and Owens 2002: 64) therefore, justifies in part the suggestion that intellectuals are made in specific conditions (social class) as well as circumstances (crises, wars, situations of political disconnect), both of which are embedded in and involve relations of power.

Alternative loci for intellectuals, transcending strict class or status divides, oscillate between notions of marginality and privilege or find themselves dissolved in enclaves of avant-gardism in the form of the ‘café culture’ of ‘urban bohemies’ (Jacoby 1987); archetypical examples of which are to be found in the Parisian Quartier Latin or in New York’s Greenwich Village.

How to speak and what to say: The intellectuals’ mode and content

Having seen where the intellectuals are made, it is now important to turn to how intellectuals are thought to make their public interventions, and to what they have to say.

Alluding to Oswell’s (2009: 12) apt observation that ‘democracy is figured out through the modalities of speaking and listening’ a brief look in the sociological literature on how might the intellectuals speak, what Homi K. Bhabha (1994) ‘enunciatory modalities’, finds them articulating their message in the following three ways:

(a) Objectively but with courage and virtuous frankness (parrhesia\textsuperscript{195}),

(b) Through legislation, interpretation, mediation, expertise and reform, or

\textsuperscript{195} Parrhesia can be translated as and be simultaneously used to denote virtue, courage and frankness. For a good discussion on the term’s use in the thought of Michel Foucault and de Beauvoir, see Hengehold (2006: 178-200).
(c) By means of protest, petitioning, lampooning, exile, dissidence and co-optation.

These being the three main modes identified in relation to how might the intellectual speak, the content of that speech or what to say, appears in the form of the truth, but is also punctuated by laments, rants, jeremiads and supportive statements for the intellectual’s role and profile as a valuable agent provocateur of and in public life.

Public characters, not public intellectuals

Following this historicisation, periodization and insight into discussions of “the intellectual” in the literature, Thesis IV offers a shift from ‘public intellectuals’ (Jacoby 1987, Said 1994) to ‘public characters’ (Jacobs 1961), thus re-conceiving of the entire enterprise of intellectual life as represented by what American novelist Ralph Waldo Ellison (1965 [1952]: 10) called ‘thinker-tinkers’, makers and doers, rather than sedentary, institutionalised, armchair-bound orators, demagogues and salonniers.

The idea of the public character is found in the writings of Jane Jacobs (1961) on The Death and Life of Great American Cities, a seminal work of urban sociology that established Jacobs firmly into a cohort or ‘breed’ of ‘missing intellectuals’ who were committed to an educated public (Jacoby, 1987: 9, 42, 55).

Unlike Jacoby however, Jacobs ‘modelled her idea of the public character after the local shopkeepers with whom she and her Greenwich Village neighbours would leave their spare keys’ (Duneier 2000: 7).

Inspired by such an alternative social structure of “sidewalk life”, Jacobs (1961: 68) defined the public character as:

‘[A]nyone who is in frequent contact with a wide circle of people and who is sufficiently interested to make himself a public character. A public character need have

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196 It is perhaps interesting to note that Ellison himself was a “thinker-tinker”, trained at the Booker T. Washington Tuskegee Institute where he won a scholarship to study music.

no special talents or wisdom to fulfil his function—although he often does. He just needs to be present, and there need to be enough of his counterparts. His main qualification is that he is public, that he talks to lots of different people. In this way, news travels that is of sidewalk interest’.

Jacobs’ brief outline of the public character’s role urges us to reimagine how and what we conceive intellectuals and public life to be; offering a view of intellectuals as ordinary co-authors of social relationships ‘handl[ing] their social boundaries in situ’ (Duneier 2000: 8), and redefining public life as an informal institution structured by the inhabitants of a *polis*, therefore complementing life of and in the mind with practice on the street by transforming “habits of the mind” to “habits of the street”, to paraphrase Bellah (1985).

Such a re-orientation of the mind’s “I” to the *polis’ “we”* calls into question the problem of ‘whether [intellectuals] devote at least part of their skills to the political and cultural emancipation of humanity’ (Wald, 1987: 324), with Jacobs’ idea of the public character posing as a provocative answer on a number of counts. Firstly, it works towards ‘depersonalising the term “intellectual”’ so that it no longer stands for a social type but for the capacity to make a public intervention, a capacity to many actors can lay claim’, thus recognising that ‘the classical sociology of intellectuals’ with its emphasis on ‘allegiance’ no longer seems relevant or ‘productive’ (Eyal and Bucholz, 2010: 117).

Secondly, it alerts us to the virtues of attempting a shift in the way we understand and value public participation from “speaking” to “listening”, therefore re-introducing intellectuals as what poet Ebony Ajibade (1984: 51) calls ‘inter-lectuals’. Accepting Jacobs’ idea of the public character as an active supporter of living together peaceably as a result of endless negotiations and tensions with our fellow-citizens, also involves a change of communicative gear from speaking *de haut en bas* to adopting a listening post in everyday social life (Back 2007), as an alternative modality for producing meaningful conversations through the recognition of the space of others instead of dominating it by virtue of our identity as intellectuals. This in turn cultivates an ethic of acknowledgement and understanding the public *milieu* as an environment where people gather to make sense of each other and their reality together by negotiating their divergent interests and values through agreed procedures rooted in reasonable
civil ways that are mediated by and through listening as a ‘realpolitik of sound and sense’ (Oswell 2009: 2).

Thirdly, this back-translation of speaking to listening amounts to an invitation to view political articulation and expression not in terms of grandiose, authoritative declarations such as Zola’s ‘J’Accuse’ but in terms of humble, egalitarian, searching admissions of Montaigne’s ‘Que sais-je?’. The difference between the two is not one of a contrast between politicised plaintive pleas for justice (Zola) and apolitical resignation (Montaigne), but between the “moral selfishness” of public intellectuals who preen themselves in the warm public glow and the “situatedness” of the public characters who adopt a more subdued and nuanced role which requires dialogical imagination, and befriends co-operation as found in the Renaissance idea of *sprezzatura* as a more ‘companionable’ discursive mode that urges ‘less self’ and ‘more sociab[ility]’ (Sennett 2012: 117).

Last but not least, a reconceptualization of public intellectual life from gate-keeping intellectualism to self-appointed public action involves a different *dramatis personae* for the role in question requiring an alternative list of ‘professionals’ and ‘amateurs’ (Said 1994: 65-83) to include West-African *griots* (singers-storytellers), West-Indian calypsonians, dancehall artists and rasta revolutionaries, all of whom have had the backing of prominent postcolonial thinkers who have specifically argued for their public role and performance in a renewed or re-imagined public realm (Gilroy 1987, Campbell 1987, Hebdige 1987, Jones 1988, Chevannes 1994, Hall 2003, Cooper 1986, 2004, Henry 2006, Stanley Niaah 2010). Rappers (Baker Jr 1993, Barron 2013), jazz musicians (McKay 2005), artists and photographers can be added (Dewey 1934, Becker 1974, 2007), as well as community organisers and craftsmen (Sennett, 2009 2012), or even perhaps programmers as politicians of the online commons (Berry 2006), not to mention urban planners such as Jacobs, Patrick Geddes, Lewis Mumford or Dolores Hayden, rubbing shoulders with *flâneurs* (Benjamin 1983, Simmel 1971, Frisby 1981, De Certeau 1984 Raban 2008), pedagogues (Freire 1994) or inventors, industrial scientists (Gallison 2008: 38).

Drawing Thesis IV to a close, it seems worth insisting that preferring the term “public characters” to “public intellectuals” allows us to include, as Gallison (2008: 38) does, anyone who might be ‘responsible for generating and conveying knowledge’, provided
that they wish to do so as public characters rather than as public intellectuals. The difference is not so much of individual preference or conceptual demarcation but of direct commitment to being public.

v. Thesis V: Public sphere; “founded” not found

Returning to arguments about ‘the place’ of intellectual life (Fuller 2009), we find the public sphere subjected to a variety of competing interpretations about (a) what it is, (b) who represents it, (c) who it represents, and (d) whether it exists at all, justifying perhaps Virginia Woolf’s (in Carey, 1992: 25) depiction of it as ‘a vast, almost featureless, almost shapeless jelly of human stuff’.

To make matters worse, the first component of the term, namely “the public”, is itself much disputed about in the relevant literature described, often confusingly and interchangeably, as a crowd, a multitude, a construct, a social and political category, a historical agent or simply as “the people”, often falling prey to the dangers, logic, and tactics of populism (Laclau, 2005).

What this wealth of descriptions about the notion of “the public” and the public sphere show is not merely a scholarly fascination with the topic, but also the ability to imagine both notions in a multiplicity of ways sometimes as a ‘phantom realm’ (Lippmann), a virtue or a vice (Mandeville), obscured in eclipse (Dewey), threatened by collapse (Putnam) or fall (Sennett), managerialised (Skocpol) , and even masquerading as a ‘native state’, a ‘lost realm’, and a ‘strategic ploy’, to adapt Proctor’s (2008: 3) typology of ignorance to the study of the public sphere.

Drawing on such multiple interpretations of the public sphere, without necessarily agreeing with their tone or temper, Thesis V argues that the public sphere can be discursively realised, “founded” and made rather than “found” through ‘the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion’ (Dewey, 1927: 208), as developed in the routine, everyday social life of a ‘culture-debating’ (kulturräsonierend) polity (Habermas 1991 [1989]: 159).

Founding the public sphere in this way requires nothing but the willingness to imagine public participation as a process of ‘communicative action’ (Habermas 1984), where actively involved citizens seek to reach common understanding and consensus through reasoned argument and co-operation as vital vocabularies of associational life, thereby creating what Latour (2005) calls ‘atmospheres of democracy’ by everyday involvement and participation as a committed demos that works hard towards the (re)constitution of its polis.

Insisting on the ability of language to make things public, Thesis V, envisages the founding of the public sphere as a ‘struggle with language’ (Wittgenstein 1977 [1931]: 11e), (a) first in words, and (b) later by developing communities not as an aggregate of individuals or a demographic statistic, but as a community that places singularities and pluralism in dialogue thus allowing a conversation between self-realisation, and the sustainability and nourishment of group life through the mobilisation and the practice of (c) cosmopolitan citizenship and cosmopolitan imagination (Delanty 2009) as a successor-script of global associational life.

vi. **Thesis VI: Funding knowledge for founding new knowledge**

Having so far exhausted our attention to the ‘stuff’, the ‘place’ and the ‘people’ of intellectual life (Fuller 2009), Thesis VI makes a case for “resources” as an important element in the alchemy of intellectual life, not only materially, but also symbolically and pragmatically given that the allocation of funding can substantially allow or hinder the foundation of disciplinary knowledge.

Although funding has traditionally been seen with suspicion in sociology (Mills 1959, Gouldner 1970, Bulmer 1981, Fisher 1983), with raging controversies over the ‘funding effect’ (Krimsky 2005, Michaels, 2008), it is here argued that serious discussions about how funding is intellectually theorised and practically distributed need to happen as a way of reaching consensus on what matters and what needs to be prioritised, if at all, in our discipline. This involves an intense, and perhaps unpleasant, dialogue, if not a compromise, between aims, objectives and outcomes desired by funding bodies on the
one hand, and between aims, objectives and outcomes desired by researchers on the other.

While acknowledging the scepticism of Michaels (2008: 98) who blames ‘the lure of profits’ for ‘corrupting the virtue of research’ or Holmwood’s (2011c) lament on the way humanities and the social sciences languish in the doldrums of funding regimes, Thesis VI sides with Jennifer Platt’s (1996) more complicated reading of and research into whatever difference funding makes in research, who considers (a) the intentionality of agency policies and imagines (b) how disciplines would develop in the absence of such funding.

Drawing on such discussions, the issue of funding returns as an important practical dilemma between allocating resources for problem-based scientific research or discipline-based endeavours, but it is here argued that in the advent of Mode Two knowledge, such a dichotomy may seem false and misleading given that the pursuit of scientific research may not be inimical to disciplinary concerns if scholars are prepared to model their work in a way that satisfies both the demands of the market as well as the needs of academic scholarship.

This however requires a shift in outlook and professional practice (Bastow et al. 2014), based on accepting the possibility of constituting scholarship as a ‘public agora’ (Nowotny 2001) on the one hand, while meeting the demands of the market on the other. Such a flexibility in confidently navigating the two realms does not necessarily amount to submitting scholarship to pressures dictated by the market, but to imagine the two as complementary; provided that a necessary critical check is kept from our side to police market interventions to our work. In addition to that, opening up the humanities and social sciences to the possibility of negotiating with, but not submitting to, markets may work in our discipline’s favour given that instead of occupying a defensive and stubbornly adversarial stance, scholarship can be seen as a confident and determined player that will attract funds from the necessary agencies without necessarily compromising its integrity.

To conclude, Thesis VI calls for academics to ‘have the nerve to build [their] own establishment arrangements’, while never losing sight of ‘criticising’ them to paraphrase Nuffield sociologist A.H. Halsey (1964: 19-10). Doing so however may require reconceptualising the entire discipline in terms of the types of knowledge that
are produced, and the role that they serve, while also rethinking disciplinary priorities in terms of “what knowledge” and “which public” matters for sociology to matter.

**vii. Thesis VII: From “dead” to “live” sociology**

Taking a cue from Latour and Weibel’s (2005) book and exhibition *Making Things Public* which sought to expand the ‘atmospheres of democracy’ by allowing things to become public through a complex set of technologies, interfaces, platforms, networks and media, Thesis VII entertains the idea of sociology as an online ‘curatorial’ practice

Conceiving the discipline in online terms, Thesis VII contends, might help in leading the discipline away from definitions of itself as “dead”, by making it “live” through the use of digital technologies in a way that transcends its crisis and ushers in the freedom that the new digital atmospheres, or “netospheres”, of democracy seem to offer.

In doing so sociologists are invited to adopt a more positive stance towards ‘the (coming) social media revolution in the academy’ (Daniels and Feagin 2011), by shifting their emphasis from introspective accounts of the discipline’s mood to sociology’s potential online mode through the incorporation of, what Savage and Burrows (2007: 13) call, ‘new digitalisations’ in its theoretical and methodological repertoire.

This shift from “mood” to “mode” largely depends on sociologists’ recognition of:

(a) The emergence of ‘alternative sources of knowledge which undermine the university’s monopolistic position’

(b) The liberation of the production, reproduction and dissemination of knowledge ‘[b]eyond the walls of established higher education institutions’, ‘floating in cyberspace’, and

(c) The proliferation of think tanks, discussion groups, research networks bulletin boards and associated forms of the emergent ‘virtual university’, such as MOOCs and

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199 The idea of an online curatorial sociology is here suggested as an extension to the initiative of Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel to launch their 2005 book *Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy* as an exhibition in Karlsruhe, Germany which invited participants to engage with objects producing an assemblage of political views on current debates that brought a new kind of public assembly into being.
EdX platforms, which have brought increasingly changing ways of teaching and learning.

(Smith and Webster, 1997: 106)

In the light of such developments, Back (2012: 19) argues that academic researchers seem to have been ‘out-manoeuvred by freelance fact-makers’, to the point of assuming, as Urry (2003: 38) does, that ‘[o]ne could hypothesize that current phenomena have outrun the capacity of the social sciences to investigate’, while Savage (2010: 249) suggested that ‘[w]e cannot simply carry on interviewing or sampling as if the world is unchanged by fifty years of extensive social research’.

Alternatively, we may find it useful, Back (2012: 21-3) argues, to:

(a) Stop ‘the rendering of live things’ like sociology ‘to dead objects’,

(b) Resist the ‘intellectual comfort’ of what Beck (2000) calls ‘zombie concepts’ defined as ‘residual dead theoretical ideas [which] inhibit the sociological imagination and are ill-fitted to the task of understanding the contemporary shape of global society’, and

(c) Replace them with standing face to face with the consequences and challenges of the digitalisation of social life. In this way, sociology might develop away from the influence of what Beck and Sznaider (2006: 3) call ‘methodological nationalism’, which ‘assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations’ or spaces of and for developing research and knowledge, and aspire instead to “methodological connectivity” instead.

To do so, sociologists need encouragement to:

(a) Use multimedia for re-imagining social research and sociological thinking and knowledge production, given how ‘little attention has been [so far] paid to opportunities that digital photography, mobile and sound technologies, CD ROMs and online publishing opportunities might offer’ (Back 2012: 27)

(b) Embrace ‘live methods’ to foster a new ‘digital sociology’ (Back and Puwar, 2012), and

(c) Account for the ‘fleeting’, the ‘distributed’, the ‘multiple’, the ‘emotional’ and the ‘kinaesthetic’ as a way of ‘enacting the social’ (Law and Urry 2004: 403).

This “enacting of the social” through the “use of the digital”, would need to consider “the mobile” and “the emotive” as the ‘important “missing link” capable of bridging mind, body, individual society, and body politic’ (Hughes & Lock, 1987: 29),
transforming it into a ‘the catalyst that transforms knowledge into human understanding and that brings intensity and commitment to human action’ (Blacking, 1977: 5).

Such a shift from an analogue to a digital sociology also offers an appreciation of these new digital devices, not simply as tools for research but also as instruments of political purpose, as manifested in the recent events of the so-called Arab Spring. Taking cues from Edward Said’s (2001) op-ed *The Public Role of Writers and Intellectuals*, Back (2012: 35) compares and contrasts ‘today’s global informational culture with the 18th century pamphleteer Jonathan Swift, who brought down the Duke of Marlborough with just one publication’.

Popular social media platforms are likened by Back to ‘oratorical machines’ that are ‘fluid, fast and result in unpredictable circumstances’, offering the ability to reach ‘much larger audiences than any we could conceive of even a decade ago’, thus paving the way for sociology’s freedom from disciplinary necrologies by re-constituting itself as a new, “live” public sphere of scholarship and public opinion.

### viii. Thesis VIII: Re-assembling the human

Thesis VIII attempts to recover the idea of “humanity” as a necessary pre-occupation of and for the discipline of sociology, suggesting that a process of “re-assembling the human” in and for sociology might return the discipline to its foundational concerns as an inquiry into what makes us human\(^\text{200}\), especially in the context and lived experience of what Fuller (2011) describes as ‘Humanity 2.0’.

Acknowledging Williams’ (1983 [1976]: 148) assertion that humanity ‘belongs to a complex group of words’, it is here understood (a) as a trait of humans as well as (b) a kind of learning about those traits, where sociology can be thought to function as a midwife which assists in such labour opening up organs, anointing channels, facilitating processes, offering judgement, nursing doubt, and generally exercising and employing

\(^{200}\) This is described by Joanna Bourke (2011) as ‘zoélogy’, calling for a perspective for and of the humanities as a targeted to a *studia humanitatis* which embraces fundamentally human concerns rather than mere abstractions.
its disciplinary skills in understanding the perils and fortunes of who, what we are and why.

The remainder of Thesis VIII endeavours to:
I. Suggest reasons for “re-assembling the human”
II. Show how it might become possible, and
III. Describe what significance such a proposition may have for the sociology, by proposing a leap into what is here termed a “physiology of knowledge”\(^{201}\).

I. Taking a literary cue from James Baldwin’s (1984 [1955]: xv) hyperbolic statement that, as people, we have ‘the choice of becoming human or irrelevant’, and puzzling over Michael Billig’s (2013) recent op-ed, against ‘social science’ that ‘talks of things when it needs to describe people’, Thesis VIII fears that both accounts may be relevant to the current professional practice of sociology, especially with regards to Billig’s criticisms of the ‘nominalisation’ of social science through the use ‘big nouns’ to ‘avoid describing people’, therefore ‘treating humans as if they were things’. While not treating Billig’s observation as a decisive diagnosis, Thesis VIII treats his critique as a useful word of caution with manifold implications on studying “the human”.

II. Thesis VIII aspires to study the human by re-assembling it in theory, thus departing from the realm of the ideational and the analytical to concentrate instead on the demonstrative and felt by making sense of ‘thought as felt and feeling as thought’ Rosaldo (1993: 106). This incorporation of thought and feeling is further developed by Rosaldo as a ‘practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and inter-relating community’ that accounts for the lived, the embodied and the sensate alongside the abstract and the cognitive, much like the notion of the public characterdispenses the idea of the public intellectual (see Thesis IV).

III. Having preliminarily sketched the position and the role of the physical, and the sensate as quintessential human traits, it seems necessary to expand on this assumption by suggesting that any notion of humanity almost inevitably entails the

\(^{201}\) The term “physiology” is here used to describe a sense of humanity and an understanding and appreciation of the human body, thus bearing little resemblance to the *physiologies* as a literary genre in mid-19\(^{th}\) century France. Benjamin’s (1983: 35-6) essay on “The Flâneur” provides a good intro to that literary fashion.
possibility and the responsibility to view our humanity as a kind of learning about ourselves. Suggesting this as the vantage point of sociology, what is here proposed is a discursive and analytical turn to a “physiology of knowledge”; a type of sociology of knowledge that takes into account and gives an account of the physical processes of human social life.

Bearing in mind the centrality of the body in much of human history, experience, science and culture, especially in the way it has been used as ‘the measure of humanity’ to quote Robert Tavernor (2007), it is surprising to notice how little mention of it is being accorded in analyses of the production and dissemination of sociological knowledge, particularly in the wistful musings on sociology’s public relevance following the resurgence of interest in public sociology since Burawoy’s 2004 ASA address. Against this paradoxical omission of the physical, a form of “sociological Palladianism” is here defended suggesting that eschewing the mention of the physical in social processes might run the risk of the objectification of knowledge and human experience.

The implications of such an omission or a gap in our thinking about sociology as a disembodied practice are considerable, given that the renewed puzzlement over sociology’s remove from relevance, or its abstinence from public discourse may rest in its distance from the physical, the immediate and the sensate; a re-invigoration of which is here defended and proposed as an alternative to the perils of over-abstraction or quantification as feared by Sorokin (1954), Mills (1959), O’Neill (1972) and Gouldner (1973).

Drawing on the sentiment of such fêted sociological luminaries, Thesis VIII invites sociologists to place their hands on the ‘foundations, ribs and pelvis of the world’ (James 1953: 103), engaging in research that develops knowledge as a ‘physical skill to apply to social life’, a process that ‘happens in the [...] body’ as a link between the ‘physical and the social’ (Sennett 2012: 199).

This view of the uses of knowledge for the body, and the use of the body towards such knowledge understands knowledge as ‘something [that is learned] on [o]ur body’

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202 Shilling (2003) has playfully commented on the ‘absent-presence’ of the body in sociology.

203 The neologism here offered suggests the centrality of the body in human experience as defended by the 16th century Venetian architect Andrea Palladio. See also Tavernor (1991)
taking the ‘form of things happening to you’ (Bakewell 2011: 327). Such a view of knowledge and learning attempts to do away with the motionless withdrawal of abstract reasoning, routinely attributed to the intellectual legacy of Cartesian dualism, and invites sociologists to re-orient their discipline and themselves using the physical realm as its navel, its centre of gravity and balance in the manner suggested by the writings of Montaigne whose ‘thoughts fall asleep’ if he ‘make[s] them sit down’ and whose ‘mind will not budge unless’ his ‘legs move it’ (Bakewell 2011: 158).

Wittgenstein (1974: 178) took a similar view in his *Philosophical Investigations*, claiming that ‘[t]he human body is the best picture of the human soul’, a proposition echoed in the anthropology of Marcel Mauss (1979 [1950]) who adapted the quote to mean that ‘[t]he body is the first and most natural tool of man’ (Hughes and Lock 1987: 6).

Such philosophical musings on the body not only alert us to the centrality of the physical realm in our thinking, but also suggest possibilities for change in the way in which we practice sociology as a pursuit of knowledge, taking into account Merleau-Ponty’s (1964: 98) assertion that ‘[e]very science secretes an ontology; every ontology anticipates a body of knowledge’.

**ix. Thesis IX: Public sociology in the curriculum**

Thesis IX aims to re-introduce public sociology as a practical challenge rather than as an epistemological trauma, endeavouring to show how public sociology can be integrated in the curriculum, arguing that such an inclusion might prove a decisive step towards putting an end to the nauseating jeremiads on how to make sociology public. The suggestion offered here departs from theory and is instead a practical proposition modelled on the ‘Public Sociology, Live!’ course devised by Michael Burawoy and Laleh Behbehanian for the University of California, Berkeley and supported by the International Sociological Association.

‘Public Sociology, Live!’ was conceived and put into practice in Spring 2012 at Berkeley University as an alternative to conventional sociology courses setting itself against ‘deal[ing] with knowledge accumulated in a particular subfield-economic sociology, political sociology, sociology of development, social theory, deviance and social control
etc.’ but rather, it is ‘concerned with ‘the way sociologists (re)present sociology to the worlds they study, the ways and means sociologists use to disseminate their knowledge’; engaging questions like ‘How does sociological knowledge become part of other people’s worlds?’ Armed with the conviction that such an initiative is ‘what we call “public sociology”, Burawoy and Behbehanian have organised the course in the form of seminars that are filmed in a revamped laboratory at Berkeley which, Burawoy’s introductory session apart, feature a host of notable sociologists from around the world including Lebanon, Colombia, Brazil, South Africa, Portugal, India, Philippines, Ukraine, China, France, Spain, and the United States. This allows not just open-access, with the help of technology using Skype or video-conferencing, but also a global reach and the opportunity to ‘explore how public sociology is practiced in different countries’ around the world.

Besides the obvious merits of such an undertaking which exposes sociology students to different kinds of sociology as practiced in different parts of the world, as well as its core objective which is to inspire and show how public sociology is and can be done around the world and by a number of scholars, it is also a commendable effort to show how public sociology can become part of the curriculum with the advantage being the possibility of imaginatively, effectively and constructively responding to the chorus of laments regarding the discipline’s insularity and isolation from the world it studies, therefore setting an example of how and why public sociology may become part of sociology curricula around the world.

x. Thesis X: Towards a cosmopolitan public sociological imagination

Building on the example of ‘Public Sociology, Live!’, Thesis X attempts to draw on those insights of institutionalising public sociology as part of the curriculum by suggesting that the example can be followed and developed globally with the aim of fostering a cosmopolitan sociological imagination that is not simply interdisciplinary but “intercultural” too.

204 All references and quotations come from the course’s mission statement which can be found online here: http://www.isa-sociology.org/public-sociology-live/
This suggestion builds upon the example of ‘Global Sociology, Live’, the precursor of ‘Public Sociology, Live!’, also developed by Burawoy and Behbehianian, and offered by the University of California, Berkeley and the International Sociological Association.

Drawing on Collyer’s (2012: 1, 13) research on core and periphery relations in the sociological production of knowledge which shows how '[s]ociologists are increasingly aware of themselves as academic workers within a global system, where their work is generated within locally situated institutions but shaped by the social relations and material conditions of the broader social context', Thesis X puzzles over her conclusion that knowledge production practices among scholars ‘rely on their own locally produced reference materials’.

Such a ‘lack of interest in reference materials from non-core countries is alarming if not paradoxical, making Burawoy and Behbehianian’s initiative particularly attractive given its focus on developing a curriculum that focuses on the ‘particularity of many universal claims, but without dissolving everything into particularity, without abandoning the search for the universal’\textsuperscript{205}.

‘Global sociology’, according to Burawoy and Behbehianian, ‘is the third stage in the scaling up of sociological practice’. In the first phase ‘sociology began as very much concerned with communities. In the US, the Chicago School was really about one city, Chicago, even if it claimed to be about the world’.

The second phase, Burawoy and Behbehianian note, ‘was about the nation state’ where we get ‘the classic studies of Weber and Durkheim, but also the research programs that drew on national data sets, focusing on national political systems and civil society in national dimensions’.

The third phase is ‘a global sociology, which while not discounting the local or the national, reaches for global forces, \textit{global connections and global imaginations}’.

Pinning our hope to that third phase of sociology, may be the start of bridging the gap between core-periphery tensions in the production of sociological knowledge, both in the curricular and the research level of scholarship, thus leading the way to the multiplication of such practical responses to “methodological nationalism” \textit{à la} Beck by

\textsuperscript{205} All references and quotes are from the course description of ‘Global Sociology, Live’, hosted by the ISA website: \url{http://www.isa-sociology.org/global-sociology-live/}
cultivating and fostering public sociology as a cosmopolitan outlook and mode of theory and research.

**xi. Thesis XI: Sociology of crisis**

The last Thesis of this current thesis, seeks to depict sociology, not “in crisis” but “of crisis” possessing an acute ability for *krinein* (judgement). This involves adopting a sceptical stance towards “crisis-talk” in and about sociology, making the term “crisis” allude to a crisis for sociology to apply itself against what Luhmann (1984) saw as the ‘crisis-fashion’ in social theory.

Thesis XI celebrates the merits of such intellectual effort, but remains sceptical of crisis-talk, in agreement with Luhmann (1984: 68) who interprets such thinking as composed of a ‘fashionable semantic predisposition looking out for supporting theories’, and Holton (2004: 503) who saw ‘the idea of crisis’ as ‘so massively over-inflated with rhetorical significance, as to have become de-valued in its analytical specificity’. The danger with such exaggerated crisis-talk, Holton (2004: 504) argues, is its capacity to be ‘extended in such an indiscriminate manner that it becomes synonymous with modern social life itself’ in the form of an ‘all-pervasive rhetorical metaphor’.

In the space of this thesis, this is judged an unsuitable way of exploring or understanding the epistemic identity or existential condition of sociology, suggesting instead the injection of “*krisis*-as-judgement” into the existing “rhetoric of crisis”, as a way of alchemising an epistemological moral panic into a critical appreciation of where the discipline actually stands at this present juncture. Like Holton’s (2004: 503) own paper, Thesis XI’s aim is neither to ‘diagnose’ nor to ‘adjudicate’ the ‘relative merits of the existing multiplicity of crisis-concepts’ but to question their ‘analytical utility’ and

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206 The idea for this Thesis derives from the ‘Sociologists of Crisis’ column which, this thesis’ author edits for the online sociology magazine, *The Sociological Imagination*. All contributions can be accessed at: [http://sociologicalimagination.org/archives/category/sociologists-of-crisis](http://sociologicalimagination.org/archives/category/sociologists-of-crisis)

207 See Chapter 6 for a more detailed account on the alleged crisis of sociology.
usefulness ‘of the crisis-metaphor’ for the understanding of both sociology and society at large.

The premature and exploratory verdict here voiced comes in the form of a modest proposal to seek refuge to the eleven theses here suggested not as an authoritative programme of sociological renewal, but as reflections on some recurrent problems identified in the literature and the practice of sociology, as witnessed in and centred around the public sociology debate.

The adoption of a sociological judgement on crisis, a sociological *krisis* on crisis, is here nick-named “sociology of crisis”, in the belief that the discipline of sociology possesses the tools, the ability and the imagination to offer a critical judgement on terms, issues, debates and rhetorical metaphors that cloud our perception instead of rendering it sharper and clearer.


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**APPENDIX I**

Diagram 2

**What is it?**
- ivory tower (Newman); hub of culture and academic freedom (Humboldt); feasible utopia, entrepreneurial, commodified, civic, public, accessible, debating, anarchic, borderless, collaborative, congested, corporate, corrupt, creative, dialogic, digital, ecological, liquid, multi-nodal, performative, socialist, soulless, technologico-Benthamite, theatrical, translucent, imaginative, imagining, first class, edgeless, capitalistic, university as fool (Barnett 2013), global (Miyoshi, 1998), McDonaldised (Parker and Igar 1995); postmodern (Smith and Webster, 1997); enterprising (Williams, 2003); corporate (Jarvis, 2003); meta-entrepreneurial, public (Holmwood, 2011); without conditions (Derrida, 2002); post-historical, community of dissent, in ruins (Readings, 1996); site of activism (Lynch, 2010); crisis-ridden (Scott, 1984); for sale (Brown and Carasso, 2013); in need of rescue (Furlong, 2013); science park hub embedded in the life of the city (Goodard and Vallance, 2013); agora (Nowotny, 2001); a co-operative (Boden, Ciancaglini and Wright, 2011, 2012)

**What is it for?**
- thought beside thought (Smith and Webster, 1997); social change, credentials, epistemic authorization, reproduction of disciplinary expertise (Fuller, 2009); human resource development, job training (Readings, 1996); collective intelligence (Holmwood, 2011); trained intelligence (Desey, 1927; Keri, 1995); deepening human understanding (Collini, 2012); instruction in skills, promotion of the general powers of the mind, advancement of learning, transmission of a common culture, common standards of citizenship (Robbins, 1963)

**Whose is it?**
- the public’s (Holmwood, 2011); the state’s; the nation state’s (Readings, 1996); the welfare state’s (Fuller, 2009); the dean’s (Rosovsky, 1991); the impact assessors’, the campaigners’, the board of trustees’, the for-profit institutions’

**Who is it?**
- academics, students, administrators, managers, service staff, “We are the University” (Auckland University, New Zealand), stakeholders, shareholders (Boden, Ciancaglini and Wright, 2011, 2012)

**Why it matters?**
- it allows debates on its nature, position, identity, function and role as a physical, intellectual and discursive space
APPENDIX II

Diagram 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Intellectuals</th>
<th>Protagonists</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zola, the Dreyfusards (Collins, 2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>laments</td>
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<td>Sartre, Gide, Fanon, collaborationists and anti-collaborationists (WWII, France) (Sapiro, 1999)</td>
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<tr>
<td>fall</td>
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<td>betrayal</td>
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<td>disappearance</td>
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<td>decline</td>
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<td>absence</td>
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<td>extinction</td>
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<td>autopsy</td>
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<td>death</td>
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<td>resurrection</td>
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<td>speaking truth to power</td>
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<tr>
<td>specific or total</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Early 20th century</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>struggle and political change, Marxists’ attack on detached intellectuals as ‘waverers’ (Jacoby, 1987); in praise of active participation, intellectuals as constructors, organizers, and permanent persuaders (Gramsci, 1971): Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci.</td>
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<thead>
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<th>Mid 20th century</th>
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<tr>
<td>Relativism: Thomas Kuhn</td>
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<td>The ‘new class’ thesis: Daniel Bell, Alvin Gouldner.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Late 20th century</th>
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<tr>
<td>Empiricism: Pierre Bourdieu, Michèle Lamont (1980s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intellectuals as legislators or interpreters?: Zygmunt Bauman, Robert Nisbet (1990s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towards a sociology of intellectuals: Pierre Bourdieu, Randall Collins (1990s)</td>
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<tr>
<th>21st century</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully fledged sociology of intellectuals: Camic and Gross, Ben Agger, Michael Burawoy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Diagram 4

**Role: what do they do?**
- Some have purpose, while others have none (Valery, 1962)
- Economist, financier, politician, journalist, propagandist, lawyer, statesman, prophet, soothsayer (Keynes, in Varoufakis, 2013)
- Diagnose, pamphleteer, prophesize (Weber, 1948)
- Prophecy (Sapiro, 2013)
- Intellectuals: engaged, carrier-groups, voice concerns, act as therapists of cultural or civic traumas (Eyerman, 2011)
- Symbols/spectacles in the form of celebrities (Debray, 1981)

**Time: when to act?**
- In times of crisis, political turmoil, disorder, unrest (Charle, 1990)

**Mode: how to speak?**
- With a mixture of humility and pride (Bauman, 1992)
- Objectively, but with courage and virtuous frankness (parresia); Foucault and de Beauvoir (Hengkohl, 2006)
- Through legislation, interpretation, mediation, expertise, reform
- Protest, petitioning, lampooning, exile, dissidence, co-optation

**Content: what to say?**
- Truths, laments, warnings, complaints
- Political lies (Swift, 1803)

**Position: where to stand?**
- In the academy, mounting a war of position and organizing resistance, in journals, books, teaching, conferences and research (Lynch, 2010)
- Civil society (Gramsci, 1971)
- Somewhere, as there is no view from nowhere (Becker, 1967; Nagel, 1986)
- Situated in particular surroundings (de Beauvoir, 1974)
- In neutrality (Bends, Weber and Manheim)
- Attached to oikos, city, patriotism, passion (Alexander, 2011)
- Bound to their class origin (Kurzman and Owens, 2002)
- In support of the marginalized, or the privileged
- Cafe culture and urban bohemia (Jacoby, 1987)

**Place: where are the intellectuals?**
- Space of opinion (Jacobs and Townsley, 2011)
- Markets, media, fields (Bourdieu, 1992)
- Public sphere, university institutions, cultural contexts, online, offline

**Identity: who is an intellectual?**
- Makes no sense to define (Bauman, 1989)
- Of academic descent, but not necessarily of academic destiny; shakespearean fool (Fuller, 2009)
- A new class (Gouldner, 1979; Bell, 1973)
- The person who uses knowledge, competence and her relation to truth, in the field of political struggles (Foucault, 2006)
- A hero with a thousand faces (Alexander, 2011)
- Men of letters, savants, artists (Valery, 1962)
- Revolutionaries, recipients of political patronage, working in and out of public office; major, secondary, minor (Collins, 2011)
- Institutionalised, tenured radicals (Jacoby, 1987)
- Philosopher kings, advisors to the king (Mills, 1959)
- Experts, in absentia (Baert and Isaac, 2011)